Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II [2 ed.] 076568005X, 9780765680051

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ISBN 978-0-7656-8005-1

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9 780765 680051

01

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

CONFLICTS

SINCE WORLD WAR II S E C O N D

E D I T I O N

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

CONFLICTS

SINCE WORLD WAR II S E C O N D

EDITED BY

E D I T I O N

JAMES CIMENT

V O L U M E O N E -F O U R

First published 2007 by M.E. Sharpe Published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use of operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II / James Ciment, editor. – 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7656-8005-1 (set : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7656-8005-X (set : alk. paper) 1. World politics—1945–1989—Encyclopedias. 2. World politics—1989—Encyclopedias. 3. Military history, Modern—20th century—Encyclopedias. 4. Military history, Modern—21st century—Encyclopedias. I. Ciment, James. D843.E46 2007 909.82'5—dc22

2006014011 ISBN 13: 9780765680051 (hbk )

Cover images, clockwise from top left, by Getty Images and the following: Piero Pomponi; Sven Nackstrand; Marco Di Lauro; Three Lions/Stringer; Jean-Philippe Ksiazek; STR/Stringer

CONTENTS Volume 1

Ethiopia: Revolution, 1974–1978 ......................... 165 Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978............... 170 Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–1991............................ 174 Ghana: Rawlings Coups, 1979–1981..................... 180 Guinea-Bissau: War of National Liberation, 1962–1974 ....................................................... 183 Guinea-Bissau: Civil War, 1998–2000................... 186 Ivory Coast: Civil Disorder Since 1999 .................. 190 Kenya: Mau Mau Uprising, 1952–1956 ................ 195 Liberia: Doe Coup, 1980 ....................................... 199 Liberia: Civil War, 1989–1997 .............................. 202 Liberia: Anti-Taylor Uprising, 1998–2003 ............ 208 Madagascar: Independence Movement and Coups, 1947–2002 ....................................................... 212 Mali: Ethnic and Political Conflict, 1968–1996 ....................................................... 218 Mauritania: Coups Since 1978 ............................... 221 Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974 ....................................................... 224 Mozambique: Renamo War, 1976–1992................ 230 Namibia: War of National Liberation, 1966–1990 ....................................................... 238 Niger: Ethnic and Political Conflict Since 1990 ........................................................ 242 Nigeria: Biafra War, 1967–1970............................ 245 Nigeria: Coups and Ethnic Unrest Since 1966 ................................................................. 251 Rwanda: Civil War and Genocide Since 1991 ........ 258 Sierra Leone: Civil Conflict, 1990–Present ............. 269 Somalia: Civil War Since 1991............................... 274 South Africa: Anti-Apartheid Struggle, 1948–1994 ....................................................... 282 Sudan: Civil Wars in South, 1955–1972; 1983–2005 ....................................................... 292 Sudan: Conflict in Darfur Since 2002..................... 301 Togo: Coups and Political Unrest, 1963–1990s...................................................... 307 Uganda: Anti-Amin Struggle, 1971–1979 ............ 310 Uganda: Civil Conflict Since 1980 ......................... 315 Western Sahara: Polisario-Moroccan War, 1975–1991 ....................................................... 319 Zimbabwe: Struggle for Majority Rule, 1965–1980 ....................................................... 324 Zimbabwe: Anti-Mugabe Struggle ........................ 330

Alphabetical List of Entries....................................... ix Contributors........................................................... xiii Introduction ............................................................ xv

Roots of War Cold War Confrontations........................................... 3 Anticolonialism ....................................................... 13 People’s Wars........................................................... 20 Coups ...................................................................... 29 Invasions and Border Disputes................................. 37 Ethnic and Religious Conflicts................................. 47 Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s .............. 55 International Arms Trade......................................... 63

Conflicts

Africa, Sub-Saharan Map: Sub-Saharan Africa ......................................... 76 Angola: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974 ......................................................... 77 Angola: Struggle over Cabinda, 1960– .................... 83 Angola: First War with UNITA, 1975–1992........... 86 Angola: Second War with UNITA, 1992–2002 ......................................................... 93 Burkina Faso: Coups, 1966–1987 ............................ 97 Burundi: Ethnic Strife Since 1962 ......................... 101 Central African Republic: Coups Since 1966 ......... 108 Chad: Civil Wars, 1960s–1990s............................. 114 Chad: War with Libya, 1986–1987........................ 119 Comoros: Coups, 1980s ......................................... 123 Congo, Democratic Republic of the: PostIndependence Wars, 1960–1965 ....................... 128 Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997 ....................................................... 136 Congo, Democratic Republic of: Invasions and Internal Strife, 1998– ................................. 142 Congo, Republic of: Civil Conflict, 1997............... 147 Djibouti: Civil Conflict, 1991–2000 ..................... 152 Eritrea: War for Independence, 1958–1991 ........... 155 Eritrea: Border War with Ethiopia, 1998–2000 ....................................................... 161 v

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Contents

Volume 2

Americas Map: North and Central America .......................... 336 Map: South America .............................................. 337 Argentina: Dirty War, 1960s–1970s...................... 339 Argentina: Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982 ............. 346 Bolivia: Revolution, 1952...................................... 352 Brazil: General’s Coup, 1964 ................................. 358 Canada: Quebec Separatist Movement, 1960–1987 ....................................................... 364 Chile: Coup Against Allende, 1973 ....................... 369 Colombia: Internal Insurgencies, 1970s–2000s...... 374 Cuba: Communist Revolution, 1956–1959 ........... 381 Cuba: Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961 .......................... 389 Cuba: Missile Crisis, 1962 ..................................... 394 Dominican Republic: Coup and U.S. Invasion, 1965........................................... 400 Ecuador: Border Dispute with Peru, 1941– ........... 408 El Salvador: Soccer War with Honduras, 1969 ....... 411 El Salvador: Civil Wars, 1970s–1980s ................... 414 Grenada: U.S. Invasion, 1983 ................................ 421 Guatemala: Coup Against Arbenz, 1954................ 427 Guatemala: Civil War, 1970s–1990s ..................... 435 Guyana: Ethnic Conflict, 1960–1992 .................... 442 Haiti: Civil Conflict, 1990s– ................................. 447 Mexico: Zapatista Uprising Since 1994.................. 458 Nicaragua: Revolution, 1970s ............................... 466 Nicaragua: Contra War, 1980s............................... 473 Panama: Torrijos Coup, 1969................................. 482 Panama: U.S. Invasion, 1989 ................................. 485 Peru: Shining Path Rebellion, 1970s–1997 ........... 493 Puerto Rico: Anti-U.S. Terrorism, 1934–1954 ...... 501 United States: War on Terrorism, 1990s– .............. 505 Uruguay: Tupumaro Uprising, 1967–1985 ........... 513 Venezuela: Anti-Chávez Movement Since 1999...... 517

Asia, East and Southeast Map: East and Southeast Asia ................................ 524 Cambodia: Civil Wars, 1968–1998........................ 525 Cambodia: U.S. Interventions, 1969–1973............ 537 Cambodia: Vietnamese Invasion, 1978–1979 ........ 541 China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949................... 544 China: Invasion of Tibet, 1950–1959 .................... 555 China: Quemoy and Matsu, 1954–1958 ................ 560 China: Border War with India, 1962 ..................... 571 China: Border Clash with the Soviet Union, 1969.... 575 China: War with Vietnam, 1979............................ 580 China: Tiananmen Violence, 1989 ......................... 583

East Timor: Independence Struggle, 1974–2002 ....................................................... 590 Indonesia: Wars of Independence, 1945–1949 ....................................................... 597 Indonesia: Communist and Suharto Coups, 1965–1966 ....................................................... 603 Indonesia: Aceh Separatist Conflict Since 1976 ................................................................. 609 Korea, North: Seizure of the Pueblo, 1968 .............. 613 Korea, North: Nuclear Standoff Since the 1990s .......................................................... 617 Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 1950–1953 ....................................................... 622 Laos: Pathet Lao War, 1960s–1970s....................... 633 Malaysia: Communist Uprising, 1948–1960 ......... 640 Myanmar (Burma): Civil Wars and Coups Since 1948 ........................................................ 645

Volume 3 Philippines: Huk Rebellion, 1948–1953 ............... 653 Philippines: Moro Uprising, 1970s–1980s ............ 657 Philippines: War on Islamic Militants Since 1990 ........................................................ 661 Thailand: Muslim Rebellion, 2004–...................... 664 Vietnam: First Indochina War, 1946–1954............ 667 Vietnam: Second Indochina War, 1959–1975 ........ 673

Asia, South Map: South Asia .................................................... 684 Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion, 1979–1989.............. 685 Afghanistan: Civil War, 1989 ................................ 692 Afghanistan: U.S. Invasion, 2001– ........................ 698 India: Partition Violence, 1947.............................. 704 India: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 1947 ........................................................ 709 India: Invasion of Goa, 1961.................................. 715 India: War with Pakistan, 1965 ............................. 718 India: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence, 1971 .......................................... 724 India: Sikh Uprising Since 1973 ............................ 729 India: Ethnic and Separatist Violence in Assam Since 1979 ........................................................ 734 India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 1998 ........................................................ 737 Nepal: Maoist Insurgency ...................................... 742 Sri Lanka: Tamil Uprising Since the Late 1970s................................................... 746

Contents

Europe and Former Soviet Union Map: Europe.......................................................... 754 Map: Former Soviet Union..................................... 755 Albania: Civil Conflict, 1990s ............................... 757 Armenia: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 1990s........ 761 Bosnia: Civil War, 1992–1995............................... 764 Croatia: War with Serbia, 1991–1995.................... 775 Cyprus: Communal Conflict Since 1955 ................ 780 Czechoslovakia: Coup, 1948 .................................. 786 Czechoslovakia: Soviet Invasion, 1968 ................... 793 Georgia: Civil War, 1990s ..................................... 800 Germany: The Berlin Crises, 1948–1949 and 1958–1962................................................ 805 Germany: East German Uprising, 1953................. 813 Greece: Civil War, 1944–1949 .............................. 818 Hungary: Soviet Invasion, 1956............................. 824 Ireland: The Troubles Since 1968 .......................... 830 Italy: Anti-Mafia Campaign Since 1980................. 842 Macedonia: Ethnic Conflict, 1990s ........................ 854 Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 1981–1983 ....................................................... 859 Romania: Fall of Ceausescu, 1989.......................... 866 Russia: Chechen Uprising Since 1994.................... 870 Serbia: Kosovo Secessionist Movement, 1990s................................................................ 876 Soviet Union: Conflict with Iran over Azerbaijan, 1945–1946..................................... 881 Soviet Union: Conflict with Turkey, 1945–1953 ....................................................... 887 Soviet Union: Downing of Korean Airliner, 1983 ................................................... 892 Spain: Basque Uprising Since 1959........................ 895 Tajikistan: Civil War, 1990s .................................. 902 Turkey: Kurdish War Since 1984........................... 906 Uzbekistan: Conflict with Islamists Since 1999 ........................................................ 913

Middle East and North Africa Map: Middle East and North Africa....................... 918 Algeria: War of National Liberation, 1954–1962 ....................................................... 919 Algeria: The Fundamentalist Struggle Since 1992 ........................................................ 927 Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970 ....................................................... 933 Egypt: Sinai War, 1956 ......................................... 940 Egypt: War of Attrition, 1967–1970 ..................... 946 Iran: Coup Against Mossadegh, 1953 .................... 949 Iran: Islamic Revolution, 1979 .............................. 953

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Volume 4 Iran: War with Iraq, 1980–1988............................ 963 Iraq: Revolution and Coups, 1958–1968 ............... 970 Iraq: Kurdish Wars Since 1961 .............................. 974 Iraq: Gulf War, 1990–1991 ................................... 982 Iraq: U.S. Invasion, 2003–..................................... 990 Israel: War of Independence, 1948–1949 ............... 997 Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948 ................ 1005 Israel: Six-Day War, 1967.................................... 1015 Israel: Yom Kippur War, 1973............................. 1020 Israel: Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 1981 ............................................................... 1025 Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 2006 ............................................................... 1028 Jordan: Civil War, 1970....................................... 1035 Lebanon: Civil Conflict, 1958.............................. 1039 Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990.......................... 1043 Libya: Qaddafi Coup, 1969.................................. 1053 Libya: U.S. Air Attacks, 1986.............................. 1057 Palestine: First Intifada, 1987–1992.................... 1061 Palestine: Second Intifada, 2000– ....................... 1067 Yemen: Civil War, 1960s–1980s.......................... 1073

Oceania Map: Oceania ...................................................... 1080 Fiji: Ethnic Conflict and Coups Since 1987 ...................................................... 1081 Indonesia: Irian Jaya Separatist Conflict Since 1964 ...................................................... 1085 New Caledonia (France): Independence Struggle Since the 1970s................................. 1088 Papua New Guinea: Bougainville Independence Struggle Since 1988 ........................................ 1093 Solomon Islands: Separatist and Ethnic Conflict, 1999–2003 ....................................... 1098

Organizations, Alliances, Conventions, and Negotiations African Union...................................................... 1103 ANZUS Pact ....................................................... 1109 Arab League ........................................................ 1112 Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact) ........ 1116 Non-Aligned Movement—The Bandung Conference ....................................... 1118 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)...................................................... 1122

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Contents

European Defense Community (EDC), 1952–1954 ..................................................... 1126 International Criminal Court............................... 1129 Middle East Negotiations .................................... 1131 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ...... 1143 Organization of American States (OAS) ............... 1149 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)...... 1153 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)....... 1157 United Nations.................................................... 1161 Warsaw Pact ........................................................ 1173 War and Weapons Conventions............................ 1176

Appendixes Biographies ......................................................... 1189 Glossary .............................................................. 1201 Bibliography ....................................................... 1213

Indexes General Index ......................................................... I-3 Biographical and Organizational Name Index ....... I-41 Geographical Index............................................... I-59

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF ENTRIES Afghanistan: Civil War, 1989 ................................ 692 Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion, 1979–1989.............. 685 Afghanistan: U.S. Invasion, 2001– ........................ 698 African Union...................................................... 1103 Albania: Civil Conflict, 1990s ............................... 757 Algeria: The Fundamentalist Struggle Since 1992 ........................................................ 927 Algeria: War of National Liberation, 1954–1962 ....................................................... 919 Angola: First War with UNITA, 1975–1992........... 86 Angola: Second War with UNITA, 1992–2002 ......................................................... 93 Angola: Struggle over Cabinda, 1960– .................... 83 Angola: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974 ......................................................... 77 Anticolonialism ....................................................... 13 ANZUS Pact ....................................................... 1109 Arab League ........................................................ 1112 Argentina: Dirty War, 1960s–1970s...................... 339 Argentina: Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982 ............. 346 Armenia: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 1990s........ 761

China: War with Vietnam, 1979............................ 580 Cold War Confrontations........................................... 3 Colombia: Internal Insurgencies, 1970s–2000s...... 374 Comoros: Coups, 1980s ......................................... 123 Congo, Democratic Republic of: Invasions and Internal Strife, 1998– ................................. 142 Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997........................................ 136 Congo, Democratic Republic of the: PostIndependence Wars, 1960–1965 ....................... 128 Congo, Republic of: Civil Conflict, 1997............... 147 Coups ...................................................................... 29 Croatia: War with Serbia, 1991–1995.................... 775 Cuba: Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961 .......................... 389 Cuba: Communist Revolution, 1956–1959 ........... 381 Cuba: Missile Crisis, 1962 ..................................... 394 Cyprus: Communal Conflict Since 1955 ................ 780 Czechoslovakia: Coup, 1948 .................................. 786 Czechoslovakia: Soviet Invasion, 1968 ................... 793 Djibouti: Civil Conflict, 1991–2000 ..................... 152 Dominican Republic: Coup and U.S. Invasion, 1965........................................... 400

Bolivia: Revolution, 1952...................................... 352 Bosnia: Civil War, 1992–1995............................... 764 Brazil: General’s Coup, 1964 ................................. 358 Burkina Faso: Coups, 1966–1987 ............................ 97 Burundi: Ethnic Strife Since 1962 ......................... 101

East Timor: Independence Struggle, 1974–2002 ....................................................... 590 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)............................................ 1122 Ecuador: Border Dispute with Peru, 1941– ........... 408 Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970 ....................................................... 933 Egypt: Sinai War, 1956 ......................................... 940 Egypt: War of Attrition, 1967–1970 ..................... 946 El Salvador: Civil Wars, 1970s–1980s ................... 414 El Salvador: Soccer War with Honduras, 1969 ....... 411 Eritrea: Border War with Ethiopia, 1998–2000 ....................................................... 161 Eritrea: War for Independence, 1958–1991 ........... 155 Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–1991............................ 174 Ethiopia: Revolution, 1974–1978 ......................... 165 Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978............... 170 Ethnic and Religious Conflicts................................. 47 European Defense Community (EDC), 1952–1954 ..................................................... 1126

Cambodia: Civil Wars, 1968–1998........................ 525 Cambodia: U.S. Interventions, 1969–1973............ 537 Cambodia: Vietnamese Invasion, 1978–1979 ........ 541 Canada: Quebec Separatist Movement, 1960–1987 ....................................................... 364 Central African Republic: Coups Since 1966 ......... 108 Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact) ........ 1116 Chad: Civil Wars, 1960s–1990s............................. 114 Chad: War with Libya, 1986–1987........................ 119 Chile: Coup Against Allende, 1973 ....................... 369 China: Border Clash with the Soviet Union, 1969.... 575 China: Border War with India, 1962 ..................... 571 China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949................... 544 China: Invasion of Tibet, 1950–1959 .................... 555 China: Quemoy and Matsu, 1954–1958 ................ 560 China: Tiananmen Violence, 1989 ......................... 583 ix

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Alphabetical List of Entries

Fiji: Ethnic Conflict and Coups Since 1987 ............................................................... 1081 Georgia: Civil War, 1990s ..................................... 800 Germany: East German Uprising, 1953................. 813 Germany: The Berlin Crises, 1948–1949 and 1958–1962 ....................................................... 805 Ghana: Rawlings Coups, 1979–1981..................... 180 Greece: Civil War, 1944–1949 .............................. 818 Grenada: U.S. Invasion, 1983 ................................ 421 Guatemala: Civil War, 1970s–1990s ..................... 435 Guatemala: Coup Against Arbenz, 1954................ 427 Guinea-Bissau: Civil War, 1998–2000................... 186 Guinea-Bissau: War of National Liberation, 1962–1974 ....................................................... 183 Guyana: Ethnic Conflict, 1960–1992 .................... 442 Haiti: Civil Conflict, 1990s– ................................. 447 Hungary: Soviet Invasion, 1956............................. 824 India: Ethnic and Separatist Violence in Assam Since 1979 ........................................................ 734 India: Invasion of Goa, 1961.................................. 715 India: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 1947 ........................................................ 709 India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 1998 ........................................................ 737 India: Partition Violence, 1947.............................. 704 India: Sikh Uprising Since 1973 ............................ 729 India: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence, 1971 .......................................... 724 India: War with Pakistan, 1965 ............................. 718 Indonesia: Aceh Separatist Conflict Since 1976 ...... 609 Indonesia: Communist and Suharto Coups, 1965–1966............................................ 603 Indonesia: Irian Jaya Separatist Conflict Since 1964 ...................................................... 1085 Indonesia: Wars of Independence, 1945–1949 ....... 597 International Arms Trade......................................... 63 International Criminal Court............................... 1129 Invasions and Border Disputes................................. 37 Iran: Coup Against Mossadegh, 1953 .................... 949 Iran: Islamic Revolution, 1979 .............................. 953 Iran: War with Iraq, 1980–1988............................ 963 Iraq: Gulf War, 1990–1991 ................................... 982 Iraq: Kurdish Wars Since 1961 .............................. 974 Iraq: Revolution and Coups, 1958–1968 ............... 970 Iraq: U.S. Invasion, 2003–..................................... 990 Ireland: The Troubles Since 1968 .......................... 830

Israel: Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 1981 ...... 1025 Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 2006 ............................................................... 1028 Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948 ................ 1005 Israel: Six-Day War, 1967.................................... 1015 Israel: War of Independence, 1948–1949 ............... 997 Israel: Yom Kippur War, 1973............................. 1020 Italy: Anti-Mafia Campaign Since 1980................. 842 Ivory Coast: Civil Disorder Since 1999 .................. 190 Jordan: Civil War, 1970....................................... 1035 Kenya: Mau Mau Uprising, 1952–1956 ................ 195 Korea, North: Nuclear Standoff Since the 1990s ................................................. 617 Korea, North: Seizure of the Pueblo, 1968 .............. 613 Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 1950–1953 ....................................................... 622 Laos: Pathet Lao War, 1960s–1970s....................... 633 Lebanon: Civil Conflict, 1958.............................. 1039 Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990.......................... 1043 Liberia: Anti-Taylor Uprising, 1998–2003 ............ 208 Liberia: Civil War, 1989–1997 .............................. 202 Liberia: Doe Coup, 1980 ....................................... 199 Libya: Qaddafi Coup, 1969.................................. 1053 Libya: U.S. Air Attacks, 1986.............................. 1057 Macedonia: Ethnic Conflict, 1990s ........................ 854 Madagascar: Independence Movement and Coups, 1947–2002 ..................................... 212 Malaysia: Communist Uprising, 1948–1960 ......... 640 Mali: Ethnic and Political Conflict, 1968–1996 ....................................................... 218 Mauritania: Coups Since 1978 ............................... 221 Mexico: Zapatista Uprising Since 1994.................. 458 Middle East Negotiations .................................... 1131 Mozambique: Renamo War, 1976–1992................ 230 Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974 ....................................................... 224 Myanmar (Burma): Civil Wars and Coups Since 1948 ........................................................ 645 Namibia: War of National Liberation, 1966–1990 ....................................................... 238 Nepal: Maoist Insurgency ...................................... 742 New Caledonia (France): Independence Struggle Since the 1970s................................. 1088 Nicaragua: Contra War, 1980s............................... 473

Alphabetical List of Entries

Nicaragua: Revolution, 1970s ............................... 466 Niger: Ethnic and Political Conflict Since 1990 ........................................................ 242 Nigeria: Biafra War, 1967–1970............................ 245 Nigeria: Coups and Ethnic Unrest Since 1966 ....... 251 Non-Aligned Movement—The Bandung Conference ....................................... 1118 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ...... 1143 Organization of American States (OAS) ............... 1149 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)...... 1153 Palestine: First Intifada, 1987–1992.................... 1061 Palestine: Second Intifada, 2000– ........................ 1067 Panama: Torrijos Coup, 1969................................. 482 Panama: U.S. Invasion, 1989 ................................. 485 Papua New Guinea: Bougainville Independence Struggle Since 1988 ........................................ 1093 People’s Wars........................................................... 20 Peru: Shining Path Rebellion, 1970s–1997 ........... 493 Philippines: Huk Rebellion, 1948–1953 ............... 653 Philippines: Moro Uprising, 1970s–1980s ............ 657 Philippines: War on Islamic Militants Since 1990 ........................................................ 661 Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 1981–1983 ....................................................... 859 Puerto Rico: Anti-U.S. Terrorism, 1934–1954 ....................................................... 501 Romania: Fall of Ceausescu, 1989.......................... 866 Russia: Chechen Uprising Since 1994.................... 870 Rwanda: Civil War and Genocide Since 1991 ........ 258 Serbia: Kosovo Secessionist Movement, 1990s................................................................ 876 Sierra Leone: Civil Conflict, 1990–Present ............. 269 Solomon Islands: Separatist and Ethnic Conflict, 1999–2003 ....................................... 1098 Somalia: Civil War Since 1991............................... 274 South Africa: Anti-Apartheid Struggle, 1948–1994 ....................................................... 282

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Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)....... 1157 Soviet Union: Conflict with Iran over Azerbaijan, 1945–1946..................................... 881 Soviet Union: Conflict with Turkey, 1945–1953 ....................................................... 887 Soviet Union: Downing of Korean Airliner, 1983 ................................................... 892 Spain: Basque Uprising Since 1959........................ 895 Sri Lanka: Tamil Uprising Since the Late 1970s ..... 746 Sudan: Civil Wars in South, 1955–1972; 1983–2005 ....................................................... 292 Sudan: Conflict in Darfur Since 2002..................... 301 Tajikistan: Civil War, 1990s .................................. 902 Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s .............. 55 Thailand: Muslim Rebellion, 2004–...................... 664 Togo: Coups and Political Unrest, 1963–1990s ..... 307 Turkey: Kurdish War Since 1984........................... 906 Uganda: Anti-Amin Struggle, 1971–1979 ............ 310 Uganda: Civil Conflict Since 1980 ......................... 315 United Nations.................................................... 1161 United States: War on Terrorism, 1990s– .............. 505 Uruguay: Tupumaro Uprising, 1967–1985 ........... 513 Uzbekistan: Conflict with Islamists Since 1999 ................................................................. 913 Venezuela: Anti-Chávez Movement Since 1999...... 517 Vietnam: First Indochina War, 1946–1954............ 667 Vietnam: Second Indochina War, 1959–1975 ........ 673 War and Weapons Conventions............................ 1176 Warsaw Pact ........................................................ 1173 Western Sahara: Polisario-Moroccan War, 1975–1991 ....................................................... 319 Yemen: Civil War, 1960s–1980s.......................... 1073 Zimbabwe: Anti-Mugabe Struggle ........................ 330 Zimbabwe: Struggle for Majority Rule, 1965–1980 ....................................................... 324

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Editor James Ciment Contributors Fatimakhon Ahmedova Khujand State University (Tajikistan) William H. Alexander Norfolk State University Charles Allan East Tennessee State University Michael Andregg University of St. Thomas Daniel F. Cuthbertson University of New Brunswick (Canada)

Ravi Kalia City College–City University of New York

Emin Poljarevic Silk Road Studies Program/Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

John A. King Jr. Ransom Everglades School

Erika Quinn California State University Sacramento

Keith A. Leitich Independent Scholar David MacMichael Independent Scholar

Kenneth Quinnell Central Florida Community College

Eric Markusen

Peter Jacob Rainow Independent Scholar

D. Elwood Dunn University of the South

Gordon H. McCormick Naval Postgraduate School

Julian Schofield Concordia University (Canada)

James Frusetta American University (Bulgaria)

Sean J. McLaughlin University of Western Ontario (Canada)

Jeffrey A. Shantz York University (Canada)

A.J.R. Groom University of Kent (United Kingdom) Aidan Hehir University of Sheffield (United Kingdom) Kenneth L. Hill La Salle University Adam Hornbuckle Independent Scholar Tim Jacoby University of Manchester (United Kingdom)

Patit Paban Mishra Sambalpur University (India) Caryn E. Neumann Ohio State University

Carl Skutsch Independent Scholar Samuel Totten University of Arkansas

Luke Nichter Bowling Green State University

Mark Ungar Brooklyn College–City University of New York

James D. Perry Independent Scholar

Andrew J. Waskey Dalton State College

Luke Perry University of Massachusetts

Brandon Kirk Williams University of Colorado

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INTRODUCTION In that light, September 11 changed little. Conflicts continue to rage around the world—some of them influenced by cultural clashes but most of them triggered by a host of factors, from economics to ethnicity to environmental breakdown to political ambition. Many are legacies of nineteenth-century colonialism, a few continue to reverberate with Cold War tensions, and some may indeed be attributable to clashes between global cultures. What is indisputable—and indisputably disturbing—is how much new material needs to be included to bring this encyclopedia, just eight years old, up to date. The figures are distressing. Whereas the first edition contained articles on some 151 conflicts around the world, the new edition traces more than 175. In addition, almost 40 conflicts covered in the original edition have had to be substantially updated to keep track of continued fighting—though, in a few cases, the updates are happily concerned with reports of truces, treaties, and conflict resolution. Like its predecessor, the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II is comprehensive, covering every major and minor armed conflict—inter-state and intra-state—from 1945 through the middle of the first decade of the twentyfirst century. That it takes approximately 1,400 pages to chronicle a mere sixty or so years of humanity’s propensity to settle its differences through bloodshed is a sad indictment of both our species and the age in which we live. If, as American Civil War general William Tecumseh Sherman famously said, “War is hell,” then these volumes serve as a travel guide to a netherworld of recent human creation.

The expression almost instantly became a cliché— that, after September 11, 2001, “everything had changed.” And at least for the United States, it had. Prior to that date, the country had been enjoying a post–Cold War decade of unparalleled global hegemony, declining defense expenditures, and a lowered overseas military profile. Aside from having its nose bloodied in Somalia in 1993 and suffering an assault on one of its destroyers—the USS Cole— in Yemen in 2000, the United States military had effectively been at peace since the end of the Gulf War in February 1991. The largest U.S. military commitment of the decade—as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization assault on Serbia in 1999—had come off without the death of a single American soldier. Then came 9/11 and the deaths of nearly 3,000 Americans in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the single deadliest day in the nation’s history since the Civil War battle of Antietam. In the aftermath of that attack, President George W. Bush declared a “war on terrorism” and launched large-scale invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. As of 2006, more than 150,000 American troops were engaged in both theaters, and more than 2,500 soldiers had been killed. For the United States, then, 9/11 had changed everything. But what of the rest of the world? For some countries—particularly those, like Great Britain, allied with the United States in the “war on terrorism”— there has been great change. They are now at war, whereas they were once at peace. Taking a still larger view of things, there is a growing feeling in the West and in much of the Islamic world—in both policymaking circles and among the public at large—that, to borrow from political scientist Samuel Huntington’s now famous thesis, a “clash of civilizations” has begun. But, of course, this “clash” and others long predated 2001 (indeed, Huntington first presented his ideas in the early 1990s) and even the post–World War II era covered in this encyclopedia. For all their horror, then, the attacks on September 11 were more like a flare, illuminating to the American public a battlefield hitherto dimly seen.

From World War to Cold War In 1945, the world emerged from a conflagration of epic proportions. With the broad exception of the Western Hemisphere, no part of the world lay untouched by World War II. Europe, Asia, North Africa, and the far-flung islands of the Pacific basin had all seen armies pass through and great battles fought. Much of the globe lay in ruins, devastated by bombing, artillery, street-fighting, and tank battles. xv

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Humanity emerged from the war hungry, displaced, and shell-shocked. What would happen next? There was hope. Fascism—in its German, Italian, and Japanese incarnations—had been crushed. A new United Nations offered an international dispute-resolution forum that seemed to offer more promise than had the doomed League of Nations established at the end of the century’s first global conflict. There was an alliance, however shaky and uneasy, between the two emerging superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States. For the peoples of Asia, Africa, and other colonized regions, the end of the war promised the possibility of independence, if only because the imperialist European powers (and Japan) had been left so wasted by the conflict. To paraphrase a popular World War II song, the lights appeared to be coming on all over the world Sadly, they only flickered. The grand wartime alliance of the Soviet Union and the United States quickly disintegrated into a chilly standoff of distrust and blustering. The UN—enveloped in the smothering ideological confrontation between East and West— proved nearly as impotent in settling disputes as the League had. The European powers, particularly France and Portugal, showed themselves unwilling to accept what British prime minister Harold Macmillan dubbed “the winds of change”—that is decolonization. Moreover, these stubborn colonial powers were joined by settler states such as Israel and South Africa, where the population of European origin—seen as alien by their non-European co-inhabitants, but lacking a native land to return to—attacked and came under attack repeatedly. Even where the Europeans did depart, longstanding indigenous disputes—made worse by imperialist policy and practice—erupted with a vengeance. The nearly 1 million Muslims and Hindus slaughtered in the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent did not bode well for the postcolonial order, as was borne out by the seemingly endless conflicts that later engulfed Africa. Finally, hanging over the collective head of humankind was a new weapon—tried and proved on Japan near the end of World War II—that finally made world-ending Armageddon, a portentous element in many of the world’s great faiths, a distinct possibility. The mushroom cloud and the specter of World War III had come to haunt the world’s imagination.

Many World Wars? Some historians have argued, however, that World War III was not a specter but a reality, having taken the form of a Cold War between the superpowers that regularly turned hot on battlefields as far strewn in time and place as Greece (1947), Laos (early 1960s), and Nicaragua (1980s). In other words, World War III began within a few years of the close of World War II and continued through the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But what of the conflicts that have erupted in the wake of the Cold War? Despite ballyhooed predictions of history ending with the fall of Communism and the universal “triumph” of Western-style freemarket economies and political democracy, fighting and dying continued on every continent. Had humanity entered a new phase of planetary warfare? And, finally, what of the fateful attacks on New York and Washington on that glorious blue-sky morning of September 11, 2001? Was that a portent of a new worldwide struggle to come? In short, has the post–World War II era merely been a series of evolving global conflicts? World Wars III, IV, and V, as it were. A look at the evolution of war in the twentieth century might offers insights. The world wars of the first half of the twentieth century evolved from the largely static, European-based World War I to the mobile, semiglobal World War II. Moreover, the fronts of World War I—in France, Russia, and the Middle East—were hundreds of miles apart and largely involved the same adversaries. The fronts of World War II were thousands of miles apart and were fought by semi-related adversaries: primarily Germany and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe; Britain, Germany, and the United States in Western Europe and North Africa; and the United States, Japan, and China in Asia and the Pacific. The “world wars” of the second half of the twentieth century were transformed into truly global conflicts involving dozens of adversaries fighting along fronts entirely disconnected from one another. But World War II and the hypothetical World War III did have one thing in common: many of the adversaries were partly or fully integrated into grand alliances, even if the combatants fought their wars for a host of reasons unrelated to the power politics of the Cold War. As for the even more hypothetical World War IV, any hint of grand alliances and ideology seemed

Introduction

to have disappeared altogether. Conflicts in the wake of the Cold War appeared fought over entirely parochial issues. The “war on terrorism”—“World War V” in the scheme of things suggested in this introduction— would appear at first to be a throwback to earlier conflicts, with the greatest alliance in world history—the nation-states of the world—pitted against an equally far-flung adversary, a shadowy global network of terrorists and perhaps a few “rogue” states that provide them sanctuary, weapons, and financing. Gone are the parochial concerns of the localized conflicts of the 1990s. In their place is a “clash of civilizations,” or at least a global struggle between “civilization” and barbarism. But the nature of the new battlefield bears out the twentieth-century pattern described above: from the static fronts of World War I to the disconnected global battlefields of the “war on terrorism.” Now even the world capital of finance and the political capital of the world’s only superpower were vulnerable to attack. So what is new in all of this? Perhaps nothing. Perhaps the idea that the last hundred years of human history can be segmented into consecutive “world wars” is a flawed one. Rather than splitting history, it might be better to try lumping it together. Since the late fifteenth century, the capitalist order of Europe— and, later, a few of the more rapidly developing countries beyond its borders, such as the United States and Japan—has been gradually extending its grip over the rest of the world, while the rest of the world has mounted a mighty, though often futile, resistance. Might not the various “world wars” of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries be seen as mere battles in a conflict half a millennium in the making? For all the madness of his methods, Osama bin Laden has made it quite clear that the presence of “infidels” (read: U.S. and European troops) on Islamic holy soil has been the prime motive for his terrorist attacks on the West. This is, perhaps, too big a question for any single study to answer, especially one such as this—one that attempts to provide the details of dozens of conflicts that may or may not be manifestations of some grand, epochal war. Rather, the following articles attempt to define the differences among these many conflicts of the past sixty years, even as the accumulation of that detail hints at something bigger and more unifying.

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Organization—How to Use This Encyclopedia Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II, Second Edition, is divided into three sections, plus two appendices, a bibliography, and specialized indexes.

Roots of War The first section is called “Roots of War” and consists of eight entries outlining the major types of conflicts and the underlying causes of war in the post–World War II era. Each entry concludes with a bibliography. “Cold War Confrontations” outlines how different historians interpret the roots of the Cold War in Europe and the developing world. In addition, it discusses how the superpower struggle manifested itself in various developing world conflicts. “Anticolonialism” reveals the ways in which many of the conflicts of the past fifty years remain a legacy of the European imperialist order of past centuries. “People’s Wars” examines the means by which people of the developing world have struggled to overcome the legacy of the imperialist order in a world divided ideologically between East and West. “Coups” explains why violent internal power struggles—usually involving various groups of elites in developing world countries—have been so ubiquitous over the past fifty years. “Invasions and Border Disputes” provides an examination of international conflicts within the context of international law and geopolitical power struggles. “Ethnic and Religious Conflicts” explains why and how these long-standing internal divisions can sometimes become the battle lines of civil conflicts. “Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s” discusses the means and ends of perhaps the most desperate of tactics in modern warfare. Finally, “International Arms Trade” offers a study of how the largely political neutral marketplace in weapons has served to exacerbate the conflicts of the post–World War II era.

Conflicts By far the longest section of this encyclopedia, “Conflicts” consists of some 170 articles. The section is organized into regions: Africa, sub-Saharan; Americas; Asia, East and Southeast; Asia, South; Europe and the Former Soviet Union; Middle East and North Africa; Oceania. Within each section, conflicts involving

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multiple nations are arranged according to the most significant country involved in the conflict. Thus, Israel’s several wars with neighboring Arab states are listed in the section Middle East and North Africa, under Israel. In conflicts involving two nations, the entry appears under the country that comes first in the alphabet. For example, the several conflicts between India and Pakistan are listed under India. After listing the most important country involved in the conflict, the entry heading indicates the type of conflict and the participants in the conflict. The type of conflict category correlates with the “Roots of War” essays. For example, if a conflict is listed as a Cold War confrontation, the reader may turn to the appropriate essay in part 1 on this type of conflict to learn more about how that conflict fits into the larger context of the Cold War. Each “Conflicts” entry concludes with two items: a “See also” heading that lists related entries within the “Conflicts” section, as well as in the “Roots of War” and “Organizations, Alliances, Conventions, and Negotiations” sections, and a bibliography listing books and articles for further reading.

Organizations, Alliances, Conventions, and Negotiations This section deals with the ways various countries, regions, blocs of geographically and ideologically united or culturally related nations, or the international community as a whole have dealt with threats to security, resolved conflicts, maintained peace, and punished war criminals. In general, these efforts fall into two areas: collective security arrangements in the form of alliances and blocs, and conflict resolution and international tension reduction through the

United Nations and international summits. This section consists of sixteen entries, arranged alphabetically. Each of the entries concludes with a bibliography listing articles and books for further reading.

Appendices Biographies This section consists of brief biographies of the most significant individuals involved in the conflicts and diplomacy of the post–World War II era.

Glossary This section offers definitions of key organizations, groups, and terms involved in the conflicts and diplomacy of the post–World War II era. It also offers a handy reference guide to the many abbreviations and acronyms listed in the “Organizations, Alliances, Conventions, and Negotiations” and “Conflicts” entries.

Bibliographies In addition to the bibliographies in the individual entries, a general bibliography is presented here, offering reading suggestions on the general history and theory of warfare, as well as individual conflicts.

Indexes Encyclopedia of Conflicts Since World War II, Second Edition, contains three separate indexes: a general index, a biographical and organizational name index, and a geographical index.

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COLD WAR CONFRONTATIONS This entry attempts to define the Cold War in two ways. First, it examines the origins of the conflict—specifically, the different schools of thought concerning who started it and why. Second, it examines the Cold War in its effects—how it played itself out in the developing world. Indeed, after the initial, largely nonviolent confrontation over Europe in the late 1940s, the Cold War’s real battlegrounds were in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. First, however, an account of the Cold War is required.

The Cold War—a term coined by journalist and scholar Walter Lippmann in 1947—refers to the forty-five-year-long confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union that began at the end of World War II and ended with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Though appropriate for the time and poetic enough to last the ages, the term “Cold War” is something of a misnomer. Contrasted to a hot war—such as World War II—it implies a nonviolent confrontation between the two great superpowers of the post–World War II era. Where hot wars produce invasions, power politics, and the application of violence, the Cold War consisted of tense borders, ideological disputes, and an arms race—an unnerving and costly war, but essentially a bloodless one. Indeed, many American and Soviet apologists for the nuclear arms race that accompanied it say the Cold War kept the peace. This is roughly true in Europe, where the Cold War began, but it is preposterous when applied to much of the rest of the world, particularly the developing world. There the Cold War turned hot. The Cold War only occasionally involved soldiers from the United States and the Soviet Union in significant numbers (Korea and Vietnam for the former; Afghanistan for the latter). Instead, the two superpowers armed their proxies, or substitutes, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to do their fighting—and their dying—for them. The Cold War is also a misleading term for a less direct reason: both the United States and the Soviet Union tended to interpret most civil and international conflicts as part of the great ideological struggle between East and West. Indeed, policymakers in both Washington and Moscow generally believed that their superpower opponent was behind every conflict. Both sides often failed to consider indigenous historical considerations in their assessment of why conflicts erupted and how conflicts could be resolved. Thus, in Vietnam, the United States ignored traditional Vietnamese nationalism, while the Soviet Union underplayed clan strife and Islamic fundamentalism before intervening in Afghanistan.

Origins If the Cold War began shortly after World War II, its background can be found in the disaster of World War I. In March 1917, the czarist government of Russia collapsed, a victim of wartime shortages and antiwar sentiment as well as other, more long-term problems. The democratic government that replaced it insisted on keeping its wartime obligations to its allies, France and England. This intention inspired more unrest in Russian cities, leading to a second uprising, spearheaded by the Communist Bolsheviks under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin and implemented through local worker and peasant councils, known as “soviets.” Promising “land, bread, and peace,” the new Bolshevik government immediately pulled Russia (soon to be renamed the Soviet Union) out of World War I. The revolution set off a civil war between Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik, or “white” Russian, forces— bolstered by small contingents of troops from Britain, France, Japan, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere. The civil war ravaged the country for two years and resulted in the total victory of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The United States, among other nations, severed diplomatic relations with the new government in Moscow, not reestablishing them until 1933. Meanwhile, within the Soviet Union, a struggle emerged following the death of Lenin in 1924 between advocates of world revolution and proponents of “socialism in a single country.” The latter, led by Joseph Stalin, triumphed. Stalin industrialized the economy rapidly. He did this by collectivizing agriculture, 3

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starving out the independent peasantry, and centralizing economic decision-making. In the process, millions of people died, but the Soviet Union made rapid strides in creating an industrial infrastructure, an achievement admired by many in the West who were dismayed by capitalism’s failure in the Great Depression. Indeed, it was the Great Depression that helped propel the rise to power of National Socialism—or Nazism—in Germany in 1933. Advocating renewed militarism and German racial superiority, Nazi Germany quickly rearmed and began its expansionist crusade. Nazism and Soviet Communism were bitterly opposed to each other, but for pragmatic reasons— each feared the other’s power—they signed a nonaggression pact in August 1939. A month later, the Nazis invaded Poland, with the Soviets taking their own half of the defeated nation. England and France immediately declared war on Germany, and World War II began, with the Soviet Union largely neutral. In June 1941, however, the Nazis tore up the nonaggression pact and sent a massive force into the Soviet Union in one of the greatest invasions in history. Within months, the Soviets had fallen back to the suburbs of Moscow, and it appeared as if the country might completely fall to the Nazis. Gradually, however, the Soviet Red Army halted the invasion and within eighteen months began to push the Germans back. Meanwhile, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States entered the war. (Japan, Germany, and Italy had formed an alliance called “the Axis.” After Pearl Harbor, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.) An alliance was quickly established between the three main anti-Axis powers—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. There were strains in the alliance, however. Stalin, in particular, was angry at what he perceived to be delays in AngloAmerican plans to open a second front against Nazi Germany in Western Europe. Still, the alliance held through the end of the European war in May 1945. By that final year, when it was apparent that it was only a matter of time until Germany was defeated, questions began to present themselves concerning the postwar order. There were essentially three important areas of dispute: the fate of Germany, the fate of Eastern Europe, and the ongoing war with Japan. In February 1945, the leaders of the three great powers—Soviet Premier Stalin, British Prime Minister

Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt—met at Yalta, in the Russian Crimea. There it was decided that Germany would be jointly occupied by the victors, East European nations would be permitted to decide their own destiny in popular elections (so long as they pursued a pro-Soviet foreign policy), and the Soviet Union would join the AngloAmerican war against Japan ninety days after the surrender of Germany. In July, the three powers met again at Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin, the former capital of the nowdefeated Germany. There the three powers created a joint military administration (which also included France) for occupied Germany and agreed to move the borders of Poland westward. In midconference, however, the American delegation—headed by U.S. President Harry Truman, who had replaced Roosevelt upon the latter’s death in April—received word that the atomic bomb had proved successful in tests in the New Mexico desert. The atomic bomb rendered Soviet help in the war against Japan unnecessary. By implication, this development undermined Britain and America’s need to offer concessions to the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe—consisting largely of pro-Soviet regimes. After atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9), Japan surrendered and was occupied by the United States.

Post–World War I I Crises It did not take long for tensions to build between the former Allies. When the Soviet Union demanded access to the Dardanelles—linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean—and Iran, with its oil reserves, the United States and Britain refused. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union refused to participate in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, two institutions designed to revive the war-damaged capitalist economies of Europe and Asia. In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, tensions were highest. With the Red Army occupying all of the former and much of the latter (the main exceptions being much of Yugoslavia and Greece), there appeared to be little the Allies could do to demand free elections, short of launching World War III. In 1946, former British Prime Minister Churchill warned of a Soviet-imposed “iron curtain” falling across Eastern Europe. In Greece, however, a civil war between proWestern and Communist forces offered an opportunity.

Cold War Confrontations

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Unresolved issues at the Potsdam Conference in July–August 1945—attended by (left to right) British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (later replaced by Clement Atlee), U.S. President Harry Truman, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin— foreshadowed the conflicts of the Cold War. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

In 1947, the British government told Washington that it no longer had the resources to back the proWestern elements there. This was part of an exhausted and war-ravaged Britain’s overall retreat from much of the world, thus leaving the United States to assume the mantle of Western leadership. The U.S. administration responded with the Truman Doctrine, effectively promising U.S. aid to any country attempting to fight off a Communist insurgency. That same year, George Kennan, a State Department officer in America’s Moscow embassy, enunciated a policy—known as the “containment” doctrine—that soon won the attention of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. The doctrine proposed that the Soviet Union’s expansionist policies must be resisted by force if necessary, especially in those areas of vital interest to the United States. Eastern Europe, it was soon decided, lay outside that area. Thus, while Stalin imposed pro-Soviet Communist regimes in these countries by force, the United States did little but complain. By the end

of the 1940s, then, both Germany and Europe were divided into two spheres, with the western half of Germany and the continent (supported by the United States through the massive aid of the Marshall Plan) becoming democratic and capitalist and the eastern half (under the umbrella of the Soviet army) Communist. Both sides soon organized military blocs to protect themselves against attack by the other. In 1949, the United States established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), followed six years later by the Warsaw Pact of Soviet-bloc countries. With the occasional confrontation over Berlin, the EastWest confrontation in Europe soon settled into a status quo of peace, economic development, and nuclear tension (the Soviet Union having tested its own atomic bomb in 1949).

Shift to the Third World By 1950, the battle lines between the capitalist and Communist worlds had shifted to Asia. In 1949, the

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Communist Chinese had defeated the nationalists in a massive civil war. A year later, the Communist North Koreans invaded the non-Communist southern half of the peninsula. The United States—at the head of a United Nations force—rose to the latter’s defense. The conflict became a three-year-long bloody stalemate following Communist China’s entry into the war at the end of 1950. Meanwhile, in 1954, French colonial forces were defeated in Vietnam by Communist-led nationalists, leaving Vietnam divided between a Communist north and a non-Communist south. Tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States eased a bit by the late 1950s. A more liberal Nikita Khrushchev had taken power in the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin in 1953. Khrushchev began to enunciate the doctrine of “peace-

ful coexistence” with the West. Still, Khrushchev was determined to keep Eastern European countries in the Soviet orbit, sending an invasion force into wavering Hungary in 1956. The United States and the West refused to intervene, revealing to many in Eastern Europe that there was little chance the West would help them rid the region of Soviet control. The decision not to intervene was part of President Dwight Eisenhower’s policy. After the war ended in Korea, he was not eager to engage U.S. forces in conflicts around the world. Instead, Eisenhower relied on covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow developing world regimes deemed hostile to the West, while keeping the Soviets at bay through America’s overwhelming nuclear superiority, which had been enhanced by the detonation of the first hydrogen bomb in 1953.

The 38th parallel divided the Korean peninsula between the communist North and democratic South in 1945, giving rise to the first major military confrontation of the Cold War era—the Korean War, from 1950 to 1953. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)

Cold War Confrontations

Increasingly, there was growing dissent to these policies in both the United States and the Soviet Union. In America, many politicians, including 1960 presidential candidate John F. Kennedy, believed that America must develop a more flexible response to the varied types of Communist threat—from nuclear blustering by the Soviet Union to the “brush-fire” insurgencies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In 1961, President Kennedy approved an Eisenhower-era plan to launch a CIA-backed invasion of Cuba, led by anti-Communist exiles. (Cuba had undergone a revolution in 1959 under the leadership of the Marxistnationalist Fidel Castro.) The invasion failed disastrously. A year later, the Soviets began placing nuclear missiles on the island. Confronted by the United States, Khrushchev was forced down. The humiliation led to his overthrow two years later by Leonid Brezhnev and other hard-liners in the Kremlin who believed that the Soviet Union should pursue its interests in the developing world more forcefully. Meanwhile, Kennedy—fearful of being branded soft on Communism by Republicans—began sending advisers to back the anticommunist regime in South Vietnam, under siege from indigenous Communist forces. Following Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, his successor Lyndon Johnson escalated U.S. involvement. Eventually 550,000 U.S. troops were serving in Vietnam by 1968. The increasingly unpopular war led to Johnson’s decision not to run for reelection and America’s withdrawal in 1973. The rapid collapse of the South Vietnamese in 1975 embittered Americans toward direct involvement in international conflicts. This so-called Vietnam syndrome coincided with a period of Soviet expansionism. Having largely achieved nuclear parity with the United States by the mid-1970s, the Soviets embarked on a campaign to support Communist and pro-Communist regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, largely through military aid and advisers. In Afghanistan, however, Moscow sent in tens of thousands of troops in 1979 to back the pro-Soviet regime there. In the United States, political forces challenged the legacy of Vietnam. By the end of the Carter administration, the United States had started supporting anticommunist forces and governments from El Salvador to Afghanistan, while beginning a new arms build-up. This process was dramatically escalated during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, who also upped the level of anti-Soviet rhetoric.

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By the mid-1980s, it was the Soviet Union’s turn to feel the limits on its power. Bogged down in Afghanistan, the increasingly cumbersome centralized economy of the Soviet Union was going broke trying to match the latest arms build-up by the United States. Recognizing its plight, the ruling Politburo chose a young reformer named Mikhail Gorbachev to revamp the Soviet economy and ease tensions with the United States. Gorbachev quickly announced that as far as he was concerned, the arms race with the United States was no longer relevant, and he moved to develop closer relations with Washington. At the same time, he opened up political debate at home and made it clear to Eastern European governments that they could no longer expect Soviet aid in quelling domestic disturbances. This new doctrine allowed anticommunist sentiment to come into the open across Eastern Europe, leading to the collapse or total weakening of all Communist regimes there by the end of 1989. Soviet troops were soon withdrawn from the region, and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. Beset by a collapsing economy at home and apparent political chaos, the Soviet army decided to step in, launching a military coup in August 1991. The rapid demise of the coup quickly led to the downfall of the Soviet Union. In December, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin officially dissolved the union, establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States in its place. With the Soviet Union gone and Eastern Europe no longer Communist, the Cold War had come to a sudden end.

Theories About Origins Essentially, theories about the origins of the Cold War—at least, among scholars in the United States specifically and the West generally—fit into three general categories: orthodox, revisionist, and realist. To simplify—or rather, to oversimplify—the arguments of these three schools of thought, it can be said that orthodox theorists blame the Soviet Union for starting the Cold War, revisionist scholars say the United States was at fault, and the realists argue that both and neither powers were to blame. This latter group argues that the origins of the Cold War were fixed in misconceptions by both sides and driven by forces of history beyond the command of policymakers in both Washington and Moscow. The orthodox theorists rose to predominance first. Largely products of the early years of the Cold

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War themselves, the ideas of orthodox scholars reflected the thinking of policymakers in Washington and London. The revisionists came next, responding to U.S. hegemony overseas in the 1950s and 1960s, especially during the course of the Vietnam War. The realist school somewhat overlapped the revisionists, but generally came to the fore in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union were aggressively pursuing their interests throughout the developing world.

Orthodox Theory According to orthodox theorists, the United States was filled with good intentions as World War II came to a close. Hoping to build on the collective allied security principles of World War II, American policymakers wanted to rely on the newly created United Nations and its Security Council to resolve international tensions. Moreover, the United States was willing to forgo the advantage of its nuclear monopoly by turning over control of those weapons to an international monitoring agency. In Eastern Europe, says the orthodox school of thought, the United States was willing to meet the Soviet Union halfway. As long as there were free elections, Moscow could insist that the foreign policy of the democratic states be proSoviet. Finally, the United States was willing to help the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe recover from the devastation of World War II through the massive aid program known as the Marshall Plan. According to the orthodox school, America had reached an understanding on these points with the Soviets at Yalta—agreements that the Soviet Union either never intended to honor or refused to honor later. For all these benign intentions, however, American policymakers were met by Soviet duplicity, intransigence, and aggression, say orthodox theorists. Rather than agreeing to collective security, the Soviet Union engaged in unilateral measures to ensure its national interests. It refused to allow free elections in Eastern Europe. It ignored American offers for an internationally monitored atomic bomb and embarked on a nuclear weapons program of its own. And it contemptuously dismissed the Marshall Plan as a clandestine American plot to undermine its Communist system. The Soviet Union, says the orthodox school, was also responsible for putting the Communists in power in China and giving the go-ahead to North Korea for its invasion of the south.

Differences of opinion existed, however, within the orthodox school when Soviet motivation was discussed. Extreme hard-liners—many of whom were exiles from the Soviet Union—claimed that Moscow was primarily driven by Marxist ideology, which called for a worldwide anticapitalist revolution. The implication of this interpretation was grim. Since any agreement would be torn up by the ideologically committed Soviets when it was convenient, negotiations with Moscow were worse than useless, they were dangerously naive. Moreover, the United States must adopt a policy of “liberating” Soviet-controlled countries or face an indefinite future of hostile aggression. Others, especially the career diplomats and State Department officials such as Kennan, offered a less desperate view of Soviet motivations. Rather than being driven by ideological considerations, Moscow was merely trying to pursue its own national interests, just as the czarist government had done for centuries. Its efforts to dominate Eastern Europe were part of a centuries-old policy of using that territory to protect itself from aggressive Western European states, a fear aggravated by twin German invasions in World War I and World War II. By this reasoning, the United States could best deal with Soviet expansionism by meeting it with selective force, the so-called containment doctrine. Moreover, since Soviet aims were based on national self-interest, it was possible to negotiate with Moscow.

Revisionist Theory Like the orthodox school of thought, revisionist theory has many variants, though all are united by several basic premises. First, the United States generally took the lead in provoking Cold War confrontations, whether by cutting off aid to the Soviet Union in the days following the end of World War II or making demands that ran counter to legitimate Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe. Secondly, the United States, with its overwhelming military and economic power in 1945, was, by necessity, the nation that should have offered conciliatory gestures. Third, the Soviet Union, having had much of its industrial infrastructure destroyed in the war and having lost some 8 percent of its population, was in a far weaker position than the United States and was motivated to take the actions it did out of fear. According to what might be called the moderate school of revisionism, the United States—by making

Cold War Confrontations

demands for democratic governments in Eastern Europe, the key security zone for a Soviet Union recently invaded via that region—provoked the Soviet Union into setting up puppet regimes in Poland and overthrowing the democratically elected government in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the overall weakness of the Soviet Union during the 1940s and 1950s dictated a cautious foreign policy. For example, Stalin only acted in those parts of Eastern Europe where he felt that he had a right to do so. He quickly backed down in the face of Western protests in Iran and Turkey in 1946 and agreed not to intervene to help the Greek Communists in 1947. Thus, despite the ideological bravado and bombastic anti-Western rhetoric, the Soviet Union acted carefully abroad and stuck to the letter of the agreements it signed. Most moderate revisionists blame the Truman administration for the origins and onset of the Cold War. Truman lacked the diplomatic finesse of Roosevelt. Instead of recognizing the Soviet Union’s legitimate security concerns, Truman tried to bully Moscow. According to these revisionists, the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945—despite evidence that Tokyo was about to surrender—was done to inform Moscow of U.S. possession of a nuclear arsenal and Washington’s resolve to use those weapons. In other words, Truman practiced the ageold tactic of saber rattling to force the Soviet Union to back down, interpreted Soviet moves to defend itself as acts of aggression, precipitously cut off aid to a desperate former ally, and launched a war of rhetoric intended to rally world opinion against Moscow. All of these moves, then, forced the defensive and fearful Soviet Union to react. More radical revisionists dismissed the moderate revisionist argument as too personality-based. It did not matter, they said, who was in charge of American foreign policy, since that policy was driven by political, economic, and ideological forces beyond the control of any administration. Specifically, they argued that in the wake of Britain’s collapse, the United States took up the mantle of Western leadership. This meant maintaining the West’s centuries-long hegemony over the rest of the world. Moreover, U.S. policymakers believed that a postwar depression could only be prevented through opening up the international marketplaces to U.S. products. With the collapse of Nazism and Japanese imperialism in World War II, Soviet communism represented the only threat to Western hegemony, as

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witnessed by Moscow’s successful efforts to reorient the economies of Eastern Europe away from the West. Indeed, this desire to keep Communism at bay—for fear of losing markets and Western control of the developing world, especially as the latter decolonized in the two decades following World War II—was the underlying motive behind American foreign policy throughout the Cold War. In effect, then, radical revisionists agreed with official Soviet theories on the origins of the Cold War. According to Moscow, America was driven not by a fear of the Soviet Union but a desire to capture world markets, since imperialist capitalism depended on ever-greater access to markets and resources. Communism, by this reckoning, threatened those markets and resources and had to be stopped. And since the Soviet Union generally supported Communist movements in those countries, it had to be contained.

Realist Theory The realist school mixed elements of the revisionist and orthodox theorists in its own assessment of the causes of the Cold War. At the same time, it tried to mesh the actions of individuals with the forces of history. According to the realists, both sides hoped that wartime cooperation would continue after the war, though each expected this to happen on its own terms. The Soviets, pursuing what they considered their own legitimate security concerns in Eastern Europe, expected the United States to go along. Washington, fearful that a collapsing international economy would set off a major depression at home, expected the Soviets to accept U.S. hegemony in much of the world outside the immediate Soviet orbit. Neither wanted to precipitate a confrontation. But in taking steps to pursue their own interests, each forced the other to take countermeasures, thereby setting off a vicious cycle of fear and hostility on both sides. In short, the realists saw the Cold War confrontation as a new version of an old-fashioned balance-of-power struggle. The realists also argued that internal politics in the United States and even the Soviet Union played a role in the Cold War confrontation. Because the Red Army occupied Eastern Europe toward the end of World War II, Roosevelt was forced to recognize Soviet hegemony there. He could not admit this to the country, however, especially since descendants of immigrants from that region were a key component of

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the New Deal coalition. Thus, when the reality of Soviet dominance became clear after the war, the American people felt that Roosevelt and the Democrats had betrayed the country, leading to a rise in anticommunist hysteria at home. At the same time, they also believed that the Soviets had gone back on their word and could not be trusted. Other realists cited contradictions within the Communist system. They noted the great irony of the Cold War’s ideological struggle: specifically, that those countries under Soviet control—namely, Eastern Europe—were the most hostile to Communism, while countries outside the Soviet orbit—including such countries as Italy, India, and Vietnam—were more amenable to Communism. In a sense, then, Soviet foreign policy was driven by an effort to survive in the face of a hostile capitalist West by maintaining control over a restive East European sphere of influence while projecting influence into those parts of the world that were sympathetic to Communism. Both of these policies served to further antagonize the West, leading to countermeasures that forced the Soviet Union into more aggressive action abroad.

Impact The Cold War, as noted above, was driven in part by an ideological struggle between East and West. Part of this struggle, of course, involved the best means to organize human society—that is, via capitalist democracy or Communism. Aside from this basic split, however, there were many other underlying beliefs, beliefs that came to be accepted as unquestioned facts. For Soviet leaders, there were several such truisms. One was that capitalism was doomed to collapse from its own contradictions. That is to say, that the exploitation of workers by capitalists was destined to intensify to a point in which the former would overthrow the latter. A second Soviet truism said that the only way this event could happen was through violent revolution. Third, capitalist powers, led by the United States, were determined to prevent this from happening by any means necessary. Since the Soviet Union offered a model for developing world countries to emulate—as well as concrete assistance to groups in those countries attempting to foment Communist revolution—the West felt compelled to contain Moscow, as part of its overall defense of capitalism worldwide.

Out of these beliefs gradually developed a Soviet policy in which virtually every nationalist rebellion or anti-Western government was seen as a potential Soviet ally, thereby deserving of help. Any movement fighting against a pro-Western government also fell into the same category. Thus, the Soviet Union found itself backing both legitimate Communist governments, as well as dictatorial governments that paid little more than lip service to the Communist cause. This policy was mirrored by the United States, which also backed brutal dictatorships that were anticommunist. American policymakers had other truisms that were uniquely their own, leading to errors in policy. Such policy errors based on false truisms are not unique to the Cold War. For example, at the 1938 Munich conference, Britain and France acceded to Hitler’s demands as a means of appeasing the German dictator and preventing war. Because they failed to do either, the Munich agreements offered powerful lessons to Western policymakers. Specifically, Munich confirmed the belief that bowing to a dictatorial government’s demands only leads to further demands and eventually war. This experience offered a model for dealing with Soviet expansionism. U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was equally misguided. It assumed that all efforts to overthrow pro-Western governments were Communist in origin and that all of them were directed by Moscow. The depth of this belief can be measured by the fact that it persisted among many U.S. policymakers long after events revealed an increasingly hostile relationship between Moscow and Beijing—the two giants of the Communist world—in the early 1960s. These truisms on both sides had fatal consequences. One, of course, was the arms race. Since both superpowers believed that the other was driven by ideology and self-interest to neutralize their antagonist, each side believed it had to defend itself by any means necessary. In a nuclear age, this meant building enough weapons to utterly destroy the other. This volatile situation, then, created enormous constituencies in both countries—the military elite in the Soviet Union and the military-industrial complex in the United States—that demanded more weapons to counter advances made by the other side. Ultimately, the arms race would distort the American economy and destroy the Soviet Union’s. More importantly for the purposes of this book, the truisms of the Cold War served to ensure that the United States and the Soviet Union involved

Cold War Confrontations

themselves in many of the world’s civil conflicts— conflicts that were often based on causes indigenous to each society. By offering money, weaponry, intelligence, military training, and, occasionally, advisers and soldiers, the United States and the Soviet Union exacerbated, extended, and exaggerated these conflicts. At the same time, the two sides cast the struggle in ideological terms, which made it impossible to seek out the true causes of the conflict. By setting up a kind of ideological force field, the Cold War confrontation deflected potential negotiations and peaceful solutions to many conflicts. Many developing world countries tried to evade the implications of these Cold War truisms by advocating a middle course. In 1955, many of the leaders of the developing world met at Bandung, Indonesia, to establish the nonaligned group of nations. Somewhat successful in charting a third way for a number of developing countries, the movement faced enormous obstacles, perhaps the most important of which was the overall distrust in which Moscow and especially Washington held this movement. Much of the Cold War policy of both the Soviet Union and the United States was driven by one basic rule of thumb: those who are not with us are against us. Membership in the nonaligned movement—though widespread— was often rendered meaningless by Soviet and American policy of interference. Of course, the Cold War had its ups and downs. From time to time, tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States eased, resulting in the occasional trade agreement and nuclear weapons limitation treaty, but it rarely served to limit U.S. or Soviet interventionism in developing world conflicts. Indeed, the mid-1970s, the period of warmest détente, or friendship, between Moscow and Washington, was marked by an escalation of U.S. and Soviet interference in the conflicts of Africa. Thus, despite moves toward reconciliation on arms and trade or the easing of tensions along the heavily armed European divide, the Cold War never really lessened in the developing world. That should not seem too surprising since, with the advent of European peace in the late 1940s, it was the developing world—many of the countries newly independent—that served as a battleground between East and West and as the main prize sought by both sides. In that sense, the Cold War was little different than most of the major “hot wars” of the last several hundred years: it was a battle to control the vast resources and markets of the devel-

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oping world. And like those hot wars, the Cold War could not end until one side was defeated. Just as the two great struggles of the first half of the twentieth century—that is, World Wars I and II— left a legacy of troubled peace, so has the great Cold War confrontation. Many of the conflicts that punctuated the Cold War had origins that stretched to an era long before Yalta or even the Bolshevik revolution. It could be argued that the era of European imperialism planted the seeds for many of the bitterest and most long-lasting struggles of the post–World War II era, including the conflicts between Israel and Palestine, India and Pakistan, and even Vietnam. Clearly, the Cold War fueled the fury of these wars, although in the case of the first war, it started long before the Cold War began and has now outlasted it. Yet, there are many other conflicts that, while rooted in the pre–Cold War era, were intensified so greatly by Soviet and American involvement that they can be said to be legacies of the Cold War. These conflicts include such long-simmering struggles as the one in Angola between the government and Jonas Savimbi’s rebels (Savimbi was backed by the United States; the government by the Soviet Union) or the strife in Cambodia. Moreover, the very collapse of the Communist order triggered a number of conflicts in that part of the world, most notably in the former Yugoslavia. The impact of the Cold War there is less certain. Clearly, Communism contained ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia. Its repressive political system—whether it was triggered by Cold War fears or was an inherent part of Communism as it came to exist in Eastern Europe—prevented ethnic groups with both a long tradition of rivalry and a recent history of brutality (specifically, the struggle between fascist Croats and Communist Serbs during World War II) from cutting each other’s throats. Whether the Communist system honestly reconciled these groups (if only temporarily), simply postponed the inevitable, or actually inflamed ethnic hatred by refusing to acknowledge it is uncertain. One thing does seem certain, however. The legacy of the Cold War is bound to inspire as many competing scholarly theories as its origins. James Ciment

Bibliography Ball, Simon J. The Cold War: An International History, 1947– 1991. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998.

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Clough, Michael. Free at Last? U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992. Crockatt, Richard. The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991. New York: Routledge, 1994. Day, Richard B. Cold War Capitalism: The View from Moscow, 1945–1975. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Hunter, Allen, ed. Rethinking the Cold War. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998. Judge, Edward H., and John W. Langdon. A Hard and Bitter

Peace: A Global History of the Cold War. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996. LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945– 1990. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991. Leffler, Melvyn, ed. Origins of the Cold War: An International History. New York: Routledge, 1994. Rodman, Peter W. More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994. Young, John W. Cold War Europe, 1945–1989: A Political History. New York: Routledge, 1991.

ANTICOLONIALISM tion, which inevitably subordinated the interests of colonies to those of European nations. Consequently, colonies were to provide markets for manufacturers, to supply raw materials that could not be produced at home, to support a merchant marine that would be valuable in wartime, and to engender a large colonial population that would provide manpower. All Western European nations followed these mercantilist practices, whether it was Portugal obtaining spices in the East Indies, Spain extracting gold and silver in the Americas, Holland developing a worldwide merchant marine, or Britain passing the Navigation Acts against Dutch trade and enforcing the British East India Company’s tea monopoly, which culminated in the Boston Tea Party. What distinguished this new mass trade in necessities from the earlier traditional trade in luxury goods was its unprecedented volume encompassing the globe and integrating countries and continents into the new international market economy in which each trading European nation was obligated to defend its monopoly. Defense of monopoly inevitably resulted in gaining political control of a colony. The Englishman W. W. Hunter best described the practice in the nineteenth century when he admitted that in the case of India the British, “true to our national character,” had transformed themselves from “merchants” into “rulers.” Adam Smith, the astute Scottish economist of the late eighteenth century, perceived in his The Wealth of Nations the significance of the global trade when he noted that the overseas discoveries opened “a new and bottomless supply of customers for all European goods”—a market that encompassed “most of Asia, Africa and Americas.” But he also noted the adverse effect of the global trade on the native populations:

Anticolonialism grew in response to European colonial expansion. Its origins can be traced to the West itself, although it ultimately found its strongest expression in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Fueled by the maturing of commercial capitalism at home, and in pursuit of gold, God, and glory, Western Europeans in the fifteenth century began their great expansion overseas. What was different about commercial capitalism from earlier developments in the world was its inherently expansionist social order that stimulated the discovery of new lands overseas, the acquisitions of colonies globally, and the pursuit of economic theories and practices known as mercantilism. Simultaneously, Europe experienced the emergence of the scientific revolution, which, together with mercantilist theories, was to usher in the age of capitalist civilization. Growing populations and increased output in agriculture, mining, fishing, and forestry stimulated economic growth in Europe, increasing the power and prestige of the European merchant class that was unmatched elsewhere in the world. In China, for example, merchants were regarded as socially inferior and suffered several political restrictions. Significantly, just when European merchants and their joint stock companies began to provide monarchs with the capital to launch overseas expeditions, the Chinese expeditions, which predated the European efforts, were suddenly halted by imperial fiat in 1433. The resulting European global expansion between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries led to the development of mercantilism, which by its inherent logic was aimed at enhancing and unifying the power of new monarchies. This result was to be achieved by amassing gold to pay for the cost of the recurring wars and the proliferating bureaucracies. Maintaining a favorable balance of trade became a preoccupation of every European monarchy and was to be achieved by granting royal charters of monopoly privileges to joint stock companies in colonizing or trading in specified overseas territories. The logic of monopoly privileges to these trading companies meant that these privileges had to be defended at every cost to prevent unwanted competi-

By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however, both of the 13

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Roots of War

East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits, which can have resulted from those events, have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. . . . The savage injustice of the Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all, ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate countries. In assigning “dreadful misfortunes” to the “savage injustice of the Europeans,” Adam Smith articulated perhaps one of the earliest anticolonial sentiments and opened a debate on the effects of colonialism that persists to the present day. On the one hand, there are those who have supported Smith’s position, arguing that Western colonization resulted in the deprivation from which the third world still suffers. A more nuanced interpretation of this position has been provided by Edward Said, who in his polemical work Orientalism (1978) argued that European literature about the East could not be politically neutral because of the authors’ colonial relationship. On the other hand, there are those who argue that pre-European overseas societies were not “moral” utopias, and that there was at least as much exploitation under native rulers and elites as later under European administrators and businessmen. A more brazen interpretation of this position has been provided by the Swiss-born French architect Charles-Edouard Jeanneret (popularly known as Le Corbusier), who called Western colonization a “force morale” for development. A more recent reassertion of this position was provided by the American columnist Patrick Buchanan, who remarked that Africa would not have had railways and all its other modern comforts were it not for European rule. The remarkable thing about Western expansion after the fifteenth century is not that Europeans were able to colonize such large territories globally; rather, it is that Europeans in such small numbers were able to control and govern such disparate peoples in farflung parts of the world for so long with relative ease. It could not have been possible without the collaboration of the native populations in administering European rule in colonies. The Europeans were obliged to educate at least enough natives to facilitate and sustain the effective administration of the territories recently brought under their vast new imperial umbrella. The alternative—training young Europeans to become fluent enough in native languages to carry on

the daily chores of administrative collecting, spending, and punishing—was simply too expensive and intellectually unappealing. The impact of Western education, much like that of Christian missionary preaching, proved, at best, a mixed blessing to European rule. The shrewd Scot, Mountstuart Elphinstone, had known how dangerous Western education would prove to be when he had the courage to introduce it in Bombay in India; indeed, he called it “our highroad back to Europe.” Introduction of Western education in colonies accelerated demands for the demise of European colonial rule by arming local elites with the words with which to call for it.

Beginnings of Decolonization Much of the European mystique and position had been based on its historical establishment and control of a world system. By the early twentieth century, the fortunes of empire-building since the fifteenth century had given Europe influence in the hybrid New World societies it had created and control over Africa and much of Asia. Indeed, conscripts from the colonies joined forces with the metropolitan states during both world wars. But the wars weakened Europe just as they intensified the resolve of colonized peoples to direct their own destinies. Many in the colonies and beyond employed European socioeconomic doctrines and different elements of nationalism to challenge the structures of dominance; the postwar decades witnessed the self-assertion of the non-European world at the expense of the imperial systems. At the end of World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin emerged as beacons of anticolonialism. In his Fourteen Points, Wilson’s plan for a postwar order set the principles for peace settlements, calling for “adjustment of all colonial claims,” insisting that “the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” The United States would be “intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists.” Notwithstanding the fact that Wilson did not have Asia and Africa in mind when he articulated these positions to colonized peoples, they were still a clarion call to independence and self-government. Lenin had defined imperialism as “the highest stage of capitalism,” which he heartily condemned.

Anticolonialism

As leader of the Russian Revolution (1917) and heir to the Marxist doctrine advocating the end of oppression and the transformation of society, Lenin was poised to symbolize colonial struggles even though he paid little attention to the aspirations of the colonized in Asia and Africa. Lenin’s Communism, however, provided both critical theory and an ideology that was amazingly adaptable to colonial assertion. The Soviet-led Communist International (Comintern, 1919–1943) offered a vehicle for the export of revolution, although the late twentieth-century events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union proved nationalism to be a far more powerful force than international Communism. The process of decolonization transformed colonies into nations that were often geopolitical constructs at variance with the traditions and allegiances of the societies involved. That ambiguous force known as nationalism obviously played a consequential role in these designs. Decolonization created independent political units, but it did not end the “crossfertilization” existing between the European states and their former colonies: migrations and cultural and economic movements have kept the ties alive. Sometimes these relationships have perpetuated conditions of dominance (economic, cultural, and so on) by former European colonial powers, a phenomenon referred to as “neocolonialism.” When associated with earlier colonies (especially those in Latin America), these emergent states have been designated the “third world,” a term that was coined after World War II to refer to countries that were not part of either NATO (the Western capitalist nations allied with the United States) or the Warsaw Pact (the Eastern Communist nations allied with the Soviet Union). The fortunes of third-world countries have run the gamut from positive nonalignment, founded in 1955 by Afro-Asian nations at the Bandung (Indonesia) Conference, to pawnship at the hands of the United States or the Soviet Union and their respective allies. China offered a different response to European influences, albeit a curious blend of Communist and capitalist principles, and a unique pattern of self-assertion against the Western world and the United States. European society itself underwent major disruptions in the early part of the twentieth century that had startling repercussions for its global roles. The two world wars that emanated from traditional European power conflicts demonstrated the fragility of the

15

European balance of power. While Europe’s global dominance gradually came to be challenged by the United States and Japan, it became equally evident that, given the imperial system, a war among European states could scarcely be contained in that orbit. For the colonies, the wars displayed the vulnerabilities of the imperial powers, which during wartime were often forced to relax their controls over their charges. Hundreds of thousands of indigenes served in the war efforts under European banners and frequently on European battlefields. Many of those who remained in Europe after the wars became organizers of anticolonial movements. Amid the turmoil of war, Europe actually consolidated its colonial holdings and refined its techniques of rule. Colonial officials were trained more seriously, and indigenous elites were increasingly incorporated into authority structures as policies of indirect rule (“association” or trusteeship) were employed. The empires of England and France expanded after World War I with the transfer of German territories in Africa and the Pacific and the acquisition of mandates over former Turkish subjects in the Middle East. Europeans provided colonized peoples with examples—traditions of resistance and doctrines— which could be used to transcend local disparities of language, religion, and allegiance, and provided rallying points for common action. Such doctrines as socialism and nationalism were powerful ideologies, the effectiveness of which had been demonstrated in the European arena. Moreover, these ideologies were sufficiently flexible to allow for numerous interpretations, and they could be adapted to the needs of different societies. Nationalism and socialism were especially appropriate because of their popular appeals in the colonies. Religious kinship allegiances could be expanded to nationalistic fervor; forms of communalism and cooperation, important ingredients of socialism, were not alien to the colonized. Beyond these, populism suggested a folk orientation that could appeal to the primarily agrarian masses. But the element of modification is extremely important, for the colonized peoples had not shared in the experiences out of which the doctrines had originally emerged. The challenge of employing European doctrines, even in modified forms, was complicated by the disparities between European societies and the nonEuropean societies of their colonies. The latter were primarily agrarian societies with traditional economic

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Roots of War

structures; the inhabitants had little secular education, were often extremely religious, and were the victims of a situation where history and development had largely been frozen by colonialism. They confronted representatives of modern, industrial peoples rather confident of their historical roles. For premodern societies to adopt the expressions of modern societies, when in fact that very modernization had contributed much to the plight of colonized peoples, required considerable adjustment.

Decolonization and Third World Nationalism “Westernized” elites were the vanguard of the liberation movements in colonial regions. The colonized elites often matured in European or Europeanized school systems, a long-standing practice that had increased in the early twentieth century. The elements and background of the European doctrines were familiar to the elites, and these doctrines included a long tradition of challenge to authority in European countries. Also, the elites and many others in each colony could make common cause through their use of a single language, albeit the one imposed by the colonizers.

After a decades-long nationalist struggle, India celebrated peaceful independence from Britain in August 1947. The partitioning of the subcontinent between India and Pakistan, however, proved highly volatile. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Given the arbitrariness that led to the establishment of many colonies, cutting across ethnic and linguistic divisions, one can only speculate whether colonized regions would have united in protesting their situation as effectively as they did had they not availed themselves of European doctrines. These doctrines—particularly, nationalism—had much value as organizing themes, which charismatic leaders could use to wield discipline and commitment. In the long run, though, it has been the practical needs of a movement rather than strict adherence to doctrinal subtleties that has determined its directions. The doctrines have been most important at the resistance and transitional stages; beyond this point, pragmatism has taken hold. As a political ideology, nationalism is based on the premise that nationality (not territory) is the proper organizing principle for a state, and that therefore the existence of a nation is enough justification for the existence of a state that is to exercise sovereignty only over that nation. Thus, as it emerged in Europe by the middle of the nineteenth century, political nationalism signified the extension of representative democracy and popular sovereignty to the international system under the slogan “One nation, one state.” Imperial systems are always organized according to the territorial principle, and European empires were no exception. However, previous empires (including those of pre-nineteenth-century Europe) had to contend only with the resistance that normally meets conquest, but which, lacking in ideology as a rallying point, can be dealt with in a variety of ways. The new “imperialism” had to contend with what was essentially an anti-imperialist doctrine not amenable to “sensible modification.” Nationalism holds that whether there is oppression or not, whether there are advantages or not, each nation must have separate statehood. As long as the Great Powers held nationalism in check in Europe, it was also possible to rationalize imperial action. When self-determination for national groups became the ordering principle for post–World War I Europe, it became intellectually dishonest to defend colonial rule. The mandate system of the League of Nations acknowledged that territorial possessions would in time receive national independence. There were other signs that the imperial armor had been seriously cracked. In 1931, the Statute of

Anticolonialism

Westminster, passed by the British parliament, recognized the extent of this process among whitesettler colonies by granting independence and Commonwealth status to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, and Newfoundland. And Egypt received nominal independence in 1922, in part due to agitation from the Wafd party. The colonies were hit hard by the economic crisis of the 1930s. Prices for tropical raw materials declined, and colonies felt their vulnerability as the imperial powers became preoccupied with their own recovery. While many peasants migrated to urban areas, in general the output of the colonial peasant rose, reflecting a move toward self-sufficiency. India, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies are classic examples of the process of decolonization in Asia. These territories were pretty much within colonial orbits by 1870. The Dutch thrust into the East Indies (the fabled Spice Islands) dates from the seventeenth century, the British filled a power vacuum in India in the eighteenth, and France secured Indochina in the nineteenth. The impact of modernization affected the peoples of these lands in varying manners, but such elements as the construction of communications arteries and the use of a European language to facilitate contact among diverse linguistic groups did foster a tendency toward unification in each colony; yet World War II was the decisive historical juncture in the transition from colonial territory to independent state. The Hindu religious renaissance of the nineteenth century had stirred national pride in India. The first Indian national congress met in 1885, and the idea of a self-governing dominion within the empire emerged around World War I. During the interwar period the nationalist movement grew under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi, with his program of passive resistance (satyagraha—literally, to hold fast to truth) and home rule (swaraj), while at the same time Muslim factions agitated for a separate Muslim state where Muslims were a majority. Soon after World War II an Indian independence bill passed by the British parliament became law (August 1947) and gave rise to the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. The nationalist movement in the Dutch East Indies emerged in the early twentieth century, supported by the formation of a Communist party in the 1920s. The nationalists reacted to the Japanese occupation of the territory in March 1942, and at the close

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of the war, the Japanese finally offered them independence in 1945. The Dutch attempt to reclaim Indonesia resulted in years of fighting, but pressures from the United Nations and the United States led to independence at the end of 1949 under the leadership of Sukarno. The Dutch held on to New Guinea through several years of protracted hostilities until they finally surrendered the area in 1962. Most of the Dutch had been expelled, and the movement was complete. Indochina offers a somewhat more complicated story, yet the process was similar. Nationalist uprisings began around 1908; Ho Chi Minh emerged as a charismatic leader, founding the Communist Party in 1931. Like Indonesia, Indochina was occupied by the Japanese (1941), and Japan also offered independence, with Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China becoming the autonomous state of Vietnam under the emperor, Bao Dai. After a temporary Chinese-British occupation following the war, France attempted to resume its prewar colonial position and fought the nationalist Vietminh forces but was defeated in 1954. Later, the United States became embroiled in a protracted conflict in Vietnam. Finally, the states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia emerged from French Indochina. The Japanese takeover of most of Southeast Asia during World War II fatally weakened the position of the European colonial powers. Once Japan was defeated, independence in fact was a matter of time. After World War II, there were only three independent states in Africa: Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South Africa. Egypt, though technically independent since 1922, was still occupied by British troops. In 1945, the Sixth Pan-African Congress was held in Manchester, England. Significantly, unlike previous conferences, which had been organized by African Americans and West Indians, this one was dominated by Africans, who included Kwame Nkrumah, future president of Ghana, and Jomo Kenyatta, future president of Kenya. The congress, among other things, demanded complete independence for the colonial areas of black Africa. Nationalist revolts broke out in Madagascar, a French colony, in 1947, and in Kenya, a British colony with a large white-settler population, in 1952 (the Mau-Mau Rebellion). Two years later, in 1954, the Algerian war of independence began. In 1957, the Gold Coast was granted its independence by England. Renamed Ghana, after the great medieval state in the savannah region, it was the first

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Roots of War

after 1945 were varied and often bumpy, with peaceful transfers of power in Ghana and Ceylon (modern Sri Lanka) matched by protracted colonial wars in Algeria, the Belgian Congo, and Angola.

Decolonization and the Cold War

Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah (left) and Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta (right), the first leaders of their respective independent nations, were at the forefront of the anticolonial movement in postwar Africa. (Evening Standard/Getty Images)

sub-Saharan African colony to gain its independence from a European colonial power. In 1960, a total of seventeen African colonies, including Nigeria, Somalia, Senegal, and Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), became independent. However, in southern Africa, Portugal resisted the trend toward independence by its colonies; war broke out in Angola in 1961, Guinea in 1963, and Mozambique in 1964. In 1963, at the Pan-African Congress Conference meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African leaders established the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). Since its founding, the OAU has successfully arbitrated a number of inter-African disputes. It also consistently opposed white minority rule in the Republic of South Africa. In June 1977, the last major European colony in Africa, Djibouti (the former French Somaliland and, later, the French Territory of the Ifar and Issas) became independent. Following World War II, England, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal no longer had the will or the means to control vast colonial empires. Cold War realities demanded at least the rhetoric of decolonization from the European states. The Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Trustee Council endorsed self-government, and the United States, having fulfilled its promise of independence for the Philippines in 1946, actively supported the self-rule of India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The paths of decolonization

The Cold War played an important role in shaping the world after 1945, but events in the 1990s marked a historical turning point. Communism collapsed almost everywhere by 1991, ending the Cold War and lifting the fear of global nuclear war. The Soviet Union, the last great colonial empire, dissolved into fledgling independent states, prompting Francis Fukuyama, a political analyst with the right-wing think tank Rand Corporation, to proclaim the “end of history.” The 1990s also witnessed the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa. In 1994, a multiracial government headed by the African political activist Nelson Mandela replaced the minority white rule. (Southwest Africa, under United Nations guidance, made the transition to majority rule in 1990, as the country of Namibia.) Neither World War II nor the collapse of the Soviet system and Communism really resulted in the end of history. The rise of ethnic and nationalist conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have made some Western political analysts romanticize about the old Cold War rivalry. And the third world, made up principally of former colonies, continues to face severe economic challenges, even though since 1945 global economic productivity has expanded more rapidly than at any time in the past. Consequently, anticolonialism, which in the first half of the twentieth century was directed against European colonial rule, in the second half of the century came to be redirected against Western political dominance and disproportionate control of global economic resources. The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America maintained that they continued to be exploited by the Western states. Apart from being exploited in international trade and finance, these countries argued, they were being subjected to the “media imperialism” of the West. In fact, the controversy over the control of global resources and the international flow of information developed alongside a related north-south controversy: the demand for a New International Economic Order. Some third-world countries organized themselves in

Anticolonialism

the “Group of Seventy-Seven” (named for the number of its original participants in 1964) in their efforts to gain economic leverage against the developed world and use the international forum of the United Nations and its many agencies to realize their demand for a fair share in world resources and communications, as these clearly affect their own economic and social development. Not surprisingly, Western countries, especially the United States, did not respond warmly. Not all governments of the third world were hostile to the West, notwithstanding the political rhetoric used to gain popular support domestically. Third-world countries remained well aware of the West’s power in encouraging economic and social development and in maintaining political peace. What the third-world governments complained about was the West’s disproportionate control of global resources and its ethnocentric attitudes. The creation of a new world economic order in which the third world shared a proportionate representation would, in their view, eliminate the negative effects of the West’s “predilection” for trivializing the developing countries. Ravi Kalia and William H. Alexander

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Bibliography Chamberlain, Muriel Evelyn. Decolonization: The Fall of the European Empires. New York: B. Blackwell, 1985. Childs, Peter. An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory. New York: Prentice Hall, 1997. Darwin, John. Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988. Fanon, Frantz. A Dying Colonialism. New York: Grove Press, 1965. Fredi, Frank. Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994. Hintjens, Helen M. Alternatives to Independence: Explorations in Post-Colonial Relations. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995. James, Lawrence. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Moore-Gilbert, B.J. Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics. New York: Verso, 1997. Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1978. Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 1776. Reprint, Hartford, CT: Cooke & Hall, 1818. Urquhart, Brian. Decolonization and World Peace. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989. Williams, Patrick, and Laura Chrisman, eds. Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

PEOPLE’S WARS the larger concept of guerrilla warfare, we should not lose sight of the fact that the first is merely an ideological subset of the second. The defining operational problem, in each case, is the same: overcoming the conventional military superiority of the state (or occupying power) through an asymmetrical campaign based on the support (and resources) of a constituent population. While the leadership of a people’s war will attempt to draw support from among a revolutionary class (classically, the peasantry), the nonMarxist insurgency will define its natural constituency along different lines (e.g., ethnicity, communal affiliation, or regional identity). Where the first defines its popular base “horizontally” (according to class) across national or ethnic lines, the second defines its base of support “vertically” (according to some other group identifier) without regard to its class affiliation. The underlying organizational tasks facing the leadership of a people’s war are similar to those faced by that of any insurgency. We can define these as (1) penetration, which speaks to the revolutionary organization’s need to “get inside” targeted social groupings as a prelude to “turning” them to the service of the organization’s political and military objectives, (2) transformation, which speaks to the insurgency’s need to consolidate its control over the targeted group and redirect some percentage of its resources to the organization’s goals, and (3) application, which refers to the ways in which these resources are used to further develop an insurgent infrastructure, undermine the competing infrastructure of the state, and, ultimately, extend the insurgent’s zone of control. Collectively, these tasks define the process of social mobilization. Every insurgent organization must address each of these operational tasks if it is to pose a viable challenge to the state. The manner in which it does so will define its theory of victory. Revolutions and people’s wars in the twentieth century have virtually all imitated or tried to imitate earlier revolutions. These successful cases of the past establish operational models that are adopted by latter-day revolutionaries who hope to repeat the success of those that preceded them by replicating their experience. While such cases have generally addressed

What is meant by the term “people’s war”? The concept can be defined both narrowly and broadly. Defined narrowly, the term is used to denote the body of strategic thought on “protracted war” developed by Mao Zedong in the 1930s and 1940s, during the period of the Chinese Civil War and the struggle against the Japanese. This definition is firmly rooted in the larger Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle. Defined broadly, the concept of people’s war is used generically to denote any form of guerrilla conflict or popular insurrection, regardless of its ideological roots. By this definition, the opening and middle stages of the Chinese Communist struggle against the Nationalist (Kuomintang) regime was an example of a people’s war, as was the Afghan campaign against the Marxist regime in Kabul in the 1980s and early 1990s. The definition of people’s war used in this entry takes a middle course. The term, on the one hand, will be used to describe a body of ideas on populationbased conflict or insurgency that goes beyond the specific concept of operations developed by Mao. At the same time, we will retain the ideological meaning of the term by referring to those forms of “popular warfare” based on the concept of class struggle. Defining the concept in this manner distinguishes it, on the one hand, from the type of conflict waged in Afghanistan, which would represent a more generalized form of guerrilla warfare, as well as from the type of classbased revolutionary conflict envisioned by Lenin, which was based primarily on political rather than military forms of struggle. While the last act of revolutionary takeover, in Lenin’s view, would be carried out by a popular insurrection, the months and years leading up to the insurrection would be characterized by careful, behind-the-scenes political work, designed to place the revolutionary party in a position to catalyze a final uprising and seize power when the historical moment was deemed to be propitious. It would not be characterized by a period of revolutionary war, per se, in which the outcome of the struggle would be decided by a military interaction. Although the concept of people’s war, for definitional purposes, can be usefully distinguished from 20

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the question of “why” one should revolt, as well as what revolutionary changes should be carried out in society at such time as one actually wins, the principal influence has been over how an armed revolt should be prosecuted in the first place. For those who come to the problem of overthrowing a standing regime with high ambition but little practical experience, a revolutionary paradigm offers an immediate (if often stylized) recipe for action. The tradition of people’s war, for its part, has been dominated by two original paradigms: the model of protracted conflict developed by Mao Zedong in China and the foco concept of guerrilla warfare developed by Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Latin America. Most revolutionary insurgencies since the end of World War II have sought either to apply or adapt and refine one or the other of these concepts of operation to local circumstances. The concept of protracted conflict developed by Mao is designed to be carried out by a “low-profile” organization carrying out a “bottom-up” approach to insurgency. By contrast, the theory of insurgency developed by Che Guevara is designed to be prosecuted by a “high-profile” organization from the “top down.” In key respects, these two models represent operational opposites, and they represent the outer limits of the concept of people’s war.

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Mao Zedong (left), seen with Zhou Enlai on the Long March of 1935, brought his Chinese Communist Party to power in a highly strategic and protracted people’s war that began in the countryside and grew into a nationwide insurgency. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Chinese Model of People’s War Mao’s assessment of the operational problem facing the Chinese Communist Party during its early struggles in the 1920s and 1930s rested on two essential considerations that bear on the general study of people’s war. The first of these was his assessment of the standing government’s overwhelming material advantage over the Communist Party. The second was the government’s equally apparent political weakness. Deposing the old regime, in Mao’s view, would require the party to overcome its material weaknesses by exploiting the opportunities provided by its comparative political advantage. As Mao observed at the time, “All guerrilla units start from nothing and grow.” At the outset of this type of struggle, the standing regime represents a force in being. The guerrilla, by contrast, represents a force in development. The latter begins with little more than an idea. The guerrilla’s one opening under these circumstances, according to the theory of class conflict, is provided by the inherent frailty of the regime’s political base and the corresponding weakness of its institutional presence through-

out the countryside. Exploiting this opening, Mao argued, will permit a guerrilla force to bridge the gap between its grand ends and limited means over the course of the struggle.

Time, Space, and Initiative The strategy designed by Mao to square the circle between ends and means rested on the calculated use of time and space. Buying time, Mao argued, was essential if the regime’s strengths were to be turned into weaknesses and the guerrilla weaknesses were to be turned into strengths. The struggle, in its most abstract form, was envisioned to be an institutional contest between the developing architecture of the “new state” on the one hand and the declining institutions of the “old state” on the other. Building the new and dismantling the old, Mao recognized, would be a protracted undertaking. As this process unfolds, however, the relative balance between the guerrilla and the government would gradually shift. This shift, furthermore, could be expected to take on a dynamic quality

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over time. Guerrilla successes, he argued, would tend to be self-reinforcing, just as the regime’s growing record of failure would tend to lead to the further erosion of the state and its administrative organs. While this process would ebb and flow, over the long run the decline of the state could be expected to accelerate, eventually at an increasing rate. The guerrillas’ principal operational challenge, in this view, was not to end the war quickly, but to keep it going. Unlimited time, in this strategy, required unlimited space. Space, in Mao’s view, would provide the guerrillas with the room for maneuvers to buy the time necessary to win. All space, in this sense, is not created equal. For practical purposes, a distinction was made between territory that, in the opening stages of the engagement, was under the effective control of the regime, and that which was not. If the guerrillas’ evaluation of the political environment facing each side was accurate, the regime’s administrative control throughout the countryside would be imperfect. To survive their weak beginning, the guerrillas would open the struggle in those areas of the country in which the regime was weak and avoid making a stand in those areas of comparative regime strength. In pursuing such a strategy, the insurgency would give itself the best opportunity to gain the time it required to establish an institutional counterweight to the state. Revolutionary organization, in turn, would further extend the guerrillas’ ability to establish effective spatial control. These ideas formed the basis of Mao’s concept of protracted war. According to this formula, the war will evolve via the dual mechanisms of “destruction and construction”—through the step-by-step destruction of the state and the associated construction of the new counterstate. The two, in Mao’s view, are mutually dependent and must proceed in tandem. The erosion of the government’s administrative architecture at the margin of its control will open additional opportunities for the insurgents to expand their own institutional presence, just as the organization’s earlier (if still limited) institutional base provided the springboard to open its campaign against the state in the first place. This can be expected to take on an iterative quality over time, as each new advance by the guerrillas lays the groundwork for the next. The speed with which this campaign unfolds will be regulated by the strength of the state (which will tend to increase as the opposition pushes forward from the periphery to the state’s center of gravity),

the nature of the government’s counterstrategy, the level of local resistance to the guerrillas’ efforts to establish their own institutional presence, and the natural time limits associated with building an alternative set of political and military forms. Expressed in geographical terms, this progression is intended to result in a slow extension of guerrilla authority from peripheral areas of the countryside (or political margin), where state control will be comparatively weak, toward the cities (or political center) of the country, where the position of the regime is traditionally much stronger. This process can be described as one of protracted encirclement, in which the urban regions of the country are encircled and eventually detached from the interior. The dynamic quality of this strategy is manifest in several ways. First, it calls for the guerrillas to push into areas of marginal control, even as they are being pulled into these areas by the political vacuum created by the retreat of the state. Second, as the opposition gains ground, it will naturally acquire the means to gain strength by gradually expanding its base of popular support. The inverse process, meanwhile, is occurring with the state, which is losing ground in a contest for territorial control with the guerrillas. The result, in theory, is a compound shift in the relative balance of advantage as the guerrillas become absolutely stronger and the regime grows absolutely weaker at a more or less equivalent rate. The nature of this encirclement strategy is somewhat different from that which typically characterizes Western military thought. For Mao, encirclement is not achieved by means of development, but through a process of “strategic convergence.” Encirclement in the first sense, as one commentator noted some years ago, refers to a process of “eccentric maneuver,” in which the attacking force advances from a single point to surround and strike at the enemy’s flanks. In the Maoist system, by contrast, encirclement has taken on a more subtle cast. It is not a single action, but a complex “concentric maneuver” in which semi-autonomous forces converge on their target from multiple points in a protracted series of coordinated moves. Such an approach, if successful, will complicate the task facing the regime, which will be forced to counteract the guerrillas on multiple fronts, while simplifying the task facing the insurgents, who will be able to reduce their profile (and hence their vulnerability) to the enemy by not placing all of their eggs in a single (easily targeted) basket.

People’s Wars

The Evolution of the Armed Struggle A centerpiece of this strategy is the development of a series of rural bases from which the insurgents will attempt to extend their areas of control. “Political mobilization,” Mao observed, is a fundamental condition for winning the war. Mobilization, in turn, will only be translated into effective insurgent support if it results in the creation of a network of strategic areas that are able to service the guerrillas’ material needs. The base area, in this sense, provides a “protective shell” that provides the guerrillas with the opportunity “to organize, equip, and train.” It is formed by bringing a large number of points of influence together under a common administrative center. This process is achieved by establishing a local military advantage, displacing (or neutralizing) the residual presence of the old regime, and creating an alternative set of governing and administrative institutions. This progression, once again, is a dynamic one. According to Abimael Guzman, one of Mao’s recent imitators, “Base development, the [concomitant] development of [a] popular guerrilla army, and the resulting extension of the people’s war [can be expected to take on a] momentum of their own, leading to the greater unfolding of the revolutionary situation.” One thing leads to the next. In developing this view, Mao clearly distinguished between “guerrilla bases” and “guerrilla zones.” The guerrilla base, as we have suggested, is a region that has already been incorporated into the emerging insurgent regime. While Mao acknowledged that there could be different types of bases, depending upon their location and relative vulnerability to government attack, each represents a guerrilla “stronghold.” Such strongholds can be distinguished from guerrilla zones, which Mao defined as areas in which the insurgents were able to operate with relative freedom, but where the state still retained a meaningful political and military presence. The guerrilla zone, in this sense, is considered to be an area of transition (contested ground). The final conquest of the zone, according to Mao, will be achieved by using the established basing system as a springboard to converge on any remaining state presence within the target area. Bases, in this view, effectively “encircle” guerrilla zones, which, once captured, will be absorbed into an expanded base area. The revolution, in Mao’s concept, will unfold in a series of stages, moving from the “strategic defen-

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sive,” through a period of “strategic equilibrium,” on to the “strategic offensive.” The initial defensive stage of the conflict can be characterized as a period of “preparation.” The insurgents’ overriding objective during this phase is to establish a secure political base in the interior from which they can subsequently branch out and expand their range of operations. This is a period of high vulnerability. As on a water course, the guerrillas must find their own level. Decisive battles, head-on engagements, and areas of regime strength must all be avoided as the opposition gradually lays down its roots. This view was summarized nicely by Mao in his argument that the “first principle of war is to preserve oneself, and destroy the enemy.” The insurgents’ primary concern during the defensive stage of the struggle, in this view, must be to preserve their core organization, from which the means to destroy the enemy will eventually develop. By the end of this period, much of the countryside will have been transformed into a political checkerboard. While the regime will still enjoy effective control at the center, large areas of the countryside will have been brought under guerrilla influence. The second stage of the conflict, strategic equilibrium, will be reached when the insurgents feel they have achieved “equivalence” with the incumbent regime. Mao referred to this stage as a period of “stalemate.” If the initial defensive struggle can be described as a period of preparation, this phase of the war can be characterized as one of “consolidation.” While the overriding concern during phase one was to establish an initial series of base areas, the primary operational objective in stage two will be to geographically connect these bases in an effort to consolidate and further extend the guerrillas’ zone of control. Over time, the regime’s remaining positions of influence in the interior are to be restricted, isolated, and gradually disconnected from the center. The checkerboard or “jigsaw” pattern of influence that characterized the end of phase one will evolve into an increasingly continuous pattern of guerrilla control by the end of phase two. At the conclusion of this period, the regime will find itself forced into a defensive posture, preoccupied with hanging on to what it has and decreasingly able to move offensively against the guerrillas. In Maoist parlance, the final phase of a people’s war is the period of “annihilation.” It might also be thought of as a period of “exploitation,” in which the institutional groundwork laid during the preparatory

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and consolidative phases of the struggle are brought to fruition. The guerrillas will enter this stage poised to transition to the strategic offensive. The early pattern of territorial dispersion made necessary by the weakness of the guerrillas will have been transformed over time into a pattern of territorial control in which the insurgents will have surrounded all but the most important points of regime influence. This development, in Mao’s view, should be matched by a reorganization of significant elements of the guerrilla “army,” which can now be gradually reformed into units capable of carrying out fluid but increasingly conventional operations. Guerrilla warfare, according to Mao, is not a strategy of choice but of necessity, imposed by the initial material weakness of the opposition. Once the balance of advantage in the conflict has swung to the opposition, the guerrillas are in a position to come out of the shadows and confront the regime on its own terms.

Cuban Model of People’s War The Cuban model of people’s war, codified by Che Guevara, was based on a highly stylized (and often inaccurate) interpretation of the Cuban insurrection (1956–1959). The baseline document outlining the key features of this model was written by Che Guevara and published by the Cuban Ministry of the Armed Forces in 1960 under the title Guerrilla Warfare. It was Che Guevara’s first and most influential book. Guevara opened the monograph with the following observation: “The victory of the Cuban people over the Batista dictatorship . . . showed plainly the capacity of the people to free themselves by means of guerrilla warfare from a government that oppresses them.” Three “fundamental lessons,” he argued, could be drawn from this experience: First, that “popular forces can win a war against the army”; second, that “it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making [a] revolution exist, the insurrection can create them”; and, third, that “in underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area of fighting.” The model of action that emerged from these “lessons” would shape or otherwise influence revolutionary efforts over the next thirty years. Guevara’s concept of operations was developed without reference to Mao’s earlier writings on protracted war or a close understanding of the experiences of the Chinese Revolution. Guevara and Fidel Castro both claimed to have only been introduced to

The Communist guerrilla leader Che Guevara—seen here at a decisive battle in the Cuban revolution in late 1958— codified a new paradigm of the people’s war that he believed could be successfully prosecuted throughout Latin America. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Mao’s work in 1958, after the key features of the Cuban insurrection were already well defined. In their view and the view of others, this lack of knowledge proved to be fortuitous, freeing them from the temptation to apply revolutionary lessons from a time and place that may have little to do with the particular challenges (and opportunities) faced by the Cuban guerrillas. The “university of experience,” in Guevara’s view, was a more useful instructor “than a million volumes of books.” This perspective was echoed by Régis Debray, one of the chief interpreters of the Cuban insurrection, who suggested that it was a “stroke of good fortune that Fidel had not read the writings of Mao Zedong before disembarking on the coast of Oriente: he could thus invent, on the spot and out of his own experience, principles of a military doctrine in conformity with the terrain.” Where Mao’s concept of protracted conflict may have been an appropriate model for the Far East, the new doctrine of people’s war that emerged from the experience of the Cuban insurrection, it was argued, was the model of choice for the unique circumstances

People’s Wars

found in Latin America. “Revolutionaries in Latin America,” Debray observed, were “reading Fidel’s speeches and Che Guevara’s writings with eyes that have already read Mao on the anti-Japanese war, Vo Nguyen Giap, and certain texts of Lenin—and they think they recognize the latter in the former.” This, he argued, was both a distorted and dangerous “superimposition.” The popular struggle in Latin America, according to Debray, possessed “highly special and profoundly distinct conditions of development, which [could] only be discovered through a particular experience.” Prior “theoretical works on people’s war,” accordingly, could “do as much harm as good.” While such writings, he suggested, “have been called the grammar books of the war, . . . a foreign language is learned faster in a country where it is spoken than at home studying a language manual.” The Cuban experience, in short, was believed to offer a new paradigm for action.

