Encyclopedia of modern ethnic conflicts (2 Volume Set) [1-2, 2 ed.] 9781610695527, 9781610695534

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Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts

Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts Volume 1: Armenia to Mexico Second Edition

JOSEPH R. RUDOLPH Jr., EDITOR

Copyright © 2016 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Encyclopedia of modern ethnic conflicts / Joseph R. Rudolph Jr., editor.—Second edition.     2 volumes ; cm   Includes bibliographical references.   Contents: v.  1.  Armenia to Mexico—v.  2.  The Middle East to Western Sahara.   ISBN 978-1-61069-552-7 (hardback)—ISBN 978-1-61069-553-4 (e-book)  1.  Ethnic relations—Political aspects—Encyclopedias.  2.  Culture conflict— Encyclopedias.  3.  World politics—1995–2005—Encyclopedias.   GN496.E56 2016  305.8003—dc23   2015017207 ISBN: 978-1-61069-552-7 EISBN: 978-1-61069-553-4 20 19 18 17 16  1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

To Cybelle, Tallulah, (okay) Adolph, and the Highway Robber, and in the Memory of his longtime trail mate, Heidi Burns

Contents

Acknowledgmentsxi Introductionxiii Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. VOLUME 1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh: A Not So “Frozen” Conflict Ohannes Geukjian

1

Bolivia: A History of Struggle: From Anticolonial Resistance to Progressive Extractivism in the Morales Era Nicole Fabricant and David W. Dent

19

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Deconstruction of a State and the Birth and Growing Pangs of Bosnia-Herzegovina Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

39

Canada: The Nationalism Movement in Quebec Saul Newman

61

Central Europe: The Romany: A Stateless Minority in a World of States Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

79

China: Ethnic Conflict in the World’s Largest Multinational State Katherine P. Kaup

99

Cyprus: Turkish Cyprus: The Dynamics of a Frozen Conflict Magdalena Dembinska Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak Republics: The Peaceful Breakup of a State and Life after the Velvet Divorce Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

119

137

East Timor (Timor-Leste): The Birth of a New State Stephen Zunes

155

France: Ethnic Conflict and the Problem of Corsica Sue Ellen M. Charlton

169

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France: The “Foreigner” Issue Britta Nelson Bleigh and Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

189

Georgia: Separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Jesse Dillon Savage

207

Germany: The Foreign Worker Issue John S. Bendix and Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

221

Guatemala: Mayas and the Guatemalan Civil War Betsy Konefal

237

India: Ethnic Conflict and Nation-Building in a Multiethnic State Maya Chadda

253

Iraq: The Progress of the Kurdish Movement in Iraq Burak Bilgehan Ozpek

265

Ivory Coast: Conflict and the Politics of Belonging in Côte d’Ivoire Jeremy S. Speight

287

Kenya: Kenya’s Legacy of Violent Ethnic Politics and the 2007–2008 Postelection Crisis Sarah Jenkins

305

Kosovo: The Conflicts in Kosovo and the Limits of Third-Party Conflict Management Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

325

Lebanon: The Lebanon Civil War, 1975–1990 Marie-Joelle Zahar

347

Malaysia: The Malay-Chinese Conflict Amy L. Freedman

365

Mali: The Mali Crisis Jaimie Bleck

379

Mexico: The Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas Richard Stahler-Sholk

393

VOLUME 2 The Middle East: The Arab-Jewish Struggle for Palestine to 1948 James A. Reilly

413

The Middle East: The Question of Palestine Maia Carter Hallward

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The Middle East: Christians in the Middle East Paul S. Rowe

457

The Middle East: The Kurds’ Struggle for Kurdistan Michael M. Gunter

477

Myanmar (Burma): The Karen Conflict Marie Olson Lounsbery

501

Nigeria: Ethnic Conflict in Multinational West Africa Olugbemiga Samuel Afolabi

517

Russia and the Northern Caucasus: The Continuing Unrest Renat Shaykhutdinov

535

Rwanda: Hutu-Tutsi Conflict and Genocide in Central Africa Stephen D. Wrage

549

Spain: Nationalism without Contentious Conflict: The New Basque Normal Roland Vazquez Sri Lanka: Tamil-Sinhalese Conflict in India’s Backyard Nikolaos Biziouras and Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. Sudan: Ethnic Conflict in the Sudan and the Tumultuous Birth of a New Nation Susan R. Alaniz

567 585

607

United Kingdom: The Making of British Race Relations Anthony Mark Messina

627

United Kingdom: The Irish Question and the Partition of Ireland Sean P. Duffy

641

United Kingdom: The Conflict in Ulster Elham Atashi

659

United Kingdom: Nationalism in Scotland Robert J. Thompson

681

United Kingdom: The Decline and Revival of Welsh Nationalism Elin Royles and Terrence Casey

703

United States: The Struggle for Survival and Equality of the First Americans Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

723

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United States: Racial Violence in the United States: 1900–1919 James N. Upton United States: Race and the Civil Rights Struggle in Post–World War II America Kevin J. Mumford and John Bullock United States: The United States–Puerto Rico Relationship Lynn-Darrell Bender

743

765 785

Western Sahara: Ethnic Conflict and the 20th Century’s Last Colonial War Stephen Zunes

807

About the Editor and Contributors

819

Index825

Acknowledgments

My thanks begin with my deep gratitude to the contributors. Virtually all of those who joined in the first edition of this work a decade ago, now deep in their careers with all the extra commitments and obligations that entails, were good enough to find the time to return to their manuscripts for this second edition, where they are joined by a small set of new scholars who kindly agreed to cover the remaining topics and the new entries included in the case studies. Thanks as well to Sam Kerns, my research assistant in the early stages of the project for his help in launching it; to our editors at ABC-CLIO for their guidance on, and patience with, receiving the final manuscript; and to all those at ABC-CLIO who worked on it after it left my littered desk. Finally, in terms of my own contributions, my sincere thanks to the Fulbright Association, the United States Department of State, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and my home institutions for providing me with the fieldwork opportunities I have enjoyed throughout my career and upon which I have so often capitalized. Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. Baltimore, 2015

Introduction Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics Even more so than when the first edition of this encyclopedia was published over a decade ago, the literature on ethnicity is truly voluminous. The literature also continues to be appropriately interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary, with particularly significant contributions drawn from history, sociology, and political science. Just the portion of it that focuses on the meaning of ethnicity is vast and still continues to grow. There remains, nonetheless, a consensus concerning both the general nature of an ethnic group and the ongoing political importance of ethnicity. Defined broadly—as opposed to narrowly in terms of genetic traits—an ethnic group consists of a people “who identify themselves or are identified by others in cultural terms, such as language, religion, tribe, nationality, and possibly race.”1 As such, ethnicity has long been a basis of political as well as social association. Moreover, defying the prognostications of the Marxists, who a century and a half ago were predicting that social class would replace such primordial bases of political association as ethnicity and language, ethnic identity continues to be very much a part of politics in the modern world. Indeed, as the 20th century drew to a close, ethnicity had not only proven to be an extraordinarily resilient factor but remained one of the most virulent political forces in the world. In domestic and international politics, in developed and developing countries, in democracies and autocracies, peacefully and violently, ethnopolitical actors and issues often commanded center stage, sometimes destroying states and societies. If anything, the early years of the 21st century have seen an increase in the often destructive influence of ethnic and national identity on domestic, regional, and global politics. Even where ethnicity functions in the context of a multiethnic society with an overarching sense of national identity, as in the United States, ethnic selfconsciousness can exert a powerful impact on a political process, as is indicated by the chapters in this volume that treat African Americans’ struggle for civil rights. In the 20th century, however, the most significant manifestations of ethnicity occurred where it became the building block of nations either seeking self-determination or attempting to preserve their ethnic purity. Using Rupert Emerson’s still eminently serviceable definition of a nation as “the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men’s loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a still greater society,”2 the link

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between an ethnic group and a nation becomes obvious. People usually develop this paramount level of identification only with those with whom they already have much in common. In turn, once aware of their distinctiveness, a nation is apt to develop a desire for political self-determination (nationalism, or—more precisely— what Walker Connor labels “ethnonationalism”).3 It is in this form that ethnicity made its greatest mark in the latter half of the 20th century and continues to do so in these early years of the new millennium, frequently prompting groups with a territorial base to press demands—both peacefully and otherwise—for autonomy or even independence against the leaders of the broader political systems housing their communities. Organizing the Study Given the pervasiveness of the ethnic factor and the extensive number of instances in which ethnicity had a pivotal impact on political developments during the 20th century alone, this volume makes no claim to being comprehensive in cataloging all of the ethnic conflicts of the past 100-plus years. Nor do the chapters pretend to be comprehensive analyses of their individual case studies. Rather, as Thomas Spira observed in his Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide, “Encyclopedias and dictionaries are designed as consultation guides, and not as primary or secondary research sources.”4 Thus, this book is envisioned as a starting point for research in the areas it explores. Each case study therefore includes a preliminary bibliography for follow-up research and relevant public documents. At the same time, the selection of case studies was not a haphazard process. Organized alphabetically on the basis of the country or geographical area in which the conflicts currently unfold, or did so during the 20th century, each study follows a common organizational format focusing on (1) the history and issues involved in each case, (2) the efforts pursued to manage the conflict, and (3) the significance of the conflict in terms of its impact on politics in the area in question or in illuminating the general nature of contemporary ethnic conflict and the strategies— including violent repression—employed to manage or control it. Similarly, several explicit criteria were used in selecting the entries. First and foremost, each study represents an important example of 20th-century or early-21stcentury ethnic conflict measured in terms of its longevity, level of violence, or impact on the political process confronting it. To these criteria others were added. A conscious effort, for example, was made to include studies illustrative of the variety and the geographical scope of modern ethnic conflicts, although some areas do receive far greater attention than others.5 This tilt reflects the fact that certain types of ethnic conflict are far more salient in some regions of the world than in others, as well as the editor’s desire to include examples of the different faces that the same type of conflict can adopt across time and space and the different forms in which ethnic conflict can occur in the same political system. The studies are also chronologically skewed in the sense that a significant majority are drawn from the second half of the 20th century and, especially in two

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notable instances (Iraq and the conflict surrounding Christians in the Middle East), from the early years of this century. During these 60-plus years, two broad developments produced a sharp increase in ethnic conflict in large portions of the globe: (1) the steady increase in the number of self-governing, multinational states and the growing political assertiveness of their minority communities and (2) the equally steady increase in the forces of globalization and accompanying mass migrations of peoples to ethnically different and economically more advanced countries. To these developments we may add a third reason for exploring modern ethnic conflicts: the still-growing, dramatic shift since World War II in the nature of conflict from international wars to domestic civil wars and unrest. Much of the ethnic conflict we experience today is, consequently, predominantly a creature of the second half of the last century, albeit one owing a significant debt to Woodrow Wilson’s World War I popularization of the twin ideals of national self-determination and the protection of minority rights.6 The Expanding World of Ethnopolitics The Multiplication of Multinational States

The most important factor accounting for the mushrooming of multinational states and ethnonational politics during the latter half of the 20th century was the state-making legacy of colonialism. When the 20th century dawned, 84 percent of the earth’s surface was under the control of Europeans.7 Part of that surface was Europe itself. An even greater landmass was composed of non-European areas that had been settled by Europeans and had already achieved self-government, for example, the United States and Canada in North America and New Zealand and Australia in the Southern Hemisphere. The greatest amount of this territory, however, housed the non-self-governing parts of the empires of European states. In most instances, the boundaries of these possessions were constructed with little or no attention to the ethnic makeup of the included populations. Occasionally, individual ethnic communities were split apart and consigned to two or more separate colonies. More frequently, the result was to encapsulate in the same colonial possession numerous ethnonational groups, with different languages, religions, precolonial histories, and ways of life, and then to widen the differences separating these peoples via the uneven impact of such forces associated with European colonialism as Christianization, Westernization, and urbanization. When these predominantly Third World areas began to achieve their independence in large numbers after World War II (approximately 30 new states emerged in Africa alone in 1960), they overwhelmingly did so within those boundaries drawn by their European rulers during the colonial era. As a consequence, the vast majority of the independent states that emerged in postwar Africa and Asia tended to be multinational—often extensively so. Moreover, once independence was achieved (the indigenous independence struggles are excluded from this volume on the grounds that they were primarily anti-imperialist struggles, not ethnic conflicts between the ruled and their European rulers), the minority ethnic groups in these newly self-governing countries began to assert their right to national

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self-determination against the other ethnic fellows now governing them. The demand of India’s Tamil-speaking minority for their own state, raised only a few years after India achieved independence in 1947, shortly proved to be a harbinger of things to come throughout emergent multinational states (see, for example, the chapters on India, Nigeria, Burma, and Indonesia). It also initiated a series of challenges to India’s internal stability that have bedeviled India’s government in New Delhi ever since and have on occasion cost India’s prime ministers their lives. Meanwhile, at approximately the same time that the decolonization process began to unfold in earnest in the Southern Hemisphere, a significant resurgence of ethnopolitical identity and activity began to emerge in the multinational states of the developed world. This phenomenon resulted largely from the simultaneous convergence of several propitious factors during the 1945–1970 period, especially (1) the diminishing status of the national capitals in Europe following their liquidation of empire; (2) the desire of the governed throughout the developed democratic world for less remote, less bureaucratic government, which was reinforced by the ethnic factor in the ethnoterritorially distinct regions of such states as Britain (Scotland, Wales) and France (Alsace, Brittany, Corsica); (3) the feelings of minority regions that they were being economically neglected or exploited by the majority groups controlling them (Quebec, Basque Spain); and often (4) the surfacing of visible threats to the survival of minority cultures in postwar Europe (the declining numbers speaking Welsh in Wales, for example). In coping with these developments, political leaders in numerous states were forced to reconsider and, sometimes, drastically revise their constitutions. The case studies of federalization in post-Franco Spain, Canada’s constitutional debates and referendums on the status of Quebec, and the creation of assemblies in Wales and Scotland in Great Britain and Corsica in France examine this development, but by no means exhaustively. Finally, and again increasing the number of multinational states, ethnopolitics in the developed world received a significant, end-of-the-century boost from the collapse of communism and the subsequent resurfacing inside the former Soviet Union and Central Europe of ethnic hostilities that had long been kept more or less under control. The violent breakup of Yugoslavia into seven separate multinational states, chronicled here in separate entries on the birth of Bosnia and the struggle for self-government in Kosovo, provides the most dramatic example of this resultant ethnic conflict. Other examples abound, some of which—such as the intensification of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict over an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, the more peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia, and the upsurge in political violence against the Romany in most of post-communist Central Europe—are included in this work. So too is the 21st-century birth of the world’s newest state: the Republic of South Sudan, carved from the multinational country of Sudan and itself an ongoing arena of contemporary multinational conflict. The Age of Globalization and Mass Migration

Incidents of ethnopolitical conflict also multiplied during the 20th century as a result of the steady increase in global interdependence. Revolutionary developments in the fields of transportation and communication, the relative global peace

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following World War II, and the eras of economic expansion in the developed world, which date from the postwar period, combined during the second half of the 20th century to produce a new diversity in numerous states. This was particularly true of the relatively ethnically homogeneous states of the developed Western world, into which large numbers of immigrants and foreign workers moved from culturally remote areas in search of jobs. Reinforcing this development was the large influx of refugees and asylum seekers entering the stable Western democracies during the 1990s from politically turbulent areas in Africa and the Middle East and politically dangerous areas, including countries embroiled in interethnic civil wars as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In virtually all instances, this growing ethnic diversity in Northern Hemisphere states begat political conflict between the host populations and the incoming peoples. As early as 1971, West Germany closed its borders to additional “guest workers”; however, the presence of non-Germans within Germany’s workforce and borders remains a major issue in the reunified Germany of today. In a similar manner, the movement of foreign workers from the former French empire in North Africa to jobs in France and the flood of immigrants from the “Coloured Commonwealth” who settled in Britain during the 1950s and 1960s have made heavy imprints on the politics as well as the populations of these states. The Changing Face of Conflict

Prior to 1945, the majority of wars were fought between different states across internationally recognized boundaries. The end of World War II obviously did not mark the end of such conflicts, but it did mark the end of their frequency. Moreover, the shift toward intrastate conflicts embodying varying levels of violence began almost immediately in a series of rebellions against colonialism, even as the international system became increasingly dominated by Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. As the years passed, the number of intrastate conflicts multiplied as those of an international nature diminished. Thus, nearly three-quarters of the 225 armed conflicts occurring between 1946 and 2001 were intrastate in nature, and only 42 fell into the prewar pattern of interstate conflicts.8 And, according to the Conflict Barometer Report for 2010, the same percentages remained true in the early years of the 21st century. Of the 363 crises, wars, and other conflicts the report tracked for that year, 269 (74.13%) were intrastate, and only 94 were interstate.9 To be sure, not all intrastate conflicts turn violent or involve an ethnic factor; however, the evidence is strong that most of the violent conflicts tend to be intrastate. As Heidelberg’s Institute for International Conflict Research noted in surveying 345 cases of violence in 2008, not only were 254 (73.6%) of these intrastate but “intrastate conflicts accounted for the vast majority of violent, and especially highly violent conflicts. . . . Eight of the nine wars as well as all of the 30 severe crises [inventoried] were conducted within a state.”10 As for the ethnic factor, 40 percent of the most violent intrastate conflicts reportedly involved a struggle for control of territory, that is, secession-born intrastate wars involving territorialized national minorities seeking self-determination.

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Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century It is this steady growth in the incidence and significance of ethnic conflict that has made compiling this reference work so difficult. Conflicts not primarily rooted in ethnic or national differences have had to be excluded, including some wellknown recent conflicts, for example, those in Afghanistan and Somalia in the first edition and Ukraine in this one. In each case, the conflicts have an ethnic dimension, but neither Afghanistan nor Somalia have been nor are fundamentally ethnic conflicts.11 As for the complex situation in the Ukraine, the conflict there at this writing between the Ukraine-centered central government in the west and the ethnic-Russians in the east may well develop into a genuine ethnic civil war in the years ahead. It is omitted here, however, for several reasons. Chief among these are the roles of outsiders (Russia, the European Union, NATO) in instigating and fueling the conflict; the propaganda and manipulation of the story by the media on both sides, inside and outside the country; the presence of splinter groups, opportunists, and mercenaries inside the eastern Ukraine seeking personal advantages; and the long history of the Ukrainians and Russians living there without violent conflict before the 2014 uprising in the west that drove from office the Russia-leaning president who had been legitimately elected based primarily on his voter base in the east.12 Elsewhere, legitimate candidates for inclusion have been omitted either because of space restrictions or idiosyncratic elements too numerous and diverse to list. Thus, the limited success of Welsh nationalists in squeezing an assembly out of London in the 1990s and the greater success of Scot nationalists in forcing a 2014 referendum on Scotland’s continued membership in the United Kingdom are treated, as is Biafra’s unsuccessful bid for independence in Nigeria generations ago because ethnic tension remains an issue in that West African country. The successful effort of Bangladesh (previously East Pakistan) to win independence from (West) Pakistan in 1970, however, is not because that successful secession essentially ended the nationalist conflict between then West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and the overwhelmingly Bengali East Pakistan. On the other hand, the extra space afforded in this second edition has allowed the inclusion of such legitimate candidates for inclusion in the first edition as Guatemala and the Ivory Coast. To those who would have made other choices, the editor tenders his understanding and regrets. We can hope, of course, that future similar compendiums will have fewer choices to make. Developments during the decade that has separated the first and second editions of this work, however, do not encourage that belief. Such new states as South Sudan continue to emerge as a result of ethnic conflict. Meanwhile, in such long-established states as the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium, resource- or economically rich regionalized national communities toy with holding independence referendums rather than continue to subsidize the poorer regionalized groups with whom they share common borders. New issues in the world of ethnic conflict have also emerged or been highlighted since the first edition went to press. In particular, the fall or removal of a series of

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secular if nondemocratic governments in the Arab world and the growing influence of Islamic forces there have drawn attention to the problems of Christian groups in Middle East, though ethnic conflict involving them is not localized to that region, as attacks on Christian communities in Nigeria, Malaysia, and elsewhere attest. Still elsewhere, conflicts treated in the first edition have often intensified, growing more violent or spreading geographically. France has moved more forcefully in its efforts to integrate its Muslim minorities into traditional French society, and some of its means of doing so—such as banning the veil and burqa—have already been adopted or considered by Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland.13 More generally, immigration has become a growing issue almost throughout the Northern Hemisphere, from the United States and its growing illegal minorities; to Denmark, where a cartoon treating Mohammad sparked violence across Europe and against Western embassies in the Middle East and Africa; to Russia; to the reaction against unchecked immigration within the European Union’s zone without borders, which is widely credited as contributing to the success of anti-immigrant parties in France, Greece, Italy Switzerland, and other EU member states in the spring 2014 elections of the European Parliament.14 And, though by no means finally, the violence occurring in Russia’s Caucasus has not only been linked to the continuing terrorist attacks in Moscow and other Russian cities outside that region, but to the terrorist attack at the 2013 Boston Marathon. In short, ethnic conflict continues to shape the human existence. The case studies that follow chart some of its most visible contours in the second decade of the new millennium. Notes 1. Thomas Spira, Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide, vol. 1 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1999), 207, with specific reference to Rodolfo Stavenhagen’s definition in Conflicts, Development and Human Rights (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1990). 2. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 95–96. 3. See especially Walker Connor’s landmark essay “The Politics of Ethnonationalism,” Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 1 (1973): 1–21. 4. Spira, Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies, ix. 5. The case studies cover instances of ethnic conflict on all continents except Australia, where a considerable degree of anti-Asian immigration politics—similar to the antiforeigner sentiment in France chronicled in this volume—could be found at century’s end. 6. At President Woodrow Wilson’s insistence, clauses were explicitly inserted in the postwar accords to protect the religious and ethnic minorities in those states destined to be carved out of the defunct Ottoman and Austrian-Hungarian empires in Central Europe. The League of Nations was charged with guaranteeing the majorities’ compliance with these provisions. 7. Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3.

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8. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1965–2011: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5, (2002): 615–637, 620. See also Monty G. Marshall and Ted Gurr, Peace and Conflict, 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self Determination Movements and Democracy (College Park, MD: University of Maryland Center for International Development, 2005). 9. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2010: Crises-Wars-Coups d’Etats-Negotiations-Mediations-Peace Settlements: 19th Annual Conflict Analysis, 1–2, http://hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer. 10. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2008: Crises-Wars-Coups d’Etats-Negotiations-Mediations-Peace Settlements: 17th Annual Conflict Analysis, 2, http://hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2008.pdf. 11. Although there has been limited political unrest among ethnic minorities located along Somalia’s borders, Somalia has been principally troubled by clan and intraclan conflict within its Hamitic community, which comprises 85 percent of its population. A better case can be made for including Afghanistan, which houses four major ethnic groups, including the Pashtuns, who accounted for approximately half of the country’s people prior to the population dislocations that began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and have continued intermittently to this day. On the other hand, the bloody conflicts that have dominated Afghanistan’s politics in the late 20th century have centered more on the persistent feuds of regional warlords within its dominant ethnic group, the ideological and international conflict resulting from the Soviet Union’s 1979–1989 effort to maintain a pro-Soviet government in Kabul, the bloody quasi-religious warfare that involved the fundamentalist Taliban’s acquisition of power in the 1990s and ouster from power in 2001, and the U.S.-led war on terrorism and “nation-building” efforts in Afghanistan after 2001. 12. See, for example, Edward Cody, “Anti-Islamic Sentiments Surface in Wake of Restrictions on Veils: Anxious Times for Muslims Seeking to Define Themselves in Adopted European Homes,” Washington Post, May 15, 2012; and Anthony Faiola, “Anti-Muslim Feelings Propel Right Wing: Political Rise across Europe,” Washington Post, October 26, 2010. 13. See Kathy Lally, “In Russia, Growing Anger toward Immigrants: Nationalism on the Rise,” Washington Post. November 12, 2013. For complete results, see Steve Bernard, Katie Carrie, Callum Lock, and Tom Pearson, “European Parliament Elections 2014: Live Results,” Financial Times, May 26, 2014. 14. I am indebted to Susanne Cooper for her assistance in analyzing events in Ukraine as of 2014. Ms. Cooper has long served as an election monitor for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and served as a long-term observer for that body in Ukraine’s May 2014 presidential election.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh A Not So “Frozen” Conflict Ohannes Geukjian

Timeline 95–55 BCE The kingdom of Tigran the Great is the cradle of Armenian statehood. 19th century–6th century BCE Urartu-Armenia is an ancient polity. 1st century BCE The kingdom of Caucasian Albania is a sovereign state in the territory of modern Azerbaijan. 301–314 CE Armenia becomes the first country to adopt Christianity. 11th and 12th centuries Turkish tribes invade Azerbaijan, and Turkification intensifies. 18th century Five Armenian principalities in Karanakh temporarily enjoy independence. 1813–1828 Russia annexes Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchai. 1905–1906 The Armeno-Tatar War takes place.

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1915 The Ottoman government commits the Armenian genocide. 1920 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabakh are Sovietized. 1921 The Kavburo awards Karabakh to Azerbaijan. 1923 The Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) Autonomous Region is established within Azerbaijan. 1986 The policies of glasnost and perestroika prepare the groundwork for secessionist demands. 1988 Ethnic mobilization and demonstrations in Karabakh and Yerevan support unification of N-K with Armenia; Sumgait experiences anti-Armenian violence. 1989 The Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) is created. 1989 The Armenian Supreme Soviet with the Armenian National Council (ANC) of Karabakh annex N-K into Armenia. 1990 Black January events take place in Baku. 1991 The Azerbaijani parliament terminates the autonomous status of N-K. N-K declares independence from Azerbaijan. 1992 All-out war breaks out in N-K. CSCE/OSCE mediation begins in the NagornoKarabakh conflict. 1994 The Russian brokered Bishkek cease-fire protocol ends the war. 2007 The Madrid Principles are presented to the conflicting parties.

ARMENIA, AZER B A I JA N, A ND NA G O R NO -K A R A B A K H

2008 The Moscow Declaration is signed by Dmitry Medvedev, Ilham Aliev, and Serge Sarkisian. From 1923 until 1991 Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) was an autonomous region in the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), one of the 15 Union Republics of the Soviet Union. N-K was one of the 8 autonomous regions in the Soviet Union that were established as a result of Soviet nationalities policy and ethno-territorial federalism. The population of Nagorno (or mountainous) Karabakh is predominantly Armenian. Karabakh was physically separated from Soviet Armenia by a strip of Azerbaijani land, known as the Lachin corridor. During the Soviet period, the controversy between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the status of N-K continued to dominate society and politics. N-K was an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan capable of generating future ethnic strife should economic and cultural deprivation be caused by the policies of the dominant Azerbaijanis. Meanwhile, the Karabakh Armenians continuously asked for unification with Armenia because possession of territory as a means of maintaining group identity was imperative. But the Soviet leaders and Soviet nationalities policy prevented revision of interrepublican borders because that could threaten the integrity of the Soviet Union. The Soviet divide-and-rule policy toward the nationalities aimed to facilitate political control by Moscow and prevent the development of ethnonationalism. But when Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost opened the door for the expression of ethnic grievances, he also opened the door to long-latent cultural, territorial, and even secessionist demands. In February 1988, ethnic mobilization for the cause of N-K was occurring in both Armenia and Karabakh. The initial peaceful rallies in N-K escalated into interethnic tensions and eventually to all-out war between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis as the Soviet Union went into terminal decline in 1991. By the time of the cease-fire in May 1994, the conflict had resulted in the death of thousands of people from both sides, the expulsion of the Azerbaijanis from N-K, the occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory by the Karabakh Armenian forces, and approximately a million refugees and internally displaced persons. Although the Armenians emerged victorious, the conflict over the control of N-K remains unresolved to this day. Historical Background The Armenians and Azerbaijanis used myths of ethnogenesis and antiquity to strengthen their national claims to the territory of N-K. They used them to create ancestors and thus legitimize their control over what was supposedly their territory. Homeland myths in particular tend to be exclusive, ignoring rival groups in the picture and delegitimizing their claims to the territory in question. Thus, Armenian myths of ethnogenesis tried to explain the rise of the Armenian nation in terms of antecedent ethnic ties and groups to find elements of nationhood stretching back to premodern epochs that prove that their existence in the south Caucasus

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(comprising the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) prior to the formation of the Azerbaijani nation. The Armenians, a historically Christian people who speak a unique IndoEuropean language, plausibly refer to the kingdom of Tigran the Great (95–56 BCE) as the cradle of their statehood, whereas the Azerbaijanis have no real past polity to glorify before the establishment of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in the early 1920s. Prior to 1918, the Russians called the Azerbaijanis Caucasian Tatars or just Tatars. In spatial terms, Armenian historians went further by equating Hayasa to Urartu as an Armenian state that emerged as an empire in the 19th century BCE and lasted until the 6th century BCE.1 To trace the Armenian indigenousness of ancient and medieval Karabakh, a reference to the Urartu period is inevitable. As for the Azerbaijanis, the period during the 11th and 12th centuries, when Turkification intensified as the Oguz Turkish tribes invaded Azerbaijan and intermingled with the aboriginal population, was crucial because those ethnic mergers culminated in the consolidation of the Azerbaijani people. Subsequently, under Iranian influence, the Azerbaijanis adopted the Shiite branch of Islam late in the 16th century. Azerbaijani historians plausibly argue that the Azerbaijani ethnos was anthropologically preserved and not assimilated, a point that supports the Caucasian Albanian (not to be confused with the Albania of the Balkans) origin of the Azerbaijanis, who consider themselves the direct descendants of Caucasian Albania, which ceased to exist after the 8th century CE.2 Azerbaijani historians trace their ancestry and their claim to Karabakh to these Albanians. The political situation in Karabakh changed when Armenia was exhausted and partitioned in the 4th century CE between the Roman Empire and the Sasanid Persians, who terminated the Armenian kingdom in 428 CE. In the 16th century, after the conquering of Karabakh by the Safavid Persians, the Caucasus became part of the Safavid administrative system. The territory of Caucasia, in turn, was divided into four administrative districts: Tabriz, Chukhur-Saada, Shirvan, and Karabakh. Azerbaijani sources say that the Safavids called these administrative districts Azerbaijan. During this period, Karabakh was ruled by Armenian feudal lords, or Meliks, who became temporarily independent in the first half of the 18th century. Five of these Meliks or principalities formed a coalition in Karabakh and were called the Melikates of Khamsa (khamsa is five in Arabic). The weakening of Persia during the early 1750s was accompanied by Ottoman influence, and a Turkish khanate of Shusha-Karabakh was established by Panah Ali Khan (a Turk and chief of the Jevanshir tribe).3 The competition for power between the Armenian Meliks in Karabakh allowed Panah to penetrate the region and impose his authority on the Meliks. Consequently, the Meliks petitioned Catherine the Great of Russia to liberate them from Persian domination. The Russian annexation of Karabakh from Persia in 1805 as a result of the first Russo-Persian War (1804–13) was a significant event for the development of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Thus, the modern history of the Karabakh conflict begins with the 1813 Treaty of Guilistan and the later 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai.

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Russian policy afterward aimed at neutralizing national claims by altering the administrative divisions in the conquered territories and stopping the formation of ethnic homogeneous territories that might pose a danger to Russian rule. Karabakh became part of the Caspian territory in 1840, part of the province of Shemakhi in 1846, and—eventually in 1867—part of the province of Elizavetpol, together with the provinces of Kutaisi, Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku. By creating the new Elizavetpol province, the Russians had linked the mountainous region of Karabakh with the plains to the east, where the Azerbaijanis formed a majority. The Russian administrative divisions dissolved the traditional Armenian semiautonomy in N-K, which dated to the 2nd century BCE. But the Armenians never relinquished their claim to N-K, and, as a result, ethnic tensions would develop in the future. The Russian conquest of the Trancaucasus (Zakavkaz in Russian, meaning beyond or over the Caucasus) also had a significant impact on demographic changes in the newly created provinces. The Russians intended to increase the Armenian population of Karabakh and Yerevan. Hence, under Russian rule, Karabakh, particularly Shushi, became the third most important town for the Armenians, after Baku and Tbilisi, where an Armenian bourgeoisie flourished. In Baku, a general mood of mistrust and hatred prevailed among the Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Russians. Religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences became barriers that hindered tolerance and peaceful coexistence. The Azerbaijani anti-Armenian reaction that resulted from the migrations to Baku and the Armenian domination in the economy proved a major catalyst in the Armenian-Azerbaijani ethnic clashes of 1905–6 (also known as the ArmenoTatar War). These serious episodes of conflict would leave serious residues in both peoples’ memories and afterward would be used by national leaders to justify political action. With the outbreak of the World War I in 1914, and with the Armenians manifesting vivid sympathy for the invading Russian army in eastern Anatolia, in 1915, the Ottoman Turks committed the Armenian genocide as a radical measure to eliminate the so-called Armenian internal threat to Turkey. Armenia and Azerbaijan emerged from the Russian Revolution as independent states in 1918 with disputed borders over Karabakh, Nakhichevan, and Zangezur. In 1919, British diplomacy in the south Caucasus also contributed to the Karabakh conflict when Britain prevented the unification of Karabakh with Armenia. After the Sovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1920, the Karabakh conflict became an internal matter in Soviet Russia. Thus, in 1921, the Azerbaijani SSR insisted that the Karabakh issue be considered at a plenary session of the Kavburo (Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party). The Kavburo, under pressure from Joseph Stalin and without deliberation of a final vote, decided to leave Mountainous Karabakh within the boundaries of the Azerbaijani SSR, while declaring it an autonomous region, with Shushi as its administrative center. In 1922, there was friction between Baku and the Armenians over how much autonomy N-K should enjoy. Eventually, on July 7, 1923, the Azerbaijani SSR published the decree on the formation of the N-K Autonomous Region (NKAR), with Khankend (Armenian Stepanakert) as its capital.

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Despite the fact that Soviet control temporarily limited ethnic tensions in N-K, the Armenians constantly attempted to reverse the situation because they considered the 1923 decision iniquitous. On the other hand, the Azerbaijanis viewed the same decision as a victory because it confirmed their historical claim to the region. Although Armenian complaints were silenced during Stalin’s rule, the aim of unification with the homeland, Armenia, remained. The Karabakh Armenians pursued this aim whenever a thaw in Soviet nationalities policy permitted them to do so. The Conflict Within this context, Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika created an opportunity for asserting long-latent cultural, territorial, and secessionist demands. Given the window of opportunity, the Karabakh Armenians started to organize themselves to pursue cultural freedom and attain political independence from the dominant Azerbaijani nation. In 1986–87, Armenian delegations from N-K visited Moscow to lobby for the transfer of the region from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. Petitions were also signed by thousands of Armenians and sent to Moscow for the same purpose. When Moscow declined to fulfill Armenian demands, orderly demonstrations and rallies were organized in Armenia and N-K to support Karabakh’s unification campaign with Armenia. The turning point in the dynamics of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict occurred in February 1988, when in a special session, Karabakh’s regional Soviet (legislature) adopted a resolution demanding the transfer of the NKAR from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. The decision was followed by massive demonstrations in Yerevan, which brought together 1 million people who were mobilized to support the unification campaign. A Karabakh Committee was also set up under the patronage of nationalist intellectuals to lead the nationalist movement. The Azerbaijani Communist authorities refused the resolution of the N-K Soviet and ruled out any territorial changes. Ayaz Mutalibov, the deputy chairperson of Azerbaijan’s Council of Ministers, refuted Armenian allegations that Azerbaijani authorities were responsible for N-K’s economic underdevelopment and neglect. Meanwhile, the mobilization of the Azerbaijanis under a full-fledged nationalist movement was gradually emerging. Hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis gathered in Lenin Square in Baku, where the orators addressed Armenian hostility and the N-K problem. Consequently, ethnic tensions escalated, and menacing incidents took place in the town of Askeran, near the eastern borders of N-K, where thousands of Azerbaijanis attacked their Armenian neighbors. Gorbachev did not acknowledge that there was a nationalities problem in the Soviet Union and ignored all demands related to the redrawing of republican borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the crisis escalated, anti-Armenian pogroms broke out on February 28–29 in the Azerbaijani town of Sumgait. Soviet military units stationed nearby did not intervene to stop the bloodshed. The violence committed in Sumgait caused the mobilization of the Armenian historical awareness. Thus, the Armenians associated the pogroms with the violent clashes of 1905–06 and the 1915 genocide that

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was carefully planned and executed by the Turks. Moscow’s sterile approach to the nationalities question revealed that the Soviet authorities had no clear policy applicable to solving the Karabakh question and avoiding violent ethnic confrontations. In the aftermath of the Sumgait violence, the Armenians living in Azerbaijan started to leave to Armenia and, likewise, the Azerbaijanis living in Armenia began to flee to their own republic. To prevent further rallies in Opera Square, the Soviet Interior Ministry deployed troops in Yerevan, and the Armenian Communist authorities outlawed the Karabakh Committee. Moscow could have responded to the Armenian unification demands by upgrading the status of N-K from that of an autonomous region to that of an autonomous republic within Azerbaijan. Such a political act might have satisfied the Armenian nationalist movement. In June 1988, under huge popular pressure, the Armenian Supreme Soviet endorsed the decision of the NKAR of February 20, 1988, which had requested the transfer of the region to the jurisdiction of Armenia. Further, in July, the Karabakh Regional Soviet passed a resolution to secede from Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet rejected in turn both decisions and labeled them undesirable. Ethnic clashes escalated, and another round of violence took place in the Azerbaijani-populated town of Khojaly. These clashes gave rise to a lasting and tragic refugee problem. Indeed, by the end of December 1988, the majority of the approximately 180,000 Armenians in Azerbaijan and the 160,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia, feeling isolated and vulnerable, had either left or were planning to leave.4 Hence, cohabitation between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis in both republics was difficult. In 1989, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) emerged as a mass movement under the leadership of Abulfaz Elchibey. To counterbalance the Armenian Nationalist Movement (ANM), the APF also organized mass demonstrations and called for Azerbaijani sovereignty over N-K; however, in adopting an anti-Soviet policy and calling for pan-Turkism, the APF also antagonized Moscow and threatened its economic interests in Azerbaijan. In late 1989, an Azerbaijani voluntary militia was created to counterbalance the ANM’s defense units and skirmishes started between protagonists from both sides. Soviet troops in the region were totally ineffective in maintaining law and order. The political event that triggered the escalation of the conflict occurred on December 1, 1989, when, in a joint session, the Armenian Supreme Soviet, together with the hastily formed Armenian National Council (ANC) of N-K, annexed N-K into Armenia and extended citizenship rights to the region’s population. The response to that political act was massive anti-Armenian riots in Baku that on January 13, 1990, resulted in violence. There were also armed clashes between the two communities in N-K and along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On January 19 (Black January events), Soviet forces started their assault on Baku to crush the Azerbaijani nationalists, discredit the APF, and establish a pro-Soviet government. Indeed, Moscow installed Mutalibov, who subsequently became president of Azerbaijan. The escalating violence in January 1990 brought the ANM closer to the levers of political power, and, in August, a founding member of the Karabakh Committee and nationalist leader, Levon Ter-Petrosian, was

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elected chairperson of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. On October 16, 1991, TerPetrosian became Armenia’s first president elected by a popular vote. In Azerbaijan, Mutalibov’s poor management of the N-K conflict and his failure to restore Azerbaijani sovereignty over N-K affected the republic’s internal stability and weakened its national unified stance against the Armenians. Facing increasing popular demands for a firm position on N-K, in November 1991, the Azerbaijani parliament voted to terminate the autonomous status of N-K. This political act led the ANC, which was now in control of N-K, to call for a referendum on N-K’s independence to decide its future status. Consequently, in the autumn of 1991, the population of N-K (180,000, the majority of whom were Armenian) voted overwhelmingly for independence. A parliament was elected on January 6, 1992, and it declared independence from Azerbaijan. The unsuccessful August 1991 coup against Gorbachev in Moscow was the death knell of the Soviet Union. After Soviet troops withdrew from the region, and both Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence, both nations headed toward open warfare. As a result of Armenia’s boycotting the 1991 referendum on preserving the Soviet Union, the Soviet armed forces, together with the Azerbaijani Special Function Militia Troops (or OMON), launched a massive offensive known as Operation Ring against the Karabakh Armenians to demoralize the Armenians and dissuade them from pursuing their territorial demands. However, the escalation of violence created a security dilemma and led to the emergence of a more militant Armenian leadership in N-K to protect Armenian villages from further attacks. N-K became an open battlefield, with many atrocities committed on both sides and hundreds of thousands of refugees seeking passage out of the region. In 1992, the Azerbaijani offensive that aimed to capture Stepanakert failed. The Armenian counteroffensive took place in February against the Azerbaijanipopulated town of Khojaly. The Armenians strategically employed violence to polarize the conflict to their advantage and to prevent interethnic cohabitation with the Azerbaijani inhabitants of N-K. By the end of May 1992, almost all of N-K was under Armenian control, and the danger to the Lachin corridor was relieved. The June 1992 presidential elections in Azerbaijan brought the nationalist opposition, the APF, to power. Elchibey, who was elected president, resorted to military operations. For the first time since 1988, northern N-K fell into the Azerbaijani hands. The large-scale Armenian offensive in April 1993 recaptured many villages in the Martakert region of N-K and seized strategic territories beyond the borders of N-K as far as Kelbajar in the west and Fizuli in the southeast. The Armenian incursion, which added to the number of refugees and approached the borders of Iran, was condemned by Iran, Turkey, and the UN Security Council. The Karabakh Armenian forces took advantage of the repeated political disarray in Azerbaijan and launched a new offensive on the town of Agdam, in Azerbaijan proper, to establish a security zone around N-K. As a result of this military setback, Elchibey was ousted by the popular army commander Surat Huseinov, and Heidat Aliev was brought to power. The massive Armenian assault against Azerbaijani towns and villages turned an estimated 1 million Azerbaijanis into refugees in their own country and created a humanitarian problem that was beyond the coping

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capabilities of Azerbaijan. From August to October 1993, facing a retreating and demoralized Azerbaijani army, the Karabakh forces, in addition to Agdam, seized the Azerbaijani districts of Qubatli, Jebrail, Fizuli, and Zangelan and occupied large swathes of territory between the southern border of N-K and the AzerbaijaniIranian frontier. Although the Karabakh Armenian forces had emerged victorious, the parties to the conflict realized that the costs of continuing the fighting would far outweigh any potential benefits. Thus, on May 12, 1994, parliamentary representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the self-proclaimed N-K republic signed the Russianbrokered Bishkek cease-fire protocol under the aegis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and pledged to accept peacekeeping troops to monitor the cease-fire. Management of the Conflict Until the Soviet demise in 1991, the government of the Soviet Union had the responsibility of managing the Karabakh conflict. Thus, in March 1988, the Soviet government rejected the unification of N-K with Armenia but acknowledged that several economic and cultural reforms had to be introduced to improve the conditions of Karabakh Armenians. Although consistent with Gorbachev’s reformist policies, the Soviet government’s decision reflected Moscow’s hesitant will and did not leave much room for optimism because the proposed reforms did not address communal security. To curb Armenian nationalism, on March 22, the Soviet army, with armored personnel carriers, rolled into the Armenian capital, Yerevan, to stop the demonstrations and rescue the Soviet Union from a possible collapse. On the same day, the local Communist authorities outlawed the Karabakh Committee. To calm the situation, on January 12, 1989, Moscow set up a commission led by Arkady Volsky (a Russian politician) with extraordinary powers to address the demands of both nations and seek a permanent solution to the conflict. In late 1989, after having been unable to restore order and find a mutually acceptable solution, Moscow abolished the Volsky Commission and returned N-K to direct Azerbaijani control. In addition to Russia, Turkey and Iran expressed interest in mediating the conflict, but their efforts were unsuccessful because neither party to the conflict was ready to stop fighting and the conflict was not ripe for resolution. Additionally, the Armenians rejected Turkish mediation, and the West was not in favor of Iranian influence in the region. Still, Azerbaijan did not trust Russia because it was not a neutral mediator. In 1991, the Russian-Kazakhstani-brokered negotiations failed to de-escalate the conflict because the belligerents thought that it was premature to negotiate and that each party could improve its negotiating position by fighting. A key development in third-party intervention to resolve the N-K conflict was the UN’s agreement, in 1992, to let the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, OSCE after 1994) become the main leading international body in the management and resolution of the conflict. The CSCE, which had been involved in facilitating negotiations since the summer of 1992, in the form of its 12-member Minsk Group, continued to be guided by the principles agreed upon

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in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which included the inviolability of international borders, the territorial integrity of member states, and human rights and selfdetermination of peoples. The OSCE’s Budapest summit in December 1994 and Lisbon summit in December 1996 achieved very little progress in resolving the conflict. The contested issues of the security of N-K, the Shushi problem, the Lachin corridor problem, and the final status of N-K remained unsolved. For both parties to control the territory of Karabakh and have sovereignty over it was crucial because it had tremendous impact on their identity. Additionally, the OSCE faced the difficulty of reconciling the Azerbaijani demand of territorial integrity with the Armenian demand of self-determination. The Karabakh leadership rejected any attempt to restore the previous autonomous status of N-K and demanded the right to participate in the negotiations. In 1997, the OSCE’s step-by-step and package peace plans did not resolve the conflict because the withdrawal of the Karabakh forces from the occupied territories, the deployment of peacekeeping forces, the return of the refugees to their homes and the determination of the final status of N-K continued to be issues of disagreement between both parties. The Karabakh leadership wanted nothing short of independence, whereas for Azerbaijan N-K’s independence was unacceptable. Deadlock in the negotiations occurred because of uncertainty and lack of trust. In 1998, to break the deadlock and establish peace, the OSCE proposed the common state plan that envisaged a two-state arrangement with a possible confederation between Azerbaijan and N-K. But Azerbaijan rejected the plan because it would threaten its security and resources. In the internal conflict of N-K, negotiating a settlement to the mutual satisfaction of the conflicting parties was very difficult, which is to say nearly impossible, because the issues of security, status, and identity are often the least negotiable. The 1999 bilateral negotiations between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents were a positive factor in the peace process, but both men were unable to diffuse the anger, fears, and suspicions of their constituencies. In 2001, bilateral talks between Heidar Aliev and Robert Kocharian continued in Paris and Key West with high-level French and U.S. pressure. The core of that framework was a territorial exchange in which Armenia would cede its Meghri region in return for the Lachin corridor that would establish a geographic link between N-K and Armenia. However, selling such an agreement to both peoples seemed very unlikely. Later, in 2006, in Rambouillet and Bucharest, the three cochairs (American, French, Russian) of the Minsk Group unleashed two rounds of negotiations to enable the parties to reach an agreement on core principles involving the perceived conflicts of interest that were the nub of the problem: that is, security, withdrawal, and the referendum. In light of unwillingness by both parties to relinquish control over N-K, the zero-sum outcome continued. With no mutually hurting stalemate, the moment was not ripe for resolution. At the OSCE ministerial conference in Madrid, in November 2007, the Madrid Principles were presented to both parties. These basic principles included, inter alia, return of the occupied territories, an interim status for N-K, a corridor linking

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Armenia to N-K, future determination of the final legal status of N-K through a referendum, the return of the refugees, and international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation. The Moscow Declaration that was signed between Ilham Aliev, Dmitry Medvedev, and Serge Sarkisian in November 2008, stressed the importance of the Madrid Principles as a basic blueprint for resolving the conflict. The declaration carried significant diplomatic weight as the first document signed by the disputants since the 1994 cease-fire that was brokered by Russia and the first on the N-K conflict signed by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan since their countries’ independence. Peacemaking attempts continued at the G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy, on July 10, 2009, and later, in January 2010, when the cochairs of the Minsk Group presented updated Madrid Principles that envisaged withdrawal from five of the seven occupied Azerbaijani districts and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force as a first stage. A second stage entailed withdrawal from Lachin and Kelbajar, the return of the displaced population, and a decision on the status of N-K. But disagreements between both sides that centered on the practical modalities of the referendum, the time frame for the withdrawal from Lachin and Kelbajar, and the status of the land link across Lachin that would connect Karabakh with Armenia hindered the negotiations. The torturous peace process over N-K entered a very difficult phase after the failure of the talks between Aliev, Medvedev, and Sarkisian in the Russian city of Kazan on June 24, 2011. Both sides failed to move forward by a single millimeter with regard to the key issues of the conflict, mainly the political status of N-K, the problem of the occupied territories, the refugees, and the format of the peacekeeping operation. Aliev reiterated that Azerbaijan could resort to the military option to restore its territorial integrity. Cease-fire violations occurred often, causing casualties on both sides. Military rhetoric dominated, and Azerbaijan preferred to invest its huge revenues from oil and gas in weapons procurements. In January 2012 and August 2014, to prevent further military escalation, Russia hosted two important meetings in Sochi between Aliev and Sarkisian and stressed the importance of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. After two decades of negotiations, the two sides were apparently still far apart. Significance Soviet ethnoterritorial federalism treated national identities as nations so as to stress the primordial relationship of a people with its homeland. Further, language, culture, and territory imbued national identities in the Soviet Union with a sense not only of difference from outsiders but also of fraternity. The Soviet regime, in addition to institutionalizing the system of territorial nationhood, institutionalized an ethnic nationality that divided the population of the Soviet Union into national groups. Therefore, at a later stage, when the ethnic boundaries of a titular nation did not match its political boundaries and when ethnic minorities found themselves on the wrong side of an ethnic border under alien domination, as was the case in N-K, ethnic identity in the Soviet Union proved to be problematic.

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This meant that local national elites sought to redraw the boundaries of their ethnorepublics to match the geographical extent of their nations or the historical or mythological image of the homeland. The autonomy granted to N-K was fictitious, and Karabakh continued to be subordinate to Azerbaijani constitutional economic restraints. Thus, whenever there was change in nationalities policy, the Karabakh Armenians demanded reconsideration of their case. In the late 1980s, the gradual ethnic mobilization of the Armenians could be perceived within the context of Gorbachev’s reformist policies and the political rehabilitation of previous Armenian ethnocultural and territorial demands. The policies of perestroika and glasnost encouraged the non-Russians to raise the mistakes of the past and the grievances of the present against the regime. Indeed, the reforms introduced by Gorbachev undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet system because Moscow was unable to defuse ethnic tensions and loosen political control by guaranteeing political and civil rights to discontented nationalities. The Armenian nationalist intellectuals argued that the Armenian cultural community had been threatened by its division since the 1920s and what was needed was the preservation of Armenian identity and the redefinition of the vernacular communal nation against incorporation into Azerbaijan. More broadly, informal patriotic associations and popular fronts in the Baltic republics were becoming active in the Soviet Union. Still, a joint committee of Armenian, Georgian, and Ukrainian dissidents proposed a set of reforms to be implemented in all nonRussian republics. As demonstrations continued in Stepanakert’s Lenin Square, Karabakh Armenians demanded an official declaration from Baku about its N-K policy. These political developments occurring in N-K were unprecedented. Never before had public pressure overridden Communist Party discipline. The N-K nationalist movement played a major role in spurring the collapse of the Soviet Union. The demonstrations that were taking place within the framework of glasnost confirmed that national consciousness had been an ineradicable feature of Soviet society. The Karabakh Committee thought that a solution to the N-K conflict would only be possible by adopting a new nationalities policy and revising interrepublican borders, which never happened. The revival of nationalism not only in N-K but also elsewhere had shown that conflict rather than national harmony and consensus had been endemic in Soviet interethnic relations. The Soviet authorities had no clear policy applicable to all the nationalities’ problems and conflicts so as to avoid violent ethnic confrontations. The broader current of democratic awakening and political change in the Soviet Union and the escalation of violence into all-out war in N-K in the early 1990s led to ethnic self-determination and de facto independence of Karabakh from Azerbaijan. But the N-K conflict remains unsolved. Notes 1. See James Russell, “The Formation of the Armenian Nation,” in The Armenian People, from Ancient to Modern Times, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian, vol. 1 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

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2. See Tamara Dragadze, “Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijanis,” in The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1990). 3. George A. Bournoutian, Two Chronicles on the History of Karabakh, Introduction and Annotated Translation (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2004). 4. Mark Malkasian, Gha-ra-bagh, the Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996), 176.

Suggested Readings Altstadt, Audrey L. 1994. “O Patria Mia: National Conflict in Mountainous Karabakh.” In Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, edited by W. Raymond Duncan and Paul G. Holman, Jr. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chorbajian, Levon, Patrick Donabedian, and Claude Mutafian, eds. 1994. The Caucasus Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabakh. London: Zed Books. Croissant, Michael P. 1998.The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. Westport, CT: Praeger. De Waal, Thomas. 2003. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press. Dudwick, Nora. 1990. “Nagorno-Karabakh and the Politics of Sovereignty.” In The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, edited by Graham Smith. New York: Longman. Geukjian, Ohannes. 2012. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus: NagornoKarabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy. London: Ashgate. Geukjian, Ohannes. 2014. Negotiating Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace: Opportunities, Obstacles, Prospects. London: Ashgate. Goltz, Thomas. 1998. Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-rich, War-torn, Post-Soviet Republic. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Libaridian, Gerard J., ed. 1988. The Karabakh File: Documents and Facts on the Region of Mountainous Karabakh, 1918–1988. Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute. Malkasian, Mark. 1996. Gha-ra-bagh!: The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia. Detroit: Wayne University Press. Maresca, John. 2000. “Resolving the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: Lost Opportunities for International Conflict Resolution.” In Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press. Schwartz, Donald V., and Razmig Panossian, eds. 1994. Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for Russian and East European Studies. Suny, Ronald G. 1993. Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Suny, Ronald G., ed. 1996. Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Walker, Christopher J., ed. 1991. Armenia and Karabagh: The Struggle for Unity. London: Minority Rights Publications.

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Appendices 1. Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Finalizing the Incorporation of Karabakh into Azerbaijan (July 1923) Appendix 1 refers to the July 7, 1923, decree issued by the Soviet Azerbaijani authorities on the creation of an autonomous Armenian region within Azerbaijan to address Armenian demands. N-K was officially confirmed as a constituent part of Soviet Azerbaijan. Although not mentioned in the decree, it was confirmed that business, legislation and instruction in schools would be conducted in Armenian. The aim was to nurture Armenian identity. The Karabakh Armenians were disappointed because the decree on the formation of the autonomous region excluded some border districts, such as Lachin and Kelbajar. N-K was never granted a statute of its own and remained dependent on Azerbaijan. Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Finalizing the Incorporation of Karabakh into Azerbaijan (July 1923) 1-To form, as part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, an autonomous Armenian region in Karabakh with Khankend as its center. 2-The administrative organs of the mountainous region are the regional executive and the local soviets. 3-Until such time when a regional executive committee can be organized, to create a provisional revolutionary committee whose responsibilities will include the invitation of the regional soviet conference within two months, for the purpose of instituting a permanent executive organ. 4-The financial and technical resources for the region’s executive committee will be provided from the general resources of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic; immediate arrangement to be made in this regard by the Azerbaijani central committee. 5-To invite a mixed commission composed of representatives from Mountainous Karabakh, the Plains Karabakh, Kurdistan and the Central authorities of the Azerbaijani SSR to devise the region’s constitution, facilitate the transformation of authority to the autonomous region, and to determine the borders of the region, all by no later than August 15. Signed Vice President of the Central Executive M. Gasumov and Secretary M. Khanpudaghov Source: Document No. 24, July 1923. G. A. Hovannisian, “The Establishment of Soviet Rule in Mountainous Karabakh,” in Libaridian, The Karabakh File, 37.

2. Text of the Resolution by the Government of Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh Requesting Incorporation in Soviet Armenia (February 20, 1988) Appendix 2 refers to the N-K regional Soviet’s resolution of February 20, 1988, on the transfer of the N-K autonomous region from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. This unprecedented action by a regional Soviet contradicted the official Communist Party policy, which prevented interrepublican border changes. Both Kyamuran Bagirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist

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Party, and Boris Kevorkov, the Karabakh Communist boss, who attended the meeting, were unable to prevent a vote on the resolution because the Karabakh Soviet was practicing its constitutional right to self-determination, albeit on paper, within the limits set by the 1977 Soviet constitution. Text of the Resolution by the Government of Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh Requesting Incorporation in Soviet Armenia (20 February 1988) Special Meeting of the 20th Session, the Soviet of People’s Deputies, Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh. Resolution: Regarding mediation for the transfer of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh (ARMK) from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. After listening to and reviewing the statements of the people’s deputies of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh Soviet “regarding the mediation of the SSR Supreme Soviet between the Azerbaijani SSR and the Armenian SSR for the transfer of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR,” the special session of regional soviet of the 20th regional soviet of Mountainous Karabakh resolves, Welcoming the wishes of the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh to request the supreme soviets of Azerbaijani and Armenian SSRs that they appreciate the deep aspirations of the Armenian population of Mountainous Karabakh and to transfer the Autonomous Region of Mountainous Karabakh from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR, at the same time to intercede with the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to reach a positive resolution regarding the transfer of the region from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. Source: Sovetakan Gharabagh, February 21, 1988, in Libaridian, The Karabakh File, 90.

3. Comments of Ayaz Mutalibov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Azerbaijan, on the Mountainous Karabakh Issue (February 23, 1988). Appendix 3 refers to the Azerbaijani government’s response to Armenian allegations of Karabakh’s economic backwardness compared to Azerbaijan. It is worth noting that Karabakh Armenians held the Azerbaijani authorities responsible for their marginalization in society and cultural, economic, and political discrimination. The Azerbaijani government refuted the Armenian claims of discrimination and tried to justify its policy in N-K. Additionally, the Azerbaijani government refused to acknowledge N-K’s socioeconomic problems and reiterated that the region was not neglected. These problems could not be considered as a cause to demand incorporation of N-K into Armenia. Comments of Ayaz Mutalibov, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Azerbaijan, on the Mountainous Karabakh Issue (23 February 1988) The attempts by individuals in Nagorno-Karabakh to justify their demands for the incorporation of that region into neighboring Armenia, a Soviet republic in Transcaucasia, by its alleged economic backwardness compared to Azerbaijan (another Soviet republic in Tranascaucasia) are irresponsible, a senior local government official pointed out today.

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Ayaz Mutalibov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers in Azerbaijan, of which the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region is part, told TASS correspondent: “In many cases of the national economy, Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Armenians make up the majority, is noticeably ahead of the average indicators in the entire republic.” “Industrial output more than trebled in the region over the past 15 years. Nagorno-Karabakh plays an important role in the economy of entire Azerbaijan and is closely connected with all its other regions.” “They sent to Nagorno-Karabakh various equipment, metal articles, building materials, fuel and energy resources, raw materials and consumer goods.” “In turn, the autonomous region supplies electrical fixtures, silk fabric, musical instruments and foodstuffs.” “Food and light industries were developing especially fast in the autonomous region, Mutalibov said. Machine-building accounted for more than 80 per cent of industrial production. Branches of several Azerbaijani industrial enterprises were being set up in the region.” Mutalibov drew attention to the extensive programme of Nagorno-Karabakh’s social development, including housing construction. ‘There are more kintergartens, hospital beds and libraries per capita of its population compared to an average in Azerbaijan.’ Source: TASS, February 23, 1988, in Libaridian, The Karabakh File, 99–100.

4. Joint Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast on the Reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (December 1, 1989) Appendix 4 refers to the December 1, 1989, resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of N-K on the reunification of Armenia and N-K. This resolution was adopted after Moscow’s inability to manage the N-K conflict and termination of its direct rule over N-K and restoration of the region to Azerbaijani sovereignty. The Volsky mission failed to restore order and Soviet rule in the region. It is crucial to stress that calls for more demonstrations and unification in the Transcaucasus coincided with calls for a referendum in the Baltic states. The December 1989 resolution on annexation of N-K into Armenia was a political event that triggered the escalation of the conflict. Joint Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast on the Reunification of Armenia and NagornoKarabakh (1 December 1989) Proceeding from the Universal principles of national self-determination and acceding to legal aspirations of the two segments of the Armenian people torn apart by force, the Armenian Supreme Soviet recognizes the fact of NKAO’s self-determination, and the congress of the parliamentary representatives of the NKAO and the National Council it has elected as the sole legal authority in force in the oblast. The Armenian Supreme Soviet and NKAO National Council declare the reunification of the Armenian republic and the NKAO. The Armenian republic citizenship rights extend over the population of the NKAO. The Supreme Soviet and the National Council hereby set up a joint commission to formulate practical steps to realize reunification. They assume the obligation to represent the national

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interests of the Armenian population in northern Artsakh (NKAO), Shaumyan rayon, and Getashen districts. Decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR in Connection with the Decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR on Uniting the Armenian SSR and the NagornoKarabakh Autonomous Oblast (6 December 1989) The Decision adopted by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on 1 December 1989 to unite the Armenian SSR and NKAO is regarded as an impermissible interference in the sovereign Azerbaijan SSR’s affairs and a measure aimed at encroaching on the Azerbaijan SSR’s territorial integrity, which does not contribute toward the effort made to stabilize the situation in the region and restore normal conditions. Sources: Yerevan International Service, December 3, 1989, in Croissant, The ArmeniaAzerbaijan Conflict, appendix C; and Baku Domestic Service, December 6, 1989, in Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, appendix C.

5. Declaration between the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation (Moscow Declaration, November 2, 2008) Appendix 5 refers to the November 2, 2008, Moscow Declaration that was signed jointly by the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Although lacking in specifics, the declaration carried significant diplomatic weight as the first document signed by the disputants since the 1994 cease-fire that was brokered by Russia and the first on the N-K conflict signed by the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan since their countries’ independence. It was also important for Moscow, which wanted to remind the international community that it held the key to a solution, despite the fact that the other two Minsk Group cochairs, the United States and France, were present at the signing ceremony. Declaration between the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation (Moscow Declaration, 2 November 2008) The presidents of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation, meeting on 2 November 2008, in Moscow, at the invitation of the president of the Russian Federation, Having held substantive discussions in a constructive spirit on the state and prospects for political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through a continuation of direct dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia through the mediation of Russia, the USA and France as co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, 1-Declare that they will facilitate improvement of the situation in the South Caucasus and establish stability in the region through political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on the principles of international law and the decisions and documents approved within this framework, thus creating favorable conditions for economic growth and all-round cooperation in the region. 2-Affirm the importance of having the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group continue their mediation efforts, including based on the outcome of the meeting between the parties in

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Madrid on 29 November 2007, and subsequent discussions on further steps to agree on the basic principles for political settlement. 3-Agree that peace settlement should be accompanied by legally binding guarantees for every aspect and stage of the settlement process. 4-Note that the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed to continue work, including through further contacts at the highest level, on reaching a political settlement to the conflict and have instructed the heads of their respective foreign ministers to work together with the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group to activate the negotiation process. 5-Consider it important to encourage the establishment of conditions for carrying out confidence-building measures in the context of work in a peace settlement. Source: Sabuhi Mamedli, Naira Melkumian, and Karine Ohanian, “Hopes and Fears after Karabakh Declaration,” in Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Caucasus Reporting Service, no. 467 (November 6, 2008).

Bolivia A History of Struggle: From Anticolonial Resistance to Progressive Extractivism in the Morales Era Nicole Fabricant and David W. Dent

Timeline1 1538 The Spanish conquer Bolivia, which becomes part of the Vice-royalty of Peru. 1824 Venezuelan freedom fighter Simon Bolivar, after whom Bolivia is named, liberates the country from Spanish rule. 1825 Bolivia becomes independent, with Simon Bolivar as its president. 1836–1839 Bolivia enters into a federation with Peru, but the federation fails following Peru’s defeat in a war with Chile. 1879–1884 Bolivia becomes landlocked after losing mineral-rich coastal territory in the Atacama to Chile. 1903 Bolivia loses the rubber-rich province of Acre to Brazil. 1920 There is a rebellion by indigenous peoples. 1923 A revolt by miners is violently suppressed.

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1932–1935 Bolivia loses territory to Paraguay after its defeat in the Chaco War. Military Coups 1952 Peasants and miners overthrow the military regime. Victor Paz Estenssoro returns from exile to become president and introduces social and economic reforms. 1964 Vice President Rene Barrientos stages a military coup. 1967 The United States helps suppress a peasant uprising led by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who is killed after being betrayed by peasants. 1969 Vice President Siles Salinas replaces Barrientos after Barrientos is killed in a plane crash, but Salinas is himself deposed by the army, which rules with increased severity. 1971 Hugo Banzer Suarez comes to power after staging a military coup. 1974 Banzer postpones elections and bans political and trade union activity in the wake of an attempted coup. 1980 General Luis Garcia stages a coup after inconclusive elections. The United States and European countries suspend aid amid allegations of corruption and drug trafficking. 1981 General Celso Torrelio Villa replaces Garcia after Garcia is forced to resign. 1982 The military junta hands over power to a civilian administration led by Hernán Siles Zuazo, who heads a leftist government. 1983 The United States and European countries resume aid following the introduction of austerity measures.

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1985 Siles resigns in the wake of a general strike and an attempted coup. Elections are held but are inconclusive. Parliament chooses Paz Estenssoro as president. 1986 Twenty-one thousand miners lose their jobs following the collapse of the tin market. 1989 Leftist Jaime Paz Zamora becomes president and enters into a power-sharing pact with former dictator Hugo Banzer. 1990 Some 4 million acres of rainforest are allocated to indigenous peoples. 1993 The presidential race is won by Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. 1997 Banzer is elected president. 1999 Encouraged by moves to prosecute former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, the opposition demands an inquiry into Banzer’s role during the repression of the 1970s. January 2001 The government declares almost half of Bolivia a natural disaster area following heavy rains. Banzer Dies 2001 August 8: Vice President Jorge Quiroga is sworn in as president, replacing Hugo Banzer, who is suffering from cancer. Banzer dies in May 2002. December: Farmers reject a government offer of $900 each a year in exchange for the eradication of the coca crop used to produce cocaine. August 2002 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada wins a clear victory in a National Congress runoff vote and becomes president for a second time. 2003 February: More than 30 people are killed during violent protests against a proposed income tax. President Sanchez de Lozada withdraws the proposal.

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September–October: Eighty people are killed and hundreds injured during protests fueled by government plans to export natural gas via Chile. President Sanchez de Lozada resigns under the pressure of protests and is succeeded by Carlos Mesa. 2004 April: President Mesa signs a natural gas export deal with Argentina. Protesters take to the streets and demand the president’s resignation. Wrangling over gas exploitation sparks unrest. July: A referendum on gas exports is held. Voters back greater state involvement in the industry and approve exports of the resource. August: A landmark deal is signed to allow Bolivia to export gas via a Peruvian port. 2005 January: Rising fuel prices trigger large-scale antigovernment protests and blockades in Santa Cruz and in El Alto, near La Paz. Civic and business leaders in Santa Cruz push for autonomy for the province. May: Protests over energy resources bring La Paz, and government business, to a near standstill. President Mesa promises a rewritten constitution and a referendum on autonomy demands from resource-rich provinces. December: Socialist leader Evo Morales wins the presidential election. He becomes the first indigenous Bolivian to take office. 2006 June: President Morales claims victory in elections for a new assembly that will write a new constitution aimed at giving more power to the indigenous majority. October: Clashes between rival groups of tin miners leave 16 dead in the town of Huanuni. November: A land-reform bill is narrowly approved by the Senate. The bill aims to expropriate up to one-fifth of Bolivian land for redistribution to the landless poor. Nationalization December 2006 Bolivia completes its gas nationalization program, giving the state control over the operations of the country’s foreign energy firms. 2007 January: Pro-Morales trade unionists and coca growers set up a parallel local government in Cochabamba and demand the resignation of the state’s pro-autonomy governor. Constitutional Moves December 2007 President Morales formally receives a controversial new draft constitution that he says will promote redistribution of the country’s wealth and give greater voice to the indigenous majority.

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2008 August: President Morales gains 67 percent of vote in a recall referendum on his leadership. September: Antigovernment protests escalate into violence in the east and north of Bolivia, with 30 people killed in the worst-affected region, the northern province of Pando. Bolivia expels the U.S. ambassador, accusing him of fomenting civil unrest. Washington reciprocates by expelling the Bolivian ambassador. November: Bolivia stops the U.S. drug enforcement agency from operating in the country. 2009 January: A new constitution giving greater rights to the indigenous majority is approved in a national referendum, with more than 60 percent voting in favor. May: Former president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada is tried in absentia over the deaths of 60 people during protests in 2003. Morales Reelected December 2009 President Morales is reelected for a second term with more than 60 percent of the vote. 2010 May: President Morales orders the nationalization of four electricity firms, saying the state now controls 80 percent of the country’s power generation. Strikes and rallies against the government’s wage policies occur. October: The government scraps a new law designed to cut cocaine production in response to anger from coca growers. December: Thousands take to the streets to protest government plans to increase the cost of fuel. 2011 January: The government drops plans to raise fuel prices by more than 70 percent. February: Sharp rises in the prices of basic foodstuffs and food shortages spark violent demonstrations. August–September: Plans to build a major road through a rainforest reserve—a project the government says is essential for development— spark mass protests. October: More than 60 percent of voters cast invalid ballots in an election to choose Bolivia’s top judges, in what is interpreted as major slap in the face for President Morales. 2012 January: Bolivia temporarily leaves the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in protest against classification of coca as an illegal drug and signs an agreement with the United States and Brazil to help reduce the production of illegal cocaine. April: President Morales rescinds a contract awarded to Brazil’s OAS to build a controversial road through the Amazon forest.

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2014 Morales is reelected for a third time. Bolivia, a multiethnic society, evolved from a clash of indigenous cultures in the Andes of South America and Spanish explorers in search of mineral wealth in the 16th century. From the beginning, the Iberian conquest (1519–1540) and expansion brought excessive levels of cruelty, deprivation, and death to the native populations, aided by smallpox and the exploitation of the original inhabitants. The majority of the indigenous population in Bolivia today are Quechua-speaking (30 percent) and Aymara-speaking (25 percent) Indians who live in the highlands of South America’s poorest country. The rest of Bolivia’s population is made up of citizens of European descent (15 percent) and mixed European and Indian ancestry (30 percent). With a total population of approximately 8 million in 2000, Bolivia is sharply divided between its Indian and non-Indian populations, which is the source of most of the country’s struggle over Indian rights, class and political power, and overall economic well-being. This ethnic conflict in many ways reflects what is frequently called the “curse of resources.” Since the Spanish conquest, Bolivia has been a “resource colony”— the discovery of silver riches in the highlands of Potosi by the Spaniards transformed ways of life, imposed a laboring structure and system of mining upon indigenous peoples, and broke up their communal lands and territories. But essentially, “the old globalization” of resource extractivism fueled the Spanish Empire, for it was said that you could build a silver bridge that extended from Cerro Rico to the door of the royal palace across the ocean, while Bolivia was left deeply impoverished.2 Historical Background Since the arrival of the Spanish conquistadores, indigenous communities in Bolivia have endured with astonishing reserve a multitude of intrusions and indignities. However, the restraint exhibited by tribal and indigenous communities over the centuries has often been interrupted by cycles of rebellion and state repression, compounded by violent confrontations between Indian organizations and the state. The exploitation of Indian communities led to indigenous rebellions in the highlands, including the 1780–1782 revolt led by Tupac Amaru and Tupac Katari. Before he was killed by the Spaniards in 1782, Tupac Katari offered this prophetic statement to his executioners: “I will return and I will be millions.” As Indian communities faced repeated discrimination by the state, they gradually realized the potent symbolism of Tupac Katari’s struggle and martyrdom in challenging the authority of the state. From independence from Spain in 1825 to the middle of the 20th century, Bolivia lost a considerable amount of its national territory in wars with its neighbors (including its outlet to the sea) and settled landownership battles through the creation of neo-feudal estates that reduced the communal ownership of land by Indian communities. The internationalization of the Bolivian economy—particularly the

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rubber boom in the 1890s and the emergence of tin as a major export at the turn of the 20th century—further contributed to the concentration of power in the hands of a white minority and a few mestizos who continued to resist the demands for reform by mine workers and Indian peasants. The Bolivian National Revolution

Indigenous communities formed rural unions in the 1940s to settle the question of the growing inequality in landownership. By 1950, Bolivia’s large landowners controlled over 92 percent of all land, and Indians were forced to work on the land they considered theirs under traditional communal laws of ownership. The Bolivian revolution of 1952—one of the defining events in modern Bolivian history— decreed a major land redistribution, universal suffrage that gave Indians the right to vote for the first time, and the nationalization of the mining industry. Under the leadership of Víctor Paz Estenssoro, a moderate leftist who decades later turned into a conservative during the economic and political turmoil of the 1980s, Bolivia responded positively to Indian demands for the first time during the 1950s. On April 9, 1952, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) led a successful revolt and set into motion the Bolivian National Revolution. Under President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, and later Hernan Siles, the MNR introduced universal adult suffrage, carried out a sweeping land reform, promoted rural education, and, in 1952, nationalized the country’s largest tin mines. The 1952 Bolivian revolution addressed some of the concerns of indigenous groups—particularly the landownership issue, citizenry, and the right to vote—but the goal of the MNR was to assimilate Indians by eliminating their cultural autonomy and distinct living patterns. Furthermore, Indians continued to face discrimination and were denied many political rights enjoyed by non-Indians. While part of the platform was a radical agrarian reform, land reform never really occurred in the eastern region of the country, leading to great landed inequality today in that region. Military Rule

The 1960s and 1970s were defined by military rule in Bolivia. The most significant was that of (later General) Hugo Banzer Suárez, who assumed the presidency in 1971. Banzer ruled with MNR support from 1971 to 1974. Then Luis Garcia Meza carried out another violent coup in 1980, which, like that of Banzer, was notorious for human rights abuses, narcotics trafficking, and economic mismanagement. The Conflict Neoliberal Period: A Period of Conflict and New Forms of Governance

Military governments siphoned off critical resources during the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the debt crisis of the mid-1980s. Deep in debt, Bolivia asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans to pull itself out of crisis. The first round of reforms was called the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was intended to redefine the country’s future economic, social, and political choices

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through particular economic prescriptions.3 The NEP cut government spending and imposed a rigid monetary policy, which succeeded in bringing hyperinflation under control. It allowed the currency to float against the U.S. dollar, privatized state-owned industries, opened the country to direct foreign investment, and ended a protectionistic policy. The second round of neoliberal reforms came in the 1990s under President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s Plan de Todos (Plan for All) and had seven key components that aligned with this project: (1) constitutional reforms, (2) privatization through the law of capitalization, (3) the law of decentralization, (4) agrarian reform under the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, (5) judicial reforms, (6) educational reforms, and (7) restructuring of the pension system.4, 5 The centerpiece of the proposal was an ambitious plan that combined administrative decentralization with privatization, placing a special emphasis on popular participation. Under this plan, 50 percent of publicly owned shares in various enterprises were to be transferred to transnational corporations. For example, the publicly controlled water system in Cochabamba was privatized.6 Resource-Based Struggles in Bolivia

In February 2000, protesters took to the streets after the Cochabamba water system was privatized. Residents across class and ethnic and racial identities experienced an increase in their water bills by as much as 100 percent. Coca growers in the tropics of Cochabamba, altiplano campesinos, and teachers’ unions joined the protests.7 By April, the situation had deteriorated to the point that Banzer, who had ruled the country as a military dictator from 1971–1978, responded to the popular rebellion by calling a state of siege that, according to the official count, left 5 dead and 42 wounded.8 When the political situation settled, a social movement, which united urban and rural Cochabambinos, forced the government to return the water company to public control.9 Further unrest occurred across the country in the months that followed. Coca producers protested against government-assisted coca eradication policies.10 The protests ground the country to a halt for over three weeks: private industry lost millions, schools were closed, and cities were unable to receive food supplies.11 Three and a half years after the “Water Wars,” when President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada proposed to export Bolivia’s gas in a pipeline through Chile, distinct groups, this time centered in the Aymara city of El Alto, came together to resist dispossession and the alienation of resources in the Gas War of 2003. Analyses of the Gas War highlight the ways in which local movements articulated around a national frame to recover control over a resource that was seen as the country’s national patrimony.12 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozado sent the military to open fire on the protestors who took to the streets, which left some 60 people dead in October 2003, mostly inhabitants of El Alto, located on the Altiplano above the capital city of La Paz. Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign on October 18, 2003, and interim president Carlos Mesa put the gas issue to a referendum on July 18, 2004. In May 2005, under much stress from protesters, the Bolivian Congress enacted a new hydrocarbons law that increased the state’s royalties from natural gas

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exploitation. However, protesters demanded full nationalization of hydrocarbon resources and the increased participation of Bolivia’s indigenous majority, mainly composed of Aymaras and Quechuas, in the political life of the country. On June 6, 2005, Mesa was forced to offer his resignation, as tens of thousands of protesters blockaded La Paz from the rest of the country daily. It was within this context that Evo Morales, a former coca grower and union leader, rose to power in 2005. Management of the Conflict The Rise of Morales and New Forms of Governance

The election of Evo Morales and his political party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), represented a watershed victory for social movements and indigenous peoples worldwide. Morales was elected on a platform to (a) undo the legacy of neoliberal reforms by moving from a model of privatization to nationalizing key industries and ( b) to incorporate the majority indigenous into the nation-state. The MAS government has overturned many of the neoliberal economic policies, most importantly “nationalizing” the hydrocarbon industry and returning a significant portion of the profits to the country’s poor in the form of cash transfers.13 La Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) notes that poverty has decreased from 63.9 percent in 2005 to 42.4 percent in 2011. Further, in 2006, a Constituent Assembly of popularly elected delegates, including many from the indigenous and popular social movements, drafted a new constitution. Approved by public referendum in 2009, the new constitution declares Bolivia to be a plurinational and communitarian state and establishes a series of rights for indigenous originary and peasant peoples and nations, including the rights to autonomy and self-government, to culture, to recognition of their institutions, and to the consolidation of their territories. In response to Morales’s progressive agenda, European elites organized in opposition (2006–2008). Elites initially feared loss of lands and a redistributive economy based on Cuba’s model. These fears have lessened over time, as the new constitution did not in fact take away their lands but rather redistributed government lands to poor campesinos. Morales made many concessions with the agribusiness elites (including the Camera Agropecuario del Oriente (Eastern Agricultural Chamber of Congress)), including his most recent concession to expand soy production and deforest parts of the Amazon, which guaranteed elites the freedom to do business as usual.14 More than the agribusiness resistance to Morales, which has subsided since 2011, the real conflicts in Bolivia today center on the contradictions of Morales’s model of progressive extractivism. While Morales and Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera argue that resource rents have significantly contributed to bettering the lives of working and poor Bolivians, others argue that this model of development will have the same destructive socioeconomic and environmental consequences. The most recent uprisings and resistance to Morales and the MAS regime centered on building a massive highway through the Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). This plan—to be funded by Brazilian development

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dollars—ignited a political scandal in Bolivia, as the Morales government failed to carry out a prior consultation as required by the new constitution and then disregarded the opposition coming directly from affected communities. Lowland indigenous peoples were not opposed to “development” per se; they were rather outraged that Morales did not carry out a prior consultation as required by law. Further, Morales ostracized these indigenous groups as being “against the government,” creating ever more frictions between highland (Aymara and Quechua) and lowland indigenous groups. Despite much resistance and backlash to these proposals (from the lowland region), Morales was reelected for the third time in October of 2014 by 63 percent of the national vote and majority vote in the Department of Santa Cruz (center of opposition). Significance Morales—for many poor and indigenous peoples—represented the hope that “another world is possible” beyond the neoliberal realities of displacement, further impoverishment, and worsening indices of inequality. However, Morales, like many other left-leaning presidents in Latin America, remains tied in the ebbs and flows of global capitalism, unable to truly break with the economic system and structure. While resource rents represent hope for redistribution, the socioeconomic and environmental ramifications of extractive industries represent a very real challenge for Bolivia today and pose a real threat to the future, particularly as such scarce resources as water become ever scarcer. Progressive social and political transformation cannot thrive on export-dependent extractivism. So what will be the creative ways in which Bolivia—influenced by social movements and grassroots—will in the future transform its economic model and release itself from the age-old grip of the resource “curse”? Notes 1. We are indebted to BBC News for much of the chronology of key events in Bolivia. Their complete timeline is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1218814.stm. 2. See Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977). 3. See Catherine Connagan, James M. Malloy, and Luis A Abugattas, “Business and the Boys: The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes,” Latin American Research Review 25, no. 2 (1990): 3–30. 4. As anthropologist Charles Hale and Nancy Postero note, this period of radical economic restructuring occurred at the same time that nation-states encouraged “cultural shifts towards diversity and inclusion.” There were a series of lowland indigenous marches in the 1990s for rights and recognition. See Charles R. Hale, “Does Multiculturalism Menace?: Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala,” Journal of Latin American Studies 34 (2004):485–523; and Nancy Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

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5. See Benjamin Kohl, “Restructuring Citizenship in Bolivia: El Plan de Todos,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 2 (2003): 337–51. 6. Nicole Fabricant, Mobilizing Bolivia’s Displaced: Indigenous Politics and the Struggle over Land (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 7. During the first round of neoliberal reforms, as the mines in Bolivia were privatized, miners migrated to Cochabamba to work as coca farmers. They brought a sindicalista tradition of organizing with them to the coca fields just as the United States began cracking down on coca production across Latin America. 8. W. Assies, “David Fights Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism and the Renovation of Social Protest in Bolivia,” draft (Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico: Colegia di Michoacan, Rural Studies Institute, 2000). 9. See Linda Farthing and Ben Kohl, “Bolivia’s New Wave of Protest,” NACLA Report on the Americas 34, no. 5 (March–April 2001). 10. The U.S. policy of zero coca, part of the broader “war on drugs,” cracked down on the producers, as opposed to the manufacturing or consumption end of the spectrum affecting the product. 11. Kohl, “Restructuring Citizenship in Bolivia.” 12. See Juan Arbona, “Neoliberal Ruptures: Local Political Entities and Neighborhood Networks in El Alto, Bolivia,” Geoforum 3 (2006): 127–137; and Farthing and Kohl, “Bolivia’s New Wave of Protest.” 13. Nancy Postero, “Protecting Mother Earth in Bolivia: Discourse and Deeds in the Morales Administration,” in Environment and the Law in Amazonia: A Plurilateral Encounter, ed. J. M. Cooper and C. Hunefeldt (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 2013). 14. See Nicole Fabricant and Nancy Postero, “Performing the Wounded Indian: A New Platform of Democracy and Human Rights in Bolivia’s Autonomy Movement,” Identities (2013): 1–17, 2011.

Suggested Readings Arbona, Juan. 2006. “Neoliberal Ruptures: Local Political Entities and Neighborhood Networks in El Alto, Bolivia.” Geoforum 3: 127–137. Assies, W. 2000. “David Fights Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism and the Renovation of Social Protest in Bolivia.” Draft. Zamora, Michoacan, Mexico: Colegia di Michoacan, Rural Studies Institute. Fabricant, Nicole. 2012. Mobilizing Bolivia’s Displaced: Indigenous Politics and the Struggle over Land. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Fabricant, Nicole, and Nancy Postero. 2013. “Performing the Wounded Indian: A New Platform of Democracy and Human Rights in Bolivia’s Autonomy Movement.” Identities: 1–17. Farthing, Linda, and Ben Kohl. 2001. “Bolivia’s New Wave of Protest.” NACLA Report on the Americas 34 (5) (March/April). Galeano, Eduardo. 1977. Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent. New York: Monthly Review Press. Gill, Leslie. 2000. Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State. New York: Columbia University Press. Hindery, Derrick. 2013. From Enron to Evo: Pipeline Politics, Global Environmentalism and Indigenous Rights in Bolivia. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

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Kohl, Benjamin. 2003. “Restructuring Citizenship in Bolivia: El Plan de Todos.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27 (2): 337–351. Postero, Nancy. 2007. Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Postero, Nancy. 2013. “Protecting Mother Earth in Bolivia: Discourse and Deeds in the Morales Administration.” In Environment and the Law in Amazonia: A Plurilateral Encounter, edited by J. M. Cooper and C. Hunefeldt. Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press. Strobele-Gregor, J. 1994. “From Indio to Mestizo to Indio: New Indianist Movements in Bolivia.” Latin American Perspectives 21 (2) (Spring): 106–123.

Appendix The 17th Constitution of Bolivia, finalized in 2009, proclaims the state as both unitary plurinational and secular, rather than Catholic. The constitution calls for a blended economy of state, private, and communal ownership; restricts private landownership; and recognizes a variety of autonomies at the local and departmental levels.

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)’s Constitution of 2009 Preamble In ancient times mountains arose, rivers moved, and lakes were formed. Our Amazonia, our swamps, our highlands, and our plains and valleys were covered with greenery and flowers. We populated this sacred Mother Earth with different faces, and since that time we have understood the plurality that exists in all things and in our diversity as human beings and cultures. Thus, our peoples were formed, and we never knew racism until we were subjected to it during the terrible times of colonialism. We, the Bolivian people, of plural composition, from the depths of history, inspired by the struggles of the past, by the anti-colonial indigenous uprising, and in independence, by the popular struggles of liberation, by the indigenous, social and labor marches, by the water and October wars, by the struggles for land and territory, construct a new State in memory of our martyrs. A State based on respect and equality for all, on principles of sovereignty, dignity, interdependence, solidarity, harmony, and equity in the distribution and redistribution of the social wealth, where the search for a good life predominates; based on respect for the economic, social, juridical, political and cultural pluralism of the inhabitants of this land; and on collective coexistence with access to water, work, education, health and housing for all. We have left the colonial, republican and neo-liberal State in the past. We take on the historic challenge of collectively constructing a Unified Social State of Pluri-National Communitarian law, which includes and articulates the goal of advancing toward a democratic, productive, peace-loving and peaceful Bolivia, committed to the full development and free determination of the peoples. We women and men, through the Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Constituyente) and with power originating from the people, demonstrate our commitment to the unity and integrity of the country. We found Bolivia anew, fulfilling the mandate of our people, with the strength of our Pachamama and with gratefulness to God.

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Honor and glory to the martyrs of the heroic constituent and liberating effort, who have made this new history possible.

PART I: FUNDAMENTAL BASES OF THE STATE: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND GUARANTEES TITLE I: FUNDAMENTAL BASES OF THE STATE

Chapter I: Model of the State Article 1 Bolivia is constituted as a Unitary Social State of Pluri-National Communitarian Law (Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional Comunitario) that is free, independent, sovereign, democratic, inter-cultural, decentralized and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded on plurality and on political, economic, juridical, cultural and linguistic pluralism in the integration process of the country. Article 2 Given the pre-colonial existence of nations and rural native indigenous peoples and their ancestral control of their territories, their free determination, consisting of the right to autonomy, self-government, their culture, recognition of their institutions, and the consolidation of their territorial entities, is guaranteed within the framework of the unity of the State, in accordance with this Constitution and the law. Article 3 The Bolivian nation is formed by all Bolivians, the native indigenous nations and peoples, and the inter-cultural and Afro-Bolivian communities that, together, constitute the Bolivian people. Article 4 The State respects and guarantees freedom of religion and spiritual beliefs, according to their view of the world. The State is independent of religion. Article 5 I. The official languages of the State are Spanish and all the languages of the rural native indigenous nations and peoples, which are Aymara, Araona, Baure, Bésiro, Canichana, Cavineño, Cayubaba, Chácobo, Chimán, Ese Ejja, Guaraní, Guarasu’we, Guarayu, Itonama, Leco, Machajuyai-kallawaya, Machineri, Maropa, Mojeñotrinitario, Mojeño-ignaciano, Moré, Mosetén, Movima, Pacawara, Puquina, Quechua, Sirionó, Tacana, Tapiete, Toromona, Uruchipaya, Weenhayek, Yaminawa, Yuki, Yuracaré and Zamuco. II. The Pluri-National Government and the departmental governments must use at least two official languages. One of them must be Spanish, and the other shall be determined taking into account the use, convenience, circumstances, necessities and preferences of the population as a whole or of the territory in question. The other autonomous governments must use the languages characteristic of their territory, and one of them must be Spanish

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Chapter II: Principals [sic], Values and Purposes of the State Article 9

The following are essential purposes and functions of the State, in addition to those established in the Constitution and the law: 1. To construct a just and harmonious society, built on decolonization, without discrimination or exploitation, with full social justice, in order to strengthen the Pluri-National identities. 2. To guarantee the welfare, development, security and protection, and equal dignity of individuals, nations, peoples, and communities, and to promote mutual respect and intra-cultural, inter-cultural and plural language dialogue. 3. To reaffirm and strengthen the unity of the country, and to preserve the Pluri-National diversity as historic and human patrimony. 4. To guarantee the fulfillment of the principles, values, rights and duties recognized and consecrated in this Constitution. 5. To guarantee access of all people to education, health and work. 6. To promote and guarantee the responsible and planned use of natural resources, and to stimulate their industrialization through the development and strengthening of the productive base in its different dimensions and levels, as well as to preserve the environment for the welfare of present and future generations.

TITLE II: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES

Chapter I: General Matters Article 14 I. Every human being, without distinction, has legal status and capacity under the law and enjoys the rights recognized in this Constitution. II. The State prohibits and punishes all forms of discrimination based on sex, color, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, origin, culture, nationality, citizenship, language, religious belief, ideology, political affiliation or philosophy, civil status, economic or social condition, type of occupation, level of education, disability, pregnancy, and any other discrimination that attempts to or results in the annulment of or harm to the equal recognition, enjoyment or exercise of the rights of all people. ...

Chapter IV: Rights of the Nations and Rural Native Indigenous Peoples Article 30 I. A nation and rural native indigenous people consists of every human collective that shares a cultural identity, language, historic tradition, institutions, territory and world view, whose existence predates the Spanish colonial invasion. II. In the framework of the unity of the State, and in accordance with this Constitution, the nations and rural native indigenous peoples enjoy the following rights:

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1. To be free. 2. To their cultural identity, religious belief, spiritualities, practices and customs, and their own world view. 3. That the cultural identity of each member, if he or she so desires, be inscribed together with Bolivian citizenship in his identity card, passport and other identification documents that have legal validity. 4. To self-determination and territoriality. 5. That its institutions be part of the general structure of the State. 6. To the collective ownership of land and territories. 7. To the protection of their sacred places. 8. To create and administer their own systems, means and networks of communication. 9. That their traditional teachings and knowledge, their traditional medicine, languages, rituals, symbols and dress be valued, respected and promoted. 10. To live in a healthy environment, with appropriate management and exploitation of the ecosystems. 11. To collective ownership of the intellectual property in their knowledge, sciences and learning, as well as to its evaluation, use, promotion and development. 12. To an inter-cultural, intra-cultural and multi-language education in all educational systems. 13. To universal and free health care that respects their world view and traditional practices. 14. To the practice of their political, juridical and economic systems in accord with their world view. 15. To be consulted by appropriate procedures, in particular through their institutions, each time legislative or administrative measures may be foreseen to affect them. In this framework, the right to prior obligatory consultation by the State with respect to the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources in the territory they inhabit shall be respected and guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement. 16. To participate in the benefits of the exploitation of natural resources in their territory. 17. To autonomous indigenous territorial management, and to the exclusive use and exploitation of renewable natural resources existing in their territory without prejudice to the legitimate rights acquired by third parties. 18. To participate in the organs and institutions of the State. III. The State guarantees, respects and protects the rights of the nations and the rural native indigenous peoples consecrated in this Constitution and the law. Article 31 I. The nations and the rural native indigenous peoples that are in danger of extinction, in voluntary isolation and not in contact, shall be protected and respected with respect to their forms of individual and collective life. II. The nations and the rural native indigenous peoples that live in isolation and out of contact enjoy the right to maintain themselves in that condition, and to the legal definition and consolidation of the territory which they occupy and inhabit.

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Article 32 The Afro-Bolivian people enjoy, in everything corresponding, the economic, social, political and cultural rights that are recognized in the Constitution for the nations and the rural native indigenous people. ...

Chapter VI: Education, Cultural Diversity and Cultural Rights Section III: Cultures Article 98 I. Cultural diversity constitutes the essential basis of the Pluri-National Communitarian State (Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional Comunitario). The intercultural character is the means for cohesion and for harmonic and balanced existence among all the peoples and nations. The intercultural character shall exist with respect for differences and in conditions of equality. II. The State takes strength from the existence of rural native indigenous cultures, which are custodians of knowledge, wisdom, values, spiritualities and world views. III. It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to preserve, develop, protect and disseminate the existing cultures of the country. Article 99 I. The cultural patrimony of the Bolivian people is inalienable, and it may not be attached or limited. The economic resources that they generate are regulated by law to give priority to their conservation, preservation and promotion. II. The State shall guarantee the registry, protection, restoration, recovery, revitalization, enrichment, promotion and dissemination of its cultural patrimony, in accordance with the law. III. The natural, architectural, paleontological, historic, and documentary riches, and those derived from religious cults and folklore, are cultural patrimony of the Bolivian people, in accordance with the law. Article 100 I. The world views, myths, oral history, dances, cultural practices, knowledge and traditional technologies are patrimony of the nations and rural native indigenous peoples. This patrimony forms part of the expression and identity of the State. II. The State shall protect this wisdom and knowledge through the registration of the intellectual property that safeguards the intangible rights of the nations and rural native indigenous peoples and of the intercultural and Afro-Bolivian communities. Article 101 The intangible aspects of the manifestations of art and popular industries shall enjoy the special protection of the State. Likewise, the tangible and intangible aspects of places and activities, which are declared cultural patrimony of humanity, shall be protected.

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Article 102 The State shall register and protect individual and collective intellectual property in the works and discoveries of authors, artists, composers, inventors and scientists, under the conditions determined by law. TITLE III: JUDICIAL ORGAN AND PLURI-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Chapter IV: Rural Native Indigenous Jurisdiction Article 190 I. The nations and native indigenous rural peoples shall exercise their jurisdictional functions and competency through their authorities, and shall apply their own principles, cultural values, norms and procedures. II. The rural native indigenous jurisdiction respects the right to life, the right to defense and other rights and guarantees established in this Constitution. Article 191 I. The rural native indigenous jurisdiction is based on the specific connection between the persons who are members of the respective nation or rural native indigenous people. II. The rural native indigenous jurisdiction is exercised in the following areas of personal, material and territorial legal effect: 1. Members of the nation or rural native indigenous people are subject to this jurisdiction whether they act as plaintiffs or defendants, claimants or accusers, whether they are persons who are denounced or accused, or are appellants or respondents. 2. This jurisdiction hears rural native indigenous matters pursuant to that established in a law of Jurisdictional Demarcation. 3. This jurisdiction applies to the relations and juridical acts that are carried out, or the effects of which are produced, within the jurisdiction of a rural native indigenous people. Article 192 I. Each public authority or person shall obey the decisions of the rural native indigenous jurisdiction. II. To secure compliance with the decisions of the rural native indigenous jurisdiction, its authorities may request the support of the competent bodies of the State. III. The State shall promote and strengthen rural native indigenous justice. The law of Jurisdictional Demarcation shall determine the mechanisms of coordination and cooperation between rural native indigenous jurisdiction and ordinary jurisdiction and agro-environmental jurisdiction and all the recognized constitutional jurisdictions.

Chapter VI: Pluri-National Constitutional Court Article 196 I. The Pluri-National Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional) assures the supremacy of the Constitution, exercises constitutional control, and safeguards respect for and enforcement of constitutional rights and guarantees.

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II. As criteria to be applied in its interpretive role, the Pluri-National Constitutional Court shall give preference to the intent of the constituent assembly as demonstrated in its documents, acts and resolutions, as well as the literal tenor of the text. Article 197 I. The Pluri-National Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional) assures the supremacy of the Constitution, exercises constitutional control, and safeguards respect for and enforcement of constitutional rights and guarantees. TITLE IV: ELECTORAL ORGAN

Chapter II: Political Representation Article 211 I. The nations and rural native indigenous peoples may elect their political representatives whenever required, in accordance with their own forms of election. II. The Electoral Organ shall assure that the norms of those peoples and nations will be complied with strictly in the elections of authorities, representatives and candidates of the nations and rural native indigenous peoples, using their own norms and procedures.

PART III: STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE TERRITORIES TITLE I: TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE

Chapter VII: Rural Native Indigenous Autonomy Article 289 Rural native indigenous autonomy consists in self-government as an exercise of free determination of the nations and rural native indigenous peoples, the population of which shares territory, culture, history, languages, and their own juridical, political, social and economic organization or institutions. Article 290 I. The formation of rural native indigenous autonomy is based on ancestral territories, currently inhabited by those peoples and nations, and pursuant to the will of their population as expressed through consultation, in accordance with the Constitution and the law. II. The self-governance of the rural native indigenous autonomies is exercised according to their norms, institutions, authorities and procedures, in accordance with their authority and competences, and in harmony with the Constitution and the law. Article 291 I. The rural native indigenous autonomies are rural native indigenous territories and the municipalities and regions that adopt that character, pursuant to that established in the Constitution and the law.

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II. Two or more rural native indigenous peoples can form a single rural native indigenous autonomy. Article 292 Each rural, native, or indigenous autonomy shall draft its Statute according to its own norms and procedures, in conformity with the Constitution and the law. Article 293 I. The indigenous autonomy, based on consolidated indigenous territories and those undergoing that process and once consolidated, shall be formed by the express will of the population through consultation, as the only necessary requisite, pursuant to their own norms and procedures. II. If the establishment of an indigenous originary peasant autonomy affects the boundaries of municipal districts, the indigenous originary peasant nation or people and the municipal government must agree on a new district demarcation. If it affects municipal boundaries, a procedure for its approval shall be conducted by the Pluri-National Legislative Assembly, following the fulfillment of the special requirements and conditions provided for by statute. III. Statute shall establish the minimum population requirements and other modalities for the constitution of an indigenous peasant farmer autonomy. IV. To constitute an indigenous originary peasant autonomy extending to territories in one or more municipalities, statute shall determine the articulation, coordination and cooperation mechanisms for the exercise of its government. Source: Oxford University Press, Inc. Translated by Max Planck Institute. Available at https:// www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009?lang=en.

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Bosnia-Herzegovina The Deconstruction of a State and the Birth and Growing Pangs of Bosnia-Herzegovina Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline 19th century The modern Yugoslav state is born in an awakening of pan-Slavic nationalist movements, chiefly in Serbia. 1878 Serbia, including Montenegro, achieves independence from Ottoman rule. 1908 Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia, leading to the Balkan wars of 1912–1913. Serbia gains northern and central Macedonia, but Austria forces Serbia to yield Albania. 1914 Serb animosity against the Austrian empire peaks when a radical Serb assassinates Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand. 1918 The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is formed following World War I. 1929 King Alexander I renames the country Yugoslavia and assumes near dictatorial powers. 1934 King Alexander is assassinated.

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1945–1947 Marshal Josip Broz Tito assumes power in postwar Yugoslavia and makes it into a Communist state comprising six republics. 1948 Tito asserts Yugoslavia’s independence from Moscow. 1966–1971 Dismantling of the repressive secret police leads to major outbursts of nationalism in Kosovo and Croatia. 1974 A new constitution gives autonomy to two Serb provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina. 1980 Tito dies. Continuing fear of the Soviet Union holds the country together temporarily, but nationalism increases among all groups in Yugoslavia. 1989 Slobodan Milosevic, fanning flames of Serbian nationalism, emerges as the state’s strongman. 1990 Revolutions sweep the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Four Yugoslav republics elect noncommunist governments. 1991 Western countries encourage Croatia and Slovenia to secede; both declare independence on June 25. The civil war is brief in Slovenia but heavy in Croatia by winter. The Soviet Union collapses. 1992 January: The European Community (EC) recognizes Croatia and Slovenia. February: Bosnia-Herzegovina votes for independence, but the republic’s Serbs vote against it. The United Nations creates a peacekeeping force for Croatia. March: A cease-fire is achieved in Croatia. April: The United States recognizes the three breakaway republics, and the EC recognizes Bosnia. War starts in Bosnia. May 7: Serbs and Croats agree to divide Bosnia without consulting the 44 percent Muslim plurality there. May 22–31: The United Nations admits Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and imposes mandatory economic sanctions on Yugoslavia for militarily aiding Bosnian Serbs. August–September: Peacekeepers are deployed in Bosnia. September 19: The UN Security Council votes 12–0 to expel Yugoslavia for supporting Serb

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aggression in Bosnia. October 9: The United Nations bans military flights over war zones. December 11: The UN Security Council votes to deploy a preventive peacekeeping force in Macedonia. February 22, 1993 The UN Security Council unanimously authorizes an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes. May 1993 The UN Security Council creates six “safe havens” in Bosnia. September 1994 Bosnian Croatian and Muslim leaders agree to construct a joint federation to produce a more effective fighting force. 1995 February 13: The UN Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal orders the arrest of 21 Bosnian Serbs for wartime atrocities. May 30: The United States agrees to permit use of U.S. ground forces to protect peacekeepers. July: Serbs launch a major offensive against safe-haven areas. Srebrenica and Zepa fall. August: Croatia launches an all-out offensive against the rebellious Serb region in Croatia. The Serb attack on Sarajevo produces a NATO air response. November 21: The presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia meet under U.S. auspices in Dayton, Ohio, and reach an agreement to end the war in Bosnia. 1996–1998 Nationalist parties form and enjoy electoral success in both zones of BosniaHerzegovina, underscoring continued ethnic divisions in the country. 2000 Former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic is tried in The Hague for war crimes and genocide in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The nationalists regain power in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 2003 The European Union (EU) takes over peacekeeping duties from the United Nations. The Serb member of the Presidency resigns over allegations of illicit activity. The European Union Force (EUFOR) replaces NATO forces the following year. 2006 The trial of those accused of committing the massacre at Srebrenica opens in The Hague. Elections again result in nationalists doing well.

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2007 The United Nations extends the EU’s peacekeeping activity for another year given “very limited Progress” on implementing key reforms in the country. The EU backs off efforts to integrate Bosnia’s police system. 2008 Bosnian Muslims celebrate the arrest of Radovan Karadzic for war crimes. Muslim, Croat, and Serb nationalist parties do well in local elections. 2009 Nearly 120,000 internally displaced persons still await housing. U.S.-EU–brokered talks on increasing the powers of central government fail. 2010 A constitutional impasse continues because of a deadlock within the three-person presidency over key reforms, including strengthening the central government. 2011 Bosnian parties agree to form a central government after a 14-plus-month-long political crisis following the 2010 elections. 2012 The country celebrates (outside the Serb Republic (RS)) the 20th anniversary of its declaration of independence. The EU ends its police training mission in the country. 2013 The president of the Muslim-Croat entity is arrested on corruption charges. 2014 Arrests of high officials for corruption and illegal activities continue. Protests against high unemployment occur in February throughout the federation, but not in the RS. The federal government fails in its response to fall flooding. October elections see nationalists win big in all three communities. To the Western European architects of the post–World War I settlement in the Balkans, the union of numerous Southern European Slavic groups into Yugoslavia in 1918 fulfilled the victor’s wartime pledge to honor the principle of national selfdetermination in drawing the region’s postwar boundaries. The entities merged together had petitioned for just such a solution, and their union seemed to give the Slavs a state of their own. By the 1930s, though, it was apparent that Yugoslavia was not a nation-state built on the principle of national self-determination, but a multinational state whose component nations—Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes,

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Macedonians, Muslims, Montenegrins, and Albanians—at best coexisted uneasily inside the state. The same was also true by then of the Slovaks and Czechs in Czechoslovakia, that Slavic union to the north that was also created in the name of national self-determination after World War I. And, with one difference, like Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia ceased to exist in the early 1990s. That difference, however, was huge. Czechoslovakia peacefully divided into two states on January 1, 1993. By that date, Yugoslavia had already split into five different countries, in most instances violently. Historical Background Yugoslavia was born in Central Europe’s heartland, at the point of intersection of two great empires that—being on the losing side—collapsed at the end of World War I: the Austrian-Hungarian Empire to the north and the Turkish Muslim Ottoman Empire to the south. By the 19th century, when pan-Slavic nationalism could be heard throughout much of this region, all of the territories that later joined to form Yugoslavia were under the rule of one or the other of these empires, and in most cases that rule left marks that significantly influenced their 20th-century history. Those living under Austrian and Hungarian rule (the Slovenes, who were ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs from 1278 to 1918, and the Croats, who fell under Hungarian control in 1102 and were ruled by Budapest until 1918) were much more economically advanced than their Ottoman-ruled Slavic cousins and the non-Slavic minorities who found themselves in Yugoslavia after 1918. On the other hand, although ruled by the Ottomans for most of the period from 1459 until its independence in 1878, by 1918, Serbia was much further advanced politically than Yugoslavia’s other areas because it was the first to gain a large measure of selfgovernment. Least economically and politically advanced of all were those peoples south of the Serbs and under tight Ottoman rule until 1918. These included both the Albanians (the majority in Serbia’s Kosovo area) and the Slavs who became Muslims in what is today Bosnia. From Independence to Communist Rule: 1918–1945

By the time that the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929) was born, Central and Southern Europe had experienced more than half a century of uprisings against outside rule, and violence had become a firmly established means of expressing political dissent. The most famous of its practitioners was Gavrilo Princip, the fervent Slavic nationalist who assassinated Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 in the hope his act would free more Slavs from Austrian-Hungarian rule. Many, however, followed in his footsteps during the interwar period, including the Macedonians, Albanians, and Muslims. The principal travelers, however, tended to be Croatian autonomists, who resented their economically more advanced region being—in their view— exploited by the Serbs. Though only a plurality (approximately 40 percent) in the Yugoslav population, Serbs dominated the country’s political and administrative

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processes, which seemed to be constantly evolving in an ever more centralized and dictatorial direction. Consequently, the “short, twenty-three year life span of the first Yugoslavia was strewn with assassinations and failed attempts to create a viable parliamentary monarchy.”1 World War II significantly exacerbated matters. In 1939, continuing Serbo-Croatian tensions prompted the government in Belgrade to reorganize Croatia administratively into a single autonomous province. Unfortunately, the move had little time in which to ease ethnic tensions. In June 1941, Nazi Germany bombed Belgrade and shortly thereafter overran and dissolved the country, dismembering Serbia into segments occupied by Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy and establishing a separate Croatian state governed by German collaborators. The latter soon absorbed Bosnia and spent a good part of the war repressing the Serbs, Jews, and Romany (Gypsies) who fell under its control. Although German occupation intensified the Serbo-Croatian conflict, opposition to the Germans also united vast portions of the country’s people and produced Yugoslavia’s postwar leader, Josip Broz (Marshal Tito). By 1944, in a brutally successful underground campaign that took the lives of 800,000 Germans and another 350,000 (disproportionately Croatian) collaborators, the Communist resistance led by Tito had liberated all of Yugoslavia and was beginning to fashion the federalist communism-based government that Tito hoped would hold together postwar Yugoslavia. Postwar Yugoslavia: Disintegration of a Multinational State

Tito’s scheme essentially had three elements, one of which was Tito himself, who replaced the monarchy with a Communist regime and the king with himself as the country’s postwar symbol of unity. The second element, designed to abate minority fears of Serbian domination, was the federal structure in which Slovenia (91 percent Slovene), Croatia (78 percent Croat), Bosnia-Herzegovina (38 percent Muslim Slav, 22 percent Croat), Montenegro (68.5 percent Montenegrin), and Macedonia (67 percent Macedonian) became autonomous republics. Finally, Yugoslavia was to be a one-party Communist state—independent from Moscow—in which the multinational Yugoslav Communist Party would hold power at both the center and in each republic. By 1948, the new state was in place and, perhaps because of collective desire among all groups not to reopen wartime wounds, appeared to be running reasonably smoothly. Beneath the surface, however, old concerns and rivalries simmered among the Serbs (who were minorities in all republics except Serbia and who felt they were losing control of their country) and the minorities (who still equated Belgrade rule with Serb rule). Hence, when the repressive national secret police network was dismantled in the name of political liberalization in 1966, the accommodative gesture backfired. By 1968, Belgrade faced strong nationalist movements among the Albanian majority in Serbia’s Kosovo region; three years later, Croat nationalists were demanding greater autonomy for Croatia. Tito nonetheless stayed with his game plan, adopting a new constitution in 1974 that provided for a rotating Yugoslav presidency (among the republics) and gave the Albanian majority in Kosovo and the large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina provincial autonomy inside Serbia.

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The 1974 constitution further alarmed Serb nationalists, who regarded it as yet another step away from Serb control of Yugoslavia, but there were few further shocks to the state until Tito’s death in 1980. Gradually, ethnic conflict again boiled into view, fueled by historical grievances, ethnonational desires for greater republic and provincial autonomy, and dissatisfaction with the still-significant economic disparities separating the republics (per capita income in Slovenia was nearly three times that of Serbia, whose per capita income was at least 50 percent greater than that of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Still, as late as 1984, Bosnia’s multinational city of Sarajevo, that year’s host of the Winter Olympics, appeared to the world to be a model of interethnic harmony. The weakening hold of the Soviet Communist Party over the USSR and its Eastern European empire during the late 1980s was paralleled in Yugoslavia by the eroding cohesiveness of its Communist Party. Croat Communists, for example, became champions of greater republic autonomy during this period, signaling a breakdown of discipline inside the party, and hence of Belgrade’s control over the state. Bosnia was both the victim and beneficiary of that meltdown. Yugoslavia’s final days essentially began with the 1988–1989 nationalist protests in Kosovo in response to Belgrade’s decision to rescind Kosovo’s provincial autonomy, and the subsequent emergence of Slobodan Milosevic as the dominant voice of Serbian nationalism and the Yugoslav government. Abandoning accommodation, Milosevic allied himself with the Serb nationalists, pledged to preserve the centralized Yugoslav state whose bureaucracy and military were still Serb dominated, and began to speak of a “Greater Serbia,” which to Yugoslavia’s minorities implied bringing all republics with Serb minorities under the firm control of Serbia and Belgrade. The pendulum did briefly swing back in 1990 when the Yugoslav Communist Party yielded its monopoly over political power and inaugurated a new set of economic reforms. By then, however, the centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia were at the point where such concessions were more likely to be exploited by the nationalists than to prop up Belgrade’s rule. Although it was not until 1992 that Yugoslavia fully disintegrated, it was the rapidly unfolding sequence of events in 1990 that made its collapse—peaceful or otherwise—inevitable. Early in the year, the Slovenes voted their Communist Party out of office in Slovenia’s parliamentary elections and installed a pro-independence cabinet. Given Slovenia’s very small (3 percent) Serb minority, this development did not, however, significantly increase ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia. The same was not true of elections held a few months later, when Croatia’s predominantly Croat voters elected a republic parliament favoring a confederate relationship with Belgrade in which vast power would be in the hands of the republics. That vote triggered a significant political backlash among the nearly 600,000 Serbs living in southern Croatia, many of whom feared that grievances dating from World War II would encourage a confederate Croatia’s majority to attack their culture. In August, the Serbs in Croatia held a referendum in which 99 percent of the Serb voters endorsed full political autonomy from Zagreb. Soon thereafter, the Serb National Council (local Serb political parties in Croatia) declared the Serb majority areas autonomous, and extremist Serb groups began to form paramilitary units in

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Croatia. By the year’s end, when Slovenia’s parliament overwhelmingly voted for independence, a major Serb-Croat conflict was brewing in Croatia. The next step toward war ironically occurred on the diplomatic front in early 1991, when Western countries—under the mistaken belief that Milosevic had his hands full in Kosovo and would accept a fait accompli in the Serb minority areas to his west—encouraged Croatia and Slovenia to secede. When both declared their independence on June 25, 1991, however, Belgrade’s response was war, although it was a brief one on the Slovenia front, where the Slovene contingent in the Yugoslav army confronted their former comrades and where the small number of Serbs in Slovenia deprived Belgrade of an internationally marketable justification for a long campaign. The situation was, again, significantly different in Croatia, where a large Serbian population qualified parts of southern Croatia for membership in Greater Serbia. During the winter of 1991–1992, as the Soviet Union imploded, Belgrade sustained a major offensive against Croatia despite the European Community’s belated (January 15) diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Meanwhile, in Bosnia, a February vote on independence produced predictably mixed results. Its Serbs, concentrated in Bosnia’s north and east, voted solidly against independence, while the Muslims and Croats throughout Bosnia voted—equally overwhelmingly—in favor of it. With an overall majority favoring the action, Bosnia shortly thereafter declared its independence. By late May, Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia had not only been admitted to the United Nations as independent states, but Bosnia had become the recipient of a lightly armed UN peacekeeping force. In the interval, the Bosnian Serbs organized their own paramilitary units, and Belgrade had begun to supply them with arms even before any of the breakaway republics had taken their UN seats.2 The Conflict The conflict in Bosnia, as in Croatia, had two broad dimensions—ethnic and territorial—and multiple variations, with its centerpiece shifting over time. At its most basic level, the conflict was about who would govern whom and who would control what territory. In this context, it primarily pitted the Croats and Muslim Slavs (Bosniaks) on the one side, united by their desire to escape Belgrade’s rule, against Bosnia’s Serbs and Belgrade, which by 1993 was the capital of a Yugoslavia reduced to Serbia and Montenegro. Less basically, as the United Nations obtained a cease-fire in Croatia, enabling Belgrade to pour more resources into the war in Bosnia but also allowing the international community to focus their mediation efforts on pressuring Belgrade to accept Bosnia’s independence, the ethnoterritorial conflict in Bosnia became far more complicated.3 Indeed, on May 7, while Bosnia was still negotiating UN admission, the struggle for political power and territory inside Bosnia was already producing strange and revolving bedfellows; in this instance, a Serb-Croat agreement to divide Bosnia internally was reached without consulting Bosnia’s then 44 percent Muslim plurality. It was a harbinger of things to come.

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During the course of the more than three-year war in Bosnia, the Croats and Muslims at times fought each other as well as the Bosnian and Yugoslav Serbs. In the process, the fighting escalated to entail ever-nastier instances of civilian shelling, the proliferation of extremist paramilitary groups, acts of atrocity by all sides, the use of rape as a tool of combat, ethnic cleansing, and mass migrations and mass graves as one group sought to rid a territory of another. By 1993, the model multinational city of Sarajevo had turned into a murderers’ row—its main street a sniper’s alley and its citizens forced to live underground as much as possible. The changing nature of the war frequently drew UN observers and peacekeepers into the combat when they tried to enforce cease-fires against armies temporarily on the losing side in a war that ebbed and flowed over time in terms of its winners and losers on the ground. On other occasions, UN forces found themselves too underarmed to halt the genocide being committed before their eyes. Above all, as the battle ensued, for want of broad cross-national support, one peace plan after another put forward by outside mediators collapsed, and the fighting only ended when NATO stepped in militarily to create a sufficient enough peace for a diplomatic settlement to be reached. Management of the Conflict Third-Party Peacemaking

The inability of the country’s Croat, Slovene, Kosovo Albanian, Bosnian Muslim, and Serb leaders to agree on accommodation formulas also made it almost impossible to settle the conflict at the diplomatic table once the wars began. Not only did the increasingly ugly nature of the conflict further dissuade the various sides from trusting one another, but with the proliferation of paramilitary groups and roving bands of essentially warrior thugs emerging in all communities, the number of “leaders” who would have had to agree to any peace accord multiplied, and many of these had uncompromising agendas. Consequently, the early failure of the mediation efforts of former U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance and former British minister David Owen was followed by a series of other diplomatic failures as the conflict escalated in intensity and propelled hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring states. Eventually, the conflict in Bosnia, like the conflict in Croatia before it, reached the United Nations. Its initial responses, however, fell largely into the too little, too late category. In both separatist republics, its peacekeeping missions were too small and often too ill equipped to halt the carnage, much less create any kind of peace that could be kept. Faced with the impossibility of ending the conflict, even with the limited resources that NATO began to put at its disposal, the United Nations basically compromised by establishing, in May 1993, six “safe havens” to be monitored continuously by its observers as well as by a rapid deployment force created by Great Britain, Holland, and France in June 1995 to supplement the UN forces in Yugoslavia. The assumption was that the refugees who reached these havens—Srebrenica, Zepa, Bihac, Tuzla, Gradzde, and Sarajevo—would be safe

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because none of the combatants would be willing to attack civilians in full view of the international community. On July 11, 1995, that assumption exploded when Bosnian Serb forces seized Srebrenica, forcing approximately 40,000 civilians to flee and, despite the presence of a small Dutch force in the city, committing the war’s worst act of mass murder. Within a week, Zepa also fell, producing another 35,000 refugees. Then the Serbs politically miscalculated and began to train their heavy artillery on Sarajevo. Motivated as much by the audacity of the Serbian attacks as the emerging stories of atrocities, both the United Nations and NATO reassessed their options. The result was a major policy shift from trying to manage the conflict by keeping a nonexistent peace to taking the military action—in particular, lethal NATO strikes against Serbian artillery—necessary to end the fighting.4 On November 21, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia met under U.S. auspices in Dayton, Ohio, and agreed to accept an independent Bosnia composed of two federal entities: a Croat-Muslim Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS, Serb Republic) in the heavily Serb areas to the north and east. Democratic governments were to be established at the local, entity, and national levels to provide experience in democratic politics, and displaced persons living abroad and in Bosnia were to be returned to their homes. State Making, International Tutelage, and Political Stalemate

Unlike the former Yugoslavia’s other breakaway republics that were admitted to the United Nations during the war and remained self-governing afterward, under the Dayton Accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina became an international protectorate with, in the contradictory term of the time, “supervised independence.” The hope at the time was that experience with democratic government would gradually produce a cross-national civic consciousness and identity among BosniaHerzegovina’s peoples and that their elected representatives would gradually agree to expand the power of the center. In the meantime, to prevent any community from fearing dominance by another, Dayton provided an elaborate conflict management system of power sharing at the center, built around a three-member presidency (one each from the Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Muslim communities) and equality of representation for each of these national communities in the federal parliament’s House of the People. Also in the meantime, the NATO forces deployed to guarantee an end of the fighting and to provide security, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would supervise elections to ensure their fair and free nature, and—capping the structure—an internationally appointed high representative with the power to unseat uncooperative elected officials, to silence seditious radio and television stations, and in general to remove roadblocks affecting democracy-building efforts would oversee politics at all levels. In practice, the plan quickly unraveled at the state level when nationalists immediately dominated the outcome of those free and fair elections in the RS and eventually surfaced in all communities as obstacles to system-wide institution-building efforts. The attempt to create an integrated, multinational police force became an early casualty of this development when the RS refused to cooperate in the

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endeavor. Subsequently, and despite the aggressive use of the powers of the high representative to the point where all communities eventually soured on its political interventionism, integrative efforts in other areas ended similarly. Thus, 20 years after Dayton, not only are Bosniak parents living in the SR still complaining about the fact that their children only have Serbian-language schools to attend, but segregated educational facilities for Croats and Bosniak Muslims remain the rule even in the federation, and Croat leaders are demanding that it be divided into separate federal entities for its separate, territorially concentrated Croat and Muslim communities. The Dayton scenario fared no better at the center, where the power-sharing arrangements begat political paralysis. The failure to develop a sound financial and banking system has thus coupled with widespread corruption in the economic and political processes to keep the anticipated international private investment at a distance. In turn, the economy has so languished that the unemployment rate among the country’s young was nearly 60 percent (57%) 20 years after Dayton, and a public protest against economic conditions in Tuzla quickly spread throughout the Muslim-Croat Federation in February 2014, although—significantly—not to the Serb-dominated RS. The failure of state-building efforts, however, should not be confused with a failure in conflict-management efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic cleansing during the war essentially ended the centuries-old living pattern wherein Croats, Muslims, and Serbs were moderately intermingled and created instead a pattern of territorially segregated communities that the return of refugees did little to change. In creating a bizonal federal form of government in postwar Bosnia, the Dayton Accords politically institutionalized this system, giving the Serbs a federal state of their own and placing the Croats (largely concentrated in the west) and Muslims in a second state, the Croat-Muslim Federation. As a result, conflict has been downloaded from the battlefield to intergovernmental relations, albeit sometimes acrimonious ones. Moreover, with each community secure from domination by another, the likelihood of renewed violence across those intergovernmental lines has all but disappeared, with NATO’s large, armored peacekeeping forces departing more than a decade ago in favor of a small contingent of EU personnel patrolling the country in unarmed jeeps. Still, as the timeline indicates, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains very much a multinational state where ethnic identity trumps common citizenship in day-to-day life and politics. Significance No area in the world better exemplifies the staying and destructive power of ethnic conflict than the Balkans. The 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo set in motion the chain of events that culminated in World War I. Violent Serb-Croat conflict tainted the history of interwar Yugoslavia. In response to Croatian collaboration with the Nazis in World War II, Yugoslavia’s largely Serb underground resistance killed hundreds of thousands of Croats before the war ended, leaving a legacy of heightened intercommunal distrust that lingered throughout

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Tito’s Yugoslavia. A decade after Tito’s death, civil war and interethnic strife finally and violently dismembered the state, claiming the lives of at least 200,000 Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs (approximately 1 in 16) and creating an international “humanitarian crisis” as even greater numbers of refugees fled their homes in response to the siege warfare and ethnic-cleansing tactics employed by the warring sides.5 Viewed from this perspective, the first, unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from the ethnic conflict in Bosnia is an unpleasant and sobering one: protracted communal conflicts in even the most seemingly civilized of settings can quickly strip away the veneer of civilization and replace it with acts of torture and mass murder. From this conclusion, two corollaries follow: (1) it is imperative that, insofar as possible, ethnic conflict be kept in the bottle, and (2) if it is not and the international community decides to intervene, little short of superior military power is apt to lower the carnage to the point where a peace in the field can be sustained. Regrettably, in the case of Yugoslavia, far from urging Slav, Croat, and Serbs inside the state to try to hold Yugoslavia together, Germany and other countries irresponsibly encouraged Croatia and Bosnia to pursue independence without providing them with the tangible support necessary to securely go their separate ways. Moreover, when the bloodletting escalated, the international community responded reluctantly and incrementally, and it was not until the summer of 1995 that the reaction extended to amassing the level of military force necessary to stop the violence. Nevertheless, out of the sad tales of intercommunal strife in the former Yugoslavia, two precedents were set that may deter similar levels of excess in the future. First, because ethnic wars tend to be so violent and eject such large numbers of refugees into adjacent countries, ethnic civil wars are now being viewed under international law as international threats to the peace and hence not domestic civil wars beyond the reach of international intervention. Second, in responding to the conflict in Bosnia on February 22, 1993, the UN Security Council unanimously authorized the creation of an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes. Reorganized with an expanded mandate after the war, the International Criminal Court now functions as a permanent war crimes tribunal in The Hague, with the roster of those having to appear before it extending all the way to the top in 2001, when the new government in Belgrade surrendered Milosevic to its jurisdiction. As for Bosnia itself, although the days of ethnic warfare seem very much over, it very much remains a federation with three dominant, nationalistic communities housed in two federal units under a weak central government. The power-sharing arrangements have, as envisioned, offered Bosnia’s principal nationalities a sense of security from political exploitation, but they have also been a prescription for political paralysis rather than the consociational cooperation in governance that the architects of the Dayton Accord envisioned. And therein lie two lessons. First, in the highly charged aftermath of an ethnic civil war, it is unlikely that local grassroots elections will produce much other than nationalist defenders of their respective communities’ interests—in other words, the type of politicians least likely to engage in the cooperative, “common interest” interaction at the center essential for

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power-sharing devices to avoid gridlock. And second, the fact that this situation has continued for nearly two decades since Dayton suggests the limits of external top-down pressure to cajole or induce that cooperation, whether we are discussing the OHR’s overt ability to intercede in Bosnian politics or EU efforts to positively shape events by dangling the carrot of EU admission to a unified Bosnia. Notes 1. David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996), 10. The assassinated included King Alexander in 1934. 2. By the end of 1992, Macedonia had also proclaimed its independence and the United Nations had established a small, preventive peacekeeping force along its border with Serbia. Until Albanian extremists sparked a conflict between its Macedonian majority and Albanian minority in 2001, Macedonia was Yugoslavia’s only separatist republic to escape war. 3. Reciprocally, as the Serbs encountered NATO resistance in Bosnia during the summer of 1995 and diplomatic efforts focused on Bosnia, the Croatian government seized the opportunity to launch an all-out offensive against its rebellious Serb region on the assumption that Belgrade would be too tied down in Bosnia to assist Croatia’s Serbs. 4. On the ability of United States diplomats to persuade both Serbian and Bosnian leaders to accept the truce and journey to Dayton to work out a settlement of the war, see Steven L. Burg, “Intervention in Internal Conflict: Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo,” in From Mediation to Nation-building: Third Parties and the Management of Communal Conflict, ed. Joseph R. Rudolph and William J. Lahneman (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 235–256. 5. Janez Kovac, “Bosnia: Ten Years On,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 15, 2002, http://www.iwpr.net. Only one year into the war, it was estimated that already more than 3 million of the former Yugoslavia’s 20 million people needed humanitarian assistance, and that without it more than 400,000 Bosnian Muslims would die of starvation in the winter of 1992– 1993, most as refugees and displaced persons. “Bosnian Deaths May Top 400,000 This Winter,” The Sun (Baltimore, MD), November 4, 1992: A3.

Suggested Readings Bieber, Florian. 2006. Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality, and Public Sector Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Clark, Wesley K. 2013. Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat. New York: Public Affairs. Honig, Jan Willem, and Norbert Both. 1997. Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. New York: Penguin Books. Peter, Mateja. 2013. “Whither Sovereignty?: The Limits of Building States through International Administrations.” In From Mediation to Nation-Building: Third Parties and the Management of Communal Conflict, edited by Joseph R. Rudolph and William J. Lahneman, 419–438. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Ramet, Sabrina P. 1996. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press/Harper-Collins.

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Ramet, Sabrina P. 1992. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Toal, Gerard, and Carl T. Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. New York: Oxford University Press. Weber, Bodo, and Kurt Bassuener. 2014. “EU Policies Boomerang: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Social Unrest.” Sarajevo: Democratization Policy Council (DPC) Policy Brief, February. http://democratizationpolicy.org.

Appendix The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords The full text of the agreement is provided below, along with representative excerpts from the annexes that highlight the degree to which the future development of Bosnia’s political system was to depend on cooperative power sharing by those communities previously at war, while its shortterm history would depend on NATO, the OSCE, and especially an externally appointed high representative judiciously using his or her paramount authority to prevent nationalist rejectionists in those camps from undermining that long-term plan. Twenty years later, the high representative was still there, and the power-sharing features of the constitution (annex 4) were still paralyzing federal politics in the country.

GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the “Parties”), Recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region, Desiring to contribute toward that end and to promote an enduring peace and stability, Affirming their commitment to the Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 8, 1995, the Further Agreed Basic Principles issued on September 26, 1995, and the cease-fire agreements of September 14 and October 5, 1995, Noting the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorized the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign, on behalf of the Republika Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly and consequently, Have agreed as follows: Article I The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Parties shall fully respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means,

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and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State. Article II The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the military aspects of the peace settlement and aspects of regional stabilization, as set forth in the Agreements at Annex 1-A and Annex 1-B. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made in Annex 1-A, and shall comply fully with their commitments as set forth in Annex 1-B. Article III The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the boundary demarcation between the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 2. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. Article IV The Parties welcome and endorse the elections program for Bosnia and Herzegovina as set forth in Annex 3. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of that program. Article V The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set forth in Annex 4. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. Article VI The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, a Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments, and Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, as set forth in the Agreements at Annexes 5–9. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. Article VII Recognizing that the observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, the Parties agree to and shall comply fully with the provisions concerning human rights set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 6, as well as the provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 7. Article VIII The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been made concerning the implementation of this peace settlement, including in particular those pertaining to the civilian (non-military) implementation, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 10, and the international police task force, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 11. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein.

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Article IX The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law. Article X The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other as sovereign independent States within their international borders. Further aspects of their mutual recognition will be subject to subsequent discussions. Article XI This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. done at Paris, this [21st] day of [November], 1995, in the Bosnian, Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being equally authentic.

ANNEXES Annex 1-A Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement Annex 1-B Agreement on Regional Stabilization Annex 2 Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues Annex 3 Agreement on Elections Annex 4 Constitution Annex 5 Agreement on Arbitration Annex 6 Agreement on Human Rights Annex 7 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons Annex 8 Agreement on the Commission to Preserve National Monuments Annex 9 Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations Annex 10 Agreement on Civilian Implementation Annex 11 Agreement on International Police Task Force

Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Work Accord: Article I: General Obligations 1. The Parties undertake to recreate as quickly as possible normal conditions of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They understand that this requires a major contribution on their part in which they will make strenuous efforts to cooperate with each other and with the international organizations and agencies which are assisting them on the ground.

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They welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region, for a period of approximately one year, a force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement as described herein. (b)  It is understood and agreed that NATO may establish such a force, which will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council (“NAC”) through the NATO chain of command. They undertake to facilitate its operations. The Parties, therefore, hereby agree and freely undertake to fully comply with all obligations set forth in this Annex. . . . Article II: Cessation of Hostilities 1. The Parties shall comply with the cessation of hostilities begun with the agreement of October 5, 1995 and shall continue to refrain from all offensive operations of any type against each other. An offensive operation in this case is an action that includes projecting forces or fire forward of a Party’s own lines. Each Party shall ensure that all personnel and organizations with military capability under its control or within territory under its control, including armed civilian groups, national guards, army reserves, military police, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Police (MUP) (hereinafter “Forces”) comply with this Annex. The term “Forces” does not include UNPROFOR, the International Police Task Force referred to in the General Framework Agreement, the IFOR or other elements referred to in Article I, paragraph 1 (c). 3. The Parties shall provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking such other measures as appropriate. The Parties also commit themselves to disarm and disband all armed civilian groups, except for authorized police forces, within 30 days after the Transfer of Authority. 5. The Parties shall strictly avoid committing any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions in response to violations of this Annex by another Party. . . . Article IV: Redeployment of Forces 1. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities shall redeploy their Forces in three phases: 2. PHASE I (a)  The Parties immediately after this Annex enters into force shall begin promptly and proceed steadily to withdraw all Forces behind a Zone of Separation which shall be established on either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line that represents a clear and distinct demarcation between any and all opposing Forces. This withdrawal shall be completed within thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority. . . . (b)  The Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation shall extend for a distance of approximately two (2) kilometers on either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line. No weapons other than those of the IFOR are permitted in this Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation except as provided herein. . . . (c)  In addition to the other provisions of this Annex, the following specific provisions shall also apply to Sarajevo and Gorazde:

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Article VI 2. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right: (a)  to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this Annex (including, in particular, withdrawal and redeployment of Forces within agreed periods, and the establishment of Zones of Separation); (b)  to authorize and supervise the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation as established by the General Framework Agreement; (c)  to establish liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other international organizations as necessary for the accomplishment of its mission; and (d)  to assist in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not transferred to the IFOR, including, if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO Forces. 9. Air and surface movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be governed by the following provisions: (a)  The IFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement by ground, air, and water throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. It shall have the right to bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable. The IFOR and its personnel shall not be liable for any damages to civilian or government property caused by combat or combat related activities. Roadblocks, checkpoints or other impediments to IFOR freedom of movement shall constitute a breach of this Annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with this Annex.

Annex 3: Agreement on Elections In order to promote free, fair, and democratic elections and to lay the foundation for representative government and ensure the progressive achievement of democratic goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with relevant documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (“the Parties”) have agreed as follows: Article I: Conditions for Democratic Elections 1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom of expression and of the press; shall allow and encourage freedom of association (including of political parties); and shall ensure freedom of movement. Article II: The OSCE Role 1. OSCE. The Parties request the OSCE to adopt and put in place an elections program for Bosnia and Herzegovina as set forth in this Agreement.

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2. Elections. The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner to be determined by the OSCE and in cooperation with other international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the preparation and conduct of elections for the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska; for the Presidency of the Republika Srpska; and, if feasible, for cantonal legislatures and municipal governing authorities.

Annex 4: Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina Based on respect for human dignity, liberty, and equality, Dedicated to peace, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation, Convinced that democratic governmental institutions and fair procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society, Desiring to promote the general welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy, Guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Committed to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with international law, Determined to ensure full respect for international humanitarian law, Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, as well as other human rights instruments, Recalling the Basic Principles agreed in Geneva on September 8, 1995, and in New York on September 26, 1995, Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows: Article I: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1. Continuation. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of which shall henceforth be “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” shall continue its legal existence under international law as a state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein and with its present internationally recognized borders. It shall remain a Member State of the United Nations and may as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain or apply for membership in organizations within the United Nations system and other international organizations. 2. Democratic Principles. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections. 3. Composition. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter “the Entities”). 4. Movement of Goods, Services, Capital, and Persons. There shall be freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities shall not impede full freedom of movement of persons, goods, services, and

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capital throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither Entity shall establish controls at the boundary between the Entities. Article II: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1. Human Rights. Bosnia and Herzegovina and both Entities shall ensure the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. To that end, there shall be a Human Rights Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina as provided for in Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement. 2. International Standards. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law. ... 5. Refugees and Displaced Persons. All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. . . . Article III: Responsibilities of and Relations Between the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities ... 2. Responsibilities of the Entities. (a)  The Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ... Article IV: Parliamentary Assembly The Parliamentary Assembly shall have two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. 1. House of Peoples. The House of Peoples shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs). 2. House of Representatives. The House of Representatives shall comprise 42 Members, two-thirds elected from the territory of the Federation, one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. … Article V: Presidency The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska. … 2. Procedures. ...

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(d)  A dissenting Member of the Presidency may declare a Presidency Decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected, provided that he does so within three days of its adoption. Such a Decision shall be referred immediately to the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, if the declaration was made by the Member from that territory; to the Bosniac Delegates of the House of Peoples of the Federation, if the declaration was made by the Bosniac Member; or to the Croat Delegates of that body, if the declaration was made by the Croat Member. If the declaration is confirmed by a two-thirds vote of those persons within ten days of the referral, the challenged Presidency Decision shall not take effect. Article VI: Constitutional Court 1. Composition. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have nine members. (a)  Four members shall be selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, and two members by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska. The remaining three members shall be selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency. …

Annex 10: Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska (the “Parties”) have agreed as follows: Article I: High Representative 1. The Parties agree that the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement will entail a wide range of activities including continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections according to the timetable in Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. A considerable number of international organizations and agencies will be called upon to assist. 2. In view of the complexities facing them, the Parties request the designation of a High Representative, to be appointed consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out, as entrusted by a U.N. Security Council resolution, the tasks set out below. Article II: Mandate and Methods of Coordination and Liaison 1. The High Representative shall: (a)  Monitor the implementation of the peace settlement;

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(b)  M  aintain close contact with the Parties to promote their full compliance with all civilian aspects of the peace settlement and a high level of cooperation between them and the organizations and agencies participating in those aspects. (c)  Coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. The High Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace settlement. The civilian organizations and agencies are requested to assist the High Representative in the execution of his or her responsibilities by providing all information relevant to their operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (d)  Facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation. (e)  Participate in meetings of donor organizations, particularly on issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction. (f)  Report periodically on progress in implementation of the peace agreement concerning the tasks set forth in this Agreement to the United Nations, European Union, United States, Russian Federation, and other interested governments, parties, and organizations. (g)  Provide guidance to, and receive reports from, the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force established in Annex 11 to the General Framework Agreement. ... 9. The High Representative shall have no authority over the IFOR and shall not in any way interfere in the conduct of military operations or the IFOR chain of command. … Article V: Final Authority to Interpret The High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement. Source: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Other Releases, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Supplement, vol. 7, no. 1. Available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton.

Canada The Nationalism Movement in Quebec Saul Newman

Timeline 1534 Jacques Cartier explores the Saint Lawrence and claims the region for France. 1608 Samuel de Champlain establishes a trading post in the area that later becomes known as Quebec City. 1670 England grants a charter to the Hudson’s Bay Company, which increases English settlement and later results in economic and military conflict with New France. 1759 British troops defeat New France at the Plains of Abraham in Quebec City, which finally wrests control of Canada from France and becomes etched in the collective memory of French-Canadians. 1774 The Quebec Act preserves French civil codes, the system of landholding, and the freedom of the Catholic Church. 1837 The Patriotes of Louis-Joseph Papineau lead a rebellion for more political power for French-Canadians, but they are defeated. 1839 Lord Durham issues his Report on the Affairs of British North America calling for the unification of Francophone Lower Canada and Anglophone Upper Canada.

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1841 The Act of Union combines Ontario and Quebec into one province, enacting the recommendations of Governor General Lord Durham that internal ­self-government be coupled with efforts at anglicization of Quebec. 1867 The British North America Act creates the confederation of Canada. 1885 Louis Reil is hung after his second rebellion on behalf of Francophones of indigenous and European ancestry. 1917 Canada’s World War I conscription system is bitterly opposed by French-Canadians. 1936 Maurice Duplessis, the leader of the Union Nationale, is elected premier of Quebec. 1944 World War II brings about a second conscription crisis. 1960 Jean Lesage of the Liberal Party is elected premier of Quebec, and the Quiet Revolution begins. 1968 René Lévesque, a former television reporter and Lesage cabinet member, forms the Parti Québécois (PQ), which is committed to sovereignty for Quebec. 1970 The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnaps and kills Quebec’s minister of labor. Canada responds with the War Measures Act, which temporarily suspends some civil liberties in Quebec. 1976 The PQ wins the Quebec provincial elections, and Lévesque becomes premier. 1977 The National Assembly passes Bill 101, making French the language of business in Quebec.

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1980 Quebec holds its first referendum on giving the PQ government the authority to negotiate sovereignty association with Canada. The referendum is defeated, with nearly 60 percent of Quebec’s voters voting against it. 1981 The PQ is reelected to a second term. 1982 Prime Minister Trudeau negotiates the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution without the support of Quebec’s government. 1985 Lévesque retires, and the PQ is defeated by the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ). 1987 In an attempt to bring Quebec into the Canadian Constitution, Prime Minister Mulroney and the provincial premiers negotiate the Meech Lake Accords, which, among other things, recognizes Quebec as a “distinct society.” 1990 Unable to receive ratification from Newfoundland and Manitoba, the Meech Lake Accord is defeated, and, in response, support for sovereignty among Québécois soars. 1992 A second attempt to negotiate a new constitutional agreement, the Charlottetown Accord, is brought before Canadians in a national referendum and is convincingly rejected. 1994 The PQ is returned to power, with Jacques Parizeau, a committed sovereigntist, as the new premier. 1995 In a second provincial referendum committing Quebec’s government to begin the process of separation from Canada, the sovereigntist forces are defeated by a vote of 50.6 percent to 49.4 percent. 1996 Lucien Bouchard takes over as leader of the PQ and premier.

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1998 The PQ is reelected. 1999 Canada adopts the Clarity Act, which gives the Canadian government the authority to rule on the language of future independence referendum questions, determine what constitutes a sufficient majority for independence, and set the rules for negotiating provincial secession. 2001 Lucien Bouchard resigns as PQ leader and premier and is succeeded by Bernard Landry. 2003 Jean Charest, the leader of the PLQ, is elected premier of Quebec. He serves through 2012. 2005 Bernard Landry resigns as PQ leader and is replaced by André Bosclair. 2007 Bosclair resigns and is replaced as PQ leader by Pauline Marois. 2012 The PQ forms a minority government, with Pauline Marois as premier. 2013 The PQ government backs provincial legislation banning the wearing of religious clothing or symbols in public spaces. 2014 After the PQ calls early provincial elections, the PLQ soundly defeats the PQ, and Marois resigns as PQ leader. Nationalism In Quebec Although the origins of conflict between French speakers, Francophones, and English speakers, Anglophones, in Canada date back to the 17th century, the patterns of this political conflict are constantly evolving. The French were the first Europeans to explore and settle the area of North America that became known as Canada. With greater imperial might, Great Britain defeated New France and wrested control of Canada. As British subjects, French-Canadians were treated reasonably well by colonial standards, but because they were a numerical minority

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with little economic leverage, they retained little political power of their own. When, in 1837, Francophones rebelled, the British responded by encouraging both Canadian self-government and the dissolution of Francophone culture and identity in Anglophone Canada to alleviate “two nations warring in the bosom of a single state.”1 In 1867, Canada received from the British Parliament the power to govern itself in a confederation of provinces. For several generations French-Canadian nationalism was embodied in the ideology of la survivance. This entailed a glorification of rural French-Canadian agrarian life, the conservative social dominance of the Catholic Church, and an attempt to maintain a social and economic isolationism from all things Anglophone, urban and industrial. With the economic modernization of Quebec after World War II, the ideology of la survivance became unsustainable. Instead, during the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s, the French-Canadians began to expand their political power by modernizing the provincial government of the only province in which they were a majority, Quebec. This became known as rattrapage, catching up. Mobilized by both the successes and failures of the Quiet Revolution, some Québecois demanded that they truly become Maîtres chez nous, masters in our own house, through Quebec independence. Although nationalism was channeled through the Parti Québécois (PQ), resulting in growing political, economic, and cultural power for the Québecois, the PQ has not yet succeeded in achieving its raison d’etre, Quebec independence. This growing power has weakened the nationalist argument that Quebec needs to be independent, while strengthening the belief that Quebec is strong enough to succeed as an independent state. The nationalist struggle continues not through the isolationist ideology of la survivance, nor the intense effort of rattrapage, but the confidence among many that Quebec has the capacity to be a thriving independent state but possibly not the pressing need to be independent. Historical Background The origins of the present conflict in Quebec are rooted in the mercantilism, imperialism, and power politics of a bygone era. In 1534, Jacques Cartier was the first documented European to explore the region now known as Quebec, for France. Although conditions were extremely harsh in New France, other explorers and settlers followed. In 1608, Samuel de Champlain established a trading post in what is today the capital of Quebec, Quebec City. The early French settlers made a living in fur trading. French Jesuit missionaries who arrived in New France established the church institutions that would later structure Quebec’s social life. In 1670, England granted a charter to the Hudson’s Bay Company, which increased English settlement in New France. As Great Britain and France struggled for supremacy in Europe and throughout their empires, European conflicts spilled over into lands far from the European continent. In 1759, British troops fought and defeated the French settlers in New France at the Plains of Abraham in Quebec City. This battle, which finally wrested control of Canada from France, became etched in the collective memory of the defeated French-Canadians.

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Great Britain’s colonial governance of French Canada was a mixture of tolerance, indifference, and imperialism. The Quebec Act of 1774 preserved French civil legal codes, the French-Canadian system of landholding, and the freedom of the Catholic Church. The Constitutional Act of 1791 divided Upper Canada (Ontario) from Lower Canada (Québec) and granted both elected assemblies. This show of tolerance was, in fact, a veneer for translating the Anglophone numerical majority and control over coercive force into English Canada’s economic and political dominance over French Canada. After the Patriotes of Louis-Joseph Papineau were defeated in their rebellion for more political power for French-Canadians in 1837, Lord Durham was appointed by the British government to investigate the causes of the rebellion and recommend long-term solutions to the problems of governance in Canada. Durham recommended that internal self-government be coupled with efforts at the Anglicization of Quebec so as to remove the source of the conflict: French-Canadian identity and culture. The Act of Union of 1841 was designed to implement this policy by combining Ontario and Quebec into one unit so as to swamp the Francophones with a huge Anglophone majority. This continued only until 1867, however, when the British parliament passed the British North America Act, giving the confederation of Canada effective self-governance if not de jure independence. Canada was divided into provinces, each with substantial powers within the confederation. Although French-Canadians were scattered minorities in several provinces and a small but significant minority throughout Canada, they did constitute a majority in the province of Quebec. Although French-Canadians occasionally rebelled against the dominance of English Canada, they by and large developed a cogent, if potentially self-destructive, mechanism for coping with their minority status. In the 1880s, Louis Riel led two small rebellions and French-Canadians in Quebec resisted conscription in both World Wars, but these acts of resistance were the exception rather than the rule from the time of the British North America Act until the Quiet Revolution, which began in 1960. During this 93-year period, a French-Canadian survival strategy evolved, known appropriately as la survivance. La survivance rested on the almost mythological belief that the survival of FrenchCanada depended on the preservation of its rural Catholic identity as a devout agrarian society made up of small family farms. This identity was perpetuated from the depression onward by the Catholic Church and the Quebec government of Maurice Duplessis. Duplessis believed that the preservation of faith, language, and race required minimal government intervention in social and economic affairs. The provincial government supported the social dominance of the Church. The Church operated the educational system and the limited social welfare system. The government of Quebec sold, at a discount, provincial mining permits and minerals to Anglophone companies to keep Francophones out of industry. It broke the backs of union members, both figuratively and literally, to keep Francophones from being exposed to progressive ideologies. Duplessis considered himself a French-Canadian nationalist. This nationalism, however, did not involve support for an independent Quebec. Instead,

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he believed in the obligation to respect the terms of Confederation whereby the two founding nations should coexist peacefully and ensure the political stability of the country. This view rested in turn on the historical assumption that each partner had been given a vocation conforming to its aptitudes and interests. The English-speaking community occupied the domain of industry and finance and was said to be moved mainly by economic considerations. The French, on the other hand, would willingly remain a rural society steeped in religion and cultural pursuits.2

Before an independence movement could develop in Quebec, the Québécois, the French-Canadians of Quebec, had to throw off the political and ideological chains of Maurice Duplessis. The Conflict The modern independence movement in Quebec grew out of the collapse of la survivance and the successes and failures of the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s. La survivance collapsed because it no longer had any basis in reality. In 1941, 41 percent of Francophone Québecois lived on farms. In 1961, only 13 percent of Francophone Québecois lived on farms.3 This and other social changes made this ideology appear increasingly anachronistic. Quebec was becoming urbanized and industrialized. Political elites began to realize that the Church could not provide adequate social welfare and educational programs for Quebeckers. Moreover, despite comprising 80 percent of the population of Quebec, Francophones were the poor neighbors of Quebec’s Anglophones. In 1961, the per capita income of Québécois was Can$3,185.4 Non-Francophones earned Can$4,605. These realities led to the defeat of Duplessis’s Union Nationale and the victory of Jean Lesage and the Liberals who were committed to undertaking a Quiet Revolution in Quebec’s politics. The Quiet Revolution transformed the provincial government into the progressive force in Quebec. The role of the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) government was to make the Québécois “masters in our own house.” The government was committed to rationalizing and expanding its educational and social welfare responsibilities. It was also committed to developing Quebec’s economy while opening up new occupational opportunities to the Québécois. For some nationalists, however, the Quiet Revolution did not go far enough. Only independence would eliminate the cultural division of labor, protect French-Canadian language, and identity and give the Québécois the tools to manage their own destiny in their own house. This new Québécois, or Quebec-centered, nationalism, as opposed to the old survivalist French-Canadian nationalism, manifested itself through many different organizations in the late 1960s. Animated by a speech by French president Charles de Gaulle in 1967 blessing “a free Quebec” with long life, political parties organized along with the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) modeled on Third World and black liberation movements. When, in 1970, the FLQ kidnapped and murdered the Quebec minister of labor, Pierre Laporte, provoking the Canadian government to institute the War Measures Act, curtail civil liberties, and bring armed troops on to the streets of Quebec, support for violent nationalism quickly

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dissipated. Instead, nationalist activism was channeled through the newly created Parti Québécois (PQ). The story of Quebec nationalism since 1970 has been largely woven into the evolution of the PQ. Management of the Conflict The PQ quickly became the focus for the nationalist movement. The PQ was founded in 1968 by René Lévesque, a former television reporter and Lesage cabinet member. In its first few years, the PQ was a combative home for many different strands of the nationalist movement. As the PQ grew electorally in the early 1970s, Lévesque was able to direct and control the party, together with his clique of technocratic advisers. Realizing that a majority of Quebeckers did not support outright separation from Canada, Lévesque coaxed the PQ into adopting an étapiste, or stepwise, approach toward sovereignty association. The PQ promised that, if elected, it would not unilaterally declare independence but would provide good government in the hope of building support for sovereignty association, independence with an economic union with Canada. If elected, it promised it would first hold a referendum before proceeding with moves toward sovereignty association. While remaining an independence party, Lévesque sought to convince those skeptical about independence that a vote for the PQ would not set in motion the inevitable separation from Canada. Étapisme worked. On November 15, 1976, the PQ, a party committed to the dissolution of Canada, was elected to govern Quebec. Lévesque became premier of Quebec and set out introducing good government through moderate social reforms. The most important legislation of the PQ’s first term was Bill 101. This legislation required that French be used for all communications involving provincial or local governments. The law also limited English-language instruction to schoolchildren whose parents or older siblings were educated in English in Quebec. External business advertising and shop floor communications had to be in French. Over the years, this law has succeeded in making French, rather than English, the language of social and economic mobility in Quebec. But Lévesque’s biggest challenge lay ahead. On May 20, 1980, the government of Quebec held a referendum on a complicated question as to whether the people of Quebec gave the provincial government a “mandate to negotiate” sovereignty association with Canada. Despite the softness of the question, it was not a vote for immediate independence; the “no” side turned the vote into a stark choice between Quebec or Canada. In a memorable series of speeches, Canada’s prime minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, a Quebecker with a Francophone father and Anglophone mother, argued that Canada would not negotiate with a Quebec that voted “yes” but would offer the province a new version of federalism if it voted “no.” The “yes” side tried to reassure the Québécois that Quebec had as much right and ability to be a thriving independent state as other northern resource-rich countries with small populations, such as Denmark, Norway, and Finland. The “no” side won convincingly with over 59 percent of the vote.

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The defeat of the referendum deeply affected the PQ and Quebec. To win the 1981 provincial elections, the PQ had to commit itself to not holding another referendum in its second term. Even though the PQ was reelected, it was severely weakened. Trudeau saw in this an opportunity to fulfill a life’s dream, the repatriation of the Canadian constitution from Great Britain and de jure independence for Canada. He hoped that now he could enshrine in the new constitution a strong Canadian federalism that would bind all the provinces, including Quebec, to an invigorated Canada. The negotiation for repatriation took place among Trudeau and the provincial premiers. Although initially Lévesque led a coalition of provincial premiers in demanding greater provincial powers in the new constitution, Trudeau was able to artfully break apart this coalition and convince the other premiers to sign on to a new constitution without the support of Quebec. Canada had a new constitution, and the British House of Commons rescinded their legal authority over Canada. But Quebec, feeling that certain provisions undermined its provincial authority, was not a signatory. Lévesque returned to Quebec dejected and embittered by what became known among Quebec nationalists as the “Night of the Long Knives.” In 1985, Lévesque retired from politics and was replaced by a new leadership that, despite further watering down the PQ’s commitment to sovereignty, was defeated in the provincial elections. In 1987, a new Progressive Conservative prime minister who was also a Quebecker, Brian Mulroney, decided to reinvigorate negotiations to bring Quebec into the Canadian constitution. Mulroney and the provincial premiers, including Quebec’s Liberal premier, Robert Bourassa, negotiated the Meech Lake Accord, which, among other things, recognized Quebec as a “distinct society” within Canada. Although this was designed to ameliorate the concerns of Quebec nationalists by giving Quebec a unique status in Canada, the agreement was not ratified by the provinces of Newfoundland and Manitoba, intensifying anger in Quebec and resulting in polls showing, for the first time, majority support for Quebec sovereignty. Desperate to save Canada from collapse, Mulroney and the premiers met again in 1990 and negotiated the Charlottetown Accord, a second attempt at creating a constitution acceptable to Quebec. This time the agreement was submitted to a national referendum. The population of each province would have to vote in favor of the accord for it to be approved. Six provinces, including Quebec, voted against it. The defeat of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords transformed the nationalist movement in Quebec. The events of the early 1980s had made it a shadow of its former self, afraid to campaign for independence. Canada’s “rejection” of Quebec in the late 1980s and early 1990s reinvigorated the movement. Leadership of the PQ passed to Jacques Parizeau, a former minister in Lévesque’s governments and outspoken indépendantiste. Moreover, a Québécois minister in Mulroney’s cabinet, Lucien Bouchard, resigned from the federal Progressive Conservative Party to form and lead the Bloc Québécois (BQ), a party committed to Quebec sovereignty that competed in federal elections. In a dramatic set of elections, the federal Liberals led by Jean Chrétien, a federalist Québécois and former minister and close adviser to Trudeau, were elected to govern Canada in 1993, with the BQ

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and Bouchard becoming the official opposition, and in 1994, the PQ and Parizeau were elected to govern Quebec. From the nationalist perspective, with Parizeau committed to independence in power in Quebec City and Chrétien, the betrayer of Quebec, in power in Ottawa, the time was ripe for the PQ to hold another referendum on independence. The referendum campaign of 1995 was a tense affair. This time, the referendum was worded so as to give the provincial government the authority to negotiate sovereignty and a possible economic association with Canada as well as the authority to move toward a unilateral declaration of independence should those talks fail. Unable to inspire new support for independence, Parizeau relinquished the central campaign role to the more charismatic Bouchard. Since the 1970s, the provincial government had extensively expanded its powers and had improved the relative conditions of the Québécois, so the PQ found it difficult to campaign on the socioeconomic need for independence. Instead, Bouchard focused on the political offenses of Canada against Quebec through the 1980s and 1990s, while arguing that Quebec had the capacity to be independent rather than the economic need to be independent. In an election night cliffhanger, with well over 90 percent of eligible voters going to the polls and a majority of Francophones voting “yes,” the referendum was defeated 50.6 percent to 49.4 percent. In what some saw as a bitter speech the night of the defeat, Parizeau blamed the results on “money and the ethnic vote.” This allowed the opponents of sovereignty to paint the PQ and Parizeau as less the party of all Quebec than the party of Francophones. Parizeau resigned as party leader and was replaced by Bouchard. The closeness of the 1995 referendum and the reelection of Bouchard and the PQ in 1998 spurred a new confrontation between the Quebec and Canadian governments. With support for sovereignty well below a majority in Quebec, Bouchard committed to holding the next referendum when his side had “winning conditions.” Under the leadership of the Quebecois federalist Jean Chrétien, the Canadian government did not want to be forced into “neverendum referendums,” continuous referenda until a majority votes for independence. Faced with this prospect, the federal government passed the Clarity Act, giving the Canadian government the right to determine whether a referendum uses clear language proposing independence, rather than the ambiguous language of the 1980 and 1995 referenda; the right to determine what constitutes a clear majority for independence triggering federal negotiations; and the right to determine the structure of those negotiations. In response, Bouchard tried to mobilize opposition within Quebec to this supposed infringement of Quebec’s right to determine its own future in the hopes this might forge his “winning conditions.” He was unable to reinvigorate support for an independence referendum. The new millennium has not been kind to independence aspirations. After Bouchard resigned as PQ leader in 2001, his successor, Bernard Landry, was defeated by Jean Charest and the PLQ. Over nine years, Charest defeated three PQ leaders—Landry, André Bosclair, and Pauline Marois—in Quebec provincial

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elections, marginalizing independence from the provincial policy agenda. Marois and the PQ finally returned to provincial power in 2012 but have not committed to holding another independence referendum. With the independence debate muted, the PQ turned its agenda to promoting the French language and secularization within Quebec. These policies, on several different occasions, have stirred up considerable controversy. In 2007, Marois proposed a bill requiring that immigrants learn French before they can be granted certain basic rights in Quebec. In 2012, the government supported a ban on certain religious headgear by the Quebec Soccer Federation and, in 2013, proposed banning the wearing of religious clothing or symbols in Quebec’s public spaces. Ever since Parizeau’s 1995 speech attacking the “ethnic vote,” tensions have simmered between Francophones and Quebec’s minorities. These new policies have increased tensions between Francophones and ethnic and religious minorities and immigrant groups as well as groups defending civil rights, making it even less likely that the PQ can mobilize support for independence in the foreseeable future. The lack of support for these policies was partially responsible for the PQ’s resounding defeat in the April 2014 Quebec provincial elections. A second reason why Quebec separatism is “off the agenda” is the success of neo-liberal policies in Canada.5 In 2006, Stephen Harper was elected as the Progressive Conservative prime minister of Canada. As a neoliberal, he has shrunk the size of the Canadian government and given more discretion, if not funds, to individual provinces to craft those policies that serve the best interests of the provincial population. This weakening of the federal government and relative empowering of the provinces has given Quebec leeway to adopt economic policies to provincial interests within a Canadian federal structure. The Quebec independence movement grows when the Canadian government can be portrayed as dictating policy to the province, but Harper’s neoliberal policies have weakened that catalyst to support for independence. Significance For all its contentiousness, the struggle between Quebec and Canada has been a remarkably peaceful affair. In Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants, divided by religion alone, have fought a protracted low-intensity civil war. In Quebec, the protagonists have been divided by religion and language. Although one might expect these more intense and potentially less reconcilable differences would serve as the fodder of even more violent conflict, since 1970, the battle has been fought entirely with ballots rather than bullets. Why did this conflict result in bitter social divisions between the two populations, the creation of two solitudes, a cultural division of labor that guaranteed Anglophone dominance, national political domination by Anglophones, and a superiority complex that manifested itself in attempts at assimilation but did not take the form of repressive legislation, usurpation of property, or the denial of religious and political rights that could serve as the basis of sectarian political domination?

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There are two reasons why repressive political sectarianism did not develop in Canada. Anglophone Canada required the support of Francophone Canada in its struggle against the expansionist United States.6 More importantly, the lack of a feudal past and the existence of an expanding frontier undermined the foundation and need for a repressive political structure. In Ireland, a primarily agricultural settlement, land was at a premium on a small island. By contrast, Canada was an agricultural and mercantile economy where a native population had been subdued and a huge landmass was available for exploitation by merchants and free farmers. Neither ethnic group needed to institutionalize repression to maintain their economic livelihood. This tolerance, however, has had a paradoxical impact on nationalism in Quebec. Neither elite bargaining among Canada’s prime ministers and the provincial premiers nor the votes of the citizens of Quebec has resolved the dispute over the political identities of Canada and Quebec. As the pot continues to simmer, however, the success of nationalist governments in expanding provincial powers have made an independent state more viable but in some ways less necessary. As one trenchant Canadian scholar and government official has incisively observed, the better conditions are for the Québécois the more they think they can be independent but the less they feel they need it, but the worse things are the more they want to be independent and the less they think they can be independent.7 To resolve this paradox, the PQ has evolved from a social democratic party to a more liberal free-market party that sees its independent economic future tied to its participation in the global international trading order defined by treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The PQ has argued this will allow Quebec to be a viable independent state regardless of its political relationship with Canada. This, of course, may be the ultimate irony. As Canada adopts neoliberal policies, Canadian federalism appears to serve the interests of Quebec, sublimating any pressing need for independence. Notes 1. Gerald M. Craig, ed., Lord Durham’s Report (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 22–23. 2. Dominique Clift, Quebec Nationalism in Crisis (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982), 13. 3. Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 38–40. 4. The amounts listed are in Canadian dollars. Comité de documentation du Parti Québécois, La souveraineté et l’economie (March 1970), 22–23. 5. Nadine Changfoot and Blair Cullen, “Why Is Quebec’s Separatism off the Agenda?: Reducing National Unity Crisis in the Neoliberal Era,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 44, no. 4 (December 2011): 769–787. 6. Katherine O’Sullivan See, First World Nationalisms: Class and Ethnic Politics in Northern Ireland and Quebec (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 58. 7. Stephane Dion, “Why Is Secession Difficult in Well-established Democracies?: Lessons from Quebec,” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 1 (April 1996): 269–283.

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Suggested Readings Behiels, Michael D., and Matthew Hayday. 2011. Contemporary Quebec: Selected Readings and Commentaries. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Changfoot, Nadine, and Blair Cullen. 2011. “Why Is Quebec’s Separatism off the Agenda?: Reducing National Unity Crisis in the Neoliberal Era.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 44 (4) (December): 769–787. Cook, Ramsey. 1995. Canada, Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism. 2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Inc. Dion, Stephane. 1996. “Why Is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies?: Lessons from Quebec.” British Journal of Political Science 26 (1) (April): 269–283. Howe, Paul. 1998. “Rationality and Sovereignty Support in Quebec.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 31 (1) (March): 31–59. Keating, Michael. 1997. “Stateless Nation-building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System.” Nations and Nationalism 3 (4) (October): 689–717. Lévesque, René. 1986. Memoirs. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. McRoberts, Kenneth. 1997. Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity. Toronto: Oxford University Press. McRoberts, Kenneth, and Dale Posgate. 1988. Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis. 3rd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. Meadwell, Hudson. 1993. “The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec.” World Politics 45 (1) (January): 203–241. Pinard, Maurice. 1992. “The Dramatic Reemergence of the Quebec Independence Movement.” Journal of International Affairs 45 (2) (Winter): 471–497. Pinard, Maurice, Robert Bernier, and Vincent Lemieux. 1997. Un Combat Inachevé. SainteFoy: Presses de l’Université du Québec. Young, Robert A. 1999. The Struggle for Quebec: From Referendum to Referendum? Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Appendices 1. The Durham Report of 1839 Following the twin rebellions in 1837, in Anglophone Upper Canada and Francophone Lower Canada, Lord Durham was sent to Canada to analyze the causes of the rebellions and to suggest a solution for governing the colony. Durham’s 1839 Report on the Affairs of British North America recommended that Upper Canada and Lower Canada be combined into a single colony with greater local governance. The decision to create a single colony was driven by Durham’s belief that the economy and culture of Francophone Canada were inferior to those of Anglophone Canada. Combining Upper and Lower Canada would give Anglophone Canadians greater control over the colony’s political, economic, and social systems. The disdainful language used by Durham in the report has remained a potent symbol for French-Canadians of a history of discrimination by Anglophone Canada against Francophone Canada. It is also remembered by Québecois as the beginning of the formation of a federal Canada. I expected to find a conflict between the government and the people: instead, I found two warring nations within a single State; I found a struggle, not of principles, but of races. And I realized that it would be pointless to try to improve the laws or institutions without

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succeeding in extinguishing the mortal hatred which now divides the inhabitants of Lower Canada into two hostile groups: French and English. The language, the laws and the character of the North American continent are English, and every other race than the English race is in a state of inferiority. It is in order to release them from this inferiority that I wish to give the Canadians our English character. Source: Selections from the Durham Report of 1839. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/history /EPISCONTENTSE1EP7CH5PA1LE.html.

2. René Lévesque’s Speech of January 25, 1977, to the Economic Club of New York On November 15, 1976, the PQ, led by René Lévesque, won the Quebec provincial elections. This was the first time since the founding of federal Canada that a party committed to Quebec’s independence governed the province. Opponents of independence emphasized the economic risks of independence and the loss of the economies of scale that Canada provided. In the United States, business leaders feared the possible economic instability that might occur during an independence struggle. Lévesque went to New York two months after taking over as premier to reassure business leaders of both the justice of his cause and the lack of negative economic consequences of independence. Lévesque compared himself to George Washington, while Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau was comparing himself to Abraham Lincoln in his efforts to maintain a united Canada. Americans were very confused. Exactly two months ago, a new government assumed power in Québec. This government was born of a young political party which had gained strength during the two previous elections, with political sovereignty for  Québec as its prime objective. Although we at home could see such a result shaping up over the last few years, it naturally aroused interest and curiosity beyond our borders, not unmixed with some anxiety and even some hostility in certain quarters. Just what is this Québec, so close geographically, and yet so remote for many, on account of “la difference”, and also because proximity often breeds more ignorance than knowledge? French Québec was born at the same time as the first American colonies. Its history is intimately linked with that of the thirteen states which, after a hundred and fifty years of imperial rule, decided to form the United States of America. Our ancestors, among the greatest of discoverers, missionaries and . . . fur-traders, were the first white men to explore North America as far as the Rocky Mountains and Louisiana. Detroit, New Orleans and Milwaukee were founded by Quebecers. About 1830, Missouri was still French-speaking. It was the son of a Montrealer, John Charles Frémont, who commanded the troops that conquered California in 1846, and then became governor of that state. Later, owing to difficult economic conditions in the North, several thousands “Québécois” settled in your vast country, mainly in New England. So, from the beginning, we have always shared with you a taste for new frontiers, a thirst for open spaces, and a drive to overcome obstacles, even to meet sometimes quasi-impossible challenges, and thus to create our own new way of life. . . .

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Now, almost exactly two hundred years after its neighbour to the south, Québec too is making up its mind about how to set in motion the process leading to independence. . . . Some fifteen years before the American Revolution, the French colony of Québec was conquered by British troops. That conquest deprived our society of a great many of its elite, who went back to France, and it turned over our political and economic life to foreign leadership. The small “Québécois” community immediately became a very delicate plant, tenuously rooted in an alien and not always hospitable environment. Every effort had to be made to ensure its protection and even its survival. So the Québec people instinctively retreated into their shells. And then it would take some twelve generations to bring us to the threshold of national maturity. Of all the European groups who settled in America in the Seventeenth Century—French, Spanish, Portuguese and British—only the French have not yet attained full political autonomy. But now, at long last, Québec is a fully developed society. It has over six million people, 82% of whom are French by descent, language and cultural heritage. Montreal, our metropolis, is the second largest French city in the world. Our gross national product would make us twenty-third among the nations of the world, and eleventh on a per capita basis. And as for our territory, its store of resources is even more ample than its quite sufficient size. Independence for Québec, therefore, now appears as normal, I might say almost as inevitable, as it was for the American states of two hundred years ago. Along with deep and durable historical roots, this political emancipation can now count on the support of sociological change, one of the most significant aspect being the fact that our youth is already heavily committed to it. It would be senseless, like king Canute trying to stop the tide, to waste efforts in order to delay the final outcome of something as natural and irreversible as growth itself. On the contrary, it seems to me efforts should be concentrated on the rational establishment of future good relations between this emerging Québec and its neighbours. In my opinion, the important question—the question everyone interested in Québec and Canada should be asking—is not  whether  Québec will become independent, nor indeed when it will happen, but rather how, in due time, Quebecers can be expected to take full charge of their own political affairs. Source: René Lévesque, speech to the Economic Club of New York, January 25, 1977. Bibliothèque et archives nationales du Québec: Le fonds P18 René Lévesque.

3. Charter of the French Language After the PQ took office, it introduced Bill 101, which passed in 1977, and became the Charter of the French Language. The law made French the language of government and commerce in Québec. Signs on businesses could only be in French. Children who were citizens could only receive school instruction in English if they had been educated in English prior to the passage of the law or their siblings had received their education in English in Quebec. The intent of the law was to expand the usage of French in Quebec and effectively make it the language of social mobility. The law has been challenged several times in the courts and has also been amended several times since 1977. The passage of the law accelerated the exodus of some Anglophones from Quebec and expanded the percentage of Quebeckers who spoke French as their first language.

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CHARTER OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE PREAMBLE the French language, the distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking, is the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity; whereas

Whereas the National Assembly of Québec recognizes that Quebecers wish to see the quality and influence of the French language assured, and is resolved therefore to make of French the language of Government and the Law, as well as the normal and everyday language of work, instruction, communication, commerce and business; Whereas the National Assembly intends to pursue this objective in a spirit of fairness and open-mindedness, respectful of the institutions of the English-speaking community of Québec, and respectful of the ethnic minorities, whose valuable contribution to the development of Québec it readily acknowledges; Whereas the National Assembly of Québec recognizes the right of the Amerinds and the Inuit of Québec, the first inhabitants of this land, to preserve and develop their original language and culture; Whereas these observations and intentions are in keeping with a new perception of the worth of national cultures in all parts of the earth, and of the obligation of every people to contribute in its special way to the international community; Therefore, Her Majesty, with the advice and consent of the National Assembly of Québec, enacts as follows:

TITLE I STATUS OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE

Chapter I THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF QUÉBEC 1. French is the official language of Québec.

1977, c. 5, s. 1. Source: Short excerpt from Charter of the French Language, 1977. Available at http://www2 .publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/C_11 /C11_A.html.

4. Prime Minister Trudeau’s Speech Supporting a “No” Vote in the 1980 Referendum The PQ planned on holding the 1980 referendum while Joe Clark, an Anglophone progressive conservative, was prime minister of Canada. Because the Québecois were opposed to the Conservative Party and Anglophone dominance, the PQ assumed that Clark would serve as a lightning rod to mobilize support for the “yes” side. However, the Liberal Party succeeded in ousting Clark’s

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government, and Pierre Elliot Trudeau returned as Prime Minister of Canada in time for the referendum campaign. Trudeau, a hero to many Québecois, was a formidable proponent of federal Canada. During the campaign, the PQ engaged in a fairly low-key campaign strategy. Trudeau stayed out of the debate until the end of the campaign and then gave a series of blistering and memorable speeches ridiculing the referendum and separatism and calling for a renewed federalism. These speeches sealed the referendum’s defeat. Mr. Lévesque continues to repeat, “But what about democracy—what would you do if a majority of the Québec people voted yes? Would you not be obliged, by the principle of democracy, to negotiate?” No indeed! It is like saying to Mr. Lévesque, “The people of Newfoundland have just voted 100 percent in favour of renegotiating the electricity contract with Québec. You are obliged, the name of democracy, to respect the will of Newfoundland, are you not?” It is obvious that this sort of logic does not work. . . . Mr. Lévesque, if the people of Québec vote no, as I believe they will, (Applause) Why won’t you say that since the people have rejected sovereignty-association, it is your duty to be a good government and put an end to the status quo on which you place so much blame, and to join us in changing the Constitution. . . . But what we are criticizing the Parti Québecois for is for not having the courage to ask: independence, yes or no? (Applause) yes

or no?

Source: Excerpt from Prime Minister Trudeau’s May 14, 1980, speech supporting a “no” vote in the 1980 referendum at the Paul Sauvé Arena in Montreal ([Ottawa]: Office of the Prime Minister, 1980), 15. Available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/2/4/h4-4083-e.html.

5. The 1992 Charlottetown Accord In 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney, the 10 provincial premiers, and representatives of the territories and the aboriginal and Inuit peoples negotiated a more comprehensive constitutional reform than the Meech Lake Accords. This new agreement, the Charlottetown Accord, increased provincial control over natural resources and cultural affairs. It also allowed the provinces to establish certain government programs of their own and receive compensation from the federal government if the federal government had legislated a similar program. The provinces could also opt out of any constitutional transfer of powers to the federal government and receive compensation from Ottawa. It also contained a Canadian Social Charter, self-government for aboriginal peoples, and reforms of

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the Supreme Court of Canada, the Canadian Senate, and Canadian House of Commons. Importantly for Quebec, it again called for recognition of the province as a “distinct society” within Canada. The accord was submitted to a national referendum. It was approved in four provinces and the Northwest Territories. But only 45.7 percent of Canadian voters supported the accord, and it was convincingly defeated in Quebec. This was the last formal attempt to bring Quebec into the Canadian Constitution.

I: Unity and Diversity A: People and Communities: 1. Canada Clause A new clause should be included as section 2 of the Constitution Act, 1867 that would express fundamental Canadian values. The Canada Clause would guide the courts in their future interpretation of the entire Constitution, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Constitution Act, 1867 is amended by adding hereto, immediately after section 1 thereof, the following section: 2. (1) The Constitution of Canada, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the following characteristics: (a) Canada is a democracy committed to a parliamentary and federal system of government and to the rule of law; (b) the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, being the first peoples to govern this land, have the right to promote their languages, cultures and traditions and to ensure the integrity of their societies, and their governments constitute one of the three orders of government in Canada; (c) Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society, which includes a Frenchspeaking majority, a unique culture and a civil law tradition; (d) Canadians and their governments are committed to the vitality and development of official language minority communities throughout Canada; (e) Canadians are committed to racial and ethnic equality in a society that includes citizens from many lands who have contributed, continue to contribute, to the building of a strong Canada that reflects its cultural and racial diversity; (f) Canadians are committed to a respect for individual and collective human rights and freedoms of all people; (g) Canadians are committed to the equality of female and male persons; and (h) Canadians confirm the principal of the equality of the provinces at the same time as recognizing their diverse characteristics. (2) The role of the legislature and government of Quebec to preserve and promote the distinct society of Quebec is affirmed. (3) Nothing in this section derogates from the powers, rights or privileges of the Parliament. Source: The 1992 Charlottetown Accord recognizes Quebec’s “distinct society” status. Parliament of Canada. Available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications /bp406-e.htm.

Central Europe The Romany: A Stateless Minority in a World of States Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline 13th century The Romany arrive in Europe. 14th century The recorded arrival of Roma in Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Hungary takes place. 1407 The Romany are first recorded in modern-day Germany. 1416 The Romany are expelled from the Meissen region of Germany. 1418–1427 The Romany are recorded in modern France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Slovakia. 1471 Anti-Gypsy laws are passed in Lucerne, Switzerland; 17,000 Romany are deported to Moldavia as slave labor. 1493 The Romany are expelled from Milan. 1504 Louis XII prohibits Romany from living in France. 1512 Romany are recorded in Sweden. Catalonia expels Roma.

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1526 The first anti-Gypsy laws are passed in Holland and Portugal. 1532 England introduces its first laws expelling Gypsies. 1540 Gypsies are allowed to live under own laws in Scotland. 1541 Anti-Gypsy laws are passed in Scotland. Blamed for a rash of fires, Prague Romany are attacked. 1549 The first anti-Gypsy law is passed in Bohemia (Czech lands). 1568 The pope expels Romany from the domain of the Catholic Church. 1589 Denmark condemns to death any Romany not leaving the country. 1619 Spain bans all Gitanos, as well as Gypsy dress, names, and languages, under penalty of death. 1637 The first anti-Gypsy laws are passed in Sweden; expulsion is ordered under penalty of death. 1666 Louis XIV, the Sun King, orders severe punishment for any “Bohemian” found in France. 1685 Portugal bans the Romany language and deports Romany to Brazil. 1710 Prague orders the hanging of adult Romany men without trial and the mutilation of women and boys. 1721 The Austro-Hungarian Empire orders the extermination of Romany throughout its domain.

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1733 Russia forbids Romany from settling as serfs on land. 1761 Maria Theresa, the empress of Hungary, makes the first European attempt to settle and assimilate the Romany. 1773 Maria Theresa orders the taking of Romany children from their parents for assignment to foster homes. 1776 The prince of Moldavia prohibits marriages to Romany. 1782 Two hundred Romany are charged with cannibalism in Hungary. 1800s Gypsy hunts become popular sport in Germany. 1803 Napoléon Bonaparte prohibits Romany from residing in France. 1842 The Moldavian Church liberates its Romany slaves. 1856 Romany slavery (the Slobuzenia) is abolished in Europe. 1880s Argentina and United States bar Romany from entering the country. 1886 Otto von Bismarck encourages German states to deport non-German-born Romany. 1908 England requires the public education of Gypsy children. 1914 Sweden prohibits further Romany immigration. 1919 The Weimar Republic gives Romany full citizenship rights.

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1921 Czechoslovakia recognizes Romany as a separate “nationality”; the legislation is later repealed. 1924 Romany are tried for cannibalism in Slovakia. 1926 Bavaria mandates the registration of all Romany. Italy orders the expulsion of all foreign Roma. 1927 Czechoslovakia prohibits Romany nomadism and permits the taking of Gypsy children from parents for foster care. 1928 Bavaria places Romany under permanent surveillance. 1931 The Moscow Gypsy Theater opens (it still exists). 1933 July: Adolf Hitler orders the sterilization of Gypsies. The citizenship of Gypsies and Eastern Jews is revoked. September: The Law Against Habitual Criminals orders the arrest of Romany. 1934 Sweden passes a sterilization law to keep Swedish pure. 1934–1937 The German Romany are sent to processing camps; sterilization orders are gradually replaced by extermination orders. June 12–18, 1938 Romany are rounded up in Germany and Austria. 1941 Concentration camps are opened in Poland, Croatia, Ukraine, and Serbia. August 2, 1944 Four thousand Romany are gassed and cremated at Auschwitz in a single action.

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1945 World War II ends. 1946–1990 Central European Communist regimes target Romany for assimilation. 1971 The first World Romany Congress is held; delegates from 14 countries adopt the Romany flag and anthem. 1972 The International Romany Union (IRU) affiliates with the Council of Europe. Czechoslovakia initiates a sterilization program for Romany and bans Romany associations. 1975 Belgium permits Belgian-born Romany to naturalize. 1976 Indira Gandhi supports the Romany demand for recognition as a national minority of Indian origin. 1979 The IRU is given consultative status by UNESCO. 1981 Yugoslavia grants Romany national status on equal footing with other minorities. 1990 The IRU participates in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. 1991 Macedonia gives Romany equal rights. 1993 Macedonia introduces the use of Romany languages in schools. Austria recognizes Romany as an ethnic group. 1994 England abolishes caravan (trailer) sites; 3,000 Romany are left without legal homes. Numerous anti-Gypsy acts occur in the Czech Republic and Slovakia despite Romany’s improved legal status.

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1996 The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) is established in Budapest; 5,000 Roma are evicted from their quarters in Istanbul. 1997 Romany refugees from Slovakia arrive in England seeking asylum and meet with negative reaction. The Slovak deputy prime minister blames Romany for not doing enough to improve their status. 1998 New Jersey rescinds the last anti-Roma law in the United States. 1999 Hungary and the Czech Republic are admitted to NATO despite continuing issues involving their treatment of their Roma communities. In a case involving the death of a Roma woman, a Czech court reduces the charge to hooliganism and sets the sentence at 15 months. 2001 Czech Romany establish patrols in Roma areas to protect themselves from attacks by Czechs. 2002 The Dorking, England, district council distributes leaflets advertising a forthcoming performance of Budapest’s 100 Gypsies Ensemble as “the only time you want to see 100 Gypsies on your doorstep.” 2003 In anticipation of European Union (EU) enlargement, several EU members tighten immigration laws in the Schengen “Europe without Borders” zone. High-ranking Slovak army officers are fined for arguing that 97 percent of the country’s Romany “are unable to adapt and should be shot.” 2004 EU expansion admits many Central European countries with large Romany populations to a “Europe without borders” and hence legal access to Western European countries. NATO enlargement includes Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. 2005 Muslim-Romany clashes in southern France leave two dead and many injured. The Decade of Roma Inclusion program is launched in Central and Southeastern Europe to improve the status of local Roma.

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2007 The Bulgarian National Guard (BNG) is established to protect “Bulgarians against Gypsy terror.” 2008 The EU’s further enlargement adds Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, although Romania is not initially a full member of the Schengen “Europe without Borders” zone. 2008–present Violence and discrimination directed against Romany continue to characterize the Romany’s existence in Central Europe. In Western Europe, the focus is more frequently on evicting Romany settlers than integrating them into host populations. The deteriorating economic climate heightens discrimination against Romany. Discrimination against immigrants and other outsiders is neither uncommon nor new. The unfriendly, sometimes violent environment faced by North Africans, Turks, and immigrants from the “colored commonwealth” in, respectively, contemporary France, Germany, and Great Britain echoes the hostility that immigrants from Asia and Mexico faced in the United States at the turn of the 20th century.1 In the short term, immigrant and other foreign groups have often found assistance in protecting their rights and lives in an unlikely quarter: their country of origin. Thus, one of the United States’ oldest civil rights organizations, the AntiDefamation League, owes its origin at least in part to the urgings of the Italian government, which was deeply concerned about the wave of lynching aimed at Catholic Italian immigrants in the heavily Protestant South of post–Civil War America. Likewise, concern with the physical safety of Algerians working in post– World War II France prompted the Algerian government in the early 1970s to halt the flow of Algerian workers into France. Similarly, Budapest’s concern over Slovakia’s treatment of its large Hungarian minority in postcommunist Europe prompted the Hungarian government to table Slovakia’s application for membership in the Council of Europe during the middle 1990s until Slovakia’s government agreed to respect the rights of those of Hungarian descent living in the Slovak Republic. In the longer term, most immigrants, refugees, and other foreign groups have historically found relief from local persecution by assimilating, as much as possible, into the culture of their host countries. Hence, most groups migrating from continental Europe to the United States before World War I embraced not just the language of the English who colonized the original 13 colonies but also their attire, style of living, and political creed. The integrative efforts of Russian immigrants in France after the 1917 fall of the czar offers a similar example of survival through assimilation. But what happens if the migrating group refuses to settle permanently, to divest itself of its distinct culture, or to assimilate even after centuries? What if it lacks an outside protector to champion its cause? An unpleasant answer to these questions can be found in the Romany’s 600-year history of enslavement, persecution, banishment, and even genocide in the Western world.

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Historical Background The Romany (or Roma) have been known by many names in the countries to and through which they have traveled, including the generic term Gypsy and such more specific references as Gitanos, Sinti, Romanichal, and Egyptians. For a long time, there were nearly as many explanations of their origin as there were names attached to them. Relatively recent linguistic analyses, however, have produced a general consensus that the Roma, whose Indo-Aryan language is very close to the Sanskrit-based languages spoken in the Punjab and Gujarat areas of India, probably originated in this northwestern area of the Indian subcontinent. Beginning in the 11th century, it appears, the spread of Islam into that region caused numerous local tribes to move north and westward ahead of the invading Muslim conquerors. Among those fleeing were various Romany groups who reached the southeastern edge of Europe by the early 1300s. A hundred years later, they had spread into Southern and Central Europe, and by 1427, their presence had been recorded in modern-day Serbia, Greece, Hungary, Germany, Slovakia, Italy, France, Belgium, and Holland. Shortly thereafter emerged the pattern of Romani arrival and local rejection that has been their history ever since. During the following centuries, the Roma were most grievously treated in Germany—where Gypsy hunts were organized during the 19th century and the Romany Holocaust was carried out during Adolf Hitler’s era—and most consistently discriminated against in the Czech and Slovak regions of Central Europe, which still constituted the epicenter of anti-Romany activity at the end of the 20th century. At some time or another, the Roma have been enslaved, expelled, murdered, or otherwise discriminated against by virtually every state in Europe, including Switzerland, which in 1471 deported 17,000 Roma as slave labor to Moldavia; England, which passed its first expulsion laws in 1532; Scotland, which permitted Gypsies to reside under their own law in Scotland in 1540 and then passed its first anti-Gypsy law the following year; the Vatican, which in 1568 ordered their expulsion from the entire domain of the Roman Catholic Church; Denmark, which in 1589 prescribed the death penalty for any Roma not leaving the country; Prague, which in 1710 ordered the hanging without trial of any adult Gypsy male found in its domain; and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which in 1721 ordered the extermination of Roma throughout its realm. Nor did their lot improve greatly in the 19th and early 20th centuries. As early as the 1830s, Germany was removing children from their Romany families to be reared in non-Romany homes, and as late as 1924, Roma were being tried for cannibalism in Slovakia. In between, many states simply closed their borders to them, including Argentina (1880s), the United States (1885), and Sweden (1914). Then came the rise of fascism and notions of racial purity in Europe. In Germany, the Roma were first required to register; later placed under constant surveillance; then subjected to forced sterilization (all of Germany in 1933, but also in Sweden in 1934 to keep the Swedish race pure); then dispatched to work camps for processing (in Germany, 1934–1937); and finally targeted for extermination (in Germany, 1938; German-occupied Poland, Croatia, the Ukraine, and Serbia in

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1941). The data are unreliable, but certainly by the time Germany was defeated and the Roma Holocaust ended in 1945, between 50,000 and 500,000 Roma had died, and their Central European area of concentration was about to fall under the rule of Communist regimes controlled by the Soviet Union.2 The Romany under Communist Rule

The descent of the Iron Curtain, which separated Communist Central Europe from Western Europe for two generations (circa 1950–1990), had a profound if uneven impact on the lot of Central Europe’s large (at least 6 million) Roma population.3 In the economic sphere, communism guaranteed employment to all people and thereby opened some seams in the “invisible” curtain that had often made it impossible for Romani to obtain employment in the job markets of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere in Central Europe. On the other hand, these Communist regimes also proscribed many of the economic activities and shady but formerly legal occupations from which the Roma traditionally derived income: for example, fortune telling, horse trading, and selling used clothes. The policies with the most significant impact on the Romany were those that affected their living patterns. The closure of borders, including those between the Communist states themselves, halted the traditional nomadic lifestyle of various Roma tribes and resulted in the buildup of a large, more or less permanent Gypsy population in the states of Central Europe. Meanwhile, inside their individual borders, the Communist regimes attempted to settle, educate, and otherwise assimilate the Roma into their societies. Of course, the Romany had historically been targeted for assimilation by various European governments, most notably by Empress Maria Theresa in the 1760s; however, never before had these efforts been pursued with the routes of escape so solidly sealed. The policies, frequently harsh in nature and heavy handed in execution, were usually enforced by locals who had no love for the Roma element. Thus, compulsory education was usually meted out in segregated schools, frequently with the Roma children consigned to remedial classes because of lack of fluency in the national languages. Romany associations were often banned, and Romany women were disproportionally targeted for sterilization, not by being forced into the programs but by being offered more incentives than were extended to nationals. Less draconian were the housing and economic programs designed to integrate the Roma into society and the economy by placing them in normal occupations. Czechoslovakia’s 1958 policy of resettlement and integration offers a fairly typical example of the efforts made to mesh Roma integration policies with general policy needs. The nomadic lifestyle of the Roma was outlawed, and large numbers of Roma were relocated from the rural regions of Slovakia, which they favored, to the industrialized regions of the Czech lands to help revive that area’s economy by filling, with low-cost Roma labor, the jobs vacated by the Germans who had long lived in the area but were summarily expelled after World War II. One spinoff of this policy was a significant growth in the number of (largely self-segregated) Roma enclaves in Central European cities and towns. Another was the significant degree

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to which the Communist effort to socially (schools) and economically (jobs) integrate the Roma into the host population repeatedly raised tensions between the Roma and the local populations. Invariably, the locals felt that the Roma were getting preferential treatment in their governments’ housing and employment policies. With the end of Communist rule, the limited protection that the Romany had enjoyed vanished, and the resentment against them boiled into the open throughout much of Central Europe, whose citizens continued to view the Romany with a mixture of open hostility and lingering prejudices.4 The Conflict The Romany after the Fall of Communism

At its core, the conflict in postcommunist Europe was, and largely remains, uncomplicated but virtually irreconcilable. The Roma want to be allowed to live their lifestyle and stay or travel without restriction; the host population, more often than not, wants them to leave. Failing that, the host populations generally want to regulate their existence (sometimes to harass them into departing) and, more rarely, to integrate them into society to control them. At the root of these opposing positions lie two equally simple points of view. Most Roma want to preserve their ancient way of life, and they have historical reasons not to trust their hosts; the indigenous populations have deep-seated prejudices against the Roma and—when pushed into a corner to defend these prejudices—can still cite recent, objective data to support their point of view. Even without these prejudices, it would have been difficult for the Romany to achieve their basic objective—the status of a legally protected ethnic minority in the countries where they live—or their more pedestrian goals, such as access to better housing and employment and the right to home school their children. Few in number, disenfranchised as noncitizens in many states, and fragmented among dozens of different tribes, even on a level playing field, the Roma would have had difficulty amassing the political clout necessary to be politically effective. Their nomadic lifestyle and other manifestations of otherness still daily feed the biased prisms through which they are viewed and make it difficult for them to alter the hostility with which they are frequently greeted. Their unwillingness to assimilate and their disproportionate contribution to crime in the areas they frequent exacerbate the situation. The crime issue has been a particularly sensitive one, dovetailing as it does with the issue of the high unemployment rate among the Roma in postcommunist Europe. Their staggeringly high unemployment rate—60–70 percent throughout the region—according to the Roma, is the result of discrimination. In contrast, local populations argue that these rates merely reflect the disinterest of the Roma in legitimate employment. To support this view, they note that although only 10 percent of Hungary’s population, the Roma accounted for over half of all the crime in that country during the 1990s.5 Similar and more recent figures exist for other Central European states; however, sociologists are more inclined to explain the disproportionately high level of (generally nonviolent) crime committed by Roma

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in terms of their low level of education, high unemployment, and poor living conditions than to the innate dishonesty that numerous Central Europeans ascribe to the Roma. Management of the Conflict During the final days of the 20th century, the efforts to manage the conflict between the Romany and the peoples and governments of the states in which they live proceeded in two quite different directions involving three sets of actors. First, there were the governmental policies in those states housing significant numbers of Romany. Their approach was very often in the traditional mode of managing the “Roma problem” by controlling or expelling them. To be sure, none of these policies was even remotely akin to the excessive devices historically aimed at them; however, because the Roma Holocaust never received the same publicity as Hitler’s Final Solution to Germany’s “Jewish problem,” it has been easier for European democracies to discriminate against their Roma peoples in ways that would be politically unthinkable if aimed at members of the Jewish community. Thus, even the carefully monitored democratizing states in postcommunist Europe often enacted policies openly prejudicial to Romany interests, and discriminatory action was not limited to postcommunist Europe. In 1994, for example, Great Britain summarily abolished its Caravan Sites Act, leaving nearly 5,000 mostly Roma families homeless. Likewise, by the mid-1990s, Great Britain, Belgium, and other Western states were reexamining their asylum policies to the disadvantage of the Roma on the grounds that the recent movement of large numbers of Roma into their states reflected more the Romany desire to obtain the generous welfare benefits available to them while their asylum applications were being processed than flight from actual persecution in postcommunist Central Europe. Second, the 1990s witnessed numerous self-help efforts made by the Roma to increase their political clout both in their states of residence and at the European level. Typical of their action at the state level were their efforts to group fragmented Romany organizations under a single umbrella organization in each Central European country, as in the case of the 1995 formation of the Union of Romany Political Parties in Slovakia. At the same time, Roma were equally active internationally in seeking to enlist support for their causes. The International Romany Union (IRU), for example, the most influential of Europe’s Romany organizations, essentially achieved consultation status in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation in 1990, and in 1996 participated in the birth of its own watchdog and publicity arm, the Budapest-based European Roma Rights Center (ERRC). Finally, in a different domain, discrimination against the Romany was mitigated by (1) the gradual emergence of an internationally recognized, albeit implicit taboo against such action; (2) precedents granting the Romany equality in areas that once discriminated against them; and (3) the monitoring and lobbying efforts of a growing number of international agencies concerned with the behavior of European governments toward their Roma minorities. Thus, beginning in 1976, the

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prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, pledged her country’s support for the Roma demand that the Romany be officially recognized as a national minority of Indian origin. Fifteen years later, one of the first acts of Yugoslavia’s breakaway Republic of Macedonia was to give its Roma rights equal to those of its Macedonian and Albanian citizens. Even in Hungary, the late 1990s found the Ministry of Education contemplating the withdrawal of textbooks containing racist descriptions of the country’s Roma peoples. These incremental efforts toward getting the Roma accepted as a recognized ethnic minority also received significant boosts from several international organizations. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for example, in 2000, issued a stinging indictment of the continuing persecution of and “reprisal attacks on” Roma in Kosovo and other conflict-torn areas of Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, in Central Europe itself, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), while overseeing elections in much of postcommunist Europe, made serious efforts to register and turn out the vote of the Romany electorate. The most persistent efforts, however, were those of the Council of Europe, which maintained active programs in three areas of top priority to Europe’s Roma: protecting minorities, combating racial intolerance, and fighting against European policies of social exclusion. And at the bilateral level, the United States Congress—like governments in other Western democracies—was routinely reviewing the actions of Central European governments vis-à-vis human rights issues in weighing their eligibility for NATO membership. The Romany in a “Europe without Borders”

Against this backdrop, for Europe’s Romany—as for domestic and continental politics in general—the enlargement of the European Community in 2004, to include 10 new members from Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, was a watershed moment.6 It did not, however, do a great deal to favorably alter the status of Europe’s Romany peoples. First, at the most elemental level, admitting the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—and three years later Bulgaria and Romania—when anti-Roma violence and discrimination were still prevalent deprived the European Union (EU) of its principal stick for inducing change: denying the states the EU admission that they coveted until they moved beyond enacting the EU-mandated antidiscrimination statutes and began actually enforcing Romany rights and improving the conditions of their Roma minorities. To be sure, Central Europe’s Roma are now “EU citizens” as well as citizens of their home states and therefore entitled to many new rights, including that of movement. Likewise, the EU has subsequently engaged in oversight of Roma treatment in all member states—most aggressively in the case of France’s 2010 “security-based” deportation of hundreds of Romany—and has drawn up a broad framework for integrating the Roma into European societies. Nevertheless, admission to the EU took much of the international pressure off the governments of these states to pursue meaningful reforms. Moreover, the EU’s

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action was foreshadowed in nature and effect by NATO’s several years earlier, when the Czech Republic and Hungary were admitted to NATO in 1999 despite their treatment of their Roma. Second, given the fact that most EU member states participate in the Europe without Borders system, involving free movement without border controls within the zone, EU admission meant Roma access to Western Europe as a means of escaping discrimination in their home countries, if not necessarily a means of resuming a traditional nomadic lifestyle. Those taking the journey, however, have rarely found notably more hospitable environs. Lack of official passports and other government documents has frequently translated into a lack of access to the social welfare and educational systems of Western European countries (see Appendices). Moreover, if the violence and overt discrimination encountered by Roma travelers have been less in Western Europe than in Central Europe, they have not been unknown often as a part of the most common reaction that they have faced in Western Europe: forced eviction by governments and private citizens alike. Finally, the fact that access to Western Europe has not afforded a solution to the discrimination that they face may have had the effect of making the violence involving the Roma more of a two-way street, inside and outside Central Europe, as Roma fight back with force against those harassing them. Neighborhood Romany “peace patrols” have proliferated in Central Europe since first appearing in the Czech Republic in the late 1990s, and Romany demonstrations against their economic and social status, with resultant clashes with local police, are no longer rare. There is also something of a demographic time bomb ticking in Europe’s Roma communities. More than 40 percent of Europe’s Roma are under 25, and a vastly disproportionate number of these are unemployed men who would have trouble overcoming discrimination and finding employment even if the EU was not in an economic slump. A large number of restless, frustrated young people seeing themselves as victims of an unjust order is a toxic and combustible formula if shaken. And the evidence suggests provocation may ever be just around the corner. Old outlooks and behavioral patterns persist, and intolerant policies directed toward the Roma still remain easy to find, from Northern Ireland to Italy and France, to Bulgaria and Turkey. ERRC tabulations of violent anti-Romany incidents are both illuminating and depressing. Between 2008 and 2012, for example, the ERRC recorded 40 attacks against Roma in the Czech Republic; 48 in Hungary, many of which were fueled by worsening economic conditions; and more than a dozen in Slovakia that claimed the lives of five Roma.7 Meanwhile, cases involving the forced sterilization of Romany women continue to make their way to the human rights tribunals in Strasbourg, Romany children continue to be tracked into remedial and vocational education programs in disproportionate numbers, and Romany driven from their homes during the civil wars in the Balkans during the 1990s still often live, unwanted, in squalid settlement camps in neighboring states, with poverty rates 10 times or more that of the host populations and life expectancies a decade or more less than their hosts.

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Significance Case studies sometimes reveal the worst in human nature and experience. The implements of conflict—knives, clubs, pointed blades, and projectile weaponry— are universally among the anthropological artifacts of humanity. In a like manner, ethnicity has proven to be equally durable as a basis for association and discrimination over time and space. Furthermore, very often—as the history of the Roma attests—minorities receive their worst treatment at the hands of those who have themselves been the object of discriminatory rule. Abuse continued to be the lot of the Roma throughout the 20th century, although in a far gentler form as the 21st century dawned. And nowhere were the Roma more ill-treated than in Slovakia, whose majority had barely achieved self-rule after generations of oppression by the Hungarians before World War I and 75 years of standing in the shadow of the more numerous Czechs in Czechoslovakia. As for the Roma themselves, the numbers have changed little since the start of the 21st century. Current estimates—and they remain estimates because of the tendency of Roma to evade or be undercounted in census endeavors—suggest that there are approximately 12 million Romani in the world today. Eight to ten million of these live in Europe, making them Europe’s largest minority without a state of their own. For them, the bad news remains plentiful, but there is better news in that both the human condition and our concepts of acceptable levels of civility do evolve. Many countries, as well as numerous American states, now view capital punishment as a cruel and unusual act. The treatment of Native Americans has become a source of shame in American history. Numerous countries during the 1990s apologized to and compensated ethnic communities previously abused by them. The gains achieved by the Roma in the waning years of the 20th century and early years of the current one may fit into this pattern, and the 21st century may yet witness substantial Roma progress in achieving not just official recognition but equality in Europe. For all their internal fragmentation, they are, after all, the only truly transnational ethnic group in a uniting Europe committed to becoming a democratic Europe without borders. Notes 1. The “Yellow Peril” campaign conducted against Asian immigrants in the United States, for example, began in 1899, only one year after the United States Supreme Court found it necessary to affirm the citizenship of U.S.-born Chinese. 2. Roma estimates of the number of Romany Holocaust victims run as high as 1.5 million. 3. Central European states have historically undercounted their Roma population, especially during the communist era, when efforts were being made to assimilate the officially “small” Romani element. Conversely, Roma spokesmen have tended to exaggerate their numbers. The largest concentrations are in Romania (2–3 million in a country of 20 million when communism fell) and prepartition Czechoslovakia, pre–civil war Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria (600,000–800,000 each). 4. Many of the names by which the Roma have become known in Europe, especially Tshingani and Cziganye, are derived from the Byzantine word atsinganoi, which means “untouchable” in the sense of being beyond the influence of those around them. Tracy

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Brand, “Eastern Europe’s Gypsy Minority” (master’s thesis, Johns Hopkins University (1996), 18. 5. One Hungarian text, for example, claimed that many Gypsies “were unable to and did not even want to adapt to a civilized European way of life” and that “the life of Romany is marked by crime.” Cited in Budapest Sun, September 6, 2000: 3. 6. Prior to this enlargement, the European Union was essentially composed of the economically advanced and established democratic countries of a Western Europe. The 2004 enlargement added the three Baltic Republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from the former Soviet Union; the Central European postcommunist countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia; Slovenia from the former Yugoslavia; and Malta and the ethnically divided state of Cyprus from Europe’s south. The enlargement raised the number of member states from 15 to 25. Two more countries with significant Romani minorities, Romania and Bulgaria, were added in 2008, and Croatia from the former Yugoslavia joined in 2013. 7. The ERRC listings of “Violence against Roma” as of July 6, 2014, ran 29 pages in length (http://www.errc.org/en-search-results.php?mtheme=16). Particularly of note was the report of the attacks against the Roma in Bulgaria between September 2011 and July 2012, which claimed five lives and left numerous others hospitalized with injuries. On the relationship between economic woes and violence against the Roma, see Nicholas Kulish, “As Economic Turmoil Mounts So Do Deadly Attacks on Hungary’s Gypsies,” New York Times, April 4, 2009.

Suggested Readings Barany, Zoltan. 2002. The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Crowe, David M. 2007. A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Cruickshank, Neil. 2013. “The EU and Roma Rights: Ending Ethnic Conflict through Governance?” In From Mediation to Nation-Building: Third Parties and the Management of Communal Conflict, edited by Joseph R. Rudolph and William Lahneman. Lantham, MD: Lexington Press, 211–231. Fings, Karola. 1997. The Gypsies during the Second World War. Hatfield, U.K.: Gypsies Research Centre, University of Hertfordshire Press. Guy, Wil, ed. 2001. Between Past and Future: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe. Hertfordshire, U.K.: University of Hertfordshire Press. Pogany, Istvan. 2004. The Roma Café: Human Rights and the Plight of the Romani People. London: Pluto Press. Ringold, Dena. 2000. Roma and the Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Trends and Challenges. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Tong, Diane, ed. 1998. Gypsies: An Interdisciplinary Reader. New York: Garland.

Appendix Nothing currently underscores the contemporary status of Europe’s still mainly Central European Roma more authoritatively than the recent European studies of their status and European progress in securing their rights and abetting their integration into mainstream European society. Excerpted here are key portions of the 251-page Council of Europe study on “Human Rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe” (page numbers in parentheses) and a shorter 2014 EU Report on “Integration Strategies.”

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Human Rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe Roma and Travellers together comprise the largest set of minority groups in Europe. . . . Anti-Gypsyism The report shows that anti-Gypsyism is deeply rooted in Europe. Many people who have never interacted with Roma or Travellers volunteer detailed, stereotype-laden descriptions of Roma or Traveller appearance and behaviour. Public leaders and opinion bodies – both elected officials and others – have openly defamed Roma and Travellers using racist or stigmatising rhetoric. In some cases, these words have been understood as encouraging violent action against the Roma, such as mob violence and pogroms. The Commissioner is of the opinion that anti-Roma speech, including during electoral campaigns, must be strongly condemned in all cases and punished when it breaks laws against incitement to hatred. Political parties should also adopt selfregulatory measures to exclude racist language. In an increasing number of European countries, extremist groups explicitly target Roma and Travellers, in some cases galvanising segments of the public against these persons. Such extremist groups are increasingly active on the Internet, a medium which has allowed for enhanced crossborder co-operation among likeminded groups with extremist outlooks. These groups are active in recruiting youths through a variety of techniques, including the organisation of hate music concerts. Vigilante and paramilitary groups often wear uniforms, use weapons and have been increasingly tightening their net around Roma by using verbal and physical threats and carrying out massive protests. Members of these extremist groups have been found to be at the source of a number of hate crimes targeting Roma. The Commissioner has recommended the termination of financing for organisations promoting racism, including political parties. States might also usefully consider dissolving extremist parties when they are deemed incompatible with the standards and values of a democratic society. Anti-Gypsy stereotypes also continue to be spread and perpetuated in the media across Europe. A number of journals and broadcast media have been reporting on Roma and Travellers only in the context of social problems and crime. The Commissioner has stressed the need for self-regulation and ethical journalism to end the negative portrayal of Roma in the media. As a general principle, what is illegal offline should also be illegal online in a context where the Internet is used to perpetrate anti-Roma hate speech and to organize violence. Mechanisms to monitor racism on the Internet should be established by member states, in accordance with the General Policy Recommendations No. 6 of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on combating the dissemination of racist, xenophobic and antisemitic material via the Internet. Anti-Gypsyism may also entail a lack of recognition of Roma history of past suffering, particularly during the Second World War. This passive denial is often manifested in silence about Roma victims at commemorations and memorials, in media coverage, or in official history and textbooks. The Commissioner stresses that the extermination of Roma during the Second World War must not be forgotten. Teaching about Roma history, raising awareness of Roma genocide during the Second World War, and building and maintaining memorial sites are the least member states could do to honour Roma victims. (11–12) …

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Racially motivated violence against Roma and Travellers Violence against Roma and Travellers has been prevalent in post-1989 Europe, with a notable increase of serious cases in recent years. In some contexts, this violence has been perpetrated by organised fascist or neo-Nazi groups and has involved planning and preparation. However, anti-Roma violence is not committed only by organised groups. In some instances, non-Roma communities have engaged more or less spontaneously in vigilante violence against Roma and Travellers, while in other cases the violence has been carried out by individuals motivated simply by racist hatred without any particular political ideology. In some countries, anti-Roma violence has been committed by a combination of different kinds of perpetrators. . . . (13) Treatment of Roma and Travellers by law enforcement and judicial authorities Reports received by the Commissioner from around Europe indicate patterns of discrimination and ill-treatment by police towards Roma and Travellers. Roma have been subjected to police violence both in detention facilities and public spaces, such as Roma settlements during police raids. In a number of cases, when criminal investigations of such acts have been initiated, they appear to have been manifestly biased or discriminatory. (13–14) ... Roma and trafficking in human beings Reports reaching the Commissioner indicate that trafficking in human beings in Europe affects Roma disproportionately. Roma are reportedly trafficked for various purposes including sexual exploitation, labour exploitation, domestic servitude, illegal adoption and begging. Roma women and children are often seriously over-represented as victims in all forms of trafficking. The vulnerability of Roma must be taken into account in national policies regarding trafficking in human beings, without any stigmatisation. Protection measures should include training of law enforcement officials and awareness-raising campaigns targeting Roma communities, in particular segregated and socially excluded communities. (17) ... Statelessness and gaps in the personal documentation of Roma The social exclusion of Roma and Travellers can worsen as a result of their having no formal administrative existence. As the Commissioner noted in the Human Rights Comment, “Stateless Roma: no documents – no rights: tens of thousands of Roma live in Europe without a nationality. Lacking birth certificates, identity cards, passports and other documents, they are often denied basic rights such as education, health care, social assistance and the right to vote.” . . . (24) Moreover, certain consequences of state succession, such as restrictive citizenship laws, have created additional obstacles that disproportionately affect Roma. As a result, many Roma in Europe are stateless: they are not considered as nationals by any state and are frequently denied basic social rights and freedom of movement. The problem exists in many countries in Europe, but it is particularly acute in the western Balkans. Lack of a formal administrative existence, whether in the form of statelessness or the lack of personal

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identification documents, has a devastating impact on all persons’ ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . . (24–25) Enjoyment by Roma and Travellers of freedom of movement and international protection inside and outside state territory Very few European states are committed to ensuring that Travellers can exercise their freedom of movement, despite the Strasbourg Court case law on the issue. In fact, existing policies in all but a few countries serve to dissuade Travellers from developing regular migration routes. In practice, zoning measures or other rules and regulations are frequently used to discourage Travellers or itinerant Roma from coming and going. (25) ... (from the report) Despite these extensive supra-national efforts, improvements at national, regional or local level are not present on a wide scale. Statistical data on the situation of Roma in key sectors remains of limited scope and availability, as well as of poor quality. (36) ... 3.2. Roma and Travellers in the justice systems of Europe Problematic issues related to policing are frequently not corrected by prosecutors and judges. Indeed, in a number of countries, differences between Roma and non-Roma in areas such as decisions to remand into custody, rates of prosecution and sentencing are sufficiently marked to merit the conclusion that domestic judicial systems are often perpetuating and in some cases possibly amplifying bias in policing. (86–87) ... 6.1. The right to education ... Exclusion from formal schooling is reported in a number of Council of Europe member states and ranges from complete exclusion from mainstream schools to school truancy and abandonment. It is often the result of direct and indirect discrimination. ECRI reports that in countries including Albania, France, Georgia, Greece, Portugal and Russia, Roma and Travellers have been excluded from or have dropped out of school often as the result of discrimination. In Albania, for example, Roma children have been refused access to schools for lack of vaccinations, an issue that authorities have reportedly not yet fully resolved. (116) ... Segregation of Roma children Policies and practices that separate Roma in education are to be found throughout the Council of Europe member states. Three patterns of segregation of Roma children have

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been identified throughout Europe, included by UNICEF: segregation between schools (where most Roma children attend Roma-majority schools), segregation within schools (when in mainstream education Roma children are separated from the others in classes and other facilities), and segregation into special schools, including schools for mentallydisabled children. Some countries combine the three types of segregation. (123) … 6.2. Access to adequate housing Discrimination in access to adequate housing, as well as in housing policy and practice Discrimination in access to adequate housing is reported in a number of Council of Europe member states, including the Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. Discrimination against Roma and Travellers in access to housing takes several forms, such as denial of access to public and private rental housing on an equal footing with others and in some cases, refusals even to sell housing to Roma. Other forms of unequal treatment include preferential treatment of non-Roma in the development of infrastructure and systematic failure to develop infrastructure in Roma communities; as a result, a racially discriminatory tolerance of extremely substandard housing conditions can be noted as well as other situations rising to the level of degrading treatment under European Convention Article 3. (138) Segregation: informal settlements, excluded localities and other separated housing arrangements A 2010 report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights – covering only European Union member states – found that residential segregation of Roma and Travellers is evident in Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. In countries such as Belgium, Portugal and Sweden, Roma often live in the same areas as other minorities, particularly immigrants, in socially deprived areas of low-quality housing. Substandard housing conditions Segregation is usually accompanied by hazardous living conditions for Roma. Even when not formally segregated, many Roma continue to live in sub-standard conditions in most European countries. . . . Homelessness Roma migrants from Bulgaria, Romania and elsewhere in the Balkans have frequently become homeless in western Europe. Homelessness is also reported among Roma and Travellers in their own countries, with Roma particularly evident among post-1989 populations of homeless adults and children in countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. (156) …

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6.3. Access to employment Employment of Roma women Employment issues facing Roma on the labour market have an important gender dimension. European employers discriminate against Roma women on the grounds of both ethnicity and gender. However, as noted by the Spanish NGO Fundacion Secretariado Gitano, Roma women often shoulder the brunt of family financial obligations. (162) … Exclusion from health insurance and denial of medical services as a result of a lack of personal documents or related status issues In many countries, Roma have been excluded from health care schemes as they cannot afford to pay health insurance contributions or are not formally employed or registered in employment agencies. Lack of identification. . . . (171–172) … Conclusions The years 2010 and 2011 saw major advances in the development of the European institutions’ explicit commitments to tackle the exclusion of Roma. The Council of Europe Strasbourg Declaration on Roma provides the political impetus to take concrete measures in this direction. The EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 also constitutes a move long sought after by Roma rights activists throughout Europe. On the other hand, there are troubling trends. European institutions responded with caution to policies evidently destructive of the fundamental rights of Roma in Italy and France. At a number of key moments, member states have rendered European-level calls to tackle Roma and Travellers’ exclusion hollow, by openly flouting those expressions of concern. . . . At the same time, new voices from the extreme right are gaining volume, and resentment against any “positive discrimination” for Roma and Travellers appears to be growing. In many places, such views are a thin cover for sentiments that Roma and Travellers can never be accepted as full and equal citizens of Europe, and will only be tolerated if they remain a docile and ideally invisible population of outsiders, or if they cede any affiliation with the Roma and Travellers community and blend or “assimilate” into a – generally fictive – “majority.” (221) Source: “Human Rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe,” Commissioner for Human Rights (Paris: Council of Europe Publishing, 2012).