The Foco The central instrument in Guevara’s theory was the guerrilla foco, or guerrilla band. In Guevara’s view, the foco was the nucleus of the insurrection. It would consist of a handful of dedicated men who would “jump-start” the campaign to overthrow the standing government through the power of example. Over time, Guevara envisioned, the foco would naturally begin to attract recruits. As this occurred, it would slowly grow until it reached some maximum (optimal) size, which Guevara defined as somewhere between thirty and fifty men. At this point, it would split in two, each foco working independently of the other to attract a following in different regions of the country. Over time, as this budding process continued, the number of operational guerrilla bands would grow until the insurgents would eventually become a force to be reckoned with in the countryside. In Guevara’s view, this process was similar to that of a beehive “when at a given moment it releases a new queen, who goes to another region with a part of the swarm.” The “mother hive,” in this case, “with the most notable guerrilla chief will stay in the less dangerous places, while the new columns will penetrate other enemy territory [and repeat the earlier] cycle.” Guevara’s concept of operations, to be sure, shared certain features with the theory of protracted war formulated by Mao. First and foremost was the assumption that the guerrillas’ natural base of sup-

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port would be found among the peasantry. It followed, in turn, that the natural locus of the insurgency should also be in the countryside. While Guevara, at least in theory, did not completely dismiss the supporting role that could be played by an urban underground, he clearly relegated the struggle in the cities to a subordinate position. The insurrection would turn on the rural guerrilla. Those who, “following dogma,” still believed that a revolutionary action could only be carried out by urban workers, underrated, in his view, both the revolutionary sentiment of the peasantry on the one hand and the difficulties associated with operating in an urban environment on the other. “Illegal workers’ movements,” Guevara argued, faced “enormous dangers” (which were not similarly faced by their rural counterparts) because of their greater proximity to the regime’s center of influence. To offset this greater risk, “They must function secretly without arms.” The rural guerrilla, by contrast, is able to operate “beyond the reach of the oppressive forces,” and is thus able to sidestep the state’s opening advantage. Like Mao, Guevara also believed that the insurgent struggle would evolve in stages. The first stage of the conflict was the “nomadic” phase, in which the initial guerrilla nucleus must continually remain on the move in order to survive. As the foco’s relationship with the peasantry began to stabilize, the guerrillas would move into the second, “semi-nomadic” phase, in which the guerrillas, while still retaining a high level of fluidity, would be able to establish the first permanent base areas. The final phase of the conflict, Guevara argued, was the stage of “suburban guerrilla warfare.” In language reminiscent of Mao, Guevara wrote that this stage would finally enable the guerrillas to “encircle fortified bases,” engage in “mass action,” and confront the army in open battle and win. “The enemy will fall,” he suggested, when “the process of partial victories becomes transformed into final victories, that is to say, when the [army] is brought to accept the battle in conditions imposed by the guerrilla band; there he is annihilated and his surrender compelled.” This, in turn, would ultimately result in an uprising of popular sentiment against the standing regime, sweeping it from power.

The Heroic Guerrilla While Guevara’s writings on people’s war share certain similarities to those of Mao, the strategic theory

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that underlies this work is, in the end, quite distinct. First, in contrast to Mao, Guevara gave primacy to what he referred to as the “subjective” rather than “objective” conditions for victory. A successful insurrection, in this view, did not require that the peasantry be already primed to revolt; the conditions for revolution could often be engineered by the guerrilla band. While Guevara gave at least passing reference to the necessary preconditions for revolution in his initial discussion of the problem in Guerrilla Warfare, this caveat was increasingly relaxed over time. Guerrilla conflicts, he argued in a later article, could be successfully prosecuted throughout Latin America. Once set in motion, the revolution would “make itself.” While the “initial conditions” did not exist everywhere in the orthodox sense of the term, the desire for revolutionary change lay just below the surface of the popular consciousness. It was only necessary to define, release, and finally channel these sentiments. In contrast to Mao, Guevara’s theory of victory ultimately relied heavily on the spontaneity of the insurgent’s natural allies to provide the guerrilla foco with the critical mass it required to win. Guevara assumed that Latin-American society was in an inherently unstable state. The task facing the guerrilla nucleus was to aggravate the tension that he believed defined every Latin-American society, kick out the props that held up the old regime, and stand back while the target government was overcome in a popular uprising. Once set in motion, the guerrillas would not so much control this event as ride it into power. What was required under these circumstances was not a grassroots, step-by-step program of local contact, indoctrination, and organization, but an action-oriented program designed to capture the popular imagination and inspire the peasantry “from above.” The foco’s operational challenge, in this respect, was to sharpen and accelerate the natural process of social polarization, raise the peasants’ political consciousness, and embolden them to join the revolution. While the Chinese model of people’s war considered political organization to be a necessary precondition for social mobilization, the Cuban model argued that a high-profile “guerrilla outbreak” could be used to effectively bypass the organizational requirement and proceed directly to mobilization. The basis of the insurgency, in the first case, rests with the vitality of the guerrillas’ interlocking, village-based associations. Collectively, these represent an institutional

counterweight to the state and the foundation of the insurgency’s political and military position. The basis of the insurgency, in the second case, rests squarely on the shoulders of the guerrilla combatant and, through him, the guerrilla foco. Success or failure in this case depends on the power of their example. The guerrilla, for his part, must be a “fighter-teacher,” who “need know little more than what is required of a good man or soldier.” The guerrilla foco, for its part, must be an “armed nucleus,” able to employ its limited resources to move its would-be followers to action. Creating this effect would not depend on organization, but on courage, discipline, and a willingness to act. As this discussion suggests, the Cuban model placed great importance on the psychological dimensions of a guerrilla conflict. The guerrilla combatant, we are told, must never lose faith. He must “see reasons for a favorable decision even in moments when the analysis of the adverse and favorable conditions does not show an appreciable positive balance.” It is particularly important to continually generate the impression of impending victory. This can be achieved initially in small ways that have big effects. A small guerrilla force can enhance its offensive punch, for example, by “striking like a tornado” to “sow panic” within the enemy’s ranks. The cumulative effects of small victories won in such a fashion can, in turn, have higher-order effects on the general morale (and, hence, effectiveness) of the regime’s military and political base, imbuing them with a sense of imminent doom. As these perceptions begin to take hold, the “objective conditions” of the conflict will gradually begin to shift to the insurgents’ advantage, making it increasingly easy to sustain this momentum over time. The guerrillas will win when the enemy has finally come to believe that its own defeat is inevitable. The theory of guerrilla warfare advanced by Che Guevara, in the end, had an uneven relationship to the underlying dynamics of the Cuban insurrection. Many aspects of the Cuban experience that proved to be critical to the ultimate success of the July 26 revolutionary movement were either left out or significantly downplayed in Guevara’s concept of operations. Several of these should be noted here. First and foremost, perhaps, was Guevara’s increasingly unrealistic view of the “revolutionary readiness” of Latin American society. As noted above, Guevara gave little attention to the particular preconditions that must exist to bring to fruition even the best-laid plan to

People’s Wars

seize power in a popular insurgency. Revolution for Che Guevara could effectively be created out of whole cloth. What was of critical importance was not the particular state of society, or even the competing institutional strength of the opposition, but the courage, fortitude, and determination of the guerrilla fighter. Winning, in his view, boiled down to an act of will. Weak, preexisting objective conditions could be offset by the individual guerrilla’s grim refusal to accept defeat. Second, in focusing on the rural guerrilla, Guevara ignored the decisive role played by the urban underground during the Cuban insurrection. The latter provided significant assistance to Fidel’s rural operations. During the early days of the war, in particular, support from the July 26 movement’s preexisting urban networks was critical to the very survival of the rural foco. Throughout the course of the war, the actions of the urban underground—often carried out in a coordinated and simultaneous manner across the country— served as a major source of distraction, providing the guerrillas with the breathing space they required to stay in the game. The army was continually faced with the need to divide its efforts between the countryside and the cities, which made it difficult to concentrate on finding, fixing, and finally destroying Fidel’s small group of rural combatants. In these and other ways, the cities proved to be a key variable in the outcome of the war. Despite this fact, the role of the urban underground was effectively dismissed in Guevara’s writings in favor of his naturally heroic country cousin. Finally, as much as Guevara appreciated the inherently dynamic, interactive nature of warfare, in attempting to generalize from the Cuban experience he imposed a post facto order and associated determinism on the course of the Cuban insurrection that it did not possess. Under the best of circumstances, combat is an uncertain process. There is often a high level of uncertainty surrounding the thousands of individual events that might make up a battle, and the hundreds of battles that might make up a war, which will often prove to be decisive in determining who is left standing at the end of the day. This was certainly the case in the Cuban insurrection, where, except for happy chance, the guerrillas could have been defeated on any number of occasions during the course of the struggle. As the Duke of Wellington said of the Battle of Waterloo, “it was a close run thing.” And yet, the problematic character of the conflict (and guerrilla warfare in general) is missing in Guevara’s interpretive mode.

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The inherent uncertainty surrounding the problem of revolutionary action, in this case, is effectively replaced by a discussion of the guerrilla’s fighting spirit. The guerrilla, in Guevara’s view, will dominate events because of his superior determination. The limits of this last assumption were demonstrated once and for all in Guevara’s final action in Bolivia (1966–1967), where he was captured and killed attempting to put his theory into practice. The dramatic nature of his defeat proved to be the death knell for his model of guerrilla warfare. While the heroic quality of his death served to inspire those who came after him, subsequent guerrilla operations in Latin America would be defined by their efforts to correct the weaknesses inherent in his voluntarist theory of people’s war.

Summar y The Chinese and Cuban models of people’s war represent competing views of the structure and dynamics of guerrilla warfare. While both theories acknowledge that the underlying basis of revolutionary change ultimately rests on long-run historical forces, the operational guidance given to revolutionary hopefuls attempting to tap into and harness these forces, in each case, is distinct. For the Maoist, it is ultimately a problem of organization, which, in this sense, means building a grassroots, village-based alternative to the state. It follows that the chief measure of performance—which in this case is provided not by the scope or intensity of one’s military actions, but by the scope, depth, and vitality of one’s organizational forms. The guerrilla’s ability to pose a political and military challenge to the state is believed to be a byproduct of his slowly developing institutional base. There is nothing “willful,” in this view, about revolutionary outcomes. Strength of character and a pure heart are not considered to be effective substitutes for building an institutional counterweight to the state. The opposite point of view, in many respects, defines the Cuban model of insurgency. Guerrilla actions, in this theory, are not a manifestation of popular support but the source of such support in the first place. The target population, in this respect, is not “organized” but “impressed.” Popular mobilization is less an iterative process than a catalytic event, in which the insurgents’ natural constituency, spurred by the dramatic character of guerrilla actions, discovers its revolutionary identity and joins the rebellion.

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This shift, as noted, is expected to occur with little or no organizational investment by the insurgents. It will occur not as a result of a prior shift in local control, but in the wake of a general change in the sentiment of the revolutionary class. The guerrillas’ primary task, then, is not institutional but psychological. Their goal is to capture the popular imagination in the expectation of generating a popular uprising against the state. Will, rather than numbers, can be expected to carry the day. These two models of people’s war, then, can be defined by a simple dichotomy. The Chinese model represents a bottom-up, low-profile approach to guerrilla conflict. For the low-profile challenger, insurgency is considered to be an institutional contest. The conflict will be pursued by undermining the institutional architecture of the state and replacing it with the guerrillas’ own institutional alternative. Popular support is mobilized at the grassroots level (from the bottom up) in a staged process of organization building. The Cuban model, by contrast, can be defined as a topdown, high-profile approach to insurgency. For the high-profile challenger, a guerrilla conflict will not be prosecuted by undermining the state’s institutional forms, but by attacking its perceptual foundations. The regime will not be slowly dismantled and replaced, but effectively taken by storm (from the top down) in a psychological convergence of popular sentiment away from the old regime and in favor of the opposition. The guerrilla’s operational challenge is, first, to provide the spark that sets the conflict in motion and, second, to serve as a conduit to channel the population’s revolutionary sentiments. Gordon H. McCormick

Bibliography Boorman, Scott A. The Protracted Game: A Wei-chi Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Childs, Matt D. “An Historical Critique of the Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto Che Guevara’s Foco Theory.” Journal of Latin American Studies (October 1995). Connor, Walker. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. Debray, Régis. Revolution in the Revolution? Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980. Dunn, John. Modern Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Guevara, Che. Guerrilla Warfare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985. ———. “Guerrilla Warfare: A Method.” In Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto (Che) Guevara, ed. John Gerassi. New York: Macmillan, 1968. ———. “Interview with Laura Berquist” (No. 1). In Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara, ed. Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdés. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969. Guzman, Abimael. “Interview.” El Diario, July 24, 1988. Johnson, Chalmers. Autopsy on People’s War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Katzenbach, Edward L., Jr., and Gene Hanrahan. “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung.” Political Science Quarterly (September 1955). Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). “Guerrilla Warfare.” In Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, trans. and ed. Samuel B. Griffith II. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992. ———. “On Protracted War.” In Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967. ———. “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan.” In Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967. McCormick, Gordon H. “Che Guevara’s Revolutionary Odyssey.” Queen’s Quarterly (Summer 1998). ———. Peruvian Maoism: The Shining Path and the Theory of People’s War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992. ———. Sharp Dressed Men: Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993. Tucker, Robert C. The Marxian Revolutionary Idea. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969.

COUPS needed by a small group of plotters is the existence of a state bureaucratic apparatus. When that bureaucracy is filled with people who are linked to the political leaders through ethnic or other loyalties, as in countries such as imperial China and contemporary Saudi Arabia, clandestine infiltration and sudden action are exceedingly difficult. But in the political development of most countries, fewer state employees are connected with the leaders, the state bureaucracy becomes the foundation of governmental control and societal interaction, and the military and police forces become more hierarchal and professional. Under such conditions, it is far easier to have a sudden seizure of the state and removal of the government officials who run it. Coups themselves encourage further coups, since each one sets a legal and political precedent that weakens civilian rule and makes its overthrow even more legitimate and practical. Constitutional executives under the threat of a coup feel pressed to maintain popular support through patronage and rash short-term policies, which end up undermining both the government and popular support for democracy. When combined with ethnic, political, or other societal divisions, such patterns lead to what political scientist Samuel Huntington calls “praetorian politics,” in which every sector becomes more mobilized, less willing to compromise with other groups, and more likely to clamor for the “ultimate” resolution to domestic ruptures: a coup. In the process, the framework of democracy— accountable state agencies, meaningful elections, and a rule of law—becomes even more debilitated. Legitimization also comes through official or de facto recognition by other countries. The Wilson-Tobar Doctrine prohibits international recognition of a regime that seizes power by force, at least until it has demonstrated public support. This and related international standards, however, are not legally binding and in any case are obviated by the fact that states give de facto recognition to new governments by simply not making any declarations. Although modern political developments have made coups common, the causes of each coup are rooted primarily in the particular conditions of the

The most common form of change in government since World War II has been the coup d’état. A coup is a quick, violent, and illegal overthrow of a government by a faction of the armed forces or other powerful sector in society. There are many specific kinds of coups. One type, a putsch, occurs during or immediately following a war, in which a segment of the military forms an alternative leadership as a first step toward creating a new government. Other unconstitutional changes are not considered coups, such as a “palace revolution” in which government insiders manipulate or replace the leader. The practice goes as far back as government itself, ever since Absalom conspired with leaders of ancient Israel’s tribes to try to depose his father, King David. Such overthrows began to be called “coups d’état” in the late seventeenth century, as the rise of the modern state and its professional militaries—along with the nationalist tumult set in motion by the French Revolution—made them both feasible and common. Latin America’s first century of independence, for example, was characterized by frequent coups, often in the form of the pronunciamiento, in which the military used its constitutional position as the defender of the national interest to conduct a ritualized process of consultations prior to bringing down a weak government. The proliferation of new nations and ideologies in the twentieth century— combined with the superpower rivalry of the Cold War—led to an exponential increase in coups around the world after 1945. Nearly every Latin American country, and a majority of African and Asian countries, suffered successful and unsuccessful overthrows in this era. There were an estimated 380 successful coups and coup attempts between 1945 and 1967. There were at least 50 successful and 150 unsuccessful coups in Africa alone between 1955 and 1985.

Causes Although coups are usually facilitated by external support and internal upheaval, the need for secret planning precludes inclusion in the planning by large sectors of the armed forces or population. All that is 29

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country in which it takes place. A country’s own political, economic, and social conditions often lead to demands for a change in government, and the existence of a state structure, combined with meddling from other countries, makes a coup the easiest and quickest way to fulfill such demands. An understanding of coups in the post–World War II era, therefore, requires a look not just at American and Soviet actions, but at their underlying national and regional causes and at the motives of those carrying them out. Most generally, coups are caused by the inability of political parties and governments to enact effective policy and to keep societal divisions in check. Most coups, in fact, occur in the wake of an economic downturn or a bout of political conflict, as manifest social discontent and waves of mobilization compel the military and its allies to intervene. Many coup leaders cite economic mismanagement and fault the deposed government’s inability to control spending, maintain citizens’ standard of living, or avoid painful austerity measures. An economic decline not only undermines the government’s legitimacy, but undercuts support from key sectors such as the middle class. Such scenarios are often rooted in “relative deprivation,” which is the difference between the population’s expectations of entitlements and its capabilities to attain them. When those capabilities decrease or the expectations increase without a corresponding change in the other, the result is often mass protest in the forms of strikes, looting, and rebellion. When the military also suffers from relative deprivation, the likelihood of a coup increases dramatically. The frequency and causes of coups are also determined by regional characteristics. Latin America has the longest tradition of coups, rooted in a history of civil strife, political instability, the military’s institutional and legal power, and, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the battle against socialism and Communism. In East Asia, agitation by Communist and nationalist forces during the Cold War was one of the main causes of that region’s coups. In the Middle East, independence and Cold War geopolitics brought out the deep-seated tensions between traditional and modernizing sectors, which coups tried to reconcile, often in the name of Islam and panArabism. Even greater levels of economic underdevelopment and institutional weakness in sub-Saharan Africa combined with ethnic rivalry and the chaos of decolonization to give that region the greatest frequency of coups in the post–World War II period.

Motives and Justifications Underlying and often contradicting the causes of a coup, however, are its motives and justifications. Motives are the coup-makers’ specific judgments, assessments, and personal and collective ambitions. While causes set the stage for a coup, motives make it happen. Ethnic and class differences cause coups, for example, but only when the military and its allies deem them serious enough. Amid Africa’s prevalent ethnic strife, some successfully integrated militaries have launched coups in an attempt to control violence in society. Other armed forces mirror their societies’ ethnic division, spurring coups when one group seizes power in its rivalry with the others. Only about one-third of Africa’s armies have a stable ethnic balance, in fact, and threats to a particular ethnic group were at least one of the causes in most of the continent’s coups. Class interests are another motive of coup-makers. Most military officers come from the middle classes—mainly from the middle and uppermiddle classes in Asia and Latin America and mainly from the lower-middle classes in Africa and Asia— and so often represent and speak for the interests of those classes. Justifications, which are usually but not necessarily in line with the motives, are public stances designed to maximize political support for the coup leaders. Divulged in the new government’s first public statements, justifications usually focus on the actions of the previous government, such as overcentralizing power, suppressing political opposition, indulging in nepotism, curtailing constitutional rights, fomenting ethnic rivalry, mismanaging the economy, or inviting condemnation by the international community. Most new leaders point to the specific shortfalls of their predecessors, who they claim are incompetent, too greedy, or too absorbed in personal rivalries to run a government that promotes the nation’s interests. In all too many cases, the difference between justifications and motives becomes clear as the new regime repeats practices it had criticized. Another common set of justifications is the military’s self-proclaimed responsibility to act on behalf of the “national interest” in times of internal disorder, threats to national institutions, or foreign intervention. Such justifications usually mask motives of resentment against the government’s interference in military affairs, its unwillingness to cooperate with the military, or its tarnishing of the military’s honor.

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It is often the process of asserting that control, rather than the control itself, that breeds coup plots. A government asserting little control is unlikely to be offensive to the military, and most governments that already have control are capable of preventing coups altogether. A government makes itself vulnerable by trying to alter recruitment and dismissal policies, change training and education, or place its own officials in the military’s top ranks. Another provocative move by the government is to establish security forces separate from the military, such as presidential or party militias. Prior to his 1971 coup in Uganda, for example, Major General Idi Amin criticized President Milton Obote for establishing an elite security force. Even military “professionalism” does not inoculate governments against coups. While some argue that the professional military’s national loyalty, social responsibility, and attention to procedure make them less disposed to coups, others counter that such assumptions all hinge on the military’s “principle of civil supremacy” and point to the many “professional” armies that have launched coups. Even though it is carried out by a small group, a coup does not necessarily imply any political orientation. While most coups since 1945 have been headed by conservative elements against leftist or moderate governments, many other coup-makers have been leftist or progressive aiming to remove oligarchies that block needed reform and they often align themselves with workers and peasants. Coup-makers’ ideology, in fact, is often formed in opposition to that of the existing government. According to Huntington, “In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass-society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.” In Venezuela, for example, the military intervened on behalf of the progressive Acción Democrática Party in 1945 and 1958, but against it in 1948. While coup leaders often portray their action as a temporary measure to restore order, democracy, or the “legitimate” government, they often have a longterm agenda that is revealed gradually and “requires” them to stay in power in order to carry it out. The 1968 coup in Peru, for example, enacted a radically new and extensive economic program, including renationalization of key industries. Such long-term maintenance of power is supported through violent repression or legitimizing means such as new constitutions or elections or, in most cases, a combination

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of the two. Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973–1989) and Sani Abacha in Nigeria (1993–1998) were two presidents who used such a combination. Sometimes junior officers are the ones who carry out a coup, overriding superiors who are regarded as part of the existing government. While most older officers gained their positions through traditional routes and were perhaps trained by the colonial power, junior officers often are educated with a very different set of principles and suffer from inadequate or irregularly paid salaries. Without some involvement by top military leaders, though, such attempts usually fall short—intentionally or unintentionally— of a complete takeover. Junior officers arrested their superiors in Ethiopia but did not attempt to bring down the government in 1964, for example, while in Venezuela junior officials were responsible for two failed coup attempts in 1992. On the other hand, a coup based solely on the personal ambitions or grievances of a top military officer is rare. Even in extreme examples of personal ambition, such as Jean Bedel Bokassa’s takeover of the Central African Republic on December 31, 1965, the coup leader must be able to exploit some flaw in the government and to convince other officers to help depose it.

Coups and the Cold War Since 1945, all of these causes and motives played themselves out in a world where the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union pervaded nearly every country and had at least some connection to nearly every coup. Rarely did the superpowers intervene directly; instead, they armed and encouraged military factions or revolutionary groups, bringing a country’s own political polarizations to the boiling point and providing a justification for the government’s overthrow. Coups were also set off by regional “contagions,” in which military factions acted out of fear of being pulled into neighbors’ moves into the Communist or Western camp. For the Soviet Union, coups were often the best way to install Communist or otherwise friendly regimes. With the Red Army occupying Eastern and Central Europe at the end of World War II, coups were unnecessary in countries, such as Poland and Hungary, or in countries with strong indigenous Communist movements, such as Yugoslavia and Albania. But in Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that the Communists won a larger share of the vote than any

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other party in the postwar elections, the 1948 coup was needed to give them complete power. Because the Soviet Union had weak ideological links to the third world and little to offer it in terms of long-term economic development, coups were also the usual way that pro-Soviet governments came into power in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Prior to the 1960s, the Soviets optimistically predicted that decolonization and rejection of the West would alone bring about pro-Soviet coups around the world. By the time of the fall of Premier Nikita Khrushchev, however, this optimism had been deflated by reality. There had been thirteen pro-Soviet coups, but many of them were unstable or more closely connected with religious or other ideologies than with Soviet Communism. (Such coups include those in Egypt in 1952; Iraq in 1958 and 1968; Syria in 1966; Peru and Republic of Congo-Brazzaville in 1968; Somalia, Sudan, and Libya in 1969; Benin in 1972; Ethiopia in 1974 and 1977; South Yemen and Afghanistan in 1978; Grenada in 1979; and Suriname in 1980.) Many of them were short-lived and soon fell to pro-Western forces. While they still continued to encourage coups among military factions, the Soviets broadened their strategy by also promoting “vanguard” parties that would bolster Marxist governments’ defenses against military plots. This approach had several notable successes, in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and South Yemen. With generous military assistance and the provision of Cuban, East German, or Soviet advisers to “protect” these governments, chances of a countercoup were minimized. In many countries the presence of Cubans was less offensive and imperialistic than that of Russians. Cuban advisers helped put down coup attempts against pro-Soviet presidents MassambaDebat of Congo-Brazzaville in 1966 and Agostinho Neto of Angola in 1977. (In some cases, however, Cuban and Soviet interests diverged, as in Grenada in 1983, when a radical Marxist pro-USSR faction overthrew President Maurice Bishop, a close ally of Cuba. In other cases, East German advisers helped prevent coups, such as the 1980 attempt against pro-Soviet Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.) The United States was more successful in encouraging, engineering, or suppressing coups. (Coups in Africa that replaced pro-Soviet governments with pro-American ones include those in Algeria in 1965, Ghana in 1966, Mali in 1968, Sudan in 1971, and

Equatorial Guinea in 1979.) While it never formulated an explicit policy on coups, U.S. action could be divided into two approaches. In the first, the United States directly fomented and organized coups by military factions or armed opposition groups in countries of vital geopolitical importance. In 1953, the United States and Great Britain feared a turn toward Communism in Iran under that country’s popular nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. It then carried out an elaborate plan in which the hereditary shah of Iran replaced Mossadegh during demonstrations whipped up in the capital of Teheran. A year later, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency used similar tactics to oust reformist President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala, orchestrating a fake invasion that forced the army and the population to lose faith in Arbenz and force him out. In 1963, as Vietnam became a central concern of U.S. foreign policy, the Kennedy administration worked with disgruntled military factions to overthrow the increasingly corrupt and repressive South Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. As its operations came under more criticism and became a liability for its allies, the United States tried to avoid direct participation in coups, relying instead on economic aid and covert action. This new approach had mixed success. It supported successful coups against João Goulart in Brazil in 1964 and against Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970 and helped stave off coups against friendly regimes in Egypt and the Dominican Republic. But it failed in Iran in 1979 and in Libya during the 1980s, resulting in anti-American revolutions and coups. The United States and the Soviet Union, though, were not the only powers using coups as an instrument of foreign policy. Eager to maintain influence in their former colonies and to ensure supplies of raw materials, Great Britain and France used military assistance and economic aid to encourage or suppress coups throughout Africa and Asia. If circumstances called for it, they did not flinch from direct intervention. The British were becoming annoyed with Ugandan President Milton Obote, for example, and inexplicably delayed his flight back from a 1971 Commonwealth meeting while Idi Amin was seizing power in Uganda; then Britain quickly recognized the Amin government. Unlike other powers, France has been unapologetic about using its military to help out its friends. It has been on the scene during unstable times in Benin, Burundi, Zaire, Togo, Chad, and

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Congo-Brazzaville. Though France’s exact role is often unclear, on some occasions French troops prevented coups, such as the February 1964 effort to save Gabon President Léon M’Ba. Most coups from the end of World War II to the late 1980s, in sum, were the result both of internal conflicts and weaknesses and of external Cold War politics. Three case studies, each from a different region, demonstrate how a particular set of causes and motives combined with international politics to lead to coups.

Argentina, 1976 An ever-growing Communist menace aggravated Latin America’s predilection toward coups, especially after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. While countries such as Mexico and Colombia escaped this pattern, a rash of coups that hit Central and South America brought in regimes far more durable than those in the past. Chile had been South America’s most demo-

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cratic country, for example, until the 1973 coup supported by the United States brought on seventeen repressive years of military rule. But the most brutal military regime in the region was the one that seized power in Argentina in 1976. Carried out against a weak civilian government unable to suppress leftist guerrillas, the coup seemed at first to be caused by Cold War politics, but it was rooted in a national history of civil strife and authoritarianism that extended back to the colonial era. After declaring independence in 1816, Argentina plunged into sixty years of civil war between the Unitarians of the powerful Buenos Aires province and the Federalists from outlying provinces. The violence was brought under control only by the increasing power of the military and the executive. A series of coups beginning in 1828 eventually led to the rule of Juan Manuel de Rosas, who used a populist appeal to create a highly centralized, paternalistic, and repressive state that maintained continuing dominance over the economy by an agricultural and industrial oligarchy.

Argentinian soldiers stand guard at Government House in Buenos Aires after the March 1976 coup that overthrew President Isabel Perón. (Keystone/Getty Images)

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Political strife reemerged at the turn of the twentieth century amid growing immigration and trade union activism. In 1912, a progressive government introduced democratic and electoral reforms, which were continued through the 1920s under President Hipólito Yrigoyen of the Radical Party. Yrigoyen’s democratic policies and his own concentration of power rankled conservatives, who supported his overthrow by the military in 1930. The Supreme Court ruled the new regime legal and put in place a vehicle that would justify military coups over the course of the next fifty years. The military regime repealed the democratic reforms, carried out widespread arrests, dismissed judges, and annulled local elections. Amid worsening economic problems, a military faction called the Group of United Officers (GOU) overthrew it in 1943. Disunity in that junta led to the rise of General Juan Perón, who quickly came to dominate a divided society that could not accept its own diversity. As president, Perón purged the judiciary, created a monopolistic government-backed union, and enacted a constitution that gave him authority to impose a “state of internal war.” The military faction that overthrew Perón in 1955 promised a timely return to “the rule of law” and “an authentic democracy.” With the Peronists banned, fresh elections brought in two weak Radical presidencies, but the party’s stint in power was abruptly ended in June 1966 by the “Argentine Revolution,” a military junta that made no pretense of being “provisional.” It promptly dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court, prohibited political activity, awarded itself full executive and legislative authority, governed by decree, and demoted the constitution to third place behind the “Revolutionary Objectives” and the “Statute of the Argentine Revolution.” Growing internal violence by armed groups such as the left-wing pro-Peronist Montoneros guerrillas led to even harsher measures, such as the creation of special courts for insurrectionists. The exiled Perón returned to power in 1973, but his government was riven both by factionalism and unrealistic popular expectations. Upon his death in 1974, Perón was succeeded by his widow and vice president, Isabel. Her incompetent government was no match for the increasing leftist violence, and two years later it was overthrown by a military junta that ruled the country for the next seven years. As before, the Supreme Court recognized the new regime by citing the need to end internal instability, which the

regime did by dismantling the constitution, subjecting civilians to military tribunals, and “disappearing” nearly 30,000 people suspected of sympathizing with leftist parties. So while the battle with Communism was the declared motive and justification for the 1976 coup, its main causes were historical patterns of military rule, internal violence, and political division.

Ghana, 1966 While Latin America already had a long history of coups by 1945, the many newly independent nations of Africa hoped to have a different start. Most hope was pinned on countries with buoyant economies and highly developed political structures, such as Ghana. But the 1966 coup that overthrew Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah revealed that Cold War Africa was not immune to coups. When Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African colony to gain independence in 1957, Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) had already become the dominant political force during the 1951–1957 period of internal self-government. Although many traditional leaders did not accept the CPP and although distrust continued among the country’s main ethnic groups, Nkrumah’s charisma and anticolonial populism succeeded in uniting the country. The CPP distributed patronage widely, and the Ghanaian military was thoroughly steeped in the British apolitical tradition. The immense expectations accompanying independence, however, generated increasing political pressure and opposition from all sides, including regional movements, the Muslim minority, and farmers who complained that their cocoa crop was subsidizing the poorer southern regions. National institutions were too fragile to accommodate these divisions, and political organizations began resorting to violence and electoral fraud. Nkrumah began restricting regional governments, deporting political leaders, enacting preventive detention laws, and stepping up anti-Western rhetoric. As the regime became more personalistic and corrupt, it lost touch with the people and its own grassroots base. The 1960 parliamentary elections were suspended, and a 1964 referendum officially made the country a one-party state. On the economic front, the president began instituting a policy of “socialism from above,” with measures such as agricultural collectivization. Although these policies

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Workers in the streets of Accra, Ghana, cheer the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah—the populist liberator turned “great devil”—in a February 1966 military coup. (AFP/Getty Images)

increased state controls and strengthened the CPP, they soon collapsed into runaway unemployment and inflation. Along with a fall in cocoa prices, this failure obliged the government to turn to loans and aid from the Communist bloc. Nkrumah’s pan-African interventions in countries such as Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) further harmed the Ghanian economy and raised the ire of the 14,000-man military. The armed forces had a strong personal affinity with the British, which had educated, trained, and equipped them, and so reacted strongly when Nkrumah began purchasing arms from the Soviet Union and sending recruits there for training. Antagonism deepened when the president formed a Russian-trained presi-

dential guard, cut the military’s budget, neglected to implement military plans, and increased his interference in activities ranging from officer selection to troop exercises. Confident that it would have Western support, a group of military officers overthrew the Nkrumah regime on February 24, 1966, during a presidential trip to Beijing and Hanoi.

Iraq, 1963 Coups in the Middle East were rooted less in institutional or economic weakness than in tension between supporters of tradition and advocates of modernization. As one of the most economically and politically developed Arab states with a pivotal role in the superpower

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rivalry in the region, Iraq illustrated how this tension interacted with Cold War politics. As a British mandate after World War I, the country adopted Western democratic institutions such as a parliament, judiciary, and civil service. This transplant was eased through the leadership of King Faisal I, who was trusted by both the modernizing elite and traditional sectors. After becoming independent in 1932, however, Iraq’s system of government fell apart. Faisal died unexpectedly in 1933, generating a period of upheaval in which the army constantly replaced unpopular governments or took power itself. This praetorian pattern was halted only with the revolution of 1958. A new generation of intellectuals and professionals, disparaged by the elite, had begun to grow in importance and numbers. They allied with a growing number of military officers who were also becoming convinced that progress required a radical change in leadership and policy. These “Free Officers” created a Central Organization in the mid-1950s and were bound with the intellectuals by nationalism and Ba’athism, a pan-Arabist movement begun in Syria in 1940. On July 14, 1958, Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, leader of the Free Officers, successfully overthrew the government and killed the royal family. Qasim, however, continued old practices of centralization and repression. He aligned the country with the Soviet Union. His military forays included staking old claims to neighboring Kuwait and beginning an internal war with the Kurds, embarrassing his Soviet allies. Meanwhile, the Free Officers split into proCommunist and pro-Ba’athist factions, adding to the growing assertiveness by both the Communist and Ba’athist parties. On February 8, 1963, an army faction supported by the Ba’athists overthrew Qasim,

once again trying to stop the cycle of praetorianism with an appeal to Islam and Arab nationalism. Mark Ungar

Bibliography Andrews, William George. The Politics of the Coup d’Etat: Five Case Studies. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. Ciria, Alberto. Parties and Power in Modern Argentina (1940– 1946). Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964. David, Steven R. Third World Coups d’Etat and International Security. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. Farcau, Bruce W. The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. Finer, S.E. The Man on Horseback. London: Pall Mall Press, 1962. Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968. Kraus, John. “Ghana, 1966.” In The Politics of the Coup d’Etat, ed. William G. Andrews and Uri Ra’anan. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969. Luttwak, Edward. Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook. New York: Knopf, 1969. Malaparte, Curzio. Coup d’Etat: The Technique of Revolution. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1932. Nordlinger, Eric. Soldiers in Politics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977. O’Kane, Rosemary H.T. The Likelihood of Coups. Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1987. Tullock, Gordon. The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg, VA: University Publications, 1974. Wheatcroft, Andrew. The World Atlas of Revolution. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. Woddis, Jack. Armies and Politics. New York: International, 1978.

INVASIONS AND BORDER DISPUTES reflect especially arcane bits of history. For example, most people know that the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 between Iraq, Kuwait, and the United States and its allies began with an invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990. Almost everyone knows that control of oil supplies was more important than details of the border. Very few people in the Western world, however, know the seminal role played seventy-three years earlier by Sir Percy Cox. Cox was a British diplomat based in Baghdad who drew the line between what would become Iraq and Kuwait, as part of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between Britain and France. He deliberately separated one tiny village, which became Kuwait City, and a large area of oil-rich desert from what would become modern Iraq. This was more than merely an expression of the principle of divide and rule as applied by the British in controlling oil supplies in the region. The British were also concerned about Turkey, which was then an ally of Germany and Austria in their war against Britain, France, and other Allied Powers. Cox was also trying to balance British and French “spheres of influence” among the dozens of tribes and clans in the region. The Iraq-Kuwait border, drawn for reasons long forgotten and past, served as the flashpoint for the first Gulf War in 1991. Several wars in Africa late in the twentieth century reflect similar echoes of colonial mapmakers who carved up African lands according to European concerns and were relatively indifferent to local ethnic geography. For example, Sudan suffered about 1 million dead in a long-running civil war between fundamentalist Islamic Arabs in the North, who controlled the central government, and animist or Christian Nubians and other black Africans in the South. The central political issue was the Arabs’ move to impose strict Sharia (Islamic law) on the whole nation. This would not have been an issue if colonial mapmakers had not created a cultural artifact called “Sudan,” which puts very different peoples into the same formal nation-state. The general causes of war include: competition for resources and power, population pressure, corruption of governance, authoritarian politics and militant

The twentieth century saw more change in warfare than did the previous 3,000 years. One obvious change was the development of weapons of mass destruction. Early in the century, most casualties in a war were military personnel, but by the end of the period, most casualties were civilians. Less obvious has been the transition from interstate wars to intrastate wars, from conflicts between countries to conflicts within countries. In recent years, almost all wars have been civil wars between factions within a nation-state. The latter change highlights an often-overlooked dimension of war, its legal status. Initially, invasions are almost always illegal unless preceded by a formal declaration of war (a rarity after World War II). That legal status can change overnight when treaties are signed, or almost imperceptibly as the world becomes accustomed to what once was a tragic crime. For example, the invasion of Tibet by the forces of Communist China in October 1950 was widely condemned. But decades of patient diplomacy have done little to change this “fact on the ground,” and on the maps published around the world. Tibetan partisans point out grotesque conditions that continue, resulting in very high death rates for ethnic Tibetans who are being slowly replaced by Han Chinese. Most of the capitals of the world observe discreetly, however, because their calculations favor the government in Beijing. Technical students of war sometimes refer to border disputes as “irredentist” disputes. More narrowly, irredenta refer to territories historically or ethnically related to one political unit, but presently subject to another. There are many. A global history of wars and of mass migrations of refugees fleeing war or persecution has left many irredenta that can serve as flashpoints for future war. Other than its use here, the term “irredentist” will be replaced with the word “border.”

Border Disputes Versus General Roots of War The causes of “invasions and border disputes” are not significantly different from the causes of wars in general, except for the fact that disputes over borders can 37

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religions, inequalities of wealth within and between nations, the hubris and demagoguery of scapegoating politicians, and the desire of people to find an enemy to blame all for their problems. The lack of effective “international conflict resolution systems” is another important root of organized, armed conflict in the modern world. By contrast, the United States has managed to control most local violence. Who could imagine, for example, Minnesota going to war with North Dakota over rights to the Red River water? Killing a neighbor because of a disagreement regarding city boundaries is considered murder all around the world. But Iraq’s Saddam Hussein started an eightyear war that killed about a million people in September 1980, when he asserted a historic claim to the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which divides Iraq from Iran. No higher authority existed to restrain him, and the international community did not have the intelligence or the will to stop him. Another great complication for those who study why wars start is called “transmutability of cause,” which means that causes can shift and blend so that no one can say for sure which cause for a particular war was the “most important.” For example, one could say that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s later invasion of Kuwait was motivated by historic border disputes (as he did) and recent insults like Kuwait poaching oil from across the border by slant drilling (which it was). Or one could say that history played little part and that the war was a simple struggle over oil or money. The point is that no one can find a truly “objective” way to determine which of these, or twenty other putative causes of that war, was the most important. Invasions are easier to discern precisely because of borders: One group using the force of arms crosses a common border and moves into someone else’s territory. But even then, the question of who was the aggressor can be difficult to answer because provocations often precede the invasion—for example, intelligence organizations may stage bogus events to precipitate a crisis. The dark art of psychological operations, in which propaganda is used to play with the minds of the enemy, and covert action were much enhanced by the Cold War between the superpowers, which led to interventions nearly everywhere on earth.

The Cold War and Its Aftermath The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union thoroughly dominated the period from

1947 to 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated into fifteen independent states. Many wars in third world locales resulted from the very conscious decision of the superpowers to do everything possible to avoid nuclear warfare. The reasoning was that regular combat forces of the United States and the Soviet Union should never fight each other publicly, lest their own populations insist on full-scale nuclear war. Instead, the fierce contest between capitalism and Communism was fought by proxy wars around the world as the United States and the Soviet Union took opposite sides in scores of local disputes. About sixty countries around the world attracted major covert operations during the Cold War, many with largescale lethal consequences. Everywhere the CIA was, the KGB (Soviet intelligence) was there also. Some of these wars would have occurred in any event, because many arguments had local roots. Other proxy wars would never have occurred without the “assistance” of the superpowers, which were eager to play out their competition on foreign soils without engaging their own combat units. But almost all of the proxy wars and many civil wars that attracted support by the superpowers went on longer and were far more lethal than otherwise would have been possible because of the relatively unlimited supplies of small arms and financial support available to those who would be clients of the superpowers. As the Cold War came to an end, Soviet/Russian aid for previous clients declined rapidly in their many proxy wars with U.S. interests. The reduction of aid and the end of superpower hostility led to eventual resolution of several civil wars. Examples include El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and, ultimately, Angola. In Angola, peace was achieved with UN help, between the central government in Luanda (formerly sponsored by the Soviets) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the main insurgent group backed by the United States. Soon afterward, however, UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi began the war again when he lost the UN-sponsored election. That war continued until his death in 2002. One thing that the Cold War almost always accomplished was a massive transfusion of weapons and political money into combat zones around the world. For example, Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia in northeast Africa played off the United States and the Soviet Union, alternately accepting support from each. When he left the scene in 1991, the money was gone, and vast stocks of light arms were available for

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the many militias that arose to continue fighting over the borders. An abortive peacekeeping effort by the United Nations in 1992–1994 managed to save many people from starvation but utterly failed to stop the fighting and was ultimately driven out of the capital city, Mogadishu. For years afterward, no recognizable central government existed in Somalia. These connections do not mean that border wars stopped with the end of the Cold War. In fact, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, several small wars began at the edges of its own empire. In Moldova, between 830 and 930 persons died in a brief but fierce dispute in 1991 and 1992. In the Ingush Republic, about 350 died when Slavic North Ossetians battled Muslim Ingush over who would rule. In Georgia, latent ethnic tensions between dominant Georgians and minority Abkhazians in one area and South Ossetians in another led to a three-front civil war from 1989 to 1994. In Tajikistan, at least 20,000 people died during another civil war over succession to power. And in Azerbaijan, ethnic Armenians in a disputed enclave called Nagorno-Karabakh joined forces with Armenians from the homeland (formerly another Soviet republic, now an independent state) to battle the Azeris over this territory. Approximately 20,000 people died there from 1991 to 1994. The greatest casualties, however, occurred in Chechnya, where an invasion by Russian troops on December 11, 1994, led to a minimum of 40,000 dead, including several thousand Russian troops. Chechnya, unlike the other war sites, had never been recognized as one of the Soviet republics, which theoretically retained some independence. Although Chechens were fiercely independent, their land had been considered part of Russia ever since it was overrun by czarist troops in the nineteenth century. The Chechens declared independence in 1991, under the leadership of former Soviet air force general Dzhokhar Dudayev. In the war that followed, the two sides described it in completely different terms. To the Russians it was a civil war within territorial Russia. To the Chechens, the Russians had invaded independent Chechnya. As a practical matter, the Russian side of the argument carried the day because other national governments had refused to recognize Chechnya as an independent state.

Why Latin America Is Different Although there are many theories on this, the most likely is that Latin America has been so thoroughly

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dominated by the United States, its patron to the north, that many disputes have been suppressed, or at least settled short of large-scale, lethal conflict. So the armies of this region have turned to persecuting their own peoples, in the name of stability and order, rather than planning invasions of their neighbors, which all know would be quickly, and if need be ruthlessly, suppressed by the United States. Certainly a long history of “gunboat diplomacy” in this area, familiar to every Latin American if not to every North American, would support that point of view. In the post–World War II period, examples of that “diplomacy” in the Caribbean and Central America include the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961) and the secret war that followed, armed intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), invasions of Granada (1983) and Panama (1989), and the long “secret” war against Nicaragua, staged from Honduras and Costa Rica (1982–1990). Other civil wars in Central America, like in El Salvador and Guatemala, involved the superpowers, but while some involved invasions and borders (especially the “contra” war in Nicaragua), they were mainly local disputes between rich and poor enflamed by the Cold War competition between superpowers using third-world battlegrounds. The dirty war in Argentina (1976–1979) and its analogs in Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, and elsewhere, while killing many thousands of people, often innocent ones, reflected the same forces and very seldom involved crossing borders. This leaves five cases with other dynamics or unambiguous border crossings by armed forces: the “secret war” between America and Cuba known to spies as Operation Mongoose during the mid-1960s (preceded by the invasion of the Bay of Pigs); the “soccer war” of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras; the semiannual border “war” between Ecuador and Peru, which killed few but grew more serious with global competition for resources; the Falklands war of 1982 between Argentina and Britain; and the invasion of Panama by U.S. forces on December 20, 1989. Operation Mongoose in Cuba is unknown to most North Americans but very well known to Cubans. It was a covert war carried out by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. In that crisis, begun when the United States revealed evidence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the superpowers came close to nuclear holocaust. The crisis was resolved when the Soviets agreed to remove the missiles. In return, President John F. Kennedy

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promised never to invade Cuba again. However, the CIA was determined to proceed with covert paramilitary operations, using expatriate Cubans based mainly in Miami and the Florida Keys. The CIA’s Miami station became its largest station in the world. Hundreds of Cuban enemies of Fidel Castro were trained in paramilitary commando tactics and armed with various weapons. Besides blowing up oil installations and attempting many times to assassinate Castro (twentyeight tries, according to Cuba), many unconventional attacks were launched, including the use of biological weapons against Cuban crops and pigs. The “soccer war” between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 was simpler, but no less bizarre. The nominal cause of this brief war was a disputed call in a soccer game. But this war began for another, more fundamental reason. That problem was illegal immigration from desperately crowded and poor El Salvador into much less crowded but no less poor Honduras. Honduras expelled about 11,000 Salvadoran “settlers” (of between 200,000 and 300,000 estimated in that country). El Salvador’s army invaded Honduras to protect the remaining settlers. Honduras responded to protect its territory. Both claimed to be protecting the honor of World Cup soccer, and about 5,000 people died. The Organization of American States intervened diplomatically; the regional powers and common sense stopped the fighting. The war between Peru and Ecuador had deep historical roots. The countries had disputed the location of a jungle border since its creation in 1821. From that time until the late twentieth century, there was nothing really to fight about since the jungle is extremely dense, waterlogged, and virtually uninhabited. Still, for many years border clashes between the respective forces have occurred over three disputed areas during the few months when travel of any kind is practical there. These skirmishes became more severe as oil companies explored the region. Oil—or other valuable substances—might one day give a real purpose to the yearly battles. Similarly, the dispute between Great Britain, which claims the Falkland Islands, and Argentina, which calls them the Islas Malvinas, had endured for almost 150 years. These barren rocks in the South Atlantic were home to about 2,000 people and 50,000 sheep. The Falkland Islands War (which the British won) is illustrative of “scapegoating,” the so-called “Simmel effect,” so named for an Austrian sociologist who first formulated it in print. Simply put, foreign

wars distract from domestic discontent. Argentine President Leopoldo Galtieri was losing domestic support prior to an election, due partly to the fact that he was being blamed for bad economic times and many dead Argentines after the dirty war from 1976 to 1979, when about 15,000, mostly young people, died at the hands of secret police. Galtieri sought support in a time-honored way, by resurrecting an ancient land claim to the Malvinas (as Argentines called the Falklands) and making it a cause of the people. The Argentine navy and army invaded the islands, whose virtually unarmed people promptly surrendered. The residents did, however, call London and beg for help. Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was facing political opposition of her own. The “Iron Lady” of Britain was already known for her strong will, and she commanded a powerful military force with genuine global experience. British nuclear submarines sank an Argentine troop ship, resulting in the largest casualties of the conflict. Britain won the war, and Thatcher was reelected, while Galtieri was not. About 1,000 people died in this political exercise. The invasion of Panama by U.S. forces in the early morning of December 20, 1989, was called Operation Just Cause. No one will ever know the true number of casualties. The official U.S. count was 516 Panamanian and 24 American deaths, while local estimates ran to at least 4,000. Almost a year after the event, American news organizations documented several mass graves, which the Pentagon had denied existed, leading to an estimate of 1,500 killed in the invasion. The nominal causes of the war were the need to remove dictator Manuel Noriega, to stop drug running through Panama, to safeguard American citizens there, and to “restore democracy.” Other than disobedience by Noriega, none of these official “just causes” was likely a real cause of this war. Far more important was the desire to reassert American control over Panamanian politics and to send an unambiguous message to Nicaragua, which was facing an election in two months that could end the long-running contra war, which was also being backed by the United States. Noriega was later convicted in U.S. courts of drug trafficking. This was the same Manuel Noriega who had been recruited from a military academy by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency at the age of seventeen. The problem was that he was becoming uncontrollable, building an independent base of support among the poor and the defense forces in Panama, and had refused to allow Panama to

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become a staging area for the U.S.-backed contras. (Nicaragua’s more compliant neighbors, Honduras and Costa Rica, had agreed.) So Noriega was removed, by force of arms. His Panamanian defense forces were decimated, and his base of support among the poor was warned by the complete destruction of a neighborhood called Chorrillo. All that said, Latin America experienced fewer wars than any other major third world region thanks in part to the watchful eye of its powerful northern neighbor. The danger remains, however, that the dominance of the United States may one day incite a reaction in the region that even its great power cannot control.

Colonial Maps and African Conflicts In the twentieth century, Africa, by contrast, had more wars than any other continent and more bloodshed by most counts. Most of these conflicts have not been invasions from without or disputes over recognized borders, but civil wars among factions within the nation-states. The great majority resulted from the great decolonization of Africa following World War II. Many of those retreats by Western powers were preceded by wars of national liberation. The list of wars includes: Algeria (4 wars), Angola (2), Burundi (2), Cameroon, Chad (2), Congo (then Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, 4 wars), Ethiopia (2), Ghana (2), Guinea-Bissau, Kenya (2), Liberia (2), Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique (2), Namibia, Nigeria (4), Rwanda (3), Sierra Leone (1), Somalia (1), South Africa (2), Sudan (2), Tunisia, Uganda (4), Western Sahara (1), Zambia (1), and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia, 3). At least 15 million people have died in these wars or by related famine, as in Sudan, where denial of food was used as a weapon against the south. The most obvious problem in Africa is the history of colonization and all that it has represented. An equally important problem later was the tendency of some African leaders to blame all problems on their former colonial masters. Other causes for the high level of conflict included widespread inexperience in large-scale government and poverty. The old problem of maps—in which the correlation between political boundaries and the distribution of ethnic groups is very poor—remains a big problem. Many of the borders were drawn up by colonial Europeans

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without much interest in ethnic variations, yet in a region as ethnically diverse as Africa, they would likely not have succeeded in drawing perfectly logical boundaries. For example, Nigeria alone has about 400 linguistic groups, including three very large tribes dominant in their respective areas, and a dozen other major tribes. To further complicate matters, there are deep disputes among Muslims, Christians, and animist, or nature-based, religious groups. So, colonial history and mixed ethnicity are pervasive in Africa, as well as poverty and meddling by the superpowers. What else applies to Africa? 1. A long history of armed nomadic groups, relatively indifferent to geopolitical boundaries. 2. A short history of governance by Western methods, which led both to hatred of elites and also to inflated expectations when elections finally came, soon to be dashed by corrupt practices that are inevitable even in advanced Western democracies. 3. Crushing debts to international institutions, some of which sincerely tried to help during the postcolonial period, but did not do so effectively, others of which clearly set out to create banker-managed capitalism via debt. 4. Very high birth rates, which, aside from the obvious contribution to competition for resources, also result in skewed age distributions where half the population is under the age of twenty, sometimes under fifteen years old. In many African states, huge numbers of teenage males in desperate poverty with low confidence and even lower prospects for employment watch very wealthy elites gain government appointments and company jobs for their clans while excluding others. Add plenty of arms left over from the Cold War, and you have a very explosive mix. Add an AIDS epidemic that has infected huge fractions of young adults, and you have the kind of despair that leads to conflicts of every sort. A single example will illustrate this. Rwanda had the bloodiest war on earth in 1994, when between 500,000 and 1,000,000 mostly ethnic Tutsi were slaughtered with small arms and machetes by the majority Hutu in a period of about three months. Rwanda also had a long colonial history in which the Belgians manipulated the region’s ethnic differences, the French manipulated economic and military interests, and complex internal politics made moderate Hutu in the political elite the primary target for the

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Hutu special forces when the killing began. Ironically, a Tutsi-led army based in Uganda (the Rwandan Patriotic Front) ultimately won this war and drove the hard-line Hutu out. Rwanda also had the highest birth rate in Africa when the killing began, yielding a growth rate of 3.8 percent per year. At that rate, the population would double in just over eighteen years, with half the population under the age of fifteen. Under these circumstances, even an extremely fertile country like Rwanda will become deforested, and crowded, and any ethnic conflicts that existed before will be further enflamed as places to hide, or even places to make a living, become scarce. The history of African conflicts after World War II is not complete without mention of its most notable successes. In 1980 very few observers would have predicted that South Africans would successfully end their brutal civil war among nine tribal and linguistic groups (two white, seven black) to forge a multiethnic nation with a relatively wealthy and stable economy. Also, Tanzania has avoided most of these problems and certainly war, due largely to enlightened leadership and industrious peoples.

Asian Agonies Any discussion of Asia and war properly begins with China, the imperial power of its region since World War II. As soon as that war concluded, China was convulsed by its own civil war, between the Communist forces of Mao Zedong and the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. By 1949, Mao and his Communist troops had gained control of the country, and the defeated Nationalists had fled to the island of Taiwan. In the next forty years, China was involved in invasions or border disputes with at least five countries: Tibet (1950–1951); Korea (1950–1953); India (1962); the Soviet Union (1969); and Vietnam (1979 and 1987). There is no doubt that the invasion of Tibet was a disaster for that thinly populated country with a history of prior wars with and domination by China. After the invasion, the land of Buddhist temples and its people was slowly absorbed into China. Tibet’s remoteness from Western capitals made the invasion an “internal affair,” as the Chinese claimed, but protests continue around the world. Korea, unlike Tibet, was much closer to Western interests. After World War II it was partitioned, with the north dominated by Soviets and the south dominated by Americans. Just who crossed the border first

in 1950 is a matter of dispute, but there is no doubt the north soon invaded the south with a huge Sovietsupplied army. President Harry Truman gained United Nations support to defend South Korea, and a long contest between capitalism and Communism began. When U.S. and South Korean troops invaded the North and neared the Chinese border, the Chinese got involved. Massive attacks by China almost pushed the Americans into the sea, but increased Western support allowed them to gain the upper hand. The war ended in a stalemate with the line between North and South Korea very near the border before the fighting began. About 3 million people died in that conflict. The vast second Indochina war between North Vietnam, which received support from China, and South Vietnam, which was heavily subsidized by the United States (1962–1973), also spread to neighboring Cambodia and Laos, where North Vietnamese regular forces and special U.S. forces fought a clandestine battle. In the war, more bombs were dropped than were used in all of World War II. The aggregate death toll was estimated to be at least 2 million Vietnamese, 58,000 to 60,000 Americans (depending on the status of 2,000 still missing), and uncounted numbers of Cambodians and Laotians caught in the crossfire. It is likely that at least 3 million people died as a direct or indirect result of this war. Even as North Vietnam took full control of the country in 1975, civil war was raging in Cambodia (1975–1998). Radical Communist Pol Pot, supported by the Chinese, took power in 1975 as leader of the Khmer Rouge, then killed or “caused to die” roughly a million of his fellow Cambodians. In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, allegedly to stop the slaughter and at least to stop the waves of refugees into destitute Vietnam, and installed a client of their own named Hun Sen. The civil war continued for many years between these two groups and another “royal” faction. That conflict ended with the death of Pol Pot in 1998, and the virtual elimination of the Khmer Rouge. In 1975, Indonesia was consolidating power under Suharto, who had deposed his predecessor (Sukarno) ten years earlier at a cost of about 650,000 lives. Indonesia is a vast nation encompassing hundreds of islands. While the world’s attention in Southeast Asia was on ending the Vietnam War, Suharto decided to remove a minor irritant by invading and annexing the free half of the island of Timor. The island had been divided for almost 500 years between Dutch and Portuguese colonists. But the age of colonies was over.

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Indonesia already controlled the western half. Suharto thought the East Timorese would surrender quickly and that no one would care. He was right that few cared, and he got permission from U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger just days before the invasion. He was wrong about resistance. By the time the Indonesian army was finished, about one-third of East Timor’s population of 600,000 were dead. The slaughter gained the world’s attention, and Indonesia was forced to withdraw from the region. East Timor voted for independence as a nation, and with the help of United Nations peacekeepers achieved independence in 2002. Many smaller ethnic groups on smaller islands in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and elsewhere in the world have been overwhelmed by central governments that considered themselves not as invaders but as peacekeepers, bringing the rule of national government to “rural areas.” Such was the fate of many minority populations in this world. Either they accepted the terms and definitions of the central government with the bigger guns, or they passed the way of indigenous peoples of many places and times, including the Iroquois long gone from North America and the Yanomami of Brazil, who are rapidly disappearing today. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they were born by partition of Britain’s south Asian colony in 1947. Most of the blood was shed over a small piece of territory that began as a “princely state” called Kashmir. In the original partition, regions with a majority of Muslims became part of Pakistan and those with a majority of Hindus part of India. As inevitably occurs with such partitions, there were some places where two faiths were mixed quite thoroughly and where the residents’ loyalty to their local ruler was stronger than to either emerging nation. Although Pakistani and Indian populations differ ethnically, religiously, and culturally, they compete for the same natural resources. Who controls fertile ground can be the difference between life and death when harvests are slim. The two countries have many causes for friction, some extending back centuries or millennia and some much more recent, including the seemingly endless border dispute over Kashmir. The rest of the world took special note of the rivalry in 1998, however, when both India and Pakistan began substantial tests of nuclear weapons. Neighboring China has had nuclear weapons and border disputes of its own (it seized some Himalayan territory from

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India in 1962), and China’s contested province of Tibet lies right on India’s border.

The Balkans World War I nominally began when a militant Serb in Sarajevo named Gavrilo Princip murdered Austrian archduke and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, on June 28, 1914. Within a few weeks, all of Europe was at war. Before the war ended, one-tenth of all young European men were dead. During World War II, the Nazis involved themselves in Balkan disputes. They supported the Croatian faction there, whose Ustashe security force helped kill Chetnik Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Communist partisans of many ethnicities led by Josip Broz Tito. About a million died in these conflicts, setting the stage for the largest war in Europe during the post–World War II period, when the newly formed state of Yugoslavia disintegrated during three wars. Field Marshal Josip Broz Tito became the dictatorial ruler of Yugoslavia, which was Communist but genuinely independent. A Croatian Catholic by birth, he married a Serbian woman, and having led the dominant partisans during the downfall of Nazi Germany, he was in a position to establish the Yugoslav

Josip Broz (Marshal Tito), the leader of the Yugoslav resistance during World War II and Communist head of state until 1980, succeeded in quelling longstanding ethnic rancor. His death and the demise of Communist rule opened a new era of fragmentation in the Balkans. (John Phillips/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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Republic and to stifle ethnic dissent during his time. The ethnic peace he had imposed began to unravel shortly after his death, with mysterious but calculated hate campaigns dominated by the Serbs and a former Communist official named Slobodan Milosevic. Tensions grew, especially between the prosperous north (the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia) and the poorer, but militarily stronger, south (Serbia and smaller republics that it dominated). Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia seceded, leaving the old Yugoslavia so reduced that it was soon renamed Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia’s autonomous region of Kosovo became the scene of further ethnic struggle as the majority population (ethnically Albanian) demanded independence from its Serbian masters. The United States intervened in this dispute and in 1999 bombed Serbian positions in Kosovo and in the rest of Serbia. Eventually Milosevic, the Serb leader, was ousted and was later tried for war crimes. In the meantime, Kosovo remained under UN supervision. One can tease out the historic roots of this conflict forever. Devotion to historic grievances and excessive nationalism were the main causes. But there are many others, including leaders more interested in power than in governing, religious differences (Yugoslavia had large populations of Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christians and Muslims), and broader world trends. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the idea of national or ethnic independence was in the air in Eastern Europe. The Balkans are a region where civilizations collide, cultures mix, and the permutations of conflict are complex. Some of the issues tie the region to large populations in other parts of the world, increasing the risk that small conflicts will escalate into large ones, as occurred at the beginning of World War I. Another area with an unparalleled history of armed conflict is the Middle East.

The Middle East Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all converge in present-day Israel. Paradoxically, faithful followers of all these religions are working hard for peace in the midst of bitter conflict, but the entire area remains one big dispute over borders. Every square centimeter is claimed by at least two parties, and there have been many invasions there since World War II. Views about responsibility for these conflicts are highly polarized. Of the six wars involving Israel,

hard-liners among both Arab and Jewish populations blame everyone on the other side. Parallel realities among polarized enemies like this can result in cycles of war without apparent end. And cycles of revenge provide many opportunities for each side to blame the “other” still again. Israel was established in 1948 by the declining colonial powers in the Middle East and the recently organized United Nations as a homeland for Jews who had survived the Holocaust in Europe in which millions had been killed. On the day the British left the newly created state, members of the Arab League invaded. When the Israeli Jews won the first rounds of the 1948–1949 war, they killed some Palestinians and expelled many more (about 700,000), who became a new refugee population. Many Palestinians stayed, however, making up about 20 percent of Israel’s population. In 1956, when Egypt attempted to nationalize its biggest resource, the Suez Canal, taking it from a British-French company, Israel joined Britain and France in seeking a military assault against the Egyptians, but the action was countermanded after widespread disapproval from other powers, including the United States. In 1967, in response to a direct threat along the length of Israel’s territory, the Israelis started what came to be known as the SixDay War by bombing Egyptian air bases at dawn (they felt that war was inevitable, and called the bombings a “pre-emptive strike”). As in many crises, this one had been preceded by a long period of mutual animosity in which each side provoked the other. The 1967 war resulted in substantial territorial losses to all Arab states involved: Israel occupied Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula; the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which had been under the rule of Jordan; and Syria’s Golan Heights. Egypt’s President Nasser began a long series of small border skirmishes along the Suez Canal, which came to be known as the War of Attrition and lasted until 1970. In 1973, still another war began on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. This time, according to the United Nations, Egypt and Syria began the hostilities. Fighting was intense for several weeks, until the threatened use of “clandestine” nuclear weapons helped American and Soviet Union diplomatic efforts to broker another UN cease-fire. This time Israel suffered the major losses, including 6,000 dead and economic costs of nearly $7 billion, equal to Israel’s annual GNP, and eventually led to the Camp David

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Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat holds up a map of the West Bank during Israel’s construction of a security barrier in 2003. Territorial disputes in the Middle East have ancient roots. (Hussein Hussein/PPO via Getty Images)

Accords involving U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, and Israel’s Menachem Begin. Meanwhile, the rest of the Middle East was also not peaceful. In 1974, Turkey’s army invaded the island of Cyprus, not far from the Israeli and Syrian coasts, in a dispute between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The invasion divided the island into separate ethnic sectors, which remain to this day. To the world, it was not very important (and nuclear weapons were not threatened). But to the Cypriots, it divided a beautiful and prosperous island into two bitter enclaves, each much poorer by far. During this time, and continuing to this day, there were also large numbers of armed actions involving ethnic Kurds seeking independence from the four countries their historic territories straddle: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. To the Kurds, this land was “Kurdistan,” but no other nation recognizes such a state. Thus the wars and skirmishes do not count as border wars, even though each of the four named countries has sent troops past national boundaries in pursuit of Kurdish rebels. Turkey, in particular, killed thousands of Kurds across its border in Iraq.

In 1982, the Israelis invaded Lebanon in a bid to rid themselves of continued attacks by Palestinian terrorists The Israelis had been provoked by many rocket attacks from Lebanese positions and commando raids across their border—hundreds of episodes over thirtysix years. Israeli armored divisions drove all the way to Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, occupying a third of the country along the way, and did indeed destroy the Palestinian governmental structures there. Of course, the Palestinian people still had no permanent land and continued to harbor bitter grudges. So despite the ten-mile buffer strip in southern Lebanon, and despite a virtually permanent UN presence feeding Palestinian refugees there, commando raids across the Israeli border and terrorist bombings continued, as did Israeli bombing raids and artillery attacks on Palestinians in Lebanon. In response to Israeli incursions, neighboring Syria occupied Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley in 1982, with a mandate from the Arab League to restore order and protect what was left from the Israelis. Once again, in 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon, partly to halt rocket attacks on its territory launched by the Shiite militia Hezbollah.

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Recall the eternal causes of wars: competition for resources and power, population pressure, authoritarian political systems and militant religions, corruption of governance, inequalities of wealth within and between nations, the lack of effective international conflict resolution systems, the hubris of political leaders and especially demagogic leaders who thrive on the hatred of others, and the folly of the people who follow them. One can find all these elements in both the Balkans and the Middle East. Michael Andregg

Bibliography Anderson, Malcolm. Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World. New York: Blackwell, 1996. Boggs, Samuel Whittemore. International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems. New York: AMS Press, 1966. Prescott, J.R.V. The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries. Chicago: Aldine, 1965. Schofield, Clive H., ed. Global Boundaries. New York: Routledge, 1994. Wilson, Thomas, and Hastings Donnan, eds. Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS borders. Thus, in the midst of an alarming number of ethnic and religious conflicts stands the hope that such communal conflicts may be limited or ended by some form of political settlement.

While interethnic competition, some with religious overtones, can be traced to biblical times, it has been a prominent characteristic of the post–World War II era. More than 300 of these struggles have occurred since the end of the war. Only with the end of the Cold War did the international community recognize how pervasive such ethnic disputes had become. Communal conflicts devastated the former Yugoslavia, threatened or even overwhelmed the stability of most of the former republics of the Soviet Union, brought about state collapse in a variety of African countries, exacerbated historic disputes in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and even threatened violence in some Western industrialized countries. Together, such conflicts have serious implications for international peace and security. The domestic instabilities and collapses have spawned a sharp rise in refugees and the internally displaced and have triggered some fifty episodes of genocide or mass murder directed at more than seventy ethnic and religious minorities, resulting in between 12 million and 25 million civilian fatalities. Such developments are accompanied by a proliferation of both conventional and nuclear arms. This consequence was dramatically underscored in May 1998 when India and Pakistan expressed their rivalry by competitive tests of nuclear weapons. Perhaps a natural outcome of these unsettling facts is the alarmist interpretation that some analysts have advanced, such as post–Cold War “global chaos,” unrestrained “international disorder,” and global “pandemonium.” Professor Samuel Huntington even promoted a thesis of “cleavage among civilizations,” asserting that a “cultural” curtain has replaced the “iron” curtain that previously divided the world, and that religion (a crucial component of culture) provides new fuel for conflict as it inspires intolerance and irreconcilable images of “identity” and loyalty. Yet ethno-religious conflicts are not necessarily the harbingers of global chaos, for most seem amenable to some form of management or resolution. Most minorities, often the subject of ethno-political conflicts, have sought “voice” or “access” within existing societies, not “exit” or adjustment of international

Defining the Problem What is an ethnic group? What is a religious group? How do they become politically salient within or beyond the nation-state? What is it that gives rise to groups’ protests and rebellions or their demands for voice, access within, or exit from the societies of which they are a part? Answers to these questions may help understand the ethno-religious conflicts since the end of World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Max Weber, the great German sociologist, defines an ethnic group as a people holding “a subjective belief in their common descent.” There is a “presumed,” “artificial,” “accidental” identity that may be associated with such characteristics as physical appearance, customs, common memories, language, religion, and so on. Many scholars are in agreement about these “ethnic criteria,” loose as they are, and point out that the strength of ethnic groups lies in the bonds of culture and not in those of association. Questions remain regarding the context of those “bonds of culture” and how one might explain the religious component. Usually, conflict is occasioned by the recognition of discrimination and politically channeled collective grievance within a society, as well as the authorities’ resistance to such demands. Ethnic conflicts are thus “conflicts in groups that define themselves using ethnic or national criteria,” and on this basis claims on behalf of collective group interests are made against political actors, including the state. Ethnic conflicts also bear a correlation with religious belief in that ethnicity’s subjective belief in a common descent carries with it a “sacred” focus of group attention, the idea of a “chosen people,” a “providential mission.” Although religion can often be a force for peace and harmony, espousing universalistic ideals that accept all people’s rights, it can also be a 47

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Weapons captured in a 2003 raid against ETA, the militant Basque separatist organization, are displayed in the northern Spanish city of Bilbao. Basques were granted home rule in 1980, but ethnonationalist violence has continued. (Rafa Rivas/AFP/Getty Images)

catalyst for “holy wars.” When religious groups adopt particularistic and intolerant outlooks, they become a potential source of conflict and war. Often religious and ethnic solidarity are joined. Arab Muslims in the Middle East or Irish Protestant and Roman Catholic Christians in Northern Ireland are communal groups that define themselves in terms of both ethnic and religious beliefs. Their religious differences reinforce and add a special intensity to ethnic conflicts. A study by Ted Robert Gurr suggests that religious cleavages are contributing factors to communal conflicts but seldom the root cause. He found that only eight of forty-nine militant minority sects studied were defined solely or mainly by religious beliefs. The Shiites of Lebanon and Iraq have goals of political recognition, not faith propagation, and the sectarian minorities represented by Catholics in Northern Ireland and Turks in Germany have clear political (not religious) agendas, as do the Kurds and Palestinians of the Middle East. It has been suggested that coexisting with (or existing within) most or all modern states are five important politically active ethnic groups: ethnonationalists (independent identities seeking to reestab-

lish their own state); indigenous peoples (primarily concerned with protecting their traditional lands, resources, and culture); communal contenders (one among a number of culturally distinct groups in plural societies that compete for a share of political power); ethno-classes (desirous of equal rights and opportunities to overcome effects of discrimination resulting from their immigration and minority status); and militant sects (politicized minority peoples defined wholly or substantially by religious beliefs). Ethno-nationalists include Corsicans and Bretons in France, Basques in Spain, French Canadians, Palestinians and Kurds in the Middle East, Slovenes, Latvians, and Armenians. Since 1991, more than a dozen new ethno-nationalities have emerged within the former states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Usually equipped with an organized leadership and occupying substantial territory, these groups or movements may straddle internationally recognized borders, and thus their activities spill over such borders with consequences for international peace and security. Indigenous peoples are descendants of the original inhabitants of conquered or colonized regions. A major impetus for their development of a common identity

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of purpose is their being discriminated against and exploited by peoples with advanced technology. Examples of indigenous peoples include the natives of the Americas (36 million or 5 percent of the population of the Western Hemisphere, though in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru they constitute one-half of the populations), the Aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, and the Masai of East Africa. For a long time, these groups resisted discrimination in uncoordinated uprisings. The League of Nations was petitioned, with little effect, by a number of North American indigenes and the Maori of New Zealand. Since the creation of the United Nations, however, a number of measures have been taken to address the problems of indigenous peoples. They include the creation in 1975 of a World Council of Indigenous Peoples, a non-governmental organization that provides a forum for discussion, publicity, and concerted planning; the 1992 UN-sponsored conference in Brazil, which issued an Indigenous Peoples Earth Charter, a document that outlines a comprehensive set of cul-

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tural and environmental demands; and the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which assembles 200 groups at annual meetings in Geneva, Switzerland. The latter has prepared a draft Universal Declaration of Indigenous Rights, which many hope will become a part of the corpus of international law. Communal contenders are ethnic groups within national societies more interested in acquiring access to power than in instigating exit from the state. Such contenders include the Maronite Christians and the Druze, Sunni, and Shiite Muslims of Lebanon, the South Sudanese, and the Igbos of Nigeria. The context for struggle involving this group is usually an arrangement where government political power is based on a coalition among traditional or modern leaders of ethnic groups. Failure to establish or maintain multiethnic coalitions or otherwise manage cleavage conflicts may lead to wars of secession such as the Biafran attempt to secede from Nigeria in the late 1960s and the recent conflict in the Sudan, which essentially pitted two culturally and religiously dissimilar groups, one

The Golden Temple in Amritsar, India, the chief Sikh shrine, has been the site of sporadic violence between militant separatists and government forces. Here, the wounded are carried out after Indian Army troops opened fire during a May 1988 siege on the temple complex. (Pablo Bartholomew/Getty Images News)

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having the advantage of control of the government. The distinction between communal contenders and ethno-nationalists is not a rigid one, for a communal group, once interested in secession, may be persuaded to enter a power-sharing arrangement at the political center. Settlement efforts in the Sudan have this in view, as did the restoration in the 1960s of the breakaway province of Katanga to the central government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, when Moise Tshombe, the secessionist leader, assumed the premiership of the Congo republic. Ethno-classes are ethnic groups that resemble classes. They are ethnically and culturally distinct minorities, often descendants of slaves and immigrants, whose circumstances led them to specialize in distinctive economic activities, usually of low status. Ethnoclasses in advanced industrial societies include the Muslim minority in France, people of color in Britain and the United States, Koreans in Japan, and blacks in some nine countries of Latin America. In developing countries, ethno-classes at times are economically advantaged but politically restricted. They include merchants and professionals, such as the Chinese minorities in many countries of Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa, and Lebanese in much of West Africa. Militant sects are religiously defined politicized minority peoples and include Islamic minorities in societies dominated by other religious traditions, such as Turks in Germany, Muslim Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, Arabs in Israel, and Malay Muslims in Thailand. They also include the warring Sunni, Shiite, and Druze in Lebanon, the Shiite in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the Kashmiris and Sikhs in India. Some non-Muslim groups include the Jews of Argentina, the Copts of Egypt, and the Baha’is of Iran. Whether categorized or characterized as national peoples (ethno-nationalists or indigenous peoples), or minority peoples (ethno-classes, communal contenders, or militant sects), these groups share a perception about something that sets them apart from other groups. Cultural, economic, and political differentials between a group and others tend to reinforce identification.

Historical Context of Conflicts Citizenship is an element of identity that can reinforce or compete against other elements such as race, ethnicity, religion, region, class, and so forth. As nationstates gain control of their citizens, many show a growing intolerance to other identity elements. Some

scholars suggest that other elements of modernization such as development of a market economy and the communications revolution may encourage such intolerance. Historically, ethnic groups, nations, empires, and other large-scale social organizations (Islam, Christendom) have coexisted, but since the seventeenth century, the state has been the dominant form of social organization. The state has been defined by the territory it controls, its sovereignty, and its ability to claim the allegiance of its subjects/citizens. Prevailing ideologies and political movements within state systems dramatically influence ethnic conflict. In the 1920s and 1930s, anti-Semitic doctrines in Germany and other European countries promoted ethnic polarization. They competed with Communist doctrines in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, which emphasized a common interest of all national (even international) Communist peoples and minimized the significance of ethnic and other particularistic identities. In the 1940s and 1950s, anticolonial sentiments found expression in nationalist movements in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean to challenge European colonial domination. Such sentiments, in time, resulted in a marked increase in the number of states claiming exclusive loyalties of diverse peoples. For a while, then, nationalists succeeded in uniting ethnic groups to end colonial rule and to consolidate their newly won independence. Later, they began to have their own problems with local minorities. During the Cold War (1945–1991), the United States and the Soviet Union helped new states to consolidate and enforce national unity, often to speed up “economic development.” By the late 1960s and early 1970s, decolonization was all but completed, but politicized ethnic consciousness soon reemerged in a number of states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan. More recently, a new kind of resistance to the monopolistic state system has left few world regions unaffected and has led to an increasing number of movements for ethnic autonomy. In emulating the industrialized states of Europe and North America, newer states began to subordinate the interests and relative autonomy of ethnic minorities in the name of pursuing national goals of consolidation or expansion. State-building came to mean policies of assimilating national and minority peoples, curbing their historical autonomy, and extracting their material and human resources for the state. The building of Communist states in Eastern Europe after

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1945 followed this pattern. There were exceptions. For example, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia were able to share power and prosperity at the center of the several developing states. Elsewhere, as in parts of Africa, the reach of state power was limited, which enabled some groups to retain de facto local autonomy. The state-building process was accompanied by development of the market economy and a revolution in communications technology. Colonial imperialism grafted large populations of colonized peoples onto the global capitalist economic system primarily assigning to them the role of providing raw material and being consumers of finished products. The communications revolution reduced distance, removed isolation, and disseminated information on such a scale that human relations were irrevocably changed. These developments deeply affected the old-fashioned state system premised on the notions of state sovereignty and the subordination of national and minority peoples. Two competing trends can be seen in the treatment of national and minority peoples. One is the reemergence of xenophobia, as seen in Germany, France, and Britain, as well as in movements demanding ethnic purity in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The second trend is the rise of oppressive leaders who defend existing state borders at all costs, disregarding historically justified claims for internal autonomy or independence by national peoples, such as Kurds and Southern Sudanese. Ironically, the leaders of former Asian and African colonies were willing to fight to maintain existing boundaries that had been drawn arbitrarily by colonial authorities, sometimes to purposely divide ethnic and or religious groups. It appears that world leaders have become more willing to reconsider the balance between the old norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity against the long ignored rights of ethnic and religious groups. This new attitude is often expressed as seeking to balance nations’ rights with peoples’ or human rights. It can be seen in such regional groups as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and Management of the Organization of African Unity.

Regional Manifestations of Conflicts Employing the term “ethno-religious” to encompass all categories of conflicts among national and minority peoples, how have the various regional manifestations

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informed our understanding of the phenomenon? SubSaharan Africa is the region most associated with the phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict, especially in its negative and intractable forms. Often it is equated with racial conflict. Anthropologists have challenged the idea that ethnicity is an essentialist and apolitical concept, insisting that the concept is relative, linked to socially defined and publicly expressed ideas about culture and political identities that are changeable. Thus the debate about the nature of ethnicity in Africa has been between the primordialists—ethnicity as an immutable set of emotionally charged biological, cultural, linguistic, and religious givens that are the primary source of identity—and the situationalists— ethnicity as an almost totally flexible set of identities, which vary depending on rational calculation of material, political, and other types of advantages, and which are often stimulated by political mobilization led by actors whose primary identities and motives are nonethnic. A middle interpretation maintains that ethnicity is a shared cultural identity that may be energized in response to political, class, and economic interests or circumstances, or alternatively weakened depending on the same set of circumstances. Since 1945, all types of ethno-religious conflicts have occurred in Africa, but the group called communal contenders has been the most common instigator. This prevailing form of conflict stems from competition over political and economic power in unstable, multiethnic coalitions, either within single governing parties or among officers in a military regime. All types of politicized communal groups exist in Africa. Examples of the more intense and violent ethnoreligious conflicts involve ethno-nationalist groups, ethno-classes, and militant sects. Some have been long term (in Burundi, Rwanda, Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, apartheid South Africa), and others have been relatively short term (civil wars in Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Congo/Zaire). In terms of their impact on international relations, communal contentions in the following African countries stand out: Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Western Sahara, Rwanda, and Burundi, among others. All tend to sustain the situationist position that politicized communal contention over political power-sharing and economic distribution issues is the prevalent form of politically relevant ethnicity in Africa, not the primordialist intractability of the Western media. Eastern Europe and Russia constitute the thirdlargest concentration of politicized communal groups

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after Africa and Asia. This region has perhaps received more world attention than others, a fact that once prompted former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to lament that the “rich man’s war” in Bosnia received far greater attention than the “poor man’s war” in Somalia. Where most countries of Western Europe are nearly culturally homogeneous, those in Eastern Europe and Russia are culturally and ethnically heterogeneous multinational states. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the two together accounted for thirty-two ethnic groups, or 35 percent of the region’s population. The ideology of MarxistLeninism managed to contain the cultural and ethnic tensions implicit in aggrieved situations of such diversity. With its demise, a dramatic change occurred in ethnic relations and the status of minorities in this region. Three of the federated, multinational states of the region—the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia—disintegrated because their constituent republics exercised their constitutional rights of secession from the political union. As if that were not enough, at least two of the successor sets of states— the former Yugoslavia, now known as Serbia and Montenegro, and the Russian Federation—are now themselves at risk of massive disruption in social relations and have each, in fact, experienced civil wars. The original state of Yugoslavia was dismembered into five sovereign states—Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro. But ethnopolitical divisions within each of the new units, particularly Bosnia and Croatia, have occasioned wars accompanied by “ethnic cleansing,” or genocide, on such a scale that the world community, though reluctantly and belatedly, was drawn into the conflicts to resolve or at least contain them. The efforts continued with new violence in the Serbian province of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians asserted their identity in response to overbearing Serbian nationalism. The Russian Federation was challenged by a long and violent rebellion in Chechnya, which resulted not only in brutal fighting and the destruction of the Chechen capital, but also in terrorist attacks outside Chechnya, on a theater in Moscow and a school in Beslan, among others. Other ethnic battles consumed the newly independent states of Armenia and Azerbaijan over the fate of an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan named Nagorno-Karabakh.

Still, many newly independent nations, free from the shadow of the former Soviet central government, have provided freedom and opportunity to subject nations and national ethnic groups. Peoples formerly disadvantaged and aggrieved became governing majorities and sought to redefine themselves and their relations with one another peacefully. North Africa and the Middle East together have thirty-one politicized minorities comprising 28.8 percent of the total population. Kurds and Palestinians are the most numerous among those who lost out in the twentieth-century process of state formation. There are also the Saharawis (who continue to resist incorporation by Morocco), the Berbers of North Africa, and the Azeris of Iran. Since World War II, North Africa and the Middle East have seen the most significant rebellions and disruptions of any other world region. The Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories represent a dispersed group seeking greater autonomy and independence. They are, in fact, a national people dispersed throughout the world, with politically active segments in Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, and Jerusalem. The bilaterally negotiated Oslo Accords of September 1993 led to the creation of a Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza, but a number of intractable issues remained outstanding between the Palestinians and the government of Israel. The Kurds were also a dispersed national people, but their situation differed from the Palestinians’ in that they were a non-Arab, mostly Sunni Muslim, people. Their territory, which they call “Kurdistan,” contains 21 million Kurds and stretches across part of four independent states—Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. They number 10 million in Turkey alone. In each of these countries, the governments view the Kurds as a threat to national unity and civil peace. Relations among communal groups in North Africa and the Middle East are shaped in a fundamental way by Islamic doctrine and practice. Where shari’ah, or Islamic law, reigns supreme, there is no separation of state and religion. The perennial tension between secular forces and pious Muslims is a result of the inability of modernizers to reduce a religious culture to a personalized path to salvation. With the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Muslim modernizers faced increasing challenges. On this account, the ethno-religious conflicts in this region have no easy answers. If religious revivalists eventually achieved electoral victories in Algeria, Jordan,

Ethnic and Religious Conflicts

and Egypt, could they build modern states based on Islamic principles? Or was modernity incompatible with Islamic principles? How compatible was the ever-increasing separation among ethnic or national groups with the doctrinally prescribed unity of the religious community? Minorities in Western democracies and Japan, from a global perspective, are distinct from those in other world regions because they usually express their grievances through protest as opposed to rebellion, and the responses of their governments tend generally to accommodate their interests, not to enforce their subordination or incorporation. But seemingly intractable problems remain in Northern Ireland and Canada’s Quebec. These regions have the smallest number of minority populations (twenty-four groups or 84 million people), including ethno-classes of African, Islamic, and Asian origin in Western Europe and the United States. In these countries, one also finds the indigenous rights movements. In France, Spain, Italy, Britain, and Canada, ethno-national demands have generally been resolved or managed by resource and autonomy concessions. Northern Ireland has not been amenable to this approach because it remains at odds both with its own state (Great Britain) and with the Irish Republic, which occupies most of the land area of Ireland. A middle course for genuine power-sharing between the Catholic and Protestant contenders was being worked out, but deep resentments and dangers remain. Quebec nationalism within the Canadian federal system was another remaining challenge. A near vote on secession in 1995 seriously threatened national unity and resulted in a political impasse. While there was little potential for violence, a resolution to the impasse could produce negotiated sovereignty for Quebec and thus lend further credence to the principle of the rights of peoples to exit sovereign states. In world regions as varied as Eastern Europe and Russia, sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Western democracies, ethno-religious conflicts have played themselves out with devastating effects for an increasingly large number of national and minority peoples.

Challenge of International Response As indicated at the outset, a major characteristic of the past half-century has been a growing realization of the

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coexistence of the state with ethno-religious and other groups. Where once states claimed exclusive rights over their citizens, now competing identities challenge such rights. The nature of the challenge is itself a subject of controversy, since the international order recognizes the sovereign state and its exclusive prerogatives. Challenge to the state is tantamount to challenge to the international order, and the ethnoreligious challengers are deemed to have no independent status in the international system. Yet these culturally bounded groups are quite capable, given the often fierce loyalties of their members, of presenting the international community with major humanitarian disasters—including genocide, “ethnic cleansing,” huge internal and external displacements of civilian populations, and the death of millions of the most vulnerable in societies around the world. There is no world region that has been free of such conflicts, and a new wave was unleashed in the aftermath of the Cold War. Some of these conflicts were joined to geopolitical rivalries and border disputes, further complicating their resolutions. It bears repeating that a primary factor in the political saliency of ethno-religious identity is unequal treatment by the larger society or national government. Nevertheless, such an ethnic grievance must be mobilized, and the mobilization process may involve movement from ethnic disadvantage to grievance, to protest, or to rebellion. There are often many factors involved, including the “demonstration effect,” or groups emulating others; “cessation of suppression,” or sudden liberation, as occurred in Eastern Europe and Russia; and the availability of “ethnic entrepreneurs” who provide leadership. But the most crucial of the factors is the response of the state to these manifestations of mobilization. Does it cultivate loyalty by granting access, does it coerce loyalty, or does it negotiate exit? Once mobilized, ethno-religious grievances raise a number of questions for the state and the international order, the principal one being how to address contradictory principles that coexist in international law—on one hand, the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference, and, on the other hand, the right of outsiders to intervene in domestic jurisdictions in cases of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian principles. One strategy requires a careful balance in preserving minority rights and the legitimate claims of the

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state. The UN Agenda for Peace, formulated by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali on June 17, 1992, outlined four types of responses to ethnoreligious conflicts: preventive diplomacy (creative measures to preempt conflict); peacemaking (international action for peaceful settlement); peacekeeping (use of military personnel in noncombatant roles, such as monitoring cease-fires); and post-conflict peacebuilding (international action to address root causes of conflict such as economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression). Another strategy for conflict resolution is to allow secession of the aggrieved group from the larger government. Traditionalists point out that widespread use of this option could increase pressures on largely heterogeneous states to give corresponding rights to their own minorities. Put simply, the question is how to balance the rights of states already established with the rights of groups currently in contention. The way forward for all types of ethno-religious conflicts is not to attempt a reconstruction of the state system so that territorial boundaries are more closely aligned to ethnic borders. That direction would simply raise the kind of complex issues that successor states to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have grappled with. Rather, the way forward is to acknowledge and strengthen ethno-religious groups within the existing state system by the devolution of authority, among other measures. Scholar Elise Boulding contends that devolution of authority to leaders of ethno-religious groups would concentrate attention on the process of problem-solving rather than on the problems themselves. For the international community, the challenge is to develop and strengthen norms for the protection of collective rights within the emerging international system. Such protected rights should include the “rights to individual and collective existence and to cultural self-expression without fear of political repression” or other forms of reprisal. Such rights should be accompanied by the pledge of the state or regime

to refrain from imposing of ethno-religious standards or agendas on other peoples. Unless the international community upholds such obligations and otherwise develops human rights and humanitarian law, as well as equips itself with some measure of political will to address ethno-religious conflicts, everyone will lose as these conflicts threaten peace and security everywhere. D. Elwood Dunn

Bibliography Allen, T., and J. Eade. “Anthropological Approaches to Ethnicity and Conflict in Europe and Beyond.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 4 (1997): 217–46. Boulding, Elise. “Ethnicity and New Constitutive Orders: An Approach to Peace in the Twenty-First Century.” Paper prepared for a Festschrift (Memorial Conference) for Kinhide Mushakoji, 1990. See Gurr, “Communal Conflicts.” Crocker, Chester A., and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall, eds. Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflicts. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996. Gurr, Ted Robert. “Communal Conflicts and Global Security.” Current History 94, no. 592 (May 1995): 212–17. ———. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993. Gurr, Ted Robert, and Barbara Harff. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf. World Politics: Trends and Transformations. 6th ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Smith, Anne-Marie. “Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking.” USIP Publication, n.d. United Nations. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. Report of the SecretaryGeneral (Boutros Boutros Ghali) pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992. New York, 1992.

TERRORISM: Global History Since the 1940s The horrors of terrorism were brought home to Americans on September 11, 2001, when hijacked airliners were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City and into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Although terrorism and the “war on terror” dominated political discourse in the United States and American foreign policy after that day, the shock and fear of terrorism had become familiar to people in many parts of the world long before 2001. In the years after 9/11, Western nations soon found themselves divided over the best response to the rise of Islamic terrorism. Most of America’s traditional allies supported the Bush administration’s initiative to attack Afghanistan, which provided safe haven for those who helped plan and finance the 9/11 attacks. But many of those same nations rejected the administration’s preemptive military strike against the “rogue state” of Iraq in early 2003. Years after these conflicts began, it was still difficult to measure progress in the suppression of modern terrorism, given its nebulous character. Islamic militants struck again on March 11, 2004, when they bombed a commuter railway in Madrid, killing 190 and injuring more than 1,800. On July 7, 2005, another cell carried out coordinated attacks on the London Underground, killing 56 and injuring 700. These fresh attacks indicated that Islamic terrorism remained a potent and unpredictable force.

into submission. Their most common methods are car bombings in crowded areas or against symbolic targets (e.g., police or army facilities, foreign banks or companies), targeted assassination, hostage-taking, and airplane hijacking. Terrorists rarely consider themselves as such, preferring to adopt the mantle of freedom fighters forced to adopt unconventional tactics to counter the overwhelming conventional strength of their opponents. They seldom work for national governments but occasionally find common cause with a rogue regime willing to sponsor them. President George W. Bush singled out Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil” in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union address in an allusion to the Axis powers in World War II—Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan. The United States also accused Sudan, Libya, Syria, and Cuba of sponsoring terrorism in recent years, but Sudan and Libya had publicly renounced terrorism, and evidence of terrorist acts sponsored by Cuba was sparse. Terrorism can be divided into four broad categories: political terrorism, state terrorism, statesponsored terrorism, and criminal terrorism. The primary aim of political terrorism is to force the enemy state to comply with the terrorists’ political demands by instilling fear in its populace or by provoking it into taking countermeasures that undermine its own core values and damage its institutions. Political terrorists almost always cite long-standing historical grievances or unfinished business from past conflicts as justification for their actions. State terrorism is a government strategy designed to intimidate the regime’s own citizenry through political purges, persecution of certain elements in society, mass starvation, and the like. This form of terrorism was perfected by Nazi Germany and Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union. State-sponsored terrorism is a form of proxy war in which a state actor clandestinely employs third-party terrorist organizations or separatists to strike out against a rival state. Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya, for example, based its foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s on a mix of pan-Islamic, Arab nationalist, and

Defining Terrorism There is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism because of the difficulty of separating a “pure” terrorist act from a legitimate act of war committed by “freedom fighters.” The most widely accepted academic definition is provided by UN expert A.P. Schmid, who argues that terrorism is employed by semi-clandestine individuals, groups, or state actors largely for personal, criminal, or political reasons. Terrorists choose their targets at random—often deliberately killing innocent civilians—to draw attention to their demands, inspire anxiety in the targeted population, and intimidate or coerce their opponent 55

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socialist ideologies. Qaddafi is widely believed to have financed and harbored a variety of international and domestic terrorists, including those responsible for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Finally, criminal terrorism is designed to bring monetary or commercial gain rather than to further a political goal and can include kidnapping, extortion, and racketeering.

Historical Background The terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” have their roots in the Jacobin Reign of Terror in early postrevolutionary France (1793–1794), in which successive government leaders and their closest associates were executed or driven into exile. Long before the invention of the term, however, terrorism was a facet of world politics. One early instance of terrorism was the activity of two Jewish sects, the Zealots and Sicarii, during the first century c.e. in present-day Palestine. The Zealots and Sicarii launched brazen daytime attacks on the Roman officials who governed the province, on soldiers, and on Jewish moderates, seemingly at random, a tactic to provoke fear and escalate Jewish-Roman tension. The groups succeeded in inspiring a widespread revolt among the Jews against Judea’s Roman occupiers, but the Romans crushed the rebellion, pursuing the leaders of the insurgency to the death. About a thousand Sicarii were trapped at Masada and chose mass suicide rather than being captured by the victorious Romans. From the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries c.e., the Assassins, a Shi’ite Ismaili Muslim sect, combined equal doses of religious fanaticism and political extremism in terrorizing Persia, Iraq, and Syria. Feared for their secrecy, golden daggers, and suicidal attacks on Christians and Sunni Muslims alike, the group reputedly used hashish before launching a raid and became known as the hashashin, or hashish eaters. With the onset of European colonialism from the eighteenth century on, various local groups targeted their imperial rulers in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines with terrorist tactics, but most were small and accomplished little to disrupt imperial rule. In nineteenth- and early-twentieth century Rus-

sia, anarchist and populist revolutionaries employed terrorist methods in their battle against the authoritarian czarist regime. The Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will), a socialist movement that emerged in the 1870s, launched a campaign of terror against government bureaucrats who abused their authority. Its members used primitive dynamite bombs to great effect—one of its suicide bombers succeeded in assassinating Czar Alexander II in 1881. The attack proved to be the group’s greatest triumph, since the government’s subsequent security crackdown resulted in the arrest of its leadership, permanently crippling the organization. The assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by the Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, was undoubtedly the most far-reaching single act of terrorism ever committed. The killing prompted Austria to take harsh countermeasures against neighboring Serbia, which it blamed for the assassination. Russia intervened on behalf of the Serbs, and soon the local dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia spiraled out of control. Germany, France, and Britain mobilized in support of their respective alliance partners, leading to the outbreak of World War I. More than 15 million people were killed in four years of fighting.

Terrorism Since World War I I After World War II, terrorism grew in intensity and frequency. In many cases, the peoples in colonial empires grew restive and sought to overthrow their weakened European masters, seeking independence and greater economic opportunity. Other terrorist groups were minority groups in multi-ethnic states who were similarly seeking greater autonomy or independence and expanded economic choices. Still other terrorists were driven by their belief in radical Communism, seeking to reform corrupt traditional regimes and redistribute political power and economic resources. Frustrated by the lack of rights accorded their countrymen, national liberation movements throughout the Middle East and Africa began to take up arms against European colonial rule beginning in the 1940s, frequently adopting terrorist tactics when avenues to peaceful change appeared closed. Britain, France, and other colonial powers had been seriously damaged during the war and had spent most of their military and economic resources. Often they had lit-

Terrorism: Global Histor y Since the 19 4 0s

tle choice but to yield to political and terrorist pressures and abandon their colonies.

Algeria The bloodiest terrorist campaign against colonial rule took place in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. North African Arabs living under French rule were inspired by France’s defeat in Indochina by Viet Minh guerrilla fighters in 1954 and soon after began to escalate their own respective independence campaigns. While the socialist government of French premier Pierre Mendes-France chose to concede autonomy for Morocco and Tunisia, both French protectorates, it refused to countenance self-determination for Algeria, which had a large French settler population and constitutional links to metropolitan France. Recognizing that French authorities had no intention of relinquishing control, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and other Algerian independence groups launched a series of attacks against symbols of French rule in November 1954. The FLN initially took care to target only military, economic, and governmental facilities, but one local commander ordered the massacre of French civilians at Phillipeville in August 1955. Infuriated by the slaughter of 123 Europeans—including women, children, and the elderly—the French army, police, and settler gangs responded with brutal reprisals against Muslims, killing as many as 12,000. Radicalized, the FLN responded with regular bombings against civilian targets, while the French army used increasingly brutal methods of torture and killed Muslims indiscriminately. After eight years of violent guerrilla warfare, France was exhausted and humiliated. It finally granted a shattered Algeria its independence in 1962.

Israel/Palestine The British faced similar difficulties as their empire began to crumble, especially in Palestine, where the ascendant forces of Arab nationalism and Zionism had been struggling against one another since the late nineteenth century. Britain assumed a League of Nations mandate to govern Palestine in 1918, at the end of World War I, and it tried vainly to balance competing claims by Jews and Arabs. Soon the British government was under attack by discontented members of both camps. Two ultra-radicals in the Jewish

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Lehi underground, Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu BetZuri, assassinated Lord Moyne, the British minister of state for the Middle East, in Cairo on November 6, 1944, after he sought to ban Jewish immigration to Palestine. In the fall of 1946, Jewish militants in the Irgun blew up the King David Hotel, which was serving as the British military and police headquarters, killing 92 people, mostly civilians. Soon after the bombing, Britain announced that it would withdraw from its mandate responsibilities and pull out of Palestine by 1948. The United Nations developed a new partition plan for Palestine, but on May 14, 1948, the Jewish community declared the establishment of the independent state of Israel. Palestinian Arabs attacked the new government, but Israel won a quick victory in its “War of Independence.” These events set the stage for one of the bitterest and longest conflicts of the postwar era. Palestinians and their Arab allies in neighboring states sought to reverse the Nakba (catastrophe) of 1948, which forced the exodus of roughly 700,000 Arabs from Israeli territory. Israel, surrounded by enemies but supported by the United States and countries in Western Europe, took active measures to defend itself. The first two decades of the conflict were marked by sporadic, small-scale Palestinian border raids and attacks on Israeli settlements. This period of relative tranquility was broken by Israel’s resounding victory over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the Six Days’ War of 1967, during which it occupied the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula (formerly under Egyptian control), the West Bank (protected by neighboring Jordan), and the Golan Heights (formerly controlled by Syria). With the defeat of Israel’s neighbors, the Palestinians formed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and affiliated groups to continue their struggle against the Jewish state via guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Early acts of Palestinian terrorism were geared toward drawing international attention to the plight of Arabs living under Israeli occupation and to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners. Unlike much later terrorism in the Arab Muslim world, these acts, which ranged from plane hijackings to targeted attacks on Israeli civilians, were motivated largely by a secular brand of nationalism. In fact, Luttif “Issa” Afif, the leader of the PLO-affiliated Black September group that captured and killed 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, was born to a Jewish mother and a Christian father.

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A German official negotiates with one of the Black September terrorists holding nine Israeli athletes hostage at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. This and other atrocities by Palestinian terrorists brought international attention to their cause. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Cooler heads within the Palestinian camp considered terrorism as a means to force negotiations with Israel, leading to establishment of a Palestinian state. After years of struggle, the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Israel and Palestine did establish the PLO as a political organization with which Israel was to negotiate. So many Palestinians had been radicalized by decades of conflict, however, that the PLO found it increasingly difficult to restrain their nonsecular rivals, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which continued to practice terrorism. Terrorist acts from the 1960s to the present have succeeded in focusing the world’s eyes on the Palestinian struggle, though mostly in a negative light. The steady barrage of suicide bombings beginning in the mid-1990s in Israel and the occupied territories expressed the frustration and misery of young Palestinians, but they did little to facilitate a comprehensive regional settlement. While there was a tactical logic to suicide bombings, they helped create a pow-

erful response by Israeli hard-liners, who blocked a full withdrawal from the West Bank and discouraged serious negotiations with Palestinian leaders. Thus, the vicious cycle continued.

Western Europe In the 1960s and 1970s, various separatist movements in Europe adopted violent terrorist tactics, often couching their struggle in Marxist-Leninist terms. Most of these movements petered out over the two decades after 1980. The main exception was the Basque separatist movement Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). ETA launched a wave of robberies, car bombings, kidnappings, and politically motivated assassinations across the Basque country of northern Spain and in the Spanish capital, Madrid, in the mid-1960s in response to three decades of government attempts to suppress Basque culture and language. More recently, however, the vast majority of Basques demon-

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strated their rejection of violence after Spain transformed itself into a model European state. Even though it had lost broad support, however, ETA refused to renounce terrorism as a means of achieving its goals. The Spanish government made major concessions, providing regional autonomy for the Basque territory, but remained unable to negotiate a final settlement with ETA. ETA attacks claimed well over 800 victims over 40 years. The victims included judges, journalists, businessmen, police officers, and politicians. In 1973, ETA attacks reached their height with the assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco. Meanwhile in Ireland, sectarian violence between Catholic Republicans and Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland during the late 1960s brought the establishment of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The dispute had roots dating back to British settlement in Ireland in the seventeenth century and to the settlement after the Irish Civil War in the early 1920s. At that time, most of Ireland became independent, but the smaller northern region traditionally dominated by Protestants remained under the control of Britain. Approximately 1,700 civilians and British soldiers and police were killed during the “Troubles,” as Provisional IRA (PIRA) militants learned to use car bombings, pub bombings, targeted assassinations, and sniping to deadly effect. In one of its most spectacular operations, it nearly succeeded in assassinating British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in October 1984 during a Conservative Party conference at the Grand Hotel in the British seaside resort of Brighton. After twenty-five years of terrorism, however, most PIRA militants recognized that their tactics had done little to secure a British withdrawal and chose to accept peace and negotiation with London. The Provisional IRA agreed to a cease-fire in 1997 and officially announced the end of its armed campaign in July 2005. That left only two small factions, the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA, as the sole remaining practitioners of political terrorism within the Irish Republican movement.

Left-Wing Terrorism Revolutionary leftist terrorist groups took up arms in various countries across the globe beginning in the mid-1960s as a violent effort to reform capitalist society. The first of these was the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia in

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1964. Founded as a Marxist-Leninist militia dedicated to protecting Colombia’s poor, FARC was increasingly associated with Colombian drug producers and was often accused of becoming a drug cartel hiding behind a façade of revolutionary Communism. Peace talks between the government and FARC from 1998 to 2002 failed to yield any lasting results, leading FARC to resume its campaign of bombings, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and guerrilla warfare. The United States provided millions of dollars in military aid to the Colombian government to crush FARC, but little real progress was made. FARC continued to control roughly a third of the country’s territory, and about 3,500 Colombians were killed each year in the crossfire between the army and rival militias of the right and left. Other Communist terrorist groups formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but all were considerably smaller and less successful. The Red Army Faction (RAF, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang) in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Japanese Red Army in Japan all shared the same goal: the overthrow of their capitalist national governments and the establishment of revolutionary leftist regimes. Many of their members received weapons training in the Middle East and North Africa—frequently alongside Palestinian terrorists—and targeted NATO or U.S. military installations, industrialists, the conservative press, and politicians. Although the Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army both made headlines—the former kidnapped and murdered former Italian prime minister Aldo Moro in 1978 and the latter attacked Lod Airport in Tel Aviv with machine guns and grenades in 1972 as an act of solidarity with their Palestinian counterparts—arrests of key members took their toll on both organizations. Their activities dropped off sharply by the 1980s, and both were effectively neutralized by the end of the decade. The RAF, meanwhile, had received substantial support from the Stasi, East Germany’s secret police for its terrorist activities in West Germany. Thus, when Germany was reunified in 1990, the RAF was defused; it announced its dissolution in 1998.

Rise of Extremist Islamic Terrorism Modern Islamic terrorism has its philosophical roots in the writings of Egyptian literary critic Sayyid Qutb

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(1906–1966), but almost certainly it would not have become the political force that it has without a widespread sense of humiliation in an Arab Muslim world that found itself seemingly powerless to resist Israeli and American military incursions. Qutb wrote several highly influential works on the Koran that earned him the status of modern Islam’s most notable theorist before his execution by Egyptian authorities in 1966. Qutb spent two years in the United States in the late 1940s and became deeply hostile to Western mores and “modernity” (capitalism, individualism, promiscuity, and decadence), which he saw as threats to Islamic values. Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda followers share Qutb’s perception that Islam is under a two-pronged attack from the West: first, the external military challenge in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere; and second, the spread of Western values that challenge traditional notions of Islam. Al-Qaeda and its allies believe that this tide can be reversed only through jihad (holy war) against Islam’s domestic and foreign enemies. Some Islamic terror groups dedicated themselves to achieving local goals, such as the overthrow of a single national government and its replacement with an Islamic state—notably the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Hezbollah, and Hamas in Palestine/Israel; Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines; the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée, or GIA) in Algeria; Asbat al-Ansar in Lebanon; and Gama’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt. Others, like al-Qaeda, embrace a more global vision. In broad terms, international Islamic terrorist groups share several or all of the following key aims: the destruction of the state of Israel, a rollback of American influence in key Middle Eastern governments, the elimination of Western military bases in Islamic countries, the overthrow of secular Western-backed regimes in the Muslim world, and the creation of a pan-Islamic caliphate from Morocco to the Philippines. Al-Qaeda emerged as a force during the ten-year war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union (1979– 1989). Muslim guerrillas from outside Afghanistan, the international mujahideen, were lined up against Soviet efforts to establish a regime friendly to Soviet Communism. The United States and Saudi Arabia provided financial aid for the guerrilla forces, and Pakistan provided logistical support. Aiming to “bleed the Soviet Union white,” the Reagan administration in the United States backed the most fanatical Muslims in Afghanistan because they would refuse

peace negotiations with Moscow and prolong the conflict as long as possible. During the resulting battles, Osama bin Laden and his collaborators learned how to finance and run logistics for a large international terrorist organization. He also came to believe that a small band of dedicated mujahideen could defeat and topple a superpower if they set their minds to it. Bin Laden and other leaders were driven to action against the United States by the events of the first Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). Bin Laden was infuriated when his native country, Saudi Arabia, invited U.S. troops to take up positions on its soil to counter the threat of an Iraqi invasion. Bin Laden believed it was blasphemous to invite Western nonbelievers into a nation that was home to Islam’s holiest cites, and he was further angered when American forces did not leave Saudi Arabia at the end of the conflict. He was exiled from Saudi Arabia in 1992 for his strident attacks against the Saudi government and began organizing the nucleus of al-Qaeda in Sudan. As an heir to a huge Saudi fortune, he provided the financial resources. Bin Laden’s followers, mostly former mujahideen, saw action fighting with Bosnian Muslims in the mid-1990s, then returned to Afghanistan at the invitation of its hard-line Islamic Taliban regime at the end of the decade. Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan became the control center for a series of attacks on American military targets and embassies in Asia and Africa during the late 1990s, ultimately culminating in bin Laden’s plan to use hijacked planes as missiles to attack the World Trade Center in New York and targets in Washington. After the successful strike on September 11, 2001, the United States and several Western allies invaded Afghanistan, seeking to put al-Qaeda out of business and unseat the country’s Islamist government. They succeeded in overthrowing the government but were less successful in pursuing al-Qaeda. Clashes between al-Qaeda remnants and allied forces continued along the mountainous frontier with Pakistan for years. After the United States also invaded Iraq in 2003, an al-Qaeda offshoot run by Jordanian Abu Musab alZarqawi carried out devastating suicide bombings in Iraq and played a major role in assisting local insurgents fighting against occupying coalition forces and the provisional government. The kidnapping and execution of foreigners, in addition to suicide and car bombings, became a staple of daily life in post-invasion Iraq.

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Efforts to Combat Terrorism Democratic governments in the West, preoccupied with their Cold War rivalry with the Soviet bloc, proved to be ill equipped to deal with modern terrorism. After the kidnapping and murder of Israeli Olympic athletes in Germany in 1972, some governments began to take counterterrorist measures. These included the creation of SWAT-type units, improved intelligence gathering, and tightened security measures for likely terrorist targets (such as transportation hubs, government buildings, and financial centers). A series of antihijacking conventions was instituted to increase international cooperation after a wave of political skyjackings in the late 1960s and 1970s. After September 11, 2001, the United States reorganized its agencies to create a new Department

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of Homeland Security (although the major intelligence agencies, including the CIA and FBI, were not part of the department). It was not yet clear what practical effects this reorganization would have on U.S. success in counteracting terrorist groups. Threats of terrorism from Muslims created special concerns in Europe, where many countries had substantial populations of Muslims who were guest workers or descendants of former colonies. Most countries were not eager to assimilate Muslims as full citizens. They tightened immigration regulations to discourage increased immigration and insisted on strict standards for Muslims who sought permanent resident status. They hoped that these steps would decrease the pool of future homegrown terrorists.

The attacks of September 11, 2001—the deadliest ever on U.S. soil—made antiterrorism the centerpiece of American foreign policy and made homeland security the focus of domestic policy. (AFP/Getty Images)

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At the same time, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United States, with the cooperation of Israel, Russia, and Western Europe, adopted an aggressive strategy of preempting terrorists by capturing or killing them before they could act. The antiterrorist sponsors have been accused of holding suspected terrorists without charges for months or years, operating secret detention centers, and using torture to obtain key information about future plots. Such policies have raised heated debate over the conflict between curbing terrorism and preserving civil liberties. The most drastic countermeasure to Islamic terrorism is military intervention. Although the United States enjoyed near universal support from its Western allies for the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, many traditional U.S. allies did not support the 2003 invasion of Iraq, also justified as part of the war on terror. Several smaller countries that did support the invasion later withdrew their forces. Many Europeans felt that the alleged links between Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and Islamist terrorism were tenuous at best. They warned that a second war with a major Arab state in the Middle East could actually increase the likelihood of further terrorist attacks. Spain and Britain, both strong backers of the war in 2003, were victims of major terrorist bombings in the following two years.

Conclusion The transformation of some terrorist groups into responsible political organizations provides faint hope that today’s terrorists organizations may choose to lay down their arms and pursue their aims through peaceful negotiation. However, the ultimate success of other terrorists (including Israeli groups in the 1940s and the FLN in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s) may still provide hope to future terrorists. It seemed unlikely that the fanatics in al-Qaeda and

similar organizations would relent until they are either destroyed or accomplish their goals. It also appeared that Iraq itself would fill Afghanistan’s former role as a terrorist training ground, providing a new generation of terrorists with the opportunity to hone their deadly craft. To defeat modern Islamic terrorism, the United States and its allies would need to deal carefully both with the Arab Muslim world and with their own respective Muslim minorities. Improved intelligence and military capabilities, most experts agree, must be accompanied by a measured political strategy if they are to be effective. Sean J. McLaughlin

Bibliography Chomsky, Noam. Pirates & Emperors: International Terrorism in the Real World. New York: Claremont Research and Publications, 1986. Crenshaw, Martha, and John Pimlott, eds. Encyclopedia of World Terrorism. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. Laqueur, Walter. The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004. Milton-Edwards, Beverley, and Peter Hinchcliffe. Conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945. New York: Routledge, 2004. Poland, James M. Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies, and Responses. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988. Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Schanzer, Jonathan. Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror. New York: Specialist Press International, 2005. Schmid, Alex P., Albert J. Jongman, et al. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1988. Yapp, M.E. The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995. New York: Longman, 1996.

INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE were still colonized, and thus not a market for arms. And those countries in Asia and Latin America that were independent were generally too impoverished to purchase much in the way of weapons overseas. Thus, much of the market for weapons was in the Western bloc of nations dominated by the United States and in the Soviet bloc, which included Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Many of the countries in these regions had arms industries of their own. Indeed, the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union actively rebuilt the arms industries of Germany and other former Axis powers, despite wartime agreements not to do so. The dynamics of the early Cold War also worked to limit arms sales. During the 1940s and 1950s, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union saw the third world—those countries not aligned with either nation—as a significant battleground for their ideological struggle and made few efforts to arm them. In the 1960s, both sides shifted strategies and began to arm regimes that would carry on “proxy wars” directly or indirectly supported by the superpowers. It was the events of the 1970s that produced the great rise in international arms sales. In the wake of its Vietnam debacle, the United States embarked on what was called the Nixon Doctrine, a policy of setting up regional powers to act as surrogates for the United States. This doctrine involved beefing up the armories of these various third world countries. At the same time, one group of countries had grown enormously wealthy and became major customers for arms. The quadrupling of oil prices made it possible for states rich in hydrocarbon resources to arm rapidly. Thus, between 1971 and 1975, U.S. arms sales alone climbed from about $1.4 billion annually to nearly $16 billion. Other industrialized countries, in both the East and West, showed similar gains. Indeed, by the mid-1970s, international arms sales were becoming a significant political issue in the United States, Britain, and several other Western democracies. In the United States, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter made the reduction of arms sales a key plank in his foreign policy platform. When he took office in 1977, he offered plans to limit arms

The massive international arms trade has been as much a hallmark of the post–World War II period as the wars it spawned and aggravated, though the commerce in weapons has origins before the war. In the 1930s, for example, a congressional investigation cited the “merchants of war”—that is, U.S. weapons suppliers—as the significant culprits in drawing the United States into World War I. By supplying arms to belligerents, Congress argued, the United States inevitably joined their ranks, forced to defend the arms trade by going to war. The result was the so-called cash-and-carry legislation that required combatants engaged in World War II before the United States joined the fighting to pay in advance for their supplies—including arms— and pick them up in their own ships from U.S. ports. Like later efforts to curb U.S. arms sales abroad, however, the legislation ultimately proved futile. The arms trade in the decades after World War II—especially after 1970—put all earlier weapons trafficking in the shade, and the United States was not the only country involved. Today, arms sales are a major export of most industrialized countries and a host of industrializing ones. Moreover, the market for arms has spread to all corners of the globe.

Quantity Statistics on the sale of arms are tricky to assess, due to varying kinds of measurements and a lack of verification in many instances, but it is clear that the volume of arms sales and arms transfers (those delivered as part of military aid packages) is enormous. According to the Congressional Research Service, it was estimated that some $33 billion in international arms orders went through in 1996. Four years earlier, in 1992, the total reached $42 billion, because Persian Gulf countries were replacing armaments destroyed in the first Gulf War (1991). Between 1945 and 1960, international arms sales were relatively small. The United States, for example, sold just $500 million worth of weapons annually during these years. This relatively low figure was due to several causes. First, large parts of the third world 63

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sales significantly. The policy was strongly opposed, however, especially by defense industries, and the final bill was riddled with loopholes and exceptions. It slowed the upward trend in sales but did not reverse it. In 1980, Carter’s last year in office, foreign military orders still amounted to some $16 billion. The Reagan years witnessed a quantum increase in U.S. arms sales, matched by similar increases in other industrialized countries. Indeed, not only did the Reagan administration remove the limitations on weapons sales and transfers enacted during the Carter presidency, but policymakers actively moved to streamline the process, offering new financial arrangements and subverting congressional oversight in ways both legal and illegal (in the case of Iran and the contras of Nicaragua). By 1982, U.S. arms sales totaled more than $22 billion. The Soviet Union was also seeking to bolster its allies’ military capacities—and its own balance of payments—in the competition with U.S. efforts. In 1973, the Soviet Union delivered some $5.3 billion in weapons overseas; by 1982, the total was nearly $11 billion. European arms exporters increased their sales from roughly $5 billion in 1974 to $13 billion in 1982. In addition, by the 1980s several major industrializing countries, including Brazil, China, and Israel, had become major producers of armaments. Under presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the U.S. government took an even more active role in the sale of arms. Both administrations made the promotion of world trade—including arms sales—a major component of their foreign policy, with U.S. arms sales reaching a historic peak in the early 1990s. This new pro-trade policy further increased competition from other countries with arms to sell. At the same time, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left a vast arms manufacturing capacity both in the West and the former Communist bloc. Russia, in particular, desperately used arms sales to bring in much-needed foreign exchange in the 1990s. Still, a lowering of tensions in the weapons-buying Middle East and economic downturns in many third world countries led to a slackening demand in the arms business and a decline in arms orders and deliveries.

Quality Just as there has been a general upward trend in the quantity of weapons offered in the international arms

market, so too have the variety and sophistication of available weapons increased in recent decades. Essentially, there are two kinds of arms transfers: those involving weapons and weapons systems, and those including the technology to manufacture weapons. The latter can include licensing agreements, coproduction deals, or, more rarely, the supply of turnkey factories. Throughout the 1960s, most arms exports consisted of weaponry, most of it rather unsophisticated or considered obsolete by the selling nation. For example, most of the military aircraft sold by the United States in this period were hand-me-downs from its own military services. By the early 1970s, increased quantity was being matched by increased complexity, as wealthier and more sophisticated buyers in both the West and among the nonaligned nations demanded newer equipment of more recent vintage. Thus, by the late 1970s and early 1980s— despite the Carter administration’s effort to withhold weapons systems that would upset regional balances of power—the United States was selling arms that were only slightly less advanced than those used by its own military services. These included such near top-of-the-line items as F-15 and F-16 fighters, M-60 tanks, and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The Reagan administration shifted from a policy constrained by fears of a local arms race to a view that appropriate weapons for export by the United States meant anything that, in the words of expert Michael Klare, produced a “net contribution to enhanced deterrence and defense.” This naturally created a spiral in the sophistication of weapons sold by other suppliers, since the United States not only led the world in its volume of arms sales but in the quality of the weapons it sold as well. For reasons of geopolitical competition, the Soviet Union was forced to respond by upscaling the weapons it exported, to maintain the balance of power between its surrogates and those of the United States. This became especially critical after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when the U.S. weapons systems used by Israel proved to be superior to Eastern bloc systems used by Arab forces. For the big four European arms suppliers (France, Britain, Italy, and Germany), economic competition was more important than the Cold War rivalry. To win a share of the most lucrative markets— particularly in the Middle East—the European arms industry increased the sophistication and improved

International Arms Trade

the quality of weapons it offered. Between 1975 and 1982, for example, the Soviet Union sold more than 3,000 supersonic aircraft to nonaligned nations, along with more than 18,000 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. The former included such items as late-model MiG 23s and 25s. The big four European arms suppliers also sold about 500 such aircraft and nearly 3,000 missiles. This tendency toward high-end items only increased in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. With oversized arms industries in much of the industrialized world, the pressure to stay afloat economically forced manufacturers to market their cutting-edge technology aggressively. Moreover, national governments in the West and in the former Communist bloc were actively engaged in promoting the most sophisticated wares of their arms industries, largely for economic and domestic political reasons—that is, to maintain high employment at home. These “big-ticket items” gain most of the publicity in discussions of the arms trade. The vast bulk of arms sales, however, receive little attention. They involve small arms, useful for both military and policing purposes, including handguns, rifles, grenades, and land mines; counterinsurgency gear, including jeeps, trucks, helicopters, and light attack planes; and riot control equipment, including tear gas, handcuffs, armored cars, and truncheons. In the late 1970s, the United States exported over 50,000 rifles, 600,000 tear-gas grenades, and 55 million rounds of small-arms ammunition to the police forces of nonaligned nations. For rough comparison, between 1975 and 1982, the Soviet Union and Europe provided more than 1,200 light aircraft, some 2,800 helicopters, and nearly 17,000 armored cars to military and police forces of nonaligned nations. In addition, sales of goods classified in the socalled “gray areas” increased. These included items that could be used for civilian or military/police purposes, such as jeeps, trucks, transport planes, communications gear, and computers. Such items were sold even to countries under arms embargoes, since they could be classified as material for civilian use. During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, a number of American and European companies sold such equipment to the embargoed apartheid regime in South Africa. During the post–World War II era, the United States led the world not only in the sale of weapons, but also in the sale of weapons-making technology. Until the early 1970s, it arranged most of the licensing

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and coproduction deals with its allies in NATO and with Australia and Japan. The Soviet Union generally shared its arms-making expertise with its Warsaw Pact allies and China. By the late 1970s, however, the same forces pushing arms manufacturers to offer more complex weapons systems were leading to more technology transfers. Still, most such U.S. transfers involved countries with historical ties to the United States or great strategic significance. Thus, in 1978, the United States had just eight technology transfer programs with four countries: Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey. Several other countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and Israel, had licensing agreements with U.S. arms suppliers. Under the Reagan administration, licensing for weapons-making technology changed dramatically. By 1982, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Thailand also had such licensing agreements. The agreements covered increasingly sophisticated weapons. For example, South Korea was coproducing F-15 fighter jets. In general, European arms manufacturers were more circumspect in their technology transfers, largely for economic reasons. They did not want to give up their technology edge. As for the Soviet Union, most of its third-world buyers were not technologically advanced enough to use such technology transfer. More advanced industrializing countries tended to prefer the higher-quality weaponry of the United States and Europe. Finally, many of these technology deals involved the temporary assignment of technicians from the supplying nations. In deals with the United States and Europe, these were usually civilians from private companies; in deals with the Soviet Union, the technicians were usually military personnel. At the same time, both Western and Soviet firms and countries welcomed students and technical workers from friendly third-world nations. Those who worked for arms manufacturers could take their knowledge and skills back to their native countries, where they could help develop arms production facilities. Of course, not all of the spread of arms-making technology transfers originated with the United States or the Soviet blocs. A number of nonaligned countries developed their own arms-manufacturing capacity, especially those that were embargoed by the United States and the Soviets because of war, political isolation, or egregious human rights violations. Thus the so-called pariah states—Israel, Taiwan, and South

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Africa—developed their own arms industries in the 1970s, sharing technology among themselves. At the same time, both India and Pakistan, locked in a strategic struggle and embargoed during their several wars, made it national policy to develop their own arms-making capacities. Nor is the problem of technology transfers strictly confined to sophisticated weapons systems. In recent years, there has been a growing international awareness of the destructive capacity of land mines and small arms, both decidedly low-tech items. It is estimated that no fewer than fifty countries have the capacity to produce small arms, while two dozen or so can make land mines.

Who’s Selling and Why As noted above, the six most important armssupplying countries for most of the post–World War II era were the United States, the Soviet Union, and

the big four European countries—France, Britain, Germany, and Italy. These main suppliers were supplemented by Japan, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and several other European countries. In more recent years, a number of industrializing countries joined the ranks of major arms suppliers. The most important of these included Brazil, China, Israel, and South Africa. Still, the United States remained the number-one arms exporter through the entire period in both the quality and cost of weapons. Between 1974 and 1982, for example, the United States signed arms agreements with third-world countries that amounted to more than $82 billion, the big four European sellers contracted for roughly $65 billion among them, and the Soviet Union made deals for about $70 billion. The total world market for arms-export orders in those years was roughly $260 billion. Thus, the United States controlled about a third of the business, while Europe and the Soviet Union accounted for roughly 25 percent each. These numbers did not

A salesman for a U.S. defense contractor shows an air-to-surface missile system to potential buyers at the Dubai Air Show. The United States accounts for more than 40 percent of global weapons sales. (Barry Iverson/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

International Arms Trade

change significantly in the 1990s. In 1996, the United States accounted for about 35 percent (more than $12 billion) of all arms orders, while Russia’s share had fallen to about 15 percent (roughly $5 billion). The United States had a variety of motives for selling arms abroad, which changed over time and varied from customer to customer. During the Cold War, political and strategic imperatives tended to predominate. These included the need to support U.S. allies and share military burdens—particularly in the wake of the Vietnam War; to gain political influence and leverage; to block successes by the Soviet bloc; to gain access to bases and to political and military elites; and to bolster friendly regimes against internal unrest. A final factor that tended to make political and strategic factors paramount over economic ones— especially during the first thirty years of the Cold War—was that the business of arms sales was rather small, accounting for a tiny proportion—about 1 percent in the 1950s and 1960s—of all U.S. exports. For the Soviet Union, the motivations were roughly similar to those of the United States, though Moscow had a few idiosyncratic reasons of its own for promoting the sale of arms, including a desire to establish secure borders. Thus, the Soviet Union made a major point of selling arms to friendly countries on its periphery, first in Eastern Europe and later in Asia, including long-term agreements with India and Iraq. In addition, Moscow used arms sales and transfers to compete with China and win the allegiance of leftist regimes among nonaligned nations. For the big four European powers, strategic considerations were also important, but they remained secondary to economic ones, even at the height of the Cold War. To bolster their influence in regions they considered to be in their traditional sphere of influence, France and Britain in particular sold weapons to former colonies in Africa and the Middle East. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the pariah states such as Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan sold arms of their own manufacture as a way to shore up support in a hostile world. In the post–Cold War era, economic considerations tended to outweigh other factors in the promotion of arms sales abroad. Of course, strategic matters still matter, and it is sometimes difficult to separate economic from strategic considerations, since the bolstering of friendly regimes can have a direct economic impact on the arms-selling country.

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In addition, the arms industry—largely a creation of the Cold War in the United States and the Soviet Union—had gained economic imperatives of its own. In both the United States and the Soviet Union, offsetting some of the huge costs of weapons development at home drove the governments to share the burden with allies by selling them the improved weapons. Since manufacturing costs tend to go down with increased output, selling abroad was a way to lower the costs of new weapons. In other cases, the superpowers subsidized the cost of new weapons by selling off the old. When they wrote technology transfer agreements, they could even share the cost of research and development. Even during the Cold War, the arms manufacturers were driven in part by economic factors. For example, at the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. military demand for armaments dropped rapidly. Arms manufacturers were forced to look abroad to keep their factories running and their profits up. The U.S. government itself had an interest in keeping employment high, especially because the end of the war occurred during a recession. Thus, political leaders agreed to allow companies to sell their arms abroad. For the United States—as well as the Europeans and even the Soviet Union—there were foreign economic considerations in the promotion of arms exports in the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, all their economies faced increasing balance-of-payments crises, due in part to the spiraling cost of oil in the West and the stagnation of the agricultural sector in the Soviet Union. Thus, the governments in all of these countries used arms sales to win back some of the money they were paying to oil-producing or grain-exporting countries. In the case of the United States, the transaction was direct, since it effectively financed oil purchases through the sale of armaments to the oilproducing states of the Persian Gulf. After the end of the Cold War, other economic factors came into play. Both for the United States and more critically for the former Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War brought a crisis in the arms business, with declining domestic demand. Not surprisingly, both Moscow and Washington have moved from permitting and indirectly encouraging arms sales to working actively with arms manufacturers as part of the normal governmental policy of promoting exports. The administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton—both especially assiduous in developing cooperative relations with exporters or potential

68

Roots of War

exporters—had few qualms about extending this new relationship to encompass arms manufacturers. Indeed, it can be argued that political and strategic factors have at times been harnessed to economic considerations. Some experts, for example, contended that the first Gulf War (1991) represented, at least in part, a way to show off new weapons systems to potential buyers around the world. Later, in the Clinton administration’s sale of more sophisticated arms sales to Latin America, there was evidence that the needs of the domestic arms industry were an important consideration. The Clinton administration was heavily criticized for its sales of certain technologies with military capabilities to China. The public position of the administration was that it did not know about these deals or that the deals did not involve critical technologies, but some observers detected a hidden message: If America does not offer this technology, someone else will, thus winning the economic and political benefits of doing so.

Who’s Buying and Why During the first thirty or so years of the post–World War II era, as noted above, most arms purchases were made by the industrialized countries of Europe, as well as Japan. Beginning in the 1970s, however, a variety of factors came into play that encouraged many nonaligned nations to increase their arms purchases. The most important were the countries of the Middle East, especially those rich in petroleum resources and, with the hike in oil prices of those years, awash in petrodollars. These included Iraq (buying largely from the Soviet Union and Europe), the Persian Gulf Arab countries (making purchases mostly from the United States and Britain), and, above all, the shah’s Iran (buying almost exclusively from the United States). Between 1976 and 1980, Saudi Arabia purchased roughly $5 billion in weapons on the international market: 40 percent from the United States, 20 percent from Britain, and another 20 percent from France and West Germany combined. At the same time, Iraq bought nearly $8 billion in weapons, 60 percent of which came from the Soviet Union. Iran, however, outbid them all, with weapons purchases well in excess of $8 billion, 75 percent of which were made in the United States. Moreover, the so-called frontline states—those facing the enormous power of the Israeli Defense Forces—purchased large quantities of arms in the

late 1970s, when tensions with Israel remained high. Between 1976 and 1980, Syria, for example, bought some $6.6 billion in arms, roughly 80 percent of which was from the Soviet Union and much of which was intended to replace equipment destroyed in the 1973 Arab-Israel War and Syria’s incursions into Lebanon in the late 1970s. Even when the price of oil declined, countries of the Middle East continued to make large purchases. The volatile political climate, regional rivalries, and near-constant state of war in the region ensured a steady demand, which arms-supplying countries— eager to balance their oil payments—actively filled. This steady trend could be observed over the course of the 1990s. While arms sales to the region peaked in the year after the first Gulf War—as nations in the region replenished their depleted arsenals—they declined only very slowly in the following years. In 1990, before the war, the Persian Gulf countries purchased $37.2 billion in arms; after the Gulf War in 1992, they bought $42.2 billion in arms. As late as 1996, however, Saudi Arabia alone purchased $5.2 billion, making it the largest arms importer in the world. In the 1980s, increasing purchases on the other side of Asia enhanced the market for weapons in the Middle East. During these years, the industrializing countries of East Asia—the so-called tiger economies— found themselves increasingly able to purchase weapons and pay for them through exports. At the same time, they sought to bolster their own defense capacities, largely to counter the overwhelming power of China. Thus, Taiwan, South Korea (which, of course, also faced a well-armed foe in North Korea), Singapore, and later Malaysia, Thailand, and especially Indonesia hiked their defense purchases dramatically in the 1980s. The latter purchased some $1.5 billion in arms between 1984 and 1993, over one-third of which was from the United States. Finally, these rapidly developing counties had a variety of reasons to buy weapons on the international arms market. First, and most importantly, were legitimate defense concerns, either against an external foe or, in the case of unpopular regimes, against domestic opposition. Other factors included a desire to project an image of strength abroad for reasons of national pride or to gain concessions in disputes about territory, offshore resources, and the like. Internally, some military leaders needed weapons purchases to gain the upper hand in their struggle with other national elites.

International Arms Trade

Economic factors came into play as well. The more developed countries sought weapons or weapons technology to study and emulate as they developed their own weapons development capacities. More countries—especially in East Asia—demanded technology transfers as a precondition for arms sales, a stipulation that supplier governments—eager to bolster their own defense industries—were increasingly willing to meet.

Impact Arms-supplying nations consistently argued that their sales of weapons do not contribute to armed conflict. Rather, they said, the sales helped promote regional and global security by providing effective deterrence, regional balances of power, and the means for governments to stabilize disruptive and subversive domestic elements. The confidence that arms sellers have in these arguments are called into question by their own warnings that arms sales by rival suppliers threaten instability. Thus, throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged charges that the other was undoing carefully nurtured balances of power in various regions of the world. Washington accused the Soviet Union of fomenting unrest and subversion by providing arms to leftwing insurgents and belligerent leftist countries. At the same time, Moscow said that the United States was supporting regressive and unpopular regimes by providing them with the military and police supplies they needed to remain in power. In the 1980s, Moscow added the charge that the United States itself was fomenting subversion by supplying weapons to anticommunist insurgents in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. More recently, there was a shift in rhetoric among arms-supplying countries. No longer did they accuse each other of fomenting conflict by selling weapons abroad. Instead, the criticisms involved the sophistication of arms, particularly so-called weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons) and vehicles (particularly missiles) by which to deliver them. In recent years, various members of the U.S. government charged China, France, Russia, and even Israel of selling inappropriate military technology to countries the United States considered dangerous, such as Iran. Meanwhile, other countries contended that the United States set a double standard, selling arms to Turkey and Indonesia—which used them to invade

69

Cyprus and East Timor, respectively, in 1974—while condemning sales to Iran in the 1980s. Aside from the charges hurled at each other by the arms-supplying nations, there remain the simple numbers of wars and human rights violations involving governments that have made substantial purchases of arms in the international marketplace. The United States—as the largest supplier of arms—found itself with the dubious distinction of having its weapons involved in more wars than any other arms-exporting nation. Among the fifty or so ongoing conflicts in developing nations and former socialist bloc states in the early 1990s, U.S. weapons were involved in some forty-five, or 90 percent, of them. In more than half the wars, the United States continued to provide arms after the wars had begun. Moreover, in many countries with ongoing insurgencies—such as Israel, Egypt, Somalia, Indonesia, and Mexico—the United States remained the largest supplier of counterinsurgency or riot control weaponry and equipment. The damage done by the arms trade is not confined to periods of war. Though the international community acted to ban the sale of antipersonnel land mines, there remain some 50 to 70 million scattered across current and former war zones around the globe. In places like Angola and Cambodia, it was estimated that these mines produced a new death or crippling injury every day. Small arms, too, continue to haunt countries long after the war is over. It was estimated in the late 1990s that there were some 75 million assault rifles in circulation around the world. This means they can be had readily and cheaply, for as little as $6 in places like Mozambique. Just as the end of a war means an abundance of weapons, it also means an abundance of demobilized soldiers and guerrillas, a recipe for banditry in many parts of the developing world, particularly in Africa. Finally, it is important to note the consequences of arms sales for the arms-supplying countries themselves. First, there is the boomerang effect, in which the weapons sold are used against the countries that have supplied them. In the case of the United States, in four recent military missions—Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti—its troops have faced an enemy armed with U.S. weapons. A second consequence is called “blowback.” This involves national action that later contributes to injure that same nation. For example, during the Soviet war with Afghanistan (1979–1988), the United States helped train and arm Islamist militants in Afghanistan to fight Soviet

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forces. Later terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and on New York’s World Trade Center in 1993 were carried out by terrorists trained and formerly armed by the Central Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan. In 2001, after the attacks of September 11, U.S. troops found themselves in Afghanistan in combat against some of these same people. There are also large costs—both direct and indirect—to the taxpayers of arms-supplying countries. First, governments pay enormous subsidies to arms manufacturers, often in the form of military aid to friendly countries, which allows them to purchase the weapons with taxpayer money. The governments may also offer low-interest loans and credits to arms customers and sponsor promotional activities on behalf of arms manufacturers. In the United States in 1995, for instance, it is estimated that these subsidies amounted to some $7.6 billion, nearly half the total value of the weapons exported. Indirect costs can be even higher. As weapons suppliers offer more sophisticated systems to other countries, a vicious cycle is perpetuated. Because the United States and other large arms-producing countries try to keep the most advanced weapons for their own use, selling ever more sophisticated weapons creates strong pressures for developing ever newer and more expensive weapons for the domestic military.

Efforts at Control With most arms sales in the period from 1945 to 1977 confined to Western and Eastern blocs in the Cold War, there was little concern about controlling the international trade in weaponry. The proliferation of sales to the countries of the Middle East—and especially Iran—in the mid-1970s, however, brought the issue to the fore, at least in the United States. As noted above, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter voiced serious concerns about U.S. involvement in the international arms trade during his 1976 campaign and sought to limit arms sales during his term of office. He imposed specific controls on arms sales. These limits included a total ceiling on U.S. sales based on 1977 levels, a ban against modifying advanced systems for export purposes, the prohibition on co-production deals, an end to governmental promotion of arms sales, a linkage between human rights and arms sales, and efforts at multilateral negotiations among the major arms-supplying countries both in the West and the Communist bloc.

Carter’s efforts, however, were hamstrung from the beginning in several ways. First, they contained many exemptions, exceptions, and waiver possibilities. NATO and ANZUS (Australia and New Zealand) countries, as well as Japan and Israel, were never included. Second, the rules allowed the president to waive these limitations in “exceptional circumstances.” Thus, under a variety of domestic and foreign pressures, Carter increasingly used waivers to allow arms sales in individual cases. In addition, Carter’s political opponents criticized the administration’s arms sales limitations as being detrimental to the projection of U.S. power and interests abroad. Paradoxically, even Carter’s own peacemaking efforts—in the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1979—required him to provide more military aid to these two countries. Ultimately, however, the fact remained that as long as other countries were willing to sell arms to undesirable customers, a unilateral set of limitations by the United States remained unfeasible. Thus, arms orders approved by Washington increased from $8.8 billion in 1977 to $11.7 billion in 1978, and included such controversial deals as the sale of 200 modern jet aircraft to three Middle Eastern countries. As noted above, the Reagan years witnessed a near-total disregard for limitations of any kind. Indeed, the new administration actively promoted arms sales as a means of shoring up U.S. power abroad and fighting Communism. With the United States taking the lead, international arms sales soared in the 1980s and early 1990s, once again provoking efforts to establish some kind of controls on the sale of weapons abroad. These initiatives, however, were largely aimed at the two extremes of the trade. First were attempts to create treaties limiting the transfer of technologies required to construct weapons of mass destruction— including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons— and their delivery systems. The effectiveness of these treaties has been limited. For example, India developed much of its nuclear weapons manufacturing capacity on its own, while Pakistan received help from China, Libya, and European suppliers. Pakistan’s nuclear experts also proved eager to pass their knowledge and designs to other countries eager to develop nuclear capabilities. At the same time, there was a concerted effort to limit the international trade in small arms. In 1997, most of the international community signed a treaty banning the production, sale, and use of antipersonnel

International Arms Trade

land mines. (The United States, citing its needs to defend South Korea, refused to sign.) The push to set international limits on the trade in small arms, especially assault rifles, was stymied by several factors. First, domestic lobbying groups including the National Rifle Association in the United States pressured politicians and negotiators not to sign any treaties that limit the domestic sales of small arms. Second, advocates faced serious logistical problems in limiting the international trade in small arms. Trade of big-ticket items such as aircraft, tanks, and missiles can be policed with the help of inspections and reconnaissance; by contrast, it is virtually impossible to police the trade in small arms. This has led to talk of designing small arms with built-in obsolescence devices or designing ammunition that scars weapons, thus demobilizing them after a certain period of use. Still, the fact that small arms—as well as land mines—can be manufactured cheaply and easily with low-tech equipment means that limitations on international sales may be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain. Advocates for control answer that any limitation is worth the effort, since it is bound to dry up some of the lethal supply. James Ciment

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Bibliography Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael Klare, and Laura Reed. Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995. Grimmett, Richard. Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986–1993. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1994. Hartung, William. And Weapons for All. New York: HarperCollins, 1995. ———. US Weapons at War. New York: World Policy Institute, 1995. Klare, Michael. American Arms Supermarket. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984. Klare, Michael, and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the 1980s. New York: Hill and Wang, 1988. Rana, Swadesh. Small Arms and Intrastate Conflicts. New York: United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, 1995. Sampson, Anthony. The Arms Bazaar. New York: Viking Press, 1977. Sennott, Charles. “Armed for Profit: The Selling of U.S. Weapons—A Special Report.” Boston Globe, February 11, 1996, supplement. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990. Washington, DC: U.S. General Printing Office, 1990.

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eventually become dominant among Angola’s elite. Later, these creoles would play the leading role in their nation’s struggle for independence from Portugal in the mid-twentieth century. The Afro-Portuguese defended their position by balancing the interests of the Europeans and the Africans, preventing either from coming into contact with one another or growing too powerful. This balancing act allowed them to maintain their role as the irreplaceable middlemen of Angolan trade, including its most lucrative commodity, human beings. It has been estimated that fully 12 million Africans from lands south of the equator were forcibly shipped to the Americas, and the bulk of these were captured in or transported through Angolan territory. But several factors in the late nineteenth century undermined the position of the Afro-Portuguese. The outlawing of the international slave trade eliminated a valuable commodity. The Berlin Congress, which divided Africa into European colonies, forced Portugal to begin asserting its claims for territory by demonstrable efforts to suppress indigenous peoples. And finally, the presence of the British in the interior of southern Africa led to new trading patterns and competitors. The Afro-Portuguese in the cities faced their own problems. By the turn of the century, more and more impoverished whites were emigrating to Angola, many encouraged by the government. Lisbon hoped to solve several problems through immigration to Africa. First, it hoped to relieve population pressures in Portugal, then one of the most crowded and poorest countries in Europe. Second, the government hoped to provide a white bulwark in the colonies as a defense against both rebellious Africans and covetous Europeans in neighboring colonies. Third, it hoped that new

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BOTSWANA RHODESIA (Bechuanaland until 1966)

Angola, one of the first territories to be incorporated into a European empire, had been a Portuguese colony since the late fifteenth century when explorers looking for an all-sea route to India and China established trading posts and forts near the mouth of the Congo River and the present-day capital of Luanda. Nevertheless, Portuguese efforts to penetrate and establish hegemony over the interior of the colony were sporadic and largely ineffectual until the twentieth century. That is not to say, however, that the Portuguese soldiers, traders, and settlements did not have an impact far outweighing their limited numbers and limited geographical penetration. Many of the settlers took Angolan wives, gradually establishing a population of mixed Afro-Portuguese in Angola. This group of people established themselves as a class of commercial intermediaries between the European traders of the coast and the African nations of the interior. These creoles spoke Portuguese, but blended European and African customs to create a unique culture that would 77

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

KEY DATES Late 1400s– early 1500s

Portuguese begin to settle in Angola and engage in the slave trade.

Late 1950s– France and Britain grant independence to almost all of their early 1960s colonies in Africa. 1960

Rioting breaks out among farmers in Malange Province over falling prices for their crops set by the government; some 7,000 protesters are killed; police arrest nationalist leader Agostinho Neto.

1961

Large-scale rioting breaks out against police brutality in Luanda in February; Kikongo people, led by the Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola (later the National Liberation Front in Angola, FNLA, its Portuguese acronym), rise up in rebellion in March; some 20,000 Kikongo are killed; fighting breaks out in October between the FNLA and another rebel group, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

1966

Jonas Savimbi, a leader among the Ovimbundu people of the southern part of the country, organizes the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

1974

Portuguese dictator Marcello Caetano is overthrown by leftwing, anticolonialist military officers in the Carnation Revolution; the new government announces it will immediately pull out of Portugal’s African colonies.

1975

Heavy fighting breaks out between the FMLN and the MPLA; each is trying to take control of the capital before the Portuguese officially pull out; UNITA launches an offensive against the MPLA in August; MPLA is largely victorious in both struggles, taking control of the capital and becoming the ruling party upon Angola’s formal independence on November 11.

farmers would raise valuable tropical products that would bring revenue to the treasuries of both Angola and Portugal. The policy largely failed. The farmers, usually the least educated and least successful in Portugal, could not make a go of it in the harsh wilds of Angola. Most drifted to Luanda or to the provincial capitals, where they increasingly competed with the Afro-Portuguese for civil service and commercial positions. They pressured the government to defend

their own interests with a series of racist edicts, favoring whites over Africans and creoles. The situation intensified after dictator Antonio Salazar rose to power in Portugal in the 1920s. Like Mussolini in Italy, the fascistic Salazar was eager to revive a glorious national past. He hoped to accomplish this by building what was called a Lusotropical (Luso is the adjective for Portuguese) empire in Africa, Asia, and even Brazil. Settlement of white farmers in Angola was again encouraged, but this

Angola: War of National Liberation, 19 61–1974

time with better effect. Better roads, more capital, and more effective medicines against tropical disease allowed many white farmers to succeed. Most important, Portugal’s neutral status in World War II put it in an ideal situation to produce and sell critical tropical products to both the Allies and Axis powers. Angola flourished, and more white settlers poured in, though most of them still ended up in the cities. The decades following the end of World War II saw much of the same, but at an even more accelerated pace. In the great capitalist expansion of the 1950s and 1960s, Angola’s products—including cotton, coffee, ivory, diamonds, gold, and increasingly oil—were in high demand. By the early 1970s, several hundred thousand whites—mostly Portuguese, but also Spanish and Italian—lived in Angola. Many remained poor, living in conditions little better than the creoles and often competing for the same jobs. At the same time, however, the winds of decolonization were sweeping across sub-Saharan Africa, beginning in Ghana in 1957 and spreading to virtually the entire continent from the Congo River basin north. Soon only southern Africa remained under white control, including the two settler republics of Rhodesia and South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. Portugal had several reasons for resisting the so-called winds of change in Africa. For one, large parts of the population in Angola and Mozambique wanted to remain under Portuguese rule. They even helped to develop a rationale for continuing occupation in an age of decolonization. The Portuguese, it was argued, had developed a nonracial form of cooperation with the Africans, unlike the racist apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. The races socialized, worked, and married together, creating a unique Lusotropical civilization. There was a kernel of truth to these assertions. The Portuguese did not seem quite so obsessed with maintaining the separation between the races; there was a far more relaxed social atmosphere in Angola and Mozambique than in neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa. But this kernel of truth was wrapped in layers of hypocrisy. Angolan society was stratified by race, with white colonists in near total control of the political and commercial scene. For Africans and creoles, there was more than just poverty to bear; there was a repressive police state designed to break any

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attempts to organize or demonstrate for improved economic conditions or true political equality. The more important reason for Portugal to hold on to its African colonies was that they were immensely profitable. Portugal, unlike France and Britain, the two other colonial powers in Africa, did not have the means to compete in the international marketplace. They knew that if they lost political control of their colonies, they could not maintain their economic control against the encroachments of other Europeans and South African whites. France and Britain would develop a kind of neocolonialist system based on economic control in their former African possessions, but Portugal did not have the resources to do the same.

Angolan Society In the early 1960s, on the eve of the national liberation struggle in Angola, it was a complex society. Stratified by race and class, it had a small elite of administrators, businesspeople, and planters. Beneath the elite was a middle class of professionals, retailers, and civil servants, largely white but including the occasional assimilado, the official designation for the Afro-Portuguese and other educated and acculturated Africans. Beneath the middle class were the masses of workers in the cities, largely black, and farmers in the countryside. This group, representing the vast majority of Angolans, was itself divided by ethnicity and economics. The indigenous African people of Angola were divided into three major ethnic and linguistic groups: the Ovimbundu in the south and central parts of the country, the Kimbundu along the coast, and the Kikongo in the northeast. Moreover, each of these different peoples played a different role in the country’s economy and was, in turn, shaped by that role. Many of the Ovimbundu worked for the cotton planters of the Central Highlands, but others had migrated or been transported to the north to work on the coffee plantations. This move put them into a fierce rivalry with the Kikongo, who resented their access to jobs and who held them in contempt for being under the thumb of white planters. Meanwhile, the Kimbundu of the coast dominated the African neighborhoods of the major cities and were increasingly resented by the Kikongo and Ovimbundu for their street-smart ways and their control of the job market in the port cities.

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War for Independence In the late nineteenth century, Portugal was forced to assert strong administrative control over its African colonies because of the aggressive forays of Belgium into the Congo. In a similar manner, the beginnings of the movement resisting Portuguese rule in Angola in the 1950s can be traced to the sudden decolonization of the Belgian Congo. In 1959, Belgium agreed to a four-year decolonization plan, but then abruptly changed its mind, giving the Congo independence in 1960. Ill prepared, the country was immediately embroiled in a multisided struggle for power between right- and left-wing elements, as well as separatists in different provinces of the vast new country. The conflict in the Congo worried the authorities in Angola since the two shared a border more than 1,000 miles long. More ominous was the large Kikongo population in the Congo, many of whom drifted back to their homes in Angola after the Belgian-owned plantations where they worked closed down. Even before the war, the Kikongo had taken the lead in pushing for autonomy. Under the leadership of Holden Roberto, they formed the Union of the Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA, later the UPA) in 1957, a largely ethnic-based, rural organization. With a leadership largely made up of small commercial farmers and small-time urban entrepreneurs, the organization took on a strongly anticommunist ideology. Meanwhile the Kimbundu people in Angola were also getting organized, having formed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, its Portuguese acronym), under the leadership of an assimilado doctor named Agostinho Neto. Like Neto himself, the MPLA was cosmopolitan in outlook and socialist in its political orientation, quite unlike the UPNA. In June 1960, colonial police arrested Neto, setting off riots in Luanda that resulted in the deaths of several unarmed demonstrators. Then, in an entirely separate incident, thousands of Kimbundu cotton farmers in the Malange province 400 miles southeast of Luanda began an armed uprising (the arms were machetes) over falling prices. They destroyed colonial livestock and property before being brutally suppressed by soldiers. It is estimated that some 7,000 farmers were killed. The incident, so distant from the capital, went largely unnoticed. Then, in February 1961, hundreds of African residents of Luanda, angered at police brutality and arbitrary arrests in the city, stormed the prisons,

freeing dozens of militants along with petty criminals. While the MPLA claimed credit, most historians believe it was a spontaneous affair. In either case, the uprising fueled a violent reaction among the city’s whites, who brutally killed hundreds of unarmed blacks in retaliation. This particular incident officially marked the beginning of the war of liberation and is celebrated today as Angola’s major national holiday. A month later, the Kikongo of the north rose up under the loose control of the UPNA, now renamed the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). Again, the Portuguese forces reacted brutally, killing some 20,000. These repressive measures were largely effective against the FNLA. Within a couple of years, the organization was limited to ineffective raids across the border from its sanctuary in the now-independent Congo. Even more destructive for the cause of Angolan independence was the growing animosity between the rightist, rural, Kikongo-based FNLA and the socialist, urban, and cosmopolitan MPLA. Indeed, as early as October 1961, FNLA partisans were attacking MPLA guerrillas, a harbinger of much worse to come. Soon afterward, MPLA cadres were evicted from the Congo by its right-wing dictator, Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko), and were forced into CongoBrazzaville, which shared no border with Angola proper. This made it difficult for MPLA to attack inside Angola. Despite these setbacks, the MPLA, with its more left-wing politics and nontribal inclusiveness, attracted the lion’s share of recruits to the rebel cause. Finally, in 1966, part of the MPLA relocated to Zambia, on Angola’s eastern border. Once again it was within striking distance of colonial forces. Unfortunately for the MPLA, however, the move to Zambia also put the organization into conflict with yet another rebel movement, that of Jonas Savimbi’s Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Savimbi, once a leader in Roberto’s FNLA, had left that organization because of its timidity and its ethnic exclusiveness. Savimbi was a well-educated and highly ambitious Ovimbundu man who felt that his own career and the interests of his people were better served by their own organization. He formed UNITA in 1966. From the beginning, the MPLA had suspicions about the organization. They claimed it was really a front set up by the Portuguese, to engage the MPLA in battle and keep the Ovimbundu in line. (These accusations were later corroborated.)

Angola: War of National Liberation, 19 61–1974

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Meanwhile, the Portuguese military began employing the anti-guerrilla strategy developed by the United States, which was also its main weapons provider. All the tactics used in Vietnam were copied on a smaller scale in Angola, including search-anddestroy missions, helicopter-aided mobility, the establishment of village militias, and even the use of napalm to deny the rebel forces jungle cover. Ovimbundu peasants were herded into relocation camps to keep them from providing aid to the rebels. Because of the vast reaches of the country and the relatively small areas in which the Portuguese planters and urban population lived, the army was able to keep the guerrilla war largely out of sight and out of mind. But the effort was costly, both in financial and political terms.

Independence and Internecine Fighting Trying to suppress rebellions in several of its colonies—Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, and Mozambique—put too much of a strain on Portugal. In February 1974, a group of centrist and left-wing military officers overthrew the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano, the man who had acceded to power after Salazar’s death in 1968. For a time, the new government, under the leadership of war hero Antonio de Spinola, tried to find a way to maintain some kind of political union with the colonies. But in October, Spinola was forced out by officers who immediately declared their intention to free Portugal’s colonies. The news caught the different rebel groups and the colonial leadership in Angola by surprise. The MPLA, its Luanda and eastern factions locked in a power struggle, were suspicious. The FNLA, backed by Zaire and China, believed it was in the best position to assume power. It welcomed negotiations with Lisbon, as did the more isolated UNITA in the southeast. Meanwhile, the whites of Angola were, not surprisingly, filled with trepidation about the events unfolding in Lisbon. Riots, largely instigated by whites, broke out in the capital. The whites talked about a unilateral declaration of independence, much as Rhodesian whites had done when Britain talked of black rule there in 1965. Arms began to flow into the country as the Portuguese prepared to pull out. The FNLA was supplied with weapons by China and, oddly, by the CIA as

The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) prevailed over rival nationalist groups and took the reins of power after the withdrawal of Portuguese colonial forces in 1975. (Library of Congress, POS 6—U.S., no. 739)

well. This case of strange bedfellows can be explained by Beijing and Washington’s mutual suspicions of the Soviet-backed and armed MPLA. By November 1974, when representatives of the three rebel groups met with Portuguese officials in the Lisbon suburb of Alvor, Angola was slipping into a foreign-aided civil war. While the Alvor accords promised elections following Angola’s formal independence on November 11, 1975, few observers believed the situation would be solved off the battlefield. In March 1975, the well-armed FNLA in the northeast marched on Luanda, hoping to capture the strategic junction at Caxito just north of the city. In response, the Soviets and Cubans began a major arms shipment to the MPLA. The fighting escalated

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through the summer, causing the vast majority of Portuguese colonists to flee, though not before vengefully destroying whatever property they could not take with them. In mid-September came the inevitable showdown between the FNLA and the MPLA. Utilizing rather ineffective but terrifying World War II–vintage Soviet rocket launchers—popularly known as “Stalin’s Organs”—the MPLA routed the FNLA. Roberto’s advisers from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised him to retreat and regroup, but the FNLA leader insisted on pushing on toward Luanda. The FNLA forces arrived in the suburbs of the capital on the eve of independence but were again turned back by MPLA and Cuban forces, this time for good. Meanwhile, the war was heating up in southern Angola. By August, UNITA had formed a strategic alliance with the government of South Africa, the latter fearing an Angola ruled by the socialist and militantly anti-apartheid MPLA. On October 16, the South African Defense Forces (SADF) invaded Angola in order to back UNITA’s push on Luanda, only to be pushed back by a Cuban and MPLA counteroffensive in mid-November. The SADF soon retreated to South African–controlled Namibia, Angola’s neighbor to the south. By the end of the year, the MPLA was in firm control of most of the country. The FNLA, having pulled back to Zaire, largely collapsed, especially after the U.S. Congress passed a law forbidding CIA interven-

tion in Angola, and Beijing decided it needed to find a way to work with the victorious MPLA government. UNITA was a different story. A more effective strategist and leader than Roberto, Savimbi led the remnants of his forces on a “long march” into the bush of southern Angola, determined to fight another day. James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; Angola: Struggle over Cabinda, 1960– ; Angola: First War with UNITA, 1975–1992; Angola: Second War with UNITA, 1992–2002; Congo, Democratic Republic of the: Post-Independence Wars, 1960–1965; Guinea-Bissau: War of National Liberation, 1962–1974; Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974.

Bibliography Bender, Gerald. Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Ciment, James. Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Davidson, Basil. In the Eye of the Storm: Angola’s People. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972. Marcum, John. The Angolan Revolution. Volume 1, The Anatomy of an Explosion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969. ———. The Angolan Revolution. Volume 2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978. Minter, William, ed. Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1988. Stockwell, John. In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. New York: W.W. Norton, 1978.

ANGOLA: Struggle over Cabinda,1960– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Separatist PARTICIPANT: Portugal CONGO

Brazzaville

CABINDA Oil fields

OCEAN

0

100 100

supported the occasional kidnapping of oil industry officials. In 1974, a new government in Portugal took steps to grant Angola’s independence, setting up talks in Alvor, a seaside town along the Portuguese coast. These negotiations for independence included three Angolan nationalist groups but excluded FLEC. Article 3 of the Alvor Accord of 1975 affirmed Cabinda’s status as a province of Angola. Soon afterward, Cabindan independence forces began a guerrilla struggle against the Angolan government. The violent conflict in Cabinda continued even as Angola carried out a series of peace conferences and negotiations with other dissident groups in the country but continued to ignore and exclude the Cabindan dissidents in FLEC. Upon the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Cabinda, forces from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has formed Angola’s government since independence, gained control of the province. Since then, various Cabindan separatist forces have fought with the Angolan government for control. In the three decades of struggle, almost 30,000 people have lost their lives.

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Cabinda

ATLANTIC

0

Luanda

ANGOLA

The enclave of Cabinda, a province of Angola since that country’s independence in 1975, has been a site of often intense conflict since the 1960s, first involving Cabindan struggles for independence against the Portuguese colonizers and, later, similar struggles against the Angolan government. Prior to Angolan independence in 1975, Cabinda, a small, oil-rich territory separated from the rest of Angola by the Democratic Republic of Congo, was listed by the Organization of African Unity as a country to be liberated. Cabinda’s first independence movement, the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC from its acronym in Portuguese) was founded in 1960 at the time armed struggle was launched throughout Angola against Portuguese rule. In 1963, MLEC merged with two other groups, the Committee for Action and Union of Cabinda (CAUNC) and the Maiombe Alliance (ALLIAMA), to form the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC), which has continued in various forms up to the present. Over the years, FLEC would engage in guerrilla warfare first against the Portuguese and later against Angolan troops. It also

Oil Cabinda is critical to Angola’s economic development since the province is the source of more than half of Angola’s oil production, which totals approximately 1 million barrels per day. Oil revenues make up more than 40 percent of Angola’s gross national product and provide the funding for more than 80 percent of Angola’s national budget. A key point of contention for Cabinda separatists is the way the Angolan government spends the revenues it receives from Cabinda’s plentiful oil. Cabindans point out that they bear the negative impacts of the oil industry on its environment and society but receive a very small fraction—only about 10 percent— of the revenues. There is also little indication that the 83

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KEY DATES 1960

The Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC, its Portuguese acronym) is formed to fight for independence against Portuguese colonizers.

1963

MLEC joins with two other Cabinda liberation organizations to form the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC).

1974

Portugal signs the Alvor Accord with three Angolan liberation organizations but not FLEC; accords call for Cabinda to be included in an independent Angola, which comes to be the following year.

1975–2002

Intermittent fighting occurs between the Angolan government and FLEC militants.

2002

Having reached a peace accord with its main internal enemy— the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—the Angolan government conducts a major sweep of Cabinda, defeating FLEC militarily.

2003

Negotiations begin between the Angolan government and Cabinda independence advocates.

2004–2005 While some refugees return to Cabinda from neighboring Republic of Congo, the UN issues a report saying the enclave is still unsafe for political dissidents owing to the presence of large numbers of Angolan military personnel.

oil companies contribute to the humanitarian and social development needs in the province. Cabinda suffers from shortages of food and farming materials as well as a lack of educational and employment opportunities. The oil companies employ thousands of people, but most of them work and live outside the territory. Cabindans charge that they are exploited both by the companies and by the Angolan government. The situation for Cabinda was especially difficult in the 1990s. In 1992, troops of the dissident UNITA party occupied the diamond mines in southern Angola, which were the country’s other major source of income. This occupation increased the government’s dependence on oil revenues, prompting it to step up efforts to control activities in Cabinda and vanquish the Cabindan insurgents. A large-scale sweep of Cabinda by Angolan forces in 2002 destroyed the main bases of FLEC’s two main factions

and forced many independence fighters to give up the guerrilla struggle. FLEC’s leaders went into exile and in 2003 began negotiations with Angolan authorities. At the same time, the Angolan army continued to maintain a strong military presence in Cabinda. Human rights groups and observers in Cabinda reported numerous atrocities, including rape, abuse, torture, and illegal detentions, carried out against the local population by the Angolan army. A 2004 report by Human Rights Watch also documented cases of arbitrary arrest, military interference with civilians’ freedom of movement, and extra-judicial executions. The Angolan government did not begin the process of forming a national human rights institution until January 2005. Even then, citizen groups complained that public participation was still not allowed. In February 2005, a delegation of Cabindan refugees made a brief visit to their former home and determined that it was unsafe for them to return

Angola: Struggle over Cabinda, 19 6 0–

because of the presence of Angolan military forces in civilian areas. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) did not have a permanent presence in Cabinda because of the continuation of conflict and because the primitive conditions restricted their access to necessary resources. The presence of land mines, along with impassable roads and bridges destroyed by fighting, made the movement of refugees unsafe and slowed the delivery of food to those who still lived there. Despite these unpromising conditions, more than 100 refugees returned to the province in September 2005 from the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville. This was the first repatriation of refugees to Cabinda in more than two years. Those who returned were a small percentage of those who had been stranded in CongoBrazzaville, and a similarly large number of refugees are living in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In addition to the great number of refugees outside of Cabinda, at least 25,000 internally displaced persons were within the province itself. Many Cabindans, while still desiring independence, would settle for autonomy within Angola. Their main demand is a fairer return on the contribution of their oil to the Angolan economy. In addition, civil society groups demand the end of human rights violations by the Angolan army, improved rights for oil workers, and better living conditions.

Negotiations In the peace negotiations with the Angolan government, the Cabindan Dialogue Forum, which includes FLEC and various Cabindan citizen groups, represents Cabinda. The negotiations proceeded with

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great difficulty and the prospects for peaceful resolution seemed dim. Fighting continued. Cabinda’s importance to the Angolan economy became even greater in 2005, when Angola’s stateowned oil company Sonangol announced that it would soon begin explorations for additional oil in Cabinda itself. It is believed that new onshore oil reserves will prove even greater that those in the substantial offshore fields already developed. Pro-independence forces were strongly opposed to any onshore oil development under Angolan direction. They cite the history of political and environmental damage within the province and continued concerns for local autonomy and self-determination as reasons for their opposition. It seemed likely that the prospect of new oil reserves in Cabinda would harden the positions of both the secessionist forces and the Angolan government. Already, in response to the Sonangol announcement, younger militants had promised to form a more radical and violent guerrilla force than the greatly diminished FLEC. Jeffrey A. Shantz See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Angola: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974; Angola: First War with UNITA, 1975–1992; Angola: Second War with UNITA, 1992–2002; Congo, Democratic Republic of the: Post-Independence Wars, 1960–1965.

Bibliography Ciment, James. Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Porto, João Gomes, and Imogen Parsons. Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2003.

ANGOLA: First War with UNITA,1975–1992 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Congo (Zaire); Cuba; South Africa; Soviet Union; United States CONGO

0 0

150 150

300 Miles

300 Kilometers

CABINDA (ANGOLA)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (Zaire from 1975 to 1997)

Luanda

OCEAN Benguela

UNDU KIMBOPLE PE

ATLANTIC

ANGOLA B e n g u ela R

ailr

oad

Huambo OVIMBUNDU PEOPLE Cuito Cuanavale Mavinga

NAMIBIA (Southwest Africa until 1990)

In the capital, the leadership of the MPLA moved on its political enemies. Both UNITA and the FNLA were outlawed, and what few supporters remained in Luanda were rounded up. Some thirteen FNLA mercenaries, mostly Americans and Britons, were convicted of various crimes, and four were executed. Even dissidents within the MPLA felt the postwar wrath. Two top advisers to President Agostinho Neto were arrested for organizing opposition within the party. Meanwhile, the MPLA tried to establish its international credentials. Strong-arming neighboring Zaire and Zambia, both dependent on Angolan railroads and ports for the bulk of their international trade, Angola won agreements that neither country would sponsor rebel movements within the country. While leaning toward the socialist bloc countries— for both ideological and military reasons—the MPLA government also tried to reach out to the West, knowing that only the big oil companies could provide the expertise and capital necessary to fully exploit the country’s vast reserves. MPLA spokespersons refused to see any contradiction in establishing a socialist government even as they opened up the country to capitalist investment. This contradiction was made possible by the general political tenor of the times. The socialist bloc was confident and assertive, having defeated the United States in Southeast Asia and having taken power in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique in Africa. At the same time, both the South African government under Prime Minister John Vorster and the U.S. government under President Jimmy Carter were in periods of foreign policy retrenchment, both having been burned in Angola by backing a losing side. Despite this auspicious beginning, the MPLA began making mistakes in its administration of the Angolan economy. Rather than attempting true land reform, the government continued the hated agricultural policies of the earlier Portuguese colonists,

Battle site

ZAMBIA Jamba

ZIMBABWE (Rhodesia until 1980) BOTSWANA

On November 11, 1975, Angola held what may be the strangest independence day in African history. As Portuguese Admiral Leonel Cardoso lowered his country’s flag over the capital city of Luanda, artillery could be heard in the background. While the left-wing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, its Portuguese acronym) took the reins of power, a rival group, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was marching on the city. Meanwhile, in the southern provincial capital of Huambo, a third liberation force, the South African–assisted Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was conducting its own independence celebration and getting ready to launch a military drive on the capital hundreds of miles to the north. Within a few months, however, MPLA forces, backed by Soviet arms and augmented by Cuban troops, would crush both the FNLA and the UNITA in battle, sending the former into oblivion and the latter on its famous “long march” into the southern Angolan bush, to prepare for yet another round of fighting. 86

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KEY DATES 1975

As independence approaches, various rebel forces—including the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, its Portuguese acronym), the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) battle for control of the country; the MPLA wins the conflict; when Portugal grants independence, the MPLA takes power in Luanda; the FNLA largely disbands while UNITA retreats to rural areas in southern and central Angola.

1977

An attempted coup by top MPLA official Nito Alves is crushed.

1981

With accession of anticommunist Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency, South Africa feels emboldened to increase its attacks on the leftist MPLA government.

1983 South Africa launches Operation Askari, working with UNITA forces to put Jonas Savimbi in power; the offensive fails but causes high casualties. 1984 A cease-fire is signed in Lusaka, Zambia, between UNITA, MPLA, the Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO), and South Africa. 1987 Battle of Cuito Carnevale results in major Cuban-backed MPLA victory over South Africa and UNITA. 1989 Moderate F.W. de Klerk becomes president in South Africa, replacing hawkish P.W. Botha; de Klerk vows to reach a peace settlement for interconnected conflicts in Southwest Africa and Angola; South Africa pulls out of Southwest Africa, which is renamed Namibia, the following year. 1991

Under the aegis of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Portugal, UNITA and MPLA sign Bicesse Accords, agreeing to a cease-fire, a demobilization of UNITA, and national elections.

1992 National elections result in an MPLA victory; Savimbi, whose forces do not fully demobilize, charges fraud and vows to continue fighting.

forcing small farmers to sell their crops at belowmarket rates to government purchasing boards. To guarantee stability in the countryside, the government often used holdovers from colonial times, many of them chieftains and labor bosses who had worked with the Portuguese. And on top of all this, the MPLA laid down an enormous bureaucracy to institute a centralized, command economy on the lines of its mentors, the Soviet Union and Cuba. This combination of blunders sparked a coup in 1977 among more radical members of the MPLA including Nito Alves, who had been put in charge of

organizing Luanda’s citizens into poder popular (people’s power) committees during the late stages of the national liberation war. The coup was easily crushed and the committees were hounded out of existence, but their repression left a residual bitterness among the Angolans and killed any possibility of a diplomatic opening to the United States or South Africa.

Rise of U N ITA Following his defeat in 1975, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi maintained a low profile in a redoubt hidden

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UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi retreated to southeastern Angola after his defeat by the leftist MPLA in 1975 and launched a U.S.-backed guerrilla war that did not end— or at least pause—until the Bicesse Accords of 1991. (Selwyn Tait/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

in the southern Angolan bush, an area the Portuguese had aptly named “the land at the end of the earth.” His main backer, South Africa, had largely abandoned him, and a potential backer, the U.S. government, was legally mandated by an act of Congress to stay out of Angolan affairs. Still, by 1977, Savimbi felt confident enough to begin launching hit-and-run attacks on isolated MPLA outposts and infrastructure targets, the latter mostly confined to the Benguela rail line between the Atlantic port of that name and the copper belt of Zambia. By 1980, however, UNITA had grown significantly, both in numbers and in military potential, and was now capable of hitting the railroad at almost any point along its 700-mile length in Angola. How UNITA grew so fast is a matter of some controversy. Its supporters say that it appealed to disenchanted farmers of the Ovimbundu tribe, who were upset by the government’s agricultural policies, which included the consolidation of villages into farming cooperatives under the control of bureaucrats from Luanda and local chieftains, many of them quite unpopular. Savimbi himself was an Ovimbundu, and UNITA offered his fellow tribesmen a way to fight back. The organization’s opponents say that UNITA’s forces improved only after South African Defense Minister P.W. Botha staged a right-wing “coup.”

Botha had made support of anticommunist rebel movements in southern Africa a key part of his strategic defense of the apartheid regime. The policy, known as “total strategy,” was intended to make surrounding countries ungovernable and to portray black majority rule as incapable of bringing peace and prosperity. At the same time, he hoped to strong-arm the new independent black states into giving up any support for the African National Congress (ANC), which was fighting for an end to apartheid in South Africa. Then in 1980, conservative Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter for the U.S. presidency. Botha in South Africa now felt he had a kindred spirit in Washington. So, too, did Savimbi, who was quoted as saying that Reagan’s election was “the best news since the beginning of the war.” Indeed, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, outlined his “constructive engagement” policy toward South Africa and insisted on a new linkage of southern African issues. Specifically, he urged that South Africa agree to pull out of its illegal colony in Namibia only when Cuban troops left Angola.

South Africa Invades With the green light on in Washington, South Africa stepped up its support for UNITA dramatically. In 1981 alone, the South African Defense Forces (SADF) conducted over 1,000 bombing missions and fifty ground assaults, including the massive Operation Protea, in which a 5,000-man force occupied the southern Angolan province of Cunene for several weeks. The declared rationale was to eliminate Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) forces, which were fighting for the liberation of Namibia from South Africa. Eventually, Angolan forces, with Cuban support, halted the South African advance sixty-five miles north of the Namibian border. UNITA, now a well-armed and formidable force of its own, had stolen the MPLA government’s authority in much of southern Angola, as well as in the Ovimbundu homeland in the central highlands. Still, it was always at a disadvantage, because the MPLA had an enormous war chest paid for by its substantial oil revenues. The MPLA had more soldiers, more arms, and virtually total control of the skies, except when South African forces invaded, as they did once more with Operation Askari at the end of 1983. Initially, Askari was not meant to be a mere attack on

Angola: First War with U N ITA, 1975–19 92

southern Angola, as Protea had been, but an all-out invasion intended to put Savimbi and UNITA in power in Luanda. But when military satellites revealed the extent of the South African buildup, the Soviet Union, a supporter of the Angola government, issued stern warnings to South Africa, forcing it to scale back its plans. With anti-apartheid sentiment growing in the United States in the election year 1984, the Reagan administration temporarily backtracked, pushing negotiations on all parties to the conflict. An accord signed in the Zambian capital of Lusaka included a cease-fire and assurances that neither UNITA nor SWAPO would take advantage of a SADF pullback from southern Angola. But South Africa had no intention of honoring its word, a fact made plain when a group of South African commandos were captured while attempting to blow up oil facilities in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda far to the north. On the eve of Angola’s tenth anniversary of independence, both UNITA and the MPLA were growing weary. The MPLA was alarmed at the SADF’s capacity to attack anywhere in the country, and UNITA was worried, for a time at least, that the Lusaka accord might mean an end to South African aid. Rather than encouraging peace, this mutual weariness led to increasingly brutal tactics by both sides. Savimbi’s aim was to make Angola ungovernable. To do this, UNITA engaged in a reign of terror, murder, and destruction. Its combatants attacked and destroyed cooperative farms and forcibly recruited villagers to serve as porters, servants, farmers, and soldiers in the UNITA cause. For its part, the MPLA considered almost any Ovimbundu person to be a potential supporter of UNITA. This thinking led to mass arrests and confinement of thousands of Ovimbundu peasants in camps that bore a striking resemblance to the fencedin, prison-like strategic hamlets Portugal set up during Angola’s war of independence. Thus, UNITA was not always required to forcibly recruit new soldiers; MPLA tactics did much of this work. Nor did war weariness encourage any of the warring parties to scale back their operations. Indeed, 1986 represented a watershed in the war, as UNITA, the MPLA, and their respective allies prepared for what they all saw as the decisive showdown in the now almost decade-long conflict. The flood burst the following year in the great land battles of Mavinga

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and Cuito Cuanavale, the largest military engagements in the history of sub-Saharan Africa. The precipitating event was the result of the MPLA’s military edge over UNITA. Having installed air defense systems capable of keeping the South African air force out of Angolan skies, the MPLA had been ruthlessly tracking down and bombing UNITA forces. Fearing defeat, Savimbi appealed to South Africa, which then launched a massive 10,000-man assault first on the town of Mavinga, then on the fortified city of Cuito late in 1987. With supplies running low, the MPLA turned to its patron, Cuba, which came to its aid with some 50,000 troops. A successful Cuban-MPLA assault on the SADF’s rear placed the South Africans in dire straits, pummeled by the Angolan air force and unable to retreat. Fearful of a mass surrender, and facing increasing protests at home, the South African government agreed to pull out of Angola and sit down to negotiate an end to its war in Angola.

End of the War The defeat was not just a watershed moment in Angolan history, but also for South Africa itself. Many students of apartheid believe that the defeat in Angola represented a critical blow to both the “total strategy” policy and the Botha administration. Within two years of the Cuito defeat, a new and more conciliatory South African government under F.W. de Klerk had legalized the African National Congress (ANC) and set the country on the road to racial reconciliation. South Africa also agreed to free Namibia before the Cubans pulled out of Angola, one of the sticking points in earlier negotiations. Indeed, Namibia held elections in 1989 and 1990, leading to independence and the victory of SWAPO as the country’s ruling party. Cuba lived up to its word and pulled its troops out of Angola by the May 1991 deadline in the accords, which were signed in New York in 1988. Savimbi was distraught as a result of these developments, and by the knowledge that the Reagan administration was coming to an end. But when George Bush was elected president in 1988, Savimbi was assured of American support. Bush had been director of the CIA during that agency’s earlier foray into Angola in 1975. In addition, the congressional act banning aid to the parties in the Angola conflict had expired in 1986.

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In 1989 and 1990, both the war and the negotiations to end the war sputtered on. The U.S. government, taking up the slack left by the departing South Africans, pumped millions into UNITA coffers, sending in biweekly flights with supplies to UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba, in southeastern Angola, from bases in Zaire. Even though the Soviet Union was in collapse and its Cuban allies were scheduled to leave Angola, they provided handsome support for the MPLA government. The Soviets not only provided much-needed weapons, but also rescheduled some $2 billion in loans owed to Moscow. Still, both the military and political situations had changed dramatically since the signing of the New York Accords. Gone were the days of major land battles. Instead, the war returned to the course it had taken in the early 1980s, in which the MPLA and UNITA engaged in guerrilla attacks and counterattacks, with the civilian population caught in the middle. Meanwhile, the departure of the Cubans and South Africans had pulled the ideological rug out from under the feet of both parties to the conflict. With Havana gone and the Cold War ebbing, Savimbi could no longer portray himself as the bulwark against the spread of Communism in southern Africa. And with South Africa’s withdrawal, the MPLA lost its most compelling rationale for all-out war against UNITA. Thus, both sides were more willing to negotiate, even if talks served as a cover for their continuing efforts to settle their struggle for power on the battlefield. In June 1989, Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko invited both sides to talk at his presidential compound in Gbadolite. Mobutu, however, proved himself a disingenuous intermediary by promising mutually exclusive things to the MPLA and UNITA, telling one that Savimbi would go into exile and the other that he would be guaranteed a role in a government of national reconciliation. Not surprisingly, the talks went nowhere and both sides dug in their heels. Many in Luanda felt that Savimbi had been South Africa’s puppet and, with aid from Pretoria drying up, he could be easily defeated. For his part, Savimbi ruthlessly purged his ranks of leaders favoring conciliation, including his chief lieutenant Tito Chingunji. Meanwhile, UNITA was coming under increasing fire from human rights organizations, which accused it, among other things, of using food relief as a weapon. Since 1990, it had blocked UN convoys from delivering much-needed foodstuffs to Angolan peas-

ants, who were suffering both from disruptions caused by the war and from the extended drought that hit southern Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As 1990 drew to a close, both the war and the talking—the latter, this time, under the aegis of the Portuguese—accelerated. In December, the MPLA launched its long-expected assault on Jamba. But instead of defending his headquarters, Savimbi outflanked the government forces and took his army to the north and east. It was a clever tactical move. Without the support of the SADF, Savimbi knew he could not beat the MPLA in a head-on conflict. Instead, he adopted a more mobile strategy, employing hit-andrun tactics. In addition, he sought to entrench himself in the diamond-mining areas near the country’s northeastern frontier with Zaire, thereby assuring himself of a steady source of revenues and access to U.S. arms. By spring 1991, the war had again stalemated, with neither side able to deliver the knockout blow against the other. This situation, however, benefited Savimbi who, by the oldest rule of guerrilla warfare, simply had to survive in order to win, which is exactly the way he liked it. The UNITA leader had always made it clear that he did not like to negotiate from a position of weakness. In May, the two sides finally signed onto a deal that seemed to promise an end to hostilities. Under the so-called Bicesse Accords, named after the Portuguese resort town where they were signed, both sides agreed to an in-place cease-fire within one month, a UN-monitored election and demobilization of both forces, a joint commission to draw up a new constitution—overseen by the three Bicesse guarantors: the Soviet Union, the United States, and Portugal—and an integrated 50,000-man army. The treaty did not come a moment too soon. In the fifteen years since independence, war had engulfed the country and brought appalling losses in its wake. Some 100,000 Angolans had died in battle, while another 700,000 died from disease and malnutrition directly related to the war. Approximately 30 percent of the nation’s 10 million citizens had been displaced and over 6 million land mines laid, leaving Angola— together with Cambodia—as a world leader in amputees. It is estimated that between them, the MPLA and UNITA spent $10 billion prosecuting the war, with a further $2 billion pumped in by both the Soviet Union and South Africa, and with several hundred million provided by the United States. Cuba had committed no fewer than 100,000 troops over that same

Angola: First War with U N ITA, 1975–19 92

period of time. It was, by all accounts, the bloodiest war in the history of southern Africa.

Participants Despite its claims to being the most inclusive of Angola’s three major political movements of the pre-independence period, the MPLA had a leadership largely composed of urban intellectuals. Both Neto and Jose Eduardo dos Santos—who became president in 1979 and held the office for more than thirty-five years— held advanced degrees. A further contradiction in the makeup of the party was its factionalism. While the leaders shared similar backgrounds, the infighting among them was often intense. Both Daniel Chipenda and Nito Alves, among the leading figures in the movement before independence, were ruthlessly purged when their radical politics ran afoul of the bureaucratic and centralized dictates of Neto and dos Santos. The MPLA was heavily criticized on several counts, and not just by supporters of UNITA. First, its urban leadership, many say, failed to understand the needs of the vast majority of Angolans who remained in the countryside. Its push to communalize holdings offended many tradition-bound farmers, while its support of purchasing boards run by local strongmen seemed too akin to Portuguese practices. Finally, its army—often forcibly recruited, poorly trained, and underpaid—tended to act like an army of occupation rather than as a defender against rebel attacks. In several ways, UNITA has been the mirror opposite of the MPLA. Where the MPLA liked to portray itself as an inclusive party representing all Angolans, Savimbi did little to dispute the charges that UNITA was nothing more than an Ovimbundu political and military front. Yet while the MPLA leadership remained in Luanda, almost entirely out of touch with the Angolan peasantry, Savimbi remained in the bush and sought to retain a close rapport with the peasant farmers in his area of control. At the same time, however, UNITA was largely the creation and tool of Savimbi’s own thinking and ambition. Savimbi was a very effective military and political leader, resurrecting an almost totally destroyed or outnumbered force on at least two occasions through his ruthless and charismatic leadership. A chameleon-like political figure, Savimbi espoused a

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cross section of doctrines and won accolades from an odd cross section of admirers that, over the years, included such disparate figures as Ronald Reagan and Mao Zedong.

Issues and Tactics Like many civil conflicts, the post-independence war in Angola was sparked by one set of issues but became bogged down in other disagreements as it continued on for fifteen years. As a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist organization, the MPLA instituted a bureaucratic centralized state, with forced communalization of the countryside, state-run agricultural purchasing boards, single-party politics, and a repressive political apparatus. In essence, the MPLA tried to create a Soviet-bloc–style state in a country whose economy, outside of a few key sectors, was dominated by subsistence farmers. This is what Savimbi and UNITA said they were fighting against. Savimbi made it clear that he believed that a free market economy and a nonintrusive state were what Angolans wanted and needed. His rhetoric included frequent references to the use of Angolans as guinea pigs in a misguided experiment to impose a command-style economy on a people with a free enterprise tradition. But his chameleonlike ways often made his criticisms seem suspect. Having once trained in mainland China, Savimbi began his career as a Maoist believer in peasant revolution. When the Cold War heated up, he changed his tune, emphasizing his anticommunist credentials. And when the Cold War ended, he reworked himself once again, this time as a defender of democracy. As the war continued, however, new issues came to the fore. Most important among these was foreign involvement. By appealing for aid from South Africa, Savimbi lost credibility with many Angolans and with leaders throughout Africa. At the same time, the MPLA constantly charged that UNITA was a mere tool of reactionary white regimes, in both Pretoria and Washington, determined to prevent the establishment of a truly revolutionary state in southern Africa. UNITA countered with charges that the MPLA was little more than a tool of Soviet expansionists and their Cuban allies. Because of its length, intensity, and wide array of outside interests, the MPLA war with UNITA saw virtually every tactic of modern warfare employed

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during the fifteen years from independence to ceasefire. They included guerrilla warfare in the bush as well as house-to-house urban fighting. There were great land battles and lengthy sieges. Aside from the massive amount of weaponry employed, the only constant during the war was the suffering of the civilian population caught in the middle. Both sides also engaged in egregious human rights violations, not as a by-product of the war but as a conscious tactic to win. Aiming to overthrow the MPLA government, UNITA tried to undermine the government’s authority in the countryside by destroying infrastructure and murdering civilians, both tactics aimed at showing the peasantry that the government could not effectively defend them. As for the MPLA’s forces, their mission to uproot a largely Ovimbundu army in Ovimbundu territory led to a military mindset in which every Ovimbundu-speaking person was a potential enemy.

Negotiations The long post-independence war between the MPLA and UNITA saw no fewer than four separate attempts to find a negotiated settlement. The first were the 1984 Lusaka Accords. A complete failure, the accords were meant to disengage South African, Cuban, and Angolan forces in the southern part of the country. They lasted less than six months, when the MPLA government discovered that both South Africa and UNITA were engaging in illegal sabotage. The second set of negotiations in 1988 led to the only permanently successful agreement of the war. With the New York Accords, both South Africa and Cuba agreed to pull their forces out of Namibia and Angola, respectively, with the former country being granted independence. Both Cuba and South Africa lived up to the letter and spirit of the accords in full. The final two sets of negotiations—those conducted under Zairean aegis in 1989 and those held in Portugal in 1991—concerned the two Angolan

antagonists. The Zairean talks utterly failed, undermined by the mutually exclusive promises Mobutu made to each side. The Bicesse Accords of 1991— with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Portugal as guarantors—was nominally more successful, though it, too, would prove temporary. With its strict deadline and demobilization deadlines, the Bicesse Accords did not allow enough time for the tensions between the two sides—built up over years of bitter and bloody fighting—to subside sufficiently to conduct such delicate procedures. They, too, would break down, leading to a second and even fiercer war between the MPLA and UNITA. James Ciment See also: Cold War Confrontations; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Angola: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974; Angola: Struggle over Cabinda, 1960– ; Angola: Second War with UNITA, 1992–2002; Congo, Democratic Republic of the: Post-Independence Wars, 1960–1965; Namibia: War of National Liberation, 1966–1990; South Africa: AntiApartheid Struggle, 1948–1994.

Bibliography Bridgland, Fred. Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1986. Ciment, James. Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Minter, William. Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London: Zed Books, 1994. Ohlson, Thomas, and Stephen Stedman. The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994. Saul, John. Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993. Seidman, Ann. The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985. Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1993. Vines, Alex. Angola and Mozambique: The Aftermath of Conflict. Washington, DC: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995.

ANGOLA: Second War with UNITA, 1992–2002 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Democratic Republic of Congo CONGO

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disengage and demobilize two large and hostile armies scattered over a terrain twice the size of Texas, while simultaneously registering millions of voters, albeit with the help of both government and UNITA officials, and setting up some 6,000 polling stations. Mistaken assumptions and expectations compounded these massive logistical problems. Like most outside observers, and indeed like most Angolans, the UN force expected UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to win the elections handily, given the rotten shape of the Angolan economy and the widespread criticisms of the MPLA that UN officials were hearing from the Angolan people. Thus, when journalists and human rights activists pointed out the egregious campaign irregularities and intimidation of voters occurring in the zones under UNITA control, the United Nations turned a blind eye, since it expected Savimbi to win anyway. In addition, UN peacekeepers largely ignored the fact that only the Angolan army was effectively demobilizing, while UNITA was merely handing over its most out-of-date weapons, keeping its more modern armaments and best-trained men in reserve in bush camps. The UN was not wholly at fault. Fearful of infringements on its sovereignty—not a surprising attitude given its experience with foreign interference since independence—the MPLA insisted on keeping the UN force as small as possible and giving it minimal freedom of action. For example, UN monitors could do nothing to stop violations of the Bicesse Accords; they could only take notes and make their reports. Electoral predictions, however, did not turn out as anyone expected. Instead of awarding a landslide victory to UNITA, Angolan voters—fearing the harsh, ethnically charged rhetoric coming from the UNITA camp—chose the MPLA. As campaign graffiti on the walls of Luanda put it: “The MPLA steals; UNITA

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With the Bicesse Accords of May 1991, the first postindependence war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, its Portuguese acronym) government in Angola and the U.S.supported rebel forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) came to a gradual end, though sporadic fighting between the two groups continued through 1992. Under the Bicesse Accords, named after the Portuguese resort town where the accords were signed, both sides agreed to the following: an in-place cease-fire within one month, national elections by September 1992, and the demobilization of both forces and their integration into a 50,000-man national military force by the same time. A multinational UN force was supposed to monitor all these activities. The problems began here. The United Nations committed neither the money, the personnel, nor the guidance on the complicated and sensitive procedures required. The UN budgeted about $130 million and dispatched 500 peacekeepers and election monitors to 93

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KEY DATES 1992

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, its Portuguese acronym) leader Jonas Savimbi loses the election for the presidency; claiming fraud, he vows to continue fighting.

1993–1994

Using oil revenues, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) purchases $3.5 billion in new weaponry, goes on the offensive against UNITA forces in northeastern Angola; new talks between MPLA and UNITA begin in Lusaka, Zambia.

1994

MPLA and UNITA sign the Lusaka Accords, calling for UNITA demobilization and national elections.

1995–1998

Even as fighting continues, the UN begins setting up demobilization camps throughout the country.

2002

Government forces kill Savimbi on February 22 during a military offensive; representatives of UNITA and the government meet to sign a peace agreement on April 4.

2003

UN peacekeepers wind up their observation mission in February.

kills.” Voters evidently preferred thieves to murderers and gave the MPLA 129 out of 220 seats in the national assembly. They also opted for MPLA leader Jose dos Santos over Jonas Savimbi as president. UNITA garnered only 70 seats, with the vast majority of its votes coming from the areas under its own control. The troubles began on September 30, 1992, the second and final day of voting. Both sides had suspicions about voter fraud and intimidation. But UNITA was particularly upset that MPLA-controlled radio and TV announced the government party’s victory even before the polls had closed. Adding to the problem, neither the Angolan parties nor the United Nations had thought much about what would happen after the elections. That is to say, all parties were so concerned with the electoral process itself that they did not concern themselves with questions about what kind of government would exist after the elections and what role the opposition would play in that government.

War Begins Again Within days, angry rhetoric had degenerated into violence. As UNITA troops began to drift out of the demobilization camps, others in the south launched

their first attack against government-controlled towns in mid-October. At the same time, riots broke out in the capital. Both government troops and civilians began to attack UNITA supporters, ultimately killing more than 1,000 of them, including UNITA vice president Jeremias Chitunda, who was gunned down as he tried to flee the city. Savimbi, meanwhile, fled Huambo, the provincial capital and Ovimbundu stronghold. His return to the bush portended ominous things, given his past record of regrouping and retaliation. At first it seemed that Savimbi had made a gross error in judgment. Usually an astute reader of the American political scene, the UNITA leader had banked on support from past patron President George H.W. Bush, whom he expected to win the American elections that were being held just over a month after those in Angola. But Bush lost to Democrat Bill Clinton, who made it clear that the United States would not continue to support a movement it considered a relic of the Cold War, especially when it apparently refused to play by the rules of the electoral game. Even though UNITA now lacked a superpower patron, it still had the advantage over the MPLA on the battlefield, which had effectively demobilized in the months leading up to the election. By the middle

Angola: Second War with U N ITA, 19 92–2002

A UNITA soldier oversees local garimpeiros (miners) searching for diamonds along a river in northern Angola. UNITA used the profits from diamond mining to buy weapons for its ongoing civil war with the ruling MPLA. (Piero Pomponi/Getty Images News)

of November, UNITA forces were on the offensive, having captured some 57 of Angola’s 164 official municipalities, including 3 provincial capitals, in both the north and the south of the country, as well as the port of Lobito in the south. A brief government offensive stalled in December, and Savimbi, sensing the tide was going with UNITA, kept the military pressure on. Using his resources from diamond-mining interests in his stronghold in the northeast of Angola, Savimbi went on a buying spree in the international arms market, importing some $100 million in weapons from Israel and the South African homeland of Bophutswana. Caxito, a major hydroelectric station, was captured, leaving the capital of Luanda without electricity and water. But Savimbi’s main targets were the central highlands cities of Huambo and Cuito, both of which came under lengthy and bloody sieges through much of 1993. After nearly two months of fighting,

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both fell to the rebels. Thousands of civilians fled Huambo, but UNITA forces executed many who remained, including wounded civilians and soldiers in the town’s hospital. It took some six months for the MPLA forces to get back on their feet, aided by more than $3.5 billion in weapons purchased with oil revenues in late 1993 and early 1994. Reorganized and rearmed, the Angolan army went on the offensive, sweeping UNITA forces away from the coast and into the interior. Both Huambo and Cuito came under heavy aerial and artillery bombardment, which killed thousands of civilians. Huambo returned to government control in January 1994 and, after months of block-to-block fighting, so did Cuito. With both armies poorly provisioned, soldiers and rebels alike took turns hijacking UN food convoys and seizing food drops from the air. As he had done after his defeat in 1975, Savimbi took the still substantial remnants of his army deep into the Angolan bush, though this time he headquartered himself in the east and northeast, which were the source of his diamond revenues and were close to airfields in neighboring Zaire (later renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Despite international sanctions, Savimbi appeared to have little trouble in securing the weapons he needed on the international arms market and getting them to his troops over the porous border with Zaire. Indeed, the Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko turned a blind eye to planes transshipping arms through his country to UNITA. By the end of 1993, when a new round of talks between the MPLA and UNITA began in the Zambian capital of Lusaka, the war seemed to be returning to a familiar stalemate. Negotiators at Lusaka, under the aegis of the UN, were far more careful, patient, and sober than they had been at Bicesse three years earlier. Having learned their lesson the hard way, all sides were willing to take their time in hammering out a set of accords that would work. It took them nearly a year. The Lusaka Accords of November 1994, though similar in content to those of Bicesse, were far more flexible in terms of implementation. Gone were the strict deadlines for demobilization and elections. Instead, all sides agreed to let these processes move forward under their own momentum. And this time, the United Nations committed the necessary resources, including over $1 billion and several thousand peacekeepers. From 1995 to 1998, the United Nations set up demobilization camps throughout the country. While

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the UN proclaimed it was making progress, both sides of the conflict continued to engage in sporadic armed confrontations. In addition, UN peacekeepers and monitors were attacked in several incidents. The worst of these occurred in late 1998 and early 1999 when UNITA forces shot down two UN transport planes. In February 1999, the Angolan government ejected the UN after the international organization attempted to negotiate with UNITA to protect its UN observers in UNITA-controlled territory. The government, arguing that Savimbi and his UNITA organization were terrorists and war criminals, said the UN’s actions were inappropriate. In November 1999, the government also rejected a UN effort at peace negotiations. Luanda’s hard line on the UN reflected the government’s belief that it was gaining the upper hand in the conflict with UNITA. Although well manned and well armed—from stores kept hidden after the 1991 peace agreement and through purchases on the international arms market—UNITA was becoming increasingly isolated by the late 1990s, as its three main sponsors either disappeared or cut off support: the apartheid regime in South Africa had given up power in 1994; the United States no longer saw the need for supporting an anticommunist guerrilla movement since the Cold War had come to an end in the early 1990s; and the Mobutu regime in Zaire had collapsed in 1998 in the face of a rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila. Indeed, the MPLA government had sent troops into Zaire to support the rebels, who renamed their country the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Savimbi’s Death, and Peace Still, the fighting remained intense through 2000 and 2001. The major government breakthrough came in early 2002. On February 22, 2002, government forces killed Savimbi during fighting in the eastern province of Moxico. As the government had made such announcements before, many of the Angolans and much of the world remained skeptical until the body was shown on national television a few days later. As UNITA had always been a tightly hierarchical rebel force, with the charismatic Savimbi as its indispensable leader, his death was catastrophic for the organization. Already reeling from major government offenses, and no longer enjoying access to the international arms market through air bases in the former Zaire, UNITA sought to arrange a ceasefire with the Angolan military.

Meeting in the Angolan parliament building in Luanda on April 4, 2002, UNITA chief of staff General Geraldo Abreu Kamorteiro and General Armando Da Cruz Neto, head of Angola’s armed forces, signed the peace agreement that ended more than a quarter century of civil war in Angola. The agreement called for the total demobilization of UNITA forces under UN aegis and their integration into the Angolan army and police. By August, UNITA’s military wing had officially disbanded, and in February 2003 the UN wrapped up its observation mission. Meanwhile, UNITA turned itself into a political party, led by Isaias Samakuva, the organization’s former unofficial “ambassador” to Europe. Almost continuous fighting in the country since 1961—when the armed struggle against Portuguese colonizers began—left an awful legacy of over 1.5 million dead and 3 million displaced. Much of the nation’s infrastructure lay in ruins, and the country had been seeded with anywhere between 1.5 million and 6 million land mines, most of them still in the ground. Because of frequent land mine injuries, Angola had perhaps the highest number of amputees in the world. On the positive side, most observers say the country was unlikely to return to war. Moreover, the resource-rich country had the potential for an economic renaissance, especially when oil prices rose steeply beginning in 2005. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Angola: Struggle over Cabinda, 1960– ; Angola: First War with UNITA, 1975– 1992; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Invasions and Internal Strife, 1998.

Bibliography Bayer, Tom. Angola. Presidential and Legislative Elections, September 29–30, 1992. Report on the IFES Observation Mission. Washington, DC: IFES, 1993. Human Rights Watch/Africa. Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections. New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994. Knudsen, Christine, and I. William Zartman. “The Large Small War in Angola.” Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Sciences (September 1995). Pearce, Justin. An Outbreak of Peace: Angola’s Situation of Confusion. Claremont, South Africa: D. Philip, 2005. Pereira, Anthony. “The Neglected Tragedy: The Return to War in Angola.” Journal of African Studies (Winter 1994): 76–90.

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During the colonial era, France used Burkina Faso chiefly as a labor reserve. Beginning in 1919, the French authorities instituted a system of forced labor—which lasted unti1 1946—under which village chiefs were required to provide a quota of men to work for specific periods to ensure a flow of workers to other parts of France’s African empire. While the majority of the population was used as semi-slave labor, France did, after 1946, educate a small elite, groomed to take over government after independence and to be amenable to continuing informal French control. Upper Volta became independent on August 5, 1960. The first president, Maurice Yameogo, was surrounded by French advisers. Widespread dissatisfaction with government corruption and the obvious enrichment of Yameogo and his cronies served as the excuse for a military coup in 1966 headed by Colonel Sangoule Lamizana. Lamizana held power for fourteen years, periodically allowing limited political activity and then clamping down when he deemed things to be getting out of hand. Notably, in a country with almost no industry or industrial workers, labor unions headed by French-educated left-wing intellectuals were the most active of Lamizana’s opponents. In fact, the overwhelming majority of union members were civil servants. Nevertheless, it was not workers or bureaucrats but another military coup led by Colonel Saye Zerbo that ousted Lamizana in November 1980. Zerbo ruled through a thirty-one-member Military Committee for Recovering National Progress (CMRPN), among whose members were reform-minded, even

Burkina Faso, originally known as Upper Volta, was a part of French West Africa until 1960. It is a landlocked nation of 105,870 square miles with a population estimated at 14 million in 2005. The capital, Ouagadougou, has about 650,000 people. Burkina Faso is bordered on the north and west by Mali, on the east by Niger, and on the south by, from east to west, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire. Desperately poor, with an estimated per capita national income of only about $170 a year, the country is heavily dependent on remittances that migrant workers send home to their families. About 85 percent of the people practice subsistence agriculture. National policy has been to encourage food self-sufficiency, and the main crops are maize, sorghum, and millet, with some rice and sugar. Some cotton is grown and exported. The northern and northeastern parts of the country are typical Sahel semi-desert suitable only for very limited cattle grazing. Further south are savannas, also subject to frequent drought and creeping desertification. Commercial agriculture is only possible in the country’s three river valleys. There is some mining, principally for gold. Manufacturing employs less than 1.5 percent of the labor force. The official language is French, although a large number of tribal languages are in common use. The 97

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KEY DATES 1960

Burkino Faso, then known as Upper Volta, wins independence from France.

1966

Protesting corruption in civilian government, Colonel Sangoule Lamizana seizes power in the country’s first military coup.

1980

Colonel Saye Zerbo ousts Lamizana in coup; Zerbo establishes the Military Committee for Recovering National Progress (CMRPN, its French acronym) as the governing body; CMRPN is made up of reform-minded military officers, including Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore.

1982

Zerbo is ousted in a coup by Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, who names Sankara prime minister in a leftist government, angering France.

1983

The French support an effort by Zerbo allies to seize Sankara, Campaore, and other revolutionary leaders; Campaore escapes and frees Sankara; in August, Sankara and Campaore seize power in a coup.

1984

Sankara establishes the National Revolutionary Council, launches anticorruption campaign, promotes national agricultural self-sufficiency, and changes the country’s name to Burkina Faso.

1984–1987

Sankara’s anticorruption campaign and land reform policies upset powerful interests in the country.

1987

Campaore seizes power; Sankara is murdered.

radical, young officers including future presidents Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore. Sankara acted as minister of information and gained local fame for such populist gestures as riding his bicycle to work and refusing the usual ministerial perks. In November 1982, Zerbo, in turn, was ousted and replaced by Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo, who named Sankara prime minister. Sankara dissolved the CMRPN and brought civilians, notably the MarxistLeninist union leader Souman Toure, into the government. Evidently this turn to the left disturbed French security officials. In May 1983, French president François Mitterrand’s adviser on African affairs, Guy Penne, arrived unannounced in Ouagadougou. Shortly afterward, allies of Zerbo seized Sankara, Compaore, and two other revolutionary officers. Compaore escaped, succeeded in gaining control of the country’s major

military base, and freed Sankara and the other two officers. In August, Sankara and Compaore led yet another coup and forced Ouedraogo’s resignation.

The Sankara Years Sankara, although pronouncing himself a MarxistLeninist on taking power at the head of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR, its French acronym), was basically a populist reformer with a genuine hatred of corruption. He considered it wrong, in a country where the vast majority were desperately poor, that anyone, no matter how the wealth was gained, could be rich. He assumed, in most cases correctly, that the wealthy of Upper Volta had not earned their wealth honestly. His anti-corruption campaign took particular aim at civil servants. He

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was determined that they not set themselves up as a well-remunerated educated elite, lording it over the illiterate masses. To show he meant business, he organized Popular Revolutionary Tribunals (TPR) to conduct show trials of the corrupt. Zerbo and other high officials were subsequently convicted by these courts. Sankara cracked down on the bureaucracy. For example, in 1984, Sankara prohibited the wearing of expensive foreign clothing by civil servants, making them wear clothing made of Burkinade cotton, woven and tailored locally. He also prohibited any civil servant, regardless of rank, from using any automobile larger than a Renault 5. These restrictions resulted in bitter enmity from the civil servants, which would later contribute to his downfall. A brilliant public speaker and self-publicist, Sankara not only endeared himself to the masses of Upper Volta, which he renamed Burkina Faso (Land of Incorruptible Men) in August 1984, he quickly became something of a cult figure among nationalistic young people throughout Africa. At the same time, he was feared and loathed by Africa’s “big men,” the postcolonial dictators who flaunted their new wealth while their countries remained impoverished. Sankara’s economic policy stressed food selfsufficiency. Key to this was developing new water resources, and a system of reservoirs was begun. More immediately, he ordered cutbacks on cotton production, ending the government incentives paid to cotton growers and requiring that more of the fertile land along the country’s rivers be turned over to food production. He also severely limited imports of luxury foods. Real progress was made against tremendous odds as Burkina Faso was almost able to eliminate food imports in 1985. After that, however, population growth, desertification, and a resumption of cotton exporting resulted in huge food deficits. Another Sankara economic objective was to develop major manganese deposits in the north. However, the only rail line in the country ran south from Ouagadougou to Côte d’Ivoire, and the investment required to reach the deposits caused foreign investors to shy away. Sankara’s social programs emphasized health care and education. Here again he was frustrated. It proved easy to build schools and clinics in the villages but almost impossible to staff them with qualified teachers and health care workers. A number of Cuban doctors provided assistance, but there were never enough.

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Throughout, Sankara preached self-sufficiency. He was outspoken in his denunciations of foreign aid missions. Typically, he was offended by the contrast between the living standards of foreign aid mission employees and those of the people they were ostensibly assisting. He believed that far too great a percentage of foreign aid benefited the aid workers and the local elites they employed. In an address to the UN General Assembly shortly after taking power, he said: “Few other countries have been inundated with all types of aid as mine has been. This aid is supposed to favor development. You will look in vain for any signs of anything connected with development.” In turning to countries such as Cuba, China, and Libya for guidance and assistance while publicly denouncing French imperialism, Sankara made numerous foreign enemies. The United States drastically reduced its economic assistance to show its displeasure. By 1987, Sankara’s personal popularity was still high among poor citizens, who were grateful that he had passed a tax relief program and granted women the right to own property. Neverthless, he had clearly lost most of his support in the military and the civil service. His puritanical intolerance for corruption offended the ambitious, and land reform angered the rich landowners; even the Marxist-Leninists were outraged. They hoped to act as a revolutionary vanguard, but instead were being sent off to work on village construction projects. In May 1987, a major tax fraud investigation led to the closure of many small businesses. In the same month, civil service trade union officials, who had led protests against job cutbacks and other austerity measures, were arrested for “counter-revolutionary activities.” On October 15, 1987, Sankara, age thirty-seven, was murdered, probably by order of Blaise Compaore, his one-time comrade. Thirteen members of the CNR died with him.

After Sankara Compaore, announcing establishment of a new Popular Front (FP), dissolved the CNR and denounced Sankara, even while declaring he would continue to pursue his revolutionary objectives. It soon became clear, however, that the age of reform was over. Among Compaore’s first acts was to accept a gift of a fleet of armored Alfa Romeo cars from Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi. The traditional left was pacified by emphasizing top-down control of local development work instead

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of Sankara’s insistence on local control and involvement. The traditional right—village chiefs in the rural areas and businessmen in the cities—were quietly notified that their freedom of action had been restored. Foreign powers, offended by Sankara’s often strident anti-imperialist rhetoric, also found Compaore much friendlier. Although retaining ties to Libya, Burkina Faso reestablished relations with Israel and broke relations with China to recognize Taiwan. Finally, in a gesture to the memory of Sankara,

in 1991, Compaore raised a memorial tomb to the former leader in Ouagadougou. David MacMichael See also: Coups; Ivory Coast: Civil Disorder Since 1999.

Bibliography Baxter, Joan, and Keith Somerville. “Burkina Faso.” In Benin, the Congo, Burkina Faso, ed. Bogdan Szajkowski. London and New York: Pinter, 1989.

BURUNDI: Ethnic Strife Since 1962 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Lake Victoria

RWANDA Lake Kivu KIRUNDO NGOZI

TANZANIA

Bujumbura

Lake Tanganyika

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Burundi, like its next-door neighbor Rwanda, has been wracked by genocidal conflict between the two dominant ethnic groups, the Tutsi and the Hutu. In Rwanda, at least half a million Tutsi died in a genocidal slaughter in 1994. Burundi’s mass killings came earlier: one in 1972, in which more than 100,000 Hutu were killed, and another in 1988, in which tens of thousands of Hutu were killed. Since 1988, ethnic warfare in Burundi has smoldered on, with the death toll approaching 200,000. Journalists blamed the killings on inevitable ethnic strife between “ancestral enemies,” but this explanation was overly facile. Most African countries have an ethnic mixture at least as complex as that of Burundi, yet they have managed to avoid the internecine murders that plagued both Burundi and Rwanda. Furthermore, it was impossible to accurately characterize Hutu and Tutsi as ancestral enemies. The roots of their animosity did lie in the past, but they were tangled.

Historical Background In the 1930s, about 14 percent of the indigenous populations of Burundi were Tutsi, 85 percent were

Hutu, and Twa pygmies made up the remaining 1 percent. These figures do not take into account the sizable immigrant community in Burundi. The origins of the two ethnic groups is unclear, but oral legend suggests that the Hutu may have arrived first, displacing the original Twa pygmies, and were in turn followed by the Tutsi immigrants from the north. The first reliable historical accounts come from European invaders in the nineteenth century. They found that the Tutsi in Rwanda had forced the Hutu into a subsidiary economic and political position, with Tutsi kings, chiefs, and their families dominating a Hutu peasant class. In Burundi, the situation was more complex. Tutsi tended to dominate, but Hutu chiefs still survived, and a powerful Hutu clan might have substantially more prestige and wealth than a poor Tutsi clan. Furthermore, a third class of princes, Ganwa, arose and were viewed as separate from both Hutu and Tutsi. Despite the ethnic and class divisions between Tutsi and Hutu, their history saw substantial intermingling; Hutu and Tutsi married, merged languages and culture, yet never quite merged into one ethnic group. The Tutsi remained dominant, but it was possible for a Hutu through marriage or clan membership to be accepted as Tutsi and for a Tutsi who had suffered misfortune to sink down to Hutu status. The designations “Tutsi” and “Hutu” became as much caste or class categories as ethnic labels. The situation was also complicated by the Ganwa princely caste. The Ganwa appealed to both Tutsi and Hutu for support, and political conflict was based on Ganwa rivalries, not ethnic divisions. The Germans, who ruled Burundi and Rwanda from 1897 to 1916, accentuated the existing differences between Tutsi and Hutu. Viewing Rwanda through the lens of nineteenth-century European prejudices, the Germans saw the Tutsi, who tended to be taller and more “European” in appearance than their Hutu neighbors, as obviously superior and deserving

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KEY DATES 1962

Burundi gains independence from Belgium on July 1 under Tutsi rule.

1965

A Tutsi refugee from neighboring Rwanda assassinates the Hutu prime minister of Burundi in January; in May elections, Hutu win, but King Mwambutsa IV appoints a Tutsi prime minister; Hutu military officers attempt to overthrow the government in October.

1966

The Tutsi-controlled military overthrows the monarchy and establishes a republic; over the next six years, the Tutsi purge the Hutu from the army.

1972

Uprising by the Hutu in the south leads to a crackdown by the Tutsi government, resulting in roughly 100,000 Hutu deaths.

1988

Hutu in the northern part of the country rise up against the Tutsi government; hundreds of Tutsi are killed; Tutsi retaliation leads to reprisals in which 15,000 Hutu are killed; the military leader of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya, attempts to calm the situation by bringing more Hutu into government.