China Ethnic Conflict in the World’s Largest Multinational State Katherine P. Kaup

Timeline 1279–1368 The (Mongol) Yuan dynasty rules. 1368–1644 The (Han) Ming dynasty rules. 1644–1911 The (Manchu) Qing dynasty rules. 1884 Xinjiang is incorporated as a Chinese province. 1904 The Anglo-Tibetan Treaty grants British trade concessions in Tibet. 1911 The dynastic order ends. 1912 The Dalai Lama declares Tibetan independence. 1914 Tibet, Great Britain, and China attend the Simla Convention. 1910–1949 During the Republican era, the National People’s Party (Kuo-min Tang, KMT) rules.

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1933 The East Turkestan Republic is established. 1935 The fourteenth Dalai Lama is born. 1944–1949 The second Eastern Turkestan Republic is established. 1949 Mao Zedong proclaims the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. 1950 The Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army declares the “liberation of Tibet.” 1951 The Tibetan delegation signs the 17-Point Agreement. 1956 A popular uprising occurs in Tibet. 1959 A major rebellion against Chin occurs in Tibet. The Dalai Lama flees Tibet for India with more than 50,000 followers. 1966–1976 The Cultural Revolution takes place: China’s “Ten Lost Years.” 1978 Deng Xiaoping becomes China’s paramount leader. 1979 Deng Xiaoping launches new economic and political reforms. 1981 The Communist Party announces a new development program in Inner Mongolia. 1984 The Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law is promulgated. 1987 The Dalai Lama internationalizes the campaign to free Tibet.

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1988 The Dalai Lama revokes the call for independence with the Strasbourg Proposal. 1990 The Baren uprising results in martial law. 1991 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) is dissolved. 1997 The Yining uprising occurs; several arrests follow. 1999 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan sign an agreement to fight the Islamic insurgency, which leads to creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 2001 China supports the U.S. War on Terror. 2006 The Qinghai-Tibet railway reaches Lhasa March 2008 Demonstrations against government policy turn violent in Tibet. July 2009 Dozens are killed as ethnic protests erupt in violence in Xinjiang. 2013–2014 Uygurs are accused of expanding terrorist attacks outside of Xinjiang after an attack at Tiananmen Square in October 2013 and at the Kunming Railway Station in March 2014. Conflicts between members of both the Uygur and Tibetan ethnic minorities and the state are more intense today than they have been in decades. Major protests against Chinese ethnic policies erupted in Tibet in March 2008 and spread across ethnically Tibetan areas. The government clamped down on the protests with intense force, detaining over a thousand protestors, increasing Han security forces in the area, and imposing harsh sentences on protest leaders as well as new restrictive policies on Tibetan religious activities. Over 120 Tibetans have protested Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies since 2008 by lighting themselves on fire in final acts of desperation. Ethnic tensions also flared in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous

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Region in July 2009, when over a hundred people lost their lives in street clashes between Han and Uygurs. The government’s “Strike Hard” campaigns against the “three evils of ethnic splittism, religious fundamentalism, and international terrorism” in Xinjiang and Tibet have led the government to conduct tens of thousands of random home searches, detain hundreds of ethnic minorities, and execute more than two dozen minorities accused of perpetrating violence in the demonstrations. The government regularly conflates expressions of ethnic identity with separatism or terrorism and clamps down on minorities’ freedoms of religion and expression accordingly. In September 2014, for example, Uygur scholar Ilham Tohti was sentenced to life in prison for allegedly “inciting ethnic hatred” with his postings to Uyghur Online. Tensions soared to new heights when two terrorist attacks occurred outside of Xinjiang and Tibet: in October 2013, a car allegedly driven by Uygurs drove into a crowd of civilians at Tiananmen Square, killing 5 and injuring 38, and in March 2014, a group of Uygurs attacked civilians with knives at the Kunming Train Station, killing 29 civilians and injuring over a hundred others. Although China’s ethnic minorities constitute less than 9 percent of the country’s total population, ensuring their allegiance to the state is of crucial importance to the CCP. Minority communities are spread across roughly 65 percent of China’s total landmass, 20 percent of the nation’s arable land, 90 percent of the grasslands plains, and 40 percent of the national forests. Over 90 percent of China’s international borders fall within minority territory, and these borders arbitrarily divide more than 30 Chinese nationalities from their counterparts in adjacent states. Minorities have historically been poorly integrated into the state and remain far behind the Han majority on most socioeconomic indicators, including educational levels, access to health care, and income levels. Should even 1 of the 55 officially recognized ethnic groups succeed in pressuring the state for greater autonomy, the Chinese government worries that would set a dangerous example for the remaining groups as well as for important areas contesting their relationship with the PRC government, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Chinese Communist Party has sought to ease ethnic tensions through its regional ethnic autonomy policy, which promises to make minorities “the masters of their own homes.” The state officially recognizes 55 ethnic minorities, although the state’s efforts to classify and label hundreds of smaller ethnic groups into such neat categories belies the extremely complex ethnic makeup of China’s population. The minorities are diverse, speaking nearly 100 separate languages that belong to at least 5 independent language families. Different minority groups adhere to all of the world’s major religions, and some practice religions unique to their own ethnic groups. While some of the minority groups have historically cooperated with the Han and have adopted many of their customs, others have long traditions of open conflict and warfare with the Han majority. The history of ethnic conflict since the fall of the dynastic order in 1911 has primarily been between the Han and the Tibetans, Uygurs, and Mongols. Although Mongols continue to clash with the government over a variety of issues, particularly over land-use rights and the government’s resettlement of Mongol nomadic herders, relations in Mongol regions have improved relative to the surge in tensions since 2008 in Tibet and the XUAR.

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Historical Background Prior to the 20th century, no Chinese government had successfully integrated the hundreds of ethnic groups living within its imperial administrative domain. The history of pre-20th-century China is riddled with bloody conflicts between various minority groups and the majority Han population; the best-known and largest resulted in the rule of the Mongols over the entire country from 1279 to 1367 and of the Manchus from 1644 to 1911. To prevent open conflict between the imperial authorities and the various ethnic groups, the Chinese leadership allowed minorities to govern themselves in exchange for nominal tutelage to the emperor. The Republican government that came to power in 1911 abolished the office of the emperor after more than 2,000 years. The new Nationalist, or KMT, government recognized only five nationalities (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Turkic Muslim) and generally practiced a policy of forced assimilation. In fact, KMT leader Sun Yat-sen once proclaimed, “We must facilitate the dying out of all names of individual peoples inhabiting China, i.e., Manchus, Tibetans, etc. . . . We must satisfy the demands of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political whole.”1 The Chinese Communist Party radically restructured relations between the minorities and the state when it came to power in 1949. Bent on fully integrating the diverse groups into a unified state for the first time, the CCP implemented a policy of regional autonomy for the minorities and promised to protect their unique cultures, languages, religions, and right to self-rule. The CCP’s Regional Autonomy Policy grants the minorities a number of special economic, political, and social privileges. The policy has been unevenly implemented, however, and often flagrantly contradicted in Xinjiang and Tibet, as discussed below. The CCP’s minority policy was formulated in keeping with the Marxist contention that nationality is a reflection of class relations and will die out as communism takes root. The CCP believed that its policy would both satisfy the nationalities’ demands for unique recognition and ultimately make these pressures obsolete. Unfortunately, in Tibet and the northwestern region of Xinjiang, CCP policy has not only failed to weaken ethnic identities but has led to increased tensions between the Han and their ethnic charges. After decades of repressive controls over expressions of ethnic identity in Tibet and Xinjiang, most Tibetans and Uygurs have abandoned calls for outright independence in favor of greater true autonomy within a unified state; the resentment against Han Chinese rule is palpable in the region, and violent protest against state policy appears on the rise. The nationalities constitute less than 9 percent of China’s total population, but over half of the counties below the abject poverty line are minority areas. Despite official pledges to reduce economic inequality, economic reforms since 1979 have significantly increased the economic disparity between the minorities and the Han, furthering ethnic resentment. Economic disparities, combined with CCP policies designed to control minorities’ religious and cultural practices, have exacerbated the conflicts.

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The Conflict Tibet

The conflict between Tibetans and the Chinese party-state revolves around both a fundamental clash of worldviews and a dispute over who has the right to govern Tibet, which is in part determined by historical claims over when and how Tibet became a part of China. Religion plays the most important role in defining Tibetan ethnic identity. Nearly all ethnic Tibetans adhere to a unique form of Buddhism, which blends the monastic discipline of early Theravada Buddhism with some shamanistic features of the indigenous Tibetan religion known as Bon. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual head of the Tibetan community. Although the CCP formally acknowledges the Tibetans’ right to practice their religion, the party’s official orthodoxy still follows the Marxist view that religion is a false ideology, an “opiate of the masses.” Communist propaganda condemns the material waste of supporting religious personnel and monasteries. The appeal and power of the Dalai Lama also fundamentally contrasts with the party’s self-depiction as the sole representative of the masses. The CCP demands that all citizens within the People’s Republic of China accept the sole authority of the Chinese Communist Party and unitary rule of the multinational state. The Dalai Lama’s authority is thus seen as a direct threat to the CCP as the sole voice of the people. In addition to this clash of worldviews, the Tibetans and Chinese government view the history of Tibet’s integration into the PRC in opposing terms, the Tibetans claiming that their sovereign and independent country was illegally occupied by Communist forces in 1950, and the CCP claiming that Tibet has been an integral part of China since the Yuan dynasty in the 13th century and its “peaceful liberation” in 1950. The “Liberation” of Tibet

On October 7, 1950, almost a year to the day after seizing control of China, the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began its military campaign in Tibet. The PLA declared that it was liberating the Tibetan people from the “feudal oppression” raging throughout Tibet and assured the Tibetan people that only through joining the Communist movement could their rights and culture truly be protected. The Tibetans, for their part, claimed that the Chinese forces were invading the independent nation of Tibet and appealed to the United Nations for assistance. The legal status of Tibet on the eve of the Communist takeover is contentiously debated and rarely presented objectively by either side. Whether Tibet was an independent state at the time of the PLA penetration, however, helps determine whether the Chinese Communist Party has the right to govern Tibet. The CCP itself condemns the use of force in acquiring territory and bases its claim to rule on the pre-1950 status of Tibet as a province of China, not on its military acquisition of Tibet in 1950. International jurists, scholars, and politicians can all present compelling arguments both to support and refute Tibet’s legal claims to independent statehood. What is not debated, even among Chinese officials, is that often extreme counterinsurgency measures have been taken against the Tibetans,

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including—according to groups such as Amnesty International, though denied by the CCP—“cruel and degrading treatment of children” and the torture of both adults and children to extract confessions.2 The Chinese government claims that Tibet was formally incorporated into the Chinese state during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1367). The Yuan dynasty was established by Mongol ruler Kublai Khan, who asserted his control over the majority Han population and the smaller nationalities within the territory now known as China and stretched his Mongol Empire as far west as the gates of Vienna. The Chinese government argues that the Mongol incorporation of Tibet into Chinese territory was formalized through inter alia the Yuan demarcation of Tibetan administrative boundaries, the appointment of local officials, the collection of taxes, and the imperial preceptor system in which a Tibetan religious leader served as a direct spiritual adviser to the Mongol supreme leader. Chinese control continued, according to the official Chinese stance, throughout the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and strengthened significantly under the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), another non-Han dynasty controlled by the Manchus. China contends that the British government forced the Chinese into an unequal treaty in 1904 that denied Chinese “rightful control” over Tibet. When the Tibetan spiritual and secular leader, the Dalai Lama, declared Tibet independent in 1912, he violated international law, according to the Chinese. Tibet’s declaration of independence cannot, therefore, be used to justify contemporary Tibetan claims to independence. The Tibetan government in exile, however, claims that Tibet has been an independent nation for over 2,000 years, although it experienced brief periods of foreign influence in the 13th and 18th centuries when the Mongol Empire and the Manchu Qing dynasty forced its will on Tibet. According to many Tibetans, the Mongol Empire was a world empire, and whatever ties Tibet had with the Mongol leadership ended with the fall of the empire and the reestablishment of the Han leadership under the Ming dynasty. Practically no relationship was maintained with the Ming dynasty. And the Qing dynasty was again a non-Chinese empire, so ties with it cannot be used to justify the current Han Chinese government’s claims to rule. Furthermore, the Tibetans argue, throughout most of its history, Tibet maintained all of the qualifications for statehood required by international law, including a stable population, territory, independent government, and the ability to engage in diplomatic relations with international players. Treaties concluded between an independent Tibet and Great Britain in 1904 and at the Simla Convention in 1914, as well as treaties reached between Tibet and the neighboring countries of Nepal and Bhutan, all show evidence of Tibet’s independent status and ability to engage in diplomatic relations without the involvement of the Chinese. Since the late 1980s, the Dalai Lama and most Tibetans have given up calls for an independent Tibet and instead are calling for true autonomy and democracy within Tibetan areas. Tibetans’ historical claims to statehood strengthen Tibetans’ belief that they have a right to govern themselves, even if circumstances only allow such exercise under the sovereignty of the PRC.

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The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

As in Tibet, the Chinese Communist Party views the strength of ethnic religious identity as a threat to centralized rule. The more the CCP attempts to shut down religious activities in the region, however, the more the Muslim groups tend to resist Chinese rule. Influenced even today by Marxist assumptions that ethnic loyalties will fade as economic disparities among the ethnic groups diminish, the Chinese government has pushed for rapid economic development in the region. Given low educational levels among the ethnic minorities and the government’s concerns about their loyalty to the state, however, the economic development has been led by Han Chinese who have migrated to Xinjiang, rather than by ethnic residents of Xinjiang. The Han migrants have taken the most high-wage jobs and powerful political positions. The government’s efforts to manage the conflict has, therefore, exacerbated rather than alleviated tensions. China’s northwest province of Xinjiang is home to more than 8 million TurkicMuslims, many of whom have been struggling for independence from the linguistically, ethnically, and culturally distinct Han for decades. Like the Tibetans, the Uygurs, and several of the other Turkic nationalities in Xinjiang, are deeply committed to their religion. Maintaining control over this region is a key priority for the CCP because Xinjiang is China’s largest province, contains a wealth of natural resources (including oil, natural gas, and coal), and borders several Islamic states dominated by ethnic groups also found in Xinjiang. Although the region has been of crucial importance to the Chinese for centuries as a crossing point for caravans shipping goods between China and the Middle East, Xinjiang was not formally incorporated into China as a province until 1884. The local population frequently asserted its independence from the Chinese over the next several decades, establishing an independent East Turkestan Republic in 1933, which lasted only briefly, and again in 1944. The second republic was dismantled in 1949 when the PLA took control of Xinjiang. In September 1955, the area was renamed the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Hundreds of thousands of Han Chinese have migrated to the region since the CCP created the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in the mid-1950s to establish a Han presence and to begin large agricultural farms and industrial projects. With encouragement from the state, Han Chinese have continued to flood into the region to seize new entrepreneurial opportunities under market reforms, to participate in large state-run development projects, and to serve as government and party cadres. In fact, several government documents, including the Assist Tibet, Assist Xinjiang, Assist the Border Regions Policy, indicate that the government believes Han Chinese are inherently more politically reliable than the minority population and should be dispatched to minority regions to “resist foreign and hostile forces vain attempts to split the motherland.” Han Chinese now make up over 40 percent of the region’s population, compared to 6 percent in 1950. Although the government prohibits publishing economic data on disparities in wealth among the ethnic groups, numerous Western scholars and human rights groups report that Han Chinese are taking the highest-paid positions in Xinjiang and are thus highly resented by the local ethnic minorities.

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Tensions in Xinjiang have peaked and ebbed over the last 60 years, in part reflecting shifts in broader central policies that have impacted politics across the nation. During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, for example, as radical Red Guards attacked “the four olds” (old culture, old customs, old habits, and old ideas) across the country, in Xinjiang, Red Guards violently attacked all actions associated with Islam. Muslim clerics were forced to raise pigs and often were paraded through the streets with pig heads strapped around their necks. Although tensions eased for a while during the 1980s after the loosening of controls by the new Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to increased tensions as the Chinese government imposed restrictive measures on expressions of ethnic solidarity in hopes of preventing a similar collapse along ethnic lines. Those seeking separation from China hoped for support from the new Central Asian states, many of which bore the names of the nationalities living within Xinjiang, including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Incidents of violent clashes increased as Uygurs protested government policies and some advocated for greater autonomy or even independence. In 1997, a major anti-Han riot erupted in Yining, Xinjiang, leaving 9 dead and more than 200 wounded. The Han crackdown following the Yining uprising was swift and forceful: Amnesty International reported that 210 Uygurs were sentenced to death between January 1997 and April 1999.3 The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 greatly impacted ethnic dynamics within Xinjiang. The Chinese government agreed to support the United States’ War on Terror in return for U.S. recognition that the Chinese were battling their own terrorist challenges in some of their border regions, including in Xinjiang. Since 2001, the government has increased its internal security forces in Xinjiang, tightened controls over Islamic religious practices, pushed to remove the use of Uygur language in schools, and ramped up its economic development efforts in Xinjiang in hopes of integrating the region more fully. Management of the Conflict The Chinese government has tried to manage the “nationalities problem” through its policy of Regional Autonomy. Since the party was formed in 1921, it has tried to win the support of minorities by promising them the right to be “masters of their own homes.” The party promised that all areas with “a significant concentration of minorities” would be allowed to establish “autonomous organs of government” and would be ensured a number of preferential rights, including the right to preserve their ethnic cultures, be governed by one of their own at the local level and have proportional representation within the central government, manage their own curricula, maintain a greater degree of control over local economic development plans, use their own languages, and freely practice their religions. The government also told autonomous governments that they could alter national laws to suit local conditions as long as doing so did not violate the spirit of the law or the interests of the state as a whole. All of the regional autonomy policies were codified into law in 1984 with the promulgation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.

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Importantly, the Chinese government repeatedly noted that economic development would erase ethnic tensions and moved to develop the minority regions even when doing so required importing technical experts and labor from the Han interior. The minority areas, overwhelmingly concentrated in remote and difficult to access border territories, were connected to the rest of China through massive infrastructural projects, starting with the construction of the first highway into Tibet in 1950 and continuing more recently with the engineering marvel of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, completed in 2006, and the new Lanzhou-Xinjiang highspeed railway, just completed in 2014. The Chinese government notes the massive investments it has made in minority regions’ economic development, including increased infrastructure, improvements in educational levels and access to health services, and in household income levels. It also notes the increased number of ethnic minorities serving in government posts.4 Many minority activists and outside analysts, however, contend that the massive infusion of Han Chinese has been intentionally orchestrated to weaken minority cultures and that the state’s economic development has overwhelmingly favored Han Chinese immigrants and disadvantaged local ethnic minorities. Although ethnic minorities serve in the government, nearly all leading party positions are held by Han Chinese. The party wields real power in China and oversees the government at every level of government, from the center down to the villages. Managing the Tibetan Conflict

When the PLA began invading Tibet, it claimed to be overthrowing centuries of feudalist oppression of the Tibetan masses. The Chinese forces easily vanquished the ill-equipped Tibetan army and, in May 1951, forced a Tibetan delegation in Beijing to sign the 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. The 17-point Agreement recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while purportedly giving the Dalai Lama’s government the right to administer Tibet. It promised religious freedom throughout the territory. As reports of Chinese discriminatory policies toward Tibetans and the suppression of the Tibetan religion began circulating throughout Tibet in the years following the 17-point Agreement, however, Tibetans took up arms against the Chinese in a major uprising in 1956 and in another large-scale revolt in 1959. The Dalai Lama fled Tibet for neighboring India in 1959 with an entourage of more than 50,000. The CCP labeled the Dalai Lama an enemy of the state and banned any positive reference to him or any displays of his image, either publicly or in private homes. During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese tightened their control throughout Tibet and waged a mass campaign to root out Tibetan religion and culture. Tensions between the Tibetans and Han eased somewhat after Deng Xiaoping took control of China in 1978. Although officially refusing to negotiate, the Chinese government met secretly with the Dalai Lama in the early 1980s. By 1987, the Dalai Lama abandoned his calls for outright Tibetan independence and agreed to allow CCP control over Tibet’s external affairs in exchange for allowing true

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autonomy within Tibet, including the right to have a Tibetan-led constitutional democracy with open, competitive elections. The Tibetan government in exile demanded not only the right for true political autonomy within Tibet but for the creation of Greater Tibet, including large portions of Sichuan, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces. No progress was made, and when protests erupted against CCP policies in Lhasa in 1989, the government imposed martial law in Tibet. The subsequent crackdown led to a cessation of dialog between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government for most of the 1990s. Dialogs resumed again in 2002, but after nine rounds of discussion failed to make progress and as the government continued to tighten controls over cultural and religious practices, the dialogs were abandoned in 2010. Although Tibetans have been promised regional autonomy, the policy has not been properly implemented, and controls over Tibetans’ religious practices and cultural expressions are more tightly controlled than in nonethnic and nonautonomous areas.5 The state imposes strict controls over monks’ movements and bars religious practitioners from joining the Communist Party. As of 2007, the state no longer allows Tibetans to use their traditional methods of identifying and educating boys whom Tibetans believe are reincarnations of Buddhist teachers and instead requires the State Administration on Religious Affairs to oversee the process. As in the rest of China, all religious organizations must be registered with the state, and all “religious personnel” must be licensed by the state and undergo regular “Patriotic Education” training. Speech is strictly controlled in Tibet, and any writings that hint at “separatism” result in long prison terms for their authors, as is also true in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region

Until the breakup of the Soviet Union, Xinjiang received little international attention, although tensions between the Uygurs and the state precede the establishment of the PRC. Uygur hopes for assistance from the newly independent Central Asian countries seemed dashed when China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement in August 1999 to fight Islamic insurgency and later established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to carry out this fight. Here, too, the Chinese Communist Party is banking on the fact that economic development will increase the commitment of the national minorities to the People’s Republic of China and their inclusion therein. Massive amounts of investment capital have been shipped into the areas, although several reports contend that the investment favors either the Chinese state or the Han immigrants to the area. Few Uygurs are hired by the Chinese-run state-owned enterprises that dominate the area, and Uygurs’ living conditions continue to lag behind the Han.6 Likewise, unemployment rates among the minority nationalities are significantly higher than those of the Han. Tensions have increased in Xinjiang since 2001 and dramatically since public protests turned violent in 2009. The protests in 2009 were themselves a response to repressive government policies in Xinjiang. Hundreds of Uygurs have been

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arrested over the last five years, under charges of either supporting terrorism or “endangering state security,” a nebulous term that has been leveled at those peacefully espousing critiques of policies in Xinjiang, such as Uygur economist Ilham Tohti and short-story writer Nurmuhemmet Yasin, to name but a few. International media, human rights groups, and U.S. government organizations have condemned the lack of transparency in the Chinese government’s handling of ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang, noting that journalists are regularly barred from the area and that Chinese official directives mandate that all Chinese media strictly adhere to the official rendition of conditions in Xinjiang. Although acts of violence have undoubtedly increased in Xinjiang over the last five years, lack of government transparency and manipulation of information makes it difficult to assess how many of the hundreds of Uygurs killed by security personnel over the last several months were in fact inciting violence as opposed to expressing peaceful dissent. Security personnel have been increased dramatically in Xinjiang, the public security budget rising 24 percent in 2014 alone.7 When protests erupted in Xinjiang in July 2009, Internet connections to the area were cut and not restored until early in 2010, and foreign journalists were barred from the area. Police and paramilitary searches of the general Uygur population are now widespread in Xinjiang, as are arbitrary detentions of Uygurs and crackdowns on peaceful religious practices.8 The government has launched a campaign to discourage Muslim women from wearing headdresses and men from wearing the long beards encouraged by their faith. In some areas, anyone dressed in Islamic dress is barred from riding public buses.9 Students and government officials are barred from fasting during Ramadan, in clear violation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law’s guarantee of religious freedoms. The new Religious Extremism Law put in effect January 2015 will likely further enflame tensions as Uygurs face further restrictions on their ability to practice their faith. Significance Reaching a tenable solution to the conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang is becoming increasingly challenging as the trust between the Chinese government and the Tibetans and Uygurs erodes daily. The level of violence, in Xinjiang more than in Tibet, has become so intense that the government is unlikely to ease the repressive measures that are causing the tensions in the first place. The Chinese government seems convinced that relaxing controls over Islamic activities will enable terrorists to take root, but fails to see, or at least publicly acknowledge, that its own policies are contributing to the conflict. The policies that most exacerbate tensions, in both Xinjiang and Tibet, center around controls on religious activities, strict prohibitions against objectively analyzing the source of tensions, and rapid economic development imposed by the center before the local ethnic groups are prepared to participate constructively in, and thereby best benefit from, the development. Tensions will only continue to flare until both sides acknowledge the legitimate

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concerns and interests of the other and work toward building enough trust to explore a feasible working solution.10 Notes 1. Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 180. 2. “China Accused of Horrors in Tibet,” Associated Press dispatch filed on an Amnesty International report released on May 30, 1995, http://www.christusrex.org/www1/sdc/ tibet.html. 3. Amnesty International also reported 190 executions of Uygurs (alternate spelling, Uyghurs) in the territory during the same period. Other monitoring organizations have released comparable figures. See, for example, the tabulation on Chinese executions of Uyghurs by the Uyghur American Association at its website. http://uyghuramerican.org/search/node. 4. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China, February 2005, http://www.china.org.cn /e-white/20050301/index.htm. 5. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Special Focus 2005: China’s Minorities and Government Implementation of Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,” 2005 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005). See also sections on Xinjiang and Tibet in subsequent annual reports. 6. Edward Wong, “China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and Also Strife,” New York Times, December 20, 2014. 7. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2014 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014). 8. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2014 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2014). 9. Agence-France, “Xinjiang City Bans Muslim Clothing and Large Beards on Public Buses,” South China Morning Post, February 27, 2015. 10. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Human Rights in Xinjiang: Recent Developments (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2009).

Suggested Readings Bovingdon, Gardner. 2010. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press. Goldstein, Melvyn C. 1999. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley: University of California Press. Grunfeld, A. Tom. 1996. The Making of Modern Tibet. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Kaup, Katherine P. 2000. Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Mackerras, Colin. 1994. China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Starr, S. Frederick. 2004. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Zhang, Shaoying, and Derek McGhee. 2014. Social Policies and Ethnic Conflict in China: Lessons from Xinjiang (Politics and Development of Contemporary China). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Appendices The documents that follow both reflect official government positions toward China’s minority communities (the first document, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law) and exemplify the state’s intrusions into religious practice in Tibet in clear violation of the provisions of the official policy.

1. The Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of the People’s Republic of China People’s Republic of China Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law PREAMBLE The People’s Republic of China is a unitary multinational state created jointly by the people of all its ethnic nationalities. Regional ethnic autonomy is the basic policy adopted by the Communist Party of China for resolving the ethnic issue in China through its application of Marxism-Leninism. It is an important political system of the state. Regional ethnic autonomy means that the ethnic minorities, under unified state leadership, practice regional autonomy in areas where they live in concentrated communities and set up autonomous agencies for the exercise of the power of autonomy. Regional ethnic autonomy reflects the state’s full respect for and guarantee of ethnic minorities’ right to administer their internal affairs and its adherence to the principle of equality, unity and common prosperity for all nationalities. Regional ethnic autonomy has played an enormous role in giving full play to ethnic minorities’ enthusiasm for being masters over their own affairs, in developing among them a socialist relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance, in consolidating the unification of the country and in promoting socialist construction in the ethnic autonomous areas and the rest of the country. Continuing to strengthen and improve the regional ethnic autonomy system will enable it to play a still greater role in the country’s socialist modernization in the years ahead. Practice has proven that adherence to regional ethnic autonomy requires that the ethnic autonomous areas be given effective guarantees for implementing state laws and policies in the light of existing local conditions; that large numbers of minorities be trained to become cadres at all levels and specialized personnel and skilled workers of all professions and trades; that the ethnic autonomous areas strive to promote local socialist construction in the spirit of self-reliance and hard work and contribute to the nation’s construction as a whole; and that the state strive to help the ethnic autonomous areas speed up their economic and cultural development in accordance with the plans for national economic and social development. In the struggle to maintain the unity of the nationalities, both big-ethnic chauvinism, primarily Han chauvinism, and local ethnic chauvinism must be opposed. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of MarxismLeninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, the people of various nationalities in the ethnic autonomous areas shall, together with the people of the whole country, adhere to the people’s democratic dictatorship, support reform and opening, follow the construction of a socialist road with Chinese characteristics, concentrate their efforts on the development of socialist modernization, develop socialist market economics, strengthen socialist democracy and legal development, strengthen the development of a socialist spirit

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and culture, speed up the economic and cultural development of the ethnic autonomous areas, build unified and prosperous ethnic autonomous areas, and diligently strive for the common prosperity of all nationalities by transforming the motherland into a socialist country that is prosperous, democratic, and culturally advanced. The People’s Republic of China Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law is the basic law for the implementation of the system of regional ethnic autonomy prescribed in the Constitution. …

Chapter II Establishment of Ethnic Autonomous Areas and the Structure of The Organs of Self-Government Article 12 Autonomous areas may be established where one or more minority nationalities live in concentrated communities, in the light of local conditions such as the relationship among the various nationalities and the level of economic development, and with due consideration for historical background. Within an ethnic autonomous area, appropriate autonomous areas or ethnic townships may be established where other ethnic minorities live in concentrated communities. Some residential areas and towns of the Han nationality or other nationalities may be included in an ethnic autonomous area in consideration of actual local conditions. Article 13 Except in special cases, the name of an ethnic autonomous area shall be composed of the name of the locality and the name of the ethnic minority and the administrative status, in that order.

Chapter III The Power of Autonomy of the Organs of Self-Government … Article 20 If a resolution, decision, order, or instruction of a state agency at a higher level does not suit the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous agency of the area may report for the approval of that higher level state agency to either implement it with certain alterations or cease implementing it altogether. That higher level state agency must give its decision within sixty days of receiving the report. … Article 23 When recruiting personnel in accordance with state regulations, enterprises and institutions in ethnic autonomous areas give priority to minority nationalities and may enlist them from the population of minority nationalities in rural and pastoral areas. …

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Article 26 Given the prerequisite of adherence to the principles of socialism, autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas shall, in accordance with legal stipulations and local economic development conditions, rationally readjust the relations of production and reform the structure of economic administration to work hard for the development of a socialist market economy. The organs of self-government in ethnic autonomous areas, supporting public ownership as the base of an economic system with multiple forms of ownership developing together, may encourage the development of the non-public sector. Article 27 In accordance with legal stipulations, autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas shall define the ownership of, and the right to use, the pastures and forests within these areas. Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas shall protect and develop grasslands and forests and organize and encourage the planting of trees and grass. Destruction of grasslands and forests by any organization or individual by whatever means shall be prohibited. Destruction of grasslands or forests in order to reclaim land for agricultural purposes is strictly forbidden. Article 38 Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas independently develop literature, art, the press, publishing, radio broadcasting, the film industry, television and other cultural undertakings in forms and with characteristics unique to the nationalities. They shall increase investments in cultural enterprises, increase the construction of cultural facilities, and speed up the development of all types of cultural enterprises. Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas support relevant departments and bureaus as they collect, organize, translate and publish historical and cultural books of the nationalities, protect the scenic spots and historical sites in their areas, their treasured cultural relics and their other important historical and cultural legacies, and preserve and develop outstanding ethnic traditional culture. Source: The portions provided are excerpted from the full text of the law. Available at http:// www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/regional-ethnic-autonomy-law-of-the-peoples -republic-of-china-amended.

2. Management Measures for the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, Administration for Religious Affairs, July 13, 2007 State Religious Affairs Bureau Order—Order No. Five These “Management measures for the reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism” were passed at the administrative affairs conference of the State Administration of Religious Affairs on July 13, 2007, and will be implemented on September 1, 2007. Bureau Director, Ye Xiaowen July 18, 2007

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Article 1 These measures have been formulated in accordance with the “Regulations on Religious Affairs” in order to guarantee citizens’ freedom of religious belief, to respect Tibetan Buddhism’s practice of inheriting living Buddha positions, and to regulate the management of living Buddha reincarnation affairs. Article 2 Reincarnating living Buddhas should respect and protect the principles of the unification of the state, protecting the unity of the minorities, protecting religious concord and social harmony, and protecting the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism. Reincarnating living Buddhas should respect the religious rituals and historically established systems of Tibetan Buddhism, but may not re-establish feudal privileges which have already been abolished. Reincarnating living Buddhas shall not be interfered with or be under the dominion of any foreign organization or individual. Article 3 Reincarnating living Buddhas should have the following conditions: (1) A majority of local religious believers and the monastery management organization must request the reincarnation; (2) The inheritance lineage should be real and have continued to the present day; (3) The monastery applying for the living Buddha reincarnation must be the monastery at which the living Buddha monk is registered, it must be registered as a Tibetan Buddhist place of religious activity, and it must have the ability to train and raise living Buddhas. Article 4 Applicants to be reincarnating living Buddhas who have any of the following conditions may not be reincarnated: (1)  Reincarnations which are not regulated by the religious doctrine of Tibetan Buddhism; (2) Those in city-level people’s governments and above with delineated districts, which ordered no reincarnations to be permitted. Article 5 Reincarnating living Buddhas should carry out application and approval procedures. The application and approval procedure is: the management organization at the monastery applying for the living Buddha reincarnation where the monk is registered, or the local Buddhist Association, should submit applications for reincarnations to the local religious affairs departments at the level of people’s government above county-level; once the people’s government above county-level has made suggestions, the people’s government religious

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affairs department reports upwards, and examination and approval shall be made by the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government religious affairs department. Living Buddha reincarnations who have a relatively large impact shall be reported to the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government for approval; those with a great impact shall be reported to the State Administration for Religious Affairs for approval; those with a particularly great impact shall be reported to the State Council for approval. Verification and authorization of the living Buddha application should solicit the opinions of the corresponding Buddhist Association. Article 6 When there is debate over the size of a living Buddha’s impact, the China Buddhist Association shall officiate, and report to the State Administration of Religious Affairs to be put on the record. Article 7 Once an application for a living Buddha’s reincarnation has received approval, depending on the size of the living Buddha’s impact, the corresponding Buddhist Association shall establish a reincarnation guidance team; the management organization at the monastery where the living Buddha is registered, or the corresponding Buddhist Association, shall establish a search team to look for the reincarnate soul child, and search affairs shall be carried out under the leadership of the guidance team. The reincarnate soul child shall be recognized by the provincial or autonomous regional Buddhist Association or the China Buddhist Association in accordance with religious rituals and historically established systems. No group or individual may without authorization carry out any activities related to searching for or recognizing reincarnating living Buddha soul children. Article 8 Living Buddhas which have historically been recognized by drawing lots from the golden urn shall have their reincarnating soul children recognized by drawing lots from the golden urn. Requests not to use drawing lots from the golden urn shall be reported by the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government religious affairs departments to the State Administration of Religious Affairs for approval; cases with a particularly large impact shall be reported to the State Council for approval. Article 9 Once a reincarnating living Buddha soul child has been recognized, it shall be reported the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government religious affairs department for approval; those with a great impact shall be reported to the State Administration for

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Religious Affairs for approval; those with a particularly great impact shall be reported to the State Council for approval. Reincarnating living Buddhas who have been approved by the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government religious affairs departments or by the autonomous regional people’s government shall be reported to the State Administration of Religious Affairs to be put on record. Article 10 When the reincarnating living Buddha is installed, a representative of the approving authority shall read out the documents of approval, and the corresponding Buddhist Association shall issue a living Buddha permit. Living Buddha permits shall uniformly be issued by the China Buddhist Association and reported to the State Administration of Religious Affairs to be put on record. Article 11 Persons and units who are responsible for being in contravention of these measures and who without authority carry out living Buddha reincarnation affairs, shall be dealt administrative sanction by the people’s government religious affairs departments in accordance with stipulations in the “Regulations on Religious Affairs”; when a crime has been constituted, criminal responsibility shall be pursued. Article 12 When the reincarnating living Buddha has been installed the management organization at the monastery where he is registered shall formulate a training plan, recommend a scripture teacher, and submit the plan to the local Buddhist Association, which shall report upward to the provincial or autonomous regional people’s government religious affairs department for approval. Article 13 Provinces and autonomous regions which are involved in affairs of reincarnating living Buddhas may formulate and implement detailed measures in accordance these measures, and report them to the State Administration of Religious Affairs to be put on record. Article 14 These measures shall be implemented from September 1, 2007. Source: The full text is provided, as made available translated into English at the Web site of the International Campaign for Tibet. Available at http://www.savetibet.org/new -measures-on-reincarnation-reveal-partys-objectives-of-political-control.

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Cyprus Turkish Cyprus: The Dynamics of a Frozen Conflict Magdalena Dembinska

Timeline 1600 BCE Six hundred years of Greek influence in Cyprus begins. 58 BCE Cyprus becomes part of the Roman Empire and later the East Roman (Byzantine) Empire. 1489 The Venetian Empire establishes an outpost in Cyprus. 1571 Ottoman (Turkish) influence begins. 1875–1878 Cyprus passes to Great Britain under the terms of the Cyprus Convention in return for Britain’s promise to aid Turkey should czarist Russia attack the Ottoman Empire. 1914 Great Britain formally annexes Cyprus. 1923 Cyprus recognizes the annexation, and, in 1925, the island officially becomes a British crown colony. 1955 Greek Cypriots begin a guerrilla war against British rule. The guerrilla movement, the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA), wants enosis

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(unification) with Greece. Turkish Cypriots envision the division of the island, taksim, and create their own organization, Volcan, which is later replaced by the Turkish Defense Organization (TMT). 1959 Britain, Greece, Turkey, and NATO members gather in Zurich for the first international attempt to resolve the conflict. 1960 In August, Cyprus achieves independence; Turkey and Greece agree not to interfere in affairs of the new state. 1963 On November 30, President Makarios proposes a constitutional change that would have effectively barred Turkish Cypriots from political power. In December, intercommunal conflict prompts Great Britain to intervene to restore order and preempt intervention by Turkey or Greece. 1964 In March, the UN Security Council creates a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus to replace British forces and establish a buffer zone, called the Green Line. Uneasy peace resumes. 1974 Despite talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on establishing a unitary Cyprus with a strong local government, on July 15, the Makarios government in Cyprus is overthrown by a pro-enosis regime in a coup led by the Cyprus National Guard, under the control of officers from mainland Greece. Turkey invades the island to protect Turkish Cypriots. Turkish forces occupy a third of the island and enforce a partition between north and south, roughly along the cease-fire “Green Line”. The UN Security Council unanimously passes a resolution calling on Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. Turkey refuses to do so, despite repeated UN Security Council resolutions making the same demand over the following decades. 1974–1975 The armed conflict triggers massive and often forced migration of Greek Cypriots to the island’s south and Turk Cypriots to the island’s north, a de facto partition of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots establish an independent administration, with Rauf Denktash as president. 1980 UN-sponsored peace talks resume.

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1983 On November 15, the Turkish Cypriot region declares itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The TRNC is only recognized by Turkey. 1988 The first significant discussions are held between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus on the topic of resolving communal conflict. March 1990 Talks collapse as a result of Turkish demand for an amended constitution recognizing the minority’s “right to self-determination.” 1990s The applications of Cyprus and Turkey for EU membership necessitate the settlement of the ethnic conflict on Cyprus and offer encouragement that the conflict will be resolved. 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proses a bicommunal institutional design for Cyprus, called the “Set of Ideas.” 2000 The Turkish Cypriot leader says the TRNC will not continue negotiations with Greek Cypriots or outside mediators until its independence is recognized. December 2001 Under EU pressure to resolve their conflict or see Cyprus passed over when the EU next expands, the leaders of the Turkish and Greek communities agree to begin a new round of efforts to resolve the conflict. 2002 November: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presents a comprehensive peace plan for Cyprus that envisages a federation with two constituent parts, presided over by a rotating presidency. December: An EU summit in Copenhagen invites Cyprus to join in 2004, provided the two communities agree to the Annan Plan by early spring 2003. Without reunification, only the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot part of the island will gain membership. 2003 Parliamentary elections in Turkish Cyprus are won by the left-wing pro-European forces, CTP, against Denktash’s Turkey-centered right-wing National Unity Party, UBP. The crossing point of the Green Line is opened. In North Cyprus, new school history textbooks replace the Turkish-nationalist ones. Assuming that EU

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membership will resolve the Cyprus problem, the European Commission decides that the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) should be accepted into the Union, even if the island is not reunited. 2004 April: Twin referendums are introduced on whether to accept the UN reunification plan in a last-minute bid to achieve united EU entry. The plan is endorsed by Turkish Cypriots but overwhelmingly rejected by Greek Cypriots. May: Cyprus is one of 10 states joining the EU, despite the division. April 2005 Mehmet Ali Talat (CTP) is elected the Turkish Cypriot president. April 2009 The UBP wins parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat remains in office, but in a weakened position. Reunification talks continue with little progress. Previous nationalist school history textbooks replace those from 2003 in northern Cyprus. April 2010 Dervis Eroglu, from UBP, who favors independence, wins the Turkish north’s leadership contest, beating pro-unity incumbent Mehmet Ali Talat. September 2011 Cyprus begins exploratory drilling for oil and gas, prompting a diplomatic row with Turkey, which responds by sending an oil vessel to waters off northern Cyprus. 2012 Turkey’s Turkish Petroleum Corporation begins drilling for oil and gas onshore in northern Cyprus, despite protests from the Cypriot government that the action is illegal. June: Cyprus appeals to the EU for financial assistance to shore up its banks, which are heavily exposed to the stumbling Greek economy. 2013–2014 Because of external actors’ concerns and interest in peaceful exploitation and transport of oil and gas, peace talks resume. After respective civil wars, 10 territorial separatist entities claimed independence without being de jure recognized by the international community. The list today includes the four post-Soviet de facto states (South-Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh); Somaliland; Taiwan; Kosovo; the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic; the Palestinian Territories; and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). They all constitute de facto states, that is, entities with a political

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leadership, governmental capacity over a defined territory, and popular support.1 Although cease-fires have been reached, peace processes are frozen. Studies of these frozen conflicts emphasize diplomatic deadlocks. Meanwhile, the unrecognized separatist entities develop statehood together with a sense of belonging. The objective of this chapter is twofold: (1) to present the so far neglected internal dynamics of frozen conflicts by deciphering nation-building processes and focusing on actors’ strategies to reinvent the nation, as in the case of Turkish Cyprus, and (2) to sensitize readers to the role of intercommunal perceptions of historical politics in ethnic conflicts and conflict resolution. Ethnic conflicts result from hostile interpretations of history, and peace-building processes include attempts at transforming them. The case of Cyprus offers some insights into when such transformations can occur. It is a puzzling case. Not only did Cyprus, despite its dispute and division, became a member of the European Union (EU) in 2004, but the referendum conducted in April 2004 in both parts of the island gave a paradoxical result—the separatist Turkish north voted for reunification, while the Greek south voted against it. Before that, in 2003, the new Turkish Cypriot government rewrote school history books, shifting the Turko-centric narrative toward a Cypro-centric one, preparing the groundwork for a future reunited Cyprus. In 2009, however, the Turko-centric narrative came back in force, reconstructing the separatist cause. These dynamics indicate that frozen conflicts should not only be considered as diplomatic stalemates but also as structures of opportunities for political elites and social actors in de facto independent territories to reinforce internal sovereignty, or to contest it. This chapter explores such opportunities by looking into the shifts in nation-building policies in relation to international incentives, external and internal actors, and changes at the societal level. Historical Background Cyprus has been occupied by different forces throughout the history. In the 15th and 16th centuries, it was Venetians, with a population entirely composed of Greekspeaking people. But in 1571, when the Ottoman Empire conquered the island, Turks were sent over en masse, and the two communities lived rather peacefully together. The Ottomans recognized the Greek Orthodox Church, thus terminating its Latin persecution. Then, in 1878, the Ottomans agreed to lease the island to the British in exchange for Great Britain’s help in combating Russia. In 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central forces, the British annexed Cyprus. The “transfer” was subsequently recognized by the Turks in 1923. The Conflict The conflict started during the British rule when an important Greek Cypriot movement developed for a union with Greece (enosis). Turkish Cypriots did not like the idea, especially when the British announced their departure in the 1950s. Facing the possibility of enosis, the Turkish community envisioned the division

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of the island (taksim). Underground organizations emerged on both sides: Greek Cypriots’ EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants) and the Turkish Cypriots’ Volcan, replaced later by the TMT (Turkish Defense Organization). Interethnic violent conflict prevailed. The conflict resolution attempts started as of 1959 when Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and other NATO members gathered in Zurich. They all rejected both enosis and taksim to instead proclaim Cyprus as an independent state. Despite an equal status granted to Greek and Turkish communities in the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the two groups remained largely divided. They had separate administrations, political parties, professional organizations, and labor unions. The textbooks used in Cypriot were mostly imported from Greece and Turkey, and the two groups read different newspapers, each emphasizing Greek-Turkish antagonism.2 The result was a growing gap in the perceptions held by the two sides about each other, and the power-sharing arrangements laid down in the new constitution became constant objects of dispute. Violence erupted again, and in 1963, a buffer zone had to be installed to separate the communities. UN peacekeeping forces were sent to the zone to guard the “Green Line.” In 1974, the Greek military regime supported Greek Cypriots in their successful coup, forcing the moderate president Makarios to flee and replacing him with an EOKA member whose aim was to realize enosis. Turkey responded with a military intervention to protect its kin and occupied 38 percent of Cyprus’ territory (Turkish Cypriots represented some 20% of the island’s population). Greek Cypriots had to flee their homes in the north and the Turkish Cypriots in the south had to make their way to the north. The latter, governed by Rauf Denktas¸ from the Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP, National Unity Party), unilaterally declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. Only Turkey diplomatically recognized it. Since then, no peace agreement has been achieved; the conflict is “frozen.” TRNC constitutes a de facto state. The situation is commonly called the “Cyprus problem,” in reference to Greek Cypriots’ constant refusal to recognize TRNC or Turkish Cypriots as constituent people of Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and to the Turkish Cypriots’ unwillingness to frame their relation with Greek Cypriots along majority-minority lines.3 For years, international organizations, principally the United Nations, have worked on and proposed different sets of institutional solutions without any success. The Cypriot Greeks evoke the principle of the territorial integrity of the island; the Turkish Cypriots evoke the principle of self-determination, aiming at the recognition of the territorial divide either by establishing a confederation or through recognition of the TRNC. In both cases, the claim is for the recognition of a sovereign Cypriot Turkish entity. The institutional designs on the table, such as the Set of Ideas by the UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in 1992 and then by his successor, Kofi Annan, in 2004, propose some form of bizonal and bicommunal federalization. The latter, in particular, generated some hope because it was negotiated in the context of Cyprus’ and Turkey’s aspirations for EU membership. “The idea was to solve the Cyprus problem before Cyprus joins the EU so that Turkey’s own EU vocation could proceed without Cyprus being a stumbling

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block. Hence, the two sides in Cyprus were motivated to start the inter-communal talks in 2000.”4 The 2004 Annan Plan called for reunification under the name United Cyprus Republic, a bizonal federal structure composed of two constituent states: the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State.5 Despite their goal of reunifying the island, the Greek community preferred the status quo that left them in total control of two-thirds of Cyprus. Abolishing the Republic of Cyprus to establish the United Cyprus Republic implied a de facto recognition of the northern political entity, which would enter the new union on a voluntary basis. Additional reasons included the institutional power-sharing agreement (equal community status for Turkish Cypriots, not minority status); security issues (involving the Turkish troops); and economic costs.6 As such, the Turkish Cypriots could have taken this opportunity to legally declare secession. On the Turkish Cypriot side, despite their previous aim to be sovereign, a bizonal federal arrangement proposal passed. The paradox, that is, the readiness of Turkish Cypriots to reunite the island, cannot be explained without looking into the nationbuilding policies of the de facto state and the changes in that entity that resulted from the dynamic processes occurring between external and internal actors as well as within the society. Management of the Conflict The Internal Political Dynamics: Nation-Building

All de facto states embark on internally legitimizing their authority by reinforcing affective and symbolic attachments to the separatist cause. This may be accomplished through nation-building policies, through such well-known strategies of propaganda as rewriting and prescribing school history textbooks, and by inventing symbols and ceremonies. School history books constitute a good medium in nation-building politics, given their role in shaping the images of enemies and friends that people develop. To legitimize the separatist cause, the Turkish Cypriot school textbooks used until 2004 presented the history of Cyprus as part of Turkish history. They recounted that Cyprus was once attached to Anatolia, but geological transformations broke the island apart from Turkey.7 The books invariably opened with the flags of Turkey, and the longest sections were on the history of Turkey. History begins with the arrival of the Ottomans in Cyprus, the most important historical event, with the aim of proving that Cyprus has been Turkish for three-quarters of its history (that is, until the British came in 1878). The Ottoman period is glorified, and Turkey’s 1974 intervention equals a glorious victory (in the Greek Cypriot narrative, it is a tragic ending). “Our Motherland Turkey” was used throughout the books, and Turkish Cypriots were presented as “Turks” or “Turks of Cyprus.” For their part, Greek Cypriots are designated as “Rum,” referring to the period when they were subjects of the Ottoman Empire and distinguishing them from Greeks, thus denying them Greek identity and delegitimizing their political demands for enosis. Most emphasis was put on the 1963–1974 period, presented as continuous attacks by “Rums” against the “Turks” in Cyprus, with battles, killings, mass graves,

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and displacements described in much detail. The TRNC’s argument here is that history proves that the two communities can never live together. In sum, pre-2004 textbooks in the north present Greek Cypriots as the primary Other, the occupiers, the invaders, the enemy.8 There is no such thing as a purely Cypriot national identity. The new textbooks produced after the change in the government in 2003 departed from the old enemy image and introduced a new strategy by redefining identity to sustain a united federal Cyprus. The books did so by incorporating the territorial element into the Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ collective identity, demilitarizing history, and reducing the hostile stereotypes.9 As observed by Papadakis, in contrast to the previous Turko-centrism, these books presented the Cyprus map with no dividing line.10 The more inclusive terms of “Cypriots” and “people” were used in referring to both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and these two communities were presented as having many similarities but divided by nationalism and the British “divide and rule” policies.11 The 1963–1974 period thus constitutes only a small part of the whole story. Ethnic groups are not portrayed as homogeneous, but rather internally divided, and internal conflicts are often discussed, including internal violence among Turkish Cypriots. Emphasis was placed on examples of coexistence and cooperation, and the people were shown to have suffered together (taxation imposed by the British for example) and died together when they were in the Cypriot contingent of the British army during World War II. The 2009 legislative elections returned the old guard parties to office, and the pre-2004 textbooks were immediately reintroduced. A 2010 Peace Research Institute (PRIO) report affirms that “in contrast to the withdrawn textbooks, there was no reference to the common past and common experiences of the two communities.”12 The 2009 reversal was also present in the media. Research by Baillie and Azgin (2008) and by Ersoy (2010) demonstrated that the Cypriot media embraced a conflict-centered approach to shaping the news that contributed to the divisive attitudes cementing the division.13 On both sides of the island, news reporting tends to reproduce the perspectives of the major political parties. External Actors and Internal Political Dynamics

Pressed by Greece and assuming that EU membership would resolve the Cyprus problem, the European Commission decided that the RoC should be accepted into the EU, even if the island was not reunited and Turkey was not accepted at the same time.14 This was a mistake. Greek Cyprus’ position was reinforced, knowing that they did not need to break a deal for the whole island to gain EU membership; the south could allow itself to refuse the Annan Plan.15 The force of Europeanization did have some effects, however: (1) Turkey changed its position toward the island, and (2) economic incentives linked to Europe had their effect on the Turkish Cypriot society. Turkey has always considered Cyprus in its sphere of influence. However, the 2002 Turkish elections brought into office a moderate reformist government, for whom the Cyprus problem represented an obstacle to Turkey obtaining EU membership.16 Turkish president Erdog˘an, thus, withdrew demands for a “two state

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solution.”17 Moreover, the 2001 Turkish financial crisis reduced Turkey’s capacity to provide north Cyprus elites with support for their patronage and clientelism. Before the crisis, generous transfer payments from Turkey ensured social security. But “the fallout of the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey led to further economic hardship in the TRNC, and accelerated the domestic discrediting of the politicaleconomic foundations of the Turkish Cypriot state.”18 Meanwhile, the material benefits of EU membership were a great incentive to compromise in the context of the economic crisis.19 Thus, the crisis, together with the refusal of the Denktas¸ government to join the EU, provided a catalyst for the people to go to the streets to demonstrate, with EU flags in hand, against the policies adopted by their Northern Cyprus government. These external developments account for the results of the 2003 parliamentary elections in TRNC. The solutionoriented, left-wing opposition party, Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP, Republican Turkish Party), defeated the Denktas¸ government with the slogan “Europe within sight.”20 CTP also gained in the following 2005 elections with campaign flyers picturing its leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, with Kofi Annan and EU Commission president Jose Manuel Baroso.21 Contrary to the conventional wisdom depicting the conflict as one between two homogeneous nationalist communities identifying with their respective motherlands, namely, Greece and Turkey, the inner identity divisions are more complicated. On both sides of the island, right-wing political parties expressed the nationalist Greek-Turkish belonging (Dhmokratiko´ Ko´mma—Democratic Party, DIKO and UBP, respectively), while left-wing parties (AKEL and CTP respectively) proposed a Cypriot-centered alternative.22 Political parties on both sides also espoused divergent historical narratives. After the 2004 referenda, peace talks were stalled. The impasse was mostly due to the unwillingness of Greek Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos. Only four years later, in 2008, when Demetris Christofias (AKEL) took the presidency, talks resumed.23 Meanwhile, however, the European factor no longer served to mobilize Turkish Cypriots.24 Two days after the Cyprus referenda, the EU Council promised to reward the northern “yes” by lifting the isolation on the Turkish Cypriots. However, the proposed regulation on direct trade between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU failed to materialize, leaving the Turkish Cypriot economy fragile.25 Disenchanted with the EU, with the Greek Cypriot “no” vote, with five years of impasse, and the lack of a solution, Turkish Cypriots went to the polls in 2009 and voted UBP back into government. And in the April 2010 presidential elections, UBP leader Erog˘lu replaced Talat. The 2009 electoral campaign refrained from the European theme. As for the textbooks, UBP reintroduced the old history books, as described above. These external-internal dynamics account for important changes at the society level. According to Sozen, the Turkish side (Turkish Cypriots and Turkey), cannot afford to say “NO” to a federal solution based on the established UN parameters—even though it is not its first choice. This is clearly observed . . . with the hardliner Turkish Cypriot leader Derviss¸

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Erog˘lu continuing the peace negotiations [till a new deadlock in 2012], on the basis of the established UN parameters, where pro-solution leader Talat left off in 2010. The Turkish Cypriot policy is also consistent with the Turkish Cypriot public opinion. . . . Compared to the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots are more flexible on the negotiation issues.26

Since the opening of the checkpoints on the Green Line in April 2003, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots have been able to cross to the other side. As no major intercommunal incident has occurred, it may be said that “there is a level of civility between the two communities.”27 Why? Let us turn now to the dynamics at the society level in the northern part of the island. Dynamics at the Society Level

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, considerable resources were used to encourage migration from Turkey to the TRNC and to bring out Turkish cultural elements that “prove” the TRNC’s affinity with Turkey and Turks. However, anthropological studies in the island’s north show how living side by side with settlers from Turkey modified Turkish Cypriots’ self-identification as distinct from their new neighbors. Three reasons are usually cited when speaking critically of the settlers: (1) they took over proprieties after fleeing Greek Cypriots, (2) they outnumbered us, and (3) they occupy high administrative and military positions.28 Moreover, living for over 40 years in isolation from the Greek Cypriots but with people from Turkey, Turkish Cypriots distinguish “us” Cypriots from “them,” the settlers. This is most obvious among young Turkish Cypriots who have never lived with nor even met a Greek Cypriot.29 Equally, while living together with settlers from Turkey, certain distinctive cultural traits came into light, such as the different manner of wearing the head scarf or of arranging gardens in the backyards.30 Moreover, more recent immigrants from Turkey, often coming in search of employment, are viewed as responsible for many social problems, such as the difficulty of Turkish Cypriots to find jobs and the incidence of crime.31 There is also the issue of religious practice. Whereas Turks from mainland Turkey are clearly observant, Turkish Cypriots do not practice much. Data presented by Vural and Rustemli (2006) confirm that the former group’s identity orientations differ significantly from that of native Turkish Cypriots. In the settlers and immigrant group, only 4.7 percent gave “Cypriotness” as the most important identity (against 35.8% in native Turkish Cypriots), whereas 56 percent identified themselves with “Turkishness” (44% in native participants), followed by “Moslemness” with 35.5 percent (13.6% in native participants).32 During the disenchantment period, Cyprus 2015—Research and Dialogue for a Sustainable Future conducted a survey on both sides of the island and found that although hopes for solution are considered low by 66 percent of respondents, Turkish and Greek Cypriots still indicated that they would not mind having a Greek or Turkish Cypriot neighbor.33 The prospect for coexistence and for forgiveness was positively assessed by, respectively, 63 percent and 54 percent of respondents of another survey conducted in 2007.34 Self-identifying respondents considered themselves Cypriot and at the same time Greek or Turk.

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The Greek Cypriots ideally preferred a unitary state. The Turkish Cypriots, having been disappointed by the 2004 “no” vote by Greek Cypriots and by the international community, who failed to deliver its promises, moved back toward the preferred two-state solution. Both publics, however, were at similar levels (around 55%) in favor of a federal government option as their second-best choice. Approximately a sixth (16%) of Turkish Cypriots were seen as committed “yes” voters for union (18% of Greek Cypriots). Alternately, 31 percent of Turkish Cypriots were seen as committed “no” voters (23% of Greek Cypriots). But importantly, 53 percent of Turkish Cypriots (59% of Greek Cypriots) were swing voters, that is, voters who may change their response depending on the situation on the day of the vote.35 Significance Frozen conflicts are dynamic and respond to changing interactions between external and internal actors and politics. They usually receive much attention whenever they challenge other issues on the international agenda. The Cyprus problem, for example, represented an impediment to Turkey’s accession to the EU in the late 1990s and early 2000s and now constitutes a challenge for the peaceful regional exploitation and transportation of those reserves of gas and oil deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean recently discovered by Israel and Cyprus. In late 2013, these discoveries revived the peace talks that had stalled in 2012. In February 2014, Greek Cypriot president Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot president Dervis Eroglu made a joint declaration. In the context of much dependency on Russian gas transported through the suddenly turbulent (as of 2013–2014) Ukraine, European countries are very interested in the potential alternative energy routes coming from the Mediterranean region through an underwater pipeline and Turkey. Turkey thus has a strong incentive to cooperate and is still governed by a moderate on the Cyprus problem albeit internally troubled president, Tayyip Erdogan. The United States is pushing peace talks, counting on a change in Turkish-Israeli relations and a stable situation in the region. On the ground, Greek Cyprus is led by the moderate Anastasiades and experiencing its worst financial crisis. Turkish Cyprus, for its part, is isolated and impoverished. And both Cyprus communities count a good number of swing voters. All these external and internal factors seem to align in favor of unfreezing the conflict. However, on both sides of the island, as in 2004, referendums would have to be conducted, and nationalist forces are still important on both sides. Notes 1. Scott Pegg, International Society and the de facto State (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Publishers, 1998). 2. Joseph S. Joseph, “Cyprus: Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflict and International Politics,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15, no. 3 (2009): 387–388; and Eiki Berg and Raul Toomala, “Mission Impossible in Cyprus?: Legitimate Return to the Partnership State Revisited,” Nationalities Papers 41, no. 2 (2013): 276–292.

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3. Ibid. 4. Ahmet Sözen, “Heading towards the Defining Moment in Cyprus: Public Opinion vs Realities on the Ground,” Insight Turkey 14, no. 1 (2012): 109–129. 5. For details, see Ahmet Sözen and Kudret Özersay, “The Annan Plan,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 1 (2007): 125–141; Yucel Vural and Nicos Peristianis, “Beyond EthnoNationalism: Emerging Trends in Cypriot Politics after the Annan Plan,” Nations and Nationalism 14, no. 1 (2008): 39–60; and Nathalie Tocci, “The Missed Opportunity to Promote Cyprus Unification,” in The EU and Conflict Resolution, London and New York: Routledge, 2007. 6. For details, see Van Coufoudakis, “Cyprus: The Referendum and Its Aftermath,” The Cyprus Review 16, no. 2 (2004): 67–82. 7. Yael Navaro-Yashin, “De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey,” in Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict, ed. Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 86. 8. Isabelle Calleja, “Education and the Teaching of History in the Light of Encouraging Conflict Resolution in Cyprus,” Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies 13, no. 2 (2008): 49–67. 9. Yucel Vural and Evrim Özuyanik, “Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks,” South European Society and Politics 13, no. 2 (2008): 133–154. 10. Y. Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus,” History and Memory 20, no. 2 (2008): 128–148. 11. Anastasia Chrysanthou, A Comparative Analysis of the Teaching of History in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities of Cyprus (master’s thesis, European Studies and International Relations, University of Nicosia, 200764. 12. Education for Peace III: Textual and Visual Analyses of Upper Secondary School Cyprus History Textbooks: A Comparative Analysis of the Old and New Cyprus History Textbooks, POST Report (Nicosia, 2010). The full text is available at https://postresearchinstitute .files.wordpress.com/2011/02/re-writing-history-textbooks.pdf 13. Mashoed Bailie and Bekir Azgin, “A Barricade, a Bridge and a Wall: Cypriot Journalism and the Mediation of Conflict in Cyprus,” The Cyprus Review 20, no. 1 (2008): 57–92; and M. Ersoy, “Peace Journalism and News Coverage on the Cyprus Conflict,” The Muslim World 100, no. 1 (2010): 78–99. 14. Hubert Faustmann, “The Cyprus Issue after Accession,” in An Island in Europe: the EU and the Transformation of Cyprus, ed. James Ker-Lindsay, Hubert Faustmann, and Fiona Muller (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 15. Sözen and Özersay, “The Annan Plan”; and Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert, “The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration,” International Organization 60, no. 3 (2006): 563. 16. Philip. Robins, “Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002,” International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 289–304. 17. Hannes Lacher and Erol Kaymak, “Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Nonsettlement in North Cyprus,” Mediterranean Politics 10, no. 2 (2005): 147–166; Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus Challenge in the Turkey-EU Relations,” unpublished paper, 2010. 18. Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities,” 156–157. 19. Tozun Bahcheli, “Saying Yes to EU Accession,” The Cyprus Review 16, no. 2 (2004): 55–65.

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20. Diez et al., “The European Union and Border Conflicts,” 580. 21. Neophytos G. Loizides, “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus,” International Studies Perspectives 8, no. 2 (2007): 172–189. 22. Yiannis Papadaki, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz, Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 9; Yiannis Papadakis, “Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus,” History and Anthropology 14, no. 3 (2003): 253–270. 23. Ahmet Sözen, “The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of April 2009,” South European Society and Politics 14, no. 3 (2009): 337–350; and Hubert Faustamann, “History in the Making: A New Drive for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem,” Mediterranean Politics 13, no. 3 (2008): 453–458. 24. Erol Kaymak, “Cyprus and the European Union,” The Cyprus Review 21, no. 2 (2009): 139. 25. See Faustmann, “The Cyprus Issue after Accession.” 26. Sözen, “Heading towards the Defining Moment in Cyprus,” 121. 27. Ibid., 110. 28. Navaro-Yashin, “De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus,” 87; and Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities,” 155. 29. Ibid. 30. Papadakis et al., Divided Cyprus. 31. Bahcheli, “Saying Yes to EU Accession,” 58. 32. Yucel Vural and Ahmed. Rustemli, “Identity Fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot Community,” Mediterranean Politics 11, no. 3 (2006): 329–348. 33. Ahmet Sözen and Ecru Canan-Sokullu, “A ‘Common Future’ in Cyprus?: Public Opinion in Cyprus on the Settlement Process,” paper presented at the International Studies Association, New Orleans, February 18, 2010. 34. Arl Sitas, Dilek. Latif, and Natasa Loizou, “Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-Existence and Forgiveness in Cyprus in the Post-referendum Period,” PRIO Cyprus Centre Report (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2007), 9. 35. Ibid.

Suggested Readings Berg, E., and R. Toomala. 2013. “Mission Impossible in Cyprus?: Legitimate Return to the Partnership State Revisited,” Nationalities Papers 41 (2): 276–292. Loizides, N. 2007. “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus,” International Studies Perspectives 8 (2): 172–189. Papadakis Y., N. Peristianis, and G. Welz. 2006. Divided Cyprus. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Sözen, A., ed. 2007. Reflections on the Cyprus Problem: A Compilation of Recent Academic Contributions. Famagusta, North Cyprus: Cyprus Policy Center, Eastern Mediterranean University Printing-house. Tocci, N. 2007. The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Vural, Y., and N. Peristianis. 2008. “Beyond Ethno-Nationalism: Emerging Trends in Cypriot Politics after the Annan Plan,” Nations and Nationalism 14 (1): 39–60.

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Appendix The 2004 Annan Plan for the Reunification of Cyprus The Annan Plan was the result of a lengthy diplomatic effort to settle the impasse between the Greek- and Turkish-controlled parts of the island, and its provisions reflect the complex arrangements necessary even to bring a potential settlement agreement before voters in such a setting. Its failure, and the decision of the European Union to nonetheless admit Cyprus, which was governed by the Greek community that had rejected the plan, removed the only existing outside pressure capable of incentivizing a solution. The island has since remained divided.

A. FOUNDATION AGREEMENT MAIN ARTICLES i. Affirming that Cyprus is our common home and recalling that we were co-founders of the Republic established in 1960 ii. Resolved that the tragic events of the past shall never be repeated and renouncing forever the threat or the use of force, or any domination by or of either side iii. Acknowledging each other’s distinct identity and integrity and that our relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other iv. Deciding to renew our partnership on that basis and determined that this new bi-zonal partnership shall ensure a common future in friendship, peace, security and prosperity in an independent and united Cyprus v. Underlining our commitment to international law and the principles and purposes of the United Nations vi. Committed to respecting democratic principles, individual human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as each other’s cultural, religious, political, social and linguistic identity vii. Determined to maintain special ties of friendship with, and to respect the balance between, Greece and Turkey, within a peaceful environment in the Eastern Mediterranean viii. Looking forward to joining the European Union, and to the day when Turkey does likewise We, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, exercising our inherent constitutive power, by our free and democratic, separately expressed common will adopt this Foundation Agreement. Article 1: The new state of affairs 1. This Agreement establishes a new state of affairs in Cyprus. 2. The treaties listed in this Agreement bind Cyprus and the attached legislation shall apply upon entry into force of this Agreement. 3. The Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance remain in force and shall apply mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, Cyprus shall sign a Treaty with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, along with additional protocols to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance. 4. Cyprus shall be a full member of the European Union as of 1 May 2004.

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5. Cyprus shall maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, respecting the balance in Cyprus established by the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and this Agreement, and as a European Union member state shall support the accession of Turkey to the Union. 6. Any unilateral change to the state of affairs established by this Agreement, in particular union of Cyprus in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession, is prohibited. Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way be construed as contravening this prohibition. Article 2: The United Cyprus Republic, its federal government, and its constituent states 1. The status and relationship of the United Cyprus Republic, its federal government, and its constituent states, is modeled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government, and its cantons. Accordingly: a. The United Cyprus Republic is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. Cyprus is a member of the United Nations and has a single international legal personality and sovereignty. The United Cyprus Republic is organised under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and the equal status of the constituent states. b. The federal government sovereignly exercises the powers specified in the Constitution, which shall ensure that Cyprus can speak and act with one voice internationally and in the European Union, fulfill its obligations as a European Union member state, and protect its integrity, borders, resources and ancient heritage. c. The constituent states are of equal status. Within the limits of the Constitution, they sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government, organising themselves freely under their own Constitutions. . . . 4. The Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic may be amended by separate majority of the voters of each constituent state in accordance with the specific provisions of the Constitution. Article 3: Citizenship, residency and identity 1. There is a single Cypriot citizenship. Special majority federal law shall regulate eligibility for Cypriot citizenship. 2. All Cypriot citizens shall also enjoy internal constituent state citizenship status. This status shall complement and not replace Cypriot citizenship. . . . 5. In addition, for a transitional period of 19 years or until Turkey’s accession to the European Union, whichever is earlier, Cyprus may limit the right of Greek nationals to reside in Cyprus if their number has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens holding Greek Cypriot internal constituent state citizenship status, or the right of Turkish nationals to reside in Cyprus if their number has reached 5% of the number of resident Cypriot citizens holding Turkish Cypriot internal constituent state citizenship status. 7. In addition, for a transitional period a constituent state may, pursuant to Constitutional Law, limit the establishment of residence by persons hailing from the other constituent state. . . .

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Article 4: Fundamental rights and liberties 1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be enshrined in the Constitution. There shall be no discrimination against any person on the basis of his or her gender, ethnic or religious identity, or internal constituent state citizenship status. Freedom of movement and freedom of residence 2. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots living in specified villages in the other constituent state shall enjoy cultural, religious and educational rights and shall be represented in the constituent state legislature. 3. The rights of religious minorities, namely the Maronite, the Latin and the Armenian, shall be safeguarded in accordance with international standards, and shall include cultural, religious and educational rights as well as representation in federal Parliament and constituent state legislatures. Article 5: The Federal Government 1. The federal Parliament composed of two chambers, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, shall exercise the legislative power: a. Each Chamber shall have 48 members. The Senate shall be composed of an equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed in proportion to persons holding internal constituent state citizenship status of each constituent state, provided that each constituent state shall be attributed no less than one quarter of seats. b. Decisions of Parliament shall require the approval of both Chambers by simple majority, including one quarter of voting Senators from each constituent state. For specified matters, a special majority of two-fifths of sitting Senators from each constituent state shall be required. . . . Article 6: The Supreme Court 1. The Supreme Court shall uphold the Constitution and ensure its full respect. 2. It shall comprise an equal number of judges from each constituent state, and three nonCypriot judges until otherwise provided by law. 3. The Supreme Court shall, inter alia, resolve disputes between the constituent states or between one or both of them and the federal government, and resolve on an interim basis deadlocks within federal institutions if this is indispensable to the proper functioning of the federal government. Article 7: Transitional federal and constituent state institutions 1. The federal institutions shall be in place upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, and shall evolve in their operation during transitional periods. . . . Article 8: Demilitarisation 1. Bearing in mind that: a. The Treaty of Guarantee, in applying mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs established in this Agreement and the Constitution, shall cover, in addition to the

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independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the United Cyprus Republic, the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the constituent states; b. Greek and Turkish contingents shall be permitted to be stationed under the Treaty of Alliance in the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State respectively as follows: i) each contingent not to exceed 6,000 all ranks, until 2011; ii) each contingent not to exceed 3,000 all ranks thereafter until 2018 or the European Union accession of Turkey, whichever is sooner; and iii) the Greek contingent not to exceed 950 all ranks and the Turkish contingent not to exceed 650 all ranks thereafter, subject to three-yearly review with the objective of total withdrawal; c. Greek and Turkish forces and armaments shall be redeployed to agreed locations and adjusted to agreed levels, and any forces and armaments in excess of agreed levels shall be withdrawn; d. There shall be a United Nations peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of this Agreement and use its best efforts to promote compliance with it and contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment, to remain as long as the federal government, with the concurrence of both constituent states, does not decide otherwise; e. The supply of arms to Cyprus shall be prohibited in a manner that is legally binding on both importers and exporters; and f. A Monitoring Committee composed of representatives of the guarantor powers, the federal government, and the constituent states, and chaired by the United Nations, shall monitor the implementation of this Agreement, Cyprus shall be demilitarised, and all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, shall be dissolved, and their arms removed from the island, in phases synchronized with the redeployment and adjustment of Greek and Turkish forces. 2. There shall be no paramilitary or reserve forces or military or paramilitary training of citizens. All weapons except licensed sporting guns shall be prohibited. 3. The constituent states shall prohibit violence and the incitement to violence against the United Cyprus Republic, the federal government, the constituent states, or the guarantor powers. 4. Cyprus shall not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations other than with the consent of both constituent states; until the accession of Turkey to the European Union, the consent of Greece and Turkey shall also be required. 5. The federal government and the constituent states shall cooperate with the United Nations operation. The United Cyprus Republic shall bear half the cost to the United Nations of the operation in the first three years and two-thirds thereafter. This arrangement shall be reviewed in 2010. 6. These provisions do not prejudice the provisions of the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, the mandate of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and the provisions of the Constitution on federal and constituent state police and the Joint Investigation Agency.

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Article 9 Constituent state boundaries and territorial adjustment 1. The territorial boundaries of the constituent states shall be as depicted in the map which forms part of this Agreement. . . . Article 10: Property 1. The claims of persons who were dispossessed of their properties by events prior to entry into force of this Agreement shall be resolved in a comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for the individual rights of dispossessed owners and current users, and the principle of bi-zonality. . . . Article 11: Reconciliation Commission 1. An independent, impartial Reconciliation Commission shall promote understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 2. The Commission shall be composed of men and women, in equal numbers from each constituent state, as well as at least one non-Cypriot member, which the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations is invited to appoint in consultation with the federal government and the constituent states. Article 12: Past acts 1. Any act, whether of a legislative, executive or judicial nature, by any authority in Cyprus2 whatsoever, prior to entry into force of this Agreement, is recognised as valid and, provided it is not inconsistent with or repugnant to any other provision of this Agreement or international law, its effect shall continue following entry into force of this Agreement. No-one shall be able to contest the validity of such acts by reason of what occurred prior to entry into force of this Agreement. 2. Any claims for liability or compensation arising from acts prior to this Agreement shall, insofar as they are not otherwise regulated by the provisions of this Agreement, be dealt with by the constituent state from which the claimant hails. Article 13: Entry into force and implementation 1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon approval by each side at separate simultaneous referenda conducted in accordance with the Agreement and the signature by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of the Treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus. . . . Article 14: Annexes The above main articles are reflected in detailed legal language in the Annexes which form an integral part of this Agreement. Source: United Nations, 2004 Annan Plan for the simultaneous union of Turkish and Green Cyprus in a federal format and entry of the united Cyprus into the European Union. Available at http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html.

Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak Republics The Peaceful Breakup of a State and Life after the Velvet Divorce Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline 1000 Slovakia becomes a part of the Hungarian state. 1467 The university in Bratislava (Academia Istropolitana) is founded. 1530 The Turkish invasion occurs. 1780 The Slovak national revival begins. 1792 The Hungarianization process begins. 1843 The Slovak literary language is legalized. 1918 Following World War I, Czechoslovakia is established as the First Czechoslovak Republic.

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1938 The Munich Accords sanction the loss of Czechoslovakia’s Sudeten region to Germany. The Vienna Award gives Slovakia to Hungary. 1939 Germany establishes the Czech lands as a German protectorate and makes Slovakia a separate state (the Slovak Republic, 1939–1945) under German sponsorship. 1944 The Slovak national uprising against German rule occurs. 1945 World War II ends. Czechoslovakia is reunited, and the second Czechoslovak Republic (1945–1948) begins. 1948 Communists seize power in February and establish a Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 1968 The Prague Spring of reform is ended by a summer invasion by the Soviet Union. In the aftermath, Czechoslovakia is restructured from a unitary to a federal state (1969). November 1989 The Velvet Revolution ends Communist rule. 1992 Nationalists emerge as the dominant parties in Slovakia’s summer state elections. Fall negotiations between the federal government in Prague and the government in Slovakia fail to find a formula for keeping the country together. 1993 On January 1, Czechoslovakia is dissolved into two sovereign states: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The Czech Republic immediately passes a citizenship law based on parental heritage; Romany lacking documents or with criminal records are ineligible. Slovakia subsequently agrees to protect the various rights of its Hungarian minority to gain admission to the Council of Europe, which was being held up by Hungary, while at same time allowing curfews to be imposed in rural Slovakia on Romany and “other suspicious persons.” 1994 Romany leaders in Kosice, Slovakia’s second-largest city, accuse the country’s Hungarian parties of intentionally increasing tension between Roma and Hungarian Slovaks.

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1997 The Czech Republic is invited to join NATO and is placed on the fast track for membership in the European Union. The Slovak Republic is not invited because of allegations that the Meciar government in Bratislava is abusing fundamental democratic rights, especially with respect to Slovakia’s Hungarian minority. 1998 The Meciar government fails to win reelection; a new coalition government is formed and includes the leaders of three parties representing the Hungarians in Slovakia. 1999 To qualify for EU membership, Slovak amends existing language in the law to permit the use of minority languages in areas with at least a 20 percent minority that speaks another native language. 2004 The European Union admits 10 new member states, including the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Slovakia is also admitted to NATO. 2007 Internal border controls between Slovakia and the Czech Republic are phased out as they participate in the Schengen zone of Europe without borders; meanwhile, tensions between Hungary and Slovakia over Slovakia’s treatment of its Hungarian minority continue to rise through 2010. 2009 Slovakia adopts the euro; it also amends the 1995 Language Law elevating Slovak as a reflection of national sovereignty and proscribing use of other languages in wide areas. The Hungarian minority protests the law as intentionally discriminatory, and protest by Hungarians ensue. 2010 A Slovak citizenship law is enacted to preclude the dual citizenship offered by Hungary; should Slovak citizens apply for citizenship elsewhere, they forfeit their Slovak citizenship. Czechoslovakia had a short history of self-rule following its creation in the aftermath of World War I. Launched as one of the century’s great experiments in state building, Czechoslovakia was meant to unite two linguistically similar but culturally distinct Slavic-speaking communities in Central Europe: the more numerous Czechs living west of the Moravia River and their “Little Brothers,” the Slovaks, to the east. Scarcely was the new state in place, however, before tensions developed between the two, and the Slovaks began lobbying for a state of their own in which they would be free to teach their own cultural heritage, control their own political

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institutions, and pursue their own future. Yet hardly had the debate over Slovak self-determination begun before the Great Depression and the prelude to World War II deprived Czechoslovakia’s leaders of the opportunity to address the separatist issue directly or, alternately, to build durable political institutions and a durable political community out of the two Slavic peoples composing the state. Then came the twin traumas of German occupation during the war and post–World War II Soviet control of Czechoslovakia. Consequently, it was not until the Velvet Revolution, a peaceful overthrow of the country’s Communist regime in 1989, that the Czechs and Slovaks had the opportunity to decide for themselves what they wanted do with their union. Within three years, they decided to end it. Historical Background When Czechoslovakia split apart on January 1, 1993, the leaders of the newly created Czech Republic and Slovak Republic alike heralded the breakup as a “velvet divorce”—an amiable decision by all parties to go their separate ways. The selfcongratulatory announcement was a considerable overstatement. The Origins of Czechoslovakia

The story of Czechoslovakia’s demise begins with a brief exploration of its origins 75 years earlier. The marriage contract that led to the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 owed its existence to several factors. First and perhaps foremost, there was the general ambiance created by U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s wartime rhetoric of making the world safe for democracy and promise to erect a postwar order based on the principle of national self-determination. To be sure, his idea of national self-determination was never intended to be evenly implemented. It was never meant to apply, for example, to the Irish seeking independence from Wilson’s wartime ally Great Britain. Likewise, it received very short treatment when the leaders of the wartime victors (Great Britain, France, and the United States) gathered at Versailles Palace outside Paris in 1918–1919 to determine the fate of the Arabs previously governed by the Ottoman Empire centered in Turkey. By the time the conferences concluded, most of these peoples found their land carved up to enlarge the French and British empires in the Middle East. The principle was, however, meant to be applied to the Central European possessions of the vast Austrian-Hungarian Empire, which also ended the war on the losing side, and that knowledge led to the outside lobbying for the creation of Czechoslovakia. Indeed, even before the war ended, Slavic immigrants in the United States and political exiles from the region living in America and France were petitioning the governments in Washington and Paris to join together into one sovereign Slavic state the Slovaks and Czechs who, for centuries, had been, respectively, under the rule of the Austria-Hungarian Empire’s twin capitals, Budapest and Vienna. The proposal made more sense from the Czech perspective than from the Slovak’s. The 19th century had seen a flowering of nationalist movements among the various Slavic peoples under the heavy-handed rule of Hungary and the less

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oppressive but still very real control of the Austrians. Both the Czechs and Slovaks had participated in this nationalist revivalism, but in significantly different ways. Czech nationalists stressed the commonality of the Czech and Slovak peoples to the point where Czech propagandists wrote frequently, but with little historical evidence, of a common history and ancestry linking the Czechs and Slovaks.1 Slovak nationalism stressed the long and unique history of the Slovak people, their rural traditions, and their distinctive folk culture. Czech nationalists stressed the historical accomplishments of the Czechs, even when under the control of their German and later Austrian conquerors—the achievements of Czech kings, the success of their merchants, and the grandeur of Prague, still one of the most beautiful European cities. A corollary to this strand of 19-century Czech nationalism was the argument that the Czechs had an obligation, through merger, to aid their unfortunate Slovak kin, whose culture was being attacked by their Hungarian masters. Meanwhile, Slovak nationalism focused on the injustices done to the Slovak peoples by their oppressors and on the sacrifices and efforts of Slovaks to do right: for example, Janocik, a Robin Hood–like folk hero who stole from Slovakia’s rich foreign tyrants and gave the gold to poor Slovaks before he was betrayed by a comrade and hung. Above all, Slovak nationalism stressed self-help, not dependency on others. Given the different outlooks and motivations of Slovak and Czech nationalists, the founding of Czechoslovakia can be largely described as an Old World marriage of convenience. Instead of lust and passion, each of the contracting parties brought to the marriage an important dowry defined in terms of ethnic group mathematics. For the Slovaks in the eastern portion of the projected state, Czechoslovakia was a means of escaping from the influence of Budapest by joining with a larger ethnic group with whom they already shared a language and common history. The merger allowed them to return to their Slavic heritage after centuries of repression and forced Hungarianization. Conversely, even if offered national self-determination for themselves at Versailles, Slovak leaders saw little chance of a small Slovak state containing a large Hungarian minority located on the northern border of Hungary being able to establish, quickly and securely, its own identity. For the Czechs, the mathematics of the pairing were even more important. The Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, adjacent to or near Germany, had a minority problem of their own; they contained very large number of Germans (33 percent of the population of Bohemia and 20.9 percent of the population of Moravia in 1921). A merger with the economically backward Slovaks, whose chief appeal in the eyes of many Czech leaders was that they were not German, would decidedly tilt the numbers inside a Czechoslovak state in the Slavic direction, with the Slovaks providing a significant counterweight to the German presence in Bohemia and Moravia. Czech-Slovak Conflict: The Formative Years

Scarcely was the union born before tensions sharpened between the Czech and Slovak communities inside the new state, where economics as well as numbers consigned the Slovaks to a minority status. Not only were they outnumbered two

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to one by the Czechs, but the economy of Slovakia was poor and still rooted in agriculture, which accounted for nearly three jobs in four (72.3 percent) in the Slovak lands in 1910. By contrast, the Czech lands enjoyed significant social and economic prosperity under Austrian rule and possessed a diverse, modern economy by the time of World War I, with more of their workforce already in industry than agriculture. Most importantly, the Czech lands already possessed a large number of professionals and public sector workers on the eve of World War I (12.3 percent of the 1910 Czech workforce) and were thus better prepared to take the helm of the new state than Slovakia, which had been under the direct and intrusive rule of Budapest and where less than one Slovak worker in fifty (1.9 percent) was employed either in the public sector or a professional field.2 A minority status of this ilk would have been difficult for any ethnic group to accept, but it was particularly grating to the Slovaks. Years of humiliation and subjection to Hungarianization had left them with a deep sense of inferiority and defensiveness. Consequently, when Czechoslovakia’s (basically Czech) leaders in Prague first rejected regional autonomy for Slovakia in organizing the state and then launched a Czech culture–based educational program to close the social and economic gaps between the Czech lands and Slovakia, large numbers of Slovaks mobilized around nationalist banners and began to press for the independent Slovakia of which they dreamed, but which they did not pursue, in 1918. By the mid-1930s Czech-Slovak relations had deteriorated to the point where estranged Slovak nationalists were openly negotiating with Germany, offering to support Adolf Hitler in his confrontation with Prague over its treatment of the Germans living in Bohemia in return for his promise to create an independent Slovak Republic should Germany invade Czechoslovakia. Their ill-considered venture would haunt Czech-Slovak relations for years. Hitler did invade Czechoslovakia in 1939, effectively ending the First Republic of Czechoslovakia. The invasion also led to the creation of the First Slovak Republic, but it quickly proved bogus: a Third Reich creation whose existence depended entirely on German military support. In 1944, the Slovaks launched a failed uprising against Slovakia’s German occupiers. After World War II, the Soviet Union’s Red Army occupied and converted Czechoslovakia into a Soviet satellite state. These developments did not end Czech efforts to punish Slovakia for the wartime collaboration of some of its leaders with Germany. Assertions of Slovak national identity were severely punished by the Communists in Prague as an assertion of “bourgeois nationalism.” Slovak political parties were either banned or enfolded into the Czech-dominated Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and the First Slovak Republic disappeared in the Communist state created in Czechoslovakia under Moscow’s supervision. In the long term, however, communism in Czechoslovakia advanced the cause of Slovak nationalism in important ways. The Marxist answer to the socioeconomic gap separating the Slovaks and Czechs was not education but economics: the industrialization of Slovakia. The program had only limited success; the Czechs’ head start in industrialization, more educated and sophisticated population, and forward location on the edge of Western Europe gave them a competitive advantage that Slovakia could not overcome with the relatively meager resources invested in

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modernizing Slovakia’s economy. Nevertheless, by the time of the Velvet Revolution, Slovakia had at last developed the type of mixed (agricultural-industrial-service) economy necessary for survival in the modern world, and Slovak nationalists could realistically talk of an economically viable, independent Slovakia, complete with a modern, urbanized capital city in Bratislava. Meanwhile, in 1968, Czech intellectuals and politicians instituted a minirevolution called the “Prague Spring” in an effort to establish a more democratic political process. Moscow summarily ended the reform movement by invading Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 and arresting the architects of the Prague Spring. Moscow’s desire to continue to control the country with minimum costs, however, forced it to engineer some reforms of its own in Czechoslovakia. A centerpiece of these reforms involved courting the Slovaks by restructuring the country along federalist lines, creating a Slovak regional government in Bratislava, and regularly appointing Slovaks to important ministerial positions in the federal government in Prague. The strategy appears to have worked despite the fact that the Czechs continued to hold the key political and economic posts in the central government. In return for their economic and political gains, the Slovaks supported their Communist rulers to a far greater extent than the Czechs. Prague Spring had been a Czech movement, with scant echoes in Slovakia. Similarly, the Charter 77 movement, which was launched in 1977 when a petition drawn up by dissidents to protest the government’s continued suppression of intellectual discourse, obtained more than a thousand signatures in the Czech lands but attracted only one Slovak signature. Even the Velvet Revolution of 1989 was largely a Czech phenomenon, both in organization and execution. As communism began to crumble elsewhere in Central Europe, beginning with the dramatic collapse of the regime in East Germany in October 1989 and the fall of the Communist government in Bulgaria in early November, hundreds of thousands filled the streets of Prague on November 24, 1989, to protest communism’s continued rule of Czechoslovakia, but only a few thousand gathered in Bratislava’s Heroes’ Square to call for the end of communism. When the Velvet Revolution succeeded and the Communist Party began a twomonth-long process of turning over the control of the Czechoslovakian government to the coalition of opposition forces known as the Civic Forum, the scene of the action was Prague. Except for Miroslav Kusy, who became President Vaclav Havel’s agent in Bratislava following the transfer of power and had been the one Slovak to sign the Charter 77 petition, Slovaks again found themselves largely the observers of political events, not participants in shaping their own destiny. The Conflict The fall of Communist rule in the Soviet Union—which began in the mid-1980s when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev began to liberalize the Soviet Union’s economic system and tolerate the discussion of political reform, and which effectively concluded with the failure of the August 1991 attempt by Communist hardliners to overthrow Gorbachev—opened the door in Czechoslovakia to a quickly

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developing debate over the future of that country. Fueled by old grievances on both sides, the debate essentially had only one dimension: whether Slovakia should remain a federally autonomous region in a Czech-Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) or should secede and form a separate, independent country. The decisive showdown between the federalists and nationalists came in the June 1992 national and regional elections, in which a nationalist coalition, headed by the former Communist now born-again-nationalist Vladimir Meciar, gained control of Slovakia’s regional assembly. Claiming that the election provided him with a mandate to pursue the Slovaks’ long-standing dream of national self-determination, Meciar immediately began negotiations with the prime minister of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Klaus, over the future of Slovakia. No seat at the table was accorded to either of the two smaller ethnic communities in the two parts of the country: Slovakia’s Hungarian minority and the Roma in both halves. Management of the Conflict The Velvet Divorce

Scholars have debated whether Meciar was single-minded in his desire for Slovak independence or was only using the threat of secession to induce Prague into increasing Slovakia’s federal autonomy and pumping more investment capital into the region. If Meciar saw the separation talks as a bargaining ploy, he grievously overplayed his hand. It takes two sides willing to compromise for reconciliation to occur in such dramatic moments, and at least three factors worked against the Czechs making any major concessions during these negotiations. At the top of this list was the fact that the Slovak economy still lagged well behind that of the Czech lands. In the minds of the Czech leadership in Prague, an independent Czech Republic would be poised for early admission into the European Union, whereas continuing the union with Slovakia would delay admission and force Prague to spend considerable resources on economically developing eastern Slovakia. In short, the union with Slovakia had become, at best, an economic inconvenience. Nor did the Czechs see any compelling political reasons for retaining their association with the Slovaks. The German minority that had existed in the Czech lands when Czechoslovakia was created and that made union with the Slovaks attractive at that time had been unceremoniously booted out of the country after World War II. A Slavic Slovak counterweight was no longer needed. Likewise, there was no any partisan political reason for clinging to Slovakia. Following the Velvet Revolution, the Czechs developed a party system similar to that of most democratic states in the West, that is, a class-based system in which the parties primarily disagree about the acceptable limits of government intervention in the economy and society. By contrast, in 1992, Slovakia’s party system was dominated by nationalist and federalist organizations less concerned with economic policy than redefining Slovakia’s political relationship with Prague. The parties in power in Prague no longer had regional wings in Slovakia to protect. Finally, there was a personal element at work in the Klaus-Meciar talks that made the Czechs less than enthusiastic about compromising with Slovakia’s leader.

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The government in Prague was widely staffed by the Czechs who had formed the backbone of the resistance to Communist rule from the days of the Prague Spring to the Velvet Revolution. For them, many of those years had been spent in jail or on state work farms. Slovakia’s rulers were, overwhelmingly, former Communists who had once been a part of the establishment that had jailed them. Fortunately, it also takes two irresolute sides for a civil war to occur: one side willing to fight to leave and another willing to fight to preserve the union. The Czechs were no more interested in fighting to keep Slovakia in the union than they were interested in bribing Slovakia into staying. Hence, the negotiations concluded by setting an early date for the dissolution of the Czech-Slovak Federal Republic: January 1, 1993, less than seven months after the summer elections brought the Slovak nationalists to power and less than three months after the conclusion of the brief Klaus-Meciar talks on the future of the country. Life from the Velvet Divorce to EU Membership

Partition brought dreams of early EU admission to the Czechs, independence to the Slovaks, and little good to the Roma minorities in both new states or the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, neither of whom had any voice in the partition process. For the Czechs, the vision of early entry into the EU proved illusory, as it did for all of those “fast track” postcommunist states (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia) before whom an early entry for three was dangled as a carrot for instituting EU-mandated reforms. In the end, none received early admission, and when the gates were opened in 2004, all entered at the same time as the other Baltic countries, the Slovak Republic, and such political oddities as the de facto internally partitioned state of Cyprus. Indeed of the postcommunist republics in Europe, only the admission of Romania and Bulgaria was further delayed, and only for three more years. In the meantime, both the Czechs and Slovaks learned that in politics as in private lives, truly velvet divorces are very rare. Recriminations among his Slovak opponents rebounded throughout Meciar’s years as Slovakia’s prime minister (1993–1998), and at the turn of the millennium, neither the Czech nor the Slovak economy was as strong as it had been at the time of the Velvet Revolution. The Czechs did gain the prize of a fast-track entry into NATO; however, that membership soon led them into an unwanted war in Kosovo. As for the Slovaks, they gained their own state, complete with its own passports, currency, border patrol posts, and a territorialized (Hungarian) ethnic minority of its own demanding autonomy. On balance, though, the true losers in Czechoslovakia’s breakup were the minorities in each state. The Meciar government’s policies were so anti-Hungarian that Hungary found it necessary to intervene and hold up Slovakia’s admission to the Council of Europe until changes were made. In a like manner, even though the EU and other international organizations undertook annual reviews of the Czech and Slovak treatment of their Roma minorities, the latter generally experienced greater discrimination and violent attacks in the 1990s than during the Communist era as the Czech and Slovak politicians either looked the other way or exploited anti-Romany sentiment for political gain.3 In the Czech Republic, 1990’s

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polls persistently found nearly 70 percent of the population harboring ill feelings toward Roma, walls went up between 1996 and 1998 in several depressed industrial towns separating the Czechs from Roma tenements, and in a highly publicized case involving the death of a Roma woman, in 1999, a Czech court reduced the charge against the accused to hooliganism and the sentence to 15 months. EU Entry and Czech and Slovak Politics, 2004–2014

The joint admission of the Slovak and Czech Republics to the EU in 2004 in part lowered the walls between the two countries that were erected following partition. Physically, the customs posts between them disappeared as both became a part of the Europe without Borders zone, and travel and trade between the two countries resumed prepartition patterns. The same year also brought admission to NATO to Slovakia, and although there has been no reintegration of the military forces of the two states reminiscent of the Czechoslovakia military, a joint Czech-Slovak rapid deployment force has been created and placed at the disposal of the EU (2009). The two countries also began cooperating in joint air patrols in 2014. Less tangibly, enhanced traffic between the two states’ citizens has seemingly shortened the gap that opened between the nature of the Czech and Slovak languages during the 1990s, and nearly 200,000 Slovaks continue to live or now live and work in the Czech lands. All of this has not prevented the governments in each state from criticizing the policies of the other; however, the rancor that characterized Czech-Slovak rhetoric during the 1990s has substantially abated, and celebrations of a shared culture has become a fixture on the political calendars of both republics. The trajectory of Slovak-Hungarian relations has been less upward since Slovakia’s entry into the EU and became decidedly downward after 2006, when the political coalition containing Hungarian parties that had governed Slovakia since 1996 was replaced by a new coalition containing the principal Slovak nationalist party. For the slightly over 500,000 ethnic Hungarians (9.7% of the population) still living in Slovakia, it was yet another in a series of unfortunate developments that began when Slovakia gained independence and the moderating Czech influence on minority politics in Slovakia was lost. Until that 2006 election, life was seemingly improving for Slovakia’s Hungarians. Travel was easier, given both Slovakia and Hungary’s participation in the Europe without Borders system, and Budapest was toying with the idea of implementing a dual-citizenship system in which Slovak’s Hungarians would also be eligible for Hungarian citizenship. A Hungarian-language university was even opened in Slovakia in 2004. The return of Slovak nationalists to power, however, quickly reversed this trend, with Hungarian party members not only banned from the governing coalition but from high office in all ministries except education, and in that ministry Slovak ministers were criticized for withholding EU-provided funds from Hungarian schools and editing the textbooks in those schools to feature Slovak ideas of nationality and culture. The major blow, in the minds of Slovak’s Hungarians, came in 2009, when the government enacted a new language law mandating the use of Slovak as the state

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language in various areas, including some business practices, and prohibiting the publication of books or journals in another language and even the singing of songs in public in a language other than Slovak or the song’s original lyrics Public protests within the Hungarian community ensued, despite the fact that technically the law does not apply to private individuals but only to government officials and public institutions and that most governmental announcements were already in bilingual form in areas with large Hungarian-minority populations. But to a community that has lived in Slovakia from the days of the Hungarian empire a millennium ago and was only placed in Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of World War I when Hungary’s northern border was set by the war’s victors, the pointedness of the law seemed to send a clear you-are-little-wanted message. And the perceived anti-Hungarian message seemed to be underscored the following year when the Slovak government tightened the means of acquiring Slovak citizenship and rejected the idea of dual citizenship to the point that even applying for citizenship elsewhere could strip a Slovak of his or her Slovak citizenship. Meanwhile, although the 110,000 Roma currently living in Slovakia have also been affected by Slovakia’s 2009 language law, they and the approximately 300,000 living in the Czech Republic continue to be more affected by their daily living conditions, including unemployment rates ranging from 40 percent to 80 percent, depending on the locale, and the discrimination and occasional violent attacks that they continue to face. Despite the fact that joining the European Union meant enacting antidiscrimination legislation in both countries, it did little to change the perceptions of the Romany by either public officials or private citizens, especially in the Czech lands. Thus, at least as late as mid-2013, various international human rights groups were calling upon Czech authorities to protect the Roma in the face of the anti-Roma protests organized in 13 Czech towns, with large numbers of ordinary Czech citizens joining the Workers Party (DS) and other right-wing extremists normally active in such matters. Likewise, all appeals to close the Levy pig farm on the site of the Romany death camp from World War II were still falling on deaf ears in Prague, and violence involving Czech Romany and the Czechs was increasing as a result of the tensions caused by the austerity measures passed by Prague to gain the Czech Republic’s admission to the Euro zone.4 Significance The lessons to be derived from both the partition of Czechoslovakia and the postbreakup history of its former constituent parts are neither simple nor clean cut, but they are suggestive in several areas. On the one hand, the relative calm and peacefulness with which the elected leaders of the Czech and Slovak communities agreed to divide their state seems to testify to the ability of reason to overcome the emotionalism of national identity. Certainly, the decision to split Czechoslovakia into two states stands in stark contrast to the violent end of the former Yugoslavia. Equally assuredly, the voluntary

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decision by all parties to split an existing state into two independent countries was unique in the annals of ethnopolitics, and—Scotland having voted “no” in its 2014 referendum on secession, Madrid refusing to consider allowing Catalonia to hold a similar vote, and Kiev adamant on not dividing Ukraine—seems likely to remain so. On the other hand, the details surrounding the breakup of Czechoslovakia do not support the conclusion that even under highly propitious circumstances nationalism can be easily separated from its emotional content and function in a world of tranquil cost-benefit analysis. Viewed objectively, there was no significant reason for the Slovaks and Czechs to divorce, much less to engage in such postdivorce shows of sovereignty as forcing their citizens to choose a single citizenship. The predominantly industrial economy of the Czech lands and the still largely agricultural economy of Slovakia complemented each other, and their respective citizens speak a shared language with approximately the same degree of deviation that you find between American and British English. They had been intermarrying and living on opposite sides of the new frontier for centuries. The explanation for the breakup lies primarily in Meciar’s self-serving exploitation of the nationalist issue to retain power in postcommunist Slovakia. To do so, he launched a movement for an independent Slovakia that gained such momentum that he could not halt it or withdraw his separatist demands when the Czechs refused to offer Slovakia incentives to remain. Thus, even though at the time of the Meciar-Klaus talks a majority in both the Czech and Slovak communities seemed opposed to dissolution, it was by then too late to stop the flow of events. Finally, the manner in which the Slovaks have treated the requests for autonomy and cultural respect of their own territorialized Hungarian minority raises grave concerns as to whether those reared as minorities can be generous in victory to other minorities when becoming majorities themselves. A similar issue haunts the future of Albanian-Serb relations in Kosovo and may go far in explaining why the immigrant and Native Americans in Quebec solidly voted against Quebec separatism in that province’s referendums on seeking independence during the late 20th century. Notes 1. See David Shot, “The Use and Abuse of the Language Argument in Mid-nineteenthcentury ‘Czechoslovakism’: An Appraisal of a Propaganda Milestone,” in The Literature of Nationalism: Essays on East European Identity, ed. Robert B. Pynsent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 40–65, esp. 52–55. 2. For a more extensive discussion of the demographic and economic conditions in the Czech and Slovak lands at the time of the creation of Czechoslovakia, see Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918–1987 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 13–21. 3. Please see the chapter on Central Europe and the Romany in this volume. 4. See Jan Richler, “Mainstream Antipathy to Roma Bigger Threat Than Far Right, Warns Czech Intelligence,” http://romove.radio.cz/en/article/25853.

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Suggested Readings Dedek, Oldrich. 1996. The Breakup of Czechoslovakia: An In-depth Economic Analysis. Aldershot, England: Avebury. Goldman, Minton F. 1999. Slovakia since Independence: A Struggle for Democracy. Westport, CT: Praeger. Henderson, Karen. 2002. Slovakia: Escape from Invisibility. New York: Routledge. Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. 1993. “Czechoslovakia: The Creation, Federalization and Dissolution of a Nation State.” In The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, edited by John Coakley, 69–95. London: Frank Cass. Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. 2005. History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Leff, Carol Skalnik. 1988. National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918–1987. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Musil, Jiri, ed. 1995. The End of Czechoslovakia. New York: Central European University Press. Olivova, Vera. 1972. The Doomed Democracy: Czechoslovakia in a Disrupted Europe, 1914– 1938. Translated by George Theiner. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Paul, Ellen. 2003. “Perception vs. Reality: Slovak Views of the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia,” Nationalists Papers 31 (4) (December): 485–491. Teich, Mikulas, Dusan Kovac, and Martin Brown. 2013. Slovakia in History. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Appendices 1. The Dissolution Act In an unprecedented act, the political leaders in Czechoslovakia chose to dissolve their state and peacefully partition it into two new states in the act below. This “Velvet” divorce officially capped a short period of political bargaining in which the marital property was divided and the final details of the divorce hammered out by the spokesmen for the two spouses, without any referendum involvement of the children (the Czech and Slovak communities) in the discussion. Constitutional Act No. 4/1993 Coll. of the Czech National Council, of December 15th, 1992, on Measures Related to the Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic The Czech National Council has resolved on the following Constitutional Act: Article 1 (1) The constitutional acts, acts of law and other legal regulations of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic valid on the date of dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic in the territory of the Czech Republic shall remain valid and effective. However, it is not possible to use those provisions which are contingent only on the existence of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and on the integration of the Czech Republic in it. (2) Unless specified otherwise legislatively, the citizenship and territory of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic specifically linked to rights and obligations defined in

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constitutional acts, acts of law or other legal regulations adopted before the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic shall mean the citizenship and territory of the Czech Republic. Article 2 In the event of any discrepancy between the legal regulations of the Czech Republic adopted before the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and the legal regulations of the same virtue specified in Article 1, Section 1 herein, the legal regulations of the Czech Republic shall prevail. Article 3 (1) Upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic all competencies of the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and its Presidium pursuant to the regulations specified in Article 1, Section 1 shall be transferred to the Czech National Council and its Presidium. (2) Upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic all competencies of the government of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic pursuant to the regulations specified in Article 1, Section 1 shall be transferred to the government of the Czech Republic. (3) Upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic all competencies of central public administration authorities of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic shall be transferred to those central public administration authorities of the Czech Republic which have been established for this purpose pursuant to competency regulations of central public administration authorities or whose existing agenda corresponds with such competencies most. All problematic cases shall be determined by the government of the Czech Republic in the form of a directive. (4) Unless specified otherwise legislatively, upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic all other public administration authorities of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic will be replaced by newly established public administration authorities of the Czech Republic to which individual competencies will be transferred pursuant to the regulations specified in Article 1, Section 1 herein. (5) Upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic the competencies of the Supreme Court of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and the General Office of Public Prosecution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, including the General Office of Military Prosecution, shall be transferred to the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic and the General Office of Public Prosecution of the Czech Republic pursuant to the regulations specified in Article 1, Section 1 herein. Upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic all circuit military courts of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and circuit military prosecution offices of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic as well as all higher military courts of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and higher military prosecution offices of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic shall be replaced by circuit military courts of the Czech Republic, circuit military prosecution offices of the Czech Republic, higher military courts of the Czech Republic and higher military prosecution offices of the Czech Republic newly established at the same locations for the same circuits, to which individual competencies will be transferred pursuant to the regulations specified in Article 1, Section 1 herein.

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(6) All authorities of the Czech Republic established pursuant to Section 4 and the second sentence of Section 5 may be abolished and their competencies changed by an act of law. Article 4 Upon the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic all proprietary and other rights and obligations of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic shall be transferred to the Czech Republic to the extent specified by the relevant constitutional act of law adopted by the Federal Assembly or by the relevant treaty concluded by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. All rights and obligations transferred in this way shall be subject to legal regulations concerning the property of the Czech Republic and temporary management of national property. The competent central public authority shall be the Ministry of Finance. Article 5 (1) The Czech Republic recognises all states and governments recognised by the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic upon the day of its dissolution. (2) The Czech Republic assumes all rights and obligations of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic not specified in Section 4 resulting from international laws as of the date of dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, except for the rights and obligations of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic linked to those sovereign territories of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic which are not sovereign territories of the Czech Republic. This in no way affects any claim of the Czech Republic on the Slovak Republic resulting from international legal obligations of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic accepted by the Czech Republic pursuant to this provision. Article 6 This Constitutional Act shall become effective on December 31st, 1992. Source: Parliament of the Czech Republic, Chamber of Deputies. Available at http://www .psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/laws/1993/4.html.

2. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the Minorities in the Slovak State Excerpted below are representative articles in Slovakia’s constitution illustrating the emphasis placed therein on the Slovak peoples, culture, and traditions, leaving little doubt as to whose unitary state Slovakia is. It is likewise significant that of the constitution’s 156 articles, only the two included below explicitly refer to the rights of non-Slovak minorities.

CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC PREAMBLE We, the Slovak nation, bearing in mind the political and cultural heritage of our ancestors and the centuries of experience from the struggles for national existence and our own statehood, mindful of the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of Great Moravia, recognizing the natural right of nations to self-determination, together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic, in the interest of lasting peaceful cooperation with other democratic states, seeking the application of the democratic form of government, guarantees of a free life,

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development of spiritual culture and economic prosperity, that is, we, the citizens of the Slovak Republic, adopt through our representatives this Constitution:

Chapter One Part One Basic Provisions Article 1 The Slovak Republic is a sovereign, democratic state governed by the rule of law. It is not linked to any ideology, nor religion. (2) The Slovak Republic recognizes and honors general rules of international law, international treaties by which it is bound and its other international obligations. Article 2 (1) State power originates from citizens, who exercise it through their elected representatives, or directly (2) State bodies may act only on the basis of the Constitution, within its limits, and to the extent and in a manner which shall be laid down by law. (3) Everyone may do what is not prohibited by law and no one may be forced to do anything that is not prescribed by law. Article 3 (1) The territory of the Slovak Republic is single and indivisible. (2) The borders of the Slovak Republic may be changed only by a constitutional law. Article 4 Natural wealth, caves, underground water, natural medicinal springs, and waterways are in the ownership of the Slovak Republic. Article 5 (1) Conditions for the acquisition and loss of the citizenship of the Slovak Republic shall be laid down by law. (2)  No one may be deprived of the citizenship of the Slovak Republic against his will. Article 6 (1)  The state language on the territory of the Slovak Republic is the Slovak language. (2) The use of languages other than the state language in official communications shall be laid down by law. Article 7a The Slovak Republic supports the national awareness and cultural identity of the Slovaks living abroad; it supports their institutions established to achieve this purpose and their relations with the mother country.

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Part Three Political Rights Article 26 (1)  The freedom of speech and the right to information are guaranteed. (2) Everyone has the right to express his views in word, writing, print, picture, or other means as well as the right to freely seek out, receive, and spread ideas and information without regard for state borders. The issuing of press is not subject to approval procedures. Enterprise in the fields of radio and television may be subject to the awarding of an approval from the state. The conditions shall be laid down by law. (3) Censorship is banned. (4) The freedom of speech and the right to seek out and disseminate information may be restricted by law, if such a measure is necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights and freedoms of others, state security, public order, or public health and morals. (5) Public authority bodies are obliged to provide information on their activities in an appropriate manner and in the state language. The conditions and manner of execution shall be laid down by law. Part Four The Rights of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups Article 33 Membership in any national minority, or ethnic group, must not be to anyone’s detriment. Article 34 (1) The comprehensive development of citizens belonging to national minorities or ethnic groups in the Slovak Republic is guaranteed, particularly the right to develop their own culture together with other members of the minority or ethnic group, the right to disseminate and receive information in their mother tongue, the right to associate in national minority associations, and the right to establish and maintain educational and cultural institutions. Details shall be laid down by law. (2) In addition to the right to master the state language, citizens belonging to national minorities, or ethnic groups, also have, under conditions defined by law, a guaranteed a)  right to education in their own language, b)  right to use their language in official communications, c) right to participate in the decisions on affairs concerning national minorities and ethnic groups. (3) The exercise of the rights of citizens belonging to national minorities and ethnic groups that are guaranteed in this Constitution may not lead to jeopardizing of the sovereignty and territorial ntegrity of the Slovak Republic, and to discrimination against its other inhabitants. Source: The full text of Slovakia’s constitution is available at http://aceproject.org/ero-en /regions/europe/SK/Constitution_slovakia.pdf.

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East Timor (Timor-Leste) The Birth of a New State Stephen Zunes

Timeline April 1974 The Portuguese Carnation Revolution overthrows that country’s dictatorship. The new government begins to reduce its far-flung colonies, including East Timor, which had been controlled by Portugal for 400 years. 1975 A brief civil war results in victory by the leftist Fretilin movement, which formally declares independence on November 28. On December 7, Indonesia launches an all-out invasion of East Timor, killing thousands in the first weeks. 1977 The Carter administration authorizes military sales to Indonesia, including counterinsurgency aircraft; widespread massacres and the forced starvation of East Timor’s civilian population follow, with the eventual death toll estimated at 200,000, onethird of the country’s population. 1991 The Santa Cruz massacre occurs in Dili in November, in which Indonesian troops kill more than 270 unarmed civilians with U.S.-supplied weapons. Western journalists with cameras escape the country and give eyewitness testimony. 1996 On October 11, the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and de facto foreign minister in exile Jose Ramos Horta for their roles in opposing the Indonesian occupation.

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May 1998 The Indonesian dictator Suharto resigns in the face of mass demonstrations held by pro-democracy students and others in Jakarta. 1999 Indonesia agrees to a plebiscite, which results in an overwhelming vote for independence. In response, Indonesian troops and allied militia rampage against the civilian population, destroying buildings and other infrastructure, killing over 1,000 people, and displacing one-quarter of the population. International pressure forces Indonesian withdrawal, and UN peacekeeping forces arrive to establish a United Nations trusteeship. 2002 East Timor becomes an independent nation-state with a democratic constitution under the leadership of former guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmao. 2006 Months of violent unrest sweeps the country, partially fueled by charges of ethnic and regional discrimination. UN forces return to restore order. Since emerging from centuries of Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of Indonesian occupation, the island nation of Timor Leste (East Timor) remains one of the world’s poorest and least-developed countries. Ethnic divisions have begun to emerge, along with other cleavages, in this small country devastated by war and one of the most brutal foreign military occupations in modern history. The country remains a constitutional democracy, however, and the government—controlled by a party that grew out of a leftist guerrilla movement that fought both the Portuguese and the Indonesians—appears to be addressing, within the limitations of the government’s paucity of resources, the grievances of ethnic groups that have felt marginalized. The invasion by Indonesia of the East Timor in 1975, less than two weeks after its declaration of independence from Portugal, and the subsequent occupation constituted one of the most serious breaches of international law and human rights of the second half of the 20th century. The nearly quarter century of Indonesian rule over East Timor was quietly supported by major world powers desiring close relations with Indonesia, itself a vast, ethnically diverse country of over 200 million people. Efforts to assimilate the East Timorese by the Javanese-dominated Indonesian government and military were unsuccessful, despite a combination of propaganda, repression, and incentives, coupled with the colonization of the territory by Indonesian civilians. However, a serious economic downturn, the end of the 34-year dictatorship of Indonesian president Suharto, and the international mobilization of human rights groups and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) forced the Indonesians to permit a free vote on the territory’s future in 1999. When the overwhelming majority of the population opted for independence, the Indonesians

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formally gave up control of the island, although the Indonesian military and allied militias massacred thousands and destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure in the process of their withdrawal. East Timor is made up a number of distinct ethnic groups, most of whom are mixtures of Malayo-Polynesian and Melanesian-Papuan background. The largest Malayo-Polynesian ethnic groups are the Tetum, followed by the Mambai, the Tukudede, the Galle, the Kemak, and the Baikeno. The largest ethnolinguistic groups of Melanesian-Papuan origin are the Bunak and the Fataluku. There are also small populations of mestiços of mixed Portuguese-Timorese heritage, as well as ethnic Chinese, Arabs, and Africans, who settled primarily during the colonial period. During the independence struggle, the leftist Front for the Liberation of East Timor (Fretilin) consciously downplayed ethnic divisions in its education, conscientization, and propaganda efforts to develop a nationalist consciousness against the Indonesian occupation. The term “Maubere,” originally used by Portuguese colonialists to refer to the indigenous East Timorese and often used to connote illiterate and uneducated people, was subsequently adopted by the Fretilin as a term to encourage a transethnic national consciousness. Since independence, ethnic identity has emerged as one, and not necessarily the most important, of an overlapping mixture of identities, ranging from extended family and marital alliances to a complex mixture of social groupings, including secret societies. And some ethnic cleavages have emerged, particularly during violent conflicts in 2006, which initially erupted over concerns about favoritism within the military toward those from the eastern part of the country over those from the west. Throughout the crisis, multiple identities and alliances emerged and transformed as the phases of the conflict progressed. The mobs and armed factions included political factions, veterans’ organizations, martial arts groups, and street gangs. Although the main leaders came from different ethnic groups, however, it never took the form of clearly ethnic conflict. Historical Background The island of Timor, along with other parts of the East Indies, was the subject of the competing colonial interests of the Netherlands and Portugal as far back as the 16th century. By the mid-19th century, Timor had been formally partitioned, with the Dutch controlling most of the western half of the island and the Portuguese controlling the eastern half, along with an enclave on the northwest coast, totaling approximately 13,000 square miles. The divisions coincidentally approximated the precolonial division of the island between two confederations of kingdoms.1 Despite the ensuing nearly 400 years of formal colonialism, Timor’s kingdoms preserved a high level of autonomy much of the time, maintaining their historic trade links with other islands of the archipelago. These kingdoms, which consisted of loosely knit localized territorial groups with a hierarchy of clans of a number of different ethnolinguistic groups, were ruled by chiefs who received tribute and arranged marital alliances with neighboring clans.2 Although Portuguese rule included many of the standard abuses by European imperial powers, there was

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also a degree of benign neglect. Portuguese became the common language among educated East Timorese and increasing numbers of the indigenous population converted to Catholicism, but the colonial imprint was weaker than in many colonized parts of the world. The East Timorese are primarily of mixtures of Malayo-Polynesian and Melanesian-Papuan background—although Chinese, Arabs, Africans, and Portuguese added to the racial mix—with a population approximating 600,000 at the time of the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975. There were virtually no cultural, ethnic, or religious linkages with the Javanese, who dominate Indonesian politics and society and control the country’s government and armed forces. Java is not the largest island in size, but it constitutes more than half of Indonesia’s population; it is the location of Jakarta, the country’s capital and largest city, and is the center of commercial and cultural life. Precolonial ties between Timor and Java were limited to some trade. Even during the height of Javanese power between the 10th and 15th centuries, there was no political or even significant cultural influence. While unity of the entire Dutch East Indies under Jakarta’s rule has been a demand of virtually every Indonesian nationalist, and President Sukarno for a time articulated Indonesian claims for such adjacent British possessions as Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei during the 1950s and early 1960s, what was then known as Portuguese Timor was never much of an issue. When it first became an item in international forums on decolonization in the early 1960s, the Indonesians explicitly discounted any territorial claims over the Portuguese colony, though there were some contradictory statements that did indicate interest among some sectors of the Indonesian leadership.3 Even during the struggle with the Dutch over Irian Jaya in the early 1960s, the question of East Timor was never raised. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, following Sukarno’s ouster in a 1965 right-wing military coup, the army’s intelligence agency, Badan Koordinasi Intel (BAKIN), began covert support for a prointegrationist group in East Timor. BAKIN led the lobbying for annexation, which proved to be decisive. Its officers and their network of allies formed the backbone of Suharto’s New Order regime and were thus able to influence government policy.4 In April 1974, Portugal’s nonviolent Carnation Revolution overthrew that country’s Fascist dictatorship. The new government began to ease out of its far-flung colonies, including East Timor, which had been under Portuguese control for 400 years. As political parties sprang up inside East Timor, the Indonesian military launched an intelligence operation that backed the tiny pro-Indonesian party Apodeti and encouraged divisions between the two major pro-independence parties, resulting in a brief civil war in the summer of 1975. The Indonesian army also engaged in a series of cross-border attacks. The leftist Fretilin, which appeared to have the broadest support across ethnic lines, was victorious and declared independence on November 28. An August 20, 1975, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cable noted that “a major consideration on [Suharto’s] part is that an invasion of Timor, if it comes, must be justified as an act of defense of Indonesian security. He is acutely aware

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that conditions of United States military assistance to Indonesia specifically limit the use of this equipment to defensive purposes.”5 In December 1975, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta. In meeting with President Suharto, Ford—who later referred to East Timor as a “lower-echelon priority” in U.S.–Indonesia relations—conceded that “the Indonesians were anxious for greater military help and assistance” and gave them what a CIA official stationed in Jakarta at the time called “the green light” for a full-scale invasion.6 The invasion of East Timor was launched just 16 hours after Ford and Kissinger left Indonesia, on December 7. Kissinger publicly stated that the United States “understands Indonesia’s position on East Timor,” namely, that it should be incorporated into Indonesia and not be allowed its right of self-determination under international law. Behind closed doors, his recommendation was to suspend arms sales “for a few weeks and then open it up again.” To justify continued military backing for Jakarta, he asked his staff, “Can’t we construe a communist government in the middle of Asia as selfdefense?” Kissinger also instructed U.S. ambassador David Newsom to avoid discussion of East Timor and limit embassy reporting, thus allowing “events to take their course.”7 While the UN Security Council voted unanimously for Indonesia to halt its invasion and withdraw to within its internationally recognized borders, the United States blocked the United Nations from imposing economic sanctions or any other means of enforcing its mandate. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Daniel Patrick Moynihan discussed it later in his memoirs: The United States wished things to turn out as they did, and I worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.8

From the beginning of the 1975 invasion, the scale of killing carried out by the invading Indonesian military was staggering. Hundreds were lined up on a dock in the East Timorese capital of Dili and shot into the sea, even ethnic Chinese merchants and others who initially welcomed the takeover. In the first few months of the occupation, the Indonesian military slaughtered more than 60,000 East Timorese. The Indonesian military faced unexpectedly tenacious resistance from the East Timorese, however, and hundreds of thousands of people managed to survive in the mountains. President Jimmy Carter, during his first year in office in 1977, authorized $112 million worth of military sales to Indonesia, up from just $13 million the year before. These sales included deliveries of counterinsurgency OV-10 Bronco aircraft, which allowed a dramatic expansion of the air war— with devastating consequences.9 By the decade’s end, as many as 200,000 East Timorese—more than one-third of the island nation’s preinvasion population— were dead as a result of aerial bombing, massacres, forced starvation, and preventable diseases, especially in the detention camps, where tens of thousands were eventually herded.10

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The Conflict In many respects, the occupation was more of a political, nationalist struggle than a purely ethnic one. Ethnically, the East Timorese were of a similar ethnic mix of Malayo-Polynesian and Melanesian-Papuan ethnicities as the people of the western half of the island, who were largely assimilated into Indonesia. While the East Timorese were overwhelmingly Catholic, as compared with largely Muslim Indonesia, the Christian minority in Indonesia largely supported the takeover of East Timor as much as the Muslim majority. Yet there was clearly an ethnic component that helped the Indonesians justify their occupation and helped fuel the widespread opposition. The East Timorese were regarded by the Indonesians as a primitive people whom they had liberated from the Portuguese. The 24-year Indonesian occupation was defended in terms of improvements in infrastructure—such as roads and bridges—which the Indonesians had brought, along with education and housing, after centuries of Portuguese colonial neglect. Propaganda from the Indonesian government justified the occupation as a kind of mission civilisatrice. In many respects, such improvements were made largely better to impose Indonesian rule and facilitate military counterinsurgency operations. Winning hearts and minds was largely unsuccessful, so Indonesia managed the conflict largely through political repression, in the knowledge that the international community would not want to risk losing close relations with this large, strategically located, resource-rich nation. As Jacques Bertrand, in his study of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia describes it, The Indonesian national model was superimposed on a society for whom Indonesian symbols, political structure, culture, and even language were alien. Subsequent efforts to assimilate and integrate the Timorese through patronage, selective development, education, in-migration, and brute force failed. Rather than creating new bonds to the nation and state, the Timorese fed their own national consciousness and solidified their unity in resisting the Indonesians.11

The Fretilin, whose short-lived government had been deposed by the Indonesians, returned to guerrilla warfare, using the mountains and jungle as their sanctuary. Without any outside support and greatly outmanned and outgunned by Indonesian occupation forces, the armed insurgency made little headway. A nonviolent civil society movement promoting human rights and self-determination emerged by the 1990s, but was faced with severe repression. Management of the Conflict The Indonesians tried to control the East Timorese population by indoctrinating them in the official ideology of the Suharto dictatorship and by stressing the unity of the archipelago under Javanese rule. For the first 13 years of the occupation, there was virtually no contact with the outside world; foreigners were largely forbidden to visit the territory. Bahasa Indonesian, the national language, was taught

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in the schools. Meanwhile, the Indonesians brought thousands of colonists into the country to encourage integration still further. Any public expression of nationalism or of ethnic identity distinct from Indonesia was ruthlessly suppressed. A small class of collaborators came into being, some of whom evolved into militias that collaborated closely with the Indonesian armed forces. Promising East Timorese students were educated at Indonesian universities in the hopes that they would identify themselves as Indonesians rather than East Timorese. Despite being granted scholarships to Indonesian universities and offered other incentives to secure their loyalty, few East Timorese students gave up on the nationalist cause, and many became involved in underground pro-independence organizations within Indonesia proper. By the early 1990s, there had been a rather dramatic growth in awareness of the East Timor situation among prodemocracy activists in Indonesia, although the concern was often focused upon improving the human rights conditions, not on recognizing the right of the East Timorese to self-determination. The most significant opposition movements criticized the repressive, overcentralized governance of East Timor by the Suharto regime, but still favored the country’s integration into Indonesia and the suppression of any distinct ethnic or national identity. The democratic movement in Indonesia included many strong nationalists. Nationalism, in the Indonesian context, included uniting all the islands, which, for most, included East Timor. Covert intervention by the United States in the late 1950s against the nationalist Sukarno government focused upon encouraging secessionist movements in Aceh in northwestern Sumatra and some outer islands in the east.12 Centralized rule from Java and bitter opposition to independence or even to a more federalist system thus became ingrained across the ideological spectrum in the Indonesian national consciousness. Expression of a distinct ethnic identity was seen as an act of national disloyalty. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the charismatic Sukarno used anti-imperialist rhetoric as a substitute for coherent economic or political planning; internal opposition was defined as a threat by external neocolonial interests.13 Later, the fact that the colonial power controlling the eastern half of Timor was a fascist European state helped give the appearance of a moral imperative for Indonesia to “liberate” the country from colonial rule. Indeed, any effort at expressing a distinct ethnic or national identity was depicted as an outside imperialist plot. Indonesia’s military regime appears to have been motivated by the desire to consolidate the fragile national unity of the country through an example of strength and firmness against East Timorese efforts at independence.14 There was an enormous fear that allowing East Timor to be an independent state run by the East Timorese would create a precedent that would lead to breakaway movements elsewhere in the archipelago. Legally, there was a significant difference in that the other regions and ethnic minorities restive for greater autonomy or independence were all part of the Dutch East Indies and were recognized as part of Indonesia at independence, whereas East Timor was invaded and placed under foreign military occupation in violation of international law and two UN Security Council resolutions. Yet there

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was no guarantee that every Indonesian would appreciate that distinction. Therefore, while in many respects the Indonesian–East Timorese conflict was not primarily an ethnic conflict, because its fate was linked to the fear of a breakup of the country on ethnic or regional lines, it took on an ethnic significance. Significance The conflict over East Timor was significant on several levels. First of all, in terms of loss of life, Indonesia’s occupation was one of the most costly in recent decades. Indeed, in terms of the percentage of the population killed, it was the deadliest conflict since World War II, surpassing even the carnage of the Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia in the late 1970s. Another significant factor is how much of the international community ignored the gross violations of international law and human rights. Indeed, such major outside powers as the United States, Great Britain, and Australia openly backed Indonesia’s occupation and supplied much of the weaponry for the occupation forces. Most of Indonesian’s Asian neighbors and most of the Muslim world also backed the suppression of East Timorese independence. For many years, students of international relations saw the conflict as the classic triumph of realpolitik over international legal norms and principles. Yet the mobilization of NGOs—particularly in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and Canada—created a situation in which it became difficult for these important allied governments to provide Indonesia with its accustomed military aid, financial loans, and other support. This forced the Indonesian government to realize that good relations with the international community—particularly important after the collapse of its stock market and currency in 1997—were far more important than holding onto this small territory. Faced with growing opposition in the international community, the Indonesian government finally allowed for a plebiscite on independence to take place in 1999, which passed with close to 80 percent voting in favor. In reaction, Indonesian troops and allied militia rampaged against the civilian population, destroying buildings, killing over 1,000 people, and displacing nearly a quarter of the country’s occupation. Under international pressure, Indonesian forces and allied militia withdrew, and Australian-led UN forces occupied the country. East Timor remained under United Nations administration until achieving independence in 2002. Perhaps the greatest significance of the case of East Timor is that it is a demonstration of the way in which NGOs from throughout the international community can successfully mobilize to support an oppressed minority or captive nation despite the narrowly defined strategic and economic interests of world powers. Notes 1. Antonio Barbedo de Magalhaes, East Timor: Land of Hope (Oporto, Portugal: University of Oporto, 1990), 17. 2. John G. Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991), 2. 3. Ibid., 20–21.

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4. Ibid., 23, 25, 30. 5. Cited by Allan Nairn in the foreword to Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance (Boston: South End Press, 1997), xii. 6. Nairn, East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle, xiii. The quotation is from an interview by John Pilger of Philip LifeChat in the documentary Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy, directed by David Munro, Great Britain, 1994. 76 min. 7. Cited in Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 680. 8. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 247. 9. Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, 2nd ed. (Monroe, ME: Odonian Press, 1999), 42. 10. Asia Watch, “Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor,” Human Rights Watch (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1989), 253. 11. Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 136. 12. See Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). 13. Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War, 20. 14. Barbedo, East Timor, 23.

Suggested Readings Budiardjo, Carmel, and Lem Sue Liong. 1984. The War against East Timor. London: Zed Books. Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste (CAVR). 2005. Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, Timor-Leste, Executive Summary. http://www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm. Cotton, James. 2000. “The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and Regional Challenges.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 22 (1) (April): 1–22. Harris, Vandra, and Andrew Goldsmith, eds. 2012. Security, Development and Nation-building in Timor-Leste: A Cross-Sectoral Assessment. New York: Routledge. Jardine, Matthew. 1995. East Timor: Genocide in Paradise. Tucson, AZ: Odonian Press. Kohen, Arnold S. 1999. From the Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggle of Bishop Belo of East Timor. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pinto, Constancio, and Matthew Jardine. 1997. East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance. Boston: South End Press. Schulze, Kirsten. 2001. “The East Timorese Referendum Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesian Politics.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (1) (January–February): 77–82. Taylor, John G. 1991. Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor. London: Zed Books. Zunes, Stephen. 2001. “Indigestible Lands?: Comparing the Fates of the Western Sahara and East Timor.” In Rightsizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders, edited by Brendan O’ Leary and Ian Lustick. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Appendices As the studies below attest, although the war with Indonesia that saw East Timor emerge as a newly independent country occurred more than a decade and a half ago, the matter did not end

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there. The quest for justice for those affected by that war and a better understanding of the causes and consequences of the violence that shook the new state in 2006 continue. In addition to the extensive CAVR study listed among the suggested readings, the two reports excerpted here represent much of the most recent information available on those matters.

1. Amnesty International Campaign for International Justice Report, 2010 International Criminal Court: Timor-Leste, Justice in the Shadow 1.1 SUMMARY BOX 1: A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY PERSISTS IN TIMOR-LESTE In a report published on 27 August 2009, Amnesty International highlighted the state of impunity in Timor-Leste ten years after the United Nations sponsored referendum that led to Timor-Leste’s independence, and the great discrepancy between victims’ demands for justice and reparations and the government’s stance in favour of reconciliation, amnesties or pardons, and ‘forgiveness.’ Amnesty International warned that the legacy of enduring impunity for past crimes was having long-lasting negative repercussions on the ability of the newly born country to develop strong deterrent to violence; an independent and trusted judiciary; and accountable members of the security forces. The Timor-Leste government’s discourse, which was aggravated by the release on the 10th anniversary of the independence vote of Maternus Bere, a Timorese militia leader who has been indicted for crimes against humanity in 1999 . . .comes in sharp contrast in place of earlier praise in favour of justice for these heinous crimes. Maternus Bere’s transfer to Indonesia in October 2009 without facing judicial proceedings and following government’s interference with the judiciary has set a dangerous precedent and has once more widened the gap between the legitimate quest of justice and enduring impunity. [page 5] 7. RECOMMENDATIONS In order to address the current culture of impunity, and set strong deterrent mechanisms, Amnesty International recommends that the Timorese authorities undertake the following as a matter of priority: Through public wide spread consultation with civil society groups, amend the Penal Code to bring it into line with the Rome Statute and other international law obligations, including an explicit ban of amnesties, pardons and other forms of impunity for crimes under international law, as well as providing for co-operation obligations under the International Criminal Court; Ensure that these additional measures are adopted and implemented after through public discussion; Publicly announce and take concrete steps so that all persons responsible for crimes against humanity and other human rights violations, wherever and whenever they occurred, including those which occurred during Indonesian occupation (1975–1999), will be brought to justice and victims will receive reparations. [page 33]

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Source: Amnesty International Campaign for International Justice, 2010. The full report is available at http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_78/documentos/timor.pdf.

2. Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, October 2, 2006 Irregular movement of weapons within the security forces 97. PNTL. The Commission notes with concern the absence of systematic control over PNTL weapons and ammunition. The PNTL General Commander removed weapons from the PNTL National Armoury without the knowledge of the armoury officer. On 23 March 60 Steyr weapons and 50 boxes of ammunition were sent to the URP compound at Alieu. On 15 April 10 Steyr weapons and ammunition were sent to the Liquiça police station. Following the 25 May incident he ordered 10 Steyr weapons and ammunition to be stored at Gleno police station. The Commission also notes with concern the selective arming of western PNTL officers under the command of PNTL Dili District Deputy Commander Abilio Mesquita, who conducted weapons training of 10 western PNTL officers from the Dili District Task Force on 11 May. Thereafter, those officers remained under his command and were armed with Steyr weapons. A further 20 western PNTL officers were armed with Steyr weapons by Commander Mesquita on 17 May and thereafter came under his command. This training and arming of western PNTL officers was done with the authority of the PNTL General Commander. 98. A recent weapons audit conducted by an international team has found that 219 PNTL weapons remain outside PNTL custody and control. These weapons comprise 190 Glock 9 mm pistols, 13 Steyr semi-automatic assault rifles, 10 HK33 semi-automatic assault rifles, 2 FN-FNC semi-automatic assault rifles and 4 12-gauge shotguns. While PNTL records identify the last known signatory for the majority of these weapons, the habit of transferring weapons absent of either written orders or documentation about the chain of custody renders it impossible to determine the current whereabouts of these weapons. … C. Institutional responsibility 1. Conceptual framework of institutional responsibility 135. The events of April and May cannot be considered in isolation. They took place within a context of particular institutional weaknesses and decisions made by those in positions of authority. This section examines the contribution of those factors to the events of April and May. In undertaking this task the Commission draws upon two aspects of its mandate: first, to “identify issues which contributed to the crisis”, and second, to “clarify responsibility” for the events of April and May. In this latter respect, it will be recalled the Commission understood that its mandate included both individual and institutional responsibility.

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Institutional responsibility has been taken to attach to acts and omissions of institutions which materially contributed to the events. Particular attention is given to the security sector. The actions of the Government, the President and UNOTIL are examined also.36. The Commission recognizes that Timor-Leste is a fledgling democracy. Its institutions are developing and face significant resource limitations. However, failures of the rule of law and accountability were at the heart of the events of April and May. Governance structures and existing chains of command broke or were bypassed. Roles and responsibilities became blurred. Solutions were sought outside the existing legal framework. Institutional weaknesses and divisions within and between institutions were brought to the fore and culminated in open confrontation between PNTL and F-FDTL on 25 May. … (c) Weak accountability mechanisms 142. F-FDTL has both a Code of Military Discipline detailing procedures for breaches of service discipline and provisions within its governing law concerning the liability of F-FDTL members to prosecution for criminal offences. However, few cases of alleged criminal conduct are brought before the courts and internal disciplinary processes suffer from delays and a lack of transparency. … (c) Weak accountability systems 151. In the face of repeated complaints of misconduct by PNTL officers, PNTL gave attention to strengthening internal accountability systems. The Professional Ethics Office and the Inspectorate within the Ministry of the Interior were established. However, processes were undermined by a lack of resources and through political interference. Several PNTL officers named in section IV as being reasonably suspected of criminal conduct during the events had previously been the subject of repeated disciplinary complaints. Relatively light penalties had been imposed. (d) The events of April and May 2006 Police response to the demonstration and events of 28 April 152. The events related to the police response to the violence at the Government Palace on 28 April 2006 are described in paragraphs 47 to 48 above. The Commission considers that the operational handling of this violence was deficient. Although the PNTL command had received assurances of a peaceful demonstration from the petitioners, the nature of the demonstration and rising tensions on 28 April warranted a more robust police readiness. 153. An inadequate number of PNTL officers were present at the Government Palace. At the time violence broke out, the police resources were limited to one Dili Task Force platoon, 16 UIR officers and some district PNTL officers. Given the lack of contingency planning and the tendency of lower-ranking officers to rely upon their senior commanders, PNTL

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officers at the scene were unclear as to their operational responsibilities in the absence of those senior commanders. At the headquarters, the agitated intervention of the Minister of the Interior, including his removal of a weapon from the armoury, would have contributed to an atmosphere of panic. 154. Many police officers present at the demonstration site lacked sufficient equipment to undertake their functions. Regular PNTL officers had only their weapons. Not all members of UIR had complete sets of riot gear. Only some officers had protective masks when tear gas was used. Radio-receiver bases were operating ineffectively, which severely restricted radio communications, and commanders were unable to transmit their operational orders effectively. Intelligence received through the Police Information Service appears not to have been processed properly nor used. A similar lack of cohesion and uniformity was noticeable in the PNTL response to the incidents of violence at Comoro. Source: The full UN report on the 2006 violence in Timor-Leste, from which the excerpts are taken, is available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/COITimorLeste.pdf.

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France Ethnic Conflict and the Problem of Corsica Sue Ellen M. Charlton

Timeline 1209 The Albigensian crusade begins; it leads to the transfer of territory in the south of France from the counts of Toulouse to the French monarchy. 1481 Provence is bequeathed to the king of France. 1532 Brittany is acquired by France through royal marriage. 1635 The Academie française is established. 1648 Alsace is attached to France by the Treaty of Westphalia. 1729 The Corsican rebellion against Genoa begins. 1752 Corsica wins nominal independence from Genoa. 1755 Pasquale Paoli becomes chief of the Corsican nation.

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1768 France purchases Corsica. 1789 The French Revolution begins. 1794 Two years of quasi-independence for Corsica begins. 1860 Savoy becomes part of France. 1871 Alsace is given to Germany as a result of the Franco-Prussian War. 1918 Alsace is returned to French sovereignty after World War II. 1962 Algeria gains independence from France; many French Algerians immigrate to Corsica. 1965 The Front regionaliste corse (FRC) is established. 1967 The Action regionaliste corse (ARC) is established; it evolves into the Action pour la renaissance de la Corse in the early 1970s. 1976 The Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) is established. 1982 A special statute for Corsica is adopted, creating the Corsican Assembly. 1991 A statute is adopted creating the Collectivité Territoriale de Corse (CTC). 1992 The European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages is adopted; a French constitutional amendment specifies French as the national language.

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1999 The Matignon Agreement is negotiated on the devolution of additional functions to the Corsican Assembly and teaching Corsican in schools; it goes into effect in 2002. 2003 A referendum on increased Corsican autonomy is narrowly defeated by voters. 2007 The Corsican TV channel is launched. 2008 A constitutional amendment recognizes the regional languages in France. Most people consider France one of the oldest, most unified, most stable of Europe’s nation-states. In many ways it is, although this image must be qualified by the reality of a number of regional conflicts that are grounded in ethnic—and particularly language—differences. In the second half of the 20th century, dozens of regional movements and political parties, most very small, demanded that the central government in Paris recognize their claims to regional distinctiveness. Some lobbied for greater decentralization of government activities and support for the teaching of regional languages in the public schools. Others went further and demanded autonomy or even independence. The most important of these autonomy-seeking movements were located in Brittany in western France, the Pyrenees region in the extreme southwest on the Spanish border, Occitania in the south, and on the island of Corsica. Occasionally, members of some of these movements resorted to violence to call attention to their grievances, but most often they used elections and other legal processes to pursue their goals. Although by the beginning of the 21st century, Corsica still experienced sporadic ethnonationalist violence, the island was primarily viewed as a tourist destination. The decline in militancy in Corsica resembles what has happened to other ethnonationalist movements in France that thrived in the 20th century. Beginning in the 1980s, the French central government followed precedents set elsewhere in Western Europe and through successive policies devolved powers to the regional government of Corsica. Despite occasional episodes of political violence, it appeared that the political situation in Corsica had stabilized by the early 21st century. The central government proposed a reorganization of the island’s institutions and additional transfer of decision-making competencies in 2002– 2003, but Corsican voters narrowly defeated the proposals in a 2003 referendum. Historical Background The origins of ethnic conflict in France, as elsewhere in Europe, lie in the construction of the modern territorial nation-state, a process that by definition meant

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the elimination of smaller feudal states and local loyalties as well as the breakup of large empires. The boundaries of France were not always what they are today. Although by the time of the French Revolution of 1789 French kings claimed a lineage dating back a thousand years, most of the land under the control of the reigning Bourbon monarchy was incorporated into the expanding French kingdom only during the preceding three centuries. Building the French State and Nation

Modern ethnonationalists argue that the French nation-state was constructed by the forcible incorporation of independent political entities and diverse local cultures into the expanding realm of centralizing Paris-based monarchies before 1789 and by the bureaucrats and politicians of the French republics after 1789. This expansion of control from Paris was composed of two overlapping processes that occurred over a long period. The first process was the construction of a modern state with clearly defined territorial boundaries and centralized political, military, and economic institutions. The second process was the elimination of the regional loyalties, customs, and languages that persisted even after political sovereignty was transferred to the kings of France. This process was one of nation building or, as Eugen Weber called it in his rich historical study of France, a process of turning Peasants into Frenchmen (1976). The construction of the modern French state required the physical incorporation of diverse regions into the control of the central monarchy. The expansion of French borders from the Paris region to the configuration we know today began in the early 13th century and continued into the 20th century with war, dynastic marriages, and diplomacy all playing a role. State-building politics mixed with religion and later with “great-power” diplomacy on a broad European scale. For example, much of contemporary southwestern France, the modern regions of Midi-Pyrénées and Languedoc-Roussillon, the area that ethnonationalists call Occitania, was under the authority of the counts of Toulouse by the 13th century. The destruction of the region’s autonomy was a result of the Albigensian crusade in southern France. The crusade targeted a dissident Christian sect branded as heretical by the Catholic Church and a regional count who was accused of being sympathetic toward this heresy. The viciousness of the crusade, which began in 1209, followed by the incorporation of the possessions of the counts of Toulouse into the realm of the French crown has led some modern ethnic nationalists to interpret the events of the 13th century as a political conspiracy designed to destroy a rich culture. Through the course of state building, most of southern France to the east of Languedoc, in the region now known as Provence, officially became part of France in the 15th century; the west and far southwest were incorporated piecemeal by the monarchs from the 15th to the 17th centuries; and Brittany became part of France in 1532 through royal marriage. Alsace, on the border with Germany in the east, was officially attached to France in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalia, but was turned over to Germany as a result of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. After Germany’s defeat in World War I, in 1918, Alsace returned to French sovereignty until it was annexed by Germany at the beginning of World War II, only to be

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ceded again to France after the war. Corsica, as explained below, did not become part of France until the 18th century, and its annexation was a result of great-power politics, not religion or dynastic marriages. Finally, Savoy, in the far southeast, was added to France in the mid-19th century. After formal annexation, the agencies of the king and state undertook to integrate the peripheral territories through a variety of policies. These policies included the elimination of regional armies, the establishment of state-controlled manufacturing enterprises (such as salt), a centralized taxation system, the abolition of local tolls, the creation of a common system of weights and measures, and, in the 19th century, centralized systems of law, railroads, and education. From as early as the 17th century, a policy of subordinating the cultures of the newly incorporated territories complemented the institutions of economic and political control. This policy was exemplified by the Académie française, which was founded in 1635 to publish a standardized dictionary of French and still exists today as an official monitor of the French language. Other national and regional academies for the arts and sciences were subsequently established in the 17th and 18th centuries. The primary objective of these academies was to foster the linguistic and cultural unification of France in the wake of territorial expansion. Although the academies did not eliminate regional languages, they did contribute to the erosion of regional identity by co-opting educated local elites and undermining the acceptability of local cultures and languages. Corsica

Corsica was one of the last regions whose sovereignty was officially transferred to the French state. This fact, along with the island’s relative geographical isolation and the circumstances under which France took control, helps account for the persistence of a strong Corsican identity and demands for political autonomy. After the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century, Corsica was subjected to successive invasions by various peoples and armies competing for power after Rome’s fall. Then the island became a pawn in the competition for power between the Italian city-states. Finally, control fell to the city-state of Genoa, which nominally ruled Corsica for most of the period from the late 13th century to the middle of the 18th century. During this time, raids against the island, combined with the notoriously corrupt Genoese rule, prompted several rebellions by Corsicans. In 1729, Corsicans launched a war of independence that eventually resulted in nominal independence from 1752 to 1768. In 1755, Pasquale (Pascal) Paoli was chosen general-in-chief of the Corsican nation, a position that earned him a place in history as Corsica’s first acknowledged nationalist. Ironically, Napoléon Bonaparte, one of France’s most famous leaders, was born in Corsica during this period, in 1769. Meanwhile, France, an expanding military power in the 18th century, was embroiled in strategic competition with England. This was the era of great-power politics and dynastic wars in Europe, and France sought to expand its influence throughout the Mediterranean region. It proposed to Paoli a protectorate over Corsica, a proposal that was rejected. In response, France simply bought the island from

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Genoa in 1768 and, in 1769, sent its troops to Corsica to make a point about the authority of the new owners. Corsica was now officially part of France. Except for a brief period from 1794 to 1796 when, during the tumult that followed the French Revolution of 1789, Paoli again led a Corsican state (under British protection), and again during World War II, when the island was occupied by Italian and German troops, Corsica has belonged to France. The Rise of Corsican Ethnic Consciousness

The rise of ethnic consciousness in the 20th century is rooted in the economic, social, and political changes of 19th-century France. Industrialization reduced the economic isolation of outlying regions while also sharpening regional differences, as some areas remained largely rural and agricultural and others became major centers of manufacturing. Textile production, for example, was concentrated in the north, while Brittany in the west and much of southern France remained underdeveloped. Regions that had been peripheral in a political and cultural sense now became peripheral in the economic sense. In the 20th century, the relative poverty of the outlying regions would merge with issues centered in the survival of regional language and culture to stimulate movements drawing on ethnic distinctiveness, especially language, as well as economic grievances. Corsica is a good example of this fusion. During the mid-1970s, when Corsican autonomy movements peaked, the French government estimated that 173,000 of the 240,000 people (72 percent) on the island still spoke Corsican, a language more closely related to Italian than French. Lying in the Mediterranean Sea, 100 miles south of France, Corsica is actually closer to Italy, which lies 50 miles to its east. The island’s physical and linguistic detachment from metropolitan France was underscored throughout most of the 20th century by the persistence on the island of a unique social structure and distinctive culture. Corsican society has historically been organized around extended-family clans, marked by strongly differentiated gender roles, codes of honor and the vendetta, and occultism. Ethnic distinctiveness, as well as a long history of outside control and the cultivated historical memory of a brief period of independence in the 18th century, are central to the ideology of Corsican autonomy movements. Economic grievances and the structure of political power on the island have fueled these movements. The French government undertook no significant economic development policies in Corsica until the 1950s, and when it did promote development, its policies benefited newcomers more than the local population. Thus, investments designed to support agriculture primarily helped the French who left Algeria in the 1960s in the wake of Algeria’s successful war of independence against France. Many of these French Algerians migrated to Corsica, where their expanding economic and social presence contributed to Corsican resentment of outsiders. Corsican economic grievances were not imaginary. The island’s population was smaller in the early 1970s than at the end of the 19th century. The island’s depopulation was typical of many rural, poor French administrative areas (departments) from which people migrated to richer areas to find work. Although the central

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government in Paris has pursued concentrated strategies of economic development for Corsica since the 1960s, and despite substantial aid from the European Union, the island remains among the least-developed and most rural regions of France and, more generally, Europe. The earliest Corsican nationalist movements followed a pattern found elsewhere among French ethnic groups by focusing on literary and language questions. Explicit political organization dates from the post–World War I period, when the Autonomous Corsican Party (Partitu Corsu Autonomista) was founded. The most important growth period for the Corsican movement was in the 1960s, when several nationalist political organizations were established. The most influential of these were the socialist Corsican Regionalist Front (Front régionaliste corse), established in 1965, and an autonomist organization that became the Action pour la renaissance de la Corse (ARC), or Action for Corsican Renaissance. All of these organizations became more radical after 1968, a year of great social, economic, and political turbulence for France in general, and the number of violent incidents provoked by autonomist and separatist Corsican groups escalated from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. By 1976, there were four legal and at least two illegal autonomist Corsican organizations. The most important of the clandestine movements, both in terms of size and longevity, was the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), which was established in 1976. The Conflict By the early 21st century, Corsica’s autonomist groups and their demands had evolved considerably. Some groups disappeared or merged, some moved into mainstream politics, and a few still operated clandestinely. A variety of goals have fueled these groups, and the groups themselves have been fragmented, thereby making it difficult to identify one or two central issues that could be addressed in the political process. At the core of the island’s autonomy demands is the identity stemming from the Corsican language, or Corsu, which developed from the colloquial Latin spoken during the Roman Empire. Over the centuries, the language became infused with Italian dialects from Pisa and Genoa. Although Corsican is seldom used in day-today communication, it has long been the most prominent and acceptable marker of cultural identity.1 Since the 1980s, it has been an optional course in the schools, but nationalists wanted its study to be mandatory—a demand that challenged the central government’s long tradition of insisting on French as the only legitimate national language. In addition to language, ethnic identity is characterized by the cultural traits noted above, such as the wide acceptance of and reliance on clan lineages, political clientelism, and patronage in social and political matters. Most observers link clans, in turn, to codes of honor, blood feuds, and the vendetta, which have long been part of the island’s social fabric. The resulting tradition of violence has led outsiders, including politicians based on the mainland, to claim that the ethnic conflict on Corsica has had more to do with vendettas and banditry than goals of

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political autonomy or a language renaissance: “nationalists and racketeers, who are sometimes one and the same, are regularly felled by bullets.”2 During the 1960s and 1970s, a coherent nationalist doctrine came to characterize the ideology of the various branches of the nationalist movement, however much they disagreed on political strategies. Under this doctrine, the history of the island was formulated in terms of colonial exploitation: Corsica was exploited first by Genoa and then by the French state, with the result that a Corsican identity was repressed, and the island was subjected to perpetual underdevelopment. By the 1980s, the language of “Corsican specificity,” which maintained the necessity of defending Corsican culture and identity, had become central to the political discourse of a broad range of political leaders and groups. Not all agreed, however, on the implications of this specificity in terms of the political strategies needed to deal with the institutions of the French state. Management of the Conflict For several decades, the policy of the central government has focused on decentralizing political authority to the island in the expectation that decentralization, combined with economic development, would undercut the residual politically motivated violence on the island. Put differently, the formula has been decentralization plus economic growth yields diminished violence. The questions that remain, of course, are how much decentralization and what kind of economic growth. The central government has pursued the strategy of political decentralization in three major steps. In 1982, a newly elected Socialist government sought to decentralize government authority throughout France by a series of institutional reforms. One of the first reforms targeted Corsica, where a directly elected Corsican Assembly was established. The assembly was given wide powers in executive decision making for the island in the areas of education, economic development, agriculture, transportation, and housing policy. In recognition of the importance of historical memory to Corsican sensibilities, a new university named for Pasquale Paoli was established, and the building used by Paoli’s government in the 1760s became the home of the new Center for Corsican Studies. The 1990s saw additional initiatives toward decentralization in the French regions, including Corsica. In 1991, the “Joxe statute” (after Pierre Joxe, then minister of the interior) led to the establishment of the Collectivite territorial de Corse, which called on the Corsican Assembly to develop a plan for teaching the Corsican language. In 1993, the central government undertook a second institutional reform package for Corsica by expanding the authority of the Corsican regional government and establishing an executive directly elected by regional councilors. These initiatives were consistent with the direction of European Union policies on regions; in 1992, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was adopted. During the same year, however, the French constitution was amended to state explicitly: “The language of the Republic shall be French” (Article 2). Ironically, although France signed the European Charter in 1999, it was not ratified because it was interpreted to violate Article 2 of the French Constitution. A 2008

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constitutional amendment (Article 75-1) did acknowledge the existence of regional languages, but stopped short of the wide-ranging protections called for in the EU Charter. The way out of this contradiction was to amend the constitution, which faced both legal and political hurdles.3 Thus, French policy illustrated both the historical commitment to a single national language and also efforts to mollify demands for recognition of regional languages and cultures. From the late 20th century to the present, both the French government and the European Union have invested heavily in the island’s economic development. Although key indicators, such as per capita gross national product and unemployment figures, showed Corsica still lagging behind most French regions by the close of the 20th century, commitments made in 1999 in both Paris and Brussels, the headquarters of the European Union, promised to gradually close the gap. It was in this context that the third major initiative of decentralization was undertaken in a series of negotiations beginning in 1998 and lasting until late 2001. Under the “Matignon agreement,” the French government negotiated a further devolution of legislative power to Corsica. The accord also provided for the obligatory instruction of the Corsican language in the public schools and reaffirmed a variety of fiscal and economic measures designed to strengthen the Corsican economy.4 Although the terms of the accord were ratified overwhelmingly by a formal vote in the Corsican Assembly, the extremist wing of the nationalist movement was not unanimous in its approval of the reforms. The majority supported the peace process and, while raising questions about the implications of the government initiatives, were prepared to wait for the unfolding of the proposed changes before passing final judgment. Notable exceptions were several small political factions, two of which appeared in 1999 and claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks that included assassinations and the bombings of public buildings at the end of the decade. By the early 21st century, language activists had become more involved in the management of language issues in the devolved institutions, such as the Corsican Assembly, leading one scholar to characterize them as part of the system of governance on the island.5 Many of the goals of three decades had been realized. For example, as a result of the 2002 Law on Corsica, Corsican has been automatically taught in primary schools unless parents opt out. Research evidence suggests that the decline in the use of Corsican has been slowed, if not halted: about 80 percent of the population said they understood Corsican, and over one-third said they could speak it well and write it.6 In early 2003, the government proposed an additional step of decentralization, calling for a referendum in Corsica on further devolution of institutional authority to a single collectivity and eliminating the separate departments of Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud. Although the nationalist movements supported it, it was rejected by a narrow majority of voters, raising the question of whether Corsican nationalism had become a spent force. The issues of Corsican identity and autonomy appear to still hold sway over voters, but postreferendum analyses found a range of possible explanations for the rejection. Some voters claimed the wording was confusing; some simply did not trust anything proposed by the central government; some politicians saw the plan for consolidating institutions (and streamlining the

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bureaucracy) a threat to their own positions; and other voters saw the last-minute capture of an alleged terrorist leader as electoral manipulation and feared the threat of more police repression on the island.7 During the first decade of the 21st century, natural population growth was at near zero, and like much of Europe, Corsica faced the pressures of an aging population, with over 25 percent of the population over the age of 60. However, the overall population of Corsica grew, based on the influx of new immigrants.8 During this same period, the GDP per capita in Corsica grew by 33 percent, much faster than the French average, and this trend continued through the global economic crisis that began in 2008. By 2010, the GDP per capita had reached the level of 90 percent of the EU average when measured by purchasing parity.9 Significance Even as the process of devolving power to Corsica was well under way, sporadic political violence—most of it targeting symbols of the French state—continued. Typically, a small splinter group of a nationalist movement would bomb a building, concentrating its attack on property damage. In 1998, the new prefect for Corsica, Claude Erignac, was assassinated, and two years later, two moderate Corsica nationalists were shot. Subsequent violence, which occurred after the government’s decentralization agreement of 2000, suggests that an ongoing complication in the Corsican situation is the division between moderates and extremists in the nationalist movement over the strategy of accommodation with the central government. Although assassinations often target prominent figures, such as the president of Corsica’s national park in 2013 and a government services director in 2014, seldom have the assassins been arrested and convicted. The killings are typically attributed to nationalists with ties to criminal gangs. Despite this violence, the history of the past half century shows the efficacy of many of the government’s efforts to respond to national demands by devolving decision-making power to the island. Most nationalists have cast their lot with such institutions as the Corsican Assembly, where parties such as the Party of the Corsican Nation regularly seek representation, and the European Parliament. Although some nationalists still demand complete independence from France, the majority are primarily engaged in managing policies in devolved competencies, such as economic development and education, where jobs created in the past two decades lure elites eager for the jobs and their attendant prestige. Notes 1. Corsican was never the official language of the island. French was the language of administration, law, and writing, although Corsican endured in proverbs, songs, and so on. Robert J. Blackwood, The State, the Activists and the Islanders: Language Policy on Corsica (New York: Springer, 2008), 132, 134–36. 2. “France: A New Army of Ghosts Haunts Corsica,” Le Monde, November 1, 2012, translated for Presseurop, http://egazette.eu/uncategorized/france-a-new-army-of-ghosts-haunts -corsica-le-monde-paris/

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3. As of this writing, France has signed but not ratified the EU Charter. 4. For the details of these negotiations and the resulting agreements, see “La question corse en 2005, 30 ans après Aleria,” La documentation francais¸e (Paris: Documentation francais¸e, 2005), www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/corse/index.shtml. The text of the resulting Corsica Act (Law 2002-92) of January 2002 is found in the Journal Officiel of France, www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT0000004094 66&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id. 5. Blackwood, The State, the Activists and the Islanders, 137. Blackwood distinguishes between language activists and political activists, noting that not all of the latter would be satisfied with the progress made. 6. Mercator, European Research on Multilingualism and Language Learning, Corsican: The Corsican Language in Education in France, 2nd ed. (Leeuwarden: Mercator, 2012), 5. 7. Elizabeth Bryant, “Corsica Defeat Leaves Paris Empty-Handed,” UPI, July 7, 2003, www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2003/07/07/Corsica-defeat-leaves -Paris-empty-handed/UPI-18241057602518. 8. Marek Kolodziejski, Economic, Social and Territorial Situation of Corsica and Sardinia (Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, 2013), 29. 9. Ibid., 30.

Suggested Readings Blackwood, Robert J. 2008. The State, the Activists and the Islanders: Language Policy on Corsica. New York: Springer. Braudel, Fernand. 1988. The Identity of France. Vol. 1. History and Environment. Translated by Sian Reynolds. New York: Harper & Row. Carrington, Dorothy. 1995. The Dream Hunters of Corsica. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. de la Calle, Luis. 2010. “Making Nationalists out of Frenchmen?: Substrates Nationalism in Corsica.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 16 (3–4): 397–419. Hepburn, Eve, and Anent Elias. 2011. “Dissent on the Periphery?: Island Nationalisms and European Integration.” West European Politics 34 (4): 859–882. Weber, Eugen Joseph. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Appendices 1. Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, as Amended Although there are numerous provisions in the constitution that are relevant to decentralization and regional governance, the most important provisions, including those that pertain to language, are Article 2 (added in 1992), Article 72 (and 72-1, 72-2), and Article 75-1.

Preamble The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, and to the rights and duties as defined in the Charter for the Environment of 2004.

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By virtue of these principles and that of the self-determination of peoples, the Republic offers to the overseas territories which have expressed the will to adhere to them new institutions founded on the common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity and conceived for the purpose of their democratic development. Article 1 France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis. Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to professional and social positions.

TITLE I – ON SOVEREIGNTY

… Article 2 The language of the Republic shall be French. The national emblem shall be the blue, white and red tricolour flag. The national anthem shall be La Marseillaise. The maxim of the Republic shall be “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”. The principle of the Republic shall be: government of the people, by the people and for the people. …

TITLE VI – ON TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

… Article 53 Peace Treaties, Trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international organization, those committing the finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, those relating to the status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory, may be ratified or approved only by an Act of Parliament. They shall not take effect until such ratification or approval has been secured. No ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory shall be valid without the consent of the population concerned. …

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TITLE XII – ON TERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES Article 72 The territorial communities of the Republic shall be the Communes, the Departments, the Regions, the Special-Status communities and the Overseas Territorial communities to which article 74 applies. Any other territorial community created, if need be, to replace one or more communities provided for by this paragraph shall be created by statute. Territorial communities may take decisions in all matters arising under powers that can best be exercised at their level. In the conditions provided for by statute, these communities shall be self-governing through elected councils and shall have power to make regulations for matters coming within their jurisdiction. In the manner provided for by an Institutional Act, except where the essential conditions for the exercise of public freedoms or of a right guaranteed by the Constitution are affected, territorial communities or associations thereof may, where provision is made by statute or regulation, as the case may be, derogate on an experimental basis for limited purposes and duration from provisions laid down by statute or regulation governing the exercise of their powers. No territorial community may exercise authority over another. However, where the exercising of a power requires the combined action of several territorial communities, one of those communities or one of their associations may be authorised by statute to organise such combined action. In the territorial communities of the Republic, the State representative, representing each of the Members of the Government, shall be responsible for national interests, administrative supervision and compliance with the law. Article 72-1 The conditions in which voters in each territorial community may use their right of petition to ask for a matter within the powers of the community to be entered on the agenda of its Deliberative Assembly shall be determined by statute. In the conditions determined by an Institutional Act, draft decisions or acts within the powers of a territorial community may, on the initiative of the latter, be submitted for a decision by voters of said community by means of a referendum When the creation of a special-status territorial community or modification of its organisation are contemplated, a decision may be taken by statute to consult the voters registered in the relevant communities. Voters may also be consulted on changes to the boundaries of territorial communities in the conditions determined by statute. Article 72-2 Territorial communities shall enjoy revenue of which they may dispose freely in the conditions determined by statute.

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They may receive all or part of the proceeds of taxes of all kinds. They may be authorised by statute to determine the basis of assessment and the rates thereof, within the limits set by such statutes. Tax revenue and other own revenue of territorial communities shall, for each category of territorial community, represent a decisive share of their revenue. The conditions for the implementation of this rule shall be determined by an Institutional Act. Whenever powers are transferred between central government and the territorial communities, revenue equivalent to that given over to the exercise of those powers shall also be transferred. Whenever the effect of newly created or extended powers is to increase the expenditure to be borne by territorial communities, revenue as determined by statute shall be allocated to said communities. Equalisation mechanisms intended to promote equality between territorial communities shall be provided for by statute. … Article 75 Citizens of the Republic who do not have ordinary civil status, the sole status referred to in Article 34, shall retain their personal status until such time as they have renounced the same. Article 75-1 Regional languages are part of France’s heritage. Source: Translation provided by the Constitutional Council of France. Available at http:// www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/constitution/constitution -of-4-october-1958.25742.html.

2. European Union Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) The EU Charter sets goals for the protection and promotion of regional languages, including Corsican. The French government signed the charter, but ratification ran up against provisions in the French Constitution that recognize French as the national language. The charter stipulates the following in its preamble: “Considering that the right to use a regional or minority language in private and public life is an inalienable right conforming to the principles embodied in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and according to the spirit of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.” Charter provisions apply to education, judicial and administrative authorities and public services, media, culture, and economic and social life

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EUROPEAN UNION CHARTER FOR REGIONAL OR MINORITY LANGUAGES, 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Strasbourg, 5.XI.1992 Explanatory Report Français Translations Charter for Regional or Minority Languages - Website Preamble The member States of the Council of Europe signatory hereto, Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members, particularly for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage; Considering that the protection of the historical regional or minority languages of Europe, some of which are in danger of eventual extinction, contributes to the maintenance and development of Europe’s cultural wealth and traditions; Considering that the right to use a regional or minority language in private and public life is an inalienable right conforming to the principles embodied in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and according to the spirit of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Having regard to the work carried out within the CSCE and in particular to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the document of the Copenhagen Meeting of 1990; Stressing the value of interculturalism and multilingualism and considering that the protection and encouragement of regional or minority languages should not be to the detriment of the official languages and the need to learn them; Realising that the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages in the different countries and regions of Europe represent an important contribution to the building of a Europe based on the principles of democracy and cultural diversity within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity; Taking into consideration the specific conditions and historical traditions in the different regions of the European States, Have agreed as follows:

Part I – General provisions Article 1 – Definitions For the purposes of this Charter: a. “regional or minority languages” means languages that are: i. traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population; and

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ii. different from the official language(s) of that State; it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants; b. “territory in which the regional or minority language is used” means the geographical area in which the said language is the mode of expression of a number of people justifying the adoption of the various protective and promotional measures provided for in this Charter; c. “non-territorial languages” means languages used by nationals of the State which differ from the language or languages used by the rest of the State’s population but which, although traditionally used within the territory of the State, cannot be identified with a particular area thereof. … Article 4 – Existing regimes of protection 1. Nothing in this Charter shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. 2. The provisions of this Charter shall not affect any more favourable provisions concerning the status of regional or minority languages, or the legal regime of persons belonging to minorities which may exist in a Party or are provided for by relevant bilateral or multilateral international agreements. …

Part II – Objectives and principles pursued in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 1 Article 7 – Objectives and principles 1. In respect of regional or minority languages, within the territories in which such languages are used and according to the situation of each language, the Parties shall base their policies, legislation and practice on the following objectives and principles: a. the recognition of the regional or minority languages as an expression of cultural wealth; b. the respect of the geographical area of each regional or minority language in order to ensure that existing or new administrative divisions do not constitute an obstacle to the promotion of the regional or minority language in question; c. the need for resolute action to promote regional or minority languages in order to safeguard them; d. the facilitation and/or encouragement of the use of regional or minority languages, in speech and writing, in public and private life; e. the maintenance and development of links, in the fields covered by this Charter, between groups using a regional or minority language and other groups in the State employing a language used in identical or similar form, as well as the establishment of cultural relations with other groups in the State using different languages; f. the provision of appropriate forms and means for the teaching and study of regional or minority languages at all appropriate stages;

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g. the provision of facilities enabling non-speakers of a regional or minority language living in the area where it is used to learn it if they so desire; h. the promotion of study and research on regional or minority languages at universities or equivalent institutions; i. the promotion of appropriate types of transnational exchanges, in the fields covered by this Charter, for regional or minority languages used in identical or similar form in two or more States. 2. The Parties undertake to eliminate, if they have not yet done so, any unjustified distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference relating to the use of a regional or minority language and intended to discourage or endanger the maintenance or development of it. The adoption of special measures in favour of regional or minority languages aimed at promoting equality between the users of these languages and the rest of the population or which take due account of their specific conditions is not considered to be an act of discrimination against the users of more widely-used languages. 3. The Parties undertake to promote, by appropriate measures, mutual understanding between all the linguistic groups of the country and in particular the inclusion of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to regional or minority languages among the objectives of education and training provided within their countries and encouragement of the mass media to pursue the same objective.

Part III – Measures to promote the use of regional or minority languages in public life in accordance with the undertakings entered into under Article 2, paragraph 2 Article 8 – Education 1. With regard to education, the Parties undertake, within the territory in which such languages are used, according to the situation of each of these languages, and without prejudice to the teaching of the official language(s) of the State: a.    i. to make available pre-school education in the relevant regional or minority languages; or ii. to make available a substantial part of pre-school education in the relevant regional or minority languages; or iii. to apply one of the measures provided for under i and ii above at least to those pupils whose families so request and whose number is considered sufficient; or iv. if the public authorities have no direct competence in the field of pre-school education, to favour and/or encourage the application of the measures referred to under i to iii above; b.    i. to make available primary education in the relevant regional or minority languages; or ii. to make available a substantial part of primary education in the relevant regional or minority languages; or iii. to provide, within primary education, for the teaching of the relevant regional or minority languages as an integral part of the curriculum; or

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iv. to apply one of the measures provided for under i to iii above at least to those pupils whose families so request and whose number is considered sufficient; c. to make available secondary education in the relevant regional or minority languages; or . . . [options are as above and in such other areas as technical and vocational education, and higher education]. f. to make arrangements to ensure the teaching of the history and the culture which is reflected by the regional or minority language; . . . g. With regard to education and in respect of territories other than those in which the regional or minority languages are traditionally used, the Parties undertake, if the number of users of a regional or minority language justifies it, to allow, encourage or provide teaching in or of the regional or minority language at all the appropriate stages of education. Article 9 – Judicial authorities 1. The Parties undertake, in respect of those judicial districts in which the number of residents using the regional or minority languages justifies the measures specified below, according to the situation of each of these languages and on condition that the use of the facilities afforded by the present paragraph is not considered by the judge to hamper the proper administration of justice: a. in criminal proceedings . . .; b. in civil proceedings: . . .; c. in proceedings before courts concerning administrative matters. if necessary by the use of interpreters and translations; 2. The Parties undertake to make available in the regional or minority languages the most important national statutory texts and those relating particularly to users of these languages, unless they are otherwise provided. Article 10 – Administrative authorities and public services 1. Within the administrative districts of the State in which the number of residents who are users of regional or minority languages justifies the measures specified below and according to the situation of each language, the Parties undertake, as far as this is reasonably possible: a. i. to ensure that the administrative authorities use the regional or minority languages; or ii. to ensure that such of their officers as are in contact with the public use the regional or minority languages in their relations with persons applying to them in these languages. . . . Article 11 – Media 1. The Parties undertake, for the users of the regional or minority languages within the territories in which those languages are spoken, according to the situation of each language, to the extent that the public authorities, directly or indirectly, are competent,

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have power or play a role in this field, and respecting the principle of the independence and autonomy of the media: a. to the extent that radio and television carry out a public service mission:  i. to ensure the creation of at least one radio station and one television channel in the regional or minority languages; or ii. to encourage and/or facilitate the creation of at least one radio station and one television channel in the regional or minority languages; or iii. to make adequate provision so that broadcasters offer programmes in the regional or minority languages; b.  i. to encourage and/or facilitate the creation of at least one radio station in the regional or minority languages; or ii. to encourage and/or facilitate the broadcasting of radio programmes in the regional or minority languages on a regular basis; c.  i. to encourage and/or facilitate the creation of at least one television channel in the regional or minority languages; or ii. to encourage and/or facilitate the broadcasting of television programmes in the regional or minority languages on a regular basis; Article 12 – Cultural activities and facilities 1. With regard to cultural activities and facilities – especially libraries, video libraries, cultural centres, museums, archives, academies, theatres and cinemas, as well as literary work and film production, vernacular forms of cultural expression, festivals and the culture industries, including inter alia the use of new technologies – the Parties undertake, within the territory in which such languages are used and to the extent that the public authorities are competent, have power or play a role in this field: a. to encourage types of expression and initiative specific to regional or minority languages and foster the different means of access to works produced in these languages; b. to foster the different means of access in other languages to works produced in regional or minority languages by aiding and developing translation, dubbing, postsynchronisation and subtitling activities. . . . Article 13 – Economic and social life 1. With regard to economic and social activities, the Parties undertake, within the whole country: a. to eliminate from their legislation any provision prohibiting or limiting without justifiable reasons the use of regional or minority languages in documents relating to economic or social life b. to prohibit the insertion in internal regulations of companies and private documents of any clauses excluding or restricting the use of regional or minority languages, at least between users of the same language; c. to oppose practices designed to discourage the use of regional or minority languages in connection with economic or social activities. . . .

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2. With regard to economic and social activities, the Parties undertake, in so far as the public authorities are competent, within the territory in which the regional or minority languages are used, and as far as this is reasonably possible: a. to include in their financial and banking regulations provisions which allow, by means of procedures compatible with commercial practice, the use of regional or minority; . . . Article 14 – Transfrontier exchanges The Parties undertake: a. to apply existing bilateral and multilateral agreements which bind them with the States in which the same language is used in identical or similar form, or if necessary to seek to conclude such agreements, in such a way as to foster contacts between the users of the same language in the States concerned in the fields of culture, education, information, vocational training and permanent education; b. for the benefit of regional or minority languages, to facilitate and/ or promote cooperation across borders, in particular between regional or local authorities in whose territory the same language is used in identical or similar form. ...

Part V – Final provisions Article 21 1. Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, make one or more reservations to paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 7 of this Charter. No other reservation may be made. 2. Any Contracting State which has made a reservation under the preceding paragraph may wholly or partly withdraw it by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. The withdrawal shall take effect on the date of receipt of such notification by the Secretary General. Article 22 1. Any Party may at any time denounce this Charter by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. . . . Done at Strasbourg, this 5th day of November 1992, in English and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each member State of the Council of Europe and to any State invited to accede to this Charter. Source: Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm.

France The “Foreigner” Issue Britta Nelson Bleigh and Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline 900s The building of modern, multilingual France begins with annexation of Occitania. 1756 State building concludes with acquisition of Corsica. 1789 The French Revolution ends the old order in the name of popular sovereignty. 1880s France inaugurates a program aimed at forced assimilation of regional minorities. 1905 A French law is passed on secularism and separation of church and state (laicite). 1912 French government creates identity cards for nomadic peoples, targeting Roma (i.e., Gypsy) populations. 1914 World War I begins: from 1914–1918, France recruits labor from the North African colony of Algeria. 1940 World War II begins, ending the Third French Republic; France recruits laborers from Algeria during the war and also creates camps in France into which nomadic people are forcibly placed.

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1945 World War II ends; France begins recruiting large numbers of foreign workers, taking a laissez-faire attitude toward their number and social problems until 1968. 1947 A year after the establishment of the Fourth French Republic, a war for independence begins in French Indochina. 1954 The Indochina war ends with the French withdrawal from the Asian empire, and an Algerian war for independence begins; refugees from Indochina increase substantially in number in France. 1958 The Fourth Republic collapses over the war in Algeria; the Fifth French Republic is founded. 1968 The government begins to study means for controlling the high numbers entering France as immigrants and foreign workers. 1972 Jean-Marie Le Pen founds the Front National (FN), an anti-immigrant party. 1973 Violence against Algerians in France prompts Algeria to ban further emigration to France. 1974 A recession prompts France to stop immigration “temporarily” from non-European Community (EC) states. A broad program is enacted to improve the living conditions of existing workers. 1977 The French government offers a free ticket home and a 10,000 franc bonus to any unemployed worker who is willing to leave the country. 1981–1986 Socialists control Parliament and the presidency and inaugurate programs accepting France as a multicultural society. Foreign workers are to receive the same rights as French in terms of wages and holidays. Naturalization laws are liberalized.

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1986 The control of Parliament reverts to the parties of the right. The sponsorship of foreign associations is reduced. 1989 A national furor occurs when three North African students in Paris refuse to remove traditional head coverings worn by Muslim women. The government responds by announcing strict border controls and the control of immigrants already in the country. 1990 The Constitutional Counsel refuses to rule that all forms of discrimination are unconstitutional. In Lyon, immigrants riot in a model redevelopment area, attacking police and looting shops. 1990 The French government begins reporting the country of origin of immigrants and including this in census data. 1993 A new anti-immigration law is enacted to reduce the numbers of illegal immigrants. 1995 Jacques Chirac, a Gaullist and the mayor of Paris, is elected president on a platform that stresses a new toughness toward illegal immigrants in France. 1996 One week after the UN Human Rights Commission denounces a “wave of xenophobia and racism” in France, France adopts new laws regulating immigration and asylum entry into France, illegal immigrants inside France, and the access of legal immigrants to French health care, education, and other services. 1997 In March, new restrictions on foreigners in France are passed. In December, Socialists controlling the French Assembly grant automatic citizenship to children born in France of foreign parents when they reach the age of 18. 1998 FN wins 15 percent of the vote in regional elections, forcing center-right parties to form alliances with the FN as the “party of governance” in three regions. 2004 French law bans “religious symbols” in schools and includes the hijab (headscarf) as a religious symbol. The European Union (EU) admits 10 new members, many

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with large Roma minorities now with access to the Western European countries in the “Europe without borders” zone. 2005 November youth riots spread throughout France as members of minority communities clash with police. 2010 The French government passes a law that essentially bans the wearing of a burqa or niqab in public and also makes it a crime to force someone to wear a burqa or niqab. 2014 Two new states, Bulgaria and Romania, with significant Roma populations, join the EU as member states. The European Court of Human Rights upholds the French law banning the wearing of the burqa in public. Conflict between indigenous peoples or older immigrant communities with more recent immigrants is not new in the world of ethnic politics. Similarly, racial prejudice has long exerted an important influence on public policy toward aliens. Historically, however, race has been an infrequent element in conflicts between diverse ethnic communities inside a country, primarily because racial considerations normally lead to the creation of legal barriers against immigrants coming from culturally “unacceptable” parts of the world. For one minority group in France—the Roma or “Gypsy” populations—the creation of legal barriers to immigration in France has been an unfortunate reality. For another minority group, Muslims, largely from North Africa, this has not always been the case. As a result of the post–World War II efforts of national leaders there to recruit workers from Southern and Central Europe, Asia, and Africa, a high level of conflict has recently emerged between the indigenous populations on the one hand and, on the other, refugees, foreign workers, and immigrants from ethnically and often racially different backgrounds who are already present in large numbers within these countries. While these groups have had different experiences over time by the French government in terms of barriers to immigration, they have each been treated as foreign within France, even if they were born and raised in France, simply because there is something culturally different or “foreign” between them and the greater “French” population. Historical Backround Despite a world image of “one people, one language, one country” and a public law that makes it illegal to distinguish citizens on the grounds of origin, race, or religion, the population in France has historically exhibited considerable ethnic and cultural diversity. Modern France is the product of the centralizing policies of French kings

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who for centuries prior to the French Revolution of 1789 used dynastic intermarriage and military conquest to establish Paris’s control over regions that neither spoke French nor thought of themselves as French. At the time of the French Revolution, the populace of France spoke more than 30 different dialects and languages. As late as 1870, despite a national school system created in 1794 to teach all children the French language, millions still conversed in Breton, Alsacian, Catalon, Flemish, or Basque. It was not until the 20th century that the language and culture of Paris finally displaced the regional tongues in daily use. Even today, French leaders must address the demands of regionalized minorities desiring greater cultural and political autonomy inside France. The migration of people from neighboring states also contributed to France’s historical cultural and ethnic diversity. During the 20th century, this traditional flow was augmented by the arrival of refugees from ever more remote areas in Europe. For the most part, however, these groups were absorbed with little political fallout. They were overwhelmingly European, frequently shared the Catholic faith of the French, arrived in relatively small numbers, and normally settled in Paris, where tens of thousands of immigrants could be absorbed without altering the city’s French nature. Most important, however, was their willingness to assimilate to the French way of life. The only group that has historically had difficulty immigrating into France from neighboring states is the Roma. Unlike other immigrants from Europe, Roma populations are often reluctant to assimilate to the French way of life and therefore have experienced a great deal of conflict while living in France. They often migrate to France illegally. Today, immigrants make up an estimated one-fifth to one-fourth of the French population. Despite accounting for upward of 25 percent of the population, they are very underrepresented in French politics. As a result, public policy has tended to follow along some of the xenophobic views toward certain “foreign” groups living within France instead of creating public policy that is inclusive of all French residents.1 The Emergence of the Foreigner Issue

In contrast to the earlier immigrants (with the exception of Roma populations) who largely came from neighboring European states, the millions of immigrants who entered France between 1946 and 1974 were overwhelmingly non-European in origin, dispersed widely throughout the country, and—except for the Vietnamese whose numbers became significant after the French withdrew from Indochina in 1954—have been slow or unwilling to assimilate. In Paris and those areas of Mediterranean France into which they settled in large numbers, North Africans refused to renounce their overseas citizenships, erected their own markets and mosques, and continued to wear their traditional apparel. As a result, their presence has become a major issue in French politics. One of the contributing factors to the “foreigner” problem in France that developed in the 20th century was the large number of immigrants during this time period. At the conclusion of World War II, France was in desperate need of labor.

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The need for labor was not solely a result of the end of a war, even though its conclusion was a contributing factor, as the war disrupted the French economy and resulted in the destruction of many factories within France. France was in need of additional manpower from the onset of the Industrial Revolution. This inability to increase the size of the French labor force inhibited France from fully participating in the Industrial Revolution. In 1870, France was the second-largest country in Europe (Russia was the largest) with 38 million people. Seventy years later, despite the arrival of substantial numbers of immigrants from elsewhere in Europe, its population was only 40 million. In the intervening period, during which its economy only grew 70 percent (versus Britain’s 350 percent and Germany’s 500 percent), a series of small colonial conflicts and two great wars with Germany as well as World War II had cost France substantial numbers of its young men. Consequently, one of the first acts of the postwar Fourth French Republic was to create a department to recruit foreign labor from France’s overseas empire in Indochina, North Africa, and West Africa. The principal recruiting grounds were its possessions in nearby North Africa. Resistance to the presence of North Africans, West Africans, and immigrants from Indochina became increasingly visible in the French political process and in the streets. In 1972, Jean Marie Le Pen founded an anti-immigrant party, the Front National (FN), to give a political voice to the growing anti-immigrant sentiment in France. By 1973, physical attacks on foreign workers were common enough to prompt the Algerian government to halt the flow of its citizens into the French workforce. In 1974, the French government limited the number of foreign workers permitted to enter France and restricted other forms of immigration. Ironically, the effect of the new legislation, which limited legal immigration into France from North African states, resulted in a much larger flow of illegal immigration. The economic conditions of the late 1970s and the 1980s intensified the emerging conflict between France’s foreign residents and their French hosts. Like virtually all other European countries and Japan, France rebuilt its economy after World War II on Middle Eastern oil—a more efficient, more useful, and less expensive resource than the coal that met France’s energy needs prior to World War II. The reliance on Middle Eastern oil made France (and many other Western states) vulnerable to crises that took place in the Middle East. The first crisis occurred in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states. The second crisis began in 1979 with the fall of the Shah of Iran, which coincided with the beginning of global “stagflation.” The energy crises and the beginning of a decade of global stagflation contributed to increased negative sentiments within France concerning non-French populations (including those born in France to non-French parents). During this time period, unemployment soared. In 1973, French unemployment was at 1.8 percent. By 1982, unemployment had reached 9 percent, and by 1993, it had increased to 12.2 percent. As a result of the increased unemployment and a more visible “foreign” population living within France, some French citizens believed that the “foreign” populations were stealing jobs away from the French, even though there is little

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evidence to support such arguments. Many of the jobs that foreign populations had within France were menial, unpleasant, and unsafe jobs that the French would not take at the prevailing market wages. Nevertheless, in the post–oil crisis world, the argument had a powerful appeal, especially to the nearly one in three workers entering the job market after 1973 who were not able to find employment.2 Weaving these elements into a politically explosive package was the FN party. During its first decade of existing, the party enjoyed very little electoral success. However, as unemployment grew in the 1980s, the FN regularly began to garner 10–15 percent of the popular vote by blaming French economic woes on the country’s large foreign population. By 1995, France’s foreign nationals from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco alone accounted for 1.5 million of the 58,027,308 people officially estimated to be living legally in France, and almost without exception, they arrived as practicing Muslims. Most alarming to those French concerned with preserving the French way of life is that after adjusting the list of legal and illegal foreigners to include the children and grandchildren of foreign-born French—most of whom are French citizens by birth—the number of foreigners in the country jumps to nearly 25 percent of the population. In part, this growth in total population within France is a result of a higher birthrate among this segment of the French population. By the mid-1990s, France’s foreign residents were responsible for 12.7 percent of all births, even though they accounted for only 6.3 percent of the population.3 It is estimated that approximately 10 percent of France’s population are Muslim immigrants. An exact number is unknown because the French government does not take into account race or ethnic backgrounds when conducting their census, and it is against the law in France to ask interviewees questions concerning their racial or ethnic backgrounds.4 Further, it is estimated that nearly 40 percent of third-generation Muslim immigrant men aged 16 to 25, that is, men who were born and raised in France by parents who were also born and raised in France, are unemployed. The growing size of the North African population created the visible mass necessary to awaken the French to the cultural distance separating them from the tens of thousands of Muslims arriving annually from France’s former empire in North Africa. The reluctance of these immigrants to close that gap by adhering to the assimilationist path taken by prior immigrants made their presence an issue. In Paris and those areas of Mediterranean France in which they settled in large numbers, North Africans refused to renounce their overseas citizenships, erected their own markets and mosques, and continued to wear their traditional apparel. The Conflict The main complaints made within France about these immigrant populations are the size of the foreign population (i.e., Muslim populations) and the unwillingness of these residents to adopt the French way of life (i.e., Roma and Muslim populations). In the case of French Muslims, as a result of their visible presence, they are held responsible by some critics for France’s high rates of unemployment.

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Although the immigrants have their own list of grievances, including substandard housing and, unless naturalized citizens, the inability to apply for a lengthy list of jobs, the political discussion within France is one-sided and focuses on these communities as the only problem requiring remedial action. The issues of social nonconformity range from the nomadic lifestyle of the Roma populations (a lifestyle that was made illegal by a 1912 French law), to the refusal of North African girls to follow the dress codes in French public schools, to immigrant groups’ occasionally violent protests concerning their living conditions and their refusal to give up their native nationalities and become naturalized French citizens. Assimilation has long been the cornerstone of French immigration policy and, for that matter, social policy in France. It was not until after the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, the founder and first president (1958–1969) of the Fifth Republic, that the government officially acknowledged that it contained any “minorities,” despite the continued presence in France of linguistic minorities in such regions as Alsace, Brittany, and Corsica. Prior to the Fifth Republic, in 1951, the French government passed the Deixonne Law, which authorized limited teaching of regional tongues in French public schools yet explicitly excluded Alsacien, the German dialect spoken daily by the citizens in Alsace, and Corse, the Italian-based language of Corsica. The basis for their exclusion is a statement that they are “corrupt” languages that are not entitled to the benefits of the new law. It is therefore not surprising that any example of the unwillingness of the current immigrant communities to embrace assimilation is broadly perceived by both the French government and its citizens socialized in the assimilationist tradition as evidence that the “foreigners” do not belong in France. This lack of trust in those who do not leave their culture behind and accept French culture and, more broadly, Western culture, likely contributed to the creation of camps during World War II by the French government where they placed nomadic peoples, largely the Roma populations living in France, throughout the duration of the war under the guise of national security.5 Another law created under the guise of both national security and the protection of women’s rights is the 2010 French law that bans the wearing of a burqa or niqab within France. Although the ban was pushed by parties right of center, it “was not opposed by the Socialist Party.”6 The ban was actually first proposed by Communist mayor Andre Gerin in 2009. Unfortunately, for Muslim populations, many on the right oppose the burqa and the niqab because of their symbols as being something that is very foreign, while those on the left view the burqa, the niqab, and even the hijab as a method of restricting the freedom of Muslim women. Although the law that bans the burqa and niqab in France does not specifically mention Islam or Muslim women, the law appears to clearly target the estimated 2,000 women living in France who wear either a niqab or a burqa. From a right-of-center perspective, the French law banning the burqa and niqab is one that will protect French Republic values and French culture and continue the French norm of separating public and private spaces in terms of religion. For those left of center, however, the law will protect women from the oppression of the veil. Unfortunately, some have claimed that this law has forced some women

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to essentially imprison themselves within their homes so they do not have to face the police or public ridicule because they do not want to leave their homes without wearing the niqab or burqa. It is a combination of laws like the banning of a facial covering in public spaces combined with police brutality that has triggered violent protests in some of these minority communities. One of the largest and longest outbreaks of violent protests occurred in November 2005, with riots spreading throughout France and even into neighboring countries. The November 2005 riots were initially sparked by the deaths of two teenage boys who were running from the police, not because they broke a law but as a result of the fear of police force and the lack of trust between the community and the police. The initial riots only lasted a couple of days, and it appeared that it would be the end of the rioting, until police officers fired tear gas into a mosque where over 500 people had gathered to pray. In response to the tear gas event, President Sarkozy stated that the police did not violate any laws or act in a manner that was rash, unreasonable, or irresponsible. As might be expected, this response further angered many marginalized individuals living in these communities and led to more rioting. As the riots spread, the French government initially responded with increased police force and police aggression instead of a much-needed dialogue between the government, the police, and the affected communities.7 Some, including Sarkozy, have blamed the riots and crime on lax immigration laws and an inability of certain immigrant communities to fully assimilate. Others, however, view the issues of crime within these communities and the problems between society and the police as directly related to the assimilationist state that largely excludes these citizens and residents from first-class citizenship. Meanwhile, from the perspective of France’s Muslim communities, the ethnocultural collision between their lifestyle and that of their hosts is definitely two-sided. In addition to their specific grievances over such issues as housing and access to jobs, practicing Muslims tend to view Western civilization in general and the French lifestyle in particular as offensive and debased. Its crass consumerism affords them job opportunities they would not have in their homelands, but at the cost of raising their families in a society where alcohol is a part of meals and where women appear in public barely dressed. To them, the dwelling enclaves in which they live and the markets and mosques they erect are not so much efforts to resist assimilation as oases in which they can continue to adhere to a faith that is an all-embracing guide to life. Management of the Conflict Given the nature of the foreigner debate, public policy is less concerned with addressing immigrant grievances than assuring the French public that the government shares their concerns. Within this framework, public policy has altered with the growing importance of the foreigner issue and the issues of the moment. Just prior to the beginning of World War I, the French government passed a law that outlawed nomadic lifestyles. This law clearly targeted Roma populations and essentially criminalized their way of life. This population would once again be

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targeted during World War II as all nomadic peoples were forcibly placed in camps for the duration of the war. During the period from 1945 to 1968, when foreign workers began to arrive from outside of Europe, most of whom were Muslim, the immigrants received little policy attention. Nothing was done to prepare the French populace for the arrival of large numbers of culturally different peoples or to help the immigrants settle in France. Settlement policies, during this first period, appeared unnecessary, as most of the new arrivals entered France as foreign workers on temporary visas rather than as immigrants destined for future citizenship. It was not until the number of foreign workers grew large enough to become a public policy issue that the government began to reassess the situation. The response the French government had on the growing population of foreign workers was to tighten visa requirements. Now, if a foreign worker lost his or her job, the work visa would be withdrawn. These new policy came about at approximately the same time as the FN’s founding. After the 1973 oil crises, the foreigner issue in French public policy only intensified. In 1974, a temporary stoppage order was imposed on all immigration originating outside of the European Community (now the European Union). This ban soon became permanent. By 1977, the French government offered broad categories of foreign workers a free ticket home and a 10,000 franc bonus (approximately US$2,000 at that time). Although only 5 percent of the unemployed foreign workers accepted the government’s offer, the proposal aligned public policy with public opinion. Thereafter, except for a brief period during the 1980s when the Socialist Party controlled both the presidency and the legislature, the politics of restrictionism dominates public policy toward foreign communities. This pattern is particularly evident when the immigrant communities call attention to themselves, for example, in the aftermath of the immigrant riots in Lyon in 1990 and during the furor caused the previous year when three North African girls attending public school in Paris refused to remove their headscarves (hijab). Since 1990, public policy in France has been decidedly biased against foreigners seeking to enter France as well as foreigners living within France. Border checks and other efforts to limit illegal immigration have been expanded, most notably in the 1993 Pasqual laws. In 1996, one year after Jacques Chirac was elected to the presidency on a platform that stressed a new toughness toward illegal immigrants and one week after the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHCR) decried the “wave of xenophobia and racism” in France, laws were enacted to deny asylum to anyone without identity papers, to require fingerprinting of all visa applicants from “high immigration risk countries,” to impose harsh fines on those employing workers without valid work permits, and to limit the rights of even legal resident aliens to health care, education, and other social services. In each instance, the policy goal has not been to manage the conflict between the French and the foreign communities, but to (1) stem the FNs further electoral growth, (2) placate the antiforeigner opinions held by some of France’s citizens, and (3) to keep the traditional parties in office.

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While much of the “foreign” population in France addressed in this essay are legal residents, some are illegal residents. Illegal residents have been increasingly deported with little opportunity to appeal the action, despite a 1997 ruling of the Constitutional Counsel that longtime residents may not be deported solely on the vague grounds of constituting a danger to the public order. In recent years, both the Sarkozy and Hollande governments have deported thousands of Roma. Both governments made decisions to increase the number of deportations after receiving low polling numbers.8 Although the French government had in recent years actively tried to deport Romani residents who did not have the proper documentation, it might become a little more difficult for the French government to continue to deport this particular minority group. As of January 1, 2014, all Romanian and Bulgarian citizens will be able to travel freely throughout European Union (EU) member states as it will have been seven years since Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU. So long as the Roma populations have proper documents, they will, at least according to EU policy, be able to live freely and work legally within France, regardless of French citizenship.9 Significance The ethnic conflict involving France’s North African communities, although not particularly violent or long in duration, is illustrative of the debate concerning foreign workers, refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants in other Western European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden. In each instance, the foreigner issue has unfolded in much the same pattern as in France, and in several countries it has propelled antiforeigner parties like the FN into parliamentary seats. Furthermore, the issue has enormous potential to disrupt and redefine French politics in the foreseeable future. Indicators of this development can already be found, for example, in the FN’s growing electoral support in those portions of southern France with high concentrations of North Africans and in the resultant weakening of the major parties’ hold over the regional governments in these areas. The ethnic conflict between the Roma populations within France and the French is also similar to the conflict and discrimination this particular group faces in other Western countries. Many of the issues the North African Muslim communities and the Roma populations face between themselves and the rest of the French populace is a misunderstanding of their respective cultures. There is a misunderstanding between many on the left in France concerning why a woman might choose to wear a veil. Those on the left who are very Western view the veil as a form of controlling women, but there are women who make the choice to wear a veil to show modesty and piety. Similarly, there is a great deal of misunderstanding of Roma culture and tradition. One in particular is the misunderstanding of dowry in marriages. As a result of this, many mistake the dowry in a marriage for the selling of child brides. It is worth remembering in this context that the French word for foreigner, l’etranger, literally means one who is strange or different. As long as the North African and Romani contingents continue to reject cultural assimilation, it is unlikely

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that the conflict between the native French and the North Africans and Romani will abate. On the contrary, as the numbers among each of the “foreign” populations grows within France, the conflict is apt to grow, even if an increasing number of these foreigners are, in fact, French citizens by birth or naturalization. Notes 1. Vincent Tiberj and Laure Michon, “Two-Tier pluralism in ‘Color-blind’ France,” West European Politics 36, no. 3 (2013): 580–596. 2. For a comparative discussion of the economic impact of the energy crises in France, see Jean Saint-Geours, “The Social Contract under Stress in Western Europe,” in Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal, ed. Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 230–264. Unemployment figures for 1973–1982 are taken from Saint-Geours, 256. 3. Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 199. 4. Henriette Dahan Kalev and Shoshana-Rose Marzel, “Liberte, Egalite, Islamite: Coping Strategies of Female Immigrants from the Maghreb in France,” Women’s Studies International Forum 35, no. 5 (2012): 354–361; and D. Fougere et al., “Social Housing and Location Choices of Immigrants in France,” International Journal of Manpower 34, no. 1 (2013): 56–69. 5. Rachel Salts, “Stories of War through a Gypsy Lens,” New York Times, March 24, 2011: C9. 6. Steven Erlanger, “Has the ‘Burqa Ban’ Worked in France?” International New York Times, September2, 2012; and Steven Erlanger and Elvire Camus, “In a Ban, a Measure of European Tolerance,” New York Times, September 1, 2012: A6. 7. David Waddington et al., “Introduction and Overview: The British and French Riots,” in Rioting in the UK and France: A Comparative Analysis, ed. David Waddington et al. (Cullompton, United Kingdom: Willan Publishing, 2009). 8. Timothy Egan, “Curse of the Scorned Class,” New York Times, September 22, 2010, Opinion Page piece; and Sara Miller Llana, “France Deports Schoolgirl Mid-Field Trip, Highlighting Roma Debate,” Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2013. 9. Steven Erlanger, “Treatment Still Harsh for Roma in France,” New York Times, June 3, 2013. See the chapter on the Romany in Central Europe, especially its appendices, on the ability of Central and Eastern European Roma to gain access to and remain in the EU’s Western European member states.

Suggested Readings DeClair, Edward G. 1999. Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Fenby, Jonathan. 2014. France on the Brink: A Great Civilization in the New Century. New York: Arcade Publishing. Fysh, Peter, and Jim Wolfreys. 1992. “Le Pen, the National Front, and the Extreme Right in France.” Parliamentary Affairs 45 (3) (July): 309–325. Heisler, Martin O., and Barbara Schmitter Heisler, eds. 1986. From Foreign Workers to Settlers?: Transnational Migration and the Emergence of the New Minorities. Vol 485 of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Lawrence, Jonathan. 2012. The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics.

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Messina, Anthony M., ed. 1992. Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York: Greenwood Press. Schain, Martin A. 2012. The Politics of Immigration in France, Britain, and the United States: A Comparative Study. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Appendix S.A.S. v. FRANCE In the still-evolving world of French politics vis-à-vis France’s “foreigner” communities, an increasing number of whom have been born in France, Muslim French citizens, the most important document to date may be the most recent one at this writing: the 2014 opinion of the European Court of Human Rights upholding France’s right to ban head coverings in public places. GRAND CHAMBER CASE OF S.A.S. v. FRANCE (Application no. 43835/11) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 1 July 2014 PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in an application (no. 43835/11) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national (“the applicant”), on 11 April 2011. The President of the Fifth Section, and subsequently the President of the Grand Chamber, acceded to the applicant’s request not to have her name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court). 3. The applicant complained that the ban on wearing clothing designed to conceal one’s face in public places, introduced by Law no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010, deprived her of the possibility of wearing the full-face veil in public. She alleged that there had been a violation of Articles 3, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, taken separately and together with Article 14 of the Convention.

RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. The Law of 11 October 2010 “prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public places” 1. Legislative history (a) Report “on the wearing of the full-face veil on national territory” 15. The conference of Presidents of the National Assembly, on 23 June 2009, established a parliamentary commission comprising members from various parties with the task of drafting a report on “the wearing of the full-face veil on national territory”.

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16. The report of some 200 pages, deposited on 26 January 2010, described and analysed the existing situation. It showed, in particular, that the wearing of the full-face veil was a recent phenomenon in France (almost no women wore it before 2000) and that about 1,900 women were concerned by the end of 2009 (of whom about 270 were living in French overseas administrative areas); nine out of ten were under 40, two-thirds were French nationals and one in four were converts to Islam. According to the report, the wearing of this clothing existed before the advent of Islam and did not have the nature of a religious precept, but stemmed from a radical affirmation of individuals in search of identity in society and from the action of extremist fundamentalist movements. The report further indicated that the phenomenon was non-existent in countries of central and eastern Europe, specifically mentioning the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Latvia and Germany. It was not therefore a matter of debate in those countries, unlike the situation in Sweden and Denmark, where the wearing of such veils nevertheless remained marginal. Moreover, the question of a general ban had been discussed in the Netherlands and in Belgium (a Law “to prohibit the wearing of any clothing which totally or principally conceals the face” has since been enacted in Belgium, on 1 June 2011; see paragraphs 40–41 below). The report was also critical of the situation in the United Kingdom, where it pointed to a sectarian trend driven by radical and fundamental Muslim groups, who were taking advantage of a legal system that was very protective of individual fundamental rights and freedoms in order to obtain recognition of rights that were specifically applicable to residents of Muslim faith or origin. … 17. The report went on to criticise “a practice at odds with the values of the Republic”, as expressed in the maxim “liberty, equality, fraternity”. It emphasised that, going beyond mere incompatibility with secularism, the full-face veil was an infringement of the principle of liberty, because it was a symbol of a form of subservience and, by its very existence, negated both the principle of gender equality and that of the equal dignity of human beings. The report further found that the full-face veil represented a denial of fraternity, constituting the negation of contact with others and a flagrant infringement of the French principle of living together (le “vivre ensemble”). … 24. On 11 May 2010 the National Assembly adopted, by a unanimous vote, a Resolution “on attachment to respect for Republic values at a time when they are being undermined by the development of radical practices”. In this Resolution the National Assembly made the following statements: “1. Considers that radical practices undermining dignity and equality between men and women, one of which is the wearing of the full veil, are incompatible with the values of the Republic; 2. Affirms that the exercise of freedom of expression, opinion or belief cannot be relied on by anyone for the purpose of flouting common rules, without regard for the values, rights and duties which underpin society; 3. Solemnly reaffirms its attachment to respect for the principles of dignity, liberty, equality and fraternity between human beings; 4. Expresses the wish that the fight against discrimination and the promotion of equality between men and women should be a priority in public policies concerning equal opportunities, especially in the national education system;

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5. Finds it necessary for all appropriate means to be implemented to ensure the effective protection of women who suffer duress or pressure, in particular those who are forced to wear the full veil.” … B. Decision of the Constitutional Council of 7 October 2010 … 5. In view of the purposes which it sought to achieve and taking into account the nature of the sanction introduced for non-compliance with the rule it has laid down, the legislature has passed statutory provisions which reconcile, in a manner which is not disproportionate, the safeguarding of public order and the guaranteeing of constitutionally protected rights. However, prohibiting the concealment of the face in public places cannot, without excessively contravening Article 10 of the 1789 Declaration, restrict the exercise of religious freedom in places of worship open to the public. With this reservation, sections 1 to 3 of the statute referred for review are not unconstitutional.

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE … 37. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe published the following “Viewpoint” (see Human rights in Europe: no grounds for complacency. . . . “Prohibition of the burqa and the niqab will not liberate oppressed women, but might instead lead to their further exclusion and alienation in European societies. A general ban on such attire constitutes an ill-advised invasion of individual privacy and, depending on its terms, also raises serious questions about whether such legislation is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. . . .The political challenge for Europe is to promote diversity and respect for the beliefs of others whilst at the same time protecting freedom of speech and expression. If the wearing of a full-face veil is understood as an expression of a certain opinion, we are in fact talking here about the possible conflict between similar or identical rights – though seen from two entirely different angles. . . . A prohibition of the burqa and the niqab would in my opinion be as unfortunate as it would have been to criminalise the Danish cartoons. Such banning is alien to European values. Instead, we should promote multicultural dialogue and respect for human rights.” …

THE SITUATION IN OTHER EUROPEAN STATES 40. To date, only Belgium has passed a law that is comparable to the French Law of 11 October 2010, and the Belgian Constitutional Court has found it compatible with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (see paragraphs 41-42 below). However, the question of a ban on concealing one’s face in public has been or is being discussed in a number of other European States. A blanket ban remains a possibility in some of them. In

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particular, a Bill has been tabled to that end in Italy: although it has not yet passed into law, it appears that the discussion is still open. In Switzerland the Federal Assembly rejected, in September 2012, an initiative of the Canton of Aargau seeking to ban the wearing in public of clothing covering all or a large part of the face, but in Ticino there was a vote on 23 September 2013 for a ban of that kind (the text still has to be validated, however, by the Federal Assembly). Such an option is also being discussed in the Netherlands, notwithstanding unfavourable opinions by the Council of State (see paragraphs 49–52 below). It should also be noted that the Spanish Supreme Court has ruled on the legality of a ban of that kind (see paragraphs 42–47 below) …

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN SEPARATELY AND TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 14 73. The Court observes that the applicant did not indicate how the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2012 would breach her right to freedom of association and would generate discrimination against her in the enjoyment of that right. It concludes that, being unsubstantiated, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention (see, for example, Özer v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 871/08, § 36, 26 January 2010) and is, as such, inadmissible. It must therefore be dismissed pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention …

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8, 9 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN SEPARATELY AND TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 14 141. The Court observes that this is an aim to which the authorities have given much weight. This can be seen, in particular, from the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill, which indicates that “[t]he voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is quite simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of ‘living together’ in French society” and that “[t]he systematic concealment of the face in public places, contrary to the ideal of fraternity, . . . falls short of the minimum requirement of civility that is necessary for social interaction” (see paragraph 25 above). It indeed falls within the powers of the State to secure the conditions whereby individuals can live together in their diversity. Moreover, the Court is able to accept that a State may find it essential to give particular weight in this connection to the interaction between individuals and may consider this to be adversely affected by the fact that some conceal their faces in public places … 146. In addition, there is no doubt that the ban has a significant negative impact on the situation of women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs. As stated previously, they are thus confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the effect of isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing the exercise of their freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right to respect for their private life. It is also understandable that the women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to their identity. …

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151. Thus, while it is true that the scope of the ban is broad, because all places accessible to the public are concerned (except for places of worship), the Law of 11 October 2010 does not affect the freedom to wear in public any garment or item of clothing – with or without a religious connotation – which does not have the effect of concealing the face. The Court is aware of the fact that the impugned ban mainly affects Muslim women who wish to wear the full-face veil. It nevertheless finds it to be of some significance that the ban is not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in question but solely on the fact that it conceals the face. This distinguishes the present case from that of Ahmet Arslan and Others (cited above). … 153. Furthermore, admittedly, as the applicant pointed out, by prohibiting everyone from wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places, the respondent State has to a certain extent restricted the reach of pluralism, since the ban prevents certain women from expressing their personality and their beliefs by wearing the full-face veil in public. However, for their part, the Government indicated that it was a question of responding to a practice that the State deemed incompatible, in French society, with the ground rules of social communication and more broadly the requirements of “living together”. From that perspective, the respondent State is seeking to protect a principle of interaction between individuals, which in its view is essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society (see paragraph 128 above). It can thus be said that the question whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places constitutes a choice of society. 154. In such circumstances, the Court has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of Convention compliance, since such review will lead it to assess a balance that has been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question. The Court has, moreover, already had occasion to observe that in matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight. … (b) Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 8 or Article 9 of the Convention. … 160. The Court notes that the applicant complained of indirect discrimination. It observes in this connection that, as a Muslim woman who for religious reasons wishes to wear the full-face veil in public, she belongs to a category of individuals who are particularly exposed to the ban in question and to the sanctions for which it provides. 161. The Court reiterates that a general policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be considered discriminatory even where it is not specifically aimed at that group and there is no discriminatory intent (see, among other authorities, D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, §§ 175 and 184-185, ECHR 2007-IV). This is only the case, however, if such policy or measure has no “objective and reasonable” justification, that is, if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality” between the means employed and

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the aim sought to be realised (ibid., § 196). In the present case, while it may be considered that the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 has specific negative effects on the situation of Muslim women who, for religious reasons, wish to wear the full-face veil in public, this measure has an objective and reasonable justification for the reasons indicated previously Source: S.A.S. v. France, Application no. 43835/11 (2014). Full text is available at http:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466#{“itemid”:[“001-145466”]}

Georgia Separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Jesse Dillon Savage

Timeline 780s Abkhazia achieves independence from Byzantium. 1008 Georgia is unified under Abkhazian ruler Bagrat III. 1089 The reign of David the Builder (1089–1125) begins. 1184 The reign of Queen Tamar (1184–1212) begins. 17th century Abkhazia achieves independence from a fragmented Georgia. The main Ossetian migration to Georgia takes place. 1801–1810 Russia annexes Georgian principalities and Abkhazia. 1866–1877 Abkhazian uprisings against Russia occur after the abolition of local autonomy provokes the mass expulsion of Abkhazians by Russia (mohajirstvo). 1918 Georgia receives independence during the Russian civil war and fights rebellions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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1921 Georgia is annexed by Soviet Russia; Abkhazia is set up as a separate Soviet republic. 1931 Abkhazia is subordinated to Georgia as an autonomous republic. 1978 Nationalist rallies take place in Georgia and Abkhazia. 1986–1988 The Georgian nationalist and Abkhazian movements reemerge. 1989 On April 9, a massacre occurs in Tbilisi. The first ethnic violence takes place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 1990 Georgian elections bring the nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia to power. South Ossetia declares independence from Georgia; Georgia dissolves South Ossetian autonomy. 1991 A war in South Ossetia begins; a new autonomous government is established in Abkhazia. The Soviet Union collapses. An effort is made to create a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) out of the former component pieces. 1992 Gamsakhurdia is ousted, sparking an intra-Georgian civil war. Eduard Shevardnadze returns to power in Georgia and ends the fighting in South Ossetia. Georgia invades Abkhazia. 1993 The Abkhazia war ends with an Abkhazian military victory. Most Georgians flee Abkhazia. The United Nations’ observer mission UNOMIG is inaugurated. 1994 A Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping force is introduced. 1998 The remaining Georgians in Abkhazia flee after renewed fighting occurs in May.