1993

After five years of Hutu–Tutsi clashes, elections are held in June, and Hutu candidate Melchior Ndadaye becomes president; in October, Tutsi military units seize the presidential palace and kill Ndadaye; a coalition government selects Hutu Cyprien Ntaryamira as president.

1994

Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana are killed when their plane is shot down in Rwanda, leading to Hutu genocide of over half a million Tutsi in Rwanda and an influx of 200,000 Tutsi refugees into Burundi; in October, Hutu and Tutsi politicians form a coalition government with a Hutu president and Tutsi prime minister.

1996

Tutsi military officers topple the coalition government and establish a military dictatorship.

2003 Hutu rebels sign a cease-fire with the government of Burundi, but sporadic fighting continues. 2005 Hutu parties win national elections but with guarantees for minority Tutsi representation.

of their higher status. The Germans seemed not to recognize that intermarriage and class mobility had already blurred physical differences between the two groups, making it very difficult to reliably identify a Tutsi or a Hutu from appearance alone. Prompted by their racial misreading of Rwandan society, the Germans favored the Tutsi ruling class, using them as their colonial puppets and proxies. The Tutsi were

labeled a superior race descended from Ethiopian invaders, while the Hutu were categorized as an inferior Bantu people. The Belgians, who took over Rwanda after World War I, went even further and issued identity cards that officially identified the ethnicity of each Rwandan as either Tutsi or Hutu. This policy exacerbated tensions between the two groups. Some Tutsis used

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their status to oppress Hutus, which naturally increased Hutu resentment.

Independence Under pressure from the United Nations, the Belgians agreed to grant Burundi and Rwanda their independence in 1962. The government was to be a constitutional monarchy, with the traditional Burundi royal clan providing the kings. In the years leading up to independence, two main political parties were created. The first was the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA). UPRONA, led by Prince Louis Rwagasore— a member of the Ganwa class and the eldest son of Burundi’s king, Mwambutsa IV—was a progressive nationalist party that advocated uniting all sections of society under a single banner. Its rival was the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC), a more conservative party with strong ties to the Belgian administration. The Belgian colonial administration favored the PDC over UPRONA, but Rwagasore was extremely popular among both Hutu and Tutsi. In the pre-independence election held in September 1961, his party won fifty-eight out of sixty-four seats in the vote for a new assembly. Two weeks later, on October 13, Rwagasore was shot by a Greek assassin who had been hired by the PDC. There was strong evidence that the Belgian authorities had some connection to the assassination. They had thought that Rwagasore and UPRONA were too radical and suspected them of having Communist sympathies—a completely erroneous belief. On July 1, 1962, Burundi achieved a peaceful transition to independence. But without the unifying force of Rwagasore, politics in Burundi became increasingly polarized. King Mwambutsa IV attempted to give positions in his government to both Tutsi and Hutu, but both resented what they felt was favoritism for the other. Polarization between the Hutu and Tutsi of Burundi was increased by a revolution in neighboring Rwanda, where ethnic divisions had always been much more important. Chafing under Tutsi domination, the Hutu of Rwanda had created an avowedly ethnic party, the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation du Peuple Hutu (PARMEHUTU). PARMEHUTU led a 1961 revolution that ended the Tutsi control of the country and went on to eliminate Tutsi from almost all positions of importance. In Burundi, many Hutu looked at events in Rwanda with envy. Hutu politicians began to campaign

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on a populist platform that advocated an end to Tutsi control in Burundi. Similarly, Tutsi in Burundi saw the Rwanda revolution as a sign that their own power might be in danger—their fears fanned by an influx of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. Tutsis reacted by attacking all Hutu parties that they perceived as ethnically based. Thus, although Burundi had not had the same kind of ethnic polarization as Rwanda did, events in Rwanda pushed Hutu and Tutsi into becoming more like their neighbors, thereby helping to fulfill their own prophecies of ethnic conflict. UPRONA, the party that had unified Burundi, began to lose its Hutu supporters and become a Tutsi-dominated party. Martin Ndayahoze, a moderate Hutu army officer, described the way in which unscrupulous politicians used ethnicity to gain power: “If they are Tutsi, they denounce a Hutu peril which must be countered. If they are Hutu, they unveil a Tutsi apartheid which must be combated.” Ndayahoze was killed by Tutsi in 1972.

Tutsi Take Control In January 1965 tensions were increased in Burundi when a Tutsi refugee from Rwanda assassinated the Hutu prime minister. In new elections held in May 1965, the Hutu won a victory, but then were incensed when King Mwambutsa IV chose a Tutsi prime minister. Hutu officers within the army and police reacted in October by attempting to overthrow the government. Their attempt was suppressed, and the Tutsi victors took advantage of their success to seize many of the leading Hutu politicians and military officers and have them executed. The attempted coup and its suppression led to upheaval in Burundi’s countryside. Through October and November, roving bands of Hutu attacked Tutsi homes and in turn were targeted by Tutsi troops and paramilitary political gangs, who also attacked innocent Hutu civilians. The Hutu, their leadership gone, received the worst of the violence; thousands were killed, many of them soldiers in the army slaughtered by their own commanders. In 1966 the now completely Tutsi-controlled army overthrew the monarchy—King Mwambutsa IV had fled the country during the failed October 1965 coup—and declared Burundi a republic. The new government was completely dominated by Tutsi officers and politicians, one of whom, Michel Micombero, was

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chosen to be president. The monarchy, which had given Hutu and Tutsi a shared symbol of unity and authority, was gone.

1972 Massacre From 1966 to 1972, Tutsi officers steadily purged the Hutu from the army. Some Hutu were included in the National Revolutionary Council (NRC), which ruled the country, and although the NRC denied that it was an ethnically based party, it was clear that part of their agenda was to make sure that Hutu had no more than a token presence at the highest levels of government. This Tutsi elitism inspired unrest among most Hutu, who felt that they were living under a system of ethnic apartheid. The animosities between Tutsi and Hutu fed off each other. When Hutu radicals accused the Tutsi of ethnic elitism, the Tutsi denounced the Hutu for practicing ethnic politics and then further tightened their grip on power. Extremists on both sides gained support by becoming even more extreme. Tutsi-Hutu hatreds, while having some historical roots, were largely manufactured by opportunistic politicians. Hutu fear and hatred escalated into violence in late April 1972 with an uprising in the southern part of Burundi, traditionally a region dominated by the Hutu. In what was probably a planned uprising, Hutu seized armories in several southern towns, including Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac, and started killing any Tutsi they could find (as well as some Hutu who refused to join their rebellion). Two or three thousand Tutsi died during the week-long revolt. The Tutsi government, led by President Micombero, responded to the Hutu rebellion with a coordinated attack on the entire Hutu elite. In May, while Tutsi troops were crushing the rebels, Hutu elsewhere who had not taken part in the uprising were rounded up and executed. Even Hutu who had helped fight against the rebels, as many had, were arrested and killed. The Tutsi carrying out these attacks came from the army and the Jeunesse Nationaliste Rwagasore (JNR), a Tutsi UPRONA youth group (by this time UPRONA was an exclusively Tutsi party). The murders were carried out with guns, clubs, and machetes. Those Tutsi who protested against the killings risked being killed themselves. Although any Hutu was vulnerable during the massacres, the Tutsi particularly targeted the educated

classes. Teachers at all levels were killed, as were their students, including those in primary school. Tutsi students helped the executioners find their victims by making lists of their Hutu classmates. A U.S. embassy report read, “Trucks ply the road to the airport every night with a fresh contribution [of bodies] to the mass grave.” Over the course of May and June the Tutsi killed at least 100,000 Hutu. This number amounted to about 2 percent of the Hutu population but included almost every educated Hutu. The Tutsi extremists of President Micombero’s government had succeeded in wiping out those Hutu who would have been best able to resist Tutsi control. The massacres left behind a legacy of hatred that would haunt Burundi.

The Tutsi State In 1976, Micombero was overthrown by JeanBaptiste Bagaza, another Tutsi officer and a cousin of Micombero’s. Bagaza attempted to maintain Tutsi power through strict bureaucratic controls placed on society. Education was restricted so that Hutu, still the vast majority of the population, were only a minority in secondary schools. Churches and missionaries were restricted because Bagaza and the Tutsi suspected them of being sources of dangerous ideas among the Hutu. Bagaza also attempted, with limited success, to force farmers to live in villages so that a closer watch could be kept upon them. In an attempt to eradicate Hutu “tribalism,” Bagaza also forbade all mention of ethnicity, in public or in private. This policy maintained Tutsi control without ever admitting that there were any such groups as Tutsi or Hutu. Officially, anyone was allowed to be a part of Burundi’s government, but in practice it was almost completely managed by Tutsi. Most government ministers were Tutsi, and the thirty-member military council that ran the country was entirely Tutsi. Bagaza’s policies were unpopular among both Hutu and Tutsi. His regime was handicapped by its nature: It was difficult to lead a system that enforced apartheid while never admitting that apartheid existed. Extremist Tutsi wanted more limitations put on the Hutu. Hutu and moderate Tutsi wanted the government to attempt reconciliation and reintegration of the two ethnicities. In 1987, Bagaza was overthrown by another coup led by a Tutsi army officer, Pierre Buyoya.

Burundi: Ethnic Strife Since 19 62

Buyoya’s Regime Buyoya, who ruled from 1987 to 1993, attempted to institute a more flexible approach to the problem of Hutu-Tutsi relations. He permitted greater freedom of speech and allowed ethnic terms to be discussed openly again. Many political prisoners, mostly Hutu, were also released. Buyoya argued that Tutsi and Hutu had to cooperate for Burundi to prosper. Finally, Buyoya ended the restrictions on religion that the previous regime had imposed. However, beyond a few superficialities, Buyoya’s regime was not substantially different from that of Bagaza before him. Tutsi still dominated the army, the civil service, and the judiciary. In August 1988, frustrated by what they perceived as a lack of change—especially after their hopes had been raised by Buyoya’s promises—Hutu in the northern provinces of Ngozi and Kirundo rose up and killed hundreds of Tutsi. This uprising, unlike the one in 1972, seemed to have been completely unplanned. The Hutus who revolted suspected that extremist Tutsi were planning another massacre and staged a preemptive strike. The Hutu fears were not completely groundless. Many ethnic clashes had occurred in the early part of 1988, often initiated by Tutsi extremists, and Tutsi army units had seemed suspiciously active in the two provinces. The murders of the Tutsi were carried out with great brutality, and the Tutsi reaction was even more brutal. Some 15,000 Hutu were killed in the reprisals that followed. Unlike 1972, this Tutsi response did not seem to be organized from the center; rather, it was a combined action from individual Tutsi commanders. Buyoya’s response to the 1988 massacres was unusual for Burundi. Rather than clamp down harder on the Hutu, Buyoya accelerated his liberalization policies. Buyoya brought a number of Hutu into his government and appointed a Hutu as prime minister. He also created a commission composed of an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi members to investigate the massacres. Buyoya’s decision to open his government was probably caused in part by foreign pressure: international opinion was extremely critical of the Tutsi policies, and Buyoya risked a loss in foreign aid payments if he did not moderate Tutsi practices. Ethnic friction continued in the early 1990s, with the occasional flare-up of violence. Buyoya, however, continued to move Burundi toward more openness. Under his guidance, Hutu gradually took over a

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majority of cabinet posts in the government. Finally, in June 1993, Buyoya allowed an open presidential election to be held. It was won by the Hutu candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, with 65 percent of the vote (Buyoya received 33 percent). Ndadaye’s party, the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), also won a majority of the seats in Burundi’s legislature.

Chaos in Rwanda and Burundi Ndadaye served as president for four months. Although the Hutu dominated the government, the Tutsi still controlled the army, and extremist officers resented Ndadaye’s attempts to bring Hutu into the army. In October 1993, Tutsi army units seized the presidential palace and executed Ndadaye and other government leaders. The leaders of this coup were not backed by the rest of the army and were either put under arrest or forced to flee the country, but the damage caused by the coup was severe. Ethnic violence by fearful Hutu and extremist Tutsi continued through 1993 and into 1994. The government was put back together with the ministers who were still alive. Moderates in the two major parties, the Hutu-dominated FRODEBU and the Tutsi-controlled UPRONA, put together a governing coalition in an effort to restore order. The coalition government picked a Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and a Tutsi prime minister, Anatole Kanyenkiko. Their attempts to end the violence were handicapped by the Tutsi-controlled army’s reluctance to search for those within its ranks who had helped the October 1993 attempted coup. The Hutu suspected, probably correctly, that the army was protecting some of its own commanders who had been involved in the coup attempt. Hutu in the countryside remained afraid of another Tutsi-led genocidal slaughter. The reaction of peasants in the villages was to target each other. Hundreds were killed every week. In a further attempt to calm the situation, the president of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, and Burundi’s president, Ntaryamira, both Hutu, met in an international summit in Tanzania. On their return, their plane was shot down above the Kigali airport in Rwanda. Who assassinated the two presidents has not been discovered as of early 2006. It was assumed by many that Hutu extremists in Rwanda had decided that the two men must die in order to prevent further reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. If the assassins were Hutu, where they acquired the

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Burundian soldiers check the papers of Hutu leaving the country for Zaire in 1995. The growing number of Hutu exiles in Zaire raised an armed force that slipped back across the border to carry out guerrilla attacks against the entrenched Tutsi. (Alexander Joe/AFP/Getty Images)

equipment to shoot down a jet airliner was unknown. An April 6, 1994, report by the French paper Le Figaro claimed that French officers admitted having sold the missiles to the Hutu as part of a general policy of supporting Rwanda’s Hutu-controlled government. A retired French minister responded by suggesting that the United States had been responsible. This seemed unlikely, particularly as other sources had proved that France continued to supply the Hutu with arms even after some of their antiTutsi intentions had become clear. In Rwanda, the double assassination was the trigger for a wave of violence that killed at least half a million Tutsi. In Burundi, the government, now shared

between Tutsi and Hutu, was able to prevent any largescale violence from breaking out. Small-scale violence, however, continued.

Violence and Breakdown In October 1994, the government—again a coalition between FRODEBU and UPRONA—appointed another Hutu, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, as president; the Tutsi Kanyenkiko continued on as prime minister. Although it was clear that some elements among both Tutsi and Hutu desired an end to the bloodshed between the two ethnic groups, extremists on both sides remained eager to undercut their efforts.

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Particularly troublesome was the influx of some 200,000 Hutu refugees from Rwanda. In July 1994 a Tutsi-led army defeated the Hutu government of Rwanda, and hundreds of thousands of Hutu fled, fearing reprisals. The violence in Rwanda had been greater than in Burundi, and the refugees helped to raise Burundi Hutu fears—and may have contributed directly to violence in Burundi. Assassinations of government officials and murders of civilians of both ethnicities continued, with women and children being prime targets. Hutu in exile in Zaire organized an armed militia to fight against the Tutsi army. The guerrilla group, Force pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD), which was the military wing of the extremist Hutu Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD), slipped its men across the border to attack Tutsi villagers. The Tutsi army responded with campaigns against the Hutu-occupied suburbs of Bujumbura, Burundi’s capital. By 1996, Burundi was becoming segregated, with the larger towns and Bujumbura becoming all Tutsi, while the countryside was transformed into Hutu-only territory. In July 1996, the Tutsi army toppled Ntibantunganya’s government (Ntibantunganya fled to the American embassy) and replaced it with a military dictatorship led, again, by Pierre Buyoya. The world, tired of the killing in Burundi, responded with economic sanctions against the country, but Buyoya refused to step down. The Hutu-dominated party, FRODEBU, now excluded from the government, became more radical and militant. Some of its members joined the CNDD in calling for an armed struggle against the Tutsi.

Possible Return to Peace In August 2000, most of the political parties of Burundi agreed to an end to hostilities and a gradual return to democracy. The two holdouts were the Hutu party CNDD-FDD and the extremist Hutu Forces of National Liberation (FNL). However, the CNDDFDD finally signed a cease-fire with Buyoya’s government in 2003. Domitien Ndayizeye, the leader of FRODEBU, the Tutsi party, became president of Burundi in late 2003. The radical FNL continued to refuse integration into the peace process and rejected the return to democracy. In August 2004, the FNL killed 152 Tutsi refugees from the Congo who had been staying at a

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camp in western Burundi. The government attempted to arrest the heads of the FNL and legally classified the FNL as a terrorist organization. The FNL embarked on a campaign of armed rebellion, chiefly in the countryside surrounding the capital. In 2005 the government concluded a cease-fire with the FNL, but hostilities did not entirely end. Long-awaited national elections were held in the summer of 2005 and were won by the Hutu CNDDFDD. The head of the group was Pierre Nkurunziza, who was overwhelmingly elected president by the country’s CNDD-FDD–dominated parliament. However, Tutsis received guaranteed numbers of governmental positions and significant control of the army. President Nkurunziza took office on August 26, 2005, in a ceremony attended by eight African heads of state, including the presidents of South Africa and Kenya. Nkurunziza said that his priorities were restoring law and order to the country and preventing further ethnic conflict. As the son of a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother, he seemed well suited to achieve that end, according to observers. Without law and order, he argued, the international aid that was essential to the economy could not be used effectively. The government also hoped to reestablish Burundi’s now moribund cash crops of tea and coffee, a key to its longer-term prospects. In regards to Burundi’s ethnic woes, Hutu extremists (as embodied by the FNL) remained opposed to the political settlement and considered the current government to be imposed by outside international forces. Some experts suggested that the FNL was seeking a general amnesty before it would sign any agreement to end its rebellion. In any case, the FNL reminded Burundi of its power in August 2005 by bombing a market in Bujumbura one day before Nkurunziza’s inauguration. Carl Skutsch and Charles Allan See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Invasions and Internal Strife, 1998; Rwanda: Civil War and Genocide Since 1991.

Bibliography Chrétien, Jean-Pierre. Trans. Scott Straus. The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History. New York: Zone Books, 2003. Eggers, Ellen K. Historical Dictionary of Burundi. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1997. Lemarchand, René. Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1996.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Coups Since 1966 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups,Left and Right PARTICIPANT: France 0

CHAD

0

100 100

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

Birao

CAMEROON

Ndélé

SUDAN

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Kaga Bandoro Bria Bossangoa Bambari Bouar Sibut Bangassou Bangui Mobaye Berberati Bimbo Nola Mbaïki Bozoum

CONGO

Obo

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (ZAIRE)

The Central African Republic (CAR), formerly part of French Equatorial Africa, has a land area of 240,500 square miles and a population estimated at 3.9 million. On the south it shares a 2,200-mile border with the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), on the north a 1,400-mile border with Chad, and on the east one of equal length with Sudan; on the west it has a short border with Cameroon. As its name implies, the nation lies almost in the center of Africa. The capital is Bangui, with a population of about 700,000. Subsistence agriculture is the major economic activity. Coffee, cotton, and tobacco are grown for export. The major earner of foreign exchange is diamond mining. There is some lumbering, but the country’s primitive road network and distance from large markets limits this enterprise. This remoteness may be an economic blessing because the combination of a relatively small population and the difficult access to natural resources has allowed the preservation of great areas of rain forest and animal life.

National leaders see ecotourism as a potential industry and have adopted a strong policy to preserve the environment. The CAR has about thirty different tribal groups, but, unusual for Africa, only one tribal language, Sango, is used by almost the whole population. Life expectancy is low—forty-eight years for men and about fifty-three for women—and AIDS is widespread. Very important for any consideration of the Central African Republic is that it is the main African base for the former colonial power, France. During World War II, Bangui was the headquarters for General Jacques-Philippe LeClerc’s Free French forces. Today, France maintains about 1,200 elite troops in the country. For military reasons, France has considerable influence over CAR affairs and a strong interest in seeing that order is maintained.

Historical Background The area of Bangui apparently had an advanced Neolithic culture and was later part of several important medieval African kingdoms. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the area and its inhabitants suffered from the depredations of slave raiders attacking from Chad and Sudan. In 1889, France established the town of Bangui and, in 1907, formally set up the colony of Oubangui-Chari (later the CAR) as part of French Equatorial Africa. French rule was harsh, and the exploited native plantation workers rose continually in revolt. World War II produced great changes in French Equatorial Africa. Many local men were recruited into the French military and fought with distinction in campaigns in North Africa and Syria. To ensure their loyalty, General Charles de Gaulle convened a conference at Brazzaville in 1944 at which plans were

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Central African Republic: Coups Since 19 6 6

109

KEY DATES 1960

The Central African Republic gains its independence from France.

1965

General Jean Bedel Bokassa seizes power in a military coup.

1976

Bokassa declares an end to the republic and announces the formation of the Central African Empire, with himself as emperor.

1979

Responding to continuing repression by Bokassa, France sends paratroopers to oust the emperor, revive the republic, and place David Dacko in power.

1981

Dacko’s government is overthrown in a military coup led by General André Kolingba.

1993

Elections return the country to civilian rule with Ange-Félix Patasse voted in as president.

1996–1998

Several army mutinies prompt France to send in troops; they are soon replaced by a peacekeeping force of African nations, and finally UN troops.

2003

A military coup led by Kolingba overthrows the unpopular Patasse regime.

2005

The country returns to civilian rule following the election of François Bozize as president.

made to abolish the worst features of colonial rule. These plans were incorporated in the French constitution of 1946, which granted limited voting rights and representation in the French National Assembly to the inhabitants of French Equatorial Africa (now consisting of Gabon, the CAR, the Republic of Congo, and part of Cameroon). The first native African deputy from French Equatorial Africa was Barthelmy Boganda, who was also the first such person ever ordained as a Catholic priest. Boganda, very much a francophile (he married a French woman after leaving the priesthood), returned to French Equatorial Africa from service in Paris disillusioned. The French people, he had learned, had little interest in the well-being of Africans. Back in his native Ubangi region of French Equatorial Africa in 1949, he began grassroots organizing. His Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN, its French acronym) worked for full political and social equality between whites and blacks. Eventually, he looked to create a single

nation within the French Commonwealth, including all the former colonies of French Equatorial Africa. By the 1950s, Boganda had become the leading native political figure in the region and a hero to black Africans everywhere. In 1958, de Gaulle, back in power after resigning in 1946, established the Fifth French Republic, whose constitution provided for the free association of autonomous republics, with France, of course, as the senior partner. Boganda went to Paris to seek de Gaulle’s endorsement of his plan for a United States of Latin Africa, which, besides the states of French Equatorial Africa, would include Rwanda, Burundi, the Belgian Congo, Angola, and Cameroon. De Gaulle was cool to the idea, as were the leaders of the other colonies of French Equatorial Africa, who were not eager to give up their local power. Boganda had to accept the situation. In December 1958, he proclaimed the constitution for an independent Central African Republic, with elections scheduled for April 1959. Boganda died in a suspicious plane crash

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

shortly before the election, however, and the CAR began life without its recognized leader. Boganda’s chief aide and obvious successor, Abel Goumba, seemed positioned to become the first president of the CAR. However, Paris and the local French residents saw him as too nationalistic and radical. Through judicious bribery, they persuaded the interim assembly to select a young cousin of Boganda’s, David Dacko, who was suspected by many of having engineered the crash that killed Boganda. Dacko, backed by the money of French commercial interests, rapidly made himself dictator. His period of rule has been described as an orgy of corruption. By 1965, Dacko’s combination of political authoritarianism and economic incompetence had brought the country to bankruptcy and the edge of revolt. His French backers, fearful of a left-wing revolution or the accession of the independent Abel Goumba (whom Dacko had imprisoned for two years), ordered Dacko to step down and arranged for a staged coup on New Year’s Day 1966 that would replace him with the commander of the gendarmerie, Jean Izamo, a man they considered safe.

Emperor Bokassa Left out of the calculations was the commander of the army, Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa. A World War II veteran who had become a lieutenant in the French army in Vietnam and was supposedly a nephew of Boganda, Bokassa learned of the plot. He feared that the CAR army, which numbered only about 3,000, would be displaced by the gendarmerie and that Izamo planned to have him assassinated. On New Year’s Eve, he invited Izamo to army headquarters and arrested him. Meanwhile, he had his troops seize the airport to prevent the landing of any French forces. Dacko, seemingly unaware, was busy packing and getting ready to be “surprised” by Izamo. Instead, he was captured by Bokassa and, early in the morning of January 1, turned the government over to him. Bokassa declared that he acted to save Dacko’s life from Izamo, who was acting for Communist China. The embarrassed French accepted the situation in silence. Early on, Bokassa was popular. The removal of Dacko was welcome, and both Bokassa and his chief assistant, Captain Alexandre Banza, represented the Mbakas, a large tribal group that had been excluded from the Dacko government. France soon learned that it had little to fear from Bokassa, who actually

Self-proclaimed emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic spent an estimated one-third of the national budget on a lavish coronation ceremony in December 1977. (Pierre Guillaud/AFP/Getty Images)

asked for and received a contingent of French paratroopers to serve as his personal security guard. Throughout his regime, monetary and technical assistance from France rose steadily. Banza, promoted to lieutenant colonel, led an anticorruption campaign that discomfited entrenched interests and made him unpopular with his brother officers, who expected to profit from an army-run regime. Bokassa eased him out of office after a year and, in 1969, had him executed for plotting against the government. By 1967, it was clear that the promised elections would not take place and the government had been turned into the private business of Bokassa and his clique, with the 4,000-member civil service essentially functioning as his employees. There was little protest. French interests were served; the bureaucracy, or some of it, was able to enjoy a European lifestyle; and the majority of the population was almost entirely unaffected by what went on in Bangui’s dingy corridors of power.

Central African Republic: Coups Since 19 6 6

In 1972, Bokassa declared himself president for life. In March 1975, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing apparently endorsed the arrangement when he honored Bokassa with a state visit. The two reportedly developed a personal friendship. However, cracks in Bokassa’s personal regime were already visible. Between late 1974 and early 1976, a series of coup attempts were staged by dissatisfied elements in the military and the bureaucracy. Bokassa, who was showing signs of psychotic behavior, responded on December 4, 1976, by proclaiming the establishment of the Central African Empire with himself as the emperor, and his wife, Catherine, as empress. A year later, he spent one-third of the national budget on an elaborate coronation ceremony, duplicating the expenditure the following year with the celebration of his anniversary on the throne. This created a serious financial situation by the end of 1978, as the regime found itself unable to pay government salaries or, just as important, student stipends. These stipends served as a sort of general welfare system for much of the population; for some families, student support was their largest source of cash income. In January 1979, Bokassa compounded his difficulties by ordering that all students in secondary schools had to purchase and wear a school uniform made in a factory owned by the Empress Catherine. This produced genuine popular demonstrations. Students in the streets cried, “Down with the uniforms,” and “Down with Bokassa,” and began looting stores. Police and military units killed as many as 200 demonstrators. The emperor went on the radio to pronounce the whole thing a Libyan and Soviet plot, but he also revoked the school uniform decree. France quickly provided enough cash to pay the student stipends and civil salaries. This move did not end the affair, however. University students and faculty denounced Bokassa’s wealth. The army occupied the university in April and began a roundup of students suspected of disloyalty. Bokassa took part personally in the torture and killing of at least 100 young people and had them secretly buried in a mass grave. When Amnesty International published the shocking news, the French public was outraged, and even Giscard was embarrassed. Some way had to be found to get rid of Bokassa. Like Dacko before him, he was pressured to resign. Unlike Dacko, he refused. Finally, on September 20, 1979, French paratroopers landed again in Bangui, this time “to reestablish

111

the Republic.” Bokassa was conveniently in Libya, avoiding the embarrassment of being arrested by the French. The paratroopers brought with them former president Dacko, the same man they had covertly ousted in 1966, who incidentally had been serving most recently as Bokassa’s personal counselor. Almost the first act of the French occupiers was to remove the CAR national archives to Paris, since they might reveal the sometimes close relationship between Bokassa and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Bokassa himself was denied asylum in France but was received “out of Christian charity” by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire.

Dacko in Power Dacko was immediately provided with the equivalent of $17 million in French francs. French troops remained to protect him from the attempts of Goumba, who had never taken part in the Bokassa government and had organized a popular political movement in Bangui, and Ange-Félix Patasse, a populist who had developed a following among students and the unemployed. Patasse had been imprisoned several times by Bokassa. Throughout 1980, Dacko showed his usual ineptness. There were show trials and executions of some of Bokassa’s intimates (widely believed to have been carried out to prevent them from revealing what they knew about Dacko’s own involvement with the former emperor). In December 1980, a new constitution was issued, providing for a multiparty system, protections for human rights, and a six-year term for a president, who had the power to appoint a prime minister. Voters approved this in a February 1981 referendum. In the subsequent presidential election, Patasse was undoubtedly the winner. However, Dacko, again with at least the tacit blessing of the Giscard government in Paris, was found to have gained just over 50 percent of the vote. But the results were disputed, and Patasse’s supporters rioted, giving Dacko the opportunity to declare a state of emergency and to announce the indefinite postponement of legislative elections. With the electoral defeat of Giscard in the French elections in May 1981, Dacko became desperate and resorted to even more dictatorial measures, declaring that the CAR would not be ready for democracy for another ten years. Patasse was arrested, and Goumba had to flee the country.

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

More Coups The assumption of the French presidency by François Mitterrand spelled the end for Dacko. Another coup was arranged. This time, French-trained General André Kolingba, formerly the CAR’s ambassador in West Germany and Canada, carried out the charade. He asked for and received Dacko’s resignation on September 1, 1981, the day after Patasse, released from arrest, returned to Bangui, where he received a joyful welcome. Kolingba’s attempts to impose a regime of fiscal austerity soon brought the usual complaints from those elements accustomed to dining well at the public trough. On March 3, 1982, he barely suppressed a military coup attempt. As rioting broke out in Bangui, Patasse claimed that he was the legitimate president and that Kolingba should step down. Kolingba’s response was to postpone any further elections until at least 1985. Patasse had to take asylum in the French embassy. In August, when Abel Goumba, who had been appointed head of the national university, enlisted French support for a more rapid return to constitutional rule, Kolingba had him tried and sentenced to prison for trying to destabilize the country. France disapproved, but short of withdrawing all financial support and seeing the country turn to Libya, it had to go along. The subsidies continued. In 1983, Paris even permitted Bokassa, who retained French citizenship, to come live in France, where he had enormous properties. In 1986, Bokassa returned to the CAR, where he was promptly imprisoned for life. Under pressure to legitimize his rule, in May 1986, Kolingba created his own political party, the Central African Democratic Assembly, and promulgated a one-party constitution under which he was elected president for a six-year term. This device stalled serious demands for political change for four years. In 1990, a difficult year economically, his attempts to institute austerity measures and job cuts had the predictable result of producing strikes, demonstrations, and calls for political reform.

Elections In March 1991, Kolingba agreed that the elections scheduled for October 1992 would be open to opposition parties. However, he refused to meet with the opposition to plan for them and then caused a crisis in mid-1992, when he canceled the scheduled elections,

possibly on the advice of his cousin, Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire), and certainly in defiance of French pressure to move forward. He may also have looked for support from the new conservative government that replaced Mitterrand in the spring of 1993, but Paris made it clear that there would be consequences if the process did not move forward quickly. The first round of elections was held on August 22, 1993, with four main parties competing: Patasse and the Central African People’s Movement (MLPC), Goumba and the Concert of Democratic Forces (CDF), Dacko as an independent, and Kolingba now heading the Patriotic Front for Progress (FPP). Kolingba used the advantages of incumbency freely, flying around the country in the presidential helicopter and using strong-arm squads to harass opposition meetings. However, when the electoral commission issued the preliminary results on August 28, Kolingba was in fourth place, with a humiliating 11 percent. Immediately, he issued decrees prohibiting further publication of results unless they were certified by a supreme court judge. The opposition candidates threatened civil war if the results were not published immediately. Again, it was French action that was decisive. All French financial aid was suspended immediately. Kolingba’s French military security detail was withdrawn, as was his French doctor and, worst of all, his helicopter pilot. Mitterrand, still in office, telephoned personally to warn of worse to come. Kolingba withdrew his decree. The second round of voting went smoothly, and Patasse won the runoff over Goumba, 53.5 percent to 46.5 percent. Parliamentary elections also gave Patasse’s MLPC the largest number of seats, with Goumba’s CFD coming in second. The transfer of power went smoothly, with Patasse naming a multiparty cabinet. Kolingba did not go altogether quietly. On September 1, he gave amnesty to all prisoners in the country’s jails, including former emperor Bokassa, who had returned to the CAR in 1987. In addition, he decreed himself a generous pension and numerous other presidential perks. This caused some outrage because civil servants had not been paid for ten months. In 1996–1997, the Patasse government experienced three mutinies, as soldiers engaged in rioting and looting over unpaid wages and discrimination against military officers from different ethnic groups.

Central African Republic: Coups Since 19 6 6

French forces put down the uprisings and, fearing a return to fighting upon their withdrawal, were replaced by an African peacekeeping force composed of members of French-speaking African countries. That force occupied Bangui until 1998, when a UN peacekeeping mission took over. The CAR’s overall economic situation did not change greatly during the Patasse presidency. However, despite the occasional intensity of partisan battles in the parliament and cabinet, there was no reversion to authoritarian or one-man rule. One sign of mellowing was the return of Catherine Bokassa, the former empress, in late 1995, shortly after her husband suffered a brain hemorrhage and was allowed to return to France to die. Despite President Patasse’s popular anti-French rhetoric, he established civil relations with the conservative Chirac administration in Paris. In fact, the most serious threat to his presidency was an army mutiny in June 1996 that was put down by French troops. Continuing unrest in the country prevented national elections from being held in August 1998, and the balloting in 1999 saw Patasse claim a second sixyear term in the face of charges of electoral fraud. The Patasse government was plagued by the combined effects of the economic damage caused by the civil unrest, energy crises, and government mismanagement. The departure of the last of the UN forces in 2000 set the stage for a March 2001 coup attempt involving military forces led by Kolingba. The attempt was defeated by forces loyal to Patasse with the assistance of troops from Libya and a Congolese rebel movement (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo), following several days of heavy fighting. In 2003, François Bozize led a successful coup against the widely unpopular Patasse, who was not in the country at the time. Patasse went into exile in Togo. Bozize and Patasse had a long history of rivalry. Not only had Bozize lost the presidential election to Patasse during the CAR’s first democratic elections in 1993, but he was also the former chief of staff of the armed forces who had been fired by Patasse. Bozize had also been linked to an unsuccessful coup attempt

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in 2001. Between November 2001 and mid-2002, forces supporting Bozize had clashed sporadically with CAR forces along the border with Chad, the country to which Bozize had fled. Following the 2003 coup, Bozize declared himself president, dissolved the National Assembly, and suspended the constitution. He also pledged to work toward national reconciliation and to improve the country’s human rights record. In December 2004, the country’s new constitution was accepted through a referendum. Bozize also lived up to his commitment to restore democratic rule in the CAR and ran as an independent. The elections of May 2005 ended two years of military rule. Bozize received more than 64 percent of votes in the second round of balloting against his challenger, former prime minister Martin Ziguele. Bozize immediately called for national unity and pledged a period of security for the coup-weary country. Despite his earlier promises, the human rights record of the Central African Republic remained troubling. Reports continued to cite instances of arbitrary detention, torture, and even extrajudicial killings. Journalists were also threatened for publishing articles critical of the government. The prospects for continued peace in the CAR were tempered by the easy availability of illegal weapons throughout the country, a legacy of years of conflict. Armed groups remained active in the northern regions, and fighting caused thousands of civilians to flee into neighboring Chad. In addition, the diamond industries of the CAR remained a target for unscrupulous developers and corrupt government officials alike. David MacMichael and Jeffrey A. Shantz See also: Coups; Congo, Republic of: Civil Conflict, 1997.

Bibliography Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Reports, 1993–1998. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998. Kalck, Pierre. Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic. 3rd ed. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 2005. O’Toole, Thomas. The Central African Republic: The Continent’s Hidden Heart. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.

CHAD: Civil Wars,1960s–1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: France; Libya

AO

Aozou

LIBYA ZO

TOUBOU

NIGER

U

ST

RI

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100 100

Chad has remained one of the most backward countries in the world—and one of the most thinly populated, with 9.8 million people (according to a 2005 estimate) scattered across nearly 500,000 square miles.

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

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Historical Background

Largeau

CHAD Abéché

Lake Chad

NIGERIA

SUDAN

ARABS

N’Djamena

Mongo

AR

ARABS

ABS

SA

FULANI MAYOKEBBI A

R

Moundou

CHARI

CAMEROON

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

ARABS CHARI

Muslim Animist-Christian “White” Muslim Animist-Christian

In many ways, Chad resembles its better-known neighbor of Sudan. The north was settled by a mix of nomadic peoples, some of them Arabs but mostly Muslims. The south was settled by black Africans in prehistoric times who focused on agricultural pursuits and were either animists or, later, Christians. After Chad’s independence from France in 1960, its civil wars, like those of Sudan, were rooted in these north-south divisions. There are also significant differences between the two countries. In Chad, the black south is more populous and powerful and has dominated much of the country’s postwar history. Chad is also far poorer than Sudan. With much of its land consisting of the southern reaches of the Sahara Desert, and without any railroads or an effective river network for transportation,

Chad became a colony of France in 1913 after French expeditions and military forays into its territory that began in 1890. The borders defined by the colonial government bore no relation to any regional ethnic groupings. Indeed Chad had more than a dozen major ethnic groups and languages, with over 100 subgroups. This would later make post-independence governance difficult. In 1958, France granted Chad autonomy, helped it to organize a political system based on the French model, and granted it full independence in August 1960. Unlike many other colonial powers, France maintained close ties with its ex-colonies, and Chad signed treaties that kept it within France’s economic orbit. It also provided for French military aid upon request by the Chadian government. François (N’Garta) Tombalbaye, a trade union leader from the black south, was chosen as Chad’s first president. In 1963, Tombalbaye outlawed all parties but his own Parti Progressiste Tchadien (PPT), turning the country into a one-party personal dictatorship. He justified his actions by claiming that he was simply preempting a Muslim coup that was being planned. Dozens of Muslims were arrested and charged with conspiring against the state. Both northern Muslims and southerners were originally part of Tombalbaye’s government, but after 1963 he gradually eliminated the northerners, packing his cabinet with his cronies. The conflict between north and south may have been inevitable, but Tombalbaye’s actions started the open struggle between the two regions.

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Chad: Civil Wars, 19 6 0s–19 9 0s

115

KEY DATES 1960

Chad wins its independence from France.

1965

Rebellion breaks out in the Muslim northern part of the country, led by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT, its French acronym).

1968–1972

French forces arrive in the country to help the government put down a FROLINAT uprising; by 1972, FROLINAT is largely defeated, and the French troops leave.

1973

Libyan forces occupy the disputed Aozou strip in the north.

1975–1982

President François (N’Garta) Tombalbaye is overthrown in a military coup; over the next seven years, control of the government alternates between civilians and the military; in 1982, Hissène Habré seizes power.

1987–1988

Habré defeats his rival, Goukouni Oueddei, and Libya and Chad reach a peace agreement.

1990

Idriss Deby, a former supporter of Habré’s, launches an attack from Sudan and seizes power.

1994

Libya withdraws its last troops from Aozou.

1998–2003 The Chadian government battles rebels of the Movement for Justice and Democracy (MDJT) in the north of the country.

Wars Begin In 1965, a full-scale revolt broke out in the Muslim north. The rebel Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT) was originally based in Sudan but transferred its base of operations to the southern deserts of Libya after 1971, when Libya’s ruler, Muammar Qaddafi, provided them with support. Many of the rebels belonged to the Toubou ethnic group, whose members lived on both sides of the LibyanChad border. Although FROLINAT was a coalition of groups and accepted soldiers from a variety of ethnicities and religions, its primary focus was on freeing the Muslim north from the control of the Tombalbaye regime. Under increasing pressure from the rebels, Tombalbaye turned to France for support. French troops began arriving in 1968, and by 1972 FROLINAT had been turned back (although not destroyed). French troops were withdrawn from the country, motivated

in part by a diplomatic disagreement between Paris and Tombalbaye, who accused the French of interfering in Chad’s domestic affairs. With the French gone, Libya was emboldened in 1973 to send forces into northern Chad to occupy a strip of land surrounding the oasis of Aozou. Many Libyans, including Qaddafi, had long claimed that much of northern Chad rightfully belonged to them. Libya continued to supply FROLINAT with weapons and supplies, a task now made easier by Libya’s base at Aozou.

Power Struggles In April 1975, Tombalbaye was overthrown and killed during a military coup led by southern officers, and General Félix Malloum was chosen to lead the country. Over the next seven years, Chad was involved in a complex dance of civil war and coalition government. At first, the security of Malloum’s government

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

was aided by divisions within FROLINAT’s ranks. Hissène Habré, who had led FROLINAT, was expelled from the alliance because he objected to Libya’s annexation of the Aozou strip. Habré formed his own faction, Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), and took up arms against FROLINAT and its new leader, Goukouni Oueddei. In 1978, Habré and Malloum, through French mediation, formed an alliance and agreed to share power. But by February 1979, fighting had broken out between their two armies in the capital of N’Djamena, which gave Goukouni, leading the FROLINAT faction known as the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP), the opportunity to gain ground against the distracted government troops. By 1979, FAP had 4,000 soldiers in the field—almost as many as the Chadian army; it was also better trained and led. Chad broke into provincial fiefdoms, each leader and army controlling its own sector of the country. Libya and France, which stationed troops in N’Djamena, occasionally interfered in the ongoing political and military struggles. Although north-south issues were still important, the struggle was largely driven by individual strongmen and their regional supporters. In April 1979, the four major armies of Chad negotiated another settlement. The two FROLINAT factions (Goukouni’s FAP and Habré’s FAN), together with the former government’s army (the Forces Armées Tchadiennes, or FAT, now led by Colonel Wadal Kamougue), and still another Muslim resistance group (Abubakar Abdelrahmane’s Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad, or MPLT) combined to form an unwieldy coalition government. Goukouni was made president, and the other leaders took positions in his cabinet. The coalition government gave Chad the ability to respond to a new threat from Libya, which was attempting to use its base at Aozou to move more deeply into Chad. From April to June 1979, the FROLINAT and FAT armies were able to hold back Libya from expanding into more territory. However, the four-way alliance did not last out the year. Fighting broke out between the factions, some of which were again supplied with arms and training by Libya’s Qaddafi. By 1980, Goukouni’s FAP had gained possession of N’Djamena, and in December of that year, he requested and received the support of Libyan troops in stabilizing his control over the country. In January 1981, Goukouni and

Qaddafi signed an agreement that would merge Chad and Libya into one country. Both France and elements within Goukouni’s FROLINAT faction objected strongly to this merger. Skirmishing broke out between the Libyans and some rebel groups, and Goukouni, thinking himself firmly in command, asked the Libyans to withdraw, which they did in November 1981. A peacekeeping force from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) helped to supervise the withdrawal in 1981 and 1982. The withdrawal of Libyan troops opened the way for Habré and FAN to lead a counteroffensive from bases in neighboring Sudan. FAN scored its first small successes in January 1982, and by June it had reached the outskirts of N’Djamena. Goukouni fled to Algeria, and Habré became Chad’s new president.

Habré Regime Hissène Habré attempted to establish a regime that would end the fighting that had plagued the country. His government included members of many former opposition parties and a substantial number of southerners, even though Habré was a northern Muslim. Habré’s success was short-lived. Goukouni, again supported by Libyan troops, attacked from the north in the spring of 1983, and the fighting continued. The use of Libyan troops brought a counter-commitment of American supplies and 3,000 French troops to the Habré government. Both the French and the Libyans were reluctant to face each other, so a stalemate line was established along the sixteenth parallel in northern Chad. Habré’s government forces were aided in their northern war by a merger of his FAN faction with elements of FAT, called Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT). While Habré fought Goukouni’s Libyan-backed northern invasion, he also faced a rebellion by southerners in late 1984. The government’s suppression of this revolt included brutal attacks against the civilian population, which alienated those southerners who had considered supporting Habré. In 1984, France and Libya both agreed to withdraw their forces from Chad. However, Libya did not abide by the agreement, leaving some 4,000 troops behind in the Aozou strip. These forces continued to support Goukouni’s efforts to defeat Habré. In 1987, France began supplying limited air support to the

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In the mid-1980s, FANT troops supporting Chadian President Hissène Habré conducted a scorched-earth campaign against guerrillas in the southern part of the country that razed villages and forced thousands of civilians to flee the country. (Joel Robine/AFP/Getty Images)

Habré government, supplemented by American aid. Neither the Americans nor the French wished to see Qaddafi increase his power in the region. By 1987, Habré had defeated Goukouni (who again fled to Algeria) and pushed Libya out of all of northern Chad but the oasis of Aozou itself. In 1988, Chad and Libya agreed to a cease-fire and reestablished diplomatic relations.

Deby and the M P S Habré’s regime was still plagued by opponents. Goukouni continued to try to gather support against him from outside the country. In April 1989, Habré claimed to have suppressed a mutiny by two former supporters. One of these, Idriss Deby, fled to Sudan with his followers. In March 1990, Deby’s army, the Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), invaded Chad, but, with French support, Habré was able to force Deby’s troops back into Sudan.

In November 1990, Deby again launched an attack from Sudan. It was clear that he had received additional support from Libya and Sudan. France, unwilling to get involved in an intra-Chad dispute, stood by. Units of Habré’s FANT army began to desert to Deby’s MPS. By the end of November, Deby’s forces had reached N’Djamena and seized the city. Habré fled to Cameroon. Over the next five years, Deby solidified his control over Chad. From 1991 to 1992, his government withstood attacks from former supporters of Habré, and attacks by various small southern factions continued as late as April 1998. Gradually, however, Deby was able to bring a large part of the country’s political establishment over to his side, and the fighting gradually died down. In early 1994, Libya withdrew from the Aozou strip, ending one of Chad’s long-standing trouble spots. Deby won Chad’s first multiparty presidential elections in June 1996, defeating 1975 coup leader

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General Komougue, and his MPS party won 63 of 125 seats in the January 1997 legislative elections. However, both the legislative and presidential elections were marked by serious irregularities, according to international observers. In 1997, the newly elected government signed peace agreements with several insurgent groups and cut off their bases in neighboring Cameroon and the Central African Republic. Hopes for a lasting peace were shattered once again, however, when one of the groups renewed its fighting against the government, finally surrendering the following year. In the intervening months, several hundred civilians in the south were killed. Between 1998 and 2003, the government battled forces of the Chadian Movement for Justice and Democracy (MDJT) under former defense minister Youssouf Togoimi, who had external support from Sudan. The fighting, primarily in the mountains and deserts of the northern Tibesti region, killed hundreds of civilians along with government and rebel forces. Under a formal peace agreement signed in 2002, many MDJT fighters became part of the Chadian army, but a small core continued a low-level armed struggle into 2003. Meanwhile, oil had been discovered in Chad and was being developed by an international consortium led by U.S.-based Exxon-Mobil. Revenue from the oil promised relief for Chad’s impoverished citizens, but the promise was slow to be fulfilled. At the same time, oil development threatened ecological damage and renewed fighting between Chad’s many ethnic and political factions, each of which threatened to demand control over some of the funds coming from oil exports. In May 2001, Deby won a victory in the presidential elections, but only after six opposition leaders were arrested. During the announcement of election results, another opposition member was killed. Because of widespread unrest, legislative elections were postponed until the spring of 2002. Labor unions and opposition leaders called for demonstrations, including general strikes, but did not succeed in shaking Deby’s hold on power.

Analysis Although Chad’s wars were largely the result of longstanding antagonisms between north and south, they were greatly exacerbated by struggle between indi-

vidual power-hungry leaders. Ethnic and religious differences made it possible for leaders to rally support for their cause; pride and a desire for power prevented them from compromising. Finally, the fighting was complicated by Libyan territorial claims on the Aozou strip, which led Qaddafi to support first one faction, then another. In the end, Libya’s role may actually have helped heal the north-south divisions. Most Chadian factions—even those receiving aid from the Libyan government—opposed any territorial concessions by Chad to the Libyans. The opposition to a threatening neighbor motivated Chadian factions to settle differences among themselves and unite under a single administration. Muslims in the north and Christians in the south could both agree that they did not want Libya interfering in their affairs. Deby’s victory also confirmed the importance of the Muslim north in Chadian politics. Despite being outnumbered by southerners, northerners were successful in establishing themselves in a position of power—even if they were forced to include southerners in a coalition government. Still, observers remained concerned that Chad’s long, open borders left it vulnerable to incursions from forces based in neighboring countries. As conflict grew in Sudan’s province of Darfur, small-scale skirmishes began with Sudanese militias that occasionally crossed into Chad. In March 2004, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an accused terrorist group based in Algeria, briefly entered Chad. Such incidents and lingering concerns within Chad led the government to join the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), whose member nations provide military assistance to each other to address terrorist operations and illegal border crossings. Carl Skutsch and Jeffrey A. Shantz See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Chad: War with Libya, 1986–1987.

Bibliography Decalo, Samuel. Historical Dictionary of Chad. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1997. Nolutshungu, Sam C. Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996. Thompson, Virginia McLean. Conflict in Chad. Berkeley: University of California Press, Institute of International Studies, 1981.

CHAD: War with Libya,1986–1987 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: France; Libya might be willing to turn over a portion of northern Chad to the Italians in Libya, which was almost completely inhabited by Muslims. Pierre Laval and Benito Mussolini drew up a Franco-Italian treaty in 1935 that would have given a northern strip of Chad to Italy, but the treaty was never ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies and never took effect. World War II intervened, in which France and Italy fought on opposite sides. When Libya became independent in 1951, some Libyans pointed to the Franco-Italian treaty and argued that the northern strip of Chad should rightfully be their territory. This was the first cause of conflict between Chad and Libya. In 1966, a Muslim group in northern Chad, the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT, its French acronym), led a rebellion against Chad’s government, gaining some sympathy from Muslims across the border in Libya. Then in 1969, Muammar Qaddafi took over the Libyan government in a coup. Almost immediately, he began support for FROLINAT in northern Chad. After 1971, the rebels received military supplies and the use of bases in southern Libya. This was the beginning of Libya’s involvement with Chad.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA Tripoli

Gulf of Sidra

EGYPT

ALGERIA

TUNISIA

LIBYA

Aozou

AO

TIBESTI MTNS.

NIGER

ZO

U

ST

RI

P

Faya-Largeau

CHAD Lake Chad

SUDAN

N’Djamena

NIGERIA CAMEROON

Proxy War and the Aozou Strip 0 0

100

200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The conflict between Chad and Libya began before either was an independent nation. The French had conquered Chad in 1913; the Italians had completed their conquest of Libya in the late 1920s. At that point the two colonial powers negotiated a possible border change between their two territories. The colonial borders in Africa had always been arbitrary, cutting across geographic and ethnic boundaries. As the northern third of Chad included a sizable Arab and Muslim population, it was reasonable that France

For two years Libya aided FROLINAT’s offensives, which had some success against Chad’s government forces. Libya’s help was counterbalanced by French aid to Chad’s army, which had helped defeat FROLINAT attacks, but in 1972, French troops withdrew from Chad. This retreat gave Qaddafi the opportunity to move directly into northern Chad. In 1973, his troops invaded Chad and occupied the “Aozou strip”—the strip of land on the Libya-Chad border centered on the Aozou oasis, which Libya claimed as its own, based on the unratified 1935 treaty. From 1973 on, Libya continued to support FROLINAT forces, but whether FROLINAT succeeded or

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KEY DATES 1965 Rebellion, supported by Libya, breaks out in the Muslim northern part of the country, led by the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT, its French acronym). 1972

Aided by French troops, the Chadian government defeats FROLINAT, but Libyan forces maintain occupation of the Aozou strip, a Chadian territory on the border with Libya.

1984 France and Libya agree to pull troops out of Libya, but Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi keeps 4,000 troops in the Aozou strip. 1986 Libyan-backed opposition leader Goukouni Oueddei invades the country trying to overthrow the government; a small contingent of French forces and planes aid the Chadian government; Qaddafi has Goukouni arrested, and Goukouni’s troops switch sides and join the Chadian government forces. 1987 With his troops isolated in Aozou, Qaddafi agrees to a cease-fire. 1988 The last Libyan troops leave Aozou. 1994 The International Court of Justice determines that Libya has no legitimate claim to the Aozou strip.

not, Qaddafi clearly intended to keep the Aozou strip. The occupation of Aozou may have been part of larger Libyan territorial goals. Unofficial maps published in Libya in 1976 showed an expanded Libya that included large sections of Chad, Niger, and Algeria. Not all FROLINAT forces were pleased with the annexation of Aozou, however. One faction led by Hissène Habré joined forces with the Chad government in protest against Libya’s actions. In 1979, both FROLINAT factions were able to come to an agreement with the southern government forces and create a new coalition government, led by FROLINAT leader Goukouni Oueddei. One of the few things the coalition government could agree on was that the Libyan annexation of the Aozou strip was invalid.

Libyan Skirmishes Libya responded to this turnabout by FROLINAT and its new allies by staging a series of ground and air raids into central Chad during April and May 1979. In June 1979, these raids escalated into an invasion by a 2,500-man army. The Libyans attacked using several

motorized columns supported by French-made Mirage fighters, but Chadian forces—mostly Toubou tribesmen fighting under the FROLINAT banner— were able to repel the Libyans in a series of desert skirmishes in and around the Tibesti Mountains. The Libyans made it as far as Faya-Largeau in northcentral Chad before being turned back. The Chad forces captured a number of Libyan prisoners in a series of ambushes, but although the Libyans retreated, they were still able to maintain control of the Aozou strip. This first direct clash between Libya and Chad demonstrated the problems of military conflict in the Sahara region. Libya’s ability to supply and advance its forces was handicapped by the rough desert terrain, the Tibesti Mountains lining Chad’s northern border, and the familiarity of Chad tribesmen with their own backyard. With few roads or villages, the Libyans were forced to hop from one oasis to another in a kind of leapfrog campaign, and each hop left them more vulnerable to ambushes and supply line interdiction. The deeper they penetrated into Chad, the harder it was to keep their troops supplied.

Chad: War with Libya, 19 8 6–19 87

Libyan Intervention Libya’s troops had withdrawn from all of Chad except the Aozou strip, but they continued to interfere with Chad’s internal affairs by supporting different factions within Chad’s coalition government. By March 1980, the government had broken down and Qaddafi was again helping FROLINAT leader Goukouni— now president of Chad—in his struggle against Habré, his defense minister. Libya invaded, and by December 1980, Libyan tanks were in N’Djamena, Chad’s capital, fighting with Habré’s forces. Habré was defeated and forced to withdraw to eastern Chad. In January 1981, Qaddafi and Goukouni announced that their two countries would work toward complete unity. This was too much for France, which still had troops stationed at the N’Djamena airport, as well as for many FROLINAT rebels. Responding to the general outcry, Goukouni requested that Libya withdraw the 10,000 troops that it had stationed in Chad. By October 1981, the Libyans had departed—except, of course, from the Aozou strip. In another of Chad’s reversals, Goukouni was forced out of N’Djamena by troops loyal to Habré in June of 1982. Habré would remain Chad’s president until 1990. Goukouni returned to his patron, Qaddafi, who again began providing Goukouni’s faction with supplies and bases in the Aozou strip. The increased Libyan presence in the Aozou region, combined with the use of Libyan bombers to hit Habré’s troops, disturbed both France and the United States. America began supplying weapons to Habré’s government, while France moved 3,000 soldiers to Chad in August 1983. The French established a defensive line at the sixteenth parallel (which divided Chad almost evenly between north and south), and Libya, which did not wish a direct confrontation with French troops, kept its 6,000 soldiers north of that line. In late 1984, the French and Libyans agreed to withdraw both their armies from Chad. The French were completely withdrawn by November, but Qaddafi kept at least 4,000 soldiers in occupation of the Aozou strip.

Open War with Chad In February 1986, the fighting, which had continued to smolder, broke out again when Goukouni’s forces, with Libyan support, invaded Chad. France responded to the attack by providing a small con-

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tingent of fighter-bombers to shield Habré’s government troops. Goukouni’s forces had some limited success. In October 1986, however, Goukouni and Libya’s Qaddafi had a falling out and Qaddafi tried to hold Goukouni under house arrest in Tripoli. Goukouni’s forces in northern Chad defected, once more establishing friendly relations with the Chad government and giving up their invasion. Without any Chad proxies in the north, Libya’s troops were on their own. The war became an open struggle between Chad’s President Habré and his FROLINAT allies, on one side, and the Libyans, on the other. By January 1987, Habré had succeeded in recapturing the northern administrative center of Fada. Qaddafi responded by sending 9,000 more troops into northern Chad, raising the total Libyan presence to at least 14,000. From January to April, the Chad army inflicted a series of defeats on its Libyan counterpart. The Libyans were much better equipped, being supplied with Russian tanks and missile launchers, but their soldiers were far less enthusiastic. Many were university students given short training courses and then shipped to the front. The Chad troops facing them were experienced desert fighters who were eager to push Libya out of their country. The Chad army also outmaneuvered the Libyans, using hit-and-run tactics to keep the larger Libyan force off balance. Chad soldiers in Toyota trucks would bounce past slow-moving Libyan tanks and then open fire from either side with antitank weapons mounted in the backs of their trucks. As much as possible, the Chad army avoided attacking large Libyan garrisons, instead focusing on their supply lines. When the Libyans came out to chase the Chad troops away, they were ambushed in the desert. By April 1998, the Libyans had been pushed completely out of all but the Aozou strip. They had lost more than 3,600 troops, along with 14 planes, 150 tanks, and more than 500 other vehicles. In August, Habré’s forces captured Aozou itself, but it was soon retaken by Libya. Chad responded with a raid against an airbase in Libya itself on September 6, 1987, destroying a number of planes and killing at least a thousand troops. On September 11, 1987, Qaddafi agreed to a cease-fire.

Epilogue Although the Aozou strip remained under Libyan control, Qaddafi had clearly lost his eagerness to hold

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it at all costs. Diplomatic relations resumed between the two nations in October 1988. Negotiations over the Aozou strip continued during 1989 and 1990, with no agreement being reached. In December 1990, the political situation changed when forces led by Idris Deby overthrew Chad’s President Habré. Deby had used Sudan as his base of operations but had received supplies from Libya. In 1994, the International Court of Justice ruled that Libya had no claim to the Aozou strip. Although Qaddafi had said he would abide by the court’s ruling, he was at first reluctant to withdraw. Negotiations between Deby and Qaddafi—whose relations remained fairly good after 1990—finally convinced the latter to withdraw from the strip in May 1994. Libya’s territorial ambitions drew it into a confused civil war in Chad. As long as the various factions in Chad continued to fight each other, Qaddafi was able to maintain this control over much of northern Chad. Once the Chad factions united against Qaddafi, his position became extremely difficult.

Chad’s defeat of Libya rested on three foundations: limited American and French support, which provided Chad with some air cover as well as critically needed antitank weapons; motivated troops who used innovative hit-and-run tactics; and the rugged Sahara terrain, which handicapped Libyan logistical efforts and gave a particular advantage to the local Chad tribesmen operating in their own backyard. Carl Skutsch See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Chad: Civil Wars, 1960s–1990s.

Bibliography Deeb, Mary-Jane. Libya’s Foreign Policy in North Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Nolutshungu, Sam C. Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996. Wright, John. Libya: A Modern History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

COMOROS: Coups,1980s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups PARTICIPANT: France Moroni KARTHALA VOLCANO

INDIAN OCEAN

soils are poor despite the islands’ volcanic character, and constant overcultivation has eroded and exhausted the soil, making the Comoros highly dependent on imports of basic foods. Exports are almost entirely spices and scent essences, primarily to France. Poverty is pervasive; malnutrition and consequent poor health are widespread. Medical services are few and poor. Education is rudimentary, and illiteracy nearly universal. Ethnically, the people of the Comoros are of mixed Arab and West African stock, the latter descended from slaves brought to the islands in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They are almost entirely Muslim. The language is a dialect of Swahili.

NJAZIDJA (Grand Comore)

COMOROS NZWANI (Anjouan)

MWALI (Moheli)

UE

MAYOTTE (FRANCE)

MBIQ

MOZAMBIQUE

MOZA

CHANNEL

MADAGASCAR 0 0

50 50

Historical Background

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

The Comoros, a small archipelago of four islands in the Indian Ocean, lie across the northern end of the Mozambique Channel between Mozambique and Madagascar. Three of the islands, Grand Comore (also known as Njazidja), Anjouan (Nzwani), and Moheli (Mwali), make up the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros. The fourth island of the group, Mayotte, is a French overseas territory with representation in the French National Assembly. The Federal Islamic Republic claims Mayotte, under the name of Mahore, as part of its territory. The capital, Moroni, is located on Grand Comore. The three islands of the Federal Islamic Republic, with a number of small islets, cover an area of 833 square miles and have a population of about 675,000 people. Almost an equal number of Comoro islanders have settled in Madagascar and Mozambique, a result of the population pressure that makes the Comoros one of the most densely populated nations on earth, with about 800 people per square mile. The islands’ economy is essentially based in subsistence agriculture, but

The Comoros have figured in world history three times. The first was during the period of European discovery and colonization between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. The Portuguese controlled most of the southwest coast of Africa, and Dutch, English, and French ships found the Comoros, then independent, a convenient stopping place for fresh water and repairs where they did not have to pay fees to Portugal. Later, as Europeans established plantations on other Indian Ocean islands, including Mauritius and Reunion, the petty sultans who ruled in the Comoros established slave markets. Slavery on the Comoros was not finally abolished until 1889. The islands also became a base for European pirates who preyed on the ships of the Dutch and British East India Companies. During the nineteenth-century scramble for African colonies, the Comoros again attracted European attention. Until then, Western nations, mainly Britain and France, had managed relations with the Comoros by making informal agreements with one or more of about fifty Comoran sultans. France was the first to take a more active role, establishing a presence

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KEY DATES 1974

In a plebiscite, residents of the Comoro Islands vote to become independent of colonial power France; only residents of Mayotte vote to stay part of France.

1975

With the exception of Mayotte, the Comoros become independent of France.

1977

Comoro residents in Madagascar are massacred, sending 17,000 refugees back to the islands; the Karthala volcano erupts on the island of Njazadija, killing 2,000 and making another 20,000 homeless.

1978

French mercenaries overthrow the government of the Comoros, putting Ahmed Abdullah in charge of the country.

1979

The National Assembly declares the Comoros a one-party government.

1987

Under pressure from France, Abdullah agrees to multiparty elections.

1990

Multiparty elections lead to a change in government.

1995

Taki Abdulkasim, the loser of the 1990 elections, hires French mercenaries to overthrow the government of Mohammed Djohar, but the coup fails.

1999

The government is overthrown in a military coup.

2001–2002 National elections in the Comoros lead to more autonomy for different islands; local elections lead to rejection of secessionist parties.

on the island of Mayotte in 1843. In the 1880s, France gained direct control over neighboring Madagascar. After England and Germany expressed interest in the Comoros, the French in Mayotte took possession of the remaining islands in 1886. They made the Comoros part of their colony of Madagascar in 1912. British forces landed in the Comoros in July 1942, during World War II, and took control from the French Vichy government. They turned the islands over to the administration of the Free French government of Charles de Gaulle, then operating in exile. After the war, France granted independence to its African colonies but strove to maintain its political and economic influence and prevent any Soviet or Chinese inroads. In 1947, the Comoros were separated from Madagascar and became a French overseas

territory with administrative autonomy and the right to elect one senator and one deputy to the French legislature in Paris. The islands gained internal selfgovernment in 1961, electing a Chamber of Deputies, which in turn elected a territorial president. In 1975, following a December 1974 plebiscite, the Comoros became independent and were admitted to the United Nations. Only Mayotte voted to retain its ties with France, which then stationed a detachment of foreign legionnaires on the island to prevent the Comoro government at Moroni from forcibly annexing it. When the Comoros broke diplomatic relations with France in the dispute over Mayotte, France withdrew all of its nationals, including doctors, technicians, administrators, and teachers, from the main islands, forcing schools and hospitals to close. France also

Comoros: Coups, 19 8 0s

ended its financial aid, which had amounted to threequarters of Comoro government revenues. The rift with France and the resulting loss of skilled workers and government revenue set the scene for the Comoros’ stormy political future.

Era of Coups The territorial president of the Comoros under the 1961 arrangement was Ahmed Abdullah, a wealthy vanilla exporter who was elected president of the new country in 1975. Despite his generally pro-French sentiments and conservative political beliefs, Abdullah was a nationalist and was determined to bring Mayotte into the Islamic Republic. His pursuit of this goal had caused him to lose favor in Paris, and he had barely taken office when he was overthrown in a coup led by Ali Soileh, which appeared to have French approval and assistance. Soileh, a French-educated agronomist, was eager to modernize the country. French aid was not restored, however, and Soileh appealed to the world community for help. In a short time, both the Soviet Union and China sent aid missions, as did the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, and francophone countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, and even Haiti. Naturally, the Chinese and Soviet presence at a time of great Western fear about Communist influence in Africa raised concerns not only in France but also in Great Britain, the United States, and South Africa. Concern grew when Soileh began a radical restructuring of the traditional island society. Tanzanians were brought in to organize a defense force, and a state company was set up to handle imports and exports. The elaborate marriage and funeral ceremonies that absorbed families’ savings were banned, and the legal powers of the Muslim clergy were restricted. As a sign of liberation, women were prohibited from wearing the veil. The pace of Soileh’s revolution quickened in 1977 after the Comoros were hit by two disasters. Comorans on Madagascar were massacred by the regime of President Didier Ratsiraka, and some 17,000 refugees flooded back home, all needing emergency assistance. Then, in April, the Karthala Volcano on Grand Comore erupted, killing 2,000 people, rendering another 20,000 homeless, and destroying the island’s agriculture. Faced with these emergencies, Soileh and his youthful supporters attempted a complete reordering

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of society on a survival basis. As a symbol of new beginnings, the government archives were burned. Central government was temporarily abandoned, and the country was reorganized into thirty-four moudiryias, or communes of about 10,000 people, each grouped into seven prefectures. Each moudiryia, under its own judge, was to concentrate on subsistence agriculture, education, and security. A rudimentary national government with a council of state and a national assembly was established at the end of the year, and yet another plebiscite approved the new constitution declaring the Comoros a secular democratic republic. A five-year plan addressed the country’s urgent problems, principally food. A modest land reform program brought unused private land into cultivation, but the emphasis was on helping peasant farmers produce more and not on any social restructuring. Soileh’s program was modeled on Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania. Not surprisingly, this intrusion of government into traditional peasant farming and marketing practices prompted growing opposition, and armed resistance flared on the islands of Anjouan and Moheli. Ahmed Abdullah was in exile in Paris and in contact with French government officials, who were unhappy with affairs in the Comoros. Abdullah struck a deal with the conservative French government of the day, which would help him return to power in exchange for his promise not to press the issue of incorporating Mayotte. Robert Denard, a French mercenary soldier with close ties to French intelligence and a long record of involvement in Africa, agreed to recruit an invasion force for a reported payment of $2 million. On the night of May 12, 1978, Denard, with fifty French mercenaries, slipped ashore and captured Soileh. Co-conspirator Ahmed Abdullah immediately took power, proclaimed the Federal Islamic Republic, and abolished Soileh’s reforms. France recognized the new government and restored diplomatic relations. Three weeks later, Soileh was shot and killed while “attempting to escape.” With Denard at his side, Abdullah moved quickly to consolidate power. In October, he was elected president under a new constitution, and in January 1979, the national assembly declared a one-party government. Soileh’s former ministers were executed without trial. Even three years later, France had to exert pressure on Abdullah to release 300 remaining political prisoners or bring them to trial. The OAU, angered by Abdullah’s use of European mercenaries to overthrow the Comoro government,

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expelled the Comoros from the organization. French economic and military assistance was restored on a limited basis, but there was widespread corruption. Abdullah and Denard, with the assistance of a Pakistani financier, organized a company that monopolized the import and export trade. Denard himself held a post in the Comoros embassy in Paris for a time. In short, the Comoros had returned to semicolonial status. Throughout the 1980s, Abdullah cemented his political control over the government even though his actual policies were to a large degree controlled by Paris. In 1987, at the urging of the French socialist government of François Mitterrand, Abdullah authorized multiparty elections on Grand Comore. When it became clear that the vote was rigged, the opposition rioted, and Abdullah called on French and South African mercenaries to quell the unrest. Several

hundred opponents were arrested. In 1989, Abdullah called a vote on constitutional amendments that would allow him to run for a third six-year term. Rioting again broke out, followed by more arrests. At this point, Denard realized that Abdullah’s growing unpopularity threatened his own profitable arrangements. The presidential guard, which he controlled, assassinated Abdullah, and when the chief justice of the supreme court, Mohammed Djohar, attempted a constitutional accession to the office of president, Denard and his mercenaries overthrew him too, killing some twenty-seven members of the Comoran army. Denard had gone too far. French paratroopers landed in December, arrested Denard and his men, and deported them to South Africa. Djohar took office with the promise that the French military presence would remain for two more years.

French paratroopers intervened in the Comoros to end the September 1995 coup by forces under mercenary leader Robert Denard. Mohamed Djohar was restored as president, if only briefly. (Alexander Joe/AFP/Getty Images)

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In January 1990, France supervised new multiparty elections. Djohar and his Comoros Union for Progress Party defeated Mohammed Taki Abdulkasim and the Union for Comoran Democracy, but once again a mercenary coup was attempted. In August 1995, Taki hired another French soldier of fortune, Max Veillard, to organize an invasion, but this one failed. Veillard was captured and sent to France for trial; Taki Abdulkasim was imprisoned. With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the strategic significance of the Comoros, never great, declined even further. The economic situation of the islands steadily worsened, as population pressures caused further environmental deterioration, and foreign assistance diminished. As a result, political instability continued. It was something of a surprise in September 1995 when the disgraced mercenary Denard reappeared at the head of another mercenary band, defeated the Comoran army, unseated Djohar, and made Taki Abdulkasim president once again. The French quickly sent a force of 900 paratroopers, captured Denard and his men, and imprisoned them in France. Taki Abdulkasim, however, stayed on as president, and in 1996 he extended his authority with a new constitution that also made Islam the basis for the nation’s laws.

In September, troops from Grand Comore landed on Anjouan but were routed by the secessionists. In 1998, Taki died of natural causes. Aging politician Tadjidine Ben Said Massounde took over as acting president until new elections could be held. Massounde moved to quell unrest in Anjouan and Moheli by meeting with secessionist representatives in Madagascar and offering greater autonomy to the two islands. The secessionists asked for time to consult with their citizens, but the request for a delay was interpreted as a rejection of the offer. In the capital of Moroni, people of Anjouan origin were attacked and beaten in the streets. Massounde’s inability to resolve the secession led to his overthrow in a military coup in April 1999. The new regime backed dissident military leaders on Anjouan, and in 2001 they seized power, intending to rejoin the island to the Comoros. Fighting continued in Anjouan, but negotiations began at the same time. In December 2001, voters on all three islands voted for a constitution allowing increased island autonomy but would keep the country together. In April 2002, pro-integrationist leaders won election on each island. Tensions eased throughout the Comoros, and secessionist impulses quieted. In November 2005, however, Mount Karthala erupted again, forcing thousands of residents of Grand Comore to flee the stricken area. This new disaster was seen as another potentially disruptive force on the Comoros polity. David MacMichael and James Ciment

Secession Struggle

See also: Coups; Madagascar: Independence Movement and Coups, 1947–2002.

Taki’s authoritarian rule and the continuing economic malaise in the country set off months of protests in Anjouan and Moheli, which culminated in declarations of secession by both islands in August 1997. The secessionists had long resented the concentration of political and economic power in Grand Comore, and their stated goal was to gain reunion with France. The French government refused to support the secessionists, however.

Bibliography Day, Alan J., ed. Border and Territorial Disputes. 2nd ed. Essex, UK: Longman Group, Keesing’s Reference Publications, 1987. Economic Intelligence Unit. Comoros: Country Profile. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003. Newitt, Malyn. The Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.

CONGO,DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE: Post-Independence Wars,1960–1965 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Belgium; France 0 0

100

200 Miles

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

100 200 Kilometers

CAMEROON

ORIENTALE

EQUATEUR Co

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B A M O N G O r ive

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O N G O B A M

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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO RWANDA BAMBALA (ZAIRE) KIVU

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LEOPOLDVILLE Kinshasa

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BURUNDI

BATETELA BALUBA (KASAI) BAKUSU

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BENALULUA

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A T L A N T IC O C E A N

and set off the war of national liberation in neighboring Portuguese Angola. In addition, the post-independence rebellion of the Katangese in the southeast part of the country (now called Shaba) represented the first great separatist movement in postcolonial, sub-Saharan African history. After several years of fighting—which witnessed, among other things, the first major UN peacekeeping effort on the continent—an army officer named Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) emerged as the nation’s strongman. His corrupt and dictatorial regime, supported by the United States as a bulwark against Communism, represented the quintessential example of African governmental mismanagement and repressiveness for three decades.

SUDAN

BALUNDA

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NG

SO

BA

Lake Tanganyika

BA ) LU GA BA TAN A (K

KATANGA

BATSHOKWE BALUNDA

Lubumbashi (Elizabethville)

ZAMBIA

Historical Background

By its sheer size, the Congo* has dominated the affairs of central Africa since it was carved out of the region as the personal fiefdom of Belgium’s King Leopold II in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, it was Leopold’s move into the Congo River basin that triggered the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, at which various European governments divided the continent up among themselves, without even a nod to the territorial lines established by the Africans themselves over hundreds of years. Then, during the great African decolonization year of 1960, disputes within the Congo triggered the first great Cold War confrontation on the continent

The Congo River basin, which comprises most of present-day DRC, was first inhabited by forestdwelling pygmies tens of thousands of years ago. During the great Bantu migrations of the first millennium c.e., the Pygmy people were pushed deeper into the rain forests and became a tiny minority of the people inhabiting the region. Upon the eve of European penetration of Africa in the 1500s, the region was inhabited largely by Bantus, but with significant minorities of Sudanese and Nilotic peoples in the north and northeast. There are still some 200 distinct linguistic groups in the country today.

*The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has changed names several times in its history. Dubbed the Republic of the Congo upon independence, its name was changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1964, the Republic of Zaire in 1971, and back to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997. Adding to the confusion, its neighbor to the west—the former French Congo—is now officially known as the Republic of Congo. To simplify things, the name Congo—or the initials DRC—will be used throughout this entry. The Republic of Congo will be referred to as Congo-Brazzaville, after its capital.

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KEY DATES 1960 On June 30, Congo wins its independence from Belgian colonizers, with leftist Patrice Lumumba as head of state; civil strife breaks out between ethnic groups on the following day, particularly in the breakaway province of Shaba (Katanga) under Moises Tshombe; Belgium sends in paratroopers to protect its citizens in the country; Lumumba asks for Soviet help in driving the Belgians out on July 14; on October 11, military chief Joseph Mobutu issues an order to arrest Lumumba; Lumumba is captured on December 1. 1961

Lumumba is transferred from the capital to hostile Katanga on January 18; the UN demands his release after delegates note that he has been beaten in a Katanga prison; on February 12, government announces Lumumba has been killed trying to escape; the UN later claims he was assassinated, while Soviets imply the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was involved in Lumumba’s transfer to Katanga and certain death; the slaying of Lumumba sets off demonstrations around much of the country; on April 24, Mobutu has Tshombe arrested; Tshombe reneges on promise to integrate his forces into the national army; in early September, the UN agrees to conduct its first aggressive action putting down the rebellion in Katanga; in the middle of September, UN SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld flies to Katanga, where he dies in a plane crash; the Congolese army invades Katanga on October 30.

1962

By January, rebellions in both Katanga and the eastern provinces of Congo have been suppressed.

1964

Followers of the late Lumumba rise up in rebellion but are quickly put down by Mobutu, who is now head of state.

1965

Mobutu dismisses Tshombe from the cabinet; with rising unrest in the Congolese capital of Kinshasa, Mobutu calls out the military to quell protests.

1966 Mobutu outlaws all political parties and assumes absolute power. 1997

Mobutu is driven from power by a rebellion led by former Lumumba follower Laurent Kabila.

The first known state in the region was the Luba Kingdom, which lay in what is now Shaba province and dated back to the sixteenth century c.e. Later states to emerge included the Kuba, the Kongo, and the Lunda kingdoms, all products of the eighteenth century, though the latter two were largely situated in what is now Angola. Belgium’s presence in the Congo dates back to 1876, when King Leopold II organized the Associa-

tion Internationale du Congo, which began setting up a series of trading posts along the Congo River. Leopold’s expanding territorial ambitions triggered alarm in other European capitals, resulting in the Berlin Congress in 1884–1885. For the next twenty years, Leopold’s territory—dubbed the Free State of Congo—became increasingly notorious for its brutal economic exploitation of native peoples. An indigenous police force under the direction of European

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officers forced local peoples to tap the region’s numerous wild rubber trees. Thousands were killed when they could not fulfill their quotas. Conditions became so bad that the international community—largely Britain and the United States— interceded, forcing Leopold to turn the colony over to the Belgian government in 1908, whereupon the region was named the Belgian Congo. While the worst of the atrocities came to an end, Brussels hardly offered an enlightened regime. There was little economic development, and political institutions remained completely under European control until shortly after World War II, when a consultative body—made up largely of white civil servants and missionaries— served to represent African interests. The lack of official outlets for political expression forced the growing number of Congolese nationalists to set up underground independence organizations of varying ideological slants. The largest of these was the Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO), founded in the 1950s. In response to the growing unrest— particularly among the small educated elite and urban masses in the capital Leopoldville (now Kinshasa)— the Belgians established a series of councils in the territory’s three largest cities, designed to (very) gradually develop indigenous representative institutions and eventually lead to independence. Still, real decision-making power lay in the Colonial Ministry in Brussels, which exercised its authority through governors and governor-generals in each of the colony’s six provinces. This arrangement—an unsatisfactory one from the African perspective—was put to the test in January 1959, when an ABAKO-sponsored demonstration in the capital was attacked by police, resulting in the deaths of some fifty Africans. Brussels responded first with an offer to extend indigenous government up to the provincial level and then, in October, announced the establishment of a central Congolese government, albeit under Belgian aegis. This, too, fell far short of African expectations, prompting the convening of the Brussels Round Table Conference in January 1960. At the conference, representatives of the Belgian government and various Congolese nationalist groups—as well as a number of ethnic-based organizations—hammered out an agreement calling for a four-year transitional government, with Africans gaining increasing control over the colony until independence was achieved. Fearing the possibility of a

protracted war, facing growing public disenchantment, and believing that it could still maintain its economic interests in the region even after an independent Congo was established, the Belgian government changed its mind shortly after the conference ended, announcing it would grant total freedom to the Congo on June 30, less than five months away. Independence day found the Congo almost totally unprepared for self-government. Because the Belgians had kept a tight rein on the colonial administration, there were few African civil servants, except at the lowest levels. Belgium expected its civil servants to remain for some years, but most of them, caught up in the ethnic violence that broke out shortly after independence, fled the country. This was also true of the security forces. The Force Publique was officered exclusively by whites, most of whom also fled after independence. Nor were there any real broad-based political parties, with national recognition, in the Congo. Instead, the new country’s political scene was divided up into a host of ethnically based parties mostly led by uneducated leaders. While primary education was widespread—about half the population was literate, high for Africa at the time—only 25,000 Congolese had achieved a secondary education by 1960. The first university in the country had opened only six years before.

Lumumba Regime With its vast size, hundreds of ethnic groups, arbitrary borders, and a history almost completely lacking in participatory government, the Congo was a nation in name only on independence day, as had already been made clear at the Brussels Conference earlier in the year. There, the various aspirants for national power—Joseph Kasavubu and ABAKO; Moise Tshombe’s Katanga Province Conakat Party; the National Progress Party’s Paul Bolya; Albert Kalonji, leader of the more conservative elements in the Congolese National Movement (MNC, its French acronym); and Patrice Lumumba, head of the latter’s radical African nationalist wing—could not agree on the kind of state they wanted. Both Kalonji and Lumumba, the latter recently freed from a Belgian prison, insisted on a centralized republic. But the other three wanted a federal state, with the provincial governments retaining most of the power. They also disagreed about the nature of

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the relationship between the Congo and its former colonial overlord, Belgium. Tshombe and Bolya wanted close political and economic ties, while the MNC and ABAKO wanted the Congo to go its own way, unfettered by ties to Brussels. In the May 1960 elections for the Congo’s first National Assembly, no party received anything close to a majority, though Lumumba’s faction won the largest group of seats, 36 out of 137. On June 24, Lumumba was confirmed by the assembly as the nation’s first premier, or prime minister, while Kasavubu was chosen as president. A week later, Belgium’s King Baudouin came to the Congo to declare it independent on June 30, 1960. Civil strife broke out the very next day in the capital and several other cities, when members of two ethnic groups clashed. Lumumba, warning citizens “that the liberty we have just received does not mean license,” sent in troops and imposed a nighttime curfew that ended independence day celebrations. New and more serious problems arose that very same week, when enlisted men mutinied against the continued presence of white officers and demanded promotions. The army was turned over to the command of a Congolese noncommissioned officer, sparking a sudden mass exodus of the Congo’s remaining European inhabitants, who represented most of the new country’s skilled and educated classes.

Problem of Katanga To protect its fleeing citizens and crush the mutiny, Belgium sent 800 paratroopers into Elizabethville, capital of Katanga province, after Congolese soldiers had attacked Europeans. The intervention was welcomed by both Kasavubu and Tshombe, the former worried about the exodus of Europeans and the latter hoping to secure Katangese independence from the Congo. Indeed, Tshombe declared Katanga independent on July 11, 1960, denouncing the government in Leopoldville as communistic, and refused to allow a plane carrying Lumumba and Kasavubu to land in Elizabethville. Worried that his own mutinous troops were incapable of controlling the growing violence in the country, Lumumba appealed to the United Nations for peacekeeping troops. The Security Council was called into special session in mid-July and, despite accusations by the Soviet Union that Belgium and the West were seeking to undermine the sovereignty of the Congo, agreed to dispatch a force, largely made up of

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African nationals and supplied by the United States and other Western countries, which began to arrive in the Congo within a few days. Belgian officials agreed to pull out their forces, once the UN force had achieved order, adding that their own troops would confine their activities to protecting Belgian nationals. But the Belgian troops, increasingly being augmented by air, continued to attack Congolese troops, prompting a warning from Lumumba that he would seek assistance in preserving Congolese sovereignty from any source. Belgium, meanwhile, insisted that it had a right to protect its interests in the country. Lumumba’s warning was a veiled threat that he would ask the Soviet Union for assistance, a threat that became more real on July 14, when Lumumba said he would call in Soviet troops if the Belgians did not leave in seventy-two hours. Premier Nikita Khrushchev responded positively, despite the fact that the Congolese Senate officially annulled Lumumba’s request. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council issued a warning to Belgium to pull out of the Congo and insisted that all other outside powers refrain from intervening. The American ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, added his own warning, which constituted a less than subtle threat that the United States would react to any Soviet involvement. In late July, Lumumba toured a series of Western capitals, asking them to put pressure on Belgium to withdraw, before flying on to UN headquarters. While he was unable to win a firm UN commitment to oust the Belgians, he did get UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s commitment to send UN technicians and security experts to help the Lumumba government. Hammarskjöld also promised to visit both Belgium and the Congo to try and resolve the dispute. Failing to win a firm commitment from Brussels to withdraw, Hammarskjöld arrived in Leopoldville, where he dispatched Undersecretary Ralph Bunche to Katanga. Tshombe, however, was in no mood to cooperate. From his base in Elizabethville, he warned Hammarskjöld that UN forces would meet armed resistance and then issued an order for full mobilization of all able-bodied men in the province. When Bunche arrived in Elizabethville, Tshombe refused to meet with him and forced a plane carrying UN technicians to leave the moment it landed. At this point, Hammarskjöld canceled UN plans to send troops to Katanga but then backed off when Lumumba, ordering his own mobilization of troops, warned he would

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Moise Tshombe, who led the secession of Katanga Province from the newly independent Democratic Republic of the Congo in July 1960, awards medals to his troops. The Katangan rebellion was quelled in 1963, but Tshombe went on to become president of the Congo. (Terrence Spencer/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

send forces into Katanga if the United Nations would not. That prompted a reassessment of the situation by the Security Council, which once again ordered UN troops to Katanga, with the strict caveat that they not try to block or support the separatist movement. This decision prompted many of Lumumba’s supporters, both inside the Congo and out, to conclude that the United Nations was not serving the interests of a member state. Indeed, many critics argued that the United Nations was caving in to U.S. pressure that it do as little as possible to support Lumumba’s left-wing government. With Hammarskjöld in the lead, the first UN troops—an advance contingent from the secretary-general’s native Sweden—arrived in Katanga on August 12. Within the week, the UN forces had secured the province, and the Belgian troops had returned to a nearby base. Lumumba was angry, however. He denounced the use of white UN troops rather than African ones to

secure Katanga, and he accused the secretary-general of plotting with Tshombe, an accusation that Hammarskjöld called “unfounded and unjustified.” Lumumba then warned the United Nations to work with Congolese forces to disarm and occupy Katanga. When Hammarskjöld said he had to go to the Security Council for further instructions, Lumumba declared he had “lost confidence” in the secretary-general. The council, however, backed Hammarskjöld’s insistence on strict neutrality in the Katangese affair, agreeing that with the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, the situation had become an internal one and was therefore off-limits to UN involvement. The situation calmed, at least temporarily. Lumumba said he was satisfied with the Security Council debate, but he continued to insist that UN aid to Congo not be conditional on any unilateral demands on his government. He agreed that Soviet intervention was not necessary, but he continued to insist that black UN troops replace white ones. Meanwhile, the

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Soviet Union redoubled its criticism of the United Nations’ actions in the Congo, accusing both Bunche and Hammarskjöld of being “pro-American” and threatening to intervene if Belgian troops did not leave the country immediately. While the UN presence had temporarily defused the crisis in Katanga, a new secessionist movement took hold in the neighboring province of Kasai in late August. Under Albert Kalonji, the Baluba ethnic leader and head of the conservative wing of the MNC, an independent “mining” state had been declared in the mineral-rich province. Tshombe of Katanga and several other provincial governors expressed their support for Kalonji, and there was increasing talk of an anti-Lumumba federation. Congo seemed to be breaking apart under the centrifugal forces of ethnicity, the personal ambitions of local leaders, and the claims of local interest groups to the mineral wealth of their provinces. But when forces dispatched by Lumumba sent Kalonji fleeing from his base in Kasai, Tshombe expressed disgust at the latter’s timidity and refused to send Katangese troops to defend him. Lumumba was more conciliatory toward the United Nations. When a group of Canadian troops were attacked at Leopoldville airport, the Congolese premier issued a plea to the citizenry, telling them to welcome those whites who had come to the country to aid in its development and security. For his efforts, Lumumba was rewarded with an agreement hammered out between Hammarskjöld and Brussels that secured the complete withdrawal of Belgian troops by September 9.

Fall of Lumumba Ironically, the Belgian departure—one of the few things the various factions in the capital agreed upon— spurred further disputes. Claiming that Lumumba had “plunged the nation into fratricidal warfare,” Congolese president Kasavubu removed Lumumba from office. Lumumba responded with the claim that Kasavubu was no longer head of state and thus his order was invalid. As tensions mounted, UN forces fanned out across the capital city of Leopoldville but could not stop Congolese police from firing on demonstrators who were marching on Lumumba’s house, demanding he obey Kasavubu. As both Kasavubu and Lumumba rallied their forces—largely broken down along rival ethnic lines— tensions mounted. Kasavubu had his police arrest

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Lumumba, but the latter’s own forces liberated him from jail a few hours later. Backed by his troops, Lumumba made a triumphal tour of the city and won “special powers” from the Congolese parliament to restore order. Meanwhile, the international situation was heating up. After it was discovered that both the Belgians and the Soviets were shipping arms to their respective sides in the Katangese conflict—that is, to Tshombe and Lumumba—the United Nations ordered the closure of the province’s airports. The Soviets then demanded that the United Nations desist, and some of the African contingents in the UN force withdrew in protest. The United Nations reopened the airports a week later, though not before the United States had issued a warning to the Soviets to stop shipping arms. Backed by a UN General Assembly resolution, Hammarskjöld finally secured a cease-fire in the Kasai and Katanga provinces, though the United Nations remained deadlocked by the United States and the Soviet Union over whether and how to continue its peacekeeping and aid activities in the Congo, as well as whether it should accept the credentials of the Kasavubu or Lumumba delegation. It ultimately decided to deny both parties a seat. Unable to make up its mind, the United Nations soon found itself outpaced by events in Leopoldville, for, on September 14, 1960, a military junta under the command of the Congolese chief of staff, Joseph Mobutu, took power. Though maintaining that both Lumumba and Kasavubu would retain their offices, he quickly had the former placed under house arrest. Mobutu then ordered all Soviet personnel out of the country and recalled government troops from Kasai and Katanga. The new Congolese strongman also announced the establishment of a nonpartisan caretaker government, known as the College of High Commissioners, to hold power until the various disputes in the country had been resolved, a move Kasavubu agreed to. On October 11, Mobutu issued an order to imprison Lumumba, but the United Nations refused to allow it to be carried out. Two weeks later, Kasavubu officially dissolved the Lumumba government and signed a constitutional decree legalizing Mobutu’s College. At the same time, Mobutu announced an accord with Tshombe that declared Katanga part of the Congolese state but agreed to a further decentralization of power. Despite these seemingly decisive moves, Mobutu was still having trouble securing his own position

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in the capital and the provinces. When Congolese troops began to riot over lack of pay, it became obvious that Mobutu was not in effective command. Criticizing the total breakdown in law and order, the United Nations announced it was willing to assume control of the situation in the capital but did not make any moves in this direction. In fact, despite a harsh report about Mobutu by Hammarskjöld’s personal representative in the Congo, the General Assembly agreed to seat the pro-Mobutu delegation of Kasavubu on November 22. Whether it was aware of it or not, the General Assembly’s decision reflected the balance of power in the Congo itself. On November 28, Lumumba had eluded the troops around his house and slipped out of the city, heading for supporters in the provinces. But he was captured by Mobutu’s forces in Kasai on December 1 and returned to the capital. Charging the former premier with inciting an army rebellion—Mobutu believed Lumumba was behind the earlier troop riots— the new head of state refused to allow the Red Cross or the United Nations to see Lumumba in prison. Meanwhile, Lumumba’s forces were rallying in Orientale province in the northeast. They established yet another rebel government in the provincial capital of Stanleyville (now Kisangani) and invaded Katanga and Kivu provinces along the border with Rwanda in December 1960 and January 1961, respectively. The invasion of Kivu took place partly under the leadership of Laurent Kabila, who would overthrow the Mobutu government, but not until 1997, more than thirty-five years later. Heavy fighting between proTshombe and pro-Lumumba troops forced the United Nations to withdraw from the region. On January 18, Lumumba was transferred from a prison in Leopoldville to one in Katanga, a provocative move, given the war situation there and the Katangese hostility to the former premier. After UN troops witnessed Lumumba being beaten in Elizabethville, Hammarskjöld demanded that he be returned to the capital. He was not. Instead, the government announced his death on February 12, 1961, in Katanga. Officials there insisted he was killed while trying to escape, but a UN report later determined that Lumumba was handed over to Tshombe’s forces for execution. The Soviets claimed that the transfer was actually orchestrated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was actively supporting Tshombe’s forces, though the agency denied any involvement. The pro-Lumumba government in Stanleyville was now headed by

Antoine Gizenga, the former leader of a party allied to Lumumba’s wing of the MNC.

More Violence The slaying set off demonstrations around the developing world and in the socialist bloc, including attacks on Belgian embassies in Cairo, Rome, and even Moscow. They also sparked a new round of violence in the Congo, prompting the United Nations to issue an order authorizing the use of force in order to disarm Congolese and rebel forces, as well as a request by Hammarskjöld to supplement the 18,000-man force with more troops. These actions, in turn, led to protests by both the socialist bloc countries and officials of the Mobutu government, both sides seeing the UN actions as being aimed at their respective positions. At the end of February 1961, the various antiLumumbist parties—including Tshombe in Katanga, Kalonji in Kasai, and the new Congolese Premier Joseph Ileo—issued a declaration announcing their intention to form a common front against “the danger of a UN trusteeship, Communist tyranny, and a Koreanstyle war” in the country. In early March, fighting broke out between Congolese forces and a UN contingent of Sudanese troops. Meanwhile, the various antiLumumbist forces were meeting in Madagascar, where they hammered out plans for a Congolese federation of quasi-independent states, a move rejected by Gizenga. Concerned about the complete breakdown of a central government, the United Nations issued a report on March 21, warning that the Congo was “on the verge of catastrophe” and appealing for more funds from member states to bolster the peacekeeping forces. Hammarskjöld also released a report that the Katanga regime was recruiting European mercenaries, with the help of the Belgian government. To prevent this and restore order to the country generally, UN officials sat down with Kasavubu in midApril. The two sides signed an agreement calling for the withdrawal of all foreign political and military personnel from the country. But the agreement was only as good as the United Nations’ and Congolese government’s capacity to enforce it. On April 24, Mobutu took a step in that direction by arresting Tshombe while he was attending a conference with other provincial officials in Coquilhatville (now Mbandaka), capital of Equateur province. Freed two months later, Tshombe agreed to send representatives to the Congolese national assembly and to

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integrate his forces in the central government’s army. While Tshombe was in jail, Gizenga, too, pledged his allegiance to the regime in Leopoldville and ordered his forces to honor a cease-fire. Then, in August, Gizenga formally disbanded the pro-Lumumbist government in Stanleyville. Despite early promises, however, Tshombe refused to integrate his forces with the Congolese army. In early September, the United Nations launched a highly controversial assault on Katanga, controversial because it was the first aggressive military action ever undertaken by the organization. Hammarskjöld justified the attack on the grounds that it would help ensure the unity and tranquility of the Congolese state, in line with resolutions passed by the vast majority of the United Nations’ member states. In mid-September, Hammarskjöld agreed to fly to Katanga to work out a truce with Tshombe, but he was killed when his airplane crashed in northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). UN officials persisted, however, working out a joint UN-Katangese occupation agreement for Elizabethville, an agreement that the Congolese government condemned in no uncertain terms. On October 30, the Congolese army invaded the province, aiming, the government’s order said, “to liquidate the Katanga secession.” The force, however, was driven back by the rebels. Meanwhile, new trouble was brewing in the eastern provinces of the country. Like Tshombe, Gizenga reneged on his agreement to support the government. Leaving the capital for Stanleyville, he instigated a mutiny among pro-Lumumbist troops of the Congolese army. In January, however, government troops were dispatched and, after a brief firefight with Lumumbist forces, succeeded in arresting Gizenga. This move quieted the situation there until January 1964, when a new rebellion had to be quelled. The proLumumbist forces were finally forced to retreat into the countryside, where they remained a destabilizing force for several decades, living off earnings from smuggling. Fighting, however, intensified in Katanga, with both UN and Congolese forces alternately assaulting Tshombe’s troops. During the summer of 1962, Hammarskjöld’s successor as secretary-general, U Thant, ordered economic sanctions imposed on Katanga and new UN assaults. These measures ultimately destroyed the Katangese rebel movement and forced Tshombe into exile in early 1963. Despite the UN victory, however, the situation remained tense in the breakaway province.

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To win the allegiance of the Katangese, Kasavubu invited Tshombe to form an interim government in Leopoldville in July 1964. But the president soon grew tired of Tshombe’s resistance to giving up Katangese autonomy and dismissed the former rebel from the government, despite the latter’s party having overwhelmingly won the legislative elections in the spring of 1965. The Katangese rebellion did not disappear forever, however. Supported by the antiMobutu Angolan government, exiled Katangese rebels invaded Katanga province, now known as Shaba, in 1976 but were quickly crushed. With a parliamentary deadlock and growing unrest in the capital, the army once again intervened in November 1965. Mobutu dismissed Kasavubu, assumed full executive powers, and declared himself head of the Second Republic. Moving quickly to consolidate his position, Mobutu outlawed all political parties in 1966 for at least five years and then established his own party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), which soon took over all administrative posts in the country. To prevent further rebellions, Mobutu changed the Congolese federal government, establishing a more centralized rule by appointing loyal supporters as governors. He then consolidated his hold over the country, ruling it as a virtual one-man state until his ouster by forces under the command of former Lumumbist Laurent Kabila in 1997. James Ciment See also: Cold War Confrontations; Anticolonialism; Coups; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997.

Bibliography Dayal, Rajeshwar. Mission for Hammarskjöld: The Congo Crisis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Epstein, Howard, ed. Revolt in the Congo: 1960–1964. New York: Facts on File, 1965. Hoskyns, Catherine. The Congo: A Chronology of Events, January– December 1961. London: Oxford University Press, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962. Kanza, Thomas R. Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Lumumba. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1972. Lefever, Ernest. Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1965. Martelli, George. Experiment in World Government: An Account of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960–1964. London: Johnson, 1966. Schatzberg, Michael G. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)* was freed from nearly a hundred years of Belgian colonial rule in June 1960. Immediately, a brutal civil war broke out in this vast land of diverse ethnic groups and semiautonomous provinces. Belgian troops remained, and UN troops were flown in. The left-wing government of Patrice Lumumba, elected in the first national elections, was overthrown, and Lumumba was allegedly ordered killed by Katangese separatist leader Moise Tshombe. By 1964, the Katangese separatist movement was crushed by a combination of UN forces and Congolese troops under the command

of Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko). Tshombe was forced into exile and died in 1969. Mobutu meanwhile declared himself head of the country’s Second Republic in 1965. The parliament ordered itself into suspension, and Mobutu then banned all political parties for five years. In 1966, he created his own party, called the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), and began consolidating state power in his own hands. To prevent rebellions in the sprawling and poorly connected country, Mobutu appointed his own supporters to the positions of provincial governors. He also ordered the execution of ministers from former governments whose loyalty he suspected. Student rebellions against the increasingly authoritarian government were crushed, and labor’s right to strike was annulled. In June 1967, a new constitution was approved by a general referendum. While the new document called for a bicameral legislature and two legally authorized political parties, Mobutu ignored it. Opposition figures were arrested, forced into exile, or assigned to diplomatic posts overseas. By the time presidential and legislative elections were held in 1970, there were no significant opposition candidates willing to campaign. Mobutu was duly elected as president, being the only candidate running, while the legislators were chosen from a slate of handpicked MPR candidates. The constitution was then amended to make all institutions of government, including the judiciary, part of the MPR, and all citizens were automatically enrolled

*The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has changed names several times in its history. Dubbed the Republic of the Congo upon independence, its name was changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1964, the Republic of Zaire in 1971, and back to the DRC in 1997. Adding to the confusion, its neighbor to the west—the former French Congo—is now officially known as the Republic of Congo. To simplify things, the name Congo—or the initials DRC—will be used throughout this entry. The Republic of Congo will be referred to as CongoBrazzaville, after its capital.

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KEY DATES 1966

Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko) bans all political parties and assumes absolute power.

1966–1996 During thirty years in power, Mobutu and his supporters pillage the national economy, growing rich while the nation’s infrastructure collapses. 1991

In the wake of massive protests, Mobutu legalizes political parties and calls for national elections; nevertheless, he clings to power.

1994

Following the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda, a Tutsi rebel group seizes power in Rwanda, sending hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees, including leaders of the genocide, into eastern Congo.

1996

To destroy Hutu forces that are conducting raids across the border into Rwanda, Rwandan forces, backed by ally Uganda, march into eastern Zaire, fighting alongside anti-Mobutu rebel leader Laurent Kabila.

1996–1997 Kabila’s forces sweep westward, meeting little resistance from the poorly equipped and motivated Congolese army; on April 8, 1997, Mobutu declares a state of emergency; on May 16, Mobutu flees the country, and four days later Kabila takes power in the capital Kinshasa. 2001

Kabila is assassinated by his bodyguards; his son Joseph is sworn into office as president four days later.

as members. As part of his policy of authenticité, Mobutu renamed the country Zaire, the capital Kinshasa, and himself Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga (translation: “great lion king who makes all his enemies run before him in fear”). From the 1960s onward, Mobutu offered his territory as a base for the rebel National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA, its Portuguese acronym), fighting against Portuguese colonialists in Angola. When Lisbon agreed to pull out of the colony in 1974, Mobutu allowed both the People’s Republic of China and the United States to use airfields in his country to transship arms to the FNLA, now fighting the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), another rebel group about to assume power in Luanda. When the FNLA began losing, Mobutu sent in his own troops, but they, too, were driven back.

With the MPLA in power, Mobutu made his peace with the new Angolan government in March 1977, agreeing to a joint exchange: Angolan refugees in Zaire would be repatriated in exchange for Katangese rebels still hiding out in Angola. Fearful of retribution, the Katangese invaded their home province of Katanga, now renamed Shaba. Mobutu asked France and Morocco for assistance. Troops were sent in and brutally crushed the rebel movement. In doing so, they sparked enormous resentment in the province, resulting in the Second Shaba War of 1978. Again, French paratroopers helped Mobutu crush the rebels. Aside from these foreign escapades, Mobutu spent the 1970s uncovering a number of real and fictitious plots against him, including within the military. He executed a number of the real and supposed coup-makers. At the same time, Mobutu began to develop his characteristic style of rule. Referred to

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by some political scientists as a “kleptocracy”—that is, a government based on theft—Mobutu’s regime allowed the numerous international mining firms enormous license to expatriate profits so long as they paid sufficiently large bribes to Mobutu and his followers. By the time of his downfall, it is estimated that Mobutu had skimmed off between $4 billion and $20 billion, much of which he secreted in Swiss and other offshore bank accounts. Other funds were spent on grandiose prestige projects, such as the government complex in Kinshasa. To secure his hold on power, Mobutu doled out much of the money destined for the provinces to his native Equateur province in the northwest part of the country. Indeed, his ancestral hometown of Gbadolite became a kind of second capital, with lavish palaces, fine roads, and other amenities virtually unknown in the rest of the country. The ranks of government were filled with people from his own ethnic group, as well as numerous members of his extended family. These favorites lived in great luxury, spending conspicuously on themselves in the midst of the country’s great poverty. To his critics, this poverty exemplified the problems of Mobutuism. Blessed with enormous mineral wealth and vast expanses of rich farmland, Zaire descended into deeper and deeper economic distress. Indeed, the gross national product of the country was far lower in 1990 than it had been at independence in 1960. Moreover, Mobutu administered his country with a kind of malicious neglect. What little transportation infrastructure had been bequeathed to the country by the Belgians was allowed to deteriorate in the tropical climate. Mobutu simply did not believe in highways or railways; their absence, he once said, prevented rebel movements from growing too big or marching on the capital. Mobutu had other, even more effective, means for maintaining a tight grip on power. First, he constantly shifted his army commanders from one part of the country to another, to keep them from developing a rapport with local opposition forces that might lead to a coup. More importantly, Mobutu was assiduous in maintaining close ties with the United States and even—albeit clandestinely—with the apartheid regime in South Africa. Fearful of Soviet and Cuban penetration in neighboring Angola, the United States provided Mobutu’s regime with arms and military aid in lavish quantities as a bulwark against Communism. Mobutu returned the favor by allowing the

United States to arm the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in his ongoing war against the leftist MPLA government in Angola during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Growing Political Opposition Still, despite these advantages, Mobutu began to face a growing opposition movement both inside the country and in exile, largely in the Congo’s former metropolis of Belgium. In 1980, Mobutu reorganized the government as a part of what he declared was an anticorruption campaign, but which his critics said was yet another purge of potential opponents. Two years later, a small group of opposition politicians tried to organize a second party, the Union pour la Democratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS). Mobutu imprisoned thirteen of its leaders—an act which, in turn, sparked the formation of yet another opposition coalition, le Front Congolais pour le Rétablissement de la Démocratie (FCD). Following a critical report on Mobutu’s government by the human rights group Amnesty International in 1983, Mobutu offered amnesty to his many political opponents in exile. Some returned, but many remained out of the country, where they continued to plot against the regime in Kinshasa. In 1984, violence broke out in the country in the form of a series of mysterious bomb explosions in the capital and a brief rebel invasion of Shaba. By the late 1980s, the opposition movement had begun to coalesce around the figure of Etienne Tshisekedi, former secretary-general of the MPR and minister of the interior. Arrested by Mobutu, he was charged with inciting riots that had led to thirty-seven deaths in 1989. This did not stop the UDPS from organizing a series of opposition rallies in the capital. In response to these demonstrations and under increasing pressure from Washington for his antidemocratic practices, Mobutu responded with a series of governmental reforms and the announcement of the inauguration of the Third Republic. He promised elections and a devolution of power to a transitional government. These reforms, however, did not stop the street demonstrations, nor did they prevent the United States from cutting off military and economic aid to Mobutu’s government in 1990. With the war in Angola winding down—at least temporarily—and with waning fears of the collapsing Soviet Union, Washington was less beholden to the anticommunist Mobutu.

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Massive student protests in 1990 and a general strike in February 1991 increased the pressure on Mobutu, who announced the restoration of multiparty democracy and the inauguration of yet another transitional government in March. Most of the now legalized major parties, however, boycotted it, calling instead for Mobutu’s resignation. In August, the opposition parties organized a conference in Kinshasa to discuss ways to oust Mobutu. When massive demonstrations in support of the conference were attacked by police, the situation deteriorated into rioting and looting throughout the capital, prompting the dispatch of French and Belgian troops, ostensibly on a peace-restoring mission. Critics of Mobutu said the Europeans had come to defend the regime. Under continuing pressure at home and abroad, Mobutu agreed to organize yet another national conference on democratization in April 1992. The conference declared itself the government and appointed Tshisikedi as prime minister, while maintaining Mobutu as head of state. In December 1992, the national conference turned itself into a parliament known as the High Council of the Republic (HCR), which followed with a warrant for Mobutu’s arrest on charges of treason. The two rival governments were unable to resolve their differences through the mid-1990s, and it seemed that Mobutu would remain in power by cleverly playing rival politicians and ethnic groups against one another.

Fall of Mobutu and Rise of Kabila In the midst of the perennial political crises in the capital, new troubles were developing for the Mobutu regime in the far eastern province of Kivu. In the summer of 1994, the decades-old conflict between the Tutsi minority and the Hutu majority in neighboring Rwanda exploded into a genocide in which hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were massacred by the Hutu. When Tutsi rebels, based in Uganda, invaded Rwanda to halt the killing, hundreds of thousands of Hutu— including many of the leaders of the genocide—fled to refugee camps inside the Congolese border, fearing Tutsi retribution. Under UN protections, former members of the Hutu army, militia, and government began to organize the masses of Hutu refugees, refusing to allow them to return to Rwanda. Beginning in mid-1996, the Hutu leaders in the camps began to try to carve a section out of Kivu

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province as a base for launching attacks against the Tutsi-dominated government now in power in Rwanda. Supported by elements of the Congolese army, the Hutu began to expel thousands of the Tutsi, who had lived in Kivu for many years. Some had fled there after the Hutu took power in Rwanda in the 1960s, but others had lived there for generations. No matter how long they had been there, the Tutsi of eastern Congo, known popularly as the Banyamulenge, had been in a long-running dispute with the Mobutu government, which had refused to grant them Congolese citizenship for decades. The governor of Kivu province, allegedly under pressure from the Hutu militia leaders, ordered all of the Tutsi to leave the province within a week, in early October 1996. Though he quickly repealed the order, the local Tutsi had already risen up to defend themselves. With covert aid from the Tutsi government in Rwanda and its ally the Ugandan government of Yoweru Museveni, the Tutsi militias soon made rapid advances against the poorly trained Congolese army, many of whose enlisted men hadn’t been paid in months and chose to either loot civilians or flee, rather than fight. What at first seemed to be a regional uprising, familiar in Congolese history, soon turned into a national military campaign to oust the dictator Mobutu from the country. The key player in all this was a local strongman named Laurent Kabila. A former minister in the leftist, post-independence Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba, Kabila had fled to the far eastern reaches of the Congo after the fall of Lumumba’s government and the rise to power of Mobutu. While maintaining the pretense of being a rebel leader, Kabila in fact had long been running a local criminal syndicate involved in smuggling goods, including weapons, across the Rwandan-Congolese border. But Kabila proved an able commander and coalition leader. As he led his army southward and westward into the Congo, he persuaded the leaders of the old secessionist movements in Shaba and Kasai provinces to join his forces, which he had dubbed the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). By early November, AFDL forces had captured much of the eastern part of the country, as the Congolese army melted in front of them. At this point violence broke out in the capital. With Mobutu fatally ill with liver cancer and staying at one of his villas in the south of France in order

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A soldier of Laurent Kabila’s rebel alliance destroys a portrait of ousted Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko at one of the former leader’s Kinshasa residences during the May 1997 military coup. (Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images)

to receive medical treatment, the opposition government ordered the expulsion of all Tutsi from the capital while turning a blind eye to popular attacks on Tutsi residents, many of whom now fled to Brazzaville, across the river in the Republic of Congo. Mobutu flew back to Kinshasa in December, banned all demonstrations and strikes, and ordered a counteroffensive against Kabila. Though aided by Serbian and other foreign mercenaries, the offensive failed as the AFDL continued its relentless march across the country, hampered less by the Congolese army than by the near total lack of serviceable roads. By early April 1997, most of the major provincial capitals in the southern and eastern parts of the country, including Lubumbashi in Katanga and Kisangani in Orientale, Congo’s second- and third-largest cities respectively, had fallen to the rebels with barely any resistance from government forces, many of whom, in fact, joined ranks with the rebels. Disgusted with Mobutu’s corrupt, dictatorial, and incompetent gov-

ernment, local peoples cheered on Kabila’s forces, especially when they showed far greater restraint than the government forces by neither looting property nor attacking civilians. On April 8, Mobutu declared a national state of emergency, but that did not prevent opposition leaders from organizing a two-day, widely observed general strike in the capital less than a week later. Besieged at home and abandoned abroad, Mobutu still seemed determined to hold onto power, preferring to die in office than go into exile. When South African President Nelson Mandela organized and mediated a conference between Kabila and Mobutu aboard a South African ship off the west coast of the Congo in early May, Mobutu, despite intense international pressure, refused to sign either a cease-fire or a transfer of power. A final Mobutu-orchestrated effort to establish yet another opposition government, with the dictator still standing as head of state, was rejected by the rebels, now close to Kinshasa and unconditional victory.

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On May 16, Mobutu fled the country, first to Togo and then on to Morocco. Members of his family and entourage escaped to Brazzaville, though not before Mobutu’s son allegedly killed Chief of Staff Mahele Bokungu, whom he suspected of negotiating a peaceful transfer of power to Kabila to avoid a battle in the capital. In the Katanga provincial capital of Lubumbashi, Kabila declared an end to the Zairean state, returning the country to its original pre-Mobutu name, the Democratic Republic of Congo. On May 20, the new head of state arrived in the capital, to cheering throngs. Three days later, he announced the formation of a new government, dominated by members of his AFDL, but also including representatives from other opposition parties. This conciliatory gesture, however, did not necessarily represent where Kabila intended to take the country. Within the week, he had banned all political parties and all public demonstrations, going so far as to use his forces to break up an opposition rally of Tshisekedi supporters. By the end of the month, Kabila had been sworn into power and had issued an interim constitution that granted him sweeping powers. Opposition politicians began to be harassed, and Tshisekedi was held in detention for a night. Antidemocratic moves such as these prompted concerns in both the Congo and the international community that Kabila intended to replace the Mobutu dictatorship with one of his own, though these fears did not stop international mining company representatives from descending on the new

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government to obtain new concessions. Adding to the concerns were reports of massacres of Hutu refugees who had fled into Zaire in front of the AFDC army earlier in the year. While Kabila allowed a UN inspection team to search for evidence of such massacres, allegedly by AFDC troops, he hampered their efforts at every turn, or so the UN investigators complained. In April 1998, the United Nations, fearing for the investigators’ safety and frustrated by the obstacles the Kabila government put in their way, pulled them out of the country. James Ciment See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Congo, Democratic Republic of the: Post-Independence Wars, 1960–1965; Rwanda: Civil War and Genocide Since 1991.

Bibliography Berkeley, Bill. “An African Horror Story.” Atlantic Monthly, August 1993, pp. 20–25. Gourevitch, Philip. “Continental Shift.” New Yorker, August 4, 1997, pp. 42–55. Parker, Frank J. “From Mobutu to Kabila: An Improvement?” America, November 8, 1997, pp. 18–21. Rosenblum, Peter. “Endgame in Zaire.” Current History (May 1997): 200–05. Schatzberg, Michael. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. ———. Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960–1990. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991. Young, Crawford. The Rise and Decline of the Zairean State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

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ment repression, retaliation for human rights abuses, and national rivalries, the war became something of a free-for-all, with various parties profiteering from the conflict by exploiting natural resources within the areas they controlled. An estimated 4 million people died in the succeeding eight years, some from the conflict itself but most from war-induced famine. It was the costliest conflict in African history and the deadliest in the world since the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s. Because of its staggering death toll and the participation of so many nations, some observers have come to call it Africa’s “first world war.”

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The Democratic Republic of Congo* became the site of a multilateral war soon after the rebel leader Laurent Kabila, with backing from Rwanda and Uganda, overthrew the decades-long dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. Kabila’s uprising is often referred to as the First Congo War, and the conflict that began in 1998—the subject of this article—is called the Second Congo War. This second war pitted rebel groups against the government and each other, and involved no fewer than seven neighboring and nearby states: Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Triggered by ethnic hatred, govern-

From the early 1960s until 1997, Mobutu ruled over what was called a “kleptocracy” in the Congo, a government by theft. Mobutu and his followers made fortunes by selling off the nation’s enormous mineral wealth to foreign corporations, while pocketing huge bribes. Little was reinvested in the country, and the Congo’s infrastructure, already dilapidated when former colonial ruler Belgium withdrew in 1960, deteriorated even further. Indeed, Mobutu made it a point of letting the transportation system decline so that various opponents in the far-flung reaches of the vast nation could not unite against him and march on Kinshasa, the capital. Mobutu maintained himself in power through a combination of repression, cooptation, and manipulation of opposition groups. Meanwhile, in 1994, long-running ethnic animosities in neighboring Rwanda exploded in genocide, as the majority Hutu massacred hundreds of thousands

* The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has changed names several times in its history. Dubbed the Republic of the Congo upon independence, it changed its name to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1964, the Republic of Zaire in 1971, and to the Democratic Republic of Congo (with no “the”) in 1997. For simplicity, it is referred to as Congo or DRC throughout this article.

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KEY DATES 1994

In the wake of the genocide of Tutsi by Hutu in neighboring Rwanda, thousands of Hutu refugees, including leaders of the genocide, flee to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

1997

Long-time Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko is overthrown in a Rwandan-backed rebellion led by Laurent Kabila.

1998

Rwanda and Rwanda-backed rebels turn on Laurent Kabila and launch an offensive aimed at overthrowing his government; with the aid of Angola and Zimbabwe, Kabila turns back the offensive, and the conflict descends into a stalemate.

1999

Splits form within the ranks of the Rwandan-backed rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy, RCD); fighting intensifies in the conflict between Hema and Lendu peoples in the Ituri region of the DRC; the UN sends 5,500 peacekeepers to the DRC in November.

2001

President Laurent Kabila is assassinated in January and replaced by his son Joseph.

2002 Peace treaties are signed between the Congolese government and foreign governments involved in the conflict, as well as with the rebel groups they support. 2004 Coup attempts by the military are put down by the Kabila government; the UN attacks rebels who have killed its peacekeepers. 2005 The Congolese vote overwhelmingly to pass a new constitution. 2006 Joseph Kabila is reelected president.

of minority Tutsi. This triggered an invasion of Rwanda by the Uganda-based Tutsi rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which overthrew the Hutu regime in Rwanda. Hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees, including many of the organizers of the genocide, fled into eastern Congo as refugees. In 1996, Hutu leaders in the refugee camps of the eastern Congo pressured the government of the Congo states of Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu (North Kivu and South Kivu) to order all Tutsi to leave. Most of the Tutsi in the region were natives known as the Banyamulenge. At the same time, Hutu based in Rwanda continued to carry out raids against Tutsi in the eastern Congo. These events triggered a rebellion by Tutsi militias in the Kivu provinces, backed by the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda and by its ally Uganda. The rebellion was led by Laurent Kabila, a longtime

opponent of Mobutu. Kabila’s forces soon swept across the eastern Congo, as the poorly trained and equipped Congo army collapsed before them. On May 16, 1996, dictator Mobutu Sese Seko fled the country. Four days later, Kabila entered Kinshasa and assumed power. At first Kabila proved conciliatory, establishing a government embracing many of the groups long opposed to Mobutu. But those democratic moves proved short-lived, as Kabila soon banned all political parties and issued an interim constitution giving himself sweeping powers. Reports also soon emerged of massacres of Hutu refugees by the Congo’s armed forces. When the United Nations sent investigators, they were harassed by the Kabila administration. Fearing for the investigators’ safety, the international organization pulled them out in April 1998.

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Second Congo War Meanwhile, in the early months of 1998, ethnic tensions were boiling over in the Kivu provinces between Hutu and Tutsi. Hutu rebels were fighting a lowintensity conflict with Banyamulenge (Tutsi) troops affiliated with Kabila and the Tutsi-led army of Rwanda. Angry at the lack of support they were receiving from Kabila, the Banyamulenge troops mutinied against the government, and the Rwanda government put pressure on the Kabila government to crush Hutu militants. With Tutsi rebels now aligned against his Tutsi government, Kabila had lost his main supporters in the east. Complaining that Rwandan Tutsi had too much power within his government, he responded by firing his chief of staff, James Kabare (a native of Rwanda), and other supporters of the eastern rebels. The loss of position and influence in the government in Kinshasa concerned the Banyamulenge. In August, they established a new rebel group known as Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy [RCD]), headed by longtime politician and scholar Ernest Wamba da Wamba. They soon captured the city of Goma, the capital of NordKivu, and began marching on the capital at Kinshasa, as Kabila had done earlier. The government claimed that the RCD was backed by Rwanda. Rwanda denied the claim, but many outside observers agreed that Rwanda was providing assistance to the RCD. In one daring move, RCD rebels hijacked a plane and flew to the government military base at Kitona at the far western edge of the Congo on the Atlantic coast. There they persuaded the government troops to mutiny and march toward Kinshasa. On the way, the RCD and the mutineers seized a major hydroelectric facility that provided power to Kinshasa. It appeared that Kabila’s regime was about to fall to an irresistible force, much as Mobutu’s had fallen earlier. Kabila was able to halt the RCD’s advance, however, after receiving troops and materiel from Angola and Zimbabwe. Angola, in the midst of its own civil war, had supported Kabila’s toppling of the Mobutu regime because Mobutu was providing sanctuary and supply lines for rebels against the Angolan government. Namibia, a longtime ally of the government in Angola, also sent help. Zimbabwe’s dictator, Robert Mugabe, announced that he supported Kabila’s government as a show of solidarity with a democratic regime under rebel threat, but many believed that he was hoping to gain access to some of the Congo’s vast mineral wealth.

By 1999, the rebels had gained control of the eastern third of the Congo. When it became clear that there would be no easy march into Kinshasa, however, the anti-Kabila forces began to come apart. In May 1999, RCD organizer Ernest Wamba dia Wamba broke away from the group. Wamba had always maintained that his movement was aiming not just to replace Kabila but also to democratize the Congo. He finally concluded, however, that the RCD was becoming a vehicle for Rwandan Tutsi to seize control of the Congo through Banyamulenge surrogates. Because Wamba’s breakaway group was formed in the eastern Congolese city of Kisangani, it became known as the RCD-Kisangani, or RCD-K, and was supported by Uganda. The latter had become increasingly alarmed at the efforts of the new Tutsi government in Rwanda to manipulate and control the Congo. Shortly after the RCD-K was formed, fighting broke out between Uganda and the RCD-K on one side and Rwanda and the RCD on the other. In a battle at Kisangani, the Ugandan and RCD-K forces were routed and forced to retreat to the town of Bunia, near the Uganda border. Bunia is the main city of the Ituri region in Congo’s vast Orientale province. Here the RCD-K got caught up in an entirely separate conflict between farming Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups. The RCD-K backed a member of the Hema people to serve as governor of a new “province” called Ituri. This caused Lenda groups to form militias and attack the Hema. Soon thousands were dead and hundreds of thousands displaced in the Ituri region. The RCDK moved to calm the situation by replacing the Hema governor with a more neutral person in late 1999, but fighting started up again in 2001. Meanwhile, the RCD-K was splitting over internal differences. In 2000, a new group called the RCDMouvement de Liberation (RCD-ML), dominated by Hema people, emerged to challenge Wamba’s RCD-K. Both groups were opposed by the Mouvement pour la Liberation de Congo, or MLC, a Ugandan-based group. In addition, Sudan, long a supporter of rebel forces in Uganda, also got involved by sending support for Congolese government troops, which were fighting both the Ugandan- and Rwandan-backed rebels.

Nature of the Conflict As this already simplified description makes clear, the Second Congo War was a complex affair with many different sides supported by at least half a dozen foreign countries. Moreover, the conflict ranged widely

Congo, Democratic Republic of: Invasions and Internal Strife, 19 9 8–

across much of eastern Congo and even into Congo’s Atlantic region, some 1,000 miles to the west. The presence of foreign troops was often overplayed in outside accounts of the conflict. In fact, these forces usually stayed close to the bases they created around supply points like towns and airstrips. Not wanting to deploy too many troops or use too much of their weaponry, the regular troops did not occupy territory. Instead, they concentrated on providing support and supplies to militias that roamed widely across the landscape, living off what they could capture or steal. With little oversight, these militias engaged in brutal human rights violations, including murder, rape, and forced conscription. Much of the conflict was financed by the plundering of resources. Indeed, the main reason there was so much fighting in Orientale province is that it is the Congo’s main diamond-mining area. Other regions offer valuable metals, including cobalt and gold, or timber. All of these plentiful natural resources were plundered by militia groups or foreign armies, working through shady middlemen who provided contacts with major multinational mining and timber corporations. Some of the wealth generated was used to supply troops, but much of it went into the pockets of militia leaders and army officers from Uganda, Rwanda, and elsewhere. The same processes work on both sides. Zimbabwe, a supporter of the Kabila government, also made arrangements to harvest its share of resources, according to a UN investigation in April 2001. Because the militias operated autonomously and were not fully answerable to any government or party, peace negotiations were especially difficult to carry out. Even if foreign governments and official Congo parties agreed at conferences in distant cities, the militias on the ground were often ignorant of what had been decided or refused to abide by decisions that had been made.

Peace Efforts By 1999, Congo had been officially carved up into three major regions. The northeast was controlled by Ugandan troops and the militias they supported, most notably the MLC. The eastern part of the country was under the control of Rwandan forces and members of the original RCD militia. Western Congo and the capital of Kinshasa were under the authority of the Congolese government, backed by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.

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In July 1999, representatives of the Congo government met with representatives from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in Lusaka, Zambia, and signed a cease-fire agreement. A month later MLC forces in the northeast agreed to the ceasefire, but the RCD in the east refused. Under the provisions of the agreement, all parties were to track down and disarm all armed groups in the Congo, especially Hutu groups connected to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The UN Security Council put its stamp of approval on the agreement and sent ninety liaison personnel to work with the signers of the Lusaka cease-fire. As noted above, however, tensions between Uganda and Rwanda and the rebel groups they supported soon flared up in Orientale province. In response, the UN decided to beef up its presence. In November 1999, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, its French acronym) was established with over 5,500 troops. While large by UN standards, the force was tiny given the size of the problem. An immense country, the Congo covers 900,000 square miles, an area equivalent to the entire United States east of the Mississippi River, and has nearly 60 million people. Fighting continued between government forces and militias connected to Uganda and Rwanda throughout 2000. Peace efforts by the African Union and the South African Development Community also failed to halt the fighting. In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. At first this seemed yet another setback to peace efforts, as various sides speculated on who ordered the assassination. Most observers finally concluded that Kabila was killed by opponents within his own ranks, concerned that Kabila had no intention of sharing power. At the discreet urging of Angola and Zimbabwe, the Congolese parliament selected Kabila’s twenty-nine-year-old son Joseph to head the government. Joseph then kept on most of his father’s cabinet. In 2002, the peace process began to move forward, spurred by two factors. One was the surprisingly effective leadership of Joseph Kabila, whose government was able to secure the western part of the country, eradicating militia forces there and helping to stabilize the economy. Meanwhile, in the eastern part of the country, both the RCD and the Banyamulenge militia were growing tired of fighting and of Rwandan control. In the Sun City agreements of April 19, 2002—named after the South African resort where they were signed—the MLC and the

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government agreed to stop fighting. They could not reach a power-sharing deal, but the agreement brought a reduction of fighting in the northeast, where the MLC predominated. Over the next eight months, several more agreements were signed, including ones between Uganda and the Congo and Rwanda and the Congo. The signings culminated in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of December 17, 2002, signed by the government and all of the major rebel groups, including the MLC and the various subdivisions of the RCD. The agreement called for a transitional power-sharing government and presidential elections within two years. The agreement marked the formal end of the Second Congo War. The year 2003 saw major progress in implementing the various accords signed in 2002. In April, President Kabila approved the transitional constitution, allowing for the formation of an interim government pending formal elections. In the following month the last Ugandan troops left the country, followed in June by deployment of a French-led, UNmandated rapid reaction force. That same month, Kabila named a transitional government, bringing in representatives of all the major rebel groups, and, in August, an interim parliament met for the first time. The following years were less hopeful. While the government was able to put down two coup attempts by elements of the military, its troops became embroiled in fighting with renegade RCD militia groups. Meanwhile, UN forces were being caught up in the conflict. In early 2005, nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers were killed, causing the UN force to go on the offensive for the first time in decades, killing some 50 militia members connected to renegade RCD groups. There was also the threat of renewed foreign involvement. Rwanda denied any involvement in the attacks by RCD members, but many observers doubted their word. Meanwhile, Uganda warned that it would send troops back into Congo unless the Congolese government could halt cross-border raids by the Lord’s Resistance Army, a particularly brutal rebel group committing human rights abuses in Uganda. Still, in December 2005, Congolese voters went to the polls, as provided in the Global and AllInclusive Agreement, only a year later than originally planned. They overwhelmingly approved a new constitution written and passed by an interim parliament. Presidential elections were scheduled for June

2006. While it took several weeks to tabulate the vote in the far-flung country, Joseph Kabila emerged the victor.

Costs of War A survey by the International Rescue Committee, a non-governmental organization that works with refugees, put the death toll in the Second Congo War at between 3.4 and 4.4 million, out of a population of about 60 million. An estimated 80–90 percent of the deaths resulted from disease and malnutrition connected to the conflict. Amnesty International put the number of rapes at 40,000. Meanwhile, the war sent roughly 2 million persons fleeing to Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Environmental groups, including the World Wildlife Fund for Nature, reported that the conflict had decimated a number of rare species, most notably the mountain gorilla. Perhaps the most serious casualty of the conflict was peace itself. While Africa had been plagued by innumerable conflicts after independence came to much of the continent in the early 1960s, most of the fighting remained within single countries, usually between government and rebel groups. Brutal as these conflicts were, they rarely drew in outside players. Most African governments took the position that the internal conflicts of their neighbors were no business of theirs. The Second Congo War broke with that pattern, and some Africa experts feared it would remove traditional constraints on interference by outside powers in internal conflicts. Thus, the Second Congo War may have been Africa’s “first world war” but perhaps not its last. James Ciment See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997; Rwanda: Civil War and Genocide Since 1991.

Bibliography Berkeley, Bill. The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe, and Power in the Heart of Africa. New York: Basic Books, 2001. Clark, John F. The African Stakes in the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Edgerton, Robert G. The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002. Gondola, C. Didier. The History of Congo. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002. Human Rights Watch. Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005.

CONGO,REPUBLIC OF: Civil Conflict,1997 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coup; Ethnic and Religious Conflict CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CAMEROON

EQUATORIAL GUINEA Impfondo Ouesso

i ve R

CONGO

r

Owando

GABON

ng Co

o

Djambala

ATLANTIC

Sibiti Loubomo

Pointe-Noire

OCEAN

CABINDA (ANGOLA)

OF CONGO (ZAIRE)

Brazzaville

Madingou

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Kinkala

Railroad 0

ANGOLA

0

100 100

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

Always overshadowed by events in its much larger and similarly named neighbor, the Republic of Congo* has had a very different history, one marred more by instability and violence than the one-man dictatorial rule that predominated in the Democratic Republic of Congo across the Congo River. The instability finally exploded into all-out civil conflict in the mid-1990s when two major party factions battled in the streets of Brazzaville, the capital, and elsewhere. Much of the fighting has pitted northerners against southerners in a struggle for political power in the capital and control over revenues from the lucrative oil fields along the coast.

Historical Background Originally known as the French Congo, CongoBrazzaville was freed from direct European rule in August 1960. Following a series of military coups

from the left and the right through the 1960s and 1970s, interspersed with brief periods of civilian rule, the country was turned over to a provisional committee of the leftist Parti Congolais du Travail (Congolese Labor Party [PCT]) in 1979. The committee in turn made its own president, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, president of the country. Though a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist, Sassou-Nguesso, a member of Edou tribe of northern Congo, opened the country up to more Western investment, particularly in its oil fields just off the Atlantic coast. Despite a collapsing economy, ethnic rivalries within the ruling PCT, and a failed coup attempt, Sassou-Nguesso kept his hold on both the chairmanship of the party and the presidency of the republic. Following a one-party election in 1989, the government moved to liberalize the economy by reducing the public sector and fostering privatization, much of this activity under the impetus of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The following year, a PCT congress, reflecting the changes in the socialist bloc countries to which it was allied, agreed to multiparty elections and a reduction of its own role as the primary political institution. A number of political prisoners, in jail since the mid-1980s, were released, and the army was ordered to disassociate itself from both the PCT and the country’s political establishment. At the end of 1991, a special council of the republic prepared a draft constitution calling for a bicameral legislature, a president, and an independent judiciary. Shortly thereafter, however, SassouNguesso and his prime minister restructured the military, dismissing from its ranks political opponents and members of rival ethnic groups. An army mutiny led to a brief bout of street fighting in the capital, which was resolved by appointing a new defense minister more popular with the army. In March, the

*Originally known as the French Congo, the country is now known as Republic of Congo. It should not be confused with the Democratic Republic of Congo, known, until 1997, as Zaire. To avoid confusion, the popular usage for the Republic of Congo—Congo-Brazzaville, after its capital—will be used throughout this entry.

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KEY DATES 1960

Congo-Brazzaville wins its independence from France.

1979

The leftist government led by the Congolese Labor Party (PCT, its French acronym) takes power, with Colonel Denis SassouNguesso as president.

1989

Following victory in the one-party election, the PCT government moves to liberalize the economy along market lines.

1992–1993 Following adoption of the new constitution, opposition party Pan-African Union for Democratic Socialism (UPADS) wins national elections, and Pascal Lissouba becomes president. 1993–1995 In the wake of disputed elections, conflict breaks out between the government and militias connected to the opposition PCT. 1995

Efforts at integrating militias into the military fail, and fighting breaks out briefly in the north of the country in 1996.

1997

Fighting breaks out once again when the government refuses to heed the opposition’s call to move elections forward from August to the early part of the year.

1999

The Government and the militias sign a peace agreement in Zambia.

2002

Sassou-Nguesso wins national elections and once again becomes president of the country.

2005

Sassou-Nguesso’s government survives a coup attempt.

electorate overwhelmingly ratified the constitution, and legislative and presidential elections were scheduled for June and July 1992. The voting went against the PCT, which won just 18 of 125 contested seats. The majority went to Union Panafricaine pour la Démocratie Sociale (UPADS), and its candidate, Pascal Lissouba, a former prime minister, was elected president. Because UPADS did not have an absolute majority in the assembly, it formed a coalition with the PCT. Sassou-Nguesso then retired to his home in the north of the country, taking a well-armed militia with him for protection and, some charged, as a power base for a possible return to power. Upon taking office, Lissouba began to act on his campaign promises to further liberalize the economy and devolve power from the central government to the provinces. But when he failed to appoint as many

of the PCT members to government posts as the PCT said he had promised, the PCT pulled out of the governing alliance, leaving Lissouba without a parliamentary majority. He then dissolved the national assembly, prompting mass demonstrations in the capital. The army chief of staff ordered that a transitional government—a coalition of UPADS and PCT members—be formed. In May 1993, legislative elections gave a majority to UPADS and its allies, while the PCT became a part of the major opposition coalition. Questions about the legitimacy of the vote and maneuverings within the opposition coalition produced a new political crisis when the opposition demanded new elections and held mass demonstrations to force the issue. Violence between militias identified with the various parties and ethnic groups broke out in the capital in June and July, leading Lissouba

Congo, Republic of: Civil Conflict, 19 97

to declare a state of emergency. Following an order from the country’s Supreme Court—declaring that irregularities in the balloting had occurred—and mediation by France, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the president of neighboring Gabon, new elections were organized, which once again led to a majority vote for the UPADS coalition. And once again, militia fighting broke out, followed by an international report challenging the legitimacy of the latest round of voting. By November 1993, the PCT coalition, led by Sassou-Nguesso, was once again mounting antigovernment protests and strikes, prompting Lissouba to charge that foreign countries—specifically, Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire— were encouraging and supporting the opposition. As sporadic violence continued through 1994, the government announced its intention of bringing members of the opposition into the ruling coalition. In early 1995, the head of the army said that some 2,000 of the estimated 3,000 members of the rival militias would be incorporated into the country’s military, though this goal failed to take place on time. At the end of 1995, a new plan was announced to integrate the militias into the military. But when the Forces Démocratiques Unies (FDU)—the new name for the Sassou-Nguesso’s PCT coalition—charged that the army was favoring progovernment militias in the integration process, some 200 FDU militia members briefly fomented a rebellion in a northern Congo-Brazzaville town in March 1996. Though some 4,000 militia members had been integrated into the military by the end of 1996, the process was marred by a series of mutinies and protests. When militiamen seized the Congo-Ocean, the country’s main rail link between the capital and Pointe-Noire, its most important port, the Lissouba government caved in to their demands, incorporating them into the military at the rank of sergeant. Opposition politicians, accusing the government of favoritism and even fomenting the rebellion itself, forced Lissouba to once again shuffle the military high command.

Conflict Breaks Out In February 1997, nineteen opposition parties, including the FDU, demanded that the government move the elections forward from July and August. They also insisted that, to avoid the violence of 1993–1994, it

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disarm civilians, establish an independent electoral commission, and deploy a multinational peacekeeping force. Lissouba turned these requests down. In March, however, he agreed that a multinational force should be stationed in Brazzaville to protect foreign nationals if violence should spill over from Congo (Zaire) where rebel leader Laurent Kabila was about to capture the capital of Kinshasa, just across the Congo River from Brazzaville. Kabila’s forces entered Kinshasa peaceably, and most of the peacekeepers left Brazzaville, leaving only a French force of 300. In May, skirmishes broke out between rival militias supporting the government and various opposition groups in the northern towns of Owando and Oyo. When Sassou-Nguesso moved back to the capital at the end of the month and declared himself a presidential candidate, Lissouba sent troops to arrest him, but Sassou-Nguesso’s militia fought them off. Barricades were then set up, and the capital became divided into three armed and hostile zones: one controlled by Lissouba’s forces, one by Sassou-Nguesso, and a third representing Bernard Kolela, another aspirant for power. Numerous cease-fires arranged by the OAU, Gabon, and Kolela failed to hold. Massacres of civilians were reported, while the French force—bolstered by new troops—evacuated foreign nationals to Gabon and to U.S. warships off the coast. By the end of July, some 3,000 people had died in the fighting. For months, the city remained divided, with no force able to gain the edge, but in the north, SassouNguesso’s troops had consolidated their control. In addition, the war was threatening to spread to neighboring Congo, especially after artillery shells landed in Kinshasa in October, killing twenty-five people. Kabila, who backed Lissouba’s government, sent troops across the river, ostensibly to protect his own citizens but also to help Lissouba. Meanwhile, the French government, still smarting from Lissouba’s decision to end the French oil company Elf ’s monopoly on oil extraction in the country, was allegedly helping Sassou-Nguesso’s forces, as was a 1,500-man contingent of Angolan forces, long allied to SassouNguesso for supporting them in their conflict with rebel forces in that country. By the end of October 1997, the fighting had come to an end, with the victory of Sassou-Nguesso and his reinstatement as president. Lissouba fled across the river to Kinshasa, and his prime minister, Bernard Kolelas, left for Mali and then France. Meantime,

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A young member of the Congolese rebel force known as the “ninja” or “Japanese” (for their fast combat skills) waits to hear whether he will be able to join the regular army of the Sassou-Nguesso regime in October 1997. International organizations launched a campaign to ban children’s participation in war. (Jean-Philippe Ksiazek/AFP/Getty Images)

refugees began to filter back into Brazzaville. A U.S.mediated agreement saw the pullout of troops from Angola, Congo (Zaire), and France.

Peace Agreements and Renewed Fighting In 1999, the government and rebel forces signed a peace deal in Zambia, calling for demilitarization of all political parties and the integration of rebel fighters into the nation’s army and police. By 2001, some 15,000 militia had disarmed and exchanged their weapons for cash payments. As for Lissouba, he was convicted in absentia of treason and corruption, and sentenced to thirty years in prison. In 2002, voters

supported a referendum calling for a new constitution, with expanded executive powers, and elected Sassou-Nguesso to the presidency. Sassou-Nguesso ran unopposed after his main rivals were banned from the contest. But Sassou-Nguesso’s consolidation of power set off new fighting in the region around the capital, where supporters of former prime minister Kolelas engaged Congolese troops in bitter conflicts. Led by renegade priest Pastor Ntumi, the rebels, known as “ninjas” after the Japanese warriors depicted in popular Asian films, feared domination by northern Edou supporters of Sassou-Nguesso. Several hundred persons were killed in the fighting that lasted into early 2003. In March, however, Ntumi and the

Congo, Republic of: Civil Conflict, 19 97

government signed an accord ending the fighting and guaranteeing that the rights of southerners would be protected. After the 2003 accord, CongoBrazzaville remained largely at peace, but tensions between northerners and southerners remained. In 2006, Sassou-Nguesso was elected to head the African Union. James Ciment See also: Coups; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997.

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Bibliography Amphas, Mbow M. Political Transformations of the Congo. Durham, NC: Pentland Press, 2000. Decalo, Samuel. Historical Dictionary of Congo. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1996. Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Congo. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005. Johnson, Douglas. “End of French Africa.” Spectator 278/8812 June 21, 1997, 14–15. United Nations. “Peacewatch: Republic of the Congo.” UN Chronicle 34, no. 3 (1997): 50.

DJIBOUTI: Civil Conflict,1991–2000 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Ethiopia; France

RE

YEMEN

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SE

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ETHIOPIA

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Balho

F

A

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Khor Angar

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Obock

DJIBOUTI Tadjoura Lac ‘Asal

Golfe de Tadjoura

Yoboki

GULF OF ADEN Djibouti

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Abhe Bad 0 0

25 25

50 Miles

‘Ali Sabih

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Djibouti is a small African nation situated on the southwestern shore of the Red Sea, surrounded by Eritrea to the north, Ethiopia to the west, and Somalia to the south. With little industry, a desert climate, and few resources, the economy is largely based on trade and providing port services to various navies in the strategic Horn of Africa region. The annual per capita income is around $1,500. A Sunni Muslim country of about 675,000 people, Djibouti is divided into two main ethnic groups, the Issa (roughly 60 percent of the population) and the Afar (about 35 percent). (The remaining 5 percent largely consist of persons of Arab and European descent.) The Issa are related to the neighboring Somalis, and the Afar to the Amharic

people of Ethiopia. The country’s official languages are Arabic and French, but most of the citizens speak either Somali or Amharic as their primary language. Djibouti was occupied by France in the late nineteenth century and was known as French Somaliland by the beginning of the twentieth century. While much of France’s African empire became independent in the early 1960s, the people of Djibouti voted in 1958 and 1967 to remain a French colony. In 1967 the country was named the Territory of Afars and Issas. As France moved to grant independence to Djibouti in the mid-1970s, there were fears that the two ethnic groups in the country would become pawns of their larger neighbors in the strategic Horn of Africa region. Ethiopia (backed by the Soviet Union) and Somalia (backed by the United States) were at war over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which was claimed by both countries. In fact, Djibouti’s leaders proved adept at keeping their country out of the conflict and, in 1988, hosted a peace conference that resulted in a series of accords ending tense relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. In its first decade or so of independence, Djibouti’s leaders also proved able to prevent conflict between the two main ethnic groups—the Issas, who favored neighboring Somalia, and the Afars, who identified with Ethiopia. During the 1980s, power was shared between an Issa president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, and an Afar prime minister, Barkat Gourad Hamadou, while various government ministries were headed by members of the two different ethnic groups through carefully determined quotas. This careful ethnic balancing in the government was more appearance than reality, however. While the heads of ministries were both Issas and Afars, the Issas dominated both the civil service and the security forces. During the 1970s and 1980s Afars lost more and more positions in the civil service and military. In

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KEY DATES 1967

Residents of Djibouti vote for second time to remain part of France.

1977

Djibouti becomes independent of France.

1981

President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, a member of the dominant Issa ethnic group, bans all opposition parties.

1991

Fighting breaks out between the Aptidon government and Afar rebels organized into the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD).

1994

While most FRUD rebels demobilize and are integrated into the military, a radical wing of FRUD continues to fight the government.

1999

Aptidon steps down from the presidency, and a coalition of the ruling People’s Progress Assembly and FRUD wins the elections in April.

1981, the president moved to ban all opposition parties, leaving his own, the People’s Progress Assembly (RPP, its French acronym), as the only legal party. It, too, was dominated by the Issas. Economic problems were adding to the country’s ethnic tensions. Under the French, the capital city of the county, also known as Djibouti, had been essentially off-limits to migrants from the impoverished and drought-stricken countryside. The poor who did migrate to the capital settled in shantytowns outside the city limits. After independence, thousands more flocked to the capital, and the shantytowns were incorporated into the city proper. By the 1980s, more than half the country’s population lived in the capital, where they faced high living costs and high rates of unemployment. The mass migration into the city also led to the establishment of neighborhoods with distinctive ethnic casts. Afars charged that the government favored Issa districts in providing much-needed services. Meanwhile, government efforts to develop rural areas were complicated when refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia poured into Djibouti’s countryside. By the end of the 1980s, tensions between the Afars and Issas had reached the boiling point. Dissatisfied Afars formed the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) to demand multiparty democracy and a more equitable distribution of government positions and services. In 1991, fighting broke out between government forces and FRUD guerrillas. FRUD soon gained control over the north-

ern and western portions of the country bordering Ethiopia and Eritrea. France sent in troops to quell the fighting in 1992, and the Afars offered a unilateral cease-fire. The government of President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, however, refused to honor the peace and launched a counteroffensive in July. Much of the rebel-held territory was retaken, and many FRUD leaders were captured and imprisoned, including FRUD leader Ali Aref Bourhan. Facing military setbacks, the FRUD leadership split over negotiations with the government. The more moderate wing signed an accord with the government in December 1994. Much of the military wing of FRUD demobilized, and its former members were integrated into the nation’s security forces. Several FRUD officials became government ministers. Meanwhile, the radical wing of the party (known as FRUD-Renaissance) was attacked in a series of government raids in the late 1990s. The organization was largely eliminated as a serious military threat, finally signing a peace accord with the government in 2000. Meanwhile, in February 1999, the authoritarian Aptidon stepped down from the presidency, and a coalition of the RPP and FRUD won the elections in April. Their candidate—Aptidon’s nephew and aide, Ismael Omar Guelleh—became president. While nominally a multiparty democracy, Djibouti was cited for human rights violations by several international monitoring groups. The United States maintained

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cordial relations with Djibouti, which it considered a strategic ally in the fight against terrorism. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978; Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–1991; Somalia: Civil War Since 1991.

Bibliography Alwan, Daoud A., and Yohanis Mibrathu. Historical Dictionary of Djibouti. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2000. Morrow, James. Djibouti. Philadelphia: Mason Crest Publishers, 2004. Tholomier, Robert. Djibouti, Pawn of the Horn of Africa. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1981.

ERITREA: War for Independence, 1958–1991 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Ethiopia

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Eritrea’s ethnic and religious makeup is complex, which made the road to independence a winding one. The original inhabitants of Eritrea were a mixed group of Cushitic and Semitic peoples who had moved into the region some 3,000 years ago. In the fourth century c.e., the coastal areas were converted to Christianity, which then spread to the inland hills and from there to the Ethiopian Empire beyond. In the seventh century, Muslim invaders and merchants brought Islam to the coastal regions of Eritrea. By the twentieth century, Eritrea was approximately evenly divided between the Muslims of the coastal towns and the plains and the Christians who lived in the highlands closer to Ethiopia. Ethnically the Eritreans were divided between the Tigrinay-speaking Tigray of the highlands (who were almost entirely Christian) and the Muslim peoples of

the lowlands, of whom the Tigre are the largest group. (Tigrinay and Tigre are linguistically related but mutually unintelligible.) Politically, the Eritreans were dominated by outsiders until the twentieth century and had little sense of self-identity as a unique or unified nation. In early modern times, the area was fought over by the Turks, who wished to control the coastal areas, and the Ethiopian Empire, which was constantly trying to expand its influence toward the sea. Starting in the 1860s, the Italians gradually took over the whole of Eritrea, both the Muslim coast and the Christian highlands. It was the Italian conquest, completed in 1889, which gave Eritrea its first experience of being a separate and united province. The creation of Eritrea was artificial—there was no homogeneous Eritrean nation that shared a common culture or religion. Its ethnic composition, however, was no more mixed than that of neighboring Ethiopia, and the Italian conquest, by imposing a common government for all of Eritrea, gave the area the beginnings of a national consciousness, one that might be shared by both Muslims and Christians.

Eritrea and Ethiopia World War II swept the Italians out of Eritrea and put the British in temporary control of the country. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia took the opportunity to demand that Eritrea be united with Ethiopia, as, he claimed, it had always been. Although this was a patent falsehood, the United Nations was willing to support Selassie’s claims out of a combination of sympathy (Ethiopia had also suffered under an Italian occupation), geopolitical realism (Eritrea did not seem large enough to be a viable state, and

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KEY DATES 1952 British occupiers turn Eritrea over to Ethiopia but with the condition that Eritrea would have autonomy. 1958 Eritrean exiles form the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) to fight for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia. 1962 An Ethiopian-controlled Eritrean legislature votes to merge Eritrea into Ethiopia, with no autonomous rights; ELM is destroyed in a government crackdown but has already been superseded by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1961. 1974

The imperial reign of Haile Selassie falls to the Communist Dergue, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam; the new government intensifies the fight against a new coalition of Eritrean independence forces, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).

1988 The EPLF wins a major battle against Ethiopian forces near the Eritrean town of Afabet. 1991

An increasingly victorious EPLF joins forces with an Ethiopian rebel group, the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), to bring down the Mengistu regime; the last Ethiopian soldiers leave Eritrea.

1993 In a UN-sponsored referendum, Eritreans vote overwhelmingly for independence, and the country becomes independent on May 3.

landlocked Ethiopia needed its seaports), and indifference (the United Nations had other issues of greater import to distract it in the late 1940s). Moreover, the Ethiopians had the support of most of the Christian Tigray in Eritrea, who felt a connection to Ethiopia because of religion and the fact that the Ethiopian province of Tigre was also dominated by ethnic Tigray. There were Eritreans who objected to union with Ethiopia. First among them were the Muslims of the coast, but some Christians also questioned whether they would truly be better off under Selassie’s autocratic rule. The United Nations committee that decided Eritrea’s fate put forward a compromise plan (as a concession to pressure from Arab member states in the UN) in which Eritrea would retain some local autonomy but would be united with Ethiopia in a federal union. This did not satisfy the Muslims, but most Christians—some of whom were beginning to question the benefits of full unity—accepted it as a fair compromise.

Selassie, however, had no intention of living up to his side of the bargain. From the moment the British turned Eritrea over to Ethiopia in 1952, Selassie and his ministers worked to undermine Eritrean autonomy. Amharic, the language of Ethiopia’s ruling ethnic group, was decreed to be the language of Eritrea; political parties were made illegal; and the government undercut or ignored the role of the Eritrean legislature. Outbreaks of labor unrest were crushed by Ethiopian troops. Finally, in 1962, the Eritrean legislature voted to merge Eritrea into Ethiopia, where it would have the same status as any other province. The election had been rigged—there was strong evidence of bribery—but Selassie had succeeded in turning Eritrea into an integral part of Ethiopia.

Eritrean Resistance Even before Ethiopia had consummated its absorption of Eritrea, the Eritreans began to resist their conquerors. In 1958, a group of Eritrean exiles formed

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the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) under the leadership of Hamid Idris Awate. An imperial crackdown had crushed the ELM by 1962; however, it had already been superseded by a new and more aggressive group, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF, founded in 1960, dedicated itself to removing the Ethiopians through armed struggle. The ELF began as a Muslim organization—for this reason it received small amounts of military aid from Sudan, Syria, and Iraq—but it soon began to gain followers from among the Eritrean Christians. Although the Christians shared religious ties with the Ethiopian establishment, they resented the prominence of the Amhara ethnic group in the upper levels of Ethiopia’s government and disliked the lack of freedom that existed under Selassie’s regime. The eleven years of British rule (1941–1952) had given all Eritreans a taste for greater freedom. In 1961, the ELF began hit-and-run raids on government outposts in Eritrea. By 1966 its guerrillas controlled large parts of the Eritrean countryside. In 1967, Ethiopia embarked on a brutal campaign against the ELF. More than a hundred villages suspected of supporting the movement were attacked and burned. Perhaps as many as 30,000 Eritreans, mostly Muslims, were turned into refugees. Ethiopia combined this offensive with a diplomatic agreement with Sudan to restrict the ELF’s access to outside support. Ethiopia promised to stop permitting Israel to transport aid through its territory to the South Sudanese Anya-Nya rebels if, in return, Sudan ceased providing aid and cross-border refuges to the ELF. The 1967 campaign slowed the ELF down but did not eliminate it. After 1969, supplies were smuggled across the Red Sea from friendly Yemen, largely bankrolled by Muammar Qaddafi’s new Libyan government. The ELF was revitalized and continued its attacks, some of which included hijackings and attempted hijackings of Ethiopian Airlines’ planes. By the early 1970s, the Eritrean countryside was again the scene of guerrilla ambushes of government troops, assassinations of government officials, and attempts to interfere with the roads connecting the coastal cities to the rest of Ethiopia. Selassie’s government responded with increased repression and more military attacks on pro-guerrilla villages. Martial law was put into effect throughout the province. These techniques did reduce the ELF’s effectiveness, but they also helped to inspire sym-

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pathy, along with anger at the Ethiopian army’s brutality—when villages were bombed, the innocent died alongside the guilty.

Birth of the E P LF From 1970 to 1974, the Eritrean resistance movement went through a civil war that temporarily limited its effectiveness in its struggle against Ethiopian control. The causes of the internal conflict are obscure, but it seems that elements in the front-line ELF felt that the leadership, which was based in Cairo, was out of touch with the realities of the Eritrean struggle. Many of them objected to the leadership’s strong Muslim orientation, which alienated the large numbers of Christians who were joining the organization. In 1970, a Muslim leader, Osman Salah Sabbe, who shared the general discontent broke away from the ELF to form the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF). This faction soon joined with other dissident factions to form the ELF-PLF. This breakup led to a civil war between the ELF-PLF and the old ELF. The struggle had ideological and religious overtones— the ELF had a stronger Muslim presence, while the ELF-PLF was more Marxist in outlook—but was also about regional and personality conflicts. By 1974 the fighting between the two groups had died down, and the new ELF-PLF had emerged as the more powerful faction. In the process, it had renamed itself the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The new EPLF would become the main revolutionary organization of Eritrea (the ELF continued to operate, but most of its supporters gradually defected to the more successful EPLF). It was a more tightly disciplined organization than its predecessor and was better able to garner support among both Christians and Muslims—the EPLF declared that religious affiliation was irrelevant to the struggle against Ethiopia. The EPLF announced that it was fighting to create a socialist and Eritrean nationalist state.

The War’s Second Phase The Ethiopian revolution, which began in 1974, gave the EPLF an opportunity to expand its support in Eritrea while Ethiopia’s army was distracted by political turmoil. There was also some hope among

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EPLF leaders that the revolution might lead to a negotiated settlement. Part of the cause of the Ethiopian revolution was the army’s dissatisfaction with the way in which Selassie was conducing the Eritrean war. As a result, there was a faction within the Ethiopian revolutionary committee (known as the Dergue, the Amharic word for “committee”) that believed in reaching an agreement with the Eritrean revolutionaries. While the Ethiopians were engaged in their internal power struggles, the EPLF was able to gain recruits and control over large sections of Eritrea, including most of its towns. This easy expansion was halted by a massive 1978 campaign of the Ethiopian army. Ethiopia’s new ruler, Mengistu Haile Mariam—who led the Dergue faction that had never favored letting Eritrea go free—had gained the support of the Soviet Union, and the post-1977 Ethiopian army was far better equipped than Selassie’s troops had been. At the start of the campaign, Mengistu was able to march a 100,000-man army into Eritrea. With this massive, well-equipped force, he was soon able to force the EPLF back into its rural hideouts. The Ethiopians were helped in their war by a final clash between the EPLF and the ELF. The fight ended with the ELF retreating to its bases in the Sudan, where it would gradually disintegrate. The internecine warfare, however, had damaged the EPLF— by the end of 1978, it probably had fewer than 15,000 soldiers under arms. The only base that the weakened guerrillas were able to hold was the town of Nakfa, in the northern mountains. The EPLF constructed a twenty-fivemile-long line of trenches and bunkers around the town that held out against every Ethiopian army assault. Nakfa became a symbol of Eritrean resistance. Assaults continued through 1982, when Mengistu mobilized a huge 120,000-man attack force in an attempt to take the redoubt. This assault, the sixth, also failed; 40,000 Ethiopian soldiers were killed in the process. In the rest of Eritrea, particularly in the coastal and southern plains, the Ethiopian army was able to dominate the towns and, during the day, the roads. But at night the EPLF could operate, carrying out raids against airfields, army bases, and local police stations. Ethiopian control was only maintained through a massive troop presence. In the north, the EPLF forces in Nakfa continued to hold out, a remarkable achievement for a guerrilla

Rebel forces of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front conduct military drills in 1988. They gained control of the province in May 1991, and Eritrean independence was formally declared two years later. (Michael Springer/Getty Images News)

group that Ethiopian authorities contemptuously referred to as “hill bandits.” Control of Nakfa gave the EPLF a base from which it could rebuild its strength and launch raids against Ethiopian-held towns. Nakfa also became a center of Eritrean civilization. The supposed hill bandits built underground schools, hospitals, pharmaceutical production centers, and even movie theaters. The mountains around Nakfa were honeycombed with bunkers, both military and civilian. Although the Ethiopians always had more troops— Ethiopia had more than ten times the population of Eritrea—and better equipment, the Eritreans around Nakfa had the advantage of operating in rough, mountainous terrain, which they knew far better than their opponents did. Ethiopia’s Soviet-built jets and helicopters were relatively useless in the rough terrain of northern Eritrea. They did, however, badly reduce the EPLF’s effectiveness in the open coastal plains.

Eritrea: War for Independence, 195 8–19 91

The EPLF received most of its military supplies from Arab countries, who smuggled them in over the Sudanese border, or from the seacoast on the occasions when the Eritreans managed to seize a coastal village or two. Even though the EPLF was fighting against a Soviet-backed government, the movement’s Marxist orientation alienated the United States and its allies and so kept them from offering support. The EPLF’s more reliable patrons were Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq.

Victor y By 1986, the Ethiopian army had effectively conceded its inability to conquer Nakfa. Instead, it concentrated on maintaining its control of the towns in the Eritrean lowlands. From 1986, the EPLF, led by its low-profile commander, Isseyas Afewerki, gradually expanded its area of operations to include most of Eritrea outside the capital of Asmara and the major coastal towns of Mitsiwa and Aseb. In March 1988, the EPLF won a fight against an entire Ethiopian army corps at the town of Afabet, killing and capturing thousands of Ethiopian soldiers after a messy pitched battle. The following year, 1989, saw increasing cooperation between the EPLF and the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), based in Tigre province, adjacent to Eritrea. The two groups joined in attacks on both sides of the border. The Soviet Union’s 1989 decision to greatly reduce military aid shipments to Ethiopia put Mengistu’s regime under increasing pressure. (Gorbachev had initiated one reduction in Soviet aid after coming to power in 1985.) Ethiopia agreed to hold peace talks with the EPLF. The late 1989 talks achieved little, but they demonstrated the weakness of a regime that had previously refused to consider the EPLF as anything but robbers and bandits. On February 10, 1990, the EPLF captured the port of Mitsiwa, which put the entire north of Eritrea, except for the capital, under Eritrean control. The following year they marched south against the port of Aseb, while also contributing troops to the general uprising against Mengistu’s regime that was taking place in Ethiopia itself. In May 1991, the EPLF finally captured the capital of Asmara. The last Ethiopian soldiers in Eritrea surrendered on May 25, 1991. In Ethiopia, Mengistu had already fled for Zimbabwe a few days earlier. The world’s longest guerrilla war had ended.

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Analysis The Eritreans’ defeat of Ethiopia, which brought down two separate governments, was an amazing military and political feat. That the EPLF succeeded rested on its ability to unite most Eritreans under its banner, whether Christian or Muslim, Tigray or Tigre. It is still unclear how the EPLF was able to unite a disparate set of peoples into one nation when similar attempts by other African nations had been only dismal failures. The Eritrean national consciousness was begun under the rule of the Italian colonizers. The Italian administrators helped to give a sense of cohesion to an area that had previously been separated by its ethnic and religious divisions. The eleven-year period of British administration gave this newly united territory an appreciation of democratic and liberal institutions, including elective assemblies and a free press. Ethiopia’s move into Eritrea in 1952 was feared by the Muslim population but largely accepted by the Christians. The Ethiopian government’s behavior— arrogant, antidemocratic, and ethnically biased in favor of Amharic speakers—convinced many Eritrean Christians that they had more in common with their Muslim neighbors than they did with their coreligionists from Ethiopia. The result was the rise of the ELF and the EPLF. Finally, the EPLF’s success owed something to brilliant leadership. With only limited outside support from the Islamic world—many Arab nations distrusted a movement that included Christians as equal partners—the EPLF was able to fight off a vastly superior army while maintaining the loyalty of its own people. The success of the EPLF inspired rebel movements elsewhere in Ethiopia, which in turn led to the final downfall of the Mengistu regime.

The Future In the aftermath of the EPLF’s victory, Eritrea’s future remained unclear but hopeful. Under the leadership of its chairman, Afewerki, the EPLF transformed itself into a civilian organization, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). In 1991 it had renounced its original hard-line Marxist ideology, embracing the idea of a mixed economy. Local elections were held in March 1997. As of May 1998, the PFDJ

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and President Afewerki, who was elected in 1993, still dominated Eritrea’s government, but they both seemed to be moving in the direction of creating full democratic institutions. In the meantime, Eritrea’s economy was being put back together, becoming one of the fastest growing in Africa. Regionally, the victory of the EPLF ended the many years of war in the Horn of Africa. With Ethiopia and Eritrea on good terms, the region seemed set on the road to stability. Finally, Eritrea’s victory had the regional effect of benefiting the South Sudanese fighters in that country’s long civil war. Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda all offered their support to John Garang’s Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), greatly improving its chances of success against the fundamentalist Islamic regime in Khartoum. But Eritrea’s promising democratic start turned sour in the late 1990s. In 1998, the country went to war with Ethiopia over a disputed border. The short

but bloody conflict left roughly 20,000 Eritrean dead. It also led to crackdowns by the Afewerki government against opposition parties and the press, both of whom questioned the government’s conduct of the war. Afewerki also indefinitely postponed discussions on a new constitution and national elections. Carl Skutsch See also: People’s Wars; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Eritrea: Border War with Ethiopia, 1998–2000; Ethiopia: Revolution, 1974–1978; Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978; Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–1991.

Bibliography Connell, Dan. Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997. Iyob, Ruth. The Eritrean Struggle for Independence. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Marcus, Harold G. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

ERITREA: Border War with Ethiopia, 1998–2000 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Border Dispute

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The 1998–2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a former Ethiopian province, would see two of Africa’s poorest nations spend millions of dollars in military expenditures to fight one another. It would end with tens of thousands of people dead and hundreds of thousands more displaced and homeless. The war exacerbated economic and social crises originally caused by the thirty-year guerrilla war (1963–1993) that culminated in Eritrean independence. That struggle was Africa’s longest war in the twentieth century.

Causes The cause of the conflict lay in the colonial history of the two countries. The Eritrean government based its claim to the disputed territory on an agreement signed between Italy’s fascist government and the

Ethiopian monarchy during the 1930s. Eritrea had been an Italian colony since the 1890s, and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini used it as a staging ground for his 1936 invasion of Ethiopia. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia were liberated by the British early in World War II. After the war, they remained under British control. In 1952, Ethiopia regained its independence. At the insistence of Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie, Eritrea became a part of Ethiopia but received semiautonomous status. In 1962, Haile Selassie ended Eritrea’s special status and made it one of Ethiopia’s provinces. This set off a thirty-year period of war and conflict. The United States supported Haile Selassie for decades, seeing him as a faithful anticommunist ally during the Cold War. The emperor granted the United States unrestricted access to a military base and, in return, received substantial military aid, which he used both against Eritrean separatists and against guerrilla forces in other provinces. The U.S. military base afforded the United States a useful post for monitoring the shipping lanes off Eritrea’s shores that connected the Persian Gulf oil fields with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, allowing oil to be shipped to the Mediterranean and Western Europe. The armed struggle for independence in Eritrea was led for two decades by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), a nominally Marxist group. In January 1974, the EPLF dealt Haile Selassie’s army a devastating setback in a battle at Asmara. The battle weakened the resolve of the Ethiopian army and also revealed the declining power of Haile Selassie himself; later that year, he was overthrown in a military coup. The disorders in Ethiopia gave Eritrea further opportunity to campaign for its independence. During the 1980s, Ethiopia formed an alliance with the Soviet Union and claimed to be creating a

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KEY DATES 1962

The Ethiopian government abolishes the federation with Eritrea and establishes full central government control over the territory, setting off a thirty-year-long civil war.

1974

The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) defeats the Ethiopian army in a major battle; the defeat contributes to the fall of the royal government of Haile Selassie and its replacement by a Marxist government.

1991

The EPLF wins control of Eritrea, leading to full independence in 1993.

1997

Growing economic and political tensions between the two countries lead Eritrea to stop using Ethiopian currency.

1998

A tense standoff on the border between the two countries’ armies breaks out into warfare.

2000 A major offensive by the Ethiopian army breaks through Eritrean lines in May; in December, the two countries sign onto the Algiers Accord, ending the conflict; in two years of fighting, more than 140,000 soldiers, mostly on the Ethiopian side, have been killed, and 750,000 Eritrean civilians have been displaced from their homes.

Marxist state. The U.S. administration of President Ronald Reagan withdrew support from Ethiopia and began to favor Eritrea’s war for independence. The EPLF gained control of an increasing area in Eritrea. Finally, in May 1991, the EPLF captured Asmara, the Eritrean capital and the last Ethiopian stronghold. Ethiopian troops withdrew before May ended. Secretary-General Issaias Afworki of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) announced the establishment of the Provisional Government of Eritrea. Meanwhile, in Ethiopia itself, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, an alliance of opposition groups, toppled the country’s ruling dictatorship and installed their leader, Meles Zenawi, as Ethiopia’s head of state. In 1993, Eritreans voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence from Ethiopia. Eritrea became an independent state on May 24, 1993. Immediately the newly formed government was forced to deal with the economic difficulties facing a small, poor country in which more than two-thirds of the population was engaged in subsistence agriculture, hundreds of thousands of peasants had been displaced by years of constant warfare, and most of

the country’s industrial and communications infrastructure had been destroyed. Disagreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia soon emerged over matters of currency and trade. In 1997 the Eritrean government stopped using the Ethiopian currency, the birr, and instead created its own currency, the nakfa. The government of Ethiopia responded by demanding that all trade between the two countries be carried out in dollars. Even during Eritrea’s war for independence, Ethiopia had been its primary trading partner, accounting for approximately two-thirds of Eritrean trade, including much of its food. After independence, Ethiopia increased restrictions on trade, and the newly independent country faced severe food shortages. By the same token, Ethiopia had also lost much in the Eritrean war. Eritrea controlled all of the coastline that Ethiopia had once claimed as its own. Now all of Ethiopia’s trade had to pass through another country on its way to market. After independence, the Eritrean government demanded that Ethiopia pay increased rates for the use of port facilities. As if disagreements on currency and access to port facilities were not enough, the agreements ending the

Eritrea: Border War with Ethiopia, 19 9 8–2000

war for Eritrean independence left the exact borders between the two countries undefined. Several border areas soon came under dispute as both countries laid claim to a number of regions, most notably Badme, Tsorona-Zalambessa, and Bure. As tensions mounted, the two nations undertook a buildup of armed forces on their respective sides of the contested border.

War On May 6, 1998, the tense standoff gave way to war when Eritrean troops advanced into a disputed region along the border with the northern Ethiopian province of Tigray. Under the pretext that several Eritrean officials had been killed by Ethiopians, the Eritreans invaded the area near Badme (previously controlled by Ethiopia) and engaged local militia and security forces. The military conflict escalated quickly, with each side increasing troop numbers to more than 100,000 and launching artillery and air attacks against the other.

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Ethiopia launched a full assault against Eritrea, including air strikes on the Eritrean capital, Asmara. In response, in June 1998, Eritrea bombed the northern Ethiopian towns of Adigrat and Mek’ele, killing dozens of civilians. In November, Eritrean forces launched an artillery assault on Adrigat in Ethiopia, killing more civilians. In June 1998, both sides agreed to cease the air raids. Within months, however, air assaults had resumed. That month, Ethiopia attacked Badme, seeking to take it from Eritrean control. In some of the heaviest fighting of the war, the Ethiopians employed artillery, tanks, and air raids in a strong push to take the town, but the Eritrean forces refused to withdraw despite suffering heavy casualties. As both sides amassed large-scale forces along the border, the battle shifted to a kind of trench warfare that had not been seen since World War I. More than 300,000 troops dug in along a 500-mile front. The pitched battles caused high casualties; in addition, tens of thousands of civilians fled the war zones, creating enormous refugee crises in both countries.

Ethiopian soldiers cheer a strategic victory in the border war with Eritrea in May 2000. A buffer zone patrolled by UN peacekeeping forces was eventually established, but not before both sides suffered heavy casualties. (Alexander Joe/AFP/Getty Images)

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To make matters worse, Ethiopia drove nearly 80,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean background out of their country and into Eritrea. Fighting eventually spread to Somalia, where the Oromo Liberation Front, another insurgent group seeking independence from Ethiopia, was based. Eritrea began supporting the group, and Ethiopia responded by supporting the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, a rebel group in Eritrea. Ethiopia also established relations with the Islamic regime in Sudan to support the Eritrean Islamic Salvation, which also opposed the Eritrean government and carried out several terrorist attacks along Eritrea’s border with Sudan. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) spent months trying to get Ethiopia and Eritrea to agree on a peace plan that called for mutual troop withdrawals, international observers to monitor the ceasefire, and a commission to establish the border between the two countries. If one country agreed to the proposal, however, the other side withdrew its approval. In May 2000, a major Ethiopian offensive broke through Eritrean lines, capturing a key town within Eritrean territory and cutting off the main supply route for Eritrean troops on the western front. By the end of the month, Ethiopian troops occupied almost a quarter of Eritrean territory. The occupation and subsequent loss of much of its infrastructure left Eritrea with little choice but to accept an Ethiopian cease-fire offer.

Negotiations and Legacy On December 12, 2000, the two countries accepted the terms of the Algiers Agreement to end

the war. The agreement established a process of binding arbitration for settling disputes between the countries and established a fifteen-mile-wide temporary security zone to be patrolled by United Nations peacekeeping forces. The agreement also established a Boundary Commission, which determined a new official boundary between the two countries. In a move that would prove controversial and potentially inflammatory, the Boundary Commission awarded Badme, formerly controlled by Ethiopia, to Eritrea. For years afterward, Ethiopia threatened further military action to reclaim Badme, raising fears that the countries might once again find themselves at war with each other. The impact of the border war on local populations in both countries was enormous. Eritrea lost approximately 19,000 soldiers, while Ethiopia lost almost 123,000. The conflict also left more than 750,000 Eritreans homeless as refugees. Jeffrey A. Shantz See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Eritrea: War for Independence, 1958–1991.

Bibliography Gilkes, Patrick, and Martin Plaut. War in the Horn: The Conflicts Between Eritrea and Ethiopia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999. Pool, David. From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001. Wrong, Michela. I Didn’t Do It for You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation. New York: HarperCollins, 2005.

ETHIOPIA: Revolution,1974–1978 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coup PARTICIPANT: Soviet Union RED SEA

A

100

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Ethiopia had been a civilized state for at least 2,000 years before the turmoil that removed Haile Selassie, its last emperor. Selassie had begun his reign as a popular monarch, and for much of the world he became a symbol of courage in adversity. His later years, however, were marked by incompetence that eventually led to his overthrow.

Historical Background Selassie had ruled the country since 1930. In the early years of his reign he had been a modernizing monarch, building roads, schools, hospitals, and a more efficient central government. Tax revenues had flowed into the previously poor kingdom. This progress was halted when Italy, ruled by fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, invaded Ethiopia in 1935. Selassie was forced to flee into exile in May 1936. The following month he made a famous speech before the League of Nations begging for justice, but the organization did not respond. During World War II, Italy allied itself with Nazi Germany, which soon overran much of Western

Europe. The British attacked Ethiopia in 1941, however, and Selassie was able to return to his country with the British army. Defeating the unenthusiastic Italian army, the British entered Addis Ababa in May 1941, and Selassie gathered up the reins of government. Although Selassie was still regarded with respect, his ability to control the country remained limited. Ethiopia was divided among dozens of different ethnic groups and two major religions (Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity and Islam) and was dominated by a wealthy class of landholders and provincial nobles who resisted sacrificing their prerogatives to the power of the throne. In the 1950s and 1960s, Selassie made some limited attempts to modernize Ethiopia’s economy, but he was unwilling to profoundly alter Ethiopia’s social or economic systems. When rich landlords resisted his attempts to alter the tax system to take some of the tax burden off the poor peasants, he backed down and allowed the landlords to retain their privileges. Selassie’s policies had the unfortunate effect of alienating both sides: The landlords were annoyed that he had even tried to reduce their economic power, while progressives in Ethiopia were angry to see no changes in its archaic structures. Selassie also did little to modernize the country’s government. In 1955 he decreed a new constitution that provided for an elected parliament, but he allowed it no power. He also did nothing to reduce the dominance of the Christian Amharic people in local and national government. The Amhara had been Ethiopia’s traditional ruling class (Selassie was an Amhara), but they made up only 25 percent of the population. Other ethnic groups, particularly the Oromo, who made up 40 percent of the population, and the Tigray, who constituted 14 percent, resented the Amhara’s privileged position.

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KEY DATES 1955

Responding to unrest, Emperor Haile Selassie decrees a new constitution, providing for an elected parliament, but he allows it no power.

1962

Selassie ignores demands for autonomy of the Ethiopian province of Eritrea, increasing armed resistance in the province.

1974

On January 12, the army brigade mutinies, citing its own poor treatment and the government’s failure to respond to famine in Wollo and Tigre provinces; in February, Selassie promises reforms but is slow to enact them; in June, a group of junior officers forms the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army, known as the Dergue, which is Amharic for “committee.”

1974–1977

Internal struggle within the Dergue ends with a victory by Major Mengistu Haile Mariam; by November of 1977, Mengistu has executed the last of his major rivals within the Dergue.

1991

Unable to quell revolts in Tigre and Eritrea, and with Tigrean forces surrounding the capital of Addis Ababa, Mengistu flees the country.

Growing Dissatisfaction By 1960 unhappiness with Selassie’s methods had increased, particularly among the educated classes. Selassie’s attempts to modernize Ethiopia’s educational system gave more students the opportunity to attend a university, but these students, seduced by Western ideas about freedom and democracy, resented that he limited modernization to economic areas and was unwilling to allow greater political freedom or to reduce the power of the traditional Ethiopian nobility. (Selassie did wish to reduce the nobility’s power, but only in order to increase his own.) On December 13, 1960, a group of disgruntled officers led a coup attempt against Selassie while he was out of the country. They were supported by student demonstrations but were quickly ousted once the emperor returned. The failure of the coup showed that Selassie still retained authority over most of the traditional forces in Ethiopia. That there had been a coup at all, however, revealed to the world and to many Ethiopians that there was also widespread dissatisfaction. The failed coup also

showed that the greatest resistance to Selassie’s regime lay with the students and the military. The army’s officers were divided between an older generation, which felt a personal loyalty to the emperor, and a younger, better-educated generation, which was frustrated with Ethiopia’s backward economy and society. After 1960, Ethiopia also faced growing regional resistance to Selassie’s centralization plans. Selassie wished all of Ethiopia’s regions to be fully under the control of a strong centralized state, but this ambition went against a strong tradition of regional autonomy in Ethiopian history. Many regions chafed under Selassie’s policies, none more so than Eritrea. Eritrea, which had been semi-independent under the Italians and the British, was forced into a federal union with Ethiopia in 1952. Selassie gradually subverted the Eritreans’ federal assembly and, in 1962, turned the territory into a mere province of Ethiopia. Eritreans fought against Ethiopian control. In 1960 they founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF led an armed resistance to Ethiopia, which

Ethiopia: Revolution, 1974–1978

forced Selassie to commit a large portion of his armed forces to hunting Eritrean guerrillas. The Eritrean resistance was the most serious regional unrest facing Ethiopia during Selassie’s regime, but the army also faced low-level resistance from the Somali, the Tigray, and the Oromo. The regions occupied by these peoples required further commitments of troops. The lack of success in these ongoing struggles disturbed the army, which blamed its failure on corruption and incompetence within Selassie’s government. Selassie also had to deal with growing resistance by the landed nobility. A 1966 plan to create a modern tax system led to a revolt in Gojam that required military intervention. Other provinces resisted the new system, and Selassie was obliged to rescind the changes, lowering his prestige in the process. Criticized by progressives for not changing fast enough, and by traditional-minded landlords for trying to change too much, and facing constant unrest by Ethiopia’s many ethnic minorities, Selassie had less and less control over his country in the early 1970s. His rule was further handicapped by his own advanced age and growing obstinacy. The progressive monarch of the 1930s had become a stubborn reactionary by 1974. Ethiopia’s government stagnated amid growing corruption.

Open Unrest On January 12, 1974, an army brigade at Negele rose up in mutiny. The soldiers were upset at their own poor treatment as well as at the government’s seeming inability to deal with a famine that had begun in 1972— 200,000 had died in Wollo and Tigre provinces. Units around the country joined the Negele brigade in its mutiny. In January the soldiers were joined by striking workers and students who demanded changes in the government ranging from better pay to more effective famine relief. Finally, many Ethiopians began to demand a complete overhaul of the government itself. In late February, Selassie responded by promising reforms and appointing a new prime minister, Endalkatchew Medonnen—Medonnen replaced Selassie’s longtime favorite Akilu Habte Wold. There was no real change, however, and the new government began to clamp down on the military, arresting officers it considered unreliable. In June, a group of young junior officers frustrated with the glacial pace of change, organized

167

themselves into a Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army. The Dergue, as the group came to be known (“Dergue” is the Amharic word for “committee”), declared themselves dedicated to a general ideal of a better Ethiopia. Operating within the chaos that was taking over Ethiopia, the Dergue was able to claim for itself the right to dictate policy to the government. These 120 men, ranging in rank from sergeant to major, slowly became Ethiopia’s new rulers.

The Dergue’s Creeping Coup At first, the old government continued to function. The Dergue pledged its loyalty to Selassie, and Medonnen remained Ethiopia’s prime minister. But the Dergue made demands and, because the army seemed to support it, the emperor and his ministers felt obliged to cooperate. Each successful demand increased the Dergue’s confidence and lowered the prestige of the regime. Selassie steadily lost what support he still had, and the Dergue became the organization that all parties felt obliged to obey. In a process that was described as a “creeping coup,” the Dergue ordered senior officers arrested for corruption, forced Selassie to replace his ministers, and gradually removed the entire structure upon which the emperor’s power rested. Throughout the creeping coup the Dergue kept itself behind the scenes as much as possible. Its chairman, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, and vice chairman, Major Atnafu Abate, did their best to avoid public notice. It seems likely that the Dergue’s members feared that revealing their identities would make them vulnerable to assassination or suppression. At first it appeared that the Dergue did not plan to replace the government and that they simply wanted to force it to reform. By August 1974, however, with the emperor obeying all their demands, it appeared their ambitions had grown. They decided that Selassie himself had to be removed from power. In August the Dergue forced Selassie to replace Medonnen with a more reform-minded prime minister, and also made him choose General Aman Michael Andom as the new defense minister (Andom was considered sympathetic by the Dergue). Finally, in September, the Dergue accused the emperor of covering up the Wollo famine (which was true). Angry crowds demanded Selassie’s arrest. On September 12, Selassie was driven away in a blue Volkswagen, emperor no more; he died in custody the following year.

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Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, who played a key role in the 1974 revolution that ousted Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie, emerged as head of the Military Administrative Council (Dergue) in 1977 and served as the nation’s president from 1987 to 1991. (AFP/Getty Images)

On September 15, the Dergue changed itself into the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) and made General Aman its chairman.

Power Struggle From 1974 to 1977 the Dergue was engaged in a struggle for power within its own ranks. At the same time, the Dergue was fighting against the attempts of Eritrea to break away. It also had to suppress popular movements within Ethiopia itself, which were demanding an end to military rule. When the struggle ended, Mengistu, chairman of the Dergue, emerged as the sole victor in this bloody civil war. The first victim to fall was General Aman. Aman was trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Eritrean war (he was an Eritrean), and many Dergue members rejected any plan that might give Eritrea its independence. On November 23, 1974 (a day that would be remembered as “Bloody Sunday”), troops loyal to the Dergue attempted to arrest Aman. The general resisted with the help of his personal body-

guard, but after a firefight, in which the Dergue was forced to call in tanks, Aman was killed, along with two Dergue members who had supported him. The Dergue then went on to kill fifty-nine prisoners already in custody, including former prime minister Medonnen. The Dergue then appointed another general, Tafari Banti, to be the new head of the PMAC, but real power remained with Mengistu and his colleagues. In December 1974, the Dergue called for Ethiopia to become a socialist state. In April 1976, Mengistu elaborated on the Dergue’s idea of socialism with the publication of a Program for the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR). The PNDR promised steady progress toward socialism under the leadership of workers, peasants, and other anti-traditionalist classes, but in practice the Dergue continued to keep all power in its own hands. It was Stalinism with a Marxist face. Although many Ethiopians on the left, particularly university students, had initially supported the Dergue, they grew increasingly angry at the Dergue’s refusal—despite its leftist rhetoric—to share power with the people. The government nationalized farms and factories, but did so completely from above, allowing little worker or farmer participation in the process. The most important Ethiopian socialist party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), had at first worked with the Dergue, but in February 1977, it decided that the military rulers would never willingly share power and so declared war on the Dergue. For more than a year the EPRP and the Dergue engaged in an urban guerrilla war of assassination and counterassassination. Squads of EPRP gunmen spent their nights stalking military leaders, while the military gave weapons to private militias who hunted EPRP members during the day. The streets of Addis Ababa echoed with gunfire and grenade blasts. Tens of thousands of students who were suspected of having EPRP loyalties were imprisoned; many were tortured and others were never seen again. A number of Dergue members were killed by the EPRP, but Mengistu succeeded in crushing the movement by the end of 1978. At least 10,000 EPRP members and sympathizers, mostly students, died in this war of Marxist military government versus Marxist revolutionary party. Before the final defeat of the EPRP, Mengistu had already eliminated his last competitors within the Dergue. In late December 1976, Tafari Banti, the official head of the PMAC, and Major Atnafu Abate, a longtime Dergue leader, had attempted to maneuver Mengistu into a less powerful position within the Dergue hierarchy. At first they seemed to have succeeded

Ethiopia: Revolution, 1974–1978

in reducing his power base, but in a February 3, 1977, shootout, supporters of Mengistu cornered Tafari at the Grand Palace in Addis Ababa and killed him, along with six other Dergue members. In November, Mengistu ordered his last rival, Atnafu, executed.

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Eritrea drained Ethiopia’s resources and weakened Mengistu’s authority. Then in May 1991 an army of ethnic Tigray was able to march on Addis Ababa and force Mengistu to flee. It was the end of the Ethiopian revolution begun seventeen years earlier.

Epilogue Analysis Mengistu was now the sole leader of Ethiopia’s revolution. Although he continued to speak in Marxist terms, it was clear that his brand of Communism was solely directed toward maintaining himself in power. He created a commission in 1979 whose job it was to build a new Marxist party in Ethiopia. The result was the September 1984 birth of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). However, the WPE had little popular support and was clearly a tool designed to keep Mengistu in power. In 1987, Mengistu ordered the name of his country changed to the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. For Ethiopia, Mengistu’s rule was disastrous. He forced all areas of the economy into a top-down statecontrolled system that emulated Soviet-style Communism, but he did so at a time when even the Soviet Union itself was recognizing the failure of its own command economy. His land distribution programs, combined with the creation of peasant agricultural associations, led to declining harvests and a massive famine in 1984. Nationalization of the industrial and financial sectors of the economy proved to be equally unsuccessful. And the indiscriminately waged war against the EPRP had killed or forced out of the country thousands of Ethiopia’s best and brightest minds (many of the students targeted by Mengistu in the anti-EPRP war had only peripheral connections to the outlawed group). In foreign policy, Mengistu’s victory had the effect of bringing Ethiopia within the Soviet Union’s system of alliances. The Soviet government began supplying large quantities of arms to the Ethiopians (an overnight switch from their previous policy of supporting Ethiopia’s neighbor and archenemy Somalia). In 1989, however, Soviet reform leader Mikhail Gorbachev ended Soviet support for the Ethiopian dictator. Mengistu also continued the previous regime’s policy of suppressing Ethiopia’s various ethnic secessionist groups. It was these groups that were the cause of his eventual downfall. Ethnic armies in

Ethiopia collapsed because Haile Selassie’s regime was too rigid to deal with the conflicting demands of a new generation that desired modernization and change, and because Ethiopia’s traditional elites resisted all change that might reduce their economic power over the poor peasantry. The government was unable to satisfy the desire of ethnic minorities, particularly the Eritreans, to achieve either autonomy or independence. Once Selassie had lost the support of most areas within Ethiopian society, it took only a spark to bring down his regime. The 1974 spark was probably the general dissatisfaction of most Ethiopians with the government’s handling of the 1972–1974 famine. The success of Mengistu and the Dergue in replacing Selassie was based upon the general disunity of the country and on Mengistu’s own political acumen. Mengistu allied himself with popular generals, and when he no longer needed them, he eliminated them. Likewise, the EPRP was a useful ally while Mengistu and the Dergue were busy tearing down the economic structures that supported Ethiopia’s traditional elites, but once they had succeeded, the EPRP was no longer needed and was removed in a bloody civil struggle. When the dust cleared, only Mengistu was left standing. And Ethiopia was forced to suffer fourteen years of Mengistu’s dictatorial policies. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Coups; Eritrea: War for Independence, 1958–1991; Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977– 1978; Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–1991.

Bibliography Keller, Edmond J. Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. Marcus, Harold G. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Tiruneh, Andargachew. The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974–1987. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

ETHIOPIA: War with Somalia,1977–1978 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Somalia

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100 200 Kilometers

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Mogadishu

INDIAN OCEAN

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Ethnic group

When the Ethiopian empire expanded its borders in the late nineteenth century, it laid claim to an eastern region called the Ogaden. Unfortunately for future peace, the Ogaden was mostly inhabited by nomadic Somali tribesmen who had no desire to be absorbed into the Ethiopian state. Unlike Ethiopia, Somalia has a largely uniform culture. Most of its population are ethnic Somalis who speak the same language and share Islam as their religion. Two-thirds of Somalis are nomadic or seminomadic, driving their herds of sheep, goats, cattle, and camels back and forth across the terrain, moving from one fertile region to another. The Ogaden lies in the middle of many Somalis’ migratory patterns. Somali clans were accustomed to moving from the Hawd to the Ogaden depending on the time of year. In the process, however, they were crossing into territory claimed by Ethiopia. It was this clash of ethnic and political realities that would lead to the 1977 war between Ethiopia and Somalia.

When the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik laid claim to the Ogaden in 1890, the Somalis had no independent government. A people made up of wandering tribesmen, they had never been united into one nation— although their shared language and culture gave a strong structure on which a sense of nationalism could be built. In 1890, the Somalis were ruled by two colonial powers. In the north, the British had established a British Somaliland Protectorate; in the south, the Italians had moved their troops into the main ports and declared the area to be Italian Somaliland. So, when Menelik announced that Ogaden should be Ethiopian territory, it was Europeans, not Somalis, who negotiated the province’s fate with him. The British only wanted to maintain their control over the coast and so had no objection to Ethiopian control of the interior. The Italians, dreaming of empire, objected more strongly, but a brief ItalianEthiopian war (1895–1896) put an end to those dreams and gave Ethiopia control over the Ogaden. The rest of the Somali people, under British, French, and Italian control, could do nothing to alter the situation. When World War II began in 1939, Italy was allied with Nazi Germany, and Great Britain was a key nation of the Allied Powers assembled to defeat them. The war quickly came to Somalia and put the Somalis on the road to independence. In 1940, an Italian army conquered British Somaliland, and Italy united all its territories in the region into one province, Italian East Africa. The Somalis, for the first time, were under a single government. In 1941, the British counterattacked and threw the Italians out of Africa, but kept Somalia. The British encouraged the Somalis in the creation of their first modern political organization, the Somali Youth League (SYL). The SYL agitated for a united Somalia, which would encompass all territories where Somalis lived,

170

Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978

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KEY DATES 1960

Somali-backed guerrillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) conduct a low-level conflict in the Ogaden region against Ethiopian government forces.

1969

General Mohammed Siad Barre leads a military coup in Somalia.

1974

Marxist forces under Mengistu Haile Mariam overthrow the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie and take power in Addis Ababa.

1977

Somali regulars begin to provide support for the WSLF; in July, Somali tanks roll into Ogaden.

1978

Ethiopian forces, backed by Cuban advisers, take the upper hand in the conflict, driving the Somali army out of Ogaden.

1980–1983 Ogaden guerrillas are pursued by Ethiopian forces into Somalia, causing tension between the two countries. 1991

Regimes in both Ethiopia and Somalia collapse.

including former British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the contested Ogaden region. Haile Selassie, Ethiopia’s emperor, contested Somalia’s claim to the Ogaden, insisting that the region was Ethiopian land. Unlike the SYL, Selassie had the ear of the United Nations, which ruled in Selassie’s favor in 1948. Britain bowed to the decision and withdrew its forces from the Ogaden. When Ethiopian administrators arrived, SYL activists attempted to keep them out, leading to bloodshed. But without international support and their own independence as a nation, the Somalis could do little to stop the Ethiopian takeover. In 1960, the Somalis had a reversal in fortune. Italy, which had regained temporary control of Italian Somaliland, gave it independence in 1959. Britain followed suit in British Somaliland in June 1960. The leading parties in the two new nations immediately agreed to merge, and on July 1, 1960, the Somali Republic was born. From the beginning, Somali politicians announced their intention of recovering lands they believed belonged to Somalia and were inhabited by people of Somali descent. These lands included northern Kenya, French Somaliland (after independence renamed Djibouti), and the Ogaden. The new government did not have the economic or military might to confront

Ethiopia directly, but it did support an Ogaden Somali guerrilla movement, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). From 1960 to 1977 the trouble caused by the WSLF was minor but irritating. Guerrillas moved back and forth across the border, using Somalia as a refuge and attacking Ethiopians in Ogaden. Sometimes Ethiopian forces pursued the guerrillas into Somalia itself. In 1961 and 1964 there were minor border skirmishes between regular Somali and Ethiopian troops. The better equipped Ethiopian army emerged victorious.

Siad Barre and War In 1969, after a civilian political crisis, the Somali military staged a coup and declared General Mohammed Siad Barre to be Somalia’s new leader. Siad Barre embraced an ideology of revolutionary Communism. Posters went up around Somalia praising “Comrade Marx, Comrade Lenin, and Comrade Siad.” While Siad Barre’s devotion to Communism seemed to stem primarily from its usefulness as a tool for totalitarian control of his country, it also gained him the friendship of the Soviet Union. The Soviets considered an ally in Somalia a counterbalance to the

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pro-American Ethiopian government. The Soviets helped their new ally by pouring economic and military aid into Somalia. Siad Barre was able to build his army up to a strength of 23,000, equipped with 200 Soviet-built tanks (including sophisticated T-54s), 300 armored personnel carriers, and 50 MiG fighterbombers. The Ethiopians had more troops, but fewer tanks and less sophisticated aircraft. When a 1974 revolution sent Ethiopia spiraling into chaos, Siad Barre saw the event as an opportunity to reopen Somali claims on the Ogaden. In 1975, the dormant WSLF was revived and encouraged to cross back into the Ogaden, attacking Ethiopian troops. In June 1977, Somali regulars began to provide surreptitious aid to the guerrillas. Finally, in July 1977, Somali tanks rolled across the border in an attempt to seize the Ogaden before the Ethiopian government could react. At first the Somalis had some success. The Ethiopian government was still distracted by its own internal problems, and its troops were not as well equipped as the Soviet-supplied Somalis. In July, the Somalis seized the provincial village of Dagahbur. By September they had captured Jijiga, along with some 60 percent of the Ogaden. They then began to move on the only remaining sizable town in the Ogaden, Harer. At that point, a reversal of alliances led to a reversal of fortune on the battlefield. Since the beginning of the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, the Soviet Union had hoped to replace the Americans and make themselves Ethiopia’s main patron. In late 1976 their efforts had begun to pay off with the signing of aid treaties between the two nations. At first the Soviets had tried to balance their Somali and Ethiopian friendships, but the July 1977 invasion made it impossible. Four months later, the Soviets decided to back the Ethiopians (with a population six times that of Somalia, it was a much better prize) and began a massive airlift of supplies to the Ethiopian army—$1 billion worth delivered over five months—along with large numbers of Cuban advisers and 17,000 Cuban ground troops. Betrayed, Siad Barre expelled his Soviet advisers and began searching for other friends and other sources of military aid, but the most likely sources, the United States and its allies, refused to supply him with any aid as long as his troops remained inside Ethiopia’s official borders. The Americans would not tolerate any African border readjustments based on ethnic self-determination, because they feared that any such adjustment would send the continent into a

series of chaotic border wars, for most African borders had been drawn by Europeans with little regard for ethnic realities. Over the 1977–1978 winter, the balance of forces shifted from the advancing Somalis to the defending Ethiopians. When the WSLF and the Somali army attacked in January 1978, they were repulsed by the Ethiopian army with the help of Cuban troops and the new Soviet supplies. In February, Ethiopia launched a counterattack with a 50,000-man force spearheaded by new tank units and backed up by helicoptertransported assault troops. The Somalis had fewer than 20,000 regulars backed by 10,000 WSLF guerrillas. The Ethiopians and Cubans outnumbered the Somalis by more than 2 to 1, and their equipment was now also better. The Somali army collapsed and fled in disorder back across the Somali border. On March 9, Siad Barre announced that all Somali forces were back in Somalia, and he declared an end to the fighting. The WSLF continued to harass the Ethiopian army. As a result, Ethiopian tanks pursued the guerrillas across the border into Somalia in 1980 and 1983. Tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia remained high; nevertheless, after 1978 Siad Barre ended his attempts to gain the Ogaden by force.

Analysis On the basis of popular sovereignty, Somalia’s claim to the Ogaden was quite reasonable. To the extent that any sizable population lived there, it was a Somali population. But Selassie and Ethiopia were able to take advantage of European lack of interest to extend the borders of their nation to surround the entire Ogaden. In the confusion following the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, Somalia saw its chance to redress this perceived wrong and gained Soviet sponsorship. It could not imagine that in the middle of the conflict, the Soviets would change sides and support the Ethiopians. The transfer of Soviet support was the critical factor that kept Somalia from retaking the Ogaden. One result of the 1977–1978 war was a shift in East African power relationships. After the Soviet Union took up support of Ethiopia, the United States began offering help to Somalia. In Cold War terms, the Soviet Union, gaining the friendship of larger and richer Ethiopia, was the winner. For the African nations, however, the result was less clear. The war would add to instability in both countries. Ethiopia’s leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam,

Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978

and Somalia’s Siad Barre both faced continued internal turmoil (sometimes supported by each other). Both leaders would fall from power in 1991. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethiopia: Revolution, 1974–1978; Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–1991.

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Bibliography Farer, Tom. War Clouds on the Horn of Africa. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979. Lewis, Ioan. A Modern History of Somalia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Marcus, Harold G. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

ETHIOPIA: Civil War,1978–1991 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Eritrea RED SEA

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Addis Ababa

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Ethnic group

The Ethiopian civil war began in 1974 when a civilmilitary uprising led to the ouster of the Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime. From that moment on, rival forces within Ethiopia did not cease their struggle for power. Even during the brief period from about 1978 through 1982, when Mengistu Haile Mariam appeared to have complete control over the country, he still faced serious military threats in the northern Eritrean and Tigray provinces. These threats, combined with other uprisings, would overwhelm his regime. Mengistu rose to power as part of a military junta known as the Dergue (“Dergue” is the Amharic world for “committee”). Once the Dergue had removed the emperor from his throne, they faced four threats to their hold on power. The first was internal, a radical Marxist movement known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP). (The Dergue also claimed to be Marxists, but the EPRP doubted their ideological purity.) The second and third threats were the Somali and Eritrean separatist movements in the north and east. In both provinces, local ethnic groups objected to Ethiopian control over their territories. The final threat came from within the Dergue itself:

Its members, unable to agree on who was to wield power, would eventually fall into a vicious internal struggle for power. By 1978, Mengistu, the Dergue’s chairman, had seemingly resolved all these threats to the Dergue’s position in Ethiopia. The EPRP was defeated in a messy civil war during 1977 and 1978. Thousands of students, the EPRP’s main base of support, were killed or forced into exile. The Somali and Eritrean rebels were defeated in 1978 with the help of military support provided by the Soviet Union. The Dergue itself was badly bloodied in all these struggles—particularly those with the EPRP, which had waged an assassination campaign against Dergue members. Those prominent Dergue members who remained were eliminated by Mengistu himself in 1977. The Dergue became a tool through which Mengistu exercised control over the country. The end of 1978 saw Mengistu apparently in firm control of almost all of Ethiopia.

A Soviet Client The key factor in Mengistu’s success, beyond his own personal ruthlessness, was the support provided by the Soviet Union. Before the 1974 revolution, Ethiopia had been a friend of the United States and its allies, and at first it seemed possible that Mengistu and the Dergue might, despite their Marxist rhetoric, stay within the American orbit. But the Soviets had assiduously courted Mengistu, and in 1976 they had signed a deal to provide his regime with $365 million in military aid. Late in 1977 the relationship was solidified when the Soviet Union decided to back Ethiopia rather than Somalia in the 1977–1978 Ethiopian-Somalian war. Before 1977, Somalia had been the Soviet Union’s favored client in the region, but responding to Mengistu’s desperate request for assistance, the Soviets ended their support of the Siad Barre regime and poured massive amounts of military equipment into Ethiopia. It was

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Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–19 91

175

KEY DATES 1958

The independence struggle by liberation forces in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea begins.

1974

The reign of Emperor Haile Selassie is overthrown in a military coup led by the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army, known as the Dergue, which is Amharic for “committee.”

1978

Dergue leader Mengistu Haile Mariam eliminates rivals and consolidates power in his own hands. Ethiopia triumphs over Somalia in a brief war over the contested Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

1988 Independence forces in the Ethiopian province of Eritrea score a major military victory over the Ethiopian army; liberation forces in Oromo and Tigre provinces begin recruiting large armies. 1991

With Tigrean forces surrounding the capital of Addis Ababa, Mengistu flees to Zimbabwe.

this aid—including 600 tanks and 300 armored personnel carriers—that allowed the Ethiopians to defeat Somalia’s attempt to seize the Ogaden province. With the Ogaden front stabilized, Mengistu was able to transfer his newly reequipped army to the Eritrean front and defeat the rebels there. In these efforts he was also assisted by Cuban soldiers and Soviet advisers. In November 1978, the Soviets and Mengistu signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Soviet Union promised full backing to Mengistu’s attempts to suppress all dissent within Ethiopia. Without such support, Mengistu’s regime might not have lasted past 1979. In return for the substantial expense of supporting Mengistu, the Soviet Union gained a loyal ally adjacent to the strategically important Horn of Africa, which all shipments going to and from the Suez Canal pass. The Soviets also used Ethiopia as an airbase from which they had easy access to the Persian Gulf and North Africa.

Problems Within Ethiopia The causes of Mengistu’s 1991 fall were rooted in two problems: economic dissatisfaction and ethnic unrest.

Mengistu, an avowed Marxist, tried to impose on Ethiopia a Soviet-style command economy, controlling all sectors of Ethiopian society and industry. He created an artificial puppet political party, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), whose popularity was minimal but which served the purpose of providing an instrument with which he could implement his economic and political decrees. Farmers were forced to subdivide their land into twenty-five-acre plots, each of which would be farmed by a separate peasant family, regardless of their effectiveness or energy. The peasant farms were grouped together in peasant agricultural associations, whose policies were guided by the WPE, and independent farmers were forced to move into village collectives. The result of these ideological plans was a 1984 famine, which led to humanitarian donations of food from the wealthy nations of the world. Mengistu’s industrial policy was no more successful. Ethiopia’s state-controlled industries had stagnant growth, and Ethiopia’s economy suffered. The influx of Soviet aid helped only slightly—most of the Soviet aid was military, not consumer or industrial, in nature. The generally poor economy helped to fuel resentment among all Ethiopians. But the ethnic groups in the outlying provinces felt that they

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suffered disproportionately from Mengistu’s failed policies. Mengistu’s original decision to call for Soviet support had been caused by the Ogaden and Eritrean separatist crises, but in reality all of Ethiopia was an ethnic problem for Mengistu. Ethiopia’s population was divided into a dozen major ethnic groups. The most prominent were the Amhara, who were Ethiopia’s traditional ruling class. Out of a population of about 30 million in 1975, approximately 25 percent were Amhara. Ethiopia also contained Tigray (14 percent of the population), Oromo (40 percent), Sidamo speakers (7 percent), Tigre speakers (3 percent), Somalis (3 percent), and a mix of other, smaller ethnic groupings. Both Amhara and Tigray were predominantly Christian, but most of the remainder were Muslim or worshiped animist gods. The population broke down thus: Christians, 45 percent; Muslims, 45 percent; and animist, 10 percent. In this complex ethnic and religious mixture, there had traditionally been much resentment by all ethnic groups directed at the dominance of the Amhara and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Even the Tigray, who were mostly Orthodox Christians, resented that the Amhara tended to receive all the best government jobs and monopolize the lion’s share of the country’s wealth. Ethiopia’s 1974 revolution claimed to have ended ethnic favoritism, but other ethnicities believed that the Amhara continued to have a preponderance of power. It was these ethnic resentments that would eventually coalesce into the rebellions that defeated Mengistu’s regime.

The Ogaden The Ogaden had been the initial reason for Mengistu’s request for Soviet help and would remain a problem for Ethiopia throughout the 1980s. The Ogaden was an arid province in eastern Ethiopia inhabited primarily by Somali tribesmen. Most Somalis lived along the Indian Ocean coast, but many Somalis—two-thirds of whom lived a nomadic life—traditionally wandered back and forth from the coastal regions to the Ogaden, looking for grazing land for their flocks. Ethiopia’s conquest of the Ogaden in the 1890s had divided the Somalis’ grazing grounds into two parts. For decades afterward, the Somalis paid little attention to the arbitrary border—border guards were nonexistent—but, in 1960, the creation of an independent Somali Re-

public among the Indian Ocean Somali led to rising tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia claimed to represent all Somalis and argued that the Ogaden should rightfully belong to Somalia. The Somali government supported a guerrilla group, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which led attacks against Ethiopian outposts. Growing friction between Somalia, the WSLF, and Ethiopia led to the 1977–1978 EthiopianSomalian War. With Soviet help—and Cuban troops—the Somalis were badly defeated, but unrest in the Ogaden did not stop. The WSLF, sometimes surreptitiously aided by Somali army regulars, continued to harass the Ethiopian army throughout the 1980s. There were also two major skirmishes between Ethiopian and Somali army units in 1980 and 1983. As a result, Mengistu was forced to maintain a large army within the Ogaden, which was both economically damaging and militarily a problem (troops in the Ogaden were unavailable to deal with troubles elsewhere in Ethiopia).

Eritrea The most serious military problem faced by Mengistu was an inheritance from imperial Ethiopia. Eritrea had been in revolt since 1962 when Ethiopia absorbed the small federal state into the empire. In past centuries, the Ethiopian empire had occasionally controlled Eritrea, but its people had no desire to be ruled from Addis Ababa. About half the population were ethnic Tigray Christians, while the other half were Muslims from a variety of ethnic groups, mostly Tigre. Originally, Eritrea’s Christians had welcomed union with Ethiopia, but the Emperor Selassie’s heavyhanded methods convinced them to join forces with their Muslim neighbors and rise up in rebellion against Ethiopian control. By the time Mengistu came to power, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) controlled most of the countryside and many of the towns within Eritrea. After Mengistu defeated the Somalians, he switched his new Soviet-equipped army to the Eritrean front and, in 1978, almost completely cleared the province of rebels. The rebels survived, however, in their fortress stronghold of Nakfa. Repeated campaigns, using more than 100,000 troops and backed by Soviet-supplied

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jets and tanks, were unable to dislodge the Eritreans from their mountain fortress. In the early 1980s, the EPLF was even able to mount occasional counterattacks against the Ethiopian invaders. Of all the problems faced by Mengistu’s regime, the chronically unresolved Eritrean war was probably the most damaging. The Eritrean front forced Mengistu to station most of the Ethiopian army within or near Eritrea, making other areas more vulnerable to unrest. And his failure to defeat tiny Eritrea, with a population of about 3 million, badly hurt his regime’s prestige. Eritrea’s successes provided encouragement for other groups within Ethiopia.

to achieve greater independence for the Oromo. Despite the large numbers of Oromo in Ethiopia, the OLF could only mobilize a small guerrilla army. By 1988, the OLF had been able to improve its position and recruit a larger army. Some of the credit belonged to the TPLF and EPLF, which had provided the OLF with weapons and military advisers. While the OLF was never as dangerous to Mengistu as its Tigray and Eritrean brethren, it created one more region where Mengistu was forced to commit his badly stretched army.

The Tigray and the Oromo

The turning point in Mengistu’s fortunes came with a change in regime in the Soviet Union. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet Union’s new reform leader and ended the virtually unlimited aid that had previously been offered to Ethiopia. Gorbachev wished to end the Cold War confrontations with the United States. Soviet military aid declined precipitously, from more than $1 billion to less than $300 million. Furthermore, Gorbachev put pressure on Mengistu to reach a negotiated settlement, warning that future Soviet support was not guaranteed. With decreasing Soviet arms shipments, Mengistu found it difficult to maintain Ethiopia’s position in its many internal wars. Particularly troublesome was the reduction in the number of Soviet and Cuban advisers stationed in the country; Ethiopia relied on these advisers to maintain its sophisticated Sovietbuilt tanks and aircraft. After 1985, the Ethiopian army became increasingly ineffective. And in 1989, the Soviets began to completely phase out all military aid. By 1991, there were no Soviets or Cubans left to help Mengistu stay in power. The effects of the Soviet reduction in aid were felt immediately. In Eritrea, the EPLF became increasingly bold, moving out from its northern mountain strongholds to harass the Ethiopian army throughout Eritrea. In March 1988, the EPLF was strong enough to destroy an entire Ethiopian army corps in a pitched battle at Afabet. This victory allowed them to gain control over all but a few major Eritrean towns. The victory also made it possible for the EPLF to provide greater support to the TPLF. In a February 1989 battle, the Tigrayans, with help from EPLF units, were able to destroy another large Ethiopian force at the town of Inda Silase. Mengistu was forced to withdraw his army from most of Tigray.

The Tigray had long resented Amharic dominance in Ethiopia. As Orthodox Christians, they believed that they had the right to share power with the Amhara elite, but although their political and economic position was substantially better than that of other ethnicities, they still considered themselves slighted within the Ethiopian empire. Their discontent led to a 1943 uprising that was brutally suppressed by Haile Selassie. The rise of Mengistu and the Dergue brought Tigrayan resentments to the fore again. An attempt by the Dergue to replace the traditional Tigrayan leaders of Tigray province led to an open revolt. Supported by the EPLF (Tigray and Eritrea are adjacent to one another), the Tigray established the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1975. The TPLF (which absorbed members from the defeated EPRP) was dedicated to overthrowing Mengistu by armed force. Gradually the number of armed fighters in the TPLF rose. By 1989, they had an army of 20,000 guerrilla soldiers. Mengistu staged numerous campaigns against the TPLF, but he was handicapped by the need to keep large numbers of troops in Ogaden and Eritrea. The Oromo, although the largest ethnic group within Ethiopia, had been late to develop a strong national consciousness. Many upper-class Oromo had learned Amharic and tried to fit into the Amhara elite, albeit with only limited success. However, by the 1970s, the Oromo had also become infected with the desire to free themselves from Addis Ababa’s control. In 1973, Oromo militants established the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and embarked on a campaign

Mengistu’s Fall

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The TPLF began to expand its operations into neighboring Gonder, Welo, and Shewa regions. In January 1989, the TPLF allied itself with a smaller Amhara organization, the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), which it had originally helped to create. The alliance was called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF, which remained dominated by the Tigrayans of the TPLF, helped to sponsor other revolutionary movements, including the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ Revolutionary Movement. These new rebel organizations, although accused by the government of being mere offshoots of the Tigrayan movement, were able to greatly increase the strength and area of the Mengistu opposition. Mengistu’s growing weakness triggered a May 1989 military coup against his government by officers frustrated with his failures to end Ethiopia’s turmoil. Mengistu successfully put down the coup, executing twelve generals in the process, but his

regime suffered increased criticism, even from Dergue loyalists. Mengistu opened negotiations with the TPLF and the EPLF, but was unable to come to any agreement, largely because the two movements saw victory within their grasp and saw no need to make any concessions to a Mengistu regime. By 1990, EPRDF forces were only 100 miles from Addis Ababa, and the EPLF had, in February, succeeded in seizing the port of Mitsiwa, cutting Ethiopia’s ties to the sea. Almost the entire north was in rebel hands. In desperation, Mengistu declared an end to Ethiopian Marxism, ending the redistribution program that had forced peasants into villages. His popularity did not rise; the peasants simply moved back into their old farms, ignoring, or sometimes attacking, local government administrators. Mengistu’s local bureaucracy began to fall apart. On May 21, 1991, with his armies throwing down their arms in the face of the advancing rebels, Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe. On May 28, the EPRDF moved into Addis Ababa and took over the reins of government. Ethiopia’s civil war was over.