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2003 Shevardnadze is ousted in a peaceful democratic revolution. The new president, Saakashvili, aims to restore control over the regions. 2004 Saakashvili seeks to integrate Adjara and remove Aslan Abashidze from power in the region. There is a brief renewal of conflict with South Ossetia. 2008 Georgia intervenes militarily in South Ossetia. Russia responds with force, defeating the Georgian military. Russia formally recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and increases its presence in these regions. Since its independence from the Soviet Union, the Republic of Georgia has dealt with several sources of violent ethnic conflict and potential unrest. Famously, the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have broken away from the state because of ethnic conflicts. However, within Georgia, there remain two additional areas that are predominately populated by ethnic minorities. One such area is Javakheti, which is mainly populated by Armenians. And the region of Kvemo-Kartli is also primarily populated by a minority group, the Azeris forming the bulk of the population. Despite tensions between the majority Georgian population and the inhabitants of these regions, ethnic violence has been nonexistent. Because of this variety in outcomes among regions populated by ethnic minorities, Georgia provides a unique opportunity to explore the development and management of ethnic conflict. A complex blend of domestic and international factors explains why the Georgian relationship with some ethnic groups has flared into conflict while others have remained quiet. Domestically, the historical and institutional legacies of the Soviet Union provided different opportunities, incentives and resources for minority groups to engage in conflict. Internationally, neighboring countries have interfered in Georgian domestic politics, sometimes exacerbating tensions and fueling ethnic rivalries. The interplay between these international and domestic influences in Georgia’s varied regions illuminates a number of general principles regarding the development of ethnic conflict. Historical Background The primary ethnic conflicts in Georgia have involved three main ethnic groups: the Georgians, the Abkhaz, and the South Ossetians. The Georgians are some of the oldest inhabitants of the South Caucasus. They primarily speak a Kartvelian language, Kartuli; however, within the territory of Georgia, there are several related languages, such as Mingrelian, spoken. The Abkhaz speak a Caucasian language and, like the Georgians, are among the original inhabitants of the region. The Ossets are from an Iranian language group that arrived in the North Caucasus region during the Middle Ages and in the subsequent centuries moved into the

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territory that is now Georgia. The relationship between the three groups, their political positions, and historical claims have been determined both by local developments and politics but also by the waves of imperial expansion and decline that have characterized the history of the Caucasus. The Georgian state traces its origin back to the nations of Colchis and Iberia in the eighth and sixth centuries BCE. These states existed on the edge of the ancient Greek world and later were incorporated into the Roman Empire through both direct conquest and the creation of vassal relations. The next centuries were characterized by periods of independence and invasion and periods of subjugation. There were periods of centralized power that were later undermined by centrifugal pressures from regional elites and groups. For example, the Abkhaz had at times been an independent state and at others a part of a unified Georgian state. These many shifts in power created a situation where each of the ethnic groups could plausibly draw on history to make their claims for either authority or autonomy. The modern history of the ethnic conflicts arguably began with Russian expansion into the South Caucasus. In l783, the Eastern Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti signed the Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia. This treaty established the kingdom as a protectorate of Russia, and, in return, Russia guaranteed the kingdom’s security from the Persian and Ottoman Empires. Russia failed to live up to its side of the agreement and did not send forces against a Persian invasion in 1795. Violating this agreement further, in 1803, the Russian Empire moved to annex the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti (Eastern Georgia) following domestic unrest and conflict over the succession to the kingship of Kartli-Kakheti. In 1810, Russia incorporated Abkhazia into the empire as an autonomous principality and at the same time annexed Imereti, or Western Georgia. Under Russian rule, the Abkhaz staged numerous rebellions, and many were ultimately forced from the region, driven to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian Empire collapsed during World War I. During the Russian Civil War that followed, an independent state emerged in Georgia, governed by the Georgian Menshevik Party. The minority groups in South Ossetia and Abkhazia chose, however, to side with the Bolsheviks. The result was a brutal conflict between the Georgians and the minority groups. In 1921, Georgia and Abkhazia, as an independent republic, were incorporated into the Soviet Union. Ten years later, in 1931, Abkhazia was incorporated into Georgia, and Stalin and Beria introduced a policy of Georgianization in Abkhazia, moving ethnic Georgians into the region.1 This policy was to change the demographics of the region and create the sense of threat that contributed to the conflict in later eras. Along with creating new demographic realities, it compounded the Abkhaz resentment of Georgia. The institutions established by the Soviet authorities to govern ethnic relations in the USSR were to have long-term ramifications for ethnic conflict in Georgia. Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

The first step to understanding ethnic conflict in Georgia is to understand the nature of Soviet political institutions. Georgia, when part of the Soviet Union, was a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). The SSRs were the 15 primary administrative

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units of the USSR, each with its own titular group that enjoyed special privileges. However, the complexity of Soviet political organization was not reducible to the SSRs. Further autonomous regions often existed within these SSRs. In Georgia, there were three different autonomous regions: the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Adjara Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. As part of the Georgian SSR, the titular minorities of these smaller autonomous areas often possessed special economic and political privileges within these limited administrative boundaries. One of the earliest manifestations of the current conflict in Abkhazia can perhaps be traced to 1978. At that time, the Abkhazians were beginning to feel threatened by moves to increase the role of the Georgian language in the Republic of Georgia. In response, the Abkhaz organized a series of protests and other political actions, demanding incorporation into Russia as an autonomous republic. The Soviet authorities responded not by changing Abkhazia’s status, but by increasing investment and appointing a Russian minister of the interior to increase the Abkhaz sense of security.2 This was, however, just a short-term solution. As central Soviet power waned in the 1980s, nationalist leaders within various republics saw an opportunity to claim greater freedom or power for themselves and the groups they claimed to represent. Georgia was no different. In Georgia, the late 1980s saw the rise of such prominent nationalist leaders as Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The rhetoric and protests of such nationalist leaders were directed not only at Soviet oppression of Georgians but also at ethnic minorities within the Georgian SSR. In 1989, in response to the perceived threat of Georgian nationalism, Abkhazians organized an anti-Georgian protest demanding independence from Georgia and incorporation into the Russian Federative Republic. This in turn triggered an aggressive nationalist response from the Georgian nationalist leaders, who organized their own huge demonstration demanding independence from the Soviet Union. In response to these protests, the Georgian Communist leaders responded with repression, killing 19 people. This further undermined the legitimacy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. In response, the Communist leaders began to compete with nationalist leaders on nationalist terms, in an attempt to increase their support. The Supreme Soviet (the peak governing institution of the republic) introduced a bill condemning the Bolshevik conquest of Georgia and soon after called for elections. In August 1989, they introduced a language bill making Georgian the official language of the republic. This exacerbated tensions with ethnic minorities, who organized protests and strikes. In the elections held in late 1989, a law prevented non-national parties from competing, effectively excluding minorities from the political process. The election was won by Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s faction. The Conflict The Breakaway Republics

Now in power, Gamsakhurdia had two aims: (1) to ensure Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union and (2) to ensure the primacy of Georgians within

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the republic. Gamsakhurdia legally disavowed the treaties between Georgia and the USSR; in doing so, he removed the autonomous status of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In response, the South Osset Soviet of People’s deputies passed a law increasing its status from ASO to an ASSR. This escalation then triggered the Georgian parliament to pass a law revoking Ossetia’s autonomy completely. In late November 1990, Gamsakhurdia organized a march on the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali. An estimated 20,000 armed Georgians joined the march. While Soviet interior forces prevented them from reaching the capital, this was the beginning of the armed conflict between Georgians and Ossetians. Violence between Georgian and Ossetian villages persisted, and the Ossetians formed their own National Guard, accused by the Georgian leaders of being armed by Moscow. The result was the displacement of tens of thousands from the region, with Ossetian refugees fleeing to North Ossetia and ethnic Georgians fleeing the region into Georgia. As conflict continued in South Ossetia, political order broke down in the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi. Gamsakhurdia’s erratic and destabilizing rule alienated his militia allies: Kitovani, Ioselani, and Sigua. These leaders defected to the political opposition. Eventually, the political contest between the different factions developed into a violent conflict, and Gamsakhurdia was forced to flee the capital. A military council took charge, but in the end, because of their lack of unity, they were forced to invite Shevardnadze, the former Communist boss of Georgia and former foreign minister of the USSR, to return to power. In June 1992, after the Georgian and South Ossetian leaders had failed to achieve any binding cease-fire in the preceding months, Ruslan Khasbulatov, the chairman of the Russian parliament, threatened Georgia with military intervention. Several days later, Russian forces entered the region. After a meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze, Georgian troops were withdrawn from the region, and a Russian peacekeeping force remained. These events rendered the state of Georgia with very little political power or ability to provide order. Outside of the capital, the new rulers of Georgia had very little control. In particular, they were faced with armed opposition from former supporters of Gamsakhurdia. These “Zviadist” forces operated mainly in the region of Mingrelia, Gamsakhurdia’s place of origin, which borders Abkhazia. While the conflict in South Ossetia and the nationalism of the Georgian government had raised tensions, the Abkhaz were not yet promoting secession. Rather, they desired to preserve their autonomy as part of Georgia and were still willing to accept a power-sharing arrangement. In August 1992, the Zviadists took the deputy prime minister hostage, and then took the delegation sent to negotiate his release hostage. The Georgian government sent a military force of several thousand to the region. This force had two goals. First, the aim of the force was to secure the release of the hostages, and second, to secure the region, including the railway that provided access to Russia, which ran through Abkhazia. The Zviadist forces had been blockading the railway through Abkhazia to Russia. Initially, the leaders of Abkhazia allowed the Georgian National Guard forces to enter the region. However, the National Guard violated an agreement between

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Abkhaz and the Georgian government by entering the capital of Abkhazia, Sukhumi. The Georgians managed to occupy five out of six districts in the region, and a violent occupation by Georgian forces began. The Georgian military also clashed with Russian soldiers in the region and killed Russian civilians.3 After this initial advance, however, the Georgian military stalled. The Abkhaz managed to regroup and also received support from volunteers from the North Caucasus. Within 10 days of the initial Georgian invasion, the Abkhaz began a counteroffensive. After several months of back-and-forth fighting, the Abkhaz began to force the Georgians back. In December 1992, Georgians shot down a Russian military helicopter, which increased Russian resolve to support the Abkhaz. In July of the next year, the Russians negotiated a cease-fire in which Georgian forces were to withdraw from the front lines and recognize Abkhazian autonomy. However, there was no permanent agreement made, as Georgia refused to agree to Russian demands to join the Commonwealth of Independent States and accept Russian military installations in Georgia. In late September, the Abkhaz reclaimed the regional capital of Sukhumi. They proceeded to force out Georgian collaborators and burned villages populated by Georgians, forcing hundreds of thousands of Georgians to flee the region. Zviadist rebels seized the opportunity provided by the instability to increase their destabilizing activities. Faced with military defeat in Abkhazia and the growing threat from the Zviadists, Shevardnadze agreed to Russia’s demands, and a final cease-fire was negotiated and then eventually signed in April 1994. In late 1993, Russian military forces now aligned with Shevardnadze helped the Georgian government put down the Zviadist rebels. Shevardnadze had saved his government, but at the cost of losing Abkhazia and giving up some sovereignty to Russia. The 2008 South Ossetian War

Following these two conflicts, Abkhazia and South Ossetia managed to set themselves up as “quasi-states.” Without official recognition of their independence by the international community, the leaders of these regions set about, under the protection of Russia, building political and economic institutions. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia maintain their own armed forces; the sizes of these are estimated at around 5,000 and 2,000, respectively.4 The economic opportunities for these two regions were limited. Russia provides pensions and other economic benefits to individuals residing in these regions. Another source of income has been smuggling and crime; this is particularly true of South Ossetia. This state of affairs existed from the mid-1990s until 2004. In 2003, Georgia underwent a democratic transition, the Rose Revolution. The regime of Eduard Shevardnadze was overthrown following a rigged election and enormous protests by the opposition. The end of Shevardnadze’s rule meant a change in the relationship between the breakaway regions and the Georgian state. Once Shevardnadze was removed from power, Mikheil Saakashvili, the primary leader of the opposition, won the subsequent elections with a huge mandate, taking almost 96 percent of the vote. The political party he established, the United National

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Movement, then dominated the parliamentary elections as well. Saakashvili was both a reformer and nationalist. He came to office with a desire to fix Georgian political institutions and centralize power. The dominant position of Saakashvili allowed him to pursue his state-building agenda. Saakashvili’s first target was the region of Adjara. Adjara, one of the autonomous regions of Georgia, had been ruled by a local warlord, Aslan Abashidze, during the 1990s and early 2000s. Abashidze used the autonomous institutions of the region for his own benefit, embezzling huge amounts of revenue. The central government, fearing that the region may secede, like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, came to an uneasy truce with Abashidze, allowing him to rule the region more or less free from impositions from the central government. Saakashvili was not prepared to accept these terms. In 2003, Saakashvili mobilized the Georgian military on the border of Adjara. Abashidze responded by mobilizing his militias and destroying the bridges that provided access to the region. As other regional powerbrokers had done in the past, Abashidze sought support from Russia, traveling to both Moscow and the Armenian capital of Yerevan when the Russian defense minister was visiting. While Russia made noises regarding Abashidze’s safety, Russian leaders were more interested in working with the new Georgian leadership. They negotiated Abashidze’s safe passage from Georgia to Moscow, but did not intervene to protect him. The removal of Abashdize allowed Saakashvili to assert central government authority over the region. Following his success in Adjara, Saakashvili turned his attention to South Ossetia. Saakashvili began a police campaign aimed at destroying the illegal trade through Russia into Georgia that was the basis of much of South Ossetia’s economy. The result was the first real violence between Georgia and South Ossetia since the early 1990s. This increased the resentment of South Ossetians toward the new Georgian government. Over the next four years, the Georgian government led by Saakashvili dramatically increased their state-building activities. In particular, the government engaged in a dramatic military buildup and increased their military activities on the border of the two breakaway republics. Additionally, Saakashvili increased Georgia’s Western focus and sought membership in NATO and the EU. Saakashvili also established an alternative “government” in South Ossetia. The effects of these actions further antagonized Russia and increased uncertainty and tension in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the first week of August 2008, Georgian and South Ossetian forces exchanged artillery fire, and clashes were reported. On August 7, the Georgian forces engaged in large-scale artillery attacks on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. The leader of the Georgian peacekeeping force announced they were restoring constitutional order to the region. Then, on the morning of August 8, a full-scale military intervention was launched. Within seven hours of this invasion, Russian forces were entering from North Ossetia through the Roki tunnel. For two days, Russian forces engaged with Georgian forces. By August10, they had forced the Georgian military from Tskhinvali. The Russians then attacked locations in Georgia proper,

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namely, the towns of Gori and Zugidi, the latter by opening a second front through Abkhazia. A cease-fire agreement was reached by August 12, and by October 8, Russian forces had withdrawn from their positions in Georgia. Management of the Conflict The conflicts between Georgians and the Abkhaz and Ossets in Georgia were first managed by the Soviet authorities and then primarily by Russia. Through the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, Moscow was able to successfully control the tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians. Moscow sought to resolve this initial burst of conflict not by recognizing demands for a right to secede or by changing the official language of Abkhazia, but by asserting greater control to increase the Abkhaz sense of security and increasing political and economic opportunities. In response to the 1978 Abkhaz protests, Moscow moved to assert greater control, providing an ethnic Russian minister of interior to the region and increased economic investment to reduce resentment. Later efforts to manage the conflict were less successful. Indeed, if anything, Moscow aggravated the situation. In the late 1980s, Moscow failed to manage the rising nationalism of the Georgian population. The repressive measures that they adopted increased the level of support for the nationalist opposition and thus may have contributed to the later ethnic conflicts between the Georgians and ethnic minorities. Once conflict emerged, Moscow again intervened. First, in South Ossetia, Soviet interior forces prevented or limited armed violence. Later, Russian military force helped South Ossetia secede from Georgia. Similarly, Russian military support for the Abkhaz played a pivotal role in the outcome of the conflict. In both cases, such support influenced the outcome of the fighting and preserved frozen conflicts in the aftermath. Russia also negotiated cease-fires between the protagonists in both cases. After both conflicts, Russia took up a role to provide peacekeeping forces to the regions. Russia also provided economic resources and support. Other actors attempting to intervene in the conflicts have also achieved little success. The United Nations unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a cease-fire in 1993 in Abkhazia, but this failed to prevent conflict as the cease-fire quickly collapsed. The United Nations did maintain an observer mission, UNOMIG, in Abkhazia from 1993 until 2009, but the mission was largely unsuccessful and ultimately withdrawn when Russia vetoed its renewal in 2009. U.S. involvement in the region may also have served to encourage the war of 2008. The military support and training that the United States provided Georgia, encouraging their membership in NATO, may have increased the Georgian government’s belief that they could use force to take back South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Georgia weeks before the renewed outbreak of the conflict, and there is some reason to think that this was taken as a sign of support by Saakashvili. The EU, particularly the French, played a key role in negotiating a cease-fire during the 2008 conflict. Nicholas Sarkozy, then the French president and the president

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in office of the EU, met with Dmitry Medvedev, having earlier met with and agreed to cease-fire terms with Sarkozy. The Russians added two additional points to what had been originally a four-point plan and agreed to sign it. Saakashvili also agreed to the cease-fire. The EU contributed 200 observers to the South Ossetian region to get Russia to agree to withdraw from Georgia. Following the conflict in 2008, Russia recognized the independence of the two breakaway regions. Russia established embassies in the two regions and signed additional agreements regarding border protection and financial support. Russia also boosted its military presence from what it had been in the past. These actions have arguably made any reunification with Georgia even more unlikely. Significance The conflicts between Georgians and Abkhaz and Georgians and Ossetians provide some important lessons for understanding ethnic conflicts. The lessons become particularly apparent when these two cases are compared to the Georgian relationship with the other ethnic minorities in the country. The first lesson is that international actors play a prominent role in facilitating as well as managing conflict. In both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has played a central role in perpetuating the conflict, negotiating cease-fires, and preventing an ultimate resolution. Similarly, the United States may have unintentionally encouraged Georgia to launch an attempt to reassert control over South Ossetia. In contrast, when we consider the lack of conflict between the Georgians and Azeris or Georgians and Armenians, the potential patrons of these groups have sought to maintain good relationships with Georgia and therefore have done nothing to encourage any potential secessionism. Despite these groups having legitimate grievances, no conflict has developed. The second lesson is the importance of institutions. The two breakaway regions possessed autonomy. The existence of these institutions provided them with organizational resources; it also gave them a motivation to resist when the majority ethnic group attempted to reduce their autonomy and privileges within the regions. Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli lacked such institutions. This reduced the capacity and incentive of these regions’ inhabitants to engage in ethnic competition with the majority group. Notes 1. Timothy Blauvelt, “Abkhazia: Patronage and Power in the Stalin Era,” Nationalities Papers 35, no. 2 (May 2007): 203–32, doi:10.1080/00905990701254318. 2. Slider provides a comprehensive discussion of these early protests. Darrell Slider, “Crisis and Response in Soviet Nationality Policy: The Case of Abkhazia,” Central Asian Survey 4, no. 4 (1985): 51–68. 3. Vicken Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus : Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics (New York: Columbia University, 2008). 4. Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” World Politics 53, no. 4 (2001): 535.

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Suggested Readings Blauvelt, Timothy. 2007. “Abkhazia: Patronage and Power in the Stalin Era.” Nationalities Papers 35 (2): 203–232. Cheterian, Vicken. 2008. War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics. New York: Columbia University Press. Derluguian, Georgi M. 2005. Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-system Biography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. De Waal, Thomas. 2010. The Caucasus: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. George, Julie A. 2009. The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hewitt, George. 2013. The Abkhazians: A Handbook. Vol. 5. London: Routledge. Jones, Stephen Francis. 2013. Georgia: A Political History since Independence. London: IB Tauris. Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. King, Charles. 2009. Extreme politics: Nationalism, Violence, and the End of Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rayfield, Donald. 2013. Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia. London: Reaktion Books. Slider, Darrell. 1985. “Crisis and Response in Soviet Nationality Policy: The Case of Abkhazia.” Central Asian Survey 4 (4): 51–68. Suny, Ronald Grigor. 1994. The Making of the Georgian Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Trier, Tom, and David Szakonyi. 2010. Under Siege: Inter-ethnic Relations in Abkhazia. New York: Columbia University Press.

Appendices The breakup of the Soviet Union almost immediately led to the breakup of Georgia into a series of regions beyond the control of its capital. Two of these—Abkhazia, whose declaration of independence and excerpts of its constitution appear below, and South Ossetia—remain self-declared independent republics, largely unrecognized except by Russia, outside Tbilisi’s reach. Indeed, when Georgian troops sought to reestablish jurisdiction over them in 2008, a result was the intervention on their behalf of Russian troops who not only took up position in these separatist regions but adjacent Georgian territory as well. As for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) that was initially deployed in 1993 to assist in maintaining the cease-fires in these areas, portions of its last report, including the recommendations of the UN’s secretary-general on strengthening its mission, led to Russia blocking any further extension of its mission in June of 2009.

1. August 14th Anniversary of the Abkhazia Declaration of Independence 1992 Abkhazia declares its sovereignty over its own territory and proposes a federative treaty with Georgie to fill the “legal vacuum” that emerged after Georgia’s unilateral abrogation of all Soviet legal documents. Exactly 20 days after being accepted by the United Nations, on August 14, Georgia troops entered the territory of Abkhazia without any notification to the Abkhazian government and launched a land and air attack on the southeast part of Abkhazia and its capital city. Bloody fighting continued for 14 months.

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Source: This statement was issued on July 10, 2010, to commemorate the anniversary of Abkhazia’s original declaration of independence and is available on the Web site of Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations at http://www.unpo.org/article/11390.

2. Abkhazia’s Constitution, November 26, 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia We, the People of Abkhazia, exercising our right to self-determination. Aspiring to promote general welfare, internal tranquility, respecting human rights and freedoms, establishing civil peace and harmony, solemnly proclaim and institute the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia

Chapter 1 Principles of the Constitutional System Article 1 The Republic of Abkhazia (Apsny) is a sovereign, democratic state, established historically under the right of a people to free self-determination, and functioning in accordance with the law The names “Republic of Abkhazia” and “Apsny” are interchangeable. Article 2 Democracy shall be the basis of state authority in the Republic of Abkhazia. The bearer of sovereignty and the only source of authority in the Republic of Abkhazia shall be its people – the citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia. The people shall exercise authority either directly or through their representatives. Article 3 The Republic of Abkhazia, which is subject of international law, enters into treaty-based relations with other nations. The rules of conclusion, promulgation, ratification, and denunciation of international treaties shall be established by the law. Article 4 The Republic of Abkhazia consists of the historical provinces of Sadz, Bzpy, Gurna, DalTsabal, Abzhywa, Samyrzakan, which are the present day Gagra, Gudauta, Sukham, Gulrypsh, Ocharn . . . and Gal districts within which the cities of Gagra . . . and Gal are located. The territory of the Republic of Abkhazia is indivisible, inviolable, and inalienable. Article 5 In the Republic of Abkhazia the land and other natural resources are the property of the people and shall be used and protected as a basis for life and activity of the citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia.

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The issues of ownership, use and disposal of natural resources shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of Abkhazia. Article 6 The official language of the Republic of Abkhazia is Abkhazian. The Russian language as well as the Abkhazian language shall be recognized as the languages of the government, public, and other institutions. The state shall guarantee all ethnic groups living in Abkhazia the right to freely use their own languages. Article 7 The state exercises its authority on the basis of a separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. The . . . branches of power shall be independent. Article 8 In the Republic of Abkhazia local governments, independent in their areas of jurisdiction, shall be recognized and ensured. These local governments shall not be a part of the system of state administration. Article 9 The following Constitution shall have supreme legal authority. The laws and other legal instruments, adopted in the Republic of Abkhazia, shall comply with this Constitution. Article 10 The Republic of Abkhazia shall have its own symbols: the state flag, national emblem and national anthem. The description of these symbols shall be established by constitutional law. The capital of the Republic of Abkhazia is the city of Sukhum (Aqua).

Chapter 6 Local Government Article 79 Local government shall be exercised by citizens by way of direct expression of their will and through the elected institutions of local government. Heads of executive authorities in the cities and districts of the Republic of Abkhazia shall by [sic] appointed by the President of the Republic from among the members of local government institutions. The composition, organizational structure and powers of local government institutions shall be established by the law. Source: Oxford Constitutions of the World, Oxford University Press, 2013.

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Germany The Foreign Worker Issue John S. Bendix and Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline 1848 The first attempt is made at German unification. 1871 German unification is accomplished. 1913 The German Citizenship Law is adopted. 1945 Allied occupation occurs; the zonal division soon leads to the creation of West and East Germany. 1949 West Germany achieves independence as the Federal German Republic under the Basic Law of 1949. 1953 The Federal Expellee Law is enacted. 1955 West Germany gains full sovereignty. The recruitment of Italian foreign workers begins. 1961 The Berlin Wall is built. A worker recruitment agreement is concluded with Turkey.

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1965 A new law requires the immediate departure of foreign laborers in West Germany at the expiration of their visas unless they have been employed in Germany for five years. 1973 The “Oil Shock” produces an economic downturn and, in turn, an end of the official recruitment of foreign laborers. Two years later, existing foreign workers are restricted from locating in regions where the foreign population is over 12 percent. 1989 German reunification occurs. 1993 Naturalization is liberalized for those born in Germany and those having lived there for 15 years. 1999–2002 There are no significant developments shaping Germany’s policies, but lesser events include a new set of laws in 2002 that tighten the requirements for asylum and halfhearted efforts in 1999 and 2001 to offer German citizenship to foreigners born in Germany. 2004 The European Union is enlarged to include most of the postcommunist states of Central Europe, and most join under the Schengen Area plan of a “Europe without Borders,” eroding Germany’s ability to control immigration. Germany exercises its option in the enlargement agreement to defer free access to citizens of new member states until 2011. 2005 The Germany Immigration Act is passed to attract more professional and highly skilled immigrants, acknowledging that Germany has become an immigrant nation. The following year, Chancellor Merkel holds what is to be an annual integration summit, and, in 2007, the federal government finances courses on German language and culture to facilitate the integration as part of a national integration plan. 2008 Further EU expansion adds Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, albeit with probationary restrictions on the ability of citizens to travel to other EU states without border control. Inside Germany, a second generation Turk becomes the leader of the German Green Party, and citizenship tests are introduced into the naturalization process.

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2010 Chancellor Merkel declares that multiculturalism in Germany has “utterly failed.” The following year, she endorses Prime Minister Cameron’s policy of “muscular liberalism” in controlling the immigration of those not sharing Great Britain’s liberal values. 2011 An economic downturn widens in the EU area, even as the German economy remains strong, making Germany an attractive destination for the skilled and professional unemployed citizens of other EU states. In the United States, the term ethnic calls attention to a history of immigration to the country by people who differed substantially from one another by national origin, religious faith, or cultural practices, as well as to the segregation and persecution of those who came to the United States involuntarily as slaves or who were Native Americans. Ethnicity implies differentiation and raises the question of whether those who claim to belong to an ethnic group should have particular group rights. Even so, there is an overarching faith that being an American is a greater and more inclusive identity and that the unity of the American nation is created out of its diversity. In Germany, ethnic has instead referred to the majority culture and to a largely 19th-century idea of the unity and community of the German people (or Volk). Minority groups of both non-German and German background exist, but American-style assertions of minority group interests or identity politics have been barely evident. Conflicts have instead generally circled around economics and cultural difference, often framed as a debate between those on the political right arguing that long-term residents from non-German national, religious, or cultural backgrounds need to integrate into and adapt to German culture and those on the political left arguing that there is de facto diversity and de facto immigration and that non-Germans have brought many benefits to Germany. For both, the ethnic view has been top down, emphasizing what the government or the Germans think minorities need to do to accommodate Germany, not the other way around. Historical Background The emphasis on a specifically German identity was a response to the need to find cultural unity among the 39 kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and free cities that were politically unified as the German Confederation in 1815, but it was also a reaction to the new idea of a nation, which emerged from the French Revolution. Protestant, militaristic, imperial Prussia in the north and west was by far the largest and most powerful of the sovereign, autonomous territories in this confederation, but it had a strong rival in the Catholic kingdom of Bavaria in the south. Each member of the confederation had its own currency, weights and measures, and passport controls, so the natives of one territory were treated as foreigners when

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they traveled to a neighboring territory. The first steps toward German unity were the creation of a customs union to level barriers and establish free trade; however, a first attempt to create a common political system failed in 1848. Only in 1871 would the German Empire be called into life under the leadership of Prussian emperor William I and chancellor Otto von Bismarck. If most of the 19th century was consumed with the effort to create a cohesive German political state, the effort to define what was German about the Germans was even more protracted. As early as the 1660s, the German language was exalted as natural and organic, as well as ancient, pure, and incomparable. That legacy fed into the Romantic notions of Johann Gottfried Herder in the 1770s of a poetic “soul of the folk” that he linked to an organic idea of the nation and the use of language. By 1810, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn was writing about the Volk as the “organic body of common life” and equating folk traditions (Volkstum) with Germanness. He used a kind of mystifying language that spoke of the “inner consolidation of folk traditions” and the idea of a German collective spirit (Geist) that would give life to what was still a very fragmented collection of German-speaking people. Over the next decades, as part of the process of nation building, such scholars as the Brothers Grimm engaged in intensive examinations of the origins of the language as well as of popular myths, beliefs, and folk tales, and in the process helped create a sense of a unique people with a common culture, character, history, and future. One still hears echoes of Romantic mystification in claims that terms like Heimat or Gemeinschaft cannot be translated or understood by non-Germans. Herder wrote that “nature obliges us to learn only our native tongue,” and the consequence of such scholarly efforts as the Grimms was to standardize German and make that standard the only language of school instruction.1 While this certainly made communication easier across the politically fragmented territories, it also devalued dialects and discouraged the use of any language but German. Herder also wrote that people held nothing dearer than the language of their fathers, and to deprive them of it was to deprive a people “of its only immortal possession.”2 Yet such deprivation seems to have been practiced on the Slavic peoples who lived in Prussia, which in its eastern and largely rural territory stretched all the way across northern Poland into Lithuania. With the rise of industrial employment in the late 19th century, rural Poles with Prussian citizenship migrated to work in the coal mines of the Ruhr river basin far to the west to escape the drudgery of agricultural work on the estates of the large eastern landowners. Prussia actively sought to Germanize these ethnic Polish Prussians, even though they resisted, while simultaneously strengthening its eastern borders to keep Russians out. This dual approach laid the groundwork for a policy pursued ever since to favor natives (Inländer) over foreigners (Ausländer, literally, those outside the territory). It also set the stage for the 1913 Reich German Citizenship Law, large parts of which were still in effect nearly a century later, which established descent by blood (jus sanguinis) as the basis for citizenship. Merely living in Germany (jus soli) has been far less important for citizenship than the efforts foreigners make to assimilate and become culturally, politically, socially, and linguistically German.

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Because homogeneity and the sharing of a common cultural heritage were the key elements of German ethnicity, the minority group of German Jews (many of whom were middle class, urban, and highly assimilated into German culture, economics, and social life) were bewildered by their rapid segregation after the Nazis came to power in 1933. Jews as well as other groups unpalatable to Nazi ideology were pushed out of many professions, deprived of their possessions and businesses, subjected to punitive taxes, and by Nazi law (rescinded in 1945) declared to not be part of the German Volk. Thousands of the persecuted had fled the country by 1939, but nearly all of the German Jews who could not leave were murdered or died as a result of disease or deprivation in various labor, concentration, and killing camps throughout the Third Reich over the next six years. The horrors of the war, coupled with military defeat, occupation, and the creation of new political institutions after 1945 in both West and East Germany deeply affected the German sense of identity to the point where there was a nearly allergic reaction in law, politics, and society to anything that even faintly smelled of nationalism. Pride in West Germany was taken in technological achievements, in the robust economy, and the sound deutsch mark currency, or in Johann Sebastian Bach and Martin Luther. Until the mid-1980s, even flag waving and national anthem singing smacked of fanaticism and the ruin brought about by Adolf Hitler. During World War II, hundreds of thousands of people lost their citizenship as they were driven from, fled from, or evacuated from their homes. About 7 million foreigners, including Jews and prisoners of war, were employed in the Third Reich by 1944, many—though not all—unwillingly. In 1945, between 5 million and 7 million “displaced persons” were in Allied-occupied Germany, living in a territory where half the buildings were damaged or destroyed.3 By 1955, many displaced persons had been repatriated, replaced in West Germany by those fleeing East Germany and by those of German background who found themselves less than welcome in Communist East Europe. By 1961, as many as 13 million displaced persons, refugees, and expellees may have been added to the West German population.4 Because many of these were of the “right” (that is, German) ethnicity, their integration was aided by public laws and private efforts, although that, in turn, created some resentment among resident Germans who felt passed over despite their own needs. In 1955, fully sovereign West Germany began to move into a phase of rapid economic growth, and with it came labor shortages (migration from the east had come to a halt in 1961 with the building of the Berlin Wall). To meet the need, the government negotiated a contract with Italy to temporarily bring agricultural workers to West Germany; however, the needs of industry for longer-term laborers soon led to recruitment agreements with Greece and Spain (both in 1960), Turkey (1961), Portugal (1964), and Yugoslavia (1968). Limited arrangements were also made to bring in Tunisians (1965) and Moroccans (1966) as well as Japanese, Korean, and Chilean coal miners (1962–1965). Labor demand was so strong that at least one-third of the foreign workers arriving in Germany were circumventing official recruitment entirely and simply arriving with a visa and looking for work. By 1973, nearly 12 percent (or 2.5 million workers) of the German workforce was foreign.5

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Although the German government assumed foreign workers would return home at the end of their labor contracts, and some indeed did, many remained even after official recruitment halted in 1973. Because the German constitution accords special protection to families, settled foreign workers were able to have their families join them in Germany if they met certain criteria. However, as this minority grew while the economy stagnated, some politicians in the mid-1980s suggested appropriate financial incentives might persuade long-term resident foreign families to return to their home countries permanently. Most foreign families were not tempted, and political opposition was sufficiently intense that this policy was soon dropped. At the same time, the inclusion of Greece, Spain, and Portugal into the European Union (EU) by 1986 meant labor migration barriers for some previously recruited Europeans were vanishing. When additional measures to “make an ever closer European Union” passed in 1992, Germans had to start thinking of, if not treating, fellow EU citizens more like Inländer; Turks and Yugoslavs (and a growing number of political asylum seekers from the Middle East and Asia) remained Ausländer. The alienness of the Ausländer was reinforced by German reunification in 1989, when West Germans suddenly discovered there were thousands of resident foreign workers from such socialist countries as Vietnam, Mozambique, and Cuba living in East Germany. The Conflict One major arena of conflict has been economic: when economic times are good or there are special labor needs, foreigners are recruited to come and work, but when economic times are bad, they are accused of taking jobs away and are encouraged to leave the country. Readily forgotten is that many foreigners began in the 1960s by working in menial service or repetitive industrial jobs to replace German natives who were only too happy to move up to better positions. With time, entire low-wage employment categories—for example, trash collection or assembly-line work—became associated with low-status foreigners, so it is very odd in economic downturns for Germans then to claim foreigners are displacing them, as even if these foreigners left, many Germans would not want the jobs that they had long ago abandoned. Competition for jobs since 1992 has increasingly been between EU workers, all of whom have priority over non-EU workers (including Turks), and not between Germans and foreigners. To complicate matters further, at least in the industrial workplace—and perhaps because the main focus there is on tasks to be completed rather than on cultural differences between workers— workers from various ethnicities (including Germans) have managed to get along with one another. Competition for the job does not preclude cooperation when on the job. The cultural conflicts have been the most visible. Some are minor, as when Italian workers in the early 1960s complained that their German employers always served potatoes and not pasta—an amusing complaint today, now that Italian cuisine is ubiquitous in German cities. Other conflicts have been more serious, with mutually held stereotypes having behavioral and workplace consequences. A 1961

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German list of pointers for dealing with Italian, Spanish, and Greek foreign workers states that “some Southerners do not yet have a proper sense of cleanliness and order,” and “communication difficulties tempt foreign workers from the South into telling white lies . . . (and) as a result one can not always or immediately believe what they say.” On the other side of the coin, there are those like the Italian worker who in 1960 said, “For the Germans, I’m a tool, like a spade or a hoe. I’m supposed to work and keep my trap shut.”6 The most enduring cultural conflict has been between the Germans and the Turkish Muslims. Germans have found some Turkish religious practices, such as those followed during Ramadan, hard to accept or understand. In addition, some cultural practices with respect to women—such as the wearing of head scarves and prohibiting daughters from school activities out of fear for their modesty— are widely judged as incompatible with German gender norms. The fact that many labor migrants came from rural Anatolia in the 1960s supported the stereotype that Turks in Germany were uneducated (if not uncivilized) peasants. The irony in the (sometimes violent) reactions even to how Turks appear in public is that Germany until recently was quite rural; German peasant women wore head scarves, and German patriarchs ruled the home. But if Turks unconsciously remind Germans of a part of their past they would like to leave behind, Muslim Turks may be equally reluctant to accommodate German mores because, for some Turks, accommodation is the first step toward Christianization and the abandoning of their faith. It has not helped that German attitudes toward foreign workers in the 1970s and 1980s were whipped up by fears of Überfremdung (literally, “overforeignization”) and political talk about how West Germany had reached its limits in its ability to take in foreigners. Those limits seem pretty low, given that foreigners remained a steady 7–8 percent of the population from 1973 to 1989 (and since reunification, 9–10 percent). Fears are worsened by the fact that disproportionate numbers of both foreigners and press reporters are concentrated in large cities. Thus, even though only 7 million of Germany’s 82 million residents are foreigners (2 million of them Turks), 29 percent of Frankfurt’s population was foreign by 1995.7 A Frankfurt reporter looking for a story on foreigners forgets that the city has triple the national average. At least as late as the first decade of the 21st century, open expression of Ausländerfeindlichkeit (hostility toward foreigners) remained all too frequent, and to the bullies willing to use violence against Turks, Vietnamese, or black Africans, these foreigners were defined as competitors taking away German jobs, sapping German society, and threatening the integrity and order of German culture. These are old nationalistic canards, though evidently newly discovered in the eastern German states since 1989—ironically, the regions where the fewest foreigners are to be found, though also some of the most economically depressed areas in reunified Germany. Against these culturally based, emotional claims from the violent political right, many Germans point to the economic benefits foreign workers have brought, and some argue that Germany has been socially and culturally enriched by their presence.

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Management of the Conflict The management of the conflict for many years was characterized by deep denial. Politicians argued persistently from at least the mid-1960s that Germany was not a country of immigration, which aside from being historically inaccurate willfully ignored the fact that in 1995 one-sixth of the 7 million foreign nationals in Germany were born in Germany, and that more than half of all resident foreigners had lived in Germany for more than 10 years by that time.8 The standard term used, Ausländerpolitik (policy toward foreigners), linguistically upheld the century-old distinction between native and foreigner and ignored immigration. Other forms of denial were not hard to find, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s refusal in 1992 to go to Mölln (the site of a horrific murder of long-resident Turks), and the thinking that by banning a few small extreme right-wing political parties one could somehow address the problems of xenophobia. Another form of management was and is more invidious. To both public and private agencies, it sounds good to try to “integrate” foreigners by providing special German-language classes or encouraging them to form associations like sports clubs (but not political associations). The ultimate point is to have foreigners adapt to the German way of life. Conflicts are thereby “managed” by teaching non-natives to behave more like natives—another form of Germanizing—rather than having Germans adapt to the customs and habits of the foreigners living among them, or at least to develop new joint forms of social behavior for both natives and foreigners. Even though some academics tried to promote it, the idea of dual citizenship or a U.S.-style ethnic hyphenation (e.g., a Turkish-German or a German-Serb) has received very little support, although some legal changes to improve access to citizenship for the children of foreign workers were enacted on the eve of the 21st century, and in 2005, Germany belated acknowledged reality and redefined itself as an immigrant country in the German Immigration Act of that year. In fact, the first steps toward that redefinition were taken seven years earlier. By then, the term “guest worker” had long since been replaced by “foreign worker” in deference to the permanence of much of this workforce over generations. Also by that time, Turkish workers had become the largest presence in the foreign worker community, giving Germany then, and now, the second-largest Muslim population of any EU member state. Yet, it was only after a long and often acrimonious debate, within and across German parties, that the Immigration Act was passed. Once enacted, a spate of immigration-oriented legislation, including expanding naturalization law, and executive activity ensued; however, as in the case of the earlier stress on competence in the German language as a criterion for work visas, much of this action tended to be exclusionary. Bowing to its needs as a country with an aging populace and still-growing economy, Germany liberalized its immigration policy, but mainly for those with middle class or professional skills. Longterm residency visas, for example, were restricted to those with job offers carrying middle-class salaries. Not surprisingly, coupled with the EU’s enlargement process, these rules redirected the pattern involving the flow of foreign workers, with the

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vast majority in the 2lst century entering from other EU member states and proportionately few from outside the EU area. Integration policy, meanwhile, quickly became a source of frustration to its architects. Launched with much fanfare by Chancellor Merkel in 2006, and followed up in 2007 with federal guidelines and monies to provide cultural and language classes to Germany’s immigrant communities, the program quickly became heavy-handed. Thus, whereas legislation in 2005 made language and civic classes available as an entitlement for those entering the country, within two years these integration classes had become mandatory for those receiving social services. Also by 2007, predeparture language tests were being administered to spouses awaiting entry under Germany’s family unification program, and the following year, a citizenship test was added to the naturalization requirements for those seeking citizenship. Significance Social science and historical studies suggest that the perception of cultural similarity has a large effect on the German acceptance of foreigners: the more similar a group seems to the German by language, religion, race, customs, and history, the more accepted it is. Physical proximity can also play a role. Cosmopolitan city dwellers find ways to cope with their foreign neighbors; it is the suburban or rural residents with little contact who are the ones who most fear and dislike foreigners. Feared and disliked groups, unfortunately, are also ready objects for projection, and those labeled different have in many cultures become scapegoats whenever personal or political matters take a turn for the worse. The importance of not leaving current cultural and economic conflicts unresolved is evident for both demographic and nationalistic reasons. Given the low birthrate among Germans and the demographic projections of current population growth among non-Germans, even conservative estimates foresee a doubling in the proportion of foreign nationals by 2030.9 If the concentration of foreigners in larger cities persists, some urban areas could have nearly half their population as disenfranchised second-class residents. The potential for social and political conflict with a population that large that continues to be held at arm’s length from German decision making and public positions looms large. Yet, at the same time, Germany continues to run headlong into the arms of Europe, coordinating its economics to the point of giving up the deutsch mark currency, a core symbol of postwar identity, in favor of the abstraction of the euro. Political and social coordination with other EU states in the growing European Union has been slower, but the direction seems inexorable: it will mean less of Germany and more of Europe. One unnoted area is legal coordination: EU law already supercedes national law, a situation that could well have an impact on minority group rights within all EU countries. In response to these impending changes, some Germans still cling to an older sense of Germanness and fight a kind of rearguard action to hold on to an older, imagined identity. Perhaps, like those who have left their home countries and chosen to move to Germany, Germans

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should themselves find this movement toward Europe less a threat than an opportunity, although, at least on the immigrant front, Germany has not been reluctant to flex its considerable economic muscle inside the EU and drag its heels in terms of implementing EU guidelines in such matters as diligently prosecuting racial and hate-related crimes.10 One thing is certain. If Germany is to become a successful immigration state and overcome the failure that Chancellor Merkel labeled its efforts at multiculturalism in 2010, it will require considerable effort on the part of both the indigenous Germans and its minority communities. Despite Germany’s redefinition of itself as an immigrant country, discrimination against the long-present Muslim Turkish community in the job market still persists when it comes to choosing between a Turk or a German, and studies have generally shown that the more menial the job, the greater that discrimination tends to be.11 It falls on the host population as well as its government as mentor to address these and other actions that make Germany less than attractive as an immigrant destination, as opposed to a source of a reliable paycheck. Likewise, within the Turkish and other foreigner communities, it will take time to dispel the memories of the long years with no opportunity to naturalize and of social and economic discrimination. It is thus not surprising that third-generation Turks born in Germany, who continue to face discrimination in the job market, unemployment rates much higher (often double) than the national average, and the need to accept jobs below their skill levels, are hesitant to embrace integration into a hostile German society. For them as well, it will take time, and opportunities, before a multicultural Germany means a Germany that values multiculturalism to the point where they want to be integrated into it. Notes 1. Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 17, ed. Bernard Suphan et al. (33 volumes, Berlin: Weichmann, 1877–1913), 58, cited in Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1967), 432. 2. Herder, Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 1, 21, cited in Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 423–433. 3. Frank Grube and Gerhard Richter, Die Gründerjahre der Bundesrepublik—Deutschland zwischen 1945 und 1955 (Hamburg: Hoffman and Campe, 1981), SR-27. 4. Robert Mueller, West Germany under Construction (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 54. 5. More precisely, 11.9 percent, or 2,595,000, of workers were foreign, according to the “Anwerbung und Vermittlung Ausländischer Arbeitnehmer—Erfahrungsbericht 1973” (pp. 70–71), an annual survey report on foreign worker recruitment and employment that was published by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (the German Federal Employment Administration) in Nürnberg from 1961 to 1973. Hartmut Esser’s “Gastarbeiter” gives a slightly different figure (11.6 percent of the employed population was foreign in 1973) in Wolfgang Benz, Hg., Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Wirtschaft, vol. 2 (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1989), 332–333. 6. This is the title quote in Gerhard Mauz, “Ich bin fur die Deutschen wie Gerat, wie Spaten, hacke,” Die Welt, August 22, 1960: 1. 7. See especially Klaus Bade and Myron Weiner, Migration Past, Migration Future: Germany and the United States, vol. 1 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997). Figure 3.4, Foreigners

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and Foreign Labor in Germany 1960–1994, p. 80, provides population numbers and trends; Table 3.5, German Cities with the Highest Share of Foreign Population, p. 97, provides breakdowns for the major cities, giving the Frankfurt percentage in 1993 as 27.9 percent. These figures are from official publications from the Federal Statistics Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) and from the Federal Employment Administration (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit). As of 1999, at http://www.bafl.de/bafl/template/migration/ content_migration_auslaenderanteil_bundeslaender.htm (citing official statistics), Frankfurt had 30.1 percent foreigners. According to “Ausländer im Bundesgebiet seit 1960,” Table 1 of “Facts and Figures on the Situation of Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany,” available at http:// www.bundesauslaenderbeauftragte.de/daten/index.stm, there were just under 7.3 million foreigners in Germany in 2000, or 8.9 percent of the population; 1,998,534 of these were Turks. The “Bundesausländerbeauftragte” is the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners. 8. According to statistics in 2000, this figure was even higher: 22.1 percent (or 1,613,778) of the 7,296,817 foreigners (e.g., more than one-fifth) were born in Germany. The source is “Die ausländische Bevölkerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 31. Dezember 2000 nach Altersgruppen und in Deutschland Geborene,” Table 4 of “Facts and Figures on the Situation of Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany,” available at http://www.bundesauslaenderbeauftragte.de/daten/index.stm. 9. This was extracted from a lengthy discussion of demographic and migration trends of both Germans and foreigners in Germany, in Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich, “Migration und zukünftige Bevölkerungsentwicklung in Deutschland,” in Migrationsreport 2000: Fakten—Analysen—Perspektiven, ed. Klaus Bade and Rainer Münz, 23–58 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2000). 10. See Sherran Clarence, “From Rhetoric to Practice: A Critique of Immigration Policy in Germany through the Lens of Turkish-Muslim Women’s Experiences of Migration,” Theoria 56, no. 121 (December 2009): 57–91. 11. See Pamela Irving Jackson and Peter A. Zervakis, “The Integration of Muslims in Germany, France and the United States: Law, Politics and Public Policy,” a paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association.

Suggested Readings Bade, Klaus, and Myron Weiner, eds. 1997. Migration Past, Migration Future: Germany and the United States. Providence, RI: Berghahn. Barbieri, William. 1998. Ethics of Citizenship: Immigration and Group Rights in Germany. ­Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Bendix, John. 1990. Importing Foreign Workers: A Comparison of German and American P ­ olicy. New York: Peter Lang, Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chin, Rita. 2007. The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fetzer, Joel. 2000. Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and ­Germany. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Finzsch, Norbert, and Dietmar Schirmer, eds. 1998. Identity and Intolerance: Nationalism, Racism, and Xenophobia in Germany and the United States. Cambridge, England: ­Cambridge University Press.

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Moeller, Robert. 1997. West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Panayi, Panikos. 2000. Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany: Jews, Gypsies, Poles, Turks and Others. London: Longman. Salem, Jacksleen. 2013. “Citizenship and Religious Expression in the West: A Comparative Analysis of Experiences of Muslims in France, Germany, and the USA.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 33 (1): 77–92. Schumann, Stefanie. 2011. Hybrid Identity Formation of Migrants: A Case Study of Ethnic Turks in Germany. Munich: GRIN Verlag GmbH.

Appendix The future of a multicultural Germany hinges on its foreign workers and their progeny becoming Germany citizens. Hence, no single document today is as important to the future of Germany as its Nationality Act, as amended since its origin as a statute limiting nationality to those born of German blood. As the excerpts below indicate, those days are gone; however, they have not been replaced by a present in which citizenship is as easy to achieve for those born in Germany of foreign parents than in France, the United States, and other states where birth alone creates a claim on citizenship. Nor is the importance of German blood downplayed in this act, the first six sections of which are concerned with those born of at least one German parent. Indeed, the act gives nearly as much attention to the factors excluding citizenship as to the process of naturalization, as indicated below.

Nationality Act Section 7 [Acquisition by issuance of the certificate pursuant to Section 15, sub-section 1 or 2 of the Federal Expellees Act] Repatriates of German ancestry and their family members included in the admission notice shall acquire the German citizenship when they are issued a repatriates certificate in accordance with Section 15, sub-section 1 or 2 of the Federal Expellees Act. Section 8 [Discretionary naturalization] (1) A foreigner who is legally ordinarily resident in Germany may be naturalized upon application provided that he or she 1. possesses legal capacity pursuant to Section 80, sub-section 1 of the Residence Act or has a legal representative, 2. has not been sentenced for an unlawful act and is not subject to any court order imposing a measure of reform and prevention due to a lack of criminal capacity, 3. has found a dwelling of his or her own or accommodation and 4. is able to support himself or herself and his or her dependents.

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(2) The requirements stipulated in sub-section 1, sentence 1, nos. 2 and 4 may be waived on grounds of public interest or in order to avoid special hardship. Section 9 [Naturalization of spouses or life partners of Germans] (1) Spouses or life partners of Germans should be naturalized in keeping with the requirements set out in Section 8, if 1. they lose or give up their previous citizenship or a ground exists for accepting multiple nationality pursuant to Section 12 and 2. it is ensured that they will conform to the German way of life, unless they do not have sufficient command of the German language (Section 10 sub-section 1, sentence 1, no. 6 and sub-section 4) and do not fulfill any condition that would justify an exception under Section 10, sub-section 6. (2) The provision pursuant to sub-section 1 shall also apply if naturalization is applied for within one year of the German spouse’s death or of a ruling dissolving the marriage becoming final and the applicant is entitled to custody of a child issuing from the marriage who already possesses German citizenship. Section 10 [Entitlement to naturalization; derivative naturalization of spouses and minor children] (1) A foreigner who has been legally ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years and possesses legal capacity pursuant to Section 80 of the Residence Act or has a legal representative shall be naturalized upon application if he or she 1. confirms his or her commitment to the free democratic constitutional system enshrined in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and declares that he or she does not pursue or support and has never pursued or supported any activities a) aimed at subverting the free democratic constitutional system, the existence or security of the Federation or a Land or b) aimed at illegally impeding the constitutional bodies of the Federation or a Land or the members of said bodies in discharging their duties or c) any activities which jeopardize foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany through the use of violence or preparatory actions for the use of violence, or credibly asserts that he or she has distanced himself or herself from the former pursuit or support of such activities, 2. has been granted a permanent right of residence or as a national of Switzerland or as a family member of a national of Switzerland possesses a residence permit on the basis of the Agreement of 21 June 1999 between the European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the Swiss Confederation on the other hand on the free movement of persons or possesses an EU Blue Card or a residence permit for purposes other than those specified in Sections 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, sub-section 1, Section 23a, 24 and Section 25, sub-sections 3 to 5 of the Residence Act.

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3. is able to ensure his or her own subsistence and the subsistence of his or her dependents without recourse to benefits in accordance with Book Two or Book Twelve of the Social Code or recourse to such benefits is due to conditions beyond his or her control, 4. gives up or loses his or her previous citizenship, 5. has not been sentenced for an unlawful act and is not subject to any court order ­imposing a measure of reform and prevention due to a lack of criminal capacity, 6. possesses an adequate knowledge of German and 7. possesses knowledge of the legal system, society and living conditions in Germany. The conditions under sentence 1, numbers 1 and 7 do not apply to foreigners who do not have legal capacity pursuant to Section 80, sub-section 1 of the Residence Act. (2) The foreigner’s spouse and minor children may be naturalized together with the ­foreigner in accordance with sub-section (1), irrespective of whether they have been lawfully resident in Germany for eight years. (3) Upon a foreigner confirming successful attendance of an integration course by presenting a certificate issued by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BMAF), the qualifying period stipulated in sub-section 1 shall be reduced to seven years. This qualifying period may be reduced to six years if the foreigner has made outstanding efforts at integration exceeding the requirements under sub-section 1, sentence 1, no. 6, especially if he or she can demonstrate his or her command of the German language. (4) The conditions specified in sub-section 1, sentence 1, no. 6 are fulfilled if the foreigner passes the oral and written language examinations leading to the Zertifikat Deutsch (equivalent of level B 1 in the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages). Where a minor child is under 16 years of age at the time of naturalization the conditions of sub-section 1, sentence 1, no. 6 shall be fulfilled if the child demonstrates age-appropriate language skills. (5) As a rule, the conditions specified in sub-section 1, sentence 1, no. 7 shall be fulfilled if the foreigner has passed the naturalization test. To prepare for the test, foreigners may participate in voluntary integration courses. (6) The requirements of sub-section 1, sentence 1, nos. 6 and 7 shall be waived if the foreigner is unable to fulfill them on account of a physical, mental or psychological illness or disability or on account of his or her age. (7) The Federal Ministry of the Interior shall be authorized, without the need for approval by the Bundesrat, to issue ordinances defining the test and certification requirements as well as the basic structure and contents of the naturalization courses under sub-section 5, based on the contents of the orientation course under Section 43, sub-section 3, sentence 1 of the Residence Act. Section 11

[Grounds for exclusion] Naturalization shall not be allowed 1. if there are concrete, justifiable grounds to assume that the foreigner is pursuing or supporting or has pursued or supported activities aimed at subverting the free democratic constitutional system, the existence or security of the Federation or a Land or at illegally impeding the constitutional bodies of the Federation or a Land or the members of said bodies in discharging their duties or any activities which jeopardize foreign interests of

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the Federal Republic of Germany through the use of violence or preparatory actions for the use of violence, unless he or she credibly asserts that he or she has distanced himself or herself from the former pursuit or support of such activities, or 2. if a ground for expulsion applies pursuant to Section 54, nos. 5 and 5a of the Residence Act. Sentence 1, no. 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis for foreigners within the meaning of Section 1, sub-section 2 of the Residence Act and also for nationals of Switzerland and their family members possessing a residence permit on the basis of the Agreement of 21 June 1999 between the European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the Swiss Confederation on the other hand on the free movement of persons. Source: Nationality Act of July 22, 1913 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 583 - Federal Law Gazette III 102-1), as last amended by Article 2 of the Act to Implement the EU Directive on Highly Qualified Workers of June 1, 2012 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 1224). Available at http:// www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/EN/Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz_englisch .pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

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Guatemala Mayas and the Guatemalan Civil War Betsy Konefal

Timeline 1880s The growth of coffee production begins. 1898–1920 Manuel Estrada Cabrera, the authoritarian who opened the country to the United Fruit Company, rules as a dictator. His rule was the inspiration for a novel by Miguel Angel Asturias, El Señor Presidente. 1920s Estrada Cabrera is ousted. Nationalist movements begin political reforms and a move toward democratization. 1931–1944 The dictator General Jorge Ubico establishes a firm grip over the countryside. 1934 The Vagrancy Law requires men without “adequate profession” or legal land title to work between 100 and 150 hours per year on coffee plantations. The state backs a coercive labor regime for agricultural exports. 1944–1954 The “October Revolution” brings about the reformist governments of Juan José Arévalo (1945–1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951–1954). 1947 Arévalo institutes moderate workers’ rights legislation. 1952 Decree 900: Agrarian Reform is passed. Arbenz says it is “the first act of justice since the conquest.” The reform is based on peasant organizing and encouraged by the state.

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1954 A CIA-sponsored coup overthrows Arbenz. A military government is installed, headed by Col. Castillo Armas. 1962 A guerrilla insurgency emerges and is united in the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). 1974 The presidency of General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud begins. The Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) is established in Ixcán, Ixil, South Coast, and capital. The Organization of People in Arms (ORPA) is established in the western highlands, coastal plain, and capital. 1978 The presidency of General Romeo Lucas García begins. The Founding of Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC), the largest peasant organization since 1954, links Mayas and ladinos. 1978–1983 State repression reaches its height, and a “scorched-earth” counterinsurgency begins. 1978 On May 29, the massacre of K’ekchi’-Maya peasants in Panzós, Alta Verapaz, takes place. 1978–1982 The military regime of General Romeo Lucas García rules. 1980 The Spanish embassy massacre takes place following the CUC occupation of the embassy. The Declaration of Iximché is issued. 1981 Civil patrols are organized by the Guatemalan military. 1982 The EGP, ORPA, FAR, and the armed wing of the Guatemalan Workers Party, PGT, join together to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Civil patrols are officially established. 1982–1983 The military regime of Efraín Ríos Montt rules. Ríos Montt states, “We have no scorched-earth policy. We have a policy of scorched Communists” (New York

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Times, December 6, 1982). A civil patrol program is expanded into most highland communities. 1983 Rigoberta Menchú publishes a testimonial narrative in Spanish, Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia,” “My name is Rigoberta Menchú and this is how my consciousness was born.” 1987 Conversations are initiated between the Guatemalan government and the umbrella URNG. 1992 The 500th anniversary of the arrival of Europeans in the Americas is marked. Rigoberta Menchú Tum is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Peace negotiations in Guatemala are suspended. 1994 Peace negotiations are resumed, suspended, and then resumed again. An accord is signed by the parties: the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights. The stage is set for human rights monitors (MINUGUA) and a truth commission, the “Commission for Historical Clarification” (CEH). 1995 An accord on indigenous rights is signed: the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It is followed by the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. 1996 Accords are reached on remaining topics: the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Agreement on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. On December 29, the parties sign the final accord: the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. 1998 On April 24, Guatemalan bishop Juan Gerardi presents the findings of the Archbishop’s Human Rights Office’s “truth commission,” the 4-volume Guatemala: Nunca más. On April 26, Bishop Gerardi is murdered by the Presidential Guard. 1999 The UN-sponsored truth commission, CEH, publishes a 12-volume report, Guatemala: Memory of Silence. The findings concluded that 200,000-plus people were dead or had disappeared; 626 Maya communities had been destroyed; and

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more than 1 million had been displaced. Government forces were responsible for 93 percent of the human rights violations brought before the commission, and the guerrillas were responsible for 3 percent. Of the dead and disappeared, 83 percent were Maya, and 17 percent were ladino. The most damning conclusion was that the state had committed “acts of genocide” in areas of the Mayan highlands. 2001 The convicted murderers of Bishop Juan Gerardi are sentenced to 30 years in prison. 2004 MINUGUA (the UN human rights mission) finally closes its offices in Guatemala, ending its “verification” role in the peace process. 2005 Over 70 million documents from the disbanded National Police are discovered. The materials are catalogued and made available in the Historical Archive of the National Police, AHPN. Legal cases are brought by Rigoberta Menchú against General Ríos Montt and seven other defendants before Spanish courts, in accordance with “universal jurisdiction” over cases involving genocide. 2007 A presidential campaign begins, with over 50 people killed in electoral violence. Businessman Alvaro Colom, on a poverty-fighting platform, defeats General Otto Pérez Molina in a runoff election. (Pérez Molina was formerly in the army’s Special Forces (Kaibiles), the director of military intelligence, and an army major in charge of military operations in the Ixil region, 1982–1983.) 2011 General Otto Pérez Molina is elected president of Guatemala. 2013 Former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt and his head of military intelligence are brought to trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. On May 10, there is a guilty verdict for Ríos Montt; ten days later, the verdict is annulled and the trial suspended. 2015 On January 5, Ríos Montt’s genocide trial is reopened, but the trial is suspended again that same afternoon. Mayas and the Guatemalan Civil War Thirty-six years of brutal civil war in Guatemala officially ended with the signing of peace accords on December 29, 1996, between the Guatemalan government

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and guerrilla armies of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The signing of accords meant an end to formal hostilities, but social conflicts that fueled the fighting remain unresolved. Looming large among them is the issue of ethnic relations between Guatemala’s indigenous (primarily Maya) majority and a European, “ladino” (non-Indian), ruling class that has dominated the political and economic life of the country since its inception. While the civil war was not primarily an ethnic conflict, it brought long-standing ethnic tensions to unprecedented levels. Of the 200,000 dead and disappeared of the war period, an estimated 83 percent were indigenous. In the early 1980s, especially, the Guatemalan Army defined Mayas in certain areas as natural sympathizers of the guerrillas and thus “subversive” enemies of the state. In scorched-earth sweeps of over 600 highland communities, army troops purposefully targeted Mayas, along with the elements that sustained community life: the army completely destroyed houses, crops, animals, and sacred sights and massacred men, women, and children. A United Nations–sponsored truth commission found that through its counterinsurgency tactics, the Guatemalan state committed “acts of genocide” against the Maya population.1 Historical Background Guatemalan genocide and the war as a whole were deeply rooted in centuries of exploitation, marginalization, and discrimination against indigenous people and the poor, categories with a great deal of overlap. In a country with extremely high levels of inequality, it must be noted that most non-Mayas, too, were (and are) poor and marginalized, like their indigenous counterparts; thus, economic and ethnic tensions and oppression fueled the war. To understand how a multifaceted civil war turned genocidal, though, it is necessary to look closely at the unfolding of ideas and practices relating to race and nation and the kinds of oppositional mobilization that grew in response. Ideas about ethnicity, race, and national belonging in Guatemala have been both ambiguous and contentious. For the Guatemalan state, the Maya of the past have long been figures to be celebrated, as the foundation of the nation and as a means to showcase a colorful and exotic heritage for tourists. Indigenous people of the present, on the other hand, have since at least the late 19th century been labeled by government officials as “stagnant” and “backward,” a dead weight on national progress. In the 1880s, the coffee industry was expanding rapidly, with the Guatemalan state its eager sponsor. Liberalism cleared the way for coffee producers and other exporters to acquire vast tracts of land, and the state provided ready access to the labor needed to make it profitable. Mayas were singled out as a crucial labor force, but one that could only contribute to modernization when forced to do so by the heavy hand of the state and oligarchy. A long series of official decrees and laws tied Mayas to export agriculture: over generations, various forms of debt servitude, labor drafts, and vagrancy laws forcibly required the landless—and in practice, mostly indigenous people—to report for work on plantations.

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There was a short period of real reform to this system, from 1944 to 1954, following the overthrow of longtime dictator General Jorge Ubico. With the successive governments of Arévalo and Arbenz, known together as the “October Revolution,” a decade of democracy, with open and contested elections, brought an expansion of social services and recognition of worker and peasant rights. The revolutionary government initiated widespread rural education. They also created the Instituto Indigenista Nacional (IIN) to design plans to incorporate (or in the thinking of the time, assimilate) the Indian into the Guatemalan nation. Mayas ran for and won local political offices, became active in new trade unions and rural cooperatives, and were deeply involved in the agrarian reform program Arbenz sponsored in 1952. The experiment in democracy and socioeconomic reform ended abruptly in 1954 when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated the overthrow of the Arbenz government.2 The Guatemalan military retook control, marking the beginning of an anticommunist counter-revolution. An almost uninterrupted series of military-led governments ruled Guatemala for the next 30 years. Within two years of the 1954 takeover, the region’s first death squad was established in Guatemala to suppress reformist pressures; within six years, junior military officers, protesting repression and the lack of democracy, founded the country’s first guerrilla army, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). The 1960s and 1970s were years of mobilization in many forms—in labor unions, student groups, and peasant cooperatives. In Maya communities, Catholic Action became an especially important catalyst for political involvement. Originally intended to be a bulwark against the spread of communism, over time, Catholic Action resulted in the politicization of young Maya catechists throughout the Guatemalan highlands, and in a broader sense, the communities they worked with. The changes these groups envisioned would be fiercely resisted by a state and oligarchy willing to resort to extreme violence to maintain the status quo. The Conflict Guatemala’s civil war began with the FAR insurgency and lasted almost four decades. The FAR was nearly wiped out in the early 1960s, but regrouped and reemerged in the 1970s, along with three other armed revolutionary movements: the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), and the armed wing of the Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT). The insurgencies caused havoc and destruction and committed an estimated 3 percent of killings during the war. The state’s reaction to revolutionary pressures, however, was wholly disproportionate to the threat. The Guatemalan Army attacked with unimaginable levels and types of violence, targeting not only guerrilla combatants but also sympathizers—actual and potential—and virtually all those who sought reform of the country’s socioeconomic, political, and racial hierarchies. The history of Mayas in these struggles—as victims and protagonists—is complex. Maya community leaders in the 1960s and 1970s led mobilization all over the highlands to challenge economic, political, and cultural exclusion. Maya-led cooperatives, literacy projects, and discussion groups pressed for socioeconomic

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justice and participants’ rights as campesinos and as indigenous. At the same time, Catholic Action and the peasant and cooperative movements became important avenues for Maya opposition organizing outside of the community. People from different regions and languages (there are 22 Maya languages spoken in Guatemala) held regional and national discussions and organizing in the mid-1970s, focusing their demands on a range of issues: ethnic and class identities, indigenous culture, economic justice, and, in time, state violence.3 The early 1970s are remembered by many Mayas as a time of hope and possibility. By the end of that decade, however, Maya mobilization was developing in a context of official terror. A turning point occurred with the army massacre of Q’eqchi’—Maya campesinos voicing land claims in Panzós, Alta Verapaz—on May 29, 1978. The army opened fire on a gathering of unarmed men, women, and children, peasant families who had been called to the plaza, purportedly to meet with the mayor. With the violence in Panzós, army counterinsurgency tactics had evolved from targeting leaders to attacking whole communities indiscriminately. Mayas point to the episode as the moment when they felt that state violence was explicitly directed at them as a people, or pueblo, when the state began equating Mayas with subversion. It was thinking that paved the way for genocide. Activist Mayas of many types—intellectuals and students, campesino organizers, catechists, guerrilla combatants, and even beauty queens—condemned the state’s actions in Panzós and the contradictions and hypocrisy evidenced by the government’s continued promotion of Maya “folklore” while it attacked actual Mayas and their communities. The indigenous-led Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC) appeared publicly in the wake of the Panzós killings. And in the midst of increasing state violence against virtually all forms of public protest, the guerrilla armies, especially the EGP and ORPA, gained the support of growing numbers of people. In February 1980, CUC and an array of other Maya and ladino organizers publicly proclaimed their collective support for revolution. (See the Declaration of Iximché in the appendix.) But certainly not all Mayas supported opposition movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Increasing politicization led to tensions in indigenous communities, with more conservative Maya leaders challenging and confronting a younger generation active in the more radical catechist movement and peasant organizing. Other Maya organizers distanced themselves from the violence as it escalated and adopted a more explicitly cultural—and seemingly nonpolitical—orientation. Still other Mayas found themselves, willingly or not, embedded in the Guatemalan Army’s efforts. To counter widening oppositional mobilization in the early 1980s, the army turned its sights explicitly on the highlands. Expanded forced recruitment— often illegal, with underage conscripts—brought young Maya men in large numbers into the army’s lowest ranks. The military simultaneously created a vast civil patrol system, requiring virtually all men in rural communities to patrol their own villages for “subversion.” In this way, the government incorporated Mayas into its counterinsurgency project, often forcing recruits and civil patrol members to participate in violence and terror against neighboring villages or even their own communities and families.

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With the dictatorship of General Efraín Ríos Montt (1982–1983), the state opted for the razing of whole villages. Within a few years of scorched-earth terror and near occupation of the highlands, the Guatemalan Army had crushed the guerrilla insurgency and decimated the countryside. The army wiped hundreds of Maya communities off the map, with 200,000 dead and disappeared, and an estimated 1 million people, mostly indigenous, fleeing into exile or living as internally displaced refugees. Those who did not flee or were captured were resettled into official “model villages” under the watchful eye of the army. Management of the Conflict After decades of war, the Guatemalan military judged in the mid-1980s that it had defeated the revolutionary threat and could afford to institute changes aiming to improve its reputation on the international stage.4 In 1986, the army officially handed over the presidency to civilians, although it retained tremendous political and economic power. In 1987, the state began long and fraught negotiations with the URNG to officially end the conflict. The arduous peace process was propelled by a revitalized civil society. In the late 1980s and 1990s, dozens of mass organizations reemerged, and new ones formed, including human rights and campesino groups with majority Maya membership and, in many cases, leadership. Although there was disagreement on specifics, virtually all participants in the negotiating process acknowledged that achieving lasting peace depended on addressing the rights of Guatemala’s Maya majority. A group of vocal and prolific Mayas began forcefully demanding respect for the rights to use indigenous languages and dress. Others in multiethnic organizations promoted a broader interpretation of indigenous rights; as key members of Guatemala’s popular movement, they sought to integrate ethnic rights discourse and demands into struggles against economic exploitation, class discrimination, and continuing state repression and terror. It was in this context that Rigoberta Menchú Tum, a K’iche’-Maya and longtime CUC activist with ties to the EGP, was awarded the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize. Even beyond Menchú, the high-profile and public role for Mayas was one of the most notable changes to come with the end of the war. Ladinos had long pondered the nation’s “Indian question,” but as Guatemalans struggled to shape a postconflict society, Mayas voicing an array of positions were the ones to dominate public discourse on ethnicity, convening high-profile conferences and debates, authoring fiery newspaper columns, and, in huge numbers, occupying plazas, plantations, and the country’s highways. Despite the buildup of public pressure, negotiations proceeded in fits and starts, with a series of accords finally reached in the mid-1990s. The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights was the first to be signed, an accord that called for the establishment of a human rights observer mission known as MINUGUA. (The mission remained in its verification role for the next 10 years). The accord also called for a truth commission to be established under the auspices of the United Nations; known as the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), it was charged

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with investigating the historical causes, methods, and consequences of the civil conflict. At the same time, the Guatemalan Archbishop’s Human Rights Office, concerned with the CEH’s restricted mandate and time frame for work, set up an independent and parallel truth inquiry. In the next step of the peace process, the Guatemalan government and the URNG signed, in March 1995, a much-anticipated indigenous rights accord, the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It was an ambitious attempt to specifically address the rights of Guatemala’s Maya, a population acknowledged as bearing the brunt of the war. (See the accord in the appendix.) It officially recognized the Guatemalan nation as “multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual in nature.” Yet the agreement’s promises were vague and depended on implementing legislation. That legislation was defeated in a public referendum in 1999. The indigenous rights accord was followed by a series of other agreements aimed at similarly thorny issues: the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation; the Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power; and the Agreement on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society. A final end to the conflict was signed on December 29, 1996. The promises of the agreements as a whole have been elusive, and the peace accords have had little real impact. The government failed to enact significant policy changes to meet the needs of Guatemalans, economic, social, cultural, or political. The problems that lay at the root of the conflict—discrimination and gaping economic and social inequalities affecting Mayas and ladinos alike—remain urgent. Significance Despite the lack of material change resulting from the peace accords, important shifts have taken place in understandings of the war and of Maya roles in Guatemalan society and political life. At the same time—and propelling these changes— ongoing efforts to challenge impunity and hold officials accountable for terror have met with some success. The two truth commission reports offered a crucial foundation, with their detailed accounts of the historical origins of the conflict and the devastation brought on by unthinkable levels of violence. The Catholic Church’s Human Rights Office released its findings first, in four volumes that delved deeply into the war’s origins and outcomes, finding the state responsible for a vast majority of atrocities. The political context remained grim, however: the leader of that effort, Bishop Juan Gerardi, was murdered shortly after releasing it, bludgeoned to death by members of the presidential guard. The United Nations’ report was even more extensive, consisting of 12 volumes of history, analysis, and case studies. It was unequivocal in its condemnation, finding the guerrilla armies responsible for 3 percent of killings and state forces 93 percent. The CEH’s most damning conclusion, the determination that specific state counterinsurgency practices amounted to acts of genocide, was met with stony silence on the part of government officials. Eventually, it helped pave the way, however, for the groundbreaking trial of General Ríos Montt on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. Ríos Montt was found guilty of these crimes in 2013.

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His conviction was overturned on procedural grounds several days later and is still pending before the courts. The history of Mayas and the Guatemalan civil war is complex, multidimensional, and ongoing. Mayas in Guatemala were not then nor have they ever been univocal; they have participated in the making of modern Guatemala in countless ways and continue to pursue a range of goals and visions for the pueblo maya. Some were protagonists of the civil war, and others stood outside of it; nearly 200,000 were among the dead and disappeared. But arguably, all Mayas—like all Guatemalans—whether they survived or not, were the war’s victims. Notes 1. See Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala), Guatemala: memoria del silencio (Guatemala: CEH, 1999), “Conclusions and Recommendations.” 17–69. Available in English at http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html. 2. See Nick Cullather and Piero Gleijeses, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 3. For a detailed look at Maya mobilization in this period, see Betsy Konefal, For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism, 1960–1990 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010). 4. For more, see Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).

Suggested Readings Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala). 1999. Guatemala: memoria del silencio. Guatemala: CEH. For “Conclusions and Recommendations,” in English, see http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html. For an abridged version in English, see Rothenberg, Daniel. 2012. Memory of Silence: The Guatemalan Truth Commission Report. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Grandin, Greg. 2011. Who Is Rigoberta Menchú? London and New York: Verso. Konefal, Betsy. 2010. For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala, 1960–1990. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Little, Walter E., and Timothy J. Smith. 2009. Mayas in Postwar Guatemala: Harvest of Violence Revisited. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. McAllister, Carlota, and Diane M. Nelson, eds. 2013. War by Other Means: Aftermath in Post-Genocide Guatemala. Durham: Duke University Press. McAllister, Carlota. 2010. “A Headlong Rush into the Future: Violence and Revolution in a Guatemalan Indigenous Village.” In A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War, edited by Greg Grandin and Gilbert Joseph. Durham: Duke University Press. Menchú, Rigoberta, and Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. 2010. I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala. London: Verso. Reprint, originally published in 1984. Proyecto Interdiocesano Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (Guatemala), Catholic Institute for International Relations, and Latin America Bureau. 1999. Guatemala, Never Again! Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. Abridged English version. Schirmer, Jennifer. 1998. The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

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Appendices 1. Declaration of Iximché In the Spanish Embassy massacre of January 31, 1980, protestors from the Committee of Peasant Unity (CUC) burned to death as police and firefighters looked on. Spurred to action by the massacre and spiraling violence in the western highlands, members of CUC and other Maya organizers met two weeks later at the symbolic Iximché ruins, site of the former Kaqchikel kingdom, to make this statement. Condemning centuries of exploitation and discrimination against indigenous people, along with the brutal repression in the present, they together proclaimed their opposition to the government and support for a radicalizing struggle. the indigenous peoples of guatemala declare and denounce to the world more than four centuries of discrimination, negation, repression, exploitation and massacres by the foreign invaders, which continue even today through their even more savage and criminal descendants

The massacre of Ixil and Quiché Indigenous at the Embassy of Spain In 1975, squads of the National Army arrived at Nebaj in the department of Quiché, . . . with the pretext of maintaining order. . . . The people, mostly indigenous, have begun to demand their rights which, for centuries, have been abused by owners of the fincas and by the government. With the presence of the National Army came the burning of ranches and harvests, plundering of money and animals, forcible rape of women, theft of lunch baskets of indigenous working in the countryside, kidnappings, tortures, disappearances, assassinations and massacres of Ixil and Quiché brothers. ... The case of the massacre at the Spanish Embassy is not an isolated case, but part of a chain of massacres. Our peoples’ suffering goes back for centuries, to 1524, when the criminal assassin Pedro de Alvarado arrived in this country. The first massacre of indigenous Quichés took place on the banks of the Tonalá River; later came the massacre of Xetulul; the massacre of 3,000 indigenous in Chuaraal; the massacre at the banks of the Olintepeque River between Quetzaltenango and Totonicapán in February, 1524; in March of the same year, . . . . At the end of many years of continuous massacres, another long chain of great sufferings began for our ancestors who survived. The exploitation, discrimination, oppression, persecution . . . began, and reached its limit when it was affirmed that our ancestors were not even human beings. . . . In 1821, the descendants of the invaders achieved “Independence,” but the situation of the indigenous stayed the same. . . . This is so because after the so-called independence . . ., the robbery of our lands, discrimination, . . . exploitation, oppression, repression, assassinations and massacres continued. . . . The massacre of Cackchiqueles in Patzicía in 1944, the massacre of Sansirisay in 1978, the massacre of Kekchíes in Panzós, in May 1978,

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massacres of Ixiles and Quichés in Chajul, Cotzal, Uspantán, Cunén and other places since 1975 until today, the massacres of Ixiles and Quichés at the Spanish Embassy on January 31, 1980. why so many massacres of the indigenous people?

... [The] criminal descendants of the invaders have been killing our people in many ways: killing us by hunger, by paying us miserable salaries in the fincas and the factories; they also rob us by cheating on the weight of coffee and cotton, by poisoning us in the cotton fields, by raising the prices of basic products. . . . They kill us when they transport us in trucks which were not made to carry people. . . . Another way of killing us is through sterilization of our women, by deceit and forced family planning. They kill our children too, when they are taken off to the army barracks with blows and kicks. There they kill their noble sentiments, those which characterize our people, and change them into killers. These rich people and their government . . . massacre us in many ways and still try to deceive us, by organizing folkloric festivals such as the day of Tecún Umán, the day of the Race, festivals such as those of Cobán, and lately, of Sololá, Huehuetenango and others, handing out medals, diplomas, pats on the back and smiles to certain professionals and indigenous queens. Their cheating ends in speeches filled with lies, and finally, the photographs which the INGUAT [tourist office] exploits for tourist trade. . . . [INGUAT] paints Guatemala in a very romantic and picturesque way with its Mayan ruins, its weaving, dances, and traditions. The indigenous becomes an object of tourism, a commercial object. . . . But in spite of all this, our voice and our struggle advance at a firm pace toward our liberation. In the face of all these savage acts by the invaders and their rich descendants and their government in complicity with the wealthy in other countries, such as the United States, in the face of persecutions, threats, tortures, dispossession of land, cheating and massacres . . . before all of this, the indigenous people have never stopped struggling. . . . In the face of this suffering, such as the latest massacre in the Spanish Embassy where 21 indigenous brothers fell, . . . among them 4 women, examples of struggle who in bravely giving their lives in the peaceful occupation of the embassy, confirmed before their pueblos and the world their bravery . . . and heroism in the struggle for liberation of our people. . . . This is not by accident, since the indigenous woman always was and is part of our struggle, since she has always been exploited in the cotton, cane and coffee fields, and discriminated against because of her clothing, language, and customs, and by her condition as a woman. . . . She has been abused through rape – unmarried, married or pregnant – by the National Army and the rich exploiters, in the countryside, in the city, and in every corner of Guatemala. To end all these evils . . . we must fight allied with workers, poor ladino peasants, committed students, residents of shantytowns, and other popular and democratic sectors, to strengthen the union and solidarity among the indigenous and poor ladinos, since the solidarity of the popular movement with the indigenous struggle was sealed with the lives

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[lost] in the Spanish Embassy. The sacrifice of these lives now brings us closer than ever to a new society and the dawn of the Indian. May the blood of our indigenous brothers and their examples of a firm and valiant struggle strengthen all indigenous in their continuing struggle to secure a just life, to fight: for a society of equality and respect, so that our indian people can develop their culture broken by the criminal invaders; for a just economy where no one exploits others; with communal lands as in the times of our ancestors; for a people without discrimination; so that all repression, torture, kidnapping, assassination and massacres may be ended; so that forced recruitment by kidnapping stops; so that we all have the same rights to work; so that we no longer serve as objects of tourism; for the just distribution and use of our wealth as in the times when the life and culture of our ancestors flourished. We also have to understand clearly that while we struggle for all this, the wealthy and their government will always accuse us of being Communists, terrorists, delinquents, subversives, guerrillas, etc. But in the face of the calumnies and lies of the wealthy and the government, our Indian peoples will continue to rise up, step by step until triumphing, because the blood of our heroes massacred on january 31, the life, struggle and blood of all the indians massacred since the time of the invasion, the blood of indians and poor ladinos spilled on the path of our fight has fertilized and fortified our hope and our struggle. —that all exploited and discriminated indigenous of the world, —that all workers of the world, —that all free and democratic peoples of the world, —that all authentic christians of the world, establish their solidarity with the struggle of the indigenous people and other exploited groups in guatemala. that all rise up, call to everyone, that there be not even one or two groups among us who are left behind! (popol-vuh)

—Alberto Fuentes Mohr, Iximché, February 14, 1980 Source: Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Guatemala, sponsored by the World Council of Churches.

2. Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples The second major agreement reached between the Guatemalan government and the URNG, this component of the peace accords, signed in 1995, recognizes Guatemala as a “multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual” nation. It sets out the rights of Maya people (and also the smaller groups of Garifuna and Xinca peoples) to respect for identities, cultural difference, and freedom from discrimination. Though its goals were ambitious, the legislation needed to codify these changes in national law was defeated in 1999. Considering That the question of identity and rights of indigenous peoples is a vital issue of historic importance for the present and future of Guatemala;

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That the indigenous peoples include the Maya people, the Garifuna people and the Xinca people, and that the Maya people consist of various socio-cultural groups having a common origin; That, because of its history, conquest, colonization, movements and migrations, the Guatemalan nation is multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual in nature; That the parties recognize and respect the identity and political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Maya, Garifuna and Xinca peoples, within the unity of the Guatemalan nation, and subject to the indivisibility of the territory of the Guatemalan State, as components of that unity; That the indigenous peoples have been particularly subject to de facto levels of discrimination, exploitation and injustice, on account of their origin, culture and language and that, like many other sectors of the national community, they have to endure unequal and unjust treatment and conditions on account of their economic and social status; That this historical reality has affected and continues to affect these peoples profoundly, denying them the full exercise of their rights and political participation, and hampering the configuration of a national unity which should adequately reflect the rich and diversified physionomy of Guatemala with its wealth of values; That until this problem affecting Guatemalan society is resolved, its economic, political, social and cultural potential will never be able to develop fully and neither will it be able to take the place in the community of nations due to it by virtue of its ancient history and the spiritual grandeur of its peoples; That it will be possible to eliminate oppression and discrimination in Guatemala only if due recognition is given to all aspects of the identity and rights of the peoples who have inhabited and continue to inhabit it, all of whom are components of its present reality and protagonists in its development, in all senses; That all matters of direct interest to the indigenous peoples need to be dealt with by and with them and that the present agreement seeks to create, expand and strengthen the structures, conditions, opportunities and guarantees regarding participation of the indigenous peoples, with full respect for their identity and the exercise of their rights; That the international community, through the United Nations and the agencies and programmes of the United Nations system, the Organization of American States and other international agencies and instruments have recognized the aspirations of the indigenous peoples who wish to gain control over their own institutions and forms of life as peoples; The Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (hereinafter referred to as the parties) have agreed as followed:

I. Identity of Indigenous Peoples 1. Recognition of the identity of the indigenous peoples is fundamental to the construction of a national unity based on respect for and the exercise of political, cultural, economic and spiritual rights of all Guatemalans.

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2. The identity of the peoples is a set of elements which define them and, in turn, ensure their self-recognition. In the case of the Mayan identity, which has shown an age-old capacity for resistance to assimilation, those fundamental elements are as follows: (a) Direct descent from the ancient Mayas; (b) Languages deriving from a common Mayan root; (c) A view of the world based on the harmonious relationship of all elements of the universe, in which the human being is only one additional element, in which the earth is the mother who gives life and maize is a sacred symbol around which Mayan culture revolves. This view of the world has been handed down from generation to generation through material and written artifacts and by an oral tradition in which women have played a determining role; (d) A common culture based on the principles and structures of Mayan thought, a philosophy, a legacy of scientific and technical knowledge, artistic and aesthetic values of their own, a collective historical memory, a community organization based on solidarity and respect for one’s peers, and a concept of authority based on ethical and moral values; and (e) A sense of their own identity. . . .

II. Struggle against Discrimination A. Struggle against de jure and de facto discrimination 1. To overcome the age-old discrimination against indigenous peoples the assistance of all citizens will be needed in the effort to change thinking, attitudes and behaviour. This change must begin with a clear recognition by all Guatemalans of the reality of racial discrimination and of the compelling need to overcome it and achieve true peaceful coexistence. 2. For its part, with a view to eradicating discrimination against the indigenous peoples, the Government shall take the following measures: (a) Promote in the Guatemalan Congress, the classification of ethnic discrimination as a criminal offence; . . . (c) Widely disseminate information on the rights of the indigenous peoples through education, the communications media and through other channels; and (d) Promote the effective protection of such rights. To that end, promote the creation of legal offices for the defence of indigenous rights and the installation of popular law offices to provide free legal assistance for persons of limited economic means. . . . B. Rights of indigenous women 1. It is recognized that indigenous women are particularly vulnerable and helpless, being confronted with twofold discrimination both as women and indigenous people, and also having to deal with a social situation characterized by intense poverty and exploitation. The Government undertakes to take the following measures: (a) Promote legislation to classify sexual harassment as a criminal offence, considering as an aggravating factor in determining the penalty for sexual offences the fact that the offence was committed against an indigenous woman; (b) Establish an Office for the Defence of Indigenous Women’s Rights, with the participation of such women, including legal advice services and social services. ...

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III. Cultural Rights 1. Mayan culture is the original basis of Guatemalan culture and, in conjunction with the other indigenous cultures, is an active and dynamic factor in the development and progress of Guatemalan society. 2. The development of the national culture is therefore inconceivable without recognition and promotion of the culture of the indigenous peoples. Thus, in contrast with the past, educational and cultural policy must be oriented to focus on recognition, respect and encouragement of indigenous cultural values. ... Signed by the Government of Guatemala and representatives of the URNG, Mexico City, March 31, 1995 Source: Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1995. United States Institute on Peace. MINUGUA, United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala. Available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources /collections/peace_agreements/guat_950331.pdf.

India Ethnic Conflict and Nation-Building in a Multiethnic State Maya Chadda

Timeline 1947 The partition of India into India and Pakistan occurs. 1956 The Indian Federation is reorganized, essentially on a linguistic state basis. 1963 Nagaland is created. 1972 The breakup of Assam occurs. 1973 The Anandpur Sahib Resolution is passed by Akali Dal in Punjab. 1980 The Congress Party under Indira Gandhi returns to power at the center. 1984 Followers of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale confront the Indian army in the Sikh Golden Temple. Indira Gandhi is assassinated. 1985 Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress Party win a landslide victory. Rajiv Gandhi signs an agreement involving Punjab with Akali Dal leader Harchandsingh Longowale. 1989 An insurgency breaks out in Kashmir.

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1992 In elections held in Punjab, the Akali Dal wins a majority. August 2000 Three additional states are carved out of the Punjab state in an effort to manage ethnic conflict in northern India: Jharkhand, Utteranchal, and Chattisgargh. 2002 In the spring, Pakistan’s alleged support of insurgents in Kashmir brings India and Pakistan to the brink of war. June 2014 The new state of Telangana is created. Press and media reporting on India is usually dominated by stories of religious and ethnic violence. Ever since India gained its independence in 1947, scholars of India have regularly predicted India’s demise. In popular perceptions, India’s unity is forever in question. Fortunately, these forebodings have failed to materialize, but their origin is not difficult to understand. How can a country of subcontinent proportions, comprising 325 distinctive languages, several separate religions, endemic poverty, and a century and a half of colonial subjugation, become a coherent nation-state? It is not surprising that many regard ethnic conflict as a threat to India’s modern and democratic political system. Yet, as one looks back from the beginning of the new millennium, India has been remarkably successful in welding together a coherent political community out of a welter of unintegrated and often mutually antagonistic regions and provinces. This is not to deny the destructive impact of ethnic violence in India—which has marked much of its recent history—but to suggest that ethnic conflicts and their accommodations need to be viewed within a single perspective that accounts for both India’s success and failures. India’s experience suggests an answer to the critical question of our times: how to accommodate multiethnic communities within a single territorial nation while retaining a broadly democratic framework? Historical Background India’s ethnic map has been shaped by many factors. The rise and fall of empires, the Mughal and then the British, led to the crystallization of ethnic consciousness in several regions of the Indian subcontinent. Before the British arrived on the scene, India was ruled by several large and small kingdoms, each multiethnic and multireligious but with one or two linguistic groups that had gained dominance because of royal patronage and size. The British had absorbed these kingdoms into their empire by 1857 but largely stayed away from the way in which local communities defined themselves. British policies nevertheless had a profound impact on the self-definition of ethnic communities. The introduction of census

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and recruitment in the colonial army along ethnic and religious lines reinforced ethnic identities. For instance, the British believed that certain ethnic groups made better soldiers than others. The Punjabi-speaking Sikhs and the Marathas who spoke Marathi were considered martial races. In contrast, the Bengali-speaking people of Bengal, perceived to be soft and artistic, were viewed as good civil servants but poor soldiers. Hence, the British created the Sikh regiment exclusively for the Sikhs and recruited other communities into the army along ethnic, caste, and religious lines. As demand for self-rule grew among Indian nationalists, the British created special electorates for the minority communities—the Muslims and Sikhs—in India. These policies gradually became a part of the ethnic history and the British perceptions, a part of the ethnic folklore. Both carried beyond the British rule into the political life of independent India. The rise of India’s nationalist movement and the way in which it came to be organized was the second factor to shape ethnic identity. The rise of nationalism in the 19th century had initiated a search for indigenous histories and cultural pride in which they, the British, were separated from we, the Indians, but the we consisted of many ethnic communities with distinctive histories and languages. These were fully formed by the time the idea of separate electorates got its first push in the 1930s. The gradual welding of pan-Indian nationalism was then mediated through ethnic identities that had firm roots in particular regions of India. In its mass mobilization phase (the 1940s), the Indian national movement gathered support by appealing to ethnic pride. By the time India became independent, it was a land of politicized ethnic and religious identities that had lent support to win independence and were ready to bargain with the new pan-Indian state. Since 1947, the management of these identities has become the principal preoccupation of every central government in India. The Conflict Not all ethnic groups demanded equal status or a separate state. Why did some seek integration while others demanded separation? First, particular ethnolinguistic communities are concentrated in and constitute a numerical majority in particular regions. For instance, the Gujarati-speaking people dominate the western regions of historical Gujarat, and the Tamil-speaking people dominate the southeastern region of Tamilnadu. There is a correlation, though not a perfect fit, between the ethnic homeland and the ethnic identity. Possessing many of the features of a nation, these ethnic communities have sought cultural and political autonomy. This has often been the cause of tension between the government in New Delhi and the ethnic community. Other ethnolinguistic groups have also constituted a significant presence in the same province. Conflict can develop if one group believes it is being discriminated against while its rival is favored with power, office, and status. Second, ethnic groups can be divided into core and periphery groups in India. The former are a part of the Indian heartland; the latter reside on the state’s outer boundaries and frequently share kinship and identity with fellow ethnic groups across borders. The Indian Kashmiris and the Kashmiris across the border in

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Pakistan, the Tamils in India and in Sri Lanka, the Bengalis in West Bengal and in what is now Bangladesh, and the Nagas on both sides of the India-Myanmar border are only a few examples of these overlapping, cross-border ethnic identities. Such ethnic group overlaps have been used by one or more countries in the region to intervene in the domestic politics of a neighboring state. Pakistan uses the Kashmiris to wage clandestine warfare against India; India has used its Bengali and Tamil ethnic nationalities to mount interventions against Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The distinction between the core and the periphery may blur where demands for autonomy give way to demands for separation, which can happen if frustrated ethnic groups seek out and receive arms and safe havens across the border. Third, as most popular movements are prone to do, ethnic conflicts have a rhythm; they rise and fall. Ethnic communities are known to move from autonomy to separatist militancy and then back to autonomy. The separatist movement in Punjab followed this rhythm between 1970s and 1990s. Fourth, electoral expansion and economic growth have contributed to and shaped ethnic tensions. Growth has produced a sense of relative deprivation among rival ethnic groups. For instance, the separatist movement in Punjab was nurtured by the perception that the central government had ignored Punjab’s need for industrial investments. Modernity and growth are the goals of both the panIndian and ethnic leaders in India. Ethnicity is not a primordial construct driven by the impulse to return to some form of nativity. Political activism of one ethnic community can often spark parallel activism in a proximate ethnic group that might have been quiescent previously. The Bodos, who constitute a relatively small ethnic group (about 5 million) within the Assam province, demanded protection from the central government when a movement calling for “Assam to the Assamese” reached a violent stage. Ethnic nationalism often has a cascading effect. Finally, but most importantly, party competition and rivalry for office and position have heightened ethnic tensions. Ethnic leaders belonging to national as well as provincial parties have fomented ethnic sentiments to win elections. Clearly no single cause explains the reasons for such conflicts that have marked India’s federal evolution since 1947. But the resurgence and diminishing of ethnic tensions does depend to a large extent on the degree to which the central government is inclusive and attentive to the needs of ethnic communities. Ethnic conflict receded during the decades of coalition rule at the center (1989–2014) when national coalition governments were more inclusive, allowing local and regional parties to gain power and place in the formation of policy. Still the problem of malgovernance, poverty, and biased structures of power remained intact, fueling violence and discontent in various parts of India. Management of the Conflict To achieve and preserve national unity in such a diverse nation, governments in New Delhi sought to centralize power. In turn, ethnic groups mobilized regional and culturally defined identities to retain autonomy and gain access to power and office. These tensions lend India’s democracy an electoral rhythm, which alternates

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between centralization and dispersal of power from the center to the periphery. This pattern began to surface after 1967, about a decade and a half after independence. In the first decade after independence, central and state governments remained firmly within the purview of the Congress Party. But after 1967, the pendulum began to swing in favor of ethnic-based, state-level parties. The decades since independence can be divided broadly into two phases: from 1950, when India gave itself a constitution and democracy, to 1989, when the Congress Party’s dominance collapsed, and from 1989 to 2014, when a series of coalition governments comprising numerous state-level political parties presided over Indian democracy. After close to 30 years of hiatus, the May 2014 elections returned a national party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, with a clear majority at the center. The Indian democratic landscape has, however, changed irrevocably. Its federal states have become powerful and demand a role in national policy making. Evolution of Ethnic Politics

The first order of required business for independent India was to weld its disparate regions and many layers of rule and jurisdictions into a single, coherent political system. That task was accomplished by merging the approximately 500 princely states and regions directly under British rule into the Indian state. This unification was not an easy task, given that the princely states possessed nominal sovereignty and had been given a choice between India, Pakistan, and independence by the departing British authorities. The Hindu-Muslim riots of 1946–1947, the communal carnage that accompanied the division of British India, and the outbreak of war over Kashmir immediately following the division all made Indian leaders fearful that a heterogenous India might not hold together. By the same token, India was too large and too diverse to fit into a unitary design. The Indian leaders thus created a constitution that sought to balance the need for unification against those of autonomy. India was to be a secular federal democracy with a strong central government that possessed vast powers over its federal units, especially in the event of a local or national emergency. The constitution, however, did not define the criterion by which India’s federal units were to be created. Originally, the Indian federation was to be structured primarily on the basis of administrative efficiency. The initial reaction to the administrative division between the center and the federal units occurred in Andhra in 1953. Setting the pattern for future demands, it took the form of a demand for a linguistically defined Andhra province. Other large and numerically dominant ethnolinguistic groups lacking states of their own soon followed Andhra’s lead. By 1954, ethnic agitation had spread far and wide. The central government of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was, nevertheless, reluctant to divide India on the basis of language or religion. The trauma of the 1947 partition had clearly left a mark. Nehru sought to calm ethnic tempers by appointing the State Reorganization Commission to look into the problem and make recommendations. In 1956, after much foot dragging, the Nehru government implemented the commission’s recommendations and reorganized the Indian federation along ethnolinguistic lines.1 However, as already noted, there was no

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perfect fit to be found in India between ethnicity and territory. The region of Punjab and Bombay could not be divided neatly along ethnolinguistic lines because the province of Bombay comprised Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking communities, both with legitimate claims to the most important commercial city in India, Bombay. Similarly, the province of Punjab included Sikhs and Hindus who both spoke Punjabi but worshiped at separate temples. Nor could any reasonable linguistic criterion be applied to the country’s northeast. The Conflict in the Punjab

In the Punjab, communal religious rivalries were exploited by both the Hindu and Sikh leaders. The Sikh leader, Master Tara Singh, argued that religion made the Sikhs a distinctive people who could be safe only in an autonomous Punjab. The Nehru government refused to recognize religion as the basis for division.  That, in his view, undermined the secular foundations of independent India. In the reorganized Punjab, which had been made larger by adding adjacent regions to it, the Sikhs had become a minority and could not win enough seats to form  the provincial government there. The Indian National Congress Party, nonetheless, remained popular with the Sikhs. Meanwhile, when it failed to garner support for the religious argument, the Akali Dal Party, which represented a segment of the Sikhs, shifted to language as the basis for demanding a provincial state of Punjab. In 1965, it was partially rewarded for this tactic when Indira Gandhi, India’s third prime minster, created three new states out of the former Punjab: Haryana, a Hindu majority state; Punjab, a Sikh majority state; and Himachal Pradesh. Although the Sikhs became a majority in the newly restructured Punjab state, the Hindus remained a significant minority. That might not have been a problem had the Akali Dal fulfilled its dream of winning assembly elections and forming a provincial-level government. Throughout the decades of 1960s and 1970s, however, the Congress Party continued to dominate Punjab in elections. The Akali Dal repeatedly appealed to the religious sentiments of the Sikhs, but, until the 1980s, a large number among them remained impervious to such appeals. The Punjabi Hindus generally supported the right-wing political party, the Jan Sangh. In the 1960s and early part of the 1970s, the Congress had managed to hold the balance between the Hindus and Sikhs by forging an alliance across religious, class, and ethnic lines. By the end of 1970s, though, the political economy of Punjab had changed, with profound implications for politics in that state.2 A whole new class of peasant proprietors had emerged in the previous decade to take control of the Akali Dal. This was the product of the agricultural development commonly known as the Green Revolution. Economic expansion in rural Punjab intensified class disparities and eventually destroyed the cross-communal alliance created by the Congress Party in Punjab. To shore up its slipping majority, the Congress Party also appealed to Sikh religious sentiments. Efforts were also made to divide the Akali Dal through outright bribery and co-optation (that is, the offer of public office). Tensions between the Congress and the Akali Dal mounted to dangerous levels throughout the early

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1970s. Each party kept edging to the extreme in its efforts to outdo the other. The Akalis led demonstrations and strikes and passed the famous Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973, which demanded that the Punjab state be given jurisdiction over all subjects except foreign policy, defense, and currency. Tensions between the center and the state parties were momentarily defused in 1977, when the Congress Party lost the general elections; however, the Congress Party and Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980. The forces that had previously paralyzed Punjab—party competition, religious extremism, and tensions over power sharing—once again picked up steam and plunged the province into confrontation with the center. This time, the struggle revolved around Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, an obscure Sikh preacher pushed to the center stage by the Congress leaders to split the Akali Dal and weaken its hold on Punjab. Bhindranwale’s religious rhetoric not only split the Akali Dal but also gained him enough of a following to swing free of his erstwhile Congress supporters and demand the creation of Khalistan—a separate Sikh state free of Hindu dominance. Bhindranwale soon fomented an insurgency, which led to the assassination of several Indian officials and political leaders. A series of tragic events then ensued: a June 1984 army assault on the Sikh Golden Temple, the holiest of all Sikh shrines; the death of Bhindranwale; and the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in November 1984 by her Sikh bodyguard. Riding on the wave of sympathy for his assassinated mother, Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress Party won the 1985 elections with a landslide, and Rajiv Gandhi’s first step as prime minister was to sign an agreement with the moderate Akali Dal leader, Harchandsingh Longowale, to bring peace to Punjab. Two months after the agreement, however, Longowale was assassinated, and the strategy fell apart. It was not until after thousands of deaths, popular fatigue with the militancy of the conflict, and the physical elimination of many militant leaders that it became possible to hold elections again (in 1992). In fact, the militancy might not have ended had there not been two dramatic shifts in Indian politics in general: the steady erosion of the Congress Party and the rise of coalition governments reflecting the growing weight of ethnic and regional political parties in the 1990s. Conflict in the Northeast and Kashmir

The conflicts in the northeast and Kashmir can be traced to many of the same factors influencing the conflict in the Punjab—arbitrary centralization of power, the center’s denial of political autonomy, and the rise of nativist, ethnic, and religious tensions. All were a result of modernization, uneven economic growth, and party competition. In the 1980s, however, a new element was added to the list: intervention by neighboring states in India’s domestic ethnic conflicts. The link between terrorism in Punjab and Pakistan did not have an impact until 1987. The Naga and Mizo tribal communities in the northeast had, on the other hand, forged a connection with Burma and China in the 1960s. Kashmir insurgents began to receive systematic support in the mid-1980s. Each of these developments had a different impact on the course of ethnic conflict.

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The Northeast

The northeast was poorly integrated into the British Raj and then independent India. Linked to India by a slim corridor, it is populated by many hill tribes who have a language and culture distinct from those residing in the plains of Assam. The Nagas were the first to demand separation from Assam, and India created Nagaland in 1963. Once the Nagas got a state, others with claims to an equally distinctive identity could not be denied a state within the Indian federation. Between 1972 and 1987, the original province of Assam was divided into seven separate federal province-states. This division brought temporary respite, but the northeast remained subject to separatist violence fueled by economic and political frustrations.3 More than most, the northeast defies a rational division on ethnic or religious lines. There are culturally distinctive communities surrounded by other equally distinctive communities whose lives have been closely intertwined. Thus, ethnic awakening created a cascading effect. The example of Bodos in Assam has already been mentioned. The Indian government has tried to manage that cascading effect by creating autonomous district councils for territorially compact tribal communities. However, these councils have worked less than perfectly. Jammu and Kashmir

Ethnic insurgency erupted somewhat suddenly in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1989, although the demand for independence had been voiced on many occasions in Kashmir. In 1947, the kingdom of Kashmir was divided into Pakistan-held and India-held parts as a result of the first India-Pakistan war. Pakistan has continued to claim the entire kingdom of Kashmir on the argument that, prior to the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in 1947, Kashmir was a Muslim majority state and that India coerced its maharajah into ceding the kingdom in India’s favor. India has argued that the maharajah of Kashmir voluntarily ceded Kashmir to India and that the Pakistani presence in Kashmir is therefore a violation of Indian territory. These opposite arguments have led to three wars and frequent confrontations, not to mention armed subversion and clashes along the disputed sectors of Indo-Pakistan borders.4 During the last decade of the 20th century, the Kashmir dispute came to combine most of the elements, domestic and international, that can make a localized ethnic struggle into a wider regional conflict. The collapse of Afghanistan and the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s has made Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan a single battlefield where regional actors have engaged in fierce warfare. While Pakistan’s interference has aggravated the Kashmir conflict, the causes of Kashmir’s alienation lie in the erosion of its autonomy. In a series of actions, the governments in New Delhi took away the autonomy granted to Kashmir in 1953 by a special amendment to the Indian constitution, known as article 370. Overall, the Kashmir conflict has claimed more than 60,000 lives over the past decade. A negotiated solution seems unlikely, at least in the near future, because moderate Kashmiri nationalists have lost control of the state to the Islamic insurgents located in Pakistan. India cannot reenact its Punjab strategy—use of coercion followed by elections—to recapture Kashmir. Rivalry among the separatists makes

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negotiated agreement almost impossible. But even this situation has turned around since the introduction of regular elections and rise of a new party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which offers an alternative to a national conference. In every election since 2004, public participation in Kashmir has steadily risen despite calls for boycotts by Kashmiri separatists. In the December 2014 state-level elections, Kashmiris turned up in large numbers despite terrorist attacks and heightened tensions on the Indo-Pakistan border. On balance, then, India’s democracy has provided both the avenue for ethnic mobilization and protest and inclusion in the body politic. There are, however, serious problems of malgovernance and economic injustice that have kept ethnic resentment simmering in many parts of India, particularly the northeast. But resentment has also flared up at the heart of the Indian nation. In 2000, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi created three new states, Chhattisgarh, Uttaranchal, and Jharkhand, reconstituting the existing states of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, respectively. Unlike in the earlier divisions, the basis for creating these new states was not linguistic but sociopolitical. In June 2014, the Andhra state was officially divided into two federal units: the state of Telangana and the state of Andhra. This division came after several years of agitation by the pro-Talangana community, who claimed distinctive cultural heritage in addition to complaints about sustained economic neglect. The Indian union currently (2014) constitutes 29 states and 7 Union Territories. Significance The success and failures of ethnic struggles in India and the central government’s efforts to manage them suggest that ethnic conflicts in general are episodic. They rise and fall and are amenable to creative power-sharing arrangements. India’s experience with ethnopolitics also suggests that ethnic identity is not a static, unchangeable primordial construct; rather, it is formed and reinforced by modern nationalism and the policies of the state. Nor are identities forged by any one factor. Finally, India’s history of coping with ethnic demands indicates that ethnic identities can be vehicles by which peoples can be mobilized, democracy can be expanded, and distinctive regions and people can be federally integrated into larger territorial entities—for example, a subcontinental state such as India or the European Union—provided power-sharing arrangements evolve out of negotiations between truly representative agencies at the various levels of government. Notes 1. Report of the Reorganization Commission (New Delhi: Government of India, 1955), 46. 2. Maya Chadda, Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 58. 3. See Sanjib Baruah, “Immigration, Ethnic Conflict and Political Turmoil—Assam 1979– 1985,” Asian Survey 26 (November 1986): 1184–1206. 4. For an overview of rival arguments, see Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

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Suggested Readings Babulal, Fadia. 1984. State Politics in India. 2 vols. New Delhi: Radiant. Baruah, Sanjib. 1999. India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Chadda, Maya. 2000. Building Democracy in South Asia, India, Pakistan, Nepal. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Chadda, Maya. 1997. Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India. New York: Columbia University Press. Chadda, Maya. 2002. “Integration through Internal Reorganization: Containing Ethnic Conflict in India.” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2 (1) (September): 44–61. Das, H. N. Beyond North East. Insurgency-History-Development. New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2011. Iff, Andrea. 2013. “Peace-promoting Federalism: Making Sense of India and Nigeria.” Publius 43 (2) (Spring): 227–250. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42000285. James, Carolyn C. 2005. “Religion as a Factor in Ethnic Conflict: Kashmir and Indian Foreign Policy.” Terrorism and Political Violence 17: 447–467. Jha, Prem Shankar. 1996. Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Lacina, Bethany. 2009. “The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India: Local Ethnic Autocracy and the Rule of Law.” Asian Survey 49 (6) (November–December): 998–1020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.6.998. Navlakha, Neha. 2009. “Kashmir: The Clash of Identity.” Beyond Intractability. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado. http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/navlakha -kashmir. Singh, M. Amarjeet. 2011. “Conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.” NIAS Backgrounder on Conflict Resolution, B6-2011. Bangalore, India: National Institute of Advanced Studies. http:// www.nias.res.in/docs/B%206%20Kashmir.pdf.

Appendix Both the India Independence Act of 1947, which divided the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan while merging Princely India into these parts, and the 1956 Reorganization Act, which began the still ongoing process of creating new states inside India based on ethnolinguistic criteria, read much like surveyor reports, focusing respectively as they do on the boundary lines separating countries and the territorialized political actors inside India. By contrast, the 1949 Constitution of India was concerned with the respective powers of the central government and the states in India’s federal system, and as the excerpts from that document indicate below, what emerged was a highly centralized federation in which the federal government could, on its finding of an emergency condition, suspend the powers given to the states and place all of India or any part thereof under central rule. Moreover, those emergency powers were often used, especially by Indira Gandhi. Thus, the historic Anandpur Sahib Resolution was as much a reaction against an overly aggressive central government and demand for a highly peripheral form of federalism in India, with most authority in the state’s hands, as a call for a reorganization of India’s federal system to accord greater self-rule to India’s Sikh nation.

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1. The Constitution of India, Emergency Provisions THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Adopted November 6, 1949 Emergency Provisions Part XVIII. Articles 352–356 Article 352 (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or [armed rebellion], he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect [in respect of the whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation]. ... (4) Every Proclamation issued under this article shall be laid before each House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of one month unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament: (5) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the passing of the second of the resolutions approving the Proclamation under clause (4) Article 355 It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the Government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. Article 356 (1) If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation— (a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State; (b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; (c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State: Source: Government of India. Available at http://india.gov.in/my-government/constitution -india/constitution-india-full-text.

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Iraq The Progress of the Kurdish Movement in Iraq Burak Bilgehan Ozpek

Timeline 1639 The Ottoman Empire and Iran sign the Treaty of Zuhab (Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin). 1914 World War I begins. The first Kurdish revolt occurs in today’s Iraq. 1918 Mahmud Barzanji is appointed the governor of Sulaymaniyah by the British occupying forces. President Woodrow Wilson declares his “Fourteen Points.” 1919 Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji’s attempts to extend autonomy trigger a Kurdish revolt that is suppressed by British forces. 1920 A revolt against the British invasion begins in Iraq. 1921 Iraq is established as a colony of United Kingdom. 1922 Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji returns as the governor of Sulaymaniyah and Kurdistan. The Regional Government is founded with British support. 1923 The Treaty of Lausanne is signed.

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1930 Mullah Mustafa Barzani emerges as the leader of the Kurdish Movement in Iraq. 1932 Iraq becomes a member of the League of Nations. Barzani’s revolt begins. 1934 The Iraqi Communist Party is founded. 1937 The Saadabad Pact is signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 1941 The Hiwa (Hope) Party is founded. 1943 Barzani’s second great revolt begins. 1945 The Iraqi army responds to Barzani’s revolt with the support of the British army. The revolt is suppressed, and Barzani flees to Iran. 1946 The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad is founded in Iran. Mullah Mustafa Barzani becomes the minister of defense. Later that year, the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party is founded by Barzani. The Mahabad Republic collapses, and Barzani flees to the USSR. 1958 The Republic of Iraq is founded after the overthrow of the monarchy. Kurds are granted social and political rights through a newly established constitution. Mullah Barzani returns to Iraq. 1961 A new Kurdish revolt begins with the rise of Arab nationalism in Baghdad. 1963 Abdul Salam Arif becomes president after overthrowing the Abdul Karim Qasem regime. 1964 The Agreement About Ending the War and the Resolution of Problems by Peaceful Means is signed by the Iraqi government and Kurds.

IRAQ

1968 The Ba’ath Party gains power through a bloodless coup. 1970 An agreement involving autonomy for Kurds is announced by the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). 1972 Saddam Hussein visits Moscow and signs a “Friendship and Cooperation” treaty with the USSR the following year. 1973 Richard Nixon makes a secret agreement with the Shah of Iran to begin covert action against Saddam’s government. The United States and Iran begin funding Kurds in their battle against the Iraqi regime. 1975 The Algiers Agreement (Algiers Accord) is signed between Iraq and Iran. Iran cuts its support for the Iraqi Kurds. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is founded under the leadership of Jalal Talabani. 1978 Conflict arises between the KDP and PUK. 1980 The Iran-Iraq War begins; it will last eight years. 1986 Saddam Hussein authorizes the al-Anfal Campaign, which will encompass a massacre of Kurds. 1987 The KDP and PUK unite against Saddam Hussein’s aggression and found the Kurdistan Front. 1988 The Halabja Massacre occurs. 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait. 1991 February. The Gulf War begins; Kuwait is secured by coalition forces led by the United States. March. Iraqi Kurds revolt; Saddam Hussein’s response results in

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humanitarian crises and large-scale immigration. April. UN Security Council Resolution 688 condemns the oppressive policies of the Iraqi government against the Kurds, and the United States, the United Kingdom, and France subsequently interpret that Resolution to authorize a no-fly zone and safe-haven measure to protect Kurds. A de facto Kurdish state emerges in Iraq. 1992 The first election takes place in the de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq. 1993 Civil conflict erupts between the KDP and PUK. 1996 A cease-fire agreement (Ankara Agreement) is signed between the KDP and the PUK. A peacekeeping force, under the supervision of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey, is commissioned. 1998 KDP and PUK clashes continue. The Washington Accords—mediated by the United States to end the conflict—is signed. 2003 The United States invades Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is founded in the northern provinces of Iraq. 2005 The first elections in post-Saddam Iraq take place; a new constitution is adopted. 2011 U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, giving Nouri Al-Maliki a free hand to follow his centralization policy. 2012 The peshmerga and KRG’s Asayish forces, and Baghdad’s Tigris troops are deployed on the outskirts of Kirkuk on the brink of a war. 2014 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS) seizes Mosul and Tikrit. The advance of ISIS in Iraq indicates the failure of Maliki’s centralization policy to unify Iraq. Maliki resigns, and Haider Al Abadi, a member of the Islamic Dawa Party, becomes prime minister. Arbil and Baghdad agree to initiate a dialogue to solve issues involving sovereignty.

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“Middle East” is an invented term, and the question of where its borders begin and end is unclear. Alfred Thayer Mahan is said to have coined this term in 1902, referring to an ambiguous area stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. In time, the borders of the Middle East region have changed, and the political concerns of foreign powers have played an important role in defining where the Middle East is.1 Its importance has also grown, especially during the Cold War years, with the region becoming, in Raymond Hinnebusch’s words, “an exceptional magnet for external interventions.”2 As a result, the borders of countries in the contemporary Middle East have often been defined by external interests and interventions instead of historical processes, and equally often have neither satisfied the needs of the Middle East nor corresponded to the realities of this region. Over time, as a result of arbitrarily drawn borders, political instability has occurred, sometimes because societies sharing the same ethnic and sectarian identities have been obliged to live under the authority of different states and have rebelled against having to do so. Iraq fits into this picture easily. After World War I, when British rule began in Iraq, its border with Turkey could not be demarcated for a long time. Although the war was over, the Ankara government refused to sign a peace treaty and launched an Independence War, refusing to cede its claims to the Mosul and Kirkuk regions and temporarily leaving open the issue of whether the region’s Kurds would live in the newly established Turkish state, a British mandate, or in an independent state of Kurds. Furthermore, when the borders were established in 1926, they divided the Kurds. The provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah, Mosul, and Kirkuk remained within Iraq, preventing the Kurds from establishing a separate state either in Iraq or Turkey. Indeed, the Middle East’s political map after World War I also left Kurds under the rule of Syria and Iran. British policy at the time appears to have been largely motivated by the oil reservoirs in the Mosul region and a concern that the Shia Arabs in Iraq, who constituted the majority, would dominate the country.2 The Kurds as well as Sunni Arabs were expected to balance the Shia population through cooperation; however, the policy went bankrupt in a short time, leaving Iraq a divided society that has experienced violent ethnic conflicts lasting for years.3 Historical Background The relations between the Kurds and Baghdad’s government can be defined as an Arab-Kurd ethnic conflict. As discussed, Iraq is a “fictionalized” country designed as a multiethnic society. However, since its establishment, there has been an issue of trust between the Kurds and Baghdad, and there have been no institutional arrangements to build confidence into the relationship. In 1958, the monarchy was overthrown with a military coup led by General Qasim; however, the revolutionary era did not produce a democracy but domestic turmoil, which evolved into an authoritarian Ba’ath Party administration in 1968. In time, the Ba’ath Party consolidated its authority in Iraq and paved the way for Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship between the years 1979 and 2003. After the U.S. invasion in 2003, instability and uncertainty again dominated the country. Moreover,

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the state being the key actor of the country’s economy, the Kurds had to show an outright loyalty to Baghdad to get a share of the national wealth, and disobedient Kurds faced, at best, “relative deprivation.” Armed struggle, therefore, remained the only option for the Kurds, whose legal options for gaining political rights were limited; however, especially after Saddam Hussein’s Anfal Campaign against civilians between 1986 and 1989 and the 1988 Halabja Massacre, the Kurds’ struggle moved beyond a political conflict and into an issue of survival. On the other hand, the Gulf War in 1990 created an opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to engage in relations with the members of the anti–Saddam Hussein coalition, and when Baghdad intensified its attacks on Northern Iraq after the Gulf War and the United Nations issued a resolution including “no fly zone” and “safe haven” measures to protect the Kurds, Northern Iraq became a de facto Kurdish state. The 2003 U.S. invasion changed the political status of the Kurds in Iraq yet again, but it left the Kurdish groups in a unified Iraq, albeit one where the policies of third parties continue to play an important role in the relations between Arbil and Baghdad. The Conflict World War I–World War II

Nationalist and separatist movements against the Ottoman Empire began to develop prior to World War I among the Kurds, often with the support of Great Britain and Russia. During the war, in 1914, some Kurdish tribes under the leadership of Abd-al-Salam Barzani revolted; however, these revolts were suppressed by the Ottoman Army. The Kurds nonetheless maintained these relationships, especially with Russia. And when the Russian invasion of the Ottoman lands neared the Iraqi border in 1917, Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, one of the tribal leaders of Iraqi Kurds, contacted the Russian embassy in Iran and conveyed that the Russian army could request Kurdish assistance. At the same time, the British troops passing by Baghdad and moving toward the north got in touch with the Kurdish leaders in the region to be able to move easily. After the war, when the British forces dominated the Iraqi lands and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson announced his “Fourteen Points” on January 8, 1918, which included “national self-determination,” separatist demands gradually increased. On November 1, 1918, Mahmud Barzanji was promulgated as the governor of the Sulaymaniyah province. His appointment misled Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji into declaring himself as the “ruler of the Kurdistan.” But an independent Kurdish state was not on Great Britain’s agenda, and his declaration of Kurdish independence turned into a revolt and clash between British and Barzanji forces in 1919. In the action, Barzanji was wounded, captured, and subsequently exiled to India. Nevertheless, an escalation of the Arab uprisings around Najaf province and the attempts of Ali Shefiq Özdemir, the commander of the Turkish troops, to maintain a Turkish presence over the Kurdish tribes, threatened British control of Iraq. Therefore, Barzanji was needed again, and he was brought back to Iraq in 1922 to control the Kurdish tribes and cooperate with the central government in maintaining the unity of Iraq.

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In doing so, Barzanji was promised the rule of an autonomous Kurdish region. But Barzanji’s bid for independence and attempts to consolidate his power soon created another crisis, which resulted in a British air attack on Sulaymaniyah in 1924, and Barzanji and his accompanying troops had to take shelter in the mountains at the Iranian border.4 Kurds’ discontent with their status nonetheless continued in Iraq. To appease them, in 1926, Iraqi prime minister Abd al-Muhsin as-Sa’dun declared that Kurdish could be the second official language, alongside Arabic, in the Kurdish-populated regions and that the government officers there had to be Kurdish. Nevertheless, procrastination characterized the implementation of the promised rights, and no serious attempt was made to solve the Kurdish problem by Baghdad’s government.5 Still, there was relative calm until 1929, when the Iraqi government sought entry into the League of Nations. Seen by the Kurds as an attempt to secure Iraq’s independence from its British rulers, who the Kurds saw as their protectors, Baghdad’s move increased discontent within the Kurdish population and culminated in violence in September 1930, with Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji crossing the Iranian border, joining the movement, and demanding an independent Kurdish state. In May 1931, Barzanji was defeated once again, but Kurdish nationalism continued to rise under the leadership of other Kurdish families, for example, by Ahmed Barzani and Mullah Mustafa Barzani in the 1943 uprising in the Barzan region that was aggressively repressed by Great Britain.6 Under pressure, the Kurdish movement slowed in the mid-1930s, though Kurdish leaders continued to be politically active, as in 1934, when the Iraqi Communist Party was founded with the Kurds playing prominent roles in it. Likewise, although Mullah Mustafa Barzani was under house arrest in Sulaymaniyah, he stayed in touch with Kurdish intellectuals and writers and laid the basis for the Hiwa (Hope) Party. It would move to the forefront of the movement in 1941 as a result of a union among Kurdish right and left factions and play a significant role in propagating the ideas of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who launched another uprising in 1943.7 Then came World War II, and two years after it started, in 1939, the British forces stepped into the Middle East again, focusing on Iraq’s southern provinces. This enabled the Kurds to move more freely in the north, and with Baghdad siding with Great Britain, the Kurds did not initially revolt against the ongoing pressures of London. Two years later, however, in 1943, Mullah Mustafa Barzani fled his exile in Saulaymaniyah and secretly relocated to the Barzan region, where he armed his immediate surroundings and initiated another Kurdish uprising. Benefiting from the disarray in Iraqi’s government, Mullah Mustafa Barzani seized 21 police stations in the north and distributed the weapons to the citizenry. In response, the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Said, who had close ties with Great Britain, launched a full-scale operation that was decisively suppressed. Barzani then fled to Iran to join the Kurdish movement there, which was overtly supported by the USSR. Under the leadership of Qazi Muhammad, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan was founded, with Mullah Mustafa Barzani actively participating in this movement.

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The Struggle Continues: From the Postwar Era to the First Gulf War

When the USSR invaded Iran following World War II, the British militarily countered by occupying parts of southern Iran. In turn, to expand its sphere of influence against the British, the USSR overtly supported the Kurds and the Azeris there. One result was the 1946 promulgation of the Republic of South Azerbaijani following negotiations with Soviet representatives in Baku; another was the Kurds proclaiming the Mahabad Kurdish Republic. However, after the withdrawal of the USSR army, Iranian troops attacked Mahabad, and the Kurdish Republic collapsed only 11 months after its establishment. Still, its establishment encouraged the Kurds of Iraq (the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party was also founded in 1946), even though after its fall Mustafa Barzani had to flee to the USSR, and the Iraqi Kurdish movement entered a period of stagnation.8 The revival began in 1958, when the Iraqi monarchy was taken down by a coup d’état led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, and a republican regime was founded. Upon this regime change, Mullah Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraq from his exile and entered into negotiations with the new government. Consequently, in the constitution proclaimed after the coup, the Kurds’ rights were legally guaranteed. With the rising tide of Arab nationalism and Nasserism in the region, however, relations between Baghdad and the Kurds gradually deteriorated, and in 1961, the Kurds launched another revolt against the Iraqi government. In fact, Qasim’s government was short-lived. It was toppled by a coup d’état in November 1963, with the ensuing general domestic turmoil destabilizing the country. These internal problems created an opportunity for new negotiations between the Kurds and Baghdad, and in 1964, the parties agreed on ending the armed conflict in Kurdish regions and resolving their problems by nonmilitary means. Furthermore, the national rights of the Kurds were to be guaranteed. On the other hand, the agreement hardly reflected the government’s interest in improving the status of the Kurds; rather, the driving force was the Iraqi government’s concern with its own internal problems and desire to avoid draining its energy by dealing with the Kurdish question.9 The domestic turmoil ended in 1968, when a group of army officers led by Hasan Al-Bakr staged a coup and declared the administration of the Ba’ath Party. Al-Bakr then took steps to solve the Kurdish issue, now necessitated by regional and structural developments in the Middle East. Iraq’s involvement in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War had led to close relations with the USSR and a deteriorated relationship with Iran. The Kurdish struggle for self-determination now offered outsiders, and especially Iran, a tool for undermining the Baghdad government. Iran thus began supporting the Kurds against the central government, and this strengthened the Kurds’ hands; however, to prevent the Kurds from becoming a problem, the Ba’ath government concluded a 1970 agreement, the 11 March Proclamation, with Kurdish representatives to find a peaceful solution to the “Kurdish question.” Signed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani on behalf of the Kurds, the agreement was to be implemented over a four-year period and was supposed to give autonomy to the regions where the Kurds were the majority. Its articles included the appointment of

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Kurds to key posts in the state; official recognition of the Kurdish language where Kurds are in the majority; a furtherance of Kurdish education and culture; the requirement that officials in the Kurdish areas speak Kurdish; economic development of the Kurdish areas; agrarian reform; appointment of a Kurdish vice-president; and the formation of a Kurdish area with self-government. This March Manifesto failed to produce a permanent peace mainly because of disagreements over the status of Kirkuk. The 11 March Agreement did not clearly define the boundaries of the Kurdish region, leaving it ambiguous as to whether it included Kirkuk province. While the KDP advocated a census in Kirkuk, where the Kurdish population is a majority, the Ba’athist government refused to accept Kirkuk as a part of the Kurdish region. Instead, Baghdad initiated an “Arabization” policy, deporting the Kurds in Kirkuk, Mosul, Khanaqin, and Faili and replacing them with Arabs. Baghdad also took advantage of the cease-fire with the Kurds to consolidate its power in the political system, and implementation of the 11 March Manifesto was delayed.10 The Kurdish issue acquired a new dimension after the USSR and Iraq signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972. Given the Cold War atmosphere at the time, the United States responded by providing arms and financial aid to the Iraqi Kurds, and the demands for autonomy by Mullah Mustafa Barzani increased. In turn, this significant increase in the support of both the United States and Iran for the Kurds, and the mounting tension between Iraq and Iran, forced Baghdad to promulgate a new plan for accepting the autonomy of the Kurdish region. However, the new autonomy law, which was unilaterally announced by the Baghdad government, was rejected by Mullah Mustafa Barzani because it conferred fewer national rights than the 1970 agreement. Barzani also demanded a larger territory for the Kurdish region and a share of Iraq’s oil revenues. A new war between Baghdad and the Kurds then began in 1974. It appears that Mullah Mustafa Barzani miscalculated the policies of Baghdad, Iran, and the United States, assuming that a rejection of the autonomy law and war with Baghdad would be more profitable than the agreement because Kurds could win that war with the help of Iran and the United States. But Iran and Iraq unexpectedly reached an agreement ending the tension between them over ownership of the Shatt al-Arab region in 1975, and Iran cut its support for the Kurds. The Ba’ath regime, its hand strengthened, thereafter forcefully suppressed the Kurdish revolt in the north, and with its collapse, a cleavage developed within the Kurds’ leadership. Ibrahim Ahmed, Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s assistant, and Jalal Talabani departed from the KDP and founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), making the struggle and cooperation among the Kurds new variables affecting the success of their movement.11 With the start of Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the Kurdish movement revived again. Having recovered militarily from its prior failure, the movement was directed by two groups, led respectively by Idris Barzani, head of KDP, and Jalal Talabani, head of PUK. At the time, Saddam Hussein was in power in Baghdad, with full control over the military and intelligence services. In contrast, the conflict between Barzani and Talabani forces undermined the Kurds’ cohesiveness during the war. While

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the KDP allied with the Iranian government, which was the product of the Islamic revolution in 1979, PUK negotiated with the Baghdad government. Toward the end of the war, in 1987, the Kurdish groups unified, and their two main parties established the Kurdistan Front, along with five other small Kurdish parties. Their initial goal was protecting the Kurds against Saddam Hussein’s aggression. The founding of the Kurdistan Front was the product of the Kurds’ collective fear, given Saddam Hussein’s 1988 “Anfal” project, a radical campaign designed to punish Kurdish treachery during the war against Iran and end Kurdish discontent once and for all. Anfal lasted for three years under the command of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein who was also known as “Chemical Ali,” and produced dramatic consequences for the Kurds. With air and land operations, Iraqi troops carried out actions that cost many lives of both peshmergas and civilians. Attacking Halabja with chemical weapons in 1988, Saddam Hussein committed one of the most horrific massacres in history.12 The Iran-Iraq War ended that same year without either side victorious. However, the Iraqi economy had collapsed, and Iraq had become indebted to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to finance the war. After the war, Hussein asked these countries to forgive the debts, believing that they should be forgiven because the war against Iran had protected the Arab world. Upon the refusal of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Saddam Hussein initiated yet another war, invading Kuwait in 1990 and announcing that Kuwait was now the 19th province of Iraq. His success lasted less than nine months. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait created an international crisis. The UN Security Council Resolution 678, passed on November 29, 1990, authorized the member states to use all necessary means to end Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait. When Hussein refused to withdraw his troops, U.S.-led coalition forces initiated air and land operations to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait. By February 27, 1991, not only was Kuwait free, but the defeat of the Iraqi army had changed the domestic atmosphere in Iraq as well. Management of the Conlflict The First Gulf War and the Emergence of a De Facto Kurdistan in Iraq

The weakness of the Baghdad regime after the war immediately led to protests and riots in the Shiite provinces of southern Iraq and in the Kurdish provinces in the north. The reaction of Saddam Hussein was to suppress the uprisings, and his action produced unexpected consequences for the Kurds, 2 million of whom fled to Turkey and Iran to escape the violence. Suddenly, the Kurdish question in Iraq became internationalized. While Turkey’s president suggested establishing a safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds, lest the Iraqi refugees interact with the Kurds of Turkey, international public opinion shaped by the CNN effect exerted pressure on the major powers, and on April 5, 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, condemning Iraq for repressing its people. Next, a no-fly zone in the north was created at the 36th parallel, encompassing the provinces of Arbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok. In other

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words, Kurds became immune to the aggression of the central government, and they took the opportunity to establish a de facto state.13 Two years later, the state-building efforts of the Iraqi Kurds collapsed as a result of an internal conflict between the armed groups linked to the Masoud Barzani–led KDP and the Jalal Talabani–led PUK. The main issue was a controversy over control of the black market and smuggling routes, which had become extremely vital because of the UN embargo on Iraq, especially as the Baghdad government had imposed an economic blockade of its own restricting the oil and food supply going to the safe-haven provinces. Although this armed conflict was ended by U.S. and Turkish diplomacy, the full-fledged cooperation between the groups occurred only on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq when the parliament of Kurdistan reconvened with the participation of the rival factions on October 5, 2002.14 The American Invasion and Federal Autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan

The 2003 U.S. invasion provided a historical opportunity for shaping the political future of Iraqi Kurds. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Transitional Administrative Law, adopted by the Coalition Provisional Authority, defined the Iraqi political system as republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic. Thereby, as the ally of the United States during the invasion process, the Kurds gained an autonomous region called the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In January 2005, parliamentary elections were held both in the KRG and Iraq. In the aftermath, the KRG government was equally shared between the KDP and the PUK, and Masoud Barzani became the president of the Kurdistan region. This unity among the Kurdish groups also strengthened their position in the Baghdad government. With the Sunni Arabs boycotting the January 2005 elections, the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan won 75 out of 275 seats in the Iraqi parliament, making the Kurds a key player in Iraqi politics, with Jalal Talabani being chosen as the president of Iraqi National Assembly. On the other hand, the Kurds’ involvement in the central government was the product of a security-driven strategy, not an idealized commitment to the unity of Iraq. As Barzani’s military adviser phrased it, “If we want federalism, we must be strong in the central government in Baghdad. If we do not go to Baghdad, the Shia will come, or the military will take over.”15 The strategy paid dividends on October 15, 2005, when Iraq adopted a new constitution giving the Kurdistan Regional Government, which includes the provinces of Arbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah, federal autonomy. In other words, the Iraqi Kurds had at last achieved their historic ambition: self-government legally insulated from the influence of Baghdad. Both the civil conflict between Sunni and Shiite groups and the U.S. military presence in post-Saddam Iraq also worked for a time in the Kurds’ favor by enabling Kurds to focus on building their state within the borders of the KRG without worrying about aggression from the Baghdad government. With the U.S. withdrawal, however, the latent problems in Iraqi politics—especially the competition for political power—reemerged, and the government of Shiite prime

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minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s response to them was political centralization, placing Arbil and Baghdad at odds over sovereignty issues. Indeed, what emerged was a constitutional crisis stemming from the fact that the Maliki government regarded the extensive constitutional autonomy of the KRG under Article 121 of the constitution as a threat to Iraq’s unity, whereas the KRG viewed the centralization policy of Maliki as an attempt to undermine its autonomy. There were three main points of contention between Arbil and Baghdad, and they are still there, albeit on the backburner because of the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and post-U.S.-withdrawal violence in Iraq. The first involves the central government’s funding of the Kurdish peshmerga forces, which are a part of Iraq’s security system under the constitution. Maliki maintained that the peshmerga forces are KRG internal security forces, independent from the Iraqi army, and should therefore be funded from the KRG’s budget, to which Baghdad contributes 17 percent from the Iraqi budget, instead of from the funds allocated to the national defense system. Conversely, KRG deputy prime minister Imad Ahmed has stressed that the peshmerga forces effectively defend the security of and stability within the KRG and the disputed zones and should therefore be centrally funded.16 The second issue is whether the KRG can sign contracts involving its oil reserves without the approval of Baghdad. Thus, the KRG’s oil contract with U.S. oil giant ExxonMobil in October 2011, soured the relations between Arbil and Baghdad. Masoud Barzani has considered a Baghdad veto of oil contracts as an intervention into the KRG’s domestic affairs and has even threatened secession.17 At its heart, the issue involves financial self-sufficiency, not independence. By signing independent contracts, the KRG receives its 17 percent share from the revenues without strings from Baghdad’s government. Finally, there is the issue of disputed territories. Under Article 140 of the constitution, the status of oil-rich Kirkuk, with its mixed population, and the other disputed territories was to be determined by the will of their citizens—following normalization, census, and referendum processes—no later than the December 31, 2007. The referendum, however, has been repeatedly postponed by third parties and domestic political groups because Kirkuk has a high potential to ignite ethnic conflict. Under the Ba’athist Arabization policy, its demographic structure dramatically changed. Thousands of Kurds and Turkomans were expelled and replaced by an Arab population. Later, after the U.S. invasion, many refugee Kurds returned to Kirkuk. Turkomans, who have strong ethnic, cultural, and political ties with Turkey, also reside there. Therefore, the results of a referendum on the status of Kirkuk are expected to increase the potential for ethnic conflict among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans. That is why the referendum has been postponed many times with the approval of the domestic political groups in Iraq and intervening third-party states. Control of the area therefore remains a potentially explosive issue and a fault line between Baghdad and Arbil. The first crisis involving Kirkuk erupted when Ahmed Davutog˘ lu, Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs, visited Kirkuk in August 2012 without notifying Baghdad. Prior to his visit to Kirkuk, Davutog˘ lu was in Arbil and held a meeting with Masoud

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Barzani. That is why Iraqi premier Maliki regarded Davutog˘ lu’s visit as a threat to Iraq’s sovereignty. To Maliki, Davutog˘ lu treated the KRG as an independent state because he received the approval of Arbil before his visit to Kirkuk instead of the Baghdad government’s approval first. The crisis deepened after Maliki established the Tigris Operation Command to provide security to Kirkuk prior to the April 2013 local elections. His unilateral action was viewed as the revival of the Arabization policy of the Ba’athist era by Iraqi Kurdish groups. The crisis almost led to a shooting war in December 2012, when both peshmerga and Asayish forces of the KRG and the Tigris troops of Baghdad were deployed to the same area on the outskirts of Kirkuk. The crisis only ended when U.S. secretary of state John Kerry visited Iraq in March 2013. During this visit, Kerry underscored the importance of the stability and unity of Iraq. His statements and dialogue with Maliki and Barzani eased the crisis and paved the way to its resolution.18 Significance Tension between Baghdad and Arbil on the aforementioned issues continues, in part as a legacy of Nouri Al Maliki, who gradually increased his control over the government, bureaucracy, and the security sector. There was also his centralization policy associated with the state-centered political economy, which contributed to the rise of an illiberal democracy in Iraq. Such was particularly true after Maliki’s State of Law coalition received popular support and won the parliamentary elections in 2014. As a result, Maliki consolidated his power both among the Shiite parties and over the Iraqi political system, and the Kurds’ presence in the Baghdad government lost its ability to shape the decision-making process. In other words, the safety valve that the Kurds previously possessed to secure themselves from the aggression of the central Iraqi government collapsed. Which leads us to a major conclusion in terms of what we can learn from our study. The picture that clearly emerges is that Kurdish sovereignty is directly related to the democratic character of the central government. The more Baghdad moves away from a pluralistic vision of society and centralizes power, the less it respects an autonomous approach to allowing the Kurds to rule themselves. The corollary here is that the Kurdish bid for autonomy is a constant given the enduring nature of ethnic and national identify, whereas the level of democracy is the variable that determines the central government’s policy toward the Kurdish demands. To the extent that the center embraces authoritarianism, the more likely conflict between the Kurds and Baghdad will emerge. For now, the June 2014 seizure of Mosul and Tikrit by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS) has changed the game again in Iraqi politics. The advance of ISIS in Iraq indicated that Maliki’s centralization policy has failed to keep Iraq either secure or unified. In contrast, concentration of power in the hands of Maliki, who mostly represented the Shiite Arab community, frustrated Iraq’s other ethnic communities, accounting for the fact that the rise of ISIS in the

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Sunni Arab–populated provinces has been perceived as at least partly the product of Maliki’s exclusionist policies. As for the Kurds, KRG president Barzani initially viewed the rise of ISIS as a conflict between Sunni and Shiite Arabs. To him, Iraq was already partitioned, and there was no reason for the KRG to be involved in the clashes among Sunni and Shiite Arabs. It was this attitude that led many to conclude that Barzani regarded the ISISprovoked crisis as an opportunity to create a fully independent Kurdish state—a view finding support in the fact that peshmerga forces immediately took full control of Kirkuk upon the withdrawal of the Iraqi army before an ISIS offensive and that Barzani declared his intention to hold a referendum on independence. The KRG, however, was unable to avoid being caught up in ISIS’s aggression. In August 2014, ISIS initiated an offensive against the Kurdish town of Sinjar (Shingal), defeated the peshmerga forces, and seized control of the territory. The ISIS invasion of Sinjar led to the mass killings of dozens of Yazidis and the exodus of the Sinjar (Shingal) residents. The advance of ISIS in Sinjar (Shingal), which is considered among the disputed territories mentioned in Article 140 of the constitution, indicated the weakness of the peshmerga forces in protecting Kurdish-populated areas. Furthermore, ISIS’s march toward Arbil surprised many observers, who expected ISIS to concentrate on taking Baghdad. Therefore, what was perceived to be an opportunity has turned into a threat for the Kurds and has compelled them to fight against ISIS in coordination with the Baghdad government in a security-focused interdependent relationship that, at least for now, downplays the ethnic discontent of the Kurds toward the central government. The invasion of ISIS has also affected—in this case positively—Kurdish leverage in Baghdad politics, at least temporarily, having resulted in the resignation of Maliki, the swearing in of a new prime minister (Haider Al Abadi, a member Islamic Dawa Party), and a commitment by the new government to initiate a dialogue with the Kurds to try to solve the issues related to the problems of sovereignty. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the direction of the détente process at this writing (January 2015) and its potential to produce a lasting peace are being shaped by the common threat perception of Arbil and Baghdad, not by the development of democracy in Iraq. Notes 1. See Roderic H. Davison, “Where Is the Middle East?” Foreign Affairs 38, no. 4 (1960): 665–675. 2. Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2003), 3. 3. See William Roe Polk, Understanding Iraq: A Whistlestop Tour from Ancient Babylon to Occupied Baghdad (New York: IB Tauris, 2006), 82; and Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007). 4. See Donald McDowall, Modern Kürt Tarihi (I˙stanbul: Doruk, 2004), 115–151.

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5. Peter Sluglett, “British Colonialism and the Kurds in Iraq: 1926–1930,” last accessed January 2, 2015, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/169/36382. html. 6. See Gareth Stansfield, “The Kurdish Question in Iraq, 1914–1974,” last accessed January 2, 2015, http://www.tlemea.com/iraq/essay5. asp. 7. See Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 120–139. 8. Ibid., 151–184. 9. On these developments, see Nader Entessar, “The Kurds in Post Revolutionary Iran and Iraq,” Third World Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1984): 917. 10. Mahir Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan (New York: IB Tauris, 2011), 167. 11. Matan Chorev, “Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semistate.” Al Nakhlah (2007): 1–11. 12. Concerning the Kurdistan Front, see especially Yaniv Voller, The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq: From Insurgency to Statehood (New York: Routledge, 2014), 59–60. 13. Voller, The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq, 69. 14. Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Question in Perspective,” World Affairs 166, no. 4 (2004): 202. 15. Cited by Gunter in “The Kurdish Question in Perspective”: 202. 16. Karim Abd Zayer, “Iraqi Kurdistan Calls on Baghdad to Recognize Peshmerga Forces,” AlMonitor, last accessed December 21, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security /01/08/iraqi-kurd-authority-calls-on-baghdad-to-recognize-its-peshmerga-forces .html. 17. See Alice Fordham and Dan Morse, “ExxonMobil Dispute Deepens Arab-Kurd Split in Iraq,” Washington Post, April 5, 2012, last accessed December 13, 2014, http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/exxon-mobil-dispute-deepens-arab-kurdsplit-in-iraq/2012/04/05/gIQAbg2txS_story.html. 18. Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “John Kerry: We Want to Bring Iraq’s Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis Closer Together,” Rudaw, July 4, 2013, last accessed December 15, 2014, http:// rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/070420131.

Suggested Readings Aziz, Mahir. 2011. The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan New York: IB Tauris. Gunter, Michael M. 2010. Historical Dictionary of the Kurds. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. Herring, Eric. 2006. Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Leezenberg, Michiel. 2006. “Urbanization, Privatization, and Patronage: The Political Economy of Iraqi Kurdistan.” In The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, edited by Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, 151–179. London: Saqi Books. Voller, Yaniv. 2014. The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq: From Insurgency to Statehood. New York: Routledge. West, Bing. 2009. The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq. New York: Random House. Yildiz, Kerim. 2007. The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future. 2nd ed. London: Pluto Press.

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Appendices 1. United Nations Security Council Resolution, 688, Adopted April 5, 1991 The hand of the international system in fostering a self-governing Kurdish province in Iraq does not date from the invasion of Iraq and toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003, but the United Nations Security Council action 14 years earlier, when in the aftermath of the Gulf War it adopted Resolution 688, creating a safe zone for Iraq’s Kurds, which they quickly made into a de facto Kurdish autonomous zone. RESOLUTION 688 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991 The Security Council, Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region, Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved, Taking note of the letters sent by the representatives of Turkey and France to the United Nations dated 2 April 1991 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22435 and S/22442), Taking note also of the letters sent by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22436 and S/22447), Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area, Bearing in mind the Secretary-General’s report of 20 March 1991 (S/22366), 1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region; 2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected; 3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities;

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5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population; 6. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts; 7. Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends; 8. Decides to remain seized of the matter. Source: United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991). Available at Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm.

2. The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, Adopted October 15, 2005, by National Referendum The current constitution of Iraq confers federal autonomy on Iraq’s Kurd region and does much to elevate the culture and language of the Kurds in Iraq, as the excerpts below indicate. For Iraq’s Kurds today, it is not so much that more is needed in terms of constitutional provisions, it is that a secure climate needs to emerge in which the existing provisions can be fully enjoyed. The Preamble In the name of God, the Most merciful, the Most compassionate {We have honored the sons of Adam} We, the people of Mesopotamia, the homeland of the apostles and prophets, resting place of the virtuous imams, cradle of civilization, crafters of writing, and home of numeration. Upon our land the first law made by man was passed, and the oldest pact of just governance was inscribed, and upon our soil the saints and companions of the Prophet prayed, philosophers and scientists theorized, and writers and poets excelled; Acknowledging God’s right over us, and in fulfillment of the call of our homeland and citizens, and in a response to the call of our religious and national leaderships and the determination of our great authorities and of our leaders and politicians, and in the midst of international support from our friends and those who love us, marched for the first time in our history towards the ballot boxes by the millions, men and women, young and old, on the thirtieth of January 2005, invoking the pains of sectarian oppression inflicted by the autocratic clique and inspired by the tragedies of Iraq’s martyrs, Shiite and Sunni, Arabs and Kurds and Turkmen and from all other components of the people, and recollecting the darkness of the ravage of the holy cities and the South in the Sha’abaniyya uprising and burnt by the flames of grief of the mass graves, the marshes, Al-Dujail and others and articulating the sufferings of racial oppression in the massacres of Halabcha, Barzan, Anfal and the Fayli Kurds and inspired by the ordeals of the Turkmen in Bashir and the sufferings of the people of the western region, as is the case in the remaining areas of Iraq where the people suffered from the liquidation of their leaders, symbols, and Sheiks and from the displacement of their skilled individuals and from drying out of its cultural and intellectual wells, so we sought hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder to create our new Iraq, the Iraq

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of the future, free from sectarianism, racism, complex of regional attachment, discrimination, and exclusion. Accusations of being infidels, and terrorism did not stop us from marching forward to build a nation of law. Sectarianism and racism have not stopped us from marching together to strengthen our national unity, following the path of peaceful transfer of power, adopting the course of just distribution of resources, and providing equal opportunity for all. We, the people of Iraq, who have just risen from our stumble, and who are looking with confidence to the future through a republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system, have resolved with the determination of our men, women, elderly, and youth to respect the rule of law, to establish justice and equality, to cast aside the politics of aggression, to pay attention to women and their rights, the elderly and their concerns, and children and their affairs, to spread the culture of diversity, and to defuse terrorism. We, the people of Iraq, of all components and across the spectrum, have taken upon ourselves to decide freely and by choice to unite our future, to take lessons from yesterday for tomorrow, and to enact this permanent Constitution, through the values and ideals of the heavenly messages and the findings of science and man’s civilization. The adherence to this Constitution preserves for Iraq its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty.

SECTION ONE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Article 1 The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq. Article 2 First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation: A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy. C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution. Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans. Article 3 Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League and is committed to its charter, and it is part of the Islamic world.

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Article 4 First: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions. ... Article 9 First: A- The Iraqi armed forces and security services will be composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their balance and representation without discrimination or exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in the political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority. B- The formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is prohibited. … SECTION FOUR POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ... Article 111 Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. Article 112 First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law. Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment. …

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SECTION FIVE POWERS OF THE REGIONS Chapter One [Regions] Article 116 The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, as well as local administrations. Article 117 First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance with its provisions. … Article 120 Each region shall adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers of the region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided that it does not contradict this Constitution. Article 121 First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government. Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation within that region. Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs, and the percentage of their population. Fourth: Offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and developmental affairs. Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region. …

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SECTION SIX FINAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS Chapter Two [Transitional Provisions] … Article 140 First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007. Article 141 Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict with the Constitution. Source: World Intellectual Property Organization. Available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex /en/text.jsp?file_id=230001.

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Ivory Coast Conflict and the Politics of Belonging in Côte d’Ivoire Jeremy S. Speight

Timeline 1893 Côte d’Ivoire is declared a formal colony of France. 1946 Under pressure from the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA), France ends its forcedlabor regime in Côte d’Ivoire. 1960 Côte d’Ivoire gains independence from France. Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) leader Houphouët-Boigny becomes president. 1990 Côte d’Ivoire holds its first multiparty elections. 1993 President Houphouët-Boigny dies. He is succeeded by his constitutionally appointed heir, Henri Konan Bedié. 1999 Bedié is removed from power in a coup d’état led by General Robert Guëi. 2000 October: Bedié and the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) candidate Alassane Ouattara are excluded from running in the 2000 elections. Laurent Gbgabo wins. However, Guëi dissolves the National Electoral Commission and proclaims himself the winner. After mass protests, Guëi flees to Benin. Gbagbo proclaims himself president. November: Mass graves of RDR supporters are discovered in the Abidjan suburb of Yopougon.

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2002 September 19: Opponents of Gbagbo launch a coordinated attack on three of Côte d’Ivoire’s major cities: Korhogo, Bouaké, and Abidjan. With the aid of the French, military forces loyal to Gbagbo repel attacks on Abidjan. Rebels retain control over Bouaké and Korhogo. The rebels identify themselves as the Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). November: Two other movements, based in Western Côte d’Ivoire, emerge—the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO)—and join the fighting. December: The MJP, MPIGO, and the MPCI formed a formal coalition under the banner the Forces Nouvelles (FN). 2003 January: France initiates a first attempt at peaceably resolving the conflict during meetings in the Parisian suburb of Linas-Marcoussis. October: Amid pro-FPI protests over the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, the rebels pull out of the transition government. 2004 July: The two sides meet again in Accra, Ghana, to restart peace talks and sign a new agreement. November: Efforts at peace are compromised when Gbagbo launches Operation Dignité, an aerial bombardment campaign on select rebel targets. Bombings hit French military barracks, killing nine French soldiers and one American. French forces respond by destroying the entirety of Côte d’Ivoire’s air force. AntiFrench riots break out in Abidjan. 2005 Rebel and government representatives meet again in Pretoria, South Africa. Talks result in the formation of a new transitional government headed by Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny. 2006 Gbagbo proposes “direct dialogue” with the rebels. March 2007 The government and rebels sign the Ouagadougou Peace Accords in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. 2010 October: Côte d’Ivoire holds its first round of presidential elections. Gbagbo obtains 38 percent of the vote, Ouattara obtains 32 percent, and Bedié 25 percent. November: Côte d’Ivoire holds the second round of elections, pitting Gbagbo against Ouattara. December 2: The Independent Electoral Commission announces provincial results of the second round of the elections, indicating the Ouattara had won,

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capturing 54 percent of the vote. The next day, the Constitutional Council declared the results invalid, citing voting irregularities in several northern departments. The outcomes of the vote in these departments that voted in favor of Ouattara were canceled. December 4: Despite the contestation surrounding the elections, Gbagbo is subsequently sworn in as president by the courts. March–April 2011 After a four-month stalemate following Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power, the former rebels, newly named the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), with support from Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) and French forces, launch an attack on March 28, 2011, on the southern half of the country. By April 3, the FRCI controlled the entirety of the country. Gbagbo was soon forced from power, and Ouattara gained sole control over the presidency on April 11, 2011. Who is a citizen? Who has the authority to define citizenship and belonging in national and local communities? When do settlers become natives? Who is part of the Ivoirian nation and who is not? Such deeply political questions surrounding citizenship, belonging, and nationhood have been at the heart of the political crisis that has divided Côte d’Ivoire over the last 20 years. National belonging and identification represent an ongoing source of tension, in part, because Côte d’Ivoire never included a core national group equivalent to the Ashanti in Ghana or the Tswana in Botswana. Upon its creation, Côte d’Ivoire’s borders encapsulated diverse peoples who were integrated into different political systems prior to the colonial period. The country’s “peopling” occurred slowly, through a series of migrations to and within Côte d’Ivoire during the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods. Not surprisingly, narratives surrounding autochthonous belonging have featured prominently in Côte d’Ivoire’s recent political history. Elites have fanned these tensions and instrumentally drawn on them as means of defending their political positions and attacking their opponents. Because the state was and continues to be the principal economic actor, restricting citizenship has functioned as a means by which elites blocked rivals from competing for control over the state. Restricting citizenship is an attractive strategy because it can undercut the legitimacy of claims made by rival elites and disenfranchise the groups from which they gain support. Overall, the case of Côte d’Ivoire points to the deeply political and distributional questions that are at the heart of processes of national identification. Historical Background Côte d’Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960. For the first two decades of independence, the “Ivoirian miracle” became a well-known African success story characterized by relative economic growth and political stability. The country’s postcolonial achievements were in large part a product of the leadership of Côte d’Ivoire’s long-reigning president, Felix Houphouët-Boigny (1960–1993). Houphouët-Boigny was an ethnic Baoulé and former medical doctor and big cocoa

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planter before he gained fame as the leader of the Syndicat Agricole Africaine (SAA), the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), and the movement against the French-imposed forced-labor regime in the 1940s. Houphouët-Boigny propelled the economic success of postcolonial Côte d’Ivoire through an open-door policy toward migration to the cocoa-growing regions in the southwest. Migration to this part of Côte d’Ivoire began in earnest during the colonial period, after the abolition of forced labour in 1946. Leading up to independence, smallholders (less than 5 hectares of land) represented the vast majority of all cocoa farmers in Côte d’Ivoire. The majority of smallholders were either Baoulé migrants from the central part of the country or Dyula from the northern Côte d’Ivoire. Migrant smallholders ultimately became a key political constituency supporting Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI during the nationalist period. The reciprocal relationship between migrant farmers and the PDCI continued into the postcolonial period. Houphouët-Boigny encouraged migration from elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire as well as from surrounding West African countries, including Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso, to the principal cocoa-growing regions in southeastern Côte d’Ivoire. In famously stating that “the land belongs to the one who cultivates it” (la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur) Houphouët-Boigny directly challenged the customary community-level authority over land in the cocoa-growing regions of the southwest, opening it up to cultivation by ethnic “strangers” (Ivoirian or otherwise). Supporting migration in the cocoa regions worked as a political strategy for Houphouët-Boigny for a number of reasons. Granting migrants access to land garnered the PDCI unwavering political support from immigrant communities. This would remain the case as long as the positions of ethnic minorities remained dependent on the support of the party to cultivate cocoa in the Ivoirian southwest. Groups indigenous to the southwest—the Bété, Attié, Dida, and Guéré—were amenable to ongoing migration into this part of the country as long as the economy was growing, education was accessible, and government jobs remained plentiful. By 1990, however, Côte d’Ivoire faced a dire economic crisis: reduced global commodity prices, overborrowing from international lenders, and an overall decline in commodity production culminated in the reluctant acceptance of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that carried the usual demands for structural adjustment. The Ivoirian government was forced to radically restructure the public sector: wages were cut by up to 40 percent, some parastatals were privatized and sold off, and many higher level bureaucrats deemed expendable by Houphouet-Boigny were sacked. These reforms undercut the capacity of the old single party to placate disaffected elites and groups through their integration into the state apparatus. The old methods of social control that Houphouet-Boigny relied upon to maintain political order soon became untenable given the growing fiscal crisis of the state.1 The shrinking pool of resources that the PDCI had at its disposal to win the support of different social groups revealed cleavages within the ruling coalition that had previously been carefully managed. Pressure from the international community to hold multiparty elections also contributed to the fragmentation of HouphouetBoigny’s political base. In 1990, the PDCI handily won Côte d’Ivoire’s first multiparty presidential elections. However, rather than pacifying growing tensions

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within the country, this victory worked to exacerbate them. During this round of elections, the primary opposition to the PDCI, the Front populaire ivoirian (FPI), led by Laurent Gbagbo, positioned itself as the defender of the rights of “indigenous” Ivoirians. The FPI attacked the PDCI for favoring its principal ethnic support base, the Baoulé, at the expense of other groups in the country and for using votes from non-Ivoirians to steal the 1990 election.2 Divisions also emerged within the ruling party itself. Leading up to the 1990 elections, Houphouët-Boigny’s then Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, began to gain some support as the figurehead of the reformist wing within the PDCI (bureaucrats, younger members of the party). Reforms proposed by Ouattara threatened to dismantle the PDCI patronage machine and attack the interests of the old guard within the party, led by Houphouet-Boigny’s constitutionally appointed presidential heir and fellow Baoulé, Henri Konan Bedié. These debates intensified after the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December of 1993, when Bedié assumed the presidency. Soon after, a number of former PDCI members supportive of Ouattara formed a new opposition party, the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR). The party’s loyalty to Ouattara represented an immediate threat to Bedié and the PDCI. Ouattara (even though he had accepted a post with the IMF in early 1994) and the RDR were viewed as capable of mobilizing “northerners”—based in the south as well as the north—against the old single party. In response to the emergence of the RDR, Bedié took decisive steps to block this challenge and prevent Ouattara from competing against him. Bedié began to promote a highly exclusive form of Ivoirian nationalism labeled ivoirité. This represented a complete reversal of the political strategies pursued by the PDCI under Houphouët-Boigny. Specifically, ivoirité demanded the exclusion of “foreigners” from the voting process and requirements that presidential and legislative candidates reside in Côte d’Ivoire for five years prior to the elections in which they intend to run and have parents who are both “native” Ivoirians. These restrictions constituted deliberate and poorly veiled attacks on Ouattara, whose origins subsequently became the subject of vigorous debate. With Ouattara excluded, Bedié won the 1995 presidential elections handily. Bedié complemented this “narrowing” of Ivoirian citizenship with the use of other measures against his political opponents. He purged the civil service of suspected Ouattara loyalists. Unable to placate potential rivals through the distribution of resources, as Houphouët-Boigny had done, Bedié increasingly relied upon state security forces to deal with the increasing number of opponents to his rule. However, these actions, coupled with the increasing international dissatisfaction with his regime, left Bedié with few supporters. On December 24, 1999, Bedié was ousted in bloodless coup led by General Robert Guëi. Guëi came to power with the stated intent of reforming Ivoirian political life. Initially, he appeared to follow his word. He made overtures to national reconciliation by restoring the citizenship of Alassane Ouattara and reaffirming the rights of immigrant populations throughout the country. Guëi also followed through on his promise of a democratic transition to civilian rule by scheduling presidential elections for October 2000. However, Guëi’s behavior quickly began to resemble the actions of the civilian politicians he had earlier criticized. After expressing interest

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in staying in power and running in the 2000 elections, Guëi appropriated the nationalist discourse used by his predecessors. He introduced Article 35 to the Ivoirian Constitution, which required that both parents be born in Côte d’Ivoire to stand as a candidate for president. This was seen as an obvious attack on Guëi’s principal opponent in the 2000 elections, Alassane Ouattara. Additionally, Guëi purged many of the 2002 rebellion’s future leaders from the military for their suspected ties to Ouattara and the RDR and their suspected roles in the September 2000 plot against Guëi, the plot of the white horse (complot de cheval blanc). In the end, the Supreme Court disqualified both Ouattara and Bedié, preventing them from running in this round of presidential elections. Despite Guëi’s efforts at controlling his opposition, the FPI candidate Laurent Gbagbo won the 2000 elections. In response, Guëi dissolved the National Electoral Commission, canceled the elections, and proclaimed himself the winner. Afterward, tens of thousands of protestors with allegiances to the various political parties participating or disqualified from the elections descended upon downtown Abidjan to protest Guëi’s decision. After these protests underlined Guëi’s growing illegitimacy, the military and police both abandoned him, and Guëi promptly fled to Benin. On October 25, 2000, one day after Guëi’s departure, the FPI candidate, Laurent Gbagbo, declared himself president of Côte d’Ivoire. Many opposition parties immediately called for new elections in which all of the parties’ candidates could run. In the wake of these calls, violence between supporters of the FPI and the RDR quickly escalated. In November 2000, a mass grave containing 57 bodies was discovered in the Abidjan neighborhood of Yopougon. Most were identified as RDR supporters killed by armed pro-FPI groups. As a result, the RDR boycotted the December 2000 legislative elections. After a failed coup attempt against Gbagbo in January 2001, the plot of the black Mercedes (complot de Mercedes noir), the crackdown on northerners and perceived Ouattara supporters continued. During this time, many RDR supporters were assaulted, killed, or arrested. Gbagbo’s contested electoral victory and nearly two years of persecution against his northern opponents ultimately led to an attempted coup d’état and coordinated attack on three of Côte d’Ivoire’s principal cities—Abidjan, Bouaké, and Korhogo—on September 19, 2002. With the aid of French forces, soldiers loyal to Gbagbo repelled the attacks on Abidjan; however, the rebels retained control over Bouaké and Korhogo. The initial attacks were organized by the Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). Two other movements based in Western Côte d’Ivoire, the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), joined the fighting in November 2002. In December 2002, the MJP, the MPIGO, and the MPCI formed a formal coalition under the banner Forces Nouvelles (FN), under the political leadership of the prominent student leader Guillaume Soro. The Conflict Although the FN would, in the end, remain in control of the northern half of Côte d’Ivoire for almost 10 years (2002–2011), the near decade-long struggle did not

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result in the levels of violence witnessed in the far shorter West African civil wars in neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia. Overall, the enduring division of the country— between a rebel-held north and the government-controlled south—continued as a result of the failure of a series of externally sponsored peace agreements, rather than ongoing fighting between the principal belligerents involved in the conflict. Initial efforts at restoring peace after the failed September 2002 coup attempt were compromised from the start by conflicts that surfaced between Gbagbo’s supporters and Côte d’Ivoire’s former colonial power, France. France’s involvement in the crisis quickly became complicated by the ambiguous and, at times, contradictory position it took vis-à-vis the different parties to the conflict. First, in light of the historic weakness of Côte d’Ivoire’s armed forces, France’s early military involvement in the crisis enabled Gbagbo to retain power at this critical moment. Well-trained and better-equipped French forces repelled the rebels as they moved southward approaching Abidjan and forced them back to Bouaké. Gbagbo used this reprieve to build up his military in the subsequent months. Yet, despite the initial actions by French forces, France was widely seen by many Gbagbo hard-liners as tacitly supporting the rebellion. France’s insistence on its role as a neutral mediator and peacekeeper in the conflict (rather than simply backing Gbagbo’s government), its reluctance to frame the rebellion as merely an “external terrorist attack,” and its refusal to hand Ouattara over to Ivoirian security forces all contributed to suspicions shared by many of Gbagbo’s supporters that the French were complicit with the rebellion.3 For others, France’s refusal to support Gbagbo’s government was tantamount to treason in light of France’s historic role of militarily supporting leaders in Côte d’Ivoire and its other former African colonies.4 For Gbagbo, by not intervening on his behalf, France was denying him the status and legitimacy accorded to past Ivoirian heads of state, particularly HouphouëtBoigny, and other contemporary French African leaders such as Omar Bongo in Gabon or Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, with whom the French had continued to maintain close relations. Political tensions between the French and Gbagbo’s government were further strained during the first round of peace talks in the Parisian suburb of LinasMarcoussis. Spearheaded by the then French president Jacques Chirac, the peace talks at Linas-Marcoussis resulted in an ambitious and comprehensive powersharing agreement. The agreement included stipulations establishing a transitional government of national reconciliation that included members of all the signatories to the agreement, the installation of a consensus prime minister with full executive powers, reforms to national citizenship laws, a tentative timetable for the holding of the next round of presidential elections, stipulations pertaining to eligibility of presidential candidates, and land reform. Despite the fact that the Linas-Marcoussis agreement explicitly addressed some of the key contentious political issues that were at the heart of the conflict, the agreement itself was fundamentally limited in its capacity to establish and maintain an enduring peace for a number of reasons. First, by including the FN in the power-sharing talks, the French and the LinasMarcoussis accords ultimately forced Gbagbo to recognize the rebels as legitimate political players with legitimate grievances that should be taken into account. For

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many within Gbagbo’s camp, this was just too much to bear. Widely viewed by Gbagbo and his supporters as “kids with pistols” and “houseboys turned rebels,” the Gbagbo camp felt that the Linas-Marcoussis accords elevated the rebels to an undeserving status within national-level political circles.5 These sentiments were further entrenched by the views of many that Linas-Marcoussis disproportionately shifted the balance of power between Gbagbo’s camp and his opponents. Referring to the distribution of seats in the transitional government established at Linas-Marcoussis, Andreas Mehler has written that “it was simply unacceptable to Abidjan (and particularly the army leadership) that the rebels should get the Defense and the Interior portfolios, ministries that would give them preponderance on all security issues.”6 Overall, many within the government viewed LinasMarcoussis as a “constitutional coup d’état,” whose outcome was largely in line with the original aims of the rebels. In the end, many on the government side refused to accept the political outcome of the French-initiated peace talks at Linas-Marcoussis. Even in the midst of negotiations, Gbagbo gave the green light to FPI youth leaders to organize anti-French rallies in Abidjan. After the installation of the power-sharing government, the prominent FPI politician Mamadou Koulibaly called for acts of civil disobedience to protest the adoption of Linas-Marcoussis. Ultimately, Gbagbo simply refused to implement some of the central components of the agreement. In response, the FN pulled out of the transition government, in October 2003, to protest Gbagbo’s growing unilateralism. The security situation and the prospects for sustained peace degenerated quickly after the collapse of the transitional government. By early 2004, the Gbagbo government had stepped up its repression of northerners and other suspected political opponents. In July 2004, the signatories met again in Accra, Ghana, to restart peace talks and sign a new agreement. Despite these diplomatic efforts, the implementation of this agreement began to stall as early as September 2004. In light of the failure of this latest round of peace talks, Gbagbo renewed his military offensive against the northern-based rebellion. On November 4, Gbagbo initiated Operation Dignité, which included a sustained aerial bombardment of selected targets in rebelheld northern zones. When the bombings hit French military barracks, killing nine French soldiers and one American, the French responded in kind by attacking and destroying the entirety of Côte d’Ivoire’s air force. This, in turn, sparked three days of anti-French riots, where bands of pro-Gbagbo youth beat, raped, and looted French and other expats of suspected European descent. By November 9, 9,000 foreigners were airlifted out of Abidjan by French forces. Despite UN sanctions against suspected human rights abusers, Gbagbo’s decision to repeal Article 35 of the constitution (the nationality clause that prevented Ouattara from running in the 2000 elections) and another round of political negotiations hosted by South African president Thebo Mbeki in Pretoria in March 2005, tensions remained. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the domestic political opposition agreed to extend Gbagbo’s presidential mandate into 2006, after the installation of a new transitional government under former head of ECOWAS,

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Charles Konan Banny. Buoyed by international support, Banny was expected to manage the transitional government, implement the peace process, and prepare the country for elections in October 2006.7 Management of the Conflict Overall, the nomination of Banny as the new prime minister did little to curb the autonomous powers of President Gbagbo. Lacking any real power base of his own, Banny was limited in his political role as prime minister and in his ability to push the peace process forward. However, in December 2006, Gbagbo surprised the international community by announcing a plan out of the current political malaise through direct dialogue with the rebels themselves. The talks between Soro and Gbagbo were hosted in Ouagadougou by the then ECOWAS chair and Burkina Faso president Blaise Compaoré in January 2007. The Ouagadougou Peace Accords (OPA) were signed on March 4, 2007. The push for direct dialogue between Soro and Gbagbo and the eventual signing of the OPA resulted from the domestic and international political pressures these actors confronted. Through cooperation with each other, both Soro and Gbagbo temporarily stemmed the sense of growing frustration felt by the variety of domestic and international-level actors involved in the peace process.8 Ultimately, ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, and France all accepted Gbagbo’s proposal as part of a modified framework for the UN Security Council Resolution 1721. The reformed proposal did look entirely different from the UN resolution and the number of agreements that came before it in terms of its substance. Now, as the International Crisis Group put it, the “responsibility for the conduct of the transition has been transferred to the protagonists themselves.”9 The OPA contained four key provisions pertaining to (1) national identification and electoral registration; (2) disarmament and the reunification of the national armed forces; (3) national reunification through the redeployment of the public administration; and, finally, (4) the organization of clear and fair elections where all parties are able to put forth the candidate of their choice (within 10 months of the signing of the OPA). Because the OPA included provisions that directly addressed issues pertaining to citizenship and national belonging that were at the heart of the conflict, it created far more optimism regarding its potential for successful implementation compared to earlier efforts at solving the crisis.10 The inclusion of these provisions was an important part of the explanation as to why there was so much optimism—in Côte d’Ivoire and within the international community—about its contributing to lasting peace, but it was not the only one. The fact that the signing of the agreement was initiated by Ivoirians and the Gbagbo-Soro partnership were the central political reasons why there was so much broad support for the OPA. Nonetheless, tensions remained. Two of central elements of the OPA, disarmament and administrative unification, directly addressed the problem of the ongoing military and political presence of the FN in the north, and a third, the holding of free and fair elections, ultimately became entirely contingent on the dismantling of the administrative structures the rebels had put in place. After the signing of

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the OPA, the removal of the military, administrative, and fiscal powers of the old rebellion and the administrative reunification between the north and the south represented two of the central goals of Gbagbo and his supporters. The interconnected issues of disarmament and administrative reunification at times strained the seemingly cordial post-OPA political relationship between the old rivals, Gbagbo and Soro. The crux of the conflict was simple. For Soro, the dismantling of the FN’s military and fiscal networks was predicated foremost on the holding of free and fair elections. Conversely, for Gbagbo, elections could not be held until all fiscal, military, and administrative powers were transferred back to the state. In the end, the rebels resisted any threat to their continued control over the north. Efforts at administrative reunification in the north went largely unfulfilled. Redeployment of administrative personnel was initiated by a series of presidential decrees made between April and July 2007, which appointed new prefectures, subprefectures, and magistrates to their respective jurisdictions in the north. However, actual efforts at reinstating the powers of civil servants at local levels were circumscribed. For the most part, the com’zones simply continued to control local tax revenue, including taxes levied through roadblocks and those derived from their administration of translocal commodity trade. This denied state actors the resources required to fulfill their duties and made the former FN the ultimate arbiter in the use and distribution of resources. Even by 2010, many mayors, mayoral assistants, and civil servants complained to this author that they had neither the resources nor the authority to fulfill their duty in any meaningful way. Former rebels generally remained the dominant political actor in local arenas. As Kathrin Heitz has written in reference to the town of Man in Western Côte d’Ivoire, the “real force in zone 6 are the ex-rebels.”11 This was the case for much of the north throughout the post-OPA period. In the end, the FN’s control over the northern half of the country remained in place for the better part of a decade, leading up to the anticipated 2010 presidential elections. In the first round of the elections, the three principal candidates—Laurent Gbagbo (FPI), Alassanne Ouattara (RDR), and Henri Konan Bedié PDCI—captured large majorities in their respective ethnoregional strongholds (Ouattara in the north, Gbagbo in the south and southwest, and Bedié in the central part of the country). After the first round, Gbagbo had obtained 38 percent of the vote. Ouattara and Bedié had obtained 32 percent and 25 percent of the vote, respectively. Prior to the first round of the elections, the RDR, PDCI, and two other smaller parties formed a pre-electoral coalition, the Rassemblement des houphouétistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP), which committed them to supporting whatever party finished with the highest vote count in the first round of the elections in the second round. The key questions were whether Bedié would follow through with this commitment and whether those who had voted for Bedié in the first round would follow his lead and vote for Ouattara. In the end, Bedié and the majority of PDCI voters voted for Ouattara, and Ouattara emerged as the victor in the second round of these elections, garnering 54 percent of the vote. However, soon after the announcement of Ouattara’s victory by Côte d’Ivoire’s independent electoral commission, the courts nullified the results, citing voting

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irregularities in several northern departments that had skewed the results in Ouattara’s favor. The Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) simply subtracted the votes cast in these northern departments from the original total. This swung results of the second round of the presidential elections in favor of Gbagbo, with 51.45 percent of the vote. Gbagbo was subsequently sworn in as president by the courts on December 4, 2010. A crisis ensued, and after a four-month stalemate following Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power, the former rebels, newly named the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), with support from Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) and French forces, launched an attack on March 28, 2011, on the southern half of the country. By April 3, the FRCI controlled the entirety of the country. Gbagbo was soon forced from power, and Ouattara gained sole control over the presidency on April 11, 2011.12 Significance In contemporary Côte d’Ivoire, serious tensions between pro-Ouattara and proGbagbo forces remain. During the electoral crisis, violence peaked, particularly around Abidjan in the southwest. In Duékoué, approximately 300 Guéré were killed by forces tied to the former rebellion and loyal to Alassane Ouattara. Since then, the violence has been perpetuated by each of these groups—autochthones loyal to former president Gbagbo and strangers (largely Dyula, Burkinabé) loyal to the FRCI and current president Ouattara. Tensions remain over belonging in local and national communities, largely because rights and access to resources are defined by one’s status as a community member. This is particularly the case regarding the issue of land. How are these tensions to be resolved? Certainly, an important factor will be the extent to which both sides of the conflict are able to participate in the processes leading to any resolution of the deeply political problem surrounding citizenship. As of now, this is not the case. Former president Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague in November 2011. Subsequently, the FPI boycotted the December 2011 legislative elections and has refused to participate in the political process unless certain demands are met (including the release of Gbagbo). As of now, FPI supporters lack any credible leadership or organization to represent their views in any meaningful way, making the resort to violence more likely. At minimum, finding ways to integrate the FPI into decision-making processes represents the first step in overcoming the divisions that have led to the violence and instability confronting Côte d’Ivoire over the last 20 years. Notes 1. Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 205; Dwayne Woods, “The Tragedy of the Cocoa Pod: Rent-Seeking, Land and Ethnic Conflict in Ivory Coast,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 4 (2003): 646–648; and Richard

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Crook, “Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Côte d’Ivoire,” African Affairs (1989): 205–228. 2. Yves Fauré, “Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the Case of Côte d’Ivoire,” Africa 63, no. 3 (1993): 313–329; and Richard C. Crook, “Winning Coalitions and EthnoRegional Politics: The Failure of the Opposition in the 1990 and 1995 Elections in Côte d’Ivoire.” African Affairs 96, no. 383 (1997): 215–242. 3. International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: The War Is Not Yet Over,” Africa Report 72, November 28, 2003: 29–30. 4. Giulia Piccolino, “David against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire?: Laurent Gbagbo’s War against Global Governance,” African Affairs 111, no. 442 (2012): 7; and Maja Bovcon, “France’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d’Ivoire and Its Ethical Implications,” African Studies Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2009): 1–24. 5. International Crisis Group, “The War Is Not Yet Over,” i. 6. Andreas Mehler, “Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship,” African Affairs 108, no. 432 (2009): 466. 7. Mike McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 24. 8. International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come,” Africa Report 90, March 24, 2005: 14–16; Giles Yabi and Andrew Goodwin, “From LinasMarcoussis to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement: The Tortuous and Open Ended Peace Agreement,” in From Civil Strife to Peace Building: Examining Private Sector Involvement in West African Reconstruction, ed. H. Besada (Waterloo ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2009), 21. 9. International Crisis Group, “Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?” Africa Report 127, June 27, 2007: 7. 10. Abu Bakarr Bah, “Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire.” African Affairs 109, no. 437 (2010): 597–615. 11. Kathrin Heitz, “Power-Sharing in the Local Arena: Man—A Rebel-held Town in Western Côte d’Ivoire,” Africa Spectrum (2009): 127. 12. Thomas J. Bassett,  “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections, ” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 469–479; and Moussa Fofana, “Des Forces nouvelles aux Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire,”  Politique africaine  122 (June 2011): 161–178.

Suggested Readings Bassett, Thomas J. 2011. “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections.” African Affairs 110 (440): 469–479. Boone, Catherine. 2007. “Africa’s New Territorial Politics: Regionalism and the Open Economy in Côte d’Ivoire.” African Studies Review 50 (1): 59–81. Boone, Catherine. 2003. Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bovcon, Maja. 2009. “France’s Conflict Resolution Strategy in Côte d’Ivoire and Its Ethical Implications.” African Studies Quarterly 11 (1): 1–24. Crook, Richard C. 1997. “Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics: The Failure of the Opposition in the 1990 and 1995 Elections in Côte d’Ivoire.” African Affairs 96 (383): 215–242. McGovern, Mike. 2011. Making War in Côte d’Ivoire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Mitchell, Matthew I. 2012. “Power-Sharing and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire: Past Examples and Future Prospects.” Conflict, Security & Development, 12 (2): 171–191. Piccolino, Giulia. 2012. “David against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire?: Laurent Gbagbo’s War against Global Governance.” African Affairs 111 (442): 1–23. Toungara, Jeanne Maddox. 2001. “Ethnicity and Political Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.” Journal of Democracy 12 (3): 63–72. Woods, Dwayne. 2003. “The Tragedy of the Cocoa Pod: Rent-Seeking, Land and Ethnic Conflict in Ivory Coast.” Journal of Modern African Studies 41 (4): 641–655. Zolberg, Aristide R. 1964. One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Appendices The United Nations peacekeeping force in the Ivory Coast—Operation des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI)—is now in its second decade of deployment in its efforts to stabilize the political situation there. As of 2014, it entailed 5,994 troops, nearly 100 staff officers, and 183 military observers. As the below excerpts from two United Nations reports in 2014 indicate, its task is far from over.

1. United Nations Security Council Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on Cote d’Ivoire Pursuant to Paragraph 27 of Security Council Resolution 2152 (2014), 13 October 2014 [S2014/729*] Summary In the context of its peacebuilding process, the Government of Cote d’Ivoire has initiated reforms in order to promote and consolidate peace and security. Progress has been made in areas of demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration of former combatants, security sector reform, national reconciliation and the fight against impunity. Despite the progress made so far, the Group remains concerned about security and stability in the lead-up to the 2015 presidential election because of the presence of large quantities of weapons and ammunition that remain unaccounted for in the country. While the improved security situation in Cote d’Ivoire has had a positive impact on the region, mercenaries in Liberia and militias in Cote d’Ivoire remain highly operational. In particular, activities and connected armed attacks in Cote d’Ivoire continue to be linked to elements of the pro-Gbagbo radical wing, which perseveres in its efforts to recruit and finance combatants. Regarding the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, three main issues are of concern: the discrepancy between the number of demilitarized combatants and the weapons collected; the large presence of non-registered ex-combatants; and discrepancies in the reintegration criteria. In the context of border control, the main concerns of the Group are the lack of infrastructure and equipment, an inefficient reintegration process and an insufficient number of trained personnel, which undermine the ability, particularly of the customs administration, to efficiently carry out its mission.

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Concerning the arms embargo, the transformation of civilian vehicles into armed military vehicles is still a major issue. Furthermore, the Group identified violations that occurred during the period of the post-electoral crisis of 2011 regarding multiple rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, related ammunition and vehicles, some of which are similar to those manufactured in the Sudan. In the area of natural resources, the Group is working closely with the Ministry of Industry and Mines and the Permanent Secretariat of the Kimberley Process in Cote d’Ivoire and welcomes the positive progress obtained so far in the diamond sector. Cocoa and gold smuggling continues. Land tenure tensions between local populations, especially in the west, and nationals from neighboring countries caused several security incidents in 2013. Investigations to identify any direct links between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the financing of the purchase of arms and related materiel and activities are ongoing. In this context, the Group is also focusing on the illegal parallel taxation system based on racketeering, money-laundering and extortion and possible links to any Group or activity threatening peace and stability in the country and in the region. The Group notes the questions addressed to relevant Ivorian ministries remain unanswered; for instance, the approval by the Minister of Defense of a laissez-passer to give the Group free access to military sites is still pending. …

II. Threats to peace and security in Cote d’Ivoire A. Militias and mercenaries. 15. The Group investigated individuals and recent episodes that represent persistent threats to stability and security in Côte d’Ivoire. On 22 and 23 February and 14 and 15 April 2014, armed elements attacked the villages of Grabo and Feteh in the western region of Côte d’Ivoire. The attacks resulted in the killing of 14 people, of whom 11 were civilians and 3 were soldiers of the Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI). On their way, in the village of Kabo Wate, Liberia, the assailants also killed three civilians. … Attacks in Grabo and Feteh 17. For both attacks, three groups of assailants converged in Grabo and Feteh: a group of Ivorian refugees recruited in the Little Lobo refugee camp in Liberia (see annex 2); a group of former Liberian combatants; and a group of former members of the Groupe des patriotes pour la paix from Abidjan. These groups are part of a unit called “Compagnie Armageddon”, set up and controlled by pro-Gbagbo radical wing elements, most of whom are in exile in Ghana. 18. While the attacks were initially attributed to land disputes between communities, the Group notes that this was not the main motive. The Group has identified at least two dynamics that warrant further investigation and will present its findings in the final report.

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19. First, the Group notes that the attacks form part of a larger plan to destabilize the country. Former political and military leaders, namely Justin Kone Katinan, Damana Pickass, Colonel Alphonse Gouanou, Colonel Henri Tohourou Dadi, Commandant Fulgence Akapea, Commissaire Patrice Loba and Commissaire Gnahoua (alias “Kabila”) have been identified by the Group as key elements in the command and control structure of the pro-Gbagbo radical wing. … 21. Second, the Group notes that the attacks were not isolated acts of violence among members of the communities. The Group found that they had been planned and financed since late 2013 by the pro-Gbagbo radical wing and consisted of waves of armed attacks in the country, mainly from the west of Côte d’Ivoire. 22. Those types of attacks displayed three main characteristics: targeting of foreign nationals (most of the victims were from Burkira Faso, Guinea and Mali), destabilization of intercommunity relationships and promotion of the return to political power of exiled elements of the pro-Gbagbo radical wing. The Group continues its investigation into the financial network established to sustain the attacks. Source: United Nations Security Council. Available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ 1572/CI_poe_ENG.shtml.

2. Thirty-Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, December, 2014. I. Introduction 1. By its resolution 2162 (2014), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) until 30 June 2015 and requested me to provide a midterm report by 15 December 2014. The present report provides an update on major developments and on the implementation of the UNOCI mandate since the issuance of my previous report (S/2014/342) on 15 May 2014; it also contains the findings and recommendations of an electoral needs assessment mission conducted during the period under review. …

III. Security situation 18. The security situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to improve but remained fragile, with sporadic incidents of armed attacks, banditry and other violent crimes persisting, particularly near the border with Liberia. However, there was a 10 per cent reduction in reported incidents involving undisciplined elements of the Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), former combatants and dozo (traditional hunters). Ivorian law enforcement and security forces were deployed throughout the country, but their operational efficiency remained hampered by the lack of equipment for public order maintenance. The frequency of violence meted out by security and defence forces, particularly FRCI, on the population is declining. 19. On 15 May, the western border town of Fété was attacked by a group of unidentified armed individuals, which resulted in the death of 13 persons, including 4 children

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and 3 FRCI soldiers, and the displacement of 3,500 community members. On 21 May, the Government approved measures aimed at enhancing security in the western areas of the country, including by increasing the presence of FRCI and launching, on 21 June, programmes to promote peace, social cohesion and security. UNOCI conducted special protection patrols and rehabilitated five bridges, facilitating returns, while the Government provided humanitarian assistance with United Nations support. The population of Fété, however, has not yet returned. 20. On 1 September, individuals armed with firearms and other weapons attacked the FPI headquarters in Abidjan, which resulted in serious injury to three FPI members. The Government condemned the attack and began an investigation into the incident. 21. On 18 September, an unknown number of assailants engaged in a shooting incident at the Akouédo camp situated in the east of Abidjan, a joint military camp hosting FRCI elements and UNOCI military personnel. Eight of the assailants were captured, including a police officer and a soldier. Two civilian vehicles and eight weapons were also seized. 22. On 18 November, separate groups of FRCI soldiers erected barricades and blocked streets outside barracks in Abengourou, Abidjan, Oboist, Bouaké, Daloa, Korhogo, Odienné and Yamoussoukro, protesting against unpaid salaries and other unpaid financial entitlements. In Bouaké, the demonstrators briefly took over the State television and radio stations; protesters also broke into the FRCI armouries in Bouaké and Daloa and looted police stations in Bouaké, which resulted in material damage and the theft of equipment, including firearms and ammunition. Both the Minister of Defence, Paul Koffi, and the Minister of the Interior issued separate statements that day, advising that the Government would meet some of the soldiers’ demands. Negotiations between the Government and representatives of disaffected soldiers were held on 19 and 20 November, during which agreements were reached to accommodate many of the soldiers’ requests. At the same time, President Ouattara declared that the military should not hold such protests in the future. …

V. Reform of security institutions 30. Restoration of public confidence in the security and defence forces remains a challenge. FRCI continued to perform law enforcement tasks in the north, south and west of the country, owing to overlapping security roles and responsibilities with the police and the gendarmerie. In addition, although the police and the gendarmerie were redeployed throughout the country, their lack of essential equipment and logistics continued to impede their operational capabilities. Moreover, the influence of former zone commanders remains a lingering challenge, affecting public trust. Despite this context, on 25 November the former zone commander of Katiola, Lieutenant Colonel Hervé “Vetcho” Touré, was appointed commander of the third infantry battalion, following FRCI protests described in paragraph 22 above.

VI. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 31. On 4 November, the Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration announced that some 44,000 former combatants, including 3,538 women, had been

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disarmed and that a revised total of 67,460 former combatants were expected to undergo the process by 30 June 2015. As at 1 December, Government statistics revealed that a total of 27,034 weapons, including grenades, and 1,537 items of explosive ordnance had been collected. 32. Since early 2014, enrolment of former combatants into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process decreased significantly, including as a result of limited reinsertion and reintegration opportunities. . . .

VII. Human rights 36. The human rights situation was characterized by reports of arbitrary arrest, illegal detention, racketeering, extortion and sexual and gender-based violence against women and children. Between 1 May and 1 December, former combatants, FRCI elements and gendarmerie, police and corrections officers were reportedly involved in 6 extrajudicial killings, 32 cases of torture and ill-treatment and 49 cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention. In most cases, no judicial or disciplinary action was taken against alleged perpetrators owing to out-of-court settlements between the victims’ families and the perpetrators. …

VIII. Media 45. UNOCI continued its efforts to enhance professional journalism and media ethics, encouraging responsible reporting on sensitive issues related to the Independent Electoral Commission, land, nationality and the legal proceedings against former President Gbagbo and Mr. Blé Goudé. However, media outlets still circulated incendiary information and hate speech …

XIV. Observations 75. Bringing to justice the alleged perpetrators of human rights violations committed during the post-elections crisis, irrespective of their status or political affiliation, would greatly contribute to healing past wounds and fostering reconciliation. . . . 76. At the same time, I remain deeply dismayed by delays in the investigation of major cases, such as the killing in June 2012 of seven United Nations peacekeepers and the attack on the Nahibly camp for internally displaced persons in July 2012. . . . 79. Consolidating peace will require that much more progress be made in addressing the root causes of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly with respect to land and nationality. I am pleased to note that intercommunal conflicts, a factor of instability, decreased during the reporting period. Source: United Nations Security Council. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search /view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/892.

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Kenya Kenya’s Legacy of Violent Ethnic Politics and the 2007–2008 Postelection Crisis Sarah Jenkins

Timeline 1895 The British East African Protectorate is formed. 1920 The protectorate becomes the British crown colony of Kenya. 1952 The Mau Mau rebellion begins. A state of emergency is declared in response to the violent resistance to colonial rule by the predominantly Kikuyu militant group called Mau Mau. The guerrilla campaign and the British army’s brutal response continued through 1960. 1963 Kenya achieves independence, with Jomo Kenyatta assuming the post of prime minister. 1964 The Kenya African Democratic Union party (KADU) collapses, and its politicians are incorporated into the ruling Kenya African National Union party (KANU). Constitutional amendments are implemented that transform Kenya into a republic, establish Kenyatta as president, and centralize power in the executive. 1966 Oginga Odinga forms the Kenya People’s Union party (KPU). 1969 Tom Mboya is assassinated on July 5, 1969. KPU is banned, and Kenya becomes a de facto one-party state.

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1978 Jomo Kenyatta dies, and Daniel arap Moi assumes power. 1982 A faction of the Kenya Air Force launches an attempted coup d’état. It is unsuccessful and leads to the implementation of increasingly heavy-handed and ethnically biased policies. 1991 Competitive multiparty politics is reintroduced in Kenya. Ethnic clashes spread across areas of the Rift Valley and western provinces. 1992 The first general elections are held since 1963. Moi and his KANU party retain power. 1993–1997 Intermittent ethnic clashes continue to affect areas of the country, particularly the Rift Valley. 1997 Moi and KANU are victorious in the second general elections, but the margin of victory is narrow. 2002 The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeats KANU in the elections, and Mwai Kibaki becomes president. 2002–2005 Promises made in the lead-up to the 2002 elections are unfulfilled, creating tensions between leading figures of NARC. 2005 The Proposed New Constitution of Kenya is put to a referendum and rejected by a significant margin. 2007 The general elections are held on December 27. Three days later, Mwai Kibaki is controversially announced as the president amid rumors of malpractice. Violence erupts across the country. 2008 Violence continues until a power-sharing agreement is brokered between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki on February 28.

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2010 After a lengthy review process, a new constitution is put to referendum in August and accepted by the electorate. 2013 Uhuru Kenyatta and the Jubilee Alliance win the elections, defeating Raila Odinga and his Coalition for Reform and Democracy party (CORD). Kenya was long considered by the international community to be an island of peace in a volatile region, an oasis of stability amid conflict and disorder. While neighboring countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and Rwanda had been afflicted by military rule, turbulent civil war, and widespread violence, Kenya had seemingly escaped such troubles and remained politically stable since gaining independence. Thus, when the country exploded into intense ethnic conflict following the 2007 elections, many—both in the international community and within Kenya itself—expressed shock and surprise. However, despite its reputation for relative stability and vibrant democracy, Kenya had in fact been plagued by underlying and increasingly violent ethnic politics throughout both the colonial and postcolonial eras, fueling the intermittent ethnic clashes of the 1990s and culminating in the widespread postelection violence of 2007–2008. Historical Background Colonial Legacies

Kenya—formerly the East Africa Protectorate—became a British Crown Colony in 1920. The policies and strategies of colonial rule had far-reaching consequences, particularly in terms of embedding ethnicity within Kenyan politics and in cultivating the norm of violence and repression as a means of maintaining order and the status quo. Identities in precolonial Kenya were extremely fluid and porous, with communities continually evolving, breaking down, or expanding through dynamic processes of integration, adaptation, and dissolution. However, colonial intervention transformed the nature of these identities, not only reifying and solidifying their boundaries, but also imbuing them with a political salience that would shape the nature of postcolonial politics. Needing to administer the colony from afar with limited personnel and resources, and fearing the potential for uprising and rebellion, the British government adopted divide-and-rule strategies in Kenya. The territory was partitioned into clearly demarcated administrative boundaries— many of which were coterminous with already existing identity groups—creating tribal provinces, and the movement of communities outside of these native reserves was heavily regulated. The colonial government identified leaders among the now more clearly bounded ethnic groups and fostered tribal “big men” through whom they administered and controlled the population. This style of rule had three important effects upon Kenyan politics and society. First, it encouraged a strong ethnic consciousness among the population that

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was only further institutionalized by the introduction of identity cards. Second, it deeply imbued ethnicity with political salience, and ethnic competition became the very foundation of politics in the country. Indeed, the heavy reliance upon provincial administrators to distribute state resources established a political structure founded upon ethnicized patron-client relationships, encouraging the African population to participate in the institutionalization of powerful, ethnic leaders in to reap the benefits of state power. Localized ethnic interests were consequently prioritized over any concern with national development, and ethnic competition became embedded within Kenyan politics. Moreover, the favoring of certain communities over others by the colonial government—a key element of divide-andrule tactics—not only created ethnospatial inequalities in terms of development and infrastructure, but it also ensured that there was a differential inclusion in the colonial economy among the various Kenyan communities. These disparities constructed political norms of ethnic division and fostered resentments. Finally, British divide-and-rule tactics constructed notions of ethnic belonging and ownership over space—an ethnic territoriality—that would define politics up until the present day.1 The administration of colonial Kenya, with its reliance on tribal big men, was premised upon this idea of ethnic territoriality. That is to say, ethnic leaders were made responsible for territorial units and the people living within them, engendering a strong sense of ethnic ownership over space.2 This, combined with the heavy restrictions on movement outside of these “native reserves,” consolidated the attachment to space and the demand for preferential social, economic, and political rights for the “indigenous” community. In addition to engendering a form of politics structured around ethnic identity, colonial rule also ensured that, with the transfer of power in 1963, the new government of Kenya inherited an apolitical and authoritarian set of institutions that were designed to maintain the status quo and consolidate the power of the executive through repressive and violent means. While these aspects of colonial rule certainly set the stage for the new political elite, the continuities that can be observed in the postcolonial era were as much the result of the deliberate actions by key political figures throughout independence as they were of colonial political norms. Decolonization and the Kenyatta Years

In 1960, as Kenya prepared for independence, two key political parties were formed: the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). These two parties not only had vastly different ethnic bases, but they also espoused divergent visions of Kenya’s constitutional future. KANU, led by Jomo Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga, was an alliance of their respective Kikuyu and Luo communities, while the smaller Luhya, Coastal, and KAMATUSA (an acronym for the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu) groups united under the KADU banner. The latter, fearing domination and marginalization under KANU, advocated a devolved system of government (majimbo), where each ethnoregional territory would maintain control over education, development, investment, policing, local government, land ownership, and other socioeconomic and political issues in their area. Thus, KADU’s vision for Kenya’s future was embedded

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within the ethnicized notions of territoriality that were constructed throughout the colonial period. KANU, on the other hand, envisaged a strong, centralized government. A compromise was reached, and both parties agreed to a quasi-federalist system. This issue, however, engendered a great deal of animosity on the ground, sparking isolated incidents of violence in the Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza, Central, and Eastern regions as minority communities were violently evicted by the “native” groups.3 The majimbo debate would continue to rear its head throughout Kenya’s postcolonial politics, and evictions of minority communities would become a defining feature of election periods. After the transfer of power and KANU’s victory in the 1963 elections, Jomo Kenyatta soon set about dismantling the devolved power structures. By 1964, Kenya had been transformed into a republic with Kenyatta as the president, and KADU had been dissolved. Kenyatta’s distaste for political dissent and his insistence upon unity in parliament did not stop there. After a series of disagreements with Kenyatta, including his demotion from the position of vice-president, Odinga resigned from KANU and formed the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). Kenyatta’s tactics in dealing with this new political competitor drew heavily upon the repressive style of colonial rule. KPU activists were arrested and its candidates harassed and detained, its public rallies were restricted, and in the local elections of 1968, all KPU candidates were disqualified for allegedly presenting incorrect nomination papers. Before the general elections could take place in 1969, KPU would be banned and Odinga detained, making Kenya a de facto one-party state. The year 1969 also brought to stark attention the lengths to which Kenyatta and his elite would go to maintain power. One of the key events that highlighted this intent was the assassination of the Luo politician Tom Mboya. An influential figure in Kenyatta’s government, and a close ally of the president in the early years of independence, Mboya had his sights set on the presidency after Kenyatta’s death. This sat uncomfortably with both Kenyatta’s inclinations and those of the Kikuyu clique at the uppermost echelons of the government. Mboya was gunned down in Nairobi on July 5, 1969. His was not the first assassination to take place during Kenyatta’s rule, nor was it the last, but it very clearly demonstrated KANU’s willingness to use any means to suppress dissent and protect the Kikuyu power base. It also deepened already emerging tensions between the Kikuyu and Luo communities, and it sparked severe rioting in Luo areas. Kenyatta employed excessive force to quell these protests, using the police and other security forces to disband demonstrations, even issuing shoot-to-kill orders in Nyanza in November 1969. Early independence politics under Jomo Kenyatta also constructed and consolidated the perception that politics was primarily an ethnic game in which the winner takes all. Kenyatta deliberately prioritized ethnic over national unity, and the Kikuyu community came to monopolize key cabinet and ministerial positions, the civil service, the parastatal sector, and other influential posts in the military and security forces. In addition, Central Province—the home of the Kikuyu—enjoyed greater levels of development and investment in such public services as health care and education. Perhaps the most explosive area in which the Kikuyu were seen to be benefiting disproportionately, however, was in land resettlement. The re-Africanization

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of land appropriated by European settlers had sparked significant debate in the lead-up to independence. While KADU-affiliated groups demanded and expected that the land would be returned to its original owners, Kenyatta insisted that no land would be freely given. He developed two concurrent policies. The first—the Million Acre Scheme—saw Luo, Luhya, Kisii, and Kikuyu communities settled in the Rift Valley, causing tensions and resentment among the indigenous Kalenjin. The Kikuyu benefited disproportionately from these schemes, and, furthermore, a significant portion of territory was excised from the Rift Valley and given to Central Province. The second approach operated on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis. This led to the formation of large land purchase companies, and Kalenjin groups, who had initially boycotted the policy, subsequently found themselves outbid by Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo buyers in the Rift Valley.4 Once again, the Kalenjin witnessed land they claimed ownership over distributed to other communities. The allocation of land throughout Kenyatta’s rule was rife with corruption and nepotism, favoring certain communities over others, and it remains an unresolved and explosive issue in contemporary Kenyan politics. Thus, the early years of independence were tumultuous and laid the foundations for the Kenya’s political future. Under Kenyatta, grievances over the inequitable distribution of socioeconomic resources and political power emerged, as the Kikuyu community was seen to benefit at the expense of others, and the norm of violence and intimidation in politics began to be institutionalized. The Moi Years and the Return to Multipartyism

Following Jomo Kenyatta’s death on August 22, 1978, his close ally, Kalenjin vice-president Daniel arap Moi, assumed the presidency amid a more fractured and divided political elite. In an attempt to settle the concerns of some of his naysayers, Moi promised to follow in the footsteps of Kenyatta, and, in many ways, this is precisely what he did. In fact, during Moi’s rule, violent ethnic politics not only continued but actually intensified, as the president sought to maintain power by any means in the face of a number of internal and external challenges. The period of 1978–2002 saw a drastic increase in the levels of corruption and state repression, the gradual shift from Kikuyu dominance to the consolidation of a Kalenjin elite, and the deliberate orchestration of violence and disorder in an effort to disrupt the democratization process. Moi’s position rested upon far shakier foundations than his predecessor’s. While Kenyatta was able to rely on the support of a powerful Kikuyu clique and members of a few other ethnic groups, Moi needed to court a wider support base. As such, he was not able to initiate a mass exodus of the Kikuyu elite upon assuming power. However, the prioritization of the Kalenjin did gradually come to define his politics. An attempted coup in 1982—led by a faction of the Kenya Air Force and supported by a number of Moi’s political rivals—hastened this process of “Kalenjinization,” encouraging the president to install members of his own and a few other loyal communities in key positions, particularly in the state security forces. The Kalenjin came to dominate the top positions in the government, the civil service, the military, and the security forces, and Rift Valley Province enjoyed better

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access to public services as the government directed investment and development projects to the region at the expense of others. Thus, Moi’s rule did nothing to deconstruct the pervasive understanding of politics as a winner-takes-all ethnic game; it became clear that those in power, or closely allied to those in power, benefit significantly, while those who are not suffer and are marginalized. Moi also continued in the same vein as his predecessor in terms of repressive politics. Beset by economic crisis, rising unemployment levels, cuts to public spending, and increasing levels of corruption, Moi’s administration faced internal discontent; repression and suppression was the immediate response. Prior to 1982, political opponents were detained and imprisoned, and licenses for public rallies were widely refused; the increasingly critical press was subject to censorship, and unfavorable journalists were arrested. Following vocal calls for a second political party in the country, Moi institutionalized the single-party system within Kenya’s constitution. After the 1982 coup attempt, however, Kenya experienced a period of extreme political repression, not only of elite figures but also of ordinary citizens. Suspected dissidents were arrested, tortured, imprisoned, and subjected to other human rights abuses, as Moi sought to quash any sign of opposition. The state security forces became a very clear tool of the state, not only acting as government spies, identifying supposed dissident groups, but also engaging in large-scale massacres of citizens in the Garissa and Wajir districts. Moi’s rule had become synonymous with tyranny and human rights abuse. This, together with the massive rigging of the elections in 1988, sowed the seeds of political uprising. While Moi strongly resisted democratization, the tide of popular demand, in addition to pressures coming from the international community, forced his hand. In December 1991, the government repealed the section of the constitution banning additional political parties, and the country prepared itself for the first multiparty elections since independence. Political liberalization was not the panacea many had thought it would be, however, as KANU sought alternative means of retaining power. In the lead-up to the 1992 elections, KANU revived the majimbo debate, inflaming ethnicized land grievances in the Rift Valley. Armed militias of Kalenjin warriors were organized, directed, and funded by politicians to launch attacks against minority groups living in the area. For the political elite, these evictions rid constituencies of likely opposition supporters, facilitating KANU’s reelection. On the ground, this incitement to violence met with a sympathetic and willing audience; the eviction of “nonnative” groups not only promised the return of land to its “rightful” owners, but it also safeguarded the region against further appropriation under opposition rule. Over a thousand people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in the electoral violence of 1991–1992. Despite the fact that Moi took less than 40 percent of the popular vote, a fractured opposition secured his and KANU’s return to power in the 1992 elections. Politicians had realized that to be successful, they needed an armed militia to ensure security, disrupt the rallies of their opponents, and intimidate opposition supporters. The “instrumentalization of disorder” by elite actors had taken hold of

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Kenyan elections.5 However, while initially instigated and organized by political elites, violence increasingly fell out of their control and became diffused in Kenyan society. Rurally based militias proliferated, and ethnicized gangs became a fact of life in urban centers as groups sought to protect their communities against the ensuing insecurity, Thus, Moi’s legacy was to intensify the violent ethnic politics that had featured in both the colonial period and during Kenyatta’s rule, and by the 2002 elections, Kenyans were clamoring for change. The Unfulfilled Promises of Kibaki’s Administration

In 2002, the opposition saw the opportunity to oust KANU from power. Learning from the mistakes of the previous elections, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga formed an alliance under the banner of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Tapping into Kenyans’ deep-rooted desire for change, NARC promised to bring an end to the corrupt tribalistic practices of Kenya’s past. The party made the ambitious pledge to draw up a new constitution within 100 days, which would devolve power away from the presidency and create a federal system of government. While it was agreed that Mwai Kibaki would run for president, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was allegedly signed between the two leading factions of the NARC alliance, promising an equitable distribution of the key positions as well as the creation of a prime minister post that would be taken up by Raila Odinga. The party defeated KANU in a relatively peaceful election, and there were widespread expectations that NARC heralded a new era of democracy in Kenya. However, Kibaki’s administration soon began to falter, and between 2002 and 2005, Kenyans witnessed the government renege on almost all of its promises. The MoU was not honored; the majority of ministerial positions were distributed to Kibaki’s own party, with only a few being reserved for Raila’s faction, and no prime minister position was created. As time passed, it became increasingly evident that the Kikuyu were dominating key ministerial positions, senior civil servant posts, and other plum jobs as Kibaki surrounded himself with a clique of politicians and businessmen from his own community. Thus, once again, the community that held the presidential seat was seen to be benefiting at the expense of all others. NARC’s commitment to anticorruption was also called into question by a large-scale scandal that came to light in 2005. This was devastating to Kibaki’s government as it only further consolidated the sentiment that very little had changed since the Moi era. However, it was the contentious draft constitution that was seen to be the biggest betrayal of Kenyan democracy. NARC’s campaign had emphasized the establishment of a constitution with decentralization and federalism at its heart. However, this draft was subject to a number of amendments after 2002, and when the Proposed New Constitution of Kenya was put to a referendum in 2005, it maintained a unitary system of government and a powerful presidency. It was widely perceived as a document that served the interests of Kikuyu hard-liners within the government. Leading politicians from different communities, led by Raila, formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) to oppose the constitution. The document was rejected by a significant margin. However, the referendum results indicated

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that the Kikuyu community had voted overwhelmingly in favor of the constitution, engendering a widespread perception of this community as selfish, arrogant, and intent on dominating the political and economic scene to the exclusion of all others—and, indeed, to the detriment of Kenyan democracy as a whole. This perception was only further consolidated when, in November 2005, Kibaki sacked members of the government who had opposed him in the referendum and replaced them with loyal Kikuyu figures. Going into the election year of 2007, then, there was a strong anti-Kikuyu sentiment across the country and a deep discontent with a regime that had seemingly squandered the opportunity to rescue Kenya from politics defined by corruption, repression, and ethnicity. The Conflict In the context of severe disillusionment with the Kibaki regime, and having enjoyed such great success in the referendum, the Orange Democratic Movement was registered as a political party in the lead-up to the 2007 elections. Headed by Raila Odinga, ODM’s leadership comprised an alliance of politicians from five of Kenya’s major ethnic groups—Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, Kamba, and Coastal—and, consequently, it enjoyed a multiethnic base of support. The incumbent, Kibaki, formed the Party of National Unity (PNU) in his campaign for reelection, which was widely perceived to be an entirely Kikuyu affair. Thus, the election was framed by a “forty-one tribes against one” rhetoric. After a heated campaign period, an election day marked by irregularities, and a significant delay in the counting process, Kibaki was controversially announced as the winner of the presidential election amid rumors of rigging and malpractice. Violence erupted almost immediately as ODM-affiliated communities launched attacks against their Kikuyu neighbors and the latter responded in kind. This conflict was deeply rooted in Kenya’s past political struggles and its tendency toward violent ethnic politics. Four key issues are central to understanding the conflict: the high stakes of elections in Kenya and the emotions of 2007, in particular; pervasive narratives of ethnic grievance and historical injustice; ethnic territoriality; and the normalization of violence in Kenyan politics. The historical pattern by which Kenyan presidents have favored their own communities in the allocation of key positions and the distribution of state resources has created a pervasive “our turn to eat” mentality in Kenyan society, a widespread idea that elections are a winner-takes-all ethnic competition. Having “our man” in the presidential seat is expected to lead to better access to such public services as education and health care, increased employment opportunities, and preferential treatment in the distribution of other tangible resources. In short, being in power is equated with better life opportunities for the entire community. By extension, losing the election means almost certain exclusion and marginalization at the hands of another group. As such, Kenyan elections are high-stakes affairs, heavily steeped in feelings of hope and fear. In 2007, these emotions were running particularly high. The Kikuyu feared retribution and subsequent exclusion for their perceived monopoly of power.

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Similarly, ODM-affiliated communities, having experienced marginalization and exclusion under Kibaki, feared its continuation should he be granted a second term. More than this, however, they had extremely high hopes and expectations for an assured ODM victory. Many believed that PNU—with its predominantly Kikuyu appeal—simply did not have the numbers to defeat ODM if the elections were free and fair. For many, the election was merely a formality, and ODM-affiliated groups had high expectations that they would soon be enjoying the spoils of power. Thus, the lead-up to the election was filled with a sense of excitement and euphoria among ODM groups. However, as the election process began to exhibit irregularities and signs of malpractice, anger and frustration began to build. The specific sequence of events throughout the counting process—such as Raila’s early lead vanishing overnight, discrepancies in some of the results, the fact that some returning officers could not be contacted, and a blackout immediately preceding the announcement—eroded any faith in the impartiality of the Electoral Commission and indicated to Kenyans that the election was being “stolen.” When Kibaki was announced as the winner, many Kenyans were already extremely angry at the apparent interference in the democratic process and watched with incredulity as their hopes for victory vanished. Within five minutes of the announcement, violence exploded across the country as ODM-affiliated communities targeted their Kikuyu neighbors in violent protests of the stolen election. The second key issue in understanding the postelection crisis relates to perceptions of interethnic grievance and historical injustice. Ethnic tensions and animosities are very much the product of contemporary political divisions and existing policies of preference and marginalization. Narratives of persistent hostility and enduring enmity, however, are often drawn upon to solidify contemporary political alliances. Kibaki’s removal of Kalenjin figures from key positions of the government and security forces in 2002, for example, engendered a prevailing sentiment that the Kalenjin community as a whole was being sidelined. In addition, large-scale evictions of Kalenjin settlers in the Mau Forest and Likia in 2005, following recommendations by a government commission, were pointed to as further evidence of Kikuyu attack on the community, and they were tied into the history of land injustice in the Rift Valley. Once again, the Kikuyu were perceived to be forcing Kalenjin off land that historically belonged to them. Similarly, among the Luo community, Kibaki’s failure to honor the MoU and install Raila as prime minister was incorporated within a narrative of a Kikuyu-Luo animosity that had endured since independence and of unremitting efforts by the Kikuyu to exclude the Luo from power. Links were drawn between Jomo Kenyatta’s disagreements with Oginga Odinga in the 1960s and Kibaki’s betrayal of Raila in 2002. Moreover, references to Luo assassinations under Kenyatta were further highlighted as lying at the root of Kikuyu-Luo tensions. Thus, narratives of past injustices are interwoven with perceptions of contemporary marginalization and, in 2007, they were central to the transformation of the Kikuyu into “the enemy.” This, combined with fears of future exclusion from power, created an explosive context for the 2007 elections.

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Third, notions of ethnic territoriality and the expectation of socioeconomic and political dominance over space are central to understanding the dynamics of the 2007–2008 crisis. As noted above, ethnic attachments to space have their roots in the colonial period, and the various provinces of Kenya are regarded as belonging to particular groups. These narratives of territoriality have also permeated into the urban arena; as ethnic enclaves emerge through settlement patterns, neighborhoods, villages and in some cases entire slums are being carved out as belonging to the group that constitutes the majority. Incorporated within this discourse of ethnoterritorial belonging is the notion that minorities residing in the area are immigrants or guests who have been invited to stay by the native or majority community. As such, they are expected to abide by certain rules of hospitality. These rules relate almost entirely to issues of political and economic dominance. Native or majority communities believe that they should benefit from the economic resources associated with the territory, including land, employment opportunities, and business. When minority communities are seen to be dominating the economic scene in an area that does not belong to them, it is a significant source of resentment. Landownership, for example, is a major source of grievance in the Rift Valley, as minority communities are seen to own, and to be benefiting from, land that does not belong to them. Similarly, the predominance of Kikuyu landlords in Luo- and Luhya-dominated slums in Nairobi continues to cause tensions among these groups. Closely tied to these issues of economic dominance is the idea that the majority community should have a greater political say in the area. That is, minority communities are expected to vote in accordance with the host group. The dynamics of the 2007 elections and the violent aftermath can be understood through this lens of ethnic territoriality. Throughout the campaigns, minority communities perceived to be supporting the “wrong” political party were threatened, intimidated, and warned not to vote against the host community’s preferred candidates. Local residents actively or visibly displaying their support for the opposing party were abused, harassed, beaten and sometimes even killed in an effort to ensure compliance. Candidates found it difficult to campaign in certain areas, and their rallies were often violently disrupted by armed youths as the majority community sought to discipline political behavior in the area. The violence that followed the elections was also intimately shaped by this narrative of territorial ownership and was largely characterized not by an attempt to kill off or exterminate any particular group, but rather to punish communities for their abuses of hospitality and to drive them back to their own territories. Revealingly, in some places residents from minority communities were issued warnings to leave before they were attacked and chased from the area. Thus, while the killings were numerous—recorded at 1,133—the numbers of displaced were far higher, at around 650,000. In ODM zones, the Kikuyu, who were perceived to have abused their hosts’ hospitality by voting for Kibaki, were violently evicted from the territory, and their homes and businesses were burned to the ground or appropriated by the majority group so that they would have nothing to return to. As the violence spread, ODM groups in Kikuyu-dominated territories were

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similarly chased from their homes as the Kikuyu launched revenge attacks. The extent to which this issue of ethnic territoriality shaped the violence is apparent in the fact that ethnically mixed urban spaces, where the discourse of ethnic ownership is markedly absent, remained relatively cool throughout the duration of the crisis, resisting degeneration into ethnic violence. Finally, the normalization of violence in Kenyan politics and its diffusion in society by 2007 facilitated the eruption, spread, and intensity of the conflict. As previously noted, the deliberate orchestration of violence by political elites has been a prominent feature of Kenyan elections since the transition to multiparty politics in 1991. To intimidate and displace ethnic groups seen to be supporting opposing parties, it has become commonplace for politicians to equip, fund, and direct armed ethnic youth groups to carry out attacks in the lead-up to elections. In 2007, while the most significant violence took place after the elections, political candidates still used these groups during the campaigns to disrupt opposition rallies and intimidate their supporters. Moreover, the violence that followed the elections exhibited clear signs of elite organization and funding in some areas. For example, well-equipped Kalenjin militias and the Kikuyu Mungiki vigilante group were transported, en masse, to carry out attacks against other ethnic groups, indicating a level of organization and funding from above. However, the 2007 postelection crisis was not simply the product of elite organization; indeed, the diffusion of violence throughout Kenyan society and the proliferation of vigilante groups at the grassroots facilitated a more spontaneous, bottom-up dynamic to the conflict.6 Throughout the campaigns, for example, local youth gangs were at the forefront of the harassment of minority communities in their territories, and following the announcement of the results, they played a key role in leading attacks and encouraging and coercing others to participate. Nevertheless, violence had become a normal part of politics and political competition in Kenya by 2007. This, combined with the high stakes and emotions surrounding the elections, the narratives of ethnic animosity and grievance, the embedded discourses of ethnic territoriality, and an almost total lack of faith in the impartiality and the ability of the judicial system to address electoral malpractice, make the violent response to the botched elections more explicable. Management of the Conflict The state security agencies in Kenya were overwhelmed by the situation and struggled to contain and manage the crisis. Indeed, to a large extent, their actions actually served to exacerbate the situation. Throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras, the Kenyan police have been employed as a repressive tool of the state and have tended to use excessive force in response to security challenges. This tendency to towards heavy-handed tactics found brutal expression once again in the 2007–2008 postelection violence. Across the country, as the demonstrations and riots broke out, the police used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the crowds. It has been estimated that approximately 400 of the recorded 1,133 casualties died at the hands of the police.7

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At the political level, there had been some unsuccessful mediation efforts by key figures, including the Ghanaian president, John Kufuor, before Kofi Annan arrived in the country on January 22, 2008. After five weeks of negotiations, a powersharing agreement was reached on February 28 in which Kibaki remained as president and Raila was installed in a new prime minister position. In addition to this interim coalition government, the principals agreed to deliver a package of reforms that would address some of the causes of violence in the country, and this would include the drafting of a new constitution and the implementation of truth and justice mechanisms. Kenya’s experience of power sharing points to some of the challenges and limitations of this form of conflict management in ethnically divided societies. Disagreements between Kibaki, Raila, and the Kamba vice president, Kalonzo Musyoka, made the everyday business of politics challenging and caused regular conflicts within the government. Moreover, while key positions were distributed evenly between ODM and PNU, this only consolidated ethnic division in Kenyan politics. Ministries, parastatal organizations, and civil service sectors, for example, quickly became saturated by particular communities as the key figures predominantly appointed members of their own group to positions under their control.8 Power sharing did not serve to depoliticize ethnicity, nor did it have much effect on the prevalence of corruption and authoritarianism in Kenyan politics. Corruption scandals, suspected political killings, and the excessive use of force continued to besmirch the government and its institutions. Despite its shortcomings, however, the coalition government did oversee the drafting and ratification of a new constitution in the face of divided public and political opinion. The final document proposed a system that would curtail some powers of the presidency, introducing a series of checks and balances on executive power, and it did provide for some element of devolution with the establishment of 47 county councils. While Kalenjin politicians, under the leadership of William Ruto, mobilized their community to oppose the constitution, the tide of popular support was very much in its favor, and the constitution was accepted in a referendum in August 2010. The long-term implications of this new system are yet to be seen. On the one hand, the decentralization of power to county councils may reduce the high stakes nature of Kenyan presidential elections. Although communities may lose in the latter, their success in the former may serve to allay their fears of exclusion and marginalization. It is this consolation, some scholars have suggested, that helps to explain the absence of violence in the most recent elections of 2013.9 However, on the other hand, devolution may serve to exacerbate notions of ethnic territoriality, shifting the struggle for power from the presidential seat to these county and gubernatorial elections. A key element of the reform process agreed to in early 2008 was the implementation of justice mechanisms that would try and prosecute the main perpetrators of the postelection violence. However, there seemed to be little action being taken on this front by the coalition government, most likely because a significant number of politicians were themselves implicated in the violence to some degree. In the

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absence of a clear commitment to bringing the instigators to justice on the part of the Kenyan government, the International Criminal Court launched an investigation and, by the end of 2010, had issued summonses to six individuals from both sides of the political divide, including the prominent figures of William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta. These ICC investigations were arguably a key factor in driving Ruto and Kenyatta to unite under the Jubilee Alliance banner in the lead-up to the 2013 elections. This Kalenjin-Kikuyu alliance campaigned against Raila’s Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) and a few other parties of minor significance that were headed up by leading Kamba and Luhya politicians. Thus, the political divisions of 2013 were far less volatile in 2013 than they were in 2007. The ICC investigations are still ongoing, but in 2013, they arguably had the unintended effect of diffusing Kalenjin-Kikuyu tensions in the lead-up to the elections. Significance The postelection violence of 2007–2008 brought to stark attention Kenya’s troubled political history and the significant challenges it faces in terms of democratic consolidation and nation-building as a whole. Despite its reputation for peace, stability and vibrant democracy, Kenya has in fact suffered from divisive ethnic politics, authoritarianism, and insecurity since the colonial period. It is a country of acute inequality, where life chances are heavily dependent on place of birth, and for decades it has suffered from profound ethnic competition and conflict over the distribution of resources. The strong executive has frequently ruled with a heavy hand, stifling political debate and crushing dissent in the pursuit of order and power maintenance, and violence has become a normal part of everyday life and an integral element of the political arena. The reforms put in motion following the 2007–2008 crisis have sought to address some of these enduring challenges, and the relatively peaceful transfer of power in the 2013 elections was lauded by many as evidence of their success. However, while some progress has been made, serious questions remain over the triumph of democracy in Kenya. Since 2008, ethnic chauvinism has persisted in the distribution of state largesse, constructing and reifying further patterns of exclusion, marginalization, and grievance. The reforms have done little to address the prevailing sense of ethnic territoriality in Kenyan society, and threats of eviction continue to be issued to minorities who are perceived to be on the wrong side of the political divide. Pervasive insecurity and violence remain a normal aspect of everyday life, and heavy-handed responses by state security agencies have not been uncommon; corruption and authoritarian tactics have continued to mark politics at the highest level. Kenya’s path toward democracy will, undoubtedly, continue to be rocky and imbued with challenges. Notes 1. Gabrielle Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 17.

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2. Ibid. 3. Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 15. 4. David Anderson and Emma Lochery, “Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?” Journal of Eastern African Affairs 2, no. 2 (2008): 328–343, 336. 5. See Patrick Chabal, and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument (London: James Currey, 1999). 6. Suzanne Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” The Journal of Eastern Asian Studies 2, no. 2 (2008): 185–210, 187. 7. See Commission of Inquiry into the Post-election Violence (CIPEV), The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008). 8. Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History since Independence (London, I. B. Tauris, 2012), 771. 9. Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis, “Democracy and Its Discontents: Understanding Kenya’s 2013 Elections,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, no. 1 (2014): 2–24.

Suggested Reading Branch, Daniel. 2011. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Branch, Daniel, and Nic Cheeseman. 2009. “Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. African Affairs 108 (430): 1–26. Cheeseman, Nic, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis. 2014. “Democracy and Its Discontents: Understanding Kenya’s 2013 Elections. Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (1): 2–24. Commission of Inquiry into the Post-election Violence (CIPEV). 2008. “Post-election Violence, 2007—How Deep Are the Roots?” In The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence. Nairobi: Government Printer, 21–36. http://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/15A00F569813F4D549257607001F459D-Full_Report .pdf. Hornsby, Charles. 2012. Kenya: A History since Independence. London: I. B. Tauris. Jenkins, Sarah. 2012. “Ethnicity, Violence and the ‘Immigrant-Guest’ Metaphor in Kenya.” African Affairs 111 (445): 576–596. Lynch, Gabrielle. 2011. I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mueller, Susanne. D. 2008. “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis.” Journal of Eastern African Studies 2 (2): 185–210. Wrong, Michela. 2009. It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower. New York: Harper.

Appendix Human Rights Watch, 2013, High Stakes: Political Violence and the 2013 Elections in Kenya, February 2013. Summary of Findings. Published in the lead-up to the 2013 elections, this report analyzes the reform process in Kenya since the postelection crisis. It reflects on the state of Kenyan democracy and the prospects for violence in the March 2013 elections. The document draws attention to the slow progress of reforms

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and argues that very little has changed since 2008. It asserts that the government has failed to address the underlying causes of past political violence and that a recurrence of conflict is possible in the upcoming elections. Key among its criticisms are the lack of police reform and the institution’s continued abuses of human rights in their responses to insecurity; the persistence of interethnic tensions across the country; the proliferation of criminal gangs and insecurity; and the ongoing culture of impunity among the political elite.

Summary Kenya will hold general elections on March 4, the first elections since the serious violence that engulfed the country after the 2007 polls and the first under Kenya’s new constitution. Inter-ethnic clashes and police violence after the 2007 elections left up to 1,300 people dead and more than 650,000 displaced. As this report shows, the underlying causes of past election-related violence remain in place, and in some parts of the country the tensions have escalated. A combination of inaction by the authorities in some regions and abusive or discriminatory conduct in others, plus a failure to implement promised reform, has led Kenya into another election where the risk of violence and human rights violations remains perilously high. The fears are real. Already in 2012 and early 2013, inter-communal clashes in parts of Kenya have claimed more than 477 lives. Another 118,000 people have been displaced. The dynamics and risks differ in each region of the country. For example, in Coast the government is facing a secessionist group opposed to the elections as well as a violent inter-ethnic conflict. In Nyanza and Central powerful criminal groups and armed gangs are backing politicians. In North Eastern government security forces have stoked tensions by using excessive force against local residents, especially after attacks by armed groups on the police and military. The common theme, however, is the unwillingness of the government and other state authorities since the post-election violence of 2007–2008 to address the root causes of violence, reform the police, tackle official corruption, disband criminal groups, resettle displaced persons, and hold accountable the many perpetrators of violence. The near total impunity for the murders, rapes, and forced displacement in 2007–2008 has left the people who committed those crimes free to commit them again. Without domestic prosecutions the International Criminal Court (ICC) has filled some of the gap. Four Kenyans are facing charges of crimes against humanity at the ICC in relation to the 2007–2008 violence, with trials due to start in April 2013. Two of the four suspects, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, are running on a joint ticket for president and vicepresident, raising the stakes of the March elections. The Kenyan commission of inquiry that examined the 2007–2008 violence identified the conduct of the police as a fundamental problem, and since then little has changed. Kenya appointed its first inspector general of police under the 2010 constitution in December 2012, but the police remain under-staffed and poorly equipped to deal with inter-ethnic violence and criminal gangs, and they frequently commit human rights violations when

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they do intervene. The police are widely considered to be corrupt and in collusion with criminal groups. The dynamics of election-related violence are complicated by Kenya’s multi-layered struggle for power, with candidates competing on the national level and for various posts in the 47 new counties created under the 2010 constitution, including in each county a governor, deputy governor, senator, member of parliament, women representative, and assembly representative. These positions offer control over government funds and local resources. Based on research conducted between August and December 2012 in Kenya’s Central, Coast, Eastern, North Eastern, Nyanza, and Rift Valley regions, this report documents and explains the patterns of violence and human rights violations in six of Kenya’s eight regions. It highlights the risks to the right to life that the government and other state authorities need to address as elections approach. The report shows how the government has failed to address the root causes of past political violence, such as police abuse, police corruption, politicians stoking inter-ethnic tension, and the near total impunity for perpetrators of serious crimes. It focuses attention on areas of Kenya where the risk of violence around the elections is high, and urges the government and other authorities to take urgent measures to protect Kenyans right to life. In total, researchers interviewed 228 people around Kenya, including community elders, youths, civil society representatives, government officials, security officials, representatives of humanitarian agencies, victims of violence, and perpetrators of violence—mostly young men in armed gangs and criminal groups. Human Rights Watch submitted detailed questions to the Kenyan government about its efforts to hold free and fair elections without violence (see Appendix A), but the government did not respond. The report builds on Human Rights Watch’s extensive reporting on the 2007–2008 election-related violence and the government’s conduct since then. The report is divided into the five sections, mirroring the regions that have recently witnessed violence. The Coast region has experienced mounting tension since 2009, with the secessionist Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) warning the government against organizing elections there. Facilities and officials of the electoral commission, as well as police stations, have come under attack in Kwale, Kilifi, and Malindi counties, but MRC denied responsibility. The police blamed MRC and arbitrarily rounded up suspected MRC members. At the same time, Tana River county has experienced a spate of serious violence since August 2012, with around 180 people killed in fighting between the agriculturalist Pokomo and the pastoralist Orma communities. An estimated 34,000 people have been displaced. Both communities complained about the police’s failure to provide protection or arrest the perpetrators of violence, which they said led both groups to take justice into their own hands. In the Rift Valley mistrust and anger remain high between members of the two main ethnic groups, the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu, who fought fiercely in 2007–2008. The government of President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, has not adequately promoted reconciliation between the communities; on the contrary, some of its policies have widened the divide. Human Rights Watch research indicates that government assistance to the roughly 400,000 persons displaced in the Rift Valley five years ago—a rebuilt home, a new home, money, or

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land—has significantly favored the Kikuyu and left the Kalenjin internally displaced, many of them unregistered, concerned that the government will not assist them. The failure to arrest, let alone prosecute, those responsible for previous election related violence has left people suspicious and afraid—emotions that are heightened when candidates for office hold secret meetings and make political appeals along ethnic lines. Unlike 2007–2008 when both sides used machetes, spears, and bows and arrows, Kalenjin and Kikuyu elders, as well as local government officials, told Human Rights Watch that both communities have now acquired guns. “The communities are preparing—they are arming themselves,” one activist in a local nongovernmental organization said. “All over they are saying: ‘This time we won’t be unprepared.’” In Eastern and North Eastern regions, the prospects for violence are on two fronts: interclan clashes and widespread abuses by government security forces after attacks inside Kenya by the Somali militant Islamist group al-Shabaab. In the former, the police have consistently failed to intervene; in the latter, they have repeatedly used excessive force. The inter-clan violence began in late 2011, primarily in Isiolo, Moyale, and Mandera, and has left roughly 120 people dead and 77,000 people displaced. At the same time, al-Shabaab has continued to target Kenyan security forces since Kenya’s intervention in Somalia in October 2011. Kenyan forces have responded with excessive force, arbitrary detention, and mistreatment in custody of people believed to be supporting al-Shabaab in places such as Garissa, Wajir, Dadaab, Mandera, and El Wak. Al-Shabaab supporters have also launched grenade and gun attacks at churches, mosques, buses, and other public places in Nairobi, Mombasa, and northern Kenya. In Central Kenya, a traditionally Kikuyu area, the key danger stems from candidates and their parties using criminal groups and armed gangs to silence opponents and rally support. As with previous elections, politicians seem to have hired gangs, including the violent Mungiki, to intimidate voters. Police have taken no effective action against these illegal groups despite the passage of a law in 2010 to respond to the threat of armed gangs. Nyanza region in western Kenya was one of the areas hardest hit by violence in 2007–2008, with about 115 people killed, more than 90 percent of them by the police, according to the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV, also known as the Waki Commission after its president, Justice Philip Waki). Nyanza has historically witnessed high levels of political violence, with partisan youth in Kisumu city playing a major role. In recent years Nyanza has been dominated by different criminal gangs, including the Baghdad Boys, Sungu, American Marine, and China Group. For the most part the police have failed to prevent these armed groups from committing crimes, and some police are accused of collaborating with them. The gangs are also allied with politicians: American Marine based in Kisumu apparently supports Prime Minister Raila Odinga and China Group appears to support Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. Violence erupted between the two gangs in September 2012 after a visit to Nyanza by Deputy Prime Minister Kenyatta, and the police failed to intervene. In October 2012 the murder by unknown suspects of a candidate from Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) sparked riots. This time the police intervened, and their apparent use of excessive force left eight people dead. Four of the eight died while hiding from police in a container; three

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witnesses told Human Rights Watch that the police locked the container door and fired tear gas inside, causing a fire. Despite promises from Kenya’s leaders to reform, the country’s political system remains haunted by the specter of violence. The rewards of political office, including protection from criminal prosecution, are huge. As such, some candidates in the past have gone to great lengths to achieve power, including unleashing violence on their opponents and their supporters. The violence over the past 14 months shows that Kenya’s political actors have failed to address the underlying causes of conflict or adequately strengthen Kenya’s institutions to protect human rights. Resolute action by these actors, including outgoing and incoming political office holders, with coordinated pressure from foreign governments and international organizations, is essential for the March 2013 elections to be free of violence and human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch recommends that the government deploy police in adequate numbers to areas of potential conflict and ensure that they perform their duties impartially and with full respect for the law. Criminal justice authorities should promptly investigate and, where there is evidence, prosecute all individuals, including government officials and candidates for office, who are suspected of inciting, planning, or organizing violence. Consistent with the responsibility to protect, the government should take all possible measures to prevent mass atrocities and support the development and implementation of effective contingency plans to halt mass atrocities rapidly should preventive efforts fail. Kenya’s development partners, as well as the United Nations and African Union, should apply sustained and coordinated pressure on Kenya’s government and politicians to take the important steps outlined in this report, with consequences when they do not, including visa bans and asset freezes of individuals credibly implicated in political violence. Longterm election observer missions are essential for effective elections monitoring, including in the post-election period. Governments and international organizations should publicly condemn human rights abuses by all actors and demand accountability for criminal acts. Source: Human Rights Watch Reports. Available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/02/07 /high-stakes.

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Kosovo The Conflicts in Kosovo and the Limits of Third-Party Conflict Management Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline 1389 Ottoman Turks defeat the Serbs at Kosovo Polje, and the settlement of Muslims in the cradle of the crumbling Serbian Empire begins. 1800s Modern Serbian and Pan-Albanian nationalism are born in Kosovo in the late 19th century. 1912 As the Ottoman Empire wanes on the eve of World War I, Serbs retake Kosovo from the Turks. By this point, Muslim Albanians constitute a majority of Kosovo’s population. 1918 The postwar settlement at Versailles creates the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which will evolve in a federalist direction during the interwar period. 1945 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) emerges as a Communist state composed of six autonomous units ruled by the head of its wartime resistance to Nazi occupation, Marshal Josip Broz Tito. Kosovo remains an integral part of the Serbian state. 1966 Dismantling of the repressive secret police network leads to an outbreak of nationalism in Kosovo. 1974 The new FRY constitution gives Kosovo autonomy inside the Serbian state.

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1989 On the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje, the chief of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Slobodan Milosevic, declares Kosovo will forever be Serbian (despite its now 90 percent Albanian Muslim population) and revokes Kosovo’s autonomy as he emerges as post-communist Yugoslavia’s strongman. 1990 Already weakened by the 1980 death of Tito, Yugoslavia begins to break apart. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia soon secede. The resultant civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina claim hundreds of thousands of lives. Kosovo Albanians establish a shadow government in exile in Albania. In Kosovo, paramilitary Albanian groups attack Serbian forces and Albanians supportive of Belgrade. 1992 Ibrahim Rugova, a moderate nationalist encouraging nonviolence, becomes president of the Kosovo shadow government. 1993 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is organized. Violence inside Kosovo escalates against Serbian forces as Belgrade focuses on wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1995 The Dayton Accord effectively ends the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Kosovo conflict is not a subject of the Dayton negotiations. 1997 KLA guerrillas escalate attacks on Serbian security forces. Turmoil in Albania makes weapons easily available to KLA operatives. 1998 The first round of ethnic cleansing begins in Belgrade. Responding to attacks on its forces, Belgrade retaliates against suspected KLA factions and mounts an ethnic-cleansing operation in the province, creating an estimated 300,000 Albanian refugees. Diplomatic efforts to end the crisis fail. 1999 March 24: Operation Allied Force begins. Following eleventh hour efforts to persuade Milosevic to permit deployment of a peacekeeping force and grant Kosovo enhanced autonomy, NATO launches a bombing campaign against the FRY and its security forces in Kosovo. The conflict escalates, and additional hundreds of thousands flee Kosovo. June 10: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1244, “Reaffirming . . . the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of

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the FRY and previous resolutions calling for “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo and creating a multidimensional UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to provide an interim government and security in the province. June 20: Milosevic relents. Outside forces occupy Kosovo, and Albanian refugees return, often attacking Kosovo’s Serbian civilians. 2000–2001 The “Wars after the War” take place. In local and then provincial elections, Rugova’s party defeats KLA’s political wing. In response, KLA extremists begin assassinating respected Albanian Kosovar moderates and encourage assertiveness in neighboring Macedonia’s Albanian community. Violence continues in Macedonia, even after international peacekeeping forces arrive, until the August Ohrid Agreement is concluded with a design for settling the conflict in Macedonia. 2004 The second round of ethnic cleansing begins. Amid false rumors of Serbs killing Albanian youths, Albanians attack minorities throughout Kosovo, with most remaining Serbs settling in northern Mitrovica, south of the border with Serbia. 2006 Following a long illness, Kosovo’s beloved nationalist president, Ibrahim Rugova, dies, stilling the last influential voice of moderation in Kosovo politics. As demands for immediate independence grow, discussions on the final status of Kosovo begin. 2007 April–May: UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari submits a detailed plan accepting independence as the best of bad options for Kosovo. Russia indicates it will block that decision on the Security Council. November: Kosovo voters give plurality to the party of the former KLA leader, who promises to declare Kosovo’s independence within one month of becoming prime minister. 2008 Kosovo declares its independence February 17. Approximately half of the countries in the world have now diplomatically recognized the new state. 2010 The International Court of Justice holds, by a 10 to 4 majority in an advisory opinion requested by the United Nations, that Kosovo’s declaration of independence “did not violate international law.” 2011–2013 Violence occurs in the north. The Kosovo government’s September 2011 decision to assert control over customs posts in the overwhelmingly Serbian north of

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Mitrovica results in violent clashes between Serbs and Albanians, necessitating the deployment of most of NATO’s peacekeepers in that region for nearly two years. 2012 International oversight of Kosovo’s politics officially ends. 2013–2014 Diplomatic negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina defuse the conflict in Mitrovica, and elections are held in that divided city. Serbian politicians loyal to Belgrade capture the posts in northern Mitrovica. January 2015 Protests take place in Pristina against corruption, the government’s inability to improve economic conditions, and the perceived continuing influence of Serbia in Kosovo’s affairs. They result in the injury of 170 people. By the time the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia was complete, the one state had—depending on whose list of diplomatically recognized countries you consult—disintegrated into six or seven. Five of these now enjoy full sovereignty and seats in the United Nations: Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. The other two are political oddities, even in the odd world of international politics. Bosnia-Herzegovina still holds the UN seat it was awarded during Yugoslavia’s violent wartime dismemberment during 1992–1995, but it falls short of enjoying full sovereignty as it continues to remain under the paramount authority of an internationally appointed administrator. Meanwhile, the system of supervised independence established in Kosovo following NATO’s 1999 air campaign on behalf of its Albanian majority officially ended in 2012. But Kosovo continues to lack a seat in the United Nations, and its independence remains unrecognized by five members of NATO and the European Union as well as by nearly half of the countries in the world. Historical Background In a sense, the Serbian-Albanian Muslim conflict in and over control of Kosovo was 600 years in the making. Consequently, distilling its historical background into a few pages is more than a little presumptuous. Still, to understand not just the conflict but the magnitude of the conflict management task that the international community assumed in 1999, some background information is necessarily in order, and the obvious starting point is the late 14th century. Whatever the ethnic origin of the peoples who originally inhabited the area that is now Kosovo, by the 14th century, it was Serbian, and the region had become the religious and cultural cradle of the ancient Serbian empire. In 1389, however, Serb rule ended abruptly when Serbian forces were decisively defeated by the Ottoman Turks at Kosovo Polje (the Battle of Kosovo), near Pristina. That defeat opened the

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door to the migration into the region of Islamized Albanians from the south, who were encouraged by the Ottomans to settle there to dilute the Serbian influence. Thus, by the time the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, Kosovo’s population already contained a significant Albanian Muslim minority. In the meantime, the second half of the 19th century witnessed the birth of modern Serbian nationalism, heavily interwoven with the symbolic importance of Kosovo and the landmarks of the ancient Serbian empire still surviving there. Indeed, 19th-century Serbian nationalism was born in a Pan-Serbian framework, and as the first part of the greater Serbian nation to acquire its independence, Serbia’s right to press for the attainment of a new pan-Serbian state founded on the modern principle of national self-determination rested heavily on Serbia’s control of Kosovo. Unfortunately for the future tranquility of the area, the late 19th century also witnessed the birth of modern Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, approximately 40 miles south and west of Pristina, in the city of Prizren. Hence, a generation before the postwar creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the same land was of symbolic importance to two different peoples and two colliding political movements. For most of its interwar life, the history of that kingdom was dominated by SerbianCroatian conflict, even as the numbers of Albanians Muslims, and Serbian-Albanian tension, continued to grow in Kosovo. German occupation further worsened those relations when the Germans established a puppet Albanian government in Kosovo paralleling the puppet Croatian government they created in Croatia, and with German cover, Kosovo’s Albanian leaders instituted their own reign of oppression over the province’s Serbs, driving as many as 100,000 of them from the province and leaving Kosovo equally Serbian and Albanian by the war’s end. It was nonetheless the postwar policies of Yugoslavia’s wartime hero and postwar leader, Marshal Tito (nee Josip Broz), that completed the Albanianization of Kosovo’s population. A Croat by birth and committed to creating a transcending “Yugoslav” identity out of the diverse peoples who constituted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) established after World War II, Tito too saw a value in diluting the Serbian presence in Kosovo. He therefore not only encouraged the migration of Albanian Muslims from the south into the province, but, in 1974, promulgated a new constitution that gave the province a measure of autonomy as well as separate representation on the collective presidency that Tito fashioned to steer the country after his rule. That autonomy essentially meant Albanian self-government by the time of Tito’s death in 1980. By then, the province’s Albanian Muslim community represented approximately 90 percent of Kosovo’s population and the Serbs only 8 percent, although the Albanians remained a distinct economic minority. As for Tito’s death, it marked the end of Belgrade’s failing efforts to create a Yugoslav identity and the beginning of the struggle to succeed Tito within the country’s Communist Party.1 For nearly a decade, however, that struggle and intercommunal tensions were kept in check by the country’s principal ethnonational communities’ shared fear of Soviet interference should Yugoslavia begin to fall apart from within. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed that glue; indeed, by the late 1980s the Communist Party wings of Yugoslavia’s various union

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republics were already showing signs of rebelling against Belgrade’s leadership and going their separate ways. They would eventually do so on the eve of the country’s collapse with the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia in 1991. By then, however, the leader of Yugoslavia’s Communist Party, Slobodan Milosevic, had played the Serbian nationalist card in his own bid to rule Yugoslavia, rescinding Kosovo’s provincial autonomy at a time when its Albanian Muslims were calling for more control over their affairs and celebrating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo by making an inflammatory nationalist speech capped with the promise that “Kosovo would forever be Serbian.” Two years later, amid riots by Albanians protesting Belgrade’s actions, Milosevic declared a state of emergency in Kosovo and essentially emptied Kosovo’s state institutions, including its police and state companies, of their Albanian employees. The Conflict Milosevic’s emphasis on Serbian nationalism accelerated the movement toward separatism in the country’s union republics outside of Serbia and Montenegro and had an immediate and negative impact on politics in Kosovo. Within a year of Milosevic’s speech, the province’s Albanians had formed a government-in-exile in Albania under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova and his fellow moderates in the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) party, and less moderate Albanian Muslims had formed militant separatist groups and begun targeting Kosovo’s Serbs, Romany, and Yugoslav security forces in Kosovo. Matters further deteriorated in 1993 when the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was founded and inaugurated a guerrilla warfare campaign for an independent Kosovo that did not spare those moderate Kosovo Albanian leaders who were still willing to settle for a restoration of Kosovo’s provincial autonomy inside Serbia. That campaign escalated after NATO’s intervention in the war in Bosnia in the summer of 1995, which (1) forced Milosevic to recognize the independence of its separatist republics in the Dayton Accord signed later that year and (2) encouraged the KLA to believe that if it provoked Belgrade into overreacting, NATO might also intervene on behalf of Kosovo, whose status was ignored at Dayton.2 There were firm reasons for the KLA to draw that conclusion. Although there was already evidence that paramilitaries on all sides had been guilty of committing atrocities during the warfare in Croatia and Bosnia, as a result of the massacre at Srebrenica in which Serbian forces killed thousands of Muslim men and boys before the helplessly underarmed European protective force assigned to that UN-designated “safe haven,” Serbs were widely seen by the outside world as purveyors of genocidal warfare. Thus, despite the fact that reporters on the spot indicated that Albanian ethnic cleansing of Serbian areas (including attacks on Serbian churches and cemeteries designed to erase the physical signs of Serbian cultural history) had been occurring in the area since the early 1980s and that much of Belgrade’s action in Kosovo during 1996 and 1997 was in response to KLA attacks on its forces, the oft-exaggerated rumors of Serbian massacres of civilians in Kosovo were given instant credibility in many Western quarters.

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In 1998–1999, the KLA’s strategy paid off. With Milosevic launching an aggressive campaign to drive large numbers of Kosovo Albanians from their homes in response to the KLA’s action, at least 300,000 refugees pouring into neighboring Albania to avoid being caught in the crossfire between the KLA and the Serbian forces in Kosovo, diplomacy failing, and rumors of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo circulating widely, Western diplomats demanded that Belgrade permit outside peacekeeping forces to enter the province to end the fighting and restructure Kosovo’s status in Yugoslavia. When Milosevic refused, U.S.-led NATO units in March of 1999 launched an air campaign against Yugoslav targets inside and outside of Kosovo to force Belgrade to reconsider restoring Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of outside peacekeepers. That campaign, now referred to simply as “the war” by Kosovo Albanians, succeeded in achieving NATO’s objective, but at the cost of further complicating the political situation and reducing the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Albanian-Serbian conflict inside that troubled province. Management of the Conflict NATO Intervention: Problem Management and Problem Making

The announced justification for NATO’s prophylactic intervention (Operation Allied Force) was threefold: (1) to halt any further commitment of the war crimes allegedly occurring in Kosovo, (2) to minimize civilian casualties there, and (3) to stem the destabilizing flow of refugees into neighboring states. In fact, NATO’s operation—which stretched across 78 days (or 75 more than initially estimated to be necessary) and involved more than 10,000 attack sorties—produced almost exactly the opposite results. Within 48 hours of NATO initiating its bombing campaign, hundreds of thousands of additional Albanian refugees flooded across Kosovo’s borders into makeshift refugee camps in neighboring areas. At the same time, inside Kosovo, Serbian forces took out their frustration against the Albanian civilians still there, who were left undefended because NATO excluded at the outset any deployment of ground forces. Consequently, many analysts have concluded that war crimes may have actually increased during the war. Nor did matters end there. Shortly thereafter, NATO’s military action morphed into an unfortunate example of conflict management in which the device chosen to manage one problem —in Kosovo, the danger faced by its Albanian peoples— created another set of problems. When the war ended and the Albanian refugees returned from exile, the absence of NATO ground troops opened the door to Albanian-committed acts of revenge against Kosovo’s vulnerable Serbian population and detested Romany community, who were forced to take flight to wherever they could find shelter elsewhere in Serbia or in Montenegro. As a result, of Kosovo’s estimated 1.9 million people at the time, by the end of Operation Allied Force, approximately 800,000 were refugees and another 500,000 had become internally displaced persons in either Kosovo (chiefly Albanians); Montenegro (where twothirds of Kosovo’s Romany fled); or Serbia (which was soon hosting 90 percent of Kosovo’s internally displaced Serbs).3

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The flight of the Serbian refugees, in turn, enormously complicated the task of peace building in postwar Kosovo. In authorizing its operations there, the United Nations explicitly recognized the province as a part of Serbia—a stipulation which Kosovo’s independence-minded Albanian community rejected almost to a person. Kosovo Albanians similarly opposed the return of Kosovo Serbs, lest their repatriation strengthen Belgrade’s claim to the province. Thus, voters gradually began to choose KLA leaders and other hard-line Albanian politicians to head Kosovo’s provincial government as the impasse continued, and when NATO sought to protect Kosovo Serbs and abet their return, its forces too were sometimes targeted by Albanian extremists. Third-Party State Building: Seeking a Strategy

The same day that the bombing campaign ended, the United Nations passed Resolution 1244, creating the broad structure for rebuilding Kosovo under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Also authorized was the deployment of a Kosovo stabilization force (KFOR) to be composed of NATO military units and charged with maintaining the secure environment necessary for creating democratic institutions of provincial governance. The reconstruction design built extensively on similar international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNMIK was to preside over four broad task areas (dubbed “pillars”), but the individual tasks were organized under the daily charge of a specific international (governmental) organization, in each case with assistance from the various nongovernmental organizations that soon arrived in Kosovo to offer their services in such humanitarian areas as caring for the refugees. The United Nations itself took charge of two of these areas: civil administration and humanitarian assistance. The third area, democratization and institution building, with its collateral concerns of protecting human rights, was placed in the hands of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) was given responsibility for reconstruction and economic development in Kosovo. The Bosnia design seemingly fit the needs of Kosovo circa the summer of 1999; however, in at least three significant ways, the environment in Kosovo was significantly different from, and far more challenging than, the circumstances challenging those involved in state-building and refugee resettlement efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First there was a problem with mission clarity. Those concerned with implementing the Dayton Accord in Bosnia were not given easy tasks, but the goal of their mission was always clear: to create an independent, multinational democratic state. In contrast, in 1999 Kosovo, state builders lacked a clear legal charge in terms of the final outcome. Were they laboring to create a state that one day would be independent or a province that was to have significant autonomy but still remain a part Serbia? UN Resolution 1244 left the issue cloudy, charging UNMIK with the vague goal of “facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status” while making that task exceedingly difficult by defining the process as one in which in the people of Kosovo “can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal

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Republic of Yugoslavia”—a phrase that Belgrade interpreted as the United Nations’ recognition of Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia. Very quickly, mission murkiness compromised mission success. Neither Belgrade nor Kosovo’s nationalists could be sure of whether their cooperation with UNMIK would result in Kosovo remaining a part of Serbia or becoming independent. Similarly, the absence of mission clarity on the matter of final status seriously handicapped resettlement efforts affecting the province’s refugees and internally displaced people. The more Serbs in Kosovo, Albanian nationalists not illogically reasoned, the better Belgrade’s case for continued ownership of the province, hence, the resultant Albania’s efforts to intimate the remaining Serbs into leaving and unwillingness to cooperate in resettling those who had left the province as a result of the war. Nor did UNMIK have much leverage in altering that inclination. In ethnically mixed postwar Bosnia, Serbs had some reason to accept the return of other minorities to Serbian-held land in return for Croats and Bosnian Muslims permitting the return of Serbs to the territory they had held. In Kosovo, the Albanians were already home. Finally, the small size of the minority communities in Kosovo, in turn, made it impossible for the international community to encourage the development of cross-communal parties or to structure multinational institutions there. The assembly in Pristina contains a permanent, overwhelming Albanian majority and, at best, the representation of a permanent minority or sets of minorities. There was and still is little incentive for the majority to make concessions to the minorities or to share power with them. It was thus small wonder that the local scene became dominated by Albanian nationalist parties demanding independence on various timetables, not parties offering different social and economic agendas. And, as in the run up to the war, the KLA and other extreme Albanian nationalists wasted little time debating the moderate nationalists willing to accept provincial autonomy or with long timetables for acquiring independence. The “War after the War”

In fairness to those who tried to create democratic institutions in Kosovo, those efforts were seriously set back by the ill health and subsequent the death of President Rugova, the widely loved leader and spokesman for the moderate Albanian community. On the other hand, by the time of his demise in January 2006, his party had already suffered from its moderation on the independence issue, being electorally outbid by the militant “Independence Now!” parties and losing control of the province’s assembly and premiership in 2004 to opponents with closer ties to the KLA. Yet even before then, and beginning almost immediately after the failure of KLA affiliates to win power in the first round of Kosovo elections in the fall of 2000, Albanian extremists had systematically targeted not just Serbs but high-profile leaders in the moderate Albanian community, including those wartime heroes not affiliated with the KLA. The ability of KLA and other extremists to do so can be traced in large part to the nature of NATO’s operation in the early postwar years. NATO entered Kosovo to prevent a resumption of warfare between Belgrade and Kosovo, brandishing

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the tanks and other armored hardware likely to deter such action on Milosevic’s part. It did not arrive to patrol the streets and deal with criminal activity inside the province. It probably should have recognized that need, especially given the rumors of criminal activity and war crimes associated with KLA leaders at the time; however, neither its personnel nor equipment were suited to the task, and it is clear in retrospect that the situation on the streets went uncontrolled for too long. Many moderate Albanian voices were silenced permanently in the process.4 Macedonia: The Conflict Spreads

The KLA’s frustration with its failure to achieve immediate electoral success in Kosovo also accounts for the role of the organization—which officially disbanded in 1999—in instigating the 2001 fighting between the Macedonian majority and Albanian minority in neighboring Macedonia, which until then had been spared the violence that had raged elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. With only a minute Serbian population (approximately 2 percent), it had hardly qualified for membership in a Greater Serbia; however, given its large Albanian community (approximately 25 percent of Macedonia’s population) and its location between Kosovo and Albania, it did qualify as a part of the Greater Albania of which some Albanian Nationalists dreamed. Hence, once rid of their Serbian controllers, it took the KLA little time to spread the gospel of pan-Albanian nationalism and stir up interethnic conflict in the soil of that adjacent, recently independent country. Moreover, it was a fertile field in which to sow dissent. By the turn of the new millennium, relations between the Macedonian people and the Macedonian government in Skopje on the one hand and Macedonia’s Albanian minority on the other had been fragile for some time, and a rebel Albanian National Liberation Army (the NLA) already existed with which the KLA could liaison. Macedonia’s secession from Yugoslavia in 1991 had hardly been a unilateral act by the country’s 65 percent Macedonia majority (a countrywide referendum preceded it), but throughout the 1990s, the country’s Albanian minority had reason to resent their inferior economic status and their scant political influence. Indeed, Albanian grievances still lingered from the 1980s, when the state’s Communist government cooperated with Belgrade in its crackdown on Yugoslavia’s Albanian communities, and the constitution adopted at independence was a particularly sore point among the country’s Albanians because it essentially defined the country as a Macedonian ethnic state (“the nation-state of the Macedonian people”). Nonetheless, the violent conflict that erupted in early 2001 in the heavily Muslim Albanian territories to the north and west of Skopje along Macedonia’s border with Kosovo was largely instigated by KLA factions working in concert with Macedonia’s own Albanian guerrilla forces. Once the fighting between the NLA and Macedonian security forces began, it quickly gained a momentum of its own that was only blunted by the subsequent intervention of Western diplomats seeking to reconcile the conflicting parties. A cease-fire was reached on June 11, and, at the formal request of the Macedonian government, NATO forces arrived shortly thereafter to assist in the disarmament of the Albanian rebels. By then, warfare had already raged for several months,

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dislocating thousands, and reports of kidnappings and of Albanian guerillas and civilians torturing and executing captives and hostages were numerous, as were documented cases of abuses by Macedonian forces against Albanian civilians and outsiders caught in the conflict. Nor did these acts end with the August 2001 signing of the Ohrid Accord, which established a framework for resolving the conflict. Some of the heaviest fighting occurred shortly after the agreement’s signing and stretched forward until at least April of 2002. On the positive side, in 2002, free and fair national elections were held under international supervision with 800 international monitors observing the polling. The result was a new governing coalition that included the political party of the former Albanian rebel leader Ali Ahmeti, and hence a government with a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the country’s Albanian minority. Subsequent elections have largely been nonviolent and have likewise often resulted in coalition governments involving ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian parties, and a great deal of credit for the cooling of violence goes to the Ohrid Agreement and the subsequent implementation of its three pivotal points: (1) a territorial reorganization of local government in such a way as to enhance the local political clout of the country’s minorities; (2) elevation of the status of the Albanian language throughout country and the certification of an Albanian-language university long opposed by the country’s Macedonian leadership; and (3) modification of the constitution to redefine Macedonia as a multiethnic “civil” state composed of the “citizens of the Republic of Macedonia” rather than as the nation-state of the Macedonians. Less positively, tensions still exist between the two communities, which remain largely segregated from one another, even where they are territorially intermingled. Likewise, parties are still organized around the country’s national minorities, and the 2014 national elections were more communally charged that those of 2010 and 2012. Also complicating conflict resolution is the fact that, as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, unemployment has continued to run high (estimated at 28.6 percent in 2013), and disproportionately so among Albanians. Even the implementation of those provisions relating to the structure of the state via the Territorial Organization Act of August 2004 has had mixed results. In amalgamating districts containing Macedonia’s minorities, the act increased the number of locales in which Albanians constitute at least 20 percent of the population, and hence the number of areas in which Albanian would become a second official language and Albanians would attain a greater representation in local governments. In doing so, it fostered fears still present among many Macedonians that by consolidating ethnic Albanian areas the plan will ultimately lead to the division of their country or encourage Albanian separatism. 2004: Ethnic Cleansing, Round II

Meanwhile, the Kosovo Albanian electorate’s movement toward more militant spokesmen not only produced growing tension within the Albanian community between its two leading parties (the more moderate Democratic League of Kosovo headed by Rugova and the KLA-backed Democratic Party of Kosovo) but also between Kosovo Albanians and UNMIK over the latter’s unwillingness to decide

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Kosovo’s final status because of the continued unrest in the province and Kosovo’s failure to meet established standards in areas of public safety. Also at issue was the international community’s failure to provide the funding necessary to resuscitate the province’s economy, which suffered badly when the Serbs left along with their capital. In a circular manner, these tensions at times exploded, severely challenging NATO in its effort to maintain order and exposing its units to acts of violence, most dramatically during the upheaval in March of 2004, when false rumors of Serbs murdering two Albanian youth in northern Kosovo led to Albanian riots and attacks on Serbs in more than 30 towns, leaving nearly a score dead, 1,000 injured, and the widespread burning of Serb homes and churches as well as dozens of UNMIK vehicles.5 If not for the Serbs victimized by the riots, certainly for Kosovo’s Serbian community as a whole, the worst part of the rioting was the fact that much of it occurred in front of NATO troops untrained and unequipped for riot control and immobile in the face of the riots. But the greater casualty was the sharp drop in international enthusiasm for further involvement in Kosovo politics. Already disenchanted (as were Kosovo’s Serbs) with its inability to guarantee a safe, sustainable return of those minorities who fled Kosovo during the war, for UNMIK officials, the events of 2004 erased much of the image of Albanians as the victims of Serbian aggression and with it any desire to continue to pour money and efforts into trying to remold Kosovo into a successful model of third-party humanitarian interventionism and post–civil war nation-building. Independence, “the Least Bad Option”

Developments came quickly thereafter. In November 2005, Matti Ahtissari was appointed as a UN special envoy to head a study group to consider the future of Kosovo, and in February of 2007, he delivered his report to the secretary-general, recommending a multistep plan for Kosovo’s future that included a provision for “supervised independence.” While discussions ensued in which Serbia continued to make it clear that it still considered Kosovo as a province of Serbia and Russia announced to the UN Security Council that it would veto any plan granting Kosovo independence, the government in Pristina moved forward with its own agenda. In February 2008, it declared Kosovo’s independence—a course of action deemed by many as the least-bad option given a vast and immovable Albanian majority in the province bent on independence. Under the circumstances, Pristina’s declaration—even with Kosovo’s immediate recognition by most, but significantly not all, EU and NATO members—hardly resolved the issue.6 Nor did the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice handed down on July 22, 2010, which was not an endorsement of Pristina’s right to declare independence but rather a holding that there was nothing to prevent it from doing so. Still, it was enough for the international community to begin closing down its oversight operation, despite the outbreak of violence in northern Kosovo in the summer of 2011, when Pristina replaced Kosovo Serbian police on Kosovo’s border crossings with Serbia with Kosovo Albanians and ordered a ban

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on goods coming in from Serbia after the breakdown of trade negotiations with Belgrade.7 Thus, in September 2012, international oversight officially ended, albeit with the country’s politics still mired in corruption; bribes common for everything; university heads resigning for fake credentials; organized crime largely unchecked; members of parliament being accused of profiting from the illegal sale of arms and human organs; overall unemployment figures still above 30 percent (over 50 percent for youth under 24 and over 60 percent for young women as late as 2014); half of its people living on less than US$2 a day; the European Rule of Law mission continuing to run its judicial system; a continued dependency on outside economic assistance; the presence of approximately 50,000 “internationals” with high salaries to sustain much of its service industry; and NATO for internal security.8 Significance It is very hard to talk about conflict-management efforts in Kosovo apart from those of UNMIK, the EU, and NATO. The OSCE-designed official flag for Kosovo is an arc composed of six white stars over a golden depiction of Kosovo against a blue field, with each star denoting one of the ethnic groups composing the country, that is, Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Romani, Gorani, and Bosniaks. In practice, despite the occasional presence of a Serb in a coalition cabinet, it is very much an Albanian-dominated state, and not just because Kosovo’s Albanian community represents over 92 percent of its population (Serbs now account for only 5 percent to 6 percent). Since the death of Rugova, there has been scant interest on the part of Kosovo’s Albanian leaders to accommodate the demands of its minorities or to make them feel secure or comfortable in the new state. Statues commemorating KLA fighters dot the roadways throughout Kosovo and often stand at the gateway to its larger cities. Physical markers of the other groups are either absent or are to be found in the empty and gutted Serbian Orthodox churches still to be seen in areas from which Serbs were driven in 2004. There are, however, lessons to be learned as far as humanitarian third-party military intervention in communal conflicts is concerned. On the positive side, NATO’s action in 1999 ended Belgrade’s ugly efforts to drive large numbers of the province’s Albanians from their homes and into neighboring states and indirectly contributed to Milosevic’s subsequent fall from power in Serbia. But there was also much amiss in the intervention and the dabbling in Kosovo’s politics by the third parties who sought to build a true democracy there. Perhaps the most obvious lesson relates to NATO’s intervention. Clearly, the UN-sanctioned responsibility of stable states to protect civilians elsewhere cannot be accomplished at 40,000 feet by airpower alone. At the outset, NATO complicated the task of peace building in Kosovo by ruling out the deployment of ground troops, initially leaving the Albanian population unprotected when Serbian forces, frustrated at their inability to do anything about NATO attacks on their homeland, turned on Kosovo’s unarmed Albanian civilians, and then leaving the unarmed, small Serbian minority defenseless in the face of the angry hordes of Albanian refugees returning from exile at the end of NATO’s successful effort to force Milosevic

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into accepting an international peacekeeping mission’s presence in Kosovo. It is a lesson that has yet to be learned, as witnessed by NATO’s air-only operation in support of the anti-Qaddafi factions in Libya in 2011 and the violent chaos still unfolding in that country years later. Closely related is a second lesson in the responsibility-to-protect ( or R2P) realm. Armies organized to fight outside aggressors are rarely equipped with the tools or training to effectively police streets or protect pockets of minorities from roving crowds of extremists bent on causing them harm. In time, this problem lessened in Kosovo as the professional international military personnel initially deployed were replaced with national guard types of units, which usually have some training in crowd control; however, that did not occur in time to prevent the excesses of 2004. Third, contrary to the adage, the enemy of your enemy is not necessarily your friend. In the West’s desire to rid Yugoslavia of Milosevic, too many countries looked the other way too long as far as KLA excesses were concerned, both before and after NATO’s military campaign. By the time the truth emerged concerning the criminal activity of KLA leaders and the war crimes committed by them, it was too late to dislodge their hold on power or—given the KLA’s unwillingness to settle for anything short of an independent Kosovo—to steer Kosovo toward a more multicultural, democratic future. To these observations, others could be added: avoid the kind of ambiguity in terms of ultimate goals that lurked within the UN resolution authorizing UNMIK, and do not make promises you do not intend to keep. However, ambiguity, obfuscation, untruths, and broken promises are too much a part of the currency of international relations to be dislodged by any finding of their role in shaping some of the more unfortunate results of third-party intervention in Kosovo. Notes 1. Yugoslavia’s last official (1981) census found that only 5.4 percent of the population thought of themselves as ethnic Yugoslavs. Rather, the peoples of Yugoslavia continued to see themselves as ethnically and nationally distinct. They were Serbs (33+%), Croats (19.7%), Muslim Slavs (“Bosniaks,” 8.9%), Slovenes (7.8%), Albanians (7.7%), Macedonians (6.0%), Montenegrins (2.6%), and more, including Hungarians (1.9%). Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 70. 2. On the deteriorating nature of conditions in Kosovo and the 1999 NATO action on behalf of Kosovo, see John C. Scharfen, “Yugoslavia: Ethnic Conflict and the Meltdown in Kosovo,” in Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts, ed. Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004): 337–347. For an account of Albanian ethnic cleansing of Serbian areas, see especially Alex N. Dragnich’s account of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and the Struggle for Truth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 39f. 3. See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Risk Analysis No. 18—Humanitarian Situation, Protection and Assistance: Internally Displaced Persons in Serbia and Montenegro (Belgrade: OCHA, 2002), 5–6. 4. In addition to war crimes against civilians for which several former KLA leaders and highranking Kosovo political leaders have been indicted and tried in The Hague, European

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prosecutors have implicated KLA leaders in the torture and killing of Serbs and others in KLA bases in Albania and of harvesting their organs for illegal sale. See Andrew Gray, “The Criminal Consequences of Kosovo’s Post-War Disorder,” a Balkan Insight’s Report on Balkan Transitional Justice, August 2014, http://www.balkaninsight.com. 5. See Michael J. Jordan, “Even in Eager Kosovo, Nation-Building Stalls,” Christian Science Monitor, September 22, 2004; and International Crisis Group, “Kosovo after Haradinaj,” Europe Report 163, May 26, 2005. 6. Belgium, Spain, Slovakia, and Cyprus, in particular, have yet to recognize Kosovo because each has its own territorialized minorities with separatist inclinations. The same is true of the scores of states outside NATO and the EU who have yet to recognize Kosovo’s independence lest it provide a precedent and inspiration for separatist groups within. 7. See Neil Buckley and Neil MacDonald, “Kosovo Violence Flares over Trade with Serbia,” Financial Times, July 20, 2011. The violence was common from July until November, despite virtually all of the province’s NATO forces having been deployed to the area, and tension remained high even after a trade agreement was reached between Kosovo and Belgrade in December 2011. Subsequently, EU diplomacy—and the carrot of EU membership—has moved Kosovo and Serbia closer together, albeit in a relationship far removed from cordiality. 8. See International Crisis Group, “The Rule of Law in Independent Kosovo,” Europe Report 204, May 19, 2010, on legal conditions in Kosovo as it marched toward unsupervised independence. Those under 25 years old constituted over 40 percent of Kosovo’s population in 2013.

Suggested Reading Cordesman, Anthony H. 1999. The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo: Report to the USAF XP Strategy Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://www .csis.org. Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael F. O’Hanlon. 2000. Winning Ugly, NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Holbrooke, Richard. 1999. To End a War. New York: Random House. Kearney, Philip. 2010. Under the Blue Flag: My Mission in Kosovo. Essex, VT: Phoenix Books. MacShane Denis. 2012. Why Kosovo Still Matters. Pontarddulais, Swansea, U.K.: Haus Publishing. Mertus, Julie A. 1999. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. Berkeley: University of California Press. Phillips, David L. 2012. Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sketna, Elton. 2014. Creating Kosovo: International Organizations and the Making of Ethical Institutions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Appendices The three documents below chronicle the key dates affecting Kosovo’s evolution from a province of Serbia to an independent country. UN Resolution 1244 set in motion the system of tutelage under the auspices of UNMIK that was to guide Kosovo’s transition toward a democratic, autonomous

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political system. Then came the events of 2004, which were well publicized by the prestigious Human Rights Watch organization, and the international community’s subsequent acceleration of its own timetable for withdrawal from the province and the direction political events were taking there. The result was the Ahtisaari study and report recommending independence rather than autonomy as the end goal for the province; it laid the groundwork for the declaration of independence by its nationalistic Albanian-dominated government the following year.

1. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 Establishing Kosovo Mission, June 10, 1999 The Security Council, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions, Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes, Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party, Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper, Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful selfadministration for Kosovo, Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

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Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2; 2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized; 4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2; 5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner. Source: United Nations Security Council. Available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20SRES%201244 .pdf.

2. Human Rights Watch Report on Kosovo’s 2004 Riots July 26, 2004 “Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004” On March 17 and 18, 2004, violent rioting by ethnic Albanians took place throughout Kosovo, spurred by sensational and ultimately inaccurate reports that Serbs had been responsible for the drowning of three young Albanian children. For nearly forty-eight hours, the security structures in Kosovo—the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), the international U.N. (UNMIK) police, and the locally recruited Kosovo Police Service (KPS)— almost completely lost control, as at least thirty-three major riots broke out across Kosovo, involving an estimated 51,000 participants. The violence across Kosovo represents the most serious setback since 1999 in the international community’s efforts to create a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which both the

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government and civil society respect human rights. From the capital Pristina/Prishtine, to cities like Prizren and Djakovica/Gjakove, to small villages like Slatina/Sllatine and Belo Polje/Bellopoje, large ethnic Albanian crowds acted with ferocious efficiency to rid their areas of all remaining vestiges of a Serb presence, and also targeted other minorities such as Roma, including Ashkali who are Albanian-speaking Roma. In many of the communities affected by violence, in attacks both spontaneous and organized, every single Serb, Roma, or Askaeli home was burned. In the village of Svinjare/Frasher, all 137 Serb homes were burned, but ethnic Albanian homes were left untouched. In nearby Vucitrn/Vushtrii, the ethnic Albanian crowd attacked the Ashkali community, burning sixty-nine Ashkali homes. In Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove, one Serb was beaten to death, and over one hundred Serb and Roma homes were burned, as well as the post office, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian school, and the Serbian hospital. Even the tiniest Serb presences were a target for the hostile crowds: ethnic Albanian crowds attacked the Serbian Orthodox Church in Djakovica for hours, ultimately driving out five elderly Serb women who were the last remaining Serbs in Djakovica, from a pre-war population of more than 3,000. The March violence forced out the entire Serb population from dozens of locations— including the capital Pristina—and equally affected Roma and Ashkali communities. After two days of rioting, at least 550 homes and twenty-seven Orthodox churches and monasteries were burned, leaving approximately 4,100 Serbs, Roma, Ashkali, and other non-Albanian minorities displaced. Some 2,000 persons still remain displaced months later, living in crowded and unsanitary conditions—including in unheated and unfinished apartments, crowded schools, tent camps on KFOR military bases, and even metal trucking containers. The future of minorities in Kosovo has never looked bleaker. The security organizations in Kosovo—KFOR, UNMIK international police, and the KPS— failed catastrophically in their mandate to protect minority communities during the March 2004 violence. In numerous cases, minorities under attack were left entirely unprotected and at the mercy of the rioters. In Svinjare, French KFOR troops failed to come to the assistance of the besieged Serbs, even though their main base was just a few hundred meters away—in fact, the ethnic Albanian crowd had walked right past the base on its way to burning down the village. French KFOR troops similarly failed to respond to the rioting in Vucitrn, which is located in between two major French bases. In Prizren, German KFOR troops failed to deploy to protect the Serb population and the many historic Serbian Orthodox churches, despite calls for assistance from their UNMIK international police counterparts, who later accused German KFOR commanders of cowardice. In Kosovo Polje, UNMIK and KFOR were nowhere to be seen as Albanian crowds methodically burned Serb homes. The village of Belo Polje, rebuilt on the outskirts of Pec to house returning Serbs, was burned to the ground even though it was almost adjacent to the main Italian KFOR base. Italian KFOR soldiers refused to approach the besieged Serbs, forcing the Serbs to run for several hundred meters through a hostile Albanian crowd, before KFOR evacuated them. Several Serbs were wounded in the process. Even in the capital Pristina, Serbs were forced to barricade themselves into their apartments, while Albanian rioters shot at them and looted and burned the apartments below and around them, for up to six hours before KFOR and UNMIK came to their assistance. The failure of UNMIK international police and KFOR to effectively respond to the violence left much of the security in the hands of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). . . . Some KPS officers acted professionally and courageously, risking their own lives to rescue besieged Serbs and other minorities in many towns and villages. However, many other KPS officers

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stood by passively as the ethnic Albanian crowds burned homes and attacked Serbs and other minorities, even when those attacks took place just meters away. Some KPS officers showed a clear bias by arresting only Serbs and other minorities who were defending their homes, while ignoring the criminal behavior of ethnic Albanians occurring in front of their eyes. In a few cases, KPS officers were accused of taking an active part in the burning of minority homes. The international community appears to be in absolute denial about its own failures in Kosovo. While international actors have been universally—and accurately—critical of the failures of the Kosovo Albanian leadership during and after the crisis, the dismal performance of the international community has escaped similar critical scrutiny. Instead, the leadership of KFOR and UNMIK seem happy to continue with “business as usual,” rather than putting in place the reforms needed to prevent a recurrence of mass violence—and a renewed collapse of the security institutions in the future. Source: Human Rights Watch Report. Available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/07/25/ failure-protect.

3. The Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo’s Future Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the international community, May 26, 2007 1. In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. . . . My team and I have made every effort to facilitate an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status. 2. Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. ... 5. The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. ...

Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option 6. A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of oppression—the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against

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the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life— Kosovo Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. . . . The dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) on 10 June 1999. 7. For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia . . . is simply not tenable. Continued international administration is not sustainable 8. While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued international administration. 9. Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty and unemployment. ... Independence with international supervision is the only viable option 11. While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and their participation in public life. 12. Kosovo’s minority communities—in particular the Kosovo Serbs—continue to face difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their

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fundamental position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they be able to protect effectively their rights and interests. 13. I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but focused — in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. …I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal.

ANNEX Main Provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement

I. General 1. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. . . .

II. Provisions of the Settlement 2. Kosovo’s governance. . . . Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. 3. Rights of communities. . . . Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages—such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma— shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption. 4. Decentralization. The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. . . . The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, . . . and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. 5. Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. . . . 6. Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the

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Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. . . . NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.  7. Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. . . .  8. Economy. . . . The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. ... 10. Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences. 11. International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative . . . shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. . . . 12. European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. . . . 13. International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo’s institutions until such time as Kosovo’s institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities. 14. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe . . . is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement. Source: Ahtisaari’s Report, United Nations Security Council, March 26, 2007. Available at http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf.

Lebanon The Lebanon Civil War, 1975–1990 Marie-Joelle Zahar

Timeline 1943 The National Pact is formulated. 1958 The first postindependence civil war takes place. 1967 Palestinians establish guerrilla bases in Lebanon. 1969 The Cairo Agreement on Palestinian activities in Lebanon is signed. 1975 Civil war begins. 1976 Syrian troops enter Lebanon. 1977 The Arab Deterrent Force is sent to Lebanon. 1978 Clashes occur between Syrian troops and Christian militias, Israel launches Operation Litani, and the UN Security Council Resolution 425 creates the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 1982 Israel launches Operation Peace for Galilee. Bashir Jumayyil is elected president of the Lebanese Republic.

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1983 The May 17 Agreement is signed. The Battle of the Mountain between the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and Lebanese Forces (LF) combatants takes place. National reconciliation talks take place in Geneva, Switzerland. 1984 Clashes between the Lebanese Army and Shia and Druze militias occur. A followup meeting of the Geneva Conference is held in Lausanne. The Battle of Iqlim alKharrub and Eastern Sidon between Amal and LF fighters takes place. 1985 Syria sponsors the Tripartite Agreement. 1986 The Tripartite Agreement fails. 1988 Lebanon fails to hold presidential elections; a military government of transition is set. 1989 Army commander Michel ’Awn launches war of liberation against the Syrian troops. Representatives of the Arab League mediate a cease-fire. Lebanese parliamentarians meet in Taif and produce the Taif Accord. General ’Awn rejects the Taif Accord. 1990 ’Awn is ousted from power. Taif implementation begins. 1991 Parliament orders the dissolution of all militias, with the exception of Hizballah. 1996 Israel launches Operation Grapes of Wrath against Lebanon. 2000 Israel withdraws its troops from Lebanon. 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calls for the withdrawal and dissolution of all armed forces in Lebanon. 2005 Rafik Hariri is killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut. Political forces realign in two coalitions: March 14 (Hariri-led, pro-Western) and March 8 (Hizballah-led,

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supported by Syria and Iran). The Cedar Revolution demands the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. April: Syria withdraws its armed forces. March 14: Parliamentary elections take place. 2006 A six-week war erupts between Hizballah and Israel after the Party of God kidnaps two Israeli soldiers. Disagreement between the March 8 and March 14 coalitions triggers the resignation of all Shia ministers from government. 2008 Violent conflict erupts between March 8 and March 14 supporters. The Doha Agreement brings the power-sharing crisis to an end. The Lebanese Civil War is one of the most complex internal conflicts of the 20th century.1 At least three ethnoreligious groups fought for political supremacy and committed ethnic cleansing in the course of the conflict. Domestic political issues became entangled with larger regional issues, notably the strategic relationship between Syria and Israel. Between 1975 and 1989, repeated attempts at international mediation failed. Yet, in September 1989, members of the Lebanese parliament gathered in Taif, Saudi Arabia, and reached a negotiated settlement that endures. Only 15 percent of civil wars end in negotiated settlements. Ethnoreligious conflicts are said to be the least likely candidates. During the civil war, Lebanon was a collapsed state, “where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart.”2 When collapse accompanies civil conflict, conflict resolution becomes arduous. Yet, the Taif Agreement ended a 15-year-long ethnoreligious war in a collapsed state. In other words, Lebanon’s civil war stands out. Historical Background Creation of the Grand Liban

Upon the Allied victory in World War I, France was offered a mandate over present-day Syria and Lebanon. In 1920, the French high commissioner, General Gouraud, proclaimed the creation of the Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon). The new state included the prewar autonomous province of Mount Lebanon as well as the towns and surrounding districts of Beirut, Tripoli, Sur (Tyre), and Saida (Sidon); the wheat-producing regions of Ba’albak and the Biqa’; and the districts of Rashayya and Hasbayya. The Maronites, the main Christian community in Mount Lebanon, deemed this geographic expansion necessary for the new state’s viability. Greater Lebanon gained in economic viability but lost in social homogeneity. Profound demographic changes accompanied the expansion. Maronites were a clear majority in Mount Lebanon, but not so in the new state. The Druze lost their position as the dominant Muslim sect to the Sunnis, who emerged as the main challengers to Maronite numerical and political preponderance. Nor did the various communities equally desire a separate Lebanese state.

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For Maronites and Catholics, this was a dream come true. They had always asserted Mount Lebanon’s cultural and historical uniqueness and attempted to dissociate it from the Arab world. Sunnis, influenced by Arab nationalist ideas, were “unwilling to accept the change from being part of the political community of the Ottoman Empire to being only one community among others.”3 Druze and Shia Muslims preferred a union with Syria but were partially attracted to a separate Lebanon because of their status as minority sects in the Sunni Arab world. The Institutionalization of Confessional Politics

The loss of social homogeneity propelled the various communities into direct competition over government posts and services. This state of affairs was exacerbated in 1926 when the French promulgated a new constitution. Article 95 stated, “By temporary right and with a view to justice and harmony, the communities shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the formation of the ministry, without prejudice, however, to the welfare of the State.” Thus, confessional politics were enshrined in state institutions. At independence in 1943, Maronites sought to gain control of the machinery of government to serve their (mainly) commercial interests; Sunnis, on the other hand, sought independence from the French mandate. The first postindependence president, Bishara al-Khuri (a Maronite), and prime minister, Ryad al-Sulh (a Sunni), reconciled these divergent interests in the National Pact (Al-mithaq alwatani). This informal gentlemen’s agreement supplemented the formal constitution. Under the terms of the pact, Maronites renounced French tutelage in return for key political, security, and military positions, and Sunnis renounced joining Syria and consented to Lebanon’s independence, provided the Lebanese state considered itself part of the Arab world. Institutionally, the National Pact reaffirmed two principles: segmental proportionality, or the representation of the religious communities in the political system on the basis of demographic weight, and segmental autonomy, or the recognition of the religious communities’ right to conduct their internal affairs—notably in the realms of personal status and education— without state interference. Thus, the National Pact solidified religious identities. The pact also gave the advantage to Christian Lebanese. Indeed, a 1932 census used to allocate posts in the new state’s institutions returned a proportion of six Christians for every five Muslims in Lebanon. Christians were also granted the presidency of the republic, the high command of the army, and top administrative positions. Nonetheless, the system was designed to encourage intercommunal cooperation. Seats in parliament were distributed on the basis of religious affiliation, but the electoral law divided the country into religiously mixed geographical districts where candidates needed to appeal to voters outside their own sect to be elected. This electoral device fulfilled its purpose, but not for long. Postindependence Challenges to Lebanon’s Stability

The volatile regional environment played an important role in destabilizing the Lebanese consociational formula. The Arab-Israeli conflict produced, among

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others, two phenomena of consequence for the stability of the Lebanese political system: the rise of Arab nationalism and the emergence of Palestinian guerrillas. Whenever they felt threatened, each of the communities sought to promote its vision of Lebanon by relying on outside support. The resulting linkage between domestic politics and regional conflicts became a hallmark of Lebanese politics. Prior to 1975, two crises illustrated this entanglement. In the mid-1950s, Egyptian president Gamal ’Abd al-Nasir issued calls for Arab unity that spurred the creation of revolutionary movements and threatened conservative regimes across the Arab world. Concerned about the fate of its conservative allies in the region, the United States established the U.S.-led Baghdad Pact that Lebanon’s president Camille Sham’un decided to join. This decision was strongly opposed by the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), an umbrella organization of opposition parties, which identified with the Egyptian president’s discourse. This disagreement sparked a crisis over the extensive prerogatives that the constitution granted to Lebanon’s Maronite president. The opposition demanded political reforms to prevent the Maronite vision of Lebanon from dominating. A mini–civil war, the country’s first postindependence violent breakdown, ensued, and the United States dispatched its Marines to back Sham’un. Ultimately, the crisis was resolved on the basis of a return to the status quo ante. In 1967, after the Arab armies’ defeat against Israel, Palestinians took up guerrilla warfare, and they started operating from Lebanon. Christian leadership considered the guerrillas as a threat to Lebanon’s stability. The LNM parties wanted Lebanon to embrace the Palestinian cause. Once again, differences on regional issues sparked an internal crisis in 1969, when the Lebanese Army confronted the guerrillas. The move was applauded by Christians and condemned by the LNM. Egypt mediated a settlement, the Cairo Agreement, which gave the guerrillas a wide margin in which to maneuver.4 These two pre–civil war crises and the state’s attempt to resolve them through conciliation led Christian leaders to infer that the state was weak and the army unable to defend the country. Consequently, they formed and trained paramilitaries to defend the status quo and preserve the Maronite-dominated power-sharing formula. AlKata’ib al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Phalanges), the largest Maronite political party and an outspoken proponent of the Christian vision of Lebanon, took the lead.5 Other groups armed themselves in response. By the mid-1970s, almost every party in Lebanon had its own militia. The stage was set for the eruption of civil war. The Conflict On April 13, 1975, as they rode a bus through a Christian neighborhood, 26 Palestinians were gunned down in retaliation for an attempt earlier that day on the life of Kata’ib leader Pierre Jumayyil. This event ignited the civil war. Grand conspiracy theory explanations of Lebanon’s breakdown abound. Many analysts contend that the conflict was a “war for others” fought on Lebanese soil. But, in spite of the catalyst provided by foreign intervention, endogenous factors are to blame for the breakdown of the political system.

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The two warring factions are often labeled Christian versus Muslim; at the outset of the conflict, this was only partially correct. It is more accurate to describe them as pro– and anti–status quo, with the main areas of disagreement revolving around Lebanon’s foreign policy and demands for the renegotiation of the Lebanese powersharing formula. Those in favor of the status quo came to be known as the Lebanese Front.6 The anti–status quo forces revolved around the LNM and some Palestinian guerrillas. The commonly held notion that this was a religious conflict masked the fact that religious divisions roughly overlapped with power and wealth differentials. The more powerful traditional elites (mostly Maronites) fought to maintain their privileges; the more socioeconomically disadvantaged groups (mostly Shia) fought for power and access to state resources. As the conflict went on, however, it took on an increasingly ethnic coloring. Warring factions gradually represented religious communities rather than political persuasions. The Lebanese Forces (LF) led by Pierre Jumayyil’s son, Bashir, emerged as the most powerful Christian militia. And whereas the LNM was an umbrella organization of various (though mostly Muslim) political forces with shared goals, its successors stood for specific communities. The Amal Movement was the first Shia political party in Lebanon. The Progressive Socialist Party, a largely Druze party, was created by LNM leader Kamal Junblatt. By 1983, these three groups would become the most influential actors in the conflict. Although carried out on a smaller scale than in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic cleansing was practiced in Lebanon, providing another indication that the war had taken on an ethnic dimension. The most sadly famous instances remain the massacres of Palestinians by Maronite Lebanese Forces’ militiamen in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila shortly after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. During the 1983 Battle of the Mountain, the Druze PSP militia ethnically cleansed the Shuf of its Christian presence. In 1985, the battles of Iqlim al-Kharrub and Eastern Sidon between the LF and the Amal Movement resulted in the displacement of the majority of the area’s Christian population. By the mid-1980s, sectarian-based acts of violence against civilians had driven the latter to seek refuge among coreligionists, dividing the country into largely religiously homogenous enclaves. The battles of the first two years (1975–1976) roughly determined the military map. The Lebanese Forces controlled East Beirut, the northern Metn and Kisrwan mountain ranges, and the coastal strip extending from Beirut north to Jubayl. The PSP’s fiefdom extended from the southern Metn to the Shuf, with a substantial presence in West Beirut. The Amal Movement was in control of southern Lebanon, the Biqa’ valley, and parts of West Beirut (later disputed between Amal and its Shia rival, Hizballah). After the Israeli invasion in 1982, the various forces reached a military equilibrium. A number of major confrontations did occur afterward, notably the 1983 Battle of the Mountain, the 1984 intifada (upheaval) in West Beirut when Amal and PSP militiamen fought the Lebanese Army to protest the policies of President Amin Jumayyil, and the 1985 battle of the Iqlim and eastern Sidon. But these battles did not drastically modify the military map, nor did they seriously tip the balance of power. Their net effect was to homogenize local zones of control by ridding them of pockets of “enemy” presence. They were instrumental

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in the establishment of compact territorial enclaves in which the militias asserted their control. As of the early 1980s, the Lebanese Forces, Amal, and the Progressive Socialist Party effectively governed their respective zones of control. In summer 1988, this stalemate was rocked by a political crisis when the warring factions failed to agree on a compromise candidate to the presidency of the republic. Until that time, Lebanon’s executive had continued to function, although it did not possess effective control on the ground. The ensuing deadlock created a constitutional crisis, and outgoing president Amine Jumayyil appointed a military government of transition under the leadership of Army commander General Michel ’Awn. Muslim leaders objected; ’Awn was Maronite, and customary practice reserved the premiership for the Sunnis. Instead, they extended recognition to Jumayyil’s last prime minister, Salim al-Huss. The situation was unprecedented: the presidency was vacant, there were two parallel governments, and the army split along confessional lines with troops loyal to ’Awn and others closing ranks with Huss. In January 1989, the Arab League launched an unsuccessful attempt to mediate between the parties. Against this backdrop, ’Awn started a “war of liberation” from Syrian occupation. The military escalation drew international attention. In May 1989, a Tripartite Committee of the Arab League launched a second mediation effort.7 The seven-point truce plan stipulated that a cease-fire would come into effect on August 29, followed by a meeting of the Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif. Management of the Conflict Lebanon’s civil war elicited numerous mediation and peacekeeping efforts. In October 1976, the Riyadh conference sought to find a solution to the Lebanese Civil War. In January 1977, a 30,000-strong Arab Deterrent Force was positioned in Lebanon. The Arab League and several Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Algeria, would later attempt to mediate between the various factions. The Taif Agreement is the result of such good offices. Western countries also intervened to end the war. In 1983, they sent a multinational force to help the state reestablish its authority.8 However, no country played as influential and sustained a role as Syria. Syria’s behavior during the Lebanese Civil War can appear inconsistent. Initially, Damascus supported the LNM and Palestinian fighters; Syria backed the Maronite conservative forces a year later. This shifting pattern of alliances is only understandable when evaluated against the background of Syria’s larger concerns. An unstable Lebanon could harbor political movements hostile to the Asad regime; it could also become a security liability in the conflict with Israel. Syria’s military and political intervention in the Lebanese Civil War attempted to address these two concerns. Military Intervention

Beginning in January 1976, Syria mediated cease-fires in the civil war. In late 1975 and 1976, as the conflict took a confessional coloring, Syria played the role

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of balancer. In 1976, President Franjiyya and the Lebanese Front requested the deployment of Syrian forces to prevent an all-out victory of the LNM and its allies. In May 1976, the first Syrian forces of interposition entered Lebanon. Their presence was further legitimized a few months later when the Riyadh conference established the (mainly Syrian-manned) Arab Deterrent Force. Syria’s willingness to intervene militarily in support of the Christian forces (and against its own allies) spoke to Damascus’s concerns over the partition or disintegration of Lebanon. Syrian authorities worried that partition would result in the establishment of a miniChristian state allied with Israel. The prospect of Lebanon’s disintegration also posed grave threats to Syria’s security because Lebanon is a buffer between Syria’s long and most vulnerable western border and Israel. The Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel changed Syrian calculations in Lebanon. In 1977, Syria initiated a rapprochement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to reunite the Arab front. This rapprochement starkly contrasted with mounting strains in Syrian-Maronite relations. The leading Maronite faction represented by Bashir Jumayyil wanted nothing short of political predominance. Otherwise, it advocated the creation of a Christian mini-state. The Syrian government, on the other hand, sought to bring the Lebanese Front and the LNM together in a pro-Syrian Lebanese government. In March 1978, Israeli troops launched Operation Litani, an invasion of South Lebanon, in retaliation for a guerrilla attack on a bus near Tel Aviv. United Nations Resolution 425 called on Israel to withdraw, and United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were sent to replace the Israelis as they pulled back. However, Israel retained a 10 kilometer “security belt” entrusted to a Lebanese client, the (mainly Christian) South Lebanon Army. This military incursion was accompanied by the creation of a formal alliance between the Israelis and the Lebanese Forces. As the Maronite-Israeli alliance consolidated, Maronite-Syrian fighting erupted between February and October 1978. The potential establishment in Lebanon of a regime friendly to Israel had long been of concern to Syria. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the Israelis secured the election of their Maronite ally, Bashir Jumayyil, to the presidency of the republic.9 Jumayyil’s election was highly criticized by Damascus. When Jumayyil was assassinated two weeks before assuming his functions, his brother, Amin, was elected to the presidency. Under U.S. auspices, Amin Jumayyil negotiated the May 17 treaty with Israel. The agreement called for, among other things, the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian troops from the country. Damascus expressed its rejection of these terms by applying military pressure on the Christian enclave. Syria’s allies in the Lebanese parliament blocked the treaty’s ratification, and the resumption of national reconciliation talks in Switzerland was conditioned upon the treaty’s abrogation. The Syrian military presence in Lebanon remained a bone of contention in Christian political circles. It was at the heart of the “War of Liberation” launched in 1989 by the head of the interim military cabinet, General ’Awn, and emerged as a central issue at the negotiating table in Taif.

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Political Intervention

Syria’s role in the elaboration of several conflict-resolution blueprints reflects the general Syrian policy in Lebanon. Syria sought peace agreements that would maintain the regional strategic balance. The Syrian regime did not want the partition of Lebanon, but it was also weary of Lebanese leaders who did not ascribe to Syrian strategic concerns. Damascus thus sought to promote a modification of the Lebanese power-sharing formula with an eye on giving pro-Syrian communities more power in decision making. The first Syrian mediation attempt, the 1976 Constitutional Document, conceded some of the internal reforms sought by the LNM but did not alter the confessional character of the top decision-making elites. As a counterpart for Maronite acceptance of the document, Syria offered guarantees that the PLO would respect the terms of the 1969 Cairo Agreement. In 1980, the Fourteen Points for Reconciliation called for the reestablishment of Lebanese sovereignty, an equilibrated system of power sharing, close cooperation with Syria, and support for the Palestinian cause. In fall 1983 and spring 1984 the national reconciliation talks in Geneva and Lausanne produced a cabinet of national unity that confirmed Lebanon’s full affiliation to the Arab world, projected the redistribution of parliamentary seats on a 50-50 basis, and planned the deconfessionalization of most of the Lebanese civil service. In all three instances, Christian political forces ultimately rejected the Syrian mediation efforts, arguing that Syria’s intervention in Lebanese domestic affairs revealed an intent to alter the nature of Lebanon. The Tripartite Accord, signed in Damascus on December 28, 1985, was the principal Syrian mediation effort. The agreement thrust Lebanon at the heart of Syria’s policy of strategic parity with Israel. To prevent Lebanon from serving as a gateway between Israel and Syria, the latter would station troops at strategic positions in Lebanese territory. The agreement also curtailed the powers of the president and transferred executive power to the cabinet. Although LF leader Ilyas Hubeiqa was one of its signatories, the agreement failed to secure support in Christian ranks. Maronites especially perceived the settlement as bringing Lebanon under Syrian tutelage. Merely two weeks after the agreement was signed, Hubeiqa was overthrown by an upheaval within the ranks of the Lebanese Forces. Dynamics

Against all odds, Lebanon’s Civil War ended in a negotiated settlement. The Taif Agreement has endured for over two decades, albeit with ups and downs. General ‘Awin attempted to spoil the agreement, but on October 13, 1989, Syrian troops assisted the state in ending the general’s rebellion. The agreement recalibrated power sharing among the various communities, and it clarified the nature of Syrian-Lebanese relations. The new power-sharing dispositions curtailed the wide prerogatives of the Maronite president, vesting most executive powers in the council of ministers, customarily led by a Sunni. The allocation of parliamentary seats was also modified from a 6:5 in favor of Christians to having them evenly split.

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Taif attempted to ensure mutual peaceful coexistence between the different confessional groups in the country (Al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak) and to guarantee that each group be properly represented politically (Sihhat Al-Thamthil Al-Siyasi). The agreement also introduced safeguards to prevent any community from establishing de facto control of the executive branch. Taif stipulated that a majority of two-thirds of government was needed to vote on major issues, including “war and peace [and] international treaties.”10 It sought to succeed where the National Pact had failed: finding an acceptable compromise between all the Lebanese factions and limiting foreign intervention in Lebanese domestic political affairs. Neither objective has been fully achieved. The task of overseeing the agreement’s implementation ultimately fell to neighboring Syria, which implemented it selectively. The decision to allow Hizballah not to disarm and the gerrymandering of parliamentary elections to ensure the election of pro-Syrian parliamentarians resulted in a Christian sentiment of marginalization. Politicians continued to promote and protect their communities’ interests. In what became known as “the politics of the troika,” the Maronite president, the Sunni prime minister, and the Shia Speaker of parliament repeatedly invoked customary practice to step beyond the bounds that the Lebanese constitution had set for each of their offices. Following the February 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon’s longest serving postwar prime minister and the architect of the country’s (albeit criticized) reconstruction, the country’s power sharing system was severely tested. Hariri’s assassination triggered the Cedar Revolution, a mass mobilization against Syria’s presence in Lebanon. It also cemented the realignment of political factions in two coalitions known as March 8 (Hizballah-led, supported by Iran and Syria) and March 14 (Hariri-led, pro-Western), with Christians divided between the two. In the polarized context where the Syrian army had to withdraw from Lebanon and against the background of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), which called for the disarmament and demobilization of all factions in Lebanon, the March 8 coalition demanded a blocking minority of one-third plus one in government to be able to veto decisions that, it felt, went against the national interest. March 14 was opposed to this demand. The power-sharing crisis that ensued led to the paralysis of state institutions from December 2006 until May 2008; it also prevented the election of a new president and led to six months of political vacuum at the presidency. Tensions between the parties escalated into open confrontation, the first such serious security incident since the end of the war in May 2008. Qatar intervened, and, at a meeting in Doha, a compromise solution was crafted whereby the president of the republic would name an independent minister of state to prevent either side from automatically being able to either pass resolutions by virtue of its numerical majority or block resolutions because it had a one-third plus one minority. This would pave the way to the election of former Lebanese Army chief-of-staff Michel Suleiman to the presidency. Lebanon also continues to remain hostage to broader regional dynamics. Prior to Israel’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, the struggle between Hizballah

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and Israel flared up in the 1996 Israeli Grapes of Wrath operation. Ten years later, a Hizballah incursion into Israel in July 2006 triggered a six-week war between the Party of God and Tel Aviv that left Lebanon’s road and power infrastructures all but flattened and exacted a heavy human and material toll on the country. Following the conflict, Hizballah, which at the time was in the government, accused the March 14 members of government of colluding with the enemy; for its part, the March 14 coalition accused Hizballah of building a state-within-a-state and of standing as the major obstacle to the reinforcement of state institutions. Shia ministers withdrew from government in December of 2006, triggering the powersharing crisis that led to the violence of 2008 and to the Doha agreement. The 2011 eruption of civil war in neighboring Syria has rekindled tensions between Lebanon’s political factions, particularly as Hizballah is fighting alongside the regime of Bashar al-Assad while Lebanon’s Sunni leadership and communities support the majority-Sunni Syrian opposition forces. Significance That Lebanon’s civil war would end in a peace agreement was already significant, given that only a minority of civil wars do end in such a way. That there was no wide-scale return to armed conflict is also significant given the contentious nature of postconflict politics. For all of its failings, Syria’s custodianship played a part in imposing stability in the country, and security incidents increased following the withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces in 2005. Nevertheless, the war in Syria appears to have brought all the Lebanese communities to an understanding that domestic violence is neither feasible nor desirable. For students of ethnic conflict, the Lebanese Civil War is of particular interest to probe the links between domestic and international politics. Notes 1. By my count, there were seven major and six minor internal factions. The conflict also involved at least five Palestinian guerrilla factions. Two regional actors, Syria and Israel, were militarily embroiled in the war. Lebanon received peacekeeping assistance from the UN Intervention Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Arab Deterrent Force, and the Multinational Force (MNF), each of which involved militaries from at least three different countries. Finally, external mediators in Lebanon included, among others, France, the Vatican, the United States, the Arab League, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. 2. I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse,” in I. William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1. 3. See Albert Hourani, “Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society,” in Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981). The essay was originally written in 1963. 4. The PLO had to coordinate activities with the Lebanese Army. Some territorial restrictions were placed on the guerrillas. In exchange, the Lebanese government recognized the legitimacy of a Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon and the PLO’s right to establish autonomous institutions in the camps.

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5. Founded in 1936 by Pierre Jumayyil, al-Kata’ib fought for Lebanon’s independence before becoming a constitutional party in 1952. 6. The Front included political forces associated with Maronite traditional political families, the Jumayyils (the Kata’ib Party), the Sham’uns (the National Liberal Party), and the Franjiyyas (the Marada), in addition to the militias of Maronite religious orders. 7. The Tripartite Committee included the kings of Morocco and Saudi Arabia and the president of Algeria. 8. The MNF was composed of U.S. Marines, French Paratroopers, and Italian soldiers. It withdrew from Lebanon after simultaneous attacks on the American and French barracks claimed a high casualty toll. 9. The operation, “Peace for Galilee,” followed a PLO self-imposed six-month moratorium on guerrilla attacks into Israel. 10. Marie-Joëlle Zahar, “Peace by Unconventional Means: Evaluating Lebanon’s Ta’if Accord,” in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, ed. Donald Rothchild, Steve Stedman, and Elizabeth Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 593n20.

Suggested Readings Choueiri, Youssef M., ed. 2007. Breaking the Cycle: Civil Wars in Lebanon. London: Stacey International. Hang, Theodor, and Nawaf Salam, eds. 2003. Lebanon in Limbo: Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft and Paris: UNESCO International Center for Human Sciences. Knudsen, Are, and Michael Kerr, eds. 2012. Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution. London: Hurst. Makdissi, Ussama. 2000. The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Picard, Elizabeth. 1996. Lebanon, A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, trans. Franklin Philip. New York: Holmes and Meier. Salem, Paul, ed. 1997. Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays. Beirut: American University of Beirut. Salibi, Kamal. Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958–1976. Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1976. Sirriyeh, Hussein. 1989. Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict. Adelphi Papers #243. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies. Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. 2005. “Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure.” In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars, edited by Donald Rothchild  and Philip  Roeder. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 219–240.

Appendices The civil war in Lebanon quickly became internationalized, ultimately leading to a series of international conferences and agreements designed to halt the conflict, and eventually to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force to protect the tenuous peace produced by the Taif

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Agreement. The Taif Agreement itself is excerpted in the appendices to the essay “The Middle East: Christians in the Middle East.” What follows below are the texts and excerpts of other important documents pertaining to politics in Lebanon before, during, and after its long civil war and excerpts from a recent UN report on conditions in Lebanon, including those worsened by the spillover of the civil war into the Lebanese state.

1. The Cairo Agreement, November 3, 1969 On Monday, 3rd November 1969, the Lebanese delegation headed by Army Commander General Emile al-Bustani, and the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, headed by Mr. Yasir ‘Arafat, chairman of the organization, met in Cairo in the presence of the United Arab Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Riyad, and the War Minister, General Muhammad Fawzi. In consonance with the bonds of brotherhood and common destiny, relations between Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution must always be conducted on the bases of confidence, frankness, and positive cooperation for the benefit of Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution and within the framework of Lebanon’s sovereignty and security. The two delegations agreed on the following principles and measures:

The Palestinian Presence It was agreed to reorganize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the following bases:  1. The right to work, residence, and movement for Palestinians currently residing in Lebanon;   2. The formation of local committees composed of Palestinians in the camps to care for the interests of Palestinians residing in these camps in cooperation with the local Lebanese authorities within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty;   3. The establishment of posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle [PASC] inside the camps for the purpose of cooperation with the local committees to ensure good relations with the Lebanese authorities. These posts shall undertake the task of regulating and determining the presence of arms in the camps within the framework of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution;   4. Palestinians resident in Lebanon are to be permitted to participate in the Palestinian revolution through the Armed Struggle and in accordance with the principles of the sovereignty and security of Lebanon.

Commando Activity It was agreed to facilitate commando activity by means of:   1. Facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying points of passage and reconnaissance in the border areas;   2. Safeguarding the road to the ‘Arqub region;   3. The Armed Struggle shall undertake to control the conduct of all the members of its organizations and [to ensure] their non-interference in Lebanese affairs;   4. Establishing a joint command control of the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese Army;

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  5. Ending the propaganda campaigns by both sides;   6. Conducting a census of Armed Struggle personnel in Lebanon by their command.   7. Appointing Armed Struggle representatives at Lebanese Army headquarters to participate in the resolution of all emergency matters;   8. Studying the distribution of all suitable points of concentration in border areas which will be agreed with the Lebanese Army command;   9. Regulating the entry, exit, and circulation of Armed Struggle personnel; 10. Removal of the Jiyrun base. 11. The Lebanese Army shall facilitate the operation of medical, evacuation, and supply centers for commando activity; 12. Releasing detained personnel and confiscated arms; 13. It is understood that the Lebanese authorities, both civil and military, shall continue to exercise all their prerogatives and responsibilities in all areas of Lebanon in all circumstances; 14. The two delegations affirm that the Palestinian armed struggle is in the interest of Lebanon as well as in that of the Palestinian revolution and all Arabs; 15. This agreement shall remain Top Secret and for the eyes of the commands only. Head of Lebanese delegation Emile Bustani Head of Palestinian delegation Yasir ‘Arafat Source: Cairo Agreement, 1969. Full text available on the Palestinian Refugee Research Net, http://prrn.mcgill.ca/research/papers/brynen2_09.htm.

2. UN Security Council Resolution 425 on Conditions in Lebanon, March 19, 1978 The Security Council, Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from the Permanent Representative of Israel, Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel, Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace, Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, 1.  Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; 2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

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3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the Force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution. Adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Source: United Nations Security Council. Available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0 /E25DAE8E3CE54FB5852560E50079C708.

3. UN Security Council Resolution 1559 on Militias in Lebanon, September 2, 2004 The Security Council, Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, resolution 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, and resolution 1553 (2004) of 29 July 2004 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, Noting the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, Gravely concerned at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, which prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its full sovereignty over all Lebanese territory, Reaffirming the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory, Mindful of the upcoming Lebanese presidential elections and underlining the importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence, 1. Reaffirms its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; 2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon; 3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias; 4. Supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory;

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5. Declares its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence; 6. Calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the Security Council for the full implementation of this and all relevant resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon; 7. Requests that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council within thirty days on the implementation by the parties of this resolution and decides to remain actively seized of the matter. Source: United Nations Security Council. Available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/ resolutions/2004.shtml.

4. Twentieth Semiannual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1558 (2004), October 7, 2014 I. Background … 3. Following a time of relative calm after the formation of the Government, Lebanon witnessed further challenges to its security situation during the reporting period, including five terrorist attacks involving improvised explosive devices and car bombs that left at least three people dead and tens injured. There were also at least 15 attacks by the Syrian air force on the area around the Lebanese town of Aarsal, close to the SyrianLebanese border. Cross-border shooting, shelling and rocket attacks from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon regularly took place, causing death and injury. . . . 4. The impact of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic on the security and stability of Lebanon was unmistakeable during the reporting period. In its press statement of 4 August (SC/11507), the Security Council condemned an attack begun on 2 August by violent extremist groups on the Lebanese armed forces and internal security forces in the area of Aarsal, which had caused some 100 fatalities and numerous injuries by 7 August when it ended. The Lebanese army and security forces suffered additional casualties in other attacks against them, but remained robust and resilient in tackling multiple security challenges. There were some positive developments linked to the implementation of security plans in Tripoli and the Bekaa. …

II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) … C. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

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30. Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias within the country continue to operate outside the control of the Government, in serious violation of resolution 1559 (2004). While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside government control, the armed component of Hizbullah is the most significant and most heavily armed Lebanese militia in the country. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups poses a serious challenge to the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. In addition, several Palestinian armed groups continue to operate in the country inside and outside the refugee camps. 31. Since my previous report, there has been no tangible progress towards the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, as called for in the Taif Agreement and resolution 1559 (2004). ... 35. During the reporting period, the security situation in the Palestine refugee camps remained generally stable, with the exception of a few violent incidents. From 12 to 14 May, intermittent clashes between factions in the Ein el-Hillweh camp left one person dead. . . . 36. Humanitarian conditions for Palestine refugees in Lebanon are increasingly dire, with the influx of an additional 44,000 refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic since the beginning of the crisis placing tremendous further pressure on the overall situation in the camps and gatherings, in addition to the efforts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to assist them. . . . 37. The presence of Palestinian armed groups outside the camps continues to challenge the ability of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty over its territory. Notwithstanding the decision taken in 2006 by the National Dialogue and confirmed in subsequent sessions, no progress was made during the reporting period with regard to dismantling the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada in the country. …

III. Observations 47. The continued violations by Israel of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, most conspicuously the overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli aircraft, are deplorable. I reiterate my call upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and to withdraw its forces from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, as well as to cease its overflights of Lebanese airspace, which undermine the credibility of the Lebanese security services and generate anxiety among the civilian population. . . . 50. With Lebanon hosting the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, recent security developments, especially in the eastern border region, have put even greater pressure on the refugees, the host communities that receive them and the country

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more broadly, necessitating further support from the international community. I welcome the activation of the multi-donor trust fund with the help of the World Bank and strongly encourage Member States to fulfil their burden-sharing responsibilities by contributing generously through this and other mechanisms. Source: United Nations Security Council. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ missions/unifil/reports.shtml.

Malaysia The Malay-Chinese Conflict Amy L. Freedman

Timeline 1400 Chinese traders begin arriving on the Malay Peninsula. 1860 Significant numbers of Chinese begin to migrate to the (now) British colonies on the Malay Peninsula. Migration ends in approximately 1930. 1911 The Qing dynasty in China is overthrown. 1919 The May 4th Movement occurs in China, an intellectual protest movement against corruption and foreign influence. 1942–1945 The Japanese occupy British Malaya and an insurgency is waged by the Malayan Communist Party until military rule is re-established by the British at the end of World War II. 1948 Emergency rule is declared by the British to eliminate Communist insurgents. 1957 The Independence Constitution is drafted for the Federation of Malaya. 1963 The Federation of Malaysia is created with the merger of the Federation of Malaya states Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo (Sabah).

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1965 Singapore is separated from the Federation of Malaysia. May 13, 1969 Riots against ethnic Chinese lead to two years of emergency rule in Malaysia. 1971 The New Economic Policy is adopted. October 1987 Demonstrations are held, and the Internal Security Act (ISA) is passed to contain the opposition forces challenging government. 1997–1998 An economic crisis in Southeast Asia, in general, produces demonstrations against the regime in Malaysia; Malaysian Chinese seem to avoid the protests. 1999 General elections are held, and the leading coalition retains power with support from the ethnic Chinese. 2001 June: The Malaysian Chinese Association president is criticized for the party’s purchase of the two largest Chinese-language newspapers, and Chinese disappointment with the party intensifies. Post-September 11: The Malaysian government cracks down on Al Qaeda–linked Islamic groups. The move increases Chinese support for the ruling Malay party and is supported by moderate Malays. 2003 The multiethnic opposition party Keadilan (People’s Justice Party, or PKR) is formed. 2008 The opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) is formed among Keadilan, the Democratic Action Party, and Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). 2008 In the March 2008 elections, the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional, loses its twothirds majority in the lower house of parliament for the first time since 1969. The government can no longer change the constitution at will. 2009 A court ruling in late 2009 overturns a government ban on non-Muslim groups using the word “Allah” to refer to God. This touches off a series of arson attacks on

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Christian churches and Sikh houses of worship. In 2013, a court reverses the 2009 ruling and reinstates the ban (citing the need for order and harmony) on Christian groups using the word “Allah” to mean God. 2012 The government repeals the Internal Security Act, but it is replaced with the Security Offences Measures Act and the Peaceful Assembly Act. These new measures are widely viewed to serve the same purpose as the ISA in curtailing political rights and liberties and freedom of assembly. Malaysia is a multiethnic society sandwiched between Buddhist Thailand, which is mostly peaceful, and Muslim-dominated Indonesia, which was plagued with serious ethnic and religious violence in the wake of the 1997–1998 economic crisis. Malaysia’s population is roughly 60 percent ethnic Malay, 29 percent Chinese, and 11 percent Indian. Malaysia has been known more for its ethnic accommodation and harmony than for ethnic conflict. Such a reputation, however, makes light of the significant conflict that has occurred, and it minimizes the very real tension that still exists between the dominant Malays, on the one hand, and the Chinese and Indian populations in Malaysia, on the other—especially between the federation’s Malay and Chinese inhabitants. Overall, Malaysian politics remains highly ethnicized. Political parties represent the three largest ethnic groups and are supposed to channel ethnic interests to prevent violence. Few issues are not, in some manner, linked to ethnic relations. What is most compelling about ethnic relations in Malaysia is that, from the 1950s through the 1970s, ethnic conflict was violent. Since the 1970s, this violence has largely disappeared, and since the early 2000s, societal divisions have been recast in religious terms more than ethnic terms. There has been an Islamicization in society and politics. As such, Malaysia has seen an increase in attacks on Christian churches and increasing intolerance against non-Sunni Muslims. In general, a lack of a direct discussion about ethnic relations and how power is configured in Malaysia has led to different forms of conflict: conflict between the regime and opposition figures over a lack of democratization and an ethnic hardening within political parties where other communities are viewed with suspicion and hostility. Historical Background Ethnic relations in the Malay Peninsula can be basically viewed as falling into five distinct periods: (1) the period during British colonialism; (2) the era covering the post–World War II transition from colonial rule to independence; (3) the turbulent early years of independent Malaya/Malaysia’s existence (1957–1969); (4) the period stretching from 1969 until about 2000; and (5) the period from 2000 until today. Throughout these periods, the Chinese in Malaysia have been a dynamic economic force, and because they make up close to 30 percent of the current population, they have long been perceived as a potential political threat by the indigenous Malays.

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The Malay Peninsula has always been ethnically mixed, with indigenous and Malay inhabitants. This pluralism increased when the Chinese began coming to western Malaysia (around 1400), especially in the mid-19th century when Chinese settlement in the peninsula became significant. Most immigrants came from Guangdong and Fujian and spoke one of five major Chinese dialects: Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Teochiu, or Hainanese. Like elsewhere in the Chinese diaspora, Chinese in Malaysia were socially and politically organized into myriad commonorigin associations, for example, the Guangdong Association, the Fujian Association, and so on. The British colonial administration relied on the Kapitan Cina (Chinese secret society heads with financial power and ties to local Malay chiefs) to administer revenue farms, develop tin mining and plantation economies, and keep the peace in Chinese communities.1 During colonial rule, conflict between Malay and Chinese inhabitants was kept to a minimum. Ethnic groups were segmented by employment, place of residence, and place of education. Colonial authorities kept in place the Malay sultanates, and they relied on Malay elites to staff the civil service. Chinese were utilized as economic middleman. The Chinese under British Rule

As the British gained administrative control over Malaya, the Chinese lost some of their ability to govern themselves. Under British rule, Chinese participation in the colonial regime was highly limited. Fear of Chinese political agitation increased after the fall of the Qing dynasty in China in 1911. Since 1911, Chinese involvement in Malaysian politics has been linked to fears of Chinese Nationalist or Communist Party influence. Moreover, under colonialism, Chinese immigrants were allowed to organize and run their own schools, and the curriculum offered tended to reflect a growing sense of Chinese nationalism. Emphasis was placed on creating military spirit, drilling, and uniforms, and patriotic songs were incorporated into the school day. Shortly after the May 4th Movement of 1919 in China (a protest movement led by intellectuals against the corruption of the new republican regime), Sun Yat-sen’s three principles (nationalism, democracy, and livelihood) became mandatory political components of the already militarized curriculum. This alarmed both Malay elites and the British. Chinese schools and communal organizations would later serve as targets of ethnic conflict. The Transition to Independence

While Malaysia was under Japanese occupation during World War II, the (overwhelmingly Chinese) Communists in Malaya succeeded in organizing the only viable underground resistance. In doing so, they gathered widespread cooperation and support from the Chinese (and from some Malays), and they tried to position themselves to assume political power following the war. Indeed, after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) operated as a parallel government to the British Military Administration, which returned after the war ended. As the British solidified their rule, however, they took steps to reduce the MCP’s power. By 1948, police raids and arrests had destroyed the labor movement,

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and the party was being shut out of newly formed advisory councils. The MCP opted for armed insurrection, and the colonial government initiated a drive to eliminate the Communist insurgents. During this period, known as the emergency, the Chinese were suspected of participating in the Communist campaigns, and those supportive of the movement were targeted for education campaigns, detentions, and massive relocation efforts. The late 1940s and 1950s were a turbulent time for ethnic relations in Malaysia. Ethnic Malays were determined to win independence from the British, and they wanted to ensure that the new nation would be Malay in character. They feared the Chinese for two, somewhat contradictory, reasons. First, the Chinese Communist Party was well organized and well funded, and the British were reluctant to leave the peninsula if it looked as though the MCP was too powerful. Second, the Chinese were a significant source of capital. If Malaysia were to be independent, Chinese business interests would have to be incorporated in the new government. If not, there was a fear of capital flight that the soon-to-be-independent nation could ill afford. The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), known as the Malaysian Chinese Association after 1963 (when the addition of Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo transformed the Federation of Malaya into the Federation of Malaysia), was formed at this time as a conservative, business-oriented organization that would work with the British and Malay elites to redirect Chinese support away from the Communists. It was in the economic and political interest of this class to work against fellow Chinese Communists. The negotiations among interethnic actors in working toward independence would create a pattern for elite cooperation that would last until 1969. The Early Years of Independence, 1957–1989

The concern over non-Malay privilege and ambition (in the form of Chinese economic dominance) led to the institutionalization of Malay special rights in the Independence Constitution of 1957. These rights evolved as part of complex negotiations for multiethnic rule in postcolonial Malaysia that left the Chinese community dismayed at how Malays were favored by legitimizing the primacy of the Malay identity within the constitution. At the same time, the Chinese were willing to compromise on this in exchange for concessions on citizenship eligibility and moderate protection of the Chinese vernacular education.2 There had previously been a brief window of time during decolonization in 1946–1947 when it seemed that the Chinese might be accorded equal political and economic rights. However, intense opposition from the newly formed United Malays National Organization (UMNO) prevented it. The British then proposed a federal system that guaranteed Malay sovereignty and contained strict citizenship requirements for non-Malays. UMNO clearly favored this arrangement, and decolonization moved forward. Although the Independence Constitution was drawn up by Malay and nonMalay members of a multiethnic coalition (called the Alliance Party), the final document clearly favored ethnic Malays. The constitution defines a “Malay” as a Muslim, a Malay speaker, and a follower of Malay custom. Non-Malay culture is not defined. The Chinese in Malaysia were (and still are) Buddhist, Confucian, or

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Christian. Because few Chinese practice Islam, ethnic Chinese citizens can never be “Malay” according to the constitution, and in part for this reason, the constitution has been subsequently pointed to as a justification for pro-Malay policies. In return for allowing the Malays to retain their political preeminence, it was agreed that the economic position of the Chinese would be undisturbed and that Chinese and Indians would be permitted to maintain their cultures and traditions. For the first 10 years of independence, the ruling Alliance coalition was able to maintain about 60 percent of the votes and keep control of both parliament and the state governments, although Malay-Chinese tensions in the early 1960s led to the expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia of the overwhelmingly Chinese city-state of Singapore in 1965. In 1969, however, the system broke down. A riot erupted on May 13, after general elections in which the Alliance won only 48 percent of the votes, down 10 percent from 1964. Victory parades were held after the election, which were perceived as abusive to Malay sensibilities. Rioting ensued in which thousands (mostly Chinese) were killed, and property was burned and looted. After 1969, a consensus evolved that the disturbance was caused by an economic imbalance between the wealthier Chinese and the less-well-off native Malays.3 A countrywide state of emergency was proclaimed, and parliamentary rule was suspended for nearly two years (1969–1971). 1969–2000

The race riots marked the rise of Malay leadership dedicated to the translation of Malay constitutional privileges into actual policies. This opened the door to a massive shift in economic and social policies to boost the position of Malays within their own country. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was created. Adopted in 1971 as the first act of business of the newly reconstituted parliament, the NEP’s aim was to redistribute wealth from the Chinese to the Malays and other indigenous races. A secondary goal was to eliminate the link between race and economic function. In other words, it aimed at bringing the bumiputras (sons of the soil, or ethnic Malays) into sectors of the economy previously dominated by Chinese. It gave preference to Malays in job allocation, scholarships abroad, and university seats, and it required that Malays be given larger ownership stakes in Malaysian companies. For this legislation to go forward, however, there needed to be an agreement between Malays and Chinese on the necessity of addressing ethnic income disparity. There was, however, little discussion at the time of the distribution of power within the institutions of power and how the NEP would concern various groups in society. Given the nature and results of the bargaining that took place at independence and the fact that the constitution accords Malays political primacy, many Malays felt that they should control the political process. Any political opposition by ethnic Chinese was—and largely remains—viewed as a threat to Malay political dominance. The Conflict From 1957 to 1969, there was a tacit understanding among elites of all ethnic groups that the Chinese would be left alone to prosper economically while the

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Malays would control the political institutions, even though the Chinese slightly outnumbered the Malays in the Federation of Malaysia during the brief period when Singapore was a part of it. Over time, the violence and relocation efforts against Chinese suspected of affiliation with the Malaysian Communist Party died down. A fragile stability was created but shattered later by the riots of 1969. While there has not been a second period of violent conflict since 1969, ethnic tension lies just below the surface of ethnic tranquility. The NEP was designed to address economic inequalities through affirmative action for ethnic Malays. This severely disadvantaged Chinese and Indians, particularly in university admissions, government jobs, and corporate ownership. Small political issues have occasionally brought Malaysia to the brink of renewed conflict. For example, in October 1987, a series of demonstrations were held following the government’s appointment of more than 100 Chinese teachers to high administrative positions within Chinese primary schools. Although Chinese, these teachers did not possess Mandarin Chinese qualifications. To the Chinese community, this seemed like yet another move to undermine the Chinese schools. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), a Chinese opposition party, quickly mobilized support for a protest. Fearing that the DAP would garner greater leverage from the event, the MCA (which is part of the ruling coalition) also participated in the protest meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on October 11, 1987. At that meeting, and despite the fact that the government had already decided to reassign the teachers, the leaders agreed to call for a boycott of schools if the appointments were not withdrawn by October 14. The boycott went ahead on October 15. The Malay response to the DAP-MCA cooperation was dramatic. The youth wing of the UMNO held a huge rally denouncing the MCA and Chinese in general. People in the capital feared a repeat of May 13, 1969. Thus, when several leaders in the UMNO advocated further mass demonstrations, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad put an end to the plans and called for the detainment of activists under the Internal Security Act. Both Chinese and Malay leaders were arrested. While many were quickly released, opposition leaders were given much longer sentences. This incident illustrates two important points. First, feeling pressure from internal and external challenges, both the MCA and the UMNO were inclined to racialize the issue to mobilize support (a dynamic that continues to this day). Second, although the government may have justly feared renewed communal conflict, they used the crisis to achieve partisan goals. By arresting DAP leaders, the government not only removed the most strenuous backers of Chinese interests but also put an end to criticism from the opposition on other issues. Repression of dissent as a mode of conflict management has continued to this day. Meanwhile, from 1987 until 1998, Malaysia’s economy boomed. While there was resentment among many Chinese about their quasi second-class status and about the fact that the NEP favored Malays in education, employment, and government service, with a rising economy, disgruntlement was successfully managed. In 1997–1998, Malaysia, like the rest of Southeast Asia, suffered a serious economic crisis. For a short time in the summer and fall of 1998, it looked as though the economic turmoil would result in a political backlash against the Mahathir regime.

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Protestors took to the streets complaining about the political ousting of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on trumped-up charges of corruption and sodomy. Many wondered whether there would also be violence against ethnic Chinese, as was occurring at the time in Indonesia. The demonstrations were not ethnically motivated, however, and there was no racial violence. Malaysian Chinese, for the most part, refrained from participating in the demonstrations against the regime. In fact, in the general elections held in the fall of 1999, the Chinese were some of the strongest supporters of the ruling coalition. 2000–Present

From the 1970s until recently, Chinese in Malaysia largely supported the regime’s emphasis on stability over greater political and civil freedoms, but this has changed dramatically. In 2003, a new multiethnic political party formed called Keadilan (People’s Justice Party, or PKR). PKR calls for greater social justice and civil and political rights; an end to corruption and the cozy relationship between ruling party elites and business interests; and an end to NEP. It seeks to replace NEP with a nonethnically based approach to economic imbalances and poverty reduction. PKR has joined an informal political coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (or the People’s Alliance, with the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a traditionally Chinese-based party, and with the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). This coalition went from having one member elected to parliament in the 2004 parliamentary election to winning 31 seats in the 2008 election. Since 2003, more Chinese have come to support PKR over the ruling parties. This shift in attitudes is generally attributed to both an increase in younger voters (Chinese, Malay, and Indian alike) and an overall increase in Chinese of all ages demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the political status quo. Weakening support for the ruling parties grew considerably in the run up to the 2008 election. To win votes and stay in power, UMNO seemed to play up Malay fears of Chinese dominance; scholars noted a trend of “ethnic hardening” as UMNO leaders called attention to ethnic and religious differences to shore up support among party members (particularly conservatives).4 In 2001, Prime Minister Mahathir declared that Malaysia was an Islamic state. This had the effect of angering both the opposition forces in PAS and non-Muslim citizens of Malaysia. From 2001 until today, UMNO has in many ways tried to bolster their Islamic credentials and identity as a way of undermining the appeal of one key opposition party, PAS. The government, under UMNO leadership, has increased spending on building mosques, on religious education and outreach, and on framing Malaysia as a modern and Islamic state. This has served to make non-Muslim Malaysians (Chinese, Indians, and others) feel like outsiders in their own country. The 2013 court ruling reinstating an earlier ban on non-Muslim’s use of the word “Allah” to refer to God is just one example of this. Christian groups (of different ethnicities) had used “Allah” in Bahasa-language materials and in spoken references to God. In the run-up to the spring 2013 election, Prime Minister Najib and UMNO tried to woo voters with moderate appeals to Malaysian unity (along with direct cash

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transfers and vote buying). However, continuing dissatisfaction with a lack of substantive political reforms, continued corruption scandals, and the increasing appeal of opposition parties resulted in the poorest electoral outcomes (particularly among the middle class) for the ruling coalition since independence. The ruling coalition regained a 60 percent majority of seats in parliament, but only won 47 percent of the popular vote. Conservative forces within UMNO have been critical of Najib’s moderate approach, and in the fall of 2013, Najib seemed to give in to racialist forces within his party and approved the creation of the Bumiputera Economic Empowerment program. This is a $10 billion program aimed at enhancing Malay businesses. Management of the Conflict Malaysia’s political system is responsible both for managing ethnic conflict and for perpetuating ethnic inequalities. How can one best characterize the Malaysian political system? It contains clear elements of both authoritarianism and democracy. There are regularly scheduled, free, and fair elections, and opposition parties contest a large number of seats. However, the major media outlets, such as Malay, Chinese, and English newspapers, are owned in large measure by the major political parties. There is also a high degree of regulation and suppression of nongovernmental activity, and critics and opposition groups endure close scrutiny and harassment by the government. In addition to such repressive elements in the operation of Malaysian democracy, the organs of the state are stacked in favor of the Malays. As already described, the political party system is structured to reflect ethnic divisions. Chinese and Indians have representation through communal parties in the ruling coalition: the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress. These parties are supposed to represent the interests of each ethnic group. From 1957 until the mid-1960s, people perceived that these parties did indeed represent the needs of their constituents. After the passage of the NEP in 1971, however, many Chinese and Indians felt that these parties came to represent only the interests of those in power, not necessarily the desires of the communities as a whole. In the 2013 election, Chinese-based parties within the ruling coalition lost significant electoral support. This demonstrates the increased willingness of ethnic Chinese to vote for the opposition and the loss of support for traditional Chinese parties. Malaysia’s electoral system has also limited the power of Chinese and Indian interests. Electoral constituencies are highly gerrymandered: districts are drawn in such as way to enhance the representation of (rural) Malay voters and give overwhelming leverage to the plurality in each district. Malays constitute a majority in 70 percent of the parliamentary constituencies (versus their 60 percent share in the population as a whole). This severely disadvantages non-Malay voters and minimizes their electoral representation while promoting the political fortunes of the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. This is perhaps the greatest institutional constraint to Chinese political power. Between 1969 and 2013, the facade of influence being shared across all three major ethnic groups faded. With the creation of newly rich middle and upper

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classes of Malays and through the continued gerrymandering of electoral districts, there was less of an electoral incentive for the UMNO to cater to Chinese constituents either for funding or for electoral support. Ironically, this situation may have changed with the general election of 1999. In the face of a newly politicized (Malay) electorate, the ruling coalition turned to Chinese citizens for support. By many accounts, the Chinese voted in larger numbers for the ruling parties than they had since the mid-1960s. There are two reasons for this support. First, the major beneficiary of Malay anger against the regime was the Islamic Party of Malaysia (Partai Se Islam di Malaysia, or PAS), a Muslim opposition party. Since few Malaysian Chinese are Muslim, many felt that the ruling coalition was preferable to Islamic rule. Second, in light of the riots and violence targeted against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in 1998, many Malaysian Chinese felt that stability and the continued leadership of Mahathir was better than the risk of the chaos that could result from toppling the regime. Over time, these attitudes have shifted. More Chinese Malaysians are fed up with racial and religious policies. There has been a brain drain as educated Chinese have sought to leave Malaysia for opportunities elsewhere. And more ethnic Chinese have begun to support opposition political parties. Significance Ethnic conflict in Malaysia has occurred when cooperation between elites has broken down. Prior to 1969, the Chinese community was mobilized to participate in the political process by the MCA. The MCA represented Chinese business interests, and its leaders were able to work with Malay and Indian elites because they shared the common goals of achieving independence from the British and combating communism. Although Malay interests were privileged, the interests of other groups were addressed in significant and tangible ways. This accommodation deteriorated after the riots of 1969. Heightened ethnic demands and interethnic tensions after 1969 made the bargaining process more costly. The rise of stronger opposition parties and the less homogenous nature of the second generation of leaders within the ruling coalition made it more difficult to secure the support of constituents and less possible to reach accommodation through elite negotiation. In many ways, the fallout from the riots of 1969 included both a weakening of Chinese political power and an increase in the power of the government over all potential opposition. From 1969 until recently, the Chinese community in Malaysia was willing to trade equality of opportunity and political power for protection of their economic rights and stability, which has shifted. As democracy continues to spread both globally and within Southeast Asia, there is a sense that Malaysia’s political system will not be able to avoid reforming its nondemocratic elements. While Malaysia’s political system has successfully managed ethnic conflict by giving incentives to ethnic leaders to cooperate, a more democratic system could empower new groups within the ethnic communities. At this moment, this has resulted in two contradictory trends: the rise of a multiethnic power-sharing arrangement among opposition

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parties and more blatant Malay dominance within the ruling party UMNO. It is unclear in 2013 whether the opposition parties’ vision of a more multiethnic and democratic political system will take hold or whether the ruling party will successfully use fear and ethnic politics to keep itself in power. Notes 1. Secret societies were not actually secret until they were banned in 1890. For more information on the secret societies in Malay and a longer discussion on the Kapitan Cina system, see Lynn Pan, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 173. 2. The Malaysian Indian Congress represents Indians in Malaysia. Indians have lagged behind both Malay and Chinese in economic and political standing. 3. In 1970, the average per capita household income for Chinese was M$1,032 as compared with M$492 for a Malay household. 4. Bridget Welsh writes extensively about Malaysia, and she has used the term “ethnic hardening.” For her work on Malaysia politics, go to http://bridgetwelsh.com.

Suggested Readings Brown, David. 1994. The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia. New York: Routledge Press. Crouch, Harold A. 1996. Government and Society in Malaysia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Freedman, Amy L. 2000. Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia, the United States. New York: Routledge Press. Freedman, Amy L. 2009. “Political Viability, Contestation and Power: Islam and Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia.” Journal of Religion and Politics 2 (1): 100–127. Freedman, Amy L. 2012. “An Update on Democracy in Asia: Models or Cautionary Tales?” Global Studies Journal 4 (4): 123–134. Freedom House. 2013. “Freedom in the World: Malaysia.” http://www.freedomhouse.org /report/freedom-world/2013/malaysia. Haque, M. Shamsul. 2003. “The Role of the State in Managing Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia.” American Behavioral Scientist 47 (3): 240–266. Jalali, Rita, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1992–1993. “Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective.” Political Science Quarterly 107 (4): 585–606. Jayasankaran, S. 1999. “Malaysia: Surprise Attack.” Far Eastern Economic Review (November 18): 16–18. Kahn, Joel, and Francis Lo Kok Wah. 1992. Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Lee, Raymond, ed. 1986. Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Malaysia. Occasional Paper no. 12. Normal, IL: Center on Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series on Southeast Asia, Northern Illinois University, Means, Gordon P. 1991. Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Munro-Kua, Anne. 1996. Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia. New York: St. Martins’ Press. Pan, Lynn, ed. 1999. The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Segawa, Noriyuki. 2003. “Ethnic Politics in Malaysia: Prospects for National Integration.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 19 (2): 210–232. Skeldon, Rondald. 1996. “The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas (1945–1994): Comparative Perspectives.” International Migration Review 29 (2): 576–579.

Appendix Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution Article 153 of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia—sealed at the time of the union of overwhelmingly Chinese Singapore, the ethnically mixed islands of Sabah (formerly British North Borneo), and Sarawak and the multinational Federation of Malaya, with its Malay majority but large Chinese minority—charged the head of state king of the federation (the Yang di-Pertuan Agong) with safeguarding the preferred position of Malays in the federation. It was this article that provided the legal foundation for the 1965 expulsion of Singapore when its leader was perceived as intending to use the overall majority of Chinese in the federation to threaten Malay control of it. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA, SEPTEMBER 16, 1963 … Impartial treatment of federal employees 136. All persons of whatever race in the same grade in the service of the Federation shall, subject to the terms and conditions of their employment, be treated impartially. … Armed Forces Reservation of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc., for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak 153. (1) It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this Article. (2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, but subject to the provisions of Article 40 and of this Article, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions under this Constitution and federal law in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service (other than the public service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government and, when any permit or licence for the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, then, subject to the provisions of that law and this Article, of such permits and licences. (3) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may, in order to ensure in accordance with Clause (2) the reservation to Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of positions in

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the public service and of scholarships, exhibitions and other educational or training privileges or special facilities, give such general directions as may be required for that purpose to any Commission to which Part X applies or to any authority charged with responsibility for the grant of such scholarships, exhibitions or other educational or training privileges or special facilities; and the Commission or authority shall duly comply with the directions. (4) In exercising his functions under this Constitution and federal law in accordance with Clauses (1) to (3) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall not deprive any person of any public office held by him or of the continuance of any scholarship, exhibition or other educational or training privileges or special facilities enjoyed by him. (5) This Article does not derogate from the provisions of Article 136. (6) Where by existing federal law a permit or licence is required for the operation of any trade or business the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may exercise his functions under that law in such manner, or give such general directions to any authority charged under that law with the grant of such permits or licences, as may be required to ensure the reservation of such proportion of such permits or licences for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may deem reasonable; and the authority shall duly comply with the directions. (7) Nothing in this Article shall operate to deprive or authorize the deprivation of any person of any right, privilege, permit or licence accrued to or enjoyed or held by him or to authorize a refusal to renew to any person any such permit or licence or a refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of a person any permit or licence when the renewal or grant might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events. (8) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, where by any federal law any permit or licence is required for the operation of any trade or business, that law may provide for the reservation of a proportion of such permits or licences for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak; but no such law shall for the purpose of ensuring such a reservation— (a) deprive or authorize the deprivation of any person of any right, privilege, permit or licence accrued to or enjoyed or held by him; or (b) authorize a refusal to renew to any person any such permit or licence or a refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of any person any permit or licence when the renewal or grant might in accordance with the other provisions of the law reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events, or prevent any person from transferring together with his business any transferable licence to operate that business; or (c) where no permit or licence was previously required for the operation of the trade or business, authorize a refusal to grant a permit or licence to any person for the operation of any trade or business which immediately before the coming into force of the law he had been bona fide carrying on, or authorize a refusal subsequently to renew to any such person any permit or licence, or a refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of any such permit or licence when the renewal or grant might in accordance with the other provisions of that law reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events. (8a) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, where in any University, College and other educational institution providing education after Malaysian Certificate of Education

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or its equivalent, the number of places offered by the authority responsible for the management of the University, College or such educational institution to candidates for any course of study is less than the number of candidates qualified for such places, it shall be lawful for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by virtue of this Article to give such directions to the authority as may be required to ensure the reservation of such proportion of such places for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may deem reasonable; and the authority shall duly comply with the directions. (9) Nothing in this Article shall empower Parliament to restrict business or trade solely for the purpose of reservations for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak. (9a) In this Article the expression “natives” in relation to the State of Sabah or Sarawak shall have the meaning assigned to it in Article 161a. (10) The Constitution of the State of any Ruler may make provision corresponding (with the necessary modifications) to the provisions of this Article. Source: Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia. Available at http://www.wipo.int /wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=290292.

Mali The Mali Crisis Jaimie Bleck

Timeline 2011 March–April: Armed groups raid Qaddafi’s arsenal in Libya. October–November: The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar al Dine form. November: AQIM kidnaps five hostages in Northern Mali and kills a sixth. 2012 January: Armed groups defeat Malian forces at Aguelhock. March: A coup d’état ousts President Toure five weeks before scheduled elections. March–April: Armed groups capture Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. April: MNLA declares the independent state of Azawad. June: The Movement for Divine Unity and Jihad (MUJAO) removes MNLA from Gao. Mausoleums are destroyed in Timbuktu. August: MUJAO takes Douentza in the Mopti region. 2013 January: French intervention removes jihadi-Islamist groups from northern capital cities. April: The United Nations creates the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). June: The Ouagadougou Peace Accord is signed. August: Ibrahim Boubacar Keita is elected president of Mali. 2014 May: MNLA retakes Kidal. June: Negotiations in Algiers begin. October: Attacks against the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and government installations increase. March 2015 The Malian government signs a peace treaty in Algiers. The current crisis in Northern Mali is the fourth conflict between members of the Kel Tamasheq, or Tuareg, ethnic group and the central government since Mali’s independence in 1960. As in the past, the Tuareg, a seminomadic group of Berber

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descent, claimed discrimination and marginalization by the government in the south. However, the current conflict includes a diverse group of state challengers with disparate goals, including those with hardline Islamic agendas. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), formed in the fall of 2011 and attempted to declare a sovereign state of Azawad, named after the Tuareg homeland. Additionally, groups with Islamist-jihadist agendas, including Tuareg-led Ansar al Dine, the Arab-led Movement for Divine Unity and Jihad (MUJAO), and Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have played prominent roles in the current uprising. Initial victories by armed groups against the Malian army provoked a coup d’état in Bamako in March 2012. In the power vacuum created by the coup, rebel groups were able to occupy the three northern regions of Mali, which constitute more than two-thirds of the country’s landmass. In response to the occupation, more than 400,000 Malians fled to neighboring Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina, and Southern Mali. In the first year of the conflict, the Islamist groups displaced the secular MNLA and later pushed south toward the Malian capital in January 2013. The French countered with an intervention of more than 4,000 troops. They pushed most rebel groups out of regional capitals, with the exception of MNLA, which was allowed to stay in Kidal. France eventually transitioned to a broader counterterrorism initiative and handed peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN stabilization force of nearly than 10,0000 troops. Despite Mali holding multiparty elections in August 2013 to restore a democratically elected leader, insecurity continues to plague the north of the country. After an initial peace agreement in June 2013, armed groups took control of Kidal in May 2014 and restarted a new round of peace negotiations. Since that time, there has been a significant increase in fighting, including attacks against UN and government targets as well as fighting between progovernment and challenger armed groups. At the time of this writing (March 2015), the Malian government and some armed groups have signed a peace treaty in Algiers Peace, but Coordination for Movements of Azawad, which includes the MNLA, had asked for more time to review the document. Historical Background As this article explores “Tuareg” goals and grievances, it is important to note that there is not one Tuareg people or a single Tuareg narrative. Some Tuareg actors have remained pro-state throughout all of these conflicts; others have oscillated back and forth as state challengers or collaborators. Schisms within groups make it very difficult to characterize Tuareg objectives. Similarly, other actors, most recently foreignborn Arab actors, have joined the Tuareg struggle against the Malian central state. While this contribution focuses on the ethnic dimension of the conflict, it is important to resist reductionist distinctions between rebellious Tuareg and sedentary state actors. Despite disparate goals, militant groups’ strategies are largely fueled by internal Tuareg politics—tension across different clans, but also competition within clans. The Tuareg are a seminomadic people of Berber origin. There are various Tuareg clans and confederations of clans. Historically, Tuareg groups are composed of

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hierarchical caste systems within clans, including noble warriors, religious leaders, craftsmen, and those who were “unfree.”1 Categories of race, hierarchy, and clan have been shaped by the colonial and postindependence experience. These categories can be fluid, but they play a role in the population’s conception of social roles and duties. During emancipation campaigns against “slavery” in the 1950s, the term Bellah was used by political parties to describe the former slave communities whose votes they attempted to court; later in the 1990s, some members of the formerly unfree castes described themselves as an ethnically distinct category of Bellah.2 This article will use the word Bellah to describe those who were historically unfree, but it is important to note that many who fall into the category of Bellah identify as Tuareg. Tuareg are found along a band of desert from Algeria through Burkina Faso. Within Mali, Tuareg largely reside in the three sparsely populated northern regions of the country. Representing two-thirds of Mali’s geographic mass, these regions are home to less than 10 percent of Mali’s total population of nearly 15 million inhabitants. Seminomadic pastoralists, Tuareg have typically earned their income through raising livestock; this has made them particularly susceptible to drought and the volatile climatic conditions in Northern Mali. The Tuareg are only a majority ethnic group in the Kidal region; they share the other northern regions with Songhai, the other major ethnic group; Arabs and Moors; Peul; Bambara; and Bozo ethnic groups. The five southern regions of Mali are more densely populated and host diverse ethnic groups, including the Dogon, Soninke, Senoufo, Bobo, Malinke, and the most populous ethnic group, the Bambara. In the south of the country, most Malians speak Bambara as the shared market language. Tuareg groups engaged in fierce battles against French colonial forces in Timbuktu before their surrender in the 1910s. During Mali’s transition to independence, Tuareg were unsatisfied with the governance arrangement. Hoping to receive their own state, they felt marginalized by the southern central government’s modernization policy, which favored sedentary farmers. Further, the introduction of elections—initially under colonialism and later at independence—as well as government campaigns to “liberate former slaves” created political opportunities for Bellah to leave their former masters. The first Tuareg rebellion in the early 1960s reflected these grievances. The uprising was brutally suppressed by the Malian army, with an estimated 1,000 deaths in the Tuareg community.3 As a result, many Tuareg fled to neighboring Algeria. Some of the parents of leaders of the subsequent uprising were killed in that conflict. The drought in the 1970s and 1980s devastated livestock populations and triggered another Tuareg emigration to Libya, Mauritania, and Algeria. The government and donors attempted to implement sedentarization sites to promote a transition to farming within the Tuareg community; however, many Tuaregs saw this type of manual labor unbefitting of anyone except those Tuaregs of slave origin.4 Again, the Tuareg accused the government of inadequate response in their time of suffering. Hundreds of Tuareg, particularly those from the Kidal region, joined Muammar Qaddafi’s army in Libya and gained fighting experience in wars in Chad, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. During this time, some Tuareg joined the political movement Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA).

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In June 1990, the MPLA attacked government installations. Nearly 3,000 Tuareg returned to Mali to fight against the central state.5 Broader northern populations continued to feel marginalized by a corrupt central government, which they felt embezzled aid intended for the north of the country. However, they resented Tuareg claims to represent the broader population within the north of the country and the rebellion against the government; this period also generated tremendous interethnic tension. Accusations that the government indiscriminately attacked civilians— particularly light-skinned Tuaregs and Arabs—fueled further resentment against the southern state by these groups. The government’s attempts to co-opt leaders within the MPLA resulted in the creation of spin-off organizations, including the Popular Movement for Azawad and the Arab-led Islamic and Arab Front of Azawad, which would later fragment into yet more groups. The government attempted to offer a special status for the North, with devolution of power to the regional level, integration of former fighters into the Malian army, and greater foreign aid to the North. At the same time, Mali began its transition to democracy. After government troops fired on student protesters, a young paratrooper, Toumani Toure (ATT), ousted military dictator Moussa Traore in a coup d’état in March 1991. After a year of ATT leading an interim government, Mali held its first multiparty elections in 1992 and elected president Alpha Oumar Konare. ATT would go on to become Mali’s president in 2002–2012. Violence between the government and armed actors and across ethnic groups continued. Many “light-skinned” groups fled the region out of fear of persecution by the government. The National Pact, signed in 1992, led to a temporary de-escalation in fighting, but eventually disagreements between armed groups and interethnic fighting erupted. The Ganda Koy, or “masters of the land,” in Songhai, emerged as a selfdefense militia composed of black sedentary populations from the North. They explicitly fought against Tuareg nationalists. Some members of the Bellah community took up arms against their former masters and joined Ganda Koy, -creating increased tensions that would last into the era of multiparty democracy. Many Tuareg and Arab civilians targeted by the Ganda Koy felt that this militia group was backed by the Malian state. Despite multiple peace attempts, fighting did not subside until after the 1996 Flame of Peace ceremony. Ganda Koy and member organizations of the Unified Movements and Fronts of the Azawad (MFUA) promised to put down arms. This conflict killed an estimated 6,000–8,000 people.6 Subsequent to peace agreements of this era, the North was slated to receive a special status. Approximately 1,500 Tuareg were integrated into the military and civil service, including the appointment of a Tuareg prime minister under President Amadou Toumani Toure (2002–2004). Although these programs aimed to generate affirmative action for the entire Tuareg community, some members felt certain clans and families benefited from the program more than others. Members of other ethnic communities protested the approach, which they viewed as privileging the Tuareg over all other ethnic groups in Mali. These efforts, seen as ineffective by intended recipients, were viewed as divisive and fueled resentment among the larger Malian population.

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Instead of creating specialized institutions for the North, the government implemented a national-level decentralization reform, which aimed to give decisionmaking and budgetary power to locally elected communities.7 However, this massive decentralization effort was never adequately funded. The accords also sought to reduce military presence in Northern Mali, allowing communities to provide for their own security. In reality, this allowed the growth and proliferation of organized crime and community militias, which the government unsuccessfully attempted to manipulate. The security situation in Mali had been declining since President Toure’s second term in office. Since 2003, AQIM, which emerged out of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), kidnapped foreign nationals and brought them to Mali, where they negotiated millions of dollars of settlement money for their release. Because of Mali’s role as a key negotiator in the hostage release, regional neighbors, including Algeria and Mauritania, were frustrated with the Malian government, which they viewed as weak on jihadists. Additionally, the drug trade grew steadily from the early 2000s. In an atmosphere of weak state presence in the North, government agents and local authorities could collaborate with traffickers. Rebel groups with access to kidnapping ransoms and drug money were able to gain significant resources during this period. There was an additional, more limited, uprising between 2006 and 2009. Despite the adoption of the Algiers Accord in 2006, violence continued through 2009. Provisions in this accord aimed to reduce the Malian army’s presence in the region and create a special investment fund in the North. The conflict took place in an atmosphere of greater transnational trafficking networks. This illicit revenue generated large profit margins that also shifted the balance of power among groups in the North. This conflict pitted the Malian government and notable traffickers— many of Arab descent—as well as Tuareg allies of the state against Tuareg state challengers. The Conflict Despite efforts to improve development in the North, including the $22 million Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali, populations continued to be frustrated by what they perceived as marginalization and neglect by the central state.8 Trafficking, in drugs and humans, continued to flourish in the North of Mali. In fall 2011, three hostages were taken and one hostage killed from Timbuktu city, and an additional two were taken from Homobori, off the paved road to Gao. This was a sign of weakening security in the North. Meanwhile, poor rains in the summer of 2011 created severe food insecurity for more than 3 million Malians. Groups of Tuareg from Timbuktu had founded the National Movement of Azawad (MNA) in Timbuktu in the fall of 2010. Subsequent to the removal of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in 2011, rebel forces, including AQIM, and former loyalists, raided Qaddafi’s military supplies and brought many of these weapons back to Mali. The MNLA was created in October 2011 out of an alliance between the existing

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MNA and the National Alliance of Tuaregs of Mali (ANTM), which had been deeply involved in the 2006 fighting. MNLA leader Bilal Ag Achérif had participated in the 1990s rebellion and later served as a soldier in Libya During the formation of MNLA, Iyad Ag Ghali, a former rebel leader who had signed peace accords in 1991 and 1992 but had helped lead the 2006 uprising, was dissatisfied with the secular orientation of the group. He had previously served as a hostage negotiator and later as a diplomat in Saudi Arabia (2007–2010), until he was deported for fraternizing with extremists. He formed Ansar al Dine—meaning “the defenders of faith,” in Arabic—when MNLA rejected his sharia platform. Former members of AQIM, as well as other former Tuareg separatists, joined him. Though his ideological orientation was distinct, Ag Ghali, like the MNLA, also relied on clan-based recruitment strategies. Additionally, the Movement for Divine Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) formed out as a splinter group from AQIM in 2011. Presided over by Mauritanian, an Arab, it attracted recruits from AQIM. While some view the organization as foreign, it also included Malian members, particularly of Songhai and Arab descent. In January 2012, the rebel groups defeated the Malian army at Aguelhoc and killed dozens of soldiers. Rumors in Mali’s capital circulated that soldiers had been ill equipped and were slaughtered after they had already surrendered. Army wives and families launched protests against the lack of supplies for the soldiers and government mismanagement of the conflict. Subsequent to these protests and following a disagreement with the minister of defense, younger officers stormed the national public radio station (ORTM) and the presidential palace on March 21. They took to the airwaves the next day, pronouncing themselves the National Committee for Recovering Democracy and Restoring the State and formally announced a coup d’état. The coup took place only a month before scheduled presidential elections would have ushered in a new president. However, residents of Bamako largely welcomed the coup. Malians had grown decreasingly satisfied with the state of democracy, service provision, and corruption during President Amadou Toumani Toure’s second term. The junta, led by Colonel Amadou Haya Sanogo, managed to retain substantial political power until the 2013 elections. The presidential guard, or Red Berets, had been able to evacuate the president, and he later fled to Senegal. The Red Berets then became a target for the junta, and the junta forces defeated their attempt at a countercoup in April 2013. In attacking the Red Berets, Mali lost its best-trained fighting force. With the central state’s military power dramatically weakened, state challengers were able to take all three northern capitals within a week of the coup, with little resistance from state forces. In April 2012, the MNLA declared an autonomous state of Azawad—neatly within Malian borders. More than 400,000 Malians fled to Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Southern Mali. Poverty rates are generally higher in rural parts of Southern Mali than among those in the North. Many “Southern” citizens viewed the rebellion as yet another opportunity for Tuareg to extract resources from the state. Southerners stood firmly against the secession of Azawad. They were frustrated by some high-level

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defections of soldiers and political leaders over to rebel groups. Ethnic tension and hostility against light-skinned Malians grew. In the wake of the rebel attacks, the population in Bamako pillaged Tuareg and Arab homes, especially of those figures thought to be associated with MNLA. Many Tuareg and Arabs fled Mali in fear that they would be targeted with ethnic reprisals. As a result, many of their homes and possessions were looted. From the start, the separatist MNLA had an ambiguous relationship with jihadist groups. The MNLA’s active multimedia campaign espoused a secular, anti-jihadi stance. However, their actions proved much more ambiguous. Starting in January 2012, the MNLA collaborated with AQIM and Ansar al Dine, in a series of attacks in the three northern regions of the country.9 Later, MNLA signed a statement to formalize its pact with Ansar al Dine and agreed to implement sharia, but it rejected the alliance shortly thereafter. MNLA quickly became the least powerful of the occupying groups; it was expelled from Timbuktu by Ansar al Dine and defeated in Gao by MUJAO. Once in power, the Islamist groups adopted a hardline interpretation of sharia law, gaining international attention through amputations and stonings. In Timbuktu, Ansar al Dine destroyed centuries-old manuscripts and mausoleums that they perceived to be out of line with their interpretation of Islam. There was significant popular resistance to the sharia imposed in Northern areas, including protests against the banning of music, cigarettes, and women working in public areas. In Kidal, female members of the MNLA organized marches against sharia. During the occupation, armed groups tended to recruit along existing ethnic cleavages, particularly in Gao, where the MNLA troops largely consisted of Tuareg, but MUJAO recruited from a wider range of ethnic groups, including Peul communities along the border of Burkina Faso and Niger. Many of these groups were already in conflict, so the occupation just served to heighten existing cleavages. Ganda Iso, meaning “sons of the soil,” a Songhai militia, emerged to counter the MNLA. Additionally, Bellah leaders attempted to leverage the conflict to improve their own position. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other organizations accused the armed groups of human rights violations, including arbitrary killings, sexual abuse, and the recruitment of child soldiers. During the period of occupation, the Malian government did little to try to retake lost territories. By the fall, rebel groups took Douentza, a town in Northern Mopti. There were initial negotiations with armed groups in Burkina Faso in the fall of 2012, but very little progress. In December, the United Nations approved a resolution to authorize an African-led support mission in Mali. However, in January 2013, a group of Islamists proceeded south toward government-controlled Sevare. Armed groups took Konna and Diabali, towns south of the demarcated border of “Azawad.” At the request of Malian interim president Dioucounda Traore, the French forces launched an intervention with more than 4,000 troops, called Operation Serval. The French pushed forward and quickly removed AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar al Dine from Douentza, Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu. The French intervention paved a path for the Malian army to reenter these territories. Many Arab and Tuareg civilians accused the Malian soldiers of targeted violence against their communities,

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replicating previous patterns of abuse and sending a new wave of refugees flowing out of Malian territory. French troops allowed the MNLA to remain in Kidal and patrolled the city jointly along with support from Chadian troops. Since the French intervention, Islamist fighters have changed tactics from territorial conquest to guerilla attacks, including suicide bombings. The French have reduced their troop presence and focused on a broader regional counterterrorism initiative, Operation Barkane, while the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) had increased its presence to nearly 10,000 troops at the time of this writing. MINUSMA has one of the highest fatality rates in recent history; more than 40 UN peacekeepers have been killed in attacks by armed groups. Management of the Conflict After the French intervention, hardline Islamist organizations were no longer politically viable. Leaders sought refuge in newly created groups so that they could join the negotiation table. The Ganda Koy and Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) also attempted to join negotiations. Eventually, the MNLA, High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and Malian government met for negotiations in Burkina Faso. By June 18, 2013, these groups had signed an initial agreement that paved the way for August 2013 elections. In that vote, Malians elected president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) in the second round of the elections, with the support of 77.62 percent of the electorate. The elections boasted the highest participation rates in decades—nearly 50 percent. Key issues included restoring security and sovereignty in Northern Mali. In May 17, 2014, during a visit by Prime Minister Moussa Mara to Kidal, rebel groups launched attacks that killed and detained visiting civil servants. After a rebel victory, armed groups were able to retake Kidal. The MNLA signed a ceasefire agreement with the government on May 23, which resulted in rebel control of the city. These events substantially changed the balance of power and led to concessions by the Malian government. Algeria gathered three rebel groups HCUA, MNLA, and one faction of the MAA, and signed the Algiers Declaration on June 9. By June 14, three other groups— the Coalition of the People of Azawad (CPA), the CMFPR, and another faction of the MAA—had signed the “preliminary platform of Algiers for an inclusive interMalian dialogue.” The Malian government entered negotiations in Algiers in a much weaker position. They signed on to an initial roadmap on July 24. Certain key actors, such as Iyad Ag Ghali and prominent traffickers, did not take part in the negotiations. While many have affiliates at the table, it is unclear that these agreements will adequately address their aspirations. The new round of negotiations excludes those associated with AQIM and has led to renewed fighting by groups who are dissatisfied with their positions. In summer 2014, intense battles began in Tabankort in the Gao region—a strategic transport zone between Kidal and Southern Mali—as well as increasing attacks on MINUSMA by jihadi groups that lasted through the second half of 2014. Since January 2015, there has been a renewed series of attacks by jihadi fighters in the Mopti

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and Segou regions. In January and February 2015, fighting broke out between progovernment and pro-opposition Tuareg and Arab groups in Tabankort in Gao. This intraethnic fighting highlights the heightened tension among different clans. By February, more than 30 people had already died as a result of this violence. On March 1, 2015, the Malian government and armed groups signed a peace accord at Algiers. At the time of this writing, the Coordination for Movements of Azawad, which includes the MNLA, had asked for more time to review the content of the peace agreement and to discuss it with their constituents. The current agreement promises devolved power to the north through decentralization; integration of members of the armed movements into the Malian army, including a special regional security force; and a special development plan. MNLA leaders were still looking for amendments that give stronger political recognition for Azawad and the creation of a regional assembly. Racial, ethnic, and tribal tension remains extremely high. While many formerly displaced Malians have returned home, more than 130,000 Malians remain in refugee camps in Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Mauritania, as well as an additional 80,000 who are internally displaced in Mali. Most of these refugees are of Arab or Tuareg descent and remain fearful of persecution if they return back to Mali. Significance The Malian case teaches us that despite more than 20 years of multiparty elections, the government’s inability to adequately provide social services or govern its own territory can lead to near state collapse. Popular discontent in the context of failed peace accords, the infusion of arms and fighters from Libya, as well as the growing availability of revenue from trafficking and kidnapping created fertile ground for an uprising against the state. This rebellion is different from previous iterations because of the presence of hardline Islamist groups purporting a sharia agenda. While the rise of Islamist groups has gained global attention, it is important to recognize that localized battles for power fuel much of the rebel strategy and fighting. This rebellion, seen as historically linked to previous rebellions by the Tuareg, has heightened resentment against the Tuareg by other Malian populations. The occupation of Northern Mali and the subsequent retaking of that territory by the Malian and French army and then the retaking of Kidal by the armed movements have increased ethnic tension across Mali. Simultaneously, interethnic feuds and competition, especially among the Tuareg and Arab populations, have generated even greater fragmentation and instability. As the conflict has waged on and fractions grown, we observe new cycles of violence. Despite the presence of nearly 10,000 UN troops, insecurity continues and appears to be on the rise. More than 200,000 Malians remain displaced or are living as refugees. Notes 1. Note that the Tuareg community includes various castes of both “white” and “black” members. Black communities include members of free lineage as well as those who were traditionally unfree. See Baz Lecocq, “The Bellah Question: Slave Emancipation,

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Race, and Social Categories in Late Twentieth-century Northern Mali,” Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines 39, no. 1 (2005): 42–68, for a more detailed analysis of the specific Tuareg clans and caste systems as well as the evolution of the perception of race within Tuareg communities. 2. Ibid., 43, 49. 3. See Macartan Humphreys and Habaye Ag Mohamed, “Senegal and Mali,” in Understanding Civil War, ed. Paul Collier and Nicolas Sambanis (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005), 55. 4. Lecocq, “The Bellah Question,” 57. 5. Humphreys and Ag Mohamed, “Senegal and Mali,” 256. 6. Ibid., 248. 7. See Susanna D. Wing and Brehima Kassibo, Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Mali Desk Study (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2010). 8. Susanna D. Wing, Mali’s Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2013), 7. 9. Baz Lecocq et al., “One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A Multivocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided Republic of Mali,” Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 137 (2013): 343–357.

Suggested Readings Dowd, Caitriona, and Clionadh Raleigh. 2013. “The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel.” African Affairs 112 (448): 498–509. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. 2014. Illicit Trafficking and Instability in Mali: Past, Present, and Future. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. Humphreys, Macartan, and Habaye Ag Mohamed. 2005. “Senegal and Mali.” In Understanding Civil War, edited by Paul Collier and Nicolas Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. International Crisis Group. 2014. “Mali: Last Chance in Algiers.” Africa Briefing 104, November 18. Lecocq, Baz. 2005. “The Bellah Question: Slave Emancipation, Race, and Social Categories in Late Twentieth-century Northern Mali.” Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines 39 (1): 42–68. Lecocq, Baz. 2010. Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali. Leiden: Brill. Lecocq, Baz, et al. 2013. “One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A Multivocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided Republic of Mali.” Review of African Political Economy 40 (137): 343–357. Thurston, Alexander, and Andrew Lebovich. 2013. “A Handbook on Mali’s 2012–2013 Crisis.” Working Paper 13-001. Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. Whitehouse, Bruce. 2013. “A Festival of Brigands”: In Search of Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Mali.” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 35 (2): 35. Wing, Susanna D. 2013. “Mali: Politics of a Crisis.” African Affairs 112 (448): 476–485. Wing, Susanna D. 2013. Mali’s Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

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Wing, Susanna D., and Brehima Kassibo. 2010. Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Mali Desk Study. Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development.

Appendix Despite the peace accord, as the reports from organizations monitoring human rights violations make clear, the picture in Mali continues to involve the forced detention of minors, the murder and physical abuse of members of rival groups contesting for power, and a generally insecure environment.

Human Rights Watch: Mali: Justice Crucial to Peace Talks Draft Pact on 2012-13 Conflict Needs Strengthening, November 10, 2014 Nairobi, November 10, 2014) – A draft peace agreement to end the military and political crisis in northern Mali does not adequately address the need for justice for serious international crimes during the conflict, Human Rights Watch said today. The next round of negotiations between the Malian government and armed groups involved in the conflict is scheduled to begin on November 20, 2014, in Algiers All parties to the 2012–2013 armed conflict in northern Mali committed serious violations of the laws of war that included possible war crimes. Agreements that ended previous civil armed conflicts in Mali from 1962 through 2008 failed to address rampant impunity and weak rule of law, and some included provisions providing immunity from prosecution. “Mali’s peace talks need to succeed where previous deals have failed by bringing those responsible for atrocities to justice,” said Corinne Dufka, senior West Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The final agreement should include provisions to support the prosecution of war crimes, strengthen the truth-telling commission, and ensure the vetting of security force personnel.” Security has been deteriorating in northern Mali. While control of the north by the Malian government was largely restored in 2013 following a French-led military intervention, the groups negotiating with the government and others linked to Al-Qaeda are occupying territory and committing abuses against civilians and peacekeepers. Following the conclusion of the third round of peace talks in late October 2014, Algeria’s foreign minister, Ramtane Lamamra, said that the international mediation team had produced a “draft agreement for comprehensive peace,” which would form the basis for discussion when talks resume. Human Rights Watch research in Mali and elsewhere suggests that a failure to prosecute individuals responsible for serious wartime abuses enables and may even encourage future abuses. Providing immunity to those who committed war crimes denies the victims and their families a measure of justice for their suffering.

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Human Rights Watch and other organizations documented hundreds of alleged war crimes and other serious abuses during the 2012–2013 armed conflict. These include the summary executions of up to 153 Malian soldiers in Aguelhok by opposition armed groups; widespread looting, pillage, and sexual violence by the ethnic Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA); and the recruitment and use of child combatants, unlawful amputations, and destruction of shrines by Islamist armed groups. Malian soldiers were also implicated in serious abuses, including extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and torture or ill-treatment of suspected rebels. The government has made little progress in holding to account those responsible for war crimes and other abuses. The provisional release of scores of men detained in relation to the conflict, including several commanders from northern armed groups credibly implicated in abuses, has raised concern of a de facto amnesty for these crimes. International law encourages countries to provide a broad amnesty or pardon for captured combatants and others detained for their participation in a conflict, so long as they are not responsible for war crimes or other serious abuses. However, the releases that began in late 2013 under the June 18, 2013 Ouagadougou Accord and characterized by the government as “confidence building measures” in advance of negotiations, have been carried out without sufficient review to determine whether any of those freed are implicated in serious international crimes. Amnesties for those responsible for serious international crimes are not recognized under international law. “It is time to break the decades-long cycle of conflict, abuse, and impunity. Any deal which turns a blind eye to the need for justice will not only disregard the rights of victims and their families, but also encourage further abuses and sabotage a truly durable peace,” Dufka said. “Ensuring that the talks incorporate measures to address long-standing impunity is all the more urgent given the deteriorating security situation, and increasing attacks, lawlessness, and banditry by armed groups in the north.”

Recommendations The upcoming negotiations in Algiers should overcome the failings on human rights and accountability in previous accords among warring factions in Mali, including the 1991 Tamanrasset Accords, 1992 National Pact, 1995 Accords of Bourem, and the 2006 Algiers Accords. Any final agreement on Mali should incorporate the following recommendations, Human Rights Watch said.

Steps to Ensure Human Rights Accountability The draft agreement presented to the parties in late October 2014 and called “Elements for a peace and reconciliation agreement in Mali” (Élements pour un accord pour la paix et la Réconciliation au Mali) supports a “profound reform of the judiciary” to help end impunity, affirms “the inalienable nature of crimes against humanity,” and calls for all parties to cooperate with an international commission of inquiry. But it provides no details about the

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commission’s mandate or a time frame for establishing it, and does not specifically support justice for crimes committed during the conflict. The final agreement should: • Clearly state that no immunity will be given to anyone who committed, ordered, or had command responsibility for war crimes and other serious crimes in violation of international law; • Call on the Malian government to investigate alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties during and since the 2012–2013 armed conflict, and bring those responsible to justice before fair, impartial, and independent courts; • Support the establishment of a Bamako-based special investigation unit consisting of prosecutors, investigative judges, and others to investigate alleged crimes. Creating such a unit would increase the likelihood of credible investigations of wartime atrocities, and would: Centralize expertise in crimes not often handled by Malian courts; Help address the absence of defense lawyers in the north; Reduce the risk of attack on judicial personnel, witnesses, evidence, and judicial infrastructure; and Facilitate creation of an effective system of witness protection; • Provide details about the establishment, mandate, time frame, and powers of the international commission of inquiry, and call for the final report to be public; and • Support the establishment of the proposed “mobile testimony gathering units” (cellules d’écoute mobile 

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Justice, Truth-Telling, and Reconciliation Mechanism The draft agreement notes “the need to strengthen the mandate and organization of the Commission on Truth, Justice and Reconciliation” established by the government in 2014, though it fails to make specific recommendations. Truth commissions can make important contributions when they expose underreported atrocities committed during armed conflicts; explore the dynamics that underscored cyclical crises, including poor governance and corruption; and recommend reforms to prevent a repetition of past violations. The negotiating parties should support the following changes in the current commission: • Ensure that the commission is independent from other branches of government. The commission’s current placement under the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Northern Development subjects it to political interference and undermines perceptions of neutrality; • Create a structured, broad-based consultation process on the commission’s mandate and selection of commissioners, involving activist and human rights groups, women’s groups, youth groups, political parties, labor unions, victims’ groups, the diaspora, religious denominations, security forces, and opposition factions, among others; and • Implement regulations that provide for investigative powers, including to subpoena witnesses, hold public hearings, and issue a final public report that makes recommendations for accountability, including reparations and cases to be criminally investigated.

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Demobilization and Integration of Combatants into the Security Forces The draft agreement calls for the demobilization and integration of combatants from the warring factions into the state security forces, but does not include a program for vetting. The agreement should provide for the establishment of an independent vetting commission mandated to oversee a mechanism that would: • Screen any new proposed security force members with a view to recommending that those credibly implicated in serious human rights abuses are not allowed to join; • Recommend the removal of currently serving members of the security services credibly implicated in serious human rights abuses, against whom fair and appropriate disciplinary action, including dismissal, should be initiated; and • Given the size of the Malian security services, the vetting commission could focus first on vetting officers before addressing the lower ranks.

Mali’s Peace Negotiations and Recent Hostilities The Malian government is negotiating with several armed groups: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Le Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad, MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (Le Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad, HCUA), the Arab Movement of Azawad (Le Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad, MAA), the Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance 2 (Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Résistance, CMF-PR 2), and the Coalition of the People for Azawad (Coordination du peuple pour l’Azawad, CPA). The international mediation team facilitating the talks is led by Algeria, and includes members from the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, the United Nations, and Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as from the governments of Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania. Since late September 2013, opposition armed groups have committed several dozen ambushes and suicide bombings, and deployed improvised explosive devices and landmines. Most of these attacks targeted Malian and French troops, though others targeted civilians and peacekeepers, in violation of the laws of war. Landmines on key roads and rocket attacks striking major towns have killed and wounded civilians and generated a climate of fear. Over 30 UN peacekeepers have died in attacks. Several armed groups continue to recruit and arm child soldiers, and occupy some 20 schools. A visit by the prime minister to the MNLA stronghold of Kidal in May 2014 led to a brief resumption of hostilities there, during which eight civilians, including six civil servants, were allegedly summarily executed by the armed groups occupying the town. Source: Human Rights Watch. Available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/10/mali -justice-crucial-peace-talks.

Mexico The Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas Richard Stahler-Sholk

Timeline 1542 Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas is named Bishop of Chiapas after his Very Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies persuades the Spanish crown to enact new laws ending the enslavement of Indians. 1712 The Tzeltal revolt in Cancuc in the highlands is suppressed by troops arriving from Guatemala. 1821 Independence is gained from Spain; highlands elites request annexation by Mexico. 1869 The “Caste War” rebellion ends in a massacre of Tzotzil Indians in the highlands of Chiapas. 1910–1920 The Mexican Revolution takes place. The rights of communal landholding (ejidos) are guaranteed to peasant and indigenous communities under Article 27 of the 1917 constitution. 1934–1940 President Lázaro Cárdenas undertakes land redistributions, some of which finally reach Chiapas. The National Indigenous Institute (INI) is founded to promote assimilationist policies. 1974 The Indigenous Congress in San Cristóbal de Las Casas becomes a catalyst for grassroots organizing by Maoists and by Liberation Theology catechists influenced by Bishop Samuel Ruiz.

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1983 A tiny band of guerrilla organizers arrives in the Lacandón Jungle of Chiapas and founds the forerunner of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). 1991 Article 27 of the constitution is reformed, allowing ejido lands to be put on the market. 1992 March–April: The Ch’ol organization Xi-Nich (“Ant people”) marches from Palenque to Mexico City to protest repression. October 12: The National Emiliano Zapata Independent Peasant Alliance (ANCIEZ) leads a protest march in San Cristóbal de Las Casas. 1994 January 1: The Zapatista rebellion occurs when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) goes into effect; the army counterattack leaves 150 dead before the January 12 cease-fire. Bishop Samuel Ruiz mediates the dialogue. August: Zapatistas convene the National Democratic Convention (CND) in Lacandón Jungle, which is attended by thousands. February 1995 A government military offensive, which breaks the cease-fire, fails to capture EZLN leadership. 1996 February: The government and EZLN sign the San Andrés Accords on indigenous rights and culture. July: Zapatistas host an international forum against neoliberalism. December 22: 46 Tzotzil Indians are massacred by paramilitaries in the highlands village of Acteal. July 2, 2000 The Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) party loses the presidency after 71 years to Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) candidate Vicente Fox, who promises to resolve the Chiapas conflict “in 15 minutes.” 2001 February–March: Zapatista leaders caravan from Chiapas to Mexico City, where they hold a mass rally and address Congress, calling for indigenous rights legislation. July: A revised indigenous rights law is ratified by a majority of state legislatures but denounced as a sham by the Zapatistas and by national and international human rights groups and subject to a constitutional challenge.

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2003 January: The Zapatistas interrupt a period of silence with a peaceful march of over 20,000 in San Cristóbal de Las Casas. August: The Zapatistas inaugurate a regional structure of autonomous government, with rotating “Good Governance Councils” in five centers called Caracoles. June–July 2005 The EZLN issues the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle, launching a series of meetings with civil society in Zapatista territory to prepare “the Other Campaign,” a national tour of Zapatistas led by spokesman subcommander Marcos as “Delegate Zero.” 2006 January 1: The Other Campaign initiates in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, beginning outreach to other left groups across the country, but is suspended in May following government repression of one of its adherent organizations in San Salvador Atenco, near Mexico City. A civic uprising in Oaxaca stemming from a teachers’ strike in June is repressed by militarized federal police in November. July: In the presidential elections, PAN candidate Felipe Calderón claims victory by less than 1 percent, triggering massive civil disobedience by supporters of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the candidate of the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The Zapatistas denounce all political parties. 2009 Rising conflicts occur between adherents of the Other Campaign and supporters of government-promoted ecotourism and other development projects. There are military and police incursions into Zapatista communities and evictions and arrests of Other Campaign adherents. 2011 Bishop Emeritus Samuel Ruiz dies. The Zapatista leadership issues a condolence statement, breaking a two-year silence. May 7: Thousands of Zapatistas march silently in San Cristóbal de Las Casas in solidarity with poet Javier Sicilia’s call for national marches against drug-war violence. 2012 Enrique Peña Nieto wins the presidency in July, returning the PRI to power amid widespread discontent over President Calderón’s “war on drugs” that claimed 60,000 lives in six years. There are rising threats against human rights defenders in Chiapas. December 21: 40,000 ski-masked Zapatistas reemerge in public with silent march into Chiapas towns. 2013 February: Marcos announces the promotion of Major Moisés (a Tzeltal) to subcommander and spokesperson. August: Zapatistas hold the first of several week-long

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sessions of “Little School” to explain their movement to 1,700 invited supporters, who stay with families in Zapatista communities and receive individual tutoring. Paramilitary violence increases in the highlands. May 25, 2014 Marcos announces the retirement of his public persona, noting that a new generation of indigenous peasants were replacing the old thinking of revolutionary vanguardism. The 1994 Zapatista rebellion in the southernmost Mexican state of Chiapas was locally rooted in indigenous Maya communities, but it was timed for the day when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect, and it soon became a symbol of creative resistance to neoliberal globalization. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), an unorthodox rebel group, refused vanguard status and set aside the armed struggle for state power in favor of building a nonviolent social movement, using more guerrilla theater than guerrilla warfare. Pipe-puffing subcommander Marcos, the Zapatista spokesperson and icon, was not indigenous to the region, but the heart of the rebellion was the resistance of indigenous communities in the eastern Lacandón Jungle, northern zone, and central highlands of Chiapas. They did not seek secession, but rather autonomy, appealing to universal principles of indigenous and human rights and democracy. The rebel cry of “¡Ya basta!” (Enough is enough!) resonated strongly with indigenous and other marginalized peoples in Chiapas and the rest of “deep Mexico,” buffeted by a changing political economy since the 1970’s oil boom and 1980’s debt crisis.1 Opening to the world market provoked social upheaval, which could no longer be contained by the dominant-party authoritarian rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Marcos’s ironic style prompted some to label this the world’s “first postmodern rebellion.” Yet the rebellion focused on concrete social and political realities related to land, markets, and state policies, and it departed from the historical reference point of peasant leader Emiliano Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. Historical Background The Colonial Era and Beyond

Chiapas is “Mexico’s Mississippi,” a backwater since the colonial period when it languished at the northern fringe of the Spanish Captaincy General of Guatemala.2 Oppressive labor requirements were imposed on the indigenous populations in the Spanish-colonized Americas, prompting 16th-century Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas to persuade the Crown to end the encomienda system of royal “trusts” or grants of Indian labor to Spanish settlers. De Las Casas was appointed protector of the Indians and was sent in the 1540s as bishop of Chiapas, where he battled local clerics, encomenderos, and Guatemalan authorities until his death in 1566.

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The colonial era saw continued conflict as the local Ladino (non-Indian) oligarchy, headquartered in the provincial capital of Ciudad Real de Los Altos (later renamed San Cristóbal), sought to control Indian labor and, eventually, to institutionalize labor migration. Amid clashes between Ladino factions and periodic agricultural crises, Indian uprisings such as the 1712 Tzeltal revolt in Cancuc were crushed. Disease, forced labor, and cultural and religious imposition decimated the indigenous populations. After independence was gained from Spain in 1821, the local oligarchy chose annexation by the more powerful Mexico rather than Guatemala. The Indians suffered in the battles between Conservative and Liberal elites. When the Liberals gained the upper hand in Mexico, following the defeat of Emperor Maximilian, Tzotzil communities resisted a Liberal government’s head tax in the 1860s and sought greater independence in the highlands, which led to a massacre of Tzotzil peoples that Ladinos insisted was a “caste war.”3 Liberal reforms in the 1800s brought encroachment by Ladino landowners into previously communal indigenous areas of the central valley and highlands. Modernization also saw the transfer of the state capital in 1858 from San Cristóbal, bastion of the Conservative oligarchy, westward to Tuxtla Gutiérrez. The expansion of commercial agriculture was accelerated by foreign investment, including German immigrants from Guatemala planting coffee in the southern Soconusco region. Debt peonage, vagrancy laws, and other forms of disguised servitude recruited Indians displaced from the highlands for labor in the central valley and southern Pacific coastal plantations. Revolution, Indians, and National Identity

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 brought about a realignment of the political elites in Chiapas, but a fundamental transformation of social relations did not immediately reach the indigenous peasants. The 1917 constitution did not specifically recognize indigenous rights; however, it did incorporate peasant leader Emiliano Zapata’s Plan de Ayala in the form of Article 27, which established peasant rights to ejidos, or community-managed landholdings. For indigenous communities in Chiapas, the revolution really came during the 1934–1940 presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas. Agrarian reform significantly expanded the ejido sector, with credit and management structures increasingly tying the communities to a corporatist state controlled by the PRI. The ejidatarios remained desperately poor in contrast to commercial agriculture in the central valley and the Soconusco. A National Indigenous Institute (INI) began to promote indigenismo, the postrevolution official ideology that Indians were not inferior but rather made a positive contribution to the national “cosmic race,” celebrated in a 1925 book of that title written by education minister José Vasconcelos and in the heroic depictions of dark-skinned Mexicans in the murals of Diego Rivera, David Siqueiros, and José Clemente Orozco. In the highlands of Chiapas, Indian agencies and agrarian committees superimposed a national PRI-controlled clientelism on the indigenous communities’ cargo system of religious and political hierarchy controlled by local caciques (bosses).4 The resulting system of political control made the small, poor state of Chiapas a bedrock of electoral support for the 71-year reign of the PRI.

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Political Economy of the Late 20th Century

Changing market conditions produced an economic expansion in Chiapas from 1950 to 1980, dominated by wealthy cattle ranchers and timber companies. As unresolved agrarian reform claims rose, a growing flow of indigenous landless peasants and former plantation workers began to migrate eastward to the agricultural frontier of the Lacandón Jungle. These migrants included Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Ch’ol Indians from the central highlands, eastern, and northern zones and some Tojolab’al moving eastward into the southern Lacandón. They streamed into the canyons of the Lacandón, quadrupling that region’s population between 1950 and 1980. Economic opportunities offered by the expansion of commercial agriculture, the escape valve of migration to the Lacandón agricultural frontier, and the oil boom of the 1970s all proved to be limited, and land conflicts had escalated by the 1980s. Repression escalated under state governors Absalón Castellanos (1982–1988), a former general, and Patrocinio González (1988–1994), who favored wealthy Ladino landowners and ranchers and their private gun-toting guardias blancas (white guards). Several new organizing initiatives arose among the primarily indigenous poor peasants of Chiapas in the 1970s and 1980s. The Plan de Ayala National Coordinating Committee (CNPA), formed in 1979; the Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization (OCEZ), established in 1982; and the National Union of Regional Autonomous Peasant Organizations (UNORCA), founded in 1985, all promoted agrarian reform independently of the PRI-controlled National Peasant Confederation (CNC). The national Independent Confederation of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC), linked to the Mexican Communist Party, began operating in Chiapas in 1976. Another form of organizing had its origins in unions of ejidos (UE) created to incorporate peasants into government rural development projects in the late 1970s. These were later linked to form a Union of Unions (UU) and Rural Collective Interest Associations (ARIC), which broke free of PRI control to press for broader autonomy in production, credit, and marketing decisions. Participants in these initiatives were radicalized through alternating government attempts made at co-optation and repression. Various ideological influences shaped the mobilization of poor indigenous communities in the central highlands, north, and eastern Lacandón regions of Chiapas. Samuel Ruiz, a Roman Catholic bishop since 1960 of the diocese of San Cristóbal covering the northeastern half of the state, became inspired by the Liberation Theology movement in the Latin American Catholic Church. The movement called for a “preferential option for the poor.” The diocese, which trained indigenous catechists and community organizers, found fertile terrain among the uprooted and transplanted colonists in the canyons of the Lacandón. Protestant missionaries also organized in these new communities, but their converts were often expelled from highlands communities by traditional Catholic caciques, who resented such escape routes from their ironclad religious and civil hierarchies. Joining the mix were a handful of Maoists, many of whom were survivors of the repressed 1968 student movement, who began arriving in Chiapas in the mid-1970s. Some were from a group called Popular Politics (PP), which had been active in several northern

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Mexican cities. They joined a broader effort called Proletarian Line (LP), which made organizing inroads in the late 1970s in the northern highlands and Lacandón. A key catalyst for indigenous and peasant organizing in Chiapas was the 1974 Indigenous Congress held in San Cristóbal de Las Casas. The congress was initially called by the state governor to mark the 500th anniversary of the birth of Bartolomé de Las Casas, but owing to the state’s limited organizational presence in indigenous areas, preparation was turned over to Bishop Samuel Ruiz. The congress brought together representatives of hundreds of Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Ch’ol, and Tojolab’al communities, whose demands resisted co-optation by the PRI. It also sharpened consciousness of overlapping ethnic and class issues and laid the groundwork for overcoming mutual suspicions between Maoist organizers and religious catechists. The congress also reinforced a growing sense of cross-ethnic indigenous identity among the pioneers in the new communities on the agricultural frontier. Around 1983, members of a tiny clandestine movement called the Forces of National Liberation (FLN), including one who later became known as the rebel spokesperson Marcos, began working in the Lacandón. They recruited first among the UU, and in 1991, they organized the National Emiliano Zapata Independent Peasant Alliance (ANCIEZ). They also clandestinely trained armed units for community self-defense against the forces of the ranchers and the repressive state government, at a time when many communities were becoming radicalized in the struggle for survival. Neoliberal reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s had led to the dissolution of the state coffee marketing board and the collapse of coffee prices, the withdrawal of price supports for corn and bean producers, credit cutbacks, and the prospect of a flood of cheap U.S. agribusiness imports further devastating local markets when NAFTA took effect in 1994. In 1991–1992, President Carlos Salinas introduced reforms to Article 27 of the constitution in preparation for NAFTA, ending land redistribution and allowing private sale of ejido land. This assault on one of the pillars of the Mexican Revolution, akin to revoking the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution, sent shock waves throughout the peasantry. ANCIEZ spearheaded the opposition in the state that had the largest share of unresolved agrarian reform land claims. In mid-1992, the indigenous communities met to discuss armed struggle, and they decided, as a trial run, to have ANCIEZ lead a peaceful indigenous march into San Cristóbal on ­October 12 in defiance of the Columbus Day quincentenary, shocking the Ladino oligarchy. In early 1993, a Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous CommitteeGeneral Command (CCRI-CG) was formed, with Marcos as military secretary of what was by then called the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), and an assembly of communities in the jungle decided to support an armed rebellion. With preparations for war under way, in May 1993, a Mexican army patrol discovered an EZLN camp, and a battle ensued, which the government covered up to avoid jeopardizing passage of NAFTA in the U.S. Congress. On the eve of the rebellion, Chiapas produced half of Mexico’s hydroelectric power and a significant amount of oil and gas, but most of its indigenous regions lacked electricity. Over half the state’s population suffered from malnutrition, and illiteracy was three times the national average. Along with the southern Pacific

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states of Guerrero and Oaxaca, the population of Chiapas ranks among the poorest in Mexico, with among the highest concentrations of indigenous peoples who have endured centuries of racism. The Zapatistas, who affirmed the historically felt rights of indigenous people and Mexican peasants, organized across ethnic groups and religions and asserted women’s rights. Their rebellion also tapped into historical struggles against an authoritarian party and state that was increasingly seen as having betrayed the revolutionary promise of free elections, worker and social rights, agrarian reform, and national control of resources. More broadly, the Zapatista movement was embraced by many who felt excluded by the neoliberal model of opening to the powerful forces of the global market. The Conflict The Zapatistas chose January 1, 1994—the date NAFTA went into effect—to emerge from the jungle in an armed takeover of San Cristóbal, Ocosingo, and five other municipal seats in southeastern Chiapas. Their First Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle asserted that the dispossessed had suffered injustice and betrayal at the hands of the political elite, cited the Mexican constitution and the people’s inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government, and demanded “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace.” The Mexican military responded with ground forces and aerial strafing, driving the insurgents back into the jungle and leaving some 150 dead before mass civil society protests against the military response led to the declaration of a ceasefire on January 12. Intermittent negotiations ensued over the next seven years, along with a steadily increasing military presence in Chiapas and the proliferation of paramilitaries in a counterinsurgency campaign that killed a few hundred (mainly indigenous Zapatista sympathizers) each year. The Zapatistas also proceeded to “recover” lands from wealthy landowners and ranchers, in a kind of unilateral reinitiation of agrarian reform, in which indigenous landless and land-poor peasants established Zapatista “new population centers” that combined individual and collective production with community assemblybased decision making. Some non-Zapatista peasant groups were emboldened to follow the lead with their own land invasions. The government indemnified many of the former landowners, while fueling conflict by offering to recognize land claims by other peasant groups that staged incursions onto Zapatista territories. Management of the Conflict The Zapatista rebellion caught the PRI party, which had ruled Mexico since the 1920s, at a time of deep internal division. The PRI was still recovering from its electoral nadir of 1988, when center-left opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) had possibly won the presidency and the PRI resorted to massive fraud to claim victory. The PRI was divided between the “technocrats,” who promoted neoliberal reforms, and the “dinosaurs,” who controlled the old patronage machinery. President Carlos

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Salinas (1988–1994), who had engineered the NAFTA signing and aspired to head the World Trade Organization when his term ended, hoped to bring a quick end to the uprising. He sent Manuel Camacho Solís, a party reformer with his own presidential ambitions, to negotiate with the Zapatistas. Meanwhile, PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated in March 1994, and the compromise successor candidate was a colorless technocrat, Ernesto Zedillo. The Zapatistas submitted Camacho’s tepid proposal for study commissions and more government programs to a vote in their support communities, where it was roundly rejected. The EZLN then organized a National Democratic Convention (CND) in August 1994 in the Lacandón, where thousands of dissident organizations from all over Mexico assembled to consider democratic alternatives. They built bleachers in a jungle clearing and called the place Aguascalientes, after the site of the constitutional convention in the Mexican Revolution. When the army later dismantled the locale, the EZLN built five more and called them all Aguascalientes, turning them into cultural and multiservice centers of resistance for surrounding communities of Zapatista supporters. In October 1994, Bishop Ruiz formed the National Mediation Commission (CONAI) to try to jump-start negotiations. Tensions mounted in December as the army began closing a circle around the region of presumed Zapatista strongholds, and the EZLN peacefully occupied 38 municipalities to demonstrate their support outside the area of encirclement. The Mexican peso collapsed, and investor pressure mounted for a quick solution. In February 1995, the government launched a major military offensive in violation of its own cease-fire, failing to capture the EZLN leadership but accelerating the flow of internally displaced people fleeing the army. In March 1995, the Mexican Congress formed a Commission of Concord and Pacification (COCOPA), and protracted negotiations finally produced an Accord on Indigenous Rights and Culture, signed in February 1996 in the highlands town of San Andrés Larráinzar. However, continued attempts by the executive branch to unilaterally modify the content of the San Andrés Accords, with COCOPA proposing compromise language to salvage them, finally led to a breakdown in peace talks in August 1996 with no actual legislation to implement the accords. The conflict continued to reverberate, both locally and beyond. The Zapatistas advanced their autonomy project in supportive communities, rejected government projects in favor of self-help, and invited international solidarity and human rights observers. The government sent in between 40,000 and 70,000 troops, up to onethird of the federal army, into a poor state with under 4 percent of the country’s population, while channeling aid to PRI supporters and promoting paramilitaries in a classic low-intensity warfare strategy. Growing numbers of Mexican soldiers received counterinsurgency training at the U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (formerly School of the Americas). Many communities were divided among Zapatista supporters, PRI or other party loyalists, and groups such as Las Abejas (“The Bees”) that supported Zapatista aims but renounced violence. By the end of the 1990s, there were some 14 paramilitary groups operating, one of which conducted a particularly gruesome massacre of

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Tzotzil followers of the pacifist Las Abejas group in the highlands community of Acteal in December 1997. After the initial uprising, the Zapatistas focused on mobilizing national and international civil society support. In July 1996, they hosted an international forum for humanity and against neoliberalism, followed by a September 1997 journey of 1,111 unarmed Zapatistas to Mexico City to found a civic Zapatista Front for National Liberation (FZLN). In March 1999, 5,000 Zapatistas dispersed throughout Mexico to organize a national consultation, or informal referendum, on the San Andrés Accords; 3 million Mexicans participated. In July 2000, the political panorama shifted when Vicente Fox, a conservative populist businessman from the National Action Party (PAN), won the presidential election, the first PRI defeat since the party’s founding 71 years before. Fox’s campaign promises stressed clean government and an end to the Chiapas conflict “in 15 minutes,” though he promoted the same neoliberal policies that were anathema to the Zapatistas. In February and March 2001, the Zapatista leadership traveled in a three-week caravan from Chiapas to Mexico City, addressing rallies of supporters along the way. The caravan culminated in an enormous gathering in the capital’s zócalo (main plaza) and an historic address given by rebel commander Esther to Congress, calling for indigenous rights legislation. Observers compared the political impact to the celebrated March on Washington during the U.S. civil rights movement. In April 2001, the Mexican Senate passed weakened legislation that fell far short of the spirit of the 1996 San Andrés Accords. The law failed to recognize indigenous peoples as legal subjects or recognize their community rights to natural resources and was denounced by the EZLN and most indigenous groups. With the 2001 collapse of this effort to win legal rights, the Zapatistas turned their focus toward consolidation of autonomy within their communities. In 2003, they announced the formation of a regional structure of self-governance, grouping their autonomous municipalities into five regional centers known as Caracoles that replaced the old Aguascalientes. Each Caracol would be administered by a Junta de Buen Gobierno (Good Governance Council) composed of rotating unpaid representatives of the corresponding autonomous municipalities. The movement also continued recruiting and training mostly young community volunteers as education and health promoters, as the Zapatista support base communities declared themselves “in resistance” to the government by rejecting all government programs. In 2005, the Zapatistas issued the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle, announcing a new outreach initiative called “the Other Campaign.” In a counterpoint to the electoral campaign for the 2006 presidency, they denounced topdown partisan politics and held a series of forums in their territories for grassroots groups from across Mexico to air grievances from below. A Zapatista delegation headed by Subcommander Marcos began a national tour in January 2006, meeting with social activists around the country. The Other Campaign tour stalled a few months later when government repression fell heavily on several of the organizations that had declared themselves “adherents” to the Sixth Declaration, but the network of adherents established a layer of support for the movement. In August 2013, the Zapatistas launched another outreach effort, the “Little School” (Escuelita

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Zapatista), hosting some 1,700 invited supporters in Zapatista homes in the first week-long session with individual tutors and texts to explain the movement, with additional sessions in December 2013 and January 2014. At the national level, the narrow and contested 2006 presidential electoral victory of National Action Party (PAN) candidate Felipe Calderón was followed by significantly increased militarization, in the name of a “war on drugs” that claimed 60,000 lives by the end of President Calderón’s six-year term. Militarization also brought increasing human rights violations and suppression of activist groups, including those sympathetic to the Zapatistas, opposed to large-scale capitalist development schemes that often infringed on indigenous community preferences or movements opposed to the militarized war on drugs approach. Weary of the escalating cycle of drug cartel and military violence, Mexican voters, in 2012, elected President Enrique Peña Nieto of the old ruling PRI, a party experienced in managing conflict through a more subtle combination of clientelist largess, a populist image of social inclusion, co-optation and division of challengers, and more selective repression. Significance The Zapatista rebellion awakened the indigenous rights movement not only in Chiapas but throughout Mexico, with a National Indigenous Congress (CNI) endorsing the principles in the San Andrés Accords and insisting, “Never again a Mexico without us.” By stressing grassroots democracy in their community-based autonomy movement and by rejecting vanguardism in favor of an open invitation for civil society participation, the rebels played a significant role in the possible democratization of Mexico. The Zapatista movement reflects a wider Latin American indigenous revival and a general upsurge in social movements since the 1980s, partly in reaction to the neoliberal model, which reduces rights to individual contracts in the marketplace. The Zapatistas also creatively used the Internet, global “encounters,” and other networks, positioning themselves within a transnational “global justice” or “alterglobalization” social movement. Notes 1. This phrase, referring to the submerged identity of the country’s indigenous poor, ­originates from the classic work by Mexican anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, México Profundo: Reclaiming a Civilization (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996). 2. John Womack Jr., Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader (New York: New Press, 1999). 3. Jan Rus, “Whose Caste War?: Indians, Ladinos, and the Chiapas ‘Caste War’ of 1869,” in Spaniards and Indians in Southeastern Mesoamerica: Essays on the History of Ethnic ­Relations, ed. Murdo J. MacLeod and Robert Wasserstrom (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 144–156. 4. Jan Rus, “The ‘Comunidad Revolucionaria Institucional’: The Subversion of Native ­Government in Highland Chiapas, 1936–1968,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 265–300.

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Suggested Readings Collier, George, with Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello. 2005. Basta!: Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas. 3d ed. Oakland, CA: Institute for Food and Development Policy. González Casanova, Pablo. 2005. “The Zapatista ‘Caracoles’: Networks of Resistance and Autonomy.” Socialism and Democracy 19 (3) (November): 79–92. Harvey, Neil. 1998. The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Higgins, Nicholas. 2004. Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion: Modernist Visions and the Invisible Indian. Austin: University of Texas Press. Mora, Mariana. 2007. “Zapatista Anticapitalist Politics and the ‘Other Campaign’: Learning from the Struggle for Indigenous Rights and Autonomy.” Latin American Perspectives 34 (2) (March): 64–77. Ponce de León, Juana, ed. 2001. Our Word Is Our Weapon: Selected Writings, Subcomandante Marcos. New York: Seven Stories Press. Ross, John. 1995. Rebellion from the Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. Ross, John. 2000. The War against Oblivion: The Zapatista Chronicles. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press. Rus, Jan, Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo, and Shannan L. Mattiace, eds. 2003. Mayan Lives, Mayan Utopias: The Indigenous Peoples of Chiapas and the Zapatista Rebellion. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Shannon Speed, R. Aída Hernández Castillo, and Lynn M. Stephen, eds. 2006. Dissident Women: Gender and Cultural Politics in Chiapas. Austin: University of Texas Press. Speed, Shannon. 2007. Rights in Rebellion: Indigenous Struggle and Human Rights in Chiapas. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Stahler-Sholk, Richard. 2014. “Mexico: Autonomy, Collective Identity, and Social Movement Strategies: The Zapatistas and Beyond.” In Rethinking Latin American Social Movements: Radical Action from Below, ed. Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden, and Marc Becker, 187–208. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Stahler-Sholk, Richard. 2007. “Resisting Neoliberal Homogenization: The Zapatista Autonomy Movement.” Latin American Perspectives 34 (2) (March): 48–63. Weinberg, Bill. 2000. Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico. New York: Verso. Womack, John, Jr. 1999. Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader. New York: New Press.

Appendices 1. First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) went public with this “declaration of war.” The declaration situates the January 1, 1994, Zapatista uprising in the poor southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas in the context of historical struggles against slavery, colonialism, dictatorship, foreign domination, and more than 70 years of one-party hegemony. It initially envisions a military advance to the capital (though the uprising would soon evolve into an autonomy movement rooted in civil society). The declaration claims legitimacy based on Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution, which recognizes the people’s right to change their form of government, and outlines the movement’s 11 basic demands: work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace.

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First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle EZLN’s Declaration of War “Today we say ‘enough is enough!’ (Ya Basta!)” to the people of mexico: mexican brothers and sisters:

We are a product of 500 years of struggle: first against slavery, then during the War of Independence against Spain led by insurgents, then to avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism, then to promulgate our constitution and expel the French empire from our soil, and later the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the just application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men just like us. We have been denied the most elemental preparation so they can use us as cannon fodder and pillage the wealth of our country. They don’t care that we have nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over our heads, no land, no work, no health care, no food nor education. Nor are we able to freely and democratically elect our political representatives, nor is there independence from foreigners, nor is there peace nor justice for ourselves and our children. But today, we say enough is enough. We are the inheritors of the true builders of our nation. The dispossessed, we are millions and we thereby call upon our brothers and sisters to join this struggle as the only path, so that we will not die of hunger due to the insatiable ambition of a 70 year dictatorship led by a clique of traitors that represent the most conservative and sell-out groups. They are the same ones that opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, the same ones that betrayed Vicente Guerrero, the same ones that sold half our country to the foreign invader, the same ones that imported a European prince to rule our country, the same ones that formed the “scientific” Porfirista dictatorship, the same ones that opposed the Petroleum Expropriation, the same ones that massacred the railroad workers in 1958 and the students in 1968, the same ones the today take everything from us, absolutely everything. To prevent the continuation of the above and as our last hope, after having tried to utilize all legal means based on our Constitution, we go to our Constitution, to apply Article 39 which says: “National Sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the people and its purpose is to help the people. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government.”

Therefore, according to our constitution, we declare the following to the Mexican federal army, the pillar of the Mexican dictatorship that we suffer from, monopolized by a oneparty system and led by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the maximum and illegitimate federal executive that today holds power. According to this Declaration of War, we ask that other powers of the nation advocate to restore the legitimacy and the stability of the nation by overthrowing the dictator.

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We also ask that international organizations and the International Red Cross watch over and regulate our battles, so that our efforts are carried out while still protecting our civilian population. We declare now and always that we are subject to the Geneva Accord, forming the EZLN as our fighting arm of our liberation struggle. We have the Mexican people on our side, we have the beloved tri-colored flag highly respected by our insurgent fighters. We use black and red in our uniform as our symbol of our working people on strike. Our flag carries the following letters, “EZLN,” Zapatista National Liberation Army, and we always carry our flag into combat. Beforehand, we refuse any effort to disgrace our just cause by accusing us of being drug traffickers, drug guerrillas, thieves, or other names that might be used by our enemies. Our struggle follows the constitution which is held high by its call for justice and equality. Therefore, according to this declaration of war, we give our military forces, the EZLN, the following orders: First: Advance to the capital of the country, overcoming the Mexican federal army, protecting in our advance the civilian population and permitting the people in the liberated area the right to freely and democratically elect their own administrative authorities. Second: Respect the lives of our prisoners and turn over all wounded to the International Red Cross. Third: Initiate summary judgments against all soldiers of the Mexican federal army and the political police that have received training or have been paid by foreigners, accused of being traitors to our country, and against all those that have repressed and treated badly the civil population and robbed or stolen from or attempted crimes against the good of the people. Fourth: Form new troops with all those Mexicans that show their interest in joining our struggle, including those that, being enemy soldiers, turn themselves in without having fought against us, and promise to take orders from the General Command of the Zapatista National Liberation Army. Fifth: We ask for the unconditional surrender of the enemy’s headquarters before we begin any combat to avoid any loss of lives. Sixth: Suspend the robbery of our natural resources in the areas controlled by the EZLN. To the People of Mexico: We, the men and women, full and free, are conscious that the war that we have declared is our last resort, but also a just one. The dictators are applying an undeclared genocidal war against our people for many years. Therefore we ask for your participation, your decision to support this plan that struggles for work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace. We declare that we will not stop fighting until the basic demands of our people have been met by forming a government of our country that is free and democratic. join the insurgent forces of the zapatista national liberation army.

General Command of the EZLN 1993 Source: General Command of the EZLN. Available at http://flag.blackened.net/revolt /mexico/ezln/ezlnwa.html.

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2. Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona [Lacandón Jungle] The Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle heralded a new phase of Zapatista outreach to national and international civil society. Placing the movement in the context of larger struggles against neoliberal globalization and capitalism, the declaration reaffirms the basic Zapatista demands and pledges to continue the fight for indigenous peoples and others who are exploited and oppressed. It announces that a delegation of Zapatistas headed by Subcommander Marcos will travel the country to present their cause directly to ordinary Mexicans. This “Other Campaign” is contrasted to conventional campaigning during the 2006 presidential election year. Individuals and nonelectoral organizations “below and to the left,” sharing an anticapitalist vision, are invited to ally with the Zapatistas and join a national campaign as “adherents” of the Sixth Declaration. Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona Zapatista Army of National Liberation Mexico This is our simple word which seeks to touch the hearts of humble and simple people like ourselves, but people who are also, like ourselves, dignified and rebel. This is our simple word for recounting what our path has been and where we are now, in order to explain how we see the world and our country, in order to say what we are thinking of doing and how we are thinking of doing it, and in order to invite other persons to walk with us in something very great which is called Mexico and something greater which is called the world. This is our simple word in order to inform all honest and noble hearts what it is we want in Mexico and the world. This is our simple word, because it is our idea to call on those who are like us and to join together with them, everywhere they are living and struggling. ... And so this is our simple word that goes out to the humble and simple people of Mexico and of the world, and we are calling our word of today: Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona And we are here to say, with our simple word, that . . . The EZLN maintains its commitment to an offensive ceasefire, and it will not make any attack against government forces or any offensive military movements. The EZLN still maintains its commitment to insisting on the path of political struggle through this peaceful initiative which we are now undertaking. The EZLN continues, therefore, in its resolve to not establish any kind of secret relations with either national politicalmilitary organizations or those from other countries. The EZLN reaffirms its commitment to defend, support and obey the zapatista indigenous communities of which it is composed, and which are its supreme command, and – without interfering in their internal democratic processes – will, to the best of its abilities, contribute to the strengthening of their autonomy, good government and improvement in their living conditions. In other words, what we are going to do in Mexico and in the world, we

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are going to do without arms, with a civil and peaceful movement, and without neglecting nor ceasing to support our communities. Therefore . . . In the World . . . 1 – We will forge new relationships of mutual respect and support with persons and organizations who are resisting and struggling against neoliberalism and for humanity. 2 – As far as we are able, we will send material aid such as food and handicrafts for those brothers and sisters who are struggling all over the world. In order to begin, we are going to ask the Good Government Junta of La Realidad to loan their truck, which is called “Chompiras,” and which appears to hold 8 tons, and we are going to fill it with maize and perhaps two 200 liter cans with oil or petrol, as they prefer, and we are going to deliver it to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico for them to send to the Cuban people as aid from the zapatistas for their resistance against the North American blockade. Or perhaps there might be a place closer to here where it could be delivered, because it’s always such a long distance to Mexico City, and what if “Chompiras” were to break down and we’d end up in bad shape. And that will happen when the harvest comes in, which is turning green right now in the fields, and if they don’t attack us, because if we were to send it during these next few months, it would be nothing but corncobs, and they don’t turn out well even in tamales, better in November or December, it depends. And we are also going to make an agreement with the women’s crafts cooperatives in order to send a good number of bordados, embroidered pieces, to the Europes which are perhaps not yet Union, and perhaps we’ll also send some organic coffee from the zapatista cooperatives, so that they can sell it and get a little money for their struggle. And, if it isn’t sold, then they can always have a little cup of coffee and talk about the anti-neoliberal struggle, and if it’s a bit cold then they can cover themselves up with the zapatista bordados, which do indeed resist quite well being laundered by hand and by rocks, and, besides, they don’t run in the wash. And we are also going to send the indigenous brothers and sisters of Bolivia and Ecuador some non-transgenic maize, and we just don’t know where to send them so they arrive complete, but we are indeed willing to give this little bit of aid. 3 – And to all of those who are resisting throughout the world, we say there must be other intercontinental encuentros [encounters] held, even if just one other. Perhaps December of this year or next January, we’ll have to think about it. We don’t want to say just when, because this is about our agreeing equally on everything, on where, on when, on how, on who. But not with a stage where just a few speak and all the rest listen, but without a stage, just level and everyone speaking, but orderly, otherwise it will just be a hubbub and the words won’t be understood, and with good organization everyone will hear and jot down in their notebooks the words of resistance from others, so then everyone can go and talk with their compañeros and compañeras in their worlds. And we think it might be in a place that has a very large jail, because what if they were to repress us and incarcerate us, and so that way we wouldn’t be all piled up, prisoners, yes, but well organized, and there in the jail we could continue the intercontinental encuentros for humanity and against neoliberalism.

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Later on we’ll tell you what we shall do in order to reach agreement as to how we’re going to come to agreement. Now that is how we’re thinking of doing what we want to do in the world. Now follows . . . In Mexico . . . 1 – We are going to continue fighting for the Indian peoples of Mexico, but now not just for them and not with only them, but for all the exploited and dispossessed of Mexico, with all of them and all over the country. And when we say all the exploited of Mexico, we are also talking about the brothers and sisters who have had to go to the United States in search of work in order to survive. 2 – We are going to go to listen to, and talk directly with, without intermediaries or mediation, the simple and humble of the Mexican people, and, according to what we hear and learn, we are going to go about building, along with those people who, like us, are humble and simple, a national program of struggle, but a program which will be clearly of the left, or anti-capitalist, or anti-neoliberal, or for justice, democracy and liberty for the Mexican people. 3 – We are going to try to build, or rebuild, another way of doing politics, one which once again has the spirit of serving others, without material interests, with sacrifice, with dedication, with honesty, which keeps its word, whose o­nly payment is the satisfaction of duty performed, or like the militants of the left did before, when they were not stopped by blows, jail or death, let alone by dollar bills. 4 – We are also going to go about raising a struggle in order to demand that we make a new Constitution, new laws which take into account the demands of the Mexican people, which are: housing, land, work, food, health, education, information, culture, independence, democracy, justice, liberty and peace. A new Constitution which recognizes the rights and liberties of the people, and which defends the weak in the face of the powerful. to these ends

...

The EZLN will send a delegation of its leadership in order to do this work throughout the national territory and for an indefinite period of time. This zapatista delegation, along with those organizations and persons of the left who join in this Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, will go to those places where they are expressly invited. We are also letting you know that the EZLN will establish a policy of alliances with nonelectoral organizations and movements which define themselves, in theory and practice, as being of the left, in accordance with the following conditions: Not to make agreements from above to be imposed below, but to make accords to go together to listen and to organize outrage. Not to raise movements which are later negotiated behind the backs of those who made them, but to always take into account the opinions of those participating. Not to seek gifts, positions, advantages, public positions, from the Power or those who aspire to it, but to go beyond the election calendar. Not to try to resolve from above the problems of our Nation, but to build from below and for below an alternative to neoliberal destruction, an alternative of the left for Mexico.

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Yes to reciprocal respect for the autonomy and independence of organizations, for their methods of struggle, for their ways of organizing, for their internal decision making processes, for their legitimate representations. And yes to a clear commitment for joint and coordinated defense of national sovereignty, with intransigent opposition to privatization attempts of electricity, oil, water and natural resources. In other words, we are inviting the unregistered political and social organizations of the left, and those persons who lay claim to the left and who do not belong to registered political parties, to meet with us, at the time, place and manner in which we shall propose at the proper time, to organize a national campaign, visiting all possible corners of our Patria, in order to listen to and organize the word of our people. It is like a campaign, then, but very otherly, because it is not electoral. Brothers and sisters: This is our word which we declare: In the world, we are going to join together more with the resistance struggles against neoliberalism and for humanity. And we are going to support, even if it’s but little, those struggles. And we are going to exchange, with mutual respect, experiences, histories, ideas, dreams. In Mexico, we are going to travel all over the country, through the ruins left by the neoliberal wars and through those resistances which, entrenched, are flourishing in those ruins. We are going to seek, and to find, those who love these lands and these skies even as much as we do. We are going to seek, from La Realidad to Tijuana, those who want to organize, struggle and build what may perhaps be the last hope this Nation – which has been going on at least since the time when an eagle alighted on a nopal in order to devour a snake – has of not dying. We are going for democracy, liberty and justice for those of us who have been denied it. We are going with another politics, for a program of the left and for a new Constitution. We are inviting all indigenous, workers, campesinos, teachers, students, housewives, neighbors, small businesspersons, small shop owners, micro-businesspersons, pensioners, handicapped persons, religious men and women, scientists, artists, intellectuals, young persons, women, old persons, homosexuals and lesbians, boys and girls – to participate, whether individually or collectively, directly with the zapatistas in this national campaign for building another way of doing politics, for a program of national struggle of the left, and for a new Constitution. And so this is our word as to what we are going to do and how we are going to do it. You will see whether you want to join. And we are telling those men and women who are of good heart and intent, who are in agreement with this word we are bringing out, and who are not afraid, or who are afraid

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but who control it, to then state publicly whether they are in agreement with this idea we are presenting, and in that way we will see once and for all who and how and where and when this new step in the struggle is to be made. While you are thinking about it, we say to you that today, in the sixth month of the year 2005, the men, women, children and old ones of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation have now decided, and we have now subscribed to, this Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, and those who know how to sign, signed, and those who did not left their mark, but there are fewer now who do not know how, because education has advanced here in this territory in rebellion for humanity and against neoliberalism, that is in zapatista skies and land. And this was our simple word sent out to the noble hearts of those simple and humble people who resist and rebel against injustices all over the world. Democracy! Liberty! Justice! From the mountains of the Mexican Southeast. Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee – General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. Mexico, in the sixth month, or June, of the year 2005. Source: Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee, General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. Available at http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx /sdsl-en.

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The Middle East The Arab-Jewish Struggle for Palestine to 1948 James A. Reilly

Timeline 312 BCE Palestine is under Christian (Roman and Byzantine) rule. 142 BCE Palestine’s last independent Jewish kingdom is established. 70 BCE Romans destroy the Jewish temple in Jerusalem. 63 BCE Rome conquers Palestine; it is the end of Jewish independence. 638 CE Muslim Arabs conquer Palestine. 691 Arab rulers build the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. 1099–1291 Crusader principalities are established in and around Palestine. 1517 The Ottoman Turks seize Palestine from the Mamluk sultans of Egypt. 1881 The first Zionist society is founded in Russia.

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1888 The Ottomans give Jerusalem special administrative status. 1897 The World Zionist Organization is formed. 1908–1914 The Arab press articulates sentiments of Arab nationalism and Palestinian patriotism. 1914–1918 World War I is fought. 1916 Great Britain and France agree to partition the Ottoman lands. 1917 The Balfour Declaration commits Great Britain to supporting “a national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. 1920 The British civil administration is established in Palestine. Arab-Jewish violence flares. 1921 The British appoint al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni as mufti of Jerusalem. 1929 Major intercommunal violence is sparked by tensions surrounding the Western (Wailing) Wall. 1930 An official British commission recommends a pro-Arab policy tilt. The British government declines to accept the recommendations. 1933 Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party come to power in Germany. 1935 Sheikh ’Izz al-Din al-Qassam dies in a gun battle with British police. David BenGurion assumes leadership of the Jewish self-governing body.

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1936 An Arab general strike and subsequent armed revolt are undertaken to oppose British rule and Jewish nationalism. 1937 The official British commission recommends the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab region. The Arab revolt intensifies. The British arrest the Arab leadership, and al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni flees into exile. 1939 The Arab revolt is suppressed. Great Britain declares its intention to give Palestine independence as a unitary, Arab-majority state within 10 years. 1939–1945 World War II is fought. 1941–1945 Nazi Germany’s genocide policy kills approximately 6 million European Jews. 1946 Irgun militia (Jewish) destroy a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. 1947 The UN General Assembly votes to partition Palestine. 1948 April: Intercommunal warfare intensifies, triggering massive Palestinian Arab flight. May: The British evacuate Palestine, and Jewish leadership declares the State of Israel. The conflict between Arabs and Jews for political sovereignty in Palestine illustrates a number of themes in recent world history. An old, multinational empire was broken up and replaced by a state system whose source of legitimacy was deemed to be the principle of national self-determination. In the scramble to establish political rights and to foster modern national consciousness in a newly demarcated territory, rival political movements asserted their connection to ancient peoples, histories, and myths. European and Western imperial states sought to manipulate and guide local politics, provoking an anticolonial national movement. The two World Wars marked decisive turning points in the development of this conflict, which took on an international (not merely local or regional) dimension from its early days. All of this was played out against an evocative backdrop: Palestine, Jerusalem, and the Holy Land. Other colonial and postcolonial wars and conflicts in South Asia and parts of Africa may have been fiercer and bloodier, but none attracted the attention

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and mobilized the sentiments of the people around the world like the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine. Historical Background The country of Palestine (the Land of Israel, in Jewish tradition) loomed large in the religious and historical imaginations of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. It was the locale of most of the stories in Jewish and Christian scripture. Islam subsumed these earlier monotheistic traditions into its own narrative. The sacred histories of all three faiths reserved a special place for Jerusalem. Ancient Jewish kingdoms rose and fell in Palestine, but Jewish political sovereignty came to an end at the time of the Roman Empire. Rome’s successor, the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, emphasized Palestine’s place in Christianity through the identification of holy sites associated with the career of Jesus of Nazareth. Muslim Arabs swept the Byzantines from the country in 638 CE. In the centuries that followed, Palestine became a predominantly Muslim, Arabic-speaking country. The Islamization of Palestine accelerated in the wake of the medieval Crusades, a doomed effort by Western Europeans to create Christian colonies along the shore of the Eastern Mediterranean (11th to 13th centuries). Throughout these episodes, significant communities of Jews and Christians continued to live in Palestine. The last premodern sovereign in Palestine was the Ottoman Empire, a nonnational Islamic sultanate based in Istanbul (old Constantinople). The Ottomans established their 400-year reign in Palestine in 1517. Under Ottoman rule, the peoples of Palestine were governed by officials appointed from Istanbul as well as by their local sheikhs, chieftains, and strongmen who served as intermediaries between the Ottomans and the local population. The internal affairs of Palestine’s Jews and Christians were left mostly in the hands of their respective religious officials. The majority Muslim population were served by their own religious hierarchy. Ottoman rule in Palestine was not seriously challenged until the 19th century. From the 1850s onward, the expanding power of the European states and the growth of national movements hostile to nonnational monarchies, such as the Ottomans, combined to undermine the foundations of the political status quo in Palestine. The Conflict The emergence of what came to be known as the Jewish Question in 19th-century Europe provided the first articulation of territorial-national goals in Palestine. Prior to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution (18th century), European Jews occupied a defined, subordinate, and sometimes barely tolerated place in societies that defined themselves as “Christian.” However, the intellectual movement of the Enlightenment, the political triumph of the French Revolution (1789), and the spread of liberal values in general caused a fundamental rethinking about the place of Jews in European society. According to Enlightenment thinkers and liberal revolutionaries, all men are created equal, and (adult male) members of

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national communities should be able to participate in government and society on an equitable basis. Therefore, while Christianity remained the majority religion in Europe, more and more European states were hesitant to define rights and responsibilities in their societies along religious lines. Instead, loyalty to and affiliation with the state and the nation became a citizen’s or a subject’s basis of participation in public life. This change of paradigm presented European Jews with both a challenge and an opportunity. Their old, well-defined cultural, communal, and social roles now appeared anachronistic to many Jews. For the first time, they were being invited to participate in predominantly Gentile societies on an equal basis. But to take up this invitation, they would have to subordinate their Jewish identity and culture to their civic identity and culture as Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, and so on. If Jews were no longer a subordinate and well-defined religious and communal group, then what were they? Some European Jews sought to assimilate into Gentile society, to become wholly French, English, or German by formally abandoning Judaism. Others entirely rejected the blandishments of assimilation and modernity and clung ever more tightly to their older religious and communal traditions. The majority of European Jews searched for a middle ground that would allow them to express both their older Jewish and their modern national identities. One consequence was a Hebrew literary revival in the 19th century among intellectuals, and these writers subtly redefined Jews as a “people” with their own national history, linked to but distinct from the concept of a “religious community” defined mainly by its adherence to communal rules and structures. Liberal governments and movements promised Jews equality in a secular community; however, these promises often proved hollow. As European societies were rapidly transformed by political and economic revolutions in the 19th century, older forms of social consciousness based on religion became less prominent. New forms of consciousness based on nationality, race, and ethnicity came to the fore. If “the nation” was now seen as the basis of human history, were Jews part of “the nation” or not? If they were not, what were they? Right-wing and populist movements in France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary began propounding a new ideology, anti-Semitism, which asserted that Jews were not and could not be full members of the national community. Anti-Semitic demagogues laid the disruptions of capitalism and industrial society at the feet of the Jews. Anti-Semitism found a receptive audience among people who faced difficulty or hardship as a consequence of the dramatic social and cultural changes of the period. Even in liberal France, anti-Semitism proved a powerful force. Its spread disillusioned many Jews who had hoped that they could share in society on a basis of equality. In the Eastern European lands of czarist Russia, the situation was even worse. In a bid to strengthen itself in the era of nationalism, the Russian monarchy after 1881 allied itself with Slavic nationalists who defined the large Jewish community within Russia’s frontiers as foreign and alien. The Russian regime supported or tolerated violent attacks (pogroms) against Jewish communities. Moreover, Jews in the Russian Empire faced a range of legal handicaps limiting where they could

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live and restricting their access to modern state institutions, including universities. (It was under these circumstances that the mass Russian Jewish emigration to the United States began.) Jews radicalized by czarist repression joined revolutionary societies. Some of these espoused socialism or communism; others advocated Jewish nationalism. Thus anti-Semitism in both Eastern and Western Europe encouraged the formation of Jewish nationalist (Zionist) societies, whose members linked the Hebrew cultural revival to the articulation of a modern Jewish national claim to Palestine, at the time still under Ottoman rule. From 1882 onward, there was a small but steady inflow of immigration into Palestine of secular European Jews, who moved there to establish a modern national (as opposed to traditional religious) Jewish presence. In 1897, the World Zionist Organization (WZO) was created as a coordinating body for grassroots Jewish nationalist organizations. The WZO set itself the task of establishing a Jewish national homeland—a state—in Palestine with great power (European) support. A significant point for understanding the future of the Arab-Jewish conflict is that these aspirations for a Jewish homeland or a Jewish state in Palestine emanated from Europe. They were a response to the problems and challenges facing Jews in France, Germany, and Russia. Middle Eastern Jews, in contrast, were still largely enfolded within their traditional communities and structures. They lived under the tolerant but inegalitarian Ottoman government. Ottoman Jews had communal rights and privileges, but they were not and could not be equal citizens of the officially Muslim Ottoman state. The modern secular ideology of Jewish nationalism scarcely touched the indigenous Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East prior to 1914. The bulk of the population of Ottoman Palestine were Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians. Similar to other people coming to terms with the demands of the modern state, the Arabs of Palestine were forced to redefine and reconsider their political identities and status in the 19th century. The Ottoman Empire itself was facing crisis after crisis in its rich Balkan provinces, where national movements among its Christian subjects (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians) combined with European support for secessionist or nationalist movements to challenge the security and the identity of the empire. Like its contemporary counterparts in Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Japan, the Ottoman monarchy in the second half of the 19th century tried to strengthen its bases of support and legitimacy by forging new ties to its subject population. Because the empire remained multiethnic, the Ottoman monarchy’s modern basis of legitimacy could not be defined in ethnic national terms. However, with the loss of its Christian Balkan provinces, the Ottoman population was increasingly Muslim. Therefore, in the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman sultanate emphasized its Islamic identity, and a type of “national” identity based on religion was promoted by the Ottoman state in Palestine and elsewhere in its domains. The introduction of print technology and the spread of modern education in the Ottoman lands led to literary revivals and movements among the subject populations. An Arabic literary revival is noticeable from the mid-19th century onward.