Rebel forces of the EPRDF arrive in seized Russian tanks at the government palace in Addis Ababa during the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991. (Françoise De Mulder/Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–19 91

Epilogue The Eritreans were the key catalyst that brought down the Mengistu regime. It was the draining Eritrean war that damaged Mengistu’s army and prestige and allowed the Tigrayans to create their own successful resistance movement. Caught between these internal wars, Mengistu’s regime was unable to take the shock of the post-1985 withdrawal of Soviet support. Without Soviet aid, Mengistu’s armies steadily retreated until the inevitable collapse in 1991. The rebels’ success was facilitated by the TPLF’s decision to sponsor other ethnic liberation movements, and then coordinate the creation of the EPRDF coalition. The EPRDF originally had a Marxist program, like its creator the TPLF, but in 1991 it announced a new moderate and democratic program that was open to creating a free market economy in post–civil war Ethiopia. Politically, the EPRDF accepted the idea of a free Eritrea, and after May 1991, Eritrea was for all practical purposes an independent state. The EPRDF also supported greater autonomy for the various Ethiopian ethnicities. A new map for Ethiopia was drawn up dividing the country into nine provinces— Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, Somali, BenshangulBumuz, Southern Peoples, Gambela, and Harar—and one federal city, Addis Ababa. Despite the EPRDF’s success, there remained substantial opposition to its policies. Many groups accused the Tigrayan-dominated organization of setting up puppet parties in the various provinces in order to maintain itself in control. The OLF, in particular,

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waged a low-level guerrilla insurgency against the new Ethiopian government after 1992. Elections held in 1995 resulted in an EPRDF victory and the selection of Meles Zenawi, the EPRDF’s chairman, as Ethiopia’s new prime minister. Although foreign observers called the elections free and fair, they were marred by the lack of opposition party participation; many opposition parties had boycotted the elections, protesting what they called unfair domination of government and media by the EPRDF. Meles Zenawi was reelected prime minister in 2000 and 2005. Although Ethiopia was more peaceful than it had been for decades, ethnic tensions continued to smolder, and the EPRDF continued its iron-fist-ina-velvet-glove domination of Ethiopia’s government. Calm was disturbed once again in 1998 when Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over a border dispute. Continued strife had the unfortunate result of diminishing investment from overseas, which Ethiopia desperately needed to improve the lives of its millions of citizens. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Eritrea: War for Independence, 1958–1991; Ethiopia: Revolution, 1974–1978; Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978.

Bibliography Araia, Ghelawdewos. Ethiopia: The Political Economy of Transition. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995. Marcus, Harold G. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Prouty, Chris. Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1994.

GHANA: Rawlings Coups,1979–1981 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups 0 0

50 50

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Bolgatanga

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Tamale

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Nsawam Accra

Tarkwa Cape Coast

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Takoradi

Tema

GULF OF GUINEA

The first Europeans to arrive on the coast of what is now Ghana were the Portuguese, who established forts there to preserve their monopoly over the gold trade. (Ghana’s colonial name was the Gold Coast.) By the 1600s, the Protestant sea powers had taken over control of the coastal trade. This led to a shift in strength among the African peoples of the area, as power shifted from the kingdoms of the northern savannah to those of the coast. At the end of the century arose the Akan state of Akwamu, followed thereafter by the powerful Ashante kingdom, which encompassed what is now Ghana and surrounding areas.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the British had assumed a protectorate over the non-Ashante peoples of the coast. Continued Ashante attacks on British and non-Ashante settlements resulted in a successful punitive expedition by the British and their African allies against the Ashante capital at Kumasi in 1874. Thereafter, the Gold Coast was formally declared a British colony. Still, it took another quarter of a century to fully defeat the Ashante and establish British administration over the whole territory of what is now Ghana. From the 1920s, the British began to develop an export economy, based on cocoa, timber, and manganese. By bringing together large numbers of persons from different ethnic groups in these industries, the British incidentally established the beginnings of a Ghanaian nationalism. By the late 1940s, an independence movement was beginning to form among the professional classes of Accra, the capital. In 1949, Kwame Nkrumah broke away from the main independence organization—the United Gold Coast Convention— to form his own, more radical Convention People’s Party (CPP). Though briefly imprisoned by the British in 1950, Nkrumah was elected prime minister of a quasi-independent government in 1951. Continued agitation by Nkrumah and the CPP forced the British to speed up their plans for departure, leading to the independent British Commonwealth state of the Gold Coast on March 6, 1957, the first European colony in sub-Saharan Africa to obtain its freedom. Ghana witnessed political turmoil from its very birth. In 1957, opponents of Nkrumah’s socialist and pan-Africanist vision for the new country formed the United Party (UP) but were jailed under emergency powers assumed by the CPP government. Following a referendum in 1958, the Gold Coast broke from the Commonwealth and declared itself the Republic of Ghana. In 1964, Nkrumah officially declared Ghana a “socialist single-party state.”

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KEY DATES 1957

Ghana, then known as the Gold Coast, becomes the first of Europe’s sub-Saharan colonies to gain independent black majority rule, under the leadership of radical pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah.

1966

The military overthrows Nkrumah in the country’s first coup.

1976

The military government agrees to a referendum on a new government, in which the military, police authorities, and civilians would share power.

1978

A bare majority of 55 percent of Ghanaians vote in favor of the referendum, with national elections set for June 1979.

1979

Political parties are unbanned in January; in May, a group of young military officers led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings launches an unsuccessful coup and are arrested; quickly freed, they launch a successful coup on June 4; their takeover is greeted positively by much of the public; Rawlings allows national elections to proceed.

1979–1981 Political strife continues; Rawlings launches a third and final coup on December 31 of 1981. 1992

Military rule ends with national elections; Rawlings wins election for the presidency with 60 percent of the vote in a poll that observers from the British Commonwealth declared “free and fair.”

But economic mismanagement and official corruption led to a military coup in February 1966. Under the National Liberation Council, plans were announced for investigations into the corruption of the CPP and a quick restoration of civilian rule. Still, it was three years before a ban on political parties was lifted. In August, the Progress Party (PP)—under the leadership of Kofi Busia, the party’s founder—swept the national elections. Like its predecessor, the PP and Busia proved unable to deal with the severe economic problems of the country and were also accused of corruption, leading to yet another military coup in 1972. A National Redemption Council was established to govern the country, and political parties were again banned. With some improvements being made in the economy—largely due to rising prices for Ghanaian raw materials—the military government announced

the formation of a “union government” (UNIGOV) in 1976, in which power would be shared by the armed forces, the police, and civilian leaders. Despite widespread opposition, the plan was then put to a referendum in March 1978 where it was approved by 55 percent of the voters, though most observers of the poll agreed the results had been manipulated by the government. Still, plans for national elections in June 1979 went forward, despite widespread arrests of UNIGOV opponents.

The Rawlings Coups When the ban on political parties was lifted in January 1979, the campaign for the June elections got into full swing. Before the vote could occur, however, a group of young military officers—headed by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings—attempted an

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unsuccessful coup in May. Briefly imprisoned and then released, the group quickly re-formed and launched a successful coup, taking power on June 4 to national acclaim. Within a few days, the officers had established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Rawlings. They also launched an anticorruption investigation into the affairs of past governments, which led to a number of executions. Still, Rawlings denied that he was seeking permanent power and insisted on carrying out the elections in June. The winner, Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party, took office as scheduled, and Rawlings stepped aside. Disputes among the various other parties in the ruling coalition, however, led to political strife during 1979 and 1980, as government efforts to revive the economy in the face of yet another slump in resource prices did not produce the expected results. Instead, as the price of food escalated, strikes and rioting broke out. Most people in Ghana believed it was only a matter of time before the still-popular Rawlings took power again. He did with his third coup on December 31, 1981.

Restoration of Democracy This time, Rawlings had no intention of returning the government to civilian rule any time soon. He abolished the constitution, jailed or put under house arrest many members of the former government— including Limann—and set himself up as chairman of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). Still, Rawlings promulgated a plan to democratize the country, beginning with its local governments and armed forces. Unfortunately, this move led to a breakdown of authority in the army and several unsuccessful coup attempts. By 1990, Rawlings was forced to assume command of the military to prevent further army threats to his power. Meanwhile, efforts to reform the universities and unions soon led to demonstrations and strikes, as these institutions that had supported Rawlings turned against him.

Under both domestic and foreign pressure to return Ghana to democracy, Rawlings announced a plan for the reestablishment of constitutional rule by the end of 1991. Despite protests that the committee assembled to draw up the new constitution was dominated by progovernment appointees, the PNDC announced national elections for November 1992. With several popular measures to his credit—including an increase in government salaries and a minimum wage— Rawlings won the presidency with nearly 60 percent of the vote. Observers from the British Commonwealth declared the election “free and fair.” In the following years Rawlings’s government helped bring stability to the country. Nevertheless, serious problems remained. First, under pressure from international lending agencies, the government was forced to institute unpopular austerity plans that resulted in increases in food and fuel prices. Second, ethnic tensions broke out in the northern part of the country, where fighting between the economically dominant Nanumba and the dispossessed Konkomba led to the deaths of nearly 500 persons before government troops could restore order. Moreover, a lengthy drought in the 1990s caused severe water and power shortages, as the hydroelectric projects on which Ghana relied operated well below capacity. Still, the Rawlings government received a positive public relations boost when President Bill Clinton made Accra his first destination on his 1998 African tour, where he praised Rawlings’s commitment to democracy. Rawlings stepped down from the presidency in 2000, and John Kufuor was elected to the post. This was the first peaceful transfer of power in Ghana since its independence. Kufuor was reelected in 2004. James Ciment See also: Coups.

Bibliography Herbst, Jeffrey Ira. The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982–1991. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Petchenkine, Youry. Ghana: In Search of Stability, 1957–1992. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Shillington, Kevin. Ghana and the Rawlings Factor. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.

GUINEA-BISSAU: War of National Liberation,1962–1974 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism PARTICIPANT: Portugal Historical Background AFRICA

SENEGAL GAMBIA

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OCEAN BIJAGOS ISLANDS 0 0

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Initially colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, GuineaBissau—known before independence as Portuguese Guinea—was fully incorporated into the Portuguese Empire in 1886, following an agreement between Lisbon and France, the colonizers of Senegal and French Guinea, the two colonies that surrounded Portuguese Guinea. Largely neglected by its governing country, Portuguese Guinea’s seven major ethnic groups were mostly involved in subsistence agriculture, as well as a modicum of commercial farming and trade. Unlike Mozambique and Angola, Portugal’s larger colonies in southern Africa, Portuguese Guinea never saw a large influx of white settlers, even during the boom years of World War II and the postwar era. Because of that, Portuguese Guinea also had few of the mixed-race assimilados who would come to lead the independence movements in those other colonies.

The man who would lead the independence movement until his death in 1973, Amilcar Cabral, was born in Portuguese Guinea in 1924, the son of a schoolteacher and the operator of a small hotel. After completing his primary and secondary education in the Portuguese colony of Cape Verde Islands, Cabral won a scholarship to study agronomy at an institute in Lisbon, graduating near the top of his class in 1952. Like other Lusophone African intellectuals studying in Portugal, Cabral gravitated toward the anti-imperialist Portuguese Communist Party, which was banned and had to function underground during the rule of Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar. But the future revolutionary did not like the party’s doctrine that revolution should come in capitalist countries before their colonies were given independence. Though adhering to the economic agenda of socialism, Cabral increasingly became panAfricanist in his political outlook. During his student days in Lisbon, Cabral became a leading exponent of a movement known as reAfricanization, in which the trappings of European civilization would be discarded and replaced with African traditions. In a 1953 article, he called for intellectuals to put their education to work in the liberation of their fellow Africans. That same year, he returned to Portuguese Guinea with his family and took a job as an accountant in a Portuguese-owned manufacturing firm. Even as he became involved in nationalist politics, he was commissioned by the governor of the colony to do an agricultural survey. His travels around the country illustrated a problem he had begun to think about in Lisbon—that is, the gulf between the educated colonial elite and the masses

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KEY DATES 1500s Portugal takes control of the region that would become Guinea-Bissau, as a center of trade, including that in slaves. 1956 Left-wing pan-Africanist Amilcar Cabral and several others form the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC, its Portuguese acronym), calling for the independence of the colonies. 1960 Under pressure from Portuguese forces, PAIGC moves its headquarters to neighboring Guinea. 1962 PAIGC begins to engage Portuguese forces in conflict. 1973 Cabral is assassinated by PAIGC defectors recruited by the Portuguese government to kidnap the rebel leader. 1974 In the so-called “Carnation Revolution” in April, left-wing military officers in Portugal overthrow the right-wing dictatorship and announce their intention to free all of Portugal’s African colonies; Guinea-Bissau becomes independent on September 10.

of Africans. At the same time, he became aware of the ways colonialism sapped the strength of African agriculture by gearing it to the needs of the mother country. In 1955, Cabral left Portuguese Guinea to work in Angola, where he made contacts with nationalists there. He also made frequent trips home. During one of these, in September 1956, Cabral and five other anticolonial militants founded the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). While Cabral spent much of the rest of the decade in Angola, Portuguese Guinea saw increasing labor unrest, especially among stevedores and other workers in the administrative capital of Bissau. Under increasing pressure from the Portuguese security forces, the PAIGC decided to change tactics. At a secret meeting in September 1959, attended by Cabral, it abandoned its emphasis on organizing urban workers and shifted to rural agitation. This rural organizing was brutally suppressed in a series of massacres by Portuguese security forces. Meanwhile, after a number of arrests and raids, the PAIGC moved its headquarters to Conakry, capital of the newly independent neighboring country of Guinea, in May 1960.

Armed Conflict After winning the support of Guinea’s president Sekou Touré, Cabral and the PAIGC began to mobilize Portuguese-Guinean exiles and prepare for armed conflict. Beginning in mid-1962, the PAIGC decided it was ready and engaged in a series of small hit-and-run raids from camps inside Guinea. In September, the decision was made to launch a major guerrilla campaign from inside the colony. Concentrating their efforts in areas where political mobilization had already been achieved, PAIGC guerrillas inflicted heavy losses on the Portuguese military. Portugal responded by increasing its military force from 1,000 to 13,000 men by the following year. At the same time, Portugal decided to institute a number of political reforms in the colony. In 1963, it limited the broad executive powers of the governor. It also established a legislative assembly—most of whose eleven members were chosen by traditional leaders and Europeans—with authority over indigenous peoples. And while Lisbon offered citizenship and voting rights to the educated African elite, the vast majority of colonials could not vote. These moves did little to placate the PAIGC.

Guinea-Bissau: War of National Liberation, 19 62–1974

In 1964, the PAIGC leaders met in a congress to discuss the difficulties facing the struggle. At the top of their agenda were three problems. One concerned militarism. Though the guerrilla force was increasingly successful in its campaigns against the Portuguese army, it was also committing abuses against the indigenous peoples. Cabral immediately instituted serious punishments for violators of its rules, including the execution of a number of combatants. A second problem centered on localism. To help integrate combatants and civilians, the PAIGC had tried to send guerrillas to their native areas. But this attempt led many of them to abandon the nationalist cause once they had rid their region of the Portuguese. Finally, the PAIGC faced the problem of traditional customs’ interfering with the nationalist cause. Too many of its political and military cadres, the party leaders believed, were caught up in old practices and customs that impeded their efforts to raise the nationalist consciousness of the indigenous people. Still, the 1964 congress was largely successful in reforming the practices of party members, and through the rest of the decade, the PAIGC concentrated on mobilizing and organizing the masses in the areas liberated from the Portuguese, as well as carrying the war to the rest of the colony. By 1969, their success could be measured by the fact that the Portuguese military was largely confined to the major cities and a string of fortified camps, despite the fact that there were more than 40,000 Portuguese soldiers now in the colony. The Portuguese were forced to fight the war from the air, with helicopter-borne attacks on so-called free-fire zones. By 1973, however, the PAIGC had acquired the weapons necessary to checkmate Portuguese air superiority. At the same time, as Portugal realized it could not win the struggle by military means alone, it attempted to improve living conditions in the cities and other areas under its control. A number of schools and hospitals were built. New housing was developed, and food became cheaper and more available. So, too, the PAIGC instituted numerous economic, social, and political reforms in the liberated zones. The PAIGC established schools and clinics, while devolving political authority onto a series of local councils and courts. With the war going against them, the Portuguese decided to try a desperate gamble. In 1972, the Portuguese military forces hatched a plan to kid-

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nap Cabral and the other PAIGC leaders. Knowing that many Portuguese Guineans in the PAIGC were upset about the domination of Cape Verdeans in the party’s leadership, the Portuguese recruited a number of defectors to carry out their plan. But in January 1973, the leader of the cabal proved trigger-happy— instead of kidnapping Cabral, he assassinated him. The plan backfired in other ways as well. The new leaders of the PAIGC, less interested in political mobilization in liberated areas, decided to break the military deadlock by launching a major colony-wide campaign to drive out the Portuguese for good. On September 24, 1973, the PAIGC—now under the leadership of Cabral’s brother Luiz—unilaterally declared Guinea-Bissau independent. These attacks were more than the Portuguese military command (also faced with crises in Angola and Mozambique) could handle. In Portugal, longtime dictator Antonio Salazar had died in 1968 and been succeeded by Marcello Caetano, who lacked the support of the older leader. In April 1974, a group of Portuguese military officers overthrew the dictator Caetano. In August, Portugal withdrew its forces from Guinea-Bissau and recognized its independence on September 10. From 1974 to 1980, both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde were ruled by the PAIGC under separate constitutions, with an eye to future unification. These hopes were dashed when Guinea-Bissau Prime Minister João Bernardo Vieira led a military coup in 1980. Though committing himself to the principles of the PAIGC, Vieira began to move Guinea-Bissau toward a market economy, even as he kept a tight rein on its politics. In the country’s first multiparty elections in 1994, Vieira won by a narrow margin. He was driven from office in 1998 but would return to win another election as president in 2005. James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; Angola: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974; Guinea-Bissau: Civil War, 1998–2000; Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974.

Bibliography Chabal, Patrick. Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People’s War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Chaliand, Gérard. Armed Struggle in Africa: With the Guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969. Davidson, Basil. The Liberation of Guiné: Aspects of an African Revolution. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1969.

GUINEA-BISSAU: Civil War,1998–2000 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coup PARTICIPANTS: Guinea-Bissau; Senegal; ECOWAS

AFRICA

SENEGAL GAMBIA

GUINEA-BISSAU

AT L A N T I C

Bissau

OCEAN BIJAGOS ISLANDS 0 0

50 50

GUINEA

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

Guinea-Bissau is a small, ethnically diverse country on the western coast of Africa, one of the smallest and poorest countries in West Africa. It has been notable historically for a fairly bloody history, including a messy separation from the Portuguese in the 1960s and 1970s and continuing political strife that led to a civil war in 1998 and 1999.

Background Although the Portuguese claimed Guinea in 1446, they only subdued the coastal portions of the country and did little to develop their new possession beyond using the Guinean city of Cacheu as a major slavetrading center. Bissau was founded as a military post and slave-trading city in 1765. When the slave trade declined in the nineteenth century, Bissau became a commercial center. Although the Portuguese lost much of their African territory to the French, including Guinea, they held on to Guinea-Bissau. (Guinea is known locally as Guinea-Conakry to distinguish it from its neighbor to the northwest, Guinea-Bissau.) The Portuguese only subdued the Guinean interior after years of fighting, and it was only in 1936 that they

finally conquered the people of the Bijagos Islands. In 1941, the administrative center of Portuguese Guinea moved to Bissau. The colony of Portuguese Guinea became an overseas province of Portugal in 1952. In 1956, left-wing, pan-Africanist revolutionaries Amilcar Cabral and Raphael Barbosa secretly organized the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC, its Portuguese acronym). An armed rebellion against the Portuguese began in 1961. Despite the presence of almost 35,000 Portuguese troops, PAIGC controlled much of rural Guinea-Bissau by 1968. Cabral was assassinated by native agents of the Portuguese government in 1973. Following his death, PAIGC declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau on September 24, 1973, and in the wake of Portugal’s April 1974 revolution, Lisbon granted independence to Guinea-Bissau on September 10, 1974. Luis Cabral, half-brother of Amilcar, became president but was overthrown in a bloodless coup in 1980 by prime minister and former armed forces commander Joao Bernardo Vieira. There were attempted coups against the Vieira government in 1983, 1985, and 1993, prompted by the Vieira’s government’s penchant for cronyism and corruptions, and for its inability to deal with the nation’s endemic poverty. Coup leaders complained that PAIGC insiders and veterans were monopolizing government jobs and contracting. In 1986, coup organizer First Vice President Paulo Correia and five others were executed for treason following a lengthy trial. Nevertheless, local and international pressure forced the Vieira government to allow for reforms. In 1994, Guinea-Bissau held its first multiparty legislative and presidential elections with Vieira remaining in power.

Coup and Civil War An army uprising led by General Ansumane Mane against the Vieira government on June 7, 1998, triggered a civil war. Most of the 6,000-strong army and

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Guinea-Bissau: Civil War, 19 9 8–2000

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KEY DATES 1956

Radical pan-Africanists organize the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC, its Portuguese acronym) to fight for independence from Portugal.

1961

Fighting breaks out between PAIGC and Portuguese colonial forces.

1974

Following a leftist coup in Portugal in April, Guinea-Bissau wins its independence in September, with Luis Cabral as president.

1980 The Cabral government is overthrown in a military coup led by armed forces commander Joao Bernardo Vieira. 1994

After three attempted coups in 1983, 1985, and 1993, the government holds multiparty elections for the first time, with Vieira remaining in the presidency.

1998 An army uprising against the Vieira government triggers civil war. 1999 After several aborted cease-fires, peace returns when Vieira gives up power and multiparty elections are held.

1.1 million civilian population supported Mane. Vieira had become widely disliked for reportedly selling out Guinea-Bissau to foreign interests. Vieira brought Guinea-Bissau into the franc zone by joining the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As a result, the Central Bank of Guinea Bissau, which had controlled the national currency, lost its financial powers to the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO, its French acronym). The BCEAO, based in Senegal, issued the CFA franc, which replaced the Guinea peso. (CFA is the French acronym of the Financial Cooperative of Central Africa.) BCEAO controls the CFA franc for the seven countries in the union: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Future financial and monetary decisions for Guinea-Bissau would thereafter be taken at the conference of franc zone heads of state and of France, which guarantees the stability of the CFA franc. Guinea-Bissau, one of the poorest countries in the world, also owed Portugal $2.5 million, which had to be paid back before it joined ECOWAS. Both Senegal and Guinea sent troops to support Vieira, the former because the Guinea-Bissau junta headed by Mane was reportedly smuggling arms across the Senegalese border to assist secessionists in

the Senegalese region of Casamance and the junta headed by Mane. This foreign support kept Vieira in power, but it was not strong enough to restore peace. Soldiers from ECOWAS intervened, as did the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), and a cease-fire agreement was signed on Aug. 24, 1998. Fighting resumed in October 1998 when the rebels accused the government of breaking the truce by receiving a consignment of military equipment for the troops loyal to Vieira. A new peace agreement was signed at Abuja, Nigeria, on Nov. 1, 1998, guaranteeing that Vieira would remain in office, but Mane’s supporters would receive government positions. Eventually, four out of nine ministries in the newly appointed government went to the rebels. However, both sides remained armed, and, before ECOWAS peacekeeping forces could fully deploy, fighting broke out in February 1999. It is not known whether fighting occurred by accident or whether a group, probably not interested in the peace process, provoked this renewed fighting. After a few days of fighting, a new truce was signed. The Senegalese and Guinean soldiers left in March 1999, after 600 ECOWAS peacekeepers from Gambia, Mali, Niger, Benin, and Togo were deployed.

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General Ansumane Mane (left) meets with other military commanders after toppling Guinea-Bissau’s President Joao Bernardo Vieira in May 1999. Mane was killed in another coup attempt, against newly elected President Kumba Yala, the following year. (Tiago Petinga/AFP/Getty Images)

Elections were set for November 28, 1999. However, neither side disarmed, and both sides continued to hold entrenched positions in Bissau. The formation of a joint government did not ensure trust between the factions of Mane and Vieira. On May 8, 1999, fighting resumed when Vieira refused to reduce his 600-strong presidential guard to 30 soldiers. Within hours, Mane’s forces occupied all of Bissau and forced the surrender of the presidential guard. With rebel forces controlling most of the country, the capital had been the last government stronghold. The attack killed more than 70 people. Vieira first sought safety at the French Cultural Center, but the building was surrounded by local troops and an angry mob. To avoid further loss of life, the Portuguese ambassador drove to the French building and rescued Vieira, who then took refuge in the Portuguese embassy. The presidential palace, the French embassy, and the French Cultural Center were subsequently burned by Mane’s supporters. Malam Bacai Sanha, president of

the National Assembly, became interim president with the joint government still in office.

End of Fighting ECOWAS condemned the coup. However, fighting came to an end because Vieira gave up resistance since he had no soldiers or base of support. GuineaBissau’s civil war came to a close with very few reports of the massacres and systematic torture that often accompany civil wars. Free elections were held in November. Kumba Yala, who had lost to Vieira in 1994, won the presidency. His party, Partido Para a Renovaaao Social (PRS), subsequently took control of the government and ended twenty-six years of PAIGC governance. Since Yala came to power, human rights abuses at the hands of military personnel have continued in Guinea-Bissau. Human rights activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens have been beaten and arrested.

Guinea-Bissau: Civil War, 19 9 8–2000

Prior to the civil war, Guinea-Bissau had one of the poorest economies in Africa, and it was one of the most foreign-aid–dependent nations in the world. The fighting disrupted both the economy and shipments of aid. Trade slowed, banks were shut for more than a year, and Bissau harbor was largely unused because of the fighting. Most of the country’s infrastructure lay in ruins. Guineans expected full recovery to prewar standards to take decades. With the end of the fighting, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the World Bank, and the United States donated funds to reconstruct the economy, rebuild roads, improve the electricity grid, and demobilize 26,000 soldiers. Non-governmental organizations also helped Guinea-Bissau, with groups such

189

as Humanitarian Aid digging up unexploded shells and marking minefields. Caryn E. Neumann See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Guinea-Bissau: War of National Liberation, 1962–1974.

Bibliography Forrest, Joshua B. Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict, and Renewal in a West African Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Lobban, Richard, and Joshua Forrest. Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. London: Scarecrow Press, 1988. Mwakikagile, Godfrey. Military Coups in West Africa Since the Sixties. Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001.

IVORY COAST: Civil Disorder Since 1999 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Burkina Faso; France MALI

r Sassandra Rive

MUSLIM IVORY COAST

Bandama River

Komoé Rive r

Odienné

GUINEA

Houphouët-Boigny Era, 19 6 0–19 93

BURKINA FASO

Yamoussoukro

GHANA

CHRISTIAN/ANIMIST

LIBERIA

Abidjan

Gulf of Guinea 0 0

100 100

200 Miles 200 Kilmeters

Rebel held areas

Once lauded as a rare success story in a region plagued by corruption, coups d’état, military rule, and civil war, Ivory Coast in recent years has succumbed to the maladies that have plagued its West African neighbors since independence came to all of these countries nearly a half-century ago. The death of long-serving President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 ushered in a period of instability that his less charismatic successors have proven unable to surmount. Simmering religious and ethnic disputes, combined with rigged elections, petty political squabbling, and grave economic dislocation, provoked a civil war in 2002 that left the country divided into a Muslim north and mainly Christian south. Forces from France, Ivory Coast’s former colonial ruler, later bolstered by UN forces, helped establish a fragile cease-fire, but a peace deal between rebel forces and the government in 2003 was not fully implemented.

Felix Houphouët-Boigny, known to admiring Westerners as the “Sage of Africa” or “Grand Old Man of Africa” for his firm yet moderate leadership, served as Ivory Coast’s president from its independence in 1960 to his death in 1993, leaving an indelible mark on the country. Houphouët-Boigny’s rule was benign by most accounts—religious and ethnic strife was noticeably absent—but political opposition was illegal until 1990, and he was repeatedly reelected in stagemanaged balloting. He made tentative moves to open the political system in his last three years in office, but Ivorians were still unprepared for the shift to an open democratic system after his death. Houphouët-Boigny had chosen to avoid the socialistic experimentation that appealed to governments in so many newly independent African countries. Instead, the Ivorian president maintained close economic and political ties with the West, particularly with France. As a result, the economy—based chiefly on cocoa and coffee production—became the star performer in the region during the 1960s and early 1970s. After that, the Ivory Coast went into a slow but steady economic decline, due partly to decreased prices for its exports but also to Houphouët-Boigny’s faltering health and failure to provide leadership in the economically troubled period. State-controlled industries proved too rigid to counteract falling cocoa and coffee prices, leading to a currency devaluation and an economic recession following his death.

Post-Houphouët-Boigny Politics, 19 93–2002 The presidency of Henri Konan Bédié, HouphouëtBoigny’s hand-picked successor in 1993, was charac-

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Ivor y Coast: Civil Disorder Since 19 9 9

191

KEY DATES 1960

Ivory Coast wins its independence from France.

1993

Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the pro-French, pro-capitalist leader of Ivory Coast since its independence, dies.

1993–1999 Henri Konan Bédié, Houphouët-Boigny’s hand-picked successor, stirs up popular sentiment against foreign immigrants to bolster support for his flagging regime. 1999

Bédié is overthrown in a bloodless coup on Christmas Eve by former chief of the army Robert Guei.

2000

In elections marred by violence, Laurent Gbagbo wins the presidency.

2002

Demobilized soldiers mutiny in the commercial capital of Abidjan in September; by the end of year, armed bands have divided the country into two halves along ethnic and religious lines.

2003

Government and rebel forces sign a cease-fire accord in May.

2004

UN peacekeepers arrive in March to bolster French forces already in the country; a comprehensive peace accord between rebels and the government is signed in South Africa.

2005

In October, Gbagbo postpones elections but claims his decision does not violate the accord signed in South Africa.

terized by rampant corruption and political repression. Bédié attempted to boost flagging support for his regime by stirring up xenophobia against Muslim northerners, mostly migrants from neighboring Burkina Faso, who differed linguistically and culturally from residents of the predominantly Christian south. Under Houphouët-Boigny’s rule, immigrants from other West African countries had been welcome to settle in Ivory Coast, do the hard labor on cocoa and coffee plantations, and share in some of the country’s wealth. By the mid-1990s, roughly 40 percent of Ivory Coast’s 15 million people were foreign born. Ironically, even the xenophobic Bédié himself was rumored to be of foreign descent. Bédié made a calculated break from his predecessor’s policy of tolerance. He championed a vision of Ivoirité (“Ivorianness”) that would limit land ownership to native Ivorians and exclude immigrants from voting. Discord grew so intense in the country

that Bédié was driven from power and forced to flee by former army general Robert Guei in December 1999. The international community condemned the revolt, but residents of Abidjan, the country’s commercial and administrative capital, rejoiced in the streets at the overthrow of the unpopular Bédié. Guei’s rule began on a promising note, but he quickly disappointed many of his backers. He presented himself as a caretaker figure capable of ushering in a democratic restoration, and it appeared that he would bring a peaceful transfer of power to a newly elected government. For example, Guei also invited Alassane Ouattara to join his government of national reconciliation. Outattara, a Muslim from the north, had been Bédié’s chief political rival, and several members of his party had been jailed in November 1999 after being convicted in show trials. It seemed that Guei was shifting away from the exclusionary policies of the Bédié regime.

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

Relations between the two soon soured, however, and Guei dismissed Ouattara’s followers from the government. He also amended the constitution to prohibit anyone who had previously held a foreign nationality from running for the presidency—a deliberate bid to prevent Ouattara from taking power. This decision harkened back to the worst of the Bédié administration and left only one significant contender to run against Guei, Laurent Gbagbo. Gbagbo, a leftist history professor who had been forced into exile in the early 1980s for opposing the closed political system of the Houphouët-Boigny regime, seemed capable of creating a return to normalcy. Once again, however, Ivorians were disappointed. Though it was Bédié who let the ethnic genie out of the bottle, Gbagbo seemed unwilling to put it back in. Political allegiances divided along ethnic lines during the campaign leading to the 2000 election. Politicians of all stripes used xenophobia as a means of rallying support behind them. Gbagbo emerged victorious in October 2000, but Guei refused to recognize the result. However, the outgoing president was soon forced to flee in the face of a revolt by Ivorians, who accused him of electoral tampering. Gbagbo was proclaimed president later in the month, but Ouattara now called for a new election in which he would be permitted to run. In parliamentary elections in December, Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) gained more seats than any other party. At the same time, fighting broke out between Gbagbo’s mostly Christian backers in the south and Ouattara’s Muslim supporters in the north. The fierce rivalry between Gbagbo and Ouattara was complicated when former presidents Bédié and Guei made political comebacks, clouding Ivory Coast’s already murky political landscape. In January 2001, an attempted coup failed, but opposition newspapers openly called for a revolution throughout the year. All the while, the four men at the head of Ivorian politics squabbled bitterly, refusing to compromise for the sake of meaningful national reconciliation.

Civil War and Abortive Attempts at Power- Sharing The tenuous peace finally collapsed on September 19, 2002, as soldiers angered by orders to demobilize mutinied in Abidjan. During the following weeks,

at least 270 people were killed, including the interior minister and former president Guei. Rebels from the Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement quickly took control of the northern half of the country. Only a rapid French military intervention halted the rebels before they could capture Abidjan and chase Gbagbo from power. By late 2002, armed bands had effectively divided Ivory Coast along ethnic and religious lines. Gbagbo took a hard line on the insurgents, accusing them of being “traitors aided by a foreign rogue state” and “terrorists.” He also accused neighboring Burkina Faso of instigating the revolt in Ivory Coast. Paramilitary gendarmes supported by the government launched a campaign of persecution against migrant workers. Torching their homes became a favorite form of harassment. At first, the rebel movement (now called the New Forces) lacked leadership and a platform beyond a general desire to remove Gbagbo from power and end southern Christian domination. Still, fighting raged into 2003 as outside parties, including France and the United Nations, attempted to broker a peace deal. Gbagbo eventually backed down from his hard-line position and agreed to a power-sharing government. The new government took power in March 2003 under consensus prime minister Seydou Diarra. It was to include nine members from rebel ranks. The armed forces of the two sides signed a full cease-fire in May, ending eight months of fighting, and in July a formal end to hostilities was announced. Ivorians were hopeful. By September, however, the northerners were accusing Gbagbo of failing to honor the peace agreement, and their representatives withdrew from the national unity government. UN peacekeepers arrived in March 2004 to bolster the French force already on the ground. Soon afterward, an anti-Gbagbo rally in Abidjan provoked a violent government response. A UN report alleged that Gbagbo’s troops had killed at least 120 people, many by torture or summary execution. The opposition charged Gbagbo with deliberately flaunting the terms of the peace agreement, and a return to open warfare seemed imminent. Hostilities resumed in November 2004, when the Ivorian air force bombed rebel positions in the north. France, which had staked its reputation on upholding the cease-fire, lost nine of its soldiers in the government attacks. It responded to prevent the war from escalating, destroying the Ivorian air force (a

Ivor y Coast: Civil Disorder Since 19 9 9

193

Rivals in the tangled politics of the Ivory Coast—(left to right) opposition leader Alassane Ouattara, former president Henri Konan Bédié, President Laurent Gbagbo, and former junta leader Robert Guei—meet in January 2002 to seek an end to ethnic unrest. The fighting raged on. (Georges Gobet/AFP/Getty Images)

pair of Soviet-built aircraft and a few helicopters), then moved to capture the international airport in Abidjan and flew in reinforcements. Gbagbo supporters began violent protests across the south, objecting to French interference. Many charged that France was needlessly complicating a local dispute, but other observers believed that French actions had forestalled another bloody civil war.

Return to Peace It was clear that France could not hold the line indefinitely and that the government and opposition would have to return to the negotiating table. At this point, South Africa stepped into the process, convening peace negotiations in Pretoria. A com-

prehensive peace deal, the Pretoria Accord, was agreed to in April 2004. Under its terms, the UN was to monitor the next presidential election, the country’s Independent Electoral Commission was to include more members of the opposition, the national reconciliation government would be reconstituted with opposition participation, and President Gbagbo would disband the southern militias that were persecuting migrants and northerners. Future disputes, including those over which candidates can run for office, were to be resolved by the sponsor of the deal, South African President Thabo Mbeki. Before new presidential elections could be held in October 2005, however, President Gbagbo postponed them, invoking a law that he claimed allowed him to

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

retain power. In December, peace negotiators named economist Charles Konan Banny prime minister. He took on the difficult task of disarming governmental militias and rebels as well as organizing upcoming elections. It was not clear that the nation would easily resolve its political and ethnic differences. If it failed, the Ivory Coast, once a beacon of peace and prosperity in a troubled region, seemed destined to sink further into the ethnic and religious fighting, and the economic troubles triggered by such conflict. Sean J. McLaughlin

See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Liberia: Anti-Taylor Uprising, 1998–2003.

Bibliography Konate, Siendou A. “The Politics of Identity and Violence in Còte d’Ivoire.” West Africa Review, no. 5 (2004). Meredith, Martin. The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Mundt, Robert J. Historical Dictionary of Côte d’Ivoire (the Ivory Coast). Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1995.

KENYA: Mau Mau Uprising,1952–1956 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonial PARTICIPANT: United Kingdom SUDAN

By the 1920s, Kenyans had begun to organize political resistance to the Europeans. The most prominent of these groups was the Young Kikuyu Association (YKA), founded in 1921. The Kikuyu, making up 25 percent of the population, were Kenya’s largest ethnic group and lived directly adjacent to the area of greatest English colonization. Living next door to Nairobi gave them opportunities for education that raised their level of political sophistication. Living beside the English also meant that the Kikuyu were the group most likely to suffer from settler arrogance, land grabbing, or attempts at imposing forced labor. The young Kikuyu men in the YKA were upset that Africans had no say in Kenya’s governance. Kenya had been transformed from a protectorate into a colony in 1920, and Europeans were given the right to elect representatives to the legislative council of the new colony. Even the Indian immigrants were given minority representation in 1927, but the Africans were only represented informally by a single white missionary.

ETHIOPIA

UG

“WHITE” HIGHLANDS

K E N YA

Lake Victoria

KIKUYU RESERVES

IAN I TA L L A N D LI SOMA

AND A

Lake Rudolf

Nairobi

TANGANYIKA 0 0

100 100

200 Miles 200 Kilometers

Detention camp Railroad

Mombasa

INDIAN OC E A N

After Britain succeeded in conquering Kenya in 1900, it embarked upon a program of encouraging substantial English colonization of the country. From 1901 onward, thousands of English settlers, many of them from South Africa, came to Kenya seeking their fortune as large-scale farmers. They were joined by a large number of Indian immigrants, who came either to help build the railroads or as merchants eager to serve Kenya’s growing economy. Most of the Europeans settled in the Kenyan highlands around Nairobi, which was a city designed by the British to be Kenya’s capital. This influx of foreigners disturbed many Kenyans, particularly when the British government gave the Europeans land that had once belonged to Africans, or attempted to have forced-labor laws passed (the European settlers were frustrated by the Kenyans’ unwillingness to work long hours on their coffee and tea plantations).

Growth of the Mau Mau In 1944, a broader-based movement was organized around the Kenya African Union (KAU), which included members of all ethnic groups, although the Kikuyu were still the dominant group. In 1947, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu and former member of the YKA, was chosen to be president of the KAU. Kenyatta traveled the country gathering support for his goal of making Kenya an African country run by Africans. Kenyatta found a receptive audience. Many Kenyans had fought for the British during World War II and resented coming home to a country where they still had few economic opportunities and fewer political rights. They felt it unfair that 40,000 Europeans and 100,000 Indians should have more wealth and power than Kenya’s 5 million Africans. They were also angered by British attempts to change their

195

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

KEY DATES 1901

English colonists begin to settle in Kenyan highlands, displacing native Kikuyu farmers.

1921

Anticolonial Kikuyu organize the Young Kikuyu Association (YKA).

1944

A broader anticolonial movement emerges with the founding of the Kenya African Union (KAU).

1950 Kikuyu begin organizing an underground anticolonial militant organization known as the Mau Mau. 1952

Mau Mau begin raids on white Kenyan farms; the government declares a state of emergency.

1953

The British begin a massive military campaign against Mau Mau militants; Jomo Kenyatta, head of KAU and future president of independent Kenya, is sentenced to six years imprisonment for inciting a Mau Mau uprising.

1956 British colonial authorities declare the defeat of the Mau Mau movement. 1963 Kenya wins its independence from Britain on December 12.

culture—including attacks by missionaries on the Kikuyu practice of female circumcision. In 1950, the Kikuyu began to organize a secret organization known as the Mau Mau. The origin of the name is unclear, but the Mau Mau were dedicated to throwing the English settlers out of Kenya. New initiates to the secret society were made to swear ritual oaths dedicating themselves to the cause of Kenyan independence. Sometimes Kikuyu were intimidated into swearing the oaths. Having taken the oath, most felt tied to the cause. To tradition-minded Kikuyu, the oaths were terrible and binding, dedicating them to a lifelong commitment to the Mau Mau. Bettereducated Kikuyu were less susceptible to such mystical beliefs but joined the Mau Mau because they believed in its goals. The British authorities banned the Mau Mau in late 1950, but the secret society continued to grow.

Mau Mau Revolt Rumors of Mau Mau activity were widespread by mid-1952. English settlers demanded action on the

part of the government but were ignored. Prominent Kikuyu chiefs who argued against joining the Mau Mau were being killed. It seemed possible that the entire Kikuyu nation would be converted to Mau Mau and that the movement might then spread to other Kenyan ethnic groups. Finally, in October 1952, the government declared a state of emergency and ordered 183 known members of Mau Mau arrested, including Kenyatta. Kenyatta always denied leading the Mau Mau movement, but it was clear that he was deeply sympathetic to, if not directly involved in, its goals. In 1953, Kenyatta was found guilty of inciting the Mau Mau and sentenced to six years in prison. Despite the jailing of their supposed leaders, the Mau Mau continued to strike in late 1952 and early 1953. Most of their targets were Kikuyu who refused to join their cause, but they also murdered some English settlers in a brutal fashion, using knives and machetes to hack the victims to death. Europeans in Kenya responded by marching through downtown Nairobi and demanding firm government action. The British at first were helpless in the face of

Kenya: Mau Mau Uprising, 1952–195 6

these attacks, as the Mau Mau operated in small bands of guerrillas and would fade into the thick forest at the first sign of heavily armed troops. Mau Mau activity increased after March 1953, with entire villages of non–Mau Mau Kikuyu attacked and burned to the ground. Although the Europeans continued to demand more government action, throughout the Mau Mau rising, it was the Kikuyu loyal to Britain who suffered the greatest number of casualties.

British Sweeps and Detention Camps In June 1953, the British began to organize an effective campaign against the Mau Mau. First, they worked to strengthen the Kikuyu Home Guard, giving its units weapons so they could protect their own villages. At the same time the British targeted areas where there were believed to be high concentrations of Mau Mau sympathizers. Troops were sent on sweeps through the forests and villages looking for Mau Mau followers. In open areas the soldiers had the right to

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stop and question any suspicious-looking persons; in the forest they could shoot to kill without warning. The British had 10,000 regular troops at their disposal, divided evenly between British battalions and the King’s African Rifle (KAR) battalions (the KAR battalions consisted of black troops led by white officers). They also could use some 21,000 Kenyan police and 25,000 Kikuyu Home Guards, although the latter were reserved almost entirely for defensive purposes. Opposing them, the Mau Mau had an estimated 12,000 militants, supported by some 30,000 followers who provided safe havens and helped to keep them supplied. Only about 2,000 of the Mau Mau had modern rifles; the rest used knives, spears, and homemade gunpowder weapons. Despite the Mau Mau’s poor equipment, the terrain in which they operated made it extremely difficult for the British to defeat them. Thick forests, rugged hills, fast rivers—all made movement by regular troops difficult. The irregular soldiers of the Mau Mau, however, knew the region well and could move more quickly through it than their opponents. The

British colonial forces in Kenya set up detention camps for those suspected of Mau Mau activities in the early 1950s. Eventually more than 100,000 Kiyuku were taken prisoner. (Terrence Spencer/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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possibilities for ambush in the thick woods helped to compensate for the Mau Mau’s lack of modern rifles. Nevertheless, the British slowly beat down the Mau Mau resistance. Sweeps rounded up tens of thousands of Kikuyu. Those who were suspected of Mau Mau activities were put in detention camps. Eventually more than 100,000 Kikuyu would spend at least some time in the camps. Many other Kikuyu were forced to relocate into villages, which caused some difficulty. Most Kikuyu operated small farms; in Kikuyu tradition, centralized villages were the exception rather than the rule. But the small farms were isolated and vulnerable, and their scattered nature made it impossible for the British security forces to determine which were loyal and which were supporters of the Mau Mau. Although it was resented by the Kikuyu, the campaign to house Kikuyu in villages made it easier for the British and the Kikuyu Home Guard to defend against Mau Mau attacks; loyal Kikuyu were encouraged to dig ditches filled with stakes around their villages. Some Mau Mau bases were in especially hard-toreach areas. In particular, the bases in the central forest and in the rough woods around Mount Kenya were very hard for British troops to reach quickly. The British compensated for this difficulty by using aircraft to bomb the more inaccessible Mau Mau camps.

Mau Mau Defeated In April 1954, having successfully cleared most of the countryside, the British targeted Nairobi itself. About 65,000 Kikuyu lived in Nairobi, making up about one-third of the population. The British army, in an operation code-named “Anvil,” sealed off the city and went from house to house looking for Mau Mau. They detained more than 30,000, of whom they decided 16,000 were active or passive Mau Mau supporters. These were added to the growing numbers in the detention camps. Operation Anvil broke the back of the Mau Mau resistance. Much of the Mau Mau’s support had come from the Kikuyu of Nairobi, and without access to those resources, the units in the forest began to lose hope. The general population of Kikuyu also became more willing to help in operations against the Mau Mau guerrillas.

The British were able to use brainwashing techniques on some captured Mau Mau, changing them from opponents into collaborators. These turncoat Mau Mau were then used to help hunt down their fellows, leading special fast-moving tracker teams into the Kenyan woods. Those Mau Mau who could not be talked into surrendering could be caught or killed. By 1956, most of the Mau Mau had been caught. The most prominent Mau Mau leader, Dedan Kimathi, was captured and executed in October of that year. Kenya was once more firmly under British control.

Aftermath During the war 10,500 Mau Mau died, and another 75,000 Mau Mau and alleged supporters were arrested and detained. The Mau Mau had succeeded in killing 1,800 African civilians, along with 58 European and Indian civilians; the British army had lost 63 British soldiers and 534 Africans. The Mau Mau rebellion failed because it had been poorly equipped and extremely disorganized, and because its operations were characterized by brutal methods that repelled those it was supposed to attract. But it still took the British four years—and £55 million ($250 million)—to defeat the uprising. And they only succeeded after they had placed a large percentage of young Kikuyu males into detention camps. The uprising had made it clear to Britain that holding on to Kenya was not viable in the long term. Kenyan nationalism had only been slowed, not defeated. In 1957, the British allowed Africans to be elected to Kenya’s legislature, although only in limited numbers. In 1961, Africans won a majority of seats in a newly created legislative council. Kenyatta was freed by the British in late 1961 and became Kenya’s first prime minister. On December 12, 1963, Kenya became completely independent. Carl Skutsch See also: Anticolonialism.

Bibliography Kershaw, Greet. Mau Mau from Below. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1997. Ochieng, William R. A History of Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya: Macmillan, 1985.

LIBERIA: Doe Coup,1980 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups GUINEA SIERRA

IVORY

GOLA

DEY Monrovia Buchanan

ATLANTIC OCEAN

0

50

MANO

KPELLE

VAI

50

Ethnic group

KISSI LOMA GBANDI MENDE BELLE

LEONE

0

GIO

COAST

GIO

LIBERIA BASSA KRAHN

Greenville

KRU GREBO

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

Harper

Liberia is Africa’s oldest republic, founded by freed slaves and free blacks from the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. From the first colony in 1822 through independence in 1847 and up to the American Civil War and emancipation in the 1860s, some 20,000 descendants of North American slaves settled in what is now Liberia. They were joined by some 5,000 to 10,000 “recaptureds,” Africans seized from illegal slaving ships after the trans-Atlantic trade was outlawed by the British and Americans in the first decade of the nineteenth century. In the latter years of the century, the Americos—as the North Americans were called—and the recaptureds were joined by several thousand West Indians. Together, these groups formed the class that ruled Liberia during much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Unlike African colonies ruled by Europeans, Liberia had no racial barriers. Many of the indigenous peoples—particularly the offspring of important personages among the country’s sixteen ethnic groups— were formally adopted by Americo families and assimilated into what Liberians called “civilized life.”

Thus, the Americos, who never represented more than 2 to 3 percent of the population, were able to constantly reinvigorate their numbers. Most of the Americos lived in the coastal settlements, where they engaged in commerce, selling the products of the Liberian countryside—including timber, coffee, cotton, gold, and diamonds—on the world market. At the same time, they zealously defended their hard-won independence against the encroachment of the aggressive European powers that surrounded them. Still, by the early twentieth century, the country was in serious financial trouble, deeply in debt to European bankers. Between the 1920s and the 1940s, the Americos tried several schemes for rescuing their country from the British receivership in which it had been placed in the early 1900s. One plan involved working with Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican-born African-American leader from Harlem who wanted to establish settlements for American blacks in Liberia. But the relationship was a rocky one. The conservative Americo elite became concerned that Garvey’s plans to lead a decolonization movement from its base in Liberia would invite the wrath of European imperialists. When Garvey was convicted of mail fraud in the United States and deported to Jamaica, the plan collapsed. A second scheme involved the exportation of indigenous laborers to the cocoa and sugar islands of Fernando Po, then a Spanish colony off the coast of Nigeria (and now a part of Equatorial Guinea). But the plan smacked too much of forced labor and even slavery and was shut down after a League of Nations investigation in the late 1920s. Finally, the only successful plan to put Liberia on the road to financial security involved rubber. By the 1920s, the United States was the world’s largest rubber consumer—largely for tires for the new automobile industry—but it had no supplies of its own and was paying exorbitant prices to the Britishcontrolled rubber cartel of Southeast Asia. In the

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KEY DATES 1847

Liberia becomes Africa’s first independent republic, led by former slaves and free blacks who have emigrated from the United States.

1971

Long-time president William Tubman dies and is replaced by Vice President William Tolbert.

1979

Mass rioting breaks out across the country in response to a rise in the price of rice, the staple food of most Liberian poor.

1980 A small group of military men under the leadership of Master Sergeant Samuel Doe invade the executive mansion and murder Tolbert; Doe becomes the leader of Liberia. 1990 In the wake of an invasion by rebel forces, Doe is trapped in Monrovia and murdered by rebel leader Prince Johnson on September 9.

mid-1920s, Harvey Firestone—head of the tire company that bore his name—decided Liberia was the ideal place to set up the world’s largest rubber plantation. By the beginning of World War II, the Liberian economy was beginning to get back on its feet. Rich sources of iron ore were discovered and exploited, just in time for the huge demands of the postwar global capitalist boom of the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, there rose to power in 1944 a new and dynamic president of Liberia, William V.S. Tubman. Tubman was determined to open up Liberia to world trade. He was also a master politician. Over the course of his long tenure as president—from 1944 until his death in 1971—Tubman dramatically expanded the Liberian economy while incorporating the vast indigenous population into the political system for the first time. In some ways, this was the golden age in Liberian history. A rudimentary transportation system was constructed; the capital, Monrovia, was modernized; schools and hospitals were built—all on the revenues generated by the burgeoning rubber and iron industries. But there was a downside to this period as well. Tubman would brook no opposition and used his several security forces to crush any signs of dissent. While maintaining the appearance of electoral politics, Tubman’s True Whig party—which had been in power continuously since the late 1800s—won every campaign by a landslide.

Growing Unrest During the 1970s a downturn in the world’s economy undermined the demand for Liberian iron and rubber. Tubman’s successor—the long-serving vice president, William Tolbert—inherited a declining economy, as well as a population with rising expectations. Many of the new graduates from the indigenous groups expected to be rewarded with good-paying jobs in the upper echelons of the Liberian government and business community. But as the pie shrank, the ruling Americos more jealously guarded their perquisites. Protest movements grew, both among the newly educated indigenous population in Liberia and among the many Liberians studying at American universities. The Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) borrowed heavily from political currents in both America and Africa. They blended civil rights rhetoric with African nationalism, demanding a more inclusive political order and an end to the corruption of the Tolbert administration. By the mid1970s, they began to agitate both among the student and intellectual population of Monrovia and in the military. The Liberian military was ripe for change. Since its founding as the Liberian Frontier Force in 1909, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) had been ruled by an officer corps of elite Americos, though with

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a sprinkling of Africans largely assimilated into Americo customs and ideology. As the army expanded during the Tubman years, a number of more radical African nationalist officers rose in the ranks. Still, the institution remained highly segregated and exploitative. Enlisted men—mostly recruited from the poorest and most isolated ethnic groups in the country, including the Krahn—were routinely required to work as servants in officers’ homes. Moreover, the enlisted men lived in dismal conditions, often little more than shacks set up by the sides of roads. By the late 1970s, both the AFL and Liberian society generally were in a state of turmoil. With government revenues falling due to the continuing slump in the demand for Liberian raw materials, Tolbert decided to remove the subsidies on the basic foodstuff of the country—rice. As prices for this staple soared, the leaders of PAL and MOJA agitated the populace, pointing out to them that it was the Tolbert family, which controlled much of the rice trade, that was most likely to benefit from the price increases. In July 1979, a PAL-organized demonstration against the government degenerated into rioting and looting. The army was called out, and it shot down hundreds of demonstrators and conducted looting of its own. Tolbert, who had a reputation for vacillation, assumed emergency powers, but then resumed rice subsidies. He also agreed to allow PAL to organize a legal political party to launch a challenge in the upcoming presidential and congressional elections.

ity, they recruited Thomas Quiwonkpa, the highestranking indigenous officer in the Liberian army and a popular and well-respected leader in society. But unforeseen circumstances changed the scenario at the last minute. Hearing word of trouble, Tolbert decided to spend his nights in April 1980 at the executive mansion in Monrovia rather than at his preferred estate in the suburbs, unbeknownst to the coupplanners. Thus, Quiwonkpa was sent to arrest Tolbert at his estate while Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, a relatively uneducated Krahn man and the highestranking noncommissioned officer in the army, was sent to seize the mansion. Instead, Doe found Tolbert and had him murdered in his bed. Within a few hours, the news went out that Doe and his seventeen fellow occupiers of the mansion had seized control of the Liberian government. The news was met with jubilation throughout the country. After 133 years of Americo rule, a native African was leading the country for the first time. The following day, Doe executed eleven members of Tolbert’s cabinet on a Monrovia beach, but he still won over many of the intellectuals from PAL and MOJA to his cause. Over the course of a ten-year reign, however, the new government would prove to be even more repressive and incompetent than any Americo administration. By 1990 it had alienated most of its supporters, as well as the mass of Liberians. The Doe administration prepared the way for a disastrous civil war that would destroy the country in the course of the 1990s. James Ciment

The Doe Coup

See also: Coups; Liberia: Civil War, 1989–1997.

Bibliography The elections never took place. Instead, a group of noncommissioned officers of indigenous origins began to make plans for a coup that would topple the Tolbert administration. To lend their efforts credibil-

Boley, G.E. Saigbe. Liberia, the Rise and Fall of the First Republic. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984. Dunn, Elwood. Liberia: A National Polity in Transition. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1988.

LIBERIA: Civil War,1989–1997 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) GUINEA SIERRA

GIO

Ethnic group

KISSI LOMA GBANDI MENDE BELLE

LEONE

GOLA VAI

Bong Iron Mine MANO KPELLE Gbarnga Firestone Rubber Plantation

Monrovia

IVORY COAST

GIO

LIBERIA

Buchanan

ATLANTIC OCEAN 0 0

50 50

Greenville

KRAHN

KRU GREBO

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

Harper

After 133 years of rule by the descendants of American slaves—known in Liberia as Americos—Africa’s oldest republic fell to a coup by indigenous soldiers in April 1980. The leader of the coup, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, was a poorly educated member of the Krahn ethnic group, one of the poorest and most isolated of Liberia’s sixteen indigenous peoples. Doe was an ambitious man and a quick study. He soon gathered around him many of the reformist intellectuals at the University of Liberia who had led the protests against the last Americo regime in the 1970s. Indeed, the head of these reformers—Professor Amos Sawyer— once taught Doe in a night school Sawyer had set up for working people and soldiers in Monrovia. Doe picked Sawyer to head up a commission to draft a new constitution for the country. At the same time, Doe introduced the People’s Redemption Council (PRC). The council, largely composed of military personnel, was chaired by Doe himself and ran the country alongside the Council of Ministers, which included a majority of civilians. But this coalition collapsed within a couple of years.

Many of the reformers hoped that the Doe administration would allow them to carry out their radical plans for a redistribution of resources to the countryside and the establishment of genuine democratic rule. As it became clear that they were being marginalized by Doe’s fellow soldiers, some of the more idealistic reformers left the government, while others began to partake of the corruption themselves. Meanwhile, the Doe regime struggled to win international recognition. After being refused the seat of William Tolbert, the last Americo president and Doe’s predecessor in the executive mansion, at the Organization of African Unity summit in 1980, Doe was forced to pledge that there would be no more summary executions of members of the previous government. But it was his efforts to curry favor with the West that won his government the biggest benefits. Tolbert had followed a policy of strict neutrality between East and West and had joined with other nonaligned nations. He allowed the Soviets to open an embassy for the first time in Monrovia and he ousted the Israelis. Doe turned this policy around, welcoming back the Israelis and cozying up to the Americans. During his administration—largely coinciding with the Reagan years—Doe received nearly $500 million in aid, more than Liberia had received from the United States in its previous 130 years, making it—next to Israel—the largest recipient of U.S. aid per capita during the 1980s. Doe used most of the money to build up and improve the army. He recruited large numbers of new soldiers—mostly from his own Krahn group—and lavished new barracks, uniforms, and weapons on them, winning their undying allegiance. In return, the United States won the use of Liberian territory as a listening post for the South Atlantic, a way station for the shipment of arms to anticommunist rebels in Angola, and a site for the Voice of America’s African transmission tower.

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203

KEY DATES 1980

After 133 years under the rule of Americo-Liberians, the descendants of slaves and free blacks from the United States, the regime is overthrown in a violent coup led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe.

1989

Rebel leader Charles Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invades the country on Christmas Eve.

1990

Doe is murdered by another rebel leader, Prince Johnson, on September 9; as the NPFL and other rebel groups close in on the capital Monrovia, Economic Community of West African State Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeepers are sent in to keep the warring factions apart in October.

1996

In wake of the failure to reach a cease-fire, NPFL forces launch an offensive in April to seize Monrovia from government and ECOMOG forces; the city is heavily damaged; various rebel groups agree to demobilization efforts in late 1996 and early 1997.

1997

Charles Taylor wins the presidency in internationally monitored elections.

2003 After six years of rule, Taylor is overthrown in a rebel uprising and flees to exile in Nigeria.

By the mid-1980s, the excesses of the Doe administration were becoming an embarrassment for the Reagan White House. The Liberian leader was executing opponents and unleashing his security forces on the populace to crush all dissent. Moreover, as the more educated reformers left his government or began to engage in the widespread corruption themselves, the government’s capacity to run the country deteriorated. Doe attempted several desultory efforts to clean up the corruption, but he was too dependent on the ministers involved to remove them. He was, however, more intent on shoring up his own base in the military, dismissing his fellow plotter, the popular and competent General Thomas Quiwonkpa, in 1983. Meanwhile, the United States began pressuring Doe to hold elections under the constitution that had been ratified by nearly 80 percent of the voters in 1983. While it was not much different from the old constitution, it did get rid of property qualifications for voting and banned the hated hut tax, the flat property tax paid by every head of household. In

1984, Doe dissolved the PRC, replaced it with an interim national assembly, also under his chairmanship, and established the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) as his own electoral vehicle. Elections were scheduled for October 1985, with several reformist parties competing against the NDPL. As predicted, Doe stole the elections, or at least that’s what most people in Liberia believed. But the United States backed the results, saying that the small margin of victory—Doe took just 50.9 percent of the vote—proved their legitimacy. Of course, under the American-inspired winner-take-all system, 51 percent was as good as 99 percent. Believing that there was only one way to rid the country of the increasingly hated dictator, now the elected president, a group of reformist-minded civilians and military officers led by Quiwonkpa attempted a coup. Initially successful in seizing key points, the coup planners convinced the populace they had won, leading many opponents to come out openly against Doe. But in vicious fighting between the coup forces and the Israeli-trained elite pro-Doe

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brigades, the dictator won the day. Doe then unleashed his military forces against the conspirators and their supporters. Since Quiwonkpa came from the Gio and Mano ethnic areas of Liberia, many of his supporters also came from those two groups, both of which had had rivalries with the nearby Krahn for decades. Thousands were massacred in the Gio and Mano areas, planting animosities that would later be used to topple Doe.

Charles Taylor Invades The final Doe years were marked by increasing repression, corruption, incompetence, and regional political maneuvering, all of which contributed to the new president’s downfall and the collapse of his so-called Second Liberian Republic. The regional element was a key in Doe’s demise. Tolbert, the president Doe had assassinated, had been a close ally of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, neighboring Ivory Coast’s longserving, conservative president. Indeed, Tolbert’s son was married to Houphouët-Boigny’s daughter. Thus, there was no love lost between Houphouët-Boigny and Doe. As the Liberian leader became more erratic and repressive in the late 1980s, Houphouët-Boigny offered his territory as a base for anti-Doe forces, including those headed by Charles Taylor. A descendent of the Americo elite and an American-educated economist, Taylor served in the early Doe administration as head of the General Services Administration—the agency responsible for government supplies. He was dismissed from his post in 1983, charged with embezzling nearly $1 million. After fleeing to the United States, he was jailed in Massachusetts, at the request of the Doe administration, for possible extradition. But he escaped first and fled to Mexico, and then West Africa, allegedly showing up in both Libya and Burkina Faso before setting up operations in the Ivory Coast. On Christmas Eve 1989, Taylor led his force— consisting of several hundred men and known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)—into the Mano and Gio areas of Liberia, where he knew antiDoe sentiment ran highest. Within a few weeks, his army had swelled to several thousand, equipped with weapons supposedly received from Libya, via Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast. Over the next several months, Taylor’s forces overwhelmed the AFL and controlled most of the countryside, though bitter fighting along ethnic lines—between the Mano and Gio on the one

hand and the Krahn on the other—resulted in several hundred deaths. By May, he had Monrovia surrounded, and in July, he launched what he hoped would be the final offensive against Doe, announcing that he would honor a cease-fire only if the president resigned.

E C O M O G Intervention Several events prevented Taylor’s victory that summer. First, a breakaway faction—known as the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and headed by a former Taylor lieutenant named Prince Johnson—engaged in fighting with NPFL forces. More important in blocking Taylor, however, was the introduction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces in the fall. ECOWAS had been set up largely by the Nigerians in 1975 and soon emerged as both an economic grouping and a mutual security force. In August 1990, ECOWAS convened a conference to iron out differences between the INPFL and NPFL and find a way to ease Doe from power. But the Nigerian-led conference failed to achieve its aims. Taylor, rightly suspecting that Nigeria stood opposed to him because of his alliance with Nigeria’s main rival, the Ivory Coast, refused to attend. Nevertheless Doe offered to resign in September under ECOWAS protection. Not wanting Doe to fall into the hands of Taylor, ECOWAS turned him over to Taylor’s rival, Prince Johnson, for protection. Johnson, an unbalanced individual by most accounts, did not help Doe get out of the country, as he had promised ECOWAS. Instead, he had the former president dismembered and killed, recording the grisly event for posterity on videotape. In October, ECOWAS forces—known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—launched its first offensive, ostensibly to divide the warring factions but also to keep Taylor out of the capital. An Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was then established, with Amos Sawyer (formerly Doe’s mentor) as president. IGNU controlled little of the country outside of Monrovia. Following a series of failed cease-fires during 1991, a new group emerged in the conflict. While the INPFL faded, Doe’s former supporters rallied to the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), which had established a base in the southwestern part of the country, adjacent to the Sierra Leone border. Indeed, Taylor accused the Sierra Leone government of

Liberia: Civil War, 19 8 9–19 97

205

Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor (center) celebrates a key victory in the countryside in July 1990. Taylor’s forces surrounded the capital of Monrovia, but a multinational peacekeeping force kept him from taking over the country. He was finally elected president in 1997. (Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images)

supporting ULIMO, and he consequently aided rebels in that country. After the summer monsoon season, the NPFL launched a new offensive against ECOMOG forces in the suburbs of Monrovia. During the attack, NPFL guerrillas murdered five American nuns, earning the group Washington’s condemnation. The attack led ECOMOG to abandon whatever pretense of neutrality it had maintained. It began to launch attacks openly on NPFL forces, including aerial attacks on supply routes near the Ivory Coast border. In November 1992, the United Nations announced an arms embargo against all factions in Liberia except ECOMOG. But the ban had little effect, as the NPFL became more sophisticated in its ability to plunder national resources in exchange for arms. Thus, major battles came to be fought around the Firestone Rubber plantation in the interior and near the port of Buchanan, Liberia’s second-largest city, in early 1993. At the same time, fighting intensified in the western part of the country as ULIMO went on the

offensive against NPFL positions there. But by this time, ULIMO itself had split into two factions. ULIMO-J, headed by Roosevelt Johnson, was largely composed of Krahn men and had loose ties to the remnants of the AFL. Its main bases were along the Sierra Leone border. ULIMO-K, led by Alhaji Kromah, was made up of Mandingos, an Islamic minority widely resented in Liberia for their aloofness and commercial acumen. With the various forces fighting fiercely for control of the country’s natural resources—in order to barter for weapons—civilian deaths climbed. In June, more than 600 refugees, largely Krahn, were massacred at the Harbel Rubber Plantation, allegedly by Taylor’s forces. The UN Security Council then issued a declaration that it would isolate any faction that refused to abide by the accords signed by the various parties in the Ivory Coast the previous year. The threat appeared to work. In July, a conference of all the warring factions was held in Geneva, and the accord they reached was signed in Cotonou, Benin, in

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July. The Cotonou agreement called for a thirty-fivemember transitional parliament, consisting of representatives of all the warring factions, with the NPFL receiving the most. The cease-fire called for in the accords failed to hold, after being violated by at least two factions— the NPFL and the inappropriately named Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a collection of Krahn men and former AFL soldiers from the center of the country led by George Boley, a former member of ULIMO. Meanwhile, at year’s end, fighting intensified between ULIMO-J forces and a new regional faction known as the Lofa Defense Force (LDF). Still, there were some hopeful signs. In December, augmented ECOMOG forces and the first contingent of a UN monitoring team arrived to begin disarming the various factions under the Cotonou Accords. But their efforts were hampered by intense fighting between ULIMO factions in the western part of the country. By April of 1994, fewer than 1,500 of the estimated 60,000 combatants had been demobilized. Even the capital of Monrovia was not spared violence. In September 1994, dissident members of the AFL—led by General Charles Julu—seized the Executive Mansion, trying to oust Wilson Sankawulo, Sawyer’s successor as head of IGNU and a man seen as a Taylor protégé. The attackers were eventually removed from the mansion by ECOMOG forces. In November, yet another conference—this time sponsored by Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings—tried to bring the warring factions together. But this attempt failed when the NPFL launched a new offensive in December from its base in Gbarnga, in central Liberia. Still, a new cease-fire was arranged in early 1995. This one held for a time, despite skirmishing among the various groups, allowing Nigeria to reduce its troop contingent from 10,000 to 6,000. Under the Ghana agreement, a transition council was to be set up to rule the country until elections could be held. But Taylor’s insistence that he chair the council jeopardized the arrangements. Meanwhile, new fighting broke out in February 1995, as Taylor tried to take control of the port of Buchanan from LPC forces. Even as another peace conference was being set up in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in May, new massacres and new fighting were reported in the Buchanan area. Taylor refused to attend the conference, suspecting the Nigerians of wanting to kidnap him, but he did agree to allow ECOMOG forces to begin demining the main highway between Monrovia and his head-

quarters in Gbarnga and to set up defensive positions around the Bong iron mines near the border with Guinea. These later arrangements failed to occur when fighting broke out in July between the NPFL on one side and ECOMOG and Guinean troops on the other. The fighting around the Bong mines was indicative of some of the underlying causes of the war’s persistence. Many of ECOMOG’s officer corps saw the conflict as an opportunity to make their own personal fortunes selling off Liberian resources. Indeed, much of the fighting in the war occurred around the mines, rubber plantations, and gold and diamond fields scattered across the interior of Liberia. But by 1995, both the NPFL and ECOMOG found themselves in a stalemate. While Taylor still controlled much of the interior—where the resources were located— ECOMOG and various anti-NPFL factions—which Taylor accused of being surrogates for the Nigerians— held the ports, where the goods could be transported out of the country. In late 1995, it was reported that Taylor secretly flew to Nigeria to cut a bargain with Nigerian leader Sani Abacha, whereby the two sides would work out a plan for smuggling out contraband goods. Whether the deal succeeded or not, it failed to end the fighting. Frustrated by his inability to take power and end the war, Taylor decided on a last offensive against the capital of Monrovia. On April 6, 1996, he launched his 30,000-man force against the city. Penetrating the outskirts and even making it into the center of the city, the NPFL forces met fierce resistance from ULIMO-J and AFL fighters. In the course of the fighting, the city—which had once been a refuge from the fighting and had seen its population swell to over a million—was largely destroyed. Fighters from the various factions, often egged on by ECOMOG, which acted as a fence for the looted goods, plundered the city. Tens of thousands of refugees then poured out of Monrovia by ship, some making it to the nearby Guinean capital of Conakry, while others were forced to wander the West African coast for weeks before finally being permitted to disembark in Ghana.

Return to Peace and Elections The intensive fighting of April 6 shocked all the participants, as well as the international community, which saw extensive destruction of its aid headquarters and embassies. (The prompt dispatch of heavily

Liberia: Civil War, 19 8 9–19 97

armed Navy SEALS and marines prevented a similar fate for the U.S. Embassy, which became a refuge for the remaining foreigners in Liberia.) At this point, all sides seemed exhausted by the conflict. ECOWAS decided to appoint Victor Malu, a Nigerian general with a reputation for honesty and toughness, to head the ECOMOG forces in August 1996. Malu immediately announced a demobilization schedule, whereby all forces would be required to turn in their weapons by February 1, 1997, or face being charged as criminals. To the surprise of all concerned, Malu’s plan worked. After dispatching forces throughout the country, he was able to bring in most of the weapons and soldiers, though many caches remained hidden in the bush in case the new cease-fire and peace plan, worked out in Abuja that summer, failed to hold. But hold it did. Moreover, ECOMOG announced that elections for president and congress would be held in May. All warring factions could participate as long as they reorganized as political parties; their leaders could run for office if they resigned from the interim council. With the exception of Roosevelt Johnson— who announced his retirement from politics—all the participants complied. Because of logistical problems, however, the elections had to be delayed until July. The two frontrunners were Taylor and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, an

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economist who had spent most of the war years as a UN official in New York. Everybody expected Taylor to win, given his willingness to spend some of the fortune he had accumulated during the war on his campaign. Taylor and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) did sweep the polls, electing the former NPFL leader by more than 5 to 1 over his nearest opponent and giving the NPP a majority of congressional seats. Most Liberians hoped that by electing the most powerful of the warlords, they could assure themselves a peaceful future, and, indeed, Taylor emphasized reconciliation as the main tenet of his administration. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Liberia: Doe Coup, 1980; Liberia: Anti-Taylor Uprising, 1998–2003; Sierra Leone: Civil Conflict, 1990–Present.

Bibliography Africa Watch. Easy Prey: Child Soldiers in Liberia. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. Dolo, Emmanuel. Democracy versus Dictatorship: The Quest for Freedom and Justice in Africa’s Oldest Republic—Liberia. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996. Dunn, Elwood. Liberia: A National Polity in Transition. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1988. Osaghae, Eghosa. Ethnicity, Class and the Struggle for State Power in Liberia. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 1996.

LIBERIA: Anti-Taylor Uprising,1998–2003 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: ECOWAS; Guinea; Ivory Coast; Sierra Leone GUINEA

SIERRA

KISSI GBANDI LOMA

LEONE

LOFA

GOLA GRAND GBARPOLU CAPE MANDINGO BONG MOUNT KPELLE VAI BOMI

Monrovia

DEY

GRAND BASSA

BASSA L I B MIXED RIVER Buchanan CESS

MONTSERRADO MARGIBI

ATLANTIC OCEAN KRU

Ethnic group

IVORY

MANO

ERIA

KRAHN

GRAND GEDEH SINOE

RIVER GEE

KRU Greenville 0 0

50 50

COAST

GIO

NIMBA

GREBO

GRAND KRU 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

MARYLAND

Harper

On August 4, 1997, Charles Taylor became president of Liberia. As leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Taylor had launched a rebellion against President Samuel Doe in late 1989. Although Doe was killed in 1990 by a rival rebel leader, Taylor continued his armed efforts to seize power in Africa’s oldest republic, thwarted by other rebel groups and a Nigerian-dominated peacekeeping force from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS; the force was called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG). Finally, a peace accord reached in late 1996 called for elections the following year. Many in Liberia were wary of Taylor. Though Doe was reviled, the rebellion that Taylor had launched in 1989 resulted in the deaths of roughly 200,000 people, nearly one out of every ten Liberians, the displacement of half the country, and the wholesale destruction of city and countryside alike. As the internationally monitored elections approached in the summer of 1997, Liberians could be heard singing: “He [Taylor] killed my ma, he killed m’ pa, I gonna vote for that man,” a chant cynically taken up by Taylor’s own campaign. But as Liberia’s freewheeling press noted, Taylor

had a gun to the Liberian electorate’s head—they could vote for him or risk a new outbreak of war. Liberia’s voters took the hint, overwhelmingly electing for president a man who once fled the country under suspicion of embezzling a million dollars in government funds. Taylor’s administration started off hopefully. In a country where corruption was endemic, Taylor promised a housecleaning of government ministries. In a country where the infrastructure had been utterly destroyed (the capital Monrovia had been without running water and electricity for most of the 1990s), Taylor emphasized reconstruction. And, most importantly, in a country where leaders, including Taylor himself, had cynically pitted members of one ethnic group against another, the new president vowed to make national reconciliation a top priority. All promises soon put aside, Taylor’s administration quickly proved to be one of the most corrupt and self-serving in the country’s history, according to both Liberian and international critics. Taylor had already reaped huge profits from the civil war he launched in 1989, engaging in illicit timber sales and diamond smuggling. Once in office, he presided over the theft of the nation’s resources for the personal gain of his closest followers and himself. He invested little in rebuilding the country’s ruined infrastructure. Meanwhile, both unemployment and illiteracy in Liberia continued to hover at around 75 percent. Monrovia continued to survive without electricity or running water through his tenure and beyond. As for reconciliation, Taylor surrounded himself with loyal supporters from the Gio and Mano tribes, antagonizing many of the nation’s other fourteen official ethnic groups.

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy All of these factors contributed to the uprising that broke out in 1999, led by an armed resistance group

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KEY DATES 1980

Military coup by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe ends the 133year rule of Americo-Liberians, the descendants of free blacks and freed slaves from North America who founded the country.

1990

In the wake of the invasion by rebel forces led by Charles Taylor, Doe is killed by a rival rebel leader.

1996

The first Liberian civil war ends with a cease-fire enforced by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

1997

Taylor is elected president in internationally monitored elections.

1999

A rebel group called Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) launches attacks against Taylor’s government, which it accuses of corruption and repression.

2003

LURD and a second rebel group, known as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), launch a major offensive against the Liberian capital of Monrovia in July, forcing Taylor into Nigerian exile.

2003–2004

A UN peacekeeping force arrives in the country and conducts the demobilization of rebel armies.

2005

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is elected president, becoming the first elected female head of state in modern African history.

known as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The group was dominated by Mandingoes and Lomas (both groups members of a rebel group that opposed Taylor’s NPFL during the long civil war) and Krahns (who had been loyal supporters of former president Doe). LURD criticized Taylor for his failure to achieve the goals he set out in his inaugural speech: clean government, reconstruction, and reconciliation. In the end, however, Taylor’s interference in the affairs of neighboring states ultimately proved his undoing. He began by supporting the brutal Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone, known for hacking off the limbs of civilians as a form of terrorist intimidation. Taylor and his cronies offered RUF weapons in exchange for diamonds from Sierra Leone’s diamond-mining region, one of the richest in the world. RUF’s attacks in Sierra Leone sent thousands of its citizens into exile in neighbor-

ing Guinea, where they in turn were accused of supporting Guinean rebels. Guinea also accused Taylor of launching raids into its territory in pursuit of Liberian dissidents. Guinea was already accommodating thousands of Liberian refugees from the 1989–1996 civil war. Most were members of the Mandingo, Loma, and Krahn tribes, who feared retribution from Taylor’s government even as they suffered from raids carried out by Guinean authorities on their refugee camps. At the same time, according to experts on West African politics, Guinea helped organize and support LURD’s insurgency in Liberia to make up for Taylor’s support for the rebels of RUF in Guinea. Taylor was also suspected of interfering with Ivory Coast, Liberia’s neighbor to the east. A coup in late 1999 plunged the formerly peaceful and prosperous country into civil war, as rebel groups in the northern and western parts of the country

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challenged the leadership in the commercial capital of Abidjan. Many of the rebels were foreigners— including some Liberians—who had been attracted to Ivory Coast because of its stability and economic opportunity but had been denied citizenship by the xenophobic Ivory Coast government. Its president, Laurent Gbagbo, believed that Taylor was supporting the rebels. When a new anti-Taylor organization known as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) was founded in early 2003 in Liberia’s Krahndominated southeast, Gbagbo’s government allegedly began supplying it with arms, allowing it to use bases inside the Ivory Coast. Some experts even argue that MODEL was organized by Gbagbo’s government. Vicious as Taylor had been as a rebel leader and as president, both LURD and MODEL were also accused by aid workers and international observers of repeated human rights abuses, including murder, mass rape, and the forcible recruitment of civilians for both fighting and basic labor. Still, LURD and MODEL soon succeeded in gaining control of most of Liberia, putting themselves in a position to share in the looting of the country’s resources, most notably its rainforest timber and iron ore. MODEL captured the city of Buchanan, Liberia’s second largest port, in early 2003. By mid-2003, the insurgents controlled roughly 80 percent of Liberia’s territory, leaving Taylor with control only of the capital, Monrovia, and its environs. In June 2003, the same month that a UN-backed tribunal investigating atrocities in Sierra Leone indicted Taylor for war crimes in that country, LURD issued an ultimatum to Taylor—resign and leave the country or face a final assault on Monrovia. Taylor was being pressed from all quarters. ECOWAS was conducting on-again, off-again peace negotiations in Accra, Ghana, urging the Taylor government and rebel groups to end the fighting. Neighboring states kept up their complaints about Taylor’s meddling in their affairs, finding support from the United Nations and the United States.

Taylor Bows Out On July 6, Taylor succumbed to the pressure. He agreed to accept an offer of asylum from Nigeria, but there was one catch: Taylor himself would decide when to step down as Liberia’s president. LURD leaders, whose forces surrounded the capital and held the

port area, launched an offensive on the already battered capital that sent thousands of new refugees fleeing for safety. The United States sent warships to Liberian waters to rescue Americans and other foreigners in the capital. Taylor’s troops were able to withstand the rebel attack, but it was clear the president’s days were numbered. On August 11, Taylor fled to Nigeria, replaced by his vice president, Moses Blah, in a ceremony attended by dignitaries who included the presidents of South Africa, Mozambique, and Ghana. Leaders of both LURD and MODEL proclaimed the war over. Still, problems remained. Some 40,000 rebel soldiers, many of them teenagers, had yet to be demobilized. Meeting in Ghana, representatives of LURD, MODEL and Liberia’s political parties, women’s organizations, religious groups, and others met to hammer out plans for demobilization of rebel fighters and their integration into civilian life. Meanwhile, seeing Liberia as the linchpin of efforts to end fighting across West Africa, the UN organized the largest peacekeeping mission in its history. In February 2004, 15,000 UN troops were fully deployed. By October, the UN claimed that the rebel groups had largely demobilized. Many groups may have hidden weapons in rural areas, however, in case Taylor, who still had many supporters in the country, was plotting a return from Nigerian exile. Liberian political parties and the interim government began making plans for national elections, to be held in October 2005. While there were nearly a dozen candidates, two quickly emerged as frontrunners: international soccer star George Weah, whose support came largely from Liberia’s younger voters, and former World Bank economist Ellen JohnsonSirleaf, who had finished a distant second to Taylor in the 1997 elections. In 2005, Weah finished first, followed by Johnson-Sirleaf. Because Weah failed to win at least 50 percent of the vote, a runoff was scheduled for November 8. In that election Johnson-Sirleaf received backing from the supporters of the other losing candidates and defeated George Weah. While some Weah supporters protested the decision, claiming voting irregularities, international observers pronounced the election free, fair, and transparent. On January 16, 2006, Johnson-Sirleaf was inaugurated president, the first elected woman leader in modern African history. Among her first acts in office was an extradition

Liberia: Anti-Taylor Uprising, 19 9 8–2003

request to the government of Nigeria. JohnsonSirleaf wanted Taylor arrested and sent to the International Criminal Court in Sierra Leone, where most of Taylor’s alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed. Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo had consistently maintained that he would not extradite Taylor until a democratically elected government in Liberia asked him to. In March 2006, Taylor was arrested while trying to flee Nigeria, and sent to Sierra Leone. But a new issue arose at this point: where he should be tried. Some in West Africa argued that he should face trial in Sierra Leone, so that witnesses could more easily testify against him and so that the victims of his alleged crimes could play a role in trying him. Others feared that his presence in the region—where he still enjoyed much support—could destabilize the fragile peace in both Sierra Leone and Liberia. The government of The Netherlands, where the permanent International Criminal Court is based, said it would not allow a trial there unless another country agreed to

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take Taylor afterward, whether he was found guilty or not. In June 2006, Britain—the former colonial power in Sierra Leone—agreed to the Dutch request, and Taylor was flown to The Hague to face trial. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Liberia: Civil War, 1989–1997; Sierra Leone: Civil Conflict, 1990– Present.

Bibliography Levitt, Jeremy I. The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From “Paternaltarianism” to State Collapse. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005. Moran, Mary H. Liberia: The Violence of Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2005. Pham, John-Peter. Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State. New York: Reed Press, 2004. Sawyer, Amos. Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005. Yoder, John C. Popular Culture, Civil Society, and State Crisis in Liberia. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 2003.

MADAGASCAR: Independence Movement and Coups,1947–2002 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Coups PARTICIPANT: France tal, Antananarivo, a city of about half a million people, is on the high central plateau at an elevation of over 4,000 feet. Traditional agriculture is well developed, and Madagascar is able to feed its people. Rice, maize, yams, cassava, and small livestock and poultry are abundant. For cash crops farmers rely on coffee, cloves, vanilla, rice, peppers, tobacco, and peanuts. Landholding is essentially equitable since a plantation system never existed in Madagascar to any great extent. The society is a traditional one with a complex and sophisticated culture that has been able to absorb and exploit European innovations without surrendering its core values. One feature is a highly developed and important cult of dead ancestors, although Christianity, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, is practiced by a large majority. Malagasy is the official language, but French is widely spoken as well.

COMOROS Diego-Suarez

CF

TY IH

E

MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL

KA

TS

IM

C

BE

A

A

RI

N

AV

S

ME

AL SAK

IM

CL S CL

Antananarivo

CF

INDIAN

CL

OCEAN

CL

C C

BE

C

TS

BARA

I

O

C BA RA

LE

S

TS

M A DAG A S C A R

ISA

RA

C

C

C CF

S 0 0

50

100 Miles

50 100 Kilometers

CF V V CF V V CF V

CL V S

Major ethnic group Cotton Coffee Cloves Vanilla Sugarcane

Historical Background

The Republic of Madagascar is an island of 226,658 square miles. It is 980 miles long and, at its widest point, 360 miles across, and lies in the Indian Ocean about 300 miles off the southeast coast of Africa. It has a population of about 11 million. Despite the island’s proximity to Africa, the people are of Malayo-Indonesian stock, with some African and Arab admixture, particularly on the coasts. The capi-

The people of Madagascar apparently arrived by sea from present-day Indonesia early in the Middle Ages, an astonishing open sea voyage of about 3,500 miles. Contact with the outside world began when Arab slave traders arrived in the late Middle Ages. The Portuguese and the Dutch showed up in the sixteenth century. An English colony of several hundred people was established in 1644, but only twelve survived constant attacks from the local defenders. The colony was abandoned within two years. A contemporary and even more ambitious French settlement met the same fate, but both attempts laid the basis for nineteenthcentury English and French imperial claims. During the Napoleonic wars the island assumed strategic significance for both the British and the

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213

KEY DATES 1896

The French parliament declares Madagascar a French colony.

1947

Unknown rebel groups lead an assault on French installations and the homes of French settlers.

1960

Madagascar wins its independence from France.

1972

The government of Philibert Tsiranana is overthrown in a military coup.

1975

Military officers create the Supreme Revolutionary Council to rule the country, with Commander Didier Ratsiraka as president.

2001

Ratsiraka runs for reelection against Marc Ravalomanana, mayor of the capital Antananarivo; the government announces that results are inconclusive and that a runoff would be required.

2002

Ravalomanana cites alleged fraud in the election and unilaterally declares himself president on February 22; Ratsiraka declares martial law and flees the capital; in April the nation’s high court declares Ravalomanana the winner in elections; facing international condemnation, Ratsiraka flees the country in July.

2003

The former head of the armed forces is charged with attempting a coup against Ravalomanana in February; in August, Ratsiraka is sentenced in absentia to ten years’ imprisonment for embezzling government funds.

French. This renewed interest came at the same time the Merina kingdom with its capital at Tananarive (now known as Antananarivo) was establishing its authority over the whole island. Even after the European peace, the British and the French continued their competition. Both sent military instructors to the Merina king, Radama, who was determined to establish his rule over the coastal regions. The French, for their part, tended, at least initially, to support the coastal opponents of Radama. Religion (Protestant versus Catholic) and technology were other areas of competition. The London Missionary Society was first in the field; French Jesuits followed in the 1840s and 1850s. First British and then French craftsmen and engineers became influential. The rivalry was suspended during the Crimean War, in which Britain and France were allies. After the death of the last Merina king, Radama II, in 1862, a succession of “prime ministers” controlled the series of queens who succeeded him.

These prime ministers managed to play England and France off against each other, at the same time modernizing the society and the economy as rapidly as possible in what proved a vain attempt to head off annexation by one or another of the two foreign powers. In 1890, Great Britain officially recognized a French protectorate in Madagascar in exchange for French recognition of the British protectorate over Zanzibar. In 1894, France invaded, forcing Queen Ranavalona III to sign a treaty under which a French resident had all effective powers of government on October 1. Within months, the menalamba movement, the Uprising of the Red Shawls, inspired by the belief that abandoning the traditional religion had caused the foreign conquest, began attacking all Europeans, especially missionaries and churches. On August 6, 1896, the French parliament declared Madagascar a French colony and sent General Joseph Henri Gallieni there to be governor, with full military and civil authority. His first actions were to

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order the executions of leading Merina government officials and exile of the queen. Fighting continued sporadically until 1905 and killed as many as 100,000 Malagasy, but after that French rule was essentially uncontested for sixty-three years.

Colonial Era In many ways French colonial administration in Madagascar was beneficial. An excellent primary and vocational and technical educational system was established, and medical services were far superior to those in most European colonies. Numerous locals entered the professions, becoming medical doctors and teachers. Malagasy who spoke French and fulfilled certain educational qualifications were made French citizens with full rights. There were about 8,000 of them by 1947. The biggest local grievance was the system of forced labor under which much of the rural population had to work fifty days a year on roads and other public improvements. Basically, this was a continuation of the Merina kingdom system, but it was still widely resented.

conditions was exploited by Dr. Joseph Ravoahangy and another doctor, Joseph Raseta, who were among the two Malagasy elected to the French Constituent Assembly in 1945. In Paris, the two doctors met the young intellectual Jacques Rabemananjara, who had spent the war years in France, and formed the first true Madagascar political party, the Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renewal (MDRM, its French acronym), with Raseta as party president. In October 1946, Madagascar became a territory of France, with all of its inhabitants French citizens and with forced labor abolished. In addition, by French decree, Madagascar, unique among French territories, was divided into five provinces, each to have its own assembly and budget. Moreover, French authorities in Madagascar sponsored a new party to compete with the MDRM, the Party of the Dispossessed Malagasy (PADESM), in an attempt to pit the non-Merina groups against the Merina-dominated MDRM. Whatever the intent, the French attempt failed politically. In the November 1946 elections for the French parliament, Ravoahangy and Raseta were handily reelected and joined by a third MDRM candidate, Rabemananjara.

World War I I and After 19 47 Rebellion After the fall of France to German armies in May 1940, Madagascar came under control of France’s Vichy government, which collaborated with its German captors. As part of the international struggle, the British landed an amphibious force at DiegoSuarez (on the northern tip of Madagascar) on May 5, 1942, and secured the surrender of the Vichy French garrison in September. Two months later, authority on the island was given to the Free French governmentin-exile, but British and South African troops remained until 1946. In 1944, General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, made the famous Brazzaville Declaration, promising that all inhabitants of French territories would become French citizens. At the end of the war, the French government established the French Union, which gave representation in the French parliament to its overseas territories, the former colonies. Except for the British invasion, Madagascar was not an active theater during the war. However, the war did result in reimposition of forced labor and in what was even less popular with the small farmers, establishment of quotas for delivery of rice and other basics, as well as price controls. Resentment of these

As Madagascar prepared for the first meeting of its national assembly on March 30, the MDRM at home had become confident of controlling politics on the island. MDRM and PADESM partisans clashed in the streets. Nevertheless, Ravoahangy and his colleagues in Paris sent a telegram to local MDRM leaders urging them to “maintain . . . sang-froid” and not to react to provocations designed to “sabotage peaceful policies.” On the night of March 29, 1947, simultaneous assaults by hitherto unknown groups took place against French installations and the homes of French settlers throughout the island. Once the initial assaults had been repulsed, the rebellion, which had spread all over the island, became guerrilla warfare between the heavily armed French and the rebels, mostly equipped with spears and axes. Imposition of martial law and mass arrests caused thousands of civilians to flee into the forests. On April 19, 1947, the French high commissioner in Madagascar, Marcel de Coppet, declared the MDRM solely responsible. MDRM leaders Ravoahangy, Raseta, and Rabemananjara had their parliamentary immunity lifted and were arrested. Even

Madagascar: Independence Movement and Coups, 19 47–2002

215

A French military convoy departs on a reconnaissance mission in Madagascar during the native rebellion in 1947. Tens of thousands were killed before the violence ended late the following year. (AFP/Getty Images)

before they were tried, military tribunals had tried and executed numerous supposed leaders of the revolt, including its “generalissimo,” Samuel Rakotondrabe. The MDRM had already been officially repressed, and when, in the fall of 1948, Ravoahangy and Raseta were sentenced to death, and Rabemananjara and seven other MDRM leaders to life imprisonment, the party was effectively destroyed. By December 1, 1948, when the emergency was declared over, officially 11,000 had been killed, and as many as 80,000 may have died of starvation. There has never been a satisfactory explanation of the 1947 rebellion. It is generally accepted that the MDRM leaders were not involved. Some argue that agents provocateurs had infiltrated MDRM and used the revolt to discredit it. Another theory is that extreme MDRM elements opposed any grant of independence, insisting that true liberation had to come through violence. This theory, however, presupposes some ideological debate, which the party records do not reveal. Others believe, with some reason, that the rebellion was planned and directed by witch doctors and magicians, leaders of the most primitive ele-

ments in Malagasy society, who hated and feared the Europeanized Malagasy as much as or more than they did the French.

Independence and After After the crushing of the rebellion and suppression of the MDRM, there was essentially no visible political activity in Madagascar until 1954. French Premier Pierre Mendes-France, who had just ended the French war in France’s former colony of Indochina and granted autonomy to Tunisia, was eager to wind up the French empire. New elections to the French parliament were scheduled for January 1956. Elected to represent the west coast of Madagascar was a schoolteacher, Philibert Tsiranana, who had organized the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Events moved quickly thereafter. On June 28, France passed the Loi Cadre, establishing internal autonomy for all former colonies, with elections to the national assembly of each former colony to be on the basis of universal suffrage with no separate status for European electors. Tsiranana declared he looked forward to Madagascar’s becoming to France

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like a member of the British Commonwealth to England. On April 2, 1960, a Franco-Madagascar treaty was signed, and on June 26, Madagascar “recovered,” as its spokesman said, its independence. Tsiranana and the PSD—both the man and the party were nationalist but ideologically conservative— easily dominated the political scene. Tsiranana’s main political foe, Norbert Zafimahova, head of the Union of Social Democrats of Madagascar (USDM), differed in ideology from Tsiranana only in wanting a stronger role for the provincial assemblies. There was no vocal left-wing or third-world political movement visible. Tsiranana was easily reelected in 1965. All observers of Madagascar at the end of the 1960s remarked on the island nation’s calm, so different from that of most former colonies. After 1967, however, there was an economic downturn. Increasing complaints were heard about Tsiranana’s authoritarianism. The crime rate, always high, grew worse. In the south, riots turned into armed demonstrations. In 1972 there was a military coup, and Tsiranana turned over the government to the army chief of staff, General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, who managed to keep control until the elections of 1973, which returned the PSD to power. However, this move angered radicals within the military hierarchy, and in early 1975, Ramanantsoa resigned in favor of another military officer, Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava. Within a week Ratsimandrava was assassinated, and General Gilles Andriamahazo took power, declared martial law, and suspended all political parties. He, in turn, was succeeded in June by a naval officer, Commander Didier Ratsiraka, who made himself chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). In December 1975 the SRC proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. Only a single political party was allowed—the National Front for the Defense of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution (FNDR). Ratsiraka became president for a term of seven years, proclaiming as his policy “the creation of a socialist republic under divine protection by the year 2000.” Madagascar withdrew from the French Community and the franc zone, and established diplomatic relations with the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. The most dramatic of Ratsiraka’s acts was the 1975 pogrom against the Comoros Island community in Madagascar. Some 1,400 were slaughtered, and another 16,000 fled back to the Comoros.

Civil and Regional Conflict Despite the left-wing rhetoric and foreign policy, Ratsiraka’s government began to move to the right in the late 1980s. Its relations with France became warmer, and plans for nationalization and other socialist economic policies were abandoned in favor of market reforms, in the hope of winning the backing of international financial institutions. Political unrest, socialist experimentation, and environmental problems had had a negative impact on the economy. The shift to market reforms did little to repair the economy, however, even after France forgave Madagascar’s debt of nearly a billion dollars. Responding to domestic opposition and international pressure, Ratsiraka agreed to share power with the prodemocracy leader Albert Zafy. In elections the following year, Zafy became president. While Madagascar was returning to democracy, its economy remained in dire straits. International lending agencies and donor countries continued to press the Zafy government to cut the budget deficit, reduce the bloated civil service, and cut subsidies. As Zafy implemented the reforms, unemployment and poverty grew, leading to political unrest. In 1996, parliament moved to impeach him but, before they could, he was defeated in national elections by Ratsiraka. Madagascar was also riven by sectional unrest. While the Malagasy-speaking people make up the vast majority of the population (roughly 95 percent), they are divided by regions. The three major ones are the east coast, the west coast, and the plateau region between. The people of the plateau, known as the Merina, or “elevated people,” dominated the island’s politics both before and after the French, fostering jealousy and unrest in the other provinces, known as faritany. For years, people in the outlying faritany have demanded a decentralized governmental system that would allow more autonomy for provincial governments. This centrifugal political force had been kept in check by Ratsiraka, who enjoyed popularity in the outlying provinces. The twin crises of economic distress and regionalism came together to produce a series of political crises in the early 2000s. In December 2001, Ratsiraka ran for election against Marc Ravalomanana, mayor of the capital Antananarivo in the plateau region. When the government announced that the results were inconclusive and a runoff would be required, supporters of Ravalomanana claimed fraud

Madagascar: Independence Movement and Coups, 19 47–2002

and, on February 22, 2002, their candidate unilaterally declared himself president. Mass demonstrations by supporters of the two rival claimants for the presidency had been held throughout the crisis and turned violent by midFebruary. After Ravalomanana assumed the presidency, Ratsiraka fled the violence in the capital and set up a rival government in the east coast city of Toamasina, where he declared martial law. The move did little to stop the fighting. Clashes among protesters and between protesters and soldiers rocked the capital, which was blockaded by Ratsiraka supporters, leading to shortages of food and fuel. By April, dozens had been killed when the violence spread to the northern half of the country as Ravalomanana’s soldiers tried to quell disturbances in the region, which was dominated by Ratsikara supporters. That same month, the two claimants signed an accord in Senegal calling for a recount of December’s vote. On April 29, the nation’s High Constitutional Court officially declared Ravalomanana the winner with 51.5 percent of the vote to Raksimana’s 35.9 percent. But Ratsiraka and much of the government in Toamasina refused to abide by the ruling, and the governor of Toamasina declared his province independent, claiming that three more of the nation’s six provinces were willing to form a confederation independent of Antananarivo. Fighting continued through June as international reporters claimed that Ratsiraka’s government was fomenting clashes between his coastal supporters and the people of the central highlands. On June 26, 2002, U.S. Ambassador to Madagascar Wanda Nesbitt passed a letter to Ravalomanana telling him that the administration of George W. Bush was recognizing him as the legitimate president of the country. Most countries in Europe soon followed suit. France, which had long supported Ratsiraka, refused to go along the Ravalomanana government. The French government, caught up in its own elections, vowed not to take sides in the conflict and would abide by the Organization of African Unity’s decision on whether to intervene and how to intervene. That orga-

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nization, which had supported many long-time dictators on the mainland, had sided with Ratsiraka in the dispute but had not become directly involved in the conflict. By late June, however, the new French government of Jacques Chirac decided to break with past policies and drop support of Ratsiraka. Realizing that he was isolated internationally, Ratsiraka fled to the Seychelles in July and then to France, claiming he left his country to avoid a “bloodbath.” After Ratsiraka’s departure in 2002, Madagascar’s government remained in control of the country, but not without political intrigue and natural disaster. In February 2003, the former head of the armed forces was charged with attempting a coup against Ravalomana, and in August 2002, Ratsiraka was sentenced in absentia to ten years’ hard labor for embezzling government funds. Former prime minister Tantely Andrianariov was sentenced to twelve years’ hard labor for abuse of office. In 2004, Madagascar was devastated by two major cyclones, leading international lending institutions to forgive about half of its $4 billion foreign debt. In 2005, Madagascar became the first country to receive U.S. aid under a new Bush administration program to reward countries that promoted democratic and market economy reforms. David MacMichael and James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; Coups; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Brown, Mervyn. A History of Madagascar. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2000. Cornwell, Richard. “Madagascar: Stumbling at the First Hurdle?” Institute for Security Studies, Paper 68, April 2003. Ellis, Stephen. The Rising of the Red Shawls: A Revolt in Madagascar, 1895–1899. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Feeley-Harnik, Gillian. A Green Estate: Restoring Independence in Madagascar. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. Heseltine, Nigel. Madagascar. New York: Praeger, 1971. Stratton, Arthur. The Great Red Island. New York: Scribner’s, 1964.

MALI: Ethnic and Political Conflict, 1968–1996 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Coups PARTICIPANT: Congo (Zaire) 0 0

200 200

400 Miles

DOGON

400 Kilometers

WESTERN SAHARA

MALI

T

SONINKE

KASONKE MALINKE

U

A

R

E

G

Timbuktu SONGHAI

Gao

NIGER

DOGON

BAMAUA Bamako

GUINEA SIERRA LEONE

Ethnic group ALGERIA

MAURITANIA

SENEGAL

holdings, first through diplomacy and then by military expedition. In the 1890s, the French led a series of raids against Segou Tukolor and Samory Toure, the Muslim leader. By 1899, all hostile clans and kingdoms had been fully pacified, and the French set up their own administration in what they called French Sudan. Political parties were first established in the territory in 1946, when a legislature was established. The dominant party was the Sudanese UnionAfrican Democratic Assembly (US-RDA, its French acronym), headed by the charismatic Marxist Modibo Keita. In 1958, the territory was renamed the Sudanese Republic and was incorporated as an autonomous state within the French Community. Following a failed attempt at confederation with Senegal in 1959, the independent Republic of Mali came into being on September 22, 1960.

IVORY COAST

BURKINA FASO GHANA Lake Volta

BENIN TOGO

NIGERIA

The territory that is now Mali was the center of several of Western Africa’s greatest empires, including the Ghana from the fourth to eleventh centuries c.e., the Mali from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, and the Songhai, which followed the Mali and was then defeated by the Moroccan kingdom at the end of the sixteenth century. The Moroccans then occupied the great trading cities of Gao and Timbuktu, destroying all political and intellectual centers. These events came at a time when increased European contact on the coast was reorienting African trade in that direction. The French began to arrive in the region in the mid-nineteenth century, establishing their first outpost in what is now Mali in 1855, following a series of wars between various clans in the region. At first welcomed by Segou Tukolor’s kingdom—which had arisen earlier in the century—as a protection against the British, the French soon began to expand their

Political and Ethnic Tensions Under the leadership of the US-RDA, Mali tried to chart a course independent of France, dropping out of the franc zone in 1962. But the economic costs of this move eventually forced the government to seek reentry, a move that angered radicals within the party. When a militant wing began to purge the government of pro-French elements, the army stepped in, seizing power in November 1968. The Military Committee for National Liberation (CMLN) was established with Lieutenant Moussa Traore—one of the coup leaders—as its chair. While Traore promised a return to civilian rule, continued economic hardship and a six-year drought caused delays. In 1974, the government instituted a new constitution, calling for a return to elections after a fiveyear transition period. Throughout the 1980s, the

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Mali: Ethnic and Political Conflict, 19 6 8–19 9 6

219

KEY DATES 1960

Mali wins its independence from France.

1968

The army seizes power in the country’s first coup.

1974

The government issues a new constitution calling for national elections within five years.

1980s

Government austerity measures, urged by international lending institutions, provoke widespread protest.

1991

After issuing warnings to protesters for years, troops open fire on student demonstrators in March, killing over 100 persons; by the second half of the year, fighting breaks out between Tuareg guerrillas and government forces.

1992

Algeria mediates a truce between Tuareg rebels of the Unified Movement and Fronts of the Azaouad (MFUA, its French acronym) and the Malian government.

1996

3,000 former MFUA fighters turn in their weapons and register with the government.

government tried to introduce economic austerity measures, at the urging of major international lending institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These measures set off antigovernment protests by the end of the decade, just as the government was attempting a transition to democracy. Warnings to the protesters went unheeded for several months in 1991. In March, troops opened fire on student protesters in the capital of Bamako, killing more than 100 persons and injuring some 700 others. Nevertheless, elections were scheduled for March 1992, leading to the victory of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), headed by an academic named Alpha Oumar Konare. Democracy continued in Mali in subsequent years as the ADEMA won yet another victory at the polls in 1997. Meanwhile, ethnic tensions were building in the northern part of the country around the ancient cities of Gao and Timbuktu. Following the end of yet another prolonged drought in 1990, large numbers of Tuaregs began to return to the country after years in Algeria and Libya. Light-skinned and fiercely independent nomads, the Tuaregs had a tradition of resistance to government control that went back to the

French regime and before. The Tuaregs resented the fact that the ethnic groups of the south controlled the government. The government suspected that the Tuaregs were planning to form a breakaway republic of their own. By the latter half of 1991, fighting had broken out between the Tuaregs and government troops, as well as between the Tuaregs and the majority ethnic group in the north, the Songhai. Algeria made efforts to mediate the crisis, which led to a pact between the Tuaregs and Bamako in March 1992. Under the agreement, the Unified Movement and Fronts of the Azaouad (MFUA), as the Tuaregs call their region of Mali, were guaranteed administrative posts in the government, while some of their fighters would be incorporated into the national army. Still, sporadic attacks against the Songhai, resented for their efforts to keep the nomadic Tuaregs out of their lands, continued. A further agreement in May 1994 called for the full integration of MFUA and Tuareg fighters into the Malian government and armed forces. Even after the agreement, clashes and acts of banditry increased, and tensions grew between Tuareg fighters and regular members of the Malian armed forces. At the same time, a Songhai defense force had

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emerged in the north, and it conducted periodic attacks on Tuaregs. Despite more Algerian efforts to mediate the crisis, Tuareg anger rose as its leaders and civilians were targeted by the Songhai and the army for assassination. In early 1995, President Konare made an appeal to Tuareg and Songhai leaders to end the hostilities and implement the national reconciliation pacts reached in 1992 and 1994. The appeal seemed to work. The government’s “normalization” plan for the north included the restoration of local civilian government in the region and the establishment of a number of health clinics, schools, and utilities. By February 1996, some 3,000 former MFUA fighters had registered with the government and turned in their weapons. In March, a ceremonial burning of the

weapons was conducted in Timbuktu, as a way to symbolize the new harmonious relations between the Tuaregs and the government. During this period of reconciliation, virtually all of the 100,000 or so Tuareg and Songhai refugees in surrounding states returned to Mali. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Niger: Ethnic and Political Conflict Since 1990.

Bibliography Drisdell, Rheal. Mali: A Prospect of Peace? Oxford, UK: Oxfam UK and Ireland, 1997. Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Guinea, Mali, Mauritania. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1986– 1992.

MAURITANIA: Coups Since 1978 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups PARTICIPANTS: Spain; Western Sahara 1970s and 19 8 0s

ALGERIA

WESTERN SAHARA

Bir Moghreïn

Zouérat

Nouadhibou

Atar

MAURITANIA Offshore oil fields

Nouakchott

Tidjikdja

MALI

Rosso Kaédi

SENEGAL GAMBIA

Kiffa

Néma

250

0 0

250

500 Miles 500 Kilometers

Mauritania is a mainly desert nation that straddles black and Arab Africa. The country has significant deposits of iron ore and began exporting oil from offshore rigs in 2006. Politically, Mauritania has experienced numerous coups and countercoups since gaining independence from France in 1960. In 1975, Mauritania joined with Morocco in an effort to annex and divide Sahara (now Western Sahara), whose people were engaged in a liberation struggle against Spanish control. Mauritania had coveted the region since its independence, but its involvement in military action to occupy Sahara was ill fated. Sahara’s Polisario Front proved stronger than the Mauritanian army and ultimately occupied part of Mauritania itself, causing social and economic turmoil. Conflicting calls for withdrawal and more fighting brought mass political demonstrations, street fighting, and ultimately a popular uprising against the Mauritanian government.

Beginning in 1978, Mauritania experienced five coups in little more than six years. In 1978, military commander Mustapha Ould Salek ended the reign of the country’s first post-independence president, Ould Daddah. In January 1980, Salek was removed and replaced by Ould Haidalla, who recognized the Polisario movement in Sahara, ending Mauritania’s military actions there. Ould Haidalla lacked support in Mauritania, however, and after four years of tenuous rule was replaced in another army coup. Maaouya Ould Taya was installed as president. Ould Taya proved to be the most durable leader of Mauritania since Ould Daddah. He survived a coup attempt by the Forces de Liberation Africaine de Mauritanie (FLAM), an organization of black African nationalists, at the end of 1987. By April 1989, violent conflicts within Mauritania between African Mauritanians and Arabs and Berbers contributed to the eruption of a violent border dispute with Senegal. The conflict had a disastrous impact on both countries. Thousands of Mauritanians fled into Senegal, where they struggled to survive for years. In 1992, Ould Taya’s administration returned a form of electoral politics to Mauritania, but the first elected president was Ould Taya himself; he was reelected in 1997. As he prepared to run for yet another term in 2003, another coup attempt resulted in several days of street fighting in the capital, and the insurgents captured several government buildings. The government put down the uprising, however, and in November, Taya was reelected. Heydalla, Taya’s main challenger in the 2003 voting, rejected the results and was arrested for plotting a coup. He was convicted and sentenced to a five-year suspended jail term and a prohibition against running in future elections.

221

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KEY DATES 1960

Mauritania wins its independence from France.

1975

Mauritania joins with Morocco in annexing and occupying Western Sahara, after the withdrawal of colonial Spanish troops.

1978–1984

Mauritania experiences five military coups.

1989

Internal conflicts between black African and Arab and Berber Mauritanians spark a border conflict with Senegal.

2003

A coup attempt against the government of Maaouya Ould Taya fails, sparking street fighting in the capital.

2005

Ould Taya is overthrown in a military coup.

Finally, in August 2005, Ould Taya was overthrown by army officers who named security chief Ely Ould Mohammed Vall as the country’s new leader. The bloodless coup took place while Taya was attending the funeral of King Fahd in Saudia Arabia. Taya took up residence in the Republic of Niger, but claimed to be president of Mauritania and ordered the armed forces to protect his right to the office. Taya had become widely unpopular in Mauritania, and the military plotters paid no attention to his orders. Immediately following the announcement of the coup, hundreds of people took to the streets in Mauritania’s capital, Nouakchott, to express their support for the Military Council. Even Taya’s Social Democratic Republican Party (PRDS) issued a statement backing the council. Taya had turned the country increasingly toward the West and against radical Islamist groups. In 1999, he had established full diplomatic relations with Israel, and after the 2001 attacks on the United States, he expressed support for the U.S. war on terror. Taya often accused his opponents of being allied to insurgent groups in Algeria rumored to have connections with the international terrorist organization al-Qaeda. In predominantly Muslim Mauritania, Taya’s moves had been strongly condemned by Islamist leaders and contributed to his downfall. After the coup, the new military government reversed Taya’s diplomatic direction. Within days of its takeover, the Military Council released twenty-one Islamic activists who had been imprisoned by Taya for their supposed connection to

terrorist organizations. On the other hand, the international community condemned the coup. Disapproving statements were issued by Nigeria, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations. The United States explicitly called for a return to the established government of President Taya. It was clear even to outsiders, however, that Taya’s regime in Mauritania had created many difficulties. Economic and political mismanagement had left the country with major problems, including famine. Its vital agricultural and mining sectors were near ruin. Taya had also drawn widespread criticism for persecuting the Black Sonninkes, a small minority, most of whom were forced to flee the country. Taya’s actions against this group had led the United States to suspend aid to Mauritania in 1993. The Military Council named Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall as president of the council. Vall, 55, had participated in the 1984 coup that brought Taya to power and had served as national security chief and a member of Taya’s inner circle for more than two decades. In the weeks following the coup, the council sought to build on the support it had received at home and to answer international critics. It promised to hold a referendum on amendments to the constitution within a year and to call legislative elections within two years. A civilian prime minister, Sidi Mohamed Ould Boubacar, was selected by the council to head a caretaker government. The council also promised opposition leaders that no

Mauritania: Coups Since 1978

council member or anyone serving in the caretaker government would stand as a candidate in the new elections. Jeffrey A. Shantz See also: Coups; Western Sahara: Polisario-Moroccan War, 1975–1991.

Bibliography Amnesty International. Mauritania, 1986–1989: Background to a Crisis, Three Years of Political Imprisonment,

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Torture, and Unfair Trials. New York: Amnesty International, 1989. Fleischman, Janet. Mauritania’s Campaign of Terror: StateSponsored Repression of Black Africans. New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994. Park, Thomas K., Mamadou Baro, and Tidane Ngaido. Conflicts over Land: The Crisis of Nationalism of Mauritania. Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1991. Pazzanita, Anthony G. Historical Dictionary of Mauritania. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1996.

MOZAMBIQUE: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism PARTICIPANT: Portugal TANZANIA (Tanganyika until 1964)

ZAMBIA (Northern Rhodesia until 1964) MALAWI (Nyasaland until 1964)

DE ON AK M

Lake YAO Malawi MA

Lake Cabora NGUNI Dam Bassa

KU

COMOROS

A

Chai

MOZAMBIQUE

Za

m

be

zi

R iv er

RHO

TO N G A

DE

NA SHO

SI

AU ND

MOZAMBIQUE

A SHAN

GANA

CHANNEL

T

SO

NG

A

MADAGASCAR

SOUTH AFRICA Lourenço Marques (Maputo after 1975)

SWAZILAND

YAO

Ethnic group

0 0

150 150

300 Miles 300 Kilometers

Precolonial Mozambique was roughly divided into three regions, each with its own dominant ethnic group. The sparsely populated north was inhabited by the Lomwe- and Makua-speaking peoples, who largely lived off subsistence agriculture. The agriculturally rich Zambezi valley was populated by the Shona, who often traded their agricultural surplus with trading cities along the coast. The southern highlands were inhabited by the cattle-herding Tsonga. When the Portuguese arrived in the late fifteenth century, some of the Tsonga, descendants of the great Zimbabwe

Empire of the eleventh to fourteenth centuries, formed the Mutapa kingdom, though most of the Mutapa’s domains were located in what is now Zimbabwe. A number of Arab trading settlements existed along the coast, part of a vast archipelago that girded the Indian Ocean. Beginning in the early fifteenth century, Portuguese mariners painstakingly made their way down the Atlantic coast of Africa, seeking an all-sea route to India and East Asia. By the last decade of the century, they had rounded Cape Horn, and in 1498 they first set foot in what is now Mozambique. Utilizing their superior navigational skills and weaponry, the Portuguese quickly ousted the Arab traders from the coastal and island settlements of eastern Africa— occupying the towns at Sofala, Pemba, and Moçambique, the latter lending its name to the future colony. From these posts, the Portuguese took control of one end of an interior African trading system that saw European-manufactured goods heading inland, and gold and ivory moving toward the sea. Still, until the twentieth century, Portuguese colonization remained minimal, confined to the coastal settlements and a thin presence along the banks of the Zambezi. As late as the opening of World War II, there were just 27,000 Portuguese living in Mozambique. While their physical presence was minimal, the Portuguese cultural impact was profound. Like the Spanish of the New World, the Portuguese colonists intermingled and intermarried with indigenous peoples, producing a small but very influential Creole population of Afro-Portuguese, known as muzungu, a word also used to define whites. Indeed, it was the Afro-Portuguese who conducted most of the interior trade and policing. They led the caravans into the interior and served as officers in the military created to protect that trade. They

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Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 19 61–1974

225

KEY DATES 1500s

Portuguese traders begin to occupy Mozambique.

1932

António de Oliveira Salazar takes power in Portugal; he will rule over the country as dictator until his death in 1968.

1960–1964

Many British and French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa win their independence.

1962

Exiled Mozambican nationalists and leftists organize the Liberation Front of Mozambique (known popularly as Frelimo) in Tanzania.

1964

Frelimo launches its first attack on Portuguese troops.

1974

Left-wing anti-imperialist officers overthrow the Portuguese dictatorship in Lisbon and call for liberation of the country’s colonies in Asia and Africa.

1975

As Mozambican independence approaches, tens of thousands of Portuguese colonists flee the territory, leaving Mozambique with few trained administrators or technicians.

also served as teachers and religious officials in Mozambique and became planters on the large estates, or prazos, of the Zambezi valley. It was largely through these Creoles that the Portuguese maintained what little control they had over Mozambique during the first three centuries of colonization. Culturally, however, the Afro-Portuguese were more African than Portuguese. Though many spoke Portuguese and some converted to Catholicism, most retained their traditional African customs and ways of life. They were largely African in appearance, and most assumed the roles of traditional African leaders, especially those who ran the prazos. Economically, too, they followed African ways, practicing African forms of land use, inheritance, and reciprocal obligation that satisfied their fellow Africans and their ancestors. The presence of the Afro-Portuguese was laced with paradoxes as well. While they were partly agents of Portuguese cultural transmission, their existence prevented a deeper colonial penetration. Not only did they perform tasks for the Portuguese traders of the coast, they fiercely resisted any efforts by those traders to establish direct links with the interior. In the midtwentieth century, the Creoles would lead the nationalist cause as well.

Among the trades they engaged in was slavery, though this business came rather late to Mozambique. Located on the Indian Ocean, the colony was poorly situated to provide human cargo for the great transatlantic slave trade of the sixteenth through early nineteenth centuries. Only in the late 1700s and early 1800s was a market for slaves opened up on the French sugar islands of the southern Indian Ocean. About 10,000 slaves had been exported from Mozambique by the time the trade was shut down in the mid-nineteenth century.

Portuguese Control The pattern of limited colonial presence in Mozambique became a problem for Lisbon in the late nineteenth century, as other more powerful European countries began to cast a covetous eye on southern Africa. The discovery of diamonds and then gold in what is now the Transvaal district of South Africa— immediately adjacent to southern Mozambique— saw a massive inrush of European miners and the establishment of Boer and then British dominance on Mozambique’s southwestern frontier. Meanwhile, the Belgians and Germans were establishing a presence in central and eastern Africa.

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

This imperial scramble for Africa portended trouble for the various European countries. Thus, in the 1880s, the various governments sat down at a conference in Berlin to divide up the continent among themselves. Of concern were African resources, existing European settlements, and, perhaps most importantly, the avoidance of imperial wars. While the great powers of Europe had little respect for Portuguese power, they recognized that Lisbon’s presence in Africa served as a buffer between the colonies of more powerful players. Thus, Portugal was allowed to maintain its hold over Mozambique, which separated German-controlled Tanganyika (now Tanzania) from British-controlled South Africa. At the same time, since no Africans were consulted at the conference, the resulting colonial borders bore no resemblance to the natural or human geography of precolonial Africa. Various ethnic groups were lumped into a single colony, or a single people were divided into several colonies. The final boundaries of Mozambique proved as ill-considered as boundaries elsewhere on the continent. The Portuguese had made some desultory efforts to populate the interior of Mozambique. During the nineteenth century they had settled prisoners there, but these colonies failed, as most of the settlers disliked the harsh conditions and migrated to the coastal settlements. Still fearful that other Europeans might take advantage of the fact that much of Mozambique was still ruled by Africans or African-appearing Creoles, Lisbon instituted a series of laws designed to establish more administrative control over the region. The feudalist political power of the prazos was curtailed, even as they were given more economic leeway. To spur colonial settlement and investment, the prazos were turned into freehold properties. But the impoverished people of Portugal were in no position to take up the opportunities. Instead, many of the prazos came to be incorporated into French and British plantation systems. This intrusion was resented by both AfroPortuguese and African leaders, and it led to several decades of violence around the turn of the century. To solve the problem, the Portuguese passed a law in 1907 setting aside areas for African communities only. By implication, however, this left large swaths of land open to colonial settlement. Once again, the Portuguese attempted a colonization project, this time for the impoverished farmers of the overcrowded metropolis. Again, the experiment failed abysmally. The more entrepreneurial members of this class were emi-

grating to the more pleasant and productive climes of Brazil, leaving the most impoverished and uneducated for Mozambique. Moreover, without a proper transportation infrastructure, commercial farming remained impracticable. Again, the settlement policy proved a drain on the Portuguese treasury, as many of the farmers had to be heavily subsidized to remain on the land. Most fled to the coastal settlements. As the colonists drifted to the cities, they came into direct competition for jobs and housing with the existing Afro-Portuguese population, which had previously occupied most of the middling commercial and administrative posts. The competition between the Europeans and the Afro-Portuguese soon turned on the color question. By the early twentieth century, Lisbon and its administration in Mozambique were passing laws that made it increasingly difficult for Creoles to find government employment. These laws set higher and higher educational standards for available positions, even as funding for African schooling remained almost nonexistent. Only the largely Protestant missions in the colony offered schooling for a significant number of Africans. Yet, at the same time, practically illiterate Portuguese colonists were given jobs that better-educated Creoles could not obtain. Meanwhile, citizenship was restricted to only the wealthiest and most assimilated Afro-Portuguese. Not surprisingly, it was among the asimilados that the earliest signs of Mozambican nationalism were seen, though the movements of the early twentieth century were oriented toward racial equality within a colonial framework rather than toward independence. Part of the reason for this was the Portuguese conception of “luso-tropicalism,” an idea that implied a special role for the Portuguese in Africa. Unlike other Europeans, the thinking went, the Portuguese were not racist, a fact witnessed by the extensive intermixing of Portuguese and Africans. Thus, the Portuguese mission in Africa was to extend Portuguese culture in exchange for African loyalty and labor—and to accomplish this without the harsh racial edicts of other European colonies. The hypocrisy behind this policy was obvious, as the Portuguese began to exploit Mozambique more effectively in the early twentieth century. Unlike other European colonizers, the Portuguese had neither the capital to invest nor the manufacturing capacity to market. Thus, Mozambique was not an outlet for surplus capital but a source of it. If colonists could not be recruited to that end, then the Portuguese would

Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 19 61–1974

more effectively exploit African labor. This took several forms. First, taxes were raised on peasant farmers in the colony, and these taxes now had to be paid in cash, not kind. Thus, farmers were forced to labor part of the year on the plantations. Second, taxes were imposed on migrant workers laboring in South African mines. This source of income was particularly lucrative, since taxes could amount to nearly half of all wages, and these were collected by the more efficient British administration and passed along to the Portuguese. This labor experience in South Africa would have important repercussions for the independence struggle in Mozambique, serving as a unifying nationalist experience for the thousands of Mozambicans who discovered a common identity as exploited mine workers. Finally, vaguely worded vagrancy laws were passed that basically allowed for imprisonment and forced labor of people who were not actually working at the moment they were encountered by security forces. Two events in mid-twentieth-century Europe sped up this process of more effective exploitation of Mozambique. First was the rise to power of the dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in Lisbon. A former economist, Salazar set up an elaborate bureaucracy to micromanage the economy both at home and in Mozambique. He hoped to create a closed Portuguese colonial system that would allow Mozambican raw materials and capital to fuel industrialization in Portugal. His efforts were aided by World War II. Neutral in the conflict, Portugal and its colonies were well situated to sell critical tropical products to both sides in the war. As labor laws were more strictly enforced—to ensure output—government revenues tripled and the production of key products soared. The anomalies of Portuguese colonialism became even more apparent in the post–World War II period. While other European powers were preparing to leave their colonies in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1950s, the Portuguese were not only resisting the trend but also encouraging further settlement. As the postwar capitalist boom created seemingly endless demand for tropical products, thousands of Portuguese colonists poured in to take advantage of well-paying jobs, since most of the basic unskilled labor was performed by Africans. Still, for many of the middling occupations and semi-skilled tasks, the new colonists were able— with the help of racist employer attitudes and discriminatory laws—to muscle aside both asimilados and Africans. Between 1945 and 1974, the Portuguese

227

and European population in Mozambique grew from 50,000 to 200,000 persons. At the same time, the colony also began to develop a modest industrial infrastructure to process some of its raw materials and agricultural products. By 1974, the colony boasted the eighth-largest industrial capacity in Africa. Increasingly, the Portuguese treasury was becoming dependent on remittances from its colonies. However, because the Portuguese economy was so weak, neocolonialism was not an option. Whereas the French and, to a lesser extent, the British believed they could continue to control the economies of their former colonies, the Portuguese government and financial community felt that they would be thrust aside by greater economic powers if their colonies became independent. This newfound income was only part of the reason the Portuguese refused to give up their colonies in Africa, including Mozambique. The ideology of Salazarism also played a role, as did the political power of the growing colonial population. Salazar’s colonial policy was based on the idea that Portugal had a special role to play in the world, as a link between the cultures of Europe and the southern hemisphere. Moreover, the government hoped to reconcile the contradictions of Western Europe’s poorest society by providing a safety valve in colonial emigration. The political element in the equation came to the fore in 1961, when Portugal—hoping to take international pressure off itself for keeping its colonies— declared the colonies part of Portugal itself, extending the vote to white colonists and assimilated Africans. By this measure, they turned colonial issues into internal ones, thus outside the purview of the United Nations. But as the colonists came to vote for parliament, they became a coherent and determined voice for continued colonization.

Resistance and Rebellion By the late 1950s, resistance to colonial exploitation was growing in both rural and urban areas. There were several wildcat strikes by African workers in Mozambican ports, followed in 1960 by a massive protest of peasant farmers—angry about the low prices paid for their crops at government-controlled marketing boards—in the northern town of Mueda. When the army moved in and shot down some 500 demonstrators, the news sparked a new determination by the asimilado elite to push for independence,

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rather than equality within a Portuguese system. Moreover, it demonstrated to these potential nationalists that unarmed resistance was pointless. The fact that the revolt and suppression took place in the north meant that that region would become the most solid base of support for the anticolonial resistance. In 1962, a group of educated asimilados, in exile in Tanzania after being forced out of the colony by Portugal’s International and State Defense Police (PIDE), met to organize the Liberation Front of Mozambique (known popularly as Frelimo). While most of the founders—including leader Eduardo Mondlane—were from the elite and had been educated abroad, others, such as Mozambique’s first president, Samora Machel, were more humble in origin and products of local missionary schooling. At first, the Frelimo leadership was hesitant to launch an armed resistance, but they were persuaded that they must use violence by the rise of quasi-organized anticolonial banditry inside Mozambique and by the urging of Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere.

On September 25, 1964, Frelimo launched its first attack against the Portuguese military, at Chai in the northern part of the country. The effort to set off a massive urban uprising later in the year, however, was thwarted by a mass PIDE raid in which 1,500 Frelimo members and sympathizers were arrested in the capital. From that point on, Frelimo’s guerrilla activities were confined to the more remote northern and central sectors of the colony. The Portuguese military launched a ruthless campaign against both the guerrillas and the civilian population, which was often forced into resettlement camps where it could not help the guerrillas. Even so, the Portuguese commanders were hard-pressed to defeat Frelimo. They were fighting simultaneous conflicts in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau, and did not have the resources, despite support from their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, including the United States. While Americans condemned colonialism in public, they did not want to offend a strongly anticommunist government in

Portuguese troops pass through a Mozambican village during the campaign against colonial rule in 1973. Mozambique’s war of independence began in the early 1960s and culminated in the formal transfer of power on June 25, 1975. (David Hume Kennerly/Getty Images)

Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 19 61–1974

Lisbon, which was also allowing U.S. forces to use the Azore Islands in the Atlantic. As the Portuguese army began to adopt counterinsurgency tactics in the late 1960s, Frelimo changed its strategy as well, shifting to a “soft” policy of political education and the provision of social services in liberated areas. They also moved more heavily into the economically strategic Zambezi River valley, hoping to disrupt commerce and farming. Still, the government held the upper hand through much of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was defeated, however, in a major offensive in 1972, aided by Rhodesian and South African forces, when Frelimo guerrillas outflanked the colonial forces and headed into the southern part of the country, threatening critical rail lines and the massive Cabora Bassa dam, which was nearing completion at that time. For the next two years, the war remained stalemated.

Independence Portugal’s many ongoing colonial wars were beginning to bankrupt its economy and were sparking unrest among the population at home. On the night of April 24, 1974, a group of leftist army officers—calling themselves the Armed Forces Movement (MFA)— initiated a bloodless coup that overthrew the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano, who had ruled since Salazar’s death in 1968. Under the leadership of Commander-in-Chief General Antonio de Spinola— recruited by the MFA for his impeccable conservative credentials and high reputation—the new Portuguese government hoped to work out some kind of associative relationship between the country and its colonies. In the summer of 1974, however, the more radical elements in the MFA came to the fore, forcing Spinola to retire in September and assuming direct control of the government. Among their first decisions was the immediate and total abandonment of the Portuguese empire. While this precipitous retreat would cause enormous difficulties in Angola—where

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three different rebel groups competed for power—the transition to Frelimo rule went relatively smoothly in Mozambique, except for one thing. As the date for formal independence—July 1975—approached, the frustrations and fears of the white colonists neared fever pitch. They planned their own declaration of independence and appealed to South Africa and Rhodesia for support. When South Africa’s Pretoria turned them down, they were forced to abandon their plans. Though Frelimo promised equality for all citizens regardless of color in an independent Mozambique, the fear and anger of the now abandoned colonists ran too deep. By independence some 180,000 of the 200,000 Portuguese in the former colony had fled the country, spitefully destroying much of the country’s infrastructure before they left. The departure of these white settlers eliminated a potential fifth column within the new country, but it also cost the new country nearly all of its technicians and administrators. The crucial port and railway sector alone lost 7,000 skilled workers. Equally important, some of the embittered exiles would come to support reactionary rebel forces intent on overthrowing the Frelimo government and destroying Mozambique in the process. James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; Angola: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974; Guinea-Bissau: War of National Liberation, 1962–1974.

Bibliography Birmingham, David. Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1992. Ciment, James. Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Khadiagala, Gilbert. Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994. Newitt, Malyn. A History of Mozambique. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. Seidman, Ann. The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985.

MOZAMBIQUE: Renamo War,1976–1992 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Terrorism and International Incidents; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); South Africa TANZANIA DE ON K A M

ZAMBIA Lake YAO Malawi

MALAWI

MA

Lake Cabora NGUNI Dam Bassa

KU

COMOROS

A

MOZAMBIQUE

Za

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ZIMBABWE (Rhodesia until 1980)

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TO N G A GORONGOSA MT. NA SHO

AU ND

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SOUTH AFRICA

SHAN

GANA

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MADAGASCAR

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Nkomati Maputo

Ethnic group Railroad

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SWAZILAND

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300 Miles 300 Kilometers

The Liberation Front of Mozambique (known as Frelimo, its Portuguese acronym) fought a decadelong war against Portuguese colonists and the Portuguese military from 1964 to 1974. Though the guerrilla force had made some headway, particularly in the more remote central and northern regions of the country, it had been unable to defeat the Portuguese militarily. The war’s drain on the Portuguese treasury and the unrest it was causing among the Portuguese people led to a coup against the rightwing dictatorship in Lisbon. Among the first decisions made by the leftist coup leaders was to rid Portugal of its overseas possessions as quickly as possible.

In Angola, this divestment led to war, as three competing rebel groups fought to win control of the new government. Mozambique was more fortunate, at least at first. With no real opposition, Frelimo was able to assume power immediately, without a fight. The only major setback was the flight of 90 percent of the white colonial population, which included most of the new country’s technicians and administrators. Adding to Mozambique’s good fortune was the quality of Frelimo leadership. The country’s first president— Samora Machel, who had taken charge of Frelimo after the assassination of the organization’s founder, Eduardo Mondlane, in 1969—came from an impoverished peasant family and understood many of the concerns of this sector of the population, to which the vast majority of Mozambicans belonged. Under both Mondlane and Machel’s leadership, Frelimo had emphasized a solid working relationship between guerrilla fighter—now government representative—and peasant. In liberated zones during the war, Frelimo established health, education, and other programs, winning the confidence of much of the population. Once in power, the government committed much of its revenues to health and education. Indeed, its emphasis on low-tech, primary-care clinics earned the commendation of the World Health Organization, which used it as an example in other countries. The social indexes in the first years of Frelimo rule were excellent: 95 percent of children vaccinated within three years of independence and a fourfold increase in the number of students graduating from primary and secondary schools. At the same time, Frelimo attempted the much more daunting task of redirecting an economy built for the needs of a distant imperial government. Mozambique as a colony had been a great generator of revenue for Portugal. Tens of thousands of migrant Mozambican laborers in the South African mines were heavily taxed, while peasant farmers were forced to sell their surpluses at government-controlled

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KEY DATES 1965

White settlers in neighboring Rhodesia unilaterally declare independence from Britain, establishing white minority rule in the country.

1975

Thousands of Portuguese settlers flee Mozambique as the country wins independence under the rule of Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo, its popular name) rebels; the Frelimo government vows to aid various black guerrillas armies fighting white minority rule in Rhodesia.

1976

Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organizations set up training camps for the Mozambique National Resistance, an anti-Frelimo guerrilla group.

1980

As black majority rule comes to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), support for Renamo shifts to apartheid South Africa.

1984

Frelimo and South Africa negotiate an agreement whereby South Africa promises to stop supporting Renamo and Frelimo agrees to end its help to the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC).

1986

Mozambican president Samora Machel dies in a mysterious plane crash in South Africa.

1990

The South African government legalizes the ANC and frees ANC leader Nelson Mandela from prison.

1992

Mediated by a Catholic peace group, Frelimo and Renamo negotiate a peace agreement demobilizing Renamo and allowing it to participate as a political party in Mozambican elections.

1994

Frelimo easily defeats Renamo in national elections.

marketing boards that paid well below competitive prices. Frelimo was determined to change all that. Borrowing from the socialist bloc countries and Algeria—the models of progressive third-world development at the time—Frelimo instituted a program of rapid industrialization that would produce both the basic goods necessary for the agricultural economy and consumer goods to offset imports. To increase productivity in the countryside, the vast acreage abandoned by the Portuguese settlers was turned into state farms and cooperatives. Peasants were either moved onto these new farms or herded into new consolidated villages. The intention was a benign one. The government believed that large estates were more efficient producers and that bigger villages allowed for better provision of social services. Frelimo also attempted to break the power of the local leadership hierarchies, which Frelimo officials believed was a product of Portuguese rule. There was

some truth in this. The Portuguese had used and manipulated the more amenable local chiefs to guarantee order and production among the peasants. These chiefs were given the title regulos and virtually total sway over local peoples. Some of the regulos earned a comfortable living from lands that they forced the local peasants to work. Frelimo saw the regulos as the main obstacle to its economic, political, and social reforms, and it was determined to eliminate them. Thus, the government sent its own administrators into rural areas to displace the regulos. Within a few years, most of the local leadership network had been destroyed and replaced by a bureaucratic administration answerable to the Frelimo government in the capital, Maputo. Each of these policies—from the economic to the political—had inherent flaws. First, the model of rapid industrialization proved too ambitious, draining precious financial resources on impractical

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economic projects. More significantly, much of the peasantry was deeply opposed to the consolidation of villages and the establishment of governmentcontrolled estates. They resented being forced to move from their ancestral villages and to work in teams on large estates. Though the policy made rational sense, it failed to take into consideration ancient custom, not a surprising oversight given the urban-based origins of most Frelimo officials. Finally, the efforts to destroy the regulos and the Catholic Church were also resented to a degree. While many regulos and priests were corrupt, still others did their best to shield their villagers from the harshest effects of colonial exploitation. That they worked with the Portuguese made them suspect in Frelimo eyes but did not necessarily condemn them in the peasants’ opinion. In fact, many of the regulos would have won local elections against Frelimo officials if these had been allowed to take place. But Frelimo officials believed in the Leninist notion of a vanguard party and saw elections as a Western import with little usefulness for an African revolutionary society. Finally, Frelimo’s foreign policy—while well intentioned—also undermined its efforts to transform and improve the lives of Mozambicans. While Mozambique as a Portuguese colony had served as the major sea outlet for landlocked Rhodesia and the nearby Transvaal district of South Africa—generating large revenues in the process—that role dried up after independence. First, South Africa began to shift its rail traffic to its own ports. As for Rhodesia, the Frelimo government assiduously honored the international sanctions against that illegal, white minority regime, allowing no Rhodesian goods to travel through Mozambican ports. In fact, Frelimo’s solidarity with the guerrillas fighting the government in Rhodesia would set off the devastating civil war Frelimo fought against the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) through the early 1990s.

Rhodesia and the Birth of Renamo Renamo’s origins date back to the first years of Mozambican independence. In 1976, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) came up with a plan designed to undermine Mozambican support for the black guerrilla movements fighting against the white-minority regime. They would establish their own Mozambican guerrilla force that

would not only hunt down anti-Rhodesian guerrillas in Mozambique but also disrupt the country economically. Many former Portuguese colonists from Mozambique who now lived in Rhodesia were strong supporters of the plan. These exiles offered money and expertise. Speaking the local languages, they helped to locate and recruit likely candidates for the organization. Soon the organization had hundreds of supporters in Mozambique, including many displaced regulos and some dissatisfied Frelimo renegades, upset that their newly won power did not translate into wealth. (Frelimo officials all the way up to Machel himself were renowned for their frugality.) Among the renegades were André Matsangaissa and Afonso Dhlakama, both future heads of Renamo. They had been arrested by their former Frelimo compatriots for petty crimes and sent to reeducation camps, which is where Rhodesian recruiters found many of their converts. By late 1976, the Rhodesian CIO had set up training camps in Rhodesia, with an emphasis on economic sabotage. As far as the CIO was concerned, there need be no ideological basis for the organization, other than that it be anti-Frelimo. Later, Dhlakama would offer a free enterprise, multiparty democracy ideology for his organization. Under Rhodesia’s tutelage, Renamo’s impact was largely felt in central Mozambique, in the agriculturally rich Zambezi River valley. Because the region had little experience with the liberated zones of Frelimo activism during the anticolonial war, there was less allegiance to the Frelimo government. Moreover, this was the area where the first heavy mobilization for estate labor was conducted, and resentment of the government ran higher. But Renamo’s strategy, learned from the Rhodesians, of burning villages, plundering agricultural cooperatives, and destroying shops, clinics, and schools was not intended to win support or recruits, other than those eager for a life of banditry. Instead, it was designed to instill terror by demonstrating to the peasantry that the Frelimo government could not and would not protect them. At first, the Mozambican army was largely ineffective against the Renamo attacks. Frelimo had demobilized, since it believed that the only threat to the country’s freedom would come from South Africa and that no army Mozambique could field would stand a chance against the mighty South African Defense Force (SADF). Instead, Frelimo hoped to defend

Mozambique: Renamo War, 1976–19 92

itself by winning friends in powerful places outside the region, in both the West and East. By the late 1970s, the Frelimo government had come to recognize the extent of the Renamo threat. It began to draft many of the leaders and soldiers of its war against the Portuguese in the 1960s and early 1970s. Renamo’s efforts to push its destructive campaign to the coast, thereby cutting Mozambique in half, failed. André Matsangaissa, the organization’s first leader (though largely a figurehead), was killed in this offensive. Fighting then broke out at Renamo headquarters in the remote Gorongosa Mountains of central Mozambique between several aspirants for power. The winner was Dhlakama. At the same time, the war between the white minority government in Rhodesia and the guerrilla forces there was heading toward a negotiated settlement. In 1980, the white minority government gave way. In universal elections Robert Mugabe, leader of the largest Zimbabwean guerrilla army and a close ally of Frelimo, was elected and formed the first majority black government. Mugabe and his party changed the name of Rhodesia (for the early British capitalist Cecil Rhodes) to Zimbabwe. The government immediately ended its support for Renamo. It appeared that the loss of support from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe would condemn Renamo to defeat, but that was not to be. The South African government, seeing an opportunity to destabilize a major supporter of the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, took up the role of Renamo’s mentor and benefactor. With its immense resources, the South African government was able to turn the resistance movement into a major force for the disruption and destruction of Mozambique’s economy and society during the 1980s.

South Africa and the Growth of Renamo By the late 1970s, South Africa’s leaders had realized that continued guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia was a greater threat to their own apartheid system than the possibility of a conservative black majority regime. By supporting the British-mediated peace efforts, South Africa hoped to install a compliant regime to its north, much like that in pro–South African Malawi. This shift toward support of negotiations helped persuade the recalcitrant Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia to accept black majority rule.

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Both Rhodesia and South Africa were shocked when Mugabe, the most radical of the guerrilla leaders, won the presidency in 1980. They were not without resources, however. Even before Mugabe took office, Renamo and Rhodesian officials had been in touch with the powerful South African Defense Forces (SADF). Under arch-conservative prime minister P.W. Botha, South Africa had been supplying small shipments of arms to Renamo. Now plans were put in place for South Africa to pick up the slack if Rhodesia’s support collapsed. Support for Renamo was not universal among South African military officials; some advocated direct intervention by the SADF in Mozambique. Emboldened by the election of conservative Ronald Reagan— whom they saw as an ally—as U.S. president, the Botha government launched a raid on the suburbs of Maputo, Mozambique’s capital, in January 1981. The immediate target was the offices of the anti-apartheid ANC, but the larger aim was to show Maputo the costs of aiding the black South African resistance organization. In that, the raid was a failure. President Machel lashed out at South Africa and insisted his government would continue its wholehearted backing of the ANC. Seeing the international outcry about the raid, South Africa’s SADF decided on a new tactic— supporting Renamo heavily. Renamo’s Rhodesian instructors were integrated into the SADF’s Special Forces units, arms shipments were increased, military training facilities were set up at South African bases, and a Renamo radio station was set up on South African soil. The SADF believed that Renamo attacks could achieve many purposes beyond neutralizing the ANC’s infrastructure in Mozambique. Destabilizing Mozambique’s economy would be a useful warning to any other African country considering support for the anti-apartheid struggle. Destabilization would demonstrate to the world that the blacks of southern Africa were incapable of carrying on in the absence of white leadership. Within a year of the change in strategy, the impact could be felt in the Mozambican countryside. In 1982, Renamo forces moved southward from their stronghold in central Mozambique. The purpose of this offensive was to wreak economic havoc and sow terror among the populace. Renamo targeted both major economic projects and social service facilities. Mozambique’s rail system—a critical part of its economy and potentially a major source of foreign earnings when it began transporting the goods of

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landlocked Zimbabwe—was knocked out of commission. The Portuguese hydroelectric dam at Cabora Bassa, though never directly attacked, was rendered useless by the destruction of power lines. Meanwhile, softer targets were attacked as well. According to a 1985 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report, Renamo had destroyed some 1,800 schools, affecting more than 300,000 students, and had ruined 25 percent of the country’s newly created health clinics. Moreover, Renamo became well versed in the art of terror. It made a practice of mutilating civilians, as a warning to others not to support the government. It also forcibly recruited both soldiers and porters, some as young as ten years old. To win their allegiance, Renamo leaders in the field were known to force their potential recruits to kill family members and friends, thereby bonding them to the organization through trauma. Meanwhile, some farmers were forced to grow crops for Renamo forces while others saw their crops seized just before harvest. Looting was a major occupation of Renamo fighters as well. When they attacked villages or government facilities, they stripped away anything of value and destroyed what was left. The valuables were smuggled across the border to Malawi, where they could be sold on the black market. By the mid-1980s, Renamo had divided Mozambique into three zones. In the areas of direct control, Renamo resettled peasants around its bases, reestablishing a rudimentary barter economy and setting up a few clinics and schools. Life was relatively stable here. Much of this territory was Ndau-speaking, as were most of Renamo’s guerrillas and Dhlakama, their leader. Still, Renamo never really took on the role of an ethnic-based fighting force. Ethnicity was never part of its rhetoric, and there were many non-Ndau persons in the upper echelons of the organization. The second zone was known as the “area of taxation.” These were no-man’s lands, where neither Frelimo nor Renamo held sway. Subject to constant raiding by Renamo, the civilians were forced to surrender their property and crops as a form of “taxes.” Finally, there were the so-called areas of destruction. These were territories generally under Frelimo control. Here the object was to instill terror and undermine the authority of the government. Here, too, was where most of the worst Renamo atrocities took place. Frelimo, too, was responsible for civilian deaths, but this was largely through omission rather than commission. Having once again failed to recognize the

new and enlarged threat of a South African–backed Renamo, the Mozambican army was slow to extend its protection to the countryside, allowing the insurgents to conduct several years of destruction and terror without a response. It also failed to mobilize the peasantry to defend themselves, fearing that untrained militia would be no match for Renamo and might surrender themselves and their weapons. In addition, some of Frelimo’s more precipitous political and economic policies to drag the countryside into the modern era were highly unpopular with peasants and may have served to push some of them into the arms of Renamo. By the mid-1980s, then, Mozambique was caught up in a multifaceted catastrophe of war, compounded by prolonged drought and financial collapse. In 1984, the government was forced to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The IMF imposed strict conditions, forcing Frelimo to abandon some of its more successful programs in the countryside, including subsidizing the prices paid to peasant farmers for their surplus crops. Still, Machel and the Frelimo leadership recognized that improving the economy hinged on ending the war. Thus, in 1983, the president of Mozambique went on the diplomatic offensive, winning the support of even arch-conservatives Margaret Thatcher of Britain and Ronald Reagan of the United States to put pressure on Pretoria to stop its war against Mozambique. Thus, the war in the country never escalated into a Cold War confrontation, as the contemporaneous conflict in Angola had. Indeed, both Reagan and Thatcher even tried to offer aid to the government, though both were unable to win the approval of their respective legislatures. With this international effort, Machel was able to get South Africa to the negotiating table in 1984. At the border town of Nkomati, the two sides worked out a simple agreement whereby Frelimo would cut its support for the ANC while Pretoria would stop helping Renamo. Since the ANC had already been ordered out of Mozambique, it appeared that Frelimo had won the better bargain. But events turned out otherwise. Within a year, a raid on Renamo’s headquarters unearthed secret files detailing that the South African military had no intention of honoring the Nkomati Accords. South Africa vehemently denied the charges, saying that it had merely expanded its supply operations in the six months leading up to signing the accords.

Mozambique: Renamo War, 1976–19 92

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Natives in Mozambique celebrate the signing of a 1992 cease-fire by President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo guerrilla leader Afonso Dhlakama, ending sixteen years of civil war. (Alexander Joe/AFP/Getty Images)

This violation of the spirit of the accords—if not the letter—resulted in yet more Renamo raids and destruction in the late 1980s. The continuing warfare, drought, IMF-imposed austerity, and the mysterious death of Machel in 1986—in a plane crash over South African territory—had devastated Mozambique by the end of the decade. In 1990, it won two dubious distinctions: it was the poorest country in the world and the most aid-dependent.

Move Toward Peace In August 1988, the Mozambican Catholic Church— which officially had stayed out of the contest between Frelimo and Renamo—offered to host preliminary negotiations. But suspicions on both sides ran high. Largely cut off from the outside world (except for South Africa) and with its leadership generally uneducated, Renamo was fearful that it would be taken advantage of by the more sophisticated Frelimo representatives. Moreover, because of its isolation, it believed—quite rightly—that much of the international community was opposed to it. For its part, Frelimo did not want to give Renamo the respectability

that negotiations implied. Even after it had sat down with the insurgents, it continued to publicly refer to them as “bandits” and “terrorists.” Only when conservative Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, a nominal Renamo supporter, came on board as a mediator— along with the pro-Frelimo Mugabe of Zimbabwe— did Renamo agree to talk. But the Kenyan and Zimbabwean leaders soon proved too controversial to mediate the dispute. Frelimo pointed out that Moi offered training facilities to Renamo guerrillas, while Renamo noted that Zimbabwean troops were helping Frelimo defend the critical railways connecting that landlocked country to Mozambican ports. By the end of 1989, the talks had broken down, though they were soon revived under the good offices of the Sant’Edigio religious community in Rome, a Christian brotherhood that specialized in peace talks and had helped end a war in Lebanon. In July 1990, the negotiations began again. While there were many sticking points, the main obstacle to a treaty came from Renamo’s inability or unwillingness to negotiate in good faith. Internally divided between accepting a peaceful solution and

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continuing the war, it constantly reopened issues that had already been decided in previous sessions. In fact, Renamo’s leaders were concerned about its ability to survive after the war and to turn itself into a legitimate political party. They were also worried that their own personal safety could not be ensured if they moved to the capital to campaign. Once again the seeds of a solution came from outside Mozambique. In 1989, F.W. de Klerk became president of South Africa. He soon spoke in favor of building a multiracial state, legalized the African National Congress (ANC), and freed its leader, Nelson Mandela, from jail. De Klerk ended support of Renamo’s activities in Mozambique, and its leaders had little choice but to negotiate. Finally, after ten long sessions, the two sides reached an agreement in October 1992. Provisions included a UN-directed demobilization of Renamo guerrillas and government troops, as well as their integration into civilian life. A new 30,000-man army would be set up with equal numbers of Renamo and Frelimo troops. Elections for the presidency and parliament would be held under UN auspices within one year. The agreement came not a moment too soon. The costs of the war had been immense. UNICEF estimated that the war had directly or indirectly cost the lives of some 1 million Mozambicans—roughly 1 citizen in 16—including 500,000 children who had died of hunger and disease caused by Renamo’s destabilization tactics. At least one-third of the population were living as refugees in nearby countries or were internally displaced within Mozambique at war’s end. Financially, the conflict was estimated to have cost the Mozambican government and people some $15 billion in direct and indirect losses, roughly ten times the country’s annual gross national product. Moreover, some 3,000 schools and rural shops, 1,500 heavy vehicles (both truck and railroad), and 1,000 health clinics had been destroyed.

Postwar Era While the Sant’Edigio accords called for a strict timetable for demobilization and elections, the United Nations allowed the time frame to be stretched out. Events in nearby Angola cast a sobering shadow over the effort in Mozambique, when the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi restarted the war there after losing what he considered to be an unfair election. Because the United Nations had failed to properly demobilize

Savimbi’s forces, the war in Angola continued for another two years. Determined not to make the same mistake again, the United Nations offered a much bigger contingent of blue helmets and more money for the Mozambican effort. And it allowed both the demobilization and the electioneering schedule to fit facts in the field rather than a bureaucratic timetable. Fearful for their safety, Renamo’s leaders and its soldiers were hesitant to move to the Mozambican capital to demobilize and organize as a political party. The two processes moved at an excruciatingly slow pace. Gradually, however, the United Nations was able to set up nearly fifty demobilization camps throughout the country, hampered in part by the reluctance of member states to send troops for the UN force. The demobilization process was finally near completion by early 1994. During the rest of that year, both parties—along with several other minor ones—ran for office throughout the country. But the campaign was a desultory affair, with little enthusiasm and largely negative attacks. Ultimately, the October 1994 elections—in which some 90 percent of the electorate voted, despite a last-minute boycott call by Dhlakama and his Renamo party—offered something to both sides. The government party won a plurality of the vote, while its presidential candidate Joaquim Chissano—already in power since the death of Machel in 1986—won by a landslide. Frelimo controlled a slim majority of the 129 seats in the national assembly. Renamo, meanwhile, won a substantial minority of the votes, proving its contention that it did indeed have support among the Mozambican people. But this assertion was questioned by Frelimo officials and many outside observers, who noted that virtually all the votes for Renamo came in areas that were under its control and hinted that the former guerrilla organization had used coercion and/or fraud. While the elections decided who would govern Mozambique, they did not settle how it would be ruled. At both the national and the local levels, disputes between the two major parties quickly emerged. When Frelimo parliamentarians pushed a hard-liner of their own for speaker in December, the Renamo delegates walked out, hinting that only a power-sharing arrangement would bring them back. Meanwhile, in those provinces where Renamo had once held sway, there was general intimidation of government officials from Frelimo. At one point, former Renamo soldiers even blockaded highways, both to collect revenue and to protest the government’s

Mozambique: Renamo War, 1976–19 92

unwillingness to provide them with the money they had been promised as a condition of demobilization. Renamo’s fears and insecurities were downplayed by Frelimo officials, which still considered the group little more than terrorists who had blackmailed their way into government. There was talk of a conspiracy between Renamo officials and unreconstructed regulos from the colonial era. Renamo even tried to convince its former international backers in white South Africa and Portugal that it would be forced to go back to fighting if it did not get new financial support. Few took the threat very seriously. Meanwhile, Mozambique continued to reel from the economic effects of the war. Under the IMF sanctions, the government embarked on a privatization campaign that led to corruption, as many Frelimo officials—once known for their revolutionary-inspired frugality—took advantage of the changes to make personal fortunes. At the same time, to raise revenues, the government invited in white South African investors and farmers, which raised protests among many in Mozambique who blamed former apartheid supporters for their suffering. Natural disasters, including massive flooding in 1996, led to epidemics and losses of farmland. On the positive side, most of the Mozambican refugees returned, and the landmine problem—it was estimated that there were some 2 million un-

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mapped mines at war’s end—turned out not to be as extensive as originally feared. The government also invited international firms to begin exploration of potential gas and oil fields along the country’s 1,500mile coast. Most importantly, and in stark contrast to Angola, there was no return to warfare. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Mozambique: War of National Liberation, 1961–1974; South Africa: AntiApartheid Struggle, 1948–1994; Zimbabwe: Struggle for Majority Rule, 1965–1980.

Bibliography Birmingham, David. Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1992. Chan, Stephen, ed. Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978–1988. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. Ciment, James. Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Finnegan, William. A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. Hanlon, Joseph. Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots? Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. Magaia, Lina. Dumba Nengue: Run for Your Life: Peasant Tales of Tragedy in Mozambique. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1988. Saul, John. Recolonization and Resistance in Southern Africa in the 1990s. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993.

NAMIBIA: War of National Liberation, 1966–1990 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism PARTICIPANT: South Africa ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

OVAMBO

NAMIBIA (SOUTHWEST AFRICA)

HERERO

Walvis Bay

Windhoek

BOTSWANA

ATLANTIC OCEAN NAMA 0 0

100 100

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

SOUTH AFRICA NAMA

Ethnic group

Namibia was first inhabited by the San (who are also, though pejoratively, known as Bushmen), but these original people were gradually pushed farther into the Kalahari Desert as more technologically advanced groups such as the Nama, Herero, and Ovambo moved into the greener parts of the country. There was little European contact or settlement in the region until Germany was granted sovereignty over what was then called Southwest Africa in 1890. As German settlers moved in, they were met by Hereroled resistance. The resulting war led to a mass genocide, when about 90 percent of the Herero were massacred and the Nama were placed in concentration camps. During World War I, Namibia was taken from the Germans by South African forces. The League of Nations made the region a Class C mandate—that is, one with no prospects for independence—and awarded it to Britain, though it would be administered by South African authorities.

Over the next fifty or so years, the country was increasingly woven into the South African economy and political system, as Afrikaner ranchers, diamond companies, and railroads moved in. European enclaves in the administrative capital of Windhoek and the port of Walvis Bay flourished, especially after World War II, while black Namibians lost much of their land and were forced to work for the Europeans for poverty-level wages. Beginning in 1947, however, black Namibians began to petition the United Nations against South African rule. In a series of International Court of Justice decisions, the international community sided with the Namibians, declaring the League of Nations mandate null and void in 1966 and establishing a de jure UN trusteeship. South Africa ignored all such rulings. At the same time, the United Nations supported the cause of Namibian independence through publicity campaigns, negotiations, and even training of officials in preparation for independence. In Namibia itself, the cause of national independence—though not necessarily armed struggle—was centered in the local churches, while more militant efforts were concentrated in the growing trade union movement, even though trade unions were banned in Namibia under South African law until the mid-1980s. By the late 1950s, leadership of the movement was shifting away from the traditional chiefs and allied church groups to a younger generation of more politically oriented men and women. In 1958, an organization known as the Ovamboland People’s Organization was founded. It quickly expanded beyond a single ethnic group and became the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 1960, largely through the organizing done by Ovambo contract laborers who worked throughout the colony and developed a territory-wide national communications and mobilization capacity.

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KEY DATES 1890 Germany wins control over Southwest Africa, the future Namibia. 1915

South Africa seizes Southwest Africa from Germany in World War I.

1920

South Africa is granted a League of Nations mandate over Southwest Africa.

1947

Black Namibian nationalists begin petitioning the UN for independence from South Africa.

1958

Ovampoland People’s Organization is formed to push for Namibian independence; to avoid ethnic differences, it changes its name to Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in 1962.

1966 The UN negates South Africa’s mandate for Southwest Africa; SWAPO launches its first attacks on South African military forces in the territory. 1988 A major defeat of the South African army in the Angolan civil war resuscitates negotiations with SWAPO over Southwest Africa’s future status. 1989 The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) arrives in Southwest Africa to run the SWAPO demobilization and independence referendum; the South African military massacres SWAPO-affiliated guerrillas when they show up at the voter registration and demobilization center. 1990 Namibia becomes officially independent on March 21. 1994

Majority rule comes to South Africa with the election of African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela.

Meanwhile, beginning in the 1960s, the South African government had begun its policy of creating homeland areas for the black ethnic groups within the territory. Namibia, in effect, became the laboratory for South Africa’s efforts to relocate and manage such groups. When the South African government forced the removal of black Namibians from the Old Location neighborhood in Windhoek to a homeland at Katatura, it pushed SWAPO toward armed struggle. The group’s direction was further confirmed when the government in Pretoria ignored the United Nations’ revocation of South Africa’s mandate in the region.

The War In 1966, the year of the United Nations’ decision to revoke the South African mandate, armed conflict began in the territory. SWAPO began raids from bases across

the border in Zambia. Until the 1970s, however, these forays were largely ineffective and presented virtually no security problems for South Africa. Two events— one internal and the other external—increased the scope and seriousness of the armed struggle. The first was a general strike of black Namibian workers in 1971–1972, which helped galvanize the territory, producing a nationalist identity and solidarity among various ethnic groups for the first time. After the strikes, the administration of the liberal John Vorster made serious efforts to rectify the situation in Namibia. It began to expand social services to the black population and to incorporate more Africans into the civil service. These conciliatory gestures led in turn to the Turnhalle conference in 1975–1976, which resulted in publication of an independence plan for the territory. However, the constitution proposed by South Africa satisfied neither Namibian nationalists

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nor the international community, since it effectively denied black majority rule. It was rejected by both SWAPO and the United Nations. In 1978, Prime Minister Vorster was driven from office and replaced by P.W. Botha, a racial hard-liner. The second event leading to the expansion of the nationalist struggle in Namibia was the success of neighboring Angola, a longtime Portuguese territory, in achieving independence. The new black majority government there permitted SWAPO to use its territory as a base. Even as SWAPO went through a series of crises and divisions of its own in the late 1970s, it was becoming a serious military drain on the South African Defense Forces (SADF). By 1986, some 2,500 South African soldiers had been killed in the fighting in Namibia, along with an estimated 10,000 SWAPO guerrillas and black civilians. SWAPO’s use of bases in Angola enraged the SADF, and it conducted major operations in Angolan border territories in the early and mid-1980s. The attacks were aimed not only at disrupting SWAPO but

also at toppling Angola’s leftist, anti-apartheid regime. Although the invasions set back SWAPO military efforts and caused enormous death and destruction in Angola, they were repelled by the Angolan army, supported by thousands of Cuban troops and Sovietsupplied weapons. In 1988, a major defeat of another SADF invasion force by an Angolan-Cuban army forced South Africa to retreat permanently from Angola and to begin cutting off aid to rebel movements attempting to overthrow the government there. Meanwhile, several other factors were contributing to South Africa’s problems in the region. First, international economic sanctions were beginning to have their effect on the entire South African economy, reducing the government’s revenues and ability to support the kind of military effort necessary to overcome SWAPO resistance. Overfishing in the waters off Namibia and an extended drought undermined two of the colony’s major industries, fishing and agriculture, leading to a serious decline in the economy of Namibia that was felt even by the white residents.

SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma (on horseback) attends a political rally before the November 1989 balloting in which a Namibian assembly was chosen and Nujoma was elected president. Namibia officially became independent on March 21, 1990. (Trevor Samson/AFP/Getty Images)

Namibia: War of National Liberation, 19 6 6–19 9 0

Negotiations and Independence The economic decline and the 1988 defeat in Angola revived negotiations on the future status of Namibia. To avoid seeing its Angolan invasion force of 6,000 captured by Cubans and Angolans, South Africa was forced to make major concessions. It then sat down at U.S.-mediated talks to arrange a multilateral deal with Angola and the Cubans. In exchange for the Cubans’ withdrawal from Angola, Pretoria agreed to withdraw its troops from Namibia and to accept a UN-supervised election that would lead to independence shortly thereafter. Hopeful as this development seemed, there was still one final outrage in the Namibian conflict. Following the arrival of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in April 1989, a South African force massacred a contingent of guerrillas allied to SWAPO when they showed up at a voter registration and demobilization center. The South African government claimed it was the act of out-of-control commanders angry at the settlement. SWAPO agreed to put the incident behind them, and UNTAG soon gained control of the registration process in virtually all parts of the country. SWAPO swept to victory in the 1989 elections, with 60 percent of the seats in the national assembly and its longtime leader Sam Nujoma chosen as the country’s first president. Independence followed officially on March 21, 1990, when the South African flag was lowered over Windhoek. (South Africa did, however, keep control of the strategic port at Walvis Bay.)

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The relatively easy reconciliation process between black and white Namibians, the latter being allowed to stay in the country and granted full civil rights, saw the new country through a peaceful decade with a rising level of prosperity, particularly for its black citizens. But there have been costs. The government agreed to keep on 15,000 “unnecessary” white civil servants and to grant full amnesty to all individuals who committed war crimes during the conflict. In the early 1990s, the South African administration of F.W. de Klerk agreed to hand Walvis Bay over to Namibian sovereignty, a move that was effected in 1994. Disagreements over the border between the two countries were also settled at this time, and relations between Pretoria and Windhoek warmed considerably after the election of Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress party in 1994. The SWAPO-led government also enjoyed warm relations with its longtime ally, Angola. James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; Angola: First War with UNITA, 1975–1992; South Africa: Anti-Apartheid Struggle, 1948– 1994.

Bibliography Chan, Stephen, and Vivienne Jabri, eds. Mediation in Southern Africa. New York: Macmillan, 1993. Kaela, Laurent. The Question of Namibia. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Singham, A.W., and Shirley Hune. Namibian Independence: A Global Responsibility. Westport, CT: Lawrence and Hill, 1986.

NIGER: Ethnic and Political Conflict Since 1990 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Coups

SONGHAI-ZERMA 0 0

Ethnic group

250 250

The French tended to promote the SonghaiZerma peoples over others in the territory. As Paris began to prepare Niger for independence, it was largely members of this group that formed the first political parties. In 1958, France held the first referendum in Niger, asking the citizens if they would like to remain a part of the French Community. Despite efforts by the left-wing Djibo Bakary to turn this offer down in favor of full independence, the people of Niger agreed. Two years later, they were granted full independence. The country was then ruled by Bakary’s successor, a fellow Songhai-Zerma named Hamai Diori, as a single-party dictatorship until 1974.

LIBYA

500 Miles 500 Kilometers

ALGERIA E TUAR G NIGER

MAURITANIA

SONGHAI-ZER

BURKINA FASO

Niamey

BENIN

CHAD MA

Lake Chad

NIGERIA

For at least 1,000 years, the territory that now makes up Niger has been divided between the darkerskinned, more sedentary agriculturalists of the south and the lighter-skinned, nomadic Tuareg pastoralists of the Saharan north. The agriculturalists, in turn, are divided into three general ethnic groups: the Songhai-Zerma in the west, the Hausa in the center, and the Kanuri in the east. The Hausa have always been the most numerous and constitute about half of the country’s population today, though the vast majority of this large ethnic group lives in neighboring Nigeria. Largely isolated and composed of the peripheral populations whose cores were elsewhere, the territory that is now Niger did not excite European imperialist ambition until the last year of the nineteenth century, when a French expedition was nearly wiped out by attacks from local groups. Over the next twenty years the French were able to quell several Tuareg revolts and establish civilian administration by the end of World War I. Under the French, cash-crop agriculture spread, particularly among the Hausa. There was also a marked increase in population and a spread of Islam.

Coups and Political Tensions Diori’s government was overthrown by a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Seyni Kountche. The coup’s participants quickly formed the Supreme Military Council (CMS) to run the government. The regime of Kountche and, after his death in 1987, Chief of Staff Colonel Ali Saibou was marked by economic difficulties, rising political tensions, and demands for democratic reforms, and ethnic tensions in the northern and eastern parts of the country. The political tensions in the capital peaked in the early 1990s, when students and workers in the crucial uranium-mining industry held protests and went on strike. Saibou responded with an announcement that the military would withdraw from politics and would establish a national conference to lay out plans for a return to democracy. When the conference insisted on a halt in payments to international creditors, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank suspended new loans. This action further heightened the economic crisis and led to a mutiny among unpaid soldiers in February 1992. The government

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KEY DATES 1960 Niger wins its independence from France after nearly a century of colonial rule. 1974

A military coup overthrows the dictatorship of Hamai Diori.

1991

Backed by Libya, Tuareg rebels form the Liberation Front of Air Azaouad (FLAA, its French acronym) and launch guerrilla war against the Niger government.

1992 Elections lead to a new constitution and the accession of civilian government. 1993 The government and FLAA sign a cease-fire accord, but fighting soon resumes and continues through 1995. 1994 Ethnic tensions lead to fighting in the Lake Chad region. 1996 The military overthrows the civilian government in a coup.

eventually conceded to demands for back payments and the release of several officers arrested for the killing of Tuareg civilians. Still, the transition to democracy continued. In December 1992, nearly 90 percent of the country’s voters approved a new constitution. National elections—held in February 1993—saw the victory of a six-party coalition called the Alliance for the Forces of Change (AFC), headed by Mahamane Ousmane, an orthodox Muslim and the first Hausa to head the country. Unfortunately, continuing protests, strikes, and demonstrations—set off by internationally demanded austerity measures—led to another military coup in January 1996, leading to the formation of the military-dominated Council of National Salvation (CSN), chaired by Colonel Ibrahim Bare Mainassara. Promising a quick return to civilian rule, Mainassara himself ran for president in July 1996, winning the office by a slim majority in elections that the opposition said were rigged. Continuing labor unrest and student protests marked the Mainassara administration. Moreover, the government’s failure to return Niger to democracy jeopardized its relations with the West. Following the suspicious 1996 elections, the United States cut off all economic and military assistance to the Mainassara administration, while France merely expressed concern. Meanwhile, Mainassara tried to

shore up his relations in the region through frequent visits to neighboring capitals.

Ethnic Tensions Following a prolonged drought that afflicted the region during most of the 1980s, large numbers of Tuareg nomads began to return to Niger from Libya and Algeria. By 1990 and 1991, unrest among this group was growing, including an attack on a prison in northeastern Niger where several dozen Tuaregs were being held for having protested the government’s failure to aid the refugees in their return. The raid was quelled with great brutality by the Niger armed forces, leading to further tensions, though forty-four Tuaregs were acquitted of involvement in the prison attack in April 1991. Throughout 1991 and 1992, the Tuaregs, under the leadership of the Liberation Front of Air and Azaouad (FLAA, named after the Tuareg regions of the country), and government forces engaged in a series of attacks and counterattacks. The Tuaregs complained that they were being ruthlessly suppressed by the army, while the government said the Tuaregs were fighting to establish an independent state in the northern part of Niger. This charge was denied by FLAA leader Rissa Ag Boula, who said the organization simply wanted an autonomous region within a federated Niger.

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

By early 1993, however, the government and the FLAA were reaching an accord on ending the fighting during secret discussions in Paris. Though sporadic violence continued, the cease-fire agreed upon in April seemed to hold. But when the FLAA began to move away from the agreement—citing government violations, including the imprisonment of several dozen Tuaregs—pro-government elements in the organization formed the Tamoust Liberation Front (FLT) and signed an extension of the cease-fire. The FLAA refused, however, and renewed fighting between the government and FLAA guerrillas continued through the rest of the year. Still, by mid-1995, an accord had been reached, setting out a tentative plan for the administrative reorganization of the country into federated districts. Fighting between the FLAA and the government died down, only to flare up again when yet another Boula-led antigovernment Tuareg organization—the Organization of Armed Resistance (ORA)—accused the government of inadequacy in helping to integrate former Tuareg fighters back into Niger society. Meanwhile, there were reports of ethnic unrest in southern and eastern Niger in late 1994 and early 1995, largely in the Lake Chad region, as fighting

between nomadic and sedentary groups broke out over grazing rights. The land dispute quickly acquired political overtones when the nomads of the region formed the Democratic Renovation Front (FDR), an organization demanding autonomy in the southeast. The fighting among local peoples and between the FDR and the government was exacerbated by the huge number of refugees and weapons that had spilled over the border from Chad, then engaged in its own internal conflicts. In 1999, citizens of Niger approved a new constitution, and later that year Mamadou Tandja was elected president. His five-year term was generally peaceful, and he was reelected in December 2004. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Mali: Ethnic and Political Conflict, 1968–1996.

Bibliography Baier, Stephen. An Economic History of Central Niger. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Charlick, Robert. Niger: Personal Rule and Survival in the Sahel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Niger, Burkina Faso. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1986–1987.

NIGERIA: Biafra War,1967–1970 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious 0 0

100 100

200 Miles

NIGER

200 Kilometers

Lake Chad

HAU

BENIN N

ige

BA RU YO Ibadan

r Riv er

SA - FULA

CHAD

NIGERIA Ben

ue

IBO

Lagos

BIAFRA

Bight of Benin

NI

r ve Ri

CAMEROON

Port Harcourt Ni

g

e r Delta

Gulf of Guinea

IBO

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Oil field Ethnic group

The Biafra War represented the first great ethnic conflict of post-independence Africa, serving as a tragic harbinger of things to come. Angry at their marginalization under a northern-led military government, the Ibos of southeastern Nigeria rose up in rebellion in early 1967, attempting to establish the independent Ibo state of Biafra. Though initially successful in defending their homeland, Ibo forces were eventually overwhelmed by the Nigerian army, which attempted to starve the rebels into submission by establishing a blockade around the territory they controlled. The strategy worked, but the costs were enormous. The name “Biafra” became synonymous with hunger, suffering, and Africa’s remorseless ethnic warfare.

Causes of the War Nigeria, the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa with about 130 million people, is divided into some 200 different ethnic groups, though three dominate: the animist and Christian Yorubas in the west, the animist and Christian Ibos in the south, and the Muslim Hausa-Fulanis in the north. Together, the “big three” account for approximately two-thirds of

the country’s population. Because of its dominance of the north, the most populous region in the country, the Hausa-Fulanis controlled the largest political party in Nigeria when the country won its independence from Great Britain in October 1960. In 1963, the government drew up a new constitution providing more autonomy to individual states, but deep ethnic conflicts persisted. The first elections in independent Nigeria, held in 1964 and 1965, reflected the animosities among the various peoples that made up Nigeria. Leaders in eastern states organized boycotts, and election violence erupted in the west. The result of the vote was a coalition government in the capital of Lagos. Because of continuing violence, the state government in the west was placed under federal control until peace could be restored. When Nigerian leaders hosted the meeting of the British Commonwealth heads of state in Lagos in 1966, Nigeria seemed a picture of peace and prosperity. There was talk of this country leading Africa into the age of modern industrialism and democracy. But internally, severe problems remained. Corruption was endemic, encouraged by recent changes that gave the president power to appoint most important federal officers without consulting the legislature. Many feared that the president would choose loyalists from his own ethnic group, increasing traditional rivalries. At the same time, Nigerian citizens had already seen a marked decline in the freedoms they enjoyed in the first years of independence—including the right to assemble and the right to have an uncensored press. The most serious troubles could only be glimpsed in the provincial homelands of Nigeria’s major ethnic groups. Already a movement was growing in the north to declare an independent country to be known as the Tiv. Even more troubling, however, was the situation among the Ibo people of the south. For several generations, many had left their traditional region and settled in other parts of the country. Many were successful, but most failed—or were denied the right—to assimilate into the general population.

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KEY DATES 1960

Nigeria wins its independence from Great Britain after more than a century of colonial rule.

1963

The country draws up a federal-style constitution devolving some powers from the central government to the states.

1964–1965 Local and national elections reflect growing regional and ethnic divisions within the country. 1966

A military coup puts Ibo officers in power in Nigeria in January; this causes rioting in northern Hausa areas, forcing Ibos to flee that region for their homeland in the southeast; second military coup in July puts Hausa officers in charge of the country; an ad hoc committee of officers opts to keep the country together, but to devolve more powers to states; its meeting is boycotted by the Ibo military leader; rioting in the southeast leads to the killing of northerners in September; rioting triggers violence in the north against the Ibos.

1967

Ibo leaders in the southeast announce the secession of their region, which they call Biafra, on May 30; Nigerian forces launch an offensive against oil facilities held by Biafra in July.

1967–1970

Several outside efforts at mediating the civil war fail; as Nigerian forces surround Biafra and cut off the region from the outside world, an estimated 1/2 to 2 million Biafran civilians die.

1970

Southeast leaders formally surrender to the Nigerian government, ending the Biafra War; an estimated 100,000 soldiers on both sides died in the fighting.

The divisions within the population were reflected in the military. The Ibos dominated the officer corps, while most of the enlisted men were recruited from the middle belt of provinces. Neither officers nor men were well disposed to the northern HausaFulani people or their Northern People’s Congress (NPC), even though it was the party of Nigeria’s president, Tafawa Balewa. In January 1966, the predominantly Ibo officers launched a bloody coup in which President Balewa was killed, together with ministers for the northern and western regions. Within twenty-four hours, the surviving ministers requested the army’s Ibo commander-inchief, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, to form a new government. Ironsi immediately formed the Supreme Military Council (SMC), suspended the con-

stitution, and imposed martial law. He substituted military men, mostly of Ibo origin, for the civilian governors in the various regions of the country. Anti-Ibo rioting broke out across the country and lasted throughout the winter and spring months. In May, protests gripped the cities in the north as HausaFulani expressed their dissatisfaction with Ibo rule. They felt that Ibo leaders were taking traditional powers away from the individual states to increase Ibo dominance. Soldiers were sent in, and a number of the protesters were shot down. At the end of July, northern troops in the capital rose up and overthrew the government, killing Ironsi and massacring Ibo officers. As a conciliatory move, the northern officers chose General Yakubu Gowon—a northerner, but a Christian rather than a Muslim—to head the interim

Nigeria: Biafra War, 19 67–1970

government. Gowon tried his best to restore military discipline and revive the federal system by granting further autonomy to regional governments. These conciliatory gestures eased tensions in some regions, but were not enough to pacify the angry and frightened Ibo. Ibo living in many parts of Nigeria had closed up their homes and traveled back to the south, in fear for their safety and their lives. Meanwhile, in Lagos, Gowon established an ad hoc committee to discuss the future of the country. On the table was one basic question: whether to dissolve the Nigerian union and allow the formation of new countries or to keep the country together but federalize the government further, devolving most powers to the states. Advisers from the capital and from western Nigeria succeeded in urging unity. At the same time, they urged that past grievances be addressed, tensions lowered, and differences among the regions reconciled. Significantly, they did not approve loosening the rules of confederation, and they ruled out the right of states to secede from Nigeria. Easterners on the committee were angry with the outcome. They had held out for the right of their region to secede. Worse, the meeting was boycotted altogether by the military governor of the southern region, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, who was under pressure from leading Ibo politicians and military officers to declare the Ibos’ secession from the Nigerian confederation. In late September 1966, rioting broke out in the Ibo region. Many northerners who lived in the south were killed, and most other northerners soon fled the region. As the stories of the killings spread, Ibos living in the north were targeted for massacre by northern troops. Officially, some 7,000 were killed, though Ojukwu later claimed the figure was as high as 30,000. Most Ibos felt that the government did too little to stop the rioting. The government responded with evidence that Ibo terrorists were planning a bombing campaign in Lagos, though this allegation was never proved.

Secession and Preparations for War The Gowon government attempted to make up for its failure by supplying the southern state government with some $2.5 million to help pay for the

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resettlement of Ibo refugees. Little of this money, however, reached the refugees. The government claimed that Ojukwu’s government had used the funds to purchase arms from abroad. The allegation was a serious one, for it would indicate that the eastern government had been preparing for secession long before it announced its plans. To ease the growing tensions, a conference was held in nearby Ghana in January 1967. At the meeting, the Ibo leader Ojukwu accused the government in Lagos of preparing for a major police action in Ibo lands, pointing to recent arms purchases by the government in Europe. The government replied that the purchases had been made, but only for routine policing purposes. Even as both sides talked of peace, ominous events were occurring back in Nigeria. One of the longstanding complaints of the Ibo people was that the region did not receive its fair share of the oil revenues generated from its territory. Nigeria was the largest producer of oil in Africa, and its clean-burning fuel obtained the highest prices in the international crude oil market. To make their point, Ibos seized railroad tank cars and disrupted the Shell Oil facilities at Port Harcourt. At the same time, they demanded that tax revenues raised in the south be collected by the Ibo government for its own use. The Nigerian government responded with an offer of a bigger share of federal revenues, including those from oil, but refused to concede on tax collection. Their offer was rejected by Ibo leaders. On May 27, 1967, Gowon announced the formation of a new interim government for Nigeria and, more controversially, a plan for redistricting the country. While leaving the old west and midwest states largely intact, the plan divided the northern and southern states into six and three states, respectively. Each would be governed by a military governor— appointed by the central government—for the duration of the national emergency, after which civilian rule would be established. The plan was immediately rejected by Ojukwu and other Ibo leaders in the south, who saw it as a method for undermining their authority, diluting Ibo political power, and maintaining central government control over the region. Their demands that the plan be scuttled were ignored by the government. On May 30, Ojukwu and other Ibo leaders formally seceded from Nigeria, declaring the formation of an independent Republic of Biafra, the name based on medieval and early modern-era references to the region.

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The Biafra War The Gowon government pronounced the eastern region in a state of rebellion and said that Nigeria would crush the rebellion, by force of arms if necessary. Severe economic sanctions were imposed and all telecommunications to the region were cut. Ojukwu and all other officers in the new Biafran government were stripped of their ranks and positions and charged with treason and other crimes against the Nigerian state. At the same time, Gowon also requested that all foreign governments stay out of the conflict. Almost immediately, the new government of Biafra tried to seize control of the oil facilities in its territory, but it did permit Shell to retain its share of profits under earlier agreements it had made with the Nigerian government. In response, the Nigerian government demanded that all tankers taking on oil at Port Harcourt in Ibo territory call at Lagos first, where they would receive naval clearance. Ultimately, the oil companies—including Shell—ignored Ibo demands and continued to pay revenues into the central treasury in Lagos. Meanwhile, both sides began recruiting and conscripting soldiers for the coming battle and arranging to purchase arms. The Ibo rebels ran guns from the nearby Portuguese and Spanish colonies of São Tomé, Princípe, and Fernando Po (now Equatorial Guinea). For the first several weeks, each side could do little against the other. The rainy season had begun, and the few roads that entered the Ibo region were virtually impassable. The Ibo forces soon captured the one railroad line and the single bridge across the Niger River. The only thing federal troops could do was establish a naval quarantine around Biafra, but they were limited even here by their inability to control the Niger River. Both sides also conducted air raids, but they had so few planes that the raids caused little damage. In July, a Nigerian amphibious force succeeded in taking the oil port on Bonny Island, recently developed by Shell off the shore of Ibo territory. Later that month, Nigerian troops flanked the Biafran forces around Lagos and marched into Ibo territory from the north and west. In response, Ojukwo launched an Ibo offensive against Nigeria itself, crossing the Niger River and invading the state of Benue. Supported by those Ibo officers and men who remained in the army, the Biafran force then moved on Nigeria’s secondlargest city, Ibadan. By early August, the rebel forces were in the suburbs of Lagos itself.

Gowon responded with a general call for support from the Nigerian people, making a special appeal to the Yoruba, who were centered around Lagos. Suspicious of northerners (most of whom were Muslims), the Yoruba were reluctant to turn on their fellow Christians in the south. But the threat of invasion of their own lands by Ibo forces convinced Yoruba leaders to back the government. This decision helped turn the tide. Through September and October, federal troops slowly drove the invaders out of the western and midwestern territories of the country, inflicting a major loss on them near the city of Enugu on October 1. By the end of October 1967, the fighting had died down. But the costs to the Biafran forces had been immense. Ojukwo’s invasion had been launched in the hope that a decisive victory would end the war quickly and lead to a peace settlement that would allow Biafra to remain independent. When the invasion failed, Biafran leaders found that they had used up most of their weapons and ammunition and lost thousands of their best troops. Now they would be forced to fight a defensive war. Despite their successes, the federal forces found it difficult to take the initiative. Their desire to push the war into the southeast bogged down in a host of problems. Their supply lines were stretched thin, the transportation infrastructure was limited, and they were fighting on the enemy’s home territory, which meant they were subject to guerrilla-style raids that sapped their morale and strength. The army tried to secure the roads and airfields but often lost control of them. Thus, through much of late 1967 and early 1968, the conflict degenerated into a bloody war of attrition. Finally, in June 1968, federal troops captured the critical port and oil-shipping city of Port Harcourt. This victory effectively cut off the Ibo rebels from access to the sea and put major oil-producing assets in federal hands. International observers believed that the war was all but over. It wasn’t. New shipments of armored transports and artillery to Biafra forced the government to halt its occupation of Ibo land. And as the rebel enclave shrank, the Ibos’ job of defending it became somewhat easier. Still, the federal troops pressed on, using their increasing capacity for air attacks. They captured most of the major cities in the south by the end of 1968. By early 1969, they had surrounded the heart of Ibo land. Now the shrinking Biafran enclave was hard put to bring in enough food to sustain its people. Nigerian troops made it a point to destroy whatever acreage they

Nigeria: Biafra War, 19 67–1970

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Nigerian troops enter Port Harcourt in the secessionist state of Biafra after routing rebel troops there in 1968. Up to two million Biafrans, many of them Ibo suffering from starvation, died in the civil war. (Evening Standard/Getty Images)

found under cultivation and to seize all food stores. As the blockade became more efficient, hunger turned into malnutrition and famine. Television and newspaper photos soon conveyed to the world the image of starving Biafran civilians. Appeals by foreign governments and organizations poured into the government in Lagos, but Gowon continued his strategy of starving the rebels out. Late in 1969, the Biafran forces were all but defeated. Further Nigerian offenses had cut them off from one another and from supplies of military equipment and food. On January 10, 1970, Ojukwo fled the country, handing over authority to Major General Philip Effiong. Five days later, Effiong flew to Lagos and formally surrendered. It is estimated that some 100,000 soldiers on both sides died in the conflict. But the real tragedy concerned civilian losses. Experts estimated that at least 500,000 and perhaps as many as 2 million civilians in the war zone died, most from starvation caused by the federal blockade.

Negotiations and Aftermath There had been a number of attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully even as it was going on. In May 1968, a British Commonwealth–sponsored peace conference was held in Kampala, Uganda, with the chief justices of Nigeria and Biafra (the Biafran representative had formerly been the chief justice of the eastern region) in attendance. The two sides agreed that a cease-fire must precede any talks concerning Ibo grievances, but the talks collapsed over the question of disarming. Predictably, the government insisted that Biafran forces lay down their arms and renounce armed conflict before a ceasefire could occur. The rebels rejected the proposal outright and added denunciations of federal army atrocities. The government countered with charges of attacks by Ibo soldiers on non-Ibo minorities in rebel-held territories.

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When the rebels proposed an immediate unconditional cease-fire at Organization of African Unity (OAU)–sponsored talks in Niamey, Niger, in August 1968, the federal government refused, saying that this demand presumed equal sovereignty on both sides. Still, it was agreed to resume the talks in April 1969 in Addis Ababa. But a proposal insisting on the Ibos’ right to maintain an independent army even if it rejoined a much more loosely confederated Nigeria was rejected by Lagos, which now felt that the war was turning in its favor. Intervention by the pope in August also failed to resolve the differences between the two sides and represented the last serious effort to end the war through negotiations. The twelve-state plan initiated by Gowon in 1967 and put into effect in 1968 remained in force after the war. In January 1970, the East Central State, which had once been the heartland of Biafra, was reintegrated into the Nigerian state, on Lagos’s terms. There were, however, some attempts at reconciliation. A number of Biafran officers and government officials were reincorporated into the Nigerian army and bureaucracy. At the same time, some of the complaints about a lack of spending in the east were redressed. Several large infrastructure projects were begun, in part to take advantage of rising world oil prices following the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) boycott in 1973–1974. In 1975, Nigeria helped to organize the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The organization was largely an economic one at first, but it soon took on mutual defense and peacekeeping responsibilities. Internally, however, Nigeria remained torn by conflict. A national census held in 1973, meant to apportion political power and federal funding, was protested by the Ibos and Yorubas of the south, who disagreed with its findings that the population in the north had doubled since independence while that in the south had shrunk slightly.

Moreover, the country was having a difficult time returning to civilian rule. While Gowon had promised elections in 1976, he announced an indefinite postponement of the transition in October 1974. A year later, he was overthrown in a bloodless coup by northern Brigadier General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, who immediately purged the government of most Gowon-appointed officials and announced preparations for a return to civilian rule in 1976. Muhammed himself was overthrown by military supporters of Gowon in February 1976. As a compromise measure with the anti-Gowon forces, power was instead transferred to Muhammed’s deputy, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo presented a new constitution in 1978, which installed numerous checks and balances between the government’s three branches. It also stated that in presidential elections, the winner must receive at least 25 percent of the votes in at least twelve of the fifteen states. The first elections under the new constitution were held in 1979. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Nigeria: Coups and Ethnic Unrest Since 1966.

Bibliography Collis, William Robert. Nigeria in Conflict. London: Secker and Warburg, 1970. De St. Jorre, John. The Brothers’ War: Biafra and Nigeria. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. ———. The Nigerian Civil War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972. Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert. The Biafra War: Nigeria and the Aftermath. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1990. Niven, Cecil Rex. The War of Nigerian Unity, 1967–1970. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971. Nwankwo, Arthur Agwuncha. The Making of a Nation: Biafra. London: C. Hurst, 1969. Saro-Wiwa, Ken. On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War. London: Saros, 1989. Stremlau, John. The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

NIGERIA: Coups and Ethnic Unrest Since 1966 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups; Ethnic and Religious Conflict 0 0

100 100

NIGER Lake Chad

Kano

SA - FULA

HAU

MUSLIM

BENIN

NI

Kaduna

CHAD

NIGERIA

BA RU YO

Abuja

CHRISTIAN-ANIMIST TIV

Lagos

Protests from other Nigerian ethnic groups soon turned into to rioting, particularly in the north. Thousands of Ibo who lived in other parts of the country fled back to their homeland in the southeast. There they organized a movement supporting the secession of Ibo people to establish a new, independent state, to be called Biafra. In July 1966, Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed in a countercoup led by a northern lieutenant colonel named Yakubu Gowon. In May 1967, war broke out as the federal troops tried to crush the separatist effort in the southeast. The resulting Biafran civil war lasted for three years and resulted in hundreds of thousands of military deaths. The victory by the central government likely prevented the splintering of the newly independent state.

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

IBO

Bight of Benin Warri IJAW

CAMEROON

OGONI URHOBO

Gulf of Guinea

IBO

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Oil field Ethnic group

Torn by ethnic and geographic divisions, the Federal Republic of Nigeria was ruled by military regimes for more than twenty-five of its first forty years after achieving independence from Britain in 1960. The pattern of military coups followed a relatively predictable pattern, with northern Muslim Hausas seizing power to prevent domination by southern, often Yoruba, politicians. The south of the country is where most of the people live. It is also where all the oil, Nigeria’s most valuable export, lies. During its first six years of independence, Nigeria was torn by political infighting, marked by uprisings in the southwest among the Yoruba and repeated efforts to find a constitutional solution to its deep regional, ethnic, and religious divisions. Although the Hausa and the Yoruba peoples were the dominant groups in Nigeria, the Ibo group in the southeast brought on the country’s first major conflict. The Ibo dominated the officer corps of the Nigerian military at the time, and in January 1966, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Ibo, overthrew the government and seized power.

Coups of the 1970s At the end of the Biafran War in 1970, Gowon attempted to reconcile the defeated Biafran separatists with the remainder of Nigeria. In the following years, he incorporated many former Ibo leaders into the Nigerian government. At the same time, he embarked on a plan to construct a stronger central government and promote economic development. Internationally, the Gowon government presided over the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in an effort to strengthen the economy and security of West Africa through cooperation. Gowon often promised to return civilian rule to Nigeria, but he kept putting off the date. In July 1975, while attending a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Uganda, Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup by northern Brigadier General Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Muhammed immediately purged most Gowonappointed officials and announced preparations for a

251

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KEY DATES 1960

Nigeria wins its independence from Britain.

1966

Nigeria experiences its first military coup.

1967–1970 Ibo separatists in the southeast of the country declare independence as the Republic of Biafra but are then defeated by the Nigerian military, as up to 2 million people die of starvation due to a Nigerian blockade of the rebel-held territories. 1975

Yakubu Gowon, leader of the 1966 coup, is himself overthrown in a bloodless military coup.

1982

Uprisings in the Muslim north of the country lead to rioting and a military crackdown there.

1983

Civilian leader Alhaji Shehu Shagari is overthrown in a military coup led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari.

1985

The Buhari regime is overthrown in a coup led by Major General Ibrahim Babangida.

1993

As wealthy Yoruba publisher Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola leads in national elections for president, the military intervenes and Army Chief of Staff Sani Abacha seizes power.

1995

The Abacha government executes playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni rebels in the face of international protests.

1998

Abacha dies of a heart attack and is replaced by Chief of Staff Abdulsalam Abubakar, who promises a return to elections and civilian rule.

1999

General Olusegun Obasanjo, the only military leader to voluntarily give up power, is elected president.

2004

Conflict between Muslims and Christians in Plateau State produces 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).

return to civilian rule in 1976. These plans met with widespread approval, but not from the military supporters of Gowon, who overthrew Muhammed in February 1976. The insurgents and the outgoing government agreed to transfer power to Muhammed’s deputy, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, who established a commission to write a new Nigerian constitution. He also promised to end the practice of earlier rulers who had constantly changed borders between Nigeria’s states as a means of limiting the powers of regions and ethnic groups.

Return to Civilian Rule The constitutional commission drew up a national charter resembling that of the United States. The constitution provided for a relatively strong executive and carefully balanced powers between the federal government and the states. It also sought to prevent dominance by any single ethnic or regional group by requiring that a presidential candidate receive a solid portion of the vote in the majority of states in order to be elected.

Nigeria: Coups and Ethnic Unrest Since 19 6 6

Five major parties competed in the parliamentary elections in July 1979 and in the presidential elections in August. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) received a solid plurality of the vote with roughly 35 percent in both elections. On October 1, the military handed over power to the civilian president, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, a northern-based politician. It had been thirteen years since Nigeria had last been ruled by an elected government. Unfortunately, Shagari took office at a time when oil prices were collapsing, bringing dire consequences for the Nigerian economy and undermining his ambitious development plans. Regional leaders complained that the new constitution gave the federal government too much power at the expense of the states and that it gave Shagari and his followers the chance to grow rich at the country’s expense. Uprisings in the north in 1982 led to rioting and a military crackdown in which hundreds of dissidents were killed. Shagari became so unpopular that when he was reelected to a second term in August and September 1983, most Nigerians believed that the voting had been rigged.

Rise of Babangida On New Year’s Eve 1983, Shagari was overthrown in yet another bloodless military coup, this time led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari, a former military governor from the north. Buhari immediately moved to ban political parties and arrest members of the former government on charges of corruption. The people of Nigeria applauded. Then the corruption trials were delayed and deals were worked out to release many detainees. Sensing that Buhari had made a deal of his own with the old corrupt government, Nigerians became angry. Yet again, the military intervened. In August 1985, it overthrew the Buhari regime in a bloodless coup headed by Major General Ibrahim Babangida, the military chief of staff and a northerner. Babangida’s deputy in the coup was Major General Sani Abacha, chief of the army staff. In October 1985, Babangida declared a state of national economic emergency and assumed extensive executive powers as head of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Babangida suspended negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Nigeria’s economic policies, a move widely approved. Nevertheless, the army attempted another coup in December. This time, the government suppressed the

253

revolt and soon executed thirteen of the conspirators. At the same time, Babangida also announced that the army would transfer power to a civilian government within five years, by October 1990. In 1987, renewed ethnic and religious fighting broke out in the country. The Babangida regime announced that the return to civilian rule would be delayed until 1992. The government did set up a program for political education, however, as a first step toward ending the dictatorship. In May 1989, Babangida took other steps toward a return to civilian rule. He reduced the number of AFRC members and legalized political parties. But unrest continued, particularly in the southern and western parts of the country, where people believed they were underrepresented in the federal government. During 1990, the government announced an “open ballot” system to prevent electoral fraud. Still, numerous challenges remained for the Babangida government, including an initially disastrous military intervention in the Liberian civil war—under the aegis of ECOWAS—and renewed ethnic conflict in the southeast. In October 1990, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was founded. MOSOP demanded a fairer share of the oil revenues coming from Ogoni people’s lands and protested the extensive environmental destruction that industry had wrought in their region. Meanwhile, rioting between Christians and Muslims broke out in the north. Despite these problems, the electoral process continued. In October 1991, primary elections for governors and state assemblies were held, and in December the federal capital was officially transferred from coastal Lagos to the more centrally located Abuja. Despite rioting over a rise in fuel prices, elections for the national assembly took place in July 1992. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) received a majority in both the upper and lower houses. A month later, primary elections for presidential candidates were marred by violence and confusion, leading Babangida to announce a postponement of the final vote from December 1992 elections to June 1993. Many Nigerians feared the military was planning to hold onto power despite its promises to the contrary. The elections did occur on the new schedule, in June 1993. Voter turnout was low, and the electorate chose SDP candidate Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola, a wealthy Yoruba publisher. Even as the returns were coming in, however, there were ominous

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Africa, Sub- Saharan

signs. The military announced a delay in reporting election results. An independent commission was assembled to look into the problems, and it declared Abiola the winner. Even so, on June 23, the Babangida government announced that the results of the election were invalid. In July, the Babangida’s government seized many of Abiola’s publishing holdings and announced the formation of an “interim national government.” Under pressure from his former protégé, Abacha, Babangida resigned and transferred power to businessman Ernest Shonenkan. Supporters of Abiola rioted in the streets, demanding that power be turned over to him. In November, the high court in Lagos ruled in favor of Abiola and declared the interim government was illegal. Before their decision could be enforced, however, Shonenkan resigned on November 17 and handed power to Abacha.

Abacha Regime Within twenty-four hours of taking power, Abacha dissolved the interim government, replaced all elected state governors with military administrators, and prohibited all political activity. He announced the formation of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), composed of senior military officials and promilitary civilians. Abacha still maintained that he was committed to bringing civilian rule, but in June 1994, when Abiola had himself symbolically inaugurated as president on the one-year anniversary of his election, Abacha had him arrested and imprisoned. Abiola’s supporters demonstrated in Nigeria, and formal protests against his arrest were made by the United States, Britain, and other governments. In July, the writer Wole Soyinka, the best known and most admired Nigerian outside his own country, brought a suit against the Nigerian government challenging the legitimacy of the Abacha government. The country’s highest court ruled that Abiola’s detention was illegal, but he remained in prison. Such challenges from civilian politicians and political groups continued through 1995. Abacha addressed them by dissolving the groups involved, even while he claimed that he favored a return to civilian rule. After several alleged coup attempts were reported, Abacha cracked down further on the opposition, arresting its leaders, both military and civilian. The Abacha regime also moved against MOSOP, arresting a number of Ogoni leaders, including Ken

Sani Abacha, the military dictator of Nigeria, reviews security forces in 1996 as his regime became more repressive. With the political opposition mounting, Abacha succumbed to a heart attack in June 1998. (Issouf Sanogo/AFP/Getty Images)

Saro-Wiwa, a playwright and popular opposition figure, on charges of treason for demonstrating against the government and Shell Oil for the environmental damage to the Ogonis’ lands. In October 1995, SaroWiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were sentenced to death, attracting international condemnation and appeals for clemency. Abacha ignored the protests, and the nine Ogoni leaders were executed in November, sparking national and international outrage and limited sanctions against the government. While the Abacha regime continued to institute various programs for a return to civilian rule, most Nigerian politicians believed these were little more than delaying tactics. In June 1996, Abiola’s wife, Kudirat, a prominent opposition figure in her own right, was gunned down by unidentified assailants on a street in Lagos. Opposition figures said it was her constant agitation for her husband’s release that led to her murder, and they accused the government of complicity in the killing.

Nigeria: Coups and Ethnic Unrest Since 19 6 6

By 1997, Nigeria was in an almost constant state of crisis. The corrupt Abacha regime was bankrupting the country, rolling back virtually all the economic gains made since independence. In addition, it was fomenting ethnic unrest in a bid to stay in power. Local and international human rights organizations cited the Abacha regime as one of the greatest violators of human rights in Africa and indeed the world. But Abacha, increasingly a recluse in Abuja, conducted further crackdowns, issuing a decree in April by which he empowered himself to replace all local mayors with his own appointees. Plans announcing elections for early 1998 were denounced as shams by political opponents and international critics, especially since they would be limited to candidates nominated by a few government-approved parties. Nigerians also suspected that Abacha himself was planning to become a civilian candidate in the elections. Later, Abacha delayed the elections still again. In June 1998, all speculation about Abacha ended when he died of a sudden heart attack. At first, hopes rose that Abacha’s death might lead to an opening up of Nigerian politics, but Abacha’s chief of staff, Major General Abdulsalam Abubakar, quickly announced his succession to power. Abubakar did move to release a few political prisoners, but Abiola, the last elected president, was not among them. Opposition leaders demanded that Abubakar release Abiola and either turn power over to him or announce a legitimate schedule for free and fair elections. Then, only a month after Abacha’s death, Abiola died in prison.

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itary officers, and reclamation of fortunes stolen from the national treasury. In 1979, Obasanjo was the only Nigerian military leader voluntarily to relinquish power to a civilian government. He was a member of the Yoruba people and maintained strong support among Yorubas in the north (most of them Muslims). Obasanjo himself, however, grew up in southern Nigeria and was a Christian, which gave him some ties to southern Christians. Despite his long ties with the military, Obasanjo took steps to reduce the influence of northern Muslim officers in the army. Obasanjo himself had been imprisoned by the military regime of Sani Abacha in 1995, so he had personal experience with the brutality of military rule. After stabilizing the central government, Obasanjo faced many other daunting problems. Corruption remained widespread, limiting the ability of public and private organizations to accomplish things quickly and efficiently. Local militias—now well armed by the flood of small arms in the region—continued to threaten Nigeria with regional warfare. Perhaps most difficult was Nigeria’s reliance on oil to fund government activities and development efforts. A drop in oil prices could ruin the country’s economy in a matter of weeks or months. Despite Obasanjo’s weak support in the legislature and his inability to end persistent mass poverty, he was elected to a second four-year term in April 2003. Perhaps more encouraging, he managed to avoid intervention by the military, which had overthrown so many elected governments in the past.

Democracy Under Obasanjo Ethnic and Religious Conflict Abubakar proved more willing to end the long stretch of military rule than his critics had imagined. Regional and local elections brought to the fore former General Olusegun Obasanjo’s Popular Democratic Party, and his main rival, the Alliance for Democracy, which primarily represented the Yoruba ethnic group. Sani Abacha’s All Peoples Party won in only one of Nigeria’s thirty-six states. In the general elections of March 1999, Obasanjo won the presidency. The successful return to democracy after sixteen years of autocracy immediately improved Nigeria’s international image and won for it increases in foreign aid and IMF cooperation. Obasanjo immediately sought administrative reforms, adjustments to Nigeria’s investment policies, a purge of thirty senior mil-

Throughout his first two terms, Obasanjo faced constant ethnic and religious disorder. The region with the worst ethnic tension was the oil-rich and environmentally devastated Niger Delta in the south. There was constant conflict over the distribution of the oil wealth, little of which reached the hundred ethnolinguistic communities located there. The region’s abjectly poor people often flared up against neighboring groups and the central government. They also mounted attacks against the oil companies and their wells, kidnapping oil workers and forcing production shutdowns. Much of the communal violence was carried out by armed youth gangs belonging to such ethnic groups as the Ijaw. In one such dispute in May

256

Africa, Sub- Saharan

1999 involving the relocation of a local administrative center in the town of Warri, nearly 200 persons were killed. Directly or indirectly, these disputes were often over access to the region’s immense oil wealth. Other incidents were caused primarily by ethnic conflict. In December 1999, the Ijaw and the Ilaje communities clashed in the city of Lagos. By March 2000, hundreds had died. In this case, Obasanjo intervened and set up a committee to coordinate a truce. In another incident, in June 2001, 40,000 people fled when fighting broke out between Azara and Tiv people in the state of Nasarawa. Yet another source of tension was religion. About 36 percent of Nigerians are Christian, and 48 percent, predominantly from the North, are Muslim. The remainder practice various animist faiths. For decades, Nigeria was able to sidestep religious violence because most of the active political parties represented both Christians and Muslims. Two major parties in particular, the All Nigeria’s People’s Party (ANPP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), succeeded in finding common ground between the Muslim north and Christian south. Muslim-Christian tensions did arise after Obasanjo’s election. In December 1999, Muslim extremists damaged eighteen Christian churches in Ilorin. Further attacks targeted Christian Ibos in the northern city of Kaduna in February 2000, leaving at least 500 dead and displacing thousands of others. Violence elsewhere along the Christian-Muslim divide killed thousands more. Some of the tensions in northern Nigeria were caused by attempts of devoted Muslims to introduce Sharia (laws based specifically on the Koran and other Islamic texts). Sharia prescribes extreme punishments for common offenses— stoning for adultery, amputation of a hand for theft, and so on. The resistance of Christians and others to the new codes often erupted in violence. Although Obasanjo was himself Christian, he relied on the Muslim north for much of his political support. He did succeed, however, in reaching an agreement with the Muslim states of the north to limit the scope of Sharia.

Religious Violence in the Plateau State Nevertheless, religious conflict worsened in Nigeria. In the Plateau State, Muslim extremists attacked and

killed 48 Christian churchgoers in early 2004. In April, Christian Tarok and Muslim Fulani militants fought each other in the district of Shendam, leaving at least 20 dead. Increased police and military presence did not end the violence. In May, Christian militias killed 600 in Yelwa, and Muslim retaliation inflicted further fatalities. Hundreds of thousands were driven from their homes in search of a safe haven with co-religionists. Another dimension of the Muslim-Christian violence was the emergence of small, well-funded, and well-organized terrorist groups often associated with pan-Islamic goals. As part of an attempt to put a restraint on the preaching of factional hatred, particularly against the Christians, the Plateau authorities banned the Council of Ulamma, an extremist Muslim group. Although Obasanjo was fearful of alienating his Muslim electoral base, he was compelled by events to intervene and stop the violence. In May 2004, Obasanjo declared a state of emergency, removed the Plateau legislature, and replaced the governor with a former army general. Cash rewards and an amnesty were offered to people who turned in small arms, and it was made illegal to accumulate weapons. The military set up a cordon-and-search operation to secure the undeclared weapons caches. The Plateau was largely stabilized by November 2004, and power was transferred back to the elected governor. Nevertheless, it was likely that large caches of weapons remained hidden. Meanwhile, violence erupted elsewhere, albeit on a smaller scale. James Ciment and Julian Schofield See also: Coups; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Nigeria: Biafra War, 1967–1970.

Bibliography Diamond, Larry. Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988. Diamond, Larry, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds. Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997. Dudley, Billy. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Ike, Okonta, and Douglas Oronto. Where Vultures Feast: Shell, Human Rights, and Oil in the Niger Delta. New York: Sierra Club, 2001. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey 1999–2005. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000–2005. Joseph, Richard A. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria:

Nigeria: Coups and Ethnic Unrest Since 19 6 6 The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Maier, Karl. This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis. Scranton, PA: Perseus, 2002. McLean, George, Robert Magliola, and Joseph Abah, eds. Democracy and Values in Global Times—With Nigeria as a

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Case Study. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2004. Ndaeyo Uko. Romancing the Gun: The Press as Promoter of Military Rule. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004. Soyinka, Wole. The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

RWANDA: Civil War and Genocide Since 1991 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Congo (Zaire); Uganda Lake Edward

UGANDA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (ZAIRE) Lake Kivu

Bukavu

Rwandese Patriotic Front Lake Victoria

RWANDA Kibuye

Kigali

Gikongoro Butare

Bujumbura Lake Tanganyika

TA NZANIA

BURUNDI 0 0

50 50

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

Like many other African civil wars in recent decades, the civil war in Rwanda had its roots both in precolonial history and in misguided or maliciously guided colonial policies. The tiny country of Rwanda (some 10,000 square miles) is naturally a kind of Eden. Situated about a mile high on the equator, it is both well watered and beautiful. The altitude keeps it relatively cool and also keeps at bay certain pests dangerous to humans and animals—specifically, the malaria-carrying mosquito and the cattle-killing tsetse fly.

Historical Background This idyllic setting has drawn people from across subSaharan Africa for thousands of years. Scholars speculate that of the six to seven different sociocultural groups inhabiting Rwanda, the first inhabitants were the Twa—also known as Pygmies—who have dwelled in the extensive upland rain forests that have covered the northern Great Lakes region of Central and East

Africa since prehistoric times. These people were followed by Bantu-speaking Hutu, a largely agricultural people who settled in the region more than a thousand years ago, and the Tutsi, a largely pastoral people who moved into the area perhaps 500 years ago. By modern times, Hutu accounted for about 84 percent of the population, and the Tutsi 15 percent. The Twa had been largely displaced by the newcomers, accounting for less than 1 percent of the total. Partly because precolonial Rwanda was such a crowded and intensively farmed place, it developed a uniquely centralized and ordered form of government. At the center of political life was the king, who was believed to have divine origins, and his court. Beneath the king was an elaborate political structure of chiefs and subchiefs who had a number of duties, including the regulation of economic and political affairs, the collection of tribute and taxes, and recruitment and training for the army. The Rwandans developed a feudal social and economic order in which the cattle-owning warrior class of Tutsi acted as lords and the agricultural Hutu served as serfs. Still, these labels can be misleading. Many Hutu served in the king’s army and were rewarded with cattle, while most Tutsi were just as poor as their Hutu neighbors and tilled the fields beside them. Indeed, there was a certain amount of upward and downward mobility. In the years just before the arrival of Europeans, however, the Banyinginya dynasty was confining the Hutu to more feudal obligations and providing them with less freedom to move upward. Indeed, moves were made to ban Hutu from owning cattle altogether.

Colonial Rwanda When European colonial powers were dividing up African territories, Rwanda fell to Germany in 1890.

258

Rwanda: Civil War and Genocide Since 19 91

KEY DATES 1918

Belgians take over the colony of Rwanda from the defeated Germans; over the next forty-four years, Belgians will favor minority Tutsi over majority Hutu, creating resentment among the latter group.

1962

Rwanda wins independence from Belgium with the Hutu party in power; thousands of Tutsi flee violence in the country.

1990

Militants of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), mainly Tutsi exiles in Uganda, launch an invasion of Rwanda, in an effort to overthrow the repressive Hutu government of General Juvenal Habyarimana.

1990–1992

With the help of France, the Rwandan army expands to 50,000 troops to fight off the RPF.

1992

The Habyarimana government and the RPF sign a peace accord in Tanzania, but continuing violence in Rwanda prevents its implementation.