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Arabic-speaking intellectuals placed new emphasis on the Arabic language and on the identity of themselves as “Arabs,” that is, users of the majority language of the Fertile Crescent. These Arab thinkers included both Muslims and Christians. Muslims emphasized the Arabs’ contribution to Islam and the importance of the Arabic language in Islamic law and scripture. Christians interpreted classical Islam as the shared heritage of Arabs no matter what their religion, and they sought to define a new sense of community based on shared language and culture. Different Arabicspeaking regions began to be identified as homelands in the modern sense. By the eve of World War I, in 1914, the older Muslim and Christian Arab understandings of the Holy Land and Palestine had acquired political connotations. By this time, Arabs were aware of European Jewish national aspirations in the country, and sentiments of Palestinian patriotism were expressed in the Arabic press and among Arab deputies in the Ottoman parliament. Arab politicians and community leaders feared that the Ottoman state was not equal to the challenge of defending their community and their homeland from the Zionist movement. Because Jewish nationalism aimed to settle Jews in Palestine and to create a Jewish government there, Arabs interpreted Zionism as another face of European colonialism. Arabs’ apprehensions of European conquest were further fueled by French, British, and Italian expansion into various regions of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Jewish nationalism prescribed Jewish sovereignty and a Jewish state as a remedy to the problem of anti-Semitism, especially as it affected the Jews of Europe. Palestinian Arab nationalism sought to defend the national community and homeland against European colonization and conquest. These fundamental ideological attitudes were in place prior to World War I. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, they remained basic ingredients in the respective worldviews of Jewish and Palestinian Arab nationalists. Management of the Conflict The Zionist movement made little headway with the European great powers prior to World War I. European governments received Zionist emissaries with greater or lesser degrees of sympathy, but prior to the outbreak of the war, no great power believed its interests would be served by advocating a Jewish state in this Ottoman province. The beleaguered Ottoman government itself was strongly opposed to any movement that threatened to weaken further its own hold on the Holy Land. The outbreak of a general war in 1914 changed the political situation dramatically. Hoping to regain lands it had lost earlier to Great Britain and Russia, the Ottoman government allied itself with Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I. The Allied powers of Great Britain, France, and Russia consequently projected the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in the event of an Allied victory. To this end, Britain, France, and Russia each put forward claims to Palestine. When Russia was on the verge of being knocked out of the war (November 1917), Great Britain sought to trump France by issuing the Balfour Declaration, proclaiming Britain’s support for a “Jewish national home” in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration, the British government hoped, would lend weight to its efforts to establish Great Britain as the

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sole great power in Palestine once the war was over. Great Britain was particularly concerned with Palestine owing to its proximity to Great Britain’s strategic lifeline, the Suez Canal. The Paris Peace Conference and the British Mandate

At the Paris Peace Conference held after the war (1919–1920), Great Britain and France agreed to divide the former Ottoman lands in the Fertile Crescent. Great Britain obtained Palestine in return for agreeing to allow France a free hand in Syria. These newly demarcated and defined countries were called “mandates” of Great Britain and France. According to the theory of the mandate system, Great Britain and France were to govern those territories on behalf of the newly established League of Nations (1919). The mandatory powers were to prepare their mandated territories for self-government. When Great Britain obtained the mandate for Palestine, the language of the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the documents that legalized Great Britain’s rule. Therefore, at the end of World War I, the question of Palestine had acquired an international dimension, and Jewish national rights in Palestine were recognized in international law. Palestinian Arab opinion was outraged by the creation of the mandate, particularly by the provisions for the construction of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Palestinian Arabs argued that they were a majority in Palestine (90 percent of the population in1920) and that Great Britain did not have the right to promote a Jewish national home and Jewish self-government in the country. Right or wrong, the Arabs were unable to force Great Britain and the League of Nations to alter the terms of the Palestine mandate in their favor. The first serious incidents of intercommunal Jewish-Arab violence occurred in 1920–1921 as the personnel and institutions of the British mandate were being put into place. During the early years of the mandate, in the 1920s, British officials were confident that they could manage and contain Arab-Jewish rivalry. Even after Great Britain’s attempts to establish an Arab-Jewish government under British supervision failed, the British believed that they would be able to find the right formula to allow the development of a Jewish national home (rather than a state), while reassuring the Arabs that their rights and position in the country would not be threatened. Political tranquility in Palestine in the mid-1920s lulled the British government into thinking that this divide-and-rule policy—or balance-and-contain policy— could work. However, Arab-Jewish violence flared up anew in a dispute over the status of the Western (or Wailing) Wall, which became a symbolic flashpoint for the larger political conflict. The Western Wall is the last remnant of the ancient Jewish temple, and in Ottoman times, pious Jews had prayed there at the sufferance of the Muslim religious authorities. The major Muslim monuments of Jerusalem were built on the platform above the Western Wall, near the spot where the Jewish temple had once stood. This platform is usually referred to as the Temple Mount in English, or al-Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) in Arabic. Islam’s first major monument, the Dome of the Rock, was built there in 691 CE. The Dome of the Rock encloses Mount Moriah, identified in both the Jewish and Muslim traditions as the spot where

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Abraham prepared to sacrifice his son. In addition, Muslims associate the site with a passage in the Koran that recounts a mystical heavenly journey undertaken by the Prophet Muhammad. The Western Wall itself was part of a Muslim religious endowment. The status of the Western Wall was deeply emotive. Jewish leaders argued that because the Jewish people were building their national home in Palestine by right, it was inappropriate that they should require anyone’s permission to pray there. Jews challenged the religious status quo by trying to unilaterally introduce, in the teeth of Muslim opposition, symbolic changes to the prayer space in front of the Western Wall. Muslims regarded these measures as an attack on their religious and political prerogatives, not only as it related to the Western Wall but as it pertained to Palestine as a whole. The Western Wall became a flashpoint of communal demonstrations. In August 1929, this tension exploded into violence. In the wake of this outburst, Great Britain dispatched a committee of inquiry to ascertain what had gone wrong and to make policy recommendations for the Palestine mandate. The violence at the Western Wall demonstrated several points that were to become ever more visible in the remaining years of the mandate. First, symbols of religious communal identity became nationalized. The Zionist movement was predominantly secular, and in fact it represented a rejection of Jewish religious traditionalism. Yet the Western Wall was important to the Zionist movement as a national symbol, as a symbol of the Jewish people’s history and of their aspirations for political sovereignty in the Land of Israel. For Arabs (Muslims and Christians alike), the Western Wall (which they called al-Buraq) represented the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem and Palestine. From this point on, the leading Muslim religious official in Palestine, the mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni (d.  1974), became the leading Palestinian political figure as he attempted to mobilize Muslim and Christian Arabs, plus other Muslims throughout the world, around the symbol of al-Haram al-Sharif. Second, the Arab-Jewish conflict had irretrievably taken on an intercommunal character. The bloodshed of 1929 was not the first time that Jews and Arabs had randomly attacked one another, but the ferocity of the violence and the fact that traditionalist, non-Zionist Jews bore the brunt of Arab attacks indicated that the political boundaries were clearly drawn between Jews and Arabs. “Jew” and “Arab” became oppositional ethnic markers in Palestine in a way that they had not been just a few decades before. This gulf would widen in the ensuing decades, spurred on by a British colonial policy that encouraged the separate political, economic, and cultural development of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. The British commission of inquiry concluded that Arab fears of Zionism were justified. The British commissioners reported that Jewish immigration, land purchase and acquisition, and the construction of separate Jewish political structures had led to legitimate fears among Arabs that they faced dispossession and marginalization. The British commission recommended that Great Britain sharply restrict Jewish immigration and land purchases in the future. Conservative, pro-British Arab leaders, who had been hoping for a change in British policy, were delighted with this recommendation. The Zionist leadership, on the other hand, felt that

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Great Britain was about to betray them, in violation of the Balfour Declaration and of Britain’s commitments under international law through the mandate system. Jewish activists in Great Britain mobilized a public campaign to prevent the British government from reneging on its commitment to the Jewish national home. In 1931, the British prime minister announced that the pro-Arab recommendations of the official commission would not be implemented. Now it was the turn of the Arabs to feel betrayed. Both Arabs and Jews had increasing reason to be skeptical of Great Britain as the decade of the 1930s dawned. Pro-British figures among the Arab leadership were discredited among their own population. Likewise, pro-British figures within the Zionist movement lost influence. A new, activist Jewish leadership emerged that was based in Palestine itself, symbolized by David Ben-Gurion (d. 1973), a leader in the Zionist Labor movement. On the Arab side, the mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, found it increasingly difficult to walk the political tightrope between the British authorities (who had appointed him to his post) and an increasingly radicalized Arab public opinion. Tensions in Palestine during the 1930s were aggravated by two developments whose origins lay outside of the country: the rise of Nazism in Germany and the Great Depression that was engulfing the world economy. The Nazi Party’s takeover of Germany in 1933 produced a rapid worsening of the situation of German Jews. Pathologically anti-Semitic, the Nazi regime introduced a series of discriminatory laws aimed at humiliating German Jews and pushing them into emigration. (The formulation of the Nazis’ genocidal Final Solution to the Jewish Question would not occur until later, in 1941.) Indeed, the Zionist movement and the German government agreed to allow selected German Jews to immigrate to Palestine and take their liquid assets with them. As a consequence of these pressures, the Jewish population of Palestine doubled in three short years (1933–1936). The bulk of the new arrivals were middle-class Central Europeans, and their arrival significantly boosted the demographic and economic presence of the Jewish community in Palestine. Meanwhile, the predominantly rural Arab society was in crisis as world agricultural prices fell. Cash-strapped Arab landowners (who often were political leaders or were linked to Arab political leaders) sold off bits and pieces of their landed estates to Jewish institutions. Increasing numbers of Arab villagers became landless and unable to make a living in the countryside, either because of Jewish land purchases or because of bankruptcy and land loss brought about by their debts to Arab landowners. This was a combustible social and political mixture, and both communities (Jewish and Arab) began to arm in preparation for a showdown. The Jewish authorities had organized a clandestine militia, the Haganah, in 1920. Although technically illegal, it was tolerated by the British authorities. The polycentric Arab militias and armed groups reflected the regionally fragmented politics of the Arab population. Grassroots radicalization in this period was represented by the Muslim sheikh and religious leader ’Izz al-Din al-Qassam (d. 1935). After leading a struggle against French colonial rule in his home country, Syria, al-Qassam had arrived in Palestine

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where he worked for Muslim religious institutions in the northern port of Haifa. As registrar of marriages in the Islamic court, al-Qassam had the opportunity to travel the countryside in Haifa’s hinterland. What set al-Qassam apart from other urban Arab leaders was his genuine interest in and work with the poor and the displaced of Arab society. Al-Qassam developed a following among those who had been the most direct victims of the crisis in the Palestinian countryside. He preached a heady mixture of nationalism, religious revivalism, and dignity through work and sober morals. Unlike the traditional landowning Arab leadership, al-Qassam argued that the British mandate itself, not just the Jewish national home, was the fundamental problem facing Arab society. He encouraged militant, armed action, and in 1935, he was killed in a confrontation with British police. Al-Qassam’s death galvanized Arab opinion and led to increasing popular movements against both the British government and the Jewish community. In an attempt to keep control of the situation, the established Arab leadership (including al-Hajj Amin) called for a general strike in 1936 to compel a change of British policy. The First Partition Plan and the Arab Revolt

In response, the British sent yet another commission to Palestine. This time (1937), they recommended the partition of Palestine into a small Jewish state and a larger Arab entity that would be linked to neighboring British-ruled Transjordan. The Jewish leadership interpreted this recommendation as an important political victory. Although the projected Jewish state would be quite small, it nevertheless represented the first time that an official British body had publicly endorsed the concept of a Jewish state in Palestine, rather than the more nebulous concept of a national home. Arab reaction to the partition recommendation was hostile. Most Arabs opposed partition in principle. They argued that they were a majority in the country (still more than two-thirds of the population at this time) and that Great Britain had no right to slice off a part of the country for the benefit of foreign colonists (i.e., the Jews). Even the minority of Arab leaders who might have accepted partition in some form could not accept the specific recommendations of the 1937 commission. Although the projected Jewish state would have been small, it would have included the predominantly Arab region of Western Galilee. The British commission had recommended that the Arab population of Western Galilee be removed to facilitate the creation of the Jewish state. This was the first time that the removal of part of the Arab population was officially debated, and this element made it impossible for any Arabs of consequence to accept the plan. An armed Arab uprising against the British and the Jews broke out anew with great ferocity. At the revolt’s peak, Arab guerrillas controlled most of the countryside and dominated the Arab towns. Great Britain was compelled to bring additional troops from Europe, as well as enlist Jewish auxiliaries from the Haganah, to suppress the Arab revolt. Despite its early successes, the revolt suffered from internal divisions and weaknesses, symptomatic of an Arab society in crisis. The rank and file of the rebels were usually villagers and peasants, and they had scores to settle with Arab landowners whom they regarded as the coauthors of

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their misfortunes. Peasant guerrilla bands used their power to impose exactions on urban or well-to-do people in Arab communities. By the end of the revolt (1939), some Arab landowners had armed counterrevolutionary militias who cooperated with Great Britain in the restoration of government authority. The upshot was a defeated, divided, and disarmed Arab population. Elements of the Jewish Haganah, meanwhile, had gained some useful training and military experience through their cooperation with the British. The immediate aftermath of the Arab revolt appeared to mark a major setback for Zionist hopes of establishing a Jewish state. Arab opinion throughout the Middle East was increasingly mobilized by the question of Palestine, and Great Britain feared for the security of its imperial position in areas of vital strategic importance, such as Egypt (the Suez Canal) and Iraq (air bases and oil fields). The British government retreated from its own recommendation to partition Palestine and invited representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities to London in the summer of 1939 to find a solution to the Palestine impasse. When no common ground between Jews and Arabs could be found, Great Britain announced yet another unilateral change of policy: Palestine, London announced, would be granted its independence within 10 years. In the meantime, Jewish immigration and land purchase would be restricted to ensure that this independent Palestine would retain an Arab majority. Great Britain hoped that its announcement would reduce antiBritish Arab nationalist agitation in the Middle East on the eve of an expected new war with Germany. David Ben-Gurion and the Zionists were stung by this latest British reversal and betrayal, but they had no choice except to support Great Britain in its forthcoming war with Nazi Germany. The political question of the future of Palestine would be put off until World War II was over. Mandate’s End

Just as World War I had put the question of Palestine on the international agenda, World War II paved the way for the creation of a Jewish state. Great Britain, the ruling power in Palestine, emerged from World War II victorious but weakened. The postwar international system was dominated by two powers with little stake in the preservation of the older European empires: the United States and the Soviet Union. The genocide of some 6 million European Jews in Nazi-controlled Europe during the war had given a new urgency to Zionist efforts to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. The United States supported the immediate entry of 100,000 displaced European Jews into the country, oblivious to British worries about the political impact that this influx would have on British-Arab relations. Zionist parties, meanwhile, identified Great Britain as the principal obstacle to the creation of a Jewish state and launched a political and guerrilla campaign against British rule—marked most spectacularly by the bombing of the British headquarters at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946. The Soviet Union supported the campaign for a Jewish state, seeing this as a way to reduce British influence in the Middle East. Palestinian Arabs, meanwhile, were weakened, divided, and effectively leaderless. Al-Hajj Amin had fled Palestine into exile in 1937, following the Arabs’

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rejection of Great Britain’s partition plan and the outbreak of the Arab insurrection. He resided in various places in the Middle East before turning up in Berlin in 1941, where he lent propaganda support to the German war effort. After the war, he moved to Cairo, where he attempted to influence Palestinian politics. The United Nations and the Birth of Israel

The British despaired of ever resolving the impossible Palestine situation, and they turned the matter over to the new United Nations. Great Britain hoped in this way to confront the United States with its responsibilities, rather than be subject to unceasing U.S. criticism of British policies in Palestine. American political leaders, including President Harry S. Truman, were sensitive to the Jewish vote in key states. These electoral considerations, combined with their sympathy for the Jewish national cause provoked by the Nazi genocide, caused the American leadership to pressure Great Britain regarding Palestine in favor of Jewish aspirations. The UN General Assembly, dominated by the victorious superpowers, voted to partition Palestine, in November 1947, into two states: one Jewish and one Arab. Under this plan, a majority of the surface area of the country would be incorporated into a Jewish state, and the holy cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem would be placed under international administration. Jewish nationalists welcomed the UN partition resolution because international endorsement of Jewish sovereignty in their national homeland marked a major political and diplomatic triumph. Arabs rejected the resolution, fearful of the consequences for the large Arab minority that would remain in the Jewish state and resenting the handover of the majority of their country to a mostly foreign Jewish minority. Great Britain announced that it would not try to implement the partition resolution and prepared to withdraw unilaterally from Palestine by May 1948. Arabs and Jews would be left to fight it out to determine the country’s future. The first shots in the civil war between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine erupted within days of the November 1947 partition resolution. By January 1948, a renewed pattern of intercommunal violence was firmly established, with both Jewish and Arab paramilitary groups attacking population centers and workplaces identified with the other community. In the clashes of the first three months of 1948, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by militiamen from neighboring Arab countries, had the upper hand. The Arabs attempted, with some success, to isolate distant Jewish communities and settlements from the main bloc of Jewish population in the coastal plain between Tel Aviv and Haifa. The Arabs were most successful in cutting off the mountain road that linked Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem to the coast. As they continued their withdrawal from different regions of Palestine, British garrison commanders handed over control to whichever local community or militia was locally the strongest. With their experience of self-government under the mandate, Jewish authorities in Jewish towns and cities were able to step into Great Britain’s shoes with a minimum of disruption. But no centralized Arab authority existed, so power in Arab areas devolved to diffuse local committees or militia groups. The spreading violence and insecurity of the months between November

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1947 and March 1948 caused many of the better-off Arab families to leave Palestine for safety elsewhere. This outflow of people, who might otherwise have formed a kernel or nucleus of communal leadership, further hindered efforts to construct a coherent Palestinian Arab administration in areas from which Great Britain withdrew. In April 1948, a new and decisive phase of the Jewish-Arab civil war opened. With the British mandate in its final weeks and with British forces reduced to a token number, the Jewish leadership opted to launch a war of movement to capture and secure territory needed for the creation and consolidation of a Jewish state. Breaking the Arab siege of Jerusalem was a top priority. In this context, the Haganah undertook an operation known as Plan D, which called for clearing out Arab military and population centers that stood astride or threatened Jewish routes of communication. As Jewish forces seized Arab villagers, the Palestinian inhabitants fled or were driven out. Panic set in among the Arab population as news spread of a massacre committed by Jewish militias in the Arab village of Deir Yasin, west of Jerusalem. Accounts of Deir Yasin, spread both by Arabs (as an atrocity report) and Jews (as a psychological warfare tactic) triggered a panicky Arab exodus from areas of the country where Jewish forces were advancing. The flood of Arab refugees alarmed Palestine’s Arab neighbors and strained their resources. In keeping with the spirit of intercommunal warfare, Arab militias retaliated for Deir Yasin by attacking a medical convoy in Jerusalem a few days later, killing a number of Jewish medical workers. Jewish depopulation of Arab villages had its counterpart in the Arab seizure of Gush Etzion and the execution of its surviving Jewish defenders in May 1948. The British mandate ended, and the State of Israel was proclaimed on May 15, 1948. By that time, Palestine was already engulfed in war (a civil or intercommunal war between the country’s Jews and Arabs). With the proclamation of the Jewish state, the conflict took on an interstate dimension as neighboring Arab countries prepared to send their armies into Palestine, ostensibly to rescue their defeated Palestinian brethren but, equally important, to pursue their own particular goals as well. Significance The Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine up to 1948 illustrates a number of themes common to the history of the developing world in the last century. A modern ethnic and national conflict arose between two peoples with long histories. Jews and Palestinian Arabs began to define themselves in national terms as they struggled for control of a new state. The modern boundaries of Palestine were drawn by the imperial powers of Great Britain and France in the service of imperial interests. The previously imprecise understanding of Palestine/the Land of Israel thereby acquired a concrete, geopolitical meaning. The struggle between Jews and Arabs focused on the illegitimacy of each other’s claims, and both parties appealed to history and to religion to create a sense of historical continuity between the national present and the historical or mythical past. The Jewish nationalists, mainly Europeans, adopted

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colonial techniques to carve out a place for themselves in a predominantly Arab country. Palestinian Arabs responded as many native populations did in similar circumstances. At times of crisis and armed conflict, Arab militants made little effort to distinguish between “good” colonists and “bad,” between combatant Jews and noncombatant Jews. For their part, confronting what they perceived as a wall of native hostility, Jewish nationalists defined Arabs as an alien, hostile population whose expulsion and exile from contested lands was justified in the name of self-defense. The entire conflict unfolded in an international context that was molded by World War I and II, and events of these wars had a direct impact on the conflict’s course and development. The Arab-Jewish struggle in Palestine was not, and is not, a slice of exotica disconnected from the mainstream of world history. Instead it is very much both a product and an emblem of the bloody 20th century. Suggested Readings Avineri, Shlomo. 1981. The Making of Modern Zionism: Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State. New York: Basic Books. Khalidi, Rashid. 1997 and 2010. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of a Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press. Kurzman, Dan. 1983. Ben-Gurion: Prophet of Fire. New York: Simon and Schuster. Mattar, Philip. 1988. The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement. New York: Columbia University Press. Lockman, Zachary. 1996. Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906– 1948. Berkeley: University of California Press. Smith, Charles D. 2013. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Appendices The four documents that follow essentially bracket the birth of Israel. The Balfour Declaration issued in November 1917 represents the British government’s promise to support the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Its language would later be incorporated into the founding document of the Palestine Mandate that was ratified by the League of Nations. Therefore, it formed the basis of a Jewish national claim to Palestine under post–World War I international law. At the other end lies Israel’s Declaration of Independence, the founding document of the “Jewish State” envisioned by the United Nations partition plan. Sandwiched in between are a report by the League of Nations on the rising conflict in Palestine at the time of the 1929 riots, when the plan was to unite the Palestinian and Jewish communities in a single state, and the UN report on the continuing deterioration of conditions there only months away from the plan to partition Palestine into a separate, predominantly Jewish state and a predominantly Arab state, which collectively explain much of why partition was followed by the region’s first Arab-Israeli war in the region.

1. The Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917 Foreign Office, November 2nd, 1917.

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Dear Lord Rothschild, I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious’ rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. Yours sincerely, (Signed) Arthur James Balfour Source: United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. Available at http:// unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/e210ca73e38d9e1d052565fa00705c61?OpenDocument.

2. League of Nations Report Following the 1929 Riots in Palestine League of Nations

31 December 1929 REPORT

by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of PALESTINE AND TRANS-JORDAN FOR THE YEAR 1929 PALESTINE. 1. The events in Palestine and the activities of the Administration in the year 1929 are overshadowed by the disturbances that occurred during the week from the 23rd to the 29th August. 2. . . . Consequences of the disturbances, August, 1929.—It is unnecessary, therefore, to make further observations in this Report on the disturbances or their causes. It is proposed, however, to deal with the more important consequences of the disturbances. Generally, the concluding months of the year were characterised by political unrest, the strengthening of the forces of public security and restriction of economic activity. 3. The Wailing Wall Dispute.—The conflict of claims, Jewish and Arab, as to the rights at the Wailing Wall continued to afford opportunity for disorder. On the Arab side there is

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suspicion of any Jewish act in the vicinity of the Wall, coupled with resentment of the provisional regulations issued by the High Commissioner, which are interpreted by certain Moslems as giving authority for Jewish devotions of congregational character which, in the Moslem view, have no sanction. On the Jewish side resentment is caused by acts of Moslems which are not within the ambit of the provisional regulations of the High Commissioner and which tend to make devotions, either private or public, impossible to fulfil. The Administration therefore has been and still is obliged to maintain elaborate precautions to prevent disorder. ... 5. His Majesty's Government, recognising the importance of obtaining an early and final settlement of the rights and claims of Moslems and Jews at the Wall, and recognising that there was no prospect of a mutual agreement between the claimants, submitted proposals to the Council of the League of Nations for the appointment of a Commission to study, define and determine the rights and claims connected with the Wailing Wall. . . . 6. Public Security.—Measures are in hand, under the advice of Mr. H. L. Dowbiggin, Inspector-General of Police in Ceylon, for the reorganisation of the Police Force to ensure that it shall be able to deal more promptly and effectively in future with any similar turbulence; and the protection of exposed Jewish settlements is to be provided for by the establishment of additional police posts, improved communications by road and telephone and signalling facilities. Substantial increases in the British personnel have already been made. ... 8. Breaches of the peace.—Other consequences of the disturbances were a series of attacks upon individuals of a grievous character during September and October, and the formation of a gang of brigands in the Huleh Salient. Combined operations by police, military, the Trans-Jordan Arab Legion, assisted by the forces under the French authorities in Syria, who closed the northern frontier, were successful in breaking up the gang, eighteen members of which are now in prison awaiting trial. Evidence that another gang proposed to operate in the Plain of Sharon was forthcoming in time to permit the Administration to arrest the organisers and the gang was not formed. The country was, notwithstanding, outwardly tranquil by the end of the year and the tourist season opened and has continued without untoward incidents. ... 16. The Boycott.—Jewish indignation in Palestine at the disturbances led for a short time to a sporadic boycott of Arab produce. Subsequently, the revival of Arab nationalist and antiJewish feeling led to an organised boycott of Jewish products. This boycott was accompanied

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by acts of intimidation. In the early stages the offenders could not be prosecuted owing to the concerted withholding of evidence by the Arabs. Gradually, as the public slowly regained faith in the forces of law and order, evidence became available and offenders were summarily punished by British Magistrates. The precise effects of the boycott are not known. . . . 17. Press control.—A stricter surveillance has been instituted over the Press, and the Government are prompt to take action against any newspaper which contravenes the provisions of the Ottoman Press Law by publishing articles calculated to provoke enmity between communities or endanger the peace. ... 21. Political Development.—The Palestine Arab Executive lost no time after Sir John Chancellor's assumption of office in December, 1928, in seeking to establish direct relations with the High Commissioner with the object of securing a form of government in Palestine in which the people of the country could participate. The High Commissioner granted an interview to the Arab Executive in January, 1929, in which he promised to give consideration to the request that negotiations should be inaugurated with the Government for the constitution of a Representative Assembly. The High Commissioner reminded the delegation that Government had already made a beginning in the direction of popular representation in the shape of elective Municipal Councils, and reminded them further that offers of elective representation on a Legislative Body had been made on previous occasions by the Government and rejected by those on whose behalf they spoke. Nevertheless he recognised the question to be one of paramount importance, to which he would give earnest and careful study. ... 23. The disturbances of August had the effect of postponing further conversations on constitutional questions. Nevertheless, Arab leaders, in framing their case before the Palestine Commission of Inquiry, raised questions connected with the policy under which Palestine is administered and with the participation of the people in the government of the country. They next summoned an Arab Congress who decided to send an Arab Delegation to London with a view to initiating as soon as possible after the publication of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry direct negotiations with the Secretary of State. During the year, therefore, there was no change of constitutional character in Palestine; but the Palestine Arab Executive were in more intimate contact with the Palestine Government than they had been for some years. 24. Jewish political development in relation to Palestine consisted of the reorganisation of the Jewish Agency. After ten years of protracted and patient negotiation between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, agreement was reached which was expressed in an exchange of letters in November, 1928, between Dr. Chaim Weizman on behalf of the Zionists, and Mr. Louis Marshall on behalf of non-Zionists. The agreement was expressed and consolidated in formal manner at the Zionist Congress and the first meeting of the enlarged Jewish Agency held at Zurich in July and August, 1929. At Zurich, Jews as a whole were united and pledged to assist in the upbuilding of Palestine in which the Jewish National

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Home is established and is to develop, without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of the existing inhabitants of the country. 25. In general terms, both Arab and Jewish nationalism in Palestine received new impulses during the year 1929. On the Arab side, nationalism, which had never been dead, was given a renewed vitality through an appeal to religious sentiment. On the Jewish side, nationalism, which, in its economic aspects, had suffered reverses during the economic depression of the years 1926, 1927 and part of 1928, found renewed strength in the union of Jews for the development of the Jewish National Home. ... 35. Labour.—Continued improvement of economic conditions has resulted in the creation of openings for employment in industry, in the building trade and in agriculture. These absorbed most of those persons who were unemployed at the end of 1928. The tide of emigration turned and the demand for labour, notwithstanding the set-back of the disturbances, was greater than the supply. Government authorised the entry of 2,300 Jewish working men and women for whom the Jewish Agency guaranteed employment mostly in connexion with the planting of orange groves. In 1928, Jewish immigration and emigration balanced one another; in 1929 the immigrants exceeded the emigrants by 3,503. ... 41. Organisation of religious communities.—A Committee of Moslems, which had been appointed by Lord Plumer to make recommendations for a complete revision of the arrangements by which, in the Order constituting a Supreme Moslem Sharia Council, 1921, Moslems are enabled to administer Awqaf funds and to administer their Religious Law, reported and, with certain minority observations, made recommendations of far-reaching import Comparative Table of Births and Deaths by Religions for the Year 1929. Christians. Moslems.

Jews.

Others.

Total.

Population* ... ... ... ...

80,225

572,443

154,330

9,066

816,064

Deaths... ... ... ... ...

1,439

18,133

1,820

242

21,634

Deaths per 1,000 of population...

17.93

31.67

11.79

26.69

26.51

Births... ... ... ... ...

3,036

33,053

5,257

396

41,742

Births per 1,000 of population...

37.84

57.74

34.06

43.67

51.15

473

6,775

472

66

7,786

Infantile Mortality Rate... ...

155.80

204.97

89.78

166.66

186.52

Natural Increase per 1,000 of the population ... ...

19.90

26.06

22.27

16.98

24.64

Deaths of Infants under 1 year of age ... ... ...

*No figures are included for the nomadic Bedouin population, which in 1922 was estimated at 103,000.

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for the creation of a General Moslem Assembly and a Supreme Moslem Council separately elected. Those recommendations are under consideration. The Va’ad Leumi, which is the body acting in the capacity of the constitutional General Council in the Regulations for the Jewish Community, 1927, submitted the draft of an electoral regulation which will enable the Rabbinical Council and offices to be reconstituted, an Elected Assembly and General Council (Va’ad Leumi) to be elected and powers of taxation to be exercised by Local Community Committees. Source: United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. Available at http:// unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/38BED104DB074B49052565E70054EB22.

3. Report on Security in Palestine on the Eve of Partition UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION First Special Report to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine The United Nations Palestine Commission herewith presents to the Security Council a special report on the problem of security in Palestine, with particular reference to the maintenance of law and order and to the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly on the Future Government of Palestine. I. MAIN CONSIDERATIONS 1. In its First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council (Section 13), the Commission had informed the Security Council that “it was devoting most serious attention to the various aspects of the security problem, with particular reference to the possible need for an international force”. And that this problem would be the subject of a subsequent special report. 2. It is because of the extreme gravity of the situation in Palestine now, and the anticipated worsening of the conditions there, that this special report is presented to the Security Council at this time…. 3. The Commission has appraised the security situation in Palestine on the basis of a considerable volume of information, official and unofficial, available to it from a diversity of sources. These sources have included official reports and appraisals from the Mandatory Power; reports and comments from the Jewish Agency for Palestine; statements by the Arab Higher Committee; and dispatches from the Press of the world. On the strength of this information the Commission has concentrated its attention on the following main considerations: A. The security situation in Palestine continues to be aggravated not only in the areas of the proposed Jewish and Arab States, but also in the City of Jerusalem, even in the presence of British troops. B. The Commission will be unable to establish security and maintain law and order, without which it cannot implement the resolution of the General Assembly, unless military forces in adequate strength are made available to the Commission when the responsibility for the administration of Palestine is transferred to it.

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C. Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein. . . . II. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN PALESTINE TODAY 1. In its First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council the Commission pointed out in Section 13 that: a. The information given to the Commission by the representatives of the Mandatory Power and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine coincided in substance as regards the general insecurity in Palestine and the steady decline in the security position there; b. The information available to the Commission at the time led to the conclusion that the situation in Palestine as regards security is more likely to worsen than to improve; c. The Commission envisaged the possibility of a collapse of security on the termination of the Mandate “unless adequate means are made available to the Commission for the exercise of its authority.” 2. Information available to the Commission since the submission of its First Monthly Report to the Security Council confirms the above conclusions as regards security, . . . and reveals more clearly the existence of a determination to oppose by force the Assembly’s plan of partition. 3. The representative of the Mandatory Power informed the Commission . . . on January 1948, that as regards Arabs and Jews in Palestine “elements on each side were engaged in attacking or in taking reprisals indistinguishable from attacks”, and that as a result, were it not “for the efforts of the security forces over the past month, the two communities would by now have been fully engaged in internecine slaughter. He further stated that “the Government of Palestine fear that strife in Palestine will be greatly intensified when the Mandate is terminated”. . . . 5. The Mandatory Power has provided the Commission with a list of casualties in Palestine for the period from 30 November 1947 to 1 February 1948, which gives the following totals in killed and wounded: Nationality

Killed

Wounded

Total

British

 46

  135

  181

Arabs

427

1,035

1,462

Jews

381

  725

1,106

Others

 15

  15

  29

TOTAL CASUALTIES

869

1,909

2,778

6. The Secretary-General has been informed by the Arab Higher Committee that is determined to persist in its rejection of the partition plan and in its refusal to recognize the resolution of the Assembly and “anything deriving therefrom”. The Subsequent communication of 6 February to the Secretary-General from the representative of the Arab Higher Committee set forth the following conclusions of the Arab Higher Committee Delegation: “a. The Arabs of Palestine will never recognize the validity of the extorted partition recommendations or the authority of the United Nations to make them.

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“b. The Arabs of Palestine consider that any attempt by the Jews or any power or group of powers to establish a Jewish State in Arab territory is an act of aggression which will be resisted in self-defense by force. c. It is very unwise and fruitless to ask any commission to proceed to Palestine because not a single Arab will cooperate with the said commission. d. The United Nations or its commission should not be misled to believe that its efforts in the partition plan will meet with any success. It will be far better for the eclipsed prestige of this organization not to start on this adventure. e. The United Nations prestige will be better served by abandoning, not enforcing such an injustice. f. The determination of every Arab in Palestine is to oppose in every way the partition of that country. g. The Arabs of Palestine made a solemn declaration before the United Nations, before God and history, that they will never submit or yield to any power going to Palestine to enforce partition. “The only way to establish partition is first to wipe them out – man women and child. 7. The Commission has no reason to doubt the determination and force of the organized resistance to the plan of partition by strong Arab elements inside and outside of Palestine. In an official report, dated 4 February 1948, the Mandatory Power states that: “1. The High Commissioner for Palestine reported on 27 January that the security position had become more serious during the preceding week with the entry into Palestine of large parties of trained guerrillas from adjacent territory. A band of some 300 men had established itself in the Safad area of Galilee, and it was probably this band or part of it which carried out an intensive attack during that week on Yechiam settlement, using mortars and heavy automatics as well as rifles. 2. On the same date, the High Commissioner further reported that a second large band of some 700 Syrians had entered Palestine via Trans-Jordan during the night of 20–21 January. This band had its own mechanized transport, its members were well equipped and provisioned, and wore battle dress. . . . 3. Arab morale is considered to have risen steadily as a result of these reinforcements, of the spectacular success of the Hebron Arabs in liquidating a Haganah column near Surif, and of the capture and successful dismantling by the Arab National Guard of a Jewish van filled with explosives which was to have been detonated in an Arab locality. Even the relatively serious loss of life and damage to property caused by Jewish reprisals, have, in the High Commissioner’s view, failed to check the revival of confidence in the fellaheen and urban proletariat. Panic continues to increase, however, throughout the Arab middle classes, and there is a steady exodus of those who can afford to leave the country. 4. Subsequent reports dated 2 February indicate that a further party of troops belonging to the ‘Arab Liberation Army’ arrived in Palestine via the Jisr Djamiyeh Bridge during the night of 29–30 January. The party, numbering some 950 men transported in 19 vehicles, consisted largely of non-Palestinian Arabs, all in uniform and well armed. . . .”

…

8. A subsequent communication from the Mandatory Power under date of 9 February 1948, also reports that:

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“A report has been received from Jerusalem to the effect that it is now definitely established that a second party of some seven hundred guerrillas (believed to be under the command of Fawzi Bay al Kankji) entered Palestine via Djamiyeh Bridge on 29th/30th January. It is understood that this band dispersed rapidly among the villages of Samaria and that there is now in that district a force of not less than 1400. . . . “Individual attacks by Arabs on British troops and police have increased. These are due partly to a desire to obtain arms even at the price of murder, and partly to nervousness, particularly in rural areas, caused by the frequent use by the Jews of British uniform in order to facilitate offensive action.” 9. The main facts controlling the security situation in Palestine today are the following: a. Organized effect by strong Arab elements inside and outside Palestine to prevent the implementation of the Assembly’s plan of partition and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including armed incursions into Palestinian territory. b. Certain elements of the Jewish community in Palestine continue to commit irresponsible acts of violence which worsen the security situation, although that Community is generally in support of the recommendations of the Assembly. c. The added complication created by the fact that the Mandatory Power, which remains responsible for law and order in Palestine until the termination of the Mandate, is engaged in the liquidation of its administration and preparing for the evacuation of its troops. Source: United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. Available at http:// unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/FDF734EB76C39D6385256C4C004CDBA7.

4. Israel’s Declaration of Independence ERETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew)—the Land of Israel, Palestine] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books. After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom. Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, ma'pilim [(Hebrew)—immigrants coming to Eretz-Israel in defiance of restrictive legislation] and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood. In the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodore Herzl, the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country.

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This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and reaffirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home. The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people—the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe—was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations. Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland. In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations. On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable. This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State. accordingly we, members of the people’s council, representatives of the jewish community of eretz-israel and of the zionist movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the british mandate over eretz-israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the united nations general assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a jewish state in eretz-israel, to be known as the state of israel.

that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called “Israel”. we declare

will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will the state of israel

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ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and representatives of the United Nations in implementing the resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th November, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the economic union of the whole of Eretz-Israel. the state of israel

to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building-up of its State and to receive the State of Israel into the comity of nations. we appeal

we appeal—in

the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months—to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions. our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East. we extend

to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of EretzIsrael in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream - the redemption of Israel. we appeal

placing our trust in the “rock of israel”, we affix our signatures to this proclamation at this session of the provisional council of state, on the soil of the homeland, in the city of tel-aviv, on this sabbath eve, the

5th day of iyar, 5708 (14th may,1948). David Ben-Gurion

Source: Official Gazette, No. 1 of the 5th, Iyar, 5708 (May, 14, 1948). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Israel. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace /guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx.

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The Middle East The Question of Palestine Maia Carter Hallward

Timeline 1880s The Arab independence movement begins. 1881 Russian pogroms against Jews are initiated (1881–1903). The first wave of Russian Jewish immigration to Palestine occurs. 1914–1918 World War I is fought. Great Britain makes conflicting commitments regarding Palestine. 1936–1939 An Arab revolt against British rule takes place. 1947 The UN General Assembly enacts Resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine. 1948–1949 The First Arab-Israeli War is fought. Israel declares independence; Palestinian nakba (catastrophe) results. 1964 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is established. 1967 During the Six-Day War, Israel occupies the Sinai, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and West Bank. UN Security Council Resolution 242 is passed.

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1973 The October War occurs. The UN Security Council passes Resolution 338. 1978 The Camp David Accords are signed by Israel, Egypt, and the United States. 1982 Israeli military invades Lebanon; a massacre occurs at Palestinian refugee camps near Beirut. 1987 The Palestinian intifada begins. 1988 Yasser Arafat condemns terrorism and recognizes the State of Israel. The United States opens direct discussions with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 1991 The United States leads a war against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. An Arab-Israeli peace conference is held in Madrid, Spain. 1993 A Declaration of Principles on interim Palestinian self-government arrangements is proposed. Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Arafat sign the Oslo Accords on White House lawn. The PLO formally rejects violence and recognizes Israel. 1994 The Cairo Agreement is signed. Arafat establishes his headquarters in Gaza. 1995 The Oslo II Accords are passed. Yitzhak Rabin is assassinated. 1996 The first Palestinian elections are held. 1998 The Wye River Memorandum is issued. 2000 The Camp David II summit and negotiations end in failure; a new Palestinian uprising begins. 2001 The Taba negotiations fail. The “Mitchell Report” is issued.

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2002 A new intifada begins. Amid mounting violence on both sides, including waves of suicide bombings by Palestinians, the Israeli military occupies much of the Palestinian West Bank and threatens to exile Arafat. The Arab League offers an ill-timed Peace Initiative. 2003 The international Quartet issues the Performance-Based Roadmap for Peace. 2004 The International Court of Justice deems the West Bank’s separation barrier (wall) illegally built on occupied territory. Yasser Arafat dies of a mysterious illness in Paris. 2005 Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is elected the Palestinian president on a peace platform. Israel removes all settlers and soldiers from the Gaza Strip but retains control of borders. Palestinian civil society launches a boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement. 2006 The Islamist Resistance Movement (Hamas) wins the Palestinian parliamentary elections, leading to an international boycott and a freezing of aid to the Palestinian Authority. 2007 A short-lived Palestinian unity government is rejected by the international community. Internal fighting leads to separate Palestinian governments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. President George W. Bush holds the Annapolis Conference to try to restart the Roadmap. 2008 Israel bombs Gaza for 22 days in Operation Cast Lead, leading to 1,400 mostly civilian deaths; militants launch thousands of rockets at Israel. 2010 A humanitarian flotilla of ships bringing aid to Gaza is attacked by Israeli commandos; the resulting Turkish deaths lead to a crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations. Palestinians and Israelis briefly return to the negotiating table. 2011 Palestine launches a failed bid for statehood at the United Nations but becomes a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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(UNESCO). Israeli solider Gilad Shalit is released from captivity in exchange for 1,000 Palestinian prisoners. 2012 UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 grants Palestine nonmember observer state status. 2014 Hamas and Fatah reach a unity deal. Tit-for-tat violence leads to Operation Protective Edge, a 50-day war in Gaza resulting in the deaths of over 2,100 Palestinians (mostly civilians), 66 Israeli soldiers, and 7 Israeli civilians. The Palestinian issue remains one of the most significant and intractable conflicts facing the international community and contributes to the instability in the greater Middle Eastern region by providing a rallying cry for mobilization by political entrepreneurs. The contest over land and political control between Israelis and Palestinians emerges from the struggle of two peoples for national self-determination and international recognition. Although the conflict is often portrayed as one of “ancient hatreds,” the “question of Palestine” has its origins in 19th- and 20th-century imperialism, nationalism, anti-Semitism, struggles over the international and regional balance of power, decolonization, and evolving conceptions of statehood. The conflict has claimed the lives of many civilians over the years, through terrorist acts as well as state-sanctioned violence. The conflict is not clearly defined as inter- or intrastate, although after Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, it became the de facto sovereign over all of historic Palestine between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. The centrality of the U.S.-Israeli relationship for U.S. policies in the region, the significance of Jerusalem to the world’s monotheistic religions, and the strategic significance of the region (for oil and other reasons) to great power interests (including the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union/Russia), have meant that external parties have invested time and resources in the conflict, often in the pursuit of their own goals rather than a substantive, just, durable, and secure peace. The presence of stateless Palestinian refugees throughout the region with a dedicated UN agency tasked with providing them services as well as the existence of an active and engaged Jewish diaspora (particularly in the United States) extends the issue of Palestine regionally and globally. The United Nations has passed numerous resolutions on the question of Palestine, sent peacekeepers to monitor the EgyptianIsraeli and Israeli-Syrian borders, and its General Assembly has recognized Palestine as a nonmember state. Historical Background At the turn of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire, known as the “Sick Man of Europe,” controlled much of the Arab world, including what was vaguely called

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the “Holy Land.” During World War I, the British and French, who controlled global empires, agreed to divide the Ottoman lands between them if the allies were victorious. After the Ottomans were defeated, the British were awarded a League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. The British found governing this new territory complicated because of the rival claims for self-determination by Jewish Zionists (largely from Europe), who had been promised “a Jewish national home in Palestine” by the British government in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, and by Arabs, who had been promised independence in an exchange of letters between Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner of Egypt, if they revolted against the Ottomans. At the start of the British Mandate, in 1922, the population of Palestine was about 88 percent Arab (Muslim, Christian, and Druze). The Jewish community consisted of Jews who were culturally integrated into the region (based primarily in Hebron, Safad, Tiberias, and Jerusalem), along with more recent Jewish immigrants, most of whom came from Russia and Eastern Europe. By the end of the 1920s, about 17.7 percent of the population was Jewish, and by 1939, Jews owned about 5 percent of the land in Mandate Palestine.1 In the 1930s, with the rise of the Nazi Party in Europe, more than 270,000 Jews immigrated to Palestine, many of whom were professionals from Central Europe. Palestinian Arabs saw the influx of Jews as another example of European colonialism. Tensions built between the two national groups, each seeking self-determination from the British, and in 1936, a series of events led to tit-for-tat violence between the Jewish and Arab communities and the issuance of a general Arab strike. In response to the intensified hostility in the Mandate, the British created one of many investigative committees, the Peel Commission, which recommended the creation of separate Jewish and Arab areas with a strip of British control from the coastal city of Jaffa eastward toward Jerusalem and encompassing Jerusalem and Bethlehem. A 1939 British White Paper recommended a binational state to emerge in 10 years and imposed limits on Jewish immigration, a move that was staunchly rejected by the Jewish community, particularly given Hitler’s military advances throughout Europe. By the end of the war, the British sought to decrease their foreign responsibilities and focus on domestic rebuilding. A 1946 AngloAmerican commission rejected immigration controls as well as partition and called for a single binational state, a decision never implemented.2 In 1947, the British turned the problem of Palestine—which at the time had 1.2 million Arabs and 650,000 Jews—over to the United Nations, which created the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). UNSCOP’s majority report, favored by the Jews, recommended the creation of a Jewish state and an Arab state with international control over Jerusalem. The minority report, favored by the Arabs, recommended an independent federal state.3 The partition plan, approved by the UN General Assembly as Resolution 181 in November 1947, proposed a Jewish state on 56.47 percent of Palestine, an Arab state on 42.88 percent of Palestine, and an international zone of 0.65 percent surrounding Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Over half of the 905,000 residents of the proposed Jewish state were Palestinian Arabs, and 10,000 Jews remained within the 725,000 residents of the proposed Arab state.

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Arabs rejected the proposal, wondering “why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent).”4 The British announced the Palestinian Mandate would officially end in May 1948, and on the eve of their official withdrawal, Israel declared statehood. At this point, Arab states sent in their armies to join the local Palestinian forces who had been practically defeated by the Jewish forces in the civil war that had begun in 1947. The war ended with a series of armistice agreements rather than a peace treaty, a great sense of elation among Zionists for the creation of their new state rising up in the wake of the Holocaust, and a sense of great tragedy for Palestinians, for whom the war was al-Nakba, the Catastrophe, in which 700,000–800,000 Palestinians (over half the Arab population of Palestine) were dispossessed and became refugees.5 In the wake of the armistice agreements, Egypt remained in control of the Gaza Strip; Jordan controlled the West Bank, including East Jerusalem; and Israel destroyed over 400 Palestinian villages and embarked on a mission to rename cities, towns, and geographic landmarks.6 The 1967 war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan led to Israeli control of the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, and Golan Heights. In the wake of Israeli’s stunning victory, Yasser Arafat and his Fatah Party took control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and committed it to struggle for full control of Palestine from Israeli control. Israelis were ecstatic by their victory; doves saw the opportunity for exchanging land for peace, and religious nationalist movements saw the opportunity to “redeem” Eretz Israel by establishing Jewish settlements in the land of the Jewish forefathers. Israel integrated the West Bank and Gaza Strip into its economy and sought to erase the 1949 armistice line (called the “Green Line”) from memory and maps. In 1987, massive demonstrations following the death of Palestinian workers in an accident at an army roadblock in the Gaza Strip led to the first intifada. Palestinians throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose up in unarmed struggle to “shake off” their Israeli occupiers. The resulting “break their bones” policy of the Rabin government contributed to a shift in the international perception of Palestinians. In 1991, Palestinian leaders were included in the Jordanian delegation to the Madrid Conference, the first multilateral peace conference between Arab states and Israel. This conference led to bilateral Israeli-Palestinian and Jordanian-Israeli negotiations under U.S. auspices. Although the official negotiation track stalled, secret meetings between Israelis and Palestinians in Norway led to the 1993 Oslo Accords, a set of agreements that created the Palestinian National Authority and initiated a five-year interim period leading to final status negotiations on core conflict issues. The Conflict Contrary to its frequent portrayal in popular media as a war of ancient hatreds, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a modern creation of rival nationalisms seeking self-determination on the same territory. Because of the asymmetry between the parties, the Palestinians emphasize the dimensions of occupation, dispossession, lack of basic freedoms, and a desire for justice. Israelis emphasize the need for a

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secure Jewish homeland given the threat of anti-Semitism and terrorism. The Oslo framework for conflict settlement identified several “final status” issues: borders, security, settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is further complicated by its connection to the broader Arab-Israeli conflict; although Israel has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, its two primary neighbors, many other Arab states still do not recognize Israel (although the Arab Peace Initiative, extended in 2002 and again in 2007, offers full normalization of relations in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines). Maximalist demands by Israelis and Palestinians mirror each other: claims to all of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea using a mixture of religion, culture, and history as justification. The charter of Hamas, for example, argues that “the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up.”7 The Likud Party emphasizes that settlement of the land of “Western Israel” or “Judea and Samaria” reflects “the right of the Jewish nation to the Land of Israel” based on claims rooted in the Bible. 8 They contend that there are already 20 Arab states, whereas Israel, a tiny country, is the only state for the Jewish people. In addition to the ethnonational dimensions of the territorial conflict over the land Israel occupied in 1967, ethnonational conflict is evident in tensions between the Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel. Until 1966, those Arab Palestinians remaining in what became the State of Israel, lived under martial law. Although accorded full citizenship in the Israeli democracy, Arabs are excluded from the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and have never been included in a ruling government coalition. With the exception of a few major cities and intentional communities, such as Neve Shalom/Wahat al Salaam, Arab and Jewish citizens live in separate cities and towns, and Israel has separate public school systems for Arabs, secular Jews, and religious Jews. Since October 2000, when Arab citizens were killed by Israeli police in demonstrations, Israel’s Arabs have increasingly privileged their Palestinian roots, and with the rise of the right wing in Israel, Arab citizens are increasingly distrusted by the Jewish majority. A series of bills restricting their rights have been considered in the Knesset, including the Nakba Bill (originally aimed at outlawing remembrance activities on Israel’s Independence Day) and the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (which prevents Israeli citizens from conferring residency or citizenship status on spouses from the West Bank and Gaza).9 Consequently, Israel’s Arab citizens increasingly identify with the dispossession of Palestinians in 1948 and believe they will not achieve socioeconomic or political equality within Israel because of the state’s Jewish identity. Leading Arab citizens have called for a binational state as a way of accommodating both Jews and Arabs on all of the territory. The 2005 call by Palestinian civil society for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) on Israel includes a demand for “the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality.”10 For most Jewish Israelis, however, a binational state would once again relegate Jews to a minority status, which they reject not only because of the

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history of anti-Semitism but also because it contradicts the Zionist goal of Jewish self-determination. Perhaps the two most contentious issues in the conflict, the status of Jerusalem and the question of Palestinian refugees, both reflect ethnopolitical concerns. Historic plans for partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states kept Jerusalem as an international zone precisely because of its significance to the three Abrahamic faiths. Until 1967, West Jerusalem was under Israeli control and East Jerusalem under Jordanian control; Jordan and the Islamic waqf still control the Haram al Sharif/ Temple Mount complex, the third-holiest site in Islam, and the site of the Temple of Solomon. Some Jews wish to change the status quo and rebuild the temple; others wish to open up the complex for Jews to pray, although Israel’s chief rabbi asserts that Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount is like a crime “punishable by death.”11 The question of Palestinian refugees relates back to what Israel deems the “demographic threat” of losing a Jewish majority as well as a refusal to admit that the fulfillment of the Zionist goal of Jewish self-determination was a “catastrophe.” As of 2014, over 5 million Palestinian refugees are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the UN agency created to assist them in 1950.12 Although Palestinian refugees are denied the right of return, and most are barred from even entering Israel or the Palestinian Territories for a visit, under the 1950 Law of Return, Jews anywhere in the world can obtain Israeli citizenship. According to the Ministry of Aliya and Immigrant Absorption’s Web site, “The State of Israel invests great effort in encouraging all of its citizens who reside abroad to return to Israel, and in easing their integration.”13 Diaspora Jews are considered “returning residents,” indicating that in the eyes of the state they already belong. In contrast, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “If Israel were to allow all of [the Palestinian refugees] to return to her territory, this would be an act of suicide on her part.”14 For Palestinian refugees, who comprise the majority of Palestinians worldwide, the inability to return to live in their ancestral lands is unjust, not only because they have received no compensation for their loss of property, but—more importantly for many—their identity and connection to the land is not acknowledged.15 Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory are another major source of conflict. Since 1967, over 120 Jewish communities have been established across the Green Line in territory that had been designed for an Arab state under the UN partition plan. The vast majority of these settlements are approved and subsidized by the State of Israel, although a few small ideologically extreme “outposts” are deemed illegal under Israeli law (all settlements are viewed as illegal under international law).16 The settlements are Jewish-only cities connected to the infrastructure of the Israeli state, while Palestinian villages in the same area often lack water, electricity, and viable roads and live under Israeli military law as noncitizens. Jewish settlers live under Israeli civil law as full citizens of the state. Management of the Conflict Unfortunately, the political conflict management efforts begun at the 1991 Madrid Conference and further developed with the Oslo Accords was hampered when

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Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli in 1995 and Benjamin Netanyahu was elected prime minister on an anti-Oslo platform. Spoilers on both sides engaged in acts of violence that sabotaged the peace process, and neither side fully complied with the agreements. In 1998, the Wye River agreement led to a further redeployment from the West Bank and an agreement to divide the city of Hebron into Israeli- and Palestinian-controlled areas. A hastily arranged summit held at Camp David in July 2000 failed to reach a final agreement. The United States and Israel blamed Yasser Arafat for rejecting Ehud Barak’s “generous offer,” which went further than Israeli prime ministers had gone before, including offering a Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem, which still fell far short of Palestinian minimal demands and would have continued Israeli control over West Bank airspace and ground resources. At the end of September 2000, a second Palestinian intifada erupted after the provocative visit of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount complex with a cadre of armed guards. Although Palestinians initially coordinated nonviolent protests, they were met with live ammunition from Israeli forces, and the second intifada became known for its high civilian casualty rates as well as internal Palestinian fighting because of high levels of discontent with a corrupt leadership that had failed to deliver peace, economic development, or freedom. President Clinton offered forth the “Clinton Parameters” for peace before he left office, which included the idea of land swaps for settlement blocks and the creation of a viable Palestinian state, a solution for Palestinian refugees, an international security presence, and an open, shared Jerusalem. Negotiations at Taba in 2001 came close to an agreement, but with impending Israeli elections, the talks were ended. In 2002, the Arab League offered forth a peace initiative that would give Israel full normalization in exchange for a withdrawal to the 1967 borders and a just solution to the Palestinian refugee question. Unfortunately, the offer was given just before a massive Passover suicide bombing, after which Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield, which involved tanks in the streets of the major Palestinian cities. Yasser Arafat ended up a prisoner in two rooms in his Ramallah compound, and the offices of many Palestinian Authority agencies and NGOs were ransacked, with equipment and records destroyed. Although the Quartet, composed of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, put forth the Performance-Based Roadmap for Peace in 2003, which called on the parties to take a series of steps along the way to a provisional Palestinian state by 2005, Israel issued a series of objections to the plan, and little international effort was exerted on peacemaking, with U.S. attention turned toward Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2004, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, known for being a staunch supporter of settlements, proposed unilateral Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, pulling out the settlers and military bases while remaining in control of the borders and airspace. A senior adviser to Sharon described disengagement as “formaldehyde” and a “freezing of the peace process,” in part because of the 2003 Geneva Initiative in which Israeli and Palestinian former negotiators publicly reached a nonofficial two-state solution.17 Despite much internal debate within Israel, the removal of

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8,000 Gaza settlers occurred relatively smoothly in 2005, but the lack of coordination with the Palestinian Authority further undermined Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, elected in January 2005 after the November 2004 death of Yasser Arafat. Then, in 2006, parliamentary elections led to the victory of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, largely because of the corruption and internal divides of the rival Fatah Party. Consequently, the international community boycotted the Palestinian government, and Israel froze Palestinian tax revenues and arrested elected Hamas leaders. Despite the creation a technocratic unity government (also boycotted by the United States and Israel), clashes between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza led to the creation of two rival governments, one in the Gaza Strip led by Hamas and one in the West Bank led by Mahmoud Abbas. U.S. president George W. Bush arranged a 2007 Conference in Annapolis aimed at restarting negotiations; however, the conference did not include the Arab Peace Initiative (reissued in 2005) or UN Security Council Resolution 242 as terms of reference. Although some talks followed the conference, neither leader had the legitimacy to push talks very far given that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was under investigation for corruption and Mahmoud Abbas represented only half of the Palestinians. Intense conflict between the Gaza Strip and Israel in the 2008–2009 Operation Cast Lead left Gaza in rubble and 1,400 Palestinians dead. Tensions soared again in May 2010, when Israeli commandos boarded a Turkish vessel that was part of a humanitarian flotilla to Gaza and killed nine Turkish citizens, one of whom had joint U.S. citizenship. The negotiations initiated by President Barack Obama in 2009 did not make much progress; they fell apart in 2010 when a temporary settlement freeze expired. However, in 2011, back-channel talks between Hamas and Israel resulted in the release of Gilad Shalit, who had been held prisoner since 2006, in exchange for just over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners. In 2011 and 2012, Mahmoud Abbas shifted his attention to the United Nations, seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from that body. Although Israel denounced the move and froze Palestinian funds and the United States promised to veto any resolution at the Security Council, in 2012, the General Assembly conferred nonmember observer state status on Palestine. Secretary of State John Kerry sought to rekindle moribund negotiations in 2013; however, as most predicted, given Palestinian divisions and an extreme right-wing Israeli coalition, these did not result in any progress. In May 2014, Fatah and Hamas reached a reconciliation agreement and decided on a technocratic unity government, which was rejected by Israel as a “terrorist” government. Shortly thereafter, conflict escalated yet again in July 2014 after tit-for-tat violence resulted in three Israeli teenagers kidnapped and murdered and a Palestinian teenager burned alive. A 50-day war in Gaza, called Operation Protective Edge, led to unprecedented destruction and the deaths of over 2,100 Palestinians, the vast majority of whom were civilians; 66 Israeli soldiers; and 7 civilians in Israel.18 Although a cease-fire deal was reached, no core conflict issues were addressed, and the potential for yet another series of rocket attacks emanating from Gaza and Israeli aerial bombardment remains.

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Significance At the time of this writing, Jerusalem is rife with ethnopolitical tension. Jewish religious activists, supported by some of the more extreme members of Netanyahu’s coalition government, wish to reverse the Israeli policy prohibiting Jewish prayer on the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount complex, where Jews believe the Second Temple was built. The area is under control of Muslim authorities, as it is currently the site of two major mosques. Many fear the conflict is becoming more religious, and consequently more difficult to resolve. In November 2014, two Palestinians from Jerusalem killed Israeli Jews praying in their Jerusalem synagogue, and the Israeli government proposed a new law defining Israel as “the nation state of the Jewish people,” heightening the insecurity of Israel’s 1 million Palestinian Arab citizens, whose collective rights would not be recognized.19 With the rise of the Islamic State, ongoing regional instability from the Syrian civil war, and states such as Libya, Yemen, and Egypt experiencing difficult transitions in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings, worsening tensions in Jerusalem, a city with religious significance to Jews, Muslims, and Christians, could have serious repercussions. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians also has great resonance in the United States. Not only does the United States give Israel over $3 billion in foreign aid annually (about one-fifth of the U.S. foreign aid budget) in addition to loan guarantees, but anti-U.S. groups often cite U.S. support for Israel at the United Nations and elsewhere as a rationale for their actions. Since the August 2014 shooting of an unarmed black teenager by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, Palestinian activists have connected with antiracism activists in the United States even though in that particular instance the officer was later found to have been defending himself and no charges were brought against him. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue to polarize groups and organizations as long as the substantive issues of the conflict remain unaddressed. And as long as both peoples feel their identities are not recognized and affirmed, their insecurities will continue to fester, further contributing to a volatile Middle East. Notes 1. See David W. Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 2. See Maia Carter Hallward, Struggling for a Just Peace: Israeli and Palestinian Activism in the Second Intifada (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2011). 3. Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 134. 4. See Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–1999 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999): 186. 5. See Maia Carter Hallward, Struggling for a Just Peace: Israeli and Palestinian Activism in the Second Intifada (Gainesville; University Press of Florida, 2011): 6. See Meron Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) 7. Hamas Covenant 1988: The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, August 18, 1988, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.

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8. The reference to “Western Israel” refers to the belief among Likud members and other pro-settlement factions that Jordan reflects the creation of an Arab state out of historic British Mandate territory, as prior to the British creation of Transjordan in 1923, that territory was also connected to the British Mandate. Hence, for them, Jordan is “Eastern Israel” and reflects a loss of land to the Jewish people who should therefore retain the land in “Western Israel.” See Ze’ev B. Begin, “The Likud Vision for Israel at Peace,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (1991): 21–35. 9. See Elie Rekhess, “The Arab Minority in Israel: Reconsidering the ‘1948 Paradigm,’” Israel Studies 19, no. 2 (2014): 187–217. 10. For the full call, see http://www.bdsmovement.net/call. 11. “Chief Rabbi: Jewish Prayer on Temple Mount Is Crime Punishable by Death.” Jerusalem Post, November 7, 2014, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Chief -Rabbi-Jewish-prayer-on-Temple-Mount-is-crime-punishable-by-death-381106. 12. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), “Palestine Refugees,” http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees. 13. This quote is from one of the main headings on the homepage as of November 19, 2014. Ministry of Aliya and Immigrant Absorption, http://www.moia.gov.il/English /pages/default.aspx. 14. Ruth Lapidoth, “Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return to Israel?” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2001, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy /peace/guide/pages/do%20palestinian%20refugees%20have%20a%20right%20to%20 return%20to.aspx. 15. American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), “Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return,” https://afsc.org/resource/palestinian-refugees-and-right-return. 16. See Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The Wars Over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2009) for a complete history of Israeli state support for the settlement enterprise. A government commission led by Talia Sasson published a 2005 report that also documents how the Israeli government violated its own laws to support settlement construction. 17. Ari Shavit, “Top PM Aide; Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace Process,” Haaretz, October 6, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/top-pm-aide-gaza-plan-aims-to-freezethe-peace-process-1.136686; and Peter Beinart, “Gaza Myths and Facts: What American Jewish Leaders Won’t Tell You,” Haaretz, July 30, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/. premium-1.608008. 18. “Gaza Crisis: Toll of Operations in Gaza,” BBC News, September 1, 2014, http://www .bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28439404. 19. “Israel’s Jewish Nation-state Bill: A Primer,” Haaretz, November 25, 2014, http://www .haaretz.com/news/national/1.628365.

Suggested Readings Adwan, Sami, Dan Bar-On, Eyal Naveh, and Peace Research Institute in the Middle East, eds. 2012. Side by Side: Parallel Histories of Israel-Palestine. New York: The New Press. Campos, Michelle. 2007. “Remembering Jewish-Arab Contact and Conflict.” in Reapproaching the Border: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel/Palestine, edited by Mark LeVine and Sandy Sufian, 41–65. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Gerner, Deborah J.1994. One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over Palestine. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Hallward, Maia Carter. 2011. Struggling for a Just and Lasting Peace: Israeli and Palestinian Activism in the Second Intifada. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Khalidi, Rashid. 1997. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press. Lacquer, Walter, and Barry Rubin. 2008. The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict. New York: Penguin Books. Lesch, David. 2007. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History. New York: Oxford University Press. Shlaim, Avi. 2010. Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations. London: Verso.

Appendices 1. United Nations Resolution 242 Passed in the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, this resolution is the basis of the “land for peace” concept and was part of the terms of reference of the historic 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. Rival translations of the resolution (English versus French) are favored by the conflict parties, with the Palestinians pointing to the need for Israeli withdrawal from “the territories” occupied, and the Israelis, who assert the pre-1967 borders are merely armistice lines rather than viable borders, favoring the more ambiguous reference to “territories.” Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order

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to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting. Source: United Nations Archives. Available at http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F 729DF491C85256EE700686136.

2. President Clinton’s “Parameters” for a Comprehensive Agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, January 7, 2001 In January 2001, shortly before the end of his term, President Bill Clinton issued these guidelines for addressing the core conflict issues to serve as the basis of a comprehensive peace agreement. Unfortunately, these parameters were issued after the Second Intifada was already underway rather than in preparation for the 2000 Camp David summit, which failed because of inadequate preparations, but they provide a conceptual framework for negotiators to this day. 1. The establishment of a “sovereign, viable Palestinian State that would accommodate Israel’s security requirements and the demographic realities”. It would include the Gaza Strip and “the vast majority of the West Bank”, while settlement blocks would be incorporated into Israel “with the goal of maximizing the number of settlers in Israel while minimizing the land annex, for Palestine to be viable must be a geographically contiguous State”; some territorial swaps and other arrangements would be needed to make the agreement “durable”. 2. A solution for the Palestinian refugees that would allow them to return to a Palestinian State, those who so wished, or find new homes in their current locations or in third countries, including Israel, “consistent with those countries’ sovereign decisions”. All refugees should receive compensation from the international community for their losses and assistance in building their new lives; the US would take a lead in raising the money necessary to relocate them in the most appropriate manner. One should not expect Israel to acknowledge an unlimited right of return to present-day Israel, as that “would undermine the very foundations of the Israeli State or the whole reason for creating the Palestinian State”. 3. An “international presence in Palestine to provide border security along the Jordan Valley and to monitor implementation of the final agreement” as well as “a non-militarized Palestine, a phased Israeli withdrawal, to address Israeli security needs in the Jordan Valley, and other essential arrangements to ensure Israel’s ability to defend itself.” 4. Four “fair and logical propositions” regarding Jerusalem: (a) It should be an open and undivided city, with assured freedom of access and worship for all, encompassing the internationally recognized capitals of two States, Israel and Palestine, (b) “[W]hat is Arab should be Palestinian” and (c) “what is Jewish should be Israeli”, while (d) “what is holy to both requires a special care to meet the needs of all”, with “mutual respect for the religious beliefs and holy shrines of Jews, Muslims and Christians”. 5. “[A]ny agreement would have to mark the decision to end the conflict, for neither side can afford to make these painful compromises, only to be subjected to further demands”.

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Source: United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, United States of America. Available at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D57AFCDD6EB 1445585256E37006655E4.

3. The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 In 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah, of Saudi Arabia, issued a historic peace initiative offering Israel full recognition and normalization with the Arab states in exchange for withdrawal to the 1967 borders and a just resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. In 2005, this peace initiative was reaffirmed by the Arab League, but to date it has been ignored by Israeli officials. The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th Ordinary Session, - Reaffirming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab Countries, to be achieved in accordance with International Legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli Government. - Having listened to the statement made by His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which his Highness presented his Initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle, and Israel’s acceptance of an independent Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel. - Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the council: 1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well. 2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm: a. Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967 as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon. b. Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194. c. The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. 3. Consequently, the Arab Countries affirm the following: a. Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region. b. Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace. 4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.

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5. Calls upon the Government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab Countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity. 6. Invites the International Community and all countries and Organizations to support this initiative. 7. Requests the Chairman of the Summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the Secretary General of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States and the European Union. Source: This is the official translation of the Saudi-proposed Arab peace initiative adopted at the annual Arab League Summit in Beirut in 2002. Available at http://www.al-bab.com /arab/docs/league/peace02.htm.

4. The Palestinian Civil Society Call for Global Activism to End the Occupation One year after the 2004 International Court of Justice ruling on the illegality of the route of Israel’s separation barrier, over 170 Palestinian civil society groups representing Palestinians in the occupied territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip), Palestinian refugees, and Palestinian citizens of Israel issued a call to global civil society and concerned Israelis to engage in nonviolent efforts for boycott, divestment, and sanctions aimed at ending Israel’s occupation, based on the model used to end South African apartheid. Israeli officials deem the movement a strategic threat on par with the Iranian nuclear quest. Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS 413 Palestinian Civil Society Calls for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel Until it Complies with International Law and Universal Principles of Human Rights 9 July 2005 One year after the historic Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which found Israel’s Wall built on occupied Palestinian territory to be illegal; Israel continues its construction of the colonial Wall with total disregard to the Court’s decision. Thirty eight years into Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, Israel continues to expand Jewish colonies. It has unilaterally annexed occupied East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and is now de facto annexing large parts of the West Bank by means of the Wall. Israel is also preparing – in the shadow of its planned redeployment from the Gaza Strip – to build and expand colonies in the West Bank. Fifty seven years after the state of Israel was built mainly on land ethnically cleansed of its Palestinian owners, a majority of Palestinians are refugees, most of whom are stateless. Moreover, Israel’s entrenched system of racial discrimination against its own Arab-Palestinian citizens remains intact. In light of Israel’s persistent violations of international law; and Given that, since 1948, hundreds of UN resolutions have condemned Israel’s colonial and discriminatory policies as illegal and called for immediate, adequate and effective remedies; and

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Given that all forms of international intervention and peace-making have until now failed to convince or force Israel to comply with humanitarian law, to respect fundamental human rights and to end its occupation and oppression of the people of Palestine; and In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community have historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa through diverse forms of boycott, divestment and sanctions; and Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression; We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also invite conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace. These non-violent punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination and fully complies with the precepts of international law by: 1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall 2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and 3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194. Source: Call of the civil society, BDS Movement: Freedom Justice Equality, including the names of the nearly 140 individuals and organizations endorsing the call. Palestinian BDS National Committee. Available at http://www.bdsmovement.net/call.

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The Middle East Christians in the Middle East Paul S. Rowe

Timeline 33 CE This is the approximate date of the death of Jesus Christ in Jerusalem. 312 Emperor Constantine is victorious at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge. Christianity is tolerated throughout the Roman Empire. 325 The Ecumenical Council of Nicea meets. It is the first gathering of the Christian churches under Roman toleration. 431 The Ecumenical Council of Ephesus meets. The Nestorian Controversy leads to a division between the Roman church and the Church of the East. 451 The Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon meets. There are disputes over the nature of Jesus Christ. Syriac and Coptic Orthodox churches do not agree to the Chalcedonian definition and become independent churches. 637 The Muslim conquest of Jerusalem occurs. 1009 Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim orders the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. Christian religious sites throughout the Holy Land are destroyed. 1054 The “Great Schism” divides the Eastern and Western churches. This gives birth to the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches.

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1095 Pope Urban II declares the First Crusade to liberate the Holy Land. 1099 The Crusaders take the city of Jerusalem. 1187 The Battle of Hittin takes place. The Crusaders are defeated as Muslims reconquer Jerusalem. 1204 The Fourth Crusade begins. Constantinople is sacked. 1453 The Ottomans conquer Constantinople and end the Byzantine Empire. 1839 Hatt-i-Sherif (“Noble Rescript”) introduces the first set of reforms granting citizenship rights to Christians in the Ottoman Empire. 1860 Intercommunal violence occurs in Lebanon. France dispatches troops to Lebanon to quell the violence at the behest of the Ottoman government. 1908 Boutros Ghali becomes the first Christian prime minister of Egypt. He is assassinated in 1910. 1943 Lebanon declares its independence under the National Pact, which codifies Christian dominance in that country. 1952 The Free Officers’ Revolt takes place in Egypt. Christians are disproportionately targeted in the ensuing nationalization of key industries. 1976–1990 Violence in Lebanon leads to a prolonged civil war. The civil war has a strongly sectarian character, leading to the concentration of Christians in an enclave north of Beirut.

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1989 The Taif Accord brings an end to the Lebanese Civil War and attenuates Christian power in the National Assembly and the executive. 1996 The Al-Kosheh incidents occur; Christians are targeted for torture during a police investigation in Upper Egypt. 2003 The United States invades Iraq. Christians throughout the country are targeted in part on the suspicion that they are more likely to cooperate with the American-led administration. 2011 An explosion outside a church in Alexandria, Egypt, leads to the deaths of almost two dozen Coptic Christians on New Year’s Day. Weeks later, the Arab Spring protests cause the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. October 9, 2012 A skirmish between the Egyptian military and Coptic Christian protestors leads to the death of 28 Copts in the Maspero Massacre. 2013 The overthrow of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Muhammad Morsi, leads to widespread revenge attacks against Christians and Christian churches and businesses. June 2014 In the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS) overruns the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, forcing thousands of Christians to flee to escape extreme persecution at the hands of the extremist movement. The divide between Christians and Muslims in the Middle East presents one of the most profound political cleavages in the region. Christians have resided in the region since the foundation of their faith in the first century. Although they are a dwindling minority, they remain significant to the politics of several countries and to the ethnoreligious conflicts that have taken place in such states as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. While the majority of Middle Easterners are Muslims, Arab Christian perspectives contribute to pluralism in the region. Their differences with the majority populations have also contributed to ethnoreligious conflict, most notably in the state of Lebanon. In other cases, they are disproportionately represented among the victims of ethnoreligious conflict, contributing to the number of Christian refugees in the region and beyond. As political change came to the

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Middle East following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, the status of Christians arose as a major concern. Historical Background Christianity began in the Middle East as a Jewish sect. Following the death of Jesus Christ, his followers spread the new faith throughout the region over the first few centuries of the Common Era, reaching both fellow Jews and, increasingly, nonJewish believers. In spite of sometimes intense persecution of the faith, by the fourth century, it was one of the most prominent religions in the Roman Empire. In 312, the Emperor Constantine came to power. His sympathy for Christianity led to official toleration of Christianity and later its adoption as the official religion of the Roman Empire. Noting that Christianity in the empire had many diverse teachings, Constantine called church leaders to gather in 325 at the city of Nicea in Asia Minor (modern Turkey) to agree on the basic doctrine of the worldwide church. The ecumenical Council of Nicea established the essential tenets of Orthodox Christianity. It also set a precedent for the next few centuries as future ecumenical councils were called to deal with major theological controversies. These controversies led to the establishment of numerous separate churches and hierarchies, each of which has had an influence in defining the communities of Christians who reside in the Middle East. In 431, the Council of Ephesus dealt with a controversy over the nature of Jesus Christ. Eastern bishops from outside the Roman Empire did not attend this council, and from that time forward, churches to the east of the Roman Empire established their own independent hierarchy and theology. Today, these churches are referred to as the Church of the East. They include the Assyrian Orthodox Church, today concentrated in the northern part of the state of Iraq. Throughout the fifth century, disputes over the leadership of the Roman church and theological controversies over the nature of Jesus persisted, culminating with a major disagreement at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Many church leaders living in Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean disagreed with the majority “Diophysite” description of Jesus’s nature. These churches became independent of the larger Roman church and developed their own leadership and theology as well. The modern Syriac Orthodox and Coptic Orthodox Churches, known as the “Oriental Orthodox”, are non-Chalcedonian churches whose history dates back to this council. By the seventh century, most of the people living in the Roman and Byzantine Empires had embraced Christianity. However, political and theological divisions increasingly pitted Christian communities against one another. In 632, Muslims began the conquest of the larger Middle East by taking the city of Jerusalem. Over the next several decades, Muslim success in battle against the Byzantine Empire enshrined Islam throughout the Middle East. Islam taught tolerance for Christians, who were considered “protected people” (ahl al-dhimma or dhimmis) because they were fellow monotheists with a divine message of their own: in Islamic theology, they were known as “people of the book” (ahl al-kitab). Christian communities

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were allowed to remain as long as they accepted Islamic rule and on payment of a poll tax (jizya). Over the next several centuries, the Christian population of the Middle East went into decline as Arab and Islamic culture became dominant. Rival Muslim empires emerged in the 10th century; one of these was the Fatimid regime, which conquered Egypt in 969. While the early Fatimids were noted for their tolerant attitude toward pluralism, the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim broke with this pattern by ordering the destruction of the Christian Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, as well as other holy sites in the region, in 1009. The church was later rebuilt, but the action served to erode the confidence of Christian communities in the future of official tolerance. In 1054, political and theological divisions in the Roman Empire led to an official break between the leadership of the western (Roman Catholic) and eastern (Eastern Orthodox) hierarchies in the “Great Schism.” Most Middle Eastern Christians remained within the Eastern Orthodox fold. In response to the decline of Christianity in the Middle East and aiming to restore Roman influence in the region, in 1095, Pope Urban II called for the First Crusade. The Crusaders who responded to his call conquered the city of Jerusalem in 1099. They established several Crusader kingdoms led by European soldiers and their descendants. The Crusaders took a dim view of Orthodox Christians, many of whom were subjected to persecution and violence. Over the next century, the Crusader kingdoms fought to maintain their hold in the region, ultimately falling to Muslim forces under Salah ad-Din (Saladin) at the Battle of Hittin in 1187. Although several more Crusades followed in an attempt to restore the victories won in the First Crusade, none would have the same level of success. In 1204, armies of the Fourth Crusade engaged in an attack on the city of Constantinople, the center of Byzantine (Orthodox Christian) power in the region. The sack of Constantinople drastically weakened the Byzantine Empire and contributed to its decline and fall. When Ottoman armies conquered the city in 1453, it spelled the end of Christian political power in the Middle East. The decline in the relative numbers of Christians in the region accelerated under the Ottoman Turks. Strict regulations on the behavior of Christians, governing forms of dress, transportation, and public displays of devotion, were occasionally imposed. However, Christians were granted some autonomy to run their own affairs within their communities. This communal autonomy later came to be known as the millet system, after the term used for national minorities. Communal autonomy reinforced the sense that Christians were ethnonational communities within the Ottoman Empire. Sectarian allegiances became a form of ethnonational identity that persists to this day, even assuming constitutional importance in the state of Lebanon. During the late Ottoman period of the 1700s and 1800s, Western empires began to wield influence in parts of the Middle East. To operate within the Ottoman Empire, citizens of Western European states were granted special rights and privileges under what were called the “capitulations” (known by the Turks as ahdnames). Gradually, European delegations began to demand similar rights for Middle Eastern

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Christians. By the early 18th century, the decline in Ottoman power forced the Turks to accept governmental and regulatory reforms. Among these was the “noble rescript” of 1839, which had the effect of ending arbitrary limitations on Christian participation in public life and extending full citizenship rights to Christians. The 1839 declaration was reinforced by a similar law promulgated at the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, a war fought in part over European disputes over who should guard the rights of Christians in the Middle East. Interference by European powers had an important impact on the way Christians interacted with the politics of the Middle East in the late 1800s. In 1860, civil war broke out among Christian and Druze communities in the region of Lebanon. The Ottoman government authorized French forces to intervene in an attempt to end the violence. French influence in the region thereafter contributed to the creation, in 1920, of an independent Lebanon in which Christians formed a bare majority. Other European powers sought to gain a foothold in the region by promising protection to other minority communities. Many Christian Arabs sought to avoid association with the West and instead emphasized their commitment to the Arab cause. Christians were influential in the development of Arab nationalism and the pan-Arab movement. However, Arab and Turkish suspicion of Christian loyalties remained and contributed to outbreaks of violence against the communities. In 1908, an Egyptian Christian (or Copt), Boutros Ghali, was appointed prime minister of Egypt; his association with the colonial administration overseen by Great Britain was a motive for his assassination in 1910. With the outbreak of World War I, Turkish attempts to maintain control in the restive interior of Asia Minor provided an impetus for Turkish forces to engage in wholesale violence against Armenians, the largest Christian minority in Turkey. The Armenian community was decimated, and many were forced into exile, swelling the numbers of Armenians in Arab cities such as Beirut, Damascus, and Jerusalem. Early efforts at state building in many of the new Arab states that were created after World War I led to violence against Christian communities, most notably among the Assyrian Christian minority of Iraq, which was subjected to forced evacuations and killings at the hands of local militia and government forces, culminating in violence on a large scale in 1933.1 At the end of World War I, Lebanon and Syria came under a French mandate. In 1943, Lebanon became an independent state under a power-sharing arrangement known as the National Pact (mithaq al-watani). The pact enshrined Christian power in Lebanon by ensuring that the National Assembly would always favor Christian members to Muslim members at a ratio of 6:5. The president of Lebanon would always be a Maronite Christian, while the position of prime minister and other members of the executive would be allocated to Muslims of various sects. In other countries, Christian Arabs fell under the authority of republican majoritarianism and absolute monarchy. The ascent of authoritarian and military regimes in most Arab states limited the power of such minority communities as Christians in most countries, except where coalitions of minorities seized power, as in Syria and Iraq. In Egypt, the overthrow of the monarchy by a group known as the Free Officers, in 1952, ushered in a period of socialist redistribution under Gamal

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Abdel Nasser. Confiscation and nationalization of key industries disproportionately affected Egyptian Christians. The defeat of Arab states in the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 led to the gradual decline of pan-Arab ideology and the embrace of political Islam throughout the Arab and Islamic world. As Islam gained in importance, Christians adopted a defensive posture. Political pressures on Christians arose at the same time that religious revival was growing, in particular among Egyptian and Palestinian Christian communities. In Lebanon, Christian communities responded to political crises that erupted with the influx of thousands of Palestinian refugees by resisting changes to the Lebanese National Pact. Islamist movements engaged in violent opposition to the Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak, and in the 1990s, they began targeting Christians as soft targets, effectively threatening civil peace in parts of Egypt. The government responded with increased military intervention in Upper Egypt, the hotbed of Islamist radicalism. In 1996, Egyptian security forces engaged in aggressive efforts to force a confession in a murder case in the small village of al-Kosheh in Upper Egypt, torturing hundreds in the process. On New Year’s Day 2000, word arose of communal riots in al-Kosheh. The al-Kosheh incidents became the first in a series of high-profile cases of discrimination against the Christian community over the following decade. At the beginning of the 21st century, Christians faced many challenges throughout the Middle East. Economic crisis, armed conflict and violence throughout the region, and the growing influence of Islam all inspire many Christians to emigrate to Western societies. Both clerical and lay leaders have noted the increasing decline in the numbers of Christians as a deepening crisis. Christian communities have dwindled dramatically in Iraq and among the Palestinians. In other states, their numbers are also declining. Nevertheless, Christians are responding to this crisis by redoubling efforts to bring change to their own societies and to find survival mechanisms in hostile environments. The Conflict Christians are involved at various levels in the ethnoreligious conflicts that beset the modern Middle East. In some places, such as Lebanon, they have been important players in their own right. In other areas, such as Iraq and among the Palestinians, they have suffered as targets of intercommunal violence or as refugees. Since the end of the colonial era, Arab states in the Middle East have struggled to build coherent societies governed by multiethnic and multisectarian governments. In most cases, postcolonial governments were taken over by military or civilian dictatorships that enforced strict rule by ethnic and religious minorities or representatives of the majority religious group. Many countries did not recognize ethnic or religious diversity, including the freedoms of Christian minorities. As a result, Christians have been marginalized or have responded with efforts to maintain their position through dominance, coalitions with other minorities, or special arrangements with the government.

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In Lebanon, the large number of minority communities, including various types of Christian and Muslim groups, creates a combustible mixture of interests. Lebanon’s diverse sects, including Christians, regularly threaten to tear apart the country. The influx of tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967 complicated the political calculations of each of the sectarian groups, as did intervention by external players, including Israel, the United States, France, and Syria. Both Iraq and Syria are examples of postcolonial states whose boundaries are artificial creations. Christians find themselves as small minorities in these countries, where larger identity groups such as Sunni and Shia Arabs and Kurds seek to take control of state power. In Egypt, indigenous Christians form a small minority in a majority Sunni Muslim country. Here, Christians pursue means to protect their freedom of worship and minimize the impact of Islamic law on daily life. Among Palestinians, Christians have suffered exile and loss in the midst of wars and occupation. By and large, they identify with their compatriots in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and seek its resolution. Management of the Conflict Lebanon

The boundaries of the modern state of Lebanon were laid out to ensure that the country had a majority Christian population. Among Lebanon’s Christian communities there were several different Christian sects, or “confessions,” the largest of which was the Maronite Church, an Eastern Rite Catholic Church. Others included the Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches as well as Protestants. At independence in 1943, Christian dominance was enshrined in a set of governing principles, the National Pact. Under the National Pact, Lebanon was managed under a “confessional” system. It ensured that Christians would always remain in numerical control of the National Assembly: there would always be six elected members representing Christian confessions to every five members representing all the Muslim confessions. Representatives of the various Lebanese confessions would share executive power: the president would always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the National Assembly would always be a Shia Muslim. The regime established under the National Pact was a rigid form of power sharing. It did not include rules that governed how power would be redistributed as the demographic balance changed in Lebanon. Over the following decades, the Christian population declined as a proportion of the population while the proportion of Muslims (in particular Shia Muslims) grew. This posed a challenge to the regime enforced under the National Pact, a challenge that turned into a crisis in the early 1970s. In the wake of the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948 and 1967, thousands of Palestinian refugees had flooded into Lebanon. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they began basing attacks on Israel on Lebanese soil. Their presence threatened to upset the demographic balance of Lebanese society, its traditionally neutral foreign policy, and the dominant position of the Christian population.

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The combined challenges of demographic change and Palestinian demands that Lebanon support their fight with Israel led Christian leaders to enforce their dominance using armed force. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Christian political movements armed and engaged in skirmishes with the Palestinians and other groups. In April 1975, one of these movements, the Phalange, attacked a bus full of Palestinians, killing 27. Over the next year, this conflict expanded, and Syrian forces entered Lebanon in an effort to arbitrate the dispute. The Syrian intervention and ongoing Palestinian attacks prompted Israeli forces to invade South Lebanon in 1978. Over the next four years, the Lebanese Phalange, led by Bashir Gemayel, sought to unify Christian forces under its own authority, occasionally engaging in direct attacks on other Christian groups to marginalize its rivals. Bashir reconstituted Christian militias into a unified group called the Lebanese Forces (LF).2 In 1982, he was appointed president by the National Assembly amid a full Israeli invasion. His intent was to align Lebanese policy with Israel’s desire to root out the Palestinian resistance. In September 1982, Bashir was assassinated, and his brother Amine was appointed president. Members of the LF militia responded to the assassination by engaging in wanton attacks on the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, killing hundreds of Palestinians. Phalangist efforts to realign Lebanese policy and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 mobilized opposition among the other confessions and deepened the conflict into a wider civil war. Muslim Druze drove Christians from communities in the south central hill country of Lebanon known as the Chouf, or Shuf. Many Christians were thus internally displaced to Mount Lebanon and the central coast, an area controlled by the LF militia, as well as South Lebanon, where Israel employed a proxy militia mostly composed of Christians known as the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Political stasis perpetuated the civil war throughout the 1980s, until 1989, when fissures developed on the Christian side. Many Christians supported the efforts of General Michel Aoun to unite the country under a single Lebanese government and armed forces. Others continued to support the LF militia’s efforts to dictate terms for the reunification of the country. Under the Taif Agreement of 1989, representatives of the majority of Lebanese factions agreed to constitutional changes that would alter the balance of power in favor of Lebanese Muslims. Seats in the National Assembly would be reallocated equally between Christians and Muslims, and a new power-sharing arrangement would bolster the role of the Sunni prime minister. However, General Aoun opposed the changes. Parties to the Taif Agreement, in partnership with Syrian forces, overthrew General Aoun in October 1990 and thereby brought an end to the civil war. While the Taif Agreement succeeded in forcing an end to the conflict, it did not achieve a full reconciliation of the Lebanese factions. Lebanese governments of the 1990s were controlled by the Syrian government, which maintained an armed force in occupation of much of the country. Christians who supported the Syrian presence remained influential. Israel remained in occupation of a thin band of territory in the South Lebanon, where it continued to support the SLA in a festering

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armed conflict with the Lebanese Shia resistance movement known as Hizballah. Other political parties were limited in their ability to influence politics in the country. The official church hierarchies became vocal advocates of political change and reconciliation. In 2000, the Israeli government unilaterally retreated from South Lebanon, and the SLA collapsed. This action put increasing pressure on Syria to withdraw its troops from the country. When former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated in a car bombing in 2005, many suspected Hizballah and the Syrian government. Popular protests calling for political change, known as the Cedar Revolution, forced the removal of Syrian troops from all of Lebanon and led to a realignment of Lebanese politics. Since 2005, Lebanese governments have moved from one crisis to another. The dynamics of Lebanese politics have created two rival political blocs. One, the March 14 Alliance, is a pro-Western coalition that unites the Future Movement of Saar Hariri (son of the late prime minister) with Druze and Christian allies, including the Phalange and LF movements. The second, the March 8 Alliance, combines pro-Syrian politicians and the Shia Hizballah and Amal parties. Former prime minister General Michel Aoun returned in 2005 to establish his own political party, the Free Patriotic Movement, and joined the March 8 bloc after reconciling with the Syrian government. Lebanese politics throughout the past century have been highly personalized and factionalized. Prominent Christian leaders known as zuama (“chieftains,” singular zaim) have influence in enforcing the sectarian arrangements under the National Pact. Although the government is confessional, Christian political movements have rarely been unified. On one level, civil conflict in Lebanon has taken on the appearance of an ethnonational struggle based on confession, but it also has local, regional, and international dimensions. There have been several commitments to eliminate the confessional character of the Lebanese state, most importantly under the Taif Agreement of 1989, but to date there has been no successful move to eliminate confessionalism from Lebanese politics. A major reason for this is that established elites, especially Christians, continue to benefit by the arrangement. Many Christians (among other sects) fear that the elimination of confessional power sharing would fundamentally alter Lebanese politics and prove hostile to non-Muslim minorities. Syria

Christians in Syria and Iraq have been equally affected by armed conflict over the past few decades. But while in Lebanon Christians have been influential players, Syrian and Iraqi Christians have largely been forced to stand on the sidelines as their countries descended into civil conflict. Syrian Christians come primarily from Eastern Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, and Eastern Rite Catholic Churches. Today, they form close to 10 percent of the Syrian population. They are clustered in urban areas, especially the major cities of Aleppo and Damascus. The modern state of Syria became independent after the close of World War II. Christians in Syria were influential members of the many political factions that

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arose in the country, including the Baath Party that controlled Syria from the mid1960s. In 1970, General Hafiz al-Assad launched a coup that propelled him to the presidency. He ruled Syria from that time until his death in 2000, when he was succeeded by his son Bashar. The Syrian Baath was a pan-Arab movement that united various minority groups and stressed Arab nationalism as a definition of Syrian identity. Under the Assad family, it came to be dominated by the Alawite minority, but it also favored other minority religious groups including Christians. While Christians have been influential businesspeople and political leaders in Syria, they have not been at the center of power in the Baath Party or the regime. The Assad government has maintained control in Syria through authoritarianism and repression. By and large, Syrian Christians have remained a quiet minority, thereby avoiding lethal treatment at the hands of the regime. Instead, the opposition has been fueled by Islamists, who are often suspected of anti-Christian sentiments. Since the breakdown of public order amid popular protests against Bashar al-Assad, beginning in April 2011, Christians have largely stayed out of the fight between government forces and the armed opposition, although each side has its Christian supporters. As the 2011 protests descended into civil war, Christians became targets of anti-regime violence, and a large proportion of the Christian population was forced into internal exile or displaced to refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Clergy and church leaders have been kidnapped, held for ransom, and murdered. Iraq

The Baath Party regime that took power in Iraq in the 1960s also included Christians as a minority committed to pan-Arabism. Christians have never been more than a small minority in modern Iraq, today numbering less than 2 percent of the population and found mostly in the city of Baghdad and in the northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. The dominant churches are the Assyrian Orthodox, Chaldaean Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox. Under the republican administrations, Christians assumed some influence as a merchant class, and some participated in Baath Party politics beginning in the 1960s. Most notably, Tariq Aziz, an Iraqi Christian of the Chaldaean rite, became foreign minister in 1983 and served in that role and as a member of the Revolutionary Command Council under Saddam Hussein. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Christians were commonly targeted by insurgents for kidnapping, extortion, and murder. Coordinated bombings at several churches took place in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk in August 2004 and January 2006. The civil conflict that arose in Iraq after 2003 led the greater majority of the Christian population to leave the country. Many took up residence as refugees in Jordan and other Middle Eastern states or left for resettlement in the West. Today, a tiny population of Christians remains in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. A small number have been elected to the postwar Iraqi parliaments and to the government of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS) invaded northern Iraq from bases in war-torn Syria. The movement overran the city of

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Mosul and the surrounding Nineveh Plains, forcing thousands of Christians to flee amid extremist threats to institute strict imposition of Sharia law and efforts to extort money from religious minorities. The dispersion of the majority of Iraq’s Christian population into exile, both within Iraq and throughout the world, has brought it to the brink of extinction. Egypt

Egyptian Christians proudly identify as the indigenous Christian minority of that country and do not typically distinguish themselves as a separate ethnic group but as part of the “Egyptian fabric.” By far, the majority of Egyptian Christians are devotees of the Coptic Orthodox Church, and individual Egyptian Christians are known as Copts (a term that simply means “Egyptian”). They form a small but significant religious minority of 8–10 percent in a country where the vast majority (around 90 percent) is made up of Sunni Muslims. Egypt has largely avoided civil strife in the form of ethnoreligious conflict since the Free Officers’ Revolt of 1952. However, Christians are a marginalized minority and have wielded very little temporal power; they are sometimes perceived as easy targets for religious intolerance or opposition attacks against the government. In times of crisis, the Christian community has often been seen as a threat to the Muslim character of the state. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, efforts by President Anwar Sadat to alter the constitution to enshrine sharia as the main source of legislation in Egypt inspired the Coptic Orthodox patriarch Shenouda III to lead protests against the government.3 Eventually, this culminated in the detention of the patriarch amid a crackdown on opposition forces. The assassination of Sadat in October 1981 brought to power Hosni Mubarak, who pursued more harmonious relations with the church. The Coptic Orthodox Church accepted the official position of Islam in the Egyptian state in return for the right to govern the internal affairs of the community. In the 1990s, militant Islamist activity in Upper Egypt was associated with persistent attacks on Copts as a means of embarrassing the regime and polarizing the Egyptian public against Christians. Copts were disproportionately targeted for violence and extortion by the Islamic terrorist movement. Although the regime often looked the other way when Copts were targeted for discrimination or violence, as in the case of the al-Kosheh incidents of 1996 and 2000, it was officially committed to defending the freedom of Copts to worship and to visit holy sites and churches throughout the country. The government enjoyed success in defeating Islamist radicals and bringing an end to the worst of the violence, but occasional outbreaks of intercommunal violence arose in the late 1990s. In many cases, they were local reactions to interreligious romantic relationships that are not welcomed in Egyptian society. In one of the worst acts of violence against Egyptian Christians, on January 1, 2011, a bomb exploded just outside a Coptic Orthodox Church in the coastal city of Alexandria. Almost two dozen people were killed, most of them Christians worshipping at the church. An official investigation into the incident was interrupted when Egyptians throughout the country converged on the capital in massive

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demonstrations calling for the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak. The protests proved successful on February 11, when Mubarak was forced to step down. While most Copts supported the revolution, over the next two years, they were subjected to renewed attacks on their churches. When Copts launched protests against the military government’s neglect of Coptic concerns, the military violently cracked down on the protest on October 9, 2011, killing 27. This event, known to Copts as the “Maspero massacre,” deepened their anxieties that the government would no longer protect their interests. The election of President Muhammad Morsi in June 2012 added to these concerns the fear that the new government would take a harder line in enforcing Islamic principles. By early 2013, President Morsi was becoming extremely unpopular, and he had lost virtually all support among Copts. Over the first six months of 2013, the Tamarod (“rebel”) movement brought thousands of people into the streets in protest against the president. When these protests grew to be similar in size to those that brought down former president Mubarak, the military forced the overthrow of President Morsi in July 2013. Over the following two months, Morsi’s supporters engaged in organized opposition to the military-backed government: these demonstrations were put down with lethal force. The military’s announcement apparently had the backing of the Coptic Orthodox Church patriarch. His support led many Islamist sympathizers to blame Copts for the military coup, and radicals throughout the country took out their frustrations on Copts: Coptic businessmen were targeted and killed in the Sinai Peninsula, and churches throughout the country were attacked and burned. In all, the revolution of 2011 ushered in a period of instability in Egyptian government that has increased tensions between Copts and the Muslim majority. Palestinian Christians

Christians are a small but significant minority among Palestinians, most of whom are Sunni Muslims. After World War I, the Palestinian Arab population came under the administration of Great Britain, which was given a mandate to oversee Palestine. Under the British Mandate, Palestinian Christians found themselves in a difficult position. The colonial administration was now controlled by a Christian power, one that had promised to allow the creation of a Jewish “national home” in the land of Palestine under the Balfour Declaration of 1917. For Palestinian Christians, British power and the growing Jewish community challenged what it meant to be Christian and Palestinian. By and large, Palestinian Christians supported independence from Great Britain, but foreign Christians had a strong preference for the idea of a Jewish return to the land. These contending forces have consistently torn the Palestinian Christian community between Palestinian nationalism and the desire to live at peace with their Arab and Jewish neighbors. The 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars forced thousands of Palestinians to flee into exile in neighboring Arab states. Many of these refugees were Christians. On the other hand, many Christians did not flee and remained within the State of Israel or ended up in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, known as the “occupied territories” after they came under Israeli occupation in 1967. Since 1967, a disproportionate

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number of Palestinian Christians have immigrated to Western countries, causing their numbers to dwindle significantly. Today, they are clustered in cities with important resonance for the Christian community, including Nazareth, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem. Control of the holy sites in these communities, most notably the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (or Church of the Resurrection) in Jerusalem and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, has been the subject of rivalry and conflict between churches and states for centuries. Custodianship of these sites today is subject to an arrangement codified in the mid-1800s now known as the “Status Quo.” The rules of this arrangement strictly allocate roles and responsibilities of the various churches at the holy sites and occasionally engender disputes between the church hierarchies who are granted responsibilities under the Status Quo. Many leading businesspeople and politicians among the Palestinians are Christians. They were particularly influential in the left-wing and Arab nationalist movements that arose to represent Palestinian nationalism in the 1960s. Within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), both the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) were led by Palestinians of Christian descent, and many Palestinian Christians got involved in the Fatah movement led by Yasser Arafat. Twenty years after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian population living in the occupied territories began organized resistance to the Israeli presence in the first intifada (“uprising”). Christian Palestinians participated actively in the first intifada, most importantly by leading nonviolent resistance and tax boycott protests in Bethlehem and its neighboring towns of Beit Jala and Beit Sahour. In 1993, the PLO signed the Oslo Accords, which brought about a long period of peace negotiations toward a final status agreement to end the conflict over Palestine. This final status agreement remains an unfulfilled goal. Since 1993, Palestinian cities have been governed by an autonomous Palestinian Authority (PA), and Christian politicians have participated in the PA administration. During the first intifada, a new generation of Palestinian clergy and lay leaders began to take prominent positions in favor of Palestinian national rights. The rise of Palestinian church leaders to replace foreign leadership in many of the traditional churches contributed to this process. Since the early 1990s, a strong ecumenical trend has united many of these leaders to challenge the continuation of the Israeli presence in the occupied territories, including Israeli policies that allow the expansion of “settlements” for Israeli citizens in the West Bank. Nonviolent resistance and political organization has increased among Palestinian Christians even as their numbers have declined. However, the breakdown of peace negotiations in 2000 led to a period of renewed violence and instability in Palestinian politics that has had a profound effect on the Palestinian Christian community. The second intifada that arose in 2000 was much more violent than the first. To confront armed militants based in Bethlehem and its surrounding area, Israeli forces reoccupied the city in April 2002. The militants fled to the Christian Church of the Nativity, which was put under siege for more than a month until they agreed to depart into exile. For Bethlehem’s Christians, the

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prolonged siege and the return of Israeli troops to Bethlehem brought the ongoing conflict close to home, and it disrupted the lives of the people of the city. Four years later, in 2006, the second election for the Palestinian legislative council brought to power the Islamist resistance movement Hamas. The election of Hamas deepened the sense that Islamism was replacing the traditionally secular form of Palestinian nationalism and the sense of unease among Christians about their place in Palestinian society. More to the point, it led to a dramatic split within the Palestinian Authority in June 2007. Hamas took over the Gaza Strip amid violence between the Palestinian factions, while the PLO faction took power in the West Bank. Despite the persistent failure of the two sides to conclude the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Christians remain active proponents of a negotiated solution that would favor the construction of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. In 2009, all the major church hierarchies among the Palestinians came to a historic agreement to sign the Kairos Palestine document that called for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in a way that brought justice to Israelis and Palestinians. Significance Amid the various ethnonational conflicts and political crises that have emerged in the Middle East since the end of the colonial era, Christians have had an important role to play as political leaders, combatants, and victims. As a minority community in most Middle Eastern states, they find themselves in an uncomfortable position between East and West. As Christians, they are often associated with Western civilization and power. As Arabs and members of non-Western churches, they are often alienated from both the West and their own compatriots. The status of Christians as non-Muslim minorities in most Middle Eastern states indicates a great deal about the relative strength of pluralism and freedom from state to state. The diversity of Lebanon, including the presence of its Christian community, has made it a laboratory for numerous efforts to create a regime of coexistence. The National Pact government under the 1943 constitution is a classic example of democratic power sharing, a form of government that Arend Lijphart called “consociationalism,” or consensus democracy.4 The power-sharing provisions of the Lebanese National Pact are often studied as a means of ensuring that all groups are granted a voice within a democratic society. Even if it has not always prevented violence, it remains a model for efforts to prevent conflict through giving all parties a measure of influence in decision making. Since the 1980s, Middle Eastern politics have been strongly influence by Western responses to Islamist radicalism and terrorism. Caught in the middle between East and West, Middle Eastern Christians are often politicized and targeted or forced into the role of mediators or bridges between civilizations. In the mid-1990s, prominent U.S. political scientist Samuel Huntington presented a case that the major world conflicts of the future would focus on the fault lines between global civilizations.5 His “clash of civilizations” thesis set much of the tone for debate over the significance of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led military response in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001–2003.

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Understanding the wars of the early 21st century through the lens of such a clash complicates the status of Christian religious minorities living in states with a non-Christian majority. On one hand, it artificially implicates Christians in the larger power struggle between Middle Eastern states and the West. On the other, it politicizes the struggle of Arab and other Christians in Middle Eastern states as nothing but a smaller part of the age-old rivalry between East and West. In a controversial history of Christian minorities in the Middle East, Bat Ye’or stressed the oppression of non-Muslim minorities through the history of Islam. In her view, the victimization of Christian communities left them in a state of “dhimmitude,” in which they are forced to comply with demands made by the majority and to accept their inferior status as a normal state of affairs.6 On the other hand, many Muslims argue that Islamic society through the ages was much more tolerant of minority religious communities than continental Europe. Amid limited efforts to promote democratization as a means of managing Middle Eastern politics, Islamism has arisen as an important political force. The strength of Islamism throughout Muslim majority societies raises anxieties among Christians that political Islam will seek to marginalize non-Muslim citizens. Prior to the revolutions that changed the Arab world in 2011, it was clear that Islamists had many different interpretations of how Christians would fare under an Islamist government.7 The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood movement to the presidency of Egypt in 2012 presented one example of how an Islamist movement might work with non-Christian minorities, and most Christians were not pleased with the outcome. Overall, the significance of Christian minorities in the Middle East lies in their place as a significant religious minority in a Muslim-majority region, in their survival as a force for ethnoreligious pluralism in the Middle East, and in their significance to relations between East and West and between Christianity and Islam. Notes 1. Suha Rassam, Christianity in Iraq (Leominster, Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2005), 145–146. 2. Lewis M. Snider, “The Lebanese Forces: Their Origins and Role in Lebanon’s Politics,” Middle East Journal 38, no.1 (Winter 1984): 13–26. 3. Nadia Ramses Farah, Religious Strife in Egypt (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1986). 4. Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1968): 207–225. 5. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 6. Bat Ye’or, The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996). 7. Rachel Scott, The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

Suggested Readings Bailey, Betty Jane, and J. Martin Bailey. 2010. Who Are the Christians in the Middle East? 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. Farah, Nadia Ramses. 1986. Religious Strife in Egypt. New York: Gordon and Breach.

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Hasan, S. S. 2003. Christians versus Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Century-long Struggle for Coptic Equality. New York: Oxford University Press. Makari, Peter. 2007. Conflict and Cooperation: Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Egypt. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Molinaro, Enrico. 2010. The Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements: The Conflict between Global and State Identities. Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press. O’Mahony, Anthony, ed. 2008. Christianity in the Middle East: Studies in Modern History, Theology, and Politics, London: Mellisende. Rowe, Paul S., John Dyck, and Jens Zimmermann, eds. 2014. Christians and the Middle East Conflict. London: Routledge. Scott, Rachel. 2010. The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ye’or. Bat. 1996. The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Appendix The Taif Agreement The Taif Agreement is a constitutional document that laid the foundation for the settlement of the Lebanese civil war in 1989. It represents the first time that the various factions in Lebanon were able to agree to alterations to the structure of sectarian government in that country. For Christians, it meant letting go of their dominance of the system, enshrined in the National Pact of 1943. It promised “abolition of the sectarian system of government” at some point in the future (yet to be achieved). It also altered the balance of members of the National Assembly (the Chamber of Deputies) to make them equal and strengthened the role of the Sunni prime minister against that of the Maronite Christian president. With regard to Christian participation in Lebanon, the document stresses the “equality” of the Muslim and Christian players.

First, General Principles and Reforms: I. General Principles A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens. B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league’s charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception. C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference. D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions. E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership.

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F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state’s unity and of the system’s stability. G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform. H. Lebanon’s soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon]. I. No authority violating the common co-existence charter shall be legitimate. II. Political Reforms A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over government policy and activities. ... 5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases: a. Equally between Christians and Muslims. b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect. c. Proportionately between the districts. 6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims 7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues. … G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism: Abolishing political sectarianism is a fundamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies elected on the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, and social notables. The council’s task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period: a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect. b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card. …

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III. Other Reforms A. Administrative Decentralism: 1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority. 2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally. 3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and institutions. . . . B. Courts: [1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistence and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand: . . . [2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to: 1. Personal status affairs. 2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites. 3. Freedom of religious education. . . . … F. Education: 1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least. ... 5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education. G. Information: All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war. … Second, spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories: Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state’s own forces. Source: The Taif Accord. Available at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm.

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The Middle East The Kurds’ Struggle for Kurdistan Michael M. Gunter

Timeline 401 BCE Kardouchoi harass retreating Greeks as recorded by Xenophon in Anabasis. 600s CE Kurds are Islamized in the midcentury. 1137–1193 This is the era of Saladin, the most famous Kurd. 1847 Bedr Khan Beg, the ruler of last semi-independent Kurdish emirate, surrenders to the Ottomans. 1880 Sheikh Obeidullah conducts an unsuccessful revolt. 1891 Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II creates Hamidiye, Kurdish cavalry. 1914–1918 Kurds support the Ottomans in World War I. 1918 U.S. president Woodrow Wilson proposes the “Fourteen Points.” 1919 The British create Iraq. Sheikh Mahmud begins a decade of unsuccessful revolts in Iraq.

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1919–1922 Kurds support the Turkish War of Independence. 1920 The stillborn Treaty of Sèvres provides for possible Kurdish independence. 1923 The definitive Treaty of Lausanne fails to mention Kurds. 1925 Turks crush Sheikh Said’s rebellion. “Mountain Turks” (Kurds) are repressed. 1926 Iranian Kurdish leader Ismail Agha Simko is assassinated. 1930 Turks crush Kurdish rebellion in the Ararat area. 1931 Mullah Mustafa Barzani (1903–1979) begins to emerge in Iraq as the preeminent Kurdish leader of the 20th century. 1936–1938 Turks crush Kurdish rebellion in Dersim (Tunceli). August 16, 1946 The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (Iraq) is formed. 1946–1947 The Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan is organized in Iran. March 31, 1947 Qazi Muhammad is hanged by Iran. 1970 The March Manifesto in Iraq theoretically promises Kurdish autonomy. 1975 Mullah Mustafa Barzani is defeated. His son, Massoud Barzani, eventually emerges as his successor. June 1: Jalal Talabani (1933– ) creates the (Iraqi) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

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November 27, 1978 Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan creates the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey. 1982 The current Turkish constitution contains several provisions repressing Kurds. August 1984 A PKK insurgency in Turkey begins. 1987–1988 Saddam Hussein conducts the genocidal Anfal campaigns against Iraqi Kurds. 1989 Iranian Kurdish leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou is assassinated. 1991 The Gulf War is fought. An Iraqi Kurdish uprising occurs, and mass refugee flight takes place. The United States creates safe-haven and no-fly zones, resulting in a de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. UN Security Council Resolution 688 condemns Iraqi repression of Kurds. An antiterrorism law (Turkey) makes the peaceful advocacy of Kurdish rights a crime. 1994 In May, KDP-PUK civil war is conducted in Iraqi Kurdistan. 1995 The PKK attacks the KDP in Northern Iraq. October 1998 Syria expels Ocalan. 1999 February: The Turks capture Ocalan. June: Ocalan is sentenced to death. PKK fighters withdraw from Turkey and stop attacks. December: The European Union (EU) accepts Turkey as a candidate member. Ocalan’s death sentence is put on hold. 2002 Ocalan’s death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment. 2003 Iraqi Kurds join the U.S. coalition that overthrows Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

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2004 The transitional Iraqi constitution recognizes the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a semiautonomous federal state. Low-level PKK fighting begins again. 2005 Massoud Barzani is elected president of the KRG, and Jalal Talabani is chosen the interim president of Iraq. Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan admits Turkey has a “Kurdish problem” and has made “grave mistakes.” He calls for “more democracy to solve the problem.” Turkey begins EU accession talks. A permanent Iraqi constitution is approved which provides federal autonomy for most Kurdish areas but leaves the future status of Kirkuk to be determined by a referendum vote. 2006 Separate KDP and PUK administrations in Northern Iraq supposedly unify. Jalal Talabani is elected president of Iraq. 2007 The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) enters Turkish parliament. Turkey bombs PKK position in Northern Iraq. 2008 A Turkish military incursion into Northern Iraq against the PKK occurs. KRG peshmerga almost come to blows with Iraqi military over Khanaqin. 2009 A UN report recommends Article 140 not be implemented and that Kirkuk not become part of the KRG. In KRG elections, Barzani is reelected president. KDP and PUK lists win only 57 percent of the vote as the new reform Gorran (Change) party garners 24 percent of the vote. Turkey bans the pro-Kurdish DTP party. 2010 The KRG and Baghdad continue to argue over oil production and revenues. The new al-Maliki government with KRG backing is finally established, but arguments soon resume. 2011 The Syrian civil war begins. The pro-Kurdish BDP party wins a record 36 seats in the Turkish parliament. Thousands are arrested in Turkey on KCK and PKK “terrorism” charges. Violent demonstrations break out in Sulaymaniya against the KRG. 2012 The Kurds achieve de facto autonomy in Syria. Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD), a PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurdish party led by Salih Muslim, becomes the leading party among Kurds and uses its Peoples Defense Units (YPG) militia.

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2013 The Turkish-PKK peace process begins but remains uncertain. Syrian Kurds’ PYD and YPG battle Salafist al-Nusra. Although they form a large majority within the mountainous Middle East where Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria meet, the Kurds have been gerrymandered into being mere minorities within the existing states they inhabit. They constitute the largest nation or ethnic group in the world without its own independent state. The desire of many Kurds for statehood, or at least cultural autonomy within the states they now inhabit, has led to an almost continuous series of Kurdish revolts since the creation of the modern Middle East following World War I. This situation is the basis of the Kurdish problem, or question. The Kurds are a largely Sunni Muslim, Indo-European-speaking people. Thus, they are quite ethnically distinct from the Turks and Arabs, but they are related to the Iranians with whom they share the Newroz (New Year) holiday at the beginning of spring. No reliable estimates of the Kurdish population exist because most Kurds tend to exaggerate their numbers, while the states in which they live undercount them for political reasons. In addition, a significant number of Kurds have been partially or fully assimilated into the larger Arab, Turkish, and Iranian populations surrounding them. Furthermore, debate continues concerning whether such groups as the Lurs, Bakhtiyaris, and others are Kurds or not. Thus, there is not even complete agreement on who is a Kurd. Nevertheless, a reasonable estimate is that there may be as many as 15–20 million Kurds in Turkey (18–23 percent of the population), 6.5 million in Iran (11 percent), 5 million in Iraq (20–23 percent), and 2.2 million in Syria (10 percent). At least 100,000 Kurds, probably a lot more, also live in parts of the former Soviet Union, and recently a Kurdish diaspora of more than 1 million has risen in Western Europe. More than half of this diaspora is concentrated in Germany. Some 30,000 Kurds live in the United States. In the Middle East, Kurdistan (Land of the Kurds) is blessed with water and oil, but the Kurds themselves are divided geographically, politically, linguistically, tribally, and ideologically. Although a Kurdish adage warns that the Kurds have no friends but the mountains to protect them, these very mountains and valleys divide them as much as they ethnically stamp them. The Kurdish problem, or question, is vast, extremely complicated, and can quickly become very emotional. What follows, therefore, is only a brief introduction. Historical Background The origin of the Kurds is uncertain, although some scholars believe them to be the descendants of various Indo-European tribes that settled in the area perhaps 4,000 years ago. The Kurds themselves claim to be descendants of the Medes, who helped overthrow the Assyrian Empire in 612 BCE, and they recite interesting myths about their origins involving King Solomon, jinni, and other magical agents. Many believe that the Kardouchoi, mentioned in the Anabasis by Xenophon as

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having given his 10,000 such a mauling that they retreated from Persia in 401 BCE, were the ancestors of the Kurds. In the seventh century CE, the conquering Arabs applied the name “Kurds” to the mountainous people they Islamicized in the region, and history also records that the famous Saladin (Salah ad-Din, 1137–1193), who fought so chivalrously and successfully against the Christian Crusaders and Richard the Lionhearted, was a Kurd. Whatever their exact origin, it is clear that racially the Kurds today constitute a mixture of various groupings, the result of earlier invasions and migrations. The Kurdish language too (which is related to Iranian) has two main variants: Kurmanji (or Bahdinani), spoken mainly in the northwest of Kurdistan (Turkey and the Bahdinan or Barzani area of northwest Iraqi Kurdistan), and Sorani, spoken mainly in the southeast of Kurdistan. In addition, Dimili (Zaza) is also spoken in parts of Turkish Kurdistan, while Gurani is spoken in sections of Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan. Finally, there are numerous subdialects of each one of these four main dialects. These Kurdish language variants are only partially mutually understandable, a situation that adds to the many divisions in Kurdish society. Tribalism has also prevented Kurdish unity. Indeed, it is probably true that until recently the tribe has received more loyalty than any sense of Kurdish nationalism. In all of the Kurdish revolts of the 20th century, for example, significant numbers of Kurds have supported the government because of their tribal antipathies for those rebelling. In Iraq, these progovernment Kurds have been derisively referred to as josh (little donkeys), while in recent years, the Turkish government created a progovernment militia of Kurds called “village guards.” Similarly, the aghas (feudal landlords or tribal chieftains) and sheikhs (religious leaders) continue to command allegiances inconsistent with the full development of a modern sense of nationalism. Early in the 16th century, most of the Kurds loosely fell under Ottoman Turkish rule, while the remainder were placed under the Persians. Bedr Khan Beg, the ruler of the last semi-independent Kurdish emirate of Botan, surrendered to the Ottomans in 1847. Some scholars argue that Sheikh Obeidullah’s unsuccessful revolt in 1880 represented the first indication of modern Kurdish nationalism; others consider it to be little more than a tribal-religious disturbance. Turkey

In 1891, Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II created the Hamidiye, a modern progovernment Kurdish cavalry that proved to be an important stage in the emergence of modern Kurdish nationalism.1 Nevertheless, the Kurds supported the Ottomans in World War I and Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) during the Turkish War of Independence following that conflict. During World War I, one of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” (number 12) declared that the non-Turkish minorities of the Ottoman Empire should be granted the right of “autonomous development.” The stillborn Treaty of Sevres signed in August 1920 provided for “local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish area” (Article 62), and in Article 64, even looked forward to the possibility

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that “the Kurdish peoples” might be granted “independence from Turkey.” Turkey’s quick revival under Ataturk—ironically enough with considerable Kurdish help, as the Turks played well on the theme of Islamic unity—altered the entire situation. The subsequent and definitive Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923 recognized the modern Republic of Turkey without any special provisions for the Turkish Kurds. Ataturk’s creation of a secular and purely Turkish state led to the first of three great Kurdish revolts, the rising in 1925 of Sheikh Said, the hereditary chief of the powerful Naqshbandi Sufi Islamic order. Sheikh Said’s rebellion was both nationalistic and religious, as it also favored the reinstatement of the caliphate. After some initial successes, Sheikh Said was crushed and hanged.2 In 1927, Khoyboun (Independence), a transnational Kurdish party that had been founded that year in Lebanon, helped to launch another major uprising under General Ihsan Nuri Pasha in the Ararat area that also was completely crushed, this time with Iranian cooperation. Finally, the Dersim (now called Tunceli) rebellion from 1936 to the end of 1938, led by Sheikh Sayyid Riza until his death in 1937, also ended in a total Kurdish defeat. Although many Kurdish tribes either supported the Turkish government or were at least neutral in these rebellions, the Turkish authorities decided to eliminate anything that might suggest a separate Kurdish nation. In some cases, what can only be termed pseudo theoretical justifications were offered to defend what was being done. Thus, the so-called Sun Theory taught that all languages derived from one original primeval Turkic language in central Asia. Isolated in the mountain fastnesses of eastern Anatolia, the Kurds had simply forgotten their mother tongue. The much-abused and criticized appellation “Mountain Turks” when referring to the Turkish Kurds served as a code term for these actions. The present (1982) constitution instituted by the military after its successful coup in 1980 contained a number of specific provisions that sought to limit even speaking or writing in Kurdish. Its preamble, for example, declares, “The determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity.” Two articles banned the spoken and written usage of the Kurdish language without specifically naming it. Despite harmonization efforts of the European Union (EU), new laws continued to make it possible to imprison anyone peacefully advocating Kurdish rights for terrorism. The PKK Insurgency

Beginning in the 1970s, an increasingly significant portion of Turkey’s population of ethnic Kurds has actively demanded cultural, linguistic, and political rights as Kurds. Until recently, however, the government ruthlessly suppressed these demands for fear they would lead to the breakup of the state itself. This official refusal to brook any moderate Kurdish opposition helped encourage extremism and the creation of the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), or Kurdistan Workers Party, headed by Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan on November 27, 1978. In August 1984, the PKK officially launched its insurgency that by the beginning of 2013 had resulted in more than 40,000 deaths, as many as 3,000 villages partially or

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completely destroyed, and, during the 1990s, some 3,000,000 people internally displaced.3 Despite some success, the PKK was gradually defeated militarily. Ocalan’s ill-advised decision in August 1995 to also attack Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Northern Iraq because of its support for Turkey further sapped his strength. The final blow came when Turkey threatened to go to war against Syria in October 1998 unless Damascus expelled Ocalan from his longtime sanctuary in that country. Ocalan fled to Italy where U.S. pressure on behalf of its NATO ally Turkey pressured Italy and others to reject Ocalan as a terrorist undeserving of political asylum or negotiation. Indeed, for years, the United States had given Turkey intelligence training and weapons to battle against what it saw as the “bad” Kurds of Turkey, while ironically supporting the “good” Kurds of Iraq against Saddam Hussein. With U.S. and possibly Israeli aid, Ocalan was finally captured in Kenya on February 16, 1999; flown back to Turkey for a sensational trial; and sentenced to death for treason. Instead of making a hard-line appeal for renewed struggle during his trial, however, Ocalan issued a remarkable statement that called for the implementation of true democracy to solve the Kurdish problem within the existing borders of a unitary Turkey. He also ordered his guerrillas to evacuate Turkey to demonstrate his sincerity. Thus, far from ending Turkey’s Kurdish problem, Ocalan’s capture began a process of implicit bargaining between the state and many of its citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage as represented by the PKK and the Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP). HADEP had been founded in 1994 as a legal Kurdish party. It had elected numerous mayors in the Kurdish areas during the local elections held shortly after Ocalan’s capture, but it was banned by the government in March 2003. The Democratic Society Party (DTP), however, soon succeeded it. At this point, Turkey’s potential candidacy for membership in the European Union entered the picture. If implemented, EU membership would fulfill Ataturk’s ultimate hope for a strong, united, and democratic Turkey joined to the West. But Turkey’s long-treasured candidacy for EU membership would remain a pipe dream unless Turkey successfully implemented the Copenhagen Criteria on minority rights for its Kurdish ethnic population and suspended Ocalan’s death sentence to conform with EU standards that ban capital punishment. As some have noted, Turkey’s road to the EU lies through Diyarbakir, the unofficial capital of Turkish Kurdistan.4 However, arguing that Turkey had not implemented the necessary reforms, the PKK ended the cease-fire it had implemented after Ocalan’s capture and renewed low-level fighting in June 2004. In addition, opposition to Turkish membership in the EU began to grow in such EU members as France, Germany, and Austria, among others. In November 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) or Justice and Development Party, with its roots in Islamic politics, won an overwhelming victory, which it added to in elections held in July 2007 and again in June 2011. Beginning in 2005, the Komo Civaken Kurdistan (KCK), or Kurdistan Communities Union, began to operate as the umbrella organization bringing together the PKK and numerous other related Kurdish groups in Turkey,

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the Middle East, and Western Europe. Under the leadership of Murat Karayilan, some 5,000 PKK guerrillas remained entrenched in the Kandil Mountains straddling the border between Northern Iraq and Iran. In August 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan declared that Turkey had a “Kurdish problem,” had made “grave mistakes” in the past, and now needed “more democracy to solve the problem.” Never before had a Turkish leader made so explicit a statement regarding the Kurdish problem. As progressive Islamists, however, the AKP was increasingly opposed by the reactionary Kemalist establishment, including Turkey’s influential military, who were fearful of losing their long-held privileged positions. This situation eventually led to the crisis of 2007 over the election of the AKP’s Abdullah Gul as Turkey’s new president. The AKP triumphed in this struggle by winning an enormous electoral victory on July 22, 2007 (even slightly outpolling the pro-Kurdish DTP in the southeast) and then electing Gul as president. Gradually, the AKP began to reduce the political influence of Turkey’s military and secretive Deep State, which were opposed to Turkey’s democratization and Kurdish rights. Rise and Fall of the Kurdish Opening

During the summer and fall of 2009, the continuing and often violent Kurdish problem in Turkey seemed on the verge of a solution when the ruling AKP government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul announced a Kurdish Opening, or Initiative (also known as the Democratic Opening/Initiative). For a fleeting moment optimism ran rampant. What happened? Problems

It soon became evident that the AKP government had not thought its Kurdish Opening out very well and then proved rather inept in trying to implement it. Specific proposals were lacking. For example, the PKK’s “peace group” gambit on October 18, 2009, to return home to Turkey 34 PKK members from Northern Iraq also badly backfired when these Kurdish expatriates were met by huge welcoming receptions at the Habur Border Crossing with Turkey and later in Diyarbakir. These celebrations were broadcast throughout Turkey and proved too provocative for even moderate Turks who perceived the affair as some sort of PKK victory parade. The Peace Group affair seemed to prove that the government had not thought out the implications of its Kurdish Opening and could not manage its implementation let alone consequences. Then on December 11, 2009, the Constitutional Court, after mulling over the issue for more than two years, suddenly banned the pro-Kurdish DTP because of its close association with the PKK. Although the Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP), or Peace and Democracy Party, quickly took the DTP’s place, coming when it did, the state-ordered banning of the pro-Kurdish DTP could not have come at a worse time and put the kiss of death to the Kurdish Opening. In addition, more than 1,000 BDP and other Kurdish notables were placed under arrest for their supposed support of the PKK, yet another body blow to the Kurdish Opening. Soon the

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entire country was ablaze from the fury that had arisen, and the Kurdish Opening seemed closed. Although the AKP won practically 50 percent of the popular vote, or 326 seats, while the BDP and its allies won a record 36 seats in the parliamentary elections held on June 12, 2011, further problems soon arose, and hopes for a renewed and more successful Kurdish Opening quickly foundered. Newly reelected Prime Minister Erdogan seemingly turned his back on an earlier promise to seek consensus on the drafting of a new constitution that would help solve the Kurdish problem, broke off contact with the BDP, and continued to declare that the Kurdish problem had been solved and only a PKK problem remained. Moreover, during 2011 and 2012, more leading intellectuals have been rounded up for alleged affiliations with the KCK or PKK, whose proposals for democratic autonomy seem to suggest an alternative government. Many of those arrested were also affiliated with the BDP. However, by January 2013, it was clear that the Turkish government had reopened its closed Kurdish Opening, and tentative negotiations with Imrali (Ocalan’s prison) had begun. Public opinion polls showed that the reopened Kurdish peace talks had tentative public support, a great change from the past when any such suggestions were liable to bring accusations of treason. Gradually, the Turkish government has begun to humanize Ocalan in an effort to pave the way for talks. Ocalan’s successful call for some 600 supporters to end a hunger strike that was creating dangerous repercussions for the government in the fall of 2012 is one good example. For its part, the EU parliament endorsed the reopened Kurdish peace process in a special session. Unfortunately, these hopes for a successful conclusion of Turkey’s reopening of its closed Kurdish Opening appear tenuous for several reasons. Enormous differences between the two sides remain. The AKP government seeks to solve the issue by having the PKK disarm and its fighters involved in previous violence seek asylum in other countries in exchange for merely removing legal restrictions on the Kurdish identity and language. The PKK, however, wants meaningful autonomy that would give their supporters, including Ocalan, significant power. If the historical record is any guide, the Turkish government will never be willing to grant such concessions, which would seem to be leading to the state’s breakup. All this leads to whether the costs of the current fighting are really so high as to demand a settlement. Probably they are not. Indeed, there remain many elements in both Turkey’s security-minded Deep State and its PKK equivalent that actually see themselves as benefiting from a continuance of the fighting. Surely neither side is ready to surrender its key positions for an unfavorable peace that would be seen as a betrayal to all the suffering that has been endured. Thus, although the current reopening offers a historic opportunity, clearly there remain many serious obstacles to overcome before any permanent settlement can be reached. Nevertheless, in recognition of the positive developments for peace, the mainline U.S. weekly magazine Time, in its issue of April 29/May 6, 2013, named the previously obscure Ocalan as one of “the 100 most influential people in the world” and called him a “voice for peace.” Previously, such praise would have

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been inconceivable. By September 2013, however, there were more signs that the peace process had become bogged down. Iraq

After their victory in World War I, the British decided to attach the largely Kurdish vilayet (province) of Mosul to their newly won League of Nations mandate, Iraq, because of its vast oil resources. The British felt that this was the only way Iraq could be made viable. The Kurds in Iraq felt cheated by this situation and have been in an almost constant state of revolt ever since. With the final defeat of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji in 1931, Mulla Mustafa Barzani emerged as the leader almost synonymous with the Kurdish movement in Iraq. Although the Barzanis’ power was originally founded on their religious authority as Naqshbandi sheikhs, they also became noted for their fighting abilities. For more than half a century, Barzani fought the Iraqi government in one way or another. Despite his inherent conservatism and tribal mentality, he was the guiding spirit of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), founded on August 16, 1946; spent a decade of exile in the Soviet Union (1947–1958); and at the height of his power negotiated the March Manifesto of 1970, which theoretically provided for Kurdish autonomy under his rule. Kurdish infighting against such other leaders as Ibrahim Ahmad and his son-in-law Jalal Talabani and continuing government opposition, however, finally led to Barzani’s ultimate defeat in 1975. Barzani’s defeat also occurred because the United States and Iran withdrew their support in return for Iraqi concessions, an action U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger cynically explained as a necessary covert action not to be confused with missionary work. Following Barzani’s collapse in March 1975, his son Massoud Barzani eventually emerged as the new leader of the KDP, while Talabani established his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on June 1, 1975. Divided by philosophy, geography, dialect, and ambition, Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK have alternated between cooperation and bloody conflict ever since. They have also suffered grievously from such horrific repression as Saddam Hussein’s genocidal Anfal campaigns of 1987–1988 and the chemical attack against the city of Halabja on March 16, 1988. After the 1991 Gulf War and the failure of the ensuing Kurdish uprising in March 1991, the mass flight of Kurdish refugees to the mountains reluctantly forced the United States to create a safe-haven and no-fly zone in which a de facto Kurdish state began to develop in Northern Iraq. In addition, the unprecedented UN Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, condemned “the repression of the Iraqi civilian population . . . in Kurdish populated areas” and demanded “that Iraq . . . immediately end this repression.” As symbolic as it may have been, never before had the Kurds received such official international mention and protection. Despite the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that emerged in Northern Iraq following Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the Gulf War, the KDP and PUK actually fought a civil war against each other from 1994–1998. As a result of this internal Kurdish fighting, there were two separate rump governments in Iraqi Kurdistan after 1994: the KDP’s in Irbil and the PUK’s in Sulaymaniya. The United States

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finally brokered a cease-fire by bringing Barzani and Talabani together in Washington in September 1998. The Kurds also began to receive 13 percent of the receipts from the oil Iraq was allowed to sell after 1995. Peace, relative prosperity, and democracy began to grow in the KRG region of Northern Iraq. The 2003 Gulf War

On March 19, 2003, the United States finally launched a war against Iraq that quickly overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime. Given the sectarian and ethnic divisions, however, establishing a stable new Iraqi government has proven much more difficult. Therefore, the Iraqi Kurds were determined to establish at least an autonomous federal state in post–Saddam Hussein Iraq. If this failed, they would then opt for complete independence. For its part, Turkey feared the demonstration effect on its own restless Kurds of any Kurdish entity on the Turkish border. Given the adoption of the Iraqi constitution in October 2005 and its institutionalization of federalism, however, Turkey has begrudgingly come to accept the existence of the KRG. Indeed, by 2009, Turkey and the KRG had begun to complement their thriving economic relationship with a promising political rapprochement as Turkey sought to further its new “zeroproblems” with its neighbors’ foreign policies. Elections

On December 15, 2005, elections were held to choose the first permanent post– Saddam Hussein parliament and government. After a great deal of haggling, a Shiite Arab, Nouri al-Maliki, finally emerged, in May 2006, as the new prime minister. On June 12, 2005, the KRG parliament elected Massoud Barzani president of the KRG, while his erstwhile rival Jalal Talabani was elected to the more ceremonial but still influential position of president of Iraq on April 22, 2006. On July 25, 2009, the KRG held presidential and parliamentary elections. Approximately 78 percent of 2.5 million eligible voters participated. Massoud Barzani was reelected president with a large majority of almost 70 percent of the popular vote. In August 2013, Barzani’s term was extended for another two years. Talabani too was reelected president of Iraq in 2010, but he suffered an incapacitating stroke in December 2012. In the KRG parliamentary election of 2009, Nawshirwan Mustafa’s Gorran, or Change Party, garnered approximately 24 percent of the vote and gained 25 seats in the parliament, largely at the expense of the PUK. This new Change Party had strongly criticized what it charged was the entrenched Kurdish leadership’s corruption and nepotism. Current Situation

Despite being historically economically underdeveloped, the KRG region has witnessed a tremendous amount of economic, political, and social modernization in recent years. Even more, given the security problems to the south, many foreign investors were attracted to the much safer KRG region after 2003.

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Many foreign investors—particularly Turkish—have been attracted to the region, and construction has been booming. Modern stores, homes, and automobiles have proliferated. Two international airports have been constructed and are handling more than 100 flights a week in Irbil and Sulaymaniya. A third airport is now on tap to be constructed in Dohuk. Seven universities as well as numerous other schools of higher education are also operating. However, huge discrepancies in wealth have developed as well as corruption and nepotism. On February 17, 2011, violent demonstrations against the KDP and PUK broke out in Sulaymaniya and lasted for 62 days until forcibly curtailed by the KRG. During the first few days, at least three protesters were killed and scores wounded. Most of the demonstrators were protesting against corruption, nepotism, and the lack of effective services, such as jobs and electricity. Intellectuals and journalists also protested against limitations against speech and press as well as daily harassment. Among all, there was a deep anger against Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK family domination over society and government. There were even calls for the resignation of President Massoud Barzani and Prime Minister Barham Salih. At the least, these demonstrations constituted a serious wake-up call that all was not well with the KRG and that there were potentially momentous consequences for the future. Furthermore, at the present time, the relationship between Irbil and Baghdad “is characterized by suspicion, animosity and brinkmanship” that “threaten the stability of the [Iraqi] state at a far deeper political level.” 5 “The conflict, which has left a devastating imprint on the country’s 20th-century history, could cause political paralysis or, worse, precipitate Iraq’s break-up. . . . Arab-Kurdish relations remain a tinderbox.”6 Iran

Although twice as many Kurds live in Iran as in Iraq, the Kurdish national movement in Iran historically enjoyed much less success, possibly because of the relatively greater long-term strength of the Iranian governments as well as Kurdish ethnic affinity with the Iranians.7 Thus, even though the Iranian regime seems to hang a Kurd for some reputed political offense at least once a week, Kurdish nationalism in Iran has been quiescent in recent years. In addition, of course, the Kurds in Iran have not recently benefited from the positive developments their conationals have in Iraq, Turkey, and now Syria. Despite these problems, the Iranian Kurds are famous among their pan-Kurdish brethren for having established the only Kurdish state in the 20th century, the short-lived Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan (January–December 1946). When Iran destroyed this rump Kurdish state, however, it also hanged its president, Qazi Muhammad, on March 31, 1947, a blow from which the Iranian Kurds still have not completely recovered.8 In the 1920s, Ismail Agha Simko led major Kurdish revolts that only ended when the Iranian government treacherously assassinated him under false pretenses of negotiation in 1930. This Iranian technique of solving its Kurdish problem was

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used again on July 13, 1989, when Iranian agents assassinated the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, in Vienna, Austria, while supposedly negotiating with him.9 On September 17, 1992, Iranian agents also assassinated Ghassemlou’s successor, Sadegh Sharafkandi, while he was dining at the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin, Germany. Mustafa Hejri became the new KDPI leader and has remained so to the present despite divisions within his party. Earlier, the KDPI’s revolt against the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s new government had been completely smashed by 1981. Armed KDPI remnants, however, continued to shelter in Northern Iraq. Their goal was “autonomy for Kurdistan, democracy for Iran.” Fighting, however, broke out between the more moderate KDPI and the Marxist Komala in 1985. Hundreds died in this intra-Kurdish bloodletting. In 2006, a group calling itself the KDP and led by Khalid Aziai split from Hejri’s KDPI. However, in December 2012, these two groups began reunification talks. Moreover, in August 2012, the KDPI and the Komala, now led by Abdullah Mohtadi, reached a strategic agreement calling for federalism in Iran to undo the national oppression suffered by the Kurds. Finally, since 2004, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), a new Iranian Kurdish party affiliated with the PKK, has been ensconced in Northern Iraq’s Kandil Mountains and carries out military operations against Iran. Supposedly, PJAK reached a cease-fire agreement with Iran in 2012. Syria

From being merely a sleepy unimportant backwater in the Kurdish struggle, Syria has suddenly graduated to being not only a burgeoning center of Kurdish nationalism but, even more importantly, a major flashpoint in the regional geopolitical situation. How did this occur? The Arab Spring revolt that broke out against the long-ruling Assad family in March 2011 quickly involved not only the many different groups within Syria but also most of the surrounding states and parties, as each perceived the Syrian outcome as potentially bearing an important impact on its own future. Turkey feared that the violence would spill over into its borders and further inflame its own Kurdish problems, especially as the PKK-affiliate Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD), or Democratic Union Party, headed by Salih Muslim (Mohammed) in Syria began to gain influence. To meet this threat, Turkey supported the oppositional Syrian National Council (SNC). However, such Turkish support scared the Kurds in Syria away from backing the opposition as Turkey clearly had no interest in empowering the Syrian Kurds in a post-Assad Syria. The PYD especially argued this point. Furthermore, the Syrian Kurds did not trust any prospective Sunni Arab government that might succeed Assad to grant or protect Kurdish rights. The Sunni-ruled KRG in Northern Iraq, however, opposed Assad, whose earlier anti-Kurdish record had been abysmal. The KRG’s support for the Syrian opposition aligned it with its new ally Turkey but against the PKK and its related Syrian affiliate PYD, which in part implicitly supported Assad as it feared Turkish control of the Syrian opposition. Thus, even the Kurds in Syria were divided among themselves between the much stronger PYD and the Kurdish National Council (KNC),

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which consisted of most of the other 12–15 odd Kurdish parties in Syria. Such Kurdish divisions in Syria, however, were not novel. Nevertheless, in July 2012, KRG president Massoud Barzani managed to patch together a tenuous umbrella Supreme Kurdish Council out of the various Syrian Kurdish groups at a gathering held in Irbil. Mishaal Tammo’s Assassination

Mishaal Tammo (1957–2011), the widely respected 53-year-old leader (Speaker) of the Syrian Kurdish Future Movement and also a member of the executive committee of what was then the recently formed, broadly based opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), was assassinated by unknown perpetrators in Qamishli, Syria, on October 7, 2011. Tammo was attending a political meeting when the attack occurred. The assassination obviously held implications for the developing situation in Syria. Following Tammo’s assassination, 50,000 demonstrators took to the streets in Qamishli for his funeral. It was maybe the largest demonstration in the Kurdish areas since the Arab Spring uprising against Assad had begun in March 2011. Security forces killed six of demonstrators. Other large demonstrations took place in the suburbs of Aleppo, Latakia, and Hasaka. Ironically, the embattled Assad government had only recently rescinded the notorious Law 93 passed in 1962 that had denied citizenship to some 160,000 Kurdish ajanib (stateless) and another 75,000 Syrian Kurds known as maktoumeen (concealed). As the famous French scholar Alexis de Tocqueville once observed: revolutions seldom start when things are bad, but rather when they are getting better. The Rise of Salih Muslim Muhammed and the PYD

Salih Muslim (Muhammed), a chemical engineer and fluent in English, fled from his Syrian home to the Kandil Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2010, where he lived in a camp maintained by the PYD, an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). However, the Assad regime allowed him to return to Syria in April 2011. He quickly became the surprisingly successful leader of the rejuvenated PYD that had been created in 2003, largely from the remnants of the PKK that Hafez Assad had expelled from Syria in October 1998. Salih Muslim currently plays a complicated but potentially important role in the Syrian uprising against Bashar Assad that has been raging since March 2011. Some argue that, in effect, Salih Muslim’s PYD has become Shabiha (thuggish militiamen of Assad), unlike the other 12–15 or so odd Kurdish groups in Syria. Indeed, Assad’s late father Hafez Assad (who died in 2000) long granted the PKK a virtual alliance and safe house in Syria until Turkey’s threat to go to war in 1998 forced Assad to sign the Adana Agreement, under which Syria finally expelled the PKK, as mentioned above. However, once Turkey began supporting the Syrian Arab Spring uprising against Assad in 2011, the Syrian regime apparently began playing the PKK card again against Turkey by inviting Salih Muslim back and allowing him to operate relatively freely. Assad had already sought to appease the Syrian Kurds, who at maybe

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2.2 million constitute the largest ethnic minority in Syria, by lifting long-running restrictions against them. In this newly found role, the PYD has strongly opposed Turkish influence on the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) and (Syrian) Kurdish National Council (KNC), regarding them as lackeys of Turkey and other outside forces. Indeed, Salah Muslim went so far as to state that Turkey, the supporter of the SNC, was a greater enemy than Assad.10 However, Salih Muslim denies any support for Assad and can point to members of his PYD being detained by the Syrian regime and his own denunciations of the regime. Thus, the alliance between Salih Muslim’s PYD and Assad is more implicit, temporary, tactical, and only partial. With its military wing, the Peoples Defense Units (YPG), the PYD has become the largest, best-armed, and most-disciplined Syrian Kurdish party. Salih Muslim’s weakness, however, might be the traditional PKK inclination his PYD has inherited to either be the unchallenged leader of the Kurds and thus reluctant to join in any alliance of equals or go it alone. Indeed the so-called Supreme Kurdish Council Barzani tenuously had patched together between the PYD and the KNC in July 2012 seemed to be unraveling by October 2012. Furthermore, at the end of October 2012, 30 people were reported killed in Aleppo as a result of fighting between the PYD and Salafist elements of the oppositionist Free Syrian Army (FSA), such as the Al Qaeda–affiliated Jablat al-Nusra.11 The PYD saw the FSA as Turkey’s hireling army, while the FSA viewed the PYD as a proxy for the Assad regime. The creation of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, in November 2012, to replace the moribund SNC did not seem to solve these Kurdish problems. Even more, however, conflict threatened among the Syrian Kurds themselves, given the divisions between the PYD and KNC. De Facto Syrian Kurdish Autonomy

In July 2012, the Assad regime suddenly pulled most of its troops and authority out of the Kurdish regions of northeastern Syria, which lie just below Turkey’s southern border, to concentrate on holding its position in the heartland of the country. The Kurds quickly formed local governing assemblies, leading to comparisons with how the KRG had been initially created back in 1991. The resulting Syrian Kurdish autonomy caused great apprehension in Turkey because suddenly PKK flags were flying just across its southern border with Syria; what had been just 500 miles of border with Kurdistan had overnight metastasized into one of 750 miles. A second or even pan-Kurdish state seemed possible. Ankara feared that this newly won Kurdish Syrian position would serve as an unwanted model for Turkey’s own disaffected Kurds and PKK. Turkey also feared that the Syrian Kurdish autonomous area bordering the KRG might seek to unite with the KRG and form, for Turkey, the nightmare of a pan-Kurdish state. Significance In the midst of all the changes the Arab Spring has brought to Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, among others, the intelligent lay, media, and policy worlds also need to pay

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attention to analyzing Kurdish nation-building. Indeed, one might even refer to the most recent stage of this long continuing process as the Kurdish Spring. Ofra Bengio recently described the resulting situation: “Alongside the tectonic sociopolitical changes taking place in the region as a whole . . . the borders separating the Kurds of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran no longer appear as sacred or secure as they once did.”12 Thus, the Kurdish Spring refers to the sudden empowerment of the Kurds after being for so long mere victims whose only friends were the mountains and the Kurdish challenge to the existing borders established by the Sykes-Picot Agreement after World War I. Notes 1. For background, see Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 2. For greater detail, see Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). 3. For more background on the PKK, see Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York and London: New York University Press, 2007). 4. The EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC), an NGO established in 2004 to promote Turkish accession to the EU as a way to help solve that state’s Kurdish problem along the lines of EU democratic laws, holds annual conferences in the EU parliament in Brussels to analyze Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen Criteria of EU accession. See http://www.mesop.de. 5. For a lucid analysis, see Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson, “Kurds in Iraq: The Struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy 16 (Spring 2009): 134–145; quotation is at 135. 6. International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears,” Middle East Report 103, March 28, 2011: ii. 7. For background, see Farideh Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 8. For further analysis, see William Eagleton, The Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 9. For further analysis of Ghassemlou’s treacherous assassination, see Carol Prunhuber, The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd: Dreaming Kurdistan (New York: iUniverse, Inc.: 2009). 10. “Interview with Salih Muhammad, President of PYD,” Firat News, November 13, 2011, http://en.firatajans.com/features/interview-with-salih-muhammad-president-of-pyd. 11. Peter Hartling, “Arab Rebel-Kurd Tensions,” Agence France Presse (AFP), October 31, 2012, http://www.mesop.de/arab-rebel-kurd-tensions-peter-hartling-international-crisis-group. 12. Ofra Bengio, “Kurdistan Reaches toward the Sea,” Haaretz (Jerusalem), August 3, 2012. Http://www.mesop.de/2012/08/03/kurdistan-reaches-toward-the-sea, accessed August 8, 2012.

Suggested Readings EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC). 2012. “Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Conference on the Kurdish Question in Turkey: Time to Renew the Dialogue and

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Resume Direct Negotiations,” December 5–6, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium. For some of these proceeding, see http://www.mesop.de. Human Rights Watch. 2011. “Turkey Arrests Expose Flawed Justice System.” November 1. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/01/turkey-arrests-expose. International Crisis Group. 2011. “Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears.” Middle East Report 103, March 28. International Crisis Group. 2013. “Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle within a Struggle.” Middle East Report 136, January 22. International Crisis Group. 2012. “Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement.” Europe Report 219, September 11.

Appendices Not only has the Kurdish search for a united Kurdistan that fulfills Woodrow Wilson’s ideal of national self-determination continuously been frustrated, but even achieving autonomy in the separate states has continuously failed. Except for the constitution of contemporary Iraq, which bestows federal autonomy on its Kurdish region, Kurds have generally been denied even the right to pursue such a status, as indicated in those portions of the Turkish Constitution excepted below, where such rights as speech, press, assembly, party formation, and unionization are quickly denied to any and all using them to challenge the unitary integrity of the state.

1. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points Gentlemen of the Congress: Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace. . . . We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world’s peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this: I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

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IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.  V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired. VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development. XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

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XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. . . . We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test. Source: President Wilson’s address to the Joint Session of Congress on January 8, 1918. Library of Congress. Available at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson’s _Fourteen_Points.

2. The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982 The articles below, from Turkey’s Constitution, have hindered Kurdish efforts to achieve autonomy.

PART ONE / GENERAL PRINCIPLES I. Form of the State ARTICLE 1. The Turkish State is a Republic.

III. Integrity of the State, Official Language, Flag, National Anthem, and Capital ARTICLE 3. The Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. . . .

V. Fundamental Aims and Duties of the State ARTICLE 5. The fundamental aims and duties of the State are; to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society; to

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strive for the removal of political, social and economic obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social State governed by the rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for the development of the individual’s material and spiritual existence.

PART TWO / FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES CHAPTER ONE GENERAL PROVISION II. Restriction of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ARTICLE 13. Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public morals and public health, and also for specific reasons set forth in the relevant Articles of the Constitution. . . .

III. Prohibition of Abuse of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ARTICLE 14. None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas. . . .

IV. Suspension of the Exercise of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ARTICLE 15. In times of war, mobilisation, martial law, or state of emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms can be partially or entirely suspended, or measures may be taken, to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, which derogate the guarantees embodied in the Constitution, provided that obligations under international law are not violated. . . .

VIII. Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought ARTICLE 26. Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinion by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from official authorities. This provision shall not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, cinema, and similar means to a system of licencing. The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a State secret, protecting the reputation and rights and the private and family life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary. No language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. . . .

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X. Provisions Relating to the Press and Publication A. Freedom of the Press ARTICLE 28. The press is free, and shall not be censored. The establishment of a printing house shall not be subject to prior permission or the deposit of a financial guarantee. Publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law. The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure the freedom of the press and freedom of information. In the limitation of freedom of the press, Articles 26 and 27 of the Constitution are applicable. Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles which threaten the internal or external security of the State or the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, which tend to incite offence, riot or insurrection, or which refer to classified State secrets and anyone who prints or transmits such news or articles to others for the above purposes, shall be held responsible under the law relevant to these offences. Distribution may be suspended as a preventive measure by the decision of a judge, or in the event delay is deemed prejudicial, by the competent authority designated by law. The authority suspending distribution shall notify a competent judge of its decision within twenty-four hours at the latest. The order suspending distribution shall become null and void unless upheld by a competent judge within forty-eight hours at the latest. . . .

XI. Rights and Freedoms of Assembly A. Freedom of Association ARTICLE 33. Everyone has the right to form associations without prior permission. . . . Associations may be dissolved or suspended from activity by decision of judge in cases prescribed by law. In cases where delay endangers national security or public order and in cases where it is necessary to prevent the perpetration or the continuation of a crime or to effect apprehension, an authority designated by law may be vested with power to suspend the association from activity. The decision of this authority shall be submitted for approval to the judge in charge within twenty-four hours. Unless the judge declares a decision within forty-eight hours, this administrative decision shall be annulled automatically. . . .

CHAPTER THREE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES II. Right and Duty of Training and Education ARTICLE 42. No one shall be deprived of the right of learning and education. The scope of the right to education shall be defined and regulated by law. . . .

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No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved.

V. Provision Relating to Labour B. Right to Strike, and Lockout ARTICLE 54. Workers have the right to strike if a dispute arises during the collective bargaining process. The procedures and conditions governing the exercise of this right and the employer’s recourse to a lockout, the scope of both actions, and the exceptions to which they are subject shall be regulated by law. The right to strike, and lockout shall not be exercised in a manner contrary to the principle of goodwill to the detriment of society, and in a manner damaging national wealth. . . . Politically motivated strikes and lockouts, solidarity strikes and lockouts, occupation of work premises, labour go- slows, production decreasing, and other forms of obstruction are prohibited.

CHAPTER FOUR POLITICAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES III. Provisions Relating to Political Parties A. Forming Parties, Membership and Withdrawal From Membership in a Party ARTICLE 68. Citizens have the right to form political parties and in accordance with the established procedure to join and withdraw from them. One must be over 18 years of age to become a member of a party. Political parties are indispensable elements of the democratic political life. Political parties shall be formed without prior permission and shall pursue their activities in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Constitution and law. The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime. . . . B. Principles to be Observed by Political Parties ARTICLE 69. The activities, internal regulations and operation of political parties shall be in line with democratic principles. The application of these principles is regulated by law. ...

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The dissolution of political parties shall be decided finally by the Constitutional Court after the filling of a suit by the office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic. A party which has been dissolved permanently cannot be founded under another name. ... The members, including the founders, of a political party whose acts or statements have caused the party to be dissolved permanently cannot be founders, members, directors or supervisors in any other party for a period of five years from the date of publication in the official gazette of the Constitutional Court’s final decision and its justification for permanently dissolving the party. Source: Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Available at http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs /constitution_en.pdf.

Myanmar (Burma) The Karen Conflict Marie Olson Lounsbery

Timeline 1885 Burma becomes a part of British India. 1937 Burma is separated from British India but still remains under British rule. 1942 The Japanese occupy Burma. 1945 World War II ends. 1947 The Atlee-Aung San Agreement establishes a roadmap for independence. The Panglong Agreement is signed. The Karen National Union (KNU) is formed. 1948 Burma gains independence from Great Britain. 1949 The Karen insurgency begins in earnest. Prime Minister U Nu initiates dialogue with the KNU to no avail. 1953 The KNU is permitted to establish bases and purchase arms in Thailand. 1960 Dialogue takes place between the Kawthoolei Nationalities United Party (KNUP) and Kawthoolei Armed Forces (KAF), on behalf of the Karen, and Burmese officials.

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1962 The Federal Seminar takes place. The military seizes power in a coup d’état led by General Ne Win. 1963 The government begins using Ka Kwe Ye (KKY) in a counterinsurgency campaign. 1965 The government employs the “Four Cuts” policy against the KNU. 1967 The KNUP splits, and a faction joins the eastern KNU forces. 1975 Armed Karen insurgents meet their demise in the delta. 1988 General Ne Win resigns. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) is formed. 1991 SLORC changes the name of Burma to Myanmar. 1994 KNU splits, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) is created. 1995 The KNU headquarters at Mannerplaw falls. Talks between the KNU and SLORC commence. 1997 The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) replaces SLORC. 2010 Talks begin again in earnest between KNU and the Myanmar government. The country of Myanmar is nestled between Thailand, Laos, China, India, and Bangladesh in Southeast Asia.1 Having achieved independence in 1948 from the British, the country immediately found itself embroiled in 11 armed conflicts involving over 35 different armed factions. None of Myanmar’s conflicts have occurred in isolation, as their histories intertwine through both cooperation and conflict. The most enduring of these conflicts (in Myanmar and the world) is that involving the Karen people.

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To examine the armed struggle emerging out of the Irrawaddy delta and the eastern hills of Myanmar is to shed light on the complexity of intrastate conflict more generally. While the conflict itself is referred to as a singular conflict, the Karen are a diverse population involving multiple factions that have fought alongside each other at times only to be divided and fighting against one another at others. Through the use of mountainous terrain, as well as internal and external support, the insurgency has been kept alive, even flourished at times. Yet, despite this success on the battlefield, the Karen have been unable to address their underlying grievances either through military success or through dialogue with the various Burma and Myanmar governments, despite numerous attempts. Historical Background The Karen migrated to Southeast Asia from Central Asia prior to the 1800s.2 It was their colonization by the British that generated a distinct Karen identity, however.3 The present-day country of Myanmar includes over 135 distinct ethnic groups.4 The Karen are the second-largest behind the Shan, with each group comprising approximately 7 percent and 9 percent of the total Myanmar population, respectively.5 Both groups, along with several other ethnic minorities that have also mobilized into armed factions at various times throughout the country’s history, are located, for the most part, in the peripheral regions of the state in territories that have been referred to as hill regions or frontier regions. Under British rule, these regions were administered separately from the central region dominated by the largest ethnic group, the Burman. The British brought most of the frontier regions loosely under their control, but these frontier territories were permitted their own identities and some autonomy.6 Burma proper, however, was subjected to direct rule. This history is somewhat complicated by World War II, when the Karen (and Karenni) fought along side the British, but the Burman-dominated Burma Independence Army fought with the Japanese, at least initially, deciding to switch to support the British later in the occupation. In the process, large-scale human rights abuses of the local Karen populations were attributed to the Burman.7 This experience exacerbated an already developed sense of mistrust between the Burman and the Karen, which would continue throughout their history to present day. Further, Karen and Karenni expected their efforts would be rewarded by the British when the war came to an end. As the Japanese were defeated and independence became more likely, the Karen sought to position themselves as an independent state of their own, free from the Burman majority. To do so, Karen representatives traveled to London in an attempt to negotiate their right to self-determination. Burman revolutionary leaders were also engaging in such discussions, led by Aung San, father of current parliamentarian and former democratic opposition hero Aung San Suu Kyi. As Aung San and his Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) talked of independence for Burma with the British, they were also entering into dialogue with the Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic groups, proposing to establish a federalist-type system

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that would incorporate all frontier regions with Burma proper, including that of the Karen. Although the ethnic minorities were reluctant to trust the Burman revolutionaries, Aung San was the exception and is still considered the one political leader that could have united the territories. Their efforts resulted in the Panglong Agreement, which would do just that, including providing provisions for the Karen despite their lack of participation in the talks. That agreement, however, was never implemented as Aung San and several of his cabinet members were assassinated by a political rival. It does, however, serve as a vital reference point for minorities when they have attempted to solicit political concessions from the Burmese and Myanmar government throughout the country’s history. Prior to his death, Aung San also negotiated the 1947 Atlee-Aung San Agreement with the British, which outlined the path to independence. While this agreement did include provisions for the Karen, it did not proclaim their right to self-determination. As a result, the Karen National Union (KNU) was formed. The path to Burmese independence did unfold, but so too did various armed insurrections, as Burmese governance would be one that was politically dominated by Burman leaders. Disagreements over the ideological orientation of the new government would result in the Communist insurrection, and disagreements over the lack of a right to self-determination for minorities produced several ethnic insurrections, including that of the Karen. The Conflict As Burma achieved independence in 1948, it was already a country divided. The AFPFL had splintered. While U Nu (of the AFPFL) served as Burma’s prime minister, leftist elements of the organization had taken up arms into several factions. Rebellion was initiated in the Karenni state later in the same year, and protests by Karen for independence evolved into full-blown armed struggle by 1949.8 Armed insurrection in the western Arakan state emerged as well as armed Kachin and Mon factions. They would be joined later by armed ethnic groups organized by the Shan and Wa, among others, all of which challenged the legitimacy of the Burmese regime. The democratic experience that emerged following Burmese independence was short-lived as a result of the political instability associated with it. The Burmese military was weakened early on by mass defection, with some elements siding with the various Communist insurgents while others took up arms with their ethnic kin. Both groups were well armed and trained, given their participation in World War II. As a result, both the Communist insurgency and that involving the Karen experienced a good deal of success early on. The Karen were able to control much of lower and southeast Burma with 15,000 well-equipped troops and by collaborating with Karen, Kachin, and Pa-O in the eastern regions, while working with the Communist “white flag” forces in the Irrawaddy delta region. 9 This alliance would result in the pro-Marxist Karen National United Party (KNUP), which would become dominant in the delta, leading to the first intragroup division within the KNU.

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Although the Karen came close to moving in on Rangoon, victory was not to be achieved. By 1962, both intragovernmental instability and the democratic experience would be over. In the wake of various armed struggles, and a Federal Seminar occurring in Rangoon designed to amend the Constitution to provide some political rights for minorities, the military, led by General Ne Win, toppled the democratically elected regime.10 Over 30 Shan and Karenni leaders were arrested, along with government officials, including U Nu.11 The Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) was formed, becoming the first new regime to rule Burma in some time. Authoritarian rule brought with it the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” an agenda by the military regime to reestablish control of the country and promote a singular nationalist identity. Gen. Ne Win was initially successful in weakening the KNU by enticing the organization’s most prominent leader, Saw Hunter Tha Hmwe, to agree to peace, bringing with him several hundred troops from the eastern hills.12 After a decade of armed struggle, the KNU was suffering. Gen. Ne Win was unsuccessful in convincing other rebels to turn in their weapons and fall in line with the new regime, however. As a result, the military took a several steps to achieve its goals. The move by the dictator to strengthen the Burmese military was more a continuation of what he had been doing over the previous years. Having felt the pains of divided loyalties, Gen. Ne Win worked to discourage future deserters (for example, giving orders to shoot deserters on the spot and dealing swiftly with coup rumors).13 In addition, he dramatically increased the size of the military to better address the need to fight on multiple fronts and began utilizing Ka Kwe Ye (KKY), or home guards, the first of which was set up in 1963 to fight the Shan.14 These loosely controlled armed factions were created to operate on behalf of the government, particularly in territory with little to no Burmese military presence. Throughout of Myanmar’s history, the government has been unable to establish and maintain control over its entire country, at least until recently. The KKY units, however, tended to be more concerned about capturing drug trade routes than serving the Burmese government and did little to improve the government’s counterinsurgency campaign or instill trust in the central government. The government’s concerns over the various secessionist threats ironically led to several forced assimilationist policies. Citizenship rights were curtained, which mostly targeted Muslim populations in the western portion of the country. In addition, Ne Win’s Declaration of the Conviction of the Revolutionary Council on the Question of Union Nationalities created the Academy for the Development of National Groups. The purpose was to provide training to members of the Burmese minorities on the state’s goals of socialism and national unity, among other.15 Efforts to bring the various ethnic minorities, including the Karen, into the socialist, Burman-dominated fold only created more resentment and heightened concerns over threats to their ethnic identities. Such policies were followed by the 1974 declaration making Burmese the national language. Schools were to be taught in the national language, even in territories where the children did not speak it. These assimilationist policies only fueled the lack of trust between the government and ethnic insurgents.

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The KNU suffered further splintering in 1967 when several KNUP leaders moved to rejoin the eastern KNU, now led by Bo Mya. Both would align with the National United Liberation Front (NULF), a collaboration between Karen and Mon insurgents, who interestingly joined with former prime minister U Nu in an effort to topple the military regime.16 This would be one of several attempts by insurgents to better organize their efforts against their common enemy. Not surprisingly, the Myanmar government has sought to discourage such collaborations through the use of divide-and-conquer techniques, particularly in its approach to negotiating with armed factions (to be discussed later). This division between the delta and eastern Karen ultimately led to the demise of the delta Karen insurgency. Isolated from their eastern kin, by 1975, constant counterinsurgency operations by the Burmese government took their toll.17 Ironically, it was during this time, that the eastern Karen were finding more success in Mannerplaw, along the Thai border. In addition to benefiting from the use of rebel camps located in neighboring Thailand, which the group had been able to establish beginning in 1953, the inability of the Burmese government to control the frontier regions meant various insurgents could set up toll gates and gather revenue by taxing trade on jade, teak, and opium, among other resources.18 While the KNU tended to steer clear of the drug trade, which flourished in the Golden Triangle, it did actively benefit from black-market trade with Thailand. The KNU increased in strength to approximately 10,000 insurgents. Under Bo Mya’s leadership in 1976, the organization worked to strengthen ties between various ethnic forces, while breaking ties with U Nu, the Communist Party of Burma, and other Burman-led parties.19 Gen. Ne Win’s determination to solidify regime control over Burma led him to take a new step in counterinsurgency tactics by implementing the “Four Cuts” policy, which first was introduced to target the Communist insurrection and the KNU in 1965.20 The military worked to target rebel access to food, funding, information, and recruits. The policy essentially established “free fire” or “black zones” in heavily populated areas where Karen, Karenni, and Mon lived. Entire villages were raised, and human rights abuses were rampant, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees fleeing to Thailand.21 KNU efforts to better collaborate against the common enemy proved fruitful with the creation of the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1976 in Mannerplaw. The KNU joined with the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Lahu National United party (LNUP), the Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), the United Pa-O National Organization (UPNO), and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). They were later joined by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 1982 and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in 1983, among others.22 Despite the brutality of the Ne Win regime, or perhaps because of this brutality, these various factions were able to find common ground. Gen. Ne Win’s efforts to unite Burma under his Burman leadership failed. In July 1988, Ne Win resigned as the BSPP chairman, and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) formed, ensuring continued military control. Prodemocracy protests ensued, which were brutally repressed. Thousands of students and

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democracy advocates fled into rebel territory, including that held by the KNU.23 The Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), a 23-party collaboration, as well as the new National Council Union of Burma (NCUB), led by Bo Mya, were formed. It is in this environment that the SLORC once again made an adjustment to its counterinsurgency campaign. The brutality of the mostly nonviolent democratic movement of Burma began to gain international attention, and with that came economic sanctions. Under pressure from external actors, the SLORC actively pursued cease-fire arrangements with ethnic insurgents that would accept their terms or have their populations face severe punishment. It refused to deal with an umbrella organization, choosing instead to employ divide-and-conquer approaches by negotiating terms with individual factions. The demise of the Communist insurrection had come about in 1989 in large part by the decision of China to partner with Burma. China had been a longtime supporter of the CPB, funneling weapons and supplies across the border. To take advantage of lucrative resource and trade options with Burma, it ceased this funding and offered the aging CPB leadership exile in Yunnan province. With the CPB insurrection coming to an end, the SLORC worked quickly to address the issue of remaining ethnic insurgencies. In addition to actively pursuing its military campaign and the Four Cuts policy, it successfully negotiated cease-fire arrangements with 19 armed factions, beginning in 1989 with remnants of the Communist insurrection and the Shan State Army. Under cease-fire arrangements, the rebel factions could maintain their weapons and associated territory. They were also charged with turning on those rebels that were unwilling to sign such ceasefire arrangements. The KNU was one of these groups. In fact, it would turn out to be the most significant hold-out group. It was this counterinsurgency approach that led to the weakening of the KNU more than any others. When the KNU splintered once again in 1994, the resulting Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) would turn on the KNU and make its own cease-fire arrangement with the SLORC. In collaboration with the DKBA, the Myanmar military would take over the KNU Mannerplaw headquarters. The organization was weakened to the point it could no longer hold permanent bases.24 The conflict involving the Karen against the central government of Myanmar continues. The KNU has been significantly weakened by the government’s counterinsurgency campaign as well as by its own internal divisions. While the KNU had managed to stay united for some time after the early KNUP splinter, the reality is that the Karen population is itself diverse. In its weakened state, the KNU entered into negotiations once again with the government of Myanmar. Talks in 1995 and 1996 stalled as the SLORC refused to address any political concerns the KNU had, leading the KNU to regroup along the Thai border and employ guerrilla tactics.25 The DKBA abandoned its ceasefire with the government, as others have, when the Myanmar regime attempted to bring them under the umbrella of the Myanmar military in 2010. This was followed by another negotiated cease-fire, which failed in 2012. The KNU and the DKBA made the decision to collaborate in this same year, along with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) splinter KNLA-Peace Council. All three have

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agreed to a preliminary cease-fire with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which had replaced the SLORC in 1997. The Karen Nation Union began its struggle with the Burmese government over its right to self-determination. The contentious history with the politically dominant Burman left the Karen determined to provide security for their own people through statehood. As independence negotiations unfolded and it became clear that the wishes of the Karen would remain unfulfilled, they quickly organized and took up arms by forming the KNU. The government has made clear throughout the country’s history that targeting civilians of the many ethnic groups in Myanmar is an approach it is willing to take. As a result, the Karen have proved unwilling to lay down their arms as a condition of negotiations or any settlement that may occur. As the conflict has progressed, the KNU has adjusted its demands for outright independence. In light of the loss of external support and assistance, coupled with a lack of external support for secessionist movements more generally, ethnic insurgents in Myanmar, including the KNU, have agreed to collectively demand autonomy in the form of a federalist system. Through such a system, they hope to achieve the political rights and protections that they have lacked thus far in the highly centralized, Burman-dominated regime of both Burma and Myanmar. Further, the Karen are not alone in demanding that children be permitted to learn their lessons in their native tongue.26 While many Karen of the delta region do indeed speak the dominant Burmese language, the eastern Karen do not. The Karen also seek a cease-fire that will ease the violence and human rights violations that have been so prevalent in its conflict with the government. While trust and concerns over Karen security have been issues from the beginning of the insurrection, it is the policies of the government, particularly the Four Cuts policy, that have exacerbated these issues. More than 136,000 refugees are living in Thai refugee camps or seeking asylum according to the United Nations High Council for Refugees, some of which have been there since 1984. In addition, there are over 560,000 internally displaced persons among the Shan, Karen, Mon, and Karenni regions.27 Many in these populations have had their fields or livestock destroyed and suffer from food insecurity, forced labor, or forced relocation. The safe return of refugees has emerged as an important issue in the Karen conflict as a result. Myanmar’s transition from a closed economy to one that is open to investment has also had implications for populations in the frontier regions. As the government has negotiated investment agreements with partners, such as Thailand and China, it has done so at the expense of those living in the regions of concern. An investment project in the Kachin region involving the building of the Myitsone Dam by the Chinese, which would primarily serve the Chinese population, has led to the collapse of the cease-fire arrangement between the Myanmar government and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The rebels resorted to arms as the government moved to infringe on its territory, requiring the KIO to merge into the Myanmar military, and displacing Kachin in the process without providing a return to the region. The Karen have had similar experiences with government-led

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investment projects in their region, such as the massive Dawei port and industrial project scheduled for development along the southern coastline.28 Concerns about the forced labor and displacement of local populations have also become an issue of the conflict as a result. These are the issues that the Karen have attempted to achieve or address either through their military campaign or in dialogue with the Myanmar government. Management of the Conflict The government’s approach to managing the conflict with the Karen has been primarily military in nature. The counterinsurgency campaign of the Burmese and, later, Myanmar military has been relentless. The government has also been unwilling to entertain efforts by external actors to allow the mediation of its disputes with the various ethnic insurgents, preferring to maintain that these disputes are entirely internal to the state and should remain as such. Unassisted negotiations have occurred at various points in the Karen insurgency, however. Given the success of the Karen military campaign in the immediate aftermath of independence, it was not surprising that Prime Minister U Nu reached out to the rebels in 1949, hoping to resolve the dispute through dialogue. The discussions that followed did not address any of the political concerns that the Karen had, particularly the recognition of the Karen territory and their right to self-determination. The government had hoped that the rebels would agree to a cease their insurrection and lay down their arms. Given the security concerns discussed above, it is not surprising that these were terms unacceptable to the KNU. The issues to be discussed, and those not to be discussed, would become a theme in KNU and government dialogue. Talks resumed in 1960 in large part because the National Democratic United Front (NDUF) had been formed by the Kawthoolei Nationalities United Party (KNUP), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Collaboration among the insurgents placed them in an even stronger position vis- à-vis the government, particularly in the delta region. Even here, the government was unwilling to engage in discussions over political issues with the Karen, but instead demanded that the Karen insurgents join forces with the Burmese military. Further, requests for political discussions were responded to with a game of disingenuous semantics. The government indicated that a Karen state already existed in their system; therefore, the government was unable to help the Karen with their political concerns. Those should be dealt with through the system already in place.29 While these negotiations did not address ethnic grievances, the Federal Seminar conducted by U Nu in 1962 appeared more promising in that it finally appeared U Nu was willing to discuss political arrangements for minorities. The resulting coup d’état put an end to those discussions, however. General Ne Win was unwilling to allow such political dialogue to occur. Negotiations that followed in 1963– 1964 were more reminiscent of the previous talks. The government demanded that revolutionaries stay in designated areas determined by the government; they

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were not permitted to consolidate their forces or to govern or tax their territories. Permissions would be required to leave designated areas, and Burmese laws would apply.30 Again, the Karen found the talks fruitless. It would be 20 years before they were to engage in dialogue with the government once more. By the time of the 1995–1996 talks, the Four Cuts policy had been in full force for over a decade. The resulting human rights issues were at the forefront. Prenegotiations involved demands for an end to the violence, for the government to suspend forced recruiting and using porters in their efforts, and for ceased forced relocation. These talks took place in the aftermath of the Ne Win’s resignation and involved the SLORC. In response, the SLORC immediately rejected several key items on the Karen set of issues and would only agree to the others should the KNU surrender their weapons and “return to the legal fold.”31 Subsequent discussions would once again see a return to the disingenuous semantics of earlier times by suggesting that as a military regime it did not have the authority to make political decisions. While the military regime was willing to discuss a cease-fire and the terms of such an arrangement, it declared it was unable to address political problems. Those would remain for the future government, which was to be formed by the National Convention. These talks would be followed by a large-scale offensive into Karen State. Continued dialogue in 2001 and 2003 between the KNU and the SPDC would be the same as those in 1996, with the same result. The dialogue taking place between the KNU and the SLORC and SPDC during this time was informed by other discussions occurring in Myanmar. As indicated, the SLORC’s approach to dealing with the ethnic insurgents was to speak with each separately, attempting to make cease-fire arrangements that would permit them to maintain their weapons and essentially patrol their own territories, but work on their behalf against other insurgents that did not agree to similar arrangements. Further, groups such as the KNU, which continued to insist on political solutions before a cease-fire could be established, were subjected to a new onslaught of opposition in the form of insurgent militias turned government operatives as well as a more focused Myanmar military. These discussions were also occurring as the government faced a growing democratic opposition, which would receive important international attention. The resulting sanctions and the crippling of the previously closed Myanmar and already struggling economy would force the government to address the democratic uprising through means other than continued repression. To do so, the government has begun a series of democratic reforms, including allowing the democratic opposition, led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung San Suu Kyi, to take seats in parliament. While the government is still dominated by the military, reforms appear to be underway. In response, the European Union, the United States, and others have removed sanctions against the regime. Human rights violations involving the Karen and other minorities, particularly the Kachin, remain a concern. It appears that the assumption on the part of external actors, as well as the democratic opposition, is that the reforms with Suu Kyi playing a leading role

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would also alleviate the grievances of ethnic insurgents in Myanmar. The Karen are making an effort to work with the newly formed government, which, as they are aware, is still dominated by present and former military figures. Further, ethnic minorities in Myanmar have not forgotten that their first introduction to democracy coincided with their taking up arms as the government early on refused to address their political concerns.32 Ethnic groups, including the Karen, are approaching discussions somewhat cautiously but appear committed. To the new regime’s credit, under the direction of President Thein Sein, rather than approach the ethnic insurgencies using a divide-and-conquer approach to talks, it has shifted to attempting to reach a “single text” cease-fire among all groups through a three-phased approach.33 The first would pursue a cease-fire agreement at the state level, followed by political dialogue and nationwide cease-fire. The insurgents have collaborated in these discussions through the formation of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT). Most of the groups have agreed to individual preliminary cease-fire arrangements to be followed by continued negotiations regarding political arrangements. At this time, a cease-fire arrangement is in place with the KNU, having been signed in early 2012. Trust appears to have been improved, and it seems that Thein Sein’s government is undergoing reforms that will better respect ethnic rights. Whether the government is willing to both acknowledge and address the issue of the highly centralized, Burmandominated government remains to be seen. Significance The conflict in eastern Myanmar involving the Karen is the world’s longest-running war. The devastation the war has brought on the Karen and other minorities in the region involves high rates of human rights abuses leading to large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees now living in refugee camps in Thailand. Families have been torn apart, and casualties have been high. Despite the impact this war has had on civilian populations, it is not a conflict that has received much attention. In fact, in over 60 years of civil war, the international community has placed little to no pressure on the Burmese and Myanmar government to curb its military campaign, even in light of the destructive and abusive Four Cuts policy. It was not until the economic devastation of a closed and corrupt economy took its toll that a democratic opposition movement took place that would ultimately bring the abuses of the Myanmar regime to the attention of international community. That pressure has been successful, or so it seems, at pressuring the regime to begin the process of opening up politically and enacting democratic reforms. This process has been slow and continues to serve the interests of the Myanmar military and its leaders. The enduring nature of the Karen insurgency, coupled with the intertwined history this conflict has with several other ethnic insurgency campaigns in Myanmar, has resulted in a long history of animosity and distrust of the Burmanled regime. The government has been consistently unwilling to discuss the root of ethnic grievances forcing the Karen National Union to maintain their military

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strategy, even as they had adjusted their secessionist goals to better reflect reality. Dialogue with military-dominated or Burmese-led governments required the Karen to lay down their weapons, essentially surrender, before any sort of discussions regarding political arrangements might occur. This demand has led the Karen to abandon negotiation efforts time and again, knowing that such an act would likely prove too dangerous for their people in light of the intense and indiscriminate military campaign of the Burmese and, later, Myanmar military. It is in spite of this history that the Karen have once again engaged in negotiations with the newly somewhat democratic government. Having been abandoned by the Thai government as they pursued lucrative contracts with the Myanmar regime, as well as by the Buddhist elements in their ranks with the forming of the mutinous DKBA, the Karen had little choice by to do so in light of their diminished strength and status. The recent collaborative negotiations under the NCCT has likely improved their position along with other insurgents as the country works to emerge from a dark war-torn existence. The international community is hopeful that the Thein Sein regime and the efforts of the National League for Democracy (NLD) are sincere in addressing the underlying political grievances of the Karen and their fellow ethnic minorities. Doing so could potentially bring Myanmar along a path it has yet to experience as a nation: one that is stable, prosperous, and peaceful. Notes 1. In 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. The country continued to be referred to as Burma by the United States and its allies, which questioned the legitimacy of the Burmese regime. Recently, in light of democratic reforms in process, the Obama administration has begun referring to the country as Myanmar. 2. This is according to the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland. 3. Paul Keenan, The Karen National Union Negotiations, 1949–2012 (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2012): 4. 4. Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service. “Burma: Ethnic Rebels.” February, 28, 1997. 5. Morten B. Pederson, “Burma’s Ethnic Minorities,” Critical Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 45–66. 6. Michael C. Howard, “Burma,” in Countries and Their Cultures, vol. 1, ed. Carol Ember and Melvin Ember (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2001), 346–360. 7. Keenan, The Karen National Union Negotiations, 4. 8. Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994): 342-343. 9. See Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1999), Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 166, and Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (Date of retrieval: 2014/06/01) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University. 10. Linter, Burma in Revolt, 166. 11. Linter, Burma in Revolt, 354. 12. Smith, “Burma: Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 213, and Linter, Burma in Revolt, 181.

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13. Bertil Lintner, “Unexpected Karen Rebel Push Worries Ruling Junta: Return to the Delta,” Far East Economic Review, November 14 (1991): 26. 14. Catherine Brown, “Burma: The Political Economy of Violence,” Disasters 23, no. 3 (1999): 234–256. 15. Josef Silverstein, “Fifty Years of Failure in Burma,” in Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 16. Lintner, Burma in Revolt; 241–242, and Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 273. 17. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 262–263. 18. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict,” IPA Policy Report (October 2003). 19. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 293-300. 20. Medha Chaturvedi, “Myanmar’s Ethnic Divide: The Parallel Struggle.” IPCS Special Report 131 (June) (New Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Southeast Asia Research Programme, 2012). 21. Thomas J. Lee, Luke C. Mullany, Adam K. Richards, Heather K. Kulper, Cynthia Maung, and Chris Beyrer, “Mortality Rates in Conflict Zones in Karen, Karenni, and Mon States in Eastern Burma,” Tropical Medicine and International Health 11, no. 7 (2006): 1119–1127. 22. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 436–437. 24. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 401. 25. Keenan, The Karen National Union Negotiations. 26. Pederson, “Burma’s Ethnic Minorities.” 27. Mullany, Luke C., Catherinne I. Lee, Lin Yone, Palae Paw, Eh Kalu Shwe Oo, Cynthia Maung, Thomas J. Lee, and Chris Beyrer. 2008. “Access to Essential Maternal Health Interventions and Human Rights Violations among Vulnerable Communities in Eastern Burma.” PLOS Medicine 5(12): e242. 28. Su-Ann Oh, “Competing Forms of Sovereignty in the Karen State of Myanmar.” ISEAS Working Paper #1 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Regional Economic Studies Programme, Singapore, 2013). 29. Keenan, The Karen National Union Negotiations, 18. 30. Ibid., 20. 31. Ibid., 40 32. Pederson, “Burma’s Ethnic Minorities.” 33. Myanmar Peace Monitor, “Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide,” 2014, www.mmpeacemonitor.org.

Suggested Readings Keenan, Paul. 2012. The Karen National Union Negotiations, 1949–2012. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies. Lintner, Bertil. 1994. Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Oh, Su-Ann. 2013. “Competing Forms of Sovereignty in the Karen State of Myanmar.” ISEAS Working Paper #1. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Regional Economic Studies Programme, Singapore.

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Silverstein, Josef. 1997. “Fifty Years of Failure in Burma.” In Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, edited by Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Smith, Martin. 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 2nd edition. London: Zed Books. Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 2014. (Date of retrieval: 2014/06/01) UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: www.ucdp.uu.se/database, Uppsala University.

Appendix The Panglong Agreement, February 12, 1947 This is the agreement signed by the AFPFL representatives, particularly Aung San, and representatives of the Shan, Kachin, and Chin, which would have provided for political representation in the new Burmese government had Aung San and his cabinet not been assassinated. It serves as the basis for the political demands made by various insurgents, including the Karen, to this day. Burma Lawyers’ Council the panglong agreement,

signed February 12, 1947

A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by certain Members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills: The Members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government: The Members of the Conference have accordingly, and without dissentients, agreed as follows: 1. A representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the recommendation of representatives of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP), shall be appointed a counselor to the Governor to deal with the Frontier Areas. 2. The said Counselor shall also be appointed a Member of the Governor’s Executive Council, without portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas brought within the purview of the Executive council by Constitutional Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The Counselor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means. 3. The said Counselor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counselors representing races of which he is not a member. While the two Deputy Counselors should deal in the first instance with the affairs of the respective areas and the Counselor with all the remaining parts of the Frontier Areas, they should by Constitutional Convention act on the principle of joint responsibility. 4. While the Counselor, in his capacity of Member of the Executive Council, will be the only representative of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Counselors shall be

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entitled to attend meetings of the Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are discussed. 5. Though the governor’s Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any manner which would deprive any portion of these Areas of the Autonomy which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle. 6. Though the question of demarcation and establishing a separate Kachin State within a Unified Burma is one which must be relegated for decision by the Constituent Assembly, it is agreed that such a State is desirable. As first step towards this end, the Counselor for Frontier Areas and the Deputy Counselors shall be consulted in the administration of such areas in the Myitkyina and the Bhamo District as are Part II Scheduled Areas under the Government of Burma Act of 1935. 7. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in democratic countries. 8. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial autonomy now vested in the Federated Shan States. 9. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial assistance which the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma, and the Executive Council will examine with the Frontier Areas Counselor and Deputy Counselors the feasibility of adopting for the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills financial arrangements similar to those between Burma and the Federated Shan States. *Reproduced in the Report of the Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry, Government Press, Rangoon, 1947. Also checked with copy of Agreement preserved by U Vum Ko Hau, Minister in Paris, who took part in the Panglong conference as a leader of the Chins. Source: United Nations Archives. Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker .un.org/files/MM_470212_Panglong%20Agreement.pdf.

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Nigeria Ethnic Conflict in Multinational West Africa Olugbemiga Samuel Afolabi

Timeline 1809 The State Single Islamic State—called the Sokoto caliphate—is founded in the north by Usman dan Fodio. 1830 The Yoruba wars begin. 1886 The Yoruba wars end. 1906 Lagos and Niger Coast colonies are amalgamated by Great Britain to form the colony of South Nigeria. 1914 Northern and Southern Nigeria are amalgamated under a single governor, Lord Lugard. 1951 The initial postwar constitution is established with a weak regional system. 1954 The second postwar constitution, the Richard’s Constitution, is established with three strong regions under a federal government. 1956–1957 Elections take place in the three regions and are won, respectively, by the three regional parties, each with a core tribal base. Regional internal self-government

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begins under these parties; all major parties participate in the transitional central government. 1959 Federal elections establish the (northern) Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) as the strongest party, which joins with the (east’s) National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) to form a coalition government, with Sir Abubakan Tafawan Balewa as prime minister. 1960 Nigeria attains independence. 1962 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the (western region’s dominant) Action Group (AG) party and of the opposition in the federal parliament, is convicted of “treasonable felony” and sentenced to 10 years in prison. His rival, Chief Akintola, takes control of the AG. 1963 A controversial census fuels regional and ethnic tensions. October 1965 Regional elections in the western region, contested between Akintola and Awolowo’s followers, are marred by violence and fraud. Most observers agree Awowolo would have won a fair election. Akintola is the declared winner. Violent protests and insurrections occur. 1966 A group of junior officers, largely Igbo, launch a coup against federal, western, and northern regional governments. 1967 Three eastern states secede as the Republic of Biafra, sparking a bloody civil war. 1970 Biafra leaders surrender to the federal government. 1976 General Mohammed is assassinated in a failed coup attempt. He is replaced by his deputy, lieutenant-general Olusegun Obasanjo, who helps introduce an Americanstyle presidential constitution. 1979 The Second Republic begins under recently elected Shehu Shagari, a Hausa-Fulani.

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1983 President Shagari wins reelection in an election tainted by accusations of irregularities, fraud, and corruption. December 31: Shagari is removed in a coup led by General Muhammadu Buhari. April 1984 Significant religious rioting occurs in two states. 1985 April: General Buhari is removed in a coup led by General Ibrahim Babangida. December: Babangida presents the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Implementation begins the following June. March 1987 Muslim and Christian rioting occurs in Kafanchan. April 1990 An attempted coup is led by middle-belt minority officers and explicitly aimed at ending northern (i.e., Hausa-Fulani/Muslim/emirate) domination. The coup is put down, and 69 plotters are eventually executed. April 1991 Hundreds are killed and hundreds more are arrested in religious rioting in Bauchi State. 1993 June 12: Elections are held for the presidency of Nigeria’s Third Republic. Mashood Abiola, a Yourba Muslim from the west, appears to win (58.5 percent to 41.5 percent). Abiola wins 19 of 30 states. June 15: Babangida suspends the counting of returns when the extent of Abiola’s victory becomes apparent. June 23: The election is nullified by Babangida. July 5–7: Large-scale strikes and civil disorder occur in the southwest in response. August 26: Pressure from the sultan of Sokoto and retired generals lead to Babangida’s resignation and appointment of Chief Ernest Shonekan to head an interim government. November 15: General Sani Abacha, a northern Muslim Kanuri seizes power and declares himself head of state. May 1994 Abiola returns to Nigeria, declares himself president, and is arrested and imprisoned by Abacha. Rioting ensues. 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists are hanged after being convicted in a court of questionable neutrality and legitimacy.

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June 1998 Abacha dies suddenly. General Abdulsalami Abubakar assumes power and declares there will be a swift return to civilian rule. February 1999 Retired general Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian Yourba from the south, who was sentenced to death under Abacha, is elected president of Nigeria’s Third Republic with a majority of more than 60 percent. 2002 February: Hundreds are killed in Lagos as a result of clashes between Hausas from the north and ethnic Yorubas from the southwest. November: More than 200 people die in four days of rioting stoked by Muslim fury over the planned Miss World beauty pageant in Kaduna. The event is relocated to Great Britain. Obasanjo is reelected. 2003 April 19: The first civilian-run presidential elections take place since the end of military rule. Olusegun Obasanjo is elected for second term with more than 60 percent of the vote. Opposition parties reject the result. EU observers cite “serious irregularities.” August: Intercommunal violence in the Niger Delta town of Warri kills about 100 people and injures 1,000. 2004 January: The United Nations brokers talks between Nigeria and Cameroon about the disputed border; the sides agree to joint security patrols. May: A state of emergency is declared in central Plateau State after more than 200 Muslims are killed in Yelwa in attacks by Christian militia; revenge attacks are launched by Muslim youths in Kano. August–September: Clashes between rival gangs in Port Harcourt lead to more deaths by troops. The estimated death toll is about 500. 2006 Militants in Niger Delta attack pipelines and other oil facilities and kidnap foreign oil workers; rebels demand more control over the region’s oil wealth. Elsewhere, more than 100 people are killed in religious violence in mainly Muslim towns in the north and in the southern city of Onitsha. August: Nigeria cedes sovereignty over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to neighboring Cameroon under the terms of a 2002 International Court of Justice ruling. 2007 April: Umaru Yar’Adua of the ruling People’s Democratic Party is proclaimed the winner of the presidential election. September: The rebel Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) threatens to end its self-imposed cease-fire

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and launch fresh attacks on oil facilities and abductions of foreign workers. November: Suspected Nigerian militants kill 21 Cameroon soldiers in the Bakassi Peninsula. 2008 February: Two MEND leaders are extradited from Angola on suspicion of involvement in attacks on oil companies. A tribunal upholds the election of Umaru Yar’Adua as president following a challenge by rivals; ethnic tensions rise. August: Nigeria finally hands over the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, ending a longstanding dispute. September: Militants in the Niger Delta step up attacks on oil installations in response to what they describe as unprovoked attacks by military on their bases. November: At least 200 people are killed during clashes between Christians and Muslims in the central Nigerian town of Jos. 2009 January: MEND calls off a four-month cease-fire after the army attacks the camp of an allied group. March: Nineteen opposition parties unite to form a “mega-party” to compete against the governing People’s Democratic Party in scheduled 2011 elections. May: MEND rejects a government offer of amnesty and declares an offensive against the Nigerian military. July: Hundreds die in northeastern Nigeria after the Boko Haram Islamist movement launches a campaign of violence in a bid to have sharia law imposed on the entire country. Security forces storm Boko Haram’s stronghold and kill the movement’s leader. The government frees the leader of MEND, Henry Okah, after he accepts an amnesty offer. August: Government amnesty for Niger Delta militants goes into effect. November: President Yar’Adua travels to Saudi Arabia to be treated for a heart condition. His extended absence triggers a constitutional crisis and calls for him to step down. 2010 January: At least 149 people are killed during two days of violence between Christian and Muslim gangs in the central city of Jos. March: Further classes in Jos kill more than 120 people. May: President Umaru Yar’Adua dies after a long illness. Vice-president Goodluck Jonathan, already acting in Yar’Adua’s stead, succeeds him. October: Nigeria marks 50 years of independence. Celebrations in Abuja are marred by deadly bomb blasts. 2013 Hundreds of people are killed as a result of continuous clashes between nomadic Hausa cattle owners and farmers in various parts of Nigeria 2014 More deaths and suicide bombing by Boko Haram occur in most parts of northeastern Nigeria.

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Ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are tied together. Understanding Nigeria’s history is tantamount to ethnic narratives in pre- and postcolonial Nigeria. Thus, ethnic conflict in Nigeria requires attention to multiple and changing factors. These factors include pre- and postcolonial history, political and economic structures, access to power, and geopolitical considerations, as well as individual and group access to power. Other factors include the military’s repeated tendency to intervene in politics and continued stay in power, constitutional amendments, revenue-sharing formula, and oil politics, as well as the structure and nature of the state in Nigeria. Combined together, these factors have shaped and created the platform for various ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts that have further spawned and reinforced ethnic identities in Nigeria. The conflicts in Nigeria have never been truly ethnic in the strict sense of the word, but they have to do with many variables, particular among which are elite manipulation, the scramble for oil wealth, and the revenue-sharing formula. It should be noted that ethnic groups are not cohesive, and, by extension, ethnic conflicts reflect the desires and preferences of self-promoted ethnic leaders. For these reasons, conflict in Nigeria, most especially since independence, has always been frequent, intense, and dynamic over time and could be triggered by any sundry reason. Historical Background Nigeria’s ethnic groups comprise many tribes, people, and clans. It has been estimated that Nigeria’s ethnic groups and configurations number well over 250. The precolonial ethnic setting and history of present-day Nigeria shows that even though they were neighbors, there was little contact among them. Interaction on a more robust scale came with colonialization, best seen in the deliberate politics and policies of the British colonial masters. In the northern part of the country, the first epochal historical event in precolonial Nigeria was the Fulani jihad (holy war) and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate by Usman dan Fodio early in the 19th century. The structure of the caliphate included the creation of an emirate system, an aristocratic political class, and political structures that adapted and maintained the political and economic power of kings (sultans and emirs) throughout the colonial period and well into the independence era in the north. Closely following were the Yoruba wars, from the 1830s to 1886, between and among different tribes of the present-day Yoruba nation. The Yorubas waged war against each other mainly based on language (dialect) and land (boundary). Of course, not left out are the Igbos, Ijaws, Kanuris, and other ethnic groups that make up present-day Nigeria. Common to ethnic relations in Nigeria is the constant conflict and violence that often accompany the struggle for land, wealth, and, most importantly, the capture and exercise of political power. The Conflict The political history of Nigeria was fundamentally altered by British intervention. Its colonial policies exacerbated ethnic suspicion, distrust, and conflict throughout

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the colonial era and even afterward. In a variety of ways, the British intensified the north-south divide, which became, perhaps, the most persistent and stubborn political demarcation in modern Nigeria. At the same time, it encouraged ethnic identities and coalitions to form out of the inchoate peoples who lived throughout the regions. Key British decisions included amalgamating Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, while continuing to administer them separately. The first decision helped ensure Nigeria would reach independence as a single state. The second helped ensure that the north and south would have vast differences from one another, ones that would lead to political competition, then to ethnic conflict, and then to regional (ethnic) distrust and competition, and a north and south divide of both the military and civilians since independence. More specifically, separate administrations led to different institutions and policies for the two portions of Nigeria. The south was more exposed to education from the missionaries, cash cropping, commerce, and trade and to the beginning of investment, and that exposure continued at an increasing pace. The north was governed by a theocratic and feudal aristocracy, which continued via indirect rule, and it remained insulated from Western education by the British decision to keep Christian missionaries out of the emirates and other Islamic areas. At independence, the educational and economic gaps between north and south were enormous. This motivated the northerners to seek to capture and hold firmly to political power to avoid dominance by the southerners. It was also assumed that state power would close that gap. This capture of power by one segment to the detriment of other groups marked the beginning of more pronounced and intense ethnic conflict and violence as those left out of the power equation resorted to self-help. It would be simplistic to assume that ethnic conflict is predominantly among the three major ethic groups: the Yorubas, Hausas, and Igbos. It goes far beyond that.1 Ethnic relations in Nigeria cannot be understood outside of the pursuit of economic advantage by regional and ethnic elites, given the often corrupt accumulation of wealth by Nigerian rulers since independence. Access to state power guarantees that those who exercise the power of the state will have unlimited access to dispense favors, usually to members of the ruler’s ethnic nation, while ethnic groups shut of the power and the patronage it dispenses feel aggrieved and, in turn, resort to violence to gain access to state power. The latter factor means the political structure, which has varied much in the four decades of independence, always affects the nature and course of ethnic conflicts. Despite media stereotypes, these relations have been far more instrumental and flexible in their reaction to events, structures, and conditions than they have been primordial and rigid. Indeed, even today, one really ought not to speak of ethnic “groups” per se in Nigeria; one will better understand it and its history if one thinks of them as ethnic “coalitions of convenience.” The First Republic and the Biafran War

The three-region, three-party, three-ethnic-group dynamic of the First Republic catalyzed an intense ethnic consciousness and conflict in Nigeria that eventually led to civil war.2 This grew from the historical factors discussed above and the ways

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in which they affected the competition for political power during Nigeria’s first six years. Together, these factors created a climate in which political defeat was seen as a threat to the vital interests of each region’s political elite, whose access to wealth came entirely through political power.3 The excessive, at times violent, political conflict among these groups—and between them and the minority groups in their regions—ultimately led to a growing unity within the individual ethnic coalitions; to an intense north-south rivalry over control of the center and fear for the security of each region; to the secession of the eastern region, or Biafra; to a civil war drawn along clear ethnic lines; and to a process of majority-minority ethnic competition, which continues to this day. On January 15, 1966, a group of largely Igbo officers executed several non-Igbo leaders of the First Republic (including Prime Minister Akubakar Tafawa Balewa), most of the senior officers from the north, Chief Akintola, and the Sardauna (Sultan) of Sokoto, who was the political and religious leader of the Hausa. Twenty-seven of the thirty-two leaders of the coup were Igbo. It is important to note, however, that up to this point, even the intense conflict over control of federal and regional governments was largely among political elites and largely concerned regional interests, not the general population. To be sure, the leaders of each party were of the region’s largest ethnic group. But so were many of those who had become allied to parties from other regions that challenged the region’s dominant party. Even the coup, many still argue, was far more a modernist and nationalist coup than an ethnic coup, in spite of the Igbo “flavor” of its leaders. It was in the ethnic appearance of the coup, and the move to a unitary form of government that followed soon after it by General Aguiyi-Ironsi (also an Igbo), that threatened northerners with southern domination. General Aguiyi-Ironsi announced his Decree no. 34 on May 24, 1966, which abolished the federal system, and with it the autonomy the major tribe had over its own affairs at the state (regional) level. Five days later, riots directed at Igbos broke out in the north, and many were killed. These events led to the July 29, 1966, military mutiny and countercoup by northern troops, whose actions spoke both of vengeance and a desire to strike at the specter of southern domination.4 In that coup, some 200 Igbo officers and rank-and-file soldiers were clearly sought out by coup leaders and swiftly executed. A few weeks later, on September 29, during a violent pogrom in the north, some 30,000 Igbos were slaughtered, and many others were driven from their homes and fled to the east. Elite conflict thus became widespread, violent, and grassroots in nature. Negotiations among military governors of the four regions, held to design a mutually acceptable constitutional framework, continued throughout 1966 and well into 1967, but they were all unsuccessful. The east seceded as Biafra in May 1967. A few days later, the head of state, Colonel Yakuba Gowon, announced a 12-state, strong federal system for Nigeria. This was the exact opposite of the loose confederation demanded by Igbo leaders, and the Nigerian civil war ensued. After harsh combat and an estimated 1 million people killed either by combat or blockade, Biafra was defeated. The rapid reintegration and reconciliation of the Igbos that followed suggests this was more a political than an ethnic war. No punitive measures were pursued against the Igbos or their leaders. The official policy of

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the federal government was no victor, no vanquished. Even though the Igbo people stood alone at the end, the issue was whether they could secede, and once the issue was settled, most Nigerians seemed able to put the war behind them and move on. Still, many Igbos to this day feel like second-class citizens in Nigeria. However, new dimensions of ethnic conflict in Nigeria now include the Boko Haram (Hausa/ Islamic) insurgency, farmers and cattle owners’ ethnic violence, land (boundary) disputes with ethnic coloration, and electoral conflicts that have plagued Nigeria since the advent of democratic rule in 1999. Management of the Conflict Nigeria’s primary, overt ethnic problem in the postwar era has been the status of the smaller ethnic groups in the new multistate system. Because none of the big three groups could expect to dominate the federal government as long as electoral and constitutional governance was followed, none seriously feared domination by either of the others, though coalitions could still rule. This notched down the intense conflict of 1960, at least until the northerners began dominating the federal government during the military governments of the mid-1980s onward. Also, the larger ethnic minorities, such as the Tiv, Kanuri, Ijaw, Bini, Efik, Nupe, and others, were granted control of their own states, which satisfied them. Groups too small to win their own state, and even some larger groups who were divided among several states, were unhappy with their status. Religious conflict developed during this period, and regional fears and conflict continued, though their public manifestations were frequently hidden by the repressive nature of military rule. Often, there appeared to be implicit ethnic issues in these conflicts: feelings by Igbo and Yoruba that their fair political share was still being blocked by northerners, whether they be Hausa or other groups. Similarly, northerners have seemed intent on keeping southerners out of power. As Nigeria grew in 1967 to 12 states, and then progressively to 36 in 1995, the clamor for even more states never ceased. As other federal systems have discovered, such as Yugoslavia and India, as each demand is answered with a new state, a new group feels itself to be a conspicuous and deprived minority and soon clamors for its own state. Nigeria has not been able to solve this. Particular frustration has been expressed by the Ogoni and others in the oil-producing areas; the many non-Hausa, non-Islamic smaller groups in Kaduna and Kano states; and minority groups in the Middle Belt, such as the Idoma; and others. One author estimates that there are demands on the table for 40 additional states to help address these problems in such states as Benue, Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Kaduna, Kogi, Niger, Plateau, Rivers, and Taraba.5 Interestingly enough, in some cases, such as the call by the Idoma for their own state, minorities within an ethnic group or coalition have complained of marginalization. Thus, calls for even more states are likely to continue. The desire for statehood grows from the political power it grants to the new majority group it creates and the economic and professional opportunities for the group’s elites in staffing and operating it. Intensifying this is the “federal character” principle. First asserted in the 1975 constitution, this requires that public offices, public

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investments, appointments to the civil service, scholarships to university, and just about any other goods controlled by the federal government be distributed in a way that all states receive a fair share: one that thereby maintains Nigeria’s federal character. Of course, this creates a powerful incentive to demand one’s own state. Had the federal character been defined in ethnic rather than state grounds, there probably would have been much less pressure.6 As it was, however, the majority-minority dynamic within states, the political and economic advantages of statehood, and the fact that minority groups were not sharing in these federal resources combined to produce a widespread sense of grievance.7 The cost of minority exclusion from the federal character principle was accentuated by Nigeria’s vast oil wealth and the fact that federal and state governments controlled it. The slogan to redress this issue and imbalance was how to share the national “cake,” and revenue allocation and the revenue-sharing formula became a principal vehicle to manage ethnic conflicts. The principle of derivation, which is meant to compensate ethnic groups where oil wealth is generated, was adopted. However, who had influence in government was critical, and thus the more politically powerful became better off in what was, in reality, a zero-sum game usually lost by the less powerful. Minorities, of course, had no power. Economic conflict became political conflict, and, given the political weakness of small ethnic groups, it became ethnic conflict as well, which sometimes turned violent. Intensifying this situation was the nationalistic economic strategy Nigeria chose in the 1970s. It required foreign firms to sell substantial shares in their enterprises to Nigerians at well below market value rather than choosing an entrepreneur strategy such as encouraging the development of new enterprises that would generate new jobs and economic growth. This policy reinforced the importance of controlling the state or, more specifically, of having access to those who distributed these lucrative opportunities. Groups, including smaller ethnic groups, which did poorly in this, felt seriously aggrieved, and ethnicity became one of the more potent strategies to mobilize the populace and compete for whatever was left at the federal table.8 Ethnic conflict was not the only grounds of conflict. There were certainly classrelated aspects of economic and political deprivation during this time. The rural and urban poor, wage earners, agriculturists, and increasingly the salaried middle classes all saw their economic fortunes plummet in the 1980s and 1990s. This has continued to this day, giving rise to more conflicts.9 Much of the conflict in Nigeria, while it may be presented in religious or ethnic terms, is really at heart over economic resources or political power. In many cases, such as the violence in the central part of the southwest among the Ife and Modakeke communities (both of them Yoruba), this takes the form of which group is indigenous and which is composed of settlers, whether one group owes another rent for use of land, which should hold the seat of a local government authority, and so on. Thus, ethnic, regional, and religious differences are handy identities for mobilizing people. These may be the vehicles of conflict, but it is control over land, trade, and political power that are generally their fuel. Overall, most observers agree that military rule, far from managing conflict, seriously exacerbated ethnic and other conflict in Nigeria.10 While the military was

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able, in 1966, to summarily end the regional stand-off that civilian politicians had shown no interest or stomach in facing, the military’s defects far outweigh that one accomplishment. Those defects included its tendency to act arbitrarily and without broad investigation or consultation in establishing new states and local government authorities; its suppression of the deliberative, negotiation, and conflict-resolution bodies and processes typical of democracies (political parties, legislatures, independent judicial bodies); and its repeated flouting of the rule of law and the general insecurity this engendered. It destroyed Nigeria’s federal system, as it centralized ever-more power into military command–type governance, which, among other things, reaffirmed in Nigerians the fear of dominance by a single region, religion, or ethnic group.11 In summary, participants in ethnic conflict in the post-Biafra era are the larger and minority ethnic groups, depending on what each perceives to be an injustice. The prominence of Boko Haram since 2002 has added a more violent dimension to ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Significance The Nigerian experience suggests several important lessons for students of ethnicity and ethnic conflict.12 In general, it shows how often ethnic consciousness and conflict are stimulated by political and economic structures. These have worked to divide some groups from others (north and south); enhance the awareness of ethnicity, the rewards for ethnic organization, and the incentive to suppress other ethnic groups (the three-region system of the First Republic); increase the advantages of majority and other larger ethnic groups (the federal character principle, the growth in the number of states, the economic nationalist policy, manipulating the revenue-sharing formulas); channel the impact of the political economy (the federally controlled tide of oil money); and influence the impact of extraconstitutional and nondemocratic governance (repression; institutional erosion caused by military rule, its lack of accountability, and propensity to manipulate or deal poorly with religious divisions). As individuals sought to pursue their interests in the context of these structures and conditions, groups increasingly thought of themselves as having cultural and linguistic ties (as “ethnic”) and considered these ties relevant to the pursuit of other goods they sought. While these identities and perceptions have generally been able to coexist peacefully with one another, at times they have led to perceptions of zero-sum relations among the groups where some were consistent losers. Occasionally, they led to severe conflict, which at times burst into physical violence.13 The lessons of Nigeria are several. First, conflict was never inevitable in Nigeria. As earlier noted, in the interactions among ethnic groups in precolonial Nigeria, primordial hatreds were rare, and even spates of severe violence, as in the 1960s, have passed when the structures and policies that caused them were changed. Second, and less encouraging, the factors that caused conflicts are several, are intertwined with the interests of those who are living off the situation, probably transcend the authority or power of any identifiable actors to change, and are tied into such eternal human problems as greed, scarcity, and ambition. These may

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have been hindering the civilian government of Goodluck Jonathan as it tried to manage, end, and make progress on these and other problems, especially the killings and counter killings along ethnic lines. Third, political elites in Nigeria have often pursued their personal interests in power and wealth by mobilizing ethnic, regional, and religious suspicions and rivalries. They have rarely been concerned in this with the larger issue of the Nigerian peoples’ well-being. Fourth, and finally, the interactions among structure, policy, institutions, and autonomous actors that create ethnic conflict are too complex to avoid. Therefore, given the inevitability of human conflicts, it is safe to conclude that while conflicts happen in all societies, the preponderance, intensity, frequency, and violent nature of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria is a cause for concern. Notes 1. Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1968). 2. Audrey C. Smock, Ibo Politics: The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Howard Wolpe, Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study of Port Harcourt (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974). 3. P. C. Lloyd, “The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis,” in Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: The Prelude to Civil War, ed. K. Panter-Brick (London: Athlone Press, 1970). 4. Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960–1966 (London: Heinemann, 1977). 5. Rotimi Suberu, “Federalism, Ethnicity, and Regionalism in Nigeria,” in Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, ed. Paul Beckett and Crawford Young (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997). 6. See Nigeria—Report of the Commissions Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of the Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, cmnd. 505, 1958). 7. Eghosa Osaghae, “Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The Nigerian Experience,” Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 1 (1998): 1–24. 8. Osaghae, “Managing Multiple Minority Problems.” 9. See on this topic Toyin Falola, “Christian Radicalism and Nigerian Politics,” and Sabo Bako, “Muslims, State and the Struggle for Democratic Transitions in Nigeria: From Cooperation to Conflict,” in Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, ed. Paul Beckett and Crawford Young (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 1997). 10. Richard Joseph, “Democratization under Military Rule and Repression in Nigeria,” in Beckett and Young, Dilemmas of Democracy. 11. Osaghae, “Managing Multiple Minority Problems.” 12. Ibid. 13. John Paden, “Nigerian Unity and the Tension of Democracy: Geo-Cultural Zones and North-South Legacies,” in Beckett and Young, Dilemmas of Democracy.

Suggested Readings Ajayi, Adegboyega Issac. 2007. The Military and the Nigerian State, 1966–1993: A Study of the Strategies of Political Power Control. Trenton, NJ: Africa Word Press. Baxter, Peter. 2005. Biafra: The Nigerian Civil War 1967–1970. San Antonio, TX: Hellen and Company.

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Beckett, Paul, and Crawford Young, eds. 1997. Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria. Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press. Diamond, Larry, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds. 1997. Transition without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert. 1991. Issues in Nigerian Politics since the Fall of the Second Republic. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Joseph, Richard. 1987. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Maier, Karl. 2000. This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria. New York: Public Affairs. Mgbe, Kelly K. 2010. Politics and Election in Nigeria since1960: A Case Study of African Politics. Seattle: Amazon, Inc. Kindle edition, Osaghae, Eghosa E. 1998. “Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: The Nigerian Experience.” Journal of Modern African Studies 36 (1): 1–24. Osaghae, Eghosa E. 1995. Structural Adjustment and Ethnicity in Nigeria. Research Report no. 98. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Panter-Brick, S. K., ed. 1970. Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War. London: Athlone Press.

Appendices The critical moment in Nigeria’s history occurred during its first decade of independence, when the question of whether it would remain whole or break apart arose, and was only answered when the forces of the central government overcame those of its separatist eastern province. The two documents below were central to this development: the decree of the country’s military governor suspending the federal system in which the eastern province had previously enjoyed federal autonomy and the declaration of independence of that province’s leader that came less than a year later. Significantly, Nigeria’s return to democracy has been accompanied by a return to federalism, with its current constitution recognizing 36 separate states and providing a process for the creation of additional states as a means of peacefully accommodating minority demands for states of their own.

1. The Unification Decree: No. 34 of May 24, 1966 the federal military government

hereby decrees as follows:

1. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, Nigeria shall on 24th May 1966 (in this decree referred to as ‘the appointed day’) cease to be a Federation and shall accordingly as from that day be a Republic, by the name of the Republic of Nigeria, consisting of the whole of the territory which immediately before that day was comprised in the Federation. 2.1. As from the appointed day— a. the Federal Military Government and the Federal Executive Council shall be known respectively as the National Military Government and The Executive Council; b. the Federal territory shall be known as the Capital territory; c. the provinces, including Kaduna capital territory, in schedule 1 of this Decree which immediately before the appointed day were respectively comprised in Northern Nigeria, Eastern Nigeria, Western Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria

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shall be known respectively as the Northern group of Provinces, the Eastern group of Provinces, the Western group of Provinces and the Mid-Western group of Provinces; d. for the purpose of administration each group of provinces shall subject to the authority of the Head of the National Military Government, be under the general direction and control of a Military Governor appointed by the Head of the National Military Government; e. Act No. 20 of 1963 (that is to say the Constitution of the Federation) may be cited as the Constitution of the Republic. 2. Without prejudice to section 8 of this Decree, the person who immediately before the appointed day holds the office of Military Governor of a Region shall be deemed to have been appointed by the Head of the National Military Government as Military Governor of the corresponding group of provinces with effect from that day. 3. The National Military Government may either conditionally or unconditionally delegate to a Military Governor of a group of provinces power to make laws by edict for peace, order and good government with respect to any matter specified in the delegation in relation to that group of provinces. 4. Subject to this and any other Decree, a Military Governor of a group of provinces may exercise by way of edict or, as the case may be, by regulation, order, or instrument the powers and functions vested in the Executive Council of the Government of a former Region, or of the Governor, Premier, or Minister (except in relation to criminal prosecutions) of a government of a former Region under any existing law with respect to that group of provinces; and accordingly sections 3 (2), (3), (5), (6), and (7) and section 4 (6) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1966 (in this Decree referred to as the ‘principal Decree’) shall cease to have effect. 5. Subsection (4) shall be without prejudice to section 8 of this Decree, and the repeal by that subsection of any provision of the principal Decree shall not affect the operation of that provision in relation to any time before the appointed day. 6. Any Edict made by the Military Governor of a Region which is in force immediately before the appointed day shall, as from that day, have effect as a Decree applying only to the group of provinces which corresponds to that region; and references to a Decree shall be construed accordingly. In this subsection ‘Edict’ includes a decree made as mentioned in section 4 (6) of the principal Decree. 7. Notwithstanding section 1 of this Decree, on and after the appointed day— a. the provisions of the constitution of each former Region which are not for the time being suspended shall, in relation to the corresponding group of provinces, have effect as modified by the combined operation of the principal Decree, as amended, and this Decree; and b. the constitution of each former Region may be cited as the Constitution of the Northern, Eastern, Western or Mid-Western group of Provinces, as the case may be, and references to the constitution of a group of provinces shall be construed accordingly. 3. 1. As from the appointed day all offices in the service of the Republic in a civil capacity shall be offices in a single service to be known as the National Public Service; and accordingly all persons who immediately before that day are members of the public

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service of the Federation or of the public service of a Region shall on that day become members of the National Public Service: Provided that this subsection shall not apply to the office of the Attorney-General of the Republic or of a group of Provinces. 2. As from the appointed day— a. the Public Service Commission established under section 146 of the Constitution of the Republic shall be known as the National Public Service Commission, and references in that section and elsewhere to the Public Service Commission of the Federation shall be amended accordingly; b. all Regional Public Service Commissions established under the appropriate provisions of the Constitutions of the Regions shall be known as the Provincial Public Service Commissions, and be known as the Provincial Public Service Commissions created under the Constitutions of the Regions shall be construed accordingly. 3. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution of the Republic or of a group of Provinces, the members of the Public Service Commission of the Federation and of the Regions who, immediately before the appointed day hold office, shall continue in office until the appointments expire or are sooner revoked, and fresh appointments are made. 4. 1. Subject to the provisions of this section, power to appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the National Public Service (including power to make appointments on promotion and to confirm appointments) and to dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices shall, as from the appointed day, vest in the National Public Service Commission. 2. The National Public Service Commission may, with the approval of the Head of the National Military Government, either conditionally or unconditionally delegate any of its powers under subsection (1) above to any person or authority in Nigeria. 3. Subject to subsections (4) and (6) below, all the powers of the National Public Service Commission under subsection (1) above in respect of any office in the National Public Service carrying an initial salary not exceeding £2,292, shall be treated as having been delegated to the appropriate Provincial Public Service Commission. 4. Any delegation effected under subsection (2) above (including any delegation which in accordance with subsection (3) above or subsection (6) below is to be treated as having been effected under subsection (2) above) may be varied or revoked by the National Public Service Commission with the approval of the Head of the National Military Government. 5. Subsection (1) above shall not apply in relation to any of the following offices— a. the office of any judge of the Supreme Court, the High Court of Lagos, the High Court of a group of provinces or the Sharia Court of Appeal; b. the office of economic adviser to the republic; c. except for the purpose of making appointments thereto, the office of the Director of Audit of the Republic and the office of the Director of Audit of a group of provinces; d. the office of Magistrate and Justice of Peace; e. any office in the Nigeria Police Force; f. any office to which section 148 of the Constitution of the Republic applies.

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6. Without prejudice to subsection (4) above or to section 8 of this Decree, any delegation effected under section 147 of the Constitution of the Federation, or under the corresponding section of the constitution of a Region, which is in force immediately before the appointed day shall, as from that day be deemed to have been appointed day shall, as from that day, be deemed to have been duly effected by the National Public Service Commission under subsection (2) above. 7. The provisions of this section shall be subject to the provisions of section 5 of this decree. 5. 1. Power to appoint persons to hold or act in the office of permanent secretary to any department of government of the Republic or any other office of equivalent rank in the National Public Service, and to remove persons so appointed from any such office shall, as from the appointed day, vest in the Supreme Military Council. 2. Before appointing any person by virtue of this section, the Supreme Military Council shall consult the National Public Service Commission. 3. Subsection (1) above shall not apply in relation to any of the offices mentioned in section 4 (5) of this Decree. 6. As from the appointed day the members of the Police Service Commission shall be appointed by the Head of the National Military Government; and accordingly in the entry in Schedule 2 of the principal Decree relating to section 109 of the Constitution of the Republic, for the words ‘Federal Executive Council’ in both places where they occur, there shall, as from the appointed day, be substituted the words ‘Head of the National Military Government’. 7. 1. As from the appointed day, the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic mentioned in Schedule 2 of this Decree shall be suspended. 2. As from the appointed day— a. the provisions of the constitution of each group of provinces which are mentioned in Schedule 3 of this Decree shall be suspended; and b. Schedule 4 of the principal Decree shall have effect subject to the amendments specified in Schedule 4 of this Decree. 8. 1. As from the appointed day the principal Decree, as amended, shall have effect with such modifications (whether by way of addition, alteration or omission) as may be necessary to bring it, and through it— a. the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution of the Republic and of the constitution of each group of provinces; and b. all existing law within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 12 of the principal Decree, so far as in force immediately before the appointed day; and c. all other law which would be existing law within the meaning of the said subsection (1) if the references in that subsection to 16th January 1966 were references to the appointed day; into conformity with this Decree. 2. Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above, section 13 of the principal Decree (which makes provision for the saving of existing offices, appointments, etc.) shall, with such modifications as may be necessary in consequence of this Decree, have effect in relation to the appointed day in like manner as it has effect in relation to 16th January 1966. 3. Nothing in this Decree shall affect the validity of anything done before the appointed day.

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9. In this Decree, and in any other law—

‘enactment’ includes any provision of a Decree;

‘group of provinces’ means the Northern Group of Provinces, the Eastern Group of Provinces, the Western Group of Provinces or the Mid-Western Group of Provinces; ‘the Military Governor’, in relation to a group of provinces, means the Military Governor of that Group of Provinces; ‘the Northern Group of Provinces’, the Eastern Group of Provinces’, the Western Group of Provinces and the ‘Mid-Western Group of Provinces’ have the respective meanings assigned in section 2 (1) (c) of this Decree. 10. Every Decree made on or after the appointed day shall apply throughout Nigeria except in so far as the contrary intention appears therein. Source: The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) (No. 5) Decree 1966, Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette 51 (53), May 24, 1966: A153. Available at http://www .segundawodu.com/decree34.htm.

2. Biafra’s Declaration of Independence, 1967 Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu Declaration of Biafra Fellow countrymen and women, you, the people of Eastern Nigeria: Conscious of the supreme authority of Almighty God over all mankind, of your duty to yourselves and posterity; Aware that you can no longer be protected in your lives and in your property by any Government based outside Eastern Nigeria; Believing that you are born free and have certain inalienable rights which can best be preserved by yourselves; Unwilling to be unfree partners in any association of a political or economical nature; Rejecting the authority of any person or persons other than the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind or nature upon you; Determined to dissolve all political and other ties between you and the former Federal Republic of Nigeria; Prepared to enter into such association, treaty or alliance with any sovereign state within the former Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms and conditions as best to subserve your common good; Affirming your trust and confidence in me; Having mandated me to proclaim on your behalf, and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a sovereign independent Republic,

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Now, therefore, I, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, by virtue of the authority, and pursuant to the principles, recited above, do hereby solemnly proclaim that the territory and region known as and called Eastern Nigeria together with her continental shelf and territorial waters shall henceforth be an independent sovereign state of the name and title of “The Republic of Biafra”. And I do declare that— i. all political ties between us and the Federal Republic of Nigeria are hereby totally dissolved; ii. all subsisting contractual obligations entered into by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or by any person, authority or organization or government acting on its behalf, with any person, authority or organization operating, or relating to any matter or thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shall henceforth be deemed to be entered into with the Military Governor of the Republic of Biafra for and on behalf of the Government and people of the republic of Biafra, and the covenants thereof shall, subject to this Declaration, be performed by the parties according to their tenor; iii. all subsisting international treaties and obligations made on behalf of eastern Nigeria by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, shall be honored and respected; iv. Eastern Nigeria’s due share of all subsisting international debits and obligations entered into by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on behalf of the Federation of Nigeria shall be honored and respected; v. steps will be taken to open discussions of the question of Eastern Nigeria’s due share of the assets of the Federation of Nigeria and personal properties of the citizens of Biafra throughout the Federation of Nigeria; vi. the rights, privileges, pensions, etc. of all personnel of the Public Services, the Armed Forces and the Police now serving in any capacity within the Republic of Biafra, are hereby guaranteed; vii. we shall keep the door open for association with, and would welcome, any sovereign unit or units in the former Federation of Nigeria or in any other parts of Africa desirous of association with us for the purposes of running a common services organization and for the establishment of economic ties; viii. we shall protect the lives and property of all foreigners residing in Biafra; we shall extend the hand of friendship to those nations who respect our sovereignty, and shall repel any interference in our internal affairs; ix. we shall faithfully adhere to the charter of the Organization of African Unity and of the United Nations Organization; x. It is our intention to remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations in our right as a sovereign, independent nation. Long live the Republic of Biafra! And may God protect all who live in her! Source: Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Biafra. Federation of the Free States of Africa. Available at http://www.africafederation.net/Biafra.htm.

Russia and the Northern Caucasus The Continuing Unrest Renat Shaykhutdinov

Timeline 1722 Dagestan is annexed, and the campaign to conquer the rest of the North Caucasus by the Russian Empire ensues. Mid-19th century The Caucasian wars take place. Sheikh Shamil wages war, uniting the North Caucasian Islamic tribes in an effort to overthrow Russia’s rule, but suffers defeat. 1917 In the Russian Revolution and the subsequent civil war, North Caucasians initially support the Bolsheviks in the hopes of receiving greater autonomy, but those hopes are quickly crushed. The North Caucasus consequently resists the policies of the first Communist state in the world. 1939–1940 The Chechen-Ingush insurgence begins. 1943 The German advancement to the North Caucasus peaks during World War II. 1944 The deportation of the Vainakh (Chechen and Ingush) and other peoples from the North Caucasus to Central Asia is carried out by an order from Stalin for their alleged collaboration with Germans.

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1957 Soviet leader Khrushchev issues the policies of rehabilitation, which allow Chechens and Ingush to return to the Caucasus and reestablish their own republic within Soviet Russia. 1991 The Chechen-Ingush Republic’s Communist leader, Zavgaev, is deposed by the pro-independence forces under the Soviet general Dzhohar (Johar) Dudaev, who proclaim independence. 1994 Russian president Boris Yeltsin starts a military operation against Chechnya, leading to an extended First Chechen War. 1996 April: Dudaev is spotted while on a satellite phone and is killed by a rocket. Yandarbiev takes over as interim pro-independence president. August: The Chechen capital of Grozny is taken by the pro-independence Chechen forces. By the end of the month, Russia signs a cease-fire with the rebels and starts vacating its forces from Chechnya. October: Maskhadov is named prime minister. 1997 Maskhadov is elected president in January. The withdrawal of Russian soldiers from Chechnya is completed. A peace treaty is signed by the Russian and Chechen presidents, ending the First Chechen War. 1998 Conflict spills over to neighboring Dagestan, while Maskhadov struggles to contain Chechen faction leaders that are critical of him. Russia accuses Maskhadov of condoning criminal gangs. 1999 March: Maskhadov survives an assassination attempt. July–August: Fights along the Chechen-Dagestani border are witnessed. September: 300 people die in apartment bombings in Dagestan, Moscow, and Volgodonsk. Prime Minister Putin blames Chechen separatist forces and foreign mercenaries. Chechen field commander Basayev denies involvement. The Second Chechen War starts. 2002 A hostage crisis in a Moscow theater takes place. 2004 The Beslan school attack takes place. Moscow cancels direct elections of regional presidents and governors, choosing to appoint them from the Kremlin instead.

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2009 The active part of the military campaign is announced to be over. However, lowlevel insurgency is reported throughout the North Caucasus. 2014 The Sochi Olympics are conducted with no reports of major security contingencies. Environmental activists and members of a transnational Circassian movement criticize the games. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the conflict processes between the North Caucasian region and the Russian and Soviet state and survey the key arguments about that interaction as suggested in the extant literature. In addition to some of the most influential English-language academic books and articles, several relevant Russian-language sources are employed. The chapter starts with the general characteristics of the region and its history of military encounters up to the Russian conquest of the territory. It then surveys the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, focusing on the developments that led to the two Chechen wars. I specifically dwell on the nature of, and the factors responsible for, the infusion of the proindependence rhetoric and ideology in the North Caucasus with the narrative of political Islam. The chapter concludes by examining the significance of the region within the larger context of Russia and the world and provides a brief synopsis for future developments. Historical Background The small area of the Caucasus region squeezed in a mountainous territory between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea is one of the most diverse parts of the world. This strip of land, conceived as a geographical boundary between Europe and Asia, is home to numerous linguistic, cultural, and religious communities. An immense diversity, considerable intermingling and cultural interborrowing, coupled with a contrasting quest for uniqueness and ethnic pride is well illustrated by a prominent Western linguist of the area: “What’s so strange about the Caucasus is it violates what we think of ‘areal linguistics.’ . . .While the other languages in the region— of Semitic, Turkic, and Indo-European origin—have tended to adopt elements of Caucasian languages, the Caucasian languages themselves remain stubbornly unique”; thus, “Language serves as a very clear badge of identity. And they have to adopt some badge of identity to live.”1 The Caucasus has been a contested area for much of its history, which partly explains its current diversity. Among the first invaders (9th–12th centuries CE) were the Iranian Alars, who are related to the present-day Ossetians and were conducive to the christening of the Chechens. Golden Horde was in control of the area from 1241 but lost it to the locals in 1300. Next came the domination by the Ottomans and Persians. The Ottomans pursued a hands-off approach, allowing the territory under their control a large degree of autonomy from Istanbul.2 While Islam came to the region relative early (first to Dagestan, through the Arab conquest of

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Derbent, reportedly, as early as the seventh century), Islamization of the Chechens took place only during the Ottoman period. 3 After the Russian victory over the Ottoman and Persian powers in the region, the Caucasian Wars took place between 1817 and 1864, during which the North Caucasian peoples aspired to liberate themselves from the cultural and religious oppression of Russian imperial rule. In this period, the name of Sheikh Shamil, who united North Caucasians under the banner of Islam in their opposition to Moscow, is noteworthy. The net result of the war was the final incorporation of the area into the Russian state, with the ensuing ethnic cleansing of a significant (especially eastern) part of the region through mass killing and expulsion. (By modern standards, these events are likely to amount to acts of genocide and are currently taken up by the transnational Circassian movement in their genocide recognition campaign.) Their defeat and the subsequent repression compelled North Caucasians to live within the Russian Empire. However, their drive for independence was not crushed. In fact, the 20th century saw three distinct attempts of secession from Russia/Soviet Union by North Caucasians: at the time of the Russian Bolshevik revolution in 1918, during the World War II in the early 1940s, and at the time of the Soviet disintegration in the late 1980s and early 1990s.4 In 1918, the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus was formed. The Mountaineers helped the Bolsheviks fight the Whites in the Russian civil war, but the Bolshevik promises of a great autonomy were never realized. After the Bolsheviks occupied the republic, they carved out the Dagestan Oblast from it, and the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was formed in much of the rest of the region. The Mountain ASSR was short-lived, being abolished in 1924. The scale of mismanagement by the new regime and the degree of resistance in the territory is revealed in the speech of the Chechnya representative Elderkhanov at the secret meeting of the Russian Communist Party in 1923 about the nationality policy: Mawkish speeches about the working people, smiles about them, grabbing mullahs by their beards, extortion of the food tax with bayonets to eventually get only 5–6% of the required amount, excessive military pressure, from which suffered the civilian population, while the bandits have been fleeing into the mountains, have eventually created a front against the Soviet power. In the end, they created anarchy in Chechnya, created in Chechnya a united front, unfortunately not for the Soviet power, but against the Soviet regime. And such was the situation prior to the declaration of autonomy in [the Soviet] Chechnya.5

As the Soviet regime was awarding certain groups within the Union ethnic institutions, as a measure to promote loyalty but also as a divide-and-rule tactic, separate identities started to take root among the Caucasians by the late 1930s. An autonomous Chechnya, for example, had been carved out from the Mountain ASSR by a Moscow decree on November 30, 1922. After the Chechen and Ingush autonomous oblasts were merged in 1934 into a single entity, the 1936 “Stalin” Constitution of the USSR elevated the status of Chechen-Ingush autonomy to that of the republic. Karachay-Circassian and Kabarda-Balkar autonomies were also established.

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Immediately prior to World War II, the Chechen-Ingush insurgence began, led by Hasan Israil(ov) and inspired by the Finnish resistance during the FinnoSoviet Winter War.6 During World War II, the German advancement into the region gave some North Caucasians an opportunity to request help in their quest for independence. There were some who served in the German-organized military units.7 This development was used as a pretext by Stalin to label the entire nations as traitors of the Soviet state and “punitively” deport them from the region into the distant parts of the USSR, such as the Central Asia and Siberia. Specifically, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachays, Kalmyks, Meskhetian Turks, Karapapaks, (Armenian) Homshenis, and Kurds were deported en masse during World War II from the Greater Caucasus. For the most part, the deportees consisted of women, children, and the elderly as many men served in the Red Army and at least 18 percent of them perished as a result. Ethnoterritorial formations granted by the Soviet authorities to the repressed nations were abolished during the years of deportation but partly reestablished a decade later by Khrushchev. The Conflict Already by the late 1950s and early 1960s, “a discursive frame established and enforced by the Soviet regime boldly proclaimed that the USSR had ‘solved’ its nationalities problems and had produced ‘a new historical community—the Soviet people’ (Sovetskii narod).”8 Mikhail Gorbachev similarly claimed that the nationality question was resolved in the Soviet Union.9 However, the seeming national stability of the Soviet regime started to shatter not long after Gorbachev made his declarations. Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika (Russian for restructuring the Soviet system) gave ethnic groups within the Soviet Union an opportunity to express their grievances, which resulted, as an unintended consequence, in the emergence of potent national movements in the different corners of the USSR.10 Although these movements initially espoused environmental concerns, they quickly evolved to broaden their appeal and adopt national overtones. Already by July 1987, environmental demonstrations were held in various parts of the Soviet Union, including Kazan, Estonia, Leningrad, and Irkutsk.11 In line with other areas of the Soviet Union, the initial grievances expressed in the North Caucasus were environmental. The first protest in Chechnya took place in the city of Gudersmes, in the summer of 1988, over the proposed construction of a biochemical plant by the Soviet authorities. It is also noteworthy that the current general Western perception of the conflict in the North Caucasus is of the Islamist fundamentalist guerrilla warfare with sporadic acts of terrorism directed at Russian targets. Such understanding, however, is “deeply flawed” and “is based on a small and by no means representative segment of the gruesome realities of the conflict, which, in 1991, began as a political struggle for an independent, secular Chechen nation-state”; in that sense, their desire for national self-determination was not that different from that of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, and Armenians.12

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One of the first movements formed in opposition to the Communists in the North Caucasus was the People’s Front of Chechen-Ingushetia. As other organizations emerged, the Communists in the republic were forced to heed to the ethnonational demands of the population marginalizing the People’s Front. However, the All-National Congress of Chechen People (NCChP), organized by urban intellectuals in November 1990, became the primary organization representing nationalizing political interests. At the first meeting, they elected the Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev as the chairman. Dudayev was born in Chechnya in 1944, just before the mass deportation of the Chechens. He spent the next 13 years in exile in Kazakhstan before being allowed to return. He received a military education in Russia proper and, before returning to Chechnya in 1990, served as a commander of a military aviation division in Tartu, Estonia, where he developed sympathy for the Estonian language and national identity. In the ensuing political struggle with the Communists, the National Congress prevailed. The Congress maintained that the Communists were not legitimate representatives of the Chechen people and claimed that the right of independence for the Chechen people should be respected. The first clear support for the Congress came in August, when the Communist leader of Chechnya, Doku Zavgayev, went to Moscow to sign the union treaty put together by Gorbachev. However, Zavgayev had strategically supported the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, while Dudayev had denounced it. Protests and rallies were conducted in the capital of Grozny in support of the Congress and in opposition to the coup. In September, the members of Congress stormed the parliament, effectively taking control of the institution and leaving Zavgayev few options besides resignation. As power in Moscow shifted to Yeltsin (after the plotters were defeated), the Chechen National Congress was a natural ally for Yeltsin’s struggle against Communist reactionaries. However, the unrelenting claims for independence advanced by Dudayev made Moscow suspicious and prompted it to establish a Provisional Supreme Council as the highest authority in Chechnya in opposition to Dudayev and to announce parallel elections. The National Congress, however, held its own presidential and parliamentary elections on October 27, 1991, in which Dudayev and the proindependence forces won, marginalizing the Moscow-backed politicians. Russia viewed the elections as illegitimate and, on November 7, sent troops to Grozny. The Chechen parliament granted Dudayev extraordinary powers, and the Russian troops were disarmed and transported to North Ossetia. The Russian parliament pressured Yeltsin into recalling the state of emergency. Then came 1992, and little in terms of compromise and negotiations. In 1993, the economy in the republic continued to deteriorate as Moscow imposed a blockade and tried to cultivate internal opposition within the pro-independence movement. As much of the parliament distanced themselves from Dudayev, Dudayev sacked Prime Minister Mamodayev and dissolved parliament. However, Dudayev was largely seen as legitimate by the population, while Mamodayev remained committed to the cause of Chechen independence, further frustrating Russian politicians. By 1994, Moscow had come to terms with the reality that Dudayev could not be overthrown, which led to a meeting of the Chechen prime minister Mugadev with

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his Russian counterpart Chernomyrdin. However, Moscow insisted that Chechnya sign the Federation Treaty and sought to negotiate with other forces in the republic at the same time. By May, Dudayev had survived five assassination attempts. Throughout the summer of 1994, the Russian-supported opposition Chechen Provisional Council continued its attempts to destabilize the Dudayev government.13 As the conflict between the Dudayev government and opposition led by Avturkhanov and covertly supported by Moscow escalated, Yeltsin ordered both sides to lay down arms. By December 15, in a direct military assault dubbed the First Chechen War, some 600 tanks and 40,000 Russian soldiers had entered Chechnya. The Russian troops only left in 1996 as a result of the Khasavyurt agreements and after suffering enormous losses. The interwar period in Chechnya proved to be divisive for the central power of the state in Grozny, with the collapse of state institutions, fragmentation of politics, and an inability to consolidate a single-state authority. The position of the president, vacated by Dudayev, who was killed at the end of the First War, in April 1996, was filled by Aslan Maskhadov in January 1997, after the presidential and parliamentary elections took place in the republic with the financial and organizational help of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Maskhadov, who won with 59.3 percent of the vote in the first round, ahead of the field commander Shamil Basayev, was born in Kazakhstan in 1951. Six years later, his family was allowed to return to Chechnya. Like Dudayev, Maskhadov also pursued a military career, graduating from Tbilisi Artillery School and serving in the Soviet artillery and rocket forces in Lithuania from 1990 until his retirement in 1992. Maskhadov has been characterized as “a brilliant officer, a secular-minded person, and, despite the fierce military resistance he led against the Russian army, a moderate politician willing to negotiate with Russia.”14 The international situation in 1997 presented the newly elected president with an opportunity for peaceful resolution of the conflict, as the OSCE backed the Chechen political consolidation while Russia, dealing with an internal crisis, wanted to abstain from using force. However, in the pursuit of political power, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who served as an interim president after Dudayev’s death, established the Supreme Sharia Court to certify that all laws were consistent with Islam. Vice President Vakha Arsanov, an embattled rival to the president, attempted to set up a state shura—a body consisting of the respected political and religious leaders, especially the field commanders—who would issue guidelines to the president and parliament. The intention was to dilute Maskhadov’s presidential powers and ensure his ultimate accountability to a loose alliance of field commanders. Maskhadov tried to minimize the impact of the attacks by preventatively introducing Sharia law in Chechnya on February 3, 1999. The president then attempted to revoke the legislative power from parliament and a shura that possessed only consultative powers. The opposition resented and pushed for the formation of an alternative shura, declaring on February 9 that it was assuming responsibility over government affairs. Maskhadov sacked Vice President Arsanov, former president Yandarbiyev, former foreign minister and religious zealot Movladi Udugov, and important field commanders, such as Salman Raduyev and Shamil Basayev. The

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dissolution of the Chechen state and institutions, thus, came to a logical end in early 1999. Much of the process of the institutional destruction of the Chechen state was accompanied by Islamic rhetoric, a large part of which was a smokescreen employed by the entrepreneurs of violence to limit the central authority’s power to intervene in their economic activity. Additionally, a complex social process of Islamization was in place, which involved the “return to the roots” of ethnocultural tradition. Moreover, “the war that democratic, secular, and pro-Western Russia had unleashed against its own citizens, had set in motion a far-reaching sociocultural change within Chechen society and the wider North Caucasus.”15 The war with Russia sped up the process of Islamization, whereby a secular Chechen society had started to be exposed and mobilized through the organizational potential of Islam. It was similar to a situation, which dates some 100 years back, when Shamil was able to overcome clan and tribal loyalties in what he saw as an Islamic war against Moscow. Thus, Islam began replacing the nation as a mode for political mobilization. The most radical form of Islamization—Wahhabism— found its way to the Caucasus with the influx of the Arab missionaries. While the term is generally misused in the former Soviet space to stigmatize any form of Islam, which is not to the liking of the authorities, in its essence it refers to the “Islamic fundamentalism” of cleric ibn-Abdul Wahab, who thought that Muslims needed a reform, through which they would rid themselves of anything that is not found directly in the Koran (Islam’s holy book).16 The Second Chechen War started in the late summer of 1999 in the context of the rhetorical and ideological shift from ethnonationalist to religious warfare. Hughes claims that the failure of the initial agreements of 1996–1997 and the path toward the second modern Chechen war of 1999 was paved by “Russia’s blockade and international isolation [which] left Maskhadov with an impossible task” of state building; “It was simply that no effective postwar state-building and reconstruction occurred in Chechnya due to lack of funds and government capacity in a highly militarized, impoverished, and traumatized society.”17 An incursion into Dagestan led by the Chechen Islamist commanders Shamil Basayev and Amir Khattab prompted the military response from the Russian army. The apartment bombings that took place in September in Buynaksk (Dagestan), Moscow (twice), and Volgodonsk (Rostov Oblast) underlined the need, in the eyes of the Russian public and security services, for a final resolution of the Chechen problem. The Chechens denied the involvement, and “up to the present day, Russia has shown no proof of Chechen” responsibility.”18 In the Second War, the Russian air force and artillery were employed first, followed by the combat operations on the ground, beginning in October 1999. The Russians also attended heavily to the information warfare. The Second Chechen War is also noted for the acts of terrorism, which included the hostage crisis in the Moscow theater Nord-Ost in October 2002, the bombing of two Russian jets and a subway station in August 2004, and the school attack in Beslan, North Ossetia, in September 2004. As a result of the war, the population of Chechnya shrank from 1.05 million to, approximately, 700,000 “because 40,000 to 50,000 civilians have been killed,

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50,000 are living as internally displaced persons, tens of thousands are external refugees, and a vast number have moved permanently elsewhere (to Moscow, other Russian cities or to foreign countries).”19 Management of the Conflict As we have seen, the main political issue demanded by the Chechen resistance and denied by the Russian government revolved around the idea of “the need for independence from Russia.”20 This idea was supported by the Chechen leadership and a lion’s share of the field commanders. Over time, however, there was a gradual infusion of the independence cause with Islamic rhetoric, which has been attributed to change in allies of the Chechen resistance movement. Initially, there were hopes that the European democracies would be able to successfully pressure Russia to end the war. As the hopes failed to materialize, with Europe’s energy dependency on Russia being a factor, the concept of “Islamic solidarity” started to have traction, superseding the initial ideal of European democratic norms and practices.21 The shift toward the Islamic rhetoric was not fully supported by Chechen society, in part because of the perceived “treachery” of the leadership of some Muslimmajority states. At this point, the appeal of the Chechen leadership emphasized the Chechen constitution while talking with the European states and an intention “to build an Islamic state” in dealing with the Middle Eastern governments. The latter would produce a negative response from the European governments, yet in the face of “mostly theoretical help from Europe,” a calculation was made to “find allies wherever possible.”22 Furthermore, the watershed moment for the West came after 9/11, which has been employed by Russia to argue that the Chechen warfare was an earlier indication of worldwide Islamist opposition to the West.23 The shift to the Islamist agenda can thus be explained by tactical instrumentalization and personal inclinations of top leaders: “such tactics were instrumental and a rational use of those resources which could assist with the mobilization of society for the independence struggle.”24 Moreover, there exists “some evidence” of Dudaev’s increasing religiosity (as narrated by Russian defense minister Grachev) that Dudaev initially refused alcohol, saying that he was a Muslim; Dudaev also promoted the tradition of a councils of the elders; Similar trends were exhibited by Yandarbiev.25 Yet, the shallowness of the knowledge of the Islamic theology by the leadership and population at large is notable. A prominent expert on the ethnic and religious affairs of the regions, Paul Goble, thought that parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia would be a fertile ground for recruiting Islamist radicals “because people there know they are Muslim, but do not know exactly what it means and therefore they are prepared to listen to people who tell them exactly what it means.”26 He then recounts a conversation with Dudaev, where Dudaev said, “Mr. Goble, I’m a good Muslim. I pray three times a day.” Goble, being respectful, decided not to tell him that good Muslims would normally pray five times a day.27 Others claim that it was, “above all,” successful military campaigns by Basaev troops and foreign Islamists’ fame for courage and discipline in the fighting for Grozny that increased the appeal of political Islam to young Chechen rebels.28

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Significance The conflict in the North Caucasus is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Yet, it is important to dissect it for several reasons. First, the two modern wars in the North Caucasus largely defined the politics in Russia in the 1990s and have a great impact on the country today. In fact, many in the present-day Russian political class, including President Putin, came to power on the wave of the war in Chechnya and base their legitimacy on saving the country from disintegration. One can also draw an indirect link between the developments in the North Caucasus and the Boston Marathon bombings. While both the pro-Moscow government of Chechnya and pro-independence forces distanced themselves from the terrorist act, it is likely that the Tsarnaev brothers would not have ended up in Boston had their ancestors not been uprooted from Chechnya because of Stalin’s deportation or the two Chechen wars. Even though the pro-Russian president of Chechnya proclaimed his republic as “the most stable region of the North Caucasus” as early as 2007, the war has spread to other parts of the region, including Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Circassia, as well as, arguably, the Middle Volga and the ethnic Russian-majority territories.29 Because of the importance of the North Caucasus, it is very likely that we will continue hearing about this part of the world in the future. As one of the most thoughtful observers of the region pointed out, there are three possibilities in regard to the future of the region. First, the present-day condition of chaos, corruption, and anarchy continues in the region. The second possibility is the emergence of a united Islamic front in the North Caucasus—one that Russia claims it fights but, in fact, does a lot to promote through Russian nationalism. Third, the fragmentation of Russia may occur because of the weakness of the ethnic Russian identity, with sibiriaki (Siberians and people of the Far East) leading the secessionist movement, not necessarily through the actions of North Caucasians. Given the seriousness of the last possibility, it is important to shift our analysis of the North Caucasus from the lenses of survival and interest in “negative nationalism” to the lens of “positive nationalism—the nationalism of people who think they are going to win because they are on the winning side of history.”30 Notes 1. Interview with Prof. John Colarusso of McMaster University, Canada, by Britt Peterson, Boston Globe (www.bostonglobe.com). Web edition, February 16, 2014; and Foundation for Endangered Languages, OGMIOS Newsletter 53 (April 30, 2014), http://www .ogmios.org/ogmios/Ogmios_053.pdf. 2. Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 65. 3. Oleg G. Bol’shakov, “Kistorii zavoevaniia Derbenta Arabami” [To the History of the Arab Conquest of Derbent], in Dagestan i musul’manskii Vostok [Daghestan and the Muslim East], ed. Alikber K. Alikberov and Vladimir O. Bobrovnikov (Moscow: Marjani [Mardzhani] Publishing House, 2010). The quotation at the end of the sentences is from Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence.

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4. Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence. 5. B. F. Sultanbekov, Tainy natsional’noi politiki TsK RKP: Stenograficheskii otchet sekretnogo IV soveshchaniia TsK RKP, 1923 g [Secrets of the Nationality Policy of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (CC RCP): Stenographic Report of the Classified 4th Consultation of the CC RCP of 1923] (Moscow: Insan, 1992), 197. Translation by the author. 6. Aleksandr Uralov [A. Avtorkhanov], Norodoubiisvo v SSSR: Ubiistvo chechenskogo naroda [The Killing of Peoples in the USSR: The Murder of the Chechen People] (Munich: Svobodnyi Kavkaz [Free Caucasus], 1952), 6162, http://www.vtoraya-literatura.com/ pdf/avtorkhanov_narodoubijstvo_v_sssr_chechensky_narod_1952_text.pdf. 7. Eduard Abramian, Kavkaztsy v Abvere [Caucasians in the Abwehr] (Moscow: Iauza, 2006). 8. Mark R. Beissinger., Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 53. 9. “All nations and nationalities inhabiting our country have contributed to the development of our socialist motherland, have been jointly defending its freedom and independence, its revolutionary gains from enemy invasions. If the national question was not resolved in principle in our country, there would not have been the Soviet Union of today in the social, cultural, economic and defense aspects. Our state would not have survived if there was no actual alignment of the republics, if there was no community based on brotherhood and cooperation, respect and mutual help.” Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i vsego mira [Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and for the World] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), http:// newchrono.ru/prcv/Publ/Gorbachev/perestroika.htm. Translation from Russian by the author. 10. Gail Lapidus, Victor Zaslavsky, and Philip Goldman, From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 11. Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Jane I. Dawson, Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). 12. Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (New York and London: New York University Press, 2007), 70. 13. Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence. 14. Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars, 86. 15. Ibid., 88. 16. Ibid., 88–89. 17. James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 94. 18. Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars, 92–93. 19. Mark Kramer, “Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian—Chechen Conflict,” Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 2 (2005): 209–290. 20. Mairbek Vatchagaev, “The Chechen Resistance: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” in Volatile Borderland: Russia and the North Caucasus, ed. Glen E. Howard (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2011/2012), 203–236. 21. Ibid., 208. 22. Ibid., 209.

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23. Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars. 24. Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, 100. 25. Ibid., 99–100. 26. Paul Goble, “The Future of the North Caucasus,” in Howard, Volatile Borderland, 29–43. 27. Ibid., 38. 28. Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, 100. 29. “Prezident Chechni obeshchaet udvoit’ valovoi produkt respubliki, privlech’ chastnye investitsii i priglashaet turistov v gornye sela ‘Chechenskoi Shveitsarii’” [The Chechen President Promises to Double the Gross Domestic Product of the Republic, to Attract Private Investments and Invites Tourists to the Mountain Villages of “the Chechen Switzerland] Newsru.com, July 9, 2007, http://www.newsru.com/russia/09jul2007/kadyrov .html. 30. Goble, “The Future of the North Caucasus,” 40.

Suggested Readings Coene, Frederik. 2010. The Caucasus: An Introduction. London and New York: Routledge. Forsyth, James. 2013. The Caucasus: A History. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Gammer, Moshe. 2006. The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Holman, Mirya, and Renat Shaykhutdinov. 2012. “The Chechen War and an Emerging Gender Gap in Russia.” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes 54 (1–2), (March–June): 87–112. Howard, Glen E., ed. 2011/2012. Volatile Borderland: Russia and the North Caucasus. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation. Zürcher, Christoph. 2007. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus. New York and London: New York University Press.

Appendix 1. Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations The Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations signed in Khasavy(o)urt, Dagestan by the representatives of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic–Ichkeria signifies the end of the First Chechen War. The document contains the principles regarding mutual relations between the sides, which lay out the basis for future negotiations. Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations Khasavyourt, Dagestan, 31 August 1996 We, the undersigned, Taking into account the progress achieved in implementing the agreement on the cessation of military activities, Striving to create mutually acceptable preconditions for a political resolution of the armed conflict,

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Recognising the inadmissibility of using armed force or threatening its usage in the resolution of all issues, Proceeding from the universally recognised right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equality, voluntary and free expression of will, strengthening interethnic accord and the security of peoples, Expressing the will to protect unconditionally human rights and freedoms and those of the citizen, irrespective of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, place of residence or any other distinctions, and to prevent acts of violence against political opponents, in doing so proceeding from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Have jointly developed Principles concerning mutual relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, on the basis of which the future negotiation process will be conducted. (Signed) A. Lebed A. Maskhadov B. Khartamov S. Abumuslimov 31 August 1996 In the presence of the Head of the OSCE Assistance Group of the Chechen Republic, (signed) T. Guldimann Source: United Nations Peacemaker. Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/russia-khasav yourtdeclaration96.

2. Principles for Determining the Basis for Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic 1. An Agreement on the basis for mutual relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, to be determined in accordance with universally recognized principles and norms of international law, should be achieved by 31 December 2001. 2. A Joint Commission shall be established by 1 October 1996, composed of representatives of the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, the tasks of which shall be: To monitor the implementation of Decree No. 985 of the President of the Russian Federation of 25 June 1995 and to prepare proposals concerning the completion of the withdrawal of troops; To prepare and monitor the fulfilment of agreed measures against crime, terrorism and manifestations of ethnic and religious enmity; To prepare proposals for the restoration of currency, financial and budgetary interrelations;

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To prepare and submit to the Government of the Russian Federation programs for the restoration of the socio-economic structure of the Chechen Republic; To monitor the coordinated interaction of the organs of state power and other interested parties in the provision of food and medicines for the population.

3. Legislation of the Chechen Republic shall be based on the observance of human and civil rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, the principles of equality among nationalities, the guaranteeing of civil peace, interethnic accord and the security of those residing on the territory of the Chechen Republic, irrespective of their ethnic origin, religious beliefs or other distinctions. 4. The Joint Commission shall complete its work by mutual agreement. Source: United Nations Peacemaker. Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peace maker.un.org/files/RU_960831_Khasavyourt%20Joint%20Declaration%20and%20 Principles%20for%20Mutual%20Relations.pdf.

Rwanda Hutu-Tutsi Conflict and Genocide in Central Africa Stephen D. Wrage

Timeline Pre-1500 Sometime before 1500, Bantu and Nilotic peoples migrate into Rwanda and displace the aboriginal pygmy Twa. Over time, a feudal system develops with relatively few land- and cattle-owning masters controlling many peasant tillers of the land. The cattle owners identify as Tutsi, the land tillers as Hutu. Tutsi kings rule over Rwanda. 1885 The kingdom of Rwanda comes under German colonial rule as a consequence of the Conference of Berlin. For decades to follow, control over Rwanda is sought by Germany, Belgium, and England. 1918 Rwanda passes from German control rule to Belgian as a consequence of Germany’s defeat in World War I. 1926 Belgian colonial rulers issue identity cards that label all Rwandans as Tutsi (14 percent), Hutu (85 percent), or Twa (1 percent). The identity cards formalize and give substance to the ethnic division between Hutus and Tutsis. 1959 King Mutara III, a Tutsi, dies, setting off violence in which thousands of Tutsi are killed by Hutus. 1962 The Belgian colonial rulers depart from Rwanda. More killing of Tutsis follows independence, and many flee to neighboring countries. Repeated periods of violence against the Tutsi occur between 1963 and 1967.

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1973 Hutu military chief Juvenal Habyarimana seizes power in the wake of violence against Tutsis. Under his new government, exclusion laws ban Tutsis from such institutions as universities, deprive them of political rights, and limit their representation in government jobs to 9 percent. 1989 Social pressures build in Rwanda as the first of several years of drought occurs. Agricultural production drops. At the same time, coffee and tea prices decline, suppressing Rwanda’s foreign earnings. 1989 The Habyarimana government comes under pressure from the United States and other aid-granting governments to democratize. (About 60 percent of the Rwandan budget comes from foreign aid.) 1990 From 1990 onward, the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) wages continual low-intensity guerrilla action against the predominantly Hutu forces of Rwanda. In 1990, the RPF invades Rwanda from Uganda. French troops assist the Habyarimana regime in driving the RPF back across the border. Many Tutsi are killed in reprisal for the invasion. 1993 February: An RPF offensive is stopped near Kigali by a combined force of Rwandan government troops and French troops. The RPF continues to hold significant territory. Peace negotiations take place. August 4: Habyarimana’s government and the RPF achieve a peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania. October: The UN Security Council approves the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), a modestly sized peacekeeping force with the mission to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Between October 1993 and March 1994, UNAMIR forces are built up to about 2,500 troops from Tunisia, Belgium, Bangladesh, and Ghana. 1994 April 6: President Juvenal Habyarimana is killed when his plane is destroyed by a missile. The same day, genocidal slaughter begins in Rwanda and continues for 100 days. Rwandan prime minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a Hutu, is tortured and murdered along with 10 Belgian soldiers sent to protect her. April 7: The United Nations begins a six-week debate on how to respond to the slaughter in Rwanda. The use of the word “genocide” is avoided because the United Nations would be required to intervene in a genocide. April 16: The UN Security Council reduces UNAMIR forces by roughly 90 percent to approximately 250. May 17: The UN Security Council decides to enlarge and strengthen UNAMIR to 5,500 men.

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Decisions on financing and operational issues are delayed until late July. May 25: The UN Human Rights Commission meets in Geneva and passes a resolution that implies that the slaughter is a “genocide.” July 6: Kigali is taken by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPA). July 18: A cease-fire is announced, and a new government, headed by Pasteur Bizimungu as president and Faustin Twagiramungu as prime minister, both Hutu, is established. The real power, however, rests with the Tutsi commander of the RPF, General Paul Kagame, who holds the posts of vice president and minister of defense. November: The UN Security Council establishes the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 1998 March 25: President Clinton stops at Kigali airport to apologize for American inaction at the time of the genocide. September 4: The ICTR hands down its first rulings, marking the first time that an international court has applied the Genocide Convention of 1948. The Rwandan prime minister at the time of the massacre, Jean Kambanda, is found guilty of genocide and sentenced to life in prison. 1999 March: Local elections are held. December: The United Nations issues its report on the failure of the international system to prevent or minimize the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The following year, Paul Kagame is chosen as interim president of Rwanda, an office he will win in the country’s national elections in 2003 and to which he will be overwhelmingly reelected in 2010 in elections tainted by violence. In the 100 days following April 6, 1994, the Hutu people of Rwanda engaged in an orgy of slaughter that left 800,000 people dead.1 The Hutu majority set out to exterminate the Tutsi minority, and, at the same time, killed many Hutu moderates. The Hutus carried out this project with stunning ruthlessness and unprecedented speed. They made little effort to conceal their actions, yet they were able to proceed almost entirely without interference from the United Nations, from the other countries of Africa, or from the rest of the world. Historical Background Rwanda is a small, mountainous state in south central Africa, no larger than Maryland, bordered by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and the Congo. It has no access to the sea, and the nearest port is more than 600 miles away. Coffee and tea have long been the source of two-thirds of its foreign currency, but most of its citizens practice subsistence agriculture or herding, earning the equivalent of about $290 per year. The population of Rwanda is divided into three groups: the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa, whose proportions in 1985 were roughly 88 percent, 11 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.2 The Twa, a pygmy people who dwelled in caves in the mountains of Rwanda for several thousand years, were conquered and displaced

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by Hutu or Tutsi invaders in the 15th or 16th century. It is not clear whether the Tutsi or the Hutu arrived first (or even whether they constitute two distinct ethnic groups), but each group claims to have arrived before the other and labels the other as late-coming invaders. Some ethnographers assert that the Hutu are a Bantu people who came from the south and west and that the Tutsi are a Nilotic people who came from the north and east. Other ethnographers and linguists maintain that there is no demonstrable difference between Tutsis and Hutus in appearance, language, or genetic background and assert that the divide between the two groups is based on imaginary distinctions.3 There may be no genetic distinction between the Hutu and Tutsi, but there is an economic divide. The Hutu traditionally have been tillers of the earth while the Tutsi have been herdsmen, and a kind of feudal relationship has existed between them. Over time, the Tutsi came to be the wealthier, dominant class, even though the Hutu were eight times as numerous. The German and Belgian colonial rulers of Rwanda treated the Tutsi as a superior caste of aristocrats and the Hutu as their vassals. Rwanda was subjected to colonization later than most of Africa, reflecting both its remoteness and its relative strength as a coherent kingdom. British explorer Sir Henry Morton Stanley attempted to visit Rwanda (in 1876) but was repulsed by warriors. The first Caucasian to enter the kingdom was Count Von Gotzen of Germany, who did not arrive until 1894, 36 years after British explorer John Hanning Speke had first reached Lake Victoria. Rwanda was first a German colony and then a Belgian one, passing from one power to the other in the game of colonial checkers that followed the German defeat in World War I. Like the Germans, the Belgian colonial authorities strongly favored the Tutsi, whom they perceived to be taller, finer featured, and natural aristocrats, and they abetted and encouraged the Tutsis’ often harsh treatment of the Hutu as serfs.4 In 1929, the Belgians helped deepen and perpetuate the divide between Hutus and Tutsis by establishing an identity card system that labeled every citizen of Rwanda a Hutu, a Tutsi, or a Twa. As the Belgians began to pare down their presence in Rwanda preparatory to their total withdrawal in 1962, Hutu extremists unleashed violent attacks on the Tutsis, killing several thousand. These Hutu attacks on Tutsis continued sporadically under the long dictatorship of Hutu general Juvenal Habyarimana, who seized power in a bloody coup in 1973 and ruled until the day the genocide began in 1994. The Habyarimana regime overtly favored the Hutu majority, and by 1990, more than a million Tutsi had left the country, about half of them fleeing to armed camps across the border to the north in Uganda. Although conditions for Tutsi were always oppressive and intermittently lethal under Habyarimana’s 21-year rule, Rwanda prospered to a considerable degree. In the 1970s and 1980s, its record of economic growth was far more favorable than that of other former French and Belgian colonies in Africa. The Conflict By the late 1980s, Habyarimana’s hold on power was slipping. The years 1989, 1991, and 1993 were all years of grave drought. Starting in 1990, the Rwandan

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Patriotic Front (or RPF, as the Tutsi rebels based in Uganda called themselves) launched numerous attacks across the border. Habyarimana’s domination of the political scene waned as political parties proliferated. Most of these parties were affiliated with the cause of Hutu Power. Hutu Power proponents backed a series of Tutsi exclusion laws limiting Tutsis’ rights to own property, banning marriage to non-Tutsis, and denying the right to travel or to join most organizations or to form political parties. Hutu Power newspapers and radio programs warned, often hysterically, that the Tutsi insurgents would overrun Rwanda and enslave and murder all Hutus, and they preached the need to organize for self-defense. The most notable of the Hutu propagandists was Hassan Ngeze, “a former busfare collector who had established himself as an entrepreneur, selling newspapers and drinks outside a gas station.”5 He popularized the term inyenzi (which means “cockroaches”) to refer to the Tutsi and warned everyone to be ready to defend themselves against inyenzi and their “accomplices,” meaning moderate Hutus. In December 1990, Ngeze issued the “Ten Hutu Commandments,” the last of which was “Hutus must stop having mercy on the Tutsis.”6 The Hutu Power parties sponsored youth militias, many of them based on soccer clubs. The largest of these militias was called Interahamwe, meaning “those who stand together”: The Interahamwe, and the various copycat groups that were eventually subsumed into it, promoted genocide as a carnival romp. Hutu Power youth leaders, jetting around on motorbikes and sporting pop hairstyles, dark glasses, and flamboyantly colored pajama suits and robes, preached ethnic solidarity and civil defense to increasingly packed rallies, where alcohol usually flowed freely, giant banners splashed with hagiographic portraits of Habyarimana flapped in the breeze, and paramilitary drills were conducted like the latest hot dance moves. The president and his wife often turned out to be cheered at these spectacles, while in private the members of the Interahamwe were organized into small neighborhood bands, drew up lists of Tutsis, and went on retreats to practice burning houses, tossing grenades, and hacking dummies up with machetes.7

When the RPF scored a series of military successes against Rwandan forces, Habyarimana chose a path of negotiation. On August 4, 1993, he signed a peace agreement with the insurgents in the Tanzanian town of Arusha. Under the Arusha Accords, Tutsi refugees would come home, the RPF would be included in a new transition government, elections would be held, and a United Nations peacekeeping force would be sent to observe the process. The prospect of sharing power divided the old Habyarimana oligarchy and cost the dictator many long-term supporters. The prospect of moderation outraged the Hutu Power extremists, in part because an end to RPF attacks threatened to rob them of their militias’ rationale for preparing violence against the Tutsis. Just across the southern border in Burundi, events occurred that strengthened the Hutu Power cause. In August 1993, an election had ended 30 years of Tutsi rule and installed the country’s first democratically chosen president, a Hutu. In November of that

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year, however, four Tutsi army officers assassinated him. In the violence that followed, over 50,000 persons, most of them Hutus, were killed. In keeping with the Arusha Accords, the UN Security Council approved the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) and, in October 1993, sent a multinational force of 2,500 troops to Kigali. It took five months to assemble this force because most countries, including large and wealthy ones, were not willing to make contributions or only very small ones. Ghana and Bangladesh provided half the troops in the end. Within days of the UN deployment, Hutu Power propagandist Hassan Ngeze was warning in his broadcasts that UNAMIR was nothing but a device “to help the RPF take power by force. . . . If the RPF has decided to kill us, then let’s kill each other. Let whatever is smoldering erupt. . . . At such a time, a lot of blood will be spilled.”8 On January 11, 1994, Ngeze’s newspaper declared UNAMIR ought to “consider its danger.”9 On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana was returning by plane from a follow-on meeting with RPF representatives in Arusha. As the plane approached Kigali, it was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile fired from near the airport. All aboard were killed. Hutu Power radio announced that RPF forces had infiltrated the country and were responsible for the attack and that it was time to strike back in self-defense. There is little doubt today that Hutu Power forces actually destroyed the plane.10 In the same hour the plane went down, the genocide began. The killing began in Kigali and was carried out by squads working from lists prepared in advance. They visited the home and work addresses of prominent Tutsis and moderate Hutus and took them to warehouses and army bases, where they were executed. There was little rape or looting at the start, and the victims were primarily adult males. The killing was rapid and methodical. In two or three days, after the Tutsi political, intellectual, and social elites had been nearly eliminated and the moderate Hutu leadership had been killed, the Hutu extremists shifted their tactics to terrorizing large numbers of people in the cities, driving them into the countryside, straining them through roadblocks on the way, and selecting those whose names appeared on lists for execution. At this point, the Hutu militias and Rwandan military began exterminating entire families and seizing their property.11 In the countryside, the murders typically were committed in schoolyards and churchyards. Government-controlled radio stations announced that churches would be sanctuaries to encourage potential victims to concentrate themselves there. The churches were then surrounded by militias who often set up barbed wire and watch fires. Tutsis who defended themselves with sticks and rocks sometimes were able to make standoffs last for days or weeks, even after water and food supplies were cut off. Finally, experienced killers armed with rifles and grenades would be sent to the town to organize the slaughter. These Interahamwe professionals often found willing executioners among the locals, but they also took care to compel as many people as possible to “do their duty” with a machete. In this way, the genocide was spread, and few were left untouched. Some were made into victims, others into perpetrators.

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The Interahamwe killing squads brought order and method to the task. Because committing murder with a machete or a hoe is exhausting work, they organized people into shifts, with scheduled rest periods and communal meals, often feasting on the cattle that belonged to their victims. They cut the Achilles tendons of some intended victims so they could not run away before the work crews were ready for them. Others they allowed to pay bribes to die by a bullet rather than by hacking. The following description of the process of slaughter comes from the London Economist: Using the organizational skills of the local civil service and the muscle of the army, it was easy for the Hutu militiamen to herd 5,000 members of the minority Tutsi tribe, and some Hutu members of opposition parties, into the church of St. Vincent—and then to kill them all. . . . Militiamen controlled by the ruling party had been asking every local council to organize “local security meetings” since December. These were widely taken as means of identifying Tutsis for murder later on. “The Tutsis did not go, and those Hutu who refused would find themselves on a death list,” says a UN consultant until recently based in Kigali. With the help of the army, the victims were then crowded into St. Vincent, a few yards away. Then the militiamen were let loose. They tossed grenades in through the windows, sprayed machine gun bullets from next to the altar, and finally went in—with their wives and children—to finish the slaughter with machetes. The local council’s earth-moving equipment was used to bury the bodies of the maybe 5,000 victims in a neat mass grave.12

The genocide proceeded with astonishing speed. Although the killing was “low tech,” usually performed with a machete or a hoe and carried out in large part by amateurs (often the neighbors and workmates of the victims), “the dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust.”13 Management of the Conflict Although the remnants of the Habyarimana regime collaborated openly with the Hutu extremists and supported the genocidal militias with weapons and uniformed troops, they had no difficulty fending off efforts from outside powers aimed at stopping the slaughter.14 The rest of the world seemed eager to look the other way. The United States was loathe to intervene, in part because seven months earlier, in October 1993, 18 U.S. Army Rangers had been killed in Somalia as part of a peacekeeping mission that had gone terribly wrong. In the very months that the situation in Rwanda was unfolding, a campaign to oust a dictatorship in Haiti was coming to a climax and would result, in September 1994, in an invasion of Haiti using 20,000 troops. The Clinton administration was determined not to be drawn into a third such intervention and so responded to news of the slaughter with implausible evasions and long delays. As Rwandans were murdered at the rate of 1,000 per day, U.S. policy makers refused to use the obvious term: “genocide.” Instead, they spoke of “acts of ethnic

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violence” and maintained that the United States had no obligation to act, even though it is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Genocide. The United Nations was no more effective than the United States. There was no leadership emanating from the Security Council; in fact, the United States worked there with Belgium and other powers to forestall any response beyond debate and expressions of concern. On April 6, 1994, the day the violence began, Hutu militia killed 10 Belgian soldiers attached to UNAMIR who had been sent to protect the prime minister. The Belgians moved at once to withdraw their troops and set about lobbying others to join them in calls to reduce the UN forces or terminate UNAMIR entirely. For six weeks, April 7–May 17, 1994, the UN Security Council debated its response to Rwanda. Its only decisive act came on April 16, 10 days after Habyarimana’s assassination, when the Security Council voted to cut the size of the forces committed to UNAMIR by almost 90 percent, leaving about 250 troops in Rwanda, a force too small to even monitor the slaughter effectively. During this period, corpses were accumulating at about 8,000 per day. After watching the slaughter for six weeks, on May 17, the UN Security Council declared an intention to increase the UNAMIR forces to about 5,000, but decisions regarding the size, source, and logistical support of the various national contingents were delayed until late July. On May 25, 1994, Secretary-General BoutrosGhali told a news conference in New York, “It is a failure not only of the United Nations. . . . It is a failure of the international community. It is a genocide. More than 200,000 people have been killed, and we are still discussing what to do.”15 It was not the United Nations or the international community but rather the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front that brought the genocide to an end. By early July, the RPF had pushed to the outskirts of Kigali. On July 6, the city fell, and on July 18, the Tutsi forces imposed a cease-fire and set up a puppet government headed by two Hutu figures. At that point, of the 1.1 million Tutsis alive in April 1994, only 300,000 survived. Three years later, on March 25, 1998, President Clinton stopped at the airport in Kigali to apologize for American indifference at the time of the genocide: During the ninety days that began on April 6, 1994, Rwanda experienced the most intensive slaughter in this blood-filled century. It is important that the world know that these killings were not spontaneous or accidental. . . . They were most certainly not the result of ancient tribal struggles. . . . These events grew from a policy aimed at the systematic destruction of a people.16

Significance The record of the slaughter in Rwanda raises at least three points important to students of ethnic conflict in the 20th century. First, mass murder occurred in Rwanda at a rate unprecedented in history. With between 800,000 and 1 million dead in 100 days, an average of 8,000 to 10,000 persons died every day. This rate of killing exceeded past epochal acts in the obliteration of humanity, including the Crusaders’ sack of Jerusalem, Tamerlane’s destruction of Delhi, and the incineration of

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Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.17 In those cases, the death toll may have been very great for several days, but the profligate destruction of human life was not sustained for as long as it was in Rwanda. Second, there is excellent reason to doubt that any biologically verifiable ethnic distinction actually existed between the murderers and their victims. Although almost every Rwandan citizen carried an identity card labeling him or her a Hutu or a Tutsi, ethnographers can make only a weak case for distinguishing the two groups as they do not differ significantly in appearance, language, traditions, or in other ways. The murderers and their victims appear to have been ethnically identical, and the massive crime of hundreds of thousands of murders seems to have been carried out on the basis of an imaginary distinction. Finally, the mass murder required and was the result of years of propaganda. Over the course of a decade, the minds of both the killers and their victims had been prepared through the teachings of the Hutu Power movement. During the 100 days, the Hutu Power leaders directed the slaughter like a horrific movie with a cast of millions. In short, the genocide in Rwanda did not just happen, nor was it an inexplicable episode of mass frenzy. Rather, it was the product of a program that was successfully implemented in Rwanda and might be initiated elsewhere. While this is horrifying, it is also encouraging in this sense: if the genocide required preparation, planning, and implementation, similar preparations elsewhere may be detected, plans may be interrupted, and implementation may be disrupted. The events in Rwanda should put an end to the fatalistic cliché that genocide is merely the spontaneous and irresistible outbreak of ancient ethnic hatreds. Notes 1. Estimates of the number of violent deaths range from 800,000 to over 1,000,000. When the number of fatalities caused by disease and hardship in refugee camps is added, the estimated totals nearly double. 2. Richard F. Nyropp, Rwanda: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 3. 3. Philip Gourevitch, author of the best book-length account of the genocide in Rwanda, is skeptical of any ethnic distinction: With time, Hutus and Tutsis spoke the same language, followed the same religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled, without territorial distinctions, on the same hills, sharing the same social and political culture in small chiefdoms. The chiefs were called Mwamis, and some of them were Hutus, some Tutsis; Hutus and Tutsis fought together in the Mwamis’ armies; through marriage and clientage, Hutus could become hereditary Tutsis, and Tutsis could become hereditary Hutus. Because of all this mixing, ethnographers have come to agree that Hutus and Tutsis cannot properly be called distinct ethnic groups.

Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1998), 47–48. 4. On the dismal Belgian record of rule, see Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). 5. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 85.

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6. See Gary Rosen, “Can We Prevent Genocide?” Commentary (February 1999): 52. 7. See Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 93. Between 1990 and 1994, the Habyarimana government imported massive shipments of machetes from China and rifles and grenades from France and distributed them to these militias. 8. See Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 100. 9. Ibid., 103. 10. For a discussion of the identity of the assassins, see Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 213–229. Prunier identifies Hutu extremists as the likeliest culprits and observes, “The plane was shot down at around 8:30 pm, and by 9:15 there were already Interahamwe roadblocks everywhere in town and houses were being searched.” 11. As early as the first week, rape was deployed as a weapon to humiliate Tutsi women and destroy Tutsi families. Twa men were employed as rapists because there was an additional stigma attached to rape by a man of the pygmy race. See Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 8. 12. “Rwanda: The Art of Death,” The Economist (London), May 28, 1994: 35. 13. See Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You, 3; and Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 261: “The daily killing rate was at least five times that of the Nazi death camps.” 14. Government ministers did nothing to prevent the slaughter. Dr. Rwamakuba, a medical doctor and secretary for primary and secondary education, shouted during a recent interview, “We have tried to protect the minority [Tutsis] for 15 years. But they don’t want protection, they want war.” As he spoke, two miles away, helpless Tutsis were being murdered. “Rwanda: The Art of Death,” The Economist, May 28, 1994: 35. 15. “Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for Not Saving Rwanda,” New York Times, May 26, 1994, late edition: Al. 16. “Clinton’s Painful Words of Sorrow and Chagrin,” New York Times, March 26, 1998, late edition: A12. 17. The Nazis’ efforts at mass murder led many writers to conclude that genocide was a peculiarly 20th-century crime requiring the use of modern technology. The methods employed in Rwanda demonstrate that this is not the case.

Suggested Readings Dallaire, Romeo. 2004. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Boston: De Capo Press. Destexhe, Alain. 1995. Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press. Feil, Scott R. 1998. Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Gourevitch, Philip. 1998. We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. Hatzfeld, Jean. 2006. Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak. Translated by Linda Cloverdale. London: Picador. Hochschild, Adam. 1998. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Klinghoffer, Arthur J. 1998. The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda. New York: New York University Press.

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Kuperman, Alan J. 2000. “Rwanda in Retrospect.” Foreign Affairs 79 (1) (January/February): 94–118. Power, Samantha, 2001. “Bystanders to Genocide.” Atlantic Monthly (September). Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/ 304571/. Prunier, Gerard. 1995. The Rwanda Crisis: A History of Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press. Rosen, Gary. 1999. “Can We Prevent Genocide?” Commentary (February): 51–56. Speke, John Hanning. 1864. Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile. New York: Harper. United Nations. 1996. The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996. New York: Department of Public Information of the United Nations. United States Department of State briefing, June 10, 1994. Video. While the genocide was under way, the daily briefer at the U.S. State Department was required to perform verbal gymnastics to avoid using the politically charged word “genocide.” Video of the briefing by State Department spokesperson Christine Shelley is available at https://www .youtube.com/watch?v=bjJdZ0cUZFs.

Appendices 1.The Dallaire Telegram Four months before the genocide began, Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, sent a prophetic telegram to the office of UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, explaining the preparations for genocide being carried out by the Hutu Power faction and the interahamwe militias and asking for permission to disrupt them. He was strictly enjoined from intervening because such actions would go far beyond his mission as an observer. to: baril/dpko/unations new york from: dallaire/unamir/kigali fax no: most immediate-code cable-212-xxx-xxxx inmarsat: fax no:

011-xxx-xxxxx

subject: request for protection of informant attn: mgen baril room no:

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total number of transmitted pages including this one:

2

1. Force commander put in contact with informant by very important government politician. Informant is a top level trainer in the cadre of interhamwe-armed militia of MRND. 2. He informed us he was in charge of last Saturdays demonstrations which aims were to target deputies of opposition parties coming to ceremonies and Belgian soldiers. They hoped to provoke the RPF BN to engage (being fired upon) the demonstrators and provoke a civil war. Deputies were to be assassinated upon entry or exit from Parliament. Belgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgians soldiers restored to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda.

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3. Informant confirmed 48 RGF PARA CDO and a few members of the gendarmerie participated in demonstrations in plain clothes. Also at least one Minister of the MRND and the sous-prefect of Kigali were in the demonstration. RGF and Interhamwe provided radio communications. 4. Informant is a former security member of the president. He also stated he is paid RF150,000 per month by the MRND party to train Interhamwe. Direct link is to chief of staff RGF and president of the MRND for financial and material support. 5. Interhamwe has trained 1700 men in RGF military camps outside the capital. The 1700 are scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since UNAMIR deployed he has trained 300 personnel in three week training sessions at RGF camps. Training focus was discipline, weapons, explosives, close combat and tactics. 6. Principal aim of Interhamwe in the past was to protect Kigali from RPF. Since UNAMIR mandate he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis. 7. Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi extermination. He supports opposition to RPF but cannot support killing of innocent persons. He also stated that he believes the president does not have full control over all elements of his old party/faction. 8. Informant is prepared to provide location of major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons. He already has distributed 110 weapons including 35 with ammunition and can give us details of their location. Type of weapons are G3 and AK47 provided by RGF. He was ready to go to the arms cache tonight—if we gave him the following guarantee. He requests that he and his family (his wife and four children) be placed under our protection. 9. It is our intention to take action within the next 36 hours with a possible H HR of Wednesday at dawn (local). Informant states that hostilities may commence again if political deadlock ends. Violence could take place day of the ceremonies or the day after. Therefore Wednesday will give greatest chance of success and also be most timely to provide significant input to on-going political negotiations. 10. It is recommended that informant be granted protection and evacuated out of Rwanda. This HQ does not have previous UN experience in such matters and urgently requests guidance. No contact has as yet been made to any embassy in order to inquire if they are prepared to protect him for a period of time by granting diplomatic immunity in their embassy in Kigali before moving him and his family out of the country. 11. Force commander will be meeting with the very very important political person tomorrow morning in order to ensure that this individual is conscious of all parameters of his involvement. Force commander does have certain reservations on the suddenness of the change of heart of the informant to come clean with this information. Recce of armed cache and detailed planning of raid to go on late tomorrow. Possibility of a trap not fully excluded, as this may be a set-up against this very very important political person. Force commander to inform SRSG first thing in morning to ensure his support. 13. Peux Ce Que Veux. Allons-y. Source: Transcribed from the National Security Archive Collection. Available at http://nsar chive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw011194.pdf.

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2. United Nations Document S/199/1257 English Version Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda 15 December 1999 The United Nations report on the massacres in Rwanda in 1999 goes further than merely identifying the circumstances leading to and the failures of the multiple actors who might have prevented or minimized that genocide. Its conclusions, excerpted below, also provide a valuable insight into the nature and limitations of United Nations peacekeeping operations in general during the 1990s, when the United Nations committed itself in 5 years to more peacekeeping operations than it had undertaken in the previous 45 years of its history. … III. Conclusions The Independent Inquiry finds that the response of the United Nations before and during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda failed in a number of fundamental respects. The responsibility for the failings of the United Nations to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda lies with a number of different actors, in particular the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the Security Council, UNAMIR and the broader membership of the United Nations. This international responsibility is one which warrants a clear apology by the Organization and by Member States concerned to the Rwandese people. As to the responsibility of those Rwandans who planned, incited and carried out the genocide against their countrymen, continued efforts must be made to bring them to justice – at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and nationally in Rwanda. In the following chapter, the Inquiry wishes firstly to identify the overriding failure in the response of the United Nations: the lack of capacity of the Unite Nations peacekeeping mission in place to deal with the realities of the challenge it was faced with. Subsequently, the Inquiry will point to a number of other mistakes and failings in the response of the United Nations during the period under review. 1. The overriding failure The overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide. UNAMIR, the main component of the United Nations presence in Rwanda, was not planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble. The mission was smaller than the original recommendations from the field suggested. It was slow in being set up, and was beset by debilitating administrative difficulties. It lacked well-trained troops and functioning materiel. The mission’s mandate was based on an analysis of the peace process which proved erroneous, and which was never corrected despite the significant warning signs that the original mandate had become inadequate. By the time the genocide started, the mission was not functioning as a cohesive whole: in the real hours and days of deepest crisis,

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consistent testimony points to a lack of political leadership, lack of military capacity, severe problems of command and control and lack of coordination and discipline. A force numbering 2,500 should have been able to stop or at least limit massacres of the kind which began in Rwanda after the plane crash which killed the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. However, the Inquiry has found that the fundamental capacity problems of UNAMIR led to the terrible and humiliating situation of a UN peacekeeping force almost paralysed in the face of a wave of some of the worst brutality humankind has seen in this century. Despite the failure of UNAMIR, it should be said that United Nations personnel within UNAMIR and in the programmes and agencies also performed acts of courage in the face of the chaos that developed in Rwanda, and did save the lives of many civilians, political leaders and United Nations staff, sometimes at the risk of their own lives. . . . 2. The inadequacy of UNAMIR’s mandate The decisions taken with respect to the scope of the initial mandate of UNAMIR were an underlying factor in the failure of the mission to prevent or stop the genocide in Rwanda. The planning process failed to take into account remaining serious tensions which had not been solved in the agreement between the parties. The United Nations mission was predicated on the success of the peace process. There was no fall-back, no contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process did not succeed. The overriding failure to create a force with the capacity, resources and mandate to deal with the growing violence and eventual genocide in Rwanda had roots in the early planning of the mission. The signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 was generally hailed with optimism and relief following the years of difficult negotiations between the Rwandan parties. Although tensions clearly persisted below the surface, not least within the Government delegation, the international community received the Accords as the starting point for peace and power-sharing in Rwanda. The over-optimistic assumption by the parties to the Arusha Agreement that an international force could be deployed in about a month meant that the United Nations was fighting the clock from the first days of preparing for UNAMIR. The initial planning process suffered from insufficient political analysis. . . . 3. The implementation of the mandate Further serious difficulties arose with the implementation of UNAMIR’s mandate. UNAMIR’s mandate was cautious in its inception. It was to become equally so in its application on the ground. Headquarters consistently decided to apply the mandate in a manner which would preserve a neutral role of UNAMIR under a traditional peacekeeping mandate. This was the scope of action that was perceived to have support in the Security Council. Despite facing a deteriorating security situation which would have motivated a more assertive and preventive role for the United Nations, no steps were taken to adjust the mandate to the reality of the needs in Rwanda. . . .

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4. Confusion over the rules of engagement The Force Commander submitted a draft set of Rules of Engagement for UNAMIR to Headquarters on 23 November 1993, asking Headquarters’ approval. Headquarters never responded to that request. The Inquiry was told by General Baril that the Rules were considered guidelines. While General Baril stated that he considered the draft a good one, he also said that at the time, Headquarters did not have a procedure in place for the formal approval of the draft Rules of Engagement. To the Force Commander, in the absence of a formal reply, the Rules of Engagement must be considered approved and in effect, a conclusion which the Inquiry believes was reasonable. At the same time, another senior member of the UNAMIR command told the Inquiry that the Rules of Engagement did not conform to reality and that he ignored them. . . . It is disturbing, however, that there was such a lack of clarity in the communications between UNAMIR and Headquarters regarding which rules were in force. 5. Failure to respond to the genocide a. After the Presidential plane was shot down, the situation in Kigali quickly descended into chaos. Roadblocks were set up, massacres of Tutsi and opposition and moderate politicians began. Soon, the RPF broke out of its complex, and were strengthened by forces from outside the capital. In addition to the killings of civilians, fighting broke out between the Presidential Guards and the RPF. UNAMIR was faced with hundreds of calls for help from politicians, staff members and others. Thousands of people sought refuge at sites where UNAMIR was present, including about 5,000 people who had gathered at the field hospital already by 8 April. When the genocide began the weakness of UNAMIR’s mandate became devastatingly clear. The natural question is why a force numbering 2,500 could not stop the actions of the militia and RPF soldiers who began setting up roadblocks and killing politicians and Tutsi in the early hours after the crash. Could UNAMIR not have deterred, by its presence and a show of determination, the terrible sequence of violence that followed. . . . 6. Peacekeeping overburdened: inadequate resources and logistics Rwanda was to prove to be a turning point in United Nations peacekeeping, and came to symbolize a lack of will to commit to peacekeeping, and above all, to take risks in the field. UNAMIR came about following a dramatic expansion of the number of peacekeeping troops in the field after the end of the cold war. However, by the second half of 1993, the enthusiasm for United Nations peacekeeping of previous years was on the wane among key member states, the capacity of the Secretariat . . . to administer the approximately 70,000 peacekeepers wearing blue berets was overstretched, and several existing operations were facing severe difficulties. . . . 7. The Shadow of Somalia It has often been said that UNAMIR was an operation created in the shadow of Somalia. In particular the deaths of the Pakistani and US peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 had a deep effect on the attitude towards the conduct of peacekeeping operations. For instance, the UN commission of inquiry set up to study these tragic deaths in Somalia, whose report came out just as preparations were being made to strengthen UNAMIR in the wake of the

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genocide, concluded that “the UN should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflict of states (S/1994/653). For the Government of the United States, the events in Mogadishu were a watershed in its policy towards UN peacekeeping. By May 1994, when the genocide in Rwanda began, President Clinton had enacted PDD25, a directive which placed strict conditions on US support for United Nations peacekeeping. The killings of the peacekeepers in Somalia also had a restrictive effect on the UN Secretariat, in particular with regard to the risks that could be assumed during peacekeeping operations and in respect to the interpretation of mandates. This legacy of Somalia was of particular importance to the conduct of UNAMIR. . . . 9. Lack of analytical capacity A problem in the United Nations response to the situation in Rwanda was the weaknesses apparent in the capacity for political analysis, within particular in UNAMIR but also at Headquarters. With respect to UNAMIR, a key problem identified by the Force Commander in an interview with the Inquiry as the weak political representation in the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda in August 1993 and the lack of real understanding the team had about the underlying political realities of the Rwandan peace process. . . . 10. The lack of political will of Member States Another reason for the main failure of the international community in Rwanda was the lack of political will to give UNAMIR the personnel and materiel resources the mission needed. Even after the Security Council decided to act and try to stop the killing, and reversed its decision to reduce UNAMIR, the problems that the Secretariat had faced since UNIMIR’s inception in getting contributions of troops from Member States persisted. This was the case throughout in May and June during the urgent attempts to set up UNAMIR II. The lack of will to send troops to Rwanda continued to be deplorably evident in the weeks following the decision by the Security Council to increase the strength of UNAMIR to 5,000. For weeks the Secretariat tried to solicit troop contributions, to little avail. . . . 12. Failure to protect civilians The role of UNAMIR in the protection of civilians during the genocide is one of the most debated and painful issues of this period. Considerable efforts were made by members of UNAMIR, sometimes at risk to themselves, to provide protection to civilians at risk during the massacres. However, there do not seem to have been conscious and consistent orders down the chain of command on this issue. During the early days of the genocide, thousands of civilians congregated in places where UN troops were stationed, i.a., the Amahore Stadium and the Ecole Technique at Kieukiro. And when UNAMIR later came to withdraw from areas under its protection, civilians were placed at risk. Tragically, there is evidence that in certain instances, the trust placed in UNAMIR by civilians left them in a situation of greater risk, when the UN troops withdrew than they would have been otherwise. . . .

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19. Final observations On 15 November, 1999, a few weeks before the presentation of this report, the SecretaryGeneral published a report on the fall of Srebrenica (ref A/54/549). Clearly, some of the criticisms directed at the actions of the United Nations in that report and the lessons learned drawn from them are also relevant to the present analysis of the role of the United Nations in Rwanda. One such point is that “a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel or murder and entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means, and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion.” Faced in Rwanda with the risk of genocide, and later the systematic implementation of a genocide, the United Nations had an obligation to act which transcended traditional principles of peacekeeping. In effect, there can be no neutrality in the face of genocide, no impartiality in the face of a campaign to exterminate part of a population. Source: Council of Foreign Relations Archives. Available at http://www.cfr.org/rwanda/unreport-independent-inquiry-into-actions-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda /p24243.

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Spain Nationalism without Contentious Conflict: The New Basque Normal Roland Vazquez

Timeline 1029 Sancho the Elder incorporates the western Basque territory into the Kingdom of Navarra. 1200 The separation of Navarra and Basque provinces begins through Castilian conquest. 1379 The province of Bizkaia is joined in marriage to the Kingdom of Castilla. 1512 Navarra is absorbed by Castilla. 1545 The first book in the Basque language is published. 1717 A royal decree to include Basque imports within a common Spanish tariff system leads to revolt, with the original customs stations being returned. 1833 The First Carlist War begins. It will last until 1840. 1873 The Second Carlist War begins. Upon its conclusion in 1876, customs control is moved to state borders.

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1895 Sabino Arana founds the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). 1898 Spain’s last colonies are lost in the Spanish-American War. 1923 Miguel Primo de Rivera seizes power in Spain. 1930 Primo de Rivera resigns, with events culminating in Spain’s Second Republic and 1931 Constitution. 1936 The first Basque autonomy statute is approved and the Basque Government formed. The Spanish Civil War begins. 1937 Guernica is bombed by the German Condor Legion in alliance with the Spanish Nationalist right. 1939 The Spanish Civil War ends, with Francisco Franco assuming power. 1959 The Ekin cultural group splits from the PNV’s youth group, forming Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA). 1968 ETA member Txabi Etxebarrieta kills civil guard José Antonio Pardines and is killed. ETA retaliates by killing police inspector Melitón Manzanas. 1970 In the Burgos trial, 16 ETA members are tried and convicted, with 6 sentenced to death. The death sentences are commuted. 1973 The ETA assassinates Spanish prime minister Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s heir apparent. 1975 Franco dies.

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1977 The first elections in 41 years are held. 1978 Spain’s constitution is ratified (albeit not in the Basque Country). 1979 The Basque Autonomy Statute is approved, resulting in creation of the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC). 1983 Operations of the anti-ETA paramilitary Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (GAL) begin. 1987 The ETA carries out bloody attacks in Barcelona and Zaragoza. 1995 The corpses of ETA members Joxean Lasa and Joxi Zabala, killed by GAL, are discovered. 1997 The ETA kills Miguel Ángel Blanco. The radical nationalist executive committee is imprisoned. 1998 The highest-ranking Spanish officials to date are convicted in the GAL affair. The ETA declares a cease-fire. The Lizarra Pact is signed. 1999 The ETA resumes attacks. 2000 Socialist Fernando Buesa and bodyguard Jorge Díez are killed by the ETA. 2001 The Basque government creates the Department for Attention to Victims of Terrorism. 2002 A radical Basque nationalist party is outlawed by Spanish courts for alleged connections to the ETA.

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2004 Al Qaeda bombs Madrid-area trains. The conservative government accuses the ETA and loses the Spanish election because of a perceived lack of transparency. 2006 Spanish courts begin to apply the “Parot Doctrine,” leading to the extension of prison terms. The ETA bombs Madrid’s airport. 2007 Several radical Basque nationalist parties are declared unconstitutional by Spanish courts. The Basque government commemorates the first Institutional Act of Homage and Recognition to the Victims of Terrorism. 2008 The Basque parliament approves the Law of Recognition and Reparation to the Victims of Terrorism. 2009 The first nonnationalist Basque prime minister, socialist Patxi López, is elected. Basque nationalists represent a minority in parliament. 2011 The ETA announces the “definitive end” of its armed activity. 2012 A radical Basque nationalist party explicitly renouncing violence is declared legal by Spain’s Constitutional Court. 2013 Following the December 2012 BAC elections, Basque nationalists control parliament. The European Court of Human Rights overturns the Parot Doctrine. Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution affirms Spain’s indivisibility while recognizing its peoples’ right to self-determination. This juridical paradox has at its heart the long, unfinished process of Spain’s statecrafting in the face of alternative projects. Of these, the most virulent for the past century (and, arguably, longer) has been the Basque. In its maximalist expanse, the Basque Country consists of seven provinces or historic territories: three to the north of the French-Spanish border and four to the south. The three in France, Labourd, Basse Navarre, and Soule, are subsumed within the département of the Pyrénées Atlantiques. The four in Spain account for over four-fifths of the Basque population and territory. Three, Araba, Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa, make up the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), the result of a

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1979 statute. The fourth, Navarra, comprises its own autonomous community as a result of a subsequent statute. As the “Basque Ulster,” its noninclusion in the BAC has historically been a point of contention among nationalists (although rhetoric has diminished since the statutes).1 And, even after the October 2011 announcement of the “definitive end” of armed activities, the insurgent separatist ETA (Euskadi ’ta Askatasuna, or Basque Homeland and Freedom) remains the best-known Basque acronym. Historical Background The much-debated ethnic charter for Basque political distinctiveness is rooted in prehistory, with Cromagnon remains in the western Pyrenees Mountains suggesting (albeit not definitively) a direct connection with the historical population. The Basques are distinguished from the Spanish and French populations by different blood-type ratios. Euskera, the Basque language, is a non-Indoeuropean, agglutinative language, alone in its family. Although only a quarter of the population speaks it, Euskera’s distinctiveness is vital to the sense of Basque exceptionalism. The Basques were never fully integrated into the Roman system. Unlike a majority of the Iberian Peninsula after 8th-century North African expansion, Basque territory was not conquered by Muslims, although they did briefly take the Kingdom of Pamplona (later Navarra’s capital). By the 10th century, a small but unified Navarra would be a regional power. In 1029, Sancho the Elder incorporated the western Basque territory (roughly coterminous with the BAC) into Navarra—the first time that all Basque-inhabited land south of the Pyrenees was politically unified. The majority of the populations of Navarra, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, north across the Pyrenees into Gascogne, and south into Castilla (the heart of modern Spain) was Basquespeaking. They had no sense of political consciousness as such, however, as the language was rejected as a vehicle for high culture. Nevertheless, from at least the late 10th century (and, unmodified since the mid-12th century), local and later provincial agreements called fueros guaranteed an exceptional degree of territorial control. After Sancho’s death, his kingdom was split among his three sons, to Navarra’s detriment. In the 12th century, most of the present BAC came under control of the Kingdom of Castilla, thereby being separated from Navarra. The following two centuries witnessed a sharp recession of Basque-speaking territory. In 1379, Bizkaia was joined to Castilla through marriage. While remaining independent, Bizkaia would recognize the Crown within the limits of its own local autonomy and custom. The Spanish project was completed in 1512 when King Ferdinand conquered Navarra, incorporating it into an expanding imperial state. This was a tenuous balancing act, however, given the kingdom’s internal pluralism. Among Spanish subjects, the Basques would, through their fueros, benefit through singular exemptions and distinct legal status. They would also be major players in the rising Spanish colonial project. In 1659, France and Spain signed the Treaty of the Pyrenees, strictly determining the boundary division. This event was important in a trajectory that would pull apart the two segments of Basque territory.

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Following the War of Spanish Succession (1702–1713), Navarra and the Basque provinces accepted the inheritance of the Spanish Crown by a junior branch of the French Bourbon dynasty. But the Crown soon attempted to override the fiscal exemptions granted by the fueros by including Basque imports within a common Spanish tariff system. The reaction, a mass revolt in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, was bloodily suppressed, but the customs borders were restored. Meanwhile, an alternative cultural project was ascendant. Although Basque was and would remain (until the late 20th century) largely an oral language, the first book was published in 1545. In 1571, Esteban de Garibay published a compendium explaining Basque origins, arguing that the area was populated by Tubal (a grandson of Noah) and Euskera was one of the original languages in the Tower of Babel. In the 18th century, the Jesuit Manuel Larramendi advanced theories of Basque exceptionalism and published the first Euskera grammar. In 1766, the Basque Society of Friends of the Country was born; this transatlantic economic association was the first to use the term “Basque nation.” When Prince Fernando acceded to the throne on the eve of the French invasion and War of Independence (1808–1814), he decreed full restoration of the fueros, but they were entirely negated by the liberal Constitution of 1812. Following the disbanding of regional parliaments, support for Don Carlos’s claim to the Spanish throne led to the Carlist War (1833–1840), seen in the Basque Country as a defense of their traditions. Increasing anticlericalism throughout Spain led to the backlash of another Carlist revolt (1873–1876). One consequence of this second defeat was the definitive redrawing of customs borders. This death knell for the fueros hurt the Basques in European markets. The postwar conjuncture was one of great upheaval. Rapid growth, especially through midcentury Bizkaian industrialization, would encourage widespread Spanish migration. A Basque sense of cultural displacement arose, especially on the heels of the two unsuccessful wars. Until the late 19th century, Basques in France were more active in cultural production than their southern brethren. But, Spanish penetration into local affairs would be more problematic. The century’s final great event was the Spanish-American War of 1898, in which Spain lost its last colonies. The impact of empire upon Spain and the Basque Country alike had been great. So, too, would be the effect of its loss on political and economic alignment and sense of national identity. Important sectors of the Basque population saw that postimperial Spain could not be counted on as their “national” project. From Regionalism to Nationalism

In 1895, Sabino Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, or PNV). Arana’s father had supported Carlism, to his personal detriment. An ardent Catholic and not a native speaker, Sabino devoted himself to Basque studies. He preached a gospel of ethnic and cultural purity mixed with religious zeal after his political epiphany, denying the legitimacy of Spanish rule. A feeble but charismatic figure, Arana was revered by his followers. By the time of his premature

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death in 1903, although its infrastructure and following were limited, Arana had single-handedly founded Basque nationalism. Of negligible strength in its early years, the movement spread from its urban Bilbao cradle into the countryside. It was beset with the major dilemmas that would subsequently mark its internal dynamics: the degree that nationalism should be connected to its Catholic roots and how extreme secessionist demands should be. (Albeit, to a lesser extent since the 1980s, this latter issue has continued to mark its political trajectory.) While Spanish humiliation over the unsuccessful Moroccan campaign was the impetus for Miguel Primo de Rivera’s authoritarian state regime (1923–1930), disorder and political dissidence were also factors. The regime’s ambivalent policy of prohibiting regional political activity while allowing cultural association was the seed for nationalism’s flowering. At the beginning of the Second Republic in 1931, the PNV did not command a Basque majority. Nationalism was one vertex of a political triangle, with the statecentralizing Spanish right and the anticonfessional Spanish left. None of the three could impose its will. In the republic’s twilight, nationalists secured an autonomy statute from the left-led state government, resulting in the formation of a regional government. With the 1936 outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, choosing sides was unavoidable. Basque nationalists again cast their lot with the Spanish left. (Some PNV leaders entertained thoughts of siding with the Spanish right, largely because of leftist attacks against the church.) The war’s darkest day for the Basques was April 26, 1937, when the German Condor Legion, allied to General Francisco Franco’s cause, bombed Guernica. Largely due to Picasso’s painting named after the town, the attack would convert Guernica into an international symbol of peace. When Bilbao fell two months later, although the war would continue into 1939, it was basically over for the Basques. As retribution for their pro-republican posture, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa were declared “traitor provinces.” Executions and property confiscation were rampant. The number of Basques in exile approached 150,000. Use of Euskera was prohibited, and the outflow of capital and resources from these industrialized provinces into the early 1950s was striking. The PNV-led Basque government-in-exile, headed by José Antonio Aguirre, pinned its hopes on external intervention, especially given international isolation of Franco’s regime. Cold War geopolitics, however, led to an about-face of American attitudes in 1947. U. S. military bases would find their way into Spain. By the 1950s, with its strategy admittedly failed, the PNV was increasingly delegitimized. This time marked the beginning of two decades of industrial upsurge and a new wave of Spanish migration into Basque territory. In 1959, the cultural group “Ekin” broke its ties with the party’s youth group to form ETA, at that point an intellectually oriented group. Prime Minister Aguirre died of a heart attack in exile in 1960. Cultural resurgence began in the early 1960s, most notably through the clandestine Basque-language schools. Franco’s Spain had gradually been opening to foreign capital and economic development. The country was eager for inclusion on the European and world scenes, with corresponding international expectations for civil and political

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freedoms. Basque nationalism’s political resurgence came in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with ETA and the PNV building infrastructures. The Conflict In 1968, ETA member Txabi Etxebarrieta shot civil guard José Antonio Pardines to death and was then killed.2 Etxebarrieta’s martyrdom brought new recruits, and ETA retaliated by assassinating police commissioner Melitón Manzanas. A state of exception was declared, with arrests and torture widespread. Manzanas’s death resulted in the 1970 Burgos trial, at which 16 were convicted for ETA activity, and 6 of them sentenced to death. The trial was an international public relations nightmare for Franco’s regime, and the death sentences were commuted. In 1973, Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s self-appointed successor, was killed in a bombing. ETA’s most stunning attack to that date both potentially changed Spain’s political trajectory and marked the type of action for which the organization would become known. Most Basques saw ETA’s violence as less of a threat than that of the security forces, which killed 22 people during demonstrations or at police checkpoints in the four Spanish Basque provinces in 1974–1975. Opposition groups, while disagreeing with ETA’s methods, accepted them as a response to state violence and expected ETA to cease them under any new regime. Political Transition and Beyond

After Franco’s death in 1975, the question of rupture versus reform penetrated the Spanish transition. If the Basque sense of need for rupture manifested itself in a desire for independence, hope for change was pervasive among the PNV and radical Basque nationalists,3 as it was for other opposition groups. A series of amnesty decrees was followed by the 1978 Amnesty Law for political prisoners not convicted of blood crimes. With most others released, by the time of the first Spanish elections in mid-1977, the campaign’s focus was the Basque Country. The number of individuals in prison for ETA activity tripled between December 1978 and January 1981. Basque nationalist forces were united in their public calls for independence and amnesty. The Spanish Constitution was ratified in 1978, although, following the PNV’s lead, most Basques abstained. The 1979 Basque Autonomy Statute, negotiated by Spanish and PNV leaders, was approved by the Basque electorate, paving the way for an autonomous community. Meanwhile, ETA’s attacks were becoming increasingly indiscriminate. The number of victims and public concern grew, leading to increased condemnation by the PNV and other nationalist groups. Demands for “revolutionary tax” payments from Basque industrialists began, as did kidnappings. In 1979, one wing of ETA bombed two Madrid train stations and that city’s airport on the same day. Although this wing abandoned its arms in 1980 after negotiations with the Spanish government, violence ratcheted up throughout the 1980s, with 86 deaths in 1980 and 54 in 1987. The latter year’s Hipercor supermarket bombing in Barcelona resulted in 21 deaths and 45 injuries; perhaps even more disturbing for the government

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was the Zaragoza Civil Guard barracks attack, which left 11 dead and 88 wounded. In 1986, ETA assassinated former leader Dolores González Katarain, “Yoyes,” as a “traitor” upon her return from exile. The incident served notice to others that might contemplate following the same path. ETA could not claim a monopoly on the use of violence. The most salient posttransition moment was the unsuccessful 1981 military coup in the Spanish parliament, largely in response to handling of the regional question. It showed the extent to which any Spanish government would have to take military and right-wing backlash into account. State antiterrorist activity also grew harsher. Into the late 1970s, right-wing paramilitaries assassinated several ETA activists. The year 1983 witnessed the birth of the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, or GAL). GAL arose after the accession to state power of a Socialist party that had been in the anti-Franco opposition; and, it received state funding in a political democracy. Through 1986, GAL was responsible for 24 killings and 25 injuries. The organization withered largely because of pressure from the French government and France’s greater willingness to extradite and expel suspected ETA members—something that country had previously been reluctant to do, given the reputation of the Spanish police for torture. In 1988, Spanish police subcommissioner José Amedo was imprisoned for GAL activity; in 1991, he and his lieutenant Michel Domínguez were sentenced to over 100 years each. The following year, courts ordered Spain to indemnify victims. The scandal was revived in 1995 with the identification of the corpses of ETA members Joxean Lasa and Joxi Zabala that had been left in a pathology chamber in southern Spain for 11 years. The two youths had been tortured, dismembered, and shot in the head. In 1998, José Barrionuevo and Rafael Vera, the Spanish minister of the interior and secretary of state during GAL’s heyday, were imprisoned. GAL’s legacy was a backlash of violence, new ETA adherents, and general skepticism. ETA’s July 1997 kidnapping of Miguel Ángel Blanco, a town councilman from Ermua, Bizkaia, caused a major convulsion. This was one of a series of attacks against Spanish conservatives (particularly municipal representatives) that escalated after their accession to state power. When the Spanish government refused to transfer prisoners to Basque prisons, the kidnappers shot their victim in the head. In December 1997, the entire radical nationalist executive committee was incarcerated for collaboration, and its newspaper and radio station were ordered closed by Spanish courts. In September 1998, the three nationalist parties and other organizations signed the Lizarra Pact. Nationalists argued that “Lizarra” was a forum for cooperation. Those not participating (the major state parties) countered that it was a closing of fronts. A month before the Basque elections, citing the Irish agreements, ETA announced a “total and indefinite truce.” The Lizarra agreement ultimately led to a tripartite Basque nationalist government coalition that included the hard-liners. The tide would turn, however, with mutual accusations of duplicity with Spain. In November 1999, in a victory for its hard-line faction, ETA broke off its cease-fire. Radical nationalists abandoned parliament, leaving a tainted minority nationalist

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government. Blood again began to flow the following January, with the February 2000 death of former Basque deputy prime minister Fernando Buesa (a leading regional Spanish socialist) and bodyguard Jorge Díez in an ETA car-bomb explosion that shook society and exacerbated the polarization. In 2001, the PNV led a victorious electoral coalition in which the party stepped up rhetoric regarding the right to self-determination and the extension of selfgovernment. The radical nationalist alternative saw its vote totals greatly decline, penalized in the first Basque elections following ETA’s return to violence. One countercurrent within radical nationalism expressed displeasure over support of violence, resulting in a fraction presenting itself as an electoral alternative within this ideological spectrum in 2002. These developments portended two trends that would be on the upswing in subsequent years: (1) electoral support for radical nationalism would increasingly become inversely proportional to ETA activity, and (2) sectors of radical nationalism were slowly but surely decoupling their political programs from ETA’s influence. The 2002 Anti-Terrorist Pact was agreed to by the major Spanish parties and directed against ETA and radical Basque nationalism. Ratified by the Spanish Constitutional Court, it led to the banning of many organizations for alleged links to ETA, including the Basque-language newspaper. These measures included a successful attempt to get ETA and the radical nationalist party added to the list of international terrorist organizations in the wake of the September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda attacks in the United States. In September 2002, the PNV-led government put forth the “Ibarretxe Plan,” named after Basque prime minister Juan José Ibarretxe. The Ibarretxe Plan called for a popular referendum. Its set of demands ranged from control of legal institutions and the social security system to the right to create national sports teams. Critics claimed the plan delegitimized the existing juridico-political milieu. The 2004 Spanish elections took place in the immediate aftermath of the March 11 Madrid-area train bombings that resulted in nearly 200 deaths and many injuries. Contrary to prognostications, the Socialists emerged victorious as a result of anger toward conservatives for blaming ETA rather than Islamic extremists in an effort to avoid being penalized for support of U.S. military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Together with the September 11 attacks, the March 11 train bombings would completely change the landscape as to even minimal legitimacy of violence for political goals.4 The Ibarretxe Plan was narrowly approved in the Basque parliament in December 2004, only to be rejected by the Spanish parliament. In May 2005, all parties in Spain’s parliament, except the conservatives, approved a resolution expressing willingness to dialogue with ETA if that organization renounced violence. The “Parot Doctrine” (so named after its first application in changing the sentence of ETA member Henri Parot) was established in 2006 by Spain’s Supreme Court. Although it did not increase the maximum prison sentence from 30 years, it insisted that any subsequent reductions in time served for crimes committed prior to 1995 be applied to the summation of the sentences originally imposed rather

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than the 30-year limit. The Parot Doctrine’s questionable constitutionality created consternation in nationalist circles. In March 2006, amid dwindling support and an apparent deterioration of its infrastructure, ETA declared a “permanent” cease-fire for the first time ever. When bombs exploded in Madrid’s Barajas Airport in December 2006, killing Ecuadorans Diego Armando Estacio and Carlos Alonso Palate, it was the first time ETA had taken a life in almost four years. (The announcement that the truce was formally broken would not come until the following June.) Spanish prime minister Zapatero immediately suspended all initiatives to dialogue with ETA. The October 2007, detention of the radical nationalist party’s national committee dismantled the leadership of the force, once again illegalized. Approximately 60 percent of Basques polled were against the illegalizations. In February 2008, a Spanish judge illegalized two nationalist parties, the 9th and 10th banned since 2002. Two days prior to Spain’s March 2008 election, ETA killed former Socialist town councilman Isaís Carrasco, from Arrasate, Gipuzkoa. In the Basque autonomous elections of March 2009, the PNV won a clear relative majority in a vote devoid of radical nationalist candidacies, all declared illegal. As a result, in the wake of its best electoral results in 20 years, the PNV was left without coalition partners, relegated to opposition status after 30 years in power. Regional leaders of Spain’s leading parties ratified a working agreement, making Socialist Patxi López the Basque prime minister. In September 2010, a plethora of groups signed the Guernica Agreement, in which they made demands of Spain, including amnesty for imprisoned ETA members, but also requested a permanent cease-fire with ETA. ETA then announced an unspecific break in armed actions, followed in January 2011 by a “permanent, general and verifiable” cease-fire. Explicitly condemning violence in their proposed statutes, radical nationalists again applied for recognition as a party. Although they were denied yet again in March 2011, the Spanish Supreme Court’s 9–7 vote represented a marked departure from the standard unanimous rejection. In June 2011, a group of dissident incarcerated former ETA members calling themselves Prisoners Committed to the Irreversible Peace Process issued a letter via the news media in which they criticized ETA’s recent history. In September 2011, a year after the original Guernica Agreement, the official Collective of Basque Political Prisoners (not the dissidents) signed on. At an October 2011 peace conference in San Sebastián, the attendees, who included former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams, called for ETA to abandon violence. Within days, ETA announced “the definitive end of its armed activity.” The group was politically isolated globally and even within radical nationalism, its membership and tactical capacity greatly curtailed by police activity.5 What ETA did not do, however, is either disband or turn in its weapons. Nevertheless, the Basque situation appears to have definitively entered a postconflict phase. Albeit ambivalently, the groundwork laid by the political process of the early 21st century has redirected the conflict’s twilight. One critical development has been the ascendance of victims groups, who have risen from marginality to influence public policy. This is best symbolized by Jaime Mayor Oreja’s statements

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during his tenure as Spain’s minister of the interior (1996–2001) and subsequently that “the victims are always right.” Political work on behalf of victims has included institutional recognition of the need for attention to societal and individual healing and memory. One initiative was the Basque government’s 2001 creation of the Department for Attention to Victims.6 Another was the commemoration of the first Institutional Ceremony of Homage and Recognition to the Victims of Terrorism in Bilbao in 2007, with Prime Minister Ibarretxe asking for forgiveness on behalf of Basque society. In June 2008, the Basque parliament unanimously approved Law 4/2008, Recognition and Reparation to the Victims of Terrorism. Although not without antecedents, Law 4/2008 comprehensively covered every issue and contingency, be it reimbursement for property, payment for psychological treatment, school visits by victims, affirmative-action job placement, or prosecution of pro-ETA statements. In 2010, the Basque Government declared November 10 the Day of the Memory of Victims of Terrorism. In June 2012, by a one-vote margin, a radical Basque nationalist party explicitly renouncing violence was declared legal by Spain’s Constitutional Court, trumping the 2011 Supreme Court decision. Following the December BAC elections, the PNV’s Iñigo Urkullu was elected prime minister in January 2013, marking the PNV’s return to power, albeit as a single-party minority government, but in a parliament in which Basque nationalists controlled nearly two-thirds of the vote. In October 2013, confirming months of expectation, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg overturned the Parot Doctrine, clearing the way for the probable release of 10 percent of those in prison for ETA-related crimes. Anticipating their perceived complicity of the Spanish government, some victims groups took to the streets. Such groups, continuing to flank even Spain’s conservative government on this issue, demand resolution with clear winners and losers. In nationalist circles, one critical debate has been how the potential early release of many from among the remaining 90 percent might be engineered: individual “social reinsertion” only of those repenting, as proposed by conservative Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy, or collective amnesty.7 Management of the Conflict The final decade of the 20th century and the years of the 21st have witnessed a political milieu in which management has usurped protagonism from “the conflict” in itself. The 1990s saw new methods on both parts, with the rise of radical youth street violence creating a weapon not directly traceable to ETA and the government introducing the questionable penitentiary policy of dispersing imprisoned ETA members in a divide-and-conquer strategy. Various actors have attempted to reap political rewards and limit damage to themselves. Basque terrorism often seemed to be the Ministry of the Interior’s singular issue. For its part, the degree to which ETA regenerated itself into the 1990s was owed to its long-standing strategy of action-repression-action in portraying itself as the champion of the Basque cause, encouraging recruits, and influencing

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proindependence sentiment. Despite belief in ETA’s usefulness as a pressure mechanism into the late 1980s, the PNV and other moderate Basque nationalist groups came to categorically condemn violence when it proved a political liability. More recently, the statewide parties have extracted political capital in service of ETA-victim discourse even as victims have often proved to be uncomfortable bedfellows. Many of the dynamics reveal that intragroup mobilization strategies and interests are at least as vital to contention as the corresponding intergroup dynamics that invariably receive greater attention. In a 21st-century reality in which violence portrayable as political has lost legitimacy, radical nationalist parties have found survival to depend on explicit condemnation of violence to displease their two most critical clienteles: Spanish and European courts and Basque nationalist voters. For its part, even prior to its definitive announcement, what has awaited ETA for years is a viable exit strategy that allows it to save face and manage to satisfy, to the degree possible, two critical actors: victims of its violence and its still-jailed former members. Time will tell whether it succeeds. Significance Aside from Northern Ireland, the Basque conflict has been the most virulent ethnonationalist conflict in Western Europe over the past century, with Spain’s postFranco history conjuring up images of Balkanization in the heart of the “civilized” world. The markers of “Basqueness” (ethnicity, language, birthplace, will, political affiliation, place of livelihood, primordiality versus malleability) have been debated amid a sea of contention in a changing Basque society. How can an ethnic group be defined, to what extent does this justify a distinct political project, and by what means? Basque concerns have played a determining role in the configuration of post-Franco Spain, and the BAC is currently the most politically and financially autonomous region within the European Union. Students of politics often note the discrepancy between the political newness of modern nationalist movements and the antiquity of their claims. What such movements do have is some sort of charter that allows them to resonate with a significant segment of the population. At the same time, social and political processes matter in configuring how such conflicts play out, presenting new constraints as well as new opportunities for political actors of all stripes. Influences ranging from geopolitical alignments and changes in the meaning of “terrorism” to 21st-century immigration flows (from Latin America, North Africa, and China) have reconfigured the social world of Basque and Spaniard alike. Despite journalistic reports in the midst of violent situations around the globe that often drum up images of centuries-old hatreds leading to apparently self-perpetuating conflicts, political culture can and does change. The Basque case in the 21st century is an exemplar of great change within the course of a generation and its implication for conflict resolution and the configuration of nationalism. If violence potentially related to a social cleavage does occur, escalation can only be avoided if there is a mutually acknowledged framework to define it in other

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terms. That ETA was no longer able to define violence in “nationalist” terms was a measure of the degree to which the project lacked legitimacy among Basques, however they define their ethnic identification. At the same time, the accompanying resurgence of nationalist voting suggests a difference in the meaning of national difference itself—a new nationalism, seemingly, without contentious conflict. Notes 1. As in other contested lands, place names are problematic. I take a middle ground, using Basque spellings when referring to the BAC, French for territories in France, and Spanish for Navarra, with the exception of city names familiar in English. This point holds true regarding the nature of political language in general, with the framing of words such as “nation” and “terrorism” having implications for reality. 2. Recent Spanish historiography has argued that 1960 represents ETA’s crossing of the Rubicon of blood violence, with the death of two-year-old Begoña Urroz Ibarrola. That attack, however, was widely attributed to Spanish anarchists, and ETA never publicly assumed responsibility. Such historiography must also in part be seen as politically interested in its attempt to reframe the ETA narrative. 3. I employ the term “radical nationalism” to refer to political options, most frequently Marxist, implicated in or more accepting of violence as a means to Basque independence. The term’s introduction here is not meant to suggest that a propensity to violence never previously existed. Although not completely comfortable with the term, I accept its use as an “evil” lesser to presenting the reader with an alphabet soup of parties. 4. The European Parliament immediately adopted March 11 as Victims of Terrorism Remembrance Day. 5. One barometer is that the image of the members of ETA as either patriots or idealists, a combined 48 percent of Basque respondents in 1978 and 50 percent in 1979, fell to 23 percent in 1989 and 24 percent in 1996, before plunging in polls after Miguel Ángel Blanco’s death. A May 2010 survey notes the unconditional support of ETA at 0.2 percent among the Basque public, with such backing rising to only 2 percent among those voicing support for a radical nationalist party. In December 2011, all organizations involved in the Guernica Agreement expressed their sorrow over harm done to victims of violence. 6. Within the Ministry of the Interior, this department replaced an office in existence since the 1980s, but with a limited budget, no political visibility, and characterized by inattentiveness. The Spanish government would develop a functional equivalent in 2004. In 2013, the department has been folded into a comprehensive project under the Basque government’s new secretary general of peace and coexistence. 7. The Spanish government plan also explores bringing repentant former ETA members not immediately released to BAC prisons.

Suggested Readings Aretxaga, Begoña. 2005. States of Terror. Reno: Center for Basque Studies. Clark, Robert P. 1990. Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Conversi, Daniele. 1997. The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

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Crumbaugh, Justin. 2007. “Are We All (Still) Miguel Ángel Blanco?: Victimhood, the Media Afterlife, and the Challenge for Historical Memory.” Hispanic Review 75 (4): 365–384. Díez Medrano, Juan. 1995. Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Douglass, William A., Carmelo Urza, Linda White, and Joseba Zulaika, eds. 1999. Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium. Reno: Basque Studies Program. Kurlansky, Mark. 2001. The Basque History of the World. New York: Penguin. Lecours, André. 2007. Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State. Reno and Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press. Mata López, José M. 2005. “Terrorism and National Conflict: The Weakness of Democracy in the Basque Country.” In The Politics of Contemporary Spain, edited by Sebastian Balfour, 81–105. London and New York: Routledge. Valle, Teresa del. 1994. Korrika: Basque Ritual for Ethnic Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Vazquez, Roland. 2010. Politics, Culture, and Sociability in the Basque Nationalist Party. Reno and Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press. Woodworth, Paddy. 2007. The Basque Country: A Cultural History. New York and Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Woodworth, Paddy. 2005. “Using Terror against Terrorists: The Spanish Experience.” In Balfour, The Politics of Contemporary Spain, 61–80. Zulaika, Joseba. 1988. Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Appendix Preliminary Title of the 1979 Basque Autonomy Statute in English The “preliminary title” (“preamble,” really) below is the first nine articles of the 1979 Basque Autonomy Statute. The statute was symbolic of collective recognition of a unified Basque project in the wake of Spain’s transition to democracy in the post-Franco era, but it came to be contested by both the Spanish right and those sympathetic with ETA.

The Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country Preliminary Title Article 1 The Basque People or «Euskal-Herria», as an expression of their nationality and in order to accede to self-government, constitute an Autonomous Community within the Spanish State under the name of «Euskadi» or the Basque Country, in accordance with the Constitution and with this Statute, which lays down its basic institutional rules. Article 2 1. Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, and also Navarra, are entitled to form part of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. 2. The territory of the Autonomous Community shall comprise the Historic Territories which coincide with the provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, respecting

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their present boundaries, and with the province of Navarra, should it decide to join, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Transitory Provision Four of the Constitution. Article 3 -Each of the Historic Territories which make up the Basque Country may, within the framework of the same, preserve or, where appropriate, re-establish and bring up to date their organization and such institutions as are exclusively concerned with self-government. Article 4 -The designation of the seat of the common institutions of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country shall be effected through a Law of the Basque Parliament and shall lie within the territory of the Autonomous Community Article 5 1. The flag of the Basque Country has two crosses, a green diagonal cross and a superimposed whit e perpendicular cross, on a red background. 2. The flags and banners of the Historic Territories which make up the Autonomous Community are also recognized. Article 6 1. «Euskera», the language of the Basque People, shall, like Spanish, have the status of an official language in Euskadi. All its inhabitants have the right to know and use both languages. 2. The common institutions of the Autonomous Community, taking into account the socio-linguistic diversity of the Basque Country, shall guarantee the use of both languages, controlling their official status, and shall effect and regulate whatever measures and means are necessary to ensure knowledge of them. 3. No-one may suffer discrimination for reasons of language. 4. The Royal Academy of the Basque Language is the official advisory institution in matters regarding «Euskera». 5. Given that «Euskera» is the heritage of other Basque territories and communities, the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country may request the Spanish Government, in addition to whatever ties and correspondence are maintained with academic and cultural institutions, to conclude and, where necessary, to submit to the Spanish State Parliament for authorization, those treaties or agreements that will make it possible to establish cultural relations with the States where such territories lie and communities reside, with a view to safeguarding and promoting «Euskera». Article 7 1. For the purposes of this Statute, the political status of Basque shall be accorded to all those who are officially resident, according to the General Laws of the State, in any of the municipalities belonging to the territory of the Autonomous Community.

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2. Persons residing abroad, and their descendants, who specifically request it, shall enjoy the same political rights as those living in the Basque Country, if their last legal residence in Spain was in Euskadi, and provided they retain their Spanish nationality. Article 8 -Other territories or municipalities situated entirely within the territory of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country may be added to it by fulfilling the following requirements: a) Membership must be requested by the Town Council or a majority of the Town Councils concerned, and a hearing given to the Community or province to which the Territories or Municipalities to be added belong. b) The inhabit ants of the Territory or Municipality concerned must express their agreement by means of a referendum expressly called for this purpose. Such a referendum must be duly authorized beforehand by the competent authority and passed by a majority of validly cast votes. c) It must be passed by the Parliament of the Basque Country and subsequently, by the Spanish State Parliament, by means of an Organic Law. Article 9 1. The fundamental rights and duties of the citizens of the Basque Country are those established in the Constitution. 2. The Basque public authorities, in the areas lying within their jurisdiction, shall: a) Watch over and guarantee the proper exercise of the citizens’ fundamental rights and duties. b) Lay particular emphasis on a policy aimed at improving living and working conditions. c) Adopt measures that will help to promote higher employment and economic stability. d) Adopt measures aimed at promoting favourable conditions and removing obstacles in such a way that the freedom and equality of the individual and of the groups of which he forms part may be effective and real. e) Make possible the participation of all citizens in the political, economic and social life of the Basque Country. Source: Basque Country, Eusko Jaurlaritza-Gobierno Vasco. Available at http://www.basque country.eus/t32-448/en/contenidos/informacion/estatuto_guernica/en_455/adjuntos /estatu_i.pdf.

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Sri Lanka Tamil-Sinhalese Conflict in India’s Backyard Nikolaos Biziouras and Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline ca. 545 BCE The island’s indigenous people are conquered by Buddhists from India, the forebears of contemporary Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority. 1505 The Portuguese arrive and begin the European colonization of the island of Ceylon. 1685 Dutch control displaces Portuguese control of the island, except for the kingdom of Kandy. 1796 The British East India Company seizes the coastal towns. 1802 The Dutch cede control of the island to Great Britain; British control of Ceylon is consolidated by 1814. 1815 The British conquer the kingdom of Kandy and establish Ceylon as a Crown Colony. They begin to develop the island’s commercial tea, coffee, and coconut plantations. 1920 Local representative institutions are allowed to develop. 1926 During the independence struggle, Sinhalese political leader Solomon Bandaranaike describes Ceylon’s future in federal terms.

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1931 The British assign universal franchise voting rights. February 4, 1948 Ceylon gains independence. The pro-business United National Party (UNP) wins the first postcolonial elections. 1949 The Indian Tamils, who continue to work in the highland plantations, are disenfranchised of their voting rights, and many lose their citizenship. 1956 Running on a populist message of greater state intervention in the economy and an aggressive Sinhala-only platform, Bandaranaike’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) party wins the election. Passage of the Sinhala Only Act ends the status of English as the official language, placing Tamils at a disadvantage in obtaining civil service jobs. 1957 Prime Minister Bandaranaike agrees to some autonomy for Tamils; there is Sinhalese backlash as communal violence occurs. 1958 In response to the communal riots, in which nearly200 Tamils are killed and thousands displaced, Bandaranaike rejects federalism as a devolution option. 1959 Despite strong support from Sinhalese voters, Bandaranaike is assassinated by a Buddhist monk and succeeded as prime minister by his wife, Sirimavo Bandaranaike. 1965 The UNP returns to power by promising to limit the state’s role in the economy. 1970 Sirivamo Bandaranaike returns to power by riding a wave of populism. She implements an aggressive nationalization drive that further increases the role of the state in the economy. 1971 The Sinhalese Peoples Liberation Front (JVP) commences a pro-Marxist rebellion in Sinhalese parts of the island.

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1972 The country’s name is changed to the Republic of Sri Lanka. Buddhism becomes Sri Lanka’s primary religion, reflecting Bandaranaike’s pro-Sinhalese agenda. Velupillai Prabhakaran forms a militant group called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). 1976 Given the Sinhalese reluctance to reform the state, Tamils adopt a separatist agenda; insurgency increases in the Tamil north. TNT changes its name to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 1977 The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) wins all seats in the north and east running on a separatist platform. The UNP triumphs on the national level, campaigning on an aggressive economic liberalization program and promising to reverse the SLFP’s nationalization measures. August 16, 1978 A new constitution is adopted by the Sinhalese majority. The parliamentary model is replaced by a presidential system. 1981 The country is shaken by communal violence for a fifth time since the mid-1950s; the government holds informal talks with TULF on ways to defuse communal violence. 1982 Talks break down, and the government’s control over the north deteriorates sharply. 1983 May: An upsurge of terrorism strengthens the hands of both Sinhalese and Tamil extremists; a state of emergency is declared. July 23: Anti-Tamil riots occur in the capital, Colombo; many Tamils are driven to the Tamil north. August: A TULF proposal to accept autonomy is blocked by Tamil extremists; India is invited to mediate the conflict. October: 2,000 government troops are deployed in the northern peninsula as Colombo adopts an increasingly militaristic response to the problem of Tamil separatism. 1984 Fighting intensifies; Colombo’s reprisals against guerrilla attacks injure Tamil civilians, straining Colombo’s relations with India. 1985 February: Representatives of six Tamil groups propose a diplomatic solution to the conflict based on an autonomous homeland for Tamils. Summer: Indian prime

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minister Rajiv Gandhi agrees to clamp down on guerrilla training camps in India. September: Tamil guerrillas kill TULF moderates in an effort to torpedo a diplomatic solution to the conflict. 1986 August: Colombo proposes the creation of provincial councils with wide powers when it loses control over the north; sharp divisions appear among the Sinhalese over the government’s willingness to negotiate. November 3: Tamil militants reject Colombo’s proposals. 1987 February: Reports of government massacres in the north prompt India to threaten to suspend mediation efforts. May 26: Colombo launches a 7,000-man assault to regain control of the northern (Jaffna) peninsula; civilian Tamil casualties are high. July 29: Leaders of India and Sri Lanka announce an accord in which India agrees to stop the secessionist threat in Sri Lanka. August 4: Colombo agrees to disband paramilitary forces in Jaffna if India enforces peace there; Sinhalese militants do not trust India’s neutrality. September–October: India is unable to disarm the LTTE; intra-Tamil conflict accelerates as does tension between Indian forces and Sri Lankan security forces. October 10: Indian forces launch a major attack on LTTE. November: The Indian Peacekeeping force (IPKF) now numbers 20,000 in the north; in the south, the JVP begins a terrorist campaign to destabilize the government for collaborating with India. 1988 January: The IPKF’s success in the north forces LTTE to regroup in the east. Fall and winter: Casualties mount as fighting is divided between the IPKF and rebels in the north and Colombo’s security forces and the JVP in the south. 1989 Spring: A new government is elected in Colombo with less personal investment in the accord than the prior government of Junus Richard Jayawardene. June: India is asked to withdraw troops by July 31. July: Widespread JVP violence in the south forces the government to mobilize 15,000 voluntary militiamen, and India agrees to negotiate a timetable for withdrawal. 1990 The last Indian forces depart, and Colombo begins peace talks with Tamil leadership. When conflict resumes, thousands of Sri Lankan Muslims are forced to leave the Tamil-dominated North. May 21, 1991 Former Indian leader Rajiv Gandhi is assassinated by LTTE suicide bombers.

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1993 Peace talks stall; heavy fighting resumes. May 1: President Ranasinghe Premadasa is killed in an LTTE bomb attack during a May Day rally. 1994 President Chandrika Kumaratunga is elected with a promise to end the fighting. 1995 January: Peace talks begin. April: Peace talks fail, and conflict resumes when the LTTE sinks two Sri Lankan naval crafts. 1996 January 31: A suicide bomb attack in the heart of Colombo kills more than 100 and injures 1,400. July 24: An LTTE bomb blast in a railway station south of Colombo kills 70. July 18: An army camp near the northeastern town of Mullaitivu is overrun by the LTTE. More than 1,000 troops are killed. 1998 January 25: A suicide bomb attack on Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist shrine, Dhaladha Maligawa (Temple of the Tooth), in the central town of Kandy, kills 17 people. September 26: LTTE fighters overrun the Kilinochchi army camp, killing more than 1,000 government soldiers. December 1999 The LTTE attempts to assassinate President Chandrika Kumaratunge. 2002 February: A cease-fire agreement brokered by Norway is signed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader Prabhakaran. The decommissioning of weapons begins. December: The government and the LTTE agree to share power. April 2003 The LTTE pulls out of the negotiations. 2004 March: LTTE’s commander in the Eastern Province defects. The LTTE commences a violent intra-Tamil struggle for control of the Eastern Province. July: An LTTE suicide attack in Colombo is the first since 2001. 2005 August 12: Foreign Minister Kadirgamar is assassinated by LTTE snipers in Colombo. November: Mahinda Rajapaksa, the prime minister at the time, wins the presidential elections.

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2006 June–July: The number and intensity of LTTE suicide attacks increase. October: Peace talks fail in Geneva. 2007 July: Government forces gain control over the entire Eastern Province. November: An LTTE political-wing leader is killed in an air raid by the Sri Lankan Air Force. 2008 January: The government formally exits the 2002 cease-fire agreement. July: Government forces recapture the LTTE naval base in Vidattaltivu, ending LTTE’s ability for maritime actions. 2009 February: The government declares a 12 km-long “no fire zone” (NFZ) along Mullaitivu western coast and calls on civilians to relocate there for their own safety. International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), concerned over the thousands of civilians trapped in the battle zone, calls for a temporary cease-fire, which LTTE accepts but the government rejects. Instead, it offers amnesty to the rebels if they surrender. April 14: The LTTE offers to negotiate, but the government rejects it and insists that the rebels lay down their arms. When thousands of civilians leave the NFZ for government-controlled areas, they are placed in screening camps. May: The government declares the Tamil Tigers defeated after the army overruns the last of the rebel-held northeast territory; rebel leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is reportedly killed in fighting. The Tamil Tigers state they will lay down their arms. The crucial events involving the development of the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict on the island state of Sri Lanka unfolded over half a century, touched off in the mid1950s by the passage of a series of laws highly prejudicial to the interests of the country’s Tamil minority. By the early 1980s, the conflict had reached such intensity that neighboring India—with its large, sometimes separatist-inclined, Tamilspeaking minority—concluded that it could no longer ignore developments in Sri Lanka. Eventually, India sent more than 50,000 peacekeepers into Sri Lanka in a futile effort to control the violence there. The story of Sri Lanka’s communal conflict is consequently almost as much about the limits of peacekeeping intervention in communal conflicts as it is about the conflict between that island’s principal ethnolinguistic communities. Historical Background Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, lies just off the southern tip of India—a fact of geographical life that has profoundly shaped its demographics, its history, and its politics both before and after Ceylon achieved its independence from Great Britain in 1948.

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More than 2,500 years ago, in approximately 545 BCE, the island’s indigenous peoples were overrun, and the island was settled by waves of Buddhist peoples from India. Their descendants today make up Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese majority, who are concentrated in the island’s south and constitute approximately 74 percent of its overall population. The largest minority—approximately 18 percent of the population as late as the turn of the new millennium—can claim an even stronger, continuing connection with India. Territorially concentrated in Sri Lanka’s northern Jaffna Peninsula and eastern districts, where they respectively constitute a majority and plurality, they are the island’s original people and the ethnic and linguistic cousins of the Tamils who dominate the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, less than 20 miles to the north.1 When Europe discovered the wealth of India a half millennium ago, Ceylon became a part of the power scramble for possessions in South Asia. The outcome was the same as in India. After passing through the hands of the Portuguese and Dutch, Ceylon fell under the control of the British from 1796 to 1814. In 1815, Ceylon became a Crown Colony and an important part of the British Empire, providing Great Britain with significant quantities of tea, rubber, and other tropical goods until it gained independence in 1948, a year after the British withdrawal from India and the subcontinent’s partition into India and Pakistan. In 1926, during Ceylon’s nationalist struggle for self-rule, its nationalist leader and future prime minister, Solomon Bandaranaike, spoke of a future Ceylon whose peoples could profit from a federal division of power between the center and the regions reflecting Sinhalese and Tamil living patterns on the island. Once prime minister of independent Ceylon, however, he fell under intense pressure from Sinhalese elements to move in a quite different direction. Not only did they oppose constitutionally reorganizing the state to give Tamils federal autonomy in Tamilmajority areas, but they demanded that the government redress the fact that though a minority in Ceylon, the Tamils were better educated than the Sinhalese and held a disproportionately larger share of the civil service posts in the country. In 1956, the government bowed to their wishes and passed the controversial Sinhala Only Act, ending the official status of English in the country and placing Tamils at a disadvantage in obtaining employment in the civil service. In an effort to soften the blow, the following year, Bandaranaike agreed to support some form of devolution of power to the Tamil minority. By this point, however, the protests against the Sinhalese Only Act were beginning to turn violent, and in response to that violence, Bandaranaike further alienated Tamil leaders by disavowing federalism as an option in devolving political power (although it remained the political goal of moderate Tamil leaders until 1976). Sinhalese-Tamil relations continued to deteriorate from this (1956–1958) point onward, with the government constantly caught in the whiplash of trying to accommodate the Tamil demand for autonomy without alienating the country’s Sinhalese majority. This rarely proved possible. Thus, as communal killings began to mount in the late 1950s, the government negotiated a pact with Tamil leaders in which it promised, in vague terms, Tamil autonomy. Under pressure from the Sinhalese majority, however, Bandaranaike not only abrogated the

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agreement but also, between 1958 and 1973, implemented additional language reforms that further tilted educational and employment opportunities toward the Sinhalese majority. By 1976, accumulating Tamil grievances, based on their absence of power at the center, failure to make any headway in obtaining regional autonomy, the inability to even be able to administer themselves in their own language in Tamil-majority areas, and the barriers erected to block their access to education and jobs prompted mainstream Tamil leaders to abandon the goal of federal autonomy and adopt a separatist agenda. Almost immediately, insurgent activity increased in the Tamil north. The following year, campaigning on a separatist platform, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) won all seats in the country’s north and east areas and then forfeited them when those elected refused to take the required oath of office against secession. The same election also highlighted the Tamil’s inherent weakness at the center when the country’s gerrymandered election system gave the Sinhalese United National Party (UNP) 85 percent of the seats in parliament with only 52 percent of the vote—a majority it quickly used to adopt a new constitution built around strong (inevitably Sinhalese) presidential rule, not executive responsibility to a majority in the bicommunal parliament. Tensions continued to build throughout the early 1980s, beginning in 1981 when the country (officially renamed Sri Lanka in 1972) was rocked for the fifth time since 1956 by a significant wave of communal violence. In response, Sri Lanka’s government in Colombo, the island’s capital, again extended an olive branch to Tamil leaders, this time by holding informal discussions with the TULF on ways to defuse intercommunal conflict. The discussions broke down within a year, and so too did Colombo’s security position in the north. Moreover, tense as Sinhalese-Tamil relations had already become, they sharpened even further in December 1982 when President J. R. (Julius Richard) Jayawardene, following his reelection, proposed holding a referendum on the subject of postponing until 1989 the scheduled assembly elections, which were to be soon held on a proportional representation basis likely to give the Tamils 20 percent of the seats in the legislature. Although Tamil areas voted heavily against the postponement, the referendum passed. In protest, the Tamil representatives from those areas voting “no” resigned from the sitting legislature at the end of their regularly elected term, ending all Sinhalese-Tamil dialogue inside Sri Lanka’s parliament. The Conflict As late as 1983, though often extremely violent, the conflict in Sri Lanka was still essentially one dimensional: between the minority Tamil community and its leadership on the one side and the Sinhalese majority and the Sinhalese-dominated government in Colombo on the other. Four critical years later, when the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) was deployed into Sri Lanka, the complexity of strife in the country had increased fourfold, largely as a result of the ripples set in motion by one event that occurred in 1983 and another in 1987.

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The July Riots in Colombo and Their Aftermath

In the spring and early summer of 1983, an upsurge of terrorism strengthened the hand of extremists in both the Tamil and Sinhalese camps. By May, the violence had become so widespread that the government found it necessary to declare a state of emergency throughout the country. Then came the first crucial date, July 23, when in response to the violence being caused by the Tamil insurgents, anti-Tamil riots erupted in Colombo, frequently with the police looking on and doing nothing. The loss of Tamil property was significant, and many Tamils were forced to seek sanctuary in the Tamil-majority area of the Jaffna Peninsula. Their migration eliminated whatever moderating effect their presence as “hostages” in the south may have had on the activities of the Tamil guerrillas in the north. By August, law and order had been restored in Colombo, and—in return for the TULF abandoning its separatist goals—Colombo offered amnesty to all Tamil rebels willing to withdraw from the north. The compromise collapsed, however, when the Tamil separatists refused to support it. Running out of domestic options, President Jayawardene turned to India’s prime minister, Indira Gandhi, and requested India’s diplomatic intervention in the form of her extending her good offices to mediate the conflict in Sri Lanka. Accepting the proffered “savior mediator” role, India dispatched an emissary to commence the process, just as Sri Lanka amended its constitution to ban even the advocacy of secession. Far from providing the light at the end of the tunnel, India quickly found itself ensnared in Sri Lanka’s conflicts. In October 1983, the TULF dispatched its spokesmen to India to lobby for the Tamil cause and announced that it would talk with Colombo only through Indian intermediaries. For its part, Colombo opted for a military solution and increased the size of its security force in the north to crush the separatist guerrillas. Gradually, the pattern emerged that would last until India was finally militarily drawn into the conflict in 1987. Guerrilla attacks on government military targets increasingly begat police and military reprisals that injured growing numbers of Tamil civilians and thereby strained Sri Lanka–India relations but did little damage to the separatists, who by the end of 1984 were receiving substantial assistance from India’s southernmost state, Tamil Nadu.2 Between 1984 and 1986, the political picture in Sri Lanka deteriorated on other fronts as well. To the extent that Colombo pursued a military solution to the conflict, it became increasingly difficult for moderate Tamils to accept the proposals put forward by Colombo or even to follow up their own diplomatic initiatives. In February 1985, for example, the representatives of six Tamil groups advanced a set of four principles as a basis for negotiating with Colombo. The heart of these proposals was the creation of a Tamil homeland and full citizenship for all Tamils in Sri Lanka, including the nearly 100,000 imported from India to work on Ceylon’s plantations during the colonial era. Six months later, India-mediated peace talks based on these principles were held in Bhutan among Colombo, the TULF, and five Tamil guerrilla groups. As the discussions progressed, however, the representatives of those Tamil groups fighting the government became increasingly disenchanted, and India was forced to spend as much time trying to narrow the

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differences between the two moderate and four radical Tamil groups present as between the Tamils and Colombo. The gap between the moderate and extremist elements within the Tamil camp further widened that September when Tamil guerrillas killed several moderate TULF officials in an apparent effort to torpedo the talks. Shortly thereafter, the talks collapsed completely when the representatives of the militant Eelam National Liberation Front walked out of the negotiations. By May 1986, the rupture inside the Tamil community was complete, and the radical Tamil group LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or simply the Tamil Tigers), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, was routinely attacking its major rivals within the Tamil movement and had established itself as the spokesman for Tamil separatism. It had also established itself as the preeminent force on the Jaffna Peninsula, where local justice, once administered by the center, had collapsed into the hands of locally organized committees firmly under the control of Tamil guerrillas. The government’s declining control over the Tamil regions in turn contributed to a sharpening of divisions inside the Sinhalese community, in particular, the creation of the Movement for the Defense of the Nation (MDN) by former Prime Minister Bandaranaike. A militant Sinhalese organization dedicated to retaining Sri Lanka as a Buddhist state, the MDN explicitly opposed the passage of any legislation that might create an autonomous region for the overwhelmingly Hindu Tamils. Finally, frustrated with Colombo’s inability or unwillingness to make significant concessions to the Tamils because of the divisions inside the Sinhalese community, India’s relations with Colombo degenerated throughout 1986. Consequently, when in early 1987 stories began to circulate that government security forces were conducting massacres in the east, India quickly threatened to suspend its mediation activities until Colombo restrained its military operations in the guerrilla-held territories. By this time, though, Colombo was thoroughly disenchanted with India because of its inability to control Tamil extremists. It was against this deteriorating environment that the second crucial series of events unfolded, beginning with a wave of anti-Sinhalese Tamil violence between April 17 and April 21, 1987, which claimed nearly 300 lives. These attacks moved the country still further, if not irrevocably, away from a political solution to its communal conflict and seemingly toward all-out civil war. In retaliation, on May 26, Colombo launched a 7,000-man assault to regain control of a key portion of the Jaffna peninsula. Despite orders to limit civilian casualties, by June 1, the number of Tamil civilians killed in the assault was mounting and, under pressure from its own Tamil minority, the government of India concluded that it could no longer sit on the sidelines. Without Sri Lanka’s official permission, on June 3, India dispatched 20 small boats to provide emergency humanitarian aid to Jaffna’s civilian population; however, at the last minute, the government in Colombo, under pressure from the Sinhalese militants, had its navy turn the flotilla back to India. India responded the next day by parachuting relief supplies into the Jaffna Peninsula, defining its action as “intermestic” (neither domestic nor international) and essentially redefining its role in Sri Lanka’s communal conflict from intermediary to interventionist.

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Management of the Conflict Interventionist Peacemaking

Despite the fact that India’s relief efforts on the Jaffna Peninsula further soured its relationship with Sri Lanka, the Colombo government’s deteriorating position in the north and northeast forced it to turn back to India for assistance. Thus, in a surprise announcement on June 29, 1987, India and Sri Lanka announced a peace accord (the Indo–Sri Lankan Accord) under the terms of which India was granted hegemony over Sri Lanka’s foreign policy in return for agreeing to help Colombo defeat the Tamil secessionists. Within 24 hours, 6,000 Indian troops were deployed in the Jaffna area to enforce India’s part of the pact. Simultaneously, India began to deny the rebels the sanctuary that previously had been available to them in Tamil Nadu. The use of outside peacekeepers as a means of managing communal conflict was not as common in 1987 as it was to become during the 1990s, but the IPKF was not without precedent. British troops, for example, had been keeping the peace in Northern Ireland for nearly 20 years by that time. On the other hand, in most previous instances, there had been a peace—however tenuous—to keep when the troops arrived. The terrain was far more treacherous in Sri Lanka given the multiple, ongoing political conflicts there. India not only had to resolve the intracommunal conflict between the extremists and moderates in the Tamil camp and disarm the guerrillas, but it had to maintain an aura of neutrality in the TamilSinhalese conflict to be able to cooperate with the government in Colombo, which, under the accord, could expel the IPKF at its pleasure and which itself had to avoid appearing to make too many concessions to the Tamil community lest the Sinhalese moderates be driven into the extremist camp. India’s difficulties were further compounded by the fact that it inherited—and had to work around—Colombo’s failed strategy in dealing with Tamil demands. Colombo’s carrot-and-stick approach of responding to Tamil demands for autonomy collapsed because Colombo repeatedly conceded too little too late to satisfy the demands of even the Tamil moderates. The four-point compromise advanced by the TULF in 1985 offers a case in point. Because of Colombo’s insistence that any compromise on its part be preceded by cease-fires and other concessions by Tamil extremists, it was 12 months before Colombo finally acceded to the minimum demand in those four points and conferred Sri Lankan citizenship on the Tamil Indians long living in the country. Another five months passed before Colombo acquiesced to the TULF’s core demand: Tamil autonomy in the north in matters of law and order and the allocation of agricultural land. By that time, the TULF had so lost its credibility within the Tamil community that its continuing negotiations with Colombo acquired a surreal quality, and the effective spokesmen for the Tamil cause had become the Tamil Tigers, who were rejecting anything short of full independence for the country’s Tamil-majority north and east. India’s problems as a third-party peacemaker were less self-made than situationladen. It could not favor the Tamils in their conflict with the Sinhalese without antagonizing the Sinhalese and straining its relations with Colombo. It could not

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be too severe in repressing the Tigers without appearing to favor the Sinhalese and antagonizing the Tamil majority in southern India. It could not openly favor the moderates in Sri Lanka’s Tamil camp without so polarizing the more extremist Tamil organizations that it would be unable to mediate the intra-Tamil conflict. In practice, India focused on its most basic commitment—disarming the rebels— and-threw its support behind the TULF and other moderate Tamil organizations willing to accept regional autonomy for peace. The result was both predictable and perverse. The more India took the moderate side in the intra-Tamil dispute, the less unacceptable India’s presence in Sri Lanka became to mainstream Sinhalese, whose first reaction to the accord had been negative.3 But the more India took the moderate side, the less it could serve as a mediator in the intra-Tamil power struggle and the more it boxed itself into the position of having to subdue the Tigers militarily—the Sinhalese strategy whose failure had forced Colombo to turn to India in the first place. And the more the IPKF waged a war against Tamil separatists, with the inevitable civilian casualties, the more the Gandhi government alienated itself from its citizens in Tamil Nadu. Add India’s inclination to increase the size of the IPKF in the face of its continuing inability to subdue the insurgents—from the initial 6,000 to 20,000 by November 1987; 50,000 by July 1988; and nearly 80,000 just before the IPKF’s withdrawal in the summer of 1989—and the tale of India’s two-year excursion into militarized interventionist diplomacy can be largely written in these terms. The story might have stretched out even longer had it not been for two developments. First, throughout Sri Lanka’s south, the Sinhalese Peoples Liberation Front (JVP) used the IPKF’s inability to subdue the Tamil extremists and Colombo’s inability to protect the state to justify its terrorist campaign against civil servants, the police, and members of parliament in its all-out effort to destabilize the existing government. By the end of 1988, the JVP-Colombo conflict had reached the point where fighting in Sri Lanka was almost evenly divided between the IPKF and the rebels in the north and Colombo’s security forces and the JVP in the south. Then came the second development. In the spring of 1989, Sri Lanka elected a new government—one that had far less personal interest in the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord than its predecessor. Surveying the condition of his state, Sri Lanka’s new president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, surprised India in June by asking it to withdraw its troops from Sri Lanka by the end of July. Unfortunately for Colombo, although the last Indian troops were withdrawn during 1990, its success in reestablishing control over Sri Lanka has been, at best, incomplete. The new set of peace talks inaugurated with Tamil leaders in 1990 stalled in 1993, and the fighting that resumed almost immediately in northern Sri Lanka was still heavy when the 20th century came to its close. Constructing a Durable Conflict

While confounding both the Indian and Sri Lankan state officials, Prabhakharan remained committed to secession and full independence and unrivaled leadership of the Tamil ethnic group. To accelerate the latter part of his goals, between July 1987 and July 1990, that is, between the first and second suicide attacks, the LTTE assassinated numerous Tamil leaders.

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Indeed, by June 1990, Prabhakharan had eliminated all the Tamil leaders, either from the revolutionary left or the accommodationist center. While these assassinations did create a leadership vacuum in the Tamil ethnic mobilization drive, the expanded use of the suicide bombings solidified Prabhakharan’s control over the Tamil movement. This control happened in stages and followed a path of escalation and de-escalation that never veered off the need for control over the Tamil ethnic mobilization process and the demand for secession and sovereignty. Indeed, between July 1990 and March 2009, with a gap between November 2001 and July 2004 when the ceasefire was in operation, LTTE suicide attacks achieved these goals. The attacks demonstrated the resolve of LTTE, and—by definition—the Tamil ethnic movement. They were willing to throw away all the gains they had made because of their commitment to secession and independence. Starting with the departure of the IPKF in 1990, by the late 1990s, LTTE was operating a de facto state in the Northern and parts of the Eastern Province, confining the Sri Lankan state to garrison areas. Regardless of costs, in blood and treasure, it was continuously willing to throw all gains away by inviting retaliation by the Sri Lankan state when it used suicide attacks to demonstrate its resolve. In a cycle of violence that commenced with an LTTE suicide attack that then led to a rampant, indiscriminate, and disproportional attack by the Sri Lankan army on Tamil areas and their civilian populations and continued with more suicide attacks and more civilian deaths, LTTE was willing to jeopardize its successes to achieve its maximalist goals, even tolerating high levels of collateral damage in its war of attrition against the Sri Lankan state. Prabhakharan also used the attacks to decimate the strategic and political leadership of the Sinhalese-controlled Sri Lankan state. Nearly every major figure on the Sinhalese side was politically and militarily attacked, often by suicide attacks. More importantly, these suicide attacks targeted both moderate and hard-line Sinhalese leaders, thus indicating to the Sinhalese that no one was safe. Consequently, Prabhakharan ensured that the Sinhalese would remain at a high level of fractionalization, precluding any form of compromise and restraint that would otherwise increase the chances for a sustainable cease-fire. This high level of radical violence effectively ended India’s intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict and eliminated the chance of an external competitor for leadership over the Tamil group. The 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, LTTE’s only suicide attack outside Sri Lankan borders, effectively ended Indian support for the Tamil cause. Not only was such an outcome detrimental for political reasons—as Indian elites in New Delhi had pressured Sinhalese elites for compromise and accommodation and Tamil elites in Tamil Nadu had financed and supported the Tamil extremist groups—but it was particularly damaging for operational and logistical reasons. By the mid-1990s, LTTE could no longer rely on support bases in India for arms trans-shipments, logistical support, and operational safe havens. Yet Prabhakharan remained adamant about the need to illustrate how the Tamil cause would not be controlled by India, regardless of cost. The attacks did eliminate any pockets of intra-Tamil rivalry, thus enabling Prabhakharan to monopolize leadership over the Tamils. Not only did LTTE do that

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physically by killing all protocontenders, but it did so organizationally by forcing the label of traitor on anyone who did not agree with the methods and goals of LTTE. As the cycle of violence demonstrated, those who did not support LTTE were, by definition, supporting the Sinhalese and were opposed to the safety and freedom of the Tamil people. This lack of challengers only increased the Tamils’ exclusive dependence on their leader. The attacks also rendered Prabhakharan’s critical mass of Tamil supporters entirely dependent on him for their economic well-being and safety. LTTE members were committed to Prabhakharan not because they had signed a loyalty oath, but because it was only through the LTTE that loyalty made any sense. The nearconstant use of violence combined with the calculated use of suicide attacks meant that Tamils were under constant danger in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. Their only source of effective protection was LTTE, and that protection was provided, first and foremost, to the most passionate and intense LTTE members. Indeed, Prabhakharan had brilliantly made the protection of LTTE members the primary goal of the Tamil population, even though he was constantly adamant about how he was protecting the Tamils with LTTE forces. More often than not, though, when the Tamils could choose, they would not choose rule by the LTTE. Yet, unlike previous Tamil political entrepreneurs, Prabhakharan was able to reduce his reliance on his supporters and increase their reliance on him. Last, but not least, the suicide attacks enabled Prabhakharan to reject all reconciliation efforts by the Sinhalese, such as a federal state, and strengthened their resolve in return. By engendering such a high level of resolve within the Sinhalese and forcing them to continue the conflict, Prabhakharan was able to continue the need for the LTTE and its extremist violence. Prabhakharan effectively reversed the logic of extremist violence: he prevented the institutionalization of moderate Sinhalese leaders within the Sri Lankan state, thus guaranteeing the continuation of an extremely violent conflict that would increase the chances for an equally violent Tamil response over which LTTE had achieved a virtual monopoly. Conflict Resolution

Partisan competition for leadership within the Sinhalese voting bloc made accommodation inherently difficult. When the Sinhalese political leaders made devolution proposals that would effectively create some form of a federal structure, they were rebuffed very effectively by LTTE violence. More importantly, the LTTE rejection was followed by electoral defeat by a Sinhalese competitor for power who promised harder and more militarized reactions to the Tamil actions. Hence, when the 2002 cease-fire agreement was negotiated by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and granted near total autonomy within the Northern and Eastern Provinces to LTTE leaders, there was strong opposition by Sinhalese leaders (such as President Kumaratunga) who opposed it on partisan grounds. Similarly, when intra-LTTE leadership battles led to the defection of Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as Colonel Karuna, he was quickly supported by Sinhalese leaders, who perceived him as someone who could be used to attack Prabhakharan from within the Tamil group.

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By the time that Mahinda Rajapaksa succeeded Chandrika Kumaratunga as leader of the SLFP in 2005, this process of intra-Sinhalese outbidding was coming to a critical juncture. Raised outside of the dynastic milieus of Colombo, Rajapaksa had already built a reputation as a strong Sinhalese nationalist because of his alliance with the JVP and JHU Sinhalese nationalist parties. Utilizing their grassroots networks, much like S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in the 1950s, Rajapaksa was committed to rejecting further devolution schemes with the Tamils and was adamant about the need to maintain the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan state. In effect, Rajapaksa, like so many Sinhalese political leaders, had outbid the existing Sinhalese leader in power, in this case Kumaratunga, by campaigning against her legacy of devolution. This commitment to a hardened and more militaristic approach manifested itself in the last phase of the conflict. Set off by a series of LTTE suicide attacks during the summer and early fall of 2006, the Sri Lankan state, under the control of Rajakapsa, responded with a military campaign that sought to eradicate terrorism and LTTE support bases in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Using massive artillery and aerial bombings in an attempt to weaken LTTE’s civilian support bases to push sustained ground attacks, the Rajakapsa government developed a military strategy to accomplish a gradual, but irreversible, wrestling of territorial control away from LTTE. They accompanied these military tactics with a series of civilian control measures that further increased the level of human rights violations affecting Tamils in those areas. Although Prabhakharan could have used this opportunity to recast his position on Tamil independence, he became even more radicalized. Confronted with an increasingly weakened supply base and an increasingly smaller base of operations, he used Tamil civilians as human shields during the Sinhalese bombings, inevitably decreasing Tamil support for the LTTE. Support further plummeted when Prabhakharan, increasingly out of options and subject to increased Sinhalese pressure, began killing the Tamil civilians fleeing LTTE-controlled areas and started forcing the use of child soldiers and forced labor. Regardless of the government’s systemic targeting of hospitals, the implicit ethnic cleansing of certain areas, and the strategic use of shelling for civilian control purposes, Prabhakharan’s actions illustrated the trap that he had set for himself: his success as the leader of the Tamil group, cemented as it was by the strategic use of radicalized violence, had only tied him to actions that were costing him the support of Tamils not within his core group of supporters. For LTTE, the end came quickly thereafter, when LTTE collapsed in 2009 under the government’s relentless military assaults, and Prabhakharan was reportedly killed in the action. Significance Lessons can be drawn from virtually all stances of ethnic conflict, and usually the more complicated the conflict, the greater the number of conclusions and hypotheses to be gleaned from it. Volumes can therefore be written about the immense

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complexity of the conflicts to be found swirling within and around Tamil-Sinhalese strife in Sri Lanka. Still, three points seem to stand out. First, the history of communal conflict in Sri Lanka underscores the often overlooked fact that, in matters of managing ethnic conflict, intraethnic group conflict can be as important a factor as intergroup conflict. Ultimately, it was the intra-Tamil struggle for power that undermined India’s peacekeeping operations and forced the IPKF to become ever more involved in the military operation of pacifying Sri Lanka’s Tamil areas. Meanwhile, the Colombo government’s efforts to negotiate a compromise with the Tamil moderates was continuously undermined by the activity of uncompromising factions within the country’s Sinhalese majority. Second, because most ethnonational movements are apt to contain “rejectionist” elements unwilling to compromise on anything short of full independence, it is important—whenever the accommodation path is chosen as the strategy for dealing with minority demands—for leaders in the majority community to support, as early as possible, the moderates in the minority community. The failure of Sinhalese leadership to do so was, even at the time, as noticeable as it proved to be costly. Unlike areas in which majorities and minorities are intermingled (Beirut, Belfast), in Sri Lanka, the territorialized nature of the Tamil community not only made the Tamils’ call for territorial autonomy understandable but relatively easy to fulfill without affecting Sinhalese control over the center or the country as a whole. Finally, the Sri Lanka case dramatizes how very difficult it is for third parties to resolve communal conflicts through peacekeeping operations. Nothing is more essential in peacekeeping than maintaining a posture of neutrality in the dispute. It is, however, almost impossible to do this in an area of communal conflict. Peacekeepers invariably define their task in terms of a status quo, be it boundaries to be policed, laws to be enforced, or pacts or treaties to be implemented. Yet, by their nature, communal conflicts are precisely about the legitimacy of the status quo, and actions approved by one faction in a dispute are highly likely, sooner or later, to antagonize another. It was India’s misfortune in Sri Lanka to be perceived as biased by significant portions of both the Sinhalese community, given its semiopen support for the Tamils prior to the signing of the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, and the Tamil community, against whose separatist wing it fought a two-year-long war. Notes 1. There was also a third important group at the time of the breakdown of Sri Lanka democracy during the 1980s: the Indian Tamils. Approximately 800,000 Tamils were imported from India during the colonial period by the British to work on Ceylon’s plantations. Still living in Sri Lanka in the mid-1980s as Indian citizens, they constituted 9 percent of the country’s population at the time of India’s intervention. 2. It was not until the summer of 1985 that India’s prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, agreed to tighten India’s control over the guerrilla training camps in Tamil Nadu. His action eased the growing tensions between Delhi and Colombo at the time; however, it occurred too late to prevent Sinhalese militants from concluding that, in Sri Lanka’s communal conflict, India was pro-Tamil.

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3. Even members of the Jayawardene government initially opposed the pact on the grounds that it deprived their country of its independence in foreign policy. As time passed and the rebels in the north refused to disarm, discontent grew.

Suggested Readings Biziouras, Nikolaos. 2014. The Political Economy of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Milton Park, U.K.: Routledge. DeVotta, Neil.2004. Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Rothberg, Robert I., ed. 1999. Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Rupesinghe, Kumar. 1988. “Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF).” Journal of Peace Research 25: 337–350. Swamy, M. R. Narayan. 2002. Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas. 3rd ed. New Delhi: Konark Publishers. Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. 1999. Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Colombia Press.

Appendix Vaddukoddai Resolution The resolution was adopted at the first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) on May 14, 1976. TULF’s participation in the 1977 general elections was anchored in this resolution. In this resolution, the TULF declares its intent to form a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam. S. J. V. Chelavanayakam presided over the convention. It reflects the radicalization of the Tamil ethnic movement by 1976. The following is a translation of the resolution, which was originally adopted in Tamil. Whereas, throughout the centuries from the dawn of history, the Sinhalese and Tamil nations have divided between themselves the possession of Ceylon, the Sinhalese inhabiting the interior of the country in its Southern and Western parts from the river Walawe to that of Chilaw and the Tamils possessing the Northern and Eastern districts; And, Whereas, the Tamil kingdom was overthrown in war and conquered by the Portuguese in 1619, and from them by the Dutch and the British in turn, independent of the Sinhalese Kingdoms; And, Whereas, the British colonists, who ruled the territories of the Sinhalese and Tamil kingdoms separately, joined under compulsion the territories of the Sinhalese and the Tamil Kingdoms for purposes of administrative convenience on the recommendation of the Colebrooke Commission in 1833; And, Whereas, the Tamil leaders were in the forefront of the freedom movement to rid Ceylon of colonial bondage which ultimately led to the grant of independence to Ceylon in 1948; And,

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Whereas, the foregoing facts of history were completely overlooked, and power over the entire country was transferred to the Sinhalese nation on the basis of a numerical majority, thereby reducing the Tamil nation to the position of subject people; And, Whereas, successive Sinhalese governments since independence have always encouraged and fostered the aggressive nationalism of the Sinhalese people and have used their political power to the detriment of the Tamils by: (a) Depriving one half of the Tamil people of their citizenship and franchise rights thereby reducing Tamil representation in Parliament, (b) Making serious inroads into the territories of the former Tamil Kingdom by a system of planned and state-aided Sinhalese colonization and large scale regularization of recently encouraged Sinhalese encroachments, calculated to make the Tamils a minority in their own homeland, (c) Making Sinhala the only official language throughout Ceylon thereby placing the stamp of inferiority on the Tamils and the Tamil language, (d) Giving the foremost place to Buddhism under the Republican Constitution thereby reducing the Hindus, Christians, and Muslims to second class status in this country, (e) Denying to the Tamils equality of opportunity in the spheres of employment, education, land alienation and economic life in general and starving Tamil areas of large scale industries and development schemes thereby seriously endangering their very existence in Ceylon, (f) Systematically cutting them off from the main-stream of Tamil cultures in South India while denying them opportunities of developing their language and culture in Ceylon, thereby working inexorably towards the cultural genocide of the Tamils, (g) Permitting and unleashing communal violence and intimidation against the Tamil speaking people as happened in Amparai and Colombo in 1956; all over the country in 1958; army reign of terror in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 1961; police violence at the International Tamil Research Conference in 1974 resulting in the death of nine persons in Jaffna; police and communal violence against Tamil speaking Muslims at Puttalam and various other parts of Ceylon in 1976––all these calculated to instill terror in the minds of the Tamil speaking people, thereby breaking their spirit and the will to resist injustices heaped on them, (h) By terrorizing, torturing, and imprisoning Tamil youths without trial for long periods on the flimsiest grounds, Capping it all by imposing on the Tamil nation a Constitution drafted, under conditions of emergency without opportunities for free discussion, by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of the Soulbury Constitution distorted by the citizenship laws resulting in weightage in representation to the Sinhalese majority, thereby depriving the Tamils of even the remnants of safeguards they had under the earlier constitution; And, Whereas, all attempts by the various Tamil political parties to win their rights, by cooperating with the governments, by parliamentary and extra-parliamentary agitations, by entering into pacts and understandings with successive Prime Ministers, in order to achieve the bare minimum of political rights consistent with the self-respect of the Tamil people have proved to be futile; And,

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Whereas, the efforts of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress to ensure non-domination of the minorities by the majority by the adoption of a scheme of balanced representation in a Unitary Constitution have failed and even the meager safeguards provided in article 29 of the Soulbury Constitution against discriminatory legislation have been removed by the Republican Constitution; And, Whereas, the proposals submitted to the Constituent Assembly by the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi for maintaining the unity of the country while preserving the integrity of the Tamil people by the establishment of an autonomous Tamil State within the framework of a Federal Republic of Ceylon were summarily and totally rejected without even the courtesy of a consideration of its merits; And, Whereas, the amendments to the basic resolutions, intended to ensure the minimum of safeguards to the Tamil people moved on the basis of the nine point demands formulated at the conference of all Tamil Political parties at Valvettithurai on 7th February 1971 and by individual parties and Tamil members of Parliament including those now in the government party, were rejected in toto by the government and Constituent Assembly; And, Whereas, even amendments to the draft proposals relating to language, religion, and fundamental-rights including one calculated to ensure that at least the provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulations of 1956 be included in the Constitution, were defeated, resulting in the boycott of the Constituent Assembly by a large majority of the Tamil members of Parliament; And, Whereas, the Tamil United Liberation Front, after rejecting the Republican Constitution adopted on the 22nd of May, 1972, presented a six point demand to the Prime Minister and the Government on 25th June, 1972, and gave three months time within which the Government was called upon to take meaningful steps to amend the Constitution so as to meet the aspirations of the Tamil Nation on the basis of the six points, and informed the Government that if it failed to do so the Tamil United Liberation Front would launch a nonviolent direct action against the Government in order to win the freedom and the rights of the Tamil Nation on the basis of the right of self-determination; And, Whereas, this last attempt by the Tamil United Liberation Front to win Constitutional recognition of the rights of the Tamil Nation without jeopardizing the unity of the country was callously ignored by the Prime Minister and the Government; And, Whereas, the opportunity provided by the Tamil United Liberation Front leader to vindicate the Government’s contention that their constitution had the backing of the Tamil people, by resigning from his membership of the National State Assembly and creating a by-election was deliberately put off for over two years in utter disregard of the democratic right of the Tamil voters of Kankesanthurai, And, Whereas, in the by-election held on the 6th February 1975, the voters of Kankesanthurai by a preponderant majority not only rejected the Republican Constitution imposed on them by the Sinhalese Government, but also gave a mandate to Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C. and through him to the Tamil United Liberation Front for the restoration and reconstitution of the Free Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam.

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The first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front meeting at Pannakam (Vaddukoddai Constituency) on the 14th day of May, 1976, hereby declares that the Tamils of Ceylon by virtue of their great language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries till they were conquered by the armed might of the European invaders and above all by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a nation distinct and apart from Sinhalese and this Convention announces to the world that the Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil Nation of its territory, language citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education, thereby destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people. And, while taking note of the reservations in relation to its commitment to the setting up of a separated state of Tamil Eelam expressed by the Ceylon Workers Congress as a Trade Union of the Plantation Workers, the majority of whom live and work outside the Northern and Eastern areas, This convention resolves that restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam, based on the right of self determination inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country. This Convention further declares: That the State of Tamil Eelam shall consist of the people of the Northern and Eastern provinces and shall also ensure full and equal rights of citizenship of the State of Tamil Eelam to all Tamil speaking people living in any part of Ceylon and to Tamils of Eelam origin living in any part of the world who may opt for citizenship of Tamil Eelam. That the constitution of Tamil Eelam shall be based on the principle of democratic decentralization so as to ensure the non-domination of any religious or territorial community of Tamil Eelam by any other section. That in the state of Tamil Eelam caste shall be abolished and the observance of the pernicious practice of untouchability or inequality of any type based on birth shall be totally eradicated and its observance in any form punished by law. That Tamil Eelam shall be a secular state giving equal protection and assistance to all religions to which the people of the state may belong. That Tamil shall be the language of the State, but the rights of Sinhalese speaking minorities in Tamil Eelam to education and transaction of business in their language shall be protected on a reciprocal basis with the Tamil speaking minorities in the Sinhala State. That Tamil Eelam shall be a Socialist State wherein the exploitation of man by man shall be forbidden, the dignity of labor shall be recognized, the means of production and distribution shall be subject to public ownership and control while permitting private enterprise in

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these branches within limit prescribed by law, economic development shall be on the basis of socialist planning and there shall be a ceiling on the total wealth that any individual of family may acquire. This Convention directs the Action Committee of the Tamil United Liberation Front to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation; And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully into the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is reached. Source: TamilNet, June 8, 1997. Available at http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=74&art id=8861.

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Sudan Ethnic Conflict in the Sudan and the Tumultuous Birth of a New Nation Susan R. Alaniz

Timeline 1885 The Mahdist era begins, during which most of the territory defined by Sudan was brought under one ruler. 1898 British forces conquer Sudan and establish the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. 1922 Egypt gains independence, and Sudan is directly aligned under Great Britain. A Southern Policy is created to administratively divide North and South to recognize strong cultural differences. 1955 A mutiny of soldiers in Southern Sudan begins the first civil war. 1956 Sudan becomes independent under a parliamentary government through planned elections. 1958 General Ibrahim Abboud seizes power via a military coup and escalates the civil war in the South by suspending parliamentary rule. 1964 A popular uprising overthrows Abboud and restores parliamentary rule.

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1969 Colonel Jaafar an-Numeiri seizes power and suppresses religiously oriented political parties. 1972 The Addis Ababa Accord ends the civil war in the South by granting Southern Sudan administrative autonomy. Eleven years of relative peace follows. 1978 Oil is discovered in the south. 1983 Numeiri abolishes the Addis Ababa Accord and imposes Islamic law. The second civil war begins as John Garang leads the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). 1985 A popular uprising overthrows Numeiri. 1989 Brigadier Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir seizes power, supported by Hasan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front. The two open Sudan as a sanctuary for Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda’s beginning under Osama bin Laden. 1996 The international community pressures Sudan to expel bin Laden. 1999 Oil exports begin. 2003 There is a revolt in Darfur over perceived attacks by the government against African Muslims. There is a severe response from the government. Hundreds of thousands die, and more are relocated. 2005 A Comprehensive Peace Agreement is created to move the North and South on a path to peace to end 22 years of civil war. John Garang is installed as the first president of South Sudan and first vice president of Sudan. Garang is killed in a helicopter crash three weeks later. 2009 The International Criminal Court indicts President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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2010 The International Criminal Court indicts President Bashir for genocide committed in Darfur. Bashir remains at large. 2010 Omar Bashir is reelected as president of Sudan with 68 percent of the vote. 2011 There is a public referendum on separation. The South votes to secede from Sudan to create Southern Sudan. Disputes over borders, particularly those near oil wells, renew the civil war. Salva Kiir becomes the first president of South Sudan. 2015 Presidential elections are planned. Sudan’s civil war is emblematic of the security problems faced by Sub-Saharan Africa. In its 58 years of existence as an independent state, Sudan has experienced civil war in all but 11 years. It has suffered tragically from a lack of even governance, endured severe culture clashes, and experienced all the hope and pain that comes to a historically poor society with the discovery of large quantities of exportable oil. The scope of the human suffering is mind-boggling. Prior to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which officially ended the second civil war, more than 2 million people died during two civil wars and at least 4 million more had been displaced. In addition to these staggering numbers, additional injustices such as mass rapes, forced slavery, child abduction, aerial bombardment of civilians by military aircraft, and unrestrained robbery were imposed on entire communities. Too often these atrocities were committed with government sanctioning. Throughout the struggle and continuing to the present day, efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to affected populations have been chronically hampered by armed conflicts, poor transportation infrastructure, and a lack of government support. In 2009, the International Criminal Court indicted Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir of crimes against humanity. In 2011, the residents of Southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly to secede from Sudan. Many hoped that the referendum would pave the way for a more peaceful future, not just in the South but also in the North. Tragically, the transition process has not ended the violence, nor have effective systems yet been put in place to enable a rule of law where violators are held accountable. According to the Center for Systemic Peace State Fragility Index and Matrix for 2013, out of 167 countries assessed, Sudan is 4th from the top, with number 1 being the worst case in comparative state failure, and South Sudan is 5th. Ethnic conflict has played a crucial role in understanding the nature of the violence, but it must not be considered in isolation. This chapter will review the history of the conflict, describe the conflict itself, discuss the management of the conflict, and conclude with a description of the significance of the struggle in Sudan to our understanding of the complex nature of ethnic conflict as an overarching concept.

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Historical Background Prior to the referendum for South Sudan’s secession in 2011, Sudan was the largest nation on the continent of Africa. It covered a landmass equivalent to the geography east of the Mississippi River in the United States and shared borders with nine other countries. This territory has political, social, and economic cleavages that derive from a unique historical legacy of conflict that has no single root cause. In the past 58 years, diverse Sudanese ethnic groups have struggled mightily to reconcile their differences socially and politically. Tragically, these differences have played out with disastrous consequences. Two major civil wars plagued Sudan for 47 years, between 1955 and 2003. As can be expected of a country with such a large landmass, there are ethnic, religious, and cultural differences among the population. An indicator of this diversity is the estimate by anthropologists of the existence of 134 different languages as of the early 21st century.1 The southern population mainly follows Christian and traditional religions. By contrast, in Northern and Central Sudan, the majority of the people are Arab Muslims. Western Sudan, which is known as the Darfur region, is predominantly populated by Muslims of mixed Arab and Sub-Saharan African ancestry. Religious affiliations are further divided into ethnic subgroups, so the identification of a national identity that characterizes Sudan is undoubtedly a management challenge. Sudanese history goes back hundreds, if not thousands, of years, but for the purpose of this study, the beginning of ethnic strife is examined as it evolved during the Mahdist era, from 1885 to 1898. Abdullahi Osman El-Tom argues that the Mahdist era is the landmark point in time under which the current Sudanese national identity was formed.2 As a concept, Mahdism is an Islamic belief in a divinely chosen ruler or direction. This period was characterized by efforts to bring most of the territories of modern-day Sudan under a collective whole that could be stewarded toward an Islamic identity under sultanate rule. Before these efforts could be solidified, the region was conquered by the British in 1898 and placed into a management structure known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. This arrangement allowed Great Britain to rule from afar through leaders selected in Egypt. In 1922, the Condominium was dissolved when Egypt was granted independence, and Great Britain began to rule directly. In the early stages of British rule, there was recognition of the deep social and religious differences between the Northern and Southern parts of the country. A result was the institution of a Southern Policy, which granted the South a deliberate administrative measure of independence from the North. Although it may have provided some measure of convenience at the time, the policy exacerbated the cultural differences by reinforcing them politically. Examples of this reinforcement include (1) reducing the opportunities for Northern Muslim traders in various Southern communities to curtail the spread of Arabic as lingua franca; (2) the establishment of the Equatoria Corps as a southern military force composed of Southern soldiers in 1917 as a counterweight to potential Arab rebellion in Sudan; (3) the recognition of Sunday as the official day of rest throughout

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the South in 1918; and (4) the adoption of English as the official language of the South in 1918.3 These policies were reversed eight years before independence. Unfortunately, the Southern Policy had been in place for nearly 40 years, so it did not fade easily. Moreover, when the Southern Policy was discontinued, the North and South were already so separate that they had developed completely different identities, with different rates of socioeconomic development that further marginalized the South from the North. Thereafter, Great Britain complicated the transition by appointing Northern political leaders to oversee the South. For example, of a total of nearly 800 senior posts in the civil service filled in 1956, only 12 were awarded to Southerners.4 In addition, command positions at the military posts in the South were given to Northerners, despite the fact that troops at Southern posts were almost entirely Southerners. This did not sit well with Southerners. The Conflict In 1955, Southern soldiers mutinied to begin the first civil war. The official independence from Great Britain in 1956 did little to quell the unrest. The fighting became more intense as both sides vied for power and promulgated cycles of retributive violence that included killing, rape, abductions, and forced relocations. In 1958, Northern general Ibrahim Abboud seized power via military coup. His actions escalated the civil war when he suspended parliamentary rule. General Abboud openly disdained the cultural preferences of the South. He considered Christianity to be an alien religion imposed by foreigners that denigrated the traditional African religious practices. Additionally, he set out to forcibly promote Islam and the use of Arabic throughout the South. Fighting over the legitimacy of these policies raged until 1964, when a popular uprising overthrew Abboud and restored a semblance of parliamentary rule. The efforts to implement parliamentary rule were well intentioned, but agonizing to institutionalize. In 1969, Jafar Numeiri seized power and tried to suppress religiously oriented political groups. He initially campaigned for a unified Sudan that was not divided politically by religious activism. This sense of optimism led to the Addis Ababa Accord that was signed in 1972. The accord reinstated administrative autonomy to Southern Sudan as an attempt to mitigate the violent efforts to unify Sudan socially. Furthermore, a new constitution was drafted in 1973 that established Sudan as a secular state. Eleven years of relative peace followed. Unfortunately, the uneasy peace was disrupted when oil was discovered in 1978 by explorers from U.S.-based Chevron, and disputes became commonplace as the North and South vied for control of what promised to be a lucrative resource that could dramatically alter the historically poor condition of the Sudanese economy. From the outset, the Southern regional government wanted an oil refinery built in the South, but Numeiri ignored their request and placed not only a refinery in the North, but also directed the installation of the main pipeline for export through the North, even though the majority of the oil wells were located in the South.5

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Numeiri supported political appointees in their efforts to redraw the boundaries between Northern and Southern provinces to move oil fields from Southern to Northern provinces. Not surprisingly, these efforts by Northern politicians were viewed as stealing in the eyes of Southerners, so tensions grew exponentially. In 1985, a popular uprising expelled Numeiri. This change was only the beginning. The second civil war began with intensity. Colonel John Garang, from the South, led the creation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) as thousands of Southern troops mutinied. Initially, Garang did not press for secession. Instead, he wanted a unified, secular, and socialist Sudan that was free of Islamist rule. Northern politicians were not interested in a secular Sudan. To demonstrate their resolve, they became increasingly repressive of Southerners, even encouraging militias to attack Southern factions and to steal women and children for use as slaves in the North. The South endured the humiliation, but the desire to fight back was not uniform across the South. This prompted retribution among the Southerners as neighbors fought with those who supported the hostile Northern militias. Sadly, fighters from both sides began using food as a weapon. The year 1988 marked the worst famine in Sudan’s modern history. During this time, army commanders prevented delivery of food supplies from international humanitarian organizations as a way to increase the suffering. It is estimated that nearly a quarter of a million Southerners died in 1988 and 3 million more were forced to flee.6 The extent of the suffering and the gradual attention from the international community prompted introspection by Sudan’s president, Sadiq Al-Mahdi. He was on the verge of retracting the policy efforts to install Islamic law, but his reticence infuriated Islamic militants. In 1989, General Omar Bashir rose to power through a military coup. He immediately suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, banned political parties, and closed the newspapers. As a means of removing Western influence, President Bashir convinced Chevron to sell its claims to the Sudanese oil fields early in his presidency. Instead, he turned to China and Malaysia. Politically, Bashir relied heavily on support from Hasan Al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front (NIF) party. From 1989, the two began an effort to create a sanctuary where Islamist groups could hide from dissenting governments and continue a larger effort to spread Islam throughout Africa and the greater Middle East. However, the violent intent of these groups gained international attention, and Bashir was pressured to expel Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda training camps or face international sanctions. Not wanting to jeopardize Sudan’s ability to attract investment in the extraction of Sudan’s oil and its vast profit potential, Bashir complied. In addition, the NIF became the National Congressional Party (NCP) in 1998, and in 1999, oil exports began. Repression continued in the South, but a new front to the conflict developed in Western Sudan, in the region known as Darfur. Tensions in Darfur were tied to frustrations by African Muslims living in Darfur with the efforts by the central government to Arabize the population of Darfur. The central government engaged in a campaign of forced ideological change for all Sudanese. These changes were bound to run into dissent, considering that Bashir’s ethnic group accounted for only 5 percent, or 2 million, of the total population of

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40 million people in Sudan. By contrast, the people of Darfur before the conflict accounted for nearly 6 million. Among that group, the Fur tribe is considered to be the largest, with 1 million people. The Northern government’s explanation for the violence against the population of Darfur has been that competition over scarce resources led the people of Darfur to resort to violence.7 Others, however, claim that the conflict was essentially between Arab Muslims and African Muslims. The fighting in Darfur began with intensity in 2003, when Darfurian rebels killed 200 soldiers. The rebels claimed that African Muslims from Darfur had been systematically targeted by the central government since the 1990s. Their complaints were dismissed by the government. Instead, the group’s members were labeled as terrorists and targeted as criminals who needed to be brought to justice. The government equipped militias that came to be known as Janjaweed, or men on horseback, in Arabic. These Janjaweed worked in conjunction with government forces as they destroyed entire villages, killed, raped, and plundered at will. The military was empowered to provide air support and other transportation to the Janjaweed. It is estimated that up to 400,000 people were killed in Darfur between 2003 and 2005, nearly 1.85 million people were displaced, and about 4 million people were affected in other ways.8 In 2004, the African Union (AU) engaged to negotiate a cease-fire, not just for Darfur but for the Sudanese civil war at large. Shortly after the cease-fire, a peacekeeping force was established. Management of the Conflict Oversight during the first 30 years of the two Sudanese civil wars was largely confined to the governance capacities, or lack thereof, in Sudan. Unfortunately, an excruciating 47-year-long duration with millions of people dead or displaced proves that there were no easy answers to ending the conflict. By nature, civil war involves the government, so the possibility of having an objective arbiter was slim to nonexistent. Prior to the globalization of media, telecommunications, and transportation, atrocities committed by dictators were easier to hide from the public eye. It was not until the mid-1990s that the lack of effective governance gained international attention. Ironically, it was the existence of Osama bin Laden’s training camps within the minimally governed regions that prompted investigation. Bin Laden invested money into the creation of roads and other projects for Sudan in return for the Bashir government looking the other way. When bin Laden began issuing violent religious fatwas, or calls to take action, against Saudi Arabia and the United States, those countries were motivated to look closer at Bin Laden’s relationship with the Sudanese government. Bin Laden claimed to be infuriated by the American military presence in Saudi Arabia and also by Saudi Arabia’s willingness to host American bases of operation. He considered the presence to be an affront to Islam. After bin Laden’s open exhortation to the Islamic community to rise up against the United States and Saudi Arabia, the United States pressured the Bashir government to expel him and his mujahedeen or face sanctioning. Recognizing the larger threat to the still nascent

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Sudanese oil export capability if he was at odds with the international community, Bashir complied. However, attacks and repression against both the South and also against Darfur continued. The stories of the atrocities in Darfur and the South were slow in attracting attention outside of Sudan, but they gained momentum from 2000 through 2005. In 2000, the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom briefed the Congressional Human Rights Caucus of the U.S. House of Representatives on the situation: “The government of Sudan is the world’s most violent abuser of the right of religion and belief. The Sudanese government is committing atrocities against the civilian population in the South and the Nuba Mountains.” In July of 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives voted unanimously to describe the situation in Darfur as “genocide.” The African Union and the United Nations refrained from this description but deepened their scrutiny of the situation in Darfur. At the regional level, the AU assumed the responsibility to broker a cease-fire to the civil war in 2004. A cease-fire was brokered in neighboring Chad and attended by 60 African military observers and a 300-strong civil and military physical protection force.9 Darfur

In 2004, the African Union deployed its first peacekeeping force, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The AMIS mandate was to monitor and observe compliance with the cease-fire, build confidence among the parties, help establish a secure environment to deliver humanitarian supplies, facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes, and contribute to improving security in Darfur. Though well intentioned, the African capacity to manage the conflict was limited for several reasons. Beginning in 1963, African leaders had committed to the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Unfortunately, a key tenet of the charter for this organization was nonintervention into the affairs of member states. The OAU could only intervene if invited by the parties to the dispute. This virtually neutralized any political will across the continent to intervene, even in cases of extreme humanitarian abuse. Furthermore, ruthless dictators were not motivated to adjust deviant behavior because there was no meaningful process or structure that would hold them accountable. The nonintervention part of the charter was not modified until 2002, when the OAU was disbanded and replaced by the African Union. A significant difference between the two is that the AU adopted a more interventionist stance on peacemaking on the continent. The AU has taken a more active stance vis-à-vis the prevention of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; however, beyond the newness of the charter change, the AU’s Sudan mission was hampered by a lack of financial, material, and training resources. AMIS took over six months to deploy. It also was hampered by a lack of clear guidance on how and when the use of force was authorized.10 The AMIS had an initial authorized strength of 6,170 military personnel and 1,540 civilian police. Within the next three years, its strength as a peacekeeping force was augmented through more deliberate collaboration with the United Nations, and a new hybrid mission was activated on July 31, 2007, and designated

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as the UN Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UMAMID). The mission has an authorized strength of 25,987 uniformed military and civilian peacekeepers from 46 states, with a budget of US$1.2 billion.11 In July 2004, the UN Security Council called on the Bashir government to disarm the Janjaweed and arrest their leaders for human rights abuses. A joint implementation mechanism was created to monitor the progress, with the Sudanese foreign minister, Mustafa Osman Ismail; the UN special representative to Sudan, Jan Pronk; and representatives from the AU and the League of Arab States. The mechanism foundered because each side to the conflict was reluctant to provide details on the nature of its fighting forces. The group met in various forms from 2004 to 2006. The meetings culminated in the signing of an accord in 2006. South Sudan

In 2005, a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was created to outline a new relationship between North and South Sudan and formally end the two decades of the second civil war. The accord was signed on January 9 between the Government of Sudan (GoS), led by the National Congress Party (NCP), and the primary opposition group in the South, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The power-sharing arrangement was grouped under a structure known as the Government of National Unity (GoNU). Key features of the CPA included (1) the sharing of oil revenues between the GoNU and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS); (2) the demarcation of the North-South border and the completion of a national census; (3) national elections; and (4) a referendum on the issue of Southern secession.12 The intent was to ultimately create a structure that would enable a more equitable political and economic structure that would support national unity. Sudan effectively became a loose confederation of one country, two systems. The new government of South Sudan was given near total autonomy to manage their affairs while formally remaining a part of the Republic of Sudan. John Garang became the president of South Sudan. He assumed the office by virtue of his position as head of the rebel SPLM/A. Under the CPA, he was to serve simultaneously as the first vice-president of Sudan; however, he died in a helicopter crash in 2005, only three weeks after the CPA was instituted, and Salva Kiir took his place. For many reasons, the years after the signing of the CPA and leading up to the referendum did not provide any real momentum toward unity. In April 2010, Sudan held its first multiparty election in 24 years. Although the election was criticized by the international community as being flawed in its ability to provide fair access to all potential contenders for office and to all eligible voters, the event was lauded by observers as being an important step forward. In this election, North Sudan president Bashir was elected by 68 percent of the voters. Shortly after the election, the Government of National Unity was disbanded. In January 2011, the referendum proceeded as planned, and 98 percent of the Southerners who participated in the vote approved the plan to secede from Sudan. On July 9, 2011, Southern Sudan became an independent state, but many issues remained, including the status of Abyei and the demarcation

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of the North-South border, numerous constitutional issues relating to citizenship and nationality, arrangements for the sharing of oil revenues, and the division of national assets and debts.13 In particular, division of the access to the oil has been the most problematic. When the North began a system of shutting off use of the pipeline and access to transit points, the South responded by discontinuing oil production, which hurt both economies. At the time of the referendum, 95 percent of the economy in the South and 60 percent of the economy in the North was dependent on oil revenues. When the revenues from oil decreased to fractional amounts of the previous production, both sides suffered. Significance Sudan and the new state of South Sudan are still in the grips of violent political transition. In 2013, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranked Sudan and South Sudan as the 166th of 187 countries in terms of human development. Severe poverty, fragile governance institutions, lack of employment opportunities, poor transportation infrastructure, lack of social services such as health and education, and lack of an effective rule of law make persistent pockets of violence inevitable. According to the World Bank, in 2013, the mean level of education for both Sudan and South Sudan is a mere three years. Clearly, there is a challenge with available human capital to move political, social, and economic institutions forward anytime soon. In particular, the political development path for the two nations continues to be rocky. In 1968, Samuel Huntington published Political Order in Changing Societies to highlight the possibility of developing societies sliding into conditions of political decay as they work toward a legitimate identity that will drive the creation of viable political institutions. Huntington argues that “highly developed political systems have procedures to minimize, if not eliminate, the role of violence in the system and are able to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence of wealth in the system.”14 He explored the highly volatile nature of the transition to political maturity. In the case of Sudan, the opportunity to export oil has only been in place for 15 years. The country went from a primary economic dependence on relatively low profits from agriculture to the polar opposite profit dimension in oil revenues. In 2011, the world watched as South Sudan voted overwhelmingly to secede from the North. There was hope that secession would usher in a more peaceful future. This optimism has been met with the reality of the political development. In 2013, the United Nations nearly doubled the troop level for monitoring the cease-fire in the South and ensuring postconflict stability in response to increased killings, sexual violence, arbitrary detentions, and forced relocations. Similarly, the North continues to suffer from the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Even the presence of over 25,000 peacekeepers has not been able to bring about a sustainable peace. Both crises are rooted in political, social, and economic challenges that evade easy answers, particularly by well-intentioned foreigners. History plays an important role because all sides to the conflict gain strength from their memories,

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particularly those in which villages were completely destroyed. Such memories do not fade easily. Politically, nearly all parties to the conflict have suffered as they endured hardships imposed on them by leaders perceived by large groups of society as illegitimate. To be effective, a governance structure must have two basic characteristics: it must be (1) legitimate in the eyes of the governed and (2) capable of delivering services to the governed. The fighting in Sudan’s civil wars can be attributed to several factors. Certainly, desperate poverty has been a factor. When jobs are in short supply and crime too often goes unpunished, the environment is ripe for civil unrest. In addition, the religious differences between North and South Sudan have caused uprisings over the appropriate form of legal system of accountability. In Sudan, military regimes favoring Islamic governments have dominated national politics since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1956. Traditional Muslim societies do not subscribe to a separation of church and state. Instead, they adhere to the use of sharia law, which applies not only to private religious observances but also to public accountability and associated forms of punishment for violations of the religious code. The non-Muslim segments of Sudanese society have fought to avoid being forced under a system of sharia law. Afis Ayinde contends that any effort to eradicate traditional religions, or those not under the Christian or Islamic umbrella, were bound to be met with strong resistance because traditional religions in Africa are, since the premodern period, custodians of peoples’ cultural values.15 Both Sudan and South Sudan are still embroiled in conflict over identities and loyalties that continue to be influenced not just by ethnicities but also by history, economic realities, and opportunities to rebel. Identities change. Neal Jesse and Kristen Williams assert that Arab and African identities are very much a social construction that is defined as much by time and space as by specific designations.16 As these identities change, there are also physical security ramifications related to fractured loyalties. Lee Seymour argues that fragmentation and side switching have prolonged Sudan’s civil wars by frustrating peace efforts and forestalling military victories.17 When side switching is present, the job for peace builders is significantly more complicated because it is difficult to predict when the side switching will occur and to what extent. Economically, Sudan has suffered to some extent from what development researchers refer to as a “resource curse.” A resource curse may exist when there is a single commodity that is in high demand for export, and the host nation relies heavily, if not exclusively, on that product to keep its economy viable. There is strong cross-national evidence for development problems in countries with a resource curse. In these situations, underdevelopment and poor governance can generate grievances as rival political groups fight viciously for control. The people of Sudan and South Sudan have suffered deeply, but there is room for optimism. The world has taken notice, as evidenced by the existence of at least 50 different nongovernmental aid organizations in Sudan, particularly in Darfur. Globalization offers unprecedented opportunities to not only see what is happening but also to respond. Dictators can no longer hide behind the shroud of deniability and anonymity because modern communications technology makes

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documentation instantaneous and quickly transmissible. In the case of Sudan, President Bashir was no longer able to deny the atrocities being committed by his own government forces. How should the world respond? The international community is in agreement that it should not sit idly by while genocide is being perpetrated. This sentiment prompted collaboration on what has become known as the responsibility to protect (R2P). The challenge with the implementation of this concept is that there is still no uniform agreement on who should mobilize, how much they should spend, what the end result of the intervention should look like, or who should bear the cost of rebuilding a war-torn society. Ultimately, resolution of the extended conflict is up to the political willpower of the Sudanese people themselves. No intervention, whether by neighboring state authorities, the African Union, the United Nations, or even nongovernmental organizations can completely solve the underlying social and political challenges that continue to fuel the bloodshed. While these opportunities may offer protected spaces to negotiate, the people of Sudan and South Sudan must collectively embrace the need to move past historical aggressions and beyond retribution, whether those people are Arab, African, Muslim, or non-Muslim. Only Sudan can truly resolve this internal dilemma. Notes 1. Abdel Gadir Ali, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, and Atta El-Battahani, “Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long?” in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, vol. 1, Africa, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005): 207. 2. See Abdullahi Osman El Tom, “Darfur People: Too Black for the Arab-Islamic Project of Sudan,” in Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader, ed. Salah M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 3. Ali et al., “Sudan’s Civil War,” 195. 4. Osama El Tom, “Darfur People.” 5. International Crisis Group, “God, Oil, and Country: Changing the Logic of Civil War in Sudan,” Africa Report 39 (2003): 12, www.crisissgroup.org. 6. Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence (New York: Perseus Books, 2011), 360. 7. Neal G. Jesse and Kristen P. Williams, Ethnic Conflict: A Systematic Approach to Cases of Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2011): 202. 8. United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1, http://www.gao.gov /products/GAO-07-24. 9. Adekeye Adebajo, “The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities,” in The African Union and Its Institutions, ed. John Akokpari and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba (Auckland Park, South Africa: Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2008), 136. 10. Adebajo, “The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU,” 137.

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11. For basic information on the United Nations operations in Sudan from 2007–2014, see “United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Facts and Figures,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml 12. Gareth Curless and Annemarie Peen Rodt, “Sudan and the Not So Comprehensive Peace,” in Civil Wars 15, no. 2 (2013): 102. 13. Ibid., 102. 14. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 22. 15. Oladosu Afis Ayinde, “Beyond 9/11: Histories and Spaces of Terrorism in Africa,” in Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Africa, ed. Malinda S. Smith (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 61. 16. Jesse and Williams, Ethnic Conflict, 201–203. 17. Lee Seymour, “Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan,” International Security 39, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 93.

Suggested Readings Adebajo, Adekeye. 2008. “The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities.” In The African Union and Its Institutions, edited by John Akokpari et al. Auckland Park, South Africa: Centre for Conflict Resolution. Ali, Abdel Gadir, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, and Tata El-Batean. 2005. “Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long?” In Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Vol. 1, Africa, edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Curless, Gareth, and Annemarie Peen Rodt. 2013. “Sudan and the Not So Comprehensive Peace.” In Civil Wars 15 (2): 101–117. De Waal, Alex. 2008. “Sudan and the International Criminal Court: A Guide to the Controversy.” (July 14). http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/sudan-and-the-internationalcriminal-court-a-guide-to-the-controversy. Gomes, Solomon. 2008. “The Peacemaking Role of the OAU and the AU: A Comparative Analysis.” In The African Union and Its Institutions, edited by John Akokpari et al. Auckland Park, South Africa: Centre for Conflict Resolution. Hassan, Salah M., and Carina E. Ray, eds. 2009. Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. International Crisis Group. 2002. “God, Oil, and Country: Changing the Logic of Civil War in Sudan.” Africa Report 39. International Crisis Group. 2015. “Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts.” Africa Report 223 (January 29). Metros, Eyal, 2008. “Ever Again?: The United States, Genocide Suppression, and the Crisis in Darfur.” Journal of Genocide Research 10 (3) (September). Seymour, Lee J. M. 2014. “Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan.” International Security 39 (2) (Fall). United Nations. 2015. “United Nations Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UMAMID) Facts and Figures.” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml. United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2006. Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-24.

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Appendices As the following two appendices indicate, efforts to resolve, or even just manage, the conflicts in the Sudan have been underway for a very long time, and have as yet been unsuccessful.

1. The Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan, February 27, 1972 Draft Organic Law to organize Regional Self-Government in the Southern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9, 1969, granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralized system of the government of their country, it is hereunder enacted: Article 1 This law shall be called the law for Regional Self-Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall come into force and a date within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of Addis Ababa Agreement. Article 2 This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a three quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and confirmed by a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan. …

CHAPTER II Article 4 The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3. (iii) shall constitute a self-governing Region within the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and be known as the Southern Region. Article 5 The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and power of which are defined by this law. Article 6 Arabic shall be official language for the Sudan and English the principle language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any language or languages, which may serve a practical necessity for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Region.

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CHAPTER III Article 7 Neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national nature. … ... Article 11 The People’s Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, interim security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular in the following: Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region. Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration. Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law. Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions. Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development. Promotion of local languages and cultures. Town and village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programs Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders’ licenses and formation of co-operation societies. Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals. Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centers, dispensaries and dressing stations. Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and trade. Promotion of tourism Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organizations of trade and cultural exhibitions. Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals. Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards. Land use in accordance with national laws.

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Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases. Development, utilization, and protection of forests crops and pastures in accordance with national laws. Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes. All other matters delegated by the President or the People’s National Assembly for legislation. … Article 14 The People’s Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if he thinks fit, accede to such request. …

CHAPTER VII: FINANCE Article 25 The People’s Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislation and orders to guarantee the collection of all public monies at different levels. …

CHAPTER VIII: OTHER PROVISIONS Article 26 Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the People’s Armed Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the region. the use of the People’s Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national defense shall be controlled by the President of the advice of the President of the High Executive Council ... Article 32 a) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education, employment, commerce and the practice of any profession. No law adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.

APPENDIX A: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

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A citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship Equality of citizens. a) All citizens, without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sec, economic or social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law. All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the rights to institute legal proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without delay prejudicing their interest. Personal liberty. a) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited. The accused should be presumed innocent until proved guilty. Retrospective penal legislation and punishment should be prohibited. The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed. . . . Freedom of Religion and Conscience. Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion and of conscience and the right to profess them publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations in favor of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law. Parents and Guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under their care in accordance with the relation of their choice…. Source: United Nations Peacemaker. Available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sudan-addisababa -southsudan72.

2. Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, November 18, 2014 …

II. Political developments South Sudan peace process 2. On 22 September, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) opened the sixth session of the peace talks in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. As the basis for negotiations, the IGAD mediation prepared a draft text consolidating provisions of the Protocol on Agreed Principles on Transitional Arrangements towards Resolution of the Crisis in South Sudan, signed by IGAD Heads of State and Government at an IGAD summit held on 25 August, and a summary of the stakeholders’ consensus positions reached during the previous session. The mediators did not recognize a newly composed delegation of “other political parties” on the grounds that the selection of the delegation members had not been carried out in accordance with established procedures. Representatives of civil society organizations and faith leaders also attended the meeting. For the first time since the inception of the IGAD-led peace talks, a women’s delegation participated in the negotiations as observers.

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3. Participants reached agreement on several issues. These included the duration of the transition period, decision-making mechanisms during the transition, a bicameral structure for the legislature, the size of the Cabinet, and the right of the appointee to a new Prime Minister post to contest elections at the end of the transition period. However, no progress was achieved on a power-sharing formula between the President and a future Prime Minister within a transitional government, or on details regarding the future system of governance. The 45-day deadline set out in the 25 August Protocol expired on 9 October, without agreement on the formation of a transitional government of national unity. ... 8. On 9 November, the delegations representing the Government and SPLM/A in Opposition signed the implementation matrix for the cessation of hostilities agreement of 23 January. The signing of the implementation matrix was supposed to enable a proper monitoring and verification process to commence. However, on 10 November, SPLM/A in Opposition issued a complaint to the IGAD mediation regarding alleged Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) attacks on SPLM/A in Opposition positions in various areas of the three States of the Greater Upper Nile region. …

III. Security Situations A. Security developments 12. Sporadic fighting between the two parties to the conflict continued throughout the reporting period. Troop mobilizations and attacks were mainly concentrated: between the canal area of northern Jonglei State and the Dolieb Hill area to the south-west of Malakal in Upper Nile State; in the areas around Nassir and north of Renk in Upper Nile State; and in areas around Bentiu and Rubkona, in Unity State. Overall, the military positions of the two parties did not change significantly as the rainy season drew to a close, with the government forces maintaining control of all state capitals and strategic towns while the opposition forces were in control of outlying areas in parts of Upper Nile and Unity States, as well as northern areas of Jonglei State. Meanwhile, tensions remained high in some UNMISS protection of civilians sites, with serious incidents of violence in the sites in Juba and Malakal. … Intercommunal conflict 20. In Lakes State, intercommunal violence continued between Dinka Agar subsections, fuelled by long-standing intersectional feuds; the arming of local defence forces by state authorities following the eruption of the national crisis in December 2013; an influx of weapons from neighbouring States most affected by the conflict between the Government and SPLM/A in Opposition; and the absence of law enforcement and justice mechanisms. Incidents included cattle raiding, revenge attacks, rapes, and personal disputes in Rumbek Central, Rumbek East, Rumbek North and Cueibet Counties…. …

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IV. Humanitarian situation 23. Persistent insecurity in Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Upper Nile States during the reporting period caused displacement and disrupted livelihoods. As at 11 November, approximately1.9 million people had been forced to flee their homes: 1.4 million people had been displaced internally and, according to UNHCR, another 465,815 had fled to neighbouring countries as at 17 October. Some 100,000 internally displaced people sheltering in UNMISS bases are fleeing violence, hunger and disease. Aid agencies have reached more than 3.5 million people (92 per cent) of the 3.8 million estimated to be in general humanitarian need this year. ... 28. Humanitarian access continues to be hampered by fighting and violence against aid workers and assets. Active hostilities and insecurity in several States, especially Unity and Upper Nile, continue to disrupt humanitarian response activities and restrict humanitarian road and air access. Key obstacles include active combat, the looting of aid supplies, threats against and the harassment of aid workers, and bureaucratic impediments to road, river and air travel by those on both sides of the conflict. National staff deployments continue to be curtailed by ethnic tensions and targeting, as well as intimidation and harassment.

V. Implementation of the Mission’s reprioritized mandated tasks … C. Human rights monitoring and reporting … 47. The lack of a meaningful judicial system continues to have an impact on due process protections. Cases of prolonged and arbitrary detention continued to be reported, including proxy detention, detention for offences not defined in law and detention following the issuance of sentences by customary courts not legally empowered to order confinement. Although prevalent throughout the country, these concerns were noted in particular in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Lakes and Eastern Equatoria States. ... 53. Reports continued to be received of the large-scale recruitment of children, the military use and occupation of schools and hospitals, and other grave violations perpetrated against children by various parties to the conflict, despite commitments on the protection of children signed by both the Government and SPLM/A in Opposition. According to UNICEF, during the reporting period 70 incidents affecting 2,626 children (1,825 boys, 789 girls and 12 of unknown sex) were recorded. In total, 42 of those incidents were verified, affecting 1,111 children (646 boys and 465 girls). More than 104,000 children affected by conflict have been reached with child protection services. A total of 6,025 children have been registered as either unaccompanied or separated, 403 of whom have been reunited with their families. …

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VIII. Observations and recommendations 72. I remain deeply concerned about the continuing state of conflict in South Sudan and the long time it is taking for the warring parties to reach a comprehensive peace agreement. 73. I am particularly worried that both parties have so far indicated their preference for military conflict if the other side is not ready to sign a peace agreement on their terms. The risks of a protracted military confrontation, its impact on the civilian population, and the potential for a further spread of violence into the Greater Bahr el-Ghazal region, as well as the Equatorias, raise genuine concerns about the sustainability of any political agreement reached between the parties…. ... 77. UNMISS alone cannot effectively protect civilians. I therefore call upon all the parties, in particular the Government, which has the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians, to do their part to establish a secure environment for civilians, irrespective of their ethnic background. Source: Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council. United Nations Archive. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/documents.shtml.

United Kingdom The Making of British Race Relations Anthony Mark Messina

Timeline 1948 The British Nationality Act creates the status of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, thereby precipitating the start of significant nonwhite immigration; 492 Jamaicans arrive in Great Britain on the ship Empire Windrush. 1958 Race riots erupt in Nottingham and Notting Hill, London. 1962 The Commonwealth Immigrants Act restricts nonwhite immigration. 1964 A Labour government minister unexpectedly loses his parliamentary seat to an overtly racist Conservative challenger. 1965 The Race Relations Act is enacted. 1967 The Kenyan Asian crisis begins. 1968 In his “Rivers of Blood” speech, maverick Conservative politician Enoch Powell warns of dire social consequences if New Commonwealth immigration is not curbed. The second Commonwealth Immigrants Act is passed. 1971 The Immigration Act halts significant new labor immigration.

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1976 The third Race Relations Act establishes the Commission for Racial Equality. 1978 Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher publicly empathizes with popular fear that Great Britain is being “swamped” by people with a different culture. 1981 The new British Nationality Act narrows the scope of British citizenship. Riots in which ethnic minority youth are prominent erupt in Brixton, Toxteth, and elsewhere in England. 1987 Four ethnic minority Labour Party candidates are elected as members of Parliament. 1988 Muslims across Great Britain publicly protest the English publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. 1993 Stephen Lawrence, a young black man, is murdered in a racist attack in London. 1995 The death of a black burglary suspect at the hands of police sparks a riot led by Afro-Caribbean youth in Brixton. 1999 The Macpherson Report cites pervasiveness of “institutional racism” within the London Metropolitan police force. 2001 The Race Relations Act is extended to cover public authorities and bodies. Eleven ethnic minorities are elected to Parliament after a general election campaign in which race relations and asylum seekers are prominent issues. After race riots in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham, the Cantle Report spotlights the “depth of polarization” that is pervasive within segregated communities. 2002 Paul Boateng is appointed chief secretary of the treasury, thus becoming the first black member of the cabinet in British history. The Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act creates an English test and citizenship exam for immigrants.

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2003 Great Britain’s involvement in the U.S.-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq radicalizes many British Muslims. 2005 Sparked by the alleged rape of 14-year-old girl of Jamaican heritage, ethnic-inspired violence erupts between Afro-Caribbean and South Asian men in Birmingham. 2007 The Equality and Human Rights Commission assumes the responsibilities of the former Commission for Racial Equality, Equal Opportunities Commission, and the Disability Rights Commission. 2010 Two men are convicted of murdering Stephen Lawrence. Twenty-seven ethnic minorities are elected members of Parliament, including 11 Conservatives and the first 3 Muslim women, all Labour Party representatives. The Equality Act consolidates and expands the previous law on disability, gender, and racial discrimination. 2011 Precipitated by the shooting death of young black man by Tottenham police, thousands of people riot in several London boroughs and other English cities for five days. Although circumscribed by the legacies of the slave trade of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries and, more profoundly, by the experience of British imperialism and empire during the 19th century, it is nevertheless the case that race relations in Great Britain began to assume their contemporary shape only during the late 1940s and early 1950s. With the migration to Great Britain of some 800 immigrant workers from Jamaica between December 1947 and October 1948 and the subsequent settlement of tens of thousands of workers and their families from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent in England’s major cities during the next decade and a half, contemporary British ethnic and race relations came to assume several enduring features. First, questions of ethnicity and race became inextricably linked to immigration-related concerns and, specifically, to recurrent political pressures for immigration restrictions. Second, race relations and state policies that regulate the immigration of nonwhites brought to the forefront politically charged issues that have significantly challenged the decision-making capacity of the British political system. Finally, despite its relatively modest size—currently an estimated 18 percent of the total population and 8 percent of the electorate—Great Britain’s new ethnic and racial population either has precipitated or been the target of significant political and social change.1 Such change includes revising the very concept and basic rights of formal British citizenship, incrementally overhauling Great Britain’s immigration laws, the emergence of a multicultural society, and the

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adoption and implementation of an American-inspired legal framework proscribing overt racial discrimination in employment, housing, and other areas. Historical Background On the surface, Great Britain’s experience with post–World War II immigration was similar to that of other immigration-receiving states in Western Europe. Like many others, the British economy was handicapped by labor shortages during the early postwar period as it rebounded from the ravages of World War II and as the great economic boom among the Western countries (1945–1969) spurred domestic production. Having exhausted the available supply of white European foreign labor during the early 1950s, the economy, with some modest assistance from private employers and the government, began to attract workers from Great Britain’s New Commonwealth, particularly from the West Indies, India, and Pakistan. Although unorganized and spontaneous compared to the experiences of many other immigration-receiving states, the volume of this wave of nonwhite migration to Great Britain was nevertheless considerable. With the arrival of approximately 2,000 New Commonwealth immigrants in 1953, their numbers subsequently escalated to 46,800 in 1956, 57,700 in 1960, and 231,000 during the 18-month period between January 1961 and July 1962.2 The events that forever altered this largely self-regulating pattern of immigration were the British government’s publication, on November 1, 1961, of a bill designed to curtail New Commonwealth immigration and its subsequent implementation as the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in July 1962. On the one hand, the act restricted nonwhite immigration by instituting a labor-voucher system, which required immigrants to obtain a work permit issued by the minister of labour. This provision reduced the number of immigrant workers entering Great Britain from over 50,000 during the act’s first six months of implementation to approximately 13,000 for the whole of 1965.3 However, to placate the pro-Commonwealth lobby in Parliament and various pro-immigrant interest groups across the country, the 1962 act generously permitted the entry of the family members of previously settled workers. The origins and implications of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act have been comprehensively discussed in numerous scholarly works. In a nutshell, the British government’s hasty efforts to restrict nonwhite immigration in 1962 were mostly governed by its fear of rising public hostility toward the permanent settlement of nonwhite immigrants. However, unlike many of its European counterparts, the British government could not treat its nonwhite immigrant population, estimated to be 597,000 in 1961, as temporary “guest workers.”4 On the contrary, most nonwhite immigrants were full British citizens, having automatically acquired this status as a result of being subjects of the Commonwealth after the 1948 British Nationality Act was enacted. In the end, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was only partially effective. Although it substantially decreased labor migration to Great Britain, it inadvertently stimulated a wave of secondary, or family, immigration and significantly accelerated the pace of permanent settlement. It also failed to adequately address

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the status of a special population of British passport-holding Asians that was progressively being expelled from the African country of Kenya. As a consequence of the arrival of a substantial number of refugees during the Kenyan Asian crisis of 1967–1968, the British government again tightened its immigration rules. It did so by passing the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which, for the first time, introduced the notion of “patriality,” a category of persons with an automatic right of abode in the United Kingdom, into British immigration and nationality law.5 In turn, the 1968 act and the principle of patriality provided the foundation for further immigration restrictions contained in the 1971 Immigration Act. By sharpening the distinction between patrials and nonpatrials and by tearing down the barrier between the categories of aliens and commonwealth citizens, the 1971 Immigration Act eliminated all preferential treatment for the latter group. It also further dissolved Great Britain’s prior obligations to the peoples and governments of the New Commonwealth. However, even after the aforementioned legislative measures to reduce the intake of nonwhite immigrants into Great Britain were effected, it did not dramatically decrease. Indeed, between 1969 and 1978, over 535,000 immigrants from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan were admitted for settlement in Great Britain, or approximately 53,500 per annum, a figure only slightly smaller than the annual intake between 1963 and 1968.6 The entry of more than 50,000 nonwhite immigrants annually during the 1960s and 1970s, set against the backdrop of slow economic growth and, periodically, full-blown recession, laid the groundwork for an anti-immigrant, nativist reaction within the majority population. First in the incendiary speeches of maverick Conservative Party politician Enoch Powell, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and later in the street violence and electoral campaigns of the neofascist National Front, racist white Britons discovered their political voice and commandeered political vehicles to represent their illiberal views. Public hostility toward New Commonwealth immigration and settled immigrants continued to find political expression until 1982 or so, when it quickly began to dissipate. Despite several outbreaks of urban violence in which alienated minority youth prominently participated in 1981 and 1985, the political salience of nonwhite immigration significantly declined, Enoch Powell and the National Front receded to the political wilderness, and the British government’s immigration and immigrant policies became models of coherence. Several factors appear responsible for this sea change. First, the election in 1979 of a Conservative government that was openly hostile toward the idea of a multicultural society and committed to introducing even tighter immigration restrictions undercut political support for the National Front and other illiberal political forces. Second, the implementation of new immigration restrictions and an even more restrictive British Nationality Act during the early 1980s cut the annual inflow of New Commonwealth and Pakistani immigrants into Great Britain by half, to approximately 24,000. Further immigration restrictions imposed by a successor Conservative government in 1988 preempted any significant future increase in New Commonwealth immigration by repealing the right of the primary

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dependents of male immigrants who were settled in Britain before 1973 to enter the country. Finally, by diluting the long-observed principle of jus soli (citizenship by virtue of birth within the national territory) in favor of a greater emphasis on jus sanguinis (citizenship by virtue of inheriting the nationality of a parent or close relation), the 1981 British Nationality Act rationalized Great Britain’s nationality law and legitimized the 1962–1980 wave of immigration restrictions. In so doing, the new act removed many of the lingering ambiguities in British nationality law and immigration rules so that both became less vulnerable to legal challenges. The Conflict Apart from relatively minor political strife over an influx of asylum seekers, Great Britain was one of the least-conflicted countries in Western Europe with regard to both immigration and immigrant policy during the 1980s. As a consequence of the 1971 Immigration Act and subsequent immigration restrictions, the annual volume of both primary and secondary (kin) immigration was relatively modest. Mostly because of the legacy of the 1948 British Nationality Act, an overwhelming majority of nonwhites in Great Britain were full citizens. Thanks to the 1971 Immigration Act, the 1981 British Nationality Act, and subsequent legislation, there was little doubt about who was and who was not a citizen. Moreover, even at the turn of this century, Great Britain was only one of a handful of West European countries without a politically significant party or movement of the extreme right. The redefinition of Great Britain’s nationality laws, declining political salience of immigration-related issues, and retreat of the political far right did not mean that British ethnic and race relations had reached a harmonious equilibrium, however. To the contrary, as overt political conflict over immigration policy waned, issues associated with the incorporation of Great Britain’s new ethnic and racial minorities into British economic, political, and social life became more prominent. This shift was perhaps most explicitly reflected in the social and political turmoil that surfaced during the Salman Rushdie affair during the late 1980s and early 1990s. On one side of the conflict stood thousands of devout British Muslims incensed by the publication in Great Britain of Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses, which they viewed as blasphemy against their religion. On the opposite side were numerous white Britons who saw in the more militant and sometimes violent Muslim reaction to the publication of Rushdie’s provocative book an ominous threat to freedom of speech and the preservation of a liberal, open, and tolerant society. Although the conflict precipitated by the publication of The Satanic Verses directly affected only a minority of Britons, it nevertheless reflected the expanding ideological divide over what constitutes the good society, a divide that has largely sprung from the political and social fallout from significant nonwhite, and especially Muslim, immigrant settlement. Moreover, it exposed the erroneousness of the assumption, previously held by many progressively minded white Britons, that the incorporation of Great Britain’s new minorities would be a relatively seamless process, a process that would be driven by forces of assimilation similar to those which had acted upon Jews, Poles, and other minorities into British society in prior decades.

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The current and primary challenge with regard to the economic incorporation of Great Britain’s new ethnic and racial minorities is high unemployment and a dearth of economic mobility and opportunity—problems that are especially acute among Great Britain’s Afro-Caribbean population. Although successive race relations acts have proscribed overt discrimination in much of the public sector and the private economy, racial prejudice still unquestionably contributes to higher than average minority underemployment. In June 2012, for example, 21 percent of blacks and 12 percent of Asians were unemployed, compared with 7 percent of whites.7 Moreover, numerous studies have underscored the facts that, on the whole, ethnic minorities are overrepresented in less-skilled jobs and in lower tiers of the labor market. The picture is somewhat brighter with regard to the social incorporation of ethnic and racial minorities. Although social disadvantage and exclusion persist, especially in the form of racially segregated housing patterns and comparatively poor health standards among minority populations, interracial cohabitation and marriage are now relatively common. According to the 2011census, nearly one in eight British families is headed by a mixed-race couple or constituted by an ethnic mix of children and adults.8 In contrast to the 672,000 persons who identified themselves as belonging to various “mixed” categories in 2001, 1,224,000 did so in 2011.9 Moreover, and perhaps more significantly for the long-term trajectory of race relations, the majority of white Britons are relatively tolerant on the subject of interracial marriage. One study, for example, found that only 15 percent of Britons are uneasy about mixed-race marriages.10 Much as it has during the past 50 years, the project of politically incorporating Great Britain’s minorities is also progressing, albeit incrementally. Relatively robust turnout rates among ethnic minority voters (65–83 percent, depending on the specific minority group) and the inclusion of more minorities among the formal members of Great Britain’s major political parties obviously represent tangible progress. These trends, coupled with the elevation of 4 minority parliamentary candidates to the House of Commons, Great Britain’s lower legislative house, in 1987, 6 in 1992, 9 in 1997, 12 in 2001, 15 in 2005, and 27 in 2010, provide concrete evidence that Great Britain’s new ethnic and racial minorities have come of political age. Perhaps more importantly, a recent survey discovered that across generations and as compared to minorities in other European countries of immigration, the political norms of British minorities are little different from those of the general population, thus refuting the argument that Muslims are an especially problematic group to incorporate into British political life.11 This said, on the deficit side of the political equation is the stark fact that Great Britain’s minorities are still underrepresented among formal officeholders, and numerous public policy issues that are especially pertinent to this special population remain politically neglected. Moreover, for complex historical and ideological reasons, the articulation and promotion of the collective interests of minorities within Great Britain’s political party system are primarily borne by only one major political party, the political left-of-center Labour Party, whose near monopoly of the ethnic-minority vote is viewed by many observers as politically unhealthy for both minorities and the party.

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Management of the Conflict There are currently two schools of thought regarding the pertinence of public policy for ameliorating ethnic and race-related conflict in Great Britain. On the one side, there are those who argue that government’s primary tasks in ameliorating ethnic and race relations problems should primarily be restricted to reducing the number of new immigrants and establishing the macroeconomic conditions that can improve, rather inevitably and automatically it is often believed, the prospects for greater economic opportunity and mobility. This view assumes that, like many of the groups who previously migrated to Great Britain, the new ethnic and racial minorities will eventually gain their appropriate place once their population size is stabilized, they gradually transcend their immigrant origins, and they adopt the economic, political, and social behaviors long prevalent within the majority population. In this context, political elites should abandon their commitment to “semi-separatist multiculturalism” in favor of public policies that coerce, however gently, minorities to assimilate into the British economic, political, and social mainstream.12 On the other side, there are those who insist that Great Britain’s new ethnic and racial minorities confront considerable obstacles to their successful incorporation, obstacles that are unlikely to be overcome even over the medium to long term. This side points to empirical evidence of persistent racial and religious prejudice within British society, including overtly discriminatory practices among employers, judges, politicians, landlords, and the police to justify its prescription that government should aggressively intervene to combat prejudice and reduce disadvantage. Although this camp has succeeded in persuading Great Britain’s major political parties to support and enact significant antidiscrimination legislation and other legal protections over time, it nevertheless remains dissatisfied with the effectiveness of these measures as well as the breadth, depth, and pace of the positive social changes they have engendered. Thus inspired, it advocates further and more vigorous political efforts to accelerate the economic, political, and social incorporation of Great Britain’s ethnic and racial minorities. Significance The conflict over which general public policy courses to adopt in tackling and ameliorating the challenges posed by the emergence of an increasingly diverse Great Britain is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Indeed, transcending the practical policy dilemmas raised by the aforementioned challenges, there is an omnipresent ideological schism over the momentous changes already wrought by mass immigration and the degree to which Great Britain’s majority population should embrace further change. Whatever the future, the history of post–World War II British ethnic and race relations potentially offers valuable lessons for newer countries of immigration in Europe, such as Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, that have more recently begun to grapple with the political and social fallout of mass immigration. Perhaps the

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most important of these lessons is that the challenges of incorporating immigrants of color or minority religious backgrounds tend to evolve in extremely complex and often unforeseeable ways. As a consequence, public policy too must constantly evolve to keep pace. In the British case, domestic conflicts that were perceived, framed, and addressed through the lens of race from the late 1950s through the mid-1980s, at least with regard to “brown” Muslim immigrants, eventually morphed into conflicts over religion and, to some extent, broader political and societal disputes over questions of national identity and social cohesion. Much to the consternation of British policy makers, the intervention of international events and other unanticipated domestic factors have caused even their best intentioned public policy measures to, time and again, fall short of their intended goals. Notes 1. John Wood and Richard Cracknell, “Ethnic Minorities in Politics, Government and Public Life,” Paper (London: House of Commons Library, 2013): 1. http://www .parliament.uk/business/news/2008/11/ethnic-minorities-in-public-life; and Anthony F. Heath, Stephen D. Fisher, Gemma Rosenblatt, David Sanders, and Maria Sobolewska, The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1. 2. Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 23. 3. David Butler and Anne Sloman, British Political Facts, 1900–1979 (London, Macmillan, 1980), 300. 4. David Butler and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts, 1900–1994 (London: Macmillan, 1994), 328. 5. Patrials are, by definition, citizens of the Commonwealth and of the United Kingdom born of or adopted by parents who had British citizenship by virtue of their own birth in the United Kingdom. 6. Butler and Butler, British Political Facts, 1900–1994, 328. 7. David Hough, “Unemployment by Ethnic Background,” Paper (London: House of Commons Library, 2013): 2, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research /briefing-papers/SN06385/unemployment-by-ethnic-background. 8. David Doughty, “Decade That Changed the Face of the UK: 4 Million Migrants Settle Here—and in London Less Than Half of the Population Is White British,” Mail Online, December 12, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2246689/Census -2011-Decade-changed-face-UK-London-half-white-British.html. 9. Ibid. 10. Sunder Catalan, “Introduction,” in The Melting Pot Generation: How Britain Became More Relaxed on Race, ed. Rob Ford, Rachael Jolley, Sundar Katwala, and Binita Mehta (London: British Future, 2013), 2. 11. Anthony F. Heath, Stephen D. Fisher, Gemma Rosenblatt, David Sanders, and Maria Sobolewska, The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54. 12. David Goodhart, The British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-War Immigration (London: Atlantic Books, 2013), 334.

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Suggested Readings Bleich, Erik. 2003. Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s. New York: Cambridge University Press. Goodhart, David. 2013. The British Dream: Successes and Failures of Post-War Immigration. London: Atlantic Books. Hansen, Randall. 2000. Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Heath, Anthony F., Stephen D. Fisher, Gemma Rosenblatt, David Sanders, and Maria Sobolewska. 2013. The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Maxwell, Rashaan. 2012. Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France: Integration TradeOffs. New York: Cambridge University Press. Messina, Anthony M. 1989. Race and Party Competition in Britain. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. Phillips, Mike, and Trevor Phillips. 1998. Windrush: The Irresistible Rise of Multi-Racial Britain. London: Harper Collins. Rich, Paul B. 1990. Race and Empire in British Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Saggar, Shamit. 2009. Race and Representation: Electoral Politics and Ethnic Pluralism in Britain. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press. Schofield, Camilla. 2013. Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain. New York: Cambridge University Press. Solomos, John, and Les Back. 1995. Race, Politics and Social Change. London: Routledge. Somerville, Will. 2007. Immigration under New Labour. Bristol, England: Policy Press.

Appendices 1. Race, Religion and Equalities in England and Wales: A Report on the 2009–2010 Citizenship Survey The Report whose findings are listed below was compiled by the Department of Communities and Local Government to provide Britain’s leaders with data deemed necessary for effective policy making in such vital areas as community cohesiveness and racial equality. Commissioned by Britain’s Labour Party government, the public opinion survey on which the Report rests was terminated in 2011 following Labour’s defeat in the United Kingdom’s 2010 parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, it remains the most comprehensive study of its type, and has widely contributed to public debate on its subject areas since its release. Key findings • T  he proportion of people who identified their religion as Christian fell steadily between 2005 and 2009-10. This was associated with a corresponding increase in the proportion of people that did not identify with any religion. • Christian people were much less likely than all other main religions to say that they practised their religion, while Muslim people were most likely to practise. The proportion of Muslim people who saw themselves as actively practising their religion increased between 2005 and 2009-10, and this rise was particularly pronounced among younger Muslim people.

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• T  he proportion of people who felt that religious prejudice had increased over the previous five years fell between 2007-08 and 2009-10 from 62 per cent to 46 percent. This pattern was observed across nearly all religious groups. Correspondingly, the proportion of people who felt that Government offered about the right level of protection to religious groups rose over this same time period. People who were Muslim, Hindu and Sikh were more positive than Christian people on both of these attitudinal measures. • As in previous surveys, Muslim people were regarded by the population in general as the group most likely to encounter religious prejudice. However, in line with the overall trend, the proportion of people who felt that Muslims were the target of increased prejudice fell between 2007-08 and 2009-10. • The proportion of people who felt that racial prejudice had been increasing in the previous five years fell between 2007-08 and 2009-10 from 56 percent to 47 per cent, mirroring the trend for views on religious prejudice. • While Muslim people, Asian people and Eastern Europeans continued to be the groups most identified as being the target of increased racial prejudice, the proportion of people who cited these groups as subject to increased racial prejudice fell between 2007-08 and 2009-10. • Seven per cent of people perceived harassment on grounds of race or religion as a problem in their local area, nine per cent of people were worried about being the victim of this, and four per cent of people had actually experienced such harassment. • Experiences of harassment were considerably higher among all ethnic minority groups compared with White people, and higher among key minority religious groups than among Christians. • Where harassment had been experienced, the nature of this was predominantly verbal as opposed to physical, and people mainly reported that it was their skin colour rather than their ethnic origin or religion that was the incitement for the attack. • Perceptions of racial discrimination by key public service organisations (such as social housing departments and the police) ranged from 4 per cent to 22 per cent. These levels fell overall and across most of the organisations considered between 2008-09 and 200910. The overall decline continued a downward trend observed since 2003. • Members of ethnic minority groups however - particularly those who were Black African, Black Caribbean or mixed race – were considerably more likely than White people to feel that they would be discriminated against in favour of other races by public services. In line with the overall trend, there was a decline on this measure observed among nearly all ethnic groups between 2008-09 and 2009-10. • The prevalence of religious discrimination by different public service organisations was low overall, cited by between zero and one per cent of people, although reported rates of discrimination were higher among people who were Muslim, Hindu or Sikh and from “other” religions compared to Christians. • Overall rates of experience of workplace discrimination, both in terms of perceived discrimination when seeking employment (7%), and in respect to being promoted (6%), remained unchanged on 2008-09 levels. Black African and Black Caribbean people were considerably more likely than most other ethnic groups to cite workplace discrimination on the grounds of race or colour. Source: Department of Communities and Local Government, Race, Religion and Equalities: A Report on the 2009–10 Citizenship Survey (London: Department of Communities and Local

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Government, 2011), 7–8. Available at http://www.tedcantle.co.uk/publications/067%20 Citizen%20Survey%202011%20race%20religion%20equalities.pdf.

2. The Impacts of Migration on Social Cohesion and Integration in Great Britain An earlier (2008) and more focused study than the Report excerpted above, this study was primarily concerned with the effect of non-European immigration on national identity in Great Britain in the context of such other dynamic factors affecting national identity as family structure, the integration of new groups into the economy, and the education of Britain’s youth. Key findings The following key findings are based on both a literature review and new data analysis. The new data analysis was confined largely to impacts on cohesion and looked specifically at the impacts of European versus non-European immigrants on social cohesion and at the patterns of integration among new migrants compared with more established migrant groups. For national identity, the trend over time, such as one can be discerned, is of a move from an ancestral understanding of Britishness to one based more on civic values. There is little evidence that immigration played a role in this, but those of immigrant heritage are likely to feel this more strongly, suggesting this trend may have been accelerated by immigration. The broader historical and sociological literature supports this view, suggesting religion, war, devolution and globalisation undergirds this shift, confirming the claim that migration plays a limited role. The caveat to that interpretation is that debates around, and conceptions of, national identity are at least partially influenced by the political far right (the BNP in particular, and the mainstream political response). The animating feature of recent increased voter support for the BNP is immigration and its perceived negative effective on British culture. For integration, at least three caveats are important. First, the choice of measure is critical—for example whether we assess employment outcomes or the rates of intermarriage. The reason it is critical is that different immigrant groups perform differently depending on the measure. For example Indian men have low rates of intermarriage (a good social indicator)—around 1 in 20 Indian men marry a White partner—but high employment rates, above that of the UK-born. Black African men have much higher rates of intermarriage (1 in 7 marry a White partner) but a lower employment rate than the UK average. Secondly, the societal average is an unreliable comparator—one is not comparing like with like, and more to the point, the societal average is not constant (it is a moving average) and is therefore dynamic. Integration does not stand still. Thirdly, policy is a very important variable, whether this involves programmes to support integration, or regulations that inhibit, or at least alter, access to services and the labour market. Policy thus has a differential effect on the integration outcomes of migrants versus the average member of society, against whom they are being compared. Together, making judgements on the performance of migrants is fraught with difficulty. Notwithstanding the choice of measure or the dynamism of societal changes, it is clear that different immigrant groups perform very differently, with some exhibiting above average performance and others below average on a range of measures.

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On cohesion, our analysis indicates that it is deprivation—not migration—that best explains peoples’ perceptions of their local area. However, existing diversity may partly explain differences in levels of cohesion. In other words, new migration does not affect cohesion but pre-existing diversity (borne of earlier immigration waves) and high levels of poverty are predictors of lower social cohesion. The findings are supported by the British literature (Letki, 2008; Heath and Lawrence, 2010). Recent evidence from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England confirms this, explicitly dismissing in-migration as a predictor of low cohesion (Demack et. al., 2010, p 52). The work of Robert Putnam (2007) cannot however be ignored, as this takes a more sceptical line. The literature is more mixed in terms of the dynamics of far right voting. Recent evidence suggests the BNP has been particularly successful in areas with large Muslim populations, although in many cases these populations are well established rather than recent migrants (Ford and Goodwin, 2010). However, other research found little evidence of more intense anti-immigrant sentiment in areas with large migrant populations (Studlar, 1977) or that local migration flows only trigger hostile responses when the issue is salient nationally (Hopkins, 2011). Our research focused on the differences between the impact of European (from the EEA) immigrants and non-European immigrants. We found no significant difference between the impact of EEA and non-EEA migration once diversity and deprivation are taken into account. Our analysis of integration shows that recent and established migrants score very well on three indicators—trust in institutions, belonging to Britain and values. Recent and established migrants express higher levels of trust in British political institutions than native Britons, a tendency which is also found among the children of migrants. Although recent migrants are less likely to say they belong to Britain, this dissipates once migrants have been living longer in the country, and all established migrant groups express high levels of belonging to Britain. Migrants share many values with the native-born British, and the main differences which we identify come on issues which are particularly salient in the lives of migrant communities—the desire to maintain distinct cultural traditions, the need for equal treatment regardless of ethnic background and concerns about the negative impact of offensive speech. In the first two cases, migrants and migrant minorities express similar support for the value to native Britons, but express it more intensely. Only in the last case do we find any evidence of value conflict, and even here we find suggestive evidence that the conflict depends on context—migrants who have experienced prejudice and discrimination are likely to have a greater awareness of the damage caused by offensive speech. When the free speech issue is presented in terms of a trade-off with social order, the difference in views between migrants and native Britons disappears. Source: Shamit Saggar, Will Somerville, Rob Ford, and Maria Sobolewska, The Impacts of Migration on Social Cohesion and Integration (London: Migration Advisory Committee, UK Border Agency of the Home Office, January 2012), 64–66. Available at http:// www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/ mac/27-analysis-migration/02-research-projects/social-cohesion-integration?view=Binary.

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United Kingdom The Irish Question and the Partition of Ireland Sean P. Duffy

Timeline 1171 The Norman Conquest of Ireland is completed. Anglo-Norman rule is established in Dublin. Most Irish kings and princes swear fealty to Henry II. Direct English control over Irish affairs erodes over the following 350 years. 1533–1603 Tudors reconquer Ireland. The Protestant Reformation takes place in England. “Old English” aristocracy is replaced with new Anglo-Protestant landowning nobility. Plantations of English Protestants begin. 1691 The Treaty of Limerick is signed, in which James II surrenders to William II (of Orange). Anglo-Irish and Catholic Irish aristocrats who supported James lose their lands and titles. 1695 The Penal Law Code is established, which imposes a series of religious, social, and political limitations on Catholics. 1782 Led by Henry Grattan, the Irish Parliament wins restricted political autonomy from Westminster, establishing the golden era of Irish parliamentary democracy. 1791 The Society of United Irishmen is founded by Theobald Wolf Tone. 1795 The Orange Order is founded in Ulster.

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1798 A republican insurrection fails. 1800 The Act of Union is passed. Beginning in 1801, Ireland is ruled directly from London. 1829 The Catholic Emancipation Act is passed. 1840s The Young Ireland Movement, which embodies a nonsectarian nationalism, is started by Thomas Davis. 1844–1848 The potato crop fails, bringing famine and causing waves of mass emigration. 1858 The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) is founded, with a view to gaining Irish independence. It has strong roots and connections in the United States. 1867 The Fenian (IRB) uprising in Ireland is crushed. 1867 and 1884 Reform acts in the Westminster Parliament effectively extend the vote to many Catholics in Ireland. 1879 Land League, led by Michael Davitt, spearheads the land wars against landlords who evict their tenants and pushes for land-reform legislation. 1880 Charles Stewart Parnell becomes leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party at Westminster. He begins to campaign for Irish home rule. 1884 The Gaelic Athletic Association is founded. 1892 The Gaelic League is founded by Douglas Hyde, a Protestant.

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1893 The Home Rule Bill is passed in the House of Commons, but it is blocked in House of Lords. 1899 The Irish National Theatre is established by William Butler Yeats. 1900 Arthur Griffith founds the Cumann na nGaedhael. 1905 The Ulster Unionist Council is founded to oppose home rule. 1907 Arthur Griffith founds the Sinn Féin League to work toward a modern Catholic state. 1911 Parliamentary reform ends the House of Lords’ ability to veto legislation, granting it merely the ability to delay implementation. 1912 Over 400,000 Ulster Protestants sign a Solemn League and Covenant to defend Ulster against home rule. 1913 A second Home Rule Bill is passed in the House of Commons and delayed by the House of Lords. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) is formed to resist further attempts to institute home rule. 1913–1918 World War I is fought. In 1918, conscription is introduced. 1916 An Irish Republic is proclaimed on Easter Monday in Dublin. 1918–1921 The Anglo-Irish War is fought. 1920 The Westminster Parliament passes the Government of Ireland Act, providing for parliaments in Dublin and Belfast subordinate to itself.

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1922 The Anglo-Irish Treaty establishes an Irish Free State, comprising 26 of Irelands’ 32 counties, under the United Kingdom. Aspects of partition are deferred to the Boundary Commission. 1925 The frontier between the Irish Free State and the British province of Northern Ireland is registered at the League of Nations. 1949 The Republic of Ireland is declared. Northern Ireland remains a part of the United Kingdom. The history of ethnic conflict in Ireland, which has its origins in the 12th century, persists today. The conflict came to a head in the struggles for Irish independence in the early 20th century but was not solved at that time. Partition of the island between the Irish Free State, governed from Dublin, and Northern Ireland, governed from Belfast, was an attempt to defuse diverging identities and aspirations (as well as considerable amounts of distrust and fear) that had intensified in the first few decades of the century. The Irish historical experience could be described as one defined by conquest, colonization, and failed assimilation by and into the greater British identity. This was complicated in the 16th and 17th centuries by the religious conflict at the heart of the struggle for authority in England, which resulted in successive waves of disenfranchisement and marginalization on the basis of religion of many Irishmen and women, and the settlement of new groups of peoples. The result has been that modern Ireland can be described as one of the few postcolonial societies in Europe. As such, Irish political and social development, driven by the conflicts at the heart of Irish society, has been defined by many of the major movements in European and world history during the last 150 years, including the development of nationalism and anticolonial struggles for land reform and political independence. The culmination of these trends in the first decades of the 20th century challenged Great Britain’s idea of empire, with far-ranging implications from India to Canada. Partition has become emblematic of the difficulties resulting from colonialist boundary tampering as a solution to more fundamental underlying conflict. The incomplete resolution of these difficulties has been made manifest in the violent conflict in Northern Ireland in recent generations. Historical Background While the groundwork for ethnic divergence and conflict was laid as early as the successive conquests and plantations of new settlers in the 12th, 16th, and 17th centuries, the development of ethnic identities with identifiably nationalist characteristics began in the 1840s or—at the earliest—in the 1780s. As a result of the

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17th-century religious wars in England and Ireland, Irish society at the end of the 18th century was split into a small, landholding, politically powerful, Anglo-Irish, Protestant elite on the one hand, and large masses of disenfranchised Catholic peasants on the other. The Anglo-Irish elite were sufficiently secure in their command of Irish society to win, in 1782, an unprecedented degree of independence for the Irish Parliament in Dublin. At this time, Irish political elites began forming ideas of Irish political autonomy, if not outright independence from Great Britain. This movement toward a separate national state faltered with the failure of the United Irishmen’s uprising in 1798. Two years later, an Act of Union was passed in the British and Irish Parliaments, which disbanded the Irish Parliament and instituted direct rule of Ireland from London. By removing political power from Irish soil, this act began a slow decline in nationalist political aspirations among the Anglo-Irish political elites, who followed political power to London, leaving many of their Irish landholdings and interests behind. Nevertheless, the move toward the formation of an identifiably nationalist Irish identity continued in the form of the Young Ireland Movement and its flagship newspaper The Nation, in the 1840s. This movement, started by Thomas Davis, a Protestant from the middle classes, embodied an explicitly nonsectarian approach to Irish nationalism.1 Meanwhile, after a decade-long campaign for Catholic rights, led by Daniel O’Connell, the Catholic Emancipation Act was passed in 1829. This restored to Catholics many of the political and economic rights that had been denied them by the Penal Laws in the aftermath of the defeat of the Catholic king James II by William II of Orange in the 1690s. Reform Acts passed in Parliament in 1867 and 1884 extended the franchise throughout the United Kingdom; in Ireland, this gave the vote to many Catholics for the first time. These developments signaled a beginning to the political and economic rise of Irish Catholics. The Great Famine of the 1840s, which resulted in waves of emigration that cut the Irish population in half in only 40 years, dealt a staggering blow to Irish culture and society. Ironically, this may have hastened the rise of such organizations as the Society for the Preservation of the Irish Language (1876), the Gaelic Union (1879), and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA, 1884), which was the longest lasting.2 While nonpolitical in nature, the GAA gained mass support for the revival of such traditional Irish sports as hurling and Gaelic football. At the same time, it worked closely with Catholic social and educational institutions. This association, together with a ban placed on athletes who participated in “imported” sports (largely Protestants), increasingly identified this important venue for raising Irish nationalism with the Catholic population of Ireland. While intending to appeal to the broad Irish population, the GAA introduced a “reactionary” form of nationalism that defined itself in a way that excluded many who identified with (or participated in) a larger British culture. While not unique to the GAA, this rising trend in Irish nationalism would have important consequences for the development of conflict in the coming decades. On the political front, postfamine Irish nationalism continued to be predominantly nonsectarian, yet institutions and movements important to the coming conflict had their origins in this period. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a

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predecessor to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), was founded in 1858, with the explicit aim of gaining Irish independence. The IRB, which had important ties to the large immigrant Irish community in the United States, executed the failed Fenian uprising in Ireland in 1867, which drew its support from both sides of the Atlantic. The rising contributions of the largely Catholic American immigrant community accelerated the association of Irish nationalism with the Catholic community. From 1879, the Land League, led by Michael Davitt, spearheaded the land wars against largely Anglo-Protestant landlords who evicted their tenants. These comprised a series of formal and informal actions, ranging from demonstrations and boycotts (the origin of the term is in these struggles) to assassination and other violence against landowners and their managers. By bringing pressure to bear through these “wars” and on the parliamentary front, the Land League contributed to significant land reform in the ensuing decades, beginning with the Land Act of 1881. Meanwhile, the Irish Parliamentary Party became a significant, moderate voice for political reform at Westminster in the 1880s. Led by Charles Stewart Parnell, a Protestant landowner, the Irish in Parliament began their push for Irish home rule, a degree of political autonomy that would reverse the Act of Union within the context of the United Kingdom. In 1893, the first of three home rule bills was passed in the House of Commons, but it was blocked in the House of Lords. For the next 25 years, the Irish would use their leverage in Parliament to advance the cause of Irish political autonomy in this fashion, only to be defeated by the much more conservative House of Lords. With the founding of the Gaelic League (1892), the establishment of the Irish National Theatre (1899), and the foundation of the Cumann na nGaedhael (1900), the cultural and political groundwork was laid by the end of the century for a vibrant, and increasingly assertive, Irish nationalism.3 However, the largely nonsectarian nature of these movements had eroded, and the more demanding brands of nationalism were increasingly identified with Irish Catholicism. This sectarianization of Irish nationalism was to form the basis for increasing conflict in the early decades of the 20th century. The Conflict It is commonplace to define the Irish conflict (in the early 20th century as well as in Northern Ireland today) as a religious conflict. This is, in fact, an oversimplification of many varied divisions in Irish society that are historical, often “tribal,” and quite economic and political in nature. Nevertheless, the religious dimension closely overlaps many of these divisions, and the Irish themselves have used religion as an abbreviation for various aspects of Irish social and political cleavage. Social order in Ulster, the northern province of Ireland, has never been easily achieved or maintained. It is here, perhaps, that the roots of Irish domestic conflict find most fertile ground. The implanting of Scottish Presbyterians from Scotland’s lowlands in the 17th century substantially changed the social landscape, and the subsequent Cromwellian and Williamite attempts to resolve the resulting tribal

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conflict between native Irish and newcomers were never fully successful. Nevertheless, it was in Ulster that the Protestants were least in the minority, making up roughly half the population of the province, and it was thus there a separate Protestant society was most strongly asserted and defended, linking ethnoreligious identity with political power and economic access. While the roots of modern Irish nationalism lie in the foundation of the Society of United Irishmen in Belfast by Theobald Wolf Tone (a Church of Ireland Protestant) in 1791, only four years later, the roots of modern Irish conflict could be said to lie in the foundation of the Orange Order, following another round of conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Ulster. By explicitly invoking the Williamite (Orange) conquest of Irish Catholic power, the Orange Order became an important cultural and political referent for Ulster Protestants, who felt the continual need to defend their social, economic, and political position in Ireland. With the increasing identification of Irish nationalist aspirations with the Catholic community by the turn of the 20th century, these tensions again came to the fore. In 1905, the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) was formed to oppose home rule. Five years later, it formed a committee to buy arms to resist home rule with violence, if necessary. During the same period, Arthur Griffith founded the Sinn Féin League (1907). Literally “ourselves alone,” Sinn Féin was dedicated to the formation of a modern Catholic state in Ireland, and it became increasingly identified with the more radical politics of the IRB. Griffith himself was a member of both organizations. By 1912, 400,000 Ulster Protestants had signed a Solemn League and Covenant to defend Ulster against home rule, which was explicitly associated with “Rome rule.” A year later, after another attempt to pass a home rule bill was delayed in the House of Lords, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a militia ostensibly intended to protect all of Ireland, was formed to resist any attempts to institute home rule. These more sectarian and nationalist elements of divergence were undergirded by very real economic differences as well. The southern and western three-quarters of Ireland remained largely agricultural in nature. While land reform during the preceding decades had effectively ended the old landlord-controlled land-tenure system, the rural nature of most of Irish society at this time facilitated the rising nationalist contrast (made by Sinn Féin and others) between rural, Celtic, Catholic society and corrupt, exploitative, urban British control. The regions of Ulster around Belfast, however, differed from this pattern. In addition to being predominantly Protestant, the northeastern corner of Ireland was also more industrialized. The industries of the Belfast region tied the largely Protestant industrial working class to the larger British economic identity and interests. Ulster commercial and industrial elites also feared that an Irish state would heavily tax the northern industries to pay for a more ambitious economic statism. The Catholic populations involved in industrial production, organized around the turn of the century by James Connolly and James Larkin into the Irish Socialist Republican Party and the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, were largely ignored by the trade union movement and rising Labour Party in Britain and increasingly associated the socialist project of labor with the nationalist

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movement. Irish nationalism thereby became combined with a drive for economic self-sufficiency and the prospects of state-led economic development for Irish interests, while Unionism maintained a closer identification of economic interest with the British industrial, free-market economy of which it was a part and regarded Irish nationalism as an economic threat. Thus, twin movements were born: one aiming toward a more radically nationalist, politically independent, and culturally Catholic Irish state, and the other waging a more conservative, reactionary battle to prevent the development of such a state. The Unionist movement, largely Protestant in its membership and concentrated in the northeastern part of Ireland, saw continued union with Great Britain as its best and most reliable defense against an increasingly assertive and exclusionary Catholic Irish nationalism. Throughout the home rule debates in the 1880s and 1890s, a coalition of Ulster political groupings worked with Tory (Conservative Party) allies in Westminster to defeat home rule in the House of Lords. When British parliamentary reform ended the ability of the House of Lords to permanently block home rule for Ireland in 1911, Unionists were ready and willing to use force to prevent the devolution of political power to Dublin.4 In 1912, the UUC proclaimed a provisional government for Ulster to provide the administrative base to resist home rule, and the UVF was founded the following year to provide the military muscle against an assertion of home rule from Dublin. In reaction, Eoin Mac Neill founded a corresponding Catholic militia, the Irish Volunteers, which quickly gained membership from the increasing numbers of nationalists willing to use force to defend their aspirations. In 1914, British officers in Ireland implied that they might disobey orders to suppress Protestant unrest in Belfast. This made it increasingly clear that increased political autonomy for Ireland, no matter how established, was unlikely to be achieved easily or peacefully. The threatened violence and implementation of home rule were delayed, however, by the onset of World War I. In 1916, the more radical elements in the Irish nationalist struggle made a bid for outright Irish independence. On Easter Monday, in Dublin, a small group of idealists seized several government buildings and proclaimed an Irish Republic. The uprising was ended quite decisively five days later when the British sailed gunships up the Liffey River and shelled the city. Although the uprising initially had virtually no support from the population, the British authorities’ long, drawn-out series of executions of the participants slowly changed the tide of public opinion. In 1918, British prime minister Lloyd George introduced conscription. The conscription of Irishmen to fight “English battles” was almost universally unpopular. In December 1918, the transition from a more moderate parliamentary (home rule) movement to a more radical independence movement was made when Sinn Féin succeeded in replacing the Irish Parliamentary Party as the main political actor in Ireland. Sinn Féin captured 73 Irish seats in the Westminster Parliament; the Parliamentary Party won 6, and the Unionists won 22. The following year, those Sinn Féin members of Parliament (MPs) who were not imprisoned boycotted the Westminster Parliament and met instead in Dublin, where they passed resolutions confirming support

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for the 1916 Proclamation of the Republic and declared themselves the legislative assembly of Ireland. The Irish leaders’ aspirations for addressing Irish self-determination in the context of the Versailles Peace Conference were dashed when President Woodrow Wilson was unwilling to press the issue on Great Britain, a U.S. ally in the war. Shortly thereafter, the Irish Volunteers, renamed the Irish Republican Army, conducted an all-out guerrilla war against British authority in Ireland. British attempts to regain control in the Irish countryside resulted in a full-scale war that lasted until 1921 and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty a year later. Some of the nastiest fighting took place in Ulster, where Protestant militias ruthlessly suppressed Catholic unrest. Hence, the Anglo-Irish war was complicated throughout by the political and paramilitary pressures asserted by Irish Unionists in an attempt to resist or prevent Irish political autonomy. Management of the Conflict British forces were unable to win this guerrilla war. In 1920, in an effort to find an acceptable solution, short of recognizing the presumptive Irish government, Prime Minister Lloyd George pushed the Government of Ireland Act through Parliament. This act finally granted home rule to Ireland in the form of two legislatures: one in Dublin and the other in Belfast. This implicit division of Ireland, as well as the limited nature of the home rule granted, was unacceptable to Sinn Féin and the IRA. Faced with difficult situations elsewhere in their empire, and increasing diplomatic pressures from the United States, the British called for a truce in December 1921 and invited Sinn Féin representatives to London for talks. These talks had to deal with the difficult nature of Ulster-based Unionism and the very real division that had developed in Ireland, reflected in the two power centers of Belfast and Dublin.5 The resulting treaty deferred to a Boundary Commission the questions of partition and the precise borders of the two political entities. It also granted to Ireland fiscal and domestic autonomy within the dominion, where the Crown retained ultimate sovereignty and Great Britain managed external affairs. While a majority of the Irish cabinet (four to three) accepted the treaty, profound differences of opinion over the terms of the treaty led to two years of civil war. The grounds for the differences—Irish status within the dominion and the partition of Ireland— became the central components of Irish politics, north and south, for the rest of the century. In 1925, the Irish government ostensibly dropped its support of the Boundary Commission’s efforts to renegotiate the line of partition, and the boundary was registered with the League of Nations. Subsequent developments of the Irish state (specifically the constitution of 1937) failed to recognize the border or partition as political facts at all. Significance Partition as a solution to the Irish ethnoreligious conflict has always been an incomplete and problematic remedy. It satisfied neither group: nationalists considered it a

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hindrance to their goals, and Unionists in Ulster begrudgingly accepted local rule there as better than complete home rule from Dublin. In essence, the accomplishment was to create two incomplete state-like entities, each predicated on an exclusive ethnoreligious identity, under the overall sovereignty of the United Kingdom. The Irish Free State in the south adopted a strongly exclusionary, Catholic-Celtic basis for national identification that, when finally ensconced in the constitution of 1937, provided a major stumbling block to the highly vaunted aspirations for reunification. Likewise, the Parliament established in Belfast provided the means for the creation in Ulster of a “Protestant state for a Protestant people.” This Protestant state became notorious for its economic and political repression of the significant Catholic minority. By the late 1960s, the province became virtually ungovernable as it decayed into political unrest and violence and economic stagnation. In effect, while temporarily solving the problem of intercommunal violence in the context of all-out guerrilla warfare, partition also allowed for the solidification of exclusively ethnoreligious bases for identification in Ireland. Both the province of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were formed on the basis of chauvinistic, exclusionary ideas of identity. Each included in its very definition terms that were to be undesirable, indeed unacceptable, to a significant minority of its desired citizenry. The boundaries of Northern Ireland were specifically drawn to create a permanent Protestant majority in the province, with no thought for the status of the Catholic minority living there. When the Republic of Ireland claimed, in its 1937 constitution, jurisdiction over the entire island, its definition of itself as a Catholic, Celtic country continued to make it unacceptable to the Protestant majority living in the north, who would form a minority in a united Ireland. These tensions are only now beginning to be addressed, after a century of continued ethnoreligious conflict. Notes 1. By sectarian and nonsectarian, I refer to the religious nature of the movement. In Ireland, sectarianism has largely been based on the Catholic-Protestant distinction deriving from the 17th-century religious wars and subsequent settlements. In Ireland, three identifiable religious groups can be noted: Catholics (the majority on the island as a whole), Church of Ireland Protestants in the Anglican Communion (largely the landowning and politically powerful elites), and Presbyterian Protestants (concentrated in the northeastern corner of the island and largely working-class people). 2. In fact, it still exists today. 3. Approximately translated as “society of the Gales,” Cumann na nGaedhael was largely a cultural and educational association oriented to the de-Anglicization of Irish society. The name was later used by the political movement that favored the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922, and became the Fine Gael political parts. 4. In 1911, the Liberal Party (with the support of the Irish Home Rule Party) passed legislation that ended the Lords’ veto power over legislation and substituted in its place the ability to delay the implementation of legislation for two sessions. 5. A Parliament had been established in Belfast, according to the Government of Ireland Act, and was already running affairs in Ulster.

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Suggested Readings Bew, Paul. 1994. Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism 1912– 1916. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. Canny, Nicholas. 2003. Making Ireland British: 1580–1650. New York: Oxford University Press. Collins, Peter, ed. 1994. Nationalism & Unionism: Conflict in Ireland 1885–1921. Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, Queens University. Coonan, Tim Pat. 2013. The Famine Plot: England’s Role in Ireland’s Greatest Tragedy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Gallagher, Michael. 1995. “How Many Nations Are There in Ireland?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 18 (4): 715–739. Kiberd, Declan. 1996. “White Skins, Black Masks?: Celticism and Negritude.” Eire-Ireland 31: 163–175. Lee, Joseph. 1973. The Modernisation of Irish Society, 1848–1918. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. McGarry, Fearghal. 2011. The Rising: Ireland: Easter, 1916. New York: Oxford University Press. Suzman, Mark. 1999. Ethnic Nationalism and State Power: The Rise of Irish Nationalism, Afrikaner Nationalism and Zionism. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Appendices 1. The Penal Laws of 1695 Of all the essentially anti-Catholic laws enacted by the Crown to assure Protestant supremacy in an Ireland with an overwhelming Catholic majority, the most onerous were those passed in 1695 following Great Britain’s military victory at the Battle of Boyne in 1690, when the forces of Great Britain’s Protestant king William I defeated those of James II, Ireland’s last Catholic monarch. The backlash from their enforcement contributed to the growth of Irish nationalism in future generations of Irish Catholics. LAWS IN IRELAND FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF POPERY commonly known as the PENAL LAWS 7 Will III c.4 (1695): An Act to Restrain foreign Education Sec. 1. In case any of his Majesty’s subjects of Ireland shall go or send any child or other person beyond the seas to be trained in any popish university, college or school, or in any private popish family, or shall send any money for the support of any such person, then the person sending and the person sent shall, upon conviction, be disabled to prosecute any action in a court of law, or be a guardian or executor, or receive any legacy or gift, or bear any public office, and shall forfeit all their lands and estates during their lives. 7 Will III. c.4 (1695): An Act to Restrain foreign Education Sec. 2. Justices of the peace shall make prompt examination, upon the filing of any information that a person, child, or money has been sent beyond the seas contrary to this Act. A

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finding that such offences have been committed, shall be a conviction as well of the person so being sent as of the parties so sending, and they shall forfeit and incur all the penalties and disabilities before mentioned. One half of all forfeitures shall go to his Majesty, and the other half to the informer. 7 Will III. c.4 (1695): An Act to Restrain foreign Education Sections 3-8. Contain detailed procedures for examining the truth of such allegations, presumptions of intent to violate the act, appeals, jurisdiction, etc 7 Will III c.4 (1695): An Act to Restrain foreign Education Sec. 9. Whereas it has been found by experience that tolerating at papists keeping schools or instructing youth in literature is one great reason of many of the natives continuing ignorant of the principles of the true religion, and strangers to the scriptures, and of their neglecting to conform themselves to the laws of this realm, and of their not using the English habit and language, no person of the popish religion shall publicly teach school or instruct youth, or in private houses teach youth, except only the children of the master or mistress of the private house, upon pain of twenty pounds, and prison for three months for every such offence. 7 Will III c.4 (1695): An Act to Restrain foreign Education Sec. 10. Those cited acts of parliament which require every incumbent of each parish to keep a school to learn English, and provide that a public latin free school be constantly maintained within each diocese, (which acts have generally been kept, but have not had the desired effect, by reason of Irish popish schools being too much connived at), and all other statutes now in force concerning schools shall be strictly put in execution. And for the more effectual doing thereof, the justices of his Majesty’s court of Kings Bench each term, and the judges of assize in their respective circuits, and the justices of peace in their general quarter sessions of peace are required to give this and the said former acts in charge to the several grand juries, and to be very circumspect in seeing the same in due execution. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 1. All papists within this kingdom of Ireland shall before the 1st day of March, 1696, deliver up to some justice of the peace or corporation officer where such papist shall dwell, all their arms and ammunition, notwithstanding any licence for keeping the same heretofore granted. Justices of the peace, mayors, sheriffs, and chief officers of cities and towns and persons under their warrants, may search and seize all arms and ammunition of papists, or in the hands of any persons in trust for them, wherever they shall suspect they may be concealed. And such arms shall be preserved for the use of his Majesty. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 2. Searches of dwellings shall be made only between sunrise and sunset, except in cities and their suburbs, and market towns. If no arms are seized, chief magistrates may cause suspected persons to be examined on their oath concerning concealed arms.

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7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 3. Every papist who shall have or keep any arms or ammunition, or who shall refuse to declare what arms or ammunition they or any other to their knowledge shall have, or shall hinder the delivery thereof to the said justices, or being summoned, shall refuse to appear or make discovery under their oath, shall forfeit, if a peer or peeress, for the first offence, one hundred pounds sterling, and for a second offence, suffer praemunire*. If such offenders are under the degree of peer, they shall for a first offence forfeit thirty pounds and suffer imprisonment for one year, and until they pay the penalty, and for a second offense, incur the penalties of a person attainted in a praemunire. The penalties and sums forfeited shall go one half to his Majesty, one half to the informer who shall sue for the same.*Praemunire: “that from the conviction, the defendant shall be out of the king’s protection, and his lands and tenements, goods and chattels, forfeited to the king, and that his body shall remain in prison at the king’s pleasure. . . . Such delinquent can bring no action for any private injury, how atrocious soever, being so far out of the protection of the law, that it will not guard his civil rights, nor remedy any grievance which he as an individual may suffer. And no man, knowing him to be guilty, can with safety give him comfort, aid, or relief.” Blackstone, vol. iv, p. 117–118. 7 Will III. c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec 4-5. Papist gentlemen who can prove themselves comprized under the Articles of Limerick may have a sword, a case of pistols, and a gun for defence of their house or for fowling. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 6. No conviction shall be based on mere confession or discovery on examination, unless other proof can be shown. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 7. Provided the chief governors may by order of the privy council licence any person to keep such arms as shall be particularly expressed in such licence. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 8. No person making fire-arms, swords, knives, or other weapons shall take or instruct as an apprentice any person of the popish religion, on pain of forfeiting twenty pounds, one half to his Majesty, one half to the informer. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 9. The indenture of apprenticeship in arms making of such popish person shall be void, and every such person of the popish religion who shall be put to such an apprentice and shall exercise said art, shall for every offence forfeit twenty pounds. And justices of the peace and head corporation officers must send for all apprentices in the art of arms making, and tender them the oaths of allegiance and abhorrence, and the declaration against transubstantiation, and refusal to take the same shall constitute a conviction of the apprentice

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and also the master, unless the master shall prove that the apprentice was a known or reputed protestant. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 10. No papist shall be capable of having or keeping for his use, any horse, gelding or mare of five pounds value. Any protestant who shall make discovery under oath of such horse, shall be authorized with the assistance of a constable, to search for and secure such horse and in case of resistance to break down any door. And any protestant making such discovery and offering five pounds five shillings to the owner of such horse, in the presence of a justice of the peace or chief magistrate, shall receive ownership of such horse as though such horse were bought in the market overt. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 11. Any person who shall conceal such horses belong to any papist shall be committed to the common gaol for three months and shall forfeit to his Majesty treble the value of such horses. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 12. Every person shall be deemed a papist within the meaning of this act who shall refuse to take the oaths and subscribe the declaration when the same shall be tendered to him by a justice of the peace as required. 7 Will III c.5 (1695): An Act for the better securing the government, by disarming papists Sec. 13. Any justice or chief magistrate who shall neglect or refuse to execute the provisions of this act shall forfeit fifty pounds for each such offence, one half to his Majesty, one half to the informer who shall sue for the same, and said offender shall be incapable after conviction of serving as justice of the peace, or magistrate. 7 Will III c.14 (1695): An Act declaring which days in the year shall be observed as holy-days Sec. 1. Whereas many idle persons refuse to work at their lawful calling on several days in the year, on pretence that the same is dedicated to some saint, or pretended saint, for whom they have or pretend to have reverence, and chuse to spend such days in idleness, drunkenness, and vice, to the scandal of religion, no other day except those days listed herein, or some other day set apart by order of his Majesty, shall be kept holy. Any common labourer or servant who shall refuse to work for the usual and accustomed wages on any other day, shall forfeit two shillings on conviction. If such offender fail to pay the fine, he shall be publickly whipped. 7 Will III c.14 (1695): An Act declaring which days in the year shall be observed as holy-days Sec. 2-3. Any constable who refuses to execute this punishment shall himself be bound over for contempt, and if found guilty, fined not more that 20 shillings. Provided no justice of the peace shall execute this statute for offenses against his own personal interests, or where complaint was made more than 10 days after the offence.

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7 Will III c.15 (1695): An Act for granting a supply to his Majesty, by raising money by a poll, . . . Sec.17 and 40. Every person, except women, persons 16 years of age and under, and those paying only one shilling tax, who fail to take the oath of allegiance and the declaration against transubstantiation, shall be charged double the tax he would otherwise pay. And no person shall be a tax commissioner under this act unless he take the said oaths. 7 Will III c.21 (1695): An Act for the better suppressing tories . . . and for preventing . . . heinous crimes Sec. 1. Forasmuch as by the late rebellion in this kingdom a great part thereof hath been left waste and desolate, and the frequent robberies, murders, and other notorious felonies committed by robbers, rapparees and tories upon their keeping hath greatly discouraged the re-planting thereof, the papist inhabitants chusing rather to suffer strangers to be robbed than to apprehend or convict the offenders, of whom the greatest part are of the same country, and harboured by the inhabitants, the inhabitants of every barony and county shall make full satisfaction for all robberies, burglaries, burning of houses or haggards of corn, killing or maiming of cattle, which shall be committed by robbers, rapparees, or tories within such barony or county, such sum to be levied on the popish inhabitants if the robbers be papist, and on the protestant inhabitants if the robbers be protestant, and pro rata if the robbers be both papist and protestant. 7 Will III c.21 (1695): An Act for the better suppressing tories . . . and for preventing . . . heinous crimes Sections 2-6. Detail the procedures for collecting the satisfaction. Sec. 3 provides the complainant may sue any one inhabitant of the appropriate religion and execute judgement on him, and the rest of the inhabitants are then taxed rateably toward an equal contribution for the relief of the inhabitant who had to pay. Source: Laws in Ireland for the Supression of Popery—1695 Penal Laws. Compiled by the University of Minnesota Law Library. Available at http://library.law.umn.edu/irishlaw /chron.html#anchor205594.

2. The Easter Uprising’s Proclamation of Ireland’s Independence The original text below was read on the steps of Dublin’s central Post Office on Easter Monday, April 24, 1916, demarking the start of the Easter Uprising that, though quickly quelled, would provide Irish nationalists with a set of martyrs to the cause upon which to further grow when its ringleaders—some in their teens—were shortly thereafter executed for their actions. POBLACHT NA h-EIREANN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

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Having organized and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organizations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory. We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State. And we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations. The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irish woman. The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities of all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority in the past. Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provision Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people. We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called. Signed on behalf of the Provisional Government, thomas j. clarke sean mac diermada thomas macdonagh p.h. pearse eamonn ceannt james connolly joseph plunkett

Source: Primary Documents of the Irish Republic archives. Available at http://www.first worldwar.com/source/irishproclamation1916.htm.

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3. Official Report by General Sir John Maxwell on the Easter Rising, April 1916 Already a veteran with a long and distinguished military career, John Maxwell was sent to Dublin as its military governor four days after the Easter Rebellion began and is credited with its suppression. His report, printed below, became the official British version of the incident. The rebellion began by Sinn Feiners, presumably acting under orders, shooting in cold blood certain soldiers and policemen. Simultaneously they took possession of various important buildings and occupied houses along the routes in the City of Dublin which were likely to be used by troops taking up posts. Most of the rebels were not in any uniform, and by mixing with peaceful citizens made it almost impossible for the troops to distinguish between friend and foe until fire was opened. In many cases troops having passed along a street seemingly occupied by harmless people were suddenly fired upon from behind from windows and roof tops. Such were the conditions when reinforcements commenced to arrive in Dublin. Whilst fighting continued under conditions at once so confused and so trying, it is possible that some innocent citizens were shot. It must be remembered that the struggle was in many cases of a house-to-house character, that sniping was continuous and very persistent, and that it was often extremely difficult to distinguish between those who were or had been firing upon the troops and those who had for various reasons chosen to remain on the scene of the fighting, instead of leaving the houses and passing through the cordons. The number of such incidents that has been brought to notice is very insignificant. Once the rebellion started the members of the Dublin Metropolitan Police - an unarmed uniformed force - had to be withdrawn, or they would have been mercilessly shot down, as, indeed, were all who had the bad luck to meet the rebels. In their absence a number of the worst elements of the city joined the rebels and were armed by them. The daily record of the Dublin Magistrates’ Court proves that such looting as there was was done by such elements. There have been numerous incidents of deliberate shooting on ambulances and those courageous people who voluntarily came out to tend to the wounded. The City Fire Brigade, when turned out in consequence of incendiary fires, were fired on and had to retire. As soon as it was ascertained that the rebels had established themselves in various centres, the first phase of operations was conducted with a view to isolate them by forming a cordon of troops round each. To carry out this streets were selected along which the cordon could be drawn. Some of these streets, for instance, North King Street, were found to be strongly held, rebels occupying the roofs of houses, upper windows, and strongly constructed barricades.

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Artillery fire was only used to reduce the barricades, or against a particular house known to be strongly held. The troops suffered severe losses in establishing these cordons, and, once established, the troops were subjected to a continuous fire from all directions, especially at night time, and invariably from persons concealed in houses. To give an idea of the opposition offered to his Majesty’s troops in the execution of their duty, the following losses occurred: Officers 17 killed, 46 wounded Other ranks 89 killed, 288 wounded I wish to draw attention to the fact that, when it became known that the leaders of the rebellion wished to surrender, the officers used every endeavour to prevent further bloodshed; emissaries were sent in to the various isolated bands, and time was given them to consider their position. I cannot imagine a more difficult situation than that in which the troops were placed; most of those employed were draft-finding battalions, or young Territorials from England, who had no knowledge of Dublin. The surrenders, which began on April 30th, were continued until late on May 1st, during which time there was a considerable amount of isolated sniping. Under the circumstances related above I consider the troops as a whole behaved with the greatest restraint, and carried out their disagreeable and distasteful duties in a manner which reflects the greatest credit on their discipline. Allegations on the behaviour of the troops brought to my notice are being most carefully inquired into. I am glad to say they are few in number, and these are not all borne out by direct evidence. Numerous cases of unarmed persons killed by rebels during the outbreak have been reported to me. As instances, I may select the following: J. Brien, a constable of the Dublin Metropolitan Police, was shot while on duty at Castle Gate on April 24th. On the same day another constable of the same force named M. Lahiff was shot while on duty at St. Stephen’s Green. On April 25th R. Waters of Recess, Monkstown, County Dublin, was shot at Mount Street Bridge while being driven into Dublin by Captain Scovell, R.A.M.C. All these were unarmed, as was Captain Scovell. In the last case the car was not challenged or asked to stop. I wish to emphasize that the responsibility for the loss of life, however it occurred, the destruction of property and other losses, rests entirely with those who engineered this revolt, and who, at a time when the empire is engaged in a gigantic struggle, invited the assistance and cooperation of the Germans. Source: Charles F. Horne, ed., Records of the Great War, vol. 4, National Alumni, 1923. Primary Documents of the Irish Republic archives. Available at http://www.firstworldwar.com /source/dublin_maxwell.htm.

United Kingdom The Conflict in Ulster Elham Atashi

Timeline 1700s The Battle of Boyne led by William of Orange marks the victory of the British and defeat of Catholic King James II in Ireland. Scottish and English settlers in the north gain control of land in predominantly Catholic-populated areas. 1880s Economic prosperity in the north, mainly as a result of the surge in manufacturing, leads to tensions and growing disparities between the new landowning Protestants and Catholic populations in the South of Ireland. The Irish demand to pass the Home Rule Bill in the British Parliament to ensure independence is unsuccessful. 1905 Sinn Féin is formed as a political party with the goal of uniting Ireland with Northern Ireland as a republic and independent from British control. 1913 The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) serves as the resistance movement against Irish demands for home rule. 1914 Great Britain enters World War I with some Catholics and Protestants serving in the British military forces. 1916 Irish Republic is declared at the Easter Uprising in Dublin and put down after five days of violence. The Irish Volunteer forces that took part in the rebellion join other Nationalist groups and become known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

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1918 The Anglo-Irish war of independence takes place. 1920 The Government of Ireland Act is introduced by the British government with a plan to divide Ireland. 1922 The Anglo-Irish Treaty leads to a partition of Ireland with two separate entities. In the south, the Irish Free State is composed of Catholics with 26 counties. The 6 counties of Ulster in the north remain under British control and make up the territory of Northern Ireland. 1937 The Irish Parliament ratifies a new constitution with 32 counties, not recognizing the partition of Ireland. 1938 World War II begins. Northern Ireland under British rule enters the war against Germany with Ireland remaining neutral. 1949 The Irish Free State is granted independence, and the Republic of Ireland is formed. Northern Ireland remains under British rule. 1966 Ian Paisley, a Protestant religious leader of the Ulster Constitution Party, rejects Catholic demands for a united Ireland. Paramilitary forces, the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV) and UVF wage a violent campaign against the IRA. 1967 The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), based in the United States, initiates a campaign to demand equality for Catholics. 1968 The Catholic civil rights movement begins. A confrontation between the Protestant police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and Catholic demonstrators leads to serious clashes. The UPV rallies Protestants loyal to the British government, known as Loyalists, to stage counter protests. This begins the period known as the “Troubles.”

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1969 The escalation of rioting, bombings, and violence leads to the deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland. The IRA is divided into splinter groups, among them the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). 1970 The newly formed Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) rejects the use of violence and leads the way in becoming the most favored Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland. 1971 The continuation of unrest and protests leads to the return of an internment without trial policy. Hundreds of Catholics are arrested and interned, including the IRA members. The paramilitary organization the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) becomes the largest Loyalist group in Northern Ireland. 1972 The British army opens fire at peaceful protesters during a civil rights march, killing 14 people. The event becomes known as “Bloody Sunday.” The British government introduces direct rule from Westminster and suspends the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont. The IRA plants numerous bombs throughout Belfast, killing nine people and injuring many on “Bloody Friday.” 1973 The Sunningdale Agreement is signed, approving power sharing in Northern Ireland. Strikes by the Loyalist Ulster Workers Council as well as the resignation of Unionists from the executive, leads to the collapse of talks and the return of direct rule. 1981 Bobby Sands is one of the 10 prisoners that dies following a hunger strike in Maze prison. 1983 Gerry Adams is named the president of Sinn Féin. 1985 The Anglo-Irish Agreement is signed with some collaboration between Ireland and British government on political control of Northern Ireland. The Unionist members of Parliament in Westminster resign to protest the agreement. 1986 The Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont is dissolved.

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1988 Negotiations resume between SDLP leader John Hume and Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams. 1989 Progress is made on conditions necessary for inclusive peace negotiations between all parties. 1994 Paramilitary forces on all sides, including the main Loyalist groups and the IRA, announce a cease-fire. Official talks for multiparty negotiations start with the issue of decommissioning of IRA weapons, blocking the inclusion of Sinn Féin. 1995 David Trimble is elected as the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). U.S. president Bill Clinton invites Sein Féin leader Gerry Adams to attend an event at the White House. 1996 U.S. senator George Mitchell chairs multiparty talks. The Mitchell Report proposes six principles based on nonviolence and disarmament as conditions necessary for parties entering peace negotiations. The IRA breaks the cease-fire with a massive explosion in London’s financial district, Canary Wharf. 1998 The Good Friday Agreement, also known as the Belfast Agreement, is signed in Stormont. All political parties and groups declare a cease-fire. Referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland lead to a majority vote in favor of the peace agreement to formally end the period knows as the “Troubles.” David Trimble, the leader of UUP, is elected as the first minister in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 1999 Direct rule is officially over as political power is handed over to the Northern Ireland Assembly. 2000 The issue of decommissioning the IRA leads to the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a return to direct rule. The IRA agrees to an international monitoring team and inspector in the abandonment of weapons. The British government begins the most expensive case in legal history with the start of the Bloody Sunday inquiry.

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2001 The Protestant police force, RUC, is replaced with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). 2002 Northern Ireland elects its first Sinn Féin party member as the lord mayor of Belfast. 2003 The Democratic Unions Party (DUP) and Sein Féin see an increase in votes with gains in the second round of elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly. 2005 International weapons inspectors complete the decommissioning of IRA weapons. Sporadic low-level violence spreads throughout Northern Ireland over the issue of Orange Order parades. 2006 Multiparty talks result in the St Andrews Agreement. 2007 Ian Paisley, the leader of DUP, and Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams agree on a return to power sharing. Elections are held and followed by a return to devolution. The British government announces the official end of military deployment in Northern Ireland. Loyalist paramilitary forces agree to end their armed campaign. 2010 The Hillsborough Agreement is signed. 2011 Queen Elizabeth II makes a historic visit to the Republic of Ireland. Rioting breaks out during summer parade season in Belfast. 2012 Queen Elizabeth formally greets and shakes hands with Sinn Féin minister Martin McGuiness, a former commander of the IRA. Protests are held following the decision by the Belfast City Council to fly the British flag on certain days rather than throughout the year. The decision leads to violent protests and rioting that spread throughout Northern Ireland. 2013 Sporadic violence and rioting breaks out across Northern Ireland as the Orange Order parades are prevented from crossing Catholic areas of Belfast.

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2014 Gerry Adams is arrested for questioning over a possible connection to an IRA killing in 1972. Local council elections are held in May with Peter Robinson, the DUP leader, and Gerry Adams of Sein Féin leading the votes. The conflict in Ulster is often characterized as sectarian and rooted in the religious divide between two distinct communities, the Catholics and Protestants.1 This is somewhat misleading, as religion, while being a significant component in divisions and marking each group’s social and political identity, is not the only source of contention. The conflict is also rooted in territorial conquest and disputes between natives and settlers. There are also issues related to majority and minority status and fair distribution of resources. Over time, discrimination by the dominant minority increased with the establishment of a state that denied basic rights for the native majority. The conflict is also associated to the negative relationship between communities, as years of enmity has led each side to perceive the other with hostility, fear, and mistrust. Group identity in each community is closely tied to the collective memory of historical events passed from generation to generation, igniting resentment. Issues such as accountability, victimhood, and blame for past violence remain highly contested as each side holds to its exclusive version of history tied closely to ethnoreligious identity. Catholic grievances originate with loss of territory, colonization, inequality, and suppression of identity. The Irish-Catholics are considered to be historically native to the land that was taken over and given unfairly to settlers from England and Scotland. The arrival of new settlers changed local demographics for natives having to live side by side with communities igniting differences in culture, religion, and overall way of life. The Catholics, though the majority in Ireland, soon found themselves working for the landowning minority as laborers. The implementation of harsh policies, including new penal laws imposed by the Anglo-Scottish settlers, led to Catholics being barred from practicing culture and religion as well as restrictions in education, voting, holding public office, and property ownership. Assimilation remained low as the Catholics held strongly to Irish identity with Protestants looking to fortify ethnoreligious ties to England. For the arriving Protestants, the local Catholics remained hostile and religiously intolerant, resulting in growing hostility. Farming and exports of linen had led to economic prosperity in the north and perceived as a result of Protestant efforts. The escalation of tensions between the two communities led to the partition of Ireland by the British government. For many Catholics, the British Parliament’s decision to divide the territory of Ireland was the turning point in the conflict. In 1921, the 26 counties in the south gained independence from Great Britain as an Irish Free State. It would later become known as the Republic of Ireland. The six counties with the majority Protestant population in the north remained part of and under the control of the United Kingdom. Nationalism and the political aspirations of each side further exacerbated tensions. Protestant Unionists and Loyalists strongly affiliate with a British identity

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and protection of ties with Great Britain.2 They remain the majority population in the North of Ireland and seek to remain part of the union with Great Britain as a constitutional right. Catholics relate to the conflict as a national struggle for self-determination. Although a majority in the Republic of Ireland, the Catholics remain a minority in Northern Ireland. They pursue Northern Ireland’s unification with the Republic of Ireland and independence from Great Britain, and hence are known as Republicans.3 By the 1960s, economic, political, and social deprivation of Catholics led to a civil rights movement. This period, referred to as the “Troubles,” experienced the highest escalation in terms of the number of deaths and injuries on both sides, including many civilians. The creation and expansion of such paramilitary groups as the Irish Republic Army (IRA), supporting Catholics, and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), fighting to defend Protestant rights, was largely responsible for violence spreading throughout Northern Ireland. By the mid-1980s, after a long campaign of violence, the two sides realized that a political strategy is the only solution in advancing objectives. Violence had failed to achieve desired outcomes for each side, despite the loss of lives and injury to thousands in a country of around 1.7 million. The 1994 cease-fire by militant groups on all sides led to the start of peace talks and seeking a political agreement to end the conflict. Efforts to formally transform the conflict involved multiple external parties and stakeholders at different levels, with the governments of the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland paving the way to political negotiations. The United States and European Union also played a significant role in nurturing the peace process and taking up various third-party intervention roles. The Good Friday Agreement signed in 1998 officially ended political violence and the period known as the “Troubles.” The negotiated agreement led to a power-sharing government and formation of institutions to guarantee human rights and equality for all the people of Northern Ireland. Historical Background The conflict in Northern Ireland dates back to 1100s and the arrival of the British on the island of Ireland. The Plantation of Ulster, starting in 1610, increased the number of Scottish and British settlers to the north of Ireland, also known as Ulster.4 The large migration and confiscation of land from the native Irish changed local demographic.5 The Gaelic-speaking Irish resented the new settlers, who soon become landlords to the local population, leading to discrimination and displacement. The Catholic aspirations for retrieval of territory was crushed in 1690, an event still celebrated by the Unionist Orange Order in large-scale parades. The Battle of the Boyne, won by the new monarch, King William of Orange, marked a significant step to secure power for the Protestants. Failure to address the needs of the local Irish population in addition to oppressive laws convinced the Catholics of the deliberate efforts by the British to inflict suffering on their communities. Penal codes introduced by the English to persecute followers of the Catholic Church

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prevented Catholics from participation in politics and landownership. Catholics could not vote, hold public office, or attend church services. The Irish potato famine in 1845 led to massive starvation and the death of millions. Millions of Irish migrated to other countries, mainly the United States, to escape poverty and death from the Great Famine. The lack of intervention further strained relations and distrust toward the British government. Rebellion by the Republican movement against British rule was well under way by the early 19th century. Movements such as the United Irishmen, Young Irelanders, and the Irish Republican Brotherhood, with its members also referred to as Fenians, were dedicated to the goal of establishing an independent Republic of Ireland. By 1905, Arthur Griffith had combined several Nationalist and Republican groups to form the political organization that became known as Sinn Féin. These earlier efforts intensified Irish demands for self-rule with the goal of emancipation from British control. The quest for liberation led to Catholics declaring a war of independence. In England, the issue of Irish autonomy with home rule and limited powers for self-government was initially met with some enthusiasm. However, the outbreak of World War I and the years that followed had changed the position of British government. The aspirations of Catholic Nationalists in the south of Ireland had also changed, as they demanded nothing short of full independence. Strong resistance came from Unionists, who feared persecution as a minority; they had permanently blocked implementation and further plans for home rule. The Easter rising, also referred to as the Easter rebellion, was the first large-scale armed campaign in 1916. It marked a significant turning point as between 1,000 and 1,500 Irish Republican rebels attempted to seize Dublin with the goal of freedom from British rule and an entirely independent Ireland. The British government crushed and repelled the uprising and executed the captured rebel leaders. In 1920, British prime minister Lloyd George helped pass the Government of Ireland Act with a proposal to divide Ireland and provide some form of semiautonomous rule for each side.6 The British government considered the partition of Ireland as the best political compromise in ensuring the rights and interests of Catholics and Protestants. It would satisfy Catholic’s desire for self-rule and separation while falling short of a united Ireland. In the south of Ireland, the Catholics would be given 26 counties. Ulster, in the north, with 6 counties, would remain part of the United Kingdom, ensuring Protestants’ strong relations to British identity. Catholics, in the south, would have independence and retain ties to Celtic-Irish identity. Two parliaments in Dublin and Belfast would provide some level of control and political representation for each community. The Belfast Parliament in the area known as the Stormont would be given power to legislate over almost all aspects of Northern Ireland life. James Craig, the new leader of Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), remained confident in taking over governance of Northern Ireland and its Parliament with the strong backing of 40 seats won by the Unionists. Yet, partition had done little to end Catholic grievances as resistance and violence continued. The Nationalists rejected the new institutions of government and refused the power-sharing arrangement with the Unionists in the Stormont. They also rejected and boycotted participation in the majority Protestant police

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force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). There would be no corporation with the Unionists as along as Northern Ireland remained divided. Sinn Féin, the Irish political party representing Catholics, insisted that no settlement could be reached if it involved the separation of Northern Ireland from the rest of Ireland. The British Parliament ratified the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. The south of Ireland became the Republic of Ireland in June 1949, leaving Ulster as the home of Protestants in the North. The Irish constitution formally rejected the partition and claimed Northern Ireland as part of Ireland. Widespread violence and upheaval between the two communities continued. The Conflict The “Troubles” refers to three decades of conflict in Northern Ireland starting in 1968 and ending with the signing of the Belfast, or Good Friday, Agreement in 1998.7 This period marked by death, injury, and destruction is considered the height of the conflict and escalation of tensions between the Protestants and Catholics. Over 3,500 people died, and at least 40,000 people were injured as a result of violence by state and nonstate actors.8 Since its start, the Parliament in Northern Ireland has been dominated by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) for over 50 years, which despite elections left Nationalists with little political control. By the late 1960s, Catholics struggled to gain equal rights and continued to be discriminated against in education, housing, and employment. Frustrated by the lack of progress and inspired by other civil rights movements, such as in the United States, Nationalists decided to start a campaign in demanding equality. A nationwide resistance movement started with peaceful marches taking place in Londonderry-Derry and spread quickly to other cities throughout Northern Ireland.9 Growing civil unrest and demand to restore security led to the deployment of British troops in 1969. At first, the Nationalists’ communities welcomed and supported the arrival of British forces as an alternative to the Protestant police force, the RUC. However, as violence continued to escalate confrontation between the two communities increased. For the Catholics, the arrival of British forces in the streets of Northern Ireland had highly militarized the conflict. The entire population of Northern Ireland was affected as everyday life was interrupted with military checkpoints, roadblocks, bombings, and paramilitary violence. Communal tensions, hostility, and mistrust led to widespread self-segregation of the two communities in housing, schools, and the workplace. Catholic and Protestant communities have little to no contact with each other. The conflict had also expanded beyond the territory of Northern Ireland with the daily threats of bombings in England. Much of the violence during this period was attributed to the paramilitary forces’ retaliatory tactics, such as shootings, bombings, and assassinations, with the justification of defending and protecting their communities. The Catholic communities faced with attacks and harassment from the police force and British troops relied heavily on paramilitary protection.10 The IRA, having represented the interests of Catholics since the Irish War of Independence, was seen by many as the military wing. However, by the mid-1960s, the IRA was highly

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factionalized. Disagreements among members around issues of ideology and use of violence had led to internal divisions. This resulted in splinter groups such as Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and the Real IRA favoring more radical means and the continuation of violence until complete British withdrawal. The Loyalist paramilitary organizations of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) continued to justify the use of violence as a response and the right to protect against what they considered Nationalist and Republican threats to drive out Protestants with the goal of unification with Ireland. On Sunday January 30, 1972, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association organized a peaceful protest to highlight discriminatory policies against the Catholics. As the demonstrators continued to march toward the Nationalist Bogside area in Londonderry-Derry, 14 unarmed civilians were shot by British army troops. This event, known as the “Bloody Sunday,” is an important turning point in the conflict because the deaths had been caused by the British army rather than Protestant paramilitary organizations. Many Republicans were convinced that war was the only option, and the killing of unarmed Catholic demonstrators could only be retaliated with violence. This led to a boost in the number of volunteers joining paramilitary forces such as the IRA. Two weeks later, the British government started the official public inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday. The findings relinquished responsibility from the army paratroopers responsible for the shootings. In April 1998, British prime minister Tony Blair ordered the Seville inquiry, offering a new investigation into the Bloody Sunday. The new inquiry took 12 years to complete and became known as one of the longest and most expensive cases in British legal history. In July 1972, seven months after the Bloody Sunday, on a day that became known as Bloody Friday, the IRA exploded around 20 bombs in a matter of hours across Belfast, killing nine people and injuring hundreds. The attacks led to public outrage and tarnished the IRA’s image, as many of the victims were civilians. Fearing the deteriorating violence and the likelihood of full civil war, the British government ordered the suspension of Parliament and reintroduction of direct rule from Westminster. In 1976, the decision by the British government to criminalize political prisoners held in the Maze prison was followed by resistance and a campaign to raise awareness on the situation with hunger strikes. The campaign is considered a catalyst in bringing a change to political strategy among the Republicans. It also increased the international spotlight on the conflict, particularly the plight of Catholics. Despite spiraling violence, the conflict had largely, up to that point, been considered internal. With the internment policy reintroduced in 1971, Republicans and members of the IRA brought to Maze were given special status as prisoners of war and treated differently from those with criminal convictions. In 1976, the British government changed the policy by removing the special category status and requiring new political prisoners to be subjected to the same rules applicable to all inmates, including wearing uniforms. The Republicans rejected the new policy, arguing that it criminalized political prisoners.

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In 1981, Bobby Sands, a young member of the IRA held in Maze, was the first of nine prisoners that died as the result of the hunger strikes to protest the new policy. Bobby Sands had become an international figure, and his funeral was attended by thousands of mourners. The increasing international media attention, with reporters descending on Belfast, had created negative publicity for the British government, particularly Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s handling of the strikes. The British government had refused flexibility in dealing with the issue despite intervention by some powerful third parties, such as Pope John Paul II and special envoy John Magee. The changing shift had for the first time demonstrated the successful use of a political and public campaign as an alternative to armed struggle. Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams was ready for a new strategy of political engagement with advocacy. The Irish Republican Army could now focus on its role as the military wing, with Sin Féin emerging as the main political party in Northern Ireland. This new position and strategy was confirmed at the annual gathering of Sein Féin party members with the announcement of “the Armalite and ballot box.”11 Management of the Conflict As the cycle of violence escalated, efforts were made by successive British governments to resolve the conflict. Numerous accords, secret talks, negotiations, and agreements served as a precursor to the Good Friday Agreement that eventually ended the violence, bringing peace to Northern Ireland. The 1973 Sunningdale Agreement was the first attempt to revitalize the Northern Ireland Assembly with formal talks aimed at a negotiated peace agreement. It provided a power-sharing government and the restoration of Stormont. The agreement failed mainly because of Unionist opposition and strikes by the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) that brought Northern Ireland to a standstill. The next round of talks, leading to the Anglo Irish Agreement in 1985, served as a continuation to advance the terms negotiated in earlier talks. A significant achievement was the recognition, for the first time, that the government of Ireland would have a role as a custodian for the Catholics and in running the affairs in Northern Ireland. The new consultation role and involvement of the Irish government was an important step as it would ensure that the political future of Northern Ireland would be decided with the consent of its people. This inclusive term respected the political vision of both communities and the decision to stay part of the United Kingdom or unify with the Republic of Ireland that was now in the hands of the people of Northern Ireland. The new Irish role and involvement of the Republic of Ireland angered Unionists that were not included in the negotiation talks. The UUP organized wide-scale rallies and protests, and the resignation of Unionists from Westminster led to the collapse of the agreement. By 1980s, the political landscape in England was fast changing and had a need for a new strategy in dealing with the conflict. The resignation of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who had been opposed to any concessions to the Republicans, and new leadership by John Major provided the necessary shift in the position regarding Northern Ireland. Timing was ripe as war weariness and

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the ballot box strategy was proving more successful for paramilitary organizations. The IRA and Loyalist paramilitary organizations on both sides were fast realizing that military campaigns were not successful in achieving political goals. There was also increasing public anger and frustration directed at the British government and paramilitary groups. The IRA had lost support worldwide with events such as Bloody Friday, particularly after the 1987 bombing in the town of Enniskillen that killed 10 and wounded 63 others. The reaction from the families of those killed had set a tone for reconciliation instead of the retaliation often used in such attacks. The statement from the bereaved father of a 20-year-old nurse, Marie Wilson, who was killed in the attacks, of not holding enmity against the attackers was humbling. It was a message felt by the people of Northern Ireland. This was a significant event as the impact of violence on civilians had led to decreasing support and the formation of resistance groups, such as the “peace people,” demanding an end to violence.12 For the Catholics, electoral results had led to victory and majority votes for the more moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which opposed violence. By 1993, the Downing Street Declaration had set out a series of steps and principles necessary for reaching a political settlement. By 1994, in a surprising move, the IRA, followed by main Loyalist paramilitary organizations UDA and UDF, announced a cease-fire. The cease-fires made the possibility for inclusive talks a reality. The path to negotiation talks was now finally moving forward. Another important factor in this shift was the position of United States regarding the conflict. Northern Ireland had so far been considered a domestic problem of a close ally, the United Kingdom. Given the internal perspective, intervention would be an intrusion and an unwelcome move by the United States. The new U.S. president, Bill Clinton, and his administration changed that. In addition to increasing pressure for a viable solution among key Senate figures and cooperative Irish Americans, Clinton’s visit to Northern Ireland in December 1995 demonstrated U.S. support for a settlement. For Clinton, playing mediator in Northern Ireland was considered low risk and high gain, for if he succeeded, not only would he win praise among the Irish American community, but he would also be renowned as a peacemaker. On Good Friday, April 1998, following two years of intense negotiations, an agreement on the social, political, and economic future of Northern Ireland was signed and became known as the Belfast, or the Good Friday, Agreement. The universal feeling that the agreement generated between the Catholics and Protestants was that of euphoria. The Good Friday Agreement was hailed as a success and considered the most important event in the recent political history of the island. The agreement ended what has been known as the “Troubles,” referring to the outbreak of violent conflict since 1969 in Northern Ireland. The governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland as well as Northern Ireland’s main political parties approved and signed the agreement. The most important aspect of the agreement was the creation of various inclusive institutions, among them the power-sharing Assembly. For the first time in the history of Northern Ireland, the agreement guaranteed the Catholic minority a share of decision making in their

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political and local affairs in an inclusive Assembly alongside their previous enemy, the Protestants. John Hume of the SDLP and David Trimble of the DUP were honored for their efforts to bring an end to the conflict with the awarding of the Noble Peace Prize. By November 1998, various terms of the agreement were left unresolved. One of the most significant, the issue of decommissioning Republican arms, had kept the process lagging behind and Unionists increasingly dissatisfied. Many Unionists were disappointed with what they now were convinced to be a win-lose situation, in which the Catholics were politically benefiting. The peace process was running into problems as its implementation was interpreted differently between parties. David Trimble of the UUP was facing internal pressure from Unionists because while Sinn Féin was assuming political power in the Assembly, the IRA refused to comment on the issue of decommissioning. In August 1998, one of the deadliest incidents, the Omagh bombing by the Real IRA, led to the deaths of 29 people and hundreds injured. Domestic and international outrage at the loss of lives, mainly civilians, ensured that those opposed to the agreement did not succeed in derailing the peace process. Intervention from President Clinton led to the Hillsborough Declaration, which stressed paramilitary decommissioning verified by an independent commission followed by establishment of the institutions guaranteed by the Good Friday Agreement. Determined to push the peace process forward, British prime minister Tony Blair insisted on June 1999 as the deadline for the implementation of the agreement and the establishment of the Assembly. President Clinton and the British and Irish governments all turned to Senator Mitchell for help in bringing life to the agreement. Senator Mitchell got straight to work and, in 1999, announced the “Mitchell Review.” This report suggested decommissioning and various reforms, including changes to the police force, as ways to boost the agreement.13 However, disagreements soon emerged on the recommendations. Nationalists wanted to see a complete structural change of the police force, with name and symbol changes and Catholic recruitment equal to that of Protestants. In other words, they did not want reform but rather a total dismantling of the existing police force. Unionists were cautious of radical changes to the existing RUC force and were aware of negative public reactions. They feared that changes would be considered an insult to the Unionists and the families of those killed during the “Troubles.” Divisions over decommissioning, the changes to the police and juridical sector, and the transfer of power in general to local government continued to deter the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. By 2002, direct rule from Westminster was once again ordered as the parties failed to reach an agreement. Public anger and frustration with the lack of political progress had led to an election win in 2003 for hard-liners Ian Paisley, of the DUP, and Gerry Adams, of Sein Féin. The strife over the proposed changes as well as the electoral support for hard-liners stalled the peace process. It took five years of direct rule before amendments made in multiparty talks led to the St Andrews Agreement and an end to the political stalemate.

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By 2007, the Stormont was once again operating with the Assembly and powersharing executive on track. The main political leaders of the SDLP, Sinn Féin, the DUP, and UUP were back to working together. In May of 2007, DUP’s leader, Ian Paisley, and Martin McGuinness, of Sinn Féin, relaunched the power-sharing government. Significant changes were rapidly taking place, with the paramilitary groups laying down arms and making a full commitment in joining the political process. The IRA abandoned its weapons with full compliance to the terms of decommissioning monitored by an independent international team of inspectors.14 The RUC, a symbol of Protestant power and domination for some 80 years, was finally transformed to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The new force would consist of 50 percent Catholic recruits. This was a remarkable achievement. The 2010 Hillsborough Agreement finalized the devolution of policing and justice functions from Westminster to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Having achieved a political settlement, Northern Ireland would now have to focus on addressing social divisions and improving community relations. To support this goal, it received a huge increase in funding from the European Union (EU) directed toward programs that work in peace building and promoting reconciliation.15 These have included plans to address fear and hostility manifest in perpetual segregation in all societal sectors. Primary and secondary school education in Northern Ireland is mainly segregated along religious lines. Less than 10 percent of children in Northern Ireland attend integrated schools, with the majority Protestants attending segregated state schools. The Catholic Church maintains the education of Catholic children with around 500 separate schools. Segregated education has been pivotal in enforcing sectarian views among children, starting in their early years. Since the outbreak of the “Troubles,” tensions and increasing violence has forced communities to live as separate communities dominated entirely by either Catholic or Protestant residents. Fear for safety and security is cited as reasons for continuing segregation in housing. Symbols of national, ethnic, religious, and political identity, such as flags, pictures of past events, martyrs, and heroes depicted on murals, clearly mark the boundaries of each community and serve as a reminder of divisions. Peace lines, in the form of walls and gates constructed from barbwire and cement during the “Troubles,” to physically separate neighborhoods and defuse tensions, continue to be a feature of daily life. Despite proposals for the removal of structures that physically separate communities, the number of peace walls has increased.16 While Northern Ireland has moved on from the scale of sectarian violence experienced in the past, the two communities still face challenges in ensuring a shared future. External aid has helped bolster cooperative projects both within Northern Ireland and across the border in the Republic of Ireland. Addressing the legacy of past violence remains a delicate issue. For many families of those that lost lives, it has been difficult to move forward without some form of redress, justice, and accountability. Truth continues to be contested in remembering past events, particularly around issues of blame. The government has not dealt effectively in implementing an acceptable policy toward reconciliation. In May 2014, Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams was arrested in relation to a suspicion of ordering a killing that

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happened in 1972.17 Although Adams was later released, the move led to outrage in Nationalist communities threatening the already fragile power-sharing government. It also demonstrates the vulnerability of Northern Ireland in dealing with issues of accountability for the past. Years of hostility and fear between the two communities are not likely to disappear with a peace agreement. Divisions around various issues related to expression of national identity, structural inequality, and segregation continue to cause tensions and small-scale violence. This is particularly evident during spring and summer marching season, with violence erupting in the streets of Belfast and spreading to other cities. For Nationalists, the parades are symbolic of Unionists’ celebration of past glory, power, and victory and therefore perceived as hostile. There has been a growing concern among Unionists in expressing ethnic, religious, and national identity, particularly the right to parade.18 In recent years, the Parades Commission has provided alternative routes that restrict Unionists’ access to Catholic neighborhoods that have historically been hotspots of violence. This move has angered Unionists that resist such changes as an infringement of rights, given that they have marched through consistent routes for decades. While paramilitary groups on both sides have abandoned their militant activities, smaller splinter groups, though much less influential in comparison to the past, have emerged. On the Unionist-Loyalist side of Belfast, some of these groups have been responsible for violence around issues related to expression of identity. In 2013, Unionist anger with the city council’s decision to fly the British flag 18 days a year led to wide-scale protests in Belfast. The Union Jack, a symbol of ties to England and Unionist identity, had flown every day since 1906. Similar incidents have escalated to national protests and violence that are also rooted in Protestant anxiety with becoming a minority in Northern Ireland. Many Unionists feel betrayed at what they consider to be an abandonment by the British government. Issues such as parades, dealing with the past, segregated housing, and education reflect the many ways in which Northern Ireland has moved on and yet continues to address the causes and legacy of conflict. While significant issues remain unresolved, Northern Ireland is on the road and moving forward in addressing the deep-rooted and multiple factors that led to the conflict. Significance The most far-reaching achievement of the Good Friday Agreement has been the end of political violence and the establishment of many new structures that would guarantee equality and human rights no longer defined by religious domination. Former enemies on both sides of the conflict have abandoned the use of violence to face each other in negotiating a peace agreement. Despite the challenges to the implementation of the agreement, the security situation has greatly improved. Paramilitary activity and political violence has ceased, and groups previously dedicated to armed struggle now settle differences in negotiations with a political process. The culture of violence has been transformed to mutual understanding and seeking alternatives to division and hostility. The first significant step was the inclusive

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power-sharing Assembly involving the main parties, with 108 seats, presided over by a cross-community executive and headed by a first minister and a deputy minister. Constitutional change in the Republic of Ireland resulted in the ending of its territorial claim to Northern Ireland and cross-border bodies with executive powers set up by the two governments. A newly established north and south Ministerial Council would oversee cooperation between the new Assembly and the Irish Parliament as a way to encourage political cooperation between north and south. Other aspects of the agreement were also “people” driven, attempting to make a difference to the lives of people and their concerns on the ground. Under the terms of the agreement, paramilitary prisoners were to benefit from an early-release program. The number of British troops on the island was at first to be decreased and later end altogether, with checkpoints removed to bring a sense of security and normalcy. A newly established Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission will promote social, cultural, and economic equality and inclusion. The European Convention on Human Rights would be incorporated in Northern Ireland law. Establishment of a civic forum would allow representation from a wide range of civil and grassroots organizations. New economic initiatives included in the agreement would also promote inclusive economic development strategies. Institutions such as the police service and the judiciary, with their tarnished reputations and as historic symbols of oppression, have been completely changed to new organizations to be equally representative of the people of Northern Ireland. One of the most important aspects of the agreement regarded the future of the island. The constitutional future and the right to self-determination of its people was for once left in the hands of the people in the north and south and to their consent through a general referendum. The peace process in Northern Ireland remains uninterrupted, with all sides committed to political negotiation in resolving the remaining issues between the two communities and in moving forward. While the agreement reached in 1998 has been fragile, it has changed Northern Ireland forever, as neither side envisions a return to the violent past as peace still holds on. Notes 1. People in Northern Ireland are generally defined along religious lines as Catholics and Protestants. Protestants in Northern Ireland consist of around 48 percent, with Irish Catholics 45 percent of the population. 2. While many people in Northern Ireland associate identity along religious domination, there are exceptions. Not all Protestants in Northern Ireland consider themselves to be Unionist or Loyalist. The same goes for terms such as Nationalist and Republicans associated with Catholics. There is a small but growing percentage of people in both communities that prefer to be referred to as Northern Irish rather than affiliated to religious denomination. For more on this, see Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a better understanding of Unionist politics, ideology, and links to British identity, see Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern, Who Are the People?: Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press, 1997).

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 3. Whyte provides one of the most detailed explanations of the connection between identity, religion, and ethnicity in Northern Ireland. See John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).   4. Some trace the conflict even further to 1066 and the initial conquest of England by the Normans and the arrival later into Ireland.  5. For more on the number of Protestants arriving to the North, see John Darby, Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987).  6.  Hennessey provides a detailed account of the partition of Ireland. See Thomas Hennessey, The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles? (New York: Palgrave, 2001).   7. Tonge combines looking at the roots of the conflict with history, politics, and contemporary events to provide a complex picture of events during the period that became known as the “Troubles.” See Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 2006).   8. A detailed analysis of the impact of the conflict on civilians is provided by Marie T. Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth, Northern Ireland’s Troubles: The Human Costs (London: Pluto Press, 1999).   9. The name of the city remains controversial as it is referred to as “Derry” for IrishCatholic Nationalists and Republicans and “Londonderry” for British-Protestant Unionists and Loyalists. Both names are included in reference to the city. 10. For a very detailed account of the changing patterns of violence during the “Troubles,” see David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles (London: Penguin Books, 2001). 11. Not everyone in the Republican Party agreed to this new strategy, with some considering the change as moving away from the traditional beliefs and the use of violence as the only way to achieve goals. For more on this, see Ian McAllister, “The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Sinn Féin’s Electoral Strategy in Northern Ireland,” Electoral Studies 23 (2004): 123–142. 12. Peace People was founded in 1976 as a grassroots movement against violence and successfully led protests and rallies held in Northern Ireland, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. It won the Noble Peace Prize for its efforts. 13. The peace process has faced many challenges in implementation. However, despite obstacles and disagreements, the path to a political settlement continued. For more on the different breaking points and stages of the peace agreement, see Feargal Cochrane, Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013). Cochrane offers a comprehensive overview of peace negotiations to provide an optimist perspective on the future of Northern Ireland. 14. Canadian diplomat general John de Chastelain was appointed as the chairman of the Independent International Decommissioning Commission. 15. The European Union Program for Peace & Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland has delivered money since 1995 directed at different projects. For a comprehensive analysis of peace-building efforts by various organizations, including the European Union, see Maria Power, Building Peace in Northern Ireland (Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool University Press, 2011). 16. There has been much resistance in removing the peace walls. See Claire Mitchell, Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2013).

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17. This was in relation to the killing of Jean McConville who was abducted from her home in Belfast and murdered by Republicans who accused her of being a traitor by acting as an informer to the British army. 18. This is particularly evident in recent years as many Unionists perceive a threat to identity with a growing Nationalist control over Northern Ireland. For a detailed discussion and exploration of parades and Unionist ideology, see Richard Kirkland, Identity Parades: Northern Irish Culture and Dissident Subjects (Liverpool, U.K.: Liverpool University Press, 2002).

Suggested Readings Bew, Paul. 2009. Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789–2006. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. Bryan, Dominic. 2000. Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control. London: Pluto Press. Cochrane, Feargal. 2013. Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Coogan, Tim P. 1987. The IRA. London: Harper Collins. Cox, Michael, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen, eds. 2000. A Farewell to Arms: From Long War to Long Peace in Northern Ireland. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press. Fay, Marie-Therese, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth. 1999. Northern Ireland’s Troubles: The Human Costs. London: Pluto Press. Hennessey, Thomas. 2001. The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles? New York: Palgrave. MacGinty, Roger, and John Darby. 2002. Guns and Government: The Management of the Northern Ireland Peace Process. New York: Palgrave. McAllister, Ian. 2004. “The Armalite and the Ballot Box: Sinn Féin’s Electoral Strategy in Northern Ireland.” Electoral Studies 23: 123–142. McKittrick, David, and David McVea. 2001. Making Sense of the Troubles. London: Penguin Books. Mitchell, Claire. 2006. Religion, Identity and Politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing. Porter, Norman. 1996. Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Power, Maria. 2011. Building Peace in Northern Ireland. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Ruane, Joseph, and Jennifer Todd. 1996. The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Shirlow, Peter, and Mark McGovern. 1997. Who Are the People?: Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland. London: Pluto Press. Tonge, Jonathan. 2006. Northern Ireland. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity. Whyte, John. 1991. Interpreting Northern Ireland. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press.

Appendices 1. The Anglo-Irish Treaty, December 6, 1921 1. Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa with a Parliament having powers

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to make laws for the peace order and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State. 2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State. 3. The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada and in accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointments. ... 16. Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at the school or make any discrimination as respects State aid between schools under the management of different religious denominations or divert from any religious denomination or any educational institution any of its property except for public utility purposes and on payment of compensation. 18. This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty’s Government for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of Commons of Southern Ireland and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary legislation. Source: National Archives of Ireland. Available at http://www.nationalarchives.ie/topics /anglo_irish/dfaexhib2.html.

2. The Good Friday Agreement, April 10, 1998 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND The British and Irish Governments: Welcoming the strong commitment to the Agreement reached on 10th April 1998 by themselves and other participants in the multi-party talks and set out in Annex 1 to this Agreement (hereinafter “the Multi-Party Agreement”); Considering that the Multi-Party Agreement offers an opportunity for a new beginning in relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands; Wishing to develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union;

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Reaffirming their total commitment to the principles of democracy and non-violence which have been fundamental to the multi-party talks; Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of partnership, equality and mutual respect and to the protection of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights in their respective jurisdictions; Have agreed as follows Article 1 The two Governments: (i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland; (ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of selfdetermination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland; (iii) acknowledge that while a substantial section of the people in Northern Ireland share the legitimate wish of a majority of the people of the island of Ireland for a united Ireland, the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the Union and accordingly, that Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish; and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people; (iv) affirm that, if in the future, the people of the island of Ireland exercise their right of self-determination on the basis set out in sections (i) and (ii) above to bring about a united Ireland, it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish; (v) affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities; (vi) recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland. Article 2 The two Governments affirm their solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement. In particular there shall be

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established in accordance with the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement immediately on the entry into force of this Agreement, the following institutions: (i) a North/South Ministerial Council; (ii) the implementation bodies referred to in paragraph 9 (ii) of the section entitled “Strand Two” of the Multi-Party Agreement; (iii) a British-Irish Council; (iv) a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. Article 3 (1) This Agreement shall replace the Agreement between the British and Irish Governments done at Hillsborough on 15th November 1985 which shall cease to have effect on entry into force of this Agreement. (2) The Intergovernmental Conference established by Article 2 of the aforementioned Agreement done on 15th November 1985 shall cease to exist on entry into force of this Agreement. Article 4 (1) It shall be a requirement for entry into force of this Agreement that: (a) British legislation shall have been enacted for the purpose of implementing the provisions of Annex A to the section entitled “Constitutional Issues” of the MultiParty Agreement; (b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled “Constitutional Issues” of the Multi-Party Agreement shall have been approved by Referendum; (c) such legislation shall have been enacted as may be required to establish the institutions referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. (2) Each Government shall notify the other in writing of the completion, so far as it is concerned, of the requirements for entry into force of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the receipt of the later of the two notifications. (3) Immediately on entry into force of this Agreement, the Irish Government shall ensure that the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to the section entitled “Constitutional Issues” of the Multi-Party Agreement take effect. In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. Done in two originals at Belfast on the 10th day of April 1998. Tony Blair Marjorie (‘Mo’) Mowlam

Bertie Ahern David Andrews

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

For the Government of Ireland

Source: CAIN Archives, University of Ulster. Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk./events/peace /docs/agreement.htm.

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United Kingdom Nationalism in Scotland Robert J. Thompson

Timeline 1603 James VI, king of Scotland, succeeds Elizabeth I as James I, sovereign of England and Wales. 1707 The Act of Union creating the United Kingdom of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland is passed. 1715 The first major Scottish uprising takes place. 1745 The second major Scottish rebellion takes place. 1746 The position of Scottish secretary is eliminated. 1828 The Home Secretary Office is made responsible for Scottish matters under the supervision of the lord advocate. 1885 The Scottish Office is created, and the secretary of state for Scotland position is restored. 1885 Gladstone is supportive of home rule for Ireland and Scotland.

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1886 The Scottish Home Rule Association is founded. 1923 The National Party of Scotland (NPS) is formed. 1934 The Scottish National Party (SNP) is established, combining the NPS and other nationalist groups. 1945 The SNP wins a by-election seat for Motherwell. The seat is lost in a general election a few months later. 1967 SNP wins a by-election seat for Hamilton. 1970 In the general election, SNP wins one seat and 11.4 percent of the Scottish vote. 1973 The Report on the Royal Commission on the Constitution is issued. 1974 In the general election, SNP wins seven seats and 21.9 percent of the Scottish vote. 1974 In the general election, SNP wins 11 seats and 30.4 percent of the Scottish vote. 1979 In the first referendum, 51.6 percent are in favor of assembly, but the measure fails to secure 40 percent of the total electorate margin required. 1996 The Stone of Scone, the ancient coronation chair of Scottish kings, is returned to Edinburgh from Westminster Cathedral. 1997 In the second referendum, 74 percent of voters approve a Scottish Parliament. 1998 Parliament passes the Scotland Act.

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May 1999 The first Scottish cabinet is elected and a coalition government formed between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 2003 The second Scottish election takes place, and a coalition government between Labour and the Liberal Democrats is formed. 2007 In the third Scottish election, SNP forms a minority government with Alex Salmon as first minister. 2011 After the fourth Scottish election, SNP forms a majority government. October 15, 2012 The Edinburgh Agreement is signed between the Scottish government and Conservative government of David Cameron on a future independence referendum. September 14, 2014 Scots vote approximately 55 percent to 45 percent against Scotland separating from the United Kingdom and becoming independent. Scotland is an important example of contemporary ethnonational conflict because of the manner in which Scottish nationalism has manifested itself over the years and the ways in which the political system of the United Kingdom has responded to it. In one way or another, three examples of ethnic politics— Ireland, Scotland, and Wales—have consistently been major issues on the political agenda of the United Kingdom for the last 700 years. While Scottish and Welsh nationalism have fluctuated in their political intensity, they have never taken on the violent dimensions of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Moreover, Scottish and Welsh nationalism have lacked the resounding issues and rallying points that characterize many other ethnonational conflicts. Nonetheless, the presence of these nationalist movements, especially in Scotland, has threatened the stability of the political party system and even the nature of parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom. From the late 1960s through today, both the Labour and Conservative Parties have thought it sufficiently important that they regularly addressed it in their political campaigns and gestures. It raised different concerns for the two major political parties, but neither believed it could avoid the concerns entirely. Historical Background Britain is a comparatively small island composed of three constituent countries— England, Wales, and Scotland—and, while they share a great deal in common,

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each country has its own distinctive historical and cultural features. As for many other small countries, it is difficult to discuss the development of Scottish nationalism without discussing Scotland in terms of its relations with its larger, more powerful neighbor, England. Scotland and England have engaged in periodic conflicts from pre-Roman times. Even given those conflicts and partly in response to them, the royal families, nobility, and leading families of both countries became highly intertwined over the years. In fact, the current political union of England, Scotland, and Wales stems from the succession of James VI of Scotland to the throne of England and Wales in 1603 after the death of Elizabeth I. James Stuart ruled Scotland as James VI and England as James I. The Act of Union united these two separate kingdoms in 1707, thereby creating the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, and Wales. Dissatisfaction with this union and loyalty to the displaced Stuart line from the throne led to the uprisings in 1715 and 1745. The Act of Union, however, created the basis for the contemporary political setting within which the United Kingdom operates today. Scotland was guaranteed the separation of its religious, legal, and educational institutions. Scotland was also assured, as a region, that it would have political representation in Parliament with its representation in the House of Lords being, initially, the more important house. England, Scotland, and Wales would now have one monarch and one parliament governing them. The requirement for maintaining Scottish legal institutions, however, meant separate legislation would have to be adopted by Parliament for Scotland, with some variations in laws permitted. Over time, Scotland became highly integrated into the development of the British state, culture, and economy. English as a language became the predominant tongue, and Scottish Gaelic faded from usage. Thus, while Scotland as a country maintained a genuine sense of identity, that distinctiveness became based more on a sense of history and place than religion or language. Scotland became the site of a dual identity, with many of its citizens seeing themselves as Scots and as British. In Scotland, the sense of identity is strong, but more difficult to pinpoint as linked to a primary basis. Language as a cultural symbol did not perform a unifying role of significance for the Scots. They did not, however, see being British as the equivalent of being English.1 Political agitation for increased governmental autonomy for Scotland and Wales has been active since the mid-19th century, but it did not attain electoral prominence until the mid-1960s. In both cases, a political party scored electoral successes that enabled those parties to claim and be recognized as the political representatives for Scottish and Welsh nationalism. The Scottish Nationalists, though, were much more successful than the Welsh. In the October 1974 general election, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won 11 parliamentary seats with 30.4 percent of the popular vote, making it the second-largest party in Scotland. The Plaid Cymru (PC), on the other hand, was able to elect only three members of Parliament (MPs) with 10.8 percent of the Welsh vote. These electoral victories were followed by polls in Scotland showing high public support for the devolution of governmental power to a Scottish Parliament, although not for the SNP’s stated goal of independence. The Scottish independence option reached a high of 24 percent support in

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the mid- to late- 1970s, but was generally nearer the 15 percent mark during this period. Broader, less drastic structural changes, however, had consistent majority support among Liberal, Labour, and SNP voters, with a substantial majority of Conservative identifiers also supporting devolution.2 The reaction of the major British political parties and, consequently, the governments was basically one of neglect until the 1974 election. Both parties responded to the SNP and PC after their initial success in the 1960s, but discontinued their interest once the Nationalists failed to make as large an impact in the 1970 general election, as had been feared. Not until the SNP threatened the Labour Party’s precarious position in the later elections did devolution become a serious issue. The Labour government then began its four-year-long push to secure passage of devolution legislation granting assemblies to Scotland and Wales that culminated in the holding of the referendums. The decision to use a referendum in determining whether the Scottish and Welsh devolution bills would be implemented was not of the Labour Government’s choosing. The government was forced to accept the referendum in exchange for the support of some of its own backbenchers in passing the bills. During the parliamentary debate of the bills, however, an amendment was imposed requiring that a majority of those voting, and 40 percent of the total eligible electorate, vote affirmatively in the referendum for the legislation to be implemented. If such an affirmative majority was not secured, then the secretaries of state for Scotland and Wales were required to resubmit the legislation to Parliament, which would then decide whether to proceed with implementation of the acts. This amendment generated intense controversy, especially in Scotland, as there was considerable uncertainty over how many persons should be counted as eligible to vote, given the inevitable errors in the voting rolls. The government, however, did indicate it would seek to resecure Parliament’s approval for the legislation if the 40 percent figure were not met, as long as there was a sufficiently wide affirmative margin among those actually voting. The positions of the major political actors in the referendum were somewhat confusing. There were no government-funded umbrella organizations, as existed in the earlier referendum on whether Britain should remain in the European Economic Community (EEC). As a result, the campaigns were very much free-for-all contests, with each group responsible for raising its own funds. The SNP and Plaid Cymru both campaigned for approval of the Labour government’s devolution proposal. The Labour Party was divided on the issue despite the Labour government’s position, and individuals were permitted to campaign according to their personal preferences. Thus, an odd situation developed in the Labour Party, with some of its affiliated unions contributing money to the pro campaign, while some Labour MPs played major roles for the opposing side. The Conservatives were similarly divided, although to a lesser degree, as more of their supporters opposed the bills. Still, some prominent Conservatives, particularly in Scotland, campaigned for devolution. Umbrella organizations were also organized for both positions, but they had considerable difficulty in cooperating with one another as the Nationalists dominated the pro-groups and the Conservatives dominated the antis. The actual campaigns reflected this uncertainty of overlapping political loyalties. The antidevolutionists got off to a much earlier start, developing a well-organized

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campaign that tended to override the positive groups. The pro-forces, consequently, were put in the position of addressing the agenda established by the antidevolutionists. The pro-groups also had substantial problems campaigning for the same objective. The Labour Party in Scotland, for example, had difficulty explaining why its supporters should support something desired by the SNP when it had campaigned vigorously against the Nationalists only months before in several parliamentary by-elections. The pro-forces also have assumed that the substantial lead in public opinion polls for some form of devolution would lead to a sufficiently large turnout and positive vote in favor of these particular devolution bills. This especially occurred in Scotland, where support for devolution had consistently held a large margin in the public opinion polls. In Wales, however, that the majority would be a negative one was fairly clear from the start. Furthermore, in both regions, the entire process was complicated by the fact that a general election would obviously take place in the near future, and the outcome of the referendums would be an important factor influencing how the Labour government would face the electorate in Scottish and Welsh constituencies. The results of the March 1, 1979, referendum were not at all favorable from the Nationalists’ perspectives. The Welsh vote was overwhelmingly negative. Only 20.3 percent of those voting supported the devolution act. The Scottish vote was affirmative, but only by a small margin: 51.6 percent to 48.6 percent. Measured in terms of eligibility, however, the Scottish margin fell substantially below the 40 percent requirement: 32.8 percent to 30.8 percent.3 These results left the Labour government little discretionary room for interpretation. Even so, before it could decide to act, the SNP withdrew its support from Prime Minister Callaghan’s minority government. This triggered a series of events leading to a vote of no confidence and the 1979 general election won by the Conservative Party. In the subsequent Parliament, the SNP’s representation fell from 11 to 3 MPs, and that of the Plaid Cymru fell from 3 to 2. The new Conservative government repealed the devolution acts shortly after taking office. After the failure of the referendum and Conservative victory, Scottish nationalism entered a new phase of development, one illustrated by its mutual dependence with the fortunes of the Labour Party. The Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major basically ignored Scottish nationalism. Scotland was not electorally important to their prospects, except as a thorn in the side of the Labour Party. During the 1980s and through the mid-1990s, Labour became increasingly dependent on the seats it secured in Scotland. As a consequence, there was no incentive for the Conservatives to act, and, moreover, the SNP’s electoral appeal seemed stagnated between 10–15 percent of the Scottish vote. Labour, on the other hand, could not afford to avoid the devolution issue or the influence of the SNP. If it failed to support Scottish interests, it stood to lose even more seats in Parliament, as the SNP would pull votes away from its candidates. If the SNP did not win the seats, then the Conservatives, or later the Liberal Democrats, might squeak in as a result of a three-way race. At the same time, general interest in the concept of independence seemed to grow, and interest shifted from an assembly with limited powers to a Parliament

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with more general authority. Labour’s response to its electoral dilemma and the growing general support for Scottish self-government evolved over the period. In the 1992 general election, the party pledged to legislate on Scottish and Welsh devolution within its first year in office if elected. While Labour was not successful in 1992, support for the concept continued to build. The pledge was repeated in the May 1997 general election. Within three months of winning that election, the new Labour government issued White Papers on devolution, and a second Scottish referendum was scheduled for September 1997. As pledged, this time around, the referendum was held prior to the development of the full details of the legislative proposals. With a turnout of 60 percent of the Scottish electorate, 74 percent of the voters supported the idea of creating a Scottish Parliament, and 63 percent endorsed granting the new Parliament taxation powers.4 Legislation was subsequently introduced in Parliament on December 17, 1997. It secured royal assent in 1998, with the first elections scheduled for May 6, 1999. The Labour Party emerged from those elections with a large plurality of 53 seats, but not the majority needed for governing. The SNP came in second with 35 seats, followed by the Conservatives at 18 seats and the Liberal Democrats at 17 seats. With the new Parliament having a total of 129 seats, 65 seats were needed for a governing majority. Donald Dewar, a longtime leader of Scottish interests within the Labour Party and a former secretary of state for Scotland, consequently formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats to form the first Scottish cabinet. He was sworn in as first minister on May 17, 1999, and the Scottish Parliament assumed its full powers six weeks later on July 1, 1999. Dewar’s personal character and integrity was highly respected by his supporters and opponents alike. His efforts played a major role in effecting a smooth governmental transition. Unfortunately, he died in October 1999, after a fall in which he suffered a brain hemorrhage. His death created a serious nonnationalist leadership vacancy that has still not been effectively filled. The powers of the new Parliament are extensive, but not fully defined. Unlike the 1979 effort, the 1998 legislation listed the powers reserved to Westminster and left the remaining powers to the new Parliament.5 Reserved to Westminster are those powers dealing with the constitution, foreign policy, national security, immigration, system-wide economic policy, social security and employment, and commerce. The Scottish Parliament, in turn, can legislate on health, education, local government, job training, social work, housing, economic development, forestry, fishing, sports, the arts, agriculture, civil law, criminal law, the police and the criminal justice system, and the environment. In many ways, the range of powers granted to the new Parliament is not unlike those granted to states in a federal system. The new Parliament, however, cannot change its own authority. That power continues to reside in Westminster.6 Even increased authority of taxation powers have had to be approved by Westminster. The Conflict The key issues at the heart of Scottish nationalism are not easy to identify in a satisfactory manner. There have been no clearly resounding issues around which the

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political forces have rallied. As noted, Scottish cultural, religious, linguistic, and institutional factors are present, but not politically very significant. Neither has independence served well historically as a political objective around which to form masses of voters. While Scottish Nationalists find these factors important, they alone do not motivate voters or activists. One economic factor that influenced the political situation of the 1970s was the discovery and development of the North Sea oil fields at the same time the British economy in general was having serious problems. Scotland had had a lower growth rate and higher unemployment than England as a whole, particularly the southeastern region around London. For some of the more fervent Nationalists, the claim that the oil was Scotland’s provided a basis for arguing about the past mismanagement of the Scottish economy and was a resource base for promising better times ahead under a separate Scottish government. For their opponents, the oil revenues issue was seen as an example of the narrow self-interest base and lack of economic realism of the Nationalists. In general, though, the potential economic benefits of the oil provided a serious context for consideration of the SNP’s potential significance in the 1970s by the major parties and the central government. This political significance continued past the high point of the oil’s economic effects. At the heart of much of the debate about Scottish nationalism, however, lay a general sense on the part of many Scottish voters in all of the major political parties that the central political institutions and, hence, the central economic decision making was not sufficiently cognizant or appreciative of Scotland’s needs and could not be under the current arrangements. All of the cultural elements and history noted above acted to confirm this sense of a lack of effective representation in the decision making affecting Scotland. The cry for independence from the SNP resounded with many voters, though not nearly a majority of them, and the depth of its seriousness was never tested. The Labour Party’s approach to the establishment of an assembly reflected this desire for more representation both within the Nationalists and its own ranks. It also reflected the genuine sense of being both Scottish and British by most residents of Scotland. Management of the Conflict How the conflicts generated by Scottish nationalism have been managed is a fascinating example of the striking of a democratic balance of political interests. All of the principal political leaders, activists, and parties have sought to deal with the issues raised by Scottish nationalism within the existing political structures of the United Kingdom while seeking to modify those structures in some basic ways. In looking back over the past 125–150 years, the major political parties have consistently sought to deal with the issues through minimal political institutional changes and study. At times, the institutions moved slowly, and at other times, they moved with surprising speed. In one sense, it is as if the institutions were seeking to determine the lasting power of the issues and the size of their constituencies. The Royal Commission on the Constitution studied the issue of devolution and

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recommended a limited assembly in the early 1970s. A Conservative Study Group had made a similar recommendation in the late 1960s. In some ways, both efforts were building on the 19th-century themes of Scottish home rule. Both were also building the groundwork for the acceptance of the contemporary idea of a Scottish Parliament. In a similar way, the political parties themselves were responsive to their constituencies. The Conservatives recognized early on there was little they could electorally reap from supporting Scottish nationalism, and it was inconsistent with their overall beliefs in the unity of the United Kingdom. So they chose to ignore the issue as much as possible. As noted, the Labour Party could not afford to avoid the issue. Moreover, supporting the idea of Scottish self-government had a long-standing tradition within the party, even as it ran counter to other traditions supportive of strong centralized government. Failure to support the idea would have also likely confined the Labour Party to continued minority-party status in Westminster; thus, a compromise resulting in the new Parliament was acceptable. Even the SNP recognized this. Its leaders knew a hard-line push for independence would not likely succeed, and they had no interest in the kind of political struggle being waged in Northern Ireland. Consequently, they worked within the system to build acceptance for the idea of more direct Scottish control over its own government. They still sought independence, but within the framework of the existing institutions. In the end, the establishment of the new Scottish Parliament almost seemed a foregone conclusion. The political system had debated the issue for almost 25 years, and the fears of disastrous consequences had eroded over time. The United Kingdom and parliamentary sovereignty could survive the transition, but the debate would not cease. Recent Developments

In the years since the establishment of the Scottish Parliament, the issues behind Scottish nationalism have not appreciably changed, but they have become more focused on the quality of representation and the alleged benefits of union versus independence. The SNP has matured as a modern well-organized and funded political party.7 The party’s orientation is still social democratic in its domestic policies, with a heavy focus on establishing itself as the key advocate for Scottish economic development. It has also established a good working relationship with its competitor parties in the Scottish Parliament. Electorally, the SNP remains the second party after Labour in Scotland in Westminster elections, usually polling about 20 percent of the vote and winning 5–6 parliamentary seats. Its performance in European parliamentary elections is roughly comparable. The two-vote proportional system of elections adopted for the Scottish Parliament allows for smaller parties, such as the Conservatives, to gain seats in Edinburgh and makes it difficult for any party to overly dominate Parliament. In Scottish elections, however, the SNP has increased its share of both votes and seats, winning enough in 2007 to form a minority government with the legislative cooperation of its competitors and an absolute majority of seats in 2011.

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The SNP and the other parties in the Scottish Parliament have worked hard at establishing a cooperative, functional regional government. In doing so, they have given credibility to Scottish self-government, making the argument that this kind of quality government would continue after independence. Alex Salmond, the leader of the SNP and first minister, is regarded as the most-effective Scottish politician, and his skills have helped the SNP considerably. After the 2011 election, he pushed hard for a consultative referendum on Scottish independence, and in October 2012, Prime Minister David Cameron agreed to the concept, providing the vote was a single up or down proposition. The referendum remains consultative in nature as opposed to binding. The specific benefits and costs of independence will be the focus of the debates during the referendum. The SNP, as the governing party, has issued a 650-page White Paper on the impacts of independence.8 The party is clearly the major advocate for independence. The “no” campaign is supported by the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democratic Parties led by former labour chancellor of the exchequer Alistair Darling. Their focus will be on the disadvantages of separating from England and Wales as well as the long-term benefits of union. In the end, the key substantive issue will be one of which type of constitutional arrangement best provides for Scotland’s future—economically, internationally, and representationally. Polling on support for independence indicates that a positive majority will be difficult to attain, as the proportion of public opinion supporting independence has stayed about 30–35 percent of the electorate for a number of years.9 Significance The significance of Scottish nationalism is worth considering because of its multiple implications that extend far beyond the remnants of Hadrian’s Wall. It has implications for the other ethnic conflicts within the United Kingdom as well as other separatist movements in Europe. It also has serious implications for its political and constitutional dimensions for the United Kingdom both domestically and internationally. The United Kingdom has been a unitary political system with a strong tradition of centralized government and parliamentary sovereignty. This means the politics of these ethnic conflicts, as with other political issues, have tended to focus on central government actions. Thus, the issues raised by the conflicts in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland potentially threatened the very existence of the United Kingdom as it has developed constitutionally. The current devolution of authority to a regional government based in Edinburgh has raised serious questions about the meaning of parliamentary sovereignty as the basic organizing principle of government, and the decision reached with regard to independence will not resolve all of those questions, whatever the outcome. Scotland is also worth considering because of the changes in its self-conception or political identity as well as that of the United Kingdom. From the majority perspective, the United Kingdom was historically a homogeneous, white country with Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland joining England in its imperial glory. The cultural differences between these regions were largely dismissed as holdovers

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from the past that would vanish with the passage of time. In addition, the United Kingdom was a major world power with its colonies and later the commonwealth. That self-definition, though, has changed dramatically with the loss of its position as a world power, the rise of the regional nationalist movements, immigration of large numbers of nonwhites and noncommonwealth individuals into the country, and the United Kingdom’s entrance into the European Community. The English still dominate the political system and culture, as they are the major population group, but even English politicians can no longer ignore the regions as unimportant. And, in fact, what becomes clearer, is that they did not entirely ignore the regions beforehand. There has been substantial variation and diversity within the political structures affecting the regions and England over the years. Nevertheless, the meaning and value of being Scottish, English, and British is being redefined. If there is a positive vote in support of independence, Westminster must still concur with the granting of independence to Scotland and under what conditions separation would occur. The writing of a new Scottish constitution would represent a fundamental change to constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom, which have heavily relied on its unwritten constitutional heritage and parliamentary acts. Even the failure of the referendum promises major constitutional change, as David Cameron supports the creation of new regional authorities with substantial devolved authority even within English regions. The Conservatives have made it clear that they will campaign for a greater devolution of power to local governments, even in Scotland, as part of their response to the SNP. The electoral margin will likely play a critical role in setting the tone of any such negotiations. A higher than anticipated “yes” vote will play to the demands of the SNP, and a negative vote will work to the advantage of the U.K. Conservatives. In any case, the issue of a Scottish government with expanded authority will not go away. If the vote approves independence, the SNP will push for that, and if the vote is negative, they will continue to push for further devolution of authority. Moreover, they will likely argue that the prime minister’s push for regional governments in England substantiate their arguments about the unrepresentativeness of Westminster and its remoteness. They will simply wait for another day. They have used the existing constitutional and political practices of the United Kingdom to effectively pursue their aims without resorting to violence to great effect, and there is no reason for them not to continue to do so, even if the 2014 election results are negative. The Scottish situation is also significant because of its implications for politics south of the border. Both the Labour and Conservative Parties have responded to the Scots from perspectives reflective of their internal beliefs about how governance in Scotland and in the United Kingdom should take place, but both parties have also played a game of maximizing their own party’s overall electoral advantage in Westminster. An independent Scotland will thus have serious consequences for them. While the percentage share of the vote between the Conservatives and Labour, the two major parties, outside of Scotland is not overwhelming, the difference in seats is quite substantial, and the loss of Labour’s safe seats in Scotland would seriously damage prospects for returning to power anytime soon. It would

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mean a fundamental restructuring of Labour’s appeal to largely English voters. The Conservatives have many more safe seats from which to build their parliamentary majorities. An independent Scotland will also have implications for the position of the United Kingdom in the European Union (EU). If admitted to the European Union, an independent Scotland will decrease the representation of the United Kingdom in the European Parliament and cost it some of its share of EU resources. It will also likely further diminish the stature of the United Kingdom in the eyes of its European partners. Prime Minister Cameron’s own party continues to have serious reservations about the European Union, especially its regulations and financial policies. He has even agreed to another referendum on Europe if the Conservatives win the next parliamentary election in 2017. An independent Scotland could change the balance of the results in such a referendum, as Scotland has been more pro-Europe than the rest of the United Kingdom. There are also implications for NATO in that Scotland would need to be admitted as a member of that organization, but the SNP has stated that the nuclear facilities in Scotland would need to be relocated. Finally, what happens in Scotland also carries implications for other separatist movements in Europe and how they might achieve objections. Thus, the implications of Scottish independence reach into the very definitions of political and national identities for the Scots and the English. They reach into the established governing arrangements on both sides of the border as well as the contemporary meaning of parliamentary sovereignty, especially with the increased reliance of such measures of popular sovereignty as referendums. Moreover, they reach into the international realm affecting the United Kingdom’s position within the European Union. And, finally, Scotland is significant, even if the referendum question receives a negative majority because the Scottish nationalism has achieved more of its self-governing objectives than virtually any other such movement in Western Europe, and all through use of the broader political system’s democratic processes. Notes 1. See particularly, H. J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); and Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), for discussion of the historical development of Scottish identity. 2. See Keith Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland (Glasgow: The Molendinar Press, 1977); and Jack Brand, The National Movement in Scotland (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), on the development of the SNP and support for independence in the 1970s. 3. See Robert J. Thompson, “Referendums and Ethnoterritorial Movements: The Policy Consequences and Political Ramifications,” in Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, and the Western World, ed. Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. and Robert J. Thompson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989); and John M. Bochel, David T. Denver, and Alan Macartney., eds., The Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979 (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1981). 4. Robert Hazell, Meg Russell, Ben Seyd, and David Sinclair, “The British Constitution, 1998– 99: The Continuous Revolution,” Parliamentary Affairs 53, no. 2 (April 2000): 245–247.

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5. See the full text of the Scotland Act of 1998 at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 1998/46/enacted/data.pdf. 6. Michael O’Neill, “Great Britain: From Dicey to Devolution,” Parliamentary Affairs 53, no. 1 (January 2000): 65–95. 7. For details on the development of the SNP as a political party and on its members, see James Mitchell, Lynn Bennie, and Rob Johns, The Scottish National Party (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Peter Lynch, SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party, 2nd ed. (Cardiff, Wales: Welsh University Press, 2013). 8. For the full text of Scotland’s Future, go to http://www.scotreferendum.com/reports/ scotlands-future-your-guide-to-an-independent-scotland. 9. See John Curtice and Rachel Ormston, Attitudes towards Scotland’s Constitutional Future: Initial Findings from Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2012 (Edinburgh: ScotCen Social Research, 2013), http://www.scotcen.org.uk/media/176147/2012-scotlandsconstitutional-future.pdf; and “Scottish Independence within SNP’s Grasp—Poll,” The Scotsman, January 24, 2013, http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/top-stories/ scottish-independence-within-snp-s-grasp-poll-1-3281655.

Suggested Readings Bochel, John, David Denver, and Alan Macartney. 1981. The Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979. Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press. Bogdanor, Vernon. 1979. Devolution. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Bogdanor, Vernon. 2010. “The West Lothian Question.” Parliamentary Affairs 63 (1): 156–172. Brand, Jack. 1978. The National Movement in Scotland. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Brown, Alice, and David McCrone. 1998. Politics and Society in Scotland. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan. Bulmer, W. Elliot. 2011. “An Analysis of the Scottish National Party’s Draft Constitution for Scotland.” Parliamentary Affairs 64 (4): 674–693. Hanham, H. J. 1969. Scottish Nationalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Harvie, Christopher. 1977. Scotland and Nationalism. London: George Allen & Unwin. Keating, Michael. 2010. The Government of Scotland. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. Keating, Michael. 2009. The Independence of Scotland. New York: Oxford University Press. Kellas, James G. 1973, 1975, and 1984. The Scottish Political System (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Leith, Murray Stewart. 2010. “Governance and Identity in a Devolved Scotland.” Parliamentary Affairs 63 (2): 286–301. Levy, Roger. 1990. Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads. Edinburgh, Scotland: Scottish Academic Press. Lynch, Peter. 2013. SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party. 2nd ed. Cardiff, Wales: Welsh University Press. Mitchell, James, Lynn Bennie, and Rob Johns. 2012. The Scottish National Party. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Scottish Parliament. www.Scottish.parliament.uk. Scottish National Party (SNP). www.SNP.org.uk. Webb, Keith. 1977. The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland. Glasgow, Scotland: The Molendinar Press.

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Appendices The two documents below are keys to understanding Scotland’s past, present, and perhaps future. The Act of Union is the act of Parliament that established the constitutional basis for the current governing relationship between England and Wales on one hand and Scotland on the other. It is the fundamental initial governing document. Should Scotland yet become independent, this Act would technically be overturned. The Edinburgh Agreement is the current political agreement between the Scottish Assembly and the Prime Minister of Great Britain permitting the referendum that will be held in September, 2014. Should the nationalist position prevail in that vote, then the Scottish National Party as the governing party in the Scottish Assembly will move for independence. The Edinburgh Agreement set up the referendum rules.

1. The Act of Union Union with England Act 1707 1707 CHAPTER 7 Act Ratifying and Approving the Treaty of Union of the Two Kingdoms of

scotland

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england

The Estates of Parliament Considering that Articles of Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England were agreed on the twenty second of July One thousand seven hundred and six years by the Commissioners nominated on behalf of this Kingdom under Her Majesties Great Seal of Scotland bearing date the twenty seventh of February last past in pursuance of the fourth Act of the third Session of this Parliament and the Commissioners nominated on behalf of the Kingdom of England under Her Majesties Great Seal of England bearing date at Westminster the tenth day of April last past in pursuance of an Act of Parliament made in England the third year of Her Majesties Reign to treat of and concerning an Union of the said Kingdoms Which Articles were in all humility presented to Her Majesty upon the twenty third of the said Month of July and were Recommended to this Parliament by Her Majesties Royal Letter of the date the thirty one day of July One thousand seven hundred and six And that the said Estates of Parliament have agreed to and approven of the saids Articles of Union with some Additions and Explanations as is contained in the Articles hereafter insert And sicklyke Her Majesty with advice and consent of the Estates of Parliament Resolving to Establish the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government within this Kingdom has past in this Session of Parliament an Act entituled Act for secureing of the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government which by the Tenor thereof is appointed to be insert in any Act ratifying the Treaty and expressly declared to be a fundamentall and essentiall Condition of the said Treaty or Union in all time coming Therefore Her Majesty with advice and consent of the Estates of Parliament in fortification of the Approbation of the Articles as abovementioned And for their further and better Establishment of the same upon full and mature deliberation upon the forsaids Articles of Union and Act of Parliament Doth Ratifie Approve and Confirm the same with the Additions and Explanations contained in the saids Articles in manner and under the provision aftermentioned whereof the Tenor follows

I That the Two Kingdoms of Scotland and England shall upon the first day of May next ensuing the date hereof and forever after be United into One Kingdom by the Name of Great

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Britain And that the Ensigns Armorial of the said United Kingdom be such as Her Majesty shall appoint and the Crosses of St Andrew and St George be conjoined in such manner as Her Majesty shall think fit and used in all Flags Banners Standards and Ensigns both at Sea and Land

II That the Succession to the Monarchy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and of the Dominions thereunto belonging after Her Most Sacred Majesty and in default of Issue of Her Majesty be, remain and continue to the Most Excellent Princess Sophia Electoress and Dutchess Dowager of Hanover and the Heirs of Her body being Protestants upon whom the Crown of England is settled by an Act of Parliament made in England in the twelth year of the Reign of His late Majesty King William the Third entituled An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject And that all Papists and persons marrying Papists shall be excluded from and for ever incapable to inherit possess or enjoy the Imperial Crown of Great Britain and the Dominions thereunto belonging or any part thereof And in every such case the Crown and Government shall from time to time descend to and be enjoyed by such person being a Protestant as should have inherited and enjoyed the same in case such Papists or person marrying a Papist was naturally dead according to the provision for the Descent of the Crown of England made by another Act of Parliament in England in the first year of the Reign of their late Majesties King William and Queen Mary entituled An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and settling the Succession of the Crown

III That the United Kingdom of Great Britain be Represented by one and the same Parliament to be stiled the Parliament of Great Britain

IV That all the Subjects of the United Kingdom of Great Britain shall from and after the Union have full Freedom and Intercourse of Trade and Navigation to and from any port or place within the said United Kingdom and the Dominions and Plantations thereunto belonging And that there be a Communication of all other Rights Privileges and Advantages which do or may belong to the Subjects of either Kingdom except where it is otherwayes expressly agreed in these Articles

V [Arts. 5.8 repealed by Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906 (c. 38) Union with England Act 1707 (c. 7)]

VI That all parts of the United Kingdom for ever from and after the Union shall have the same Allowances Encouragements and Drawbacks and be under the same Prohibitions Restrictions and Regulations of Trade and lyable to the same Customs and Duties on Import and

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Export And that the Allowances Encouragements and Drawbacks Prohibitions Restrictions and Regulations of Trade and the Customs and Duties on Import and Export settled in England when the Union commences shall from and after the Union take place throughout the whole United Kingdom . . . [Words repealed by Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 (c. 80) Sch. 1]

VII That all parts of the United Kingdom be for ever from and after the Union lyable to the same Excises upon all Exciseable Liquors . . . [Words repealed by Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 (c. 80) Sch. 1] [Articles VIII–XV, XVII, and XXII subsequently repealed in their entirety.]

XVI That from and after the Union the Coin shall be of the same standard and value throughout the United Kingdom as now in England . . . [Words repealed by Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906 (c. 38)]

XVIII That the Laws concerning Regulation of Trade, Customs and such Excises to which Scotland is by virtue of this Treaty to be lyable be the same in Scotland from and after the Union as in England and that all other Lawes in use within the Kingdom of Scotland do after the Union and notwithstanding thereof remain in the same force as before (except such as are contrary to or inconsistent with this Treaty) but alterable by the Parliament of Great Britain With this difference betwixt the Laws concerning publick Right, Policy and Civil Government and those which concern private Right That the Laws which concern publick Right Policy and Civil Government may be made the same throughout the whole United Kingdom but that no alteration be made in Laws which concern private Right except for evident utility of the subjects within Scotland

XIX That the Court of Session or Colledge of Justice do after the Union and notwithstanding thereof remain in all time coming within Scotland as it is now constituted by the Laws of that Kingdom and with the same Authority and Priviledges as before the Union subject nevertherless to such Regulations for the better Administration of Justice as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain And that hereafter none shall be named by Her Majesty or Her Royal Successors to be Ordinary Lords of Session but such who have served in the Colledge of Justice as Advocats or Principal Clerks of Session for the space of five years or as Writers to the Signet for the space of ten years With this provision That no Writer to the Signet be capable to be admitted a Lord of the Session unless he undergo a private and publick Tryal on the Civil Law before the Faculty of Advocats and be found by them qualified for the said Office two years before he be named to be a Lord of the Session yet so as the Qualifications made or to be made for capacitating persons to be named Ordinary Lords of Session may be altered by the Parliament of Great Britain And that the Court of Justiciary

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do also after the Union and notwithstanding thereof remain in all time coming within Scotland as it is now constituted by the Laws of that Kindom and with the same Authority and Priviledges as before the Union subject nevertherless to such Regulations as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain and without prejudice of other Rights of Justiciary . . . [Words repealed by Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 (c. 80)] And that the Heritable Rights of Admiralty and Vice-Admiralties in Scotland be reserved to the respective Proprietors as Rights of Property subject nevertherless as to the manner of Exercising such Heritable Rights to such Regulations and Alterations as shall be thought proper to be made by the Parliament of Great Britain And that all other Courts now in being within the Kingdom of Scotland do remain but subject to Alterations by the Parliament of Great Britain And that all Inferior Courts within the said Limits do remain subordinate as they are now to the Supream Courts of Justice within the same in all time coming And that no Causes in Scotland be cognoscible by the Courts of Chancery, Queens-Bench, Common-Pleas or any other Court in Westminster-hall And that the said Courts or any other of the like nature after the Unions shall have no power to Cognosce Review or Alter the Acts or Sentences of the Judicatures within Scotland or stop the Execution of the same. . . .

XX That all heritable Offices, Superiorities, heritable Jurisdictions, Offices for life and Jurisdictions for life be reserved to the Owners thereof as Rights of Property in the same manner as they are now enjoyed by the Laws of Scotland notwithstanding of this Treaty

XXI That the Rights and Privileges of the Royall Burroughs in Scotland as they now are Do Remain entire after the Union and notwithstanding thereof

XXIII . . . .[Initial wording repealed by Peerage Act 1963 (c. 45)] That all Peers of Scotland and their successors to their Honours and Dignities shall from and after the Union be Peers of Great Britain and have Rank and Precedency next and immediately after the Peers of the like orders and degrees in England at the time of the Union and before all Peers of Great Britain of the like orders and degrees who may be created after the Union. . . . [Words repealed by virtue of repeal by Criminal Justice Act 1948 (c. 58)] and shall Enjoy all Privileges of Peers as fully as the Peers of England do now or as they or any other Peers of Great Britain may hereafter Enjoy the same. . . .

XXIV That from and after the Union there be One Great Seal for the United Kingdom of Great Britain which shall be different from the Great Seal now used in either Kingdom And that the Quartering the Arms and the Rank and Precedency of the Lyon King of Arms of the Kingdom of Scotland as may best suit the Union be left to Her Majesty And that in the mean time the Great Seal of England be used as the Great Seal of the United Kingdom and that the Great Seal of the United Kingdom be used for Sealing Writs to Elect and Summon the

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Parliament of Great Britain and for sealing all Treaties with Forreign Princes and States and all publick Acts Instruments and Orders of State which Concern the whole United Kingdom and in all other matters relating to England as the Great Seal of England is now used and that a Seal in Scotland after the Union be alwayes kept and made use of in all things relating to private Rights or Grants which have usually passed the Great Seal of Scotland and which only concern Offices, Grants, Commissions and private Rights within that Kingdom And that until such Seal shall be appointed by Her Majesty the present Great Seal of Scotland shall be used for such purposes and that the Privy Seal, Signet, Casset, Signet of the Justiciary Court, Quarter Seal and Seals of Courts now used in Scotland be Continued but that the said Seals be altered and adapted to the state of the Union as Her Majesty shall think fit And the said Seals and all of them and the Keepers of them shall be subject to such Regulations as the Parlaiment of Great Britain shall hereafter make And that the Crown, Scepter and Sword of State, the Records of Parliament and all other Records Rolls and Registers whatsoever both publick and private generall and particular and Warrands thereof Continue to be keeped as they are within that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland and that they shall so remain in all time coming notwithstanding of the Union

XXV That all Laws and Statutes in either Kingdom so far as they are contrary to or inconsistent with the Terms of these Articles or any of them shall from and after the Union cease and become void and shall be so declared to be by the respective Parliaments of the said Kingdoms the Tenor of the foresaid Act for securing the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government follows

Our Soveraign Lady and the Estates of Parliament considering That by the late Act of Parliament for a Treaty with England for an Union of both Kingdoms It is provided That the Commissioners for that Treaty should not Treat of or concerning any alteration of the Worship Discipline and Government of the Church of this Kingdom as now by Law established Which Treaty being now reported to the Parliament and it being reasonable and necessary that the True Protestant Religion as presently professed within this Kingdom with the Worship Discipline and Government of this Church should be effectually and unalterably secured Therefore Her Majesty with advice and consent of the said Estates of Parliament Doth hereby Establish and Confirm the said True Protestant Religion and the Worship Discipline and Government of this Church to continue without any alteration to the people of this Land in all succeeding generations And more especially Her Majesty with advice and consent foresaid Ratifies Approves and for ever Confirms the fifth Act of the first Parliament of King William and Queen Mary Entituled Act Ratifying the Confession of Faith and settling Presbyterian Church Government with the haill other Acts of Parliament relating thereto in prosecution of the Declaration of the Estates of this Kingdom containing the Claim of Right bearing date the eleventh of Aprile One thousand six hundred and eighty nine And Her Majesty with advice and consent foresaid expressly Provides and Declares That the foresaid True Protestant Religion contained in the above-mentioned Confession of Faith with the form and purity of Worship presently in use within this Church and its Presbyterian Church Government and Discipline that is to say the Government of the Church by Kirk Sessions, Presbytries, Provincial Synods and Generall Assemblies all established by

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the forsaid Acts of Parliament pursuant to the Claim of Right shall Remain and Continue unalterable and that the said Presbyterian Government shall be the only Government of the Church within the Kingdom of Scotland And further for the greater security of the foresaid Protestant Religion and of the Worship Discipline and Government of this Church as above established Her Majesty with advice and consent foresaid Statutes and Ordains That the Universities and Colledges of Saint Andrews Glasgow Aberdeen and Edinburgh as now Established by Law shall Continue within this Kingdom for ever . . . [Words repealed by Statue Law Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 (.80),Sch.] And further Her Majesty with advice foresaid expressly Declares and Statutes that none of the Subjects of this Kingdom shall be lyable to but all and every one of them for ever free of any Oath Test or Subscription within this Kingdom contrary to or inconsistent with the foresaid True Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government Worship and Discipline as above established And that the same within the bounds of this Church and Kingdom shall never be imposed upon or required of them in any sort And Lastly that after the Decease of Her Present Majesty (whom God long preserve) the Soveraign succeeding to her in the Royal Government of the Kingdom of Great Britain shall in all time comeing at his or her accession to the Crown Swear and Subscribe That they shall inviolably maintain and preserve the foresaid settlement of the True Protestant Religion with the Government Worship Discipline Right and Priviledges of this Church as above established by the Laws of this Kingdom in prosecution of the Claim of Right And it is hereby Statute and Ordained That this Act of Parliament with the Establishment therein contained shall be held and observed in all time coming as a fundamentall and essentiall Condition of any Treaty or Union to be Concluded betwixt the Two Kingdoms without any Alteration thereof or Derogation thereto in any sort for ever As also that this Act of Parliament and Settlement therein contained shall be Insert and Repeated in any Act of Parliament that shall pass for agreeing and concluding the foresaid Treaty or Union betwixt the Two Kingdoms And that the same shall be therein expressly Declared to be a fundamentall and essentiall Condition of the said Treaty or Union in all time coming and Act immediately above-written Her Majesty with advice and consent foresaid Statutes Enacts and Ordains to be and Continue in all time coming the sure and perpetuall foundation of ane compleat and intire Union of the Two Kingdoms of Scotland and England under this express Condition and Provision That the Approbation and Ratification of the foresaids Articles and Act shall be nowayes binding on this Kingdom untill the said Articles and Act be Ratified Approven and Confirmed by Her Majesty with and by the Authority of the Parliament of England as they are now Agreed to Approved and Confirmed by Her Majestie with and by the Authority of the Parliament of Scotland Declaring nevertheless that the Parliament of England may provide for the security of the Church of England as they think expedient to take place within the bounds of the said Kingdom of England and not Derogating from the security above provided for Establishing of the Church of Scotland within the bounds of this Kingdom As also the said Parliament of England may extend the Additions and other provisions contained in the Articles of Union as above insert in favours of the Subjects of Scotland to and in favours of the Subjects of England which shall not suspend or Derogate from the force and effect of this present Ratification But shall be understood as herein included without the necessity of any new Ratification in the Parliament of Scotland And lastly Her Majesty Enacts and Declares That all Laws and Statutes in this Kingdom so far as they are contrary to or inconsistent with the terms of these Articles as abovementioned shall from and after the Union cease and become void which articles of union

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Source: United Kingdom National Archives. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk /aosp/1707/7/data.pdf.

2. The Edinburgh Agreement This Agreement provided the foundation for Scotland’s September 2014 referendum on whether to remain a part of the United Kingdom. Although the Scots voted decisively to do so, in the United Kingdom’s 2015 parliamentary elections nine months later Scottish voters elected the proindependence SNP to 56 of Scotland’s 59 seats in Parliament. Monday 15 October 2012 between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on independence for Scotland. agreement

The United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government have agreed to work together to ensure that a referendum on Scottish independence can take place. The governments have agreed that the referendum should: - have a clear legal base; - be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament; - be conducted so as to command the confidence of parliaments, government and people; and - deliver a fair test and decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland and a result that everyone will respect. The governments have agreed to promote an Order in Council under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 in the United Kingdom and Scottish Parliaments to allow a single question referendum on Scottish independence to be held before the end of 2014. The Order will put beyond doubt that the Scottish Parliament can legislate for the referendum. It will then be for the Scottish Government to promote legislation in the Scottish Parliament for a referendum on independence. The governments are agreed that the referendum should meet the highest standards of fairness, transparency and propriety, informed by consultation and independent expert advice. The referendum legislation will set out: - - - - -

the date of the referendum; the franchise; the wording of the question; rules on campaign financing; and other rules for the conduct of the referendum.

The details of the agreement between the governments are set out in the following memorandum and draft Order, which forms part of this agreement.

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signed

The Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP Prime Minister The Rt. Hon. Alex Salmond MSP First Minister of Scotland The Rt. Hon. Michael Moore MP Secretary of State for Scotland Nicola Sturgeon MSP Deputy First Minister of Scotland Edinburgh, 15 October 2012 Source: The Scottish Government. Available at http://www.gov.scot/About/Government /concordats/Referendum-on-independence.

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United Kingdom The Decline and Revival of Welsh Nationalism Elin Royles and Terrence Casey

Timeline 1276–1282 Wales is conquered by Edward I, king of England. 1400–1410 The Rebellion of Owain Glyndwˆr occurs. 1536 and 1543 The Acts of Union with England are established. 1881 The Sunday Closing (Wales) Act is passed: it is the first separate legislation for Wales. 1886 The Cymru Fydd cultural movement is founded. 1896 An attempt to merge Cymru Fydd and the Welsh Liberal Party collapses. 1920 Legislation for disestablishment and an independent church in Wales comes into force. 1925 Plaid Cymru (PC) (Party of Wales) is founded.

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1964 A secretary of state for Wales is appointed responsible for the Welsh Office with executive responsibilities for areas of government policy in Wales, including education, local government, infrastructure, and termed administrative devolution. 1966 Gwynfor Evans gains the first House of Commons seat for PC. 1967 The Welsh Language Act allows some use of Welsh in legal proceedings and public administration. 1979 The referendum for a Welsh Assembly with executive powers fails with 20.3 percent in favor and 79.7 percent opposed. 1982 S4C (Channel Four Wales) is established as the first public-service channel aimed specifically at a Welsh-language audience. 1993 The Welsh Language Act stipulates that Welsh and English are to be treated equally as far as is reasonably practicable in public business and the administration of justice. September 18, 1997 A referendum for a National Assembly for Wales as an executive model of devolution passes with 50.3 percent voting in favor, a majority of just 0.6 percent (or 6,721 voters) on a turnout of just over 50 percent. 1998 The Government of Wales Act is passed by the United Kingdom Parliament. May 6, 1999 Elections are held for the National Assembly; the Labour Party wins plurality. 2004 The Richard Commission recommends conferring primary law-making powers to Wales based on the reserved powers model and an increase in assembly members to 80. 2006 The Government of Wales Act gives the National Assembly restricted primary law-making powers. It contains provisions for primary legislative powers in all devolved areas contingent on an affirmative referendum vote.

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2007 The Government of Wales Act 2006, Part 3, comes into force under a Labour and PC coalition “One Wales” government. March 2011 A Welsh devolution referendum is held, with 63.5 percent in favor of an Assembly with enhanced legislative powers on a turnout of 35.4 percent. 2011 The Government of Wales Act 2006, Part 4, is enacted, enabling the Assembly to legislate in the 20 areas devolved to Wales, under a conferred rather than reserved model of devolution. 2012–2014 The Silk Commission recommends fiscal devolution to Wales, changing devolution to a reserved powers model as in Scotland and expanding the policy areas devolved to Wales. 2014 The Wales Act is passed in Westminster: the Assembly is given limited tax-raising and some borrowing powers. There is a provision for devolving some autonomy over income tax, contingent on a referendum. The British Isles is a multiethnic area historically dominated by the English. Irish and Scottish resistance to that domination has resulted in some of the most dramatic moments in British history. Welsh nationalism tends to receive less attention; however, Wales has as much claim to nationalistic resentment as Scotland, if not Ireland. Wales was assimilated by England prior to the formation of the modern nationstate system with profound effects on the nature of Welsh identity. Its situation was perfectly encapsulated in a notorious Victorian-era Encyclopedia Britannica entry: “for Wales, see England.”1 More than the Scots, the Welsh have maintained a separate language, perhaps the most basic element of national identity. Why, then, has Welsh nationalism been a less prevalent issue in British political history? Conversely, establishing the National Assembly of Wales in 1999 as the first democratically elected body in Wales for centuries commenced a process of constitution building that by 2014 resulted in enhanced legislative and some tax-raising powers. Why are we presented with the dual paradox of a historically quiescent nationalism that suddenly burst forth in institutional form at a time of economic prosperity and political stability? Historical Background Historically, while Wales bore the hallmarks of a nation in its common language, common customs, a distinct culture, and a legal system, in the Middle Ages, it

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lacked internal political unity because of the divisions among kingships and the Norman Marcher lordships along the English border. For a brief period, Wales was a unified principality under Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, but reflecting the English crown’s growing might, Edward I conquered Wales (1276–1282). The result was the gradual anglicization of the elite and Welsh laws and customs being, often brutally, subsumed under English law. A 10-year rebellion led by Owen Glendower (Owain Glyn Dwˆ r), in the first decade of the 1400s, established him as the last Welsh prince that aimed to establish an independent state with its own institutions. English military superiority again won in the end, and the idea of Welsh independence became largely unthinkable. Further assimilation of Wales, and particularly its elite, into the English state ensued and became more pronounced after the ascent of the Welsh Henry Tudor (Henry VII) to the English throne. Wales was fully incorporated under the English crown under Henry VIII through the Acts of Union of 1536 and 1543. Administratively and constitutionally, Wales was in the main indistinguishable from England. Welsh was no longer an official language, and Welsh laws and political customs were officially terminated. Given that Wales played such an insignificant role in the political life of the United Kingdom, scholars might be forgiven for ignoring Welsh history, for while Scotland and Ireland were tumultuous, Wales was largely passive. In brief, Wales’ integration into the English state before the age of modernity resulted in an absence of national and civic institutions and placed the Welsh language as a critical signifier of identity and nationhood. The nationalist revival of the 19th century, emanating from economic, cultural, and political changes, resulted in a social transformation and the growth in Welsh political consciousness. Two major factors were the growth of industrialization and the expansion of religious nonconformity (i.e., sects that did not conform to Anglican doctrine). Combined, they created an upheaval and resulted in a growing divergence between the landowning elite and the people along class, language, and religious and political affiliation. A newly created Welsh middle class became involved in a revival of Welsh national self-consciousness with cultural and political dimensions. A catalyst for this revival was the report on the state of education in Wales by commissioners in 1847, also known as the “Treachery of the Blue Books.” It not only concluded that the state of education was inadequate (largely owing to the effects of the Welsh language and nonconformism) but that the Welsh were ignorant, lazy, and immoral. Its dual effects were to stigmatize the language and create a “nation-wide revulsion,” resulting in calls to address the lack of prior attention to Welsh affairs, and to recognize the distinctiveness of the Welsh nation. As this upheaval coincided with the gradual extension of the franchise from 1867 onward, the assertion of special claims for Wales gained parliamentary expression in the election of Liberal Party members of Parliament. This period has been considered as “a transition from radicalism to nationalism.”2 Key campaigning issues often reflected the strong association between Welsh political claims and nonconformism, examples being disestablishment of the church and temperance. In addition, the emphasis on education resulted in the creation of three university colleges

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in the 1880s and landmark legislation for a Welsh intermediate education system distinct from England in 1889. While support for “Home Rule for Wales” was hesitant in contrast to its Irish neighbors, it developed greater credence, particularly through the Cymru Fydd (Wales of the Future) movement. Initially a cultural and educative movement, its reach extended across Wales, and it became increasingly focused on the political aims of securing national self-government and a unified Liberal national party. Related legislative initiatives included a bill to establish an elected assembly and a secretary of state in 1892. Despite a growing semblance of coherence among the Welsh Liberal members of Parliament after 1886, attempts to merge Cymru Fydd with a unified Liberal federation within Wales ultimately failed in 1896, resulting in the movement’s collapse. The backdrop was the growing divergence in Wales between a rapidly industrializing south and more rural areas highlighting increasing social and cultural divisions. Despite subsequent attempts to advance Welsh self-government in the first two decades of the 20th century, it was many years before there was a nationalist political movement in place as strong as Cymru Fydd. World War I led the Welshman Lloyd George to the premiership, and the 1914 legislation to deliver the disestablishment through an independent Church in Wales came into force in 1920. The Welsh radical agenda, including Welsh home rule, went into demise to be surpassed by the implications of the growing industrial unrest in the South Wales valleys and the effects of global economic turmoil. It signaled the rise of the Labour Party, who had by 1922 replaced the Liberal Party as Wales’ dominant party and gained widespread support amid the troubling social and economic circumstances facing Wales.3 Labour’s socialist outlook was increasingly centralist to the extent that it has been suggested that the party played a role in the process of integrating the Welsh into the British system.4 Broader trends exacerbated these tendencies, in particular migration patterns. The recession from 1925 onward created a wave of substantial outward migration, with one in every five persons leaving Wales. This contrasts to the demographic shift experienced from the 19th century to the first decade of the 20th century when Wales had been second only to the United States in terms of immigration. Clearly, such changes had significant social implications, including the decline of the Welsh language. While Welsh society changed significantly, the nationalist movement became more politicized following the establishment of Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party in 1925, later shortened to Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales, or PC). In its first years, Plaid Cymru was essentially a marginal movement concerned with the preservation of the Welsh language and culture. In 1932, self-government and representation for Wales at the League of Nations also became its principal objectives. During the interwar years, it had little electoral impact. This largely relates to its being composed of a combination of members of socialist and leftwing orientation and a leadership of right-wing tendencies whose economic ideas did little to expand support for the party. Despite being marginal in electoral terms until the 1960s onward, its existence had a direct impact by influencing the other political parties to develop a Welsh dimension to their policies.

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World War II strengthened the sense of Britishness, and the postwar creation of the welfare state reinforced Labour’s dominance in Wales. While the 1945–1960s period has been characterized as an “age of centralism and unionism,” it also became a period when no U.K. government could ignore the Welsh dimension to British politics.5 The growth of the state’s role in delivering services was often organized on a territorial basis. Establishing Welsh bodies to administer these policies thus incidentally and incrementally created a distinct Welsh machinery of government.6 Gradual decentralization coincided with the extension in Plaid Cymru’s electoral support to the extent that it gained its first representation in Westminster in 1966 and managed to attract double-digit electoral support in the 1970s. Despite indications of a revival, the result of the 1979 devolution referendum was a humiliating defeat. Devolution was off the political agenda. However, Margaret Thatcher ultimately opened the door for what could be considered an important triumph for Welsh nationalism: the establishment of a National Assembly at Cardiff in 1999 and the beginning of constitution building in Wales. To comprehend this strange course of events, it is necessary to examine the nature of the postwar conflict and its management. The Conflict From the defeat of Owen Glendower until the reign of Queen Victoria, there was, for all intents and purposes, no Welsh nationalist movement. A movement developed in the late 1800s and the stages through which the conflict progressed overlap. It is nonetheless possible to discern three eras, each distinguished by the changing priorities of the Welsh nationalist movement. The first era, that of nonconformist political nationalism, began with the 1868 election and continued into the 1920s. Building upon a period of increasing national awareness, Welsh nationalists sought to carve out recognition of Wales’ distinctive needs within the British context. Nationalism developed in the context of industrialization and religious nonconformity and was advanced by the extension of the franchise. While the movement’s greatest achievements were more cultural than political, it achieved political recognition of Wales within the context of U.K. politics in distinct contrast to prior history. In addition, efforts were channeled through the institutions of civil society and universities; the National Library of Wales and the National Museum of Wales were created as Welsh civic institutions. Its peak came to an end with the 1920 disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales and the rise of the Labour Party in Wales.7 The second era, running from the establishment of PC in 1925 to the defeat of the 1979 referendum, was a period of transition from linguistic nationalism to political nationalism. The role of linguistic nationalism is most prevalent up to 1979. In Plaid Cymru’s early years, language preservation replaced nonconformity as the raison d’être for Welsh nationalists. The party struggled internally between prioritizing the preservation of Welsh language or the self-government cause until it embraced both as core objectives in 1932. Its process of transformation into a political party began from the 1940s onward, but it made only slow progress up

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until the 1960s in electoral terms. Indeed, the hostility to the Welsh language and to Plaid Cymru was extremely prevalent in the 1979 referendum debates, and the vote confirmed the linguistic division in Wales. Moreover, Plaid Cymru’s relative growth from the 1950s onward reflects the transition toward political nationalism. A critical moment at the end of the 1950s was the impact of state projects to supply water and power, with direct effects on Welsh communities. The key example is a U.K. government-backed bill resisted by Welsh members of Parliament (MPs) to flood the Tryweryn valley in a Welsh language–speaking community to provide a water reservoir for the city of Liverpool. Tryweryn had multiple effects. It provoked a small minority of nationalists to pursue paramilitary activities, including a symbolic bombing campaign. It was also the context for establishing Cymdeithas yr Iaith as a pressure group campaigning through nonviolent civil disobedience. The Tryweryn campaign was not exclusive to Plaid, but it gave it a particular impetus because of its effects on Welsh nationalism and fueling demands for self-government. In this context, Cymdeithas’s establishment enabled Plaid Cymru to focus more on being a political party engaged with more mainstream economic and social issues. Its growth in the 1960s and 1970s onward rested on shifting from a focus on language issues toward making the case for independence and positioning itself as more mainstream to extend its support beyond Welsh-speaking areas to the more industrialized and anglicized areas of South Wales that had long been dominated by Labour. Plaid Cymru’s breakthrough occurred when Gwynfor Evans won the Carmarthen by-election for Plaid Cymru in July 1966. The party’s percentage of votes broke into double digits in the 1970s, and it gained three seats in the House of Commons in 1974. Plaid Cymru’s performance indicates the transition toward political nationalism. An important factor in Plaid’s increased support was growing disillusionment with the Labour government’s centralist and antidevolution stance. In response to the Nationalist Party’s advances, other political parties, and the dominant Labour Party in particular, were forced to consider and advance their position on devolution to Wales. These internal debates regarding the appropriate governmental arrangements for Wales reflected two competing traditions within the party. They can be conceptualized as centralism and devolution, or Welsh nationalism and British unionism, resulting in uneasy compromising between Welsh nationhood and a centralized state socialist position.8 Developments in administrative devolution to Wales and calls for self-government exemplify that a more moderate political nationalism was also prevalent among other political parties. In 1979, following the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Commission on the constitution, devolution was advocated to counter rising nationalist sentiment in Scotland with more limited proposals for Wales.9 Labour was divided, and vociferous opponents included the future leader Neil Kinnock, who flatly opposed the move because Welsh nationalism went against the centralism inherent in their brand of social democracy. The weak and deeply divided Labour government in unfavorable economic circumstances consequently faced overwhelming defeat in the referendum, with four-to-one opposition to the plan.

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Eighteen years later, however, a referendum would pass (albeit closely) signaling a 30 percent shift of the Welsh electorate toward greater support for devolution, leading to a National Assembly for Wales governing from Cardiff. What changed? The short answer is Margaret Thatcher. The more nuanced explanation is that the period from the 1979 referendum to the present can be dubbed the era of embedding political nationalism. Plaid Cymru shifted from being perceived as extreme to being broadly acceptable to the people of Wales. The shift in attitudes toward devolution can be explained by the significant impact of Conservative governments on economic, social, and political life in Wales. There was a growing “democratic deficit” as Wales returned Labour majorities, but the Conservatives won across the United Kingdom—Wales voted Labour and got Thatcher.10 To make matters worse, Welsh secretaries often represented English constituencies, and there was an expansion in the use of appointed “quangos,” leaving the population feeling that the Westminster political system was unresponsive to Wales.11 Paradoxically, the Conservatives also contributed to creating a more “civic” Wales by expanding the institutional governance structures of Wales during the 1980s and 1990s. The 1997 vote for devolution is also associated with changes in the meaning of Welsh national identity in this period. By 1997, “devolution was no longer regarded as merely a ‘nationalist’ issue, because Welsh identity had become increasingly associated with support for constitutional change.”12 The experience in opposition during the Conservative governments was sufficient to force a rethink within the Labour Party both at a U.K. level and in Wales.13 That the internal divisions were not entirely overcome is clear in the limited autonomy proposed, an executive rather than legislative model of devolution. Nevertheless, it paved the way for establishing the National Assembly for Wales in July 1999. Management of the Conflict Welsh nationalism has been managed by four methods. The more limited method has been recognition for Welsh distinctiveness within Westminster structures. This includes an annual debate on Welsh affairs in the Commons that first took place in 1944, a Select Committee on Welsh Affairs, and the establishment of a Welsh Grand Committee as a committee of all Welsh MPs in 1960. Another facet is separate legislation for Wales. The main early examples are the Sunday Closing Act (1881); the Intermediate Education Act, 1889; and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales (1920). Wales-only legislation was utilized to apply different principles to Wales and to recognize issues that were distinctive to Wales, for example, nonconformism and education. These types of recognition were practical because they responded to Welsh needs but did not upset basic constitutional arrangements. Administrative devolution within the British bureaucracy was a second option up to 1997. The Central Welsh Board was the first all-Wales body, established in 1896 to inspect and examine Welsh intermediate schools. The process of distinct administrative arrangements in Wales initially centered on education, recognizing the distinctiveness of Welsh identity. Consequently, the range of policy areas

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expanded as the decentralization of Whitehall departments gathered pace in the postwar period. While these developments were more coincidental than coordinated, they slowly paved the way for a Welsh central administration (the Welsh Office), led by a cabinet-level Welsh secretary of state. Reflecting arrangements in Scotland since 1885, the post created by a Labour government was responsible for areas such as health, education, economic development, local government, and agriculture. Agencies such as the Welsh Water Authority and the Welsh Development Agency reinforced the trend of considering Wales as a separate unit. Administrative devolution offered bureaucratic coordination of government activities in Wales and greater cabinet representation, but little more. These administrative organs were compatible with the U.K. Parliament’s supremacy; they implemented U.K. policies and lacked autonomy in important respects. However, they contributed to a process of Welsh institution building, leading to a distinctive Welsh central administration, and facilitated the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales.14 A third method was support for the Welsh language. The centuries-long primacy of the English language and the denigration of the Welsh language from public life, compounded by the effects of industrialization and migration patterns, have meant that speakers have been in steady decline in the 20th century and beyond (see table 1). Campaigns for measures to revitalize the Welsh language have led to policies to alter its legal status and provision of state support. From the 1960s onward these campaigns were spearheaded by Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society). Reflecting the demands and strategies of social and protests movements internationally, they campaigned through nonviolent civil disobedience to strengthen the status of the Welsh language. The 1967 Welsh Language Act was the first legislation to recognize the language in public administration and gave some right to use Welsh in court and limited provisions for Welsh versions of forms Table 1  Percentage and Numbers (in Thousands) of Welsh Speakers in Wales According to Census Data 1901

50%

929.8

1911

44%

977.4

1921

37%

922.1

1931

37%

909.3

1951

29%

714.7

1961

26%

656.0

1971

21%

542.4

1981

19%

508.2

1991

19%

508.0

2001

21%

582.4

2011

19%

562.0

Source: Data from Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully (2012), 68.

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or wordings. Following further campaigning, the Welsh Language Act in 1993 placed an obligation on public-sector organizations to treat Welsh and English on an equal basis (as far as appropriate and practicable) and provide bilingual services. While the act dramatically improved bilingual services, its implementation varied in breadth, quality, and consistency.15 Education has been a central domain to sustain the language. The Welshlanguage school movement developed at the end of the 1930s. It was aided by the 1944 Education Act that directed local councils to educate children according to parental wishes. Welsh-medium schools expanded, particularly in more anglicized and urban areas of Wales. It was subsequently supported from the 1970s onward by Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin, the Welsh Nursery Schools Movement. Moreover, the Education Reform Act of 1988 symbolized the first statutory enforcement for Welsh in education by making teaching Welsh a requirement in all schools in Wales between the ages of 5–16 and Welsh becoming a core subject in the curriculum. In terms of other domains, after making headway in securing bilingual road signs in the 1970s, Cymdeithas campaigns centered on media and broadcasting, leading to BBC Radio Cymru being established in 1977, and a separate television channel supported by government subsidy, S4C, was created as a Welsh-language channel in 1982. Despite these initiatives and government funding for arts and culture, the Welsh language continues to face substantial challenges, including systemic problems associated with the education system and demographic changes. In general, attitudes toward the language have become less hostile, and public opinion data notes widespread support for the language. While policies contributed somewhat to halting the decline in Welsh speakers, language campaigns continue to attempt to ensure that the Welsh language is normalized and that Wales becomes a meaningful bilingual society. The final and most significant method of managing the conflict has come through the devolution of political authority. Proposals for self-government were raised from the end of the 19th century onward, but with little parliamentary support. The two most significant proposals for Welsh devolution were in 1979, which failed, and the one advanced in 1997, which succeeded. In both instances, devolution was driven by the interests of the Labour Party. In the context of the growing status of the Welsh Office, the increased electoral support for Plaid Cymru during the 1970s, and the findings of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, at the end of the 1970s, the Labour government proposed the creation of Scottish and Welsh assemblies. With a narrow Commons majority, Labour’s legislative attempts relied heavily on nationalist MPs in the face of opposition from Conservative and Labour ranks. The opponents gained two vital provisos: that referendums be held in Scotland and Wales and that they receive a favorable vote from at least 40 percent of the registered electorate. The latter requirement mattered in Scotland, where 53 percent of those voting—but only 32 percent of the electorate—favored devolution. In Wales, devolution was rejected on a scale of four to one by those who voted; only 12 percent of the eligible electorate voted in favor. On the basis of this vote and that of the 1979 general election resulting in a Thatcher Conservative

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U.K. government, historian Gwyn Alf Williams stated, “Welsh politics had ceased to exist. Wales had finally disappeared into Britain.”16 Or so it seemed. The intervening Conservative years changed everything. After Tony Blair’s New Labour landslide in 1997, devolution was high on the agenda. Wales would get a National Assembly, but the powers envisioned were limited, largely based on the scheme on offer in 1979. A 60-member chamber, 40 from single-member districts and 20 elected from five regional lists through proportional representation, would sit for a four-year term. Primary legislative authority remained in London; the Assembly was limited to secondary legislation, that is, to the enactment of regulations to fulfill the goals mandated by acts of Parliament. It was also denied tax-raising power. On the other hand, it was given the power to control the £8 billion (US$28.4 billion) Welsh Office budget, and the Assembly was to operate bilingually. To avoid a repeat of the 1979 debacle, the referenda were pre-legislative and required only simple majorities. Scotland voted overwhelmingly in favor; support for a Welsh Assembly was tepid, yet sufficient. On September 18, 1997, with a turnout of just barely over half of the electorate, 50.3 percent voted yes, and 49.7 percent voted no. Prominent among the latter were the quarter of the Welsh populace born outside Wales. When the last votes were counted, the referendum had passed by only 6,721 votes. The Blair government duly passed the Government of Wales Act (1998), creating a National Assembly for Wales. The Assembly elections held on May 6, 1999, garnered only a 46 percent turnout. Labour’s showing was below expectations, winning only a plurality of seats (28 out of 60). Plaid Cymru exceeded expectations and created a “quiet earthquake” by capturing 17 seats and emerging as the second-largest party. Labour formed a minority administration, and powers were formally transferred to the National Assembly on July 1, 1999. For the first time since Owen Glendower, Wales had its own government. Recent Developments

In 1998 The architect of Welsh devolution, Labour’s Ron Davies, described devolution to Wales as a “process not an event.”17 Whereas this description increasingly resonates with the asymmetric devolution of the United Kingdom, it continues to be most relevant to Wales, where 1999–2014 has been an intensive period of constitution building. The inherent weaknesses in the 1998 arrangements were apparent from the onset and resulted in a raft of reviews and inquiries. Most important was the Richard Commission on the powers and electoral arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales (2004). It recommended radical changes to Wales’ constitutional arrangements, including replacing the Assembly’s unstable local government model structure by legally separating the executive and legislature. The commission also recommended the transfer of primary legislative powers to the National Assembly and consequently to increase the number of Assembly members from 60 to 80. The rationale was to counter its limited inherited powers and functions that deterred acting on its own initiative and made it dependent on political goodwill to influence the primary legislative process at Westminster. These recommendations informed the Government of Wales Act 2006 that confirmed the

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legal separation between the executive and the legislature, the National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Assembly Government. It also provided for enhanced devolution, as provisions for devolving full legislative powers were placed on the statute book, contingent on an affirmative referendum. Part 3 of the 2006 act that came into force following the third Assembly election in 2007 represented even more complex constitutional arrangements with its legislative competence transfer mechanisms, which required the Westminster Parliament to agree to transfer legislative competence to the National Assembly to legislate on specific matters. As part of its governing agreement, the 2007–2011 Labour and Plaid Cymru coalition government established a process to proceed to a referendum on full legislative powers. The referendum held in March 2011 resulted in 63.5 percent in favor on a turnout of 35.4 percent. This progressed Wales to part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006, which provided the Assembly with full legislative powers in 20 areas, the third constitutional arrangement since 1999. The referendum result also saw the U.K. coalition government’s agreement commitment to establish a Commission on Devolution to Wales implemented. The outcome of its review into the devolution of fiscal powers is the Wales Act 2014 that begins the process of fiscal devolution to Wales. It provides for devolving tax-varying powers, particularly control over some smaller taxes (landfill tax, stamp duty), some borrowing powers, and provisions for the Welsh government to gain partial control of income tax, contingent on an affirmative referendum. The commission’s second report on the powers of the National Assembly for Wales recommended far-reaching changes. They inform the cross-party discussions led by the Conservative secretary of state for Wales that aim to reach a crossparty agreement by March 2015 on a fourth set of constitutional arrangements aimed, in the words of the secretary of state, at providing “clear, robust and lasting devolution settlement for Wales.” Clearly, these discussions on further devolution to Wales are directly influenced by the Scottish debate, with key voices asserting that Wales should be given the same powers as recommended for Scotland by the postindependence referendum Smith Commission. Closer to home, however, these changes in Wales’ constitutional arrangements have been influenced by the parallel process of substantial change in public attitudes to devolution in Wales since 1997, Table 2  Constitutional Preferences (%) in Wales, 1997–2009 Constitutional Preference

1997

1999

2001

2003

2006

2007

2009

Independence

13

10

12

13

11

12

15

Parliament

18

28

37

36

40

42

34

Assembly

25

33

25

25

24

26

27

No elected body

37

24

23

20

20

16

17

5

4

Don’t know or refused

7

Number of respondents

686

1,256 1,085

5

5

5

6

988

1,000

884

1,078

Source: Data from Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully (2012), 68.

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with increasing numbers supporting greater devolved autonomy and evidence of higher levels of trust in the National Assembly than in Westminster (see table 2).18 Does the extent of constitution building in Wales post-1999 equate to a further step in the revival of Welsh nationalism? From a number of perspectives, the response would be negative. The main rationale for the post-1999 developments in Welsh constitution building bear strong resemblance to the initial rhetoric surrounding devolution. The aspiration is striving for more accountable and efficient governmental processes rather than securing constitutional recognition of Welsh nationhood. Similarly, it would be difficult to argue that devolution has provided Plaid Cymru with the dramatic growth experienced by the SNP in Scotland. Significantly, the coalition formed with the larger Labour Party from 2007–2011 provided Plaid with its first experience as a party of government. However, Plaid Cymru’s share of the vote continues to be around 10 percent in U.K. elections. At the devolved level, despite the high expectation created by Plaid’s performance in the 1999 Assembly election result, its support in the 2003 and 2007 elections did not match this and placed it as the second-strongest party in the Assembly (12 seats in 2003 and 15 in 2007). Despite its ability to cite key policy goals realized during its period in government, it saw a drop in electoral support in 2011 that reduced the party to the third-largest in the National Assembly for Wales. Therefore, Wales’ Nationalist Party continues to attempt to reframe itself and, to date, is unable to develop a sustained program to capture widespread support throughout Wales. It must be recognized however that part of the reason for Plaid’s limited success is the way in which nationalism has a broader influence on Welsh political life post-devolution. This is highlighted in the way in which all political parties have shifted toward more “nationalist” positions and impinging on Plaid’s ground. All political parties have adapted to be more distinctively Welsh in their orientation; their organizational structures and decision-making processes have adopted a stronger Welsh image and stress their Welsh credentials. They have each pursued a particular journey toward supporting enhanced devolution to Wales, evident in the cross-party unanimous support for the 2011 referendum and key areas of consensus in response to the Silk Commission recommendations. Significance Welsh nationalism is a paradox, both in its absence and its curious revival. Historically, Wales was much more quiescent than Ireland or Scotland. Being completely subsumed into the social, economic, and political institutions of England prior to the formation of the modern nation-state had a profound impact. In the absence of other carriers of national identity, cultural distinctiveness and particularly the Welsh language were in a very important position as the basis for Welsh nationalism. The pivotal role of the Welsh language was also a challenge, as it at times played a divisive rather uniting role for the people of Wales. Wales’ strong integration with the United Kingdom in geographic, historic, economic, and social terms means that dual British and Welsh identities are extremely prevalent, and for long periods much of the population saw their interest as one with the United Kingdom and its empire.

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As in other cases, the 19th century was critical for a revival in Welsh nationalism. While it has never been a major political force, it has played a continual political influence ever since this period. The extent to which Scottish political developments have influenced Wales cannot be understated and is exemplified in the mischievous twisting of the old adage to “for Wales, see Scotland.” Nevertheless, Wales has pursued its own distinctive territorial journey, one that suggests that nationalism is not the exclusive preserve of nationalist parties but can also permeate and influence the political agendas of other political parties. The establishment of a National Assembly creates a separate sphere of Welsh politics, enabling greater recognition and articulation of Welsh distinctiveness. Devolution has made it more meaningful to consider Welsh national identity as less dependent on language and culture and more associated with Welsh institutions and framework of governance. The further steps in the process of devolution enables the journey to continue. Notes 1. Kenneth O. Morgan, Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880–1980 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3. 2. Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics 1868–1922 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1991), 75. 3. Keir Hardie, the first Labour MP, was elected to a Welsh constituency in 1906. 4. John Davies, The History of Wales (London: Penguin, 1994). 5. Kenneth Owen Morgan. “Welsh Devolution: The Past and the Future,” in Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?, ed. Bridget Taylor and Katrina Thomson (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), 205. 6. James Mitchell, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2009). 7. See Morgan, Wales in British Politics. 8. Welshman Aneurin Bevan, the conscience of the left, ridiculed the idea of a separate interest for the Welsh and English working classes during the first “Welsh Day” debate in the U.K. Parliament in 1944. See Gwyn A. Williams, When Was Wales?: A History of the Welsh (London: Penguin, 1985), 274. See also Richard Wyn Jones, “On Process, Events and Unintended Consequences: National Identity and the Politics of Welsh Devolution,” Scottish Affairs 37 (Fall 2001): 34–57. 9. Devolution refers to policies that transfer (devolve) political authority to lower levels. 10. No Conservative candidates won Westminster seats in Wales or Scotland in the 1997 general election. 11. Quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations or, in current terminology, nondepartmental public bodies are government-appointed but arm’s length public agencies. 12. Rebecca Davies, “Banal Britishness and Reconstituted Welshness: The Politics of National Identities in Wales,” Contemporary Wales 18 (2006): 106–121. 13. Labour transformed to a devolutionist party with the resignation of (Welshman) Neil Kinnock and his replacement by (Scotsman) John Smith. His untimely death in 1994 led to the leadership of (English) Tony Blair, who inherited Smith’s commitment to devolution. 14. See Mitchell, Devolution in the United Kingdom. 15. Colin H. Williams, “From Act to Action in Wales,” in Welsh in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Delyth Morris (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010).

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16. Gwyn A. Williams, When Was Wales: A History of the Welsh (London: Penguin, 1985), 297. 17. Ron Davies, Devolution: A Process Not an Event (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1999). 18. Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, “Welsh Devolution: The End of the Beginning and the Beginning of . . .?” in State of the Nations 2008: Into the Third Term of Devolution in the United Kingdom, ed. Alan Trench (Exeter, U.K.: Imprint Academic, 2008).

Suggested Readings Bogdanor, Vernon. 2001. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Davies, Charlotte Aull. 1989. Welsh Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. London: Praeger. Hough, Dan, and Charlie Jeffery. 2006. Devolution and Electoral Politics. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press. Mitchell, James. 2009. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press. Morgan, Kenneth O. 2002. Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880–1980. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Morris, Delyth, ed. 2010. Welsh in the Twenty-First Century. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Rawlings, Richard. 2003. Delineating Wales: Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of National Devolution. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Taylor, Bridget, and Katrina Thomsom, eds. 1999. Scotland and Wales: Nations Again? Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Watkin, Thomas G. 2007. The Legal History of Wales. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Williams, Gwyn A. 1985. When Was Wales?: A History of the Welsh. London: Penguin. Wyn Jones, Richard, and Roger Scully. 2012. Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Appendices Devolution is a process, not a moment in time, and in Wales, it remains an ongoing process as reflected by the 2007 agreement between the Plaid Cymru, which is excerpted below and which perhaps necessarily preceded the Government of Wales Act, and by the more recent agreement among all political parties in the National Assembly for Wales on the issue of further devolution for Wales, whose short text is included below in its entirety.

1. One Wales: A Progressive Agenda for the Government of Wales An agreement between the Labour and Plaid Cymru Groups in the National Assembly, 27 June 2007

1. A Progressive Agenda for Wales Shared values, common goals and joint aspirations for the people of Wales will drive this four-year programme for government. It offers a progressive agenda for improving the quality of life of people in all of Wales’s communities, from all walks of life, and especially the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.

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The people of Wales, and their government, face unprecedented challenges. Working together, we have devised a programme of government which meets these challenges head on. Our ambition is no less than to transform Wales into a self-confident, prosperous, healthy nation and society, which is fair to all. Our joint commitment to the principles of social justice, sustainability and inclusivity—of the whole of Wales and for all its people—run throughout this programme. These principles underpin the programme and are fundamental to its success. In devising this programme, we have explicitly recognised the diversity of Wales— geographically, socially, linguistically and culturally. We propose a comprehensive programme of government, for the full four year term, which covers the whole spectrum of policy and action. We propose a programme which builds a strong and confident nation, which will create a healthy future, and which creates prosperity and jobs in living communities including measures to support the Welsh language. We set out plans to ensure learning for life, to create a fair and just society and to ensure a sustainable environment. Finally, we aim for a rich and diverse culture, which promotes Wales as a bilingual and multicultural nation. This programme for government is ambitious yet realistic. It is radical yet deliverable. It makes best use of the powers and resources available to the government and puts on the agenda whether further changes are needed. ...

9. A Rich and Diverse Culture We celebrate Wales as a community of diverse cultures: united for our common good, celebrating our many traditions, ensuring that Wales uses its two national languages to their full potential, and bringing people of all origins together. We envisage wide participation in the full range of arts, cultural and sporting activities. Our aim is that high-quality cultural experiences are available to all people, irrespective of where they live or their background. We will celebrate and conserve Wales’s outstanding heritage, of ordinary people and well-known artists, alike. Wales is renowned across the world for the performance of its teams and sportsmen and women, from rugby to cycling to wheelchair athletes. However, we need to broaden participation in sport and physical activity because of its significant health benefits. Our ambition is for a nation where everyone gets their recommended thirty minutes of exercise five times a week, and sporting clubs and teams are flourishing. This programme of government involves: • Supporting the Welsh Language • Promoting arts and culture

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• Encouraging sport and physical activity • Placing Wales in the World Supporting the Welsh Language The Welsh language belongs to everyone in Wales as part of our common national heritage, identity and public good. We will work to ensure that more people, young and old, can learn Welsh and encourage it to thrive as a language of many communities all over Wales. • We will be seeking enhanced legislative competence on the Welsh Language. Jointly we will work to extend the scope of the Welsh Language Legislative Competence Order included in the Assembly government’s first year legislative programme, with a view to a new Assembly Measure to confirm official status for both Welsh and English, linguistic rights in the provision of services and the establishment of the post of Language Commissioner. • We will drive forward our efforts to obtain agreement on the use of the Welsh language in specified areas of EU business. We will use this experience to explore with the Westminster government the making of an official application to the Council of Ministers for the Welsh language to receive official EU language and working language status. • We will expand the funding and support for Welsh-medium magazines and newspapers, including the establishment of a Welsh-language daily newspaper. • We will support the dot.cym campaign to gain domain name status for Wales on the internet. • We will continue research work into population shifts in order to promote balanced populations in all parts of Wales. Promoting Arts and Culture Our arts and culture programme widens access to Wales’s many heritage, cultural and sporting activities so that low income should not be a barrier to participation. We will foster local cultural and sporting activity and support two major new centres. Wales’s libraries will be dramatically improved so that they can develop free access to cultural materials for all, fit for the 21st century. In this programme of government • We will ensure that opportunities to enjoy Wales’s rich cultural and sporting activities are available to all, with continued free access to museums and galleries. • We will establish a National English-language Theatre and explore the creation of a National Gallery for Wales. • We will, by building on the success of free entry to museums and galleries, give Welsh pensioners and children free entry to Assembly-funded heritage sites. • We will continue to implement the recommendations of the Stephens Review into the future development of the arts in Wales, so that there is a clear approach to setting strategic policy. • We will place a statutory obligation on local authorities to promote culture and encourage partnership to deliver high-quality cultural experiences for their communities.

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• We will support opportunities for Wales’s artistic producers to participate on the international stage. • We will consider enshrining the concept of artistic freedom in Welsh law, subject to the Assembly’s new powers. • We will continue to support the case for making St. David’s Day a Bank Holiday. • We will support establishing a Kyffin Williams gallery. • We will establish an all-Wales Collection of People’s History, backed by a permanent curatorial staff with responsibility for the promotion and development of the collection. • We will, through working with local authorities, establish a major programme of capital investment and refurbishment of our public library network. • We will continue to invest in improving ICT in libraries, including maintaining free, universal public access to the internet, to help bring them into the 21st century. Encouraging Sport and Physical Activity Seven out of ten people in Wales do not undertake enough physical activity to gain any health benefits. We will encourage greater participation by people of all ages and social backgrounds in grassroots sport. Recognising that physical activity other than sport is also beneficial to health, we will support greater participation in cycling and walking, and encourage the people of Wales, of all backgrounds, to enjoy the natural environment. Over the next four years: • We will continue to fund schemes which have enabled older people and children to enjoy free swimming. • We will significantly extend the children’s scheme by giving all children the opportunity to use a sport or leisure facility or a swimming pool free of charge at weekends. • We will provide extra support for sports bodies wishing to develop Welsh national teams. • We will increase investment in school sport and boost after-school activities, including the continued support of Dragon Sport and schemes to improve the participation of girls. • We will, in order to help boost grassroots sport we will train additional coaches to the latest standards and ensure that school children undertake at least five hours of physical activity each week. • We will deliver a successful UK Schools Games in 2009, as part of the run-up to the 2012 Olympics—which will provide a platform to help our young athletes deliver their full potential. • We will promote Wales’s contribution to international sporting events, building on the opportunities of the Ryder Cup. • We will work with Supporters Direct to help give Welsh fans of all sports a greater say in how their clubs are run. • We will create more fun and healthier opportunities for mass participation in walking, cycling and running events. • We will foster a sense of public ownership in relation to the countryside, urban green spaces and our coastline, recognising that many socially excluded groups do not currently enjoy their social, cultural and health benefits.

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Placing Wales in the World As this document ends we turn to the Wales which we will attempt to fashion over the next four years - a confident and out-going nation where we recognise the strength of our own identity and the part which we can play in the world. We envisage a Wales which is increasingly known and recognised throughout the globe, and in which Wales is a country to which the world is increasingly welcomed. Many Welsh men and women are already renowned for their outstanding contributions in the fields of film, music, literature and industry. The next four years will provide some great opportunities to welcome into Wales events which take place on that world stage—an Ashes test match in 2009, the Ryder Cup in 2011. For whole weeks at a time, Wales will be in the living rooms of nations right around the globe. Sport, of course, is only one of the ways in which the world will come to Wales. In a globalising economy, those places which will prosper in the future will be those which offer the clearest sense of stability, sustainability and identity. When information flows around the globe in nano-seconds, so that it no longer matters if your desk is in Hirwaen or Honolulu, Snowdonia or Singapore, it will be the attractions of local natural assets—of coast and climate, of scale and cultural infrastructure—which will provide an economic edge. In a world where people and organisations can go anywhere, the somewhere has to be not just another anonymous spot on the world’s surface but a place which offers a sense of identity which is confident and out-going, and a quality of life beyond the workplace which sustains a sense of creativity and well-being: in other words, the Wales we hope to foster during the lifetime of this agreement. Over the next four years: • We will widen Wales’ membership and effectiveness in appropriate international bodies, including institutions associated with the European Union. • We will support the campaign for Wales to become a fair trade nation. • We will enhance Wales’s role in key European organisations and networks such as the Committee of the Regions, the Regions with Legislative Power and the Conference of Peripheral & Maritime Regions. • We will continue to build on the work already done to raise the international profile of Wales, to make Wales a location of choice for people to live, work, study, visit and do business. • We will continue to make our contribution to the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, with support for the Wales for Africa programme and its international development fund. • We will work hard to ensure that Wales becomes a strong international trading nation and a valued partner in international relationships. • We will develop a more strategic approach to putting Wales on the world map, bringing greater coherence to the breadth of the Assembly government’s overseas activities and representation, and working with other Welsh interests outside government to maximise the impact and benefit to Wales.

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• We will develop and promote the Wales Brand in the context of a coherent marketing and public diplomacy framework. • We will engage with Welsh interests overseas—diaspora, alumni, business—to derive maximum benefit from the as-yet untapped resource they can contribute to our international agenda. • We will work actively within the re-affirmed Memorandum of Understanding, signed with Patagonia (Chubut Province) in March 2007. Source: Welsh Assembly Government. Available at http://wales.gov.uk/strategy/strategies /onewales/onewalese.pdf?lang=en

2. The 2014 Cross-party Agreement on Further Devolution for Wales, October 14, 2014 This is the agreed motion: The National Assembly for Wales: 1. Welcomes the Prime Minister’s commitment that Wales will be at the heart of the debate on the future of the United Kingdom; 2. Calls for bilateral talks that are informed by the Holtham and Silk 1 Commissions’ findings, including an updated assessment of the current level and likely future direction of Welsh relative funding; 3. Calls for those talks, which should begin immediately and be completed by January 2015, to have a particular focus on fair funding, with the goal of securing rapid implementation of a funding floor which both addresses underfunding in a way that is consistent with Welsh needs and halts future convergence; 4. Calls for the UK Government to: 1. ensure that the same powers are given to Wales regarding the devolution of Corporation Tax if they are provided to Northern Ireland and Scotland; 2. devolve Air Passenger Duty for direct long-haul flights; 3. review the level of the borrowing powers afforded to Wales in the Wales Bill; and 4. work with the Welsh Government to enable it to issue its own bonds; 5. Seeks recognition that if a decision is taken to hold a Referendum on tax varying powers, this should reflect the view of the people of Wales; 6. Seeks confirmation that the Reserved Powers model will be instituted for Wales; 7. Calls on the UK Government to give the National Assembly for Wales the power to determine its electoral arrangements; 8. Calls on the UK Government to make progress on Silk 2; 9. Affirms that these matters should be taken forward in legislative proposals, published before the end of the current Westminster parliamentary session. Source: Welsh Assembly Government, Party of Wales. Available at http://www.partyof wales.org/news/2014/10/14/plaid-cymru-statement-on-cross-party-agreement-for-further -devolution/?force=1.

United States The Struggle for Survival and Equality of the First Americans Joseph R. Rudolph Jr.

Timeline 1626 The Algonquins sell Manhattan Island to the Dutch. 1680–1730 The Native American slave trade supports the Carolina economy. 1759–1761 The Cherokee Wars take place. 1776–1783 The American Revolution is fought. 1819 The Civilization Fund Act is passed to encourage groups to provide education for Native Americans. By the century’s end, boarding schools emerge under terms of the act. 1822 The Office of Indian Affairs is created as part of the Department of War. It is reorganized as the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) within the Department of State in 1822 and is now part of the Department of the Interior. 1830 The Indian Removal Act is passed in Congress. 1831–1832 The U.S. Supreme Court hands down Cherokee decisions.

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1836 The Trail of Tears, the removal of tribes to the “Indian Territory” in the West, begins. 1851 The Indian Appropriations Act is first passed to move Native Americans to reservations. It is amended in 1871 to deprive tribes of “independent nation” status so land can be seized from tribes with treaties with the federal government, without the need for tribal agreement. 1863–1864 The Long Walk of the Navajos takes place. 1865 The Fourteenth Amendment is ratified; former slaves, but not Native American tribes, are given safeguards against hostile state action. 1870 For the first time, the census officially counts the numbers of Native Americans in the country. 1872–1874 Buffalo are killed for their hides, with drastic economic impacts on tribes that traditionally hunted them. 1887 The General Allotment (Dawes) Act is passed, breaking tribal lands into individual acreages; Native Americans who sell their allotment are entitled to citizenship. 1890 The Battle of Wounded Knee is fought 1896 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Talton v. Mayes, rules that the Bill of Rights does not protect Native Americans. 1924 Congress passes the Indian Citizenship Act, making all Native Americans U.S. citizens. 1934 The Indian Reorganization Act is passed in Congress.

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1953 The Eisenhower administration begins to terminate the wardship system, prematurely cutting many tribes free from federal assistance. 1959 Alaska and Hawaii are admitted as states to the Union. 1961 The Keeler Commission recommends that the termination process be halted. 1968 Congress enacts the American Indian Civil Rights Act, extending to Native Americans in statutory form many Bill of Rights guarantees. The American Indian Movement (AIM) is founded. 1969–1971 The occupation of Alcatraz Island by Native American organizations occurs. 1971 Congress passes the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act, recognizing the land claims of Native Indians, Aleuts, and Inuits. 1972 Civil rights demonstrations conducted by Native Americans become violent. 1973 AIM activists occupy Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in response to the efforts of reservation leaders to challenge AIM’s influence on the Pine Ridge Reservation. 1975 The Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act is passed, allowing tribes to create businesses and provide services previously handled by the federal government. 1976 The Indian Health Care Improvement Act is passed to elevate Native American health care services. 1978 The Longest Walk is staged by Native American activists protesting pending federal legislation. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act is passed, guaranteeing Native Americans the right to visit their sacred sites and use sacred objects in

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ceremonies. The Indian Child Welfare Act is passed to regulate the placement of Native American children in adoptive families and foster homes. 1988 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act permits Native American tribes to operate gambling facilities on tribal lands. 2004 The National Museum of the American Indian opens in Washington, D.C. The Supreme Court rules in U.S. v. Lara that double jeopardy does not apply if someone is convicted of a crime in both federal and reservation courts because tribes are also sovereign entities. 2005 The NCAA bars “hostile and abusive” Native American mascots from postseason games and gives colleges 10 years to alter tribally offensive athletic names and mascots. 2006 Congress enacts the Esther Martinez Native American Languages Preservation Act to fund new programs to prevent the loss of Native languages and culture. The Bureau of Indian Education is formed to fund schools for Native Americans. 2010 The Tribal Law and Order Act is passed to increase the ability of Native courts to give strong sentences in criminal cases and to authorize the prosecution of serious crimes on reservations. The National Indian Country Training Institute is launched to train individuals in criminal matters for the enlarged tribal justice system. The Claims Resolution Act is passed following 14 years of class-action litigation against the Departments of State and Interior for failure to properly manage Native American trust assets. The Affordable Care Act includes the permanent authorization of funding for the Indian Health Care Improvement Act. 2012 The Department of Justice announces plans to create special response teams to deal with sexual assault crimes on reservations. 2013 The 1994 Violence Against Women Act is reauthorized, and a task force is created for the problems of American Indian and Alaska Native children exposed to violence. 2014 The Department of Justice launches a pilot program that for the first time will allow tribal courts to prosecute non-Natives for domestic violence crimes again Native American women.

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Under the United States Constitution, the only group(s) allowed territorial autonomy based on ethnic origin were (and remain) the country’s first involuntary members, the Native Americans. Their search for survival and political rights in the continent they lost to the United States’ predominantly European settlers is not a pretty story. Nor, significantly, does it cover a statistically important part of the U.S. population—a fact of political life that explains much of the history of these tribal peoples and the strategies that they have adopted in their efforts first to survive and then to achieve the rights that others possess under the Constitution.1 Their story is nevertheless worth examining as both an example of the limits of forced assimilation policies directed at even the smallest and weakest of ethnopolitical groups, and as a study of the tendency for even oppressed minorities to splinter into internal factions when there is political power to control. Historical Background The struggle of Native Americans to survive in an increasingly explored and colonized continent long predated the birth of the United States. As an eminent American historian phrased it, “The English American empire builders went first for the land cleared and cultivated by the First Americans.”2 Likewise, most of the historical turbulence in Native American history under the U.S. government—the tribal wars against the federal government and the forced, westward relocation of numerous tribes—occurred prior to the 20th century. Indeed, the struggle of the Native Americans for rights and liberty began with the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.3 From Wardship to the Reservations

As adopted in 1789, the U.S. Constitution both bestowed on the tribes the above noted unique status of being the only cultural minority granted territorial autonomy and seriously limited their right to self-rule by making them the wards of that government. In that wardship system, members of tribes initially lacked federal and state citizenship, and hence the protection that the federal Constitution accorded other Americans and several state constitutions guaranteed to their citizens. In return, the tribal nations (Cherokees, Apaches, and so on) were to enjoy a limited right to self-government, free from state interference. The rationale for this arrangement was explained in several U.S. Supreme Court decisions authored before 1833 by Chief Justice John Marshall. Marshall believed in the right of the Native Americans to preserve their traditional ways, and he viewed the wardship system as a useful arrangement for them to do so. To him, the system rested on three premises: the weakness and helplessness of the Native Americans, the degree to which their condition could be traced to their prior dealings with the federal government, and the government’s resultant obligation to protect them. Almost from the outset, however, the federal government’s trusteeship responsibilities collided with the public and government’s Manifest Destiny agendas, which called for spreading the polity from coast to coast and populating it with nonnative

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peoples. The first Americans were often perceived as primitive, if not savage, obstacles to the achievement of these goals, and their right to self-government was distinctly expendable when it conflicted with them. Thus, when the Marshall Court adopted a protective line toward Native American rights in the Cherokee Cases of the 1830s and struck down as unconstitutional the state of Georgia’s seizure of Native American lands, President Andrew Jackson simply refused to enforce the decision. Indeed, at the time, Jackson was himself fashioning a land confiscation and Native American–removal policy based upon the concept of “Indian Territory” that was designed to push the tribes westward to ever newer and ever contracting sets of tribal lands physically remote from those inhabited by the settlers. In theory, Indian Territory was also to enable the tribes to preserve their way of life. In practice, removal was usually at gunpoint, and the journey to Indian Territory was invariably harsh: most memorably, in the winter of 1838–1839, when 4,000 of the 16,000 Cherokees driven from their homelands died on what has become known as the “Trail of Tears.” Thereafter, losing wars, periodic massacres (such as the misnamed Battle of Wounded Knee in 1890), and forced removals of the Trail of Tears variety marked the 19th-century history of the first Americans. In this world, the right to self-rule was a hollow one, and the struggle for physical survival left neither the tribe nor its members the luxury of pressing for other collective or individual rights. Finally, even though the forced migration to Indian Territory did provide the tribes with a territorial base for self-rule, it was no longer their historical land. Instead, most of the tribes originally living in the east were driven into the western half of the country, just as those traditionally living in the west were invariably relocated to other areas in that region. Within half a century (1835–1883), the ability of the tribes to practice their traditional ways on their traditional land was irrevocably destroyed. Thus, although Native Americans have subsequently expressed a dual identity (American and Cherokee, for example) not unlike that found among ethnoterritorial groups in other developed states (being British and Welsh, for example), the “indigenous homeland” factor—which has led to strong ethnoterritorial home rule movements abroad—vanished for most Native Americans in the federal government’s 19th-century relocation policies. Reservations and Forced Assimilation

When even the most remote areas were opened to European immigrants, the Indian Territory policy was abandoned in favor of settling the tribes into the contained borders of reservations. By this time, even the U.S. Supreme Court had ceased to oppose the continued denigration of the Native Americans’ lifestyle. Rather, it was persistently upholding the federal government’s right to rescind, by ordinary legislation, those rights accorded the tribes by prior treaties and refusing to accord Native Americans the protection given other federal citizens by the Bill of Rights.4 During the 1880s, the confinement policy utilizing reservations was augmented by a frequently cruel policy of forcefully assimilating the members of the tribes into the broader political community from which they had been constitutionally and

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physically removed. Concerned about the loyalty of Native Americans, the federal government began to send school-age children away from their reservations to boarding schools, which enforced extremely rigid codes of conduct. There, tribal ways were ridiculed, and the use of Native tongues in class could result in beatings. Meanwhile, a severe, secular rule was intrusively applied on the reservations by the agents of the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The right to wear traditional attire was often restricted, and the visible practice of indigenous religions vanished in administrative regulations forbidding ceremonies of “threatening unchristian primitivism.” Perhaps most devastating, a direct attack on tribal territory was mounted via the General Allotment Act of 1887, which divided tribal land into individual 160-acre allotments given to naive Native Americans who were often easily deprived of their land by unscrupulous land grabbers. Belated Citizenship

Only with World War I did these policies soften. By this time, however, the combination of forced removal, reservation confinement, and coerced assimilation had taken its toll. It is estimated that, as a result of contact with European diseases and the harsh life increasingly forced on Native Americans as a by-product of government-instigated and privately launched land grabs, the number of identifiable Native Americans in the country declined from an estimated 1,500,000 in 1830 to fewer than 250,000 by 1890.5 In addition, by the time of the Great Depression in the 1930s, Indians had lost two-thirds of the 140,000,000 acres owned in joint tenure by American tribes when the General Allotment Act became law in 1887.6 Despite its destructive effect on Native American life, however, a quarter century after its inception, the assimilation policies had also failed to achieve their goals. On the reservation, ethnic pride and self-expression had been stripped away, but poverty persisted, along with high levels of depression, alcoholism, disease, and low life expectancy. Children educated off the reservation and treated as outcasts in the broader society returned to their tribes with skills inappropriate to reservation life. Throughout, the traditional ways, which had endured among the tribes for hundreds of years, survived the intense 25-year effort to eradicate them. Nevertheless, the goal of assimilating Native Americans into the American nation continued to inspire government policy as late as the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, which bestowed federal citizenship on all Indians, but without removing their tribal citizenship, without changing their wardship status (states could continue to deny them state citizenship and Fourteenth Amendment protection), and without giving them the Bill of Rights guarantees enjoyed by other Americans. Restoration

Relief from the assimilation process and a return to the original policy of tribal self-rule did not come until the Great Depression. Even then, the policy shift came about largely as a result of the efforts of one man, John Collier, who in 1933 became head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Relying on executive orders, Collier almost immediately restored religious freedom on the reservations and encouraged BIA agents to respect bilingualism and

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cultural diversity. Collier urged the Congress to restore the system of “shared governance,” which originally characterized the wardship system between the federal government and the tribes, and proposed ending the allotment system, downsizing the BIA’s presence on the reservations, reorganizing tribal governments, and subsidizing Native American culture and development. Collectively, his proposals inaugurated a new era of Native American politics in the United States, but they did not go unchallenged. Opposition to Collier’s agenda was intense, especially among those groups coveting Native American lands and the resources they contained. Lobbyists initially succeeded in excluding Native Alaskans (whose status was never based on treaty arrangements with the federal government) and some of the largest tribes in the country from many Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) provisions. The assimilationists also achieved some of their objectives. When it was finally passed in 1934, the IRA did not contain many of Collier’s suggestions for subsidizing a renaissance of individual tribal cultures. Moreover, while the IRA embraced the philosophy of the Marshall Court decisions recognizing the right of Native Americans to territorial autonomy and selfgovernment, the IRA departed from Marshall’s image of Native self-government in an important way. The IRA proposed reestablishing a system of autonomy in which the tribes would be encouraged, though not required, to adopt governing institutions of a representative, democratic nature, whatever their traditional form of government had been. Tribal reorganization proceeded slowly but steadily under the IRA, only to be disrupted by the Communist scare in post–World War II America. In this setting, the IRA became vulnerable. The goal of assimilating the Native Americans had never been fully abandoned by its proponents. Moreover, the IRA had critics both on the reservations, where reorganization threatened traditional power structures, and in those segments of the broader society who attributed to the reservation system the high infant mortality, low life expectancy, poverty, drunkenness, and diseases afflicting Native Americans. The fear of a Communist menace lurking on the reservations provided the leverage that critics of the IRA needed to shift public policy in the direction of ending the tribes’ special legal status. In 1953, Congress approved a resolution calling for the eventual termination of the wardship system. Dismantlement began almost immediately despite the nearly unanimous opposition of reservation Native Americans and numerous non–Native American civil rights organizations. In response to their appeals, federal policy shifted again during the presidencies of John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969). Notably, the man leading this charge was a Native American with substantial status in both the white and Native American communities, W. W. Keeler, a vice president of the Phillips Petroleum Corporation and a chief of the Cherokee Nation. Appointed by President Kennedy in early 1961 to chair a task force examining the termination policy, within six months, Keeler issued its terse report. Instead of terminating the existing legal relationship with the separate tribes, the task force recommended that Washington boost its spending on the 360,000 Native Americans then living on the reservations and pursue the long-term goal of raising the

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social, economic, and political status of Native Americans to the point where a federal trusteeship would become unnecessary. Only where no harm would accrue did the Keeler Commission recommend reducing federal services to tribal communities. In July 1961, the secretary of the interior accepted the commission’s recommendations; however, by then more than a hundred tribes had lost their ward status under the termination policy. More importantly, despite having acquired formal citizenship in 1924, the members of the tribal communities still living on the reservations as wards of the federal government continued to lack the constitutional rights and protection of other American citizens. The Conflict By the time the Keeler Commission had issued its report, the Red Scare had largely passed, and the public and the government were beginning to focus their attention elsewhere. The conditions and civil rights of African Americans quickly took center stage, and Native Americans benefited from the public’s shifting interests. The attention that the civil rights of black Americans received during the 1960s also illuminated the diminished rights and the vulnerability of Native Americans in 20th-century American society. The political struggle involving the Native Americans that subsequently emerged had two broad dimensions. To the general public, the more visible front was the Native Americans’ struggle for equality and progress in a political system that had long consigned the Iroquois, Cherokee, Shawnee, Apache, Navajo, and hundreds of other Native American tribes to second-class status. Less visible but equally important in explaining Native American politics in the civil rights era was the second front—the struggle between the leaders of the Native American organizations, which emerged from the reservations in the 1960s, and the traditional leadership of the reservation communities. The Struggle for Constitutional Rights and Economic Progress

The general status of Native Americans in the civil rights–conscious era of the 1960s placed their spokesmen in a good position to piggyback on the African American and women’s rights movements of the time. Both of these groups were comparatively much better off than 20th-century Native Americans as a group—especially those exercising their qualified right to self-government on the tribal reservations, who constituted the poorest, least healthy, least educated, least long lived, and least constitutionally protected of all American ethnic groups. At the same time, the continuing, depressed social and economic conditions of Native Americans both on and off the reservations appeared to many young, educated, urbanized Native Americans as a graphic indictment of the ineffectiveness of the traditional leaders in representing Native American interests. As a result, Native American politics altered substantially during the late 1960s as pan-tribal organizations, such as the American Indian Movement (AIM), founded in Minneapolis in 1968, began to emerge and to shift the Native Americans’ political agenda from its previous stress on the status of reservation

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Natives to an emphasis on improving the general status of Native Americans in American society. As the agenda shifted, so too did the tactics of Native American spokesmen— from relying on lobbying the BIA to conducting public protests, marches, and other forms of direct-action politics. The 1969–1971 occupation of federally owned Alcatraz Island by a Native American group calling itself “Indians of All Tribes,” ostensibly in support of a century-old Sioux claim to that island, heralded the beginning of a decade of televised protests. The February 1978 “Longest Walk” march from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., to protest pending federal legislation that AIM viewed as anti–Native American, essentially marked the end of that decade. In part, this changing approach to politics reflected the impatience of the leaders of AIM and other emerging transtribal organizations with the slowness of the policy-making process in Washington. To a greater extent, however, it reflected the fact that such organizations as AIM only began to emerge at the end of the 1960s and consequently had to work hard to sustain the momentum they inherited from those groups who had previously relied on public protest to raise the public’s awareness of their causes. The Leadership Struggle Within

From the outset, the founders of AIM pinpointed tribal governments as much as federal authorities as obstacles to improving the lives of Native Americans. According to AIM, the BIA enforced unjust laws, and tribal leaders collaborated with them to protect their own corrupt hold on power. Thus, the February 1973 protest held at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, which led to a confrontation between 300 federal agents and 200 AIM activists in a small (population 400) trading-post town, actually began several months before when AIM’s leadership publicly criticized Richard Wilson, the recently elected tribal chairman on South Dakota’s Pine Ridge Reservation. In response, Wilson did his best to undercut AIM’s influence on his reservation. AIM then, in turn, countered by seizing the trading post at Wounded Knee to force the federal government to come to Wilson’s defense and thereby demonstrate anew that the traditional leaders depended on federal protection for their power and therefore could not be trusted to press aggressively for Native American interests. The resultant confrontation at Wounded Knee was the most violent of the conflicts between traditional reservation leadership and the younger, self-nominated spokesmen for Native America. It was not, however, the only one. In fact, those conflicts multiplied during the 1970s as more and more federal legislation was enacted for the special benefit of the reservation dwellers rather than the general benefit of those of Native American descent. By the late 1970s, relations between the spokesmen for these two groups had deteriorated to the point where the symbolic significance of the Longest March was vastly undermined by the conspicuous and pointed absence from the crowd gathering in Washington of any of tribal America’s traditional leaders. The conflict itself involved more than the different perspective of the two groups with respect to the status of Native Americans. The growing responsiveness of government policy to Native American issues during the 1960s and 1970s increased

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the rewards of being a Native American and, especially, of being a spokesperson for Native America. Unfortunately for the causes of the Native Americans, the resultant battle for influence inside the Native American community along generational and residential (on or off the reservations) lines further fragmented Native Americans who historically had been divided from one another on the basis of tribal identity and the cultural, linguistic, and historical differences involved in these tribal identities. In the short term, the emergence of an energetic, new set of Native American leaders worked to the advantage of Native Americans by giving their causes a greater visibility than otherwise would have occurred. In time, however, the new divisions severely undercut their voice in the American political process. As a result, by the 1980s, Native American activists had shifted their tactics from holding loud demonstrations in the streets to filing legal suits and quietly lobbying the Congress for assistance Thirty years later, it is still the route for influencing the political process that, supplemented by a growing number of Native Americans running for public office, continues to define Native American political activism. Management of the Conflict 20th-Century Accommodations and Achievements

Given the environment in which Native American spokesmen had to function after 1968—which included a political process dominated by international issues (the Vietnam War) and domestic political scandal (Watergate) between 1968 to 1973, and handicapped by more than a decade of staggering budgetary deficits thereafter—the gains achieved by Native Americans between the late 1960s and the century’s end were impressive. They were also, to no small degree, a product of the general, accommodation-oriented approach to dealing with minority demands that Washington adopted during the mid-1960s and that it has, for the most part, continued to follow since that time. More specifically, in 1968, Native Americans secured the passage of the American Indian Civil Rights Act, complete with an Indian Bill of Rights, which finally extended—albeit only in statutory form—most of the rights other Americans were constitutionally granted in 1791. Substantial gains were also achieved in the areas of property rights, education, and family law. In the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 80,000 Native Alaskans (Native Indians, Aleuts, and Inuits) were accorded two-thirds of the 60 million acres they collectively claimed, plus nearly $1 billion in a cash settlement for the lands lost. The following year, through the Indian Education Act of 1972, Congress made federal grants available throughout the country to schools educating significant numbers of Native Americans. A series of other laws granting Native Americans greater educational opportunity quickly followed; for example, the 1975 Indian Development and Education Assistance Act and the 1978 Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act. Even during the years of large budgetary deficits, important legislation was passed, though principally in the form of low-cost, enabling legislation—for example, the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which granted officially recognized tribes the right

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to operate casinos and bingo parlors on tribal lands to raise revenue—and protective family rights legislation, most significantly, the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act, which was passed to end the widespread state court practice of placing Native American children in foster homes exclusively on the legal grounds that such children would thereby have greater opportunities in life than if they remained in the economically deprived, reservation-bound surroundings of their parents. A New Century, New Agenda

The agenda of Native Americans during the last third of 20th century essentially focused on securing the same rights as other Americans: the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, various civil liberties, security in their religious rites, and protections in the area of family law. By contrast, in the early years of the 2lst century, their focus has largely, though certainly not exclusively, involved grappling with many of the same issues as other Americans, albeit usually from a far less advantageous position. Especially for those living on reservations, the greatest concerns have involved the economic, health, and law and order circumstances affecting their daily lives. When the first Allotment Act was passed in the middle of the 19th century, 371 tribes had been formally recognized through treaties with the federal government. By the time of the country’s 2010 census, that number had grown to over 560 (including 229 in Alaska) and was rapidly approaching 570, given a disposition in Washington to liberalize the requirements for official recognition. In terms of numbers, Native Americans and Native Alaskans combined accounted for approximately 5.2 million people, or 1.6 percent of the American population, with nearly 2.9 million of these identifying themselves as only Native Americans or Native Alaskans and the other 2.3 million reporting themselves as Natives in combination with one or more other races.7 And taken as a whole, they continued to represent the poorest of all ethnic minorities in the United States, with those living on reservations and in small communities in Alaska far worse off than those integrated into the population as a whole in terms of both economic well-being and personal safety. Even in the snapshot form that space here permits, the facts are as illuminating as they are depressing. More than a quarter (28.2%) of all Native Americans live in poverty, and it is not rare for the figure to be more in the 40 percent to over 60 percent range for the 22 percent of Native Americans living on tribal lands, where adequate housing is in short supply, nearly 100,000 are homeless or underhoused, and less than 50 percent of Native American housing is connected to a sewage system And as with other groups, poor economic conditions invariably correlate with poor health conditions. Depending on locale, suicide rates among Native Americans are 3 to 10 times higher than the population as a whole, abuse of various substances is at least 50 percent above national averages, infant death rates are still 60 percent higher than for Caucasians, and Native Americans are nearly twice as likely to die of diabetes than the population as a whole. In part for these reasons, while recently improved, the average life expectancy for Native Americans is still almost five years shorter than the national average.8

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The situation is worse in the area of public safety, especially for Native American women living on reservations and the Natives in rural Alaska, which has the worst crime figures among the country’s Native populations, largely because Native Alaskans have no police of their own and there is less than one state trooper to cover every million acres in Alaska. Hence, in Alaska, the domestic violence rate is 10 times the national average, physical assaults on women are 3 times the national average, and a Native Alaska woman is 3 times as likely to be raped.9 But even in the lower 48 states, where one-third of Native American women on reservations are assaulted or raped and three in five experience domestic violence, tribal justice has been historically limited by (1) an ability to try only Natives (although 86% of all reported rapes or sexual assaults have been committed by non-Native men) and (2) the ability to impose only low fines and weak sentences even in those criminal cases where convictions have been obtained.10 As the timeline indicates, since 2004, the U.S. government has become increasingly active in attempting to address these and such other Native American concerns as vanishing Native cultures (less than a quarter of all Native Americans speak a language other than English at home) and environmental threats to their lands. Health services have been bolstered, funds have been earmarked for job training and the preservation of Native cultures, the government has facilitated Native efforts to hold federal agencies accountable for mismanaging tribal trusts, and, perhaps most significantly, efforts have been made to expand the capacity of tribal courts to try and punish non-Natives as well as Natives with meaningful prison sentences for criminal acts. Even such tribal concerns as the continued use by sports teams of unflattering tribal names and mascots has been at least partially addressed by some state governments and the National Collegiate Athletic Association. On the other hand, only time and experience will tell how effective these measures will be in addressing the needs and concerns of contemporary Native Americans and Alaskans. Certainly, some of these steps have been small ones. The implementation of the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, for example, was delayed until 2015, authorizing tribal courts to prosecute nonNatives is still in the pilot program stage at this writing, and the monies set aside for Native American programs in the Workforce Investment Act of 2014 was only $56 million. Significance Given the figures cited above, it is easy to underestimate the gains harvested by Native Americans during the 1960s and early 1970s, and it is important to place them in a historical perspective. The big battles involving the Native Americans— over land preservation and constitutional rights—were fought and largely lost in the 19th century, leaving Native American leaders a diminished agenda to pursue during the 20th century. Conversely, against this backdrop, many of the gains they achieved during the second half of the 20th century initially appeared larger than they later proved to be. Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, for example,

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significantly reduced the rights bestowed on Native Americans via the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights by preventing federal courts from enforcing most of those rights against tribal institutions. Supreme Court opinions have likewise gutted the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act by severely downgrading the relative importance of the free exercise of religion by Native Americans when that exercise is in conflict with legitimate state interests. Nor did a benevolent concern with Native American interests necessarily lie behind the initial passage of many of the acts that did benefit them. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, for example, awarded Native Alaskans a share of the profits from the oil and mineral resources developed on the federal lands they claimed; however, the settlement largely reflected the interest-group politics that led to the act’s passage. In 1966, the secretary of the Department of the Interior championed the claims of the Native Alaskans and froze all further leasing of federal territories in Alaska until Congress compensated them for lands lost to the federal government. When oil was found in Alaska the following year on lands opened for exploration prior to 1966, the oil and gas industry joined the Native Alaskans in lobbying for a settlement of those claims—but one that was distinctly pro-industry in terms of the profits that Native Alaskans might receive from future resource finds. The act capped the maximum receivable royalty at 2 percent of all profits derived from such developmental ventures, or a maximum of $500 million—an amount soon dwarfed by the profits that American oil companies derived from the Prudhoe Bay oil venture alone following the 1977 opening of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline. Perhaps most importantly, the Native Americans’ acquisition of greater control over their own affairs, through such legislation as the Indian Rights Act and 1968 American Indian Civil Rights Act (which gave tribal courts limited powers to incarcerate those convicted of criminal offenses), did not attack the persistent poverty and misery experienced by reservation Indians or the socioeconomic disparity separating Native Americans living off the reservation from mainstream American society. Those figures, even worse than those of today, included unemployment rates among Native Americans persistently hovering at three times that of the population as a whole; high school completion rates below 50 percent (70% today) versus the 75 percent to 80 percent range for the population as a whole; and education figures indicating that less than 6 percent of all Native Americans had a college degree.11 Given the small number of Native Americans (then 0.8 percent of the population); the dispersion of the reservation tribes over hundreds of reservations generally containing considerably less than 1,000 people each; the Native Americans’ internal divisions across ethnotribal, socioeconomic, residential, and generational lines; and the fact that the Native Americans civil rights movement largely unfolded after the civil rights–conscious 1960s and during the stagflation and tight budget period of the 1970s and early 1980s, it is not surprising that the Native American movement was notably less successful in achieving gains from the Congress than the African American movement that preceded it. On the other hand, through the protests they conducted during the 1970s and the lobbying and litigation efforts they made during the 1980s and early 1990s,

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Native Americans did adroitly appeal to and receive benefits from federal policy makers and laid the basis for the gains that were to come in the early years of the 21st century. They also brought ever larger numbers of Native Americans into mainstream American society by opening the doors to some for greater socioeconomic progress and assimilation opportunities, albeit at the cost of eroding the ethno-class nature of Native American politics in the American political process. In fact, studies of households made during the 1980s indicated that self-identifying “Indians” were already more likely to marry whites than other Native Americans.12 The children of these unions have been able to select their own group and have tended to blur into the broader population, now reflected by the fact that nearly half of those identifying themselves as Natives in the last census did so in conjunction with another ethnic group. And as in the past, most of those continuing to identify themselves solely as Native Americans continue to be not just concentrated on the reservations, but heavily concentrated in the southwest states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oklahoma or Texas).13 Finally, despite the legislative and policy gains reaped by tribal Americans in recent years, the fact that the vast majority of Native Americans, as in the 2000 census, live off the reservation underscores the fact that the tribes themselves have also become increasingly marginal to and invisible in American society.14 Notes 1. As of 2000, in a country of more than a quarter of a billion people, only approximately 400,000 Native Americans still live on the reservations allotted to them, plus perhaps another 80,000 Native Alaskans (Indians, Inuits, and Eskimos). Combined, their total is no larger than the number of illegal aliens then estimated to be living in New York City alone. 2. William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 31. 3. For a detailed treatment of the struggle of Native Americans for their constitutional rights, see John R. Wunder, “Retained by the People”: A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 4. The key case was Talton v. Mayes (1896), which explicitly denied Native Americans the protection of the Bill of Rights. The reasoning was that Native Americans are wards of the federal government, not federal citizens. 5. See Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reforms and the Indian, 1865–1900 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976). 6. D’Arcy McNickle, The Indian Tribes of the United States: Ethnic and Cultural Survival (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 49. 7. United States Department of Commerce, The Native American and Alaska Native Population: 2010—2010 Census Briefs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, January 2012), 1 and 3. 8. Native American Aid, “Living Conditions,” http://www.nrcprograms.org/site/Page Server?pagename=naa_livingconditions.html. 9. Sari Horwitz, “In Rural Villages, Little Protections for Alaska Natives,” Washington Post, August 3, 2014. 10. Sari Horwitz, “A Shield for the ‘Hunted,’” Washington Post, February 9, 2014.

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11. See Terry E. Huffman, “The Experiences, Perceptions, and Consequences of Campus Racism among Northern Plains Indians,” Journal of American Indian Education (January 1991): 25–33; Alexander W. Astin, Minorities in Higher Education: Final Report of the Commission on the Higher Education of Minorities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1982), 2; and Harvey Markowitz, ed., “Civil Rights and Citizenship,” American Indians: Ready Reference (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 1995), I: 175–176. 12. Stephan Thernstrom, “American Ethnic Statistics,” in Immigration in Two Democracies: French and American Experience, ed. Donald L. Horwitz and Gerard Noiriel (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 80–111. Of those classifying themselves as Native Americans in the 1980 census, only 48 percent of the married males and 46 percent of the married females had Native American spouses. 13. For a thorough discussion of various estimates of the numbers of those with Native American blood in the United States’ population, and of the chronic difficulty of counting their number, see Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1982), xv–xvi, 236–241, and 346–349; and Stella U. Ugunwole, The American Indian and Alaskan Native Population: 2002—Census 2000 Brief (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002): 3–4. 14. Ibid., 3–12. As in 2010, in 2000, nearly 80 percent of all self-identifying Native Americans lived off the reservations.

Suggested Readings Gray, Christine K. 2013. The Tribal Movement in American Politics: The Struggle for Native American Sovereignty. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press/Rowman & Littlefield. Hoxie, Frederick E. 2013. This Indian Country: American Indian Activists and the Place They Made. New York: Penguin History of American Life Series. Page, Jake. 2003. In the Hands of the Great Spirit: The 20,000 Year History of American Indians. New York: The Free Press. Pevar, Stephen L. 1992. The Rights of Indians and Tribes: The Basic ACLU Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Pritzker, Barry M. 2000. A Native American Encyclopedia: History, Culture, and Peoples. New York: Oxford University Press. Prucha, Francis Paul. 1986. The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Wilkins, David E. 2013. Hollow Justice: A History of Indigenous Claims in the United States. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wilkinson, Charles F. 1987. American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern Constitutional Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Wunder, John R. 1994. “Retained by the People”: A History of American Indians and the Bill of Rights. New York: Oxford University Press.

Appendices The documents pertaining to the Native Americans in American history and recent statutes are voluminous, but none quite so underscore the rapidly diminishing status that was to come for Native Americans as the provisions of the early treaties with the tribes that promised them rights and privileges and the sad words of Justice John Marshall in the Cherokee cases that admitted the impotency of the judiciary to protect these wards of the federal government should that trustee of their interests become abusive.

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1. The Hopewell Treaty with the Cherokees, November 28, 1785. / 7 Stat., 18. The Commissioners Plenipotentiary of the United States, in Congress assembled, give peace to all the Cherokees, and receive them into the favor and protection of the United States of America, on the following conditions: Article 1 The Head-Men and Warriors of all the Cherokees shall restore all the prisoners, citizens of the United States, or subjects of their allies, to their entire liberty: They shall also restore all the Negroes, and all other property taken during the late war from the citizens, to such person, and at such time and place, as the Commissioners shall appoint. Article 2 The Commissioners of the United States in Congress assembled, shall restore all the prisoners taken from the Indians, during the late war, to the Head-Men and Warriors of the Cherokees, as early as is practicable. Article 3 The said Indians for themselves and their respective tribes and towns do acknowledge all the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whosoever. Article 4 The boundary allotted to the Cherokees for their hunting grounds, between the said Indians and the citizens of the United States, within the limits of the United States of America, is, and shall be the following, viz. Beginning at the mouth of Duck river, on the Tennessee; thence running north-east to the ridge dividing the waters running into Cumberland from those running into the Tennessee; thence eastwardly along the said ridge to a north-east line to be run, which shall strike the river Cumberland forty miles above Nashville; thence along the said line to the river; thence up the said river to the ford where the Kentucky road crosses the river; thence to Campbell’s line, near Cumberland gap; thence to the mouth of Claud’s creek on Holstein; thence to the Chimney-top mountain; thence to Camp-creek, near the mouth of Big Limestone, on Nolichuckey; thence a southerly course six miles to a mountain; thence south to the North-Carolina line; thence to the South-Carolina Indian boundary, and along the same south-west over the top of the Oconee mountain till it shall strike Tugaloo river; thence a direct line to the top of the Currohee mountain; thence to the head of the south fork of Oconee river. Article 5 If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian, shall attempt to settle on any of the lands westward or southward of the said boundary which are hereby allotted to the Indians for their hunting grounds, or having already settled and will not remove from the same within six months after the ratification of this treaty, such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Indians may punish him or not as they please: Provided nevertheless, That this article shall not extend to the people settled

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between the fork of French Broad and Holstein rivers, whose particular situation shall be transmitted to the United States in Congress assembled for their decision thereon, which the Indians agree to abide by. Article 6 If any Indian or Indians, or person residing among them, or who shall take refuge in their nation, shall commit a robbery, or murder, or other capital crime, on any citizen of the United States, or person under their protection, the nation, or the tribe to which such offender or offenders may belong, shall be bound to deliver him or them up to be punished according to the ordinances of the United States; Provided, that the punishment shall not be greater than if the robbery or murder, or other capital crime had been committed by a citizen on a citizen. Article 7 If any citizen of the United States, or person under their protection, shall commit a robbery or murder, or other capital crime, on any Indian, such offender or offenders shall be punished in the same manner as if the murder or robbery, or other capital crime, had been committed on a citizen of the United States; and the punishment shall be in presence of some of the Cherokees, if any shall attend at the time and place, and that they may have an opportunity so to do, due notice of the time of such intended punishment shall be sent to some one of the tribes. Article 8 It is understood that the punishment of the innocent under the idea of retaliation, is unjust, and shall not be practiced on either side, except where there is a manifest violation of this treaty; and then it shall be preceded first by a demand of justice, and if refused, then by a declaration of hostilities. Article 9 For the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and for the prevention of injuries or oppressions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as they think proper. Article 10 Until the pleasure of Congress be known, respecting the ninth article, all traders, citizens of the United States, shall have liberty to go to any of the tribes or towns of the Cherokees to trade with them, and they shall be protected in their persons and property, and kindly treated. Article 11 The said Indians shall give notice to the citizens of the United States, of any designs which they may know or suspect to be formed in any neighboring tribe, or by any person whosoever, against the peace, trade or interest of the United States.

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Article 12 That the Indians may have full confidence in the justice of the United States, respecting their interests, they shall have the right to send a deputy of their choice, whenever they think fit, to Congress. Article 13 The hatchet shall be forever buried, and the peace given by the United States, and friendship re-established between the said states on the one part, and all the Cherokees on the other, shall be universal; and the contracting parties shall use their utmost endeavors to maintain the peace given as aforesaid, and friendship re-established. In witness of all and every thing herein determined, between the United States of America and all the Cherokees, we, their underwritten Commissioners, by virtue of our full powers, have signed this definitive treaty, and have caused our seals to be hereunto affixed. Done at Hopewell, on the Keowee, this twenty-eighth of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-five. Source: Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2, Treaties (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904). Available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/ kappler/vol2/treaties/che0008.htm.

2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) Mr Chief Justice marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This bill is brought by the Cherokee Nation, praying an injunction to restrain the State of Georgia from the execution of certain laws of that State which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the Nation which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force. If Courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary to their comfortable subsistence. To preserve this remnant, the present application is made. Before we can look into the merits of the case, a preliminary inquiry presents itself. Has this Court jurisdiction of the cause? . . . [More specifically here] Do the Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the Constitution? . . . The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety, applicable by

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either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else. . . . They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to be under the protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs as they think proper; . . . [Therefore] it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their Great Father. They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act of hostility. These considerations go far to support the opinion that the framers of our Constitution had not the Indian tribes in view when they opened the courts of the union to controversies between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign states. . . . The Court has bestowed its best attention on this question, and, after mature deliberation, the majority is of opinion that an Indian tribe or Nation within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the Constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the Courts of the United States. . . . If it be true that the Cherokee Nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future. The motion for an injunction is denied. Source: Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)

United States Racial Violence in the United States: 1900–1919 James N. Upton

Timeline 1619 Slavery begins in British North America. 1667 Virginia legalizes slavery. 1680–1730 The Native American slave trade supports the economy in Carolina. 1700 Slavery is based on the color of a person’s skin. 1712 The first major slave revolt occurs in New York City. 1775 The Pennsylvania Society for Abolition of Slavery is founded. 1777 The Northeast states abolish slavery. 1793 The First Fugitive Slave Act is passed by Congress. 1804 Ohio limits the rights of blacks in the North.

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1807 Congress prohibits further importation of African slaves. 1810 The Underground Railroad is founded. 1820 The Missouri Compromise overcomes the division in Congress on the slavery issue. 1830 Proslavery arguments are launched. 1831 Nat Turner’s slave insurrection takes place. 1850 The Great Compromise sidesteps the division on the slavery issue. The second Fugitive Slave Law is enacted. 1853 The National Council of Colored People is founded. 1855–1858 The slavery issue leads to “Bleeding Kansas.” 1857 The Dred Scott decision on slavery is made by the U.S. Supreme Court. 1863 Abraham Lincoln writes the Emancipation Proclamation. 1865 The Ku Klux Klan is founded; the Civil War ends. 1866 Race riots occur in Memphis and New Orleans. 1868 The Fourteenth Amendment is ratified. 1883 The U.S. Supreme Court strikes down the Civil Rights Act of 1875.

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1896 The Supreme Court upholds segregation of the races in Plessy v. Ferguson. 1903 Rioting occurs in Belleville, Illinois. 1904 Rioting takes place in Springfield, Ohio. 1906 Riots happen in Brownsville, Texas, and Chattanooga, Tennessee. 1913 The Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith is founded. 1917 The Immigration Act of 1917 begins to shut the door on immigrants. Race riots occur in East St. Louis, Illinois. 1919 Riots take place in Omaha, Nebraska; Chicago, Illinois; and Elaine, Arkansas. 1920–1930 The Great Migration of Southern blacks to the North and Midwest occurs. New aggressiveness is noted in the black community. Incident-driven riots occur in several American cities. 1943 Race riots take place across the United States. 1954 The U.S. Supreme Court invalidates segregation in public education. 1955 The Montgomery bus boycott is staged. 1957 A desegregation crisis occurs in Little Rock, Arkansas. 1964 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is passed.

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1965 Rioting and violence occur in the ghetto in Watts, California. 1967 Race riots in Detroit lead to the Kerner Commission Report. 1968 The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. leads to rioting. 1971 The busing debate divides Americans. 1972 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act is passed by Congress. 1992 Rioting and violence occur in South Central, Los Angeles. Racial conflict in the United States has been so prevalent and commonplace that whites and blacks, who have been living with this conflict since the 17th century, have come to accept it as a basic feature of the American way of life.1 Since the end of the Civil War, the United States has been faced with the unique challenge of promoting the ideals of civil liberty for all—without providing national minority group rights. A contradiction is apparent in this endeavor between an egalitarian American creed, on the one hand, and a history of violence against national minority groups, on the other. In many ways, this contradiction is the “American Dilemma.”2 Martin Luther King Jr. emphasized the significance of this dilemma by referring to it as “schizophrenic behavior.” In 1967, King wrote, Ever since the birth of our nation, white America has had a schizophrenic personality on the question of race. She has been torn between selves—a self in which she proudly professed the great principles of democracy and a self in which she sadly practiced the antithesis of democracy.3

According to King, the one indispensable element of a great nation that the United States lacks is racial justice.4 This is the context in which race relations in the United States must be understood. Historical Background The pre– and post–World War I time periods in race relations between whites and blacks in the United States are significant because they chronicle the migration of blacks from the South, which led to the urbanization of the black population.

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This urbanization of the Southern black population during the first two decades of the 20th century helped create the conditions that were necessary for a social movement toward resisting white aggression. Moreover, it was the industrialized labor demands that initiated the black migration to urban centers throughout the United States that transformed the black laborer from an agricultural worker to an industrial worker. Industrialization had the long-term effect of indirectly changing the structure of power relationships between blacks and whites. This timeframe illustrates the development of an urban black community and highlights the causes and conditions that characterized race relations in the United States. A sequence of events in the first two decades of the 20th century shows the transformation of black Americans’ response to violent attacks. They moved from a defenseless position to an organized stance. These events illustrate the thesis that “interracial riots in the early years of the century were essentially pogroms in which the Negroes were victims of white aggression.”5 During the latter stage of the World War I time period, blacks moved from a defenseless position to an organized stance and, hence, the ability to effectively defend themselves.6 Racial violence in the 20th century is commonly grouped into three stages: communal riots, commodity riots, and political violence.7 This chapter considers only the anatomy of communal riots. Communal clashes characterized the first two decades of the century. During that time, racial riots occurred on the boundaries of expanding black and white neighborhoods. In such circumstances, whites—more often than blacks—were the aggressors. Racial Violence and Black Victimization: Before World War I

At the turn of the 20th century, white aggression against blacks (outside the South) demonstrated itself in white-dominated riots. Between 1900 and 1917, more than 1,100 blacks were lynched in the United States.8 In most instances of interracial violence during that time, blacks were the victims. It was not uncommon to witness the entire white adult population of certain communities—in both the South and the North—collectively violating the law by attacking entire communities of blacks. The one-sided nature of this racial violence characterizes these race riots more as “one-way terrorization” than as two-way riots.9 White law officials not only failed to enforce the law, they often joined white mobs in killing blacks. Numerous riots have been documented between 1900 and 1910; however, major riots occurred in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Brownsville, Texas.10 These riots are all examples of the one-way terrorization that characterized the riots. The immediate causes of the riots are difficult to determine, but the concentration of blacks in segregated ghettos was a frequent pattern in all of the cities involved in the riots. A brief look at two of the riots in that decade shows that the “anatomy” of the riots can provide a chart of their underlying causes. In Springfield, Ohio, in 1904, a black man shot and killed a white policeman. It was not determined whether the black man responded in self-defense. The white mob did not ponder the immediate or legitimate causes. An intense hatred of blacks led the white mob to hang the black man, riddle his body with bullets, and destroy the black section of the city of Springfield. Two generations after the Civil

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War, racial hatred overrode the American creed that proclaimed “due process and equal justice for all.”11 The riot in Brownsville, Texas, in August 1906, involved the black Twenty-Fifth Regiment, which had fought gallantly at El Caney, Cuba, during the SpanishAmerican War. A fight broke out in the town between the soldiers and a mob of white residents. The riot that followed left one white resident dead by a gunshot wound. It was never determined which soldier had fired the shot. However, by the stroke of a pen, President Theodore Roosevelt “dismissed the entire battalion stationed there without honor and disqualified its members for service in either the military or the civil service of the United States.”12 The pattern of American race riots in the first decade of the 20th century had been firmly established by the time of the 1906 riots in Chattanooga, Tennessee. At this time, a black man had only to be accused of raping a white woman to be viciously murdered by a white mob without ever appearing before a judge and jury. In March 1906, a black man, Ed Johnson, was charged with raping a white woman. Johnson was one of the few accused black men in this era to receive a trial. The trial court, however, denied him the aid of counsel and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Johnson the right of appeal and a stay of execution until the case could be reviewed: On March 19, 1906, the sheriff and his deputy in Chattanooga left the jail unguarded; a mob seized Johnson and hanged him. The Supreme Court of the United States, on November, 1909, sentenced six members of the mob to short prison terms for contempt of the court.13

Records indicate that this was a rare case in which the courts punished whites for murdering a black person. During this time, major newspapers rarely published a detailed description of a lynching unless it was very brutal or contained some unusual element. The New York Times probably provided a public service in 1903 when it published a graphic description of a black man who was lynched on the charge of rape in Belleville, Illinois: The mob hanged Wyatt to a telephone pole in the public square. Even while his body was jerking in the throes of death from the strangulation, members of the mob began building a fire at the bottom of the pole. . . . When it had begun burning briskly, the Negro still half alive, was cut down, and after being covered with coal oil . . . cast into the fire.14

In a halfhearted attempt to speak out against such inhuman acts of violence, the New York Times placed the primary responsibility for the lynching on the local sheriffs. The article called for an end to lynching, but in doing so also argued that, given the nature of American federalism, the prevention of lynching could best be achieved by a sheriff who was brave enough to defy cowardly mobs. The New York Times opposed federal intervention, but—forecasting the future—warned:

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If conditions became much worse, some action would have to be taken. The Times reported the background of race riots and the spark which inflamed them; it pointed out that the police and troops usually sided with whites by disarming Negroes and allowing whites to roam the streets beating and killing Negroes and burning their homes.15

Racial hatred in the early part of the 20th century was plagued by allegations of the rape of white women by black men. This appealed to a sort of sexual psychosis and too often became a tactic of newspaper editors to deliberately provoke whites to attack blacks. There was no evidence to associate blacks with the accusations against them, but under those conditions, evidence was not required to associate a black man with a sexual violation. The diagnosis of sexual psychosis emerged after scholars had analyzed patterns in race relations in the era that had been exacerbated by dishonest journalists. Racial Violence and Black Counterviolence: During and after World War I

A precursor to the race riots that took place during the bloody summer of 1919 was the East St. Louis riot of 1917. On July 2, 1917, a ferocious race riot broke out in the Midwestern industrial city of East St. Louis, Illinois. In an explosion of shockingly brutal violence, crowds of hundreds of local whites swarmed through downtown streets and adjacent black neighborhoods randomly attacking blacks. Throughout the day, they beat, shot, and hanged black men, women, and children in the streets of the city and set fire to their homes and businesses. Despite the ferocity of this riot, it foreshadowed black resistance to white violence that was virtually absent during the pre–World War I years. In the aftermath of the East St. Louis race riot of 1917, 39 blacks and 9 whites were killed. Despite the disparity in the number of fatal casualties during the riot, the evidence indicates that blacks were comparatively organized and prepared to resist violence with violence.16 After World War I, mob violence against blacks continued at an alarming rate and rapidly became a national phenomenon. Ironically, at the same time that this violence was occurring at home, more than 350,000 black men were serving in segregated units of the U.S. Army, winning medals and sacrificing their lives to “make the world safe for democracy.” The dilemma between egalitarian principles and the values that promoted lingering racial hatred continued to plague white Americans’ understanding of justice. Black soldiers returning home after World War I were mobbed for attempting to use facilities open to white soldiers. In the year after the war ended, 83 black men were lynched in the United States. Some were in uniform. One such lynching took place in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1919: A white mob in this city demanded that the local authorities turn over to them a Negro soldier accused of raping a white woman. . . . The mob then moved to the jail, beating and stomping any Negro who happened to be in the crowd. After seizing the accused Negro, the mob shot him, hanged him, burned his body, and hung it in the public square.17

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Another incident of interracial violence occurred in Elaine, Arkansas, on September 30, 1919. In an attempt by black sharecroppers to form a union to get an accurate account of how much they were owed by landlords, they were confronted at a local church by the local deputy sheriff and other white men with guns representing local landlords. It is not clear who fired the first shot, but after the violent confrontation, 25 blacks were dead (4 of whom were killed while in the custody of the local sheriff), and 5 whites were dead (including a white deputy sheriff). This riot is important in that the evidence demonstrates that blacks involved in this conflict were well organized and well armed, even though they suffered the greater number of fatal casualties.18 The summer of 1919 was the bloodiest, most brutal period of interracial disorder and violence in American history. Major race riots in 1919 accounted for approximately 400 black and white deaths, with significantly more black casualties. The race war of 1919 was marked by naked aggression and carried out by the worst elements of white America. As more than one analyst of the black movement in this era has observed, [Perhaps] the white mobs were driven by a will to lynch. If so, these were social orgies of cruelty in which certain classes in the community expressed their hatred of a race they considered to be inferior, their contempt for the law, and their sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority.19

Foremost among the causes of the racial violence that flared up in 1919 was the competition for jobs between black and white workers. The advent of World War I in 1914 saw both a great advancement in industrialization in the United States and a growing need for additional laborers in Northern industrial areas. Meanwhile, the sharecropping system and white violence were on the rise in the South. The South suffered an economic recession in 1914 and a boll weevil attack on cotton crops in 1915. As a result, hundreds of thousands of blacks found themselves out of work, and they headed North and to the Midwest looking for employment. Between 1910 and 1920, the black population in the North increased from 850,000 to 1.4 million.20 In the North, however, white labor unions were on the rise, and they were demanding better working conditions. There is ample evidence that big business was manipulating the white and black labor forces in such a manner as to keep the cost of labor at a minimum. Big business recruited tens of thousands of semiskilled and unskilled black workers, primarily from the South, to be used as scab workers and strikebreakers, while discouraging their participation in white unions and encouraging a false sense of racial superiority among white workers. A second effect of this large-scale migration to the North can be seen in housing disputes. With a large migration of Southern blacks and no new housing accommodations, previously white neighborhoods were overcome by black workers and their families. Whites began to feel threatened by blacks, whom they viewed as taking over not only their jobs but also their neighborhoods. The Chicago riot of 1919 illustrates this point. The underlying factor that hastened this riot was the mass influx of blacks into Chicago from the South between 1910 and 1915. This

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decade saw the black population of Chicago increase by 50,000, and this population growth resulted in increased violence. Fifty-eight house bombings occurred between July 1, 1917, and March 1, 1921, and 26 of them took place before the 1919 riot.21 As the violence escalated, so did the resistance in the black community. With the atmosphere for violence and resistance intensifying on both sides, the events that took place on July 27, 1919, provided the breaking point.22 The 1919 Chicago riot is probably the closest example of a clash between blacks and whites on an equal basis of violence. Approximately 15 whites and 23 blacks were killed, and the strong commitment of many Chicago blacks to meet white violence with counterviolence was evident.23 At the same time, it is also clear that most of the 1919 riots were white dominated and directed against black migrants from the South. The violent struggles between 1917 and 1919 are evidence of some of the first signs of retaliation, or counterviolence, on the part of blacks. Many historians have characterized blacks prior to World War I as having been spiritually crippled by the failures and disappointments of Reconstruction, the period immediately following the Civil War and the end of slavery. The combination of the Great Migration and the entrance of the United States into World War I, however, generated a new fighting spirit within the black community. As a result of being veterans of the battlefields of France or of the racial conflicts in a great metropolis, blacks had become comparatively more sophisticated and definitely more militant. Black Americans no longer automatically panicked in the face of a white mob; now they would often stand and fight for their rights. Moreover, by this time, blacks had realized that they could not expect protection from the federal government and that they thus had to defend themselves as best they could. They had witnessed local governments giving in to white lynch mobs. They had observed the onslaught of racist attacks by the white press. Indeed, never before in the history of the country had there been more distrust of whites by blacks than after World War I. The despair felt by blacks was amplified in the 1919 writings of W. E. B. Du Bois, a renowned black scholar and philosopher. Du Bois proposed a “league of nations” to curb the antiblack policies of the United States and South Africa. He argued that, unless such an international power was created, “We are doomed eventually to fight for our rights.”24 Communal riots indicate the inequality that exists between the ethnic and racial groups. They have explosive and destructive characteristics that make generalizations very difficult. As a form of “collective behavior,” their development is not easily recorded or analyzed. In addition, their history in the United States has been hidden in a system of law enforcement that has denied blacks due process and equal protection of the law and, in some instances, has weakened the legitimacy of the legal system itself. The forms and extent of collective racial violence are expressions of the social structure and the means of their change and control. Thus, the roles of the police and the mass media affect the patterns of collective urban violence and are crucial in accounting for actual occurrences of urban communal violence. Consequently, the manner in which racial conflicts are handled and controlled deeply influences race relations and subsequent patterns of violence. For instance, both law enforcement agencies

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and the mass media can be directly linked to rioting; in many cases, they are the elements that give rise to and hasten rioting and the perpetuation of riots—usually as a result of inadequate protection for minorities and inaccurate reporting of community problems. Consequently, social tensions generated by discrimination, prejudice, and poverty offer limited explanations for communal violence in the United States.25 The Conflict Racial violence in the United States is as old as the nation itself. In fact, racial clashes throughout the 20th century can be traced to these early decades. The pattern of racial violence at the beginning of the 20th century is characterized here as “communal” clashes or riots. Communal riots occur as a result of struggles between black and white civilians over areas of unclear racial domain. Usually, the contested area centers on neighborhood housing or other public places, such as a beach or park. In response to World War I, large numbers of both black and white persons migrated to the cities, and because of legal segregation and a shortage of housing, they were pitted against one another. The following lists contain suggestions of probable underlying causes and characteristics of the communal riots that occurred during the first two decades of the 20th century. Summary of Underlying Causes

• Relatively large numbers of new migrants (both black and white) lived in segregated groups in urban centers, under conditions in which older patterns of acceptance were not effective. •  Inadequate law enforcement agencies often conspired with white rioters against the black population. • Newspapers frequently published inflammatory reports, such as “Black Man Rapes White Woman.” As the riots lasted for several days, news reports served to recruit white activists from other parts of the city and even from out of town. Big business manipulation—recruiting blacks as strikebreakers while discouraging their participation in white unions—contributed to a false sense of racial superiority among white workers, thereby intensifying racial discrimination and racial prejudice. • There was poverty. • There was a shortage of housing for both blacks and whites. • Police brutality in maintaining racial segregation was common. Summary of Underlying Characteristics

• Ecological warfare (a struggle for living space) occurred over contested areas. Hastening incidents included small-scale struggles between black and white civilians, often in a public place such as a beach or in an area of unclear racial domain, and were characterized by minor but persistent outbursts of violence. The Chicago riot of 1919, for example, was preceded by two years of residential bombing.

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• Death (most often by hanging) and injuries resulted from direct confrontations between black and white citizens. • Whites invaded black neighborhoods, contributing to insufficient housing for blacks. Much of the violence occurred on the fringes of black and lowincome white neighborhoods. Moreover, violence occurred on main transfer points, when blacks attempted to return home or to seek some sort of refuge. These areas were usually central business districts where whites outnumbered blacks. • Weapons included bricks, rocks, and blunt sticks; hand-to-hand combat was common. A limited number of handguns and rifles were used in the riots. In short, the pattern of racial violence during the first two decades of the 20th century was characterized by conflict, and it reflected an attempt being made by blacks to alter their position of racial subordination and an attempt being made by whites to maintain their racial dominance. Violence during this period was an expression of the white population’s fear of black competition for jobs. The frequency of race riots was a negative response to those fears. Management of the Conflict The Role of State and Local Government

Prior to 1919, violent confrontations between blacks and whites had been hastened and managed by the local police and the local media. In many cases, the local police may even have been responsible for provoking racial violence by restricting legitimate forms of civil protest activity. Indeed, any form of organized black protest was frequently considered an internal threat to national security. Some newspapers were also blamed for provoking white attacks against black citizens. Often, after the violence had begun, the newspapers published inflammatory stories that fueled the intensity of the riots. The year 1919 became a key moment in the expression of interracial violence in the United States because black Americans began to respond to violence in an organized fashion. The federal government had long tacitly condoned lynching or pogroms (organized massacres) against blacks as almost legal. State and local government control of interracial violence was based on a system of racial hierarchy. However, two new forces began to emerge in 1919: an uneasy and tentative commitment by some elements in American society to a value system tied to “making the world safe for democracy” and therefore to racial equality; [and] an increasing feeling of power, prosperity, and dignity among Negroes.26 Response to the Conflict in the Black Community

Gradually, the lynchings instigated and fueled by local and state governments were replaced by “riots,” in which blacks were sufficiently organized to fight back when attacked. Large numbers of black men had been recruited to fight in Europe in World War I. Their return to unemployment and poverty prompted them to seek action to relieve their troubles. Their participation in the war, among other

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Table  Select Communal Riots: 1900–1919 Place

Year

Race of Aggressor

Race of Victim

Causes

Characteristics

Belleville, IL

1903

White

Black (1)

Inadequate law enforcement; role of mass media

Death by hanging

Springfield, OH

1904

Unknown

Black (1), White (1)

Role of mass media; inadequate law enforcement

Death by hanging

Brownsville, TX

1906

Unknown

White (1)

Role of mass media; inadequate law enforcement

Ecological conflict over contested area

Chattanooga, TN

1906

White

Black (1)

Inadequate law enforcement; role of mass media

Death by hanging

East St. Louis, IL

1917

White/Black

White (9), Black (39)

Black migration; competition for jobs

Ecological conflict over contested public space

Omaha, NE

1919

White

Black (1)

Inadequate law enforcement; role of mass media

Death by hanging

Elaine, AK

1919

White/Black

White (5), Black (25)

Blacks protesting sharecropping practices

Conflict over workrelated practices

Chicago, IL

1919

White

White (15), Black (23)

Black migration; competition for jobs

Insufficient housing; ecological conflict over contested area

UNI TED S TATES

factors, had given black people renewed pride in their race and new courage to fight against oppression and violence. The black press became a key factor in announcing the appearance of this new aggressiveness among blacks. At a conference held in 1918, which had been called by the War Department to secure the support of the black press for the war, 31 black editors solemnly directed the government’s attention to the upsurge in lynching and mob violence in a nation supposedly fighting to make the world safe for democracy. Moreover, early in 1919, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) published a study, Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States: 1889–1918, which documented approximately 3,224 lynchings of blacks during that period.27 The renewed spirit and the enhanced organizational response of the black community to violent attacks by local police departments and white mobs served to change the way in which the police (state, local, and national) responded to racial conflicts. The response by black citizens to meet violence with violence “spawned a fear of violence in the society at large, which had the effect of giving form to the early seeds of the American ‘state’ on race relations.”28 This resulted in the establishment of a neutral police force—from a previously nonneutral position in relationship to blacks—because the action of the local police had been associated with the length and severity of the riots. With the establishment of a neutral police force, order was more quickly restored during interracial rioting, especially when federal troops were summoned. These events signaled some meager beginnings for the use of “creative disorder” to solve racial conflict situations. For instance, in 1919, some black leaders began calling for work boycotts by black laborers and service workers. The NAACP was strengthened by its efforts to protect black people who were arrested or victimized in the 1919 riots. The NAACP and many blacks began to look to the federal government for protective legislation and help. The riots of 1919 caused blacks (and many whites) to push for a national police force or for “neutral” local and state police. Significance The interracial violence that took place in the United States from 1900 to 1919 allows us to view how the management of this conflict was transformed from private, local, and state governments to the federal government. Prior to 1919, interracial conflict in the United States was managed and even caused by a series of local systems of order (private, local, and state governments) based on a system of racial hierarchy. That is, state and local governments usually joined white mobs in their attacks on black communities. Prior to 1919, the federal government did not attempt to intercede. This changed when the black community began to defend itself violently against such attacks. The black community’s success in defending itself during what was called the “bloody summer” of 1919 (especially because of the Chicago riots) startled white America and the federal government. As a result, the federal government began to build up a peacetime military presence in the country and, consequently, created a monopoly on the legitimate and legal means of violence.

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The black community’s willingness to fight local and state governments with violence created an internal national security threat in the country, which forced the federal government to oversee state and local governments’ use of violence in interracial conflicts. The federal government’s control and management of interracial violence led to direct federal intervention in interracial violence. Paradoxically, the federal government’s intervention in interracial conflicts increased black Americans’ claims for citizenship rights and channeled the demands for equality into a type of peaceful creative disorder. This included such tactics as sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, and marches, all of which were designed to protest against a system of racial hierarchy and to replace it with a new system of order that would be more in alignment with the democratic principles of racial equality. These new creative disorder tactics were successfully employed throughout the rest of the 20th century. Notes 1. James N. Upton, “A Culture of Violence,” in Managing Divided Cities, ed. Seamus Dunn (Keele, Staffordshire, England: Keele University Press, 1994), 191–192. 2. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 567. 3. Martin Luther King Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 68. 4. Ibid., 109. 5. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., The History of Violence in America (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), 396–97. 6. William M. Tuttle, Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919 (New York: Athenaeum, 1970; Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 208–241; and Malcolm McLaughlin, Power, Community and Racial Killing in East St. Louis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2005), 163–181. 7. Morris Janowitz, “Patterns of Collective Racial Violence,” in Graham and Gurr, History of Violence in America, 412–413. 8. James S. Olson, The Ethnic Dimension in American History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 195. 9. Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 567. 10. Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro (New York: Macmillian, 1965). 11. Ibid., 349–350. 12. Ibid., 350. 13. Ibid., 348. 14. Ibid., 391–92. 15. Ibid., 392. 16. McLaughlin, Power, Community, and Racial Killing, 163–167. 17. Robert H. Brisbane, The Black Vanguard: Origins of the Negro Social Revolution 1900–1960 (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1970), 78. 18. Walter F. White, “‘Massacring Whites’ in Arkansas,” The Nation 109, no. 2840 (December 6, 1919): 715–716. 19. Brisbane, The Black Vanguard, 71. 20. Olson, Ethnic Dimension, 197; and Emmett J. Scott, Negro Migration during the War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1920; reprinted Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969).

UNI TED S TATES

21. Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1922), 122. 22. Tuttle, Race Riot, 159. 23. Arthur I. Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 10. 24. Brisbane, Black Vanguard, 74. 25. Janowitz, “Patterns of Collective Racial Violence,” 417–418. 26. Waskow, Race Riot to Sit-in, 22. 27. Brisbane, Black Vanguard, 75. 28. Waskow, Race Riot to Sit-In, 294–299.

Suggested Readings Brisbane, Robert H. 1970. The Black Vanguard: Origins of the Negro Social Revolution 1900– 1960. Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press. Chicago Commission on Race Relations. 1922. The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Duster, Alfreda M., ed. 1970. Crusade for Justice: The Autobiography of Ida B. Wells. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Graham, Hugh Davis, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. 1969. The History of Violence in America. New York: Bantam Books. King, Martin Luther, Jr. 1967. Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community? Boston: Beacon Press. Logan, Rayford W. 1965. The Betrayal of the Negro. New York: Macmillan, 1965. Reprint, 1997. McLaughlin, Malcolm. 2005. Power, Community, and Racial Killing in East St. Louis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. An American Dilemma. New York: Harper and Brothers. Olson, James S. 1994. The Ethnic Dimension in American History. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 1968. New York: Bantam Books. Scott, Emmett. J. 1920. Negro Migration during the War. New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969. Tuttle, William M. 1970. Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919. United States Kerner Commission. New York: Athenaeum. Waskow, Arthur I. 1966. From Race Riot to Sit-In. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. White, Walter F. 1919. “‘Massacring Whites’ in Arkansas,” The Nation 109 (2840) (December 6): 715–716.

Appendices Collectively known as the “Civil War Amendments,” the three constitutional amendments passed following the Civil War were intended to place black Americans on an equal footing with their white counterparts. The first, the Thirteenth Amendment, was added eight months after the end of hostilities; it eradicated involuntary servitude in the United States. Recognizing that the formerly rebellious states would likely oppose this effort toward racial equality (all three amendments were added while the South was under military rule and unable to block their ratification), the Fourteenth Amendment was added three years later—the first constitutional provision limiting the

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power of the states. Rounding out the triad, in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment extended suffrage to black males over the age of 21—the standard age and gender restrictions at the time. In fact, these amendments represented only the first, albeit necessary, steps in the long struggle to advance the rights and status of black Americans. The same month that the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, the Ku Klux Klan’s first chapter was founded to sustain white supremacy against the threat of the nonwhite and non-Christian members of American society. The first wave of KKK activity died out quickly during the Reconstruction era, but the KKK was reborn after World War I with renewed vigor—in the hands of men who often wore badges by day and sheets by night—and with due homage to the words as well as spirit of its post–Civil War ancestors. Meanwhile, for generations, the intent of the Fifteenth Amendment was frustrated at state and local levels, where discriminatorily administered poll taxes and literacy tests disenfranchised black electorates until the Supreme Court began to strike them down during the second half of the 20th century. As for the Fourteenth Amendment, it was the Supreme Court itself that for generations had emasculated its key provisions. The “privileges and immunities clause” was fatally wounded when the Court limited its application to only those rights held by virtue of federal (not state) citizenship, and for a long time, the “due process clause”—which later became the vehicle by which most of the Bill of Rights was made applicable to the states—was construed as limiting only the procedures by which states act, not what they can do. And in the 1896 Plessy case, excerpted below, the Supreme Court provided the constitutional basis for segregating American society when it ruled that “the equal protection clause” could be satisfied by the states providing “separate but equal” facilities to the races. For most of the next half century, those facilities were a great deal more separate than equal, but it was not until the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that the Supreme Court officially overruled that doctrine in a unanimous opinion by a Court that contained another Justice Harlan, the lineal descendent of the lone dissenting Justice in the Plessy case.

1. The Civil War Amendments Article XIII Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. [Adopted December 18, 1865] Article XIV 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UNI TED S TATES

2: Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,15 and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 3: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 4: The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. [Adopted July 28, 1868] Article XV The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. [Adopted May 30, 1870] Source: Amendments XIII, XIV, and XV of the United States Constitution. United States Senate. Available at https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Civil WarAmendments.htm.

2. Constitution and Laws of the Knights of the KKK, Georgia Chapter, 1921 CONSTITUTION AND LAWS Knights Of the Ku Klux Klan (Incorporated) Imperial Palace, Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Atlanta, Go.

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THE IMPERIAL PROCLAMATION. To the lovers of Law, Order, Peace and Justice of all nations, People, Tribes and Tongues of the whole earth, Greetings: I, and the citizens of the Invisible Empire through me, make declaration to you: We, the members of this Order, desiring to promote patriotism toward our Civil Government; honorable peace among men and nations; protection for and happiness in the homes of our people; manhood, brotherhood, and love among ourselves, and liberty, justice and fraternity among all mankind; believing we can best accomplish these noble purposes through a mystic, social, patriotic, benevolent association, having a perfected lodge system, with an exalted ritualistic form of work and an effective form of government, not for selfish profit, but for the mutual betterment, benefit and protection of our oath-bound associates, and their loved ones; do physically, socially, morally and vocationally Proclaim to the World That we are dedicated to the sublime duty of providing generous aid, tender sympathy and fraternal assistance amid fortune and misfortune in the effulgent light of life and amid the sable shadows of death; and to the exalted privilege of demonstrating the practical utility of the great (yet most neglected), doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man as a vital force in the lives and affairs of men. We invite all men who can qualify to become citizens of the Invisible Empire to approach the portal of our beneficent domain, join us in our noble work of extending its boundaries, and in disseminating the gospel of “Klankraft,” thereby encouraging, conserving, protecting and making vital the fraternal relationship in the practice of an honorable clannishness; to share with us the glory of performing the sacred duty of protecting womanhood; to maintain forever the God-given supremacy of the white race; to commemorate the holy and chivalric achievements of our fathers; to safeguard the sacred rights, privileges and institutions of our Civil Government; to bless mankind and to keep eternally ablaze the sacred fire of a fervent devotion to a pure Americanism. The Invisible Empire is founded on sterling character, and immutable principles based upon sacred sentiment and cemented by noble purposes. It is promoted by a sincere, unselfish devotion of the souls of men, and is governed by their consecrated intelligence. It is the soul of chivalry, virtue’s impenetrable shield; and the devout impulse of an unconquered race. done in the aulic of his majesty,

the Emperor of the Invisible Empire,

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in the Imperial Palace, in the Imperial City of Atlanta, Commonwealth of Georgia, United States of America. This the 29th day of November, Anno Domini, Nineteen Hundred and ‘Twenty-two Anno Klan. L VI. Source: Constitution and Laws: Knights of Ku Klux Klan (Atlanta: Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 1921). Available at https://archive.org/stream/ConstitutionLawsKnightsOfKKK/consti tution%20laws%20knights%20of%20KKK_djvu.txt.

UNI TED S TATES

3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 Argued: April 18, 1896 Decided: May 18, 1896 mr. justice brown

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored races. The information filed in the criminal District Court charged in substance that Plessy, being a passenger between two stations within the State of Louisiana, was assigned by officers of the company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he insisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which he did not belong. . . . And, having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected with the aid of a police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a charge of having violated the above act. . . . The object of the [14th] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced. . . . We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption. The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane. . . .

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The judgment of the court below is, therefore, Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. By the Louisiana statute the validity of which is here involved, all railway companies (other than street railroad companies) carrying passengers in that State are required to have separate but equal accommodations for white and colored persons by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations. In respect of civil rights common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights. Every true man has pride of race, and, under appropriate circumstances, when the rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems proper. . . . In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case. It was adjudged in that case that the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves were not included nor intended to be included under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and privileges which that instrument provided for and secured to citizens of the United States. . . . The recent amendments of the Constitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it seems that we have yet, in some of the States, a dominant race — a superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race. The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this country were made citizens of the United States and of the States in which they respectively reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the States are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks. . . . What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens. That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana. The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race while they are on a public highway is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.

UNI TED S TATES

If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will surely come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race. . . . The thin disguise of “equal” accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor atone for the wrong this day done. I am of opinion that the statute of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that State, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United States. If laws of like character should be enacted in the several States of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law would, it is true, have disappeared from our country, but there would remain a power in the States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race, and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens now constituting a part of the political community called the People of the United States, for whom and by whom, through representatives, our government is administered. Such a system is inconsistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down by Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. For the reasons stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent from the opinion and judgment of the majority. mr. justice brewer

did not hear the argument or participate in the decision of this case.

Source: Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Available at http://www.law.cornell.edu /supremecourt/text163/157.

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United States Race and the Civil Rights Struggle in Post–World War II America Kevin J. Mumford and John Bullock

Timeline 1664 Miscegenation laws are passed in Chesapeake and New England. 1776 The American Revolution leads to independence from colonial rule. Northern states emancipate slaves but Southerners retain their “peculiar institution.” 1787 The Three-fifths Clause in the U.S. Constitution defines slaves as partial citizens. 1840s Suffrage is restricted or denied to African Americans in the North. 1856 South Carolina passes the Slave Codes. 1863 The Emancipation Proclamation frees the slaves in rebelling states. 1865 The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits slavery. South ­Carolina passes the Black Codes, which severely restrict the freedom of former slaves. 1868 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution incorporates citizenship and guarantees legal process rights to former male slaves.

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1870 The Fifteenth Amendment grants suffrage to former male slaves. The Enforcement Act promises national government enforcement of voting rights. 1871 The Ku Klux Klan Act authorizes federal intervention in response to violence committed against African Americans. 1877 The Tilden-Hayes Compromise removes federal troops from the former Confederate states and effectively ends Reconstruction and black political participation in the South. 1883 The Civil Rights Cases overturn federal legislation that had elaborated the constitutional provisions for equal rights. 1896 Plessy v. Fergusson sustains racial segregation: separate facilities are permitted if equal, the final blow to Reconstruction. 1908 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the first national civil rights organization, is founded. 1910s The Great Migration begins; 1.5 million African Americans migrate to Northern cities by 1930. 1940s The Double V Campaign takes place. African American newspapers sustain protests against Northern segregation and win equal accommodations legislation in many states. 1946 President Harry S. Truman signs an executive order to desegregate the military. 1948 In Shelley v. Kramer, the U.S. Supreme Court prohibits restrictive covenants, which restricted sales of real estate to white buyers, enforcing neighborhood segregation.

UNI TED S TATES

1954 Brown v. Board of Education orders the integration of public education, overturning the separate-but-equal doctrine. 1955 In Brown v. Board II, the Supreme Court orders that desegregation occur with “all deliberate speed.” The vagueness of the phrase was used by many states to stall school desegregation. 1955 Rosa Parks refuses to stand on a segregated bus. The Montgomery bus boycott spawns numerous protest activities for civil rights. 1957 The Civil Rights Act of 1957 establishes the Civil Rights Commission and reaffirms the right to vote. 1960 The Civil Rights Act of 1960 establishes the Civil Rights Commission and Office of the Attorney General for Civil Rights, especially voting. In Greensboro, North Carolina, college students sit in at a segregated diner. The increase of youth involved in the civil rights struggle leads to the establishment of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. 1962 President John F. Kennedy signs an executive order pertaining to discrimination in housing. 1963 The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom was organized by a number of civil rights and religious groups; more than 200,000 Americans gathered to push for racial justice and equality. The march culminated in Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech. 1964 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in public accommodations or employment. The Twenty-First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the poll tax, protecting the right to vote. 1965 President Johnson signs the Voting Rights Act of 1965, aimed at Southern intransigence, authorizing federal protection of voting.

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1967 In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court rules that state bans on interracial marriage are unconstitutional. 1968 The Civil Rights Act of 1968 builds upon federal legislation; housing discrimination is specifically prohibited. 1971 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme Court upholds busing programs designed to desegregate public schools. 1972 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act is passed by Congress, inaugurating an affirmative action program aimed at hiring groups historically discriminated against in hiring decisions. 1975 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requires federally regulated banks to document the number and value of all mortgage loans granted by the institution; these reports must then be made available to the public. This was a direct response to home loan discrimination. 1977 The Community Reinvestment Act states that all federally regulated institutions have a continuing obligation to help meet the credit needs of their local communities. This was a direct response to redlining. 1978 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court declares affirmative action constitutional but invalidates the use of racial quotas. 1980 The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency shifts the focus of the civil rights debate to the reverse discrimination nature of affirmative action programs and marks the end of the 1945–1980 civil rights movement. 1982 Congress amends the Voting Rights Act to include requirements that certain jurisdictions provide minority voters opportunities to elect candidates of their choice. The subsequent redrawing of legislative maps results in majority-minority districts and the election of more minorities to the U.S. Congress.

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1993 In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court rules that to prevent racial gerrymandering, redistricting based on race must be held to a standard of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2003 In Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court rules that the use of affirmative action in school admission is constitutional if it treats race as one factor among many, its purpose is to achieve a “diverse” class, and it does not substitute for individualized review of the applicant, but it is unconstitutional if it automatically increases an applicant’s chances over others simply because of his or her race. 2013 In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court rules Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional. Section 4 contained the legislative formula to determine which jurisdictions must get “preclearance” from the federal government to change their voting laws. White ethnic conflict in the United States, arising from the massive European immigration between the 17th century and the early 20th century, affected every facet of American political culture. The political system, however, granted all white immigrants equal civil rights. It was black Americans who suffered the exclusion or the withdrawal of civil rights based on perceptions of racial difference. If and when African American civil status improved depended to a large extent on the unique formula for the distribution of power through American federalism—that is, both the shifting allocation of authority over citizenship as exercised by the states or local governments and the authority of the national government. Federal civil rights policies frequently contrasted with or contradicted politics and practices in the states, particularly the laws of the Southern states. Yet, significant as this resultant structural tension in federalism was in determining the course of civil rights, the rise, decline, and revival of the political activities of various African Americans were equally significant in affecting the course of integration and the struggle for equality in the United States. Historical Background From the onset of the British settlement of America in the 17th century, the legal status of black people, African and African Americans, was different from that of Europeans, with restrictions governing such diverse areas as accommodations, trade, gun ownership, baptism, and marriage with whites. During this time, New World slavery was expanding, and the mainland colonies increasingly employed slave and indentured labor for the production of staples. During the American Revolution, popular ideas of liberal or republican independence ignited a strong emancipationist movement in the Northern colonies, leading to the abolition of

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slavery there. Southern colonies, however, retained the institution. With the creation of the U.S. Constitution in 1787, regional conflict over slavery required formal political compromise, particularly concerning the national representation of slaves who were defined as three-fifths of a citizen; however, free African Americans received equal civil rights in many states. Over the course of the 19th century, the status of a slave was increasingly interrelated with second-class citizenship. One historian has characterized the free black population as little more than slaves without masters. Similarly, when Northern states adopted universal manhood suffrage for whites, special legislation appended property qualifications to black suffrage or totally prohibited it. This deepening discrimination against black Americans was sharply diverted by the outbreak of the Civil War. When Southern slaveholders seceded from the Union, Northerners embraced free labor nationalism and declared war to prevent secession. The Northern victory finally resolved long-standing tensions between the North and South; Northern troops captured slaves during the war, and what remained of the national government after Southern secession emancipated the slaves and prohibited slavery in the U.S. Constitution. Reconstruction

The period of regional reunification that followed, known as Reconstruction, was a historic milestone in civil rights. Reconstruction differed from emancipation in other countries both in speed and scope. In the United States, black slaves received citizenship rights in 1868, three years after emancipation and much earlier than slaves in Caribbean nations; for example, although slavery was abolished in Jamaica in the 1830s, black people there lacked universal suffrage until the 1940s. In part, the relatively swift extension in the American case was a product of the radical idealism of leading statesmen dating back to the abolitionist movement, and  in part, democracy grew from Republican efforts to strengthen their political standing in the South by protecting the black electorate. Toward the goal of incorporating equal citizenship for the black freedmen, the Constitution was amended three times: the Thirteenth Amendment (1865) enforced emancipation by prohibiting slavery; the Fourteenth Amendment (1868), considered by legal scholars to be the most significant constitutional mechanism for preserving civil rights, extended all privileges and immunities of citizenship to black men; and the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) extended the franchise to all men regardless of creed or color. White women were disappointed by their efforts to link woman’s suffrage to black male enfranchisement, which caused lasting rifts between black and feminist progressive social movements. The Republican Party consequently commanded the undivided loyalty of black voters for the next 60 years. In the final analysis, historians do not agree on the significance of post–Civil War national reunification for the former slaves. White Southerners never accepted the federal measures. The deliberations over emancipation did not encompass fundamental economic redistribution or compensation, such as the transfer of land or homesteading. Moreover, during the final phase of unification, the majority political party, the Republicans, lost influence within the Southern states. Factions of

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white Southerners violently resisted the extension of civil rights to African Americans and blocked their exercise of the suffrage. Eventually, federalism—that is, the intervention of the federal government—was necessary to ensure that the intention of the Congress in this regard would be fulfilled, in this case, through national military intervention. In 1870, Congress passed the Enforcement Act, which authorized prosecution of any individual who interfered with the Fifteenth Amendment, or the right to vote; the federal government could send election commissions to recalcitrant Southern states. White racist violence was prohibited in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 in response to the founding of white vigilante groups. Southern states elected moderate to reactionary governments, while the national Congress continued to pursue liberal civil rights policies. The question of segregation, or the separation of the races, which the freedmen had resisted almost from beginning of Reconstruction, was forbidden by the federal government in one final act of congressional prohibition: the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of color or creed. It is often forgotten that Reconstruction also significantly affected the status of African Americans in the North. When Northern state governments ratified the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, they repealed discriminatory legislation that had prohibited African Americans from voting, segregated public accommodations, or enforced second-class education. The Northern state of New Jersey, for instance, in 1882, removed the term “white” from its statutory provisions on voting; all men enjoyed the right to vote. In 1884, the state explicitly prohibited any sort of discrimination in accommodations on the basis of race or color. Although only 10 percent of African Americans resided in Northern states, they enjoyed tenuous equality with whites from the 1880s until approximately the 1910s. Within 20 years after the Civil War, the party of union—the Republican Party— had declined to a minority in the national government. Political reconciliation had been achieved through a political compromise known as nonintervention; both Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats granted the states increased authority over race relations. In the final analysis, the consistent tension between the unionist national government and the former rebellious states had produced extensive democratic freedom for the subordinates of the conquered regime. But when the pressure from the federal government was relieved after reunification, the Southern governments capitulated to white supremacy. This tendency worsened with the acceleration of modernization, particularly the rise of cities, and Jim Crow facilities, such as separate parks, restrooms, and water fountains, redefined the infrastructure of the New South. Worse, the U.S. Supreme Court, narrowly interpreting the intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, began to curb national liberal policy. In 1883, the Supreme Court decided the Civil Rights Cases, which nullified the equal accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In Pace v. Alabama, the Court held that a state law that prohibited interracial marriage was constitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The national backlash against Reconstruction culminated in the Court’s decision in

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Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which permitted separate facilities as long as they were substantively equal. In the 1890s, although the federal government again debated anti–Ku Klux Klan legislation and new enforcement measures to protect black voters, liberals overwhelmingly lost in the U.S. Senate. The guardianship over citizenship rights having by then shifted toward the states, the Southern governments were permitted to disenfranchise African Americans by blocking their exercise of the suffrage. From the perspective of political discourse, African Americans represented second-class citizens within the national constitution—a recognized exception to supposedly universal principles of liberal democracy. The Great Migration and the First Civil Rights Movement

The next phase in the struggle for civil rights could not have emerged without the Great Migration. In response to World War I shortages in labor and attracted by the promise of urban freedom, Southern black workers began to migrate from Southern towns to major Northern cities. In 1909, black intellectual W. E. B. Du Bois founded the first national civil rights organization in New York City, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Local black self-help and reform organizations confederated in the National Urban League in 1913. Scattered across Northern cities were local literary societies, labor unions, and fraternal orders. Together these organizations formed a foundation for a blackled civil rights movement by the beginning of World War I. The first phase of the movement focused on the problems of poverty and employment discrimination, as well as segregation, intermarriage, and lynching. Except for the black nationalism of Marcus Garvey, which flourished in the 1920s, most black leaders and intellectuals championed civil rights and linked equality to the goal of integration. Historians of black migration continue to emphasize that Northern cities were not the promised land. Extralegal mechanisms enforced neighborhood segregation, excluded black children from equal schools, and constrained economic mobility. In New Jersey, though state compliance with Reconstruction had produced equal protection legislation in the 19th century, local practices varied greatly. As the Great Migration proceeded, towns in southern New Jersey passed local ordinances prohibiting integrated high schools and elementary schools. Proprietors of restaurants, hotels, and theaters informally practiced segregation, and municipal institutions also practiced either exclusion or segregation. Much of this was de facto segregation, and it has proven to be the most difficult form of racism to combat. The Great Depression and World War II

Another important turning point was the Great Depression of the 1930s. In response to this economic disaster, the federal government reversed laissez-faire acquiescence to social problems, building the largest state structure in the history of the country. This newly discovered bureaucratic power eventually rescued African Americans. In 1941, black labor leader A. Philip Randolph threatened

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President Franklin D. Roosevelt with a disruptive march on the capital if he did not immediately address the problem of federal segregation. The president responded by signing Executive Order 8802, which established a bureaucratic organization to monitor employment discrimination in wartime industries. It subsequently served as a prototype for new state agencies that would regulate discrimination. The next phase of the civil rights struggle was more catalyzed by ideology and events than by federal legislation, that is, by American involvement in World War II. Drawing on wartime propaganda, which promoted patriotism and democracy, black activists and newspapers promoted antiracism at home as the necessary ideology with which to combat fascism abroad. More than 3 million black Americans read black newspapers and joined sporadic demonstrations against segregation. By the 1940s, many Northern states had passed equal employment legislation or had established antidiscrimination agencies. Still, Southern intransigence prevailed. Then the momentum returned to the federal government. The Allied victory against fascism led President Harry S. Truman to integrate the armed forces, a major symbolic protest against the validity of racism at home. When the president proposed the Civil Rights Act of 1948, including desegregation and antilynching measures, the Southern wing of his party bolted and blocked the legislation by filibustering. Truman’s liberal wing retreated from an active federal stance, despite the fact that the number of Southern lynchings totaled 3,842 between 1889 and 1941.1 The Conflict By the end of the 1940s, the recurrent divergence between Northern racial liberalism and Southern segregation had produced numerous tensions and contradictions. The federal government, however, was not compelled to intervene and impose a liberal constitutional interpretation on the South. In 1942, a new civil rights organization, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), targeted segregated accommodations for direct-action protest tactics. The NAACP embarked on a massive legal campaign against discrimination, led by Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall. In cases heard before the U.S. Supreme Court, the team won against the white primary in Smith v. All wright (1948) and against restrictive covenants, which incorporated a racial preference clause in deeds of sale of houses, in Shelley v. Kramer (1948). Marshall also triumphed against unequal school facilities in Sweatt v. Painter (1950) and against unequal or differential treatment of African American students in McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950). The historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which overturned Plessy, explicitly prohibited separate-but-equal facilities. Although some constituencies within black political circles criticized the legalistic approach or promoted direct-action protest tactics, the two strategies are probably best seen as complementary, even mutually dependent. African American civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr.’s first protest against bus segregation in Montgomery, Alabama, was reinforced by Thurgood Marshall’s victory in Gayle v. Browder (1956). Without this kind of legal legitimation, the protests that

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sprang up around the South would have been turned back by local courts as well as the police. Still, during the 1950s, the federal government did not actively assist protesters or consider effective federal legislation. Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered federal troops to protect Southern black students who were integrating public schools and colleges, the president’s Civil Rights Act of 1957 was comparatively weak. It could be said that the escalation of the civil rights movement responded not only to intractable segregationist policies but also to federal indifference. By testing Jim Crow legislation and challenging racist law enforcement, black activists exposed themselves to enormous physical danger in the name of demonstrating their righteousness and the evils of the white South. In 1960, for instance, Martin Luther King Jr. was arrested three times during a week of demonstrations held in Albany, Georgia, protesting segregated waiting rooms in an interstate bus terminal. At the same time, local black student activists resented King’s fame and feared that his charisma would sap the confidence of local black residents if they credited King, rather than themselves, with victories over white segregationists. King was later arrested during an antisegregation protest in Birmingham, Alabama, and he wrote a letter from prison on toilet paper. He reasserted his commitment to nonviolence, which had grown from his continual interchange with Mahatma Gandhi and the eclectic practice of satyagraha (nonviolent, or passive, resistance). Management of the Conflict As early as 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson warned of a rising tide of discontent among African Americans, and he proposed a new agenda to respond to the conflict in the South. The president maneuvered through the Congress the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The federal government prohibited discrimination in voting and permitted the registration as well as the collection of voting statistics or supervision of elections by the federal government. The most important statutes were the prohibition of employment discrimination (Title VII) and the provision for injunctive relief from discrimination in accommodations (Title II). This federal legislation, including the laws pertaining to accommodations and employment practices, was similar to that passed by the Northern states in the midst of the renaissance of democracy and black activism there after World War II. The fact that it was subsequently written into federal statutory law underscores the extent to which the momentum of federalism was often bilateral. Meanwhile, in the South, when black demonstrators attempted to conduct a protest march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, they were attacked by armed police, reminiscent of the KKK obstruction of black citizenship in the days of Reconstruction. The Selma demonstration, televised to a shocked nation, moved congressional leaders to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which appointed federal examiners to enforce the right to vote. And what was happening in the North? Informal practices of segregation in Northern neighborhoods, though illegal and challenged by black residents, had

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proceeded on such a large scale that major ghettos had formed in American cities. Economic dislocation compounded the segregation. By the 1960s, the poverty index located black women as the poorest class in the nation. It was this social distress that led to the great urban upheaval and crises of the late 1960s: for example, the 1965 rioting in Watts, California, and in 1967 in Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan. Here black protesters renounced nonviolence, demanded political representation, and temporarily reclaimed cities. At approximately the same time that the Kerner Commission Report was identifying racism in the press, ineffective city government, and excessive police force as serious problems affecting race relations, President Johnson was signing into law the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which prohibited discrimination in housing, including rental, finance, or purchase. But the specter of black uprisings in Newark, Detroit, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, had caused a conservative reaction among many white suburbanites, and the Civil Rights Act also targeted individuals or groups who had collaborated in riots or civil disobedience. Out of this setting, a new ideology of black power developed—one that escalated the demands on the federal government beyond formal civil rights to include urban renewal, education programs, and retraining or employment programs. This upstart black radicalism peaked at the end of the 1970s, when the cultural nationalists promoted the black arts movement and black studies in universities, toward the goals of fostering antiracism and a rediscovery of black identity. For their part, the militant Black Panthers agitated for black neighborhood survival, published newspapers, and campaigned for elected office. Subsequent Developments

In the aftermath of the civil rights movement, many former activists joined the ranks of local, state, and national politics. Simultaneously, the outward migration of whites from many urban centers as well as areas of increasing minority populations has resulted in bifurcated politics, and this conservative/liberal, suburban/ urban division has been apparent in a number of policy battles. As such, there has been legal and political opposition to affirmative action, social welfare spending, and the expansion of voting rights in recent years. Significance Black social protest, affected by the revival of mainstream liberalism at the end of the 1960s, gradually declined in the 1970s. The question of the radicalism of the civil rights movement continues to stir debate. Recent federal revision of voting districts, despite black appeals for actual representation, continues to raise the issue of racist disenfranchisement; procedural measures that flowed from the civil rights movement, particularly affirmative action, are less popular than the federal legislation that inspired them. Although many Americans believe that large segments of the African American population remain disadvantaged and unequal, it is unlikely that such a major civil rights movement will again emerge.

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While the language of the past voicing opposition to black civil rights may have become less virulent, much of the symbolism and rhetoric remains and has seemingly increased with the election of the first black president of the United States. Moreover, the projected demographic shift of the United States to a majorityminority nation in the next several decades will have a significant impact upon the policy positions adopted by the major political parties as they attempt to remain viable by winning elections. Note 1. On lynchings, see Jessie Carnie Smith and Carrell Peterson Horton, eds., Historical Statistics of Black America, vol. 1 (New York: Gale, 1995), 488–490.

Suggested Readings Bond, James Edward. 1997. No Easy Walk to Freedom: Reconstruction and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Westport, CT: Praeger. Carson, Clayborne. 1981. In Struggle: The SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dallek, Robert. 1998. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973. New York: Oxford University Press. Foner, Eric. 1988. Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877. New York: Harper & Row. Garrow, David. 1986. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. New York: William Morrow. Graham, Hugh. 1998. The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960– 1972. New York: Oxford University Press. Grossman, James. 1989. Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jones, Charles E. 1998. The Black Panther Party Reconsidered. Baltimore: Black Classic. Klinker, Philip A., and Rogers M. Smith. 1999. Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lawson, Steven F. 1991. Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in America since 1941. New York: McGraw-Hill. Lawson, Steven F., and Charles Payne. 1998. Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945–1968. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Leuchtenberg, William. 1979. “The White House and Civil Rights from Eisenhower to Carter.” In Have We Overcome?, edited by Michael V. Manorato, 147–71. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1979. Mumford, Kevin J. 1999. “After Hugh: Statutory Race Segregation in Colonial America, 1630–1725.” American Journal of Legal History 18 (3): 280–305. Mumford, Kevin J. 2008. Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in America. New York: NYU Press. Panetta, Leon, and Peter Gall. 1971. Bring Us Together: The Nixon Team and the Civil Rights Retreat. Philadelphia: Lippincott. Sugrue, Thomas J. 1996. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Ethnicity in Postwar Detroit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Sullivan, Patricia. 1999. “Civil Rights Movement.” In Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience, edited by Kwame Anthony Appiah and Henry Louis Gates Jr. New York: Basic Civitas Books.

Appendices 1. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 Prior to this act, it was quite common for banks to accept deposits from African Americans, yet refuse to approve loans for which they were qualified. Lack of equal access to credit had the effect of forcing blacks in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods to use the predatory lenders who operate in the vacuum left by financial institutions. The act works to reduce discriminatory credit practices against largely minority communities by requiring that the record of each depository institution be periodically evaluated by a federal supervisory agency and that a bank’s performance record be taken into account in considering an institution’s application for new branches, acquisitions, and mergers.

HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1977 AN ACT To amend certain Federal laws pertaining to community development, housing, and related programs. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

TITLE VIII—COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT SEC. 802. CONGRESSIONAL AND STATEMENT OF PURPOSE. (a) The Congress finds that— (1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business; (2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need for credit services as well as deposit services; and (3) regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered. (b) It is the purpose of this title to require each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation. SEC. 804. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS; EVALUATION. (b)  majority-owned institutions.—In assessing and taking into account, under subsection (a), the record of a nonminority-owned and nonwomen-owned financial institution, the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency may consider as a factor

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capital investment, loan participation, and other ventures undertaken by the institution in cooperation with minority- and women-owned financial institutions and lowincome credit unions provided that these activities help meet the credit needs of local communities in which such institutions and credit unions are chartered. SEC. 808. OPERATION OF BRANCH FACILITIES BY MINORITIES AND WOMEN. (a)  in general.—In the case of any depository institution which donates, sells on favorable terms (as determined by the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency), or makes available on a rent-free basis any branch of such institution which is located in any predominantly minority neighborhood to any minority depository institution or women’s depository institution, the amount of the contribution or the amount of the loss incurred in connection with such activity may be a factor in determining whether the depository institution is meeting the credit needs of the institution’s community for purposes of this title. (b)

definitions.—For

(1)

purposes of this section—

minority depository institution.—The

term “minority institution” means a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act)— (A) more than 50 percent of the ownership or control of which is held by 1 or more minority individuals; and (B) more than 50 percent of the net profit or loss of which accrues to 1 or more minority individuals.

(2)

women’s depository institution.—The

term “women’s depository institution” means a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act)— (A) more than 50 percent of the ownership or control of which is held by 1 or more women; (B) more than 50 percent of the net profit or loss of which accrues to 1 or more women; and (C) a significant percentage of senior management positions of which are held by women.

Source: FDIC Laws, Regulations, Related Acts. Available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations /laws/rules/6500-2515.html.

2. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education II, the phrase “all deliberate speed” meant no progress at all as many Southern and Northern states dragged their feet regarding school desegregation. This controversial ruling led to the policy of busing to achieve racial balance and the integration of schools, meaning that white students would be transported to schools that had previously been majority black and black students would be transported to schools that previously majority white. By exposing students to schools that had historically been reserved for one race, the inherent inequalities associated with segregation became apparent; in this regard, separate was clearly not

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equal. In the aftermath of this decision, there was significant (sometimes violent) resistance to this method of integration. mr. chief justice burger

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to review important issues as to the duties of school authorities and the scope of powers of federal courts under this Court’s mandates to eliminate racially separate public schools established and maintained by state action. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). This case and those argued with it arose in States having a long history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race. That was what Brown v. Board of Education was all about. These cases present us with the problem of defining in more precise terms than heretofore the scope of the duty of school authorities and district courts in implementing Brown I and the mandate to eliminate dual systems and establish unitary systems at once. During the 1968–1969 school year, the [Charlotte-Mecklenburg school] system served more than 84,000 pupils in 107 schools. As of June, 1969, there were approximately 24,000 Negro students in the system, of whom 21,000 attended schools within the city of Charlotte. Two-thirds of those 21,000—approximately 14,000 Negro students—attended 21 schools which were either totally Negro or more than 99% Negro. III The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of stateimposed segregation. . . . That was the violation sought to be corrected by the remedial measures of Brown II. That was the basis for the holding in Green that school authorities are clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. 391 U.S. at 437-438. If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. . . . In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this remedial power extends, it is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation. Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary. V The central issue in this case is that of student assignment, and there are essentially four problem areas: (1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas may be used as an implement in a remedial order to correct a previously segregated system;

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(2) whether every all-Negro and all-white school must be eliminated as an indispensable part of a remedial process of desegregation; (3) what the limits are, if any, on the rearrangement of school districts and attendance zones, as a remedial measure; and (4) what the limits are, if any, on the use of transportation facilities to correct state-enforced racial school segregation. (1) Racial Balances or Racial Quotas. In this case, it is urged that the District Court has imposed a racial balance requirement of 71%–29% on individual schools. The fact that no such objective was actually achieved— and would appear to be impossible—tends to blunt that claim, yet in the opinion and order of the District Court of December 1, 1969, we find that court directing that efforts should be made to reach a 71–29 ratio in the various schools so that there will be no basis for contending that one school is racially different from the others . . . , We . . . [find] that the use made of mathematical ratios was no more than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement. From that starting point, the District Court proceeded to frame a decree that was within its discretionary powers, as an equitable remedy for the particular circumstances. . . . In sum, the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court. (2) One-race Schools. The record in this case reveals the familiar phenomenon that, in metropolitan areas, minority groups are often found concentrated in one part of the city. . . . In light of the above, it should be clear that the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not, in and of itself, the mark of a system that still practices segregation by law. The district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, and will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools. No per se rule can adequately embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests involved; but, in a system with a history of segregation, the need for remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority’s compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition. Where the school authority’s proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all or predominately of one race, they have the burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory. . . . An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegregation plan. Provision for optional transfer of those in the majority racial group of a particular school to other schools where they will be in the minority is an indispensable remedy for those students willing to transfer to other schools in order to lessen the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma of segregation. In order to be effective, such a transfer arrangement must grant the transferring student free transportation and space must be made available in the school to which he desires to move. . . . The court orders in this and the companion Davis case now provide such an option.

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(3) Remedial Altering of Attendance Zones. The maps submitted in these cases graphically demonstrate that one of the principal tools employed by school planners and by courts to break up the dual school system has been a frank—and sometimes drastic—gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones. An additional step was pairing, “clustering,” or “grouping” of schools with attendance assignments made deliberately to accomplish the transfer of Negro students out of formerly segregated Negro schools and transfer of white students to formerly all-Negro schools. More often than not, these zones are neither compact . . . nor contiguous; indeed they may be on opposite ends of the city. As an interim corrective measure, this cannot be said to be beyond the broad remedial powers of a court. . . . All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations, and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school systems. . . . (4) Transportation of Students. The scope of permissible transportation of students as an implement of a remedial decree has never been defined by this Court, and, by the very nature of the problem, it cannot be defined with precision. . . . The District Court’s conclusion that assignment of children to the school nearest their home serving their grade would not produce an effective dismantling of the dual system is supported by the record. Thus, the remedial techniques used in the District Court’s order were within that court’s power to provide equitable relief; implementation of the decree is well within the capacity of the school authority. Source: Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/402/1.

3. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (No. 7811), 438 U.S. 265 (1978) Affirmative action has been a mechanism used by institutions of higher education to redress the long-standing exclusion of minority students. In response to affirmative action quotas utilized by graduate and professional schools, this suit was brought by a white man who was twice rejected from medical school in favor of minority applicants with lower test scores. The court ruled that race could be one of several factors in decision making; however, the use of quotas was effectively struck down. Such admissions systems have led to claims of “reverse racism” by whites who contend that they were denied acceptance solely on the basis of race. This was the first case challenging affirmative action and set the stage for future attempts to dismantle such policies.

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announced the judgment of the Court.

This case presents a challenge to the special admissions program of the petitioner, the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, which is designed to assure the admission of a specified number of students from certain minority groups. . . . The Supreme Court of California affirmed those portions of the trial court’s judgment declaring the special admissions program unlawful and enjoining petitioner from considering the race of any applicant . . . [and directed the trial court to order his admission. For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I believe that so much of the judgment of the California court as holds petitioner’s special admissions program unlawful and directs that respondent be admitted to the Medical School must be affirmed. . . . I also conclude, for the reasons stated in the following opinion, that the portion of the court’s judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its admissions process must be reversed. . . . Affirmed in part and reversed in part. I . . . Because the special admissions program involved a racial classification, the [California] Supreme Court held itself bound to apply strict scrutiny. . . . It then turned to the goals of the University presented as justifying the special program. Although the court agreed that the goals of integrating the medical profession and increasing the number of physicians willing to serve members of minority groups were compelling state interests, . . . it concluded that the special admissions program was not the least intrusive means of achieving those goals. . . . Petitioner argues that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny to the special admissions program because white males, such as respondent, are not a “discrete and insular minority” requiring extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. . . . Racial and ethnic classifications, however, are subject to stringent examination without regard to these additional characteristics. We declared as much in the first cases explicitly to recognize racial distinctions as suspect: . . . III.B This perception of racial and ethnic distinctions is rooted in our Nation’s constitutional and demographic history. The Court’s initial view of the Fourteenth Amendment was that its “one pervading purpose” was the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised dominion over him. . . .

Although many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white

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“majority,” Slaughter-House Cases, supra, the Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude. . . . Moreover, there are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself. First, it may not always be clear that a so-called preference is, in fact, benign. . . . Second, preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Third, there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent’s position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making. By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces. Disparate constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms, rather than alleviate them. . . . Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation. . . . IV.A If petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial, but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, supra at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, supra at 198; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). V.B In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the use of an explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class. The fatal flaw in petitioner’s preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 22. Such rights are not absolute. But when a State’s distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person’s skin, that individual is entitled to a demonstration that the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial state interest. Petitioner has failed to carry this burden. For this reason, that portion of the California court’s judgment holding petitioner’s special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment must be affirmed.

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C In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court’s judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed. VI With respect to respondent’s entitlement to an injunction directing his admission to the Medical School, petitioner has conceded that it could not carry its burden of proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program, respondent still would not have been admitted. Hence, respondent is entitled to the injunction, and that portion of the judgment must be affirmed. Opinion of mr. justice brennan, mr. justice white, mr. justice marshall, and blackmun, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

mr, justice

The Court today, in reversing in part the judgment of the Supreme Court of California, affirms the constitutional power of Federal and State Governments to act affirmatively to achieve equal opportunity for all. . . . But this should not and must not mask the central meaning of today’s opinions: Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area. marshall,

J., Separate Opinion

IV. While I applaud the judgment of the Court that a university may consider race in its admissions process, it is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In declining to so hold, today’s judgment ignores the fact that, for several hundred years, Negroes have been discriminated against not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone, but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color, he never even made it into the pot. Source: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (No. 7811), 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/SUPREMECOURT/TEXT/438/265.

United States The United States–Puerto Rico Relationship Lynn-Darrell Bender

Timeline 1493 Christopher Columbus discovers Puerto Rico on his second trip to the Americas. 1815 Spain issues the Real Cédula de Gracia, a decree establishing free trade, opening Puerto Rico’s ports to all countries and allowing non-Spanish immigration to the island. 1898 The United States invades and occupies Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War. Puerto Rico is ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. 1900 Under the Foraker Act, a civilian government controlled by the United States replaces military rule. Puerto Rican natives are classified as “nationals” of the United States. 1917 The Jones Act grants U.S. citizenship to the “citizens of Puerto Rico.” It increases local participation in the island’s government, but the island is fundamentally still under direct U.S. control. 1922 In the case of Balzac v. Porto Rico, the U.S. Supreme Court decides that the island is a territory rather than part of the Union. 1930 Puerto Rico’s population of 1 million in 1898 reaches 1,544,000 because of improved health and economic conditions. Nevertheless, the average Puerto Rican remains in poverty.

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1933 The United States responds to the Great Depression by creating the Puerto Rican Emergency Relief Administration, which spends $230 million between 1933 and 1941 for relief measures. 1938 The Popular Democratic Party (PDP) emerges under the leadership of Luis Muñoz Marín. 1941 Rexford G. Tugwell is named the governor of Puerto Rico by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He serves in this post until 1946. 1945 Large numbers of Puerto Ricans begin to migrate to the United States in search of jobs and better living conditions. 1946 President Harry S. Truman appoints Jesús Piñeiro as the island’s first Puerto Rican governor. 1948 Muñoz becomes Puerto Rico’s first elected governor. 1950 Social Security is extended to the residents of Puerto Rico. 1951 Law 600 authorizes a process to establish a constitution for Puerto Rico based on the principle of self-determination. 1952 The new constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico goes into effect. 1967 A plebiscite is held on the question of Puerto Rico’s political relationship with the United States. Voters overwhelmingly support the continuation of the commonwealth (commonwealth, 60 percent; statehood, 39 percent; independence, 1 percent). 1968 Luis A. Ferré, founder of the New Progressive Party (NPP) that favors statehood, wins the governorship.

UNI TED S TATES

1976 Congress approves Section 936 of the Federal Internal Revenue Tax Code, which allows U.S. companies operating in Puerto Rico to repatriate profits free of federal taxes. This leads to extensive U.S. investment in capital-intensive industries, which become the backbone of Puerto Rico’s economy. 1991 Puerto Rican citizens vote in a referendum authorized by the Puerto Rican legislature. Again, a majority of citizens rejects any change in the island’s status (53 percent in favor of the status quo versus 45.4 percent for change). 1993 Another status vote takes place, and commonwealth wins by a small margin (commonwealth, 48.6 percent; statehood, 46.3 percent; independence, 4.4 percent). 1995 Congress decides to phase out Section 936. Federal expenditures and transfer payments play an increasing role in sustaining Puerto Rico’s economy. 1998 Puerto Ricans once again organize a plebiscite on their own initiative, this time with five options listed on the ballot: independence, commonwealth, free association, statehood, and none of the above. The “none of the above” option prevails with 50.3 percent of the vote. 1999 A growing problem develops over the U.S. Navy’s continued use of Puerto Rico’s Vieques Island as a practice range. 2000 The PDP mayor of San Juan, Sila M. Calderón, is elected Puerto Rico’s first woman governor. 2001 By nearly a 70 percent majority, residents of Vieques Island approve referendum option 2, which calls for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. Navy ships from Vieques. Navy spokesmen immediately reject the demand, but President George W. Bush subsequently agrees to withdraw U.S. forces from the island. 2002 On July 26, Puerto Rico officially celebrates the 50th anniversary of its acquisition of commonwealth status, despite dissatisfaction among many Puerto Ricans with the arrangement.

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2003 The U.S. Navy closes its bombing range on the island of Vieques off the Puerto Rican coast. 2004 The autonomous party’s Aníbal Acevedo Vilá is confirmed as the territory’s next governor by a mere 0.2 percent margin of victory (48.4 percent versus 48.2 percent) over statehood candidate Pedro Rosselló. 2006 The U.S. Supreme Court rejects an appeal based on the alleged right of Puerto Ricans to vote in U.S. presidential elections. A budget shortfall leads to the closure of schools and many government agencies. Thousands protest. Puerto Rico adopts its first sales tax. 2008 Governor Acevedo Vilá pleads not guilty to corruption charges associated with campaign funding irregularities between 2000 and 2004. He also calls on the United Nations to back Puerto Rico’s right to self-determination. Luis Fortuño of the pro-statehood New Progressive Party wins the gubernatorial election with 59 percent of the votes over Commonwealth candidate Aníbal Acevedo Vilá. 2009 The new governor inherits an island government fighting a recession, a soaring murder rate, and a deficit of more than $1 billion. Huge protests ensue over job layoffs in the wake of Governor Fortuño’s announcement of major public spending cuts. 2010 The largest police graft probe in FBI history implicates dozens of Puerto Rican police officers in illegal drug-related activities. 2011 Barack Obama becomes the first president since John F. Kennedy to make an official visit to Puerto Rico. He expresses that a status referendum should take place, and if voters choose either statehood or independence, his administration will respect their decision. 2012 Alejandro García Padilla is elected governor over statehooder Luis Fortuño by the slim margin of 0.6 percent. That same day, another nonbinding referendum takes place that poses two questions. The first asks voters whether they favor U.S. territory status; 54 percent say “no.” The second then asks them to choose from

UNI TED S TATES

three options: statehood, independence, or sovereign free association—a status that would give Puerto Rico presumably more autonomy than it currently enjoys. Sixty-one percent chose statehood. However, 470,000 people cast blank ballots, 26 percent of all ballots cast. 2014 Puerto Rico’s high unemployment, soaring cost of living, pervasive crime, and crumbling schools prompt professionals and middle-class residents to move to the U.S. mainland. The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a transition for Puerto Rico from 400 years of Spanish rule to life under U.S. sovereignty. This encounter bonded two cultural traditions and historical experiences into what has become a fluid, dynamic, and highly controversial relationship. At its core is the persistently unresolved issue of the island’s political “status” with the United States, culminating neither in complete separation nor assimilation. Puerto Ricans themselves are almost hopelessly divided on what should be the ultimate political destiny of their people. Americans, in official circles and as individuals, are mostly just perplexed, and thus more inclined to passivity and noncommitment. Is there ethnic conflict? Perhaps so, but this takes on an entirely new dimension in the United States–Puerto Rico context. Puertorriqueños, no matter how “Americanized” they may have become, genuinely feel and consider themselves to be different from americanos. Yet, such sociological resistance to cultural absorption rarely manifests itself in overt anti-Americanism. This curious juxtaposition of values and circumstances continues to fascinate scholars and laymen alike. Historical Background Largely unknown is the fact that an economic relationship of considerable significance had developed between Puerto Rico and the United States prior to the Spanish-American War. As soon as Puerto Rico was officially allowed to engage in international trade (via the Real Cédula de Gracia) in 1815, the United States quickly replaced Spain as the island’s major trading partner. It became Puerto Rico’s leading customer for sugar and a major provider of imported goods, especially foodstuffs and agricultural implements. American merchant ships came to outnumber those of other nations, and many trading houses were established to facilitate the evolving trade pattern. The growing economic relations also produced a small yet highly influential American migration to Puerto Rico—American sugar planters who took their capital and then their slaves to the island, American ship captains and seamen, U.S. consular officers and staff, and business opportunists, as well as simple adventurers. Many were transients, but others stayed, initiating a cultural interchange on the personal level that continues to the present day. Americans in great numbers have taken up residence on the island since 1815. Thousands do today. Like so many elements of the United States–Puerto Rico relationship, this has hardly been

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a one-way road: many more Puerto Ricans, for sundry reasons, have sought new opportunities and lives in the United States. Rarely does this mean, however, that migrants forever abandon their respective homelands. The ease of modern transportation and communications greatly facilitates staying in touch. Puerto Rico came under sovereign U.S. control in the wake of the SpanishAmerican War, along with other former Spanish colonies ceded by Spain via the Treaty of Paris. Unhappy with life under Spanish colonial rule, most Puerto Ricans actually viewed the American arrival as a harbinger of freedom and prosperity. Indeed, the island’s political elite, traditionally divided into opposing camps, temporarily united in seeking statehood for the island. They were as confused about American intentions as the Americans themselves. Unfamiliar and perhaps even uncomfortable with responsibility for an “alien” people, the U.S. government vacillated: neither statehood nor independence. It opted, instead, for direct colonial rule. This was placed in the hands of military authorities until enactment of the Foraker Act (1900), which created a temporary civilian government headed by an American governor and his resident administrative staff. No civil rights were enumerated in the law, and Puerto Ricans had only limited participation in their own local affairs. Moreover, subsequent U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of this legislation defined Puerto Rico as an “unincorporated” territory of the United States—a possession subject to Congress under the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution. This “temporary” political arrangement lasted until midcentury with few significant alterations. The most significant event of the period was the decision of Congress to confer U.S. citizenship on the “citizens of Puerto Rico” via the Jones Act of 1917. Economically and socially, how did the Americans find Puerto Rico in the early decades of the 20th century? Long neglected by the Spaniards (who for centuries regarded the island mainly as a strategic garrison), Puerto Rico lacked even the most basic conditions for economic development. There were no exploitable minerals, few roads, and only 159 miles of railroad on the 3,421-square mile island whose population was already approaching 1 million people. Public education was limited to a few urban-based schools, and there was no university. Nearly 90 percent of the people were illiterate and lived practically on a subsistence level. The largely untrained and unskilled workforce engaged in rudimentary agricultural pursuits for pay only a few months each year. The new U.S. authorities gave first priority to basic social needs: public works, health, sanitation, and education. A public school system became a reality, followed by the creation in 1903 of an institution of higher learning whose initial purpose was to train people for the teaching profession. It became the University of Puerto Rico. Simultaneously, the influx of U.S. capital was rapid and dramatic. Much of Puerto Rico’s sugar, tobacco, and needlework industries came under its domination, thus tightly linking the island’s economy to American interests. Regardless, Puerto Rico remained what former Puerto Rican governor Rexford G. Tugwell called “a stricken land.” This dreary panorama began to change in the early 1940s with the victory of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) under the charismatic leadership of Luis Muñoz

UNI TED S TATES

Marín and the arrival of Governor Tugwell. A one-time proponent of independence for Puerto Rico, Muñoz came to the realization that the welfare of his people should come first. By emphasizing that Puerto Ricans could decide their own future by creating an economy with social justice, he astutely struck the chord of Puerto Rican nationalism without attacking the U.S. government. Tugwell largely supported the implementation of Muñoz’s state economic development program under the aegis of the Government Development Company (later known as Fomento) and the Government Development Bank. A key element was full tax exemption (income, property, excise, and municipal) for new industries established on the island. The response was immediate and pronounced, mostly from U.S. industries. This initiative marked the beginning of Operation Bootstrap. In 1948, Muñoz and the PDP swept the elections with 61 percent of the popular vote, thus making him the island’s first elected governor. Mñoz had concluded that Puerto Rico’s separation from the United States would be an economic disaster. He chose a middle ground between outright assimilation and independence, an arrangement that would allow Puerto Rico maximum autonomy in close association with the United States. This concept became a reality between 1950 and 1952 with the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Estado Libre Asociado) through a process that involved U.S. congressional legislation authorizing a constitutional convention and popular referenda in Puerto Rico. This legislation (the Federal Relations Act, Public Law 600) still defines the legal relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. It also let the United States off the hook with the United Nations, which had required yearly reports on the well-being of Puerto Rico as a “non-self-governing territory.” In 1953, the UN General Assembly decided (Resolution 748, VIII) that the commonwealth had produced “self-government” for the people of Puerto Rico. The Conflict Status is the linchpin of Puerto Rican politics. Without it, the wheel that propels Puerto Rican politics would fall off. While under Spanish rule, Puerto Rico’s body politic splintered around what relationship the island should have with the metropolitan power. A familiar tripartite division developed vis-à-vis the United States: yesterday’s assimilationists, autonomists, and separatists have become, respectively, today’s statehooders, commonwealthers, and independentistas. The autonomists, who sought a large measure of self-government in political association with Spain, achieved a degree of success on the eve of the Spanish-American War. Fearful that the insurrection in Cuba would reverberate in neighboring Puerto Rico, the Spanish government granted the island a charter of autonomy in 1897. But even these minimal local powers were never put to a test, being cut off by the U.S. occupation only a few months later. Now, despite the 62-year experience with commonwealth and an extremely large measure of material progress for the island residents, the status debate rages on. The statehood option (New Progressive Party, or NPP) has gained considerable acceptance, with about 45 percent of the electorate now supporting it. The

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independence movement, slivered into various factions, is electorally represented by the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), which, although quite vocal and capable of mobilizing strong demonstrations in support of its causes, rarely garners more than 5 percent of the popular vote at election time. Although diminished, support for the PDP (the populares) is still quite solid, preferred by no less than 45 percent of Puerto Rican voters. None of the parties, including the PDP, is happy with the status quo. The NPP statehooders demand the full rights and privileges of U.S. citizenship through the incorporation of Puerto Rico as a state of the Union. They believe the present commonwealth arrangement is undignified, and they are willing to forego special privileges (for example, the island’s current fiscal autonomy and federal tax exemption) for complete equality. However, they believe that Spanish should—and would—remain as the island’s principal language and that arrangements can be made to retain a separate identity in such contests as Miss Universe and the Olympic Games. Statehood itself, many of them think, will be enough to raise Puerto Rico’s economy and its citizens’ economic well-being to U.S. levels. A major hindrance is how to pay federal taxes without in some way severely reducing insular taxes and the island’s massive governmental bureaucracy. Proponents of independence emphasize the benefits of nationhood and the sovereign power Puerto Rico will have to make its own decisions. With statehood, they believe, the Puerto Rican “nation” will eventually disappear within the “melting pot” that still largely characterizes American society. The PIP advocates a democratic socialism as an ideological guide for Puerto Rico as an independent republic. They believe that close ties with the United States will continue, including open access to the United States for its people and products. Party leaders stress that it is constitutionally feasible for the United States to allow Puerto Ricans to retain U.S. citizenship, and they openly support the concept of dual citizenship as a distinctive feature of the “sovereign” Puerto Rico republic. Supporters for the continuation of the commonwealth argue that this carefully crafted arrangement gives Puerto Rico the benefits and security embodied in statehood without the loss of Puerto Rico’s unique culture. It is, indeed, a middle ground between the extremes of statehood and independence that has worked remarkably well. Puerto Ricans (on the island) enjoy the rights and privileges of all Americans, but they cannot vote in national elections for president and vice president. In turn, island residents are exempt from paying most federal taxes. Representation in the U.S. Congress is limited to one nonvoting (except in committee) resident commissioner popularly elected by island voters for a four-year term. Party ideologues insist that the commonwealth was founded on the basis of a “compact” between the U.S. government and the people of Puerto Rico that cannot be unilaterally altered. Moreover, the time has come, they assert, for negotiations leading to “improvements” in the current arrangements in the interest of expanding Puerto Rican autonomy. They cite specific areas for expanded local authority: immigration, commerce, communications, environmental control, labor relations, and, above all, the legal ability to limit the application of certain federal laws.

UNI TED S TATES

(Unless specifically omitted, all federal statutes apply equally to Puerto Rico—even when they are contrary to provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution, e.g., the death penalty for certain crimes committed in violation of federal law.) Puerto Rico would continue to share a common citizenship, currency, and defense, with exemption from federal taxes. A party slogan is “The best of both worlds.” Critics call it “Fantasy Island,” in that it is wholly unlikely that the United States would, or even could, accede to surrendering such essential attributes of its sovereignty. Another option currently gaining certain acceptance champions the idea of making Puerto Rico an “associated republic,” with sovereign power freely, and in full equality, to sign a treaty that defines in detail a relationship of mutuality. This meets one of the decolonization standards set by the United Nations (the other two are independence and full integration into the metropolitan political system). The United States already engages in this type of relationship with the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau, all formerly part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered by the United States. Its proponents in Puerto Rico believe most elements of the commonwealth could be retained, such as common market, currency, and defense, many federal social programs, and the right to enter the United States to work or establish residence. The key to this option, perhaps, is whether Puerto Ricans would willingly relinquish U.S. citizenship. Free association would certainly put to rest the question of self-determination and Puerto Rico’s place in the world community. Management of the Conflict Several plebiscites have taken place over the years to gauge public support on a preferred status alternative. In 1967, 60 percent of Puerto Ricans voted to maintain their commonwealth status, while 39 percent voted for statehood and 1 percent for independence. The 1993 vote was 48.6 percent for commonwealth, 46.3 percent for statehood, and 4.4 percent for independence. The 1998 vote was largely invalidated by the fact that 50 percent of those who participated chose the option of “none of the above.” In 2012, for the first time, Puerto Ricans were asked about their wishes in two parts, as recommended by a White House Task Force. The first part asked whether Puerto Rico should continue as a territorial commonwealth: 54 percent voted no. The second part then asked voters to express their preference between three “non-territorial” options. The result was statehood (61%), independence (5%), and sovereign free associated state (33%). However, 26 percent of the total ballots cast were deliberately left blank in protest to the absence of the commonwealth option, thereby once again producing a situation of uncertainty regarding status. Just how long will this go on? With no clear-cut winner, the United States is quite logically reluctant to impose a “solution.” In fact, without a crystal-clear signal from the Puerto Rican people in the form of an overwhelming approval of one option, Congress is unlikely to consider the vote a true expression of self-determination. A major defect in the plebiscitary process has been the practice of allowing the local parties to provide

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Table 1  Results of Puerto Rican Status Plebiscites Free Association

None/Blank

4,248

N/A

N/A

Share

60.1%

38.8%

0.6%

–

–

1993

826,326

788,296

75,620

N/A

N/A

Share

48.6%

46.3%

4.4%

–

–

1998

993

728,157

39,838

4,536

787,900

Share

0.1%

46.5%

2.5%

0.3%

50.3%

2012

N/A

834,191

74,895

454,768

498,604

Share

–

44.4%

4%

24.2%

26.5%

Turnout

Independence

274,312

Statehood

425,132

Commonwealth

1967

66.4% 73.5% 71.3% 76.7%

Source: Puerto Rico Electoral Commission http://www. ceepur. org/es-pr/Webmaster/Paginas/EveatosElectorales.aspx

their own definitions of the option they espouse, without regard to what the U.S. Congress might be willing to grant. In April 2013, President Obama proposed that $2.5 million be appropriated to the Justice Department to be assigned to the Puerto Rico Elections Commission for the purpose of resolving Puerto Rico’s status problem by consulting its voters on one or more status options that are compatible with the Constitution, laws, and public policy of the United States. This time the vote would be under federal auspices so that the results cannot be disputed by any of the political parties on the island. However, the attempt to set down a more realistic and politically feasible statement of what the options could be from the U.S. standpoint is more likely to once again be stymied by the local parties. Another difficulty is the inability of Congress to make a firm commitment to abide by the choice of the Puerto Rican people. For example, there is no constitutional imperative that could obligate a future Congress to grant statehood to Puerto Rico based on a prior agreement that guarantees this outcome. There is also the thorny issue of who should be allowed to vote: only Puerto Ricans on the island, ethnic Puerto Ricans anywhere, or all normally qualified island voters, regardless of ethnic background? Hispanics in the United States are likewise conflicted on the Puerto Rico issue. Accustomed to minority-group politics within the context of American civil rights, their natural inclination is to view it as a struggle for equality under the U.S. Constitution. They may wonder why Puerto Ricans are so unhappy with their lot, but they certainly empathize with the desire for self-identification and the preservation of the island’s distinctive culture.

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Significance It is easy to see why the contentious issue of Puerto Rico’s status seems to have a life of its own. There would be no such issue, of course, if the island were fully assimilated into the U.S. federal system and there were no striving for a political expression commensurate with a sense of cultural distinctness. As it is, in the end, it must be the Puerto Ricans themselves who decide their destiny as a people. Whether the United States–Puerto Rico relationship is viewed as good or bad, boon or bane, democratic or authoritarian, liberating or restraining, the only sure truth is that the American presence in Puerto Rico has been the dominant fact of the island’s history since 1898. The history of the island and its people is intimately intertwined with the United States on every imaginable level. Although still lagging behind U.S. norms, Puerto Rico’s social and economic indices far exceed those of neighboring islands and republics. It enjoys political stability and the trappings of modernity. The primary language is still Spanish (spoken and used more correctly today than in 1898 because of universal public education), but the thoughts, feelings, and values underlying the spoken or written word reveal evidences of deepseated American influences. Indeed, “Americanization” permeates every aspect of Puerto Rico’s physical and psychic environment—not only such things as lifestyles, employment, living and working conditions, and transportation, but also choices of entertainment, moral and ethical views, political and legal values, and aspirations for the future. From this standpoint, most Puerto Ricans would likely feel more comfortable living in Iowa than in most localities in Spanish-speaking Latin America. Still, Puerto Rico has not yet become truly “American.” Stores, malls, highways, schools, vehicles, and businesses identical to those in the United States abound, even in the far corners of the island’s rurality. Yet, nothing is quite the same. Everything becomes “Puertoricanized.” By far, the vast majority of American companies on the island are now largely staffed and run by Puerto Ricans. And no less than 90 percent of those who read English-language news sources and listen to the Englishlanguage radio station are Puerto Ricans whose first language is Spanish. Even the federal government workforce is almost entirely made up of Puerto Ricans—from postal workers to federal judges. Puerto Rico is an open society that has drawn people of diverse nationalities and backgrounds. Overt xenophobia is rare. Some rancor is displayed toward the rather large Dominican and Cuban communities, but this almost never translates into open hostility. Even some of their own (people of Puerto Rican descent born and reared off island) are oftentimes treated with condescension. Racism exists in a subtle yet pungent form. Puerto Ricans are also used to all types of Americans, from transient tourists, soldiers, businesspeople, and government employees to those who for diverse reasons decide to make the island their permanent home. The latter freely interact with Puerto Ricans at all levels as equals. Yet, seldom is an American fully accepted as a “Puerto Rican”—even those who live on the island for decades, speak fluent Spanish, work in Puerto Rican employment situations, or marry into an island family.

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Puerto Rico is increasingly integrated into the larger scope of U.S. and even world dynamics. In areas such as the economy, the military, and public administration, the distinction between americanos and puertorriqueños has become blurred over time. Notably absent, however, is any such fusion in the arena of local politics and arts, where the feeling of separateness finds its fullest expression. Despite the common tie of U.S. citizenship, Puerto Ricans show little interest in the inner workings of American politics—even though many of its outcomes bear directly on them and their society. Furthermore, the issues that fire public debate and political partisanship in the United States resonate weakly in Puerto Rico’s political culture. Ideological battles of liberals versus conservatives, states’ rights versus federal authority, welfare versus workfare are pertinent only to the extent that they may affect Puerto Rican interests. Moreover, local politics is truly a local preserve, a place where few outsiders dwell: elective offices and appointments to key governmental positions go almost exclusively to Puerto Ricans. A similar phenomenon occurs in the arts and cultural circles of the island. These are the bastions of puertorriquenidad, the exaltation of a unique cultural heritage linguistically, racially, and historically separate from that of the United States. These are the cultural elites and intellectuals who view Puerto Rico as a nation, in the sense of a distinct cultural-linguistic unit that must be defended and preserved. This sentiment predominates in their artistic creativity. Puerto Rican literature, for instance, more often than not simply ignores the effects of the American presence on island society over the past 116 years. This diversion from reality is quite prevalent even in the more popular culture, where Americans and U.S. institutions and policies are typically portrayed—if mentioned at all—in stereotypical characterizations. The analysis offered in this study highlights the contacts between two peoples with different cultures and values whose relationship is still far from settled. With the American invasion in 1898, Puerto Rico had to begin yet another process in a continuing endeavor to find a satisfactory solution to relations with a metropolitan power. Suggested Readings Bender, Lynn-Darrell, ed. 1998. The American Presence in Puerto Rico. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Publicaciones Puertorriqueñas. Cabán, Pedro A. 2000. Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898–1932. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Cabranes, José. 1979. Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the U.S. Citizenship of Puerto Ricans. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Carr, Raymond. 1984. Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment. New York: Vintage Books. Duffy Burnett, Christina, and Marshall Burke, eds. 2001. Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion and the Constitution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Fernández, Ronald. 1996. The Disenchanted Island. New York: Praeger. Freidrich, Carl J. 1975. Puerto Rico: Middle Road to Freedom. North Stratford, NH: Ayer. Garrett, R. Sam. 2011. Political Status of Puerto Rico: Options for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 7-5700.

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Gisselquist, Rachel M. 2000. The Challenge of Puerto Rico: Resolving the Status Issue. Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation. González, Guillermo, M.D. 2012. Plebiscito Status Personalidad Colonizada Puerto Rico 2012. Bloomington, IN: Palibrio, Author Solutions. Maldonado, Alex W. 1997. Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. Meléndez, Edgardo. 1989. Puerto Rico’s Statehood Movement. New York: Greenwood Press. Negrón Muntaner, F., and Ramón Grosfoguel, eds. 1997. Puerto Rican Jam: Rethinking Colonialism and Nationalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pantojas-García, Emilio. 2013. “The Puerto Rico Status Question: Can the Stalemate Be Broken?” Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy 1 (2) (June): 41–52. Pierce Flores, Lisa. 2009. The History of Puerto Rico. The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations Series. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc. Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status. 2011. Washington, D.C.: The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Puerto_Rico_ Task_Force_Report.pdf. Rezvani, David A. 2014. Surpassing the Sovereign State: The Wealth, Self-rule and Security Advantages of Partially Independent Territories. New York: Oxford University Press, 169–189. Scarano, Francisco A. 2001. Puerto Rico. Oxford, England: Latin American Histories, Oxford University Press. Trias Monge, José. 1997. The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. U.S. English Foundation. 2011. A Clash of Cultures: The Future of Puerto Rico and the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. English Foundation. Venator-Santiago, Charles R. 2010. The U.S. Citizenship in Puerto Rico, a Short History. Storrs: University of Connecticut, Institute of Puerto Rican and Latino Studies.

Appendices 1. The 1898 Treaty of Paris The Spanish-American War concluded with the two parties signing the Treaty of Paris in 1898. The treaty formally approved the cession of Puerto Rico to the United States. With no prior experience governing colonies, the United States resorted to its military to provide basic governance. During the first two years (1898–1900) of direct American rule, measures were taken to bolster the island’s economic, educational, health, and commercial infrastructure in line with American institutions and practices. Puerto Rican involvement in these matters was minimal. The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States, William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States; And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,

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Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy of the Cortes and associate justice of the supreme court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division; Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles: Article I Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property. Article II Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. Article III Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line . . .: Article VIII In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain... Article IX Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

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Article X The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion. ... Article XIII The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. . . . Article XIV Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty. … Article XVII . . . In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. Source: A Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, U.S. Congress, 55th Cong., 3d sess., Senate Doc. No. 62, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899), 5–11. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sp1898.asp.

2. The Foraker Act of 1900 On April 12, 1900, President William McKinley signed the territory’s first organic act, which established a civil government headed by a presidential appointee. It is more commonly known as the Foraker Act for its sponsor, Ohio senator Joseph B. Foraker, who introduced the legislation. The Foraker Act established civil government in Puerto Rico, formally recognized a Puerto Rican citizenship, and authorized the application of federal laws on the island. It specified that the U.S. president appoint a civilian governor, all cabinet members, and an executive council made up of Americans and Puerto Ricans. It also created the position of resident commissioner to advise Congress (without a vote) on island matters. Additionally, Puerto Ricans could now elect their own 35-member House of Representatives. The act recognized a specific Puerto Rican citizenship that, in essence, made Puerto Ricans “foreign in a domestic sense.” Foraker Act of 1900 AN ACT Temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes.

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Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the provisions of this Act shall apply to the island of Porto Rico and to the adjacent islands and waters of the islands lying east of the seventy-fourth meridian of longitude west of Greenwich, which were ceded to the United States by the Government of Spain by treaty entered into on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight; and the name Porto Rico, as used in this Act, shall be held to include not only the island of that name, but all the adjacent islands as aforesaid. General Provisions. … Sec. 6. That the capital of Porto Rico shall be at the city of San Juan and the seat of government shall be maintained there. Sec. 7. That all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in Porto Rico, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of Porto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain on or before the eleventh day of April, nineteen hundred, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain entered into on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine; and they, together with such citizens of the United States as may reside in Porto Rico, shall constitute a body politic under the name of The People of Porto Rico, with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred, and with power to sue and be sued as such. … Sec. 14. That the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States, except the internal-revenue laws, which, in view of the provisions of section three, shall not have force and effect in Porto Rico. Sec. 15. That the legislative authority hereinafter provided shall have power by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law or ordinance, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act, as it may from time to time see fit. Sec. 16. That all judicial process shall run in the name of “United States of America, ss: the President of the United States,” and all criminal or penal prosecutions in the local courts shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of “The people of Porto Rico;” and all officials authorized by this Act shall before entering upon the duties of their respective offices take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Porto Rico. The Governor. Sec. 17. That the official title of the chief executive officer shall be “The Governor of Porto Rico.” He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the

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Senate; he shall hold his office for a term of four years and until his successor is chosen and qualified unless sooner removed by the President; he shall reside in Porto Rico during his official incumbency, and shall maintain his office at the seat of government; he may grant pardons and reprieves, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses against the laws of Porto Rico, and respites for offenses against the laws of the United States, until the decision of the President can be ascertained; . . . House of Delegates. Sec. 27. That all local legislative powers hereby granted shall be vested in a legislative assembly which shall consist of two houses; one the executive council, as hereinbefore constituted, and the other a house of delegates, to consist of thirty-five members elected biennially by the qualified voters as hereinafter provided; and the two houses thus constituted shall be designated “The legislative assembly Porto Rico.” Sec. 28. That for the purposes of such elections Porto Rico shall be divided by the executive council into seven districts, composed of contiguous territory and as nearly equal as may be in population, and each district shall be entitled to five members of the house of delegates. … The Judiciary Sec. 33. . . . the chief justice and associate justices of the supreme court and the marshal thereof shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the judges of the district courts shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the executive council, and all other officials and attaches of all the other courts shall be chosen as may be directed by the legislative assembly, which shall have authority to legislate from time to time as it may see fit with respect to said courts, and any others they may deem it advisable to establish. . . . Sec. 34. That Porto Rico shall constitute a judicial district to be called “the district of Porto Rico.” The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a district judge, a district attorney, and a marshal for said district, each for a term of four years, unless sooner removed by the President. The district court for said district shall be called the district court of the United States for Porto Rico and shall have power to appoint all necessary officials and assistants, including clerk, an interpreter, and such commissioners as may be necessary, who shall have like power and duties as are exercised and performed by commissioners of the circuit courts of the United States, and shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of district courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court. … Sec. 39. That the qualified voters of Porto Rico shall, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, anno Domini nineteen hundred, and every two years thereafter, choose a resident commissioner to the United States, who shall be entitled to official recognition as such by all Departments, upon presentation to the Department of State of a certificate of

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election of the governor of Porto Rico…: Provided, That no person shall be eligible to such election who is not a bona fide citizen of Porto Rico, who is not thirty years of age, and who does not read and write the English language. … Sec. 41. That this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after the first day of May, nineteen hundred. Approved, April 12, 1900. Source: Foraker Act of 1900, in U.S. Statutes at Large, 56th Cong., sess. 1, ch. 191: 77–86. Available at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/polsciwb/brianl/docs/1900ForakerAct.pdf.

3. The Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917 The Jones-Shafroth Act (better known as the Jones Act) was signed by President Woodrow Wilson on March 2, 1917. The law amended the Foraker Act and changed Puerto Rico’s status to an organized, but unincorporated, territory. It also created a more autonomous local government with three branches, extended civil rights to the island’s citizens, and created a locally elected bicameral legislature. The governor, attorney-general, and commissioner of education were appointed by the U.S. president. The governor, in turn, appointed the remaining heads of executive departments. However, the governor and the president of the United States had the power to veto any law passed by the legislature. The U.S. Congress also retained the power to deter any other action taken by the island’s legislature. The United States thus maintained control over the island’s fiscal and economic matters and exercised authority over basic governmental matters. The Jones Act also extended U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans by statute. CHAP. 145.—An Act to provide a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes. (Sixty-Fourth Congress, Session II, Approved March 2, 1917) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the provisions of this Act shall apply to the island of Porto Rico and to the adjacent islands belonging to the United States, and waters of those islands; and the name Porto Rico as used in this Act shall be held to include not only the island of that name but all the adjacent islands as aforesaid.

BILL OF RIGHTS Sec. 2. That no law shall be enacted in Porto Rico which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws. That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a copy thereof, to have a speedy and public trial, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.

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That no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law; and no person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . . That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it, in either of which events the same may be suspended by the President, or by the governor, whenever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. That no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use except upon payment of just compensation ascertained in the manner provided by law. . . . That no law granting a title of nobility shall be enacted, and no person holding any office of profit or trust under the government of Porto Rico shall, without the consent of the Congress of the United States, accept any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, queen, prince, or foreign State, or any officer thereof. . . . That no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed, and that no political or religious test other than an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Porto Rico shall be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the government of Porto Rico. …

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT SEC. 12. That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer, whose official title shall be “The Governor of Porto Rico.” He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and hold his office at the pleasure of the President and until his successor is chosen and qualified. The governor shall reside in Porto Rico during his official incumbency and maintain his office at the seat of government. . . . SEC. 13. That the following executive departments are hereby created: A department of justice . . . ; a department of finance…; a department of interior, . . .; a department of education . . .; a department of agriculture and labor; and a department of health. . . . The attorney general and commissioner of education shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . . The heads of the four remaining departments shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of Porto Rico. …

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SEC. 23. That all local legislative powers in Porto Rico, except as herein otherwise provided, shall be vested in a legislature which shall consist of two houses, one the senate and the other the house of representatives, and the two houses shall be designated “the Legislature of Porto Rico.” … SEC. 26. That the Senate of Porto Rico shall consist of nineteen members elected for terms of four years by the qualified electors of Porto Rico. . . . SEC. 27. That the House of Representative of Porto Rico shall consist of thirty-nine members elected quadrennially by the qualified electors of Porto Rico, as herein provided. Each of the [35] representative districts hereinafter provided for shall have the right to elect one representative, and in addition thereto there shall be appointed four representatives at large. . . . …

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT SEC. 40. That the judicial power shall be vested in the courts and tribunals of Porto Rico now established and in operation under and by virtue of existing laws. . . . SEC. 41. That Porto Rico shall constitute a judic8ial district, to be called “the district of Porto Rico.” The President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint one district judge, who shall serve for a term of four years and until his successor is appointed and qualified, and whose salary shall be $5,000 per annum. Source: Jones-Shafroth Act. Pub.L. 64–368, 39 Stat. 951, enacted March 2, 1917. Available at http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Constitutional%20Law/1917/IFES_29 /CON00154.pdf.

4. The Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act of 1950 (Public Law 81-600) Finally, in 1950, Congress approved legislation to allow Puerto Rico to adopt its own constitution and form of government. Unlike the Foraker and Jones Acts, Public Law 600 was “in the nature of a compact,” which meant that both Congress and the Puerto Rican people had to agree to any proposed arrangement. The first step was a referendum whereby the island’s voters authorized a constitutional convention to propose a new constitution that was subsequently adopted by the people of Puerto Rico and formally approved by Congress in 1951. Taking effect in 1952, the new constitution officially created the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. As a result, the federal government treats Puerto Rico as a state for most purposes. The island thus remains an unincorporated U.S. territory that is allowed self-governing authority in local affairs. Federal laws apply to the island unless the U.S. Congress acts to specifically exclude Puerto Rico from its legislation.

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AN ACT To provide for the organization of a constitutional government by the people of Puerto Rico. (81st Congress, 2nd Session) Whereas the Congress of the United States by a series of enactments has progressively recognized the right of self-government of the people of Puerto Rico; and Whereas under the terms of these congressional enactments an increasingly large measure of self-government has been achieved: Therefore Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, fully recognizing the principle of government by consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption. SEC. 2. This Act shall be submitted to the qualified voters of Puerto Rico for acceptance or rejection through an island-wide referendum to be held in accordance with the laws of Puerto Rico. Upon the approval of this Act, by a majority of the voters participating in such referendum, the Legislature of Puerto Rico is authorized to call a constitutional convention to draft a constitution for the said island of Puerto Rico. The said constitution shall provide a republican form of government and shall include a bill of rights. SEC. 3. Upon adoption of the constitution by the people of Puerto Rico, the President of the United States is authorized to transmit such constitution to the Congress of the United States if he finds that such constitution conforms with the applicable provisions of this Act and of the Constitution of the United States. Upon approval by the Congress the constitution shall become effective in accordance with its terms. SEC. 4. Except as provided in section 5 of this Act, the Act entitled “An Act to provide a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes”, approved March 2, 1917, as amended, is hereby continued in force and effect and may hereafter be cited as the “Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act”. SEC. 5. At such time as the constitution of Puerto Rico becomes effective, the following provisions of such Act of March 2, 1917, as amended, shall be deemed repealed. . . . [The sections are identified in the deleted text.] SEC. 6. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed. Approved July 3, 1950. Source: Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of 1950 (Pub.L. 81–600). Available at http://www .legisworks.org/congress/81/publaw-600.pdf.

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Western Sahara Ethnic Conflict and the 20th Century’s Last Colonial War Stephen Zunes

Timeline 1884 Spaniards declare a protectorate over much of the Western Sahara. 1934 Spaniards control much of the interior for the first time. March 1956 Morocco becomes independent from France. May 1973 The Polisario Front is formed as the leading nationalist movement of the Western Sahara. 1974 Armed clashes between the Polisario and the Spanish colonial forces begin. 1975 May: A visiting UN mission notes that the overwhelming majority of the population supports independence under Polisario rule. September: Spain promises independence to the Polisario by February 1976. October: The International Court of Justice affirms a ruling affirming primacy of the principle of self-determination over irredentist claims of Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco launches the Green March into Western Sahara to assert its claim to territory, soon followed by the Moroccan army. November: The UN Security Council deplores Morocco’s actions and calls for withdrawal; the Madrid Accord is signed, provisionally partitioning territory between Morocco and Mauritania.

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1975–1976 The large-scale exodus of the Sahrawi population occurs in the face of Moroccan attacks. February 1976 Polisario declares the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. August 1979 Mauritania is defeated by the Polisario and renounces its claim over its southern third of the territory, which is promptly seized by Morocco. 1982 Successive victories by the Polisario give it control of 85 percent of the territory, leaving Morocco with control of the far northwestern corner and a few garrison towns. 1983–1987 Large-scale French and American military assistance lead to a reversal of strategic situation, including the creation of a wall sealing most of the territory from the Polisario, leading to a war of attrition. The mass Moroccan colonization of territory continues. April 1991 The United Nations accepts plans for a referendum on the fate of the territory, and a cease-fire goes into effect between Morocco and the Polisario. 1991–1997 Disputes on voter identification indefinitely delay the implementation of the referendum; continued French and U.S. support for Morocco discourages compromise. 1997 The Houston Agreement, negotiated by a UN special envoy and former U.S. secretary of state James Baker, between Morocco and the Polisario appears to break the impasse, but Morocco refuses to follow through. 1999 King Hassan II of Morocco, the architect of the takeover, dies and is replaced by his son, King Mohammed VI. 2001 Morocco—backed by France and the United States but lacking UN support— renounces its referendum plans and calls for a settlement based on limited autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.

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2005– Increasing acts of nonviolent civil resistance in the occupied territory occur in support of self-determination, and there are periodic clashes between indigenous Sahrawis and Moroccan settlers. Morocco has occupied Western Sahara, a desert country about the size of Colorado on the northwestern coast of Africa, since late 1975. While most of the international community regards this situation as a case of an illegal military occupation, Morocco has annexed the territory and considers it an integral part of its own country. Most of the indigenous Western Saharan population, known as Sahrawis, have rejected Moroccan efforts at assimilation; indeed, roughly half of the population lives in exile in self-governing refugee camps in neighboring Algeria. While the conflict in many respects is more that of territorial conquest of one country by another than a classic ethnic conflict, important issues regarding ethnicity have made the conflict one of the longest-running disputes in the world. Unlike most ethnic minorities, the Sahrawis are represented by a government, known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which has been recognized by more than 75 countries and is a full member of the African Union (AU). Indeed, most Sahrawis do not see themselves as an ethnic minority within Morocco, but as an occupied people in what many consider Africa’s last colony. Because it is one of the few remaining non-self-governing territories recognized by the United Nations, the fate of the territory has significant implications. Historical Background Just prior to the scheduled end of Spain’s colonial administration in 1976, the territory—then known as Spanish Sahara—was partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania. Spain had promised the country independence, but pressure from Morocco forced the Spanish government, in the midst of its own delicate transition period to democratic rule, to back away from its commitment. Instead, in November 1975, Spain signed the Madrid Accord, which granted to Morocco the administration of the northern two-thirds of the colony and to Mauritania the remainder. The United States played a major role in pressuring the reluctant Spain to sign the agreement, given its concern about the possible leftist orientation of an independent Western Sahara and hope that the political capital from the takeover would boost the domestic standing of Morocco’s King Hassan II, a strong American ally who had been subjected to two coup attempts in recent years. The Western Sahara Polisario Front, the nationalist movement that had until then been battling Spain for independence, rejected the accord, so Morocco seized the territory by force. The invasion was widely condemned throughout the international community. Thomas M. Franck of the New York University Law School stated before Congress that Morocco’s invasion constituted “a particularly destabilizing precedent for Africa and indeed the whole world.”1

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The UN Security Council passed a resolution deploring the invasion and called for the withdrawal of Moroccan forces and a negotiated settlement. In addition, the United Nations reaffirmed the “inalienable right of the people of Spanish Sahara to self-determination” and insisted on an end to the fighting and a referendum to decide the fate of the territory. As a result of French and American objections, however, no enforcement mechanisms, such as military or economic sanctions, were included. During Morocco’s invasion, widespread attacks on civilians forced the majority of the population into exile in a desert region of neighboring Algeria. Nearly 150,000 Sahrawis now live in a series of refugee camps spread out over a broad expanse of territory southeast of Tindouf where they have been granted effective autonomy under Polisario rule by the Algerian government. Guerrillas of the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) continued their war against the Moroccan occupation forces for the next 16 years. In 1976, the Polisario Front proclaimed the creation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). In addition to widespread international recognition, a landmark ruling by the International Court of Justice in 1975 also confirmed Western Sahara’s right to self-determination. In 1979, after a series of losses on the battlefield, Mauritania signed a peace treaty with the Polisario and renounced sovereignty over its share of Western Sahara. Morocco then simply annexed the Mauritanian share as well. By 1981, thanks in part to substantial military aid from Algeria, the Polisario had driven Moroccan forces back until the occupation forces controlled a bare 15 percent of the territory. The Polisario even began to conduct strikes in Morocco itself; however, since Morocco had long been considered an important Western ally, a bulwark against communism, France and the United States—while stopping short of formally endorsing Morocco’s takeover—came to Morocco’s assistance. Under President Ronald Reagan, the already substantial U.S. support for the Moroccan war effort, launched under President Jimmy Carter, was greatly expanded to include direct assistance in counterinsurgency operations. These efforts effectively reversed the tide of the war in Morocco’s favor. Part of Morocco’s military successes was the construction—with U.S. support—of a series of heavily fortified sand walls, now 1,500 miles long, to prevent Polisario penetration into virtually all of Western Sahara. The wall led to a war of attrition. By the time a cease-fire went into effect in 1991, more than 10,000 people had been killed. Meanwhile, the Moroccan government began encouraging the migration of Moroccan civilians into the occupied territory in an effort to change the demographics of the country. Sahrawis are now a minority in their own country. The Moroccan monarchy and virtually the entire political establishment enthusiastically embraced the takeover as a nationalist victory against Spanish colonialism. Although heavy Moroccan casualties from the 16-year war and the enormous financial costs of maintaining the occupation has lessened the enthusiasm somewhat, among Moroccans, popular support for the incorporation of “the Sahara provinces” remains high.

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The Conflict Western Sahara has been long subjected to irredentist claims from both Mauritania and Morocco. The territory, which encompasses 127,000 square miles in northwestern Africa, has historically consisted of three subethnic groups: the Requibat, the Teknas, and the Oulad Delim, whose ancestors have inhabited Western Sahara and adjacent parts of neighboring states for more than a millennium. Although, as groups, they have all maintained ties with peoples in the region, they have collectively exhibited a history of independent governance and a fierce resistance to colonialism. The ancestors of the Sahrawis resisted attempted conquests by Romans, Vandals, and Byzantines. As a distinct people, the Sahrawi date from the 14th century with the intermarriage of desert Berbers with the Maquil Arabs.2 Like the Moroccans, the Sahrawis are an Arab Muslim people. Were it not for the continued Spanish repression and the resulting sense of nationalism that emerged, Western Sahara might have been integrated into Morocco as a hinterland of traditional peoples with minimal contact with, but essentially loyal, to the government. The nomadic peoples of southern Algeria, for example, have this relationship with the government in Algiers, despite occasional acts of resistance by the Tuaregs and others. Spain traditionally emphasized the cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of the Sahrawis, though this was undoubtedly influenced by the desire to resist Moroccan and Mauritanian irredentism during their colonial rule.3 At the same time, the Sahrawis’ distinct identity was hardly an artificial creation. The pastoral nomadism of the Sahrawis, as well as their clothing, diet, style of poetry, pigmentation, and facial features, generally distinguish them from their Moroccan counterparts. Their spoken dialect of Arabic, known as Hassaniya, is very different than the Maghrebi dialect spoken in Morocco, making direct verbal communication between Moroccans and Sahrawis in their native tongues extremely difficult. As Sahrawi nationalism grew, however, Morocco continued to view the territory on its southern border as its own, basing its claim on the traditional fealty proffered at certain historical periods by some of the region’s nomadic leaders, which at most seems to have been a recognition of the sultan’s religious authority.4 The Moroccans, largely a sedentary people with a long history of centralized government, often see themselves as representing a higher form of civilization than the nomadic and anarchic Sahrawis. Having traditionally looked down on the desert peoples as dark-skinned savages, many Moroccans regard their Saharan conquest as a kind of mission civilisatriste (civilizing mission). This sentiment has been used to help fuel the transformation of the territory through the migration of over 200,000 Moroccan colonists and hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of ambitious development projects. Differentiating themselves from Israeli efforts to settle the West Bank, the Moroccans emphasize that they are sending trained people into the territory to develop it, unlike the Israelis, who have enacted measures to discourage economic initiatives to improve the Palestinians’ standard of living. Indeed, the evolution of Al Aioun— Western Sahara’s largest urban area—from a shantytown of 30,000 at the end of

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the Spanish colonialism to a modern city of nearly 200,000 people, complete with factories, schools, a stadium, an international conference center, modern hospitals, and nearby modern port facilities, exemplifies Morocco’s determination to transform Western Sahara. However, most of the modern conveniences are enjoyed by the Moroccan settlers and assimilated Sahrawis; most of the indigenous population continues to live in poverty, and the military infrastructure has been given a priority over the civilian infrastructure.5 The Moroccan settlers pay no taxes, live in heavily subsidized housing, consume duty-free items, and make twice the wages of comparable jobs in Morocco.6 Fresh meat and vegetables are flown in daily and sold for less than what they would be sold for in Morocco; physicians and other professionals are given exceptionally high salaries.7 Three-quarters of Al Aioun is now Moroccan.8 Indeed, throughout Western Sahara, settlers and civil servants outnumber the local population by at least three to one. Such population transfers are contrary to international law. The enormous cost Morocco has incurred over the years of building up such an infrastructure, providing incentives for Moroccans to emigrate and maintaining the kinds of services to win the hearts and minds of the remaining Sahrawi population, makes the prospects of Morocco’s abandoning the territory voluntarily extremely remote. The nomadic lifestyle for many Sahrawis was a matter of choice and defended as a cultural right. Even educated Sahrawis with urban jobs typically return to a tent in the desert for part of the year.9 Moroccan occupiers have forcefully sought to alter that lifestyle, imposing nearly totalitarian control over the remaining Sahrawi population under its control.10 During the 1975–1990 counterinsurgency campaign against the Polisario, nomads were either forced into exile in Algeria or forcibly moved into camps in Moroccan-controlled territory. The Moroccan government has strongly encouraged people to speak in the Moroccan dialect, teaching Moroccan versions of the country’s history at schools, forbidding the display of the Western Sahara flag or other nationalist symbols, creating artificial shortages of traditional foods, and discouraging the use of traditional clothing and other cultural attributes.11 Notably, this has taken place not just in the occupied Western Sahara, but in Sahrawi-populated areas in southern Morocco. Despite these Moroccanization efforts, however, observers have noted how the Sahrawis tend to hold on to their desert culture and traditions, and the younger generation appears to be at least as nationalistic as their parents.12 Management of the Conflict By the early 1990s, both sides were exhausted by the war. Algeria, facing a serious internal crisis, was unable to continue providing the Polisario with its high level of financial and military support. The fighting was costing the Moroccans, heavily indebted to foreign lenders, over $1 million a day. Neither side could reasonably hope for a military victory. Thanks to negotiations brokered by the United Nations, a cease-fire and a peace plan went into effect in April 1991.

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Both sides, with UN backing, agreed to a referendum that would give the Sahrawi population the choice of independence or incorporation into Morocco. The United Nations would provide funding and personnel for implementation and logistics. Refugees were to be repatriated to take part in the voting along with Sahrawis still living in the territory. The roster of eligible voters was to have been based on a 1974 Spanish census. However, disputes between the two parties erupted over Morocco’s insistence that large numbers of Moroccans with tribal links to Western Sahara be allowed to vote as well. In addition, Moroccan harassment of UN personnel and ongoing political suppression of proindependence Sahrawis made further progress difficult. The long-running diplomatic stalemate appeared to have been broken through the efforts of UN special envoy and former U.S. secretary of state James Baker in September 1997, in Houston, in an agreement between representatives of Morocco and the Polisario Front. The parties agreed on the identification process for voters and a code of conduct for the long-awaited plebiscite to determine whether the territory would become independent or be integrated into Morocco. Yet again, however, disputes erupted over Moroccan objections regarding voter identification. France and the United States, both of which have veto power in the UN Security Council, are strong supporters of the Moroccan monarchy. They fear that a vote for independence would create a political backlash against King Mohammed VI, who is considered a strong ally of the West and a bulwark against extremist Islamic movements in the region and is already facing increasing pressure at home for greater democracy, economic justice, and an end to official corruption. As a result, they have made it difficult for the United Nations to enforce its resolutions and allow a fair referendum to go forward. In response to the frustrating stalemate, Morocco—with backing from the France and the United States—repudiated the proposed referendum in 2001 and announced a plan that would offer limited autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty. The Polisario rejected the idea, citing the highly centralized nature of the Moroccan state, the ongoing Moroccan colonization of the territory, and the requirement under international law that non-self-governing territories be allowed the option of independence. Subsequently, a largely nonviolent civil resistance campaign has emerged by Sahrawis against the occupation. One of the largest manifestations was an encampment composed of 20,000 protesters—a significant percentage of the Sahrawi population in this small country—set up in the fall of 2010 just outside Al Aioun. Following its destruction in a violent attack by Moroccan occupation forces, resulting in a number of civilian deaths, rioting broke out that witnessed the first major clashes between ethnic Sahrawis and ethnic Moroccans. Significance The struggle over Western Sahara is largely seen by the international community as a struggle for self-determination that has been preempted by realpolitik, in which a foreign military occupier has been able to expand its territory by force thanks to

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the acquiescence of major Western powers. Should Morocco succeed in holding onto the territory for an indefinite period, the outcome in Western Sahara could mark the first time since the founding of the United Nations that a recognized nonself-governing territory has been denied the right of self-determination. Given the number of African states that have irredentist claims on their neighbors and the arbitrary nature of many of the colonially imposed boundaries between African states, there is similar concern over the precedent it may set. There is also a risk of the resumption of open warfare between Moroccan occupation forces and the Polisario and the danger of its becoming a wider regional war involving Algeria and perhaps other countries. The dispute has already retarded efforts at attaining greater regional integration and sustainable economic development. Given the refusal of the majority of Sahrawis, including those who have lived under Moroccan control for over 40 years, to assimilate into Moroccan society, it is unlikely that even the potential international recognition of Moroccan sovereignty will prevent future conflict. While Western Sahara has generous mineral resources and rich fishing grounds off its coast, Morocco’s takeover has been based on nationalistic more than economic grounds, particularly in light of the enormous financial drain the war and occupation have meant for the kingdom of Morocco. In many respects, however, this makes it far less likely that Morocco will willingly give up the territory, given its strong ideological and political significance to the Moroccan state. Indeed, Morocco’s takeover of Western Sahara was the only successful manifestation of the nationalist dream of Le Grand Maroc—Greater Morocco—which at one time included all or parts of several other northwestern African countries. The conflict has received enormous attention from the African Union, the United Nations, and other intergovernmental organizations. However, the geopolitical concerns of France and the United States have prevented the international community from forcing Morocco to live up to what are widely recognized as its legal obligations. The markedly similar conflict between Indonesia and East Timor ended in 1999 with an Indonesian withdrawal from that island nation, leading to eventual independence. This came about only because of belated international pressure, which was in turn a result of pressure on Western governments by human rights groups, churches, and other nongovernmental organizations. It may take a similar movement from global civil society to resolve the conflict over Western Sahara. A nascent campaign has already emerged in Europe and Australia. Whether such a movement will reach a critical mass to make a difference remains to be seen. Should the Western Saharans be allowed to achieve their independence, the conflict would most likely be resolved. Many of the Moroccan settlers still have homes and close family connections in Morocco. Unlike many Israeli settlers, they are drawn not by ideological reasons as much as the financial benefits provided by the Moroccan regime, so a large number of them would likely return. On the other hand, should an independent Western Sahara prove to be more prosperous and democratic than Morocco, many would likely stay; the Polisario has indicated they would be willing to accept them as citizens. Another factor is that a

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disproportionate number of settlers are from the far south of Morocco and are ethnically Sahrawi and would thus likely prefer to live in their own state rather than under Moroccan rule. By contrast, the continued failure to allow for an act of self-determination by the indigenous Western Sahara population would almost certainly result in ongoing conflict. And, if the 2010 riots are any indication of the consequences of the ongoing irresolution of the conflict, there is a risk that the ethnic dimension of the conflict may come to the forefront. Notes 1. Thomas Franck, U.S. Congress. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on Africa and on International Organizations, Hearings on the Question of SelfDetermination in Western Sahara, 95th Cong., 1st sess., October 12, 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 19. 2. Barbara Harrell-Bond, The Struggle for the Western Sahara (Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff Reports, 1981), 3. 3. Ibid., 1. 4. Maurice Barbier’s Voyages et explorations au Sahara Occidental (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985) raises serious doubts concerning the legitimacy of even this claim. It should be noted, however, that under Islam, the distinction between religious and political ties is vague, and, within Moroccan historical tradition, this would indeed constitute sovereignty. 5. This is a personal observation by the author during field research, June 1990. 6. Henry Kamm, “In Western Sahara, Distrust and Dislocation,” New York Times, February 7, 1984: A8. 7. Pranay B. Gupte, “Morocco, Backed by U.S., Spurs Economic Buildup in West Sahara,” New York Times, May 4, 1982: 2. 8. See Teresa Smith de Cherif, “Al-Mukhtufin: A Report on Disappearances in Western Sahara,” WSC (Washington, D.C.: Western Sahara Committee Pamphlet of February 1985). 9. Kamm, “In Western Sahara.” 10. “Dateline,” West Africa, no. 3279 (May 26, 1980): 948. 11. Majid Abdullah, the Polisario representative to the United Nations, in a talk given at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1982. 12. Smith de Cherif, “Al-Mukhtufin,” 18.

Suggested Readings “Desert Dawn: War and Peace in Western Sahara.” 1997. Special issue of the New Internationalist (Hertford, England) 297 (December). Hodges, Tony. 1983. Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War. Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill. Human Rights Watch. 2008. Human Rights in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf Refugee Camps. New York: Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports /wsahara1208webwcover.pdf. Pazzanita, Anthony, and Tony Hodges. 1994. Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. Edison, NJ: Metuchen.

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Zoubir, Yahia, and Daniel Volman, eds. 1993. International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict. Westport, CT: Praeger. Zunes, Stephen. 1998. “The U.S. and the Western Sahara Peace Process.” Middle East Policy 5 (4) (January): 131–146.

Appendix The Sudan, with its many violent facets—including the violence still besetting Darfur in Sudan itself and the conflict in the world’s newest state, South Sudan—has long been of concern to the United Nations and such humanitarian organizations as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The excerpt below provides a sad overview of conditions still prevailing there when this volume went to press in early 2015.

Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, April 10, 2014 …

II. Recent Developments 2. The situation in Western Sahara, as it presents itself to MINURSO, is generally calm. The ceasefire continues to hold and the people can live without fear of a resumption of armed conflict in the medium term. 3. That part of Western Sahara under control of Morocco, west of the berm marking the ceasefire line, continued to witness considerable Moroccan investment in infrastructure and in the social and cultural sphere. Public life proceeded peacefully, and holidays brought large numbers of people into the streets, generally without incident. This was at least in part due to the extensive presence of security forces. 4. An increased number of delegations from foreign legislatures and diplomatic missions, as well as governmental and non-governmental institutions and journalists, visited the western part of the Territory. Moroccan authorities showed increased openness to and engagement with such visits, although on occasion visitors deemed hostile to Moroccan interests were denied access to or expelled from the Territory. 5. Some underlying discontent, however, remained perceptible among the Saharan population, expressing itself in sporadic demonstrations in Laayoune and other towns in the western part of the Territory throughout the reporting period. These were usually small in scale, but at times the participation of up to 300demonstrators was reported. These demonstrations aimed at drawing attention to human rights concerns, socioeconomic issues and political demands, including the right to self-determination. They were swiftly dispersed by Moroccan security forces. On most such occasions, there were credible reports of heavyhandedness on the part of security forces, as well as violence, such as stone-throwing, on the part of demonstrators. At times, the regional offices of the Moroccan National Human Rights Council (Conseil national des droits de l’homme) in Laayoune and Dakhla deployed observers and tried to defuse tensions and prevent clashes. ...

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9. Some degree of dissatisfaction among the population in the refugee camps was perceptible, in particular among the youth. There is growing frustration at the lack of progress in the political field and at the difficult socioeconomic conditions in the camps. Several factors have contributed to the worsening conditions. External humanitarian assistance has decreased, owing to constraints faced by donors. The ability of Saharans to find employment in Europe and send remittances to the camps has suffered with the economic downturn. An additional factor has been the economic impact of the increased security measures recently instituted along the border between Algeria and Mauritania. A segment of the camps’ population that depends on income from cross-border trade perceived these measures as a limitation of freedom of movement, although the Algerian authorities and Frente Polisario characterized them as a simple regulation, not limitation, of movement. …

IV. Activities of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara A. Operational activities 33. As of 6 March 2014, the military component of MINURSO stood at 225personnel, 13 of whom are female, against the authorized strength of 231. The military component remains deployed at nine team sites and at liaison offices in Tindouf and Dakhla. . . . 34. The demands on MINURSO military observers have increased considerably over the years, owing to the growth in military dispositions west of the berm and the reduction of the Mission’s air assets. I reiterate my previous assessment and recommendation (see S/2013/220, para. 48) to increase the military component of the Mission by 15 military observers. ... 37. The lack of precise ceasefire terms and differing interpretations of the provisions in the ceasefire agreement represent a major challenge to MINURSO monitoring operations and continue to erode the Mission’s authority. My Special 37.The lack of precise ceasefire terms and differing interpretations of the provisions in the ceasefire agreement represent a major challenge to MINURSO monitoring operations and continue to erode the Mission’s authority. My Special The lack of precise ceasefire terms and differing interpretations of the provisions in the ceasefire agreement represent a major challenge to MINURSO monitoring operations and continue to erode the Mission’s authority. . . . 38. In January 2014, for the first time since its inception, MINURSO witnessed a violation of the status-of-forces Agreement when a group of Royal Moroccan Army soldiers gained unauthorized entry to the Mahbas team site, in pursuit of five unarmed civilians attempting to stage a demonstration inside the site. The five Saharan activists were apprehended in the operation by the Moroccan soldiers. My Special Representative protested the violation to the Moroccan Government, receiving assurances that Morocco remains committed to strict implementation of the status-of-forces agreement, including respect for the inviolability of United Nations premises. ...

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43. Widespread contamination caused by landmines and explosive remnants of war throughout Western Sahara continues to endanger the lives of the local, nomadic and refugee populations, along with MINURSO military observers and logistical teams. East of the berm, two civilians were injured in a mine accident. In addition, Frente Polisario reported a significant loss of livestock to mines, especially in the buffer strip. … D. Human rights 78. Regarding civil and political rights, the United Nations continued to receive communications alleging abuses of such rights in Western Sahara west of the berm, particularly in the form of arrests without warrants, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in detention, limitations on family and advocate access to detainees, confessions extracted under torture, violation of the right to a fair trial, conditions that may amount to enforced disappearance and infringement of the rights of freedom of speech, association and assembly. OHCHR also received complaints about specific cases in which investigating judges failed to open investigations into defendants’ allegations of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, despite their lawyers’ requests to do so. 79. Civil society organizations, including human rights groups active in Western Sahara west of the berm, continue to face obstacles in registering as non-governmental organizations, despite a judicial decision in their favour. Such obstacles have deterred several associations from initiating the registration process, while others suspended their activities after the authorities allegedly refused to receive their applications. ... 83. Regarding civil and political rights in the refugee camps, Moroccan officials and the media reported abuses, particularly in the form of restrictions on freedom of movement and the violation of freedom of expression, association and assembly. Source: United Nations Security Council. Available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org /atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_258.pdf

About the Editor and Contributors

The Editor Joseph R. Rudolph Jr. is a professor of political science at Towson University; has served as a Fulbright appointee to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Kosovo; and has published in the field of ethnic and nationalist politics for more than 30 years. He has also been a part of the democratization operations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in areas of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union since 1997. His more recent work includes Politics and Ethnicity: A Comparative Study (2006), and From Mediation to Nation-Building: Third Parties and the Management of Communal Conflict (2013). The Contributors Olugbemiga Samuel Afolabi holds a BS, MS, and PhD in political science; is an assistant professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria; and has been a visiting professor and researcher at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Well published, he is currently the program director and principal investigator in the Centre for Nigeria Election Study (CNES). Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Susan R. Alaniz is the chief of the Theater Engagement Division at the USAF Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida. She served in numerous capacities while on active duty, including a tour as a presidential communications officer for the White House Communications Agency, and is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi. Elham Atashi is assistant professor at the Justice and Peace Studies Program at Georgetown University. Her research interests focus on the transformation of conflict-ridden societies, and she has worked extensively as a practitioner with youth in conflict areas and peacebuilding on the ground, including workshops on conflict and transitional justice in Rwanda, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Lynn-Darrell Bender was a professor of political science at the Inter American University of Puerto Rico from 1972–2005, where he headed the American Presence in Puerto Rico research project. He is now adjunct professor of political science in the Latin Program of Keiser University. John S. Bendix is a Western Europe comparativist and author of Importing Foreign Workers: A Comparison of German and American Policy. He has taught at Lewis and

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Clark, Reed, Bryn Mawr, and Haverford Colleges. When he authored the original essay on Germany, he was living, teaching, and translating social science texts in Germany. Nikolaos Biziouras is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the United States Naval Academy. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley. His book The Political Economy of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Economic Liberalization, Mobilizational Resources, and Ethnic Collective Action was published in spring 2014. His articles have appeared in such journals as Democracy and Security, PS, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, and Religion and Ideology. Jaimie Bleck is a Ford Family Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. She has published articles in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Comparative Political Studies, and Democratization. Her book Education and Empowered Citizenship in Mali is forthcoming with Johns Hopkins Press. John Bullock is an assistant professor of political science at Towson University. He received a doctorate in government and politics from the University of Maryland, a master's in city and regional planning from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and a bachelor’s in political science from Hampton University. Terrence Casey is a professor of political science and head of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology in Terre Haute, Indiana. He is the author of The Social Context of Economic Change in Britain: Between Policy and Performance (2002) and editor of The Blair Legacy (2009) and The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Changed America and Britain (2011). Maya Chadda is a professor of political science at William Paterson University. Her scholarship includes Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India and Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal and Pakistan. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, she is the U.S. editor of the Global Review of Ethnopolitics. Sue Ellen M. Charlton is emerita professor of political science at Colorado State University. Her areas of specialization are comparative politics and development studies. Her most recent books are Women Navigating Globalization (with Jana Everett) and Comparing Asian Politics, fourth edition. Magdalena Dembinska is an associate professor of political science at the University of Montreal. She received her PhD from the University of Montreal and her master’s in international relations from Warsaw University. Her research focuses on identity politics and conflict, state building, and nationalism and diversity in Eurasia and Europe, with her work appearing in such journals as Nations and Nationalism, Ethnopolitics, and Canadian Journal of Political Science as well as in several edited volumes. David W. Dent is professor emeritus of political science and Latin American studies at Towson University and the author of 10 books on Latin American politics and

A B O UT TH E ED I TO R A ND C O NTR I B UTO R S

U.S.–Latin American relations as well as over 100 articles, essays, and chapters on Latin America and U.S.–Latin American relations. He was a contributing editor for the Handbook of Latin American Studies, a biannual reference book published by the Hispanic Division of the Library of Congress. Sean P. Duffy is a professor of political science and chair of that department at Quinnipiac University. He earned his PhD at Yale University and is the coauthor of the Atlas of Irish History. His work includes Ireland in the Middle Ages and An Illustrated History of Ireland. Nicole Fabricant is a professor of anthropology at Towson University. She received her PhD from Northeastern University and is the author of Mobilizing Bolivia’s Displaced: Indigenous Politics and the Struggle over Land (2012) and Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and Indigeneity in a Plurinational State (2011). Amy L. Freedman is a professor and department chair of the Political Science and International Studies Department at Long Island University, Post campus. She is the author of Political Participation and Ethnic Minorities: Chinese Overseas in Malaysia, Indonesia and the United States as well as several articles on Chinese overseas. Ohannes Geukjian is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut. He was awarded the PhD from Bradford University in the United Kingdom. His research includes ethnic conflict, nationalism, and peace building. He has two books on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and numerous articles in refereed journals. Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University. He has held Fulbright appointments to China, Turkey, and Israel and has taught abroad at the International University in Vienna as well as for the U.S. Government Areas Studies Program and U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute in Washington, D.C. He is the author of 11 critically praised scholarly books on the Kurdish question. His most recent book is Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War (2014). Maia Carter Hallward is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Affairs at Kennesaw State University, jointly appointed with the PhD Program for International Conflict Management. An associate editor for the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, with extensive field work in the Middle East, her publications include Struggling for a Just Peace: Israeli and Palestinian Activism in the Second Intifada (2011) and Understanding Nonviolence: Contours and Contexts (2014). Sarah Jenkins is a research associate in the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University. Her research interests include the microlevel dynamics of violence and peace, urban (in)security in sub-Saharan Africa, and the management of ethnic diversity. She has published in African Affairs and is currently working on a research monograph analyzing the 2007–2008 postelection violence in Kenya.

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Katherine P. Kaup is James B. Duke Professor of Asian Studies and Political Science at Furman University She holds an MA and PhD in government and foreign affairs from the University of Virginia. She is the author of Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China as well as several articles and chapters on ethnic conflict. Among her honors, she served as special adviser for Minority Nationalities Affairs at the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2005) and was a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Yunnan Nationalities University 2012–2013. Betsy Konefal is an associate professor of history at the College of William and Mary, specializing in modern Latin America. A Fulbright appointee to Ecuador, she received a PhD in Latin American history from the University of Pittsburgh in 2005. Her publications include For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism, 1960–1990 (UNM Press, 2010, named Choice “Outstanding Academic Title,” 2011), and “Subverting Authenticity: Reinas Indígenas and the Guatemalan State, 1978,” Hispanic American Historical Review 89, no. 1 (February 2009). Marie Olson Lounsbery received a PhD from Wayne State University in 2003 and is an associate professor of political science at East Carolina University Her recent work examines the organizational dynamics of rebel and terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. She has published articles in The Journal of Peace Research, International Interactions, and Political Violence and Terrorism, among others. Her book Civil Wars: Internal Struggles, Global Consequences (2009), coauthored with Frederic Pearson, examines various aspects of civil wars. Anthony Mark Messina is John R. Reitemeyer Professor of Politics at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, and the author of Race and Party Competition in Britain (1989) and The Logics and Politics of Post–World War II Migration to Western Europe (2007). He is also the editor or coeditor of Ethnic and Racial Minorities in the Advanced Industrial Democracies (1992), West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century (2002), The Migration Reader (2006), The Year of the Euro (2006), and Contending European Identities (2014). Kevin J. Mumford received his PhD from Stanford and is currently a professor and director of graduate studies in the History Department at the University of Illinois. A former Fulbright Scholar in Germany, his research interests focus on race, sexuality, and politics in modern America. His publications include Newark: A History of Race, Rights and Riots in America and Interzones: Black/White Sex Districts in Chicago and New York in the Early Twentieth Century. Britta Nelson Bleigh prior to entering the PhD program at West Virginia University, received her MA degree at Towson University, where her thesis Assimilation Politics: The State of French Muslims within French Society received the school’s award for best graduate work of the year. Saul Newman is an associate professor in the Department of Government in the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, D.C. He received his PhD in 1989 from Princeton University. Since then, he has taught at American University and at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. His publications include

A B O UT TH E ED I TO R A ND C O NTR I B UTO R S

Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies as well as articles on nationalism, ethnic politics, political culture, and terrorism in Comparative Politics, World Politics, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Regional Politics and Policy, and Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. Burak Bilgehan Ozpek is an associate professor in the Department of International Relations at the TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara. His main research interests include the de facto states, conflict studies, contemporary politics of the Middle East, and Turkish foreign policy. He has published articles in the Journal of International Relations and Development, International Journal, Iran and the Caucasus, Turkish Studies, Israel Affairs, and Global Governance. James A. Reilly is a historian of the modern Middle East. He is head of the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations at the University of Toronto. His book A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries is based on extensive fieldwork and extended residency in Syria during the late 20th century. Paul S. Rowe is associate professor and coordinator of political and international studies at Trinity Western University. He is author of Religion and Global Politics (Oxford University Press, 2012) and coeditor of Politics and the Religious Imagination (Routledge, 2010) and Christians and the Middle East Conflict (Routledge, 2014). His research interests lie in the field of religion and global politics as well as the politics of Christian minorities in the Middle East and South Asia. Elin Royles is a lecturer based at the Institute of Welsh Politics, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, United Kingdom. Her work entails locating Welsh devolution within a broader context to examine the significance of substate governments in Europe. In doing so, her research interests span the areas of civil society, substate activity on climate change and sustainable development, nation-building, substate diplomacy, and language planning. Jesse Dillon Savage is a lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. He did his PhD work in the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University and has subsequently continued his research in the areas of international relations theory and international security. His work has been published in the European Journal of International Relations. Renat Shaykhutdinov is an associate professor of political science and the director of the Peace Studies Program at Florida Atlantic University. His areas of interest include the politics of nonviolence, ethnic and religious policies, power-sharing institutions, and the politics of postcommunism. His publications appear in numerous journals, including the Journal of Peace Research, Politics and Religion, Problems of Post-Communism, International Canadian Slavonic Papers, and the European Journal of Economic and Political Studies. Jeremy S. Speight is a visiting assistant professor and PhD degree candidate at Concordia University, with research specializing in Ivory Coast politics. He has numerous professional papers on that topic available on his home page as well as

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having published two articles in the Canadian Journal of African Studies and another in Civil Wars between 2012 and 2013. Richard Stahler-Sholk is a professor of political science at Eastern Michigan University. He is an associate editor with Latin American Perspectives and a member of the board of directors of the International Service for Peace (SIPAZ) in Chiapas, Mexico. He is a coeditor (with Harry E. Vanden and Marc Becker) of Rethinking Latin American Social Movements: Radical Action from Below (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014). Robert J. Thompson is an associate professor of political science and interim chair of the Department of Political Science at East Carolina University. A political scientist and coeditor of Ethnoterritorial Politics, Policy, and the Western World, he is a longtime student of Scottish politics. James N. Upton is a political scientist and an emeritus professor of African American and African studies at Ohio State University. The author of Urban Riots in the 20th Century: A Social History and coeditor of the Encyclopedia of American Race Riots, volumes I and II, his research focuses on urban violence and riots, civil rights, and African American political thought and social movements. Roland Vazquez is professor of political science and anthropology at Upper Iowa University. His research interests include Basque and Spanish politics, especially the link between institutional realities and culture. His Politics, Culture, and Sociability in the Basque Nationalist Party (University of Nevada Press, 2010) is a study of partisan competition. He is currently working on another ethnography about Basque political culture based on his 2009–2010 sabbatical stay in Basque Country. Stephen D. Wrage is a professor of political science at the United States’ Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. His research and writing focuses on international politics and U.S. foreign policy, and he is the author of Immaculate Warfare: Participants Reflect on the Air Campaigns over Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Marie-Joelle Zahar is professor of political science and research director of the Francophone Network on Peace Operations at the Université de Montréal. Her research has focused on political violence, and especially nonstate armed groups, for the past decade. She has authored or coauthored numerous studies, including Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World (2012) and “Norm Transmission in Peace and State Building: Lessons from Democracy Promotion in the Sudan and Lebanon,” Global Governance 18 (2012). Stephen Zunes is a professor in the Department of Politics at the University of San Francisco. He is the principal editor of Nonviolent Social Movements (Blackwell Publishers, 1999); the author Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003); and coauthor (with Jacob Mundy) of Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse University Press, 2010.)

Index

Abadi, Haider Al-, 268, 278 Abashidze, Aslan, 209, 214 Abbas, Mahoud, 448 Abboud, Ibrahim, 611 Abdul Aziz, Abdullah bin, 453–454 Abkhazia: anniversary of declaration of independence, 217–218; changing rule of, 207–208, 210; constitution of, 218–219; demands for autonomy, 211; Zviadist, Georgian forces in, 212–213 Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 211 Academy of the Development of National Groups, 505 Accord on Indigenous Rights and Culture, 401 Act of Union (1536), 706 Act of Union (1543), 804–805 Act of Union (1707), 684, 694–700 Act of Union (1780), 645 Act of Union (1861), 66 Action for Corsican Renaissance (ARC), 175 Adams, Gerry, 577, 669, 671, 672–673 Addis Ababa Accord (1973), 611, 620–623 Adjara, 214 Adjara Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 211 African Americans. See United States: civil rights struggle; United States: racial violence African Union (AU), 613, 614 aguascalientes, as resistance centers, 401 Aguirre, José Antonio, 573 Aguiyi-Ironsi, 524 Ahmed, Ibrahim, 273 Ahmed, Imad, 276 Ahmeti, Ali, 335 Ahtisaari, Martti, 327, 336, 343–346

Akali Dal Party, 258–259 Al Aioun, 811–812 Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 380, 383 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971), 733, 736 Alaska Natives. See United States: Native Americans Al-Bakr, Hasan, 272 Albanian Muslims. See under Kosovo and Macedonia Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA), 334 Alcatraz Island occupation, 732 Algiers, 194 Algiers Accord (2006), 383 Aliev, Heidat, 8, 10, 11 Al-Kata’ib al-Lunaniyya, 351 Alliance Party, 369, 370 All-National Congress of Chechen People (NCChP), 540 Al-Majid, Ali Hasan, 274 Al-Qassam, ‘Izz al-Din-, 423 Al-Shabaab group, 322 Amal Movement, 352 Amaru, Tupac, 24 Amedo, José, 575 America Indian Movement (AIM), 731–732 American Indians. See United States: Native Americans Amin, Al-Hajj, 424–425 Amnesty Law (1978), 574 Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973), 259 Anastasiades, Nicos, 129 Anglo-Irish Treaty (1920), 649, 676–677 Ankara Agreement (1996), 268 Annan, Kofi: call for ETA cessation, 577; in Cyprus, 121, 124, 127; in Kenya, 317 Annan Plan, 121, 125, 126, 132–136

826

IN DE X

Ansar al Dine, 380, 384 Anti-Defamation League, 85 Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPEL), 503–504 Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups (GAL), 575 Anti-Terrorist Pact (2002), 576 Aoun Michel, 465 Arab Deterrent Force, 353, 354 Arab League, 353, 447 Arab Peace Initiative (2002), 453–454 Arab Spring, 490, 491, 492 Araba, 570 Arabic identity forms, 419 Arabs, Palestinian: call for binational state, 445; civil war against Arabs, 425–426; denied full rights, 445; refugees denied right of return, 446; revolt over partition plan, 423–424; see also Israel; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Jews Arafat, Yasser, 444, 447 Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), 506 Arana, Sabino, 572 Arbenz, Jacobo, 237, 242 Arbil, 270, 274, 275–278 Arévalo, Juan José, 237 Argentina, refusing Romany, 86 Armas, Castillo, 237 Armenian National Council (ANC), 7 Armenian Nationalist Movement (ANM), 7 Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), 6 Armenians: Christianity among, 4; conflict resolution for, 9–10; genocide of, 5; in Javakheti, 209; and Moscow Declaration, 17–18; and Operation Ring, 8; preserving identity of, 12; reaction to glasnost, perestroika, 6, 12; takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, 3; Turkish, 462; violence against, 6–7 Armeno-Tatar War (1905-6), 5 Arsanov Vakha, 541 Arusha Accords, 553–554 Assad, Bashar, 491–492 Assad, Bashara al-, 467 Assad, Hafiz al-, 467, 491 As-Sa’dun, Abd al-Muhsin, 271 assimilation: forced, 103, 728, 729–730; French policy of, 196–197; middle ground for, 791; in Quebec, 71;

rejection of, 195, 199–200, 417, 664, 809; of Romany, 87–88; survival through, 85–86; in Wales, 706 Assyrian Orthodox Church, 460 Asturias, Miguel Angel, 237 Ataturk, 482–483 Atlee-Aung San Agreement (1947), 504 atrocities: ease of hiding, 613; global attention to, 48, 614; government sanction of, 609; responsibility for, 245, 323, 389, 391; wartime, 8, 47, 48, 330 Aung San, 503–504 Ausländerfeindlichkeit, 227 Austro-Hungarian Empire, 86 Autonomous Corsican Party, 175 ‘Awn, Michel, 353, 355 Azawad, 380, 384–385 Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), 7 Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), 3, 4, 6 Azerbaijani Special Function Militia Troops (OMON), 8 Azerbaijanis: conflict resolution for, 9–10; expulsion from Nagorno-Karabakh, 3; Islam among, 4; launching Operation Ring, 8; and Moscow Declaration, 17–18; origins of, 4; as refugees, 8–9; response to Armenians (1988), 15–16; timeline for political history, 1–3; violence against, 7 Azeris, 209 Aziz, Tariq, 467 Ba’ath Party, 269, 272, 467 Badan Koordinasi Intel (BAKIN), 158 Baghdad Pact, 351 Baker, James, 813 Baku, 5, 6, 7 Balewa, Akubakar Tafawa, 524 Balfour Declaration, 419–420, 427–428 Bandaranaike, Solomon, 591–592, 594 Banny, Charles Konan, 295 Banzer Suárez, Hugo, 21, 25, 26 Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, 373 Barrionuevo, José, 575 Barzani, Abd-al-Salam, 270 Barzani, Ahmed, 271 Barzani, Idris, 273

I ND EX

Barzani, Masoud, 275, 276–278, 483, 487, 488–489 Barzani, Mustafa, 271, 272–273 Barzanji, Mahmud, 270–271, 487 Basayev, Shamil, 541 Bashir, Omar al-, 609, 612, 615 Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), 570–571, 578, 579 Basque Autonomy Statute (1979), 574, 581–583 Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA): activities increase, 574–576; attacks begin, 574; declares cease-fire, 577; formation of, 573; later condemnation of, 579–580; renewed violence by, 577 Basque nation: change in political structure, 579–580; Day of the Memory of Victims of Terrorism, Nov. 10, 578; desire for independence, 574; history of, 571; Law 4/2008, Recognition and Reparation to the Victims of Terrorism, 578; markers of, 579; provinces of, 570–571; in Spanish Civil War, 573. See also Spain Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), 572–573, 574, 576, 577 Basque Society of Friends of the Country, 571–572 Basse Navarre, 570 Battle of Eastern Sidon, 352 Battle of Hittin (1187), 461 Battle of Iqlim al-Kharrub, 352 Battle of the Mountain (1983), 352 Battle of Wounded Knee (1890), 728 Bavaria, 223 Bedié, Henri Konan, 287, 288, 291, 296 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998), 670–671 Bella group, 381, 382, 385 Belo, Carlos Filipe Ximenes, 155 Bengalis, in India, 256 Bengio, Ofra, 493 Ben-Gurion, David, 422, 424 Bere, Maternus, 164 Bertrand, Jacque, 160 Besa, Fernano, 576 Bevan, Aneurin, 716n8 Bharatiya Janata Party, 257, 261 Bhindranwale, Jamail Singh, 253, 259 Biafra, 524–525, 533–534. See also Nigeria

Bin Laden, Osama, 612, 613 Bismarck, Otto von, 224 Bizkaia, 571, 572, 573 Black January, 7 Black Panthers, 775 Blair, Tony, 668, 671, 716n13 Blanco, Miguel Ángel, 575 Bloc Québécois (BQ), 69 Bo Ma, 506 Bodos, in India, 256 Boko Haram, 525, 527 Bolivia: coca industry in, 10, 26–27, 29nn7; constitution of, 30–37; economic reform in, 25–26; ethnicity, history of, 24–25; judiciary of, 35–36; military rule in, 25; mine privatization, 29n7; neoliberal period in, 25–26; new governance for, 27; progressive extractivism in, 27–28; revolution of, 25; struggles over resources, 26–27; territorial organization of, 36–37; timeline for political history, 19–24. See also Indigenous peoples, Bolivia Bonaparte, Napoléon, 173 Bosclair, André, 70 Bosnia, 46–48, 49 Bosnia and Herzegovina: constitution of, 57–59; and Dayton Accords, 52–60; starvation in, 51n5; timeline for political history, 39–43; within Yugoslavia, 44 Bouchard, Lucien, 69–70 Bourassa, Robert, 69 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 124, 556 Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS), 445–446 British Nationality Act (1981), 631 Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 773 Broz, Josip (Marshal Tito), 44–45 Buddhism, 104 Bumiputera Economic Empowerment program, 373 Bureau of Indian Affairs, 729–730 Burma. See Myanmar (Burma) Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), 505 burqa, 192, 196, 199 Burundi, affecting Hutu-Tutsi conflict, 553–554 Bush, George W., 448 Byzantine Empire, 461

827

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IN DE X

Cabrera, Manuel Estrada, 237 Cairo Agreement, 359–360 Camacho Solis, Manuel, 401 Cameron, David, 691–692 Canada, 61–78. See also Quebec Caracoles, 402 Caravan Sites Act (1994), 89 Cárdenas, Lázaro, 397 Carlist War, revolt, 572 Carrasco, Isaís, 577 Carrero Blanco, Luis, 574 Carter, Jimmy, 159 Cartier, Jacques, 65 Casellanos, Absalón, 398 Catherine the Great, 4 Catholic Action, 242–243 Catholic Emancipation Act (1829), 645 Caucasus, 4. See also Russia, Northern Caucasus Cedar Revolution, 349, 356, 466 Central Europe, 79–98 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 158–159, 242 Charest, Jean, 70 Charlottetown Accord, 69, 77–78 Charter 77 movement, 143 Chechan-Ingush autonomy, 538–539 Chechnya: as autonomy, 538; blockade in, 540; dissolution of, 541–542; environmental protests in, 539; Islamization of, 542; Russian troops captured, 540; sharia law in, 541; shift to Islamist agenda, 543; wars of, 542; wartime casualties, 542–543; Western perception of, 539. See also Russia, Northern Caucasus Cherokee Indians, 739–742. See also United States: Native Americans Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), 741–742 Chiapas, 396, 399–400 Chin group, 503–504 China: background of ethnic conflict in, 103–104; managing ethnic conflict in, 107–108; Nationalist (KMT) government of, 103; Regional Autonomy policy, 107; regulating living Buddhas, 109, 114–117; timeline for political history,

99–101; Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 106–107. See also Tibet Chinese Communist Party (CCP): ethnic autonomy policy, 102–103; negotiating with Dalai Lama, 108–109; opposing religious activities, 106–107; People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of, 104, 108–109; Tibetan policies, 104–105 Chirac, Jacques, 191, 198, 293 Chrétien, Jean, 69–70 Christianity: Crusades of, 461; early tolerance by Muslims, 460–461; Great Schism of, 461; origins of, 460; under Ottoman Empire, 461–462; in South Sudan, 609–611 Christians, in Middle East: caught in the middle, 471; in ethnoreligious conflicts, 463–464; favoring Palestinian state, 471; history of, 459–460; overview of, 459–460; participating in intifada, 470; political pressure on, 463; significance to ethnoreligious pluralism, 472; targeted in Egypt, 462–464; timeline for political history, 457–459; victimization of, 472 Christofias, Demetris, 127 Civil Rights Act (1875), 771 Civil Rights Act (1964), 774 Civil Rights Act (1968), 775 Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee-General Command (CCRI-CG), 399 Clarity Act (1995), 70 Clark, Joe, 76–77 “clash of civilizations” thesis, 471 Clinton, Bill: avoiding Rwanda genocide, 555, 556; in Northern Ireland, 670, 671; offering Clinton Parameters, 447; parameters for Israeli-Palestinian agreement, 452–453 Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD), 318 Collective of Basque Political Prisoners, 577 Collier, John, 729–732 Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 401 Commission of Concord and Pacification (COCPA), 401 Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), 322

I ND EX

Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC), 238, 247 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962), 630–632 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1968), 631 Communist Party of Burma (CPB), 509 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, OSCE), 9–10 Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 773 Congress Party, 257, 258–259 Constantinople, 461 Coordination for Movements of Azawad, 380, 387 Copenhagen Criteria, 484 Coptic Orthodox Church, Copts, 460, 468–469 Corsica: “Corsican specificity” as culture defense, 176; decline in militance, 171; ethnic issues in, 175–178; under French control, 173–174; Joxe statute (1991), 176; languages as cultural identity, 175; political decentralization in, 176; significance of ethnic violence in, 178 Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), 171, 175 Corsican Regionalist Front, 175 Corsu, 175 Côte d’Ivoire: cocoa industry in, 290; ethnic conflict in, 292–295; ethnic tensions remaining, 297; genocide in, 292, 297; initial stability of, 289–290; managing conflict in, 295; national belonging questions, 289; political violence in, 292; power struggles, coups in, 291–292; timeline for political history, 287–289; UN Security Council on Côte d’Ivoire, 299–303 Council of Chalcedon (451), 460 Council of Europe, 90, 93–98 Craig, James, 666 Crimean War, 462 Croatia: and Dayton Accords, 52–60; formation of, 44; independence of, 46; Serbs in, 45–46; timeline for political history, 39–43; within Yugoslavia, 44 Croat-Muslim Federation, 48 Crusades, 461 Cumann na nGaedhael, 646, 650n3

Cymdeithas yr Iaith group, 709, 711–712 Cymru Fydd movement, 707 Cyprus: 2004 referendum, 123, 125; ethnic conflict in, 124–126; and EU membership, 121, 122–123, 124–125, 126–127; external influence on politics, 126–128; Green Line dividing, 120, 121, 124, 128; history of, 123; political dynamics of, 125–126; proposed union with Greece, 123–124; rewriting textbooks in, 125; significance of frozen conflict, 129; society dynamics, 128; timeline for political history, 119–122. See also Annan Plan Czech people, 140–141, 141–143 Czech Republic, 145, 146, 147 Czechoslovakia: Czech vs. Slovak nationalism, 141; Czech-Slovak conflicts, 141–143; Dissolution Act (1992), 149–151; division of, 43, 138; lessons from partition of, 147–148; origins of, 140–141; post-independence conflicts, 143–144; Prague Spring, 138, 143; Romany in, 87–88; self-rule of, 139–140; under the Soviet Union, 142; timeline for political history, 137–139; Velvet Divorce, 144–145; Velvet Revolution, 138, 140, 143 Dagestan Oblast, 538 Dalai Lama, 104, 105, 108–109 Darfur. See under Sudan Darling, Alistair, 690 Davies, Ron, 714 Davis, Thomas, 645 Davitt, Michael, 646 Davutoglu, Ahmed, 276–277 Dayton Accords, 48, 49, 52–60, 330 De Champlain, Samuel, 65 De Chastelain, John, 675n14 De Garibay, Esteban, 571–572 De Gaulle, Charles, 67, 196 De Las Casas, Bartolomé, 396 Declaration of Iximché, 247–249 Declaration of the Conviction of the Revolutionary Council on the Question of Union Nationalities, 505 Deir Yasin massacre, 426

829

830

IN DE X

Deixonne Law (1951), 196 Democratic Action Party (IDAP), 371 Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), 507 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), 470 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), 507 Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), 330 Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, 271 Democratic Patriotic Alliance, 275 Democratic Society Party (DTP), 484, 485 Democratic Union Party (PYD), 490, 491, 492 Deng Xiaoping, 107, 108 Denktas, Rauf, 124 Denmark, and the Romany, 86 Department for Attention to Victims, 577–578 Dewar, Donald, 687 Díez, Jorge, 576 Doha Agreement, 349 Dome of the Rock, 420–421 Domínguez, Michel, 575 Dowry, 199 Druze, 349–350, 465 Du Bois, W.E.B., 751, 772 Dudayev Dzhokhar, 540–541, 543 Duplessis, Maurice, 66–67 Durham, Lord, 66, 73–74 Durham Report, 73–74 East Timor (Timor-Leste): achieves independence, 162; Amnesty International Campaign for International Justice report (2010), 164–165; early relations with Indonesia, 158; ethnic elements in occupation, 160; ethnic groups in, 157; historical background of, 157–159; Indonesian occupation, 156–157, 159, 160–161; overview of, 156; significance of conflict over, 162; similarity to Western Sahara, 814 East Turkestan Republic, 106 Easter rising (1916), 648, 655–658, 666 Edinburgh Agreement (2012), 700–701 Egypt, 464, 468–469 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 773 ejidos rights, 397, 398

Elchibey, Abulfaz, 7, 8 Elizavetpol province, 5 Emiliano Zapaa Peasant Organization (OCEZ), 398 Enforcement Act (1870), 771 enosis, 123–124, 125 Erdogan, Tayyip, 126, 129, 484–485 Erignac, Claude, 178 Eroglu, Dervis, 121, 127–128, 129 étapiste approach, to sovereignty, 68 ethnic cleansing: in Bosnia, 47; in Kosovo, 326, 327, 330, 335–336; in Lebanon, 349, 352 ethnic conflicts: frozen, 122–123, 124, 129; importance of institutions to, 216; as international threat, 50; lessons from Yugoslavia, 50–51; outside influence on, 216 ethnogenesis, 3–4 Etxebarrieta, Txabi, 574 EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC), 493n4 European Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 294–295 European Court of Human Rights, 201–206 European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), 89, 91 European Union: Central European growth, 93n6; Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), 182–188; consequences of Scottish independence, 692; and Cyprus, 126–127; and Czech, Slovak politics, 145, 146–147; funding Northern Ireland, 672, 675n15; influence on Corsican politics, 176; negotiating in South Ossetia, 215–216; reconstructing Kosovo, 332; and Romany, 90–91; Turkey seeking membership, 484; West Germany joins, 226 Euskera language, 571, 571–572, 573 Fatah Party, 444, 448, 470 Fatimid Regime, 461 Fenian uprising (1867), 646 Fenians. See Irish Republican Army (IRA) Ferdinand, Francis, 43, 49 Fodio, Usman dan, 522

I ND EX

Foraker Act (1900), 790, 799–802 Forces Nouvelles (FN), 292, 293–294, 295–296 Forces of National Liberation (FLN), 399 Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), 297 Ford, Gerald, 159 Four Cuts policy, 506, 510 Fourteen Points, 494–496 Fox, Vincente, 402 France: annexing Corsica, 173–174; autonomy questions in, 171; ban on burqa, niqab, 192, 196, 201–206; Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, 179–182; in Côte d’Ivoire crisis, 293; dependence on foreign oil, 194; diversity in, 192; ethnic issues in, 175–178, 195–197; and European Charter, 176–177; European Union Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), 182–188; formation of nation-state, 172–173; Front National (FN) Party, 194, 195; history of ethnicities in in, 192; immigrants rejecting assimilation, 195–196; importing foreign labor, 193–195; Law on Corsica (2002), 177; managing ethnic conflict in, 197–200; Muslims in, 195; origins of ethnic conflict, 171–175; Romany in, 192, 193, 196, 197–200; significance of ethnic conflict in, 199; timeline for political history, 169–171, 189–192 Franck, Thomas M., 809 Franjiyya, Sulayman, 354 Free Syrian Army (FSA), 492 French Canadians, 65, 66. See also Quebec Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), 67 Front for the Liberation of East Timor (Fretilin), 157, 158, 160 Front National (FN) Party, 194, 195, 198 Front Populaire Ivoire (FPI), 294, 297 Fueros, 571–572 Fulari jihad, 522 Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), 645 Gaelic League, 646 Gaelic Union, 645 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 208, 211–212

Ganda Koy, 382 Gandhi, Indira, 90, 258–259, 262 Gandhi, Mahatma, 774 Gandhi, Rajiv, 259, 597, 600n2 Garang, John, 612, 615 García, Romeo Lucas, 238 Garcia Linera, Alvaro, 27 Garcia Meza, Luis, 25 Garvey, Marcus, 772 Gayle v. Browder (1956), 773 Gbgabo, Laurent, 287–289, 292–297 Geist, 224 Gemael, Amine, 465 Gemael, Bashir, 465 General Allotment Act (1887), 729 George, Lloyd, 648, 649, 666, 707 Georgia, Republic of: autonomous regions of, 211; demands for independence, 211; ethnic minorities in, 209; history of ethnicities in, 209; invading South Ossetia, 212; occupying Abkhazia, 212–213; outside influence on ethnic conflicts, 216; Rose Revolution of, 213–215; Russia manages ethnic conflicts, 215–216; South Ossetia war (2008), 214–215; timeline for political history, 207–209 Gerardi, Juan, 245 Germany: cultural conflicts in, 226–227; economics of ethnic conflict, 226; ethnic conflict and cultural similarity, 229; ethnicity of majority culture, 223; in European Union, 229–230; historic background of, 223–226; hostility toward foreigners, 227; immigration act passed, 222, 228; Inländer vs. Ausländer, 224, 226; Jews in, 225; labor imported to West Germany, 225–226; management of ethnic conflicts, 228–229; Nationality Act, 232–235; numbers of foreign workers in, 225, 227, 229, 230n5, 230n7, 231n8; and the Romany, 82, 86–87; timeline for political history, 221–223; Turkish Muslims in, 227, 230 Ghali, Boutros, 462 Ghali, Iyad Ag, 384, 386 Ghassemlou, Abdul Rahman, 490 Gipuzkoa, 571, 573 Glasnost, 6, 12

831

832

IN DE X

Glendower, Owen, 706 Goble, Paul, 543 González, Patrocinio, 398 González Katerain, Dolores, 575 Good Friday Agreement (1998), 677–679 Good Governance Councils, 402 Gorazde, 55–56 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 3, 8, 539, 545n9 Gourevitch, Philip, 557n3 Government Development Bank, 791 Government Development Company, 791 Government of Ireland Act (1920), 649, 666 Government of National Unity (GoNU), 615 Government of Wales Act (2006), 714 Gowon, Yakuba, 524 Great Britain: Caravan Sites Act (1994), 89; claiming Palestine, 420; colonizing Sri Lanka, 591; end of Palestinian mandate, 424–426; in French Canada, 66; in India, 254–255; and Karabakh conflict, 5; in Kenya, 307–308; in Nigeria, 522–523; Palestinian mandate, 443; ruling Sudan, 610–611; stand on Zionism, 421–422. See also United Kingdom Great Famine (1840s), 645 Great Schism, 461 Griffith, Arthur, 647, 666 Guatemala: civil war in, 238–239, 241–244; responsibility for civil war, 244–245; timeline for political history, 237–240. See also Mayas Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), 238, 239 Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT), 242 Guëi, Robert, 287, 291–292 Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), 242 Guernica Agreement (2010), 577 Gujuratis, of India, 255 Gul, Abdullah, 485 Gulf War (1990), 270, 274–275 Gulf War (2003), 487, 488 Gush Etzion massacre, 426 Gusmao, Xanana, 156 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 552–553, 554 Haganah, 422, 423–424, 426 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), 448, 471

Hamidiye cavalry, 490–492 Han Chinese: as majority in China, 102–103, 105, 108; in Xinjiang, 106–107, 109. See also China Haram al Sharif, 449 Hariri, Rafik, 356, 466 Harper, Stephen, 71 Havel, Vaclav, 143 Heitz, Kathrin, 296 Hejri, Mustafa, 490 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 224 Hillsborough Declaration, 671, 672 Hinnebusch, Raymond, 269 Hitler, Adolph, 225 Hiwa (Hope) Party, 271 Hizballah, 349, 356–357, 466 Horta, Jose Ramos, 155 Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 287, 289–290 Houston, Charles Hamilton, 773 Hubeiqa, Ilyas, 355 Human Rights Watch, 319–323, 341–343, 385, 389–392 Hume, John, 671 Hungary, 90, 145 Huntington, Samel, 616 Huntington, Samuel, 471 Husanyi, al-Hajj Amin al-, 422 Huseinov, Surat, 8 Huss, Salim al-, 353 Hussein, Saddam, 273, 274–275, 487–488 Hutu people: massacre of Tutsi, 551, 552, 554–555, 558n11; Ten Hutu Commandments, 553. See also Rwanda Hutu Power, 553, 554, 557 Ibarretxe, Juan José, 576, 578 Ibarretxe Plan (2002), 576 Iberian conquest, 24 Ibrahim, Anwar, 372 Igbo people, 524–525 Immigrants, refugees, foreign groups, 85, 85–86. See also Burqa; France; Romany (Roma) Immigration Act (1971), 631 Independent Confederation of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC), 396, 398 India: Anandpur Sahib Resolution, 259, 262; British impact on nationalism,

I ND EX

254–255; Chhattisgarh, Uttaranchal, Jharkhand states, 261; conflicts with Pakistan, 260; constitution of, 262–263; episodic nature of conflict, 261; ethnic politics in, 257–258; ethnic tensions in, 255–256; Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh states, 258; Independence Act (1947), 262; involvement in Sri Lanka, 590, 593–594, 594–596; Jammu and Kashmir conflicts, 260–261; northeast conflicts, 259–260; power maneuvering in, 256–257; Punjabi conflict, 258–259; recognizing Romany, 90; Reorganization Act (1956), 262; success in nationhood, 254; Telangana and Andhra states, 261; timeline for political history, 253–254 Indian Bill of Rights (American), 733, 736 Indian Child Welfare Act (1978) (American), 734 Indian Citizenship Act (1924), 729 Indian Development and Education Assistance Act (1975) (American), 733 Indian Education Act (1971) (American), 733 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988) (American), 733–734 Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), 590, 592, 595–596 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) (1934), 730 Indigenismo, 397 Indigenous Conference (1974), 399 Indigenous peoples, Bolivia: constitutional rights of, 32–34; exploitation by Bolivia, 24–25; exploitation by Spaniards, 24; marching for rights, 28n4; rights for, 27; universal suffrage of, 25. See also Bolivia Indigenous peoples, Mexico: decimated by oppression, 397; migrating for better lives, 398; mobilization of, 398–399; seeking autonomy, 396. See also Mexico Indonesia, 158, 160–162 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (1987), 595 Institutional Ceremony of Homage and Recognition to the Victims of Terrorism in Bilbao, 578 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 396, 397, 398, 400–401 Instituto Indigenista Nacional (IIN), 242 Interahamwe militia, 553, 554–555

International Criminal Court, 50 International Romany Union (IRU), 89 Inyenzi, 553 Iran, Kurds in, 489–490 Iraq: American invasion of (2003), 275; Arabization of cities, 273, 276; central government vs. Kurdish autonomy, 276; Christians in, 464, 467, 467–468; constitution of, 281–285; as divided society, 269; early history of Arab-Kurd conflict, 269–270; elections (2005), 488; Gulf War (1990), 270, 274–275; invasion of Kuwait, 274; Iran-Iraq War (1980), 273–274; Kurds in, 487–489; post-war ethnic struggles, 272–273; relations with Soviet Union, 272–273; timeline for political history, 265–268; during world wars, 270–271 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), 668 Irish Republican Army (IRA): cease-fire announced, 670; complying with decommissioning, 672; decreasing support for, 670; expansion of, 665; factionalization in, 667–668; launches guerilla war, 649. See also United Kingdom: Ulster Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), 645–646 Irish Volunteers, 648 ISIS, 268, 276–278 Islam: early tolerance for Christians, 460–461; in North Sudan, 609–611, 612; as political force, 463, 472 Islamic and Arab Front of Azawad, 382 Islamic Party of Malaysia, 374 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (or Syria)(ISIL or ISIS). See ISIS Ismail, Mustafa Osman, 615 Israel: 2002 unrest, 447; Arabs denied full rights, 445; civil war (1967), 444; foundation of, 426, 444; invasion of Lebanon, 465; in Lebanon civil war, 354; western, eastern, 450n8; withdrawal fro Gaza Strip, 447–448. See also Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Jerusalem; Jews; Palestine Israel Declaration of Independence, 435–437

833

834

IN DE X

Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Clinton’s parameters for, 452–453; continuation of, 449; intifada (1987), 444; opposing needs of, 444–445; peace agreements, 444; and wider Arab-Israeli conflict, 445. See also Israel; Palestine Ivoirité, 291 Ivory Coast. See Côte d’Ivoire Jackson, Andrew, 728 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 224 Jan Sangh Party, 258 Janjaweed militia, 613, 615 Javakheti, 209, 216 Jayawardene J.R., 592, 593 Jerusalem: 2014 unrest in, 449; Arafat rejecting offer for, 447; conquered by Crusaders, 461; conquered by Muslims, 460; as international zone, 446; Western (Wailing) Wall controversy, 420–421. See also Israel; Israeli-Palestinian conflict Jesus Christ, 460 Jews: 1930s emigration from Germany, 422; anti-Semitism begins, 417; civil war against Arabs, 425–426; Diaspora encouraged to return to Israel, 446; in European Enlightenment, 416–417; European vs. Ottoman societies, 418; Germany, 225; Haganah forms, 422. See also Arabs, Palestinian; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Pogroms; Zionism Jim Crow facilities, 771 Johnson, Ed, 748 Johnson, Lyndon B., 775 Jones Act (1917), 790 Jones-Shafroth Act (1917), 802–804 Jubilee Alliance, 318 Jumayyil, Amine, 353 Jumayyil, Bashir, 352 Jumayyil, Pierre, 351 Junblatt, Kamal, 352 Justice and Development Party (AKP), 484–486 Kachin group, 503–504, 504, 508 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), 506, 508–509 Kairos Palestine document, 471

Kalenjin community: attacks by, 316; vs. Kikuyu, 321–322; marginalization of, 314; opposing constitution, 317; resentment of others, 310 Karabakh: Committee of, 6, 7, 9, 12; history of, 3–5; Russian annexation of, 4. See also Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) Karaylian, Murat, 485 Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), 507–508 Karen National Union (KNU), 504, 506, 507–508, 509–510 Karen National United Party (KNUP), 504, 505–506 Karen people: abuse of, by Burmans, 503; collaborating with Mon insurgents, 506; devastations of war, 511; division of, 506; history of, 503–504; negotiating with Myanmar, 507; post WWII successes, 504–505; seeking autonomy, 508. See also Myanmar (Burma) Karenii group, 506 Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), 506 Kartli-Kakheti, Kingdom of, 210 Kashmiris, of India, 255–256, 259 Katari, Tupac, 24 Kavburo, 5 Kawthoolei Nationalities United Party (KNUP), 509 Keeler, W.W., 730–731 Keita, Ibrahim Boubacar (IBK), 386 Kemal, Mustafa (Ataturk), 482–483 Kennedy, John F., 730 Kenya: Africanization of land, 310; colonial legacies of, 307–308; decolonization of, 308–309; displaced minorities, 315–316, 318; disruption of peace in, 307; electoral irregularities, violence, 312–313, 314, 316; ethnic chauvinism, territoriality, 308–311, 312, 313, 315–316, 317, 318; ethnic conflict in, 313–316; ethnicity and political salience in, 308; human rights findings (2013), 319–323; Kenyatta years, 309–310; Kibaki years, 312–313; majimbo system in, 308–309, 311; managing ethnic conflict in, 316–318; Mau-Mau

I ND EX

rebellion, 305; Moi years, 310–312; police force in, 316; political repression in, 311; proposed new constitution of, 312–313, 317; refugees enter UK, 631; timeline for political history, 305–307 Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), 308–309, 310 Kenya African National Union (KANU), 308–309, 311, 312 Kenya People’s Union (KPU), 309 Kenyatta, Jomo, 308–310 Kenyatta, Uhuru, 318, 320 Kerner Commission Report, 775 Kerry, John, 277, 448 Khankend (Stepanakert), 5 Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 212 Khojaly, 7 Khuri, Bishara al-, 350 Kibaki, Mwai, 312–313, 314, 317, 321 Kiir, Salva, 615 Kikuyu community, 308, 309, 312–316, 321–322 King, Martin Luther Jr., 746, 773, 774 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 325 Kinnock, Neil, 709, 716n13 Kirkuk, oil fields in, 273, 276–278 Kissinger, Henry, 159, 487 Klaus, Vaclav, 144 Kocharian, Robert, 10 Kohl, Helmut, 228 Kohomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 490 Komala group, 490 Konare, Alpha Oumar, 382 Kosovo, 90; Ahtisaari Plan for, 343–346; Albanian Muslims in, 325, 326, 329, 331–332, 333, 335–336; autonomy for, 325; conflict spreads to Macedonia, 334–335; declaration of independence, 327; ethnic cleansing in, 326, 327, 335–336; ethnic conflict in, 90, 330–331; and EU membership, 339n7; historical background of, 328–330; Human Rights Watch report on, 341–343; independence, 336–337; lack of recognition for, 339n6; lessons from NATO intervention, 337–338; nationalist protests in, 45; NATO’s Operation Allied Force, 331–332,

333–334; Operation Allied Force, 326–327; refugees from, 331–332; timeline for political history, 322; UN Resolution 1244 on, 340–341; United Nations’ plan for, 332–333; unrecognized by global community, 328; “war after the war,” 327, 333–334 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): assassinations by, 327; formation of, 326; indicted and tried for atrocities, 338n4; targeting leaders, 330–331, 333 Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR), 332 Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 758, 759–760 Kublai Khan, 105 Kufuor, John, 317 Kumaratumga, 599 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 267– 268, 273, 275, 487–490 Kurdish National Council (KNC), 490–491 Kurdish Opening/Initiative, 485–486 Kurdish Spring, 493 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), 484 Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), 490 Kurdistan Free Life party (PJAK), 490 Kurdistan Front, 274 Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 268, 275–277, 278, 487–488 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgency, 483–487 Kurds: 11 March Proclamation, 272–273; de facto Syrian autonomy, 492; divided by borders, 269; formation of regional government for, 275–277; during Gulf War (1990), 274–275; historical background of, 481–492; internecine struggles, 273–274; lack of own state, 481; loss of safety valve, 277; modernization in KRG region, 488–489; nationalism during world wars, 270–271; overview of, 481; rebellions in Turkey, 483–485; relations with US, 273; renewal of movement, 273; rights gained, lost under Qasim, 272; significance of nation-building, 492–493; timeline for political history, 477–481; UN Security Council Resolution 688, 280–281; during WWI, 482–483; during WWII, 271

835

836

IN DE X

Kusy, Miroslav, 143 Kvemo-Kartli, 209, 216 La Comisión Económica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), 27 La survivance, 65, 66, 67 Labourd, 570 Lachin corridor, 3, 8 Ladino population, 397 Lahu National United Party (LNUP), 506 Land League, 646 Landry, Bernard, 70 Laporte, Pierre, 67 Larramendi, Manuel, 571–572 Lasa Joxean, 575 Laugerud, Kjell Eugenio, 238 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 190, 194 League of Nations, 420 League of Nations Report on 1929 riots in Palestine, 428–432 Lebanese Forces (LF), 352, 354, 355, 465 Lebanese Front, 352, 358nn5–6 Lebanese National Movement (LNM), 351 Lebanese Phlange, 465 Lebanon: Cairo Agreement, 359–360; Christian-Palestinian fighting in, 465; Christians in, 462, 464–466, 466–467; civil war, 349, 351–353, 352; constitutional crisis in, 353; Constitutional Document (1976), 355; divergent interests at independence, 350; ethnic cleansing in, 352; external mediaries in, 357n1; formation of, 462; Grand Liban years, 349–350; Hizballah in, 356–357; interventions in, 353–354, 354–357, 355, 356; March 8, March 14 coalitions, 356, 466; and the National Pact, 350, 464, 471; numbers of conflicts, 357n1; and Palestinian guerrillas, 351; PLO in, 357n4; politics of the troika, 356; and rise of Arab nationalism, 351; timeline for political history, 347–349; UN resolutions on, 360–364. See also Maronites; Taif Agreement Lesage, Jean, 67 Lévesque, René, 68, 74–75, 77 Liberation Theology Movement, 398 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): assassinating Gandhi, 597;

assassinations, suicide attacks by, 596–598; attacking rivals, 594; collapse of, 599; dependent on Prabhakaran, 598; as spokesmen, 595–596 Linas-Marcoussis accords, 293 Little School, of Zapatistas, 402–403 Lizarra Pact (1998), 575 Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, 706 Longest Walk march (1978), 732 Longowale, Harchandsingh, 253, 259 López, Paxti, 577 Luhya community, 315 Luo community, 308, 309, 314, 315 Macedonia: Albanian Muslims in, 334–335; conflict spreads from Kosovo, 334–335; ethnic cooperation in, 335; independence of, 51n2; recognizing Romany, 90; within Yugoslavia, 44 MacNeill, Eoin, 648 Madrid Accord (1975), 809 Mahabad Kurdish Republic, 272, 489 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 269 Mahdi, Sadiq al-, 612 Maîtres chez nous, 65, 67 Major, John, 669 Malasian Indian Congress, 375n2 Malayan Communist Party MCP), 368–369, 371 Malaysia: constitution, Article 153, 376–378; ethnic relations in, 367–368; ethnic violence in, 370; independence (1957–1989), 369–370; independence (1969–2000), 370; independence (2000–present), 372–373; independence transition, 369; managing ethnic conflict in, 373–374; Maylays, non-Maylays defined, 369–370; school issue dispute, 371; secret societies in, 368, 375n1; Singapore expelled, 370; timeline for political history, 365–367; during WWII, 368–369 Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), 368–369, 373, 375 Malaysian Indian Congress, 373 Mali: 2006–2009 uprising, 383; 2014–2015 fighting, 386–387; 2015 peace accord, 387; Azawad secedes, 384–385; Burkina Faso negotiations, 386; coup d’etat in,

I ND EX

384; ethnic conflict in, 383–386; ethnic groups in, 381; French intervention in, 385–386; history of, 380–383; Human Rights Watch report on, 389–392; Islamists in, 385, 386; lessons from Malian fighting, 387; managing ethnic conflict in, 386–387; overview of, 379–380; Qaddafi weapons brought to, 383; Red Berets vs. junta, 384; reform efforts in, 383; refugees from, 387; terrorists operating in, 383; timeline for political history, 379. See also Tuareg group Maliki, Nouri Al-, 268, 276, 277–278, 380 Mamodayev, Yaragi, 540 Manzanas, Melitén, 574 Mao Zedong, 112 Maor Oreja, Jaime, 577–578 Mara, Moussa, 386 Marathis, in India, 258 March Manifesto (1970), 487 Marcos (Zapatista), 399, 402 Marois, Pauline, 70–71 Maronites: holding presidency, 350–351; marginalized by Syria, 356; massacre of Palestinians, 352; as minority, 349–350; of Mount Lebanon, 349; reject Syria’s efforts, 355; vs. Syria, 354. See also Lebanon Marshall, John, 727 Marshall, Thurgood, 773 Maskhadov, Aslan, 541, 542 Matignon Agreement (1999), 171, 177 Maubere, 157 Mauritania, in Western Sahara, 810 Maxwell, John, 657–658 Mayas: Committee for Peasant Unity (CUC), 243, 247; conscription of, 243; in debt servitude, 241; Declaration of Iximché, 247–249; genocide of, 244–246; in Guatemalan civil war, 239–241; identity and rights agreement, 249–252; massacre of Q’eqchi,’ 243; mobilization, during civil war, 242–243. See also Guatemala Mboya, Tom, 309 McConnville, Jean, 676n17 McGuinness, Martin, 672 McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950), 773 Meciar, Vladimir, 144, 148 Medvedev, Dmitry, 3, 11, 216 Meech Lake Accord, 69

Mehler, Andreas, 294 Meliks, 4 Merkel, Angela, 229, 230 Mesa, Carlos, 26 Mexico: 1910 revolution, 397; 1994 Zapatista rebellion, 396; colonial era of, 396–397; economic expansion in, 398–400; ethnic conflict in, 400–403; military offensive of, 401; peace talks break down, 401; timeline for political history, 392–396; Tzotzil massacre, 401–402. See also Indigenous peoples, Mexico; Zapatista Army of National Liberation (ELZN) Middle East, 269, 461–462. See also Israel; Palestine Milosevic, Slobodan, 45, 50, 326, 330–331 Minsk Group, 9, 10, 11 Mitchell, George, 671 Mohhamad, Mathahir, 371 Moi, Daniel arap, 310–312 Mölln, 228 Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), 321 Mon group, 506 Mongols, 102, 103, 105 Montenegro, 44 Morales, Evo, 23–24, 27–28 Morocco, 809, 810, 813 Morsi, Muhammad, 468–469 Moscow Declaration, 17–18 Mount Moriah, 420–421 Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), 538 Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), 292 Mouvement Populaire Iviorian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), 292 Mouvement pour la justice e la paix (MJP), 292 Movement for Divine Unity and Jihad (MUJAO), 380, 381, 384 Movement for the Defense of the nation (MDN), 594 Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), 27 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 159 Mubarak, Hosni, 468–469 Muhammad, Qazi, 271, 489 Mulroney, Brian, 69 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 790–791

837

838

IN DE X

Muralitharan, Vinayagamoorthy, 598 Muslim, Salih (Muhammed), 491–492 Muslim-Croat Federation, 48, 49 Muslims: in France, 192, 195; in Myanmar, 505; Turkish, 227; in Xinjiang region, 106–107, 110 Musyoka, Kalonzo, 317 Mutalibov, Ayaz, 6, 7, 15–16 Myanmar (Burma): armed struggles of, 502–503; conflicts in, 504–509; displaced persons from, 508; drug trade, extortion in, 506; history of, 503–504; instability in, 506–507; Ka Kwe Ye (home guards), 505; legacy of distrust in, 511–512; managing conflict in, 509; name change of, 512n1; negotiating with Karens, 509–510; Panglong Agreement, 514–515; post-WWII struggles, 504–505; reforms, cease-fire in, 510–512; resisting negotiation, 509; targeting Muslims, 505; timeline for political history, 501–502; violence against indigenous groups, 506, 508, 510. See also Karen people Myths, homeland, 3–4 Nagas, of India, 256, 259, 260 Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K): 1988–89 conflicts over, 6–7; autonomous Armenian region formed in, 14; Azerbaijani/Armenia transfer in, 14–15; cease-fire in, 9; conflict resolution for, 9–10; friction over autonoy, 5; history of, 3; Madrid Principles for, 10–11; Moscow Declaration for, 11; post-Soviet violence in, 8; resolution for reunification with Armenia, 16–17; and Soviet Union collapse, 12; timeline for political history, 1–3. See also Karabakh Najib, Razak, 372–373 Nasir, Gamal ‘Abd al-, 351 The Nation, 645 National Action Party (PAN), 403 National Alliance of Tuaregs of Mali (ANTM), 384 National Assembly for Wales, 705, 708, 713–714 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 755, 772, 773

National Committee for Recovering Democracy and Restoring the State, 384 National Congressional Party (NCP), 612, 615 National Council Union of Burma (NCUB), 507 National Democratic Convention (CND), 401 National Democratic Front (NDF), 506, 509 National Emiliano Zapata Independent Peasant Alliance (ANCIEZ), 399 National Indigenous Institute (INI), 397 National Islamic Front (NIF), 612 National League for Democracy (NLD), 510, 512 National Mediation Commission (CONAI), 401 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA), 380, 381, 385, 386 National Organization of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA), 124 National Pact, of Lebanon, 350, 464, 471 National Pact, of Mali, 382 National Peasant Confederation (CNC), 398 National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), 312 National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), 25 National Union of Regional Autonomous Peasant Organizations (UNORCA), 398 National United Liberation Front (NULF), 506 National Unity Party (UBP), 124 National Urban League, 772 Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), 511 Native American Indian Civil Rights Act (1968), 733, 736 Native Americans. See United States: Native Americans Navarra, 571, 572 Ne Win, 505, 506, 509–510 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 258 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 446 New Economic Policy (NEP), 25–26, 370 New Mon State Party (NMSP), 506, 509 New Progressive Party (NPP), 791–792 Newsom, David, 159 Ngeze, Hassan, 553, 554 Nigeria: 1966 coup, 524; defects of military management, 526–527; economic strategies of, 523, 526; ethnic

I ND EX

conflict in, 522–525; ethnic minorities of, 525; First Republic and Biafran War, 523–525; historical background of, 522; lessons from ethnic conflict, 527–528; managing ethnic conflict in, 525–527; north-south divide in, 523; statehood quests i, 525–526; timeline for political history, 517–521; Unification Decree No. 34, 529–533. See also Biafra niqab, 196 N-K Autonomous Region (NKAR), 5 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFATA), 396, 399 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): admitting Czech Republic, Hungary, 90, 145; admitting Slovakia, 146; in Bosnia, 47–48, 55; consequences of Scottish independence, 692; in Kosovo, 331–332, 333–334; in Macedonia, 334–335 Northern Ireland. See United Kingdom: Northern Ireland; United Kingdom: Ulster Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, 668 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, 674 Numeiri, Jafar, 611–612 Obama, Barack, 448, 794 Ocalan, Abdullah (Apo), 483, 486–487 Occitania, 172 O’Connell, Daniel, 645 October Revolution, 237, 242 Odinga, Oginga, 308, 309 Odinga, Raila, 312–313, 314, 317, 322 Ohrid Accord, 335 Olmert, Ehud, 448 Omagh bombing, 671 Operation Allied Force (NATO), 331–332 Operation Barkane, 386 Operation Bootstrap, 791 Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI), 297 Operation Dignité, 294 Operation Litani, 354 Operation Ring, 8 Operation Serval, 385 Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), 312–315, 317, 322

Orange Order, 647 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): reconstructing Kosovo, 332; registering Romany to vote, 90; supervising Bosnia-Herzegovina elections, 48, 56–57; supervising Chechan elections, 541 Organization of African Unity(OAU), 614 Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), 242 Orthodox Christianity, 461 Oslo Accords, 470 Other Campaign, of Zapatistas, 402 Ottoman Empire, 418, 442–443, 461–462 Ottoman Turks, 5, 325 Ouattara, Alassane, 287, 288–289, 291, 293, 296–297 Ougadougou Peace Accords (OPA) (2007), 288, 295–296 Pace v. Alabama (1883), 771 Paisley, Ian, 671, 672 Pakistan, conflicts with India, 260 Palaung State Liberation Organization (PSLO), 506 Palestine: Arab-Jewish conflict in, 416–419, 427; Christians in, 464; Christians ousted from, 469–470; civil war in, 424–426, 444; conflict overview, 415–416; division among Palestinians, 448; effects of WWI, 419; fears Jewish nationalism, 419; first partition plan, 423; geopolitical meaning of JewishArab conflict, 426–427; historical background of, 442–444; illegal Jewish settlements in, 446; intifada (2008), 447; Jewish immigration to, 422; managing conflict in, 446–448; massacres in, 426; multinational struggle over, 439–442; Muslim, Christian majorities in, 418; Operation Cast Lead, 448; Operation Protective Edge, 448; partition plan for, 443; population during mandate, 443; as religious homeland, 416; religious monuments in, 420–421; sabotage of peace talks, 447; Status Quo at holy sites, 470; timeline for political history, 413–415, 439–442; UN Resolution 242 on, 451–452; unrest (2010), 448. See also Israel

839

840

IN DE X

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 354, 444, 470, 471 Palestinian Civil Society, 454–455 Palestinian National Authority, 444 Panah Ali Khan, 4 Panglong Agreement, 504, 514–515 Pa-O group, 504 Paoli, Pasquale, 173, 174 Papadopoulos, Tassos, 127 Pardines José Antonio, 574 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 419–420 Parizeau, Jacques, 69–70 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 638–639, 646 Parot, Henri, 576–577 Parot Doctrine (2006), 576–577, 578 Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), 290–291 Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ), 67 Parti Québécois (PQ): formation of, 65; and global economics, 72; governance of, 68–69; promoting French language, 71; referendum attempt, 70. See also Quebec Party of National Unity (PNU), 313–314, 317 Patriotes, 66 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 273–275, 487, 488–489 Paz Estenssoro, Victor, 25 Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), 485–486 Peel Commission, 443 Peña Nieto, Enrique, 403 Peoples Defense Units (YPG), 491 Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP)), 484 Peoples Democracy Party (PDP), 261 People’s Front of Chechen-Ingushetia, 540 Perestroika, 6, 12, 539 Performance-Based Roadmap for Peace, 447 Peshmerga forces, 276–278 Plaid Cymru (PC), 684–685, 707, 708–709, 715 Plains of Abraham, battle of, 65 Plan de Ayala, 397 Plan de Ayala National Coordinating Committee (CNPA), 398 Plan de Todos, 26

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 758, 761–763, 772 Pogroms: anti-Armenian, 6; against black Americans, 747, 753; in czarist Russia, 417; in Nigeria, 524 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), 672 Popular Democratic Party (PDP), 790, 792 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 470 Popular Politics (PP), 398 Portugal, in East Timor, 156–159 Powell, Enoch, 631 Prabhakaran, Velupillai, 594, 595–599 Prague, and the Romany, 86 Prague Spring, 138, 143 Premedasa, Ranasingh, 596–598 Princip, Gavrilo, 43 Prisoners Commited to the Irreversible Peace Process, 577 progressive extractivism, 27–28 Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), 352 Proletarian Line (LP), 399 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 668 Prussia, 223–226 Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act (1950), 804–805 Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), 792 Puerto Rico. See United States: Puerto Rico Punjabis, in India, 256, 259 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 272 Qatar, in Lebanon, 356 Q’eqchi’ massacre, 243 Quebec: 1980 referendum, 76–77; Charlottetown Accord, 69, 77–78; Clarity Act, 70; in Durham Report (1839), 73–74; French language in, 68, 75–76; history of, 65–66, 66–67; Levesque’s New York speech, 74–75; Meech Lake Accord, 69; modern politics in, 68–71; nationalism in, 64–65; nationalist conflict in, 67; peacefulness of ethnic conflict, 71–72; repatriation movement in, 69. See also Parti Québécois (PQ)

I ND EX

Québécois nationalism, 67 Quiet Revolution, 65, 67 Quiroga, Jorge, 21 Rabin, Yitzhak, 446 Rajapaksa, Mahinda, 599 Randolph, A. Philip, 772–773 Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), 291 Rattrapage, 65 Reagan, Ronald, 810 Real IRA, 668, 671 Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), 238, 242 Refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, 352 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), 781–784 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, 110, 112–114 Reich German Citizenship Law (1913), 224 Republican Turkish Party (CTP), 127 Republika Srpska (RS, Serb Republic), 48–49, 52–60 Resource extractivism, Bolivia, 24 responsibility to protect (R2P), 618 Rice, Condaleeza, 215 Riel, Louis, 66 Ríos Montt, Efraín, 238, 244, 245–246 Riyadh conference, 353 Romany (Roma): after the Communist fall, 88–89; under Communist rule, 87–88; Council of Europe study on, 93–98; criminal element among, 88–89; in Czech Republic, Slovakia, 147; difficulties in France, 192, 193, 196, 197–200; in the European Union, 90–91; historical background of, 86–87; vs. Hungarian Slovaks, 138; managing conflict with, 89–90; as minorities in Czech Republic, 145–146; names for, 86, 92n4; political organizations of, 89; population counts, 92n3; resisting discrimination, 91; significance of racism against, 92; timeline for political history, 79–85; violence against, 82, 93n7 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 773 Roosevelt, Theodore, 748 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 667 Rugova, Ibrahim, 326, 327, 330, 333

Ruiz Samuel, 398, 399, 401 Rural Collective Interest Association (ARIC), 398 Rushdie, Salman, 632 Russia, Northern Caucasus: Caucasian Wars in, 538; Chechan War, First, 541; Chechan War, Second, 542; ethnic conflict in, 539–543; global consequences of modern wars, 544; history of, 537–539; Kahsavourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations, 546–548; managing ethnic conflict in, 542–543; mass deportations from, 539; secession attempts of, 538; terrorism in, 542; timeline for political history, 535–537. See also Chechnya Russian Federation, 17–18, 215–216, 216 Russo-Persian War (1804–13), 4 Ruto, William, 317, 318, 320 Rwanda: Dallaire Telegram, 559–560; ethnic conflict in, 551–555; ethnicity of Hutus, Tutsis, 552, 557, 557n3; genocide preparation, 558n7; genocide significance, 556–557; history of, 551–552; managing ethnic conflict in, 555–556; timeline for political history, 549–551; UN Document S/199/1257, 561–565. See also Hutu people; Tutsi people Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 553, 556 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 209, 213–214, 216 Sadat, Anwar, 468 Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 809, 810 Sahrawi people: civil resistance against Morocco, 813; cultural identity of, 811; as nomads, 812; as refugees in Algeria, 810. See also Western Sahara Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), 810 Said, Nuri, 271 Salah ad-Din (Saladin), 461, 482 Salinas, Carlos, 400–401 Sanchez de Lozada, Gonzalo, 26 Sancho the Elder, 571 Sands, Bobby, 669 Sanogo, Amadou Haya, 384

841

842

IN DE X

Santa Cruz massacre (1991), 155 Sarajevo, 43, 45, 47, 48, 55–56 Sarkisian, Serge, 11 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 197, 215–216 The Satanic Verses, 632 Saw Hunter Tha Hmwe, 505 Scotland. See United Kingdom: Scotland Scottish National Party (SNP), 684–685, 689–690 Serbia, 39–43, 44, 45 Serbo-Croation conflicts, 44, 46–48, 49–50 Serbs: in Bosnia, 46; Croatian offensive on, 51n3; in Kosovo, 328–329, 336–337; in Yugoslavia, 43–45 Shalit, Gilad, 448 Shamil, Sheikh, 538 Sham’un, Camille, 351 Shan group, 503–504, 504 Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), 506 Sharafkandi, Sadegh, 490 sharia law, 385, 468, 541, 617 Sharon, Ariel, 447 Shefiq Özdemir, Ali, 270 Shelley v. Kramer (1948), 773 Shenouda III, 468 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 209, 212, 213 Shiite Arabs, 269, 275, 277–278 Simko, Ismail Agha, 489 Singh, Tara, 258 Sinhala Only Act (1956), 591 Sinhalese people, 591, 594, 597, 598–599 Sinhalese United National Party (UNP), 592 Sinjar (Shingal), 278 Sinn Féin League: founded, 647, 666; inflexible stand on independence, 667; as main political actor, 648–649; moving to forefront of struggle, 669. See also United Kingdom: Northern Ireland; United Kingdom: Ulster Slovak Republic, 151–153, 155–156 Slovakia: Hungarian minority in, 144, 145, 146–147; relations with Czech Republic, 146; Romany in, 147; Romany minority in, 86, 92 Slovaks, 140–143 Slovenes, 43 Slovenia, 39–43, 44, 45, 46; within Yugoslavia, 45 Smith, John, 716n13

Smith v. All wright (1948), 773 Society for the Preservation of the Irish Language, 645 Sokoto Caliphate, 522 Soro, Guillaume, 292, 295–296 Soule, 570 South Ossetia, 208, 212–213 South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, 211 South Sudan. See under Sudan Soviet Union: breakup of, 211–213; brokering peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, 9; ethnoterritorial federalism of, 11–12; policies in Nagorno-Karabakh, 3; relations with Iraq, 272–273; response to Karabakh violence, 7 Spain: ethnic conflict in, 574–578; failed military coup, 575; managing ethnic conflict in, 578–579; March 11 train bombings, 576; police torture, 574–575; political transition in, 574–578; resource extractivism in Bolivia, 24; timeline for political history, 567–570. See also Basque nation Spanish Civil War, 573 Srebrenica, 47, 48 Sri Lanka: 2006 campaign, 599; as British colony, 591; historical background of, 590–592; India’s peacemaking efforts, 590, 593–594, 594–596; Sinhalese majority of, 591; Tamil minority in, 591; Tamil-Sinhalese conflict develops, 590; timeline for political history, 585–590; Vaddukoddai Resolution, 601–605. See also Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Tamil people; Tamil-Sinhalese conflict St. Andrews Agreement, 671 Stalin, Josef, 5–6 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 506, 507, 510 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 508 Sudan: accountability of leaders, 617–618; Addis Ababa Accord (1973), 611; Al Qaeda training camps in, 612, 613–614; Arab Muslims vs. African Muslims, 612–613; AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 614; colonized by British, 610–611; continued unrest in, 609; Darfur front,

I ND EX

612–614; ethnic, religious, cultural differences in, 610–611; famine in, 612; first civil war, 611–612; forced ideological change in, 612–613; historical background of conflict, 610–611; international attention to, 614; lingering effects of war, 616–617; Mahdist Era in, 610–611; massacres in, 613; military coup in, 612; North-South peace agreement (2005), 615; oil industry in, 611, 613–614, 616, 617; peacekeeping force for, 613; political development needed in, 616–618; second civil war, 612–613; sharia law debate in, 617; South Sudan secession, 615; Southern Policy of, 610–611; timeline for political history, 607–609; UN Report on South Sudan (2014), 623 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, 615 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 612 Suharto, 156, 160 Sukarno, 158, 161 Sulh, Ryad al-, 350 Sumgait, pogrom in, 6 Sun Yat-sen, 103 Sunni Muslims: balancing populations, 269; boycotting elections, 275; and ISIS, 278; Kurds as, 481; in Lebanon, 349–350 Supreme Kurdish Council, 492 Supreme Sharia Court, 541. See also sharia law Suu Kyi, Aung San, 510–511 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), 778–781 Sweatt v. Painter (1950), 773 Sweden, refusing Romany, 86 Switzerland, and the Romany, 86 Syndicat Agricole Africaine (SAA), 290 Syria: Christians in, 464, 466; Kurds in, 490–492; and Lebanon civil war, 353–354, 465–466 Syriac Orthodox Church, 460 Syrian Kurdish Future Movement, 491 Syrian Law 93, 491 Syrian National Council (SNC), 490

Taif Agreement, 353, 465, 473–475 Taksim, 124 Talabani, Jalal: agrees to cease-fire, 488; conflict with KDP, 275; defeating Barzani, 487; founding PUK, 273; as president, 488–489 Talat, Mehmet Ali, 121, 127 Tamil Nadu, 593, 595, 596, 597, 600n2 Tamil people: citizenship, autonomy for, 595; dependent on LTTE, 598; forfeiting elected offices, 592; higher education of, 591; in India, 255; Indians among, 600n1; leaders assassinated, 596–597; moderate vs. extremist elements of, 594; separatist agenda of, 592; supported by Tamil Nadu, 593, 595–597; used to shield LTTE, 599; see also Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Sri Lanka; Tamil-Sinhalese conflict Tamil Tigers. See Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), 592, 593, 595–596 Tamil-Sinhalese conflict: 1950s escalation, 591–592; 1980s escalation, 592–593; Bhutan talks, 594–595; conflict resolution for, 598–599; constructing conflict in, 596–598; on Jaffna peninsula, 594; July riots (1983), 592–594; lessons from, 599–600; sending peacekeepers to Sri Lanka, 592; see also Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Sri Lanka; Tamil people Tammo, Mishaal, 491 Tatars, Caucasian, 4 Temple Mount, 420–421, 449 Ter-Petrosian, Levon, 7–8 Thatcher, Margaret, 669, 708, 710 Thein San, 511 Tibet: Buddhism in, 104, 109, 114–117; Communist takeover of, 104–105; declaration of independence, 105; increasing ethnic conflict in, 101–102; religious discrimination in, 108–109; significance of ethnic conflict in, 110–111; treaties of, 105. See also China Tigran the Great, 4 Tito, 44–45, 325, 329 Tohti, Ilham, 102, 110

843

844

IN DE X

Tone, Theobald Wolf, 647 Toure, Toumani (ATT), 382, 384 Trail of Tears, 728 Transcaucasus, 5 Traore, Dioucounda, 385 Traore, Moussa, 382 Treaty of Guilistan (1813), 4 Treaty of Paris (1898), 797–799 Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), 571 Treaty of Turkmenchai (1828), 4 Triball Controlled Community College Assistance Act (1978), 733 Trimble, David, 671 Tripatite Agreement (1985), 355 Troubles, Irish, 665, 667–670 Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, 68, 74, 76–77 Truman, Harry S., 773 Tuareg group: about, 380–381; fighting against Mali, 382; integrated into military, civil service, 382; in Mali, 379; subgroups in, 387n1. See also Mali Tugwell, Rexford, 791 Turabi, Hasan al-, 612 Turkey: accepting KRG, 488; border disputes with Iraq, 269; constitution of, 496–500; Kurds in, 482–487; relations with Turkish Cypriots, 124, 126–127 Turkish Cypriots. See Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Turkish Cyprus. See Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Turkish Defense Organization (TMT), 124 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC): claiming independence, 122, 124; effects of Turkish migration, 128; vs. Greek Cypriots, 129; inflexible stand on independence, 126; relations with Turkey, 124, 126–127 Tutsi people: massacred by Hutu, 551, 552, 554–555, 558n11. See also Rwanda Twa people, 551–552, 558n11 Tzotzil people, 397, 402 U Nu, 504, 506, 509 Überfremdung, 227 Ubico, Jorge, 237, 242 Ulster. See United Kingdom: Ulster Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 665, 668 Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), 647, 648

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), 666, 667, 669 Ulster Volunteer Force, 647, 648, 665, 668 Ulster Workers Council (UWC), 669 UN Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 615 UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), 554, 556, 561–565 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 90 UN Human Rights Commission, 198 UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, 165–167 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 354 UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 327, 332, 335–336 UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 386 UN Report on Palestine Security, 432–435 UN Report on South Sudan (2014), 623 UN Security Council on Côte d’Ivoire, 299–303 UN Security Council Resolution 425, 360–361 UN Security Council Resolution 688, 280–281, 487 UN Security Council Resolution 1558, 361–364 Unification Decree No. 34, 529–533 Union of Romany Political Parties, 89 United Irishmen, Society of, 645, 647 United Kingdom: assimilation vs. separatist philosophies, 634; Citizenship Survey, 2009–2010, 636–638; consequences of Scottish independence, 691–692; contemporary race relations in, 629–630; ethnic conflict in, 632–633; historical background of ethnic conflict, 630–632; ideological divide in, 632; Kenyan Asian Crisis (1967), 631; lessons from immigration issues in, 634–635; managing ethnic conflict in, 634; minority unemployment in, 633; social and political integration in, 633; timeline for political history, 626–629. See also Great Britain United Kingdom: Northern Ireland: Anglo-Irish elite vs. Catholic peasants,

I ND EX

645; dimensions of conflict, 646; Easter Rising official report, 657–658; Easter Uprising Proclamation of Ireland Independence, 655–656; ethnic conflict in, 646–649; historical background of ethnic conflict, 644–646; incomplete resolution of difficulties, 644; incomplete solution of partition, 649–650; industrial vs. agricultural factions, 647–648; Irish Catholics vs. Scottish Protestants, 646–647; Irish home rule bills fail, 646; managing ethnic conflict in, 649; partition of Ireland, 649; Penal Laws (1695), 651–655; rise in Irish nationalism, 645–646; timeline for political history, 640–644. See also United Kingdom: Ulster United Kingdom: Scotland: Act of Union (1707), 684, 694–700; dual identities in, 684; Edinburgh Agreement (2012), 700–701; future challenges for, 690–692; historical background of ethnic conflict, 683–687; and Labour Party, 686–687, 689; as model for other ethnicities, 692; nationalism in, 683, 687–688; North Sea oil issues, 688; referendum for devolution (1974), 685–686; referendum for devolution (1999), 686–687; and the Romany, 86; Scottish Parliament formed, 687; striking political balance in, 688–690; timeline for political history, 681–683; White Paper on independence, 690 United Kingdom: Ulster: Anglo Irish Agreement (1985), 669; Anglo-Irish Treaty (1920), 677–679; Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998), 670–671; Bloody Sunday, Bloody Friday, 668; British forces deployed, 667; complexity of divide, 664–665; consultation role for Irish Catholics, 669; cooperation with Republic of Ireland, 674; culture of violence transformed, 674; decommissioning issues, 671; Good Friday Agreement (1998), 665, 669, 677–679; Hillsborough Declaration, 671, 672; historical background of ethnic conflict, 665; managing ethnic conflict in, 669–673; Mitchell

Review, 671; Omagh bombing, 671; partition grievances, 666–667; Peace People, 675n12; peace walls, 672; persecution of Catholics, 665–666; potato famine, emigration, 666; religious distinctions in, 650n1; Scottish, British settlement of, 665; segregated education, neighborhoods in, 672; self-determination as Northern Irish, 674n2; St. Andrews Agreement, 671; Sunningdale Agreement (1973), 669; tensions remaining, 673; timeline for political history, 658–664; treatment of political prisoners, 668. See also Irish Republican Army (IRA); Troubles, Irish; United Kingdom: Northern Ireland United Kingdom: Wales: Acts of Union (1536, 1543), 706; Central Welsh Board, 710–711; Citizenship Survey, 2009-2010, 636–638; constitutional preferences in, 714–715; Cross-Party Agreement on Further Devolution for Wales (2014), 722; Cymdeithas yr Iaith group, 709, 711–712; Cymru Fydd movement, 707; devolution vote (1997), 710; eras of ethnic conflict in, 708–710; government of Wales Act (1998), 713; Government of Wales Act (2006), 714; gradual devolution in, 712–713; historical background of, 705–708; and Labour Party, 707, 709; legislation for, 710; managing Welsh nationalism, 710–715; National Assembly for Wales, 705, 708, 713–714; nationalism of, 705; One Wales: A Progressive Agenda for the Government of Wales (2007), 717–722; Plaid Cymru (PC), 707–708, 708–709, 715; political awareness development, 706–707, 708; population changes in, 707; Scottish nationalism’s effect on, 716; timeline for political history, 703–705; Tryweryn valley controversy, 709; Wales Act (2014), 714; Welsh language, support for, 711–712, 715; Welsh nationalism vs. British unionism, 709 United Maylays National Organization (UMNO), 369, 371 United Movements and Fronts of the Azawad (MFUA), 382

845

846

IN DE X

United Nations: avoiding Rwanda genocide; Document S/199/1257, 561–565; Guatemalan civil war report, 245; immigration acts, 630–632; intervening in Abkhazia, Georgia, 215; nonmember status for Palestine, 448; opposing Western Sahara occupation, 810; Palestinian partition plan, 425–426; on Palestinian struggle, 442; on Puerto Rico status, 791; Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 446; Resolution 181 Palestinian partition, 443; Resolution 242 on Palestine, 451–452; Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, 340–341; Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 443; and Western Sahara cease-fire, 812–813; Western Sahara report, 816–818. See also individual actions, rulings, e.g., UN Human Rights Commission United P-O National Organization (UPNO), 506 United States: avoiding Rwanda genocide, 555–556; consequences of support for Israel, 449; involvement in Turkey, 484; refusing Romany, 86; supporting invasion of East Timor, 158–160; and Western Sahara occupation, 809; Yellow Peril campaign, 92n1 United States: civil rights struggle: affecting Northern blacks, 774–775; armed forces integrated, 773; blacks’ physical danger during, 774; Civil Rights Act (1875), 771; Civil Rights Act (1974), 774; Civil War Amendments, 770; effects of Great Depression, 772–773; effects of WWII, 773; Enforcement Act (1870), 771; historical background of, 769–773; Housing and Community Development Act (1977), 777–778; Jim Crow facilities, 771; between local, state, federal governments, 769; managing ethnic conflict, 774–775; nonviolent resistance practice, 774; north to south black migration, 772; post-Revolution compromises, 769–770; during Reconstruction, 770–772; and the Republican Party, 770–771; riots over, 775; Selma demonstration, 774; significance of, 775–776; Supreme Court

cases on, 771–772, 773, 778–784; timeline for political history, 765–769 United States: Native Americans: 20th-century achievements, 733–734; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), 741–742; Communist scare affecting, 730; forced assimilation of, 727, 728–729; General Allotment Act (1887), 729; historical background of, 727–731; Hopewell Treaty (1785), 739–741; Indian Citizenship Act (1924), 729; Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) (1934), 730; Keeler Commission recommendations, 731; vs. manifest destiny agendas, 727–728; piggybacking civil rights movement, 731–732; preserving culture of, 735; progress on rights for, 736–737; public safety for, 735; reservations for, 728; restoration of rights, 729–732; right to operate gaming venues, 734; statistics on, 734, 736, 737n1, 738n13; struggle for constitutional rights, 731–732; Talton v. Mayes (1896), 737n4; territorial plan for, 728; tribal politics, 732–733; wardship of, 727–730. See also Cherokee Indians United States: Puerto Rico: Americanization of, 795; beginning of U.S. control, 790; commonwealth formed, 791; early economic relationship of, 789–790; early primitive conditions, 790; Foraker Act (1900), 799–802; historical background of, 789–791; Jones-Shafroth Act (1917), 802–804; options for status change, 792–793; political, cultural distance between, 796; Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act (1950), 804–805; timeline for political history, 785–789; Treaty of Paris (1898), 797–799; voting results, 793–794 United States: racial violence: black community response to, 753, 755; black counterviolence, 749–752; causes, characteristics of of, 750–753; Chicago riots, 752; civil liberty dichotomy, 746; Civil War Amendments, 757–759; defensive, organized stance of blacks, 747; government reponse to, 755–756; government response to, 753; historical

I ND EX

background of, 746–752; influence of black press, 755; Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 758, 759–760; lynchings, 747, 748–749, 749; managing ethnic conflict in, 753–755; non-violent reponses to, 756; non-violent responses to, 755; north to south black migration, 746–747; Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 758, 761–763; police force neutrality, 755; rape accusations, 749; riots, 747–748, 749, 750–751, 754; timeline for political history, 743–746 Urartu period, 4 Urban II, pope, 461 Urkullu, Iñigo, 578 Urroz Ibarrola, Begoña, 580n2 U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom, 614 Uygurs, 101–102, 107, 109–110, 111n3. See also China Vaddukoddai Resolution, 601–605 Vasconcelos José, 397 Vatican, and the Romany, 86 Velvet Divorce, 144–145 Velvet Revolution, 138, 140, 143 Vera Raphael, 575 Volk, Germans as, 223, 224 Volsky, Arkady, 9 Wa group, 504 Wahhabism, 542 Wales. See United Kingdom: Wales Wales Act (2014), 714 War Measures Act, 67–68 Washington Accords (1998), 268 West Beirut intifada (1984), 352 West Germany, 225–226 Western (Wailing) Wall, 420–421 Western Sahara: ethnic conflict in, 811–812; geopolitical significance of, 813–815; historical background of, 809–810; Madrid Accord (1975), 809; managing ethnic conflict in, 812–813; Moroccans outnumbering Sahrawi, 811–812; occupied by Morocco, 809; sand walls in, 810; similarity to East Timor, 814; timeline for political history, 807–809; UN report on, 816–818; UN-brokered cease-fire in, 812. See also Sahrawi people

Western Sahara Polisario Front, 809–810, 813 Wilson, Marie, 670 Wilson, Richard, 732 Wilson, Woodrow, 494 World War I, 419, 482–483 World War II, 44–47, 271, 368–369, 773 World Zionist Organization (WZO), 418 Wounded Knee protest (1973), 732 Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region: Chinese investment in, 106–107, 109; news transparency, lack of, 110; overview of, 106–107; police crackdown in, 110; Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, 110, 112–114; Religious Extremism Law (2015), 110; significance of ethnic conflict in, 110–111. See also China Yandarbiyev, Zelimkhan, 541, 543 Yasin, Nurmehemmet, 110 Yeltsin, Boris, 540 Ye’or, Bat, 472 Yerevan, Armenia, 9 Yopougon mass grave, 292 Yoruba, 522 Young Ireland Movement, 645 Yuan Dynasty, 105 Yugoslavia: creation of, 325; and Dayton Accords, 52–60; dissolution of, 45, 326; ethnic percentages, 338n1; ethnic tensions in, 44–45; history of, 42–44; timeline for political history, 39–43 Zabala, Joxi, 575 Zapata, Emiliano, 397 Zapatista Army of National Liberation (ELZN): call for indigenous rights, 402; first Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, 404–406; in group assembly, 399; importance of, 403; land recovery by, 400; mission of, 396, 400; move toward autonomy, 402; seven-years struggle of, 400; sixth Declaration of the Sela Lacandona, 406–411 Zavgayev, Doku, 540 Zedillo, Ernesto, 401 Zepa, 47, 48 Zionism, 418, 422 Zviadists, 212–213

847