1993

Fighting in neighboring Burundi leads to massacres of both Tutsi and Hutu in that Tutsi-led country; 300,000 Burundian Hutu refugees pour into Rwanda, inflaming Hutu feelings against Tutsi.

1994

In April, Habyarimana flies to Tanzania to explain to African leaders why the peace accord has not been implemented; on his return on April 6, his plane is shot down over the Rwandan capital of Kigali; Hutu extremists immediately blame Tutsi militants and call on Hutu people to massacre Tutsi; between early April and early June, Hutu—urged on by extremist politicians— massacre an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and their Hutu sympathizers in the worst genocide in world history since the Cambodian genocide of the 1970s; while the whole world does almost nothing to stop the killings, the massacres only come to an end when RPF forces enter Kigali; hundreds of thousands of Hutu— including many leaders of the genocide—flee the country, mostly to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).

1998

In an effort to prevent a Hutu revival and to stop cross-border raids by Hutu militants, the Tutsi-led Rwandan government invades Congo, setting off a rebellion that overthrows the government of that country.

2001

The government of Rwanda institutes a traditional system of popular participatory justice to deal with a massive backlog of cases against those who participated in the genocide.

259

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Early German visitors took note of the extensive and intensive farming, made possible by the benign climate and topography. They also studied the large population and identified the leading ethnic or social groups. They observed that the Tutsi and the Hutu seemed to be quite distinct and recognizable physical types and noticed the elaborate social order that had been created. Following racial beliefs then widely held in Europe and North America, German colonial leaders concluded that the Rwandan social order was based entirely on race. Because many Tutsi leaders were tall and thin and had aquiline features (more like Europeans), the Europeans judged them to be superior to the Hutu, whose body shapes and features were less European. Colonial powers were much slower to recognize the widespread intermingling and intermarriage between Tutsi and Hutu or their shared Bantu-type language. During World War I, Belgium (already a colonial power in Africa) drove German authorities out of Rwanda and took charge. At the end of the war, Belgium was given official responsibility for the colony. Based on the same racial assumptions as the Germans made earlier, the Belgian administration saw the Tutsi leaders as far more intelligent than the Hutu and gave them far more extensive power, putting the full power of the colonial regime behind them and absolving them from any need for consultation with village leaders (including the Hutu). Indeed, the old order, in which Hutu chiefs managed the lands and Tutsi chiefs the herds, was replaced by one directed by a single chief administrator, invariably a Tutsi. Not surprisingly, the Tutsi used this power to gain advantage by seizing Hutu property. When farming enterprises were commercialized and woven into the imperialist economy, the Hutu were turned into a kind of rural proletariat. In other enterprises, they were kept down by the old feudal practices more thoroughly codified and rigidly enforced. This treatment left the Hutu increasingly frustrated and angry. Gradually, both the Hutu and the Tutsi began to accept the Belgians’ distorted and simplified gloss on their own history, culture, and social order. The Tutsi came to believe that they were, in fact, superior, with a natural right to rule over the Hutu, while the Hutu came to believe they were indeed a peaceful, agricultural people who had been conquered by the stronger and more aggressive Tutsi. Even so, the seeds of resentment between the groups had been planted.

Independence After World War II, the Tutsi elite, wealthier and more educated than the vast majority of Hutu, were much better situated to comprehend the political ideas sweeping Africa. They understood that African independence was coming in the not-too-distant future, but they also understood that their superior position in Rwanda could be jeopardized if the country became a broad-based democracy, since Hutu voters would make an overwhelming majority. In the 1950s, as the Belgians began to prepare for independence by giving greater local powers to Africans, the Tutsi elite manipulated the system to ensure themselves a dominant position in an independent government. The Roman Catholic Church, which had become a powerful force in Rwanda, had begun with the same admiration for the Tutsi felt by colonial leaders, but gradually it was changing its allegiance. As the Tutsi increasingly challenged European clerics for control of the Church, those clerics began to recognize the injustice being done to the Hutu. Indeed, the Church had long represented the only path to education, better economic position, and higher status for aspiring Hutu. By the mid-1950s, the Church had nurtured a Hutu counterelite that challenged Tutsi economic dominance and the right of the Tutsi elite to inherit the colonial administration upon independence. This development produced a Tutsi backlash, and competition between the two groups became increasingly bitter as they fought over the symbolic trappings of power. More substantial developments were also occurring in the political arena on the eve of independence. In June 1957, Grégoire Kayibanda founded the country’s first political party, the MuHutu Social Movement (MSM), largely based in the central and northern parts of the country. The group later became the MSM/Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation and was known as PARMEHUTU for short. Only months later, another Hutu, businessman Joseph Gitera, formed the Association for the Social Promotion of the Masses (APROSOMA), which soon became the party of Hutu from the southern region. Meanwhile, the Tutsi were organizing political parties as well. The more conservative elements established the strongly monarchical, anti-Belgian Rwandese National Union (UNAR), while liberals founded the Rwandese Democratic Assembly (RADER). The latter group advocated social equality and cooperation

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between Hutu and Tutsi, but few Hutu joined it, distrusting its Tutsi majority. Rhetoric between these parties reached a fever pitch by late 1959, and tension in the country increased to the breaking point. A Hutu subchief was attacked by the Tutsi group UNAR, and fighting broke out between Hutu and Tutsi in various parts of the country. Some 300 people were killed, and many Tutsi homes were destroyed. Meanwhile the struggle intensified between the Hutu and Tutsi elites. The Hutu demanded that the colonial Belgian regime establish a broad-based government with majority rule before independence was declared. The Tutsi demanded immediate independence, saving questions about the permanent government for later discussion. The Belgians increasingly backed the Hutu and began to replace Tutsi chiefs with Hutu leaders. There were several reasons for doing so. First, their relations with the Tutsi had become more and more confrontational, as the Tutsi demanded to be given the preference they had enjoyed for decades. Second, government and business interests came to believe that the Hutu would be more pliable rulers, allowing Belgians to continue managing the country’s economic affairs. Finally, in the intense cold-war atmosphere of the time, the Tutsi elite, who were vocally anticolonialist, had attracted the support of Communist regimes, which persuaded the Belgians and other Western powers that the Hutu might be less dangerous. Thus the Tutsi, who were more reactionary than Marxist, were perceived as allies by leftist governments and as enemies by the colonial powers. Despite the growing state of insecurity, the Belgians organized local elections in June and July 1960 in preparation for independence. Relying on the large Hutu majority, PARMEHUTU won overwhelmingly. This victory allowed the Belgian administration to announce that the “social revolution” was complete, since the majority Hutu were taking control of the country. In fact, the new Hutu elite were already encouraging attacks on impoverished Tutsi in the countryside. The international reaction to Rwanda’s elections was not positive. Both the United Nations and the Communist bloc feared that Hutu rule would allow the Belgians to continue to call the shots in Rwanda. Thus they supported the more radically anticolonialist UNAR Tutsi party to lead the country. A conference to reconcile the Hutu and Tutsi was held in Belgium but made little progress. Grégoire Kayibanda of PARMEHUTU announced a “legal coup,”

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asserting that Rwanda had established its independence. As the violence continued, legislative elections were held. Another PARMEHUTU landslide gave it control of the legislature. Tutsi began emigrating to neighboring countries in large numbers. In the midst of this anarchic and violent situation, independence was formally declared on July 1, 1962. Since the last king had died without an heir, the new country became a republic under the presidency of Kayibanda of the PARMEHUTU Party.

Kayibanda and Habyarimana Regimes Rwanda in the Kayibanda years (1962–1973) was a rather strange place. The president ruled much as the kings of old had, appointing favorites to administer the various regions but also relying on elaborate alliances with local chiefs to ensure social peace. There was much talk of egalitarian social and ethnic order, but the country was run by a secretive clique of Hutu elites, the Akazu, who monopolized much of the country’s limited commercial potential. At the same time, having been saved by the Belgians, the Hutu government of Kayibanda did not enthusiastically join in the general African trend toward anticolonial leftist politics. Meanwhile, the rise to power of PARMEHUTU and the continuing Hutu violence against Tutsi led to a massive emigration. In a continuous stream between 1959 and 1964, some 336,000 “official” refugees had fled. The largest number, about 200,000 traveled to Burundi in the South. (Like Rwanda, Burundi was a Belgian colony divided between a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority.) More than 100,000 fled north and east to the former British colonies of Uganda and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). Many more Tutsi may have fled without official recognition. Some estimates of total emigration run as high as 775,000, about half of the Tutsi population of Rwanda. The Tutsi refugees from Rwanda were known for three things. First, they gained success in their adopted countries, thanks to their education and entrepreneurial instincts. Second, they maintained an almost mythic connection to their homeland, which, over decades, parents would pass on to their children. The exiles in Uganda dropped French as their second language and adopted English, yet they never lost their sense of belonging to Rwanda. Third, the refugee Tutsi continued to launch ineffective attacks against Rwanda. The first of these came even before independence, in the form of raids

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from Uganda that more resembled looting expeditions than guerrilla warfare. A more substantial but poorly organized invasion from Burundi nearly reached the capital, Kigali, but was driven back by the Rwandan army. A more formidable force developed in Uganda when the brutal Idi Amin ruled that country. In 1980, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda formed the militant Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), which demanded the right to return to a safe and secure Rwanda. When Amin was overthrown, Uganda’s new dictator, Milton Obote, drove RANU out of Uganda. Even so, many of the militants stayed behind, joining up with an anti-Obote guerrilla group, the National Resistance Army (NRA), headed by former defense minister Yuweri Museveni. As the Rwandan exiles gained battlefield experience, they came to dominate the officer corps of the Ugandan resistance movement. In early 1986 Museveni captured the capital, Kampala, and overthrew the old regime. More Rwandans were recruited for the new national army of Uganda. Though appreciative of the Rwandans’ help, Museveni was also worried about their dominance in the army. The Rwandans began planning a radical solution to their exile. At a congress in 1987, RANU changed its name to the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and dedicated itself to returning to Rwanda, by the use of force if necessary. Meanwhile in Kigali, the cliquish, secretive, and reactionary regime of Kayibanda had been overthrown. In July 1973, General Juvénal Habyarimana took charge after a relatively bloodless military coup. At first, the new regime was popular, and Habyarimana achieved a degree of social peace. While Tutsi remained marginalized—with virtually no representation in government or the military—the popular and official violence against them largely stopped. At the same time, however, Habyarimana made it clear that he intended to rule Rwanda in the fashion of the old monarchy. In 1974, he organized the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MNRD) and banned all political parties from the country. Indeed, he tried to ban politics altogether, declaring the MNRD to be a social movement. The new president also imposed a rigid and repressive bureaucratic structure that required people to register before moving or traveling. It was also socially conservative, arresting hundreds of Tutsi girlfriends and mistresses of European residents.

The country did progress economically, however, joining both French-speaking and English-speaking organizations in Africa. By the late 1980s it had won hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid. To outsiders, then, Rwanda appeared to be a peaceful, wellordered, and increasingly prosperous African country. But beneath the surface, things were not so peaceful. Security forces ruthlessly crushed any sign of opposition to the regime. Nor was the economic growth secure. While the vast majority of Rwandan peasants got by on subsistence farming, the commercial elites lived off earnings generated from the country’s two main exports, coffee and tin, both of which saw a downward spiral in world prices during the 1980s. Indeed, as the prices declined, political instability increased. In 1980 there was a failed coup. In 1988, Colonel Stanislas Muyuya, a potential successor to Habyarimana, was murdered. This event reflected deep divisions within the Hutu elite. Like the Rwandan royal courts of old, various clans, representing various regions of the country, maneuvered for access to the ruler. The murder of Muyuya set off serious infighting in the capital just at a time when falling commodity prices necessitated a 40 percent cut in social spending. Already overburdened by taxes and forced labor recruitment for government projects, the peasantry grew increasingly unruly, especially as overcrowding led to demands for land reform (which would ruin some commercial elites). When domestic and foreign journalists reported on the growing tensions, they were arrested or thrown out of the country.

R P F Invasion and French Intervention The Tutsi exiles in Uganda were only too aware that unrest was growing in their country. Militants in the RPF decided that the situation represented a great opportunity to seize power, or a share of power, in Kigali. Conscious of these developments, the Habyarimana regime decided to try to repatriate some Tutsi peacefully. The RPF saw this move as a threat to its plans, and on October 1, 1990, some 2,500 guerrillas of the Rwandese Patriotic Army—the military branch of the RPF—crossed the Ugandan border into Rwanda. After some initial successes, the well-equipped guerrilla operation bogged down, immeasurably set back by the accidental death of its commander, Major General Fred Rwigyema.

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Within a week, both the French—who had become increasingly involved in Rwanda’s politics and economy—and the Belgians sent in troops. But their small numbers and their official noncombat status left much to be desired as far as the Rwandan government was concerned. To win more support, Habyarimana staged a fake attack on the capital. The ruse worked, and the French sent in more troops. The scheme played on French fears—they had always insisted on tight political and economic control of the colonies they managed. They were especially eager to maintain some control in Africa, the one region in the world where they continued to dominate. They saw their main challengers as the British and Americans. The Tutsi of the invading RPF spoke English, and to the French this represented the threat that English speakers might one day dominate in Rwanda, where French had long ruled as the official language. While France sent in more troops to defend this postcolonial colony, Belgium sent more troops for a more practical reason—to protect the substantial community of Belgian expatriates in the country. Habyarimana used the staged attack on Kigali not only to gain French support, but also to justify further action against the Tutsi. The regime arrested hundreds of Tutsi political activists. At the same time, it vastly expanded its army, which succeeded in driving the RPF out of the country and back into Uganda by the end of 1990. By mid-1992, the Rwandan army had increased from a relatively welldisciplined and well-trained force of about 5,000 to some 50,000. The French, Egyptians, and South Africans supplied arms. The force represented an important deterrent to invasion, but it proved dangerous and undisciplined. If payment to the troops was late, they often looted and pillaged both Hutu and Tutsi property. For the next several years, the RPF regrouped its forces in Uganda under its new commander, Major General Paul Kagame. It recruited émigré soldiers from Uganda and other countries. The relatively high level of education among these recruits meant that the larger RPF—numbering some 25,000 by 1994— was better disciplined and better trained. Funding was provided by the international community of Tutsi expatriates from Rwanda, many of whom had done well financially. Though reorganizing itself, the RPF also continued its raids, including a successful one on a Rwandan prison that freed a number of Tutsi militants.

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Attempts at Democracy and Peace Despite its efforts to round up Tutsi militants, the Habyarimana regime sought to ease tensions by moves to liberalize. In November 1991, the president announced several reforms. For Hutu opponents, he offered multiparty elections and a new constitution. For the Tutsi, he promised an end to ethnic references on identity cards and all other official papers. In the wake of this speech, many political organizations were formed. The largest and most important was a new incarnation of the PARMEHUTU, which had been banned after the 1973 coup. Others included a radical Hutu nationalist party, Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), the more liberal Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the church-based Christian Democratic Party. Meanwhile, the president’s own National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) added a second “D” to its name standing for “and Democracy.” The new political parties quickly realized that they were meant to adorn Rwanda, not rule it. That is to say, their existence allowed the Habyarimana regime to show the world it was democratic without actually surrendering any power. A joint statement by the opposition parties complained that Habyarimana’s MRNDD party had a monopoly on the government-owned media and often used goons to break up opposition rallies. Unfortunately, the violence was not confined to political hooliganism. As the country moved hesitantly toward democracy, it remained in a high state of tension. Although it had just turned back an invasion by the RPF, it still faced a crisis atmosphere as fighting between the army and the guerrillas continued along the border. Hard-line elements within the ruling MRNDD used this climate to organize Hutu voters to combat Tutsi infiltration. Spreading rumors of Tutsi massacres of Hutu at political rallies, they set off a number of massacres of the Tutsi. Fearful of the hard-liners’ growing political power and popularity, the government failed to prosecute those who were inciting violence. Still, opposition to the regime grew. After a mass rally of some 50,000 people in the capital, Habyarimana agreed to a multiparty cabinet in January 1992. As the new cabinet worked to lower ethnic tensions and open up the government, the MRNDD hardliners were sending a different message, charging the

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Habyarimana administration with weakness in the face of Tutsi threats and labeling the opposition parties as “fifth columns” for the RPF. Habyarimana was desperately seeking a way to resolve the growing political tensions and low-level civil conflict in the country. The strife was bankrupting his regime, undermining the country’s economy, and potentially creating a revolutionary situation. Spiraling foreign debt forced the government to enact International Monetary Fund reforms that required the firing of thousands of civil servants and major cuts in food and fuel subsidies needed by the average Rwandan peasant and worker. By this time, most of the operating budget for Rwanda was coming directly from foreign aid. On August 17, 1992, the president announced on national radio that he had signed a cease-fire agreement with the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania. But as the negotiations for a repatriation of Tutsi continued in Arusha, the Hutu militants in the MRNDD and the CDR complained that the government was selling the country out to the Tutsi. More insidiously, they were beginning to organize a number of alternative institutions—including Hutu militias, known traditionally as the interhamwe, and death squads recruited from the army—designed to scare the opposition parties into submission, end the Arusha negotiations, and force the president to launch an all-out war with the RPF. The militants were also increasing their political organizing throughout the country. At rallies and over their own radio stations, they charged the government with selling out the country. Using the old myths of Tutsi dominance perpetuated by the Belgians, militants warned their fellow Hutu that the Tutsi had infiltrated the government and were using the Arusha negotiations to reestablish their dominance over the Hutu population. They described Tutsi massacres of Hutu in RPF-controlled territory and a regime that turned Hutu into slaves. In January 1993, they organized violent demonstrations in the northwest part of the country. The MRNDD and CDR militants massacred some 300 Tutsi civilians over a period of about a week. The RPF retaliated in February, invading the region and driving some 300,000 Hutu refugees before them. The RPF targeted those they believed had organized the earlier atrocities but killed numerous innocent civilians and government workers in the process. The attack alienated Hutu liberals in the

capital and sparked a harsh response from Paris, leading to the dispatch of 300 more troops to Rwanda. The presence of the French troops dissuaded the RPF from marching on the capital. Despite the setback, negotiations in Arusha continued. While a plan for repatriating refugees was worked out, the thornier question of how many Tutsi to integrate into the national army remained unsolved. Though Habyarimana faced increasing opposition from both Hutu militants and liberals at home and increasing demands from RPF negotiators, the president signed the Arusha Accord in August 1993, paving the way for Tutsi repatriation, a new coalition government, and an integrated national army. It was a complicated agreement, with many parts, and would require goodwill on the part of all parties, a commodity in short supply in Rwanda. Aside from the many difficulties of integrating the Tutsi back into Rwandan life and society, the accord also called for the presence of a multinational peacekeeping force. In September, the United Nations agreed to establish its Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) with a complement of 2,500 well-armed troops. While Rwanda waited for their arrival, tensions mounted. Preparing for a new political order, the hard-liners—now supported by a new organization, Hutu Power—began to organize for a showdown with the new coalition government, settling personal scores with opponents and setting up a clandestine network of militias and political groups. Hutu Power as a movement claimed that the Tutsi were an alien race to Rwanda and, based on their outsider status, ought to be eliminated. Amid this political turmoil came a shock from the outside: the assassination of neighboring Burundi’s first democratically elected Hutu president by Tutsi militants in October 1993. With its army still in Tutsi hands, Burundi descended into anarchy and mass killings, as soldiers massacred civilians, and Hutu militias and civilians murdered Tutsi. Over the next several weeks, some 50,000 Burundians were killed, about 60 percent Tutsi and 40 percent Hutu. Equally significant, the massacres sent some 300,000 Burundian Hutu refugees into Rwanda. The assassination and the arrival of traumatized Hutu civilians fed the propaganda of the militant Rwandan Hutu and hardened their conviction that the Arusha Accord meant disaster for themselves and their country. It also put fear into the more liberal Hutu opposition. Burned once by the RPF invasion

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A Rwandan soldier inspects the wreckage of the plane, shot down in an April 1994 missile attack, in which President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed. The incident sparked an outbreak of genocide that took the lives of up to 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutu. (Scott Peterson/Getty Images News)

in February, they now saw yet another danger of coalition-building with Tutsi, a fear enhanced by the RPF’s lack of enthusiasm in condemning the assassination conducted by fellow Tutsi in Burundi. In the midst of this growing tension, the various components of the Arusha Accord were being put into place. In November, UNAMIR peacekeepers began to replace French paratroopers. The following month, several RPF leaders flew to Kigali to take up their positions in the new cabinet. Meanwhile, demonstrations and murders rocked the capital, as militant Hutu assassinated liberal politicians, and liberal parties retaliated with attacks on the CDR. The violence prevented Habyarimana from implementing the Arusha Accord, and so he flew back to the Tanzanian city in early April to explain his difficulties to the impatient heads of states of neighboring African states. After a series of lectures, Habyarimana—along with the new Burundian president, Cyprien Ntaryamira—boarded his jet to return to Kigali, where he planned to lend it to Ntaryamira

to fly back to the Burundian capital. Flying into Kigali airport, however, the plane was struck by two missiles and crashed, killing everyone aboard.

Genocide and War While controversy surrounds the assassination, most Rwanda observers now agree, despite the lack of an official investigation, that the missiles were launched by Hutu militants who had two reasons for doing so. One was obvious: to eliminate the moderate Habyarimana and destroy the Arusha peace process. The other was to launch the genocide. Indeed, within minutes of the attack, Hutu-controlled radio, in particular Radio Télévision Libre de Mille Collines (RTLM), was broadcasting inflammatory reports about a Tutsiinspired assassination of Habyarimana. Moreover, the Hutu militia and extremist elements in the army immediately began rounding up all potential opponents, including both Tutsi and liberal Hutu. Militia roadblocks went up around the city.

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To eliminate the foreign presence in the country— which they believed might present an obstacle to their plans—Hutu militants murdered ten Belgian members of the UNAMIR force. The strategy worked. Belgium, the European country most likely to intervene against the militants, immediately pulled out the rest of its troops. And UNAMIR, lacking even a mandate to use force to defend itself, pulled back into its compound. These actions were taken despite the warnings the UN had received from UNAMIR’s commander, Roméo Dallaire, three months earlier, that massacres were occurring, and it looked as if they would spread and intensify. Meanwhile, across Rwanda, the Hutu underground went into action, organizing brigades of civilians and setting them on their Tutsi neighbors. Radio broadcasts spoke of the duty of all Hutu to defend their country by destroying the inyenzi, “cockroaches”—the term they applied to the Tutsi. Hutu propaganda broadcasts contradicted themselves. On the one hand, they sought to dehumanize the Tutsi by referring to them as insects, making it easier for Hutu peasants—long used to taking orders from a powerful and all-intrusive bureaucracy—to commit countless massacres that beggar the imagination. At the same time, the radio broadcasts insisted that the Tutsi were a dangerous and powerful group, who were secretly organizing to destroy the Hutu people. Together this potent brew of contempt and fear led thousands of ordinary Hutu into an orgy of carnage against their friends, their neighbors, and— given the tradition of Hutu-Tutsi intermarriage— their own kin. Most of the killing was done with simple tools, like machetes and clubs. Hutu peasants, organized and led by members of the militias and soldiers from the army, killed an estimated 800,000 Tutsi civilians and Hutu sympathizers, about 11 percent of the country’s population, between April 6 and early June 1994. Another shocking aspect of this genocide was the deep involvement of the Catholic Church. Rwanda was the most Catholic country in Africa, and many fled to churches seeking protection, only to find that priests were either actively or passively complicit with the genocide. This disaster was not mindless killing on the part of uneducated peasants alone: physicians in hospitals also took part, murdering their Tutsi patients in their beds. With the exception of the genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, this carnage represented the worst act of genocide since the Holocaust of World War II.

Like the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide occurred during a war that the organizers of the genocide were losing. Just two days after the assassination of Habyarimana, the RPF launched a new offensive deep into the country, with some of its troops arriving in the capital by April 11, where for the next three months they battled with elements of the Hutu army and militias for control. Not only did the RPF attack the Hutu army; when they encountered UNAMIR troops at the airport, the RPF attacked them, claiming they could not distinguish UN peacekeepers from Hutu troops. Meanwhile, the outside world failed to act. The administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton, stung by the loss of U.S. troops in Somalia a year before, equivocated on the question of genocide, fearing that any admission that genocide was taking place would require America’s intervention as a signatory of a 1948 international accord on genocide. And while both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union) recognized the genocide for what it was, the former continued to insist that it was being conducted by both Hutu and Tutsi when, in fact, it was an entirely Hutu affair. Ironically, the Rwandan genocide was financed primarily with foreign aid, particularly funds from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment programs, though neither institution was aware of what was being done with the money. It is estimated that $134 million in aid was spent on genocide preparation in Rwanda—with some $4.6 million spent on weapons alone. A number of experts believe that such spending allowed the distribution of one new machete to every three Hutu males. The poverty in Rwanda, whose government was so strongly supported by international aid, is another possible cause of the genocide. Scholars suggest that overpopulation may have been one motivation for the murder of Tutsi. Indeed, after their deaths, their land and houses were frequently claimed with eagerness by their Hutu neighbors. The presence of France, the only country to get deeply involved, made things even worse for the Tutsi of Rwanda. Still seeing their interest in defending French-speaking Africans (the Rwandan army) from English-speaking invaders (the RPF), the French determined to save the Rwandan Hutu by establishing a line that essentially trapped the Tutsi of the RPF and allowed Hutu extremists to continue their massacres. Dallaire, commander of the UN peacekeepers, later

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charged that the French troops could have been used to prevent the genocidal attacks of the Hutu.

Aftermath and Legacy By mid-June the capital of Kigali had fallen to RPF troops, who set up an interim government in July with a Hutu as president, despite the fact that most of the city’s Hutu inhabitants had fled and most of the Tutsi were dead. Indeed, under the goading of Hutu extremists and fearful of Tutsi reprisals, some 2 million Hutu refugees, many of whom had participated in the genocide, poured across the country’s borders, dropping their weapons as they fled. Most went to Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and some to Tanzania. This was the largest sudden mass movement of refugees in African history and overwhelmed the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross, that were trying to provide food and medical care. There was little water, shelter, or food. Cholera broke out in the camps, killing thousands more. The murderers of just a few weeks before now hid among the refugees, receiving foreign aid and assistance. Over the next two years, as the new Tutsidominated government of Rwanda tried to reestablish a semblance of order and redevelopment in the country, huge numbers of Hutu refugees remained in the camps in Tanzania and Zaire, cared for by the United Nations and other NGOs. Inside the camps, the Hutu militia organizers took charge. Supported by the masses of Hutu peasants, the organizers threatened violence to protect themselves from being turned over to Rwandan or international authorities. In addition, they began organizing a rebel movement to invade Rwanda, take over the government again, and finish the task of eliminating the Tutsi population once and for all. These Hutu militant plans were dashed when long-time Tutsi expatriates began to demand the leaders’ removal from the camps. In Zaire, the Tutsi, together with Zairian rebels, forced the closure of the camps in late 1996, sending hundreds of thousands of refugees back into Rwanda. The Tanzanian government soon followed suit. Some Hutu refugees escaped and traveled deeper into Zaire, to the Kivu province, pursued by the combined forces of Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian revolutionaries. In effect, both the Hutu and the Tutsi of Rwanda were exporting their bitter controversy to another and much larger

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country where an oncoming civil war would cause even more death and destruction. Like the Holocaust before it, the Rwandan genocide, along with the “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia, prompted the international community to create a court system to prosecute those who commit crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established under United Nations auspices at the end of 1994, issuing a list of 200 persons considered to be prime movers of the genocide. The list included members of the Akazu, the small circle of Hutu power elite, and Agathe Hayarimana, the wife of the slain president. In the tribunal’s first years, progress was slow. The first conviction came in 1998 and was followed by former prime minister Kambanda’s admission of guilt. Beginning in 1999, the court’s pace picked up. More than twenty-five trials were completed by 2005, and the tribunal hopes to complete sixty-five to seventy-five cases. In Rwanda, the government under the RPF’s Paul Kagame faced great difficulties in reconciling its citizens and rebuilding the country’s society. Since a majority of Hutu Rwandans may have participated in the genocide, Tutsi and other survivors remained fearful. The United Nations and nongovernmental organizations sought to help by dividing citizens into such groups as “returnee,” “victim,” and “survivor.” In 2001, the government began implementation of a traditional participatory justice system, known as “gacaca,” to address the enormous backlog of cases. Democratic local elections were held for the first time in 1999, and, despite sweeping political reforms, the country continued its struggle to attract investment and to increase agricultural production. One striking indicator of the long way left to go for true reconciliation is that Rwandan schools no longer teach history, fearing that examination of the country’s painful past would only continue to tear society apart. Ten years after the genocide in Rwanda, the world was still trying to clarify the lessons of the grim disaster. Among them were the failure of international organizations and powerful nations to intervene during the long months of slaughter; the complicity of former colonial governments in current African problems; and the deep difficulty of mounting effective humanitarian interventions in the face of longstanding feuds between ethnic and cultural ene-

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mies. The killing in Rwanda has made world powers and organizations more willing to identify emerging conflicts as “genocide” but still has not led to the development of effective means of intervention to end or prevent future conflicts. James Ciment and Erika Quinn See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Burundi: Ethnic Strife Since 1962; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Kabila Uprising, 1996–1997; Congo, Democratic Republic of: Invasions and Internal Strife, 1998.

Bibliography African Rights Organization. Rwanda, Killing the Evidence: Murder, Attacks, Arrests, and Intimidation of Survivors and Witnesses. London: African Rights, 1996. Dallaire, Roméo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003. Destexhe, Alain. Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1995. Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We

Will Be Killed with Our Families. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998. Keane, Fergal. Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey. New York: Viking, 1995. Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. McCullum, Hugh. The Angels Have Left Us: The Rwanda Tragedy and the Churches. Geneva: WCC Publications, 1995. Minear, Larry. Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda. Paris: Development Centre, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996. Peress, Gilles. The Silence. New York: Scalo, 1995. Prunier, Gérard. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. Scherrer, Christian P. Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Vassall-Adams, Guy. Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action. Oxford: Oxfam Publications, 1994.

SIERRA LEONE: Civil Conflict,1990–Present TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Coups PARTICIPANTS: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Liberia 0

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declaring the country a one-party state of the APC. Upon completion of his term in 1985, Stevens was replaced as president by the head of the armed forces, Joseph Saidu Momoh. Unable to reverse the economic decline, Momoh’s government faced a growing wave of strikes and political protests, as well as charges of corruption among government officials. In response, Momoh declared a state of emergency in November 1987, curtailing nearly all political activity and imposing harsh penalties for corruption. Still, protests calling for political reform continued to mount in the late 1980s and early 1990s, forcing Momoh to accept a new multiparty constitution in 1991, which was passed by 60 percent of the voters. Rising political unrest led to a military coup in April 1992 under the leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser.

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

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Diamond mining area Major ethnic group

Like its Liberian neighbor to the east, Sierra Leone was founded as a haven for freed slaves and, later, “recaptureds”—slaves freed from ships by the British navy after Parliament declared the international slave trade illegal in 1807. Unlike the case in Liberia, however, the population of freed slaves in Sierra Leone was never large enough to form an independent ruling class. Thus, coastal Sierra Leone remained a colony of the British government until 1961. A British protectorate over the interior of the country was established in 1896. In 1951, Britain granted a constitution to the country that allowed for free elections. On April 27, 1961, Sierra Leone won its independence from Britain, with Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) as its first prime minister and with the opposition All People’s Congress (APC) holding the majority of seats in the legislature. Following several attempted coups and mutinies, a republic was declared in 1971, with APC head Siaka Stevens as president. A declining economy in the 1970s led to political unrest and a new constitution in 1978

Rise of the R U F and Liberian Civil War While the Momoh government was collapsing and Strasser was making his plans for a coup d’état in the capital of Freetown, trouble was brewing in the provinces. Foday Sankoh, a political radical from the capital who had been involved in various protests and coup attempts, had organized a mysterious guerrilla movement called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and was establishing political cells throughout the country. Claiming to follow the precepts of Cambodia’s brutal leader Pol Pot and a mystical nineteenth-century Sierra Leonean rebel named Bai Bureh, the RUF largely confined itself during the 1980s to small raids on army outposts and smuggling of gems from Sierra Leone’s small diamond fields. Civil war in neighboring Liberia provided Sankoh the opportunity to expand his struggle to overthrow the Momoh government, which he said was corrupt and ideologically bankrupt. Liberian rebel leader Charles

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KEY DATES 1961

Sierra Leone wins its independence from Britain.

1985

Army head Joseph Saidu Momoh becomes president.

1987

Strikes and political protests lead Momoh to declare a state of emergency.

1991

Continuing protests force Momah to accept a new multiparty constitution; Nigerian and Guinean troops help the Sierra Leone government launch a counterattack against the newly formed rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

1992

A military coup, led by Captain Valentine Strasser, topples the government.

1995

RUF leaders refuse to negotiate with the government until all foreign forces leave the country.

1996

Ahmed Tejan Kabbah wins the presidency in March elections; in November, Kabbah and Foday Sankoh, head of the RUF, sign a peace agreement.

1997

Despite the fact that all foreign troops have left the country, the RUF violates the agreement and launches new attacks; Kabbah is overthrown in a military coup in May.

1998–1999

Fighting continues as first the Nigerians and then the RUF launch major offensives.

1999

On July 7, representatives from the government and the RUF sign the Lome Accord, ending the conflict and calling for the RUF’s demobilization and incorporation into the political process; nevertheless, fighting contnues.

2002

After new peace agreements, fighting in Sierra Leone comes to an end.

2003

Sankoh dies of heart failure; Liberian president Charles Taylor, who supported the RUF, is ejected from power and forced to seek exile in Nigeria.

Taylor and his National Patriotic Liberation Front (NPFL) were fighting a West African peacekeeping force called the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was headed by Nigeria and included a contingent of Sierra Leonean soldiers. In 1990 and 1991, Taylor invaded Sierra Leone, hoping to force the government to abandon its support for ECOMOG and

give him a share of its income from diamond smuggling. In his battle against the government, Taylor offered military aid to the RUF. Together, the Liberian NPFL and Sierra Leone’s RUF launched attacks on Sierra Leonean government troops. Then in November 1991, ECOMOG and the Sierra Leone government launched a counterattack against the rebels. Meanwhile, ECOMOG was cooper-

Sierra Leone: Civil Conflict, 19 9 0–Present

ating with another rebel group in Liberia—the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO)—in its battle against Taylor’s NPFL. Following failed peace talks between the Sierra Leone government, now headed by Strasser, and various Liberian factions in January 1992, government forces, aided by Guineans, went on the offensive against the RUF and gradually won the upper hand. In Liberia, ULIMO forces were gaining control of the provinces bordering Sierra Leone, increasingly isolating the RUF, which was caught between ULIMO and the forces of the Sierra Leone government. In desperation, the RUF took two British relief workers hostage, claiming that Great Britain was arming the government. The British, who had cut off relations with Sierra Leone following the Strasser coup in April 1992, denied the allegations. In January 1995, the RUF gained control of two mining companies, seizing a number of foreign nationals as hostages. Adding to the chaos was the emergence of bands of renegade soldiers. Known colloquially as “sobels,” a combination of the words soldier and rebel, the renegades often fought for the army during the day and became rebels at night. Because they frequently went unpaid, they tended to engage in banditry, smuggling, rape, and murder. By February 1995, Sankoh began making peace overtures to the government. The fighting and general chaos had displaced some 900,000 Sierra Leonean civilians—about 300,000 to neighboring Liberia and Guinea and 600,000 to the capital, Freetown. But hopes for peace collapsed when the RUF demanded that all foreign troops leave the country before the beginning of negotiations. Besides forces from neighboring Guinea, the Sierra Leone government was depending on mercenaries from South Africa and Gurkha troops from Nepal to recapture territory and mining companies held by the rebels. By June, the government had reclaimed most of the mining territory. The RUF released all foreign nationals to the Red Cross by April, and in October it requested civilian mediation; the government refused. In response, Sankoh ordered all relief agencies to leave the territory he controlled, amid reports of numerous atrocities against civilians. Meanwhile, the Strasser government in Freetown was making hesitant moves toward democracy. After defeating an attempted overthrow in October 1995, Strasser announced legislative elections for February 1996. Before they could take place, however, Strasser

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was ousted in a bloodless coup led by his chief of staff, Maada Bio. The new government allowed the election to go ahead as scheduled, despite continuing political violence and RUF efforts to disrupt the voting. The Sierra Leone People’s Party won a plurality, and in second-round voting in March, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president. Kabbah moved to end the rebellion by the RUF, demanding that the rebels lay down their arms or face a renewed government offensive. In November 1996, Kabbah and Sankoh signed a peace agreement providing that the RUF would disarm and become a legal political party, while the government agreed to remove of all foreign troops from the country and replace them with foreign observers. By February 1997, all foreign troops had indeed left the country, but no sooner had they left than the RUF began violating the agreement. In March, members of the political wing of the RUF removed Sankoh as leader, accusing him of opposing the peace agreement and fomenting unrest within the RUF. Sankoh was placed under house arrest in Nigeria. His remaining supporters sought to win his release by kidnapping the RUF members who had voted for his ouster and Nigeria’s ambassador to Sierra Leone. Neither Nigeria nor the Kabbah government would negotiate with the RUF kidnappers.

Koroma Coup In May 1997, President Kabbah was overthrown in yet another military coup. Claiming they were taking power in order to move talks with the RUF forward, the new junta, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, was condemned by the international community, which immediately slapped heavy sanctions on Sierra Leone. The Nigerian government demanded that Koroma relinquish power and restore the government of Kabbah. It also sent more troops to its base in Freetown. Supported by two naval gunboats, the Nigerians launched an attack against the Koroma regime in June but were driven back by a combined force of the Sierra Leonean army and rebels from the RUF, now formed into a security force known as the People’s Army. Koroma’s government was also facing resistance in the provinces from the Kamajors, traditional Sierra Leonean guerrillas who continued to support Kabbah. Despite being isolated by the international community and besieged by Nigerian troops, the Koroma

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government tried to consolidate its power by establishing a twenty-member ruling council and a cabinet of secretaries. Still, Koroma’s government was unable to win acceptance by its fellow African states. In August 1997, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) voted to tighten the sanctions against Sierra Leone, prohibiting shipment of virtually all essential items except food and medicine. Fighting between the Kamajors and Nigeria on one side and Koroma’s forces and the People’s Army on the other continued throughout the rest of 1997. In January 1998, the Nigerians mounted yet another offensive, backed by jet fighters and naval craft. This assault finally ousted the Koroma government on February 12, forcing its leaders to flee to Guinea. A month later, Kabbah was restored to power at an official ceremony in Freetown. International and African sanctions against Sierra Leone were lifted, but Nigerian troops remained in the country. In late 1998 and early 1999, the RUF launched a new offensive in an effort to capture Freetown. ECOWAS forces drove RUF forces from the capital and halted the offensive, but there had been thousands of casualties. Sankoh and the RUF leadership were forced to ask for terms toward a peace settlement.

Ending the Conflict Beginning in May 1999, members of Sierra Leone’s government met with the leadership of the RUF in the city of Lomé, Togo, to begin peace negotiations with the support of the international community, including ECOWAS and the United Nations, which established the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). On July 7, 1999, the Lomé Accord was announced, declaring an end to the nearly decade-old conflict between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF and providing a framework within which peace could be restored. A cease-fire would be monitored by ECOWAS and UNAMSIL, together with representatives of the government and the RUF. Once again, the RUF was to disarm and transform itself into a political party, allowing its members to hold office and help govern the country. The accord further provided for the establishment of a “commission for the consolidation of peace,” or CCP, whose duty would be to oversee the peace process and verify that all parties adhered to its provisions. The CCP was to incorporate several different committees and national commissions, including the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance to help the

thousands affected by the war, as well as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to create a record of violations of human rights and humanitarian law and promote reconciliation. A separate commission was established to help manage Sierra Leone’s strategic resources, the most important being diamonds and gold. Finally, the Lomé Accord offered full amnesty and pardon to the RUF combatants, including commander Foday Sankoh, even though many had committed horrible atrocities. The accord also provided for many details in managing the peace. They established a fixed date for elections and arranged for the withdrawal of mercenaries and the return of refugees and prisoners to their homes. The accord proved difficult to enforce. In the early months of 2000, RUF forces were already violating the cease-fire, and they compounded their offenses by killing demonstrators who were protesting the violations. These actions resulted in the repeal of some of the articles of the Lomé Accord, including the ones offering Sankoh and other RUF members amnesty as well as allowing them to hold government positions. Sankoh was arrested, and a number of RUF members were removed from office. A new cease-fire agreement was signed in November 2000 in Abuja, Nigeria. The agreement reaffirmed the Lomé Accord but failed to end the resurging conflict. A second agreement, signed in Abuja in May 2001, proved more successful in upholding the terms of the original Lomé Accord. Over the course of the next year, the government of Kabbah further consolidated its power, helping to restore the rule of law throughout large parts of Sierra Leone. This development was assisted by the demobilization and disarming of thousands of former combatants. On January 18, 2002, President Kabbah gave a speech in the town of Lungi, where he made a “declaration of peace in Sierra Leone.”

Postwar Sierra Leone Four months after declaring the civil war to be at an end, Kabbah’s party, the SLPP, won a major victory in general elections. At the same time, the RUF, which was again allowed to run its own candidates, failed to win any seats in the new government. Soon after, foreign troops began disembarking from the country, though the UN mission was extended until the end of 2005.

Sierra Leone: Civil Conflict, 19 9 0–Present

After the war’s end, Sierra Leone made a number of efforts to bring closure to the conflict. Perhaps most important was the establishment of a “special court agreement” between Sierra Leone and the UN, which was to try war criminals who bore the greatest responsibility for war crimes since 1996. These UNbacked courts provided some closure, but many of the main participants of the conflict evaded justice, including RUF commander Sankoh, who died from heart failure in 2003 while in custody and awaiting trial. Charles Taylor, whose support helped to establish the RUF as an effective fighting force, resigned as president of Liberia in 2003, following pressure from both the UN and the United States. Taylor went into exile in Nigeria, which refused to extradite him for trial on his role in the civil war. In 2006, Taylor was moved from his exile in Nigeria to face a war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone. Several months later, he was once again moved to The Hague for trial at the international criminal court.

Analysis The civil conflict that tore Sierra Leone apart ended in 2002. It is estimated that over 50,000 Sierra

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Leoneans died in the conflict, with many tens of thousands more suffering permanent injuries from the war. Millions also were left homeless and forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries, where they were not always welcomed. On the positive side, the disarmament of the country was swift, and rapid assistance from the UN, World Bank, and other international organizations allowed Sierra Leone to begin the long process of rebuilding. James Ciment and Daniel F. Cuthbertson See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Liberia: Civil War, 1989–1997; Liberia: Anti-Taylor Uprising, 1998–2003.

Bibliography Berger, Daniel. In the Land of Magic Soldiers: A Story of White and Black in West Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003. Keen, David. Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Kpundeh, Sahr John. Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995. Kup, Alexander Peter. Sierra Leone: A Concise History. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975. Richards, Paul. Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996.

SOMALIA: Civil War Since 1991 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Ethiopia; United Nations; United States DJIBOUTI

a viable political entity fifteen years after the fall of Barre.

GULF OF ADEN

Historical Background

Berbera SOMALILAND

PUNTLAND

ETHIOPIA OGADEN REGION

SOMALIA

Mogadishu

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INDIAN OCEAN

Kismaayo

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The Somali civil war, one of the most protracted in Africa, offers a series of paradoxes for students of contemporary African history. First, the nation of Somalia comprises a largely homogeneous ethnic group, sharing faith, language, and culture, which seemed to make a bitter civil war less likely. Second, it was one of the most commercially and technologically backward of African states, yet the regime of Mohammed Siad Barre from 1969 to 1991 was one of the continent’s most totalitarian systems. Finally, even though the country seemed to have little value to East or West at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, it drew the international community into its intractable disputes. Still, the Somali civil war was bloody and destructive—and one of its chief victims was the Somali state itself, which was still seeking to become

The Somalis are a distinct ethnic group of some 7 million people who have inhabited the Horn of Africa for centuries. Long connected by trading routes to Arabia, the Somalis converted to Islam soon after Muhammad founded the religion. Indeed, the Islamic connections of the Somali people are represented in both the ancient tradition of tracing their ancestry to the Prophet Muhammad and their modern membership in the Arab League. This Islamic heritage was reinforced by the strong Somali role in the religious wars against Christian Ethiopia in the Middle Ages. For much of their history, the Somalis have been divided into six major clans, distributed in distinct geographic zones and identified with particular pastoral or agricultural practices. While the Somalis never established statehood, they remained a strongly united people and effectively formed a nation. Since they were scattered across a huge, inhospitable territory, political unification proved difficult, but students of history still find it unaccountable that the closely related Somali peoples fell into such bitter internecine fighting. Somalia attracted the attention of European imperialists in the late nineteenth century because of its strategic position, with a long coastline running along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The British, who controlled Aden (in present-day Yemen), just to the north, hoped to prevent the French from gaining a foothold in the region. Thus, the British maneuvered to ensure that southern Somalia fell into the hands of its ally, Italy. The French succeeded in gaining control of Djibouti, just to Somalia’s northwest and extended their influence in that region. Britain itself seized what is now northern Somalia. At the same time, the Somalis were under siege from the west, where they

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KEY DATES 1960 The UN trusteeship of Somalia and British-administered Northern Somaliland are united to form independent Somalia. 1978 The Ethiopian army crushes pro-Somali rebels in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. 1991 Armed resistance from the United Somali Congress (USC) forces longtime dictator Siad Barre to flee the country; in the wake of his ouster, warfare among various clans breaks out across Somalia; members of the Isaq clan in northern Somalia declare their independence from the rest of Somalia. 1992 Clan fighting and drought lead to famine in large parts of Somalia; in December, 30,000 UN troops, including American soldiers, move into Somalia to prevent clan attacks on aid workers trying to feed hungry Somalis. 1993 U.S. forces begin to fight various clan leaders that have attacked UN troops; in July, a U.S. attack on clan leader Mohammed Farrah Aidid’s headquarters kills seventy-three Somali elders by accident; nineteen U.S. soldiers are killed in another raid in search of Aidid in October. 1994 UN troops pull out of Somalia in March. 1996 Aidid is killed in a skirmish; while many hope this might lead to peace, he is succeeded by his son Hussein Muhammed, who vows to fight on. 2004 Leading Somalis, meeting in Kenya, form the Transitional Federal Government in hopes of bringing an end to clan fighting in Somalia.

shared a long and isolated desert border with Ethiopia. Seeking to expand, the Ethiopians gained control of Ogaden, home to many Somalis. Each of the powers occupying parts of traditional Somalia—Italy, France, Britain, and Ethiopia— established alliances with Somali clans, beginning the splintering that would factionalize Somalia after independence. The region was divided into five different jurisdictions: one each under the Italian, French, and Ethiopian flags, and two under British control. Efforts by Muslim forces to drive the imperialists out in the early 1900s failed, leaving the Europeans and Ethiopians even more entrenched. In the 1930s, the Italian government of Benito Mussolini used Italian Somaliland as a base for the successful invasion of Ethiopia, forming a short-lived Italian East African empire. With the defeat of Italy by Allied forces in World War II, Italian Somaliland was ceded to the British.

Following the war, Britain proposed a united Somaliland under UN trusteeship, but the plan was rejected and the country remained partitioned among France, Britain, and Ethiopia. The Italians also returned to administer part of the region in 1950. During these years, the Somalis, encouraged by the British, futilely sought the return of Ethiopianoccupied western Somaliland and the Ogaden region.

Pan- Somali Nationalism In 1960, the various colonial regions of Somalia were united in the newly independent state of Somalia. At first, the leadership of Somalia struggled to overcome the colonial legacy of being administered by several distinct political, judicial, and linguistic systems. Differences were especially great between clans in the

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north and south. In 1961, officers from a northern faction of the army rose up in an unsuccessful coup against the government, which was dominated by southerners. Still, the common linguistic and ethnic bonds of the Somali people eventually led to an uneasy integration of the northern and southern administrations. What prevented a more effective administration was clan loyalty. With regional administrations controlled by different clan networks, personality and personal connections tended to matter more than competence in the appointment of government employees. To solve the problem of clan identification, the government instituted a neat but largely superficial solution: All references to clan identity had to be prefaced with an “ex-,” thereby consigning clans to history by a manipulation of language. The only topic on which most Somalis agreed was unification of the Somali homeland. They especially wanted the territories just outside their borders that were occupied by Somali-speaking peoples. These included northern Kenya (controlled by Britain), Djibouti (controlled by France), and western Somalia and Ogaden (controlled by Ethiopia). The first target was northern Kenya. When Britain refused to acknowledge the wishes of the Somali majority there and handed the territory over to newly independent Kenya in 1963, a low-intensity guerrilla war—known by Kenyan authorities as the shifta, or “bandit war”— broke out, lasting some four years. Though it disrupted the region, it never seriously threatened Kenyan sovereignty. Meanwhile, a more serious Somali uprising had broken out in Ogaden. Somalia appealed to Western powers for help in its fight against Ethiopia but was turned down. It then approached the Soviet Union and succeeded in gaining sympathy and limited assistance. This relationship between Mogadishu and Moscow would bear fruit in later years. After seven years of low-intensity conflict with Kenya and Ethiopia, a new Somali government under Muhammed Egal took office in 1969. It sought to ease relations with its neighbors, cutting off aid to the rebels and attempting to unify the Somali nation by diplomatic means. But Egal’s softer approach inflamed Somali nationalists, as did his manipulation of Somalia’s last nominally free national elections and his increasingly autocratic rule. On October 15, 1969, the president was assassinated. A week later the Somali military took over in a bloodless coup.

Somali Revolution The officers who revolted were sick of the corruption, nepotism, and incompetence of the earlier regimes. But the new government soon went a step further than the mere administrative reforms initially envisioned by the officers. Under the increasingly tight control of coup leader and army commander Mohammed Siad Barre—now head of state and president of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)— Somali society was turned upside down. Among other changes, Barre established the death penalty for serious crimes rather than the traditional tribal blood payment, hoping to break down clan loyalties and forge a more united national identity. In 1970, on the first anniversary of the coup, Siad Barre announced more far-reaching measures under a program he called “scientific socialism,” patterned after similar models in the Eastern bloc. With the army growing ever more dependent on Russian aid and advisors, the government instituted national propaganda campaigns against tribalism and corruption. The word jaalle, or “comrade,” was substituted for the complex set of forms of address in traditional Somali usage. Street children and orphans were gathered into Revolutionary Youth Centers, and vigilante squads were set up in every village and neighborhood to defend the principles of the revolution. Increasingly, the state grew more totalitarian. A national cult resembling those in Stalinist Russia or latter-day North Korea was propagated by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance around the figure of Siad Barre, who was often portrayed in murals and billboards alongside Lenin. The new form of address for Siad Barre became “Father of the Nation.” The office of the presidency was extended to include virtually all government agencies and independent organizations. A National Security Service and National Security Courts dealt with political opponents. The country was divided into fifteen new regions that had nothing to do with the old clan boundaries, while the old clan leaders were retitled “peacemakers” and woven, at least theoretically, into the state bureaucracy. The effort to destroy old political loyalties and instill a new nationalism was matched by economic and cultural reforms. The Siad Barre government nationalized what little industry the country had and made farmers and herdsmen sell their commodities to government purchasing boards. (This was difficult to

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enforce among the pastoralists, since they could simply herd their animals to market in neighboring countries.) In its efforts to settle northern nomads, in order to increase productivity and establish more effective political control, the government was aided by a drought that forced many herdsmen to settle in government camps in the south of the country, where they were taught to fish and farm.

Renewed Pan- Somali Nationalism Siad Barre focused on domestic issues of economic reform and political control during his first five years in power. In 1974 events outside the country forced him to focus his attention on foreign affairs. During that year, the longstanding monarchy of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia fell to a military coup of left-wing officers. In the confusion that followed, the Eritrean people of northern Ethiopia rose up in revolt to achieve an independent homeland. Somali nationalists in eastern Ethiopia rose up, hoping to unite with their brethren in Somalia. By 1976, the Western Somali Liberation Front had driven the demoralized Ethiopian army out of much of Ogaden. The new socialist government of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia sought military help from the Soviet Union to battle its restive minority populations. The United States had cut off assistance to Ethiopia as it became increasingly socialist. Within a year, a major change had occurred in the Horn of Africa. The Soviets abandoned Somalia, which it had been aiding, and took the side of Ethiopia. The United States moved tentatively to fill the aid gap in Somalia and retain some influence in the region. With Russian aid, Ethiopia crushed the Ogaden rebellion in 1978. Nearly a million Somali refugees crossed the border into Somalia. Half were housed in government-run camps, while the other half were absorbed by their Somalian families and clans. By 1980, approximately one out of every four Somalis was a refugee. Somalia’s defeat in Ogaden also produced unrest in its military, leading to a coup attempt in April 1978 by military officers from the Dayod clan, a traditional rival of Siad Barre’s Marrehan clan. The coup failed, but its leaders formed an antigovernment guerrilla force called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) across the border in Ethiopia.

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With Ethiopian aid, they made some progress against the Siad Barre government. Even though Russian aid to Ethiopia had helped cause a massive refugee problem for Somalia, the Russians’ departure from Somalia in 1978 was welcomed by the Somali people, who realized that Soviet advisers contributed to the more repressive aspects of the Siad Barre regime. After the Soviet departure, Siad Barre announced a return to democracy and the freeing of some 3,000 political prisoners. Much of this declaration, however, was merely rhetoric. In elections held in 1979, Siad Barre manipulated the system to ensure the overwhelming victory of the government party. With the loss of Russian support, Siad Barre felt vulnerable to his enemies at home. To strengthen his hold on power, he developed closer ties with particular clan leaders. He moved to appoint members of three specific clans—his own (Marrehan) and those of his mother (Ogaden) and son-in-law (Dulbahante)— to all key government posts. The ruling party increasingly became associated with these clans. Through the party network of security officials and spies, these three clans began to impose their will over all other clans throughout the country.

Famine and Civil War The 1980s were a terrible time for the Horn of Africa. A prolonged drought led to large-scale refugee movements and the need for massive international food aid. The suffering, as well as the increasingly militaristic rule of the Siad Barre regime, led to yet another guerrilla uprising in Somalia in the early and mid-1980s. The Isaq clan of the north formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) to express its deep resentment against the domination of southerners in the national government. To crush the movement, the government employed political repression and harsh economic measures, including withholding food aid to the northern region. Despite these measures, armed opposition to the Siad Barre regime was growing. In April 1988, Siad Barre and Ethiopia’s Mengistu finally signed a peace treaty in which they agreed to stop supporting rebel movements in each other’s territory. Siad Barre stopped supporting Somalis attempting to liberate western Somalia from Ethiopia, and Mengistu ended his help to Siad Barre’s Somali enemies in the north. This loss of support goaded the SNM to launch a bold attack on military installations

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A clan fighter loyal to the joint forces of the United Somali Congress and Somali Patriotic Movement displays a truckborne missile system amid fighting in the southern part of the country in May 1992. (Alexander Joe/AFP/Getty Images)

throughout northern Somalia, leading to an all-out civil war between the regime and the Isaq clan that would last until 1991. In southern Ethiopia, Ogaden Somalis who had lost their support from the Somali government gave up their fight against Ethiopia and crossed the border back into Somalia. There, many were recruited to serve in militias in northern Somalia, while others settled in lands and towns abandoned by the Isaq, taking over their property. Siad Barre struck back by recruiting other northern clans to fight the SNM, calling on their sense of clan solidarity. Thus the slowly collapsing Siad Barre regime used old divisions and animosities to keep itself in power. Siad Barre continued to court the Ogaden refugee population, but the increasing barbarity of his pacification efforts alienated this key group. Many accepted a deal from Ethiopia’s Mengistu that allowed them to return to new autonomous areas within the Ogaden. Angry at their second-class treatment by Somali officers, the Ogaden Somalis formed yet another rebel group, the Somali Patriotic Movement.

This group then joined other opposition groups in a loose confederation called the United Somali Congress (USC). The USC was dominated by the Hawiye branch of the Somali family of peoples. One Hawiye clan lived in and around the Somali capital, Mogadishu. Another, from the north, was led by Mohammed Farrah Aidid, a former general and diplomat in Siad Barre’s government. Desperate to end the multiple uprisings, Siad Barre called upon his Dayod clan to massacre the Hawiye opposition in Mogadishu. This warlike act sparked a new round of bitter interclan fighting and brought the northern forces of Aidid to Mogadishu. On January 26, 1991, Siad Barre was forced to flee Mogadishu, taking refuge in his clan’s home base in Gedo, northwest of the capital. He took with him the last semblance of a central government for Somalia. In Gedo, Siad Barre formed the Somali National Front (SNF), based on his own clan and its allies, to return himself to power. His recruiters told stories of the Hawiye’s indiscriminate revenge killings of

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Dayod clansmen, but it was too late to be effective. In April, the rebel USC defeated Siad Barre’s followers, driving tens of thousands of new refugees into Kenya and Ethiopia. With Siad Barre gone, the Abgal group, under a prominent Mogadishu trader named Ali Mahdi, established an interim government. But this move created suspicions among Aidid’s group, sparking renewed fighting in the capital between the two groups for six months. Finally, a USC party congress in July elected Aidid chairman and permitted Mahdi to stay on as interim president. Tensions persisted nevertheless and, by September, had flared up into heavy street fighting, leaving the capital divided between the Abgal and Aidid-run clans. Even during the fighting, the Abgal government was sending emissaries to powerful countries abroad, attempting to win recognition and support. In addition, Abgal leaders began talks with the northern Isaq clan and its organization. Misunderstanding and jealousies between regions and clans continued to disrupt the talks, however, and the Isaq organization remained cool to the idea of joining the interim government. Instead of joining an alliance with southerners, the Isaqs were successfully allying themselves with other clans in the northwest, an alliance based on their mutual distrust and hatred of southerners and the memories of the atrocities that Siad Barre had committed against the peoples of the northwest. At a conference in May 1991, the Isaqs and others in the area declared their region—formerly British Somaliland— independent of the south. Somalia was breaking apart along the old imperialist boundaries that Britain and Italy had set a hundred years earlier. It had two interim governments that refused to recognize each other, both of which were actively seeking international recognition. Neither group would gain that recognition. Mahdi’s “government” represented only the capital of Mogadishu (and sometimes only a few key neighborhoods of that city). By contrast, the Isaqs’ SNM controlled much of the country, at least on paper, but they did not have access to the remaining shreds of government administration in the capital. Throughout 1992, then, the country remained divided along clan lines, based on divisions that had been deepened by Siad Barre’s covert use of clan loyalties to reinforce his power. As they gained access to improved weapons, the clans sought first for revenge

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against enemy clans. Increasingly fearful and enraged, they launched invasions of other clans’ territories and organized to defend their own territories against attack. The year was marked by some of the most vicious fighting in the war. Mogadishu was being destroyed in the sustained street fighting between the various factions. The commercial and industrial sectors of the economy were in ruins, and even agriculture was being affected. The standard of living for ordinary Somalis, already at a low ebb, began to spiral downward again. Hunger and starvation were spreading throughout the south. Moreover, the fighting had driven the United Nations and virtually all international aid agencies out of the country, compounding the suffering. And when the effort was made to bring in supplies through the Mogadishu airport, the goods were looted by various factions, sparking resentment outside the city and a belief that the international community supported the Hawiye.

International Intervention— and Withdrawal With the intense suffering of Somali civilians gaining increasing attention in the world’s media, the international community began to respond. After failed UN mediation, U.S. President George H.W. Bush, recently defeated for reelection, decided to send U.S. troops to Somalia in December under the operational name “Restore Hope.” The 30,000-man force— known officially as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), then the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and drawn from first-world (largely the United States), Islamic, and African countries—was given the mission of securing peace, mediating between the clans, and ensuring the safe and effective delivery of food aid to the civilian population of the country. At first, UNOSOM seemed effective in cooling the fighting near Mogadishu and ensuring food deliveries, but it soon got caught up in the clan struggles. In attempting to mediate disputes, it accepted warlords and their representatives as serious negotiators. Many of these leaders proved to be more interested in using the talks to improve the position of their clan and blaming violence on others than in bringing an end to the conflict. UNOSOM commanders began to interpret the hostilities as direct attacks on them. Then Aidid’s forces did attack UNOSOM troops and killed twenty-three Pakistani soldiers to prevent

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delivery of arms and food to their opponents in the city. UNOSOM immediately set out to capture Aidid. In July, a U.S. helicopter raid on a building suspected of being Aidid’s Mogadishu headquarters accidentally killed seventy-three Somali elders holding a peace conference, increasing the animosities between UNOSOM and Aidid’s forces. The United States and UNOSOM received warnings from Somalis and international experts to call off their search for Aidid and end the spiraling violence. Yet, they persisted in their efforts. On October 3, UNOSOM forces engaged in an all-night battle with Aidid’s men, leading to the death of nineteen UNOSOM soldiers. When television news showed Somali forces dragging the body of a dead U.S. Marine through the streets of Mogadishu, public support in the United States for the mission to Somalia ended. American and European countries soon announced that they would withdraw in March 1994. U.S. military leaders felt humiliated by the incident and bitter that the Somalis seemed unable to negotiate in good faith. The United Nations was forced to revise its mandate in Somalia. Disgusted by the continuing quagmire, the UN also withdrew in March. The withdrawal seemed to spur Aidid and Mahdi to reach an agreement over the crucial question of access to the port and airport in Mogadishu, but this agreement also was quickly violated by both sides. After a conference of pro-Aidid groups in southern Somalia elected Aidid “president” of yet another interim government, conflict quickly reemerged between Aidid and opposition groups. Aidid captured the southern port of Baidoa, but renewed fighting broke out in Mogadishu at the end of 1995 and lasted into the summer. In August 1996, Aidid died in a skirmish, and many were hopeful that his death might lead to an end to the fighting. It did not. His son, Hussein Muhammed Aidid, was elected to replace his father and vowed to continue the armed struggle. Following a failed October cease-fire, fighting continued throughout the country into early 1997. Meanwhile, renewed efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict proceeded. In December 1996, the leaders of more than twenty-five Somali factions—with the notable exception of Aidid’s—met in Ethiopia, where they hammered out a resolution calling for a forty-one-member National Salvation Council (NSF), with nine members from each of the four major clans and a total of five from the smaller ones. Hussein Ai-

did, however, rejected the council, insisting he was the rightfully elected president of Somalia. Still, the NSF tried to find a way to end the fighting. When information was obtained pointing to an illicit trade between European Union countries and various clans—whereby Somalia’s banana crop was exchanged for weapons—the NSF won an EU decision to halt the imports of Somali fruit. The NSF also gained financial aid for a national reconciliation conference, which was held early in 1997 in Ethiopia. While the NSF was seeking international help, Aidid and Mahdi were attempting to resolve the differences between their groups. In January 1997, the two met and agreed to the rules established by the October 1996 cease-fire, which included halting the fighting, removing roadblocks, ending inflammatory propaganda broadcasts, helping the delivery of food aid, and permitting the free movement of people throughout the capital. Still, Aidid refused to accept a power-sharing agreement reached at the Ethiopian national reconciliation conference. It is estimated that tens of thousands of Somalis died in these years of fighting, while hundreds of thousands succumbed to the starvation and disease the war helped to create. The conflict left the country shattered, not only politically and economically but also culturally and socially. In the early 2000s, approximately 2 million Somali refugees were scattered around the globe, most of them in the neighboring countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. In addition, roughly 50 percent of the population within the country were considered by the UN to be internally displaced people (IDP), most of them living in and around the capital, Mogadishu. Although the era of major open battles ended in the mid-1990s, a lowintensity conflict among clans persisted in the capital and other regions.

Efforts to End the Conflict The political efforts to end the conflict continued. In 2004 leading Somalis met in Kenya and established the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Colonel Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed was elected interim president, although he was opposed by many factions. Many Somalis were skeptical about Yusuf Ahmed’s leadership, seeing him as a potential stalking horse for the government of neighboring Ethiopia, which had designs on Somali territory. The TFG, with its base in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, hoped to return to

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Somalia to become the resident government. But during months of waiting, it became detached from the everyday life of Somalia. Yusuf Ahmed seemed aware of his government’s unpopularity, as he requested that the African Union send troops to protect its move to Jawhar, a city just outside the old capital of Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the TGF made it a top priority to unify the clans under a single government. This meant bringing self-governing territories such as Somaliland, autonomous since 1991, and Puntland, under its own leadership since 1998, into the national polity. (Both regional governments were relatively stable, but neither was recognized internationally.) TGF plans called for unifying the government, disarming roughly 50,000 clan-based militiamen, establishing a judicial system, and rebuilding the economy with foreign aid. Establishing a new basis of national leadership was essential to the process, experts said. In the long civil war, the authority of traditional clan elders was undermined; a new political elite called the shots and told the clan elders what to do. In addition, there was a need to build a stronger civil society, with an emphasis on creating new educational institutions and allowing small businesses to take the lead in recreating the country’s shattered economy. The Somali Leadership Foundation (FALSAN) was one of the major actors in this sector. Finally, there was the matter of the Islamist movement. Organizations and parties such as Al Ittihaad Al Islami, and Islah, rose above clan-based loyalties and demonstrated a far greater sense of social responsibility than other parties. They played a major role in establishing civil society in the capital. However, the Islamists were denied opportunities to participate in the peace meetings. To succeed, observers argued, the TGF had to find a way of integrating them into the political process. International efforts to resolve the Somalian civil conflict intensified in the early 2000s. The Intergov-

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ernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) gathered all East African nations in an effort to resolve conflicts in the region. IGAD considered not only the conditions inside Somalia, but also the effects of the long struggle on neighboring states. The body’s primary fields of focus were conflict prevention, infrastructure development, food security, and environment protection. In June 2006, militias loyal to the religious and political organization Union of Islamic Courts took control of Mogadishu. This raised international concerns that an extremist government, such as the former Taliban in Afghanistan, was seizing power in the country, which might foster a haven for Islamist terrorists. James Ciment and Emin Poljarevic See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Ethiopia: War with Somalia, 1977–1978; Ethiopia: Civil War, 1978–1991.

Bibliography Abraham, Knife. Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and Quest for Peace. Addis Ababa, EIIPD, 2002. Africa Watch. Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People: Testimonies About the Killings and the Conflict in the North. New York: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. Fox, Mary-Jane. Political Culture in Somalia: Tracing Paths to Peace and Conflict. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 2000. Ghalib, Jama Mohamed. The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somalian Experience. New York: L. Barber, 1994. Laitin, David D. Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987. Lewis, I.M. A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Lyons, Terrence. Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995. Makinda, Sam. Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993. Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The Missed Opportunities. Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1994. Samatar, Ahmed I. Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1988.

SOUTH AFRICA: Anti-Apartheid Struggle, 1948–1994 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Anticolonialism

VENDA Thohoyandou L E Giyani O

A

BOPH

W

Lebowakgomo

TRANSVAAL A Sun City Siyabuswa KANGWANE AN

Mmabatho

SW AT Pretoria UTH Johannesburg NDEBELE

SWAZILAND

ORANGE FREE QWAQWA STATE

Hotazel Upington

Phuthaditjhaba

Kimberley Bloemfontein

LESOTHO

Ulundi U

NATAL ZUL Richard’s A K

NAMIBIA

ULU ZANK GA

B

Dependent homeland Homeland seat of government

banning anti-apartheid organizations and the imprisonment of anti-apartheid leaders. But it also involved massive repression and violence directed against the rank and file of the anti-apartheid movement, as well as against ordinary blacks in South Africa. The South African government organized and sustained its own black organizations that engaged in bitter ethnic fighting with ANC supporters. In defense of apartheid, the South African government also launched invasions of and supported rebel armies in neighboring black-ruled states, forcing them to cut their ties to the ANC.

QUE

ZIMBABWE BOTSWANA

MOZAMBI

Independent homeland (not recognized by the US)

W

Bay

Durban

CAPE

TRANSKEI

INDIAN OCEAN

Umtata CISKEI

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Cape Town

Bisho

Historical Background

East London

Port Elizabeth 0 0

100 100

200

200 Miles 300 Kilometers

The African and multiracial struggle against the apartheid, or official racial segregation, system of South Africa represents one of the longest, bitterest, but ultimately most successful liberation movements of the post–World War II era. Utilizing guerrilla attacks, bombings, mass demonstrations, and strikes, the outlawed African National Congress (ANC) and its anti-apartheid allies in the labor and religious spheres eventually forced the ruling National Party to legalize black opposition organizations, free antiapartheid leaders such as Nelson Mandela, dismantle apartheid legislation, and permit full and universal suffrage in open and free elections. Along the way, the ANC was supported by a growing international movement of sanctions, often inspired by solidarity demonstrations among people of goodwill throughout the world. The struggle was not an easy one. The ruling white National Party utilized brutal tactics to suppress the movement. As noted above, these steps included

One of the cradles of humanity, the area that is now South Africa has been inhabited by humans and their ancestors for more than a million years. In historic times, the region was settled by a number of ethnic groups. These include the Xhosa-speaking peoples around the western Cape, the Venda- and Tswanaspeaking peoples in the central and northern parts of the country, and the Zulu speakers in the northeast. The first Europeans to arrive in the region were the Dutch, who established provisioning stations for Dutch East India Company ships making the long journey around Africa to the East Indies. Further settlements of Dutch, French, German, and British settlers added to the population of the Cape colony through the eighteenth century, leading to its official incorporation into the British Empire in 1806 and rising enmity between the British Crown and the descendants of the original Dutch settlers, known as Boers or, later, Afrikaners. With the banning of slavery in the empire in 1834, the Boers—who spoke a dialect of Dutch called Afrikaans—emigrated to the interior in what they call the “great trek,” attacking the native Africans and seizing their lands in the

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KEY DATES 1912

The African National Congress (ANC) is founded to fight discrimination against native Africans in South Africa.

1948

The Afrikaner-dominated National Party (NP) takes power in elections on a platform of formal separation, or apartheid, of South African blacks, whites, Asians, and mixed race, or colored, persons.

1955

Africans, Asians, colored persons, and whites meet to write the Freedom Charter, calling for a nonracial democracy in South Africa.

1960

Seventy African anti-apartheid protesters are shot down by police in Sharpeville; the ANC is banned.

1964

ANC leader Nelson Mandela and other ANC officials are sentenced to life in prison.

1976

Protesting government efforts to impose the Afrikaner language in African schools, students in Soweto protest in the streets; dozens are killed by police.

1990

Responding to more than a decade of mass demonstrations and an international movement to economically isolate South Africa, the NP government legalizes the ANC and releases Mandela and other ANC leaders from prison.

1994

Mandela is elected president, and the ANC wins a majority of seats in parliament in South Africa’s first elections open to citizens of all races.

process. While Britain annexed Natal province (now KwaZulu-Natal), they permitted the formation of two independent Boer republics—the Orange Free State (now Free State) and the Transvaal (now Gauteng)—but only for a time. The discovery of diamonds and then gold in the Transvaal, beginning in the 1860s, led to a massive realignment of South Africa’s political and economic landscape. Waves of miners from around the world poured into the region, leading to the imposition of white rule over the remaining African-controlled areas, but only after a bitter struggle with the Zulu nation. The growing wealth and power of the Transvaal inspired imperial ambitions, and the British occupied the Boer republics. The Boers rose up in a rebellion to preserve their independence, but were ultimately defeated after three years of guerrilla-style warfare from 1899 to 1902. In 1910, the Union of South Africa was declared an independent dominion under the British Crown.

At the same time, the various British-owned mining companies in South Africa—increasingly powerful as they consolidated their control over the rich deposits of gold and diamonds—imported East Indians and recruited black Africans to do the heavy labor in the mines and to build the transportation and manufacturing infrastructure necessary to the industry. Unique in Africa, then, South Africa early on saw the formation of an urban black proletariat.

Independent South Africa The Union Constitution of 1910 offered the franchise to white males only, though the so-called “coloreds,” or mixed-race persons, around the Cape colony were included. The white electorate was divided into two main groups: the Afrikaners and the English. The much more numerous Afrikaners were led by Boer general Jan Smuts and Louis Botha. They organized the South Africa Party (SAP), though an anti-imperialist,

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anti-mining group broke off in 1912 to form the National Party (NP) under the leadership of J.B.M. Hertzog. At the same time, the disenfranchised African elites, under the chairmanship of Pixley Seme, formed the African Native National Congress, soon renamed the African National Congress (ANC). The first independent South African legislation to control the African population was the Land Act of 1913, denying the right of Africans to purchase land outside of their native reserves. The intent of the law was to force Africans to serve as migrant laborers in the mines. World War I, which began a year after the act was passed, represented a major watershed in South African history for several reasons. First, it led to South African control of the former German colony of Southwest Africa (now Namibia). Second, the war resulted in the formation of the secret Broederbond society of Afrikaner leaders, who established political cells in virtually every major institution of South African life and eventually paved the way for Afrikaner control of the South African government. Finally, and most importantly, the war resulted in a new wave of urbanization as Africans poured in to work in the mines and industries. The squalid living conditions in the ghettos of South African cities led to a huge number of deaths from the influenza pandemic after the war. And the influx renewed fears of African domination among the white population. In 1923, the government passed its second major piece of racial legislation: the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, making it illegal for Africans to live in most urban areas. The inflow of African miners also led to a decision by mine owners to replace highly paid white workers with blacks. This move led to a strike by poor Afrikaner workers, which was suppressed by government troops. The Labour Party, in an alliance with the NP, won the parliamentary elections of 1924. The new majority formulated the so-called civilized labor policy, whereby blacks were barred from virtually all skilled and semiskilled jobs. In 1936, the National Party and the South African Party reunited to form the United Party (UP) and gained a parliamentary majority. It passed another Land Act, excluding coloreds from owning land outside certain areas (but still allowing them to vote). The unification of the two Afrikaner parties also led its most conservative members to break away and form the “purified” NP, led by the Broederbond.

During World War II, this party would support Nazi Germany. Like World War I, World War II accelerated South African urbanization and industrialization, as the country was forced to manufacture products no longer available from Europe and America. Thousands of black workers poured into factories, as the restrictions of the “civilized labor” policy were eased. The need for black labor also reinvigorated the African National Congress, which had been hard hit by the Great Depression of the 1930s. Now the ANC demanded universal suffrage and helped organize African trade unions. Prime Minister Smuts rejected its democratic reforms—and used the military to crush a black mine workers’ strike in 1946—but his United Party accepted the need for some reforms, allowing some of the black workers into skilled positions. Smuts’s “liberal” stance and a depressed agricultural sector brought new support to the rightwing, racist National Party, which narrowly won the 1948 elections and introduced the system that would come to be known as apartheid.

Apartheid Apartheid was not merely, as it name suggests, a system of racial segregation, but a series of laws intended to guarantee the white minority in South Africa economic dominance, political control, and social supremacy. At first, there was little attempt to justify the apartheid system. Among the Afrikaners who dominated the government that imposed it, there was a general belief that Africans and other races were simply inferior to whites both biologically and culturally, incapable of running their own affairs and in need of white leadership and white-maintained law and order. As the rest of black Africa won its independence in the 1950s and 1960s, however, a new antiracist consciousness spread through the industrialized world. This development forced South African whites to develop a rationale for their system of racial separation. They argued that the different cultures of South Africa required separation for them to reach their fullest potential. For example, the government took steps to enable Africans to develop along “their own lines” in the native reserves assigned to them, though this was often interpreted to mean archaic, preindustrial tribal lines, no longer appropriate for a modern society. The government handpicked chiefs to

South Africa: Anti Apartheid Struggle, 19 4 8–19 9 4

govern these areas, giving them extraordinarily broad powers that undermined traditional forms of African democracy. From 1948 to 1959, a series of interrelated laws were passed that restructured South African society to fit the ideals of apartheid. Among the first of these laws was the Population Registration Act, which classified all South Africans into various racial groups— white, black, or colored (a class that included East Indians, other Asians, and people of mixed parentage). This was the keystone for all subsequent apartheid legislation, which was based on these classifications. Thereafter, the government passed the Immorality Act, banning all sexual relations between the races and forbidding interracial marriage. Another law designed to separate social intermingling was the Separate Amenities Act, which sanctioned separate public and private facilities for the different races and specifically stated that these need not be of equal quality. Similarly, the government passed the Bantu Education Act, “Bantu” being a pejorative word, in the South African context, for black Africans. Under this legislation, control over black education was shifted from the Ministry of Education, which had tried to promote somewhat equal educational opportunities, to the Ministry for Native Affairs, which saw its mission as keeping blacks under control. Equally significant were the laws designed to regulate black movement and labor. Legislation was enacted that further restricted black access to skilled jobs. Urban segregation was enforced through the Group Areas Act, which required different races to live in different districts of metropolitan areas and towns. Pass laws were instituted that required blacks to present identification showing that they were permitted to be in a given white area, usually for work purposes only. The many violations that this act inevitably produced provided prison labor that subsidized South Africa’s agriculture industry. At the same time that these restrictive laws were being passed, legislation was also being enacted that curtailed political activity not just by blacks but by opposition forces of all races, including whites. Under the Suppression of Communism Act, the powerful South African Communist Party was banned, along with many other opposition organizations under the loosely worded law. The act took away the voting rights of people in the colored class in the Cape Province. This result effectively reduced the power of

285

the more moderate United Party, which colored voters had long supported.

Resistance and Repression In response to this repressive legislation, the ANC— allied with the South African Indian Congress (SAIC)—began a campaign of mass civil disobedience, with members purposely violating segregation laws. At the same time, a coalition of black, colored, and liberal white forces met in 1955 to hammer out the Freedom Charter, calling for a nonracial South Africa. These moves sparked drastic retaliation by the government, which put most of the opposition leaders on trial for treason. Though acquitted after some five years on trial, their indictments deprived the anti-apartheid movement of its leadership at a critical moment in South African history. In 1960, South Africa declared itself a republic and applied for membership in the British Commonwealth, but it was rejected after strong protests from black African states that were already members of the Commonwealth. During that same year, repression of anti-apartheid activism turned extremely violent. At a rally in the Johannesburg township of Sharpeville in March, police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, leaving sixty-seven dead and hundreds wounded. After the massacre, members of the international community began to discuss ostracizing South Africa and imposing sanctions. Inside the country, the government responded to the growing unrest by banning the ANC and its more radical sister organization, the Pan African Congress (PAC). Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, the ANC formed a military wing, the Unkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, or SN), and the PAC founded Poqo. Together, they launched a campaign of sabotage against white property and government facilities, making a point of avoiding violence against persons. With the help of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the South African government was able to capture Mandela and other ANC leaders, who were put on trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. Others fled the country to continue the struggle from abroad. To counter pressure from the world community, the South African government developed a plan that it believed would pass muster under international law. In 1963, it began to “decolonize” South Africa by establishing “independent” homelands for Africans. Under this plan, South Africa’s regulations on black

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mobility and segregation would fall under the internationally recognized right of all governments to regulate the movement of “foreigners” in their territory. In 1963, Transkei—or Bantustan, as it was often called—became the first such homeland with its own government. Six others followed in the early 1970s: Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa, and KwaZulu. Though containing traditional territories of the various ethnic groups, the Bantustans were much smaller than the traditional territories, usually including only the poorest agricultural land. The South African government also developed industry around the periphery of the homelands to make use of low-paid African laborers, who would be required to return to the homeland each night. To further enhance the policy of making nonBantustan South Africa a fully white country, new and stricter controls were placed on blacks living in urban areas. Increasingly, black workers were required to leave their families in the homelands while working in the cities. Living in rundown and overcrowded workers’ barracks, they could see their families only occasionally. The homelands thus began to serve as warehouses for surplus labor. By the 1970s, the market for migrant labor was declining, as modernization eliminated the need for much low-skilled labor. The homelands grew increasingly impoverished, and more blacks violated the laws to live in urban areas. Meanwhile, blacks with the right to live in the urban townships began to demand skilled and better-paying jobs, especially since there was a shortage of white labor. In 1973, these various pressures resulted in a massive wave of African labor strikes, which paralyzed South African mines and factories. While the government of John Vorster accepted some of the black demands, it also granted full “independence” to several of the homelands. These states were then turned over to handpicked tribal leaders willing to do Pretoria’s bidding. However, none of these so-called independent nations was ever recognized by a single foreign government. Another crisis facing the apartheid government in the mid-1970s concerned developing conflicts on its borders. In 1975, Portugal abruptly pulled out of its southern African colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Mozambique shared a long border with South Africa, and Angola bordered its illegal colony of Namibia. Suddenly both were governed by socialist and strongly anti-apartheid regimes. To keep these

governments from supporting the exiled African National Congress—and to prove that black Africans were incapable of self-government—the South African military launched invasions and supported rebel movements in both countries to undermine their economies and destabilize their governments. Eventually defeated in Angola in the late 1980s, the South African military was forced to withdraw. Faced with an independence movement in Namibia, the South Africans also agreed in 1988 to grant Namibia its independence by 1990.

Resistance and Repression Intensifies The Soweto uprising, the largest black racial clash in South African history up to that time, began as a walkout by black students in Soweto, a huge impoverished black township about fifteen miles from Johannesburg. The students were protesting the requirement that they learn the Afrikaans language. Police met the marching children and opened fire without warning, killing 172 and injuring 439. Within hours, demonstrations spread across the entire country, prompting more crackdowns by police over the next year. Hundreds of demonstrators who had not been killed or arrested fled South Africa and joined the liberation organizations in exile. Most joined the African National Congress, which became the most powerful organization representing South Africa’s black population. Prime Minister Vorster responded to the widespread unrest with a plan to divide the resistance movement along racial lines. Since no homelands could be developed for coloreds—since they had no traditional territory in South Africa—the Vorster government proposed the formation of a new parliament with separate houses for coloreds and Asians. In the 1977 elections, the arch-conservative National Party (NP) won the whites-only election overwhelmingly, but was challenged for the first time by a liberal opposition party, the Progressive Federal Party. The plan for a legislature with three houses was soon sunk by hard-liners in the NP. The following year Vorster was eased out of office as a result of a corruption scandal. The new prime minister was P.W. Botha, who began easing some of the apartheid system’s restrictions. Certain job restrictions were lifted, and more trade union activities were permitted. New laws allowed blacks

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In the aftermath of the Soweto uprising of June 1976, major anti-apartheid demonstrations were held in Cape Town (seen here) and throughout South Africa. The police responded with a harsh crackdown, escalating the violence. (AFP/Getty Images)

to obtain long-term leases on their homes. Blacks with rights to be in urban areas were allowed to move freely from one town to another, and the laws against interracial sex and marriage were repealed. As had happened earlier, these modest reforms sparked a secession by hard-liners in the National Party and the formation of the Conservative Party of South Africa (CPSA). With the ultra-conservatives gone from the ruling party, Botha was able to institute the three-house legislature, which went into effect in 1984. As it turned out, the plan to provide token representation for blacks and coloreds backfired. In August 1983, various multiracial, anti-apartheid organizations gathered to form the United Democratic Front (UDF) in opposing the three-house plan. They pointed out that huge numbers of blacks had been subtracted from the South African total by making them citizens of the so-called independent homelands. In low-turnout elections in 1984, colored voters overwhelmingly voted against the plan. At the same time, a new wave of township rebellions spread across the country in opposition to the plan. The demonstrators were supported by the newly formed Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),

representing black trade unionists, which launched a series of solidarity strikes that paralyzed the country. Township violence escalated again in 1985, following yet another police massacre of black protesters, this time memorializing the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre. Twenty blacks were killed when police opened fire in Uitenhage, a township outside Port Elizabeth. Protests and demonstrations were met by police violence across the country, leading to the imposition of a state of emergency in July. The emergency allowed increased police powers, but the government was losing control of the black townships to “comrades,” who killed or terrorized the many police informers and collaborators living in their midst. In Natal province, one black group took up arms against the African National Congress. The Zulu-supported Inkatha movement, under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a minister in the government of the KwaZulu homeland, led the attack. At first, outsiders saw this as ethnic-based violence between the Zulu people and the Xhosa, who supported the ANC. The ANC insisted that the blackversus-black violence was largely instigated by the

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government. Years later, when police files were opened during “truth” hearings, the ANC claims were corroborated. By 1987, the combination of a massive army presence and a large expenditure of government funds for housing and social service in the black townships quieted the situation. In other parts of the world, however, the actions of the South African government continued to cause outrage. Under pressure from student and worker demonstrations in Europe and the United States, governments began applying economic sanctions to South Africa. The conservative administrations of President Ronald Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Britain tried to resist sanctions but were gradually persuaded to go along. Supporters of sanctions also targeted international corporations doing business in South Africa. Many companies decided they could not take the bad publicity and began withdrawing from their South African operations, often selling them to South African interests. Even though South Africa had long prided itself on its self-reliance, the country soon discovered that its economy suffered when foreign investment and business with other countries began to dry up and a large number of its experienced managers began to leave. The South African currency, the rand, collapsed. The country’s growing economic problems had a polarizing effect on politics. The liberal wing of the National Party, under Prime Minister Botha, was beginning to move toward negotiations that might lead to government participation with cooperative black leaders such as Buthelezi. By this time, however, blacks in South Africa had united behind the African National Congress and its long-imprisoned leader, Nelson Mandela. Trade unions and black church leaders such as Bishop Desmond Tutu were solidly behind the ANC. Equally important in thwarting Botha’s plans was the lurch toward the right among a large part of the Afrikaner population. The Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging—a right-wing paramilitary organization launched by Eugene TerreBlanche in 1977—was growing in popularity and recruiting heavily among the country’s various security forces. And in the all-white parliamentary elections of 1987, the arch-conservative CPSA became the main opposition party. In such a polarized environment, it seemed that South Africa might erupt in unimaginable violence.

Apartheid Abandoned There were some on both sides who were already at work trying to prevent a violent outcome. As early as 1987, influential members of the Afrikaner elite were secretly meeting with leaders of the ANC (technically breaking the law). These meetings were being encouraged quietly by elements in the Botha administration. By 1989, however, Botha had had enough and announced his resignation from the presidency, citing ill health as the reason. Before leaving office, he met with Nelson Mandela, the ANC leader, at the Robbins Island prison off the coast of Cape Town. Even though Mandela had been in jail for more than twenty-five years, Botha acknowledged that both Mandela and the ANC would have a role in negotiating the end of the apartheid regime. In August elections, F.W. de Klerk was elected president, and the National Party retained a clear but diminished majority in parliament. The full crisis was reached in 1989. The economy was deteriorating rapidly. International isolation and opprobrium were reaching a fever pitch. Indeed, new administrations in London and Washington—though still conservative—were joining in the efforts to pressure Pretoria. Black protesters and organizations had made it clear that no compromise measures such as the three-house parliament would be acceptable. Africans from the impoverished homelands were pouring into the townships in such numbers that the security forces could no longer contain them. The ANC also faced problems—including continued opposition from Inkatha and the loss of support from collapsing socialist-bloc governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Yet it was clearly recognized by the international community as the only legitimate negotiating partner, a realization that was increasingly dawning on de Klerk and the mainstream NP leadership. In September, the Bush administration announced that if Mandela was not freed within six months, the U.S. government would go along with strict UN sanctions against South Africa. Speaking before the three houses of parliament on February 2, 1990, de Klerk announced that he was releasing Mandela and ending the legal ban on the African National Congress and other antiapartheid parties, including the South African Communist Party (SACP). He also announced that it was the government’s intention to open negotiations that

South Africa: Anti Apartheid Struggle, 19 4 8–19 9 4

would lead to equality for all South African citizens and universal suffrage. On February 11, in front of the international press corps, Mandela walked to freedom after twenty-seven years in prison. ANC exiles began to return to the country. The joyous moment was shadowed by several looming problems for the ANC, which was internally divided between radicals, who demanded a social and economic revolution for the country, and conservatives, who insisted that the capitalist system in South Africa be retained in the post-apartheid era. Moreover, the ANC would have a difficult time imposing discipline on the “young comrades” in the townships who had come of age in a time of violent opposition to apartheid and retained a commitment to street confrontation. The ANC also faced challenges to its authority from Inkatha—still being provided heavy covert support by the government—as well as from the black nationalist PAC.

AN C- Government Negotiations and Renewed Violence In May 1990, as some of the more egregious segregation restrictions of the apartheid regime were reversed, the ANC met in negotiations with the de Klerk administration. The ANC agreed to end its guerrilla operations but refused to accede to the government’s plan for a multiparty conference to draw up a new constitution in which each party would represent a race and have an equal voice. The possibility of a peaceful transition to a post-apartheid era was further threatened by violence between ANC and Inkatha supporters that was spreading beyond Natal to other sections of the country. Although the government faced increasingly vocal and violent opposition from hard-line white groups, it eliminated the last remaining apartheid legislation during 1991, including the Group Areas Act and the so-called pass laws restricting black movement. The National Party even invited blacks to join it. As the restrictions fell, the international community began to lift its sanctions, despite ANC pleas to hold off until free and universal elections were held. Meanwhile, the ANC had effected a rapprochement with the PAC at a conference in April. Still, the violence between the ANC and Inkatha continued to escalate, despite meetings between Mandela and Buthelezi. The ANC threatened to walk out of the negotiations unless the government did

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more to stop the violence. Suspicions remained among ANC and PAC supporters that certain elements within the security forces were still aiding Inkatha. For example, eyewitnesses to a massacre of women and children in Biopatong, Natal, by Inkatha fighters in June 1992 reported seeing the fighters arrive in police vehicles. After a request by Mandela in July, the UN Security Council sent an investigative commission to look into the South African security forces’ complicity in the ANC-Inkatha violence. Their findings confirmed Mandela’s fears and led to the dispatch of peacekeepers to South Africa. At the same time, the ANC and its allies organized mass actions—including a two-day general strike—demanding that the government negotiate in good faith and end Inkatha violence. When police in the homeland of Ciskei fired on ANC marchers, killing 28 and wounding 200 others, Mandela demanded the dismantling of homeland governments and an end to their spurious independence. In November, the ANC and the de Klerk government announced the formation of an interim government, headed by a joint commission of ANC and NP members. This collaboration angered many in both organizations. Outsiders were also alarmed, fearing that an agreement on a new constitution was imminent. The fear was sustained by both Inkatha and white conservatives, who believed that the constitutional reforms would favor the two main parties. A group of officials from Inkatha and the various homelands organized the Concerned South Africans Group in April 1993, aimed at pressuring the negotiators to enhance the power of regional governments over the federal one. Violence also greeted the impending announcement of a constitution, as a series of terrorist bombings against white civilians—allegedly by members of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army, the new military wing of the PAC—rocked the country. Then, as the forum negotiating the coming elections announced April 27, 1994, as the date for the country’s first nonracial poll, 2,000 armed white commandos occupied the conference center. The commandos surrendered peacefully after several days, but ANC officials accused the security forces of laxity, if not complicity. Not so peaceful was the continuing conflict with Inkatha. In August, Inkatha forces near Johannesburg attacked a migrant workers’ hostel, killing 100 persons, largely ANC supporters.

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In November, the forum offered details of the interim constitution. New provinces with new names were included, and the homelands disappeared as political entities. Plans for the legislative and executive branches were drawn up with an eye to the various regions and races of the country. A central parliament with 400 members would be drawn, half from national and half from regional lists of candidates. There would be one president and two vice presidents, the latter apportioned to parties obtaining at least 20 percent of the vote. This was done to placate the National Party and its white members. Any party with 5 percent of the vote would be entitled to a cabinet member. Meanwhile, it was left up to the assembly to draw up a permanent constitution within two years of its election. Both the ANC and the NP had difficulties lining up support among their respective racial communities, though the ANC had the harder time of it. De Klerk was able to persuade right-wing groups to go along with the new constitution by promising them a possible future province of their own in a majority-ruled South Africa. Meanwhile, Buthelezi and Inkatha, though initially agreeing to register for the elections as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), soon pulled out and threatened a boycott. These actions came at a time when fighting between the ANC and Inkatha was intensifying. In March, a state of emergency was declared in Natal, and troops were sent in, but the violence continued. An alliance between Inkatha and white right-wing forces— potentially plunging the country into civil war—now seemed possible. The possibility ended, however, after right-wing forces tried but failed to bolster the Bophuthatswana homeland government, which was besieged by protesters. The humiliating retreat of Afrikaner extremists in the face of black resistance fighters deflated the right-wing cause, just as the collapse of the homeland government further isolated Buthelezi. Still, Buthelezi persisted with his threats to boycott the elections up to the last minute, changing his mind only when he won several concessions concerning the sovereignty of the Zulu monarch—largely a figurehead for Inkatha. Buthelezi’s announcement on April 21 that he would participate in the April 24 elections immediately ended much of the violence in Natal and ensured that the election went off smoothly.

Elections and AN C Government The elections produced the predicted ANC landslide, though the party fell just short of the two-thirds majority necessary to write the new constitution unilaterally. The only other party winning at least 20 percent of the vote was the NP, which entitled de Klerk to serve as vice president in the next administration. Inkatha, which took just 10 percent of the vote nationally, won a slight majority in Natal. The two main parties on the far right and black nationalist left—the Afrikaner Volksfront and the PAC—failed to receive the 5 percent necessary to earn a cabinet position. On May 9, the first truly multiracial national assembly in South African history overwhelmingly elected Mandela as the country’s first black president. The new ANC government faced a host of problems, both foreign and domestic. Recognizing South Africa’s history of interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states, it tried to stay out of conflicts in African countries, though Mandela was called in to mediate in various crises, including the Congo crisis of 1997. At home, the government walked a fine line, providing much-needed social and economic improvements in the lives of black South Africans without causing the flight of white citizens and their capital. To assure the international business community that South Africa remained a safe place to invest, Mandela appointed whites from the banking and business community to run the economy. The discrepancies in wealth between the two communities—as well as the absence of apartheid-era restrictions—led to an explosion of crime, though most victims were black. Political reforms went more smoothly. A draft for the permanent constitution was completed by June 1996, leading the NP to drop out of its coalition with the ANC to become an official opposition party, while the Inkatha Freedom Party remained part of the ruling coalition. Meanwhile, the aging Mandela— whose steady hand and universally acclaimed integrity did so much to ensure a peaceful transition to black majority rule—turned over the day-to-day running of the government and leadership of the ANC to Thabo Mbeki in 1997. The new government also walked a fine line between punishing those guilty of apartheid-era crimes and trying to turn over a new leaf in South African history. In 1995, the national assembly established a seventeen-member Truth and Reconciliation Com-

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mission, headed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Under the rules of the commission, victims and perpetrators of violence were permitted to testify, the latter receiving amnesty for full disclosure of their human rights violations and crimes. The commission was criticized by many— especially victims of apartheid oppression and the family members of those killed by police—who saw the perpetrators exonerated. Supporters argued that the commission was the only practical way to expose the crimes of the era, since it did not require long, expensive, and potentially divisive court proceedings. James Ciment See also: People’s Wars; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Angola: First War with UNITA, 1975–1992; Mozambique: Renamo War, 1976–1992; Namibia: War of National Liberation, 1966–1990; Zimbabwe: Struggle for Majority Rule, 1965– 1980.

Bibliography Crankshaw, Owen. Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour Under Apartheid. New York: Routledge, 1997.

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Gutteridge, William Frank. South Africa: From Apartheid to National Unity, 1981–1994. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1995. Juckes, Tim J. Opposition in South Africa: The Leadership of Z.K. Matthews, Nelson Mandela, and Stephen Biko. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Kanfer, Stefan. The Last Empire: South Africa, Diamonds, and De Beers from Cecil Rhodes to the Oppenheimers. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1993. Le May, G.H.L. The Afrikaners: An Historical Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995. Lester, Alan. From Colonization to Democracy: A New Historical Geography of South Africa. New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996. Marx, Anthony W. Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960–1990. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Murray, Martin J. South Africa, Time of Agony, Time of Destiny: The Upsurge of Popular Protest. London: Verso, 1987. ———. Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South Africa. New York: Verso, 1994. Thompson, Leonard Monteath. A History of South Africa. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

SUDAN: Civil Wars in South,1955–1972; 1983–2005 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Chad; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Uganda

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Sudan’s civil wars, which have raged intermittently for nearly fifty years, have been the result of the complex religious and ethnic subdivisions that exist within Sudanese society. By the twentieth century, the Sudanese were divided among nineteen major ethnic groups, spoke dozens of different languages, and followed three different religious traditions. The central divisions within Sudan have been between the Muslim Arab north and the Christian and animist African south. (Animism is the worship of traditional local gods and spirits.) The dividing line between the two groups was rather arbitrary. When Arab attackers brought Islam to the region in the

fifteenth century, the process of conquest and conversion also involved intermarriage and cultural crossfertilization. The result was that the “Arabs” of the north were of many different ethnic backgrounds, from Semitic to Nilotic, and often looked no different than the “Africans” of the south. “Arab” was as much a cultural and linguistic category as an ethnic one. Many northerners adopted Arabic as their language and Islam as their religion, and therefore called themselves Arabs. (Other northerners were Muslims but did not consider themselves Arabs.) In the south, the African peoples kept the animist religion of their ancestors. In the nineteenth century, the arrival of Christian missionaries added a third religious tradition to Sudan’s mix. (A form of Christianity had existed in Sudan many centuries before the Europeans arrived but had died out by the eighteenth century.) The missionaries had more success in the south, which became divided between animists and Christians, with a small number of Muslims. The relationship between north and south Sudan was traditionally hostile. The Arabs of the north sent soldiers, slavers, and bureaucrats to oppress the peoples of the south. The Africans felt that the Arab elites in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, were contemptuous toward the cultures of the south and treated them as second-class citizens. Although this view of north-south relations was not completely accurate on either side—the Arabs and the Africans had a complex history, and the Arabs were not always its villains—it was accepted by many southerners, encouraging suspicion and distrust. In 1899, Sudan was conquered by an AngloEgyptian army and made a part of the British Empire. Although Sudan was officially the joint conquest of the Egyptians and British, it was the British who actually ruled the country. The British administered

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KEY DATES 1956

Sudan wins its independence from joint British-Egyptian rule.

1962

Southern Sudanese exiles form the Sudan African National Union, while rebels within the south of Sudan form the Anya-Nya (“Venom of the Viper”) rebel movement, which launches its first attack on Sudanese government targets the following year.

1970

Efforts to end infighting among southerners lead southern rebels to form the unified Southern Sudan Liberation Movement.

1972

The Government of Sudan (GOS) and rebel leaders sign the Addis Ababa Agreement on February 28, ending the first phase of the southern Sudanese civil war.

1983

When the GOS tries to impose Islamic law in the country, southern army units rebel; GOS sends Colonel John Garang, a southerner, to put down the rebellion, but he joins it instead.

1989

A military coup puts a hard-line Islamic government in power in Khartoum.

1991

Rebel movement in the south splits along tribal lines.

2001

A separate conflict breaks out between rebels and GOS forces, along with government-supported militias, in the western Sudan region of Darfur.

2002 A cease-fire is declared in southern Sudan, as the two sides meet to discuss a permanent peace agreement. 2005 A final peace and power-sharing agreement is signed between southern rebels and the government on January 9; Garang dies in a helicopter crash on July 30.

north and south Sudan as two separate regions, an approach that many Arabs felt was part of a British colonial policy of divide and conquer. While this belief was partially true, the British division of Sudan also recognized that southerners had not always benefited from northern dominance. Whatever the motivations, the result was to further divide north from south. In the 1930s, a growing nationalist movement in the country began to demand Sudanese independence. In 1953, the British set up a timetable to grant selfrule. Self-government began that same year, and full independence came in 1956. The British also gave in to the demands of the Arab north that, upon independence, north and south Sudan would be ruled as one

country. It was this unified Sudan that became an independent nation on January 1, 1956. But many in the south were unhappy with the outcome.

Revolt in the South The decision to merge north and south Sudan alienated many southerners. The Muslim north not only was economically better off, it had three times the population of the south. Southerners were afraid that their rights and culture would be ignored by a government that was sure to be dominated by the Arabs of Khartoum. The initial appointments of the new government confirmed southern fears. As hundreds of low-level

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British officials left the country, they were replaced by northerners, with only four posts given to southerners. Khartoum justified this discrimination by arguing that the south had too small an educated class to fill very many government positions. While there was some truth to this contention, it did not prevent the southerners from feeling resentment. Motivated by their fear of northern power, southern politicians demanded that Sudan adopt a federal form of government that would give the south a degree of autonomy. In 1955, some of these politicians were arrested and jailed on doubtful charges, prompting the formation of southern mobs in July and August to protest Khartoum’s behavior. In small skirmishes, rioting civilians were shot and killed. In August 1955, the Equatoria Corps of the Sudanese army (consisting mostly of southerners) rose up in a mutiny. In the first few days of fighting, southern troops and mobs attacked northern merchants, officials, their wives, and sometimes even their children. Several hundred northerners were killed in these riots, which were a response to rumors that the northerners were planning massacres in the south. When northern troops were sent south to restore order, the southern mutineers fled into the bush with their weapons.

Northern Repression The unrest in the south simmered from 1955 to 1958. Khartoum attempted to reimpose control over the three southern provinces that were dominated by non-Muslim Africans (Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria) but was met with passive resistance by the population, accompanied by occasional outbreaks of violence. Rebel resistance was scattered and uncoordinated. Many southerners who thought that a political solution was possible did not support armed resistance. This mood changed with the 1958 coup d’état of General Ibrahim Abboud. Whereas the previous Sudanese government had tried to combine repression with overtures to cooperative southern leaders, Abboud set out to destroy the low-level resistance with harsh measures. Sudanese army units were encouraged to attack villages that were suspected of being sympathetic to the rebels. Southern politicians were silenced, and many were forced to flee the country to avoid arrest.

Abboud’s regime also introduced to Sudan a stricter observance of Islam, which he imposed on both the north and the south. In the south, Arabs replaced Christian missionary teachers, and Arabic became the official language rather than English. Christian churches were burned, and Friday, rather than Sunday, was made the official day of rest. These policies increased the southerners’ animosity toward the government. Although most southern Sudanese were animists, the substantial minority of Christians were often the primary target of government repression so they were at the forefront of the resistance.

Anya-Nya In 1962, a group of exiled Sudanese southerners created a political movement that eventually took the name Sudan African National Union (SANU). At the same time, resistance inside the country coalesced around a strike by secondary-school students against discrimination by Arab teachers from the north. Many students, along with many non-Arab teachers, fled the persecution that followed the strike and helped to become the nucleus of a new rebel movement: the Anya-Nya. Anya-Nya translates as “venom of the Gabon viper,” and the newly organized southern fighters intended to be as dangerous as poisonous snakes. In 1963, the Anya-Nya opened up an offensive that succeeded in temporarily capturing government outposts in Upper Nile and Equatoria provinces. At first the rebels were mostly armed with spears and machetes, along with a few captured rifles. But in 1965, they acquired weapons from Congolese who were fleeing a failed rebellion in the Congo (later renamed Zaire). The Anya-Nya also probably received secret support from Israel, which disliked the Arab-world orientation of Sudan’s government. (Khartoum had sent troops to fight against Israel in the 1967 Six Days’ War.) The Israelis supplied the Anya-Nya with weapons and also hired European mercenaries who could train the southerners in their use. The amount of support given to the southerners was minuscule compared to the military aid that the government in Khartoum received from Egypt and the Soviet Union. Egypt contributed at least 5,000 troops to its fellow Arab state, while the Soviets provided sophisticated tanks and aircraft, including MiG jets and attack helicopters. The Soviet decision to help Khartoum fit in with the general Soviet

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With foreign support, the Sudanese rebel organization known as Anya-Nya, or “viper venom,” gained control of the southern countryside by the late 1960s. Attacks by both government and guerrilla forces were reported to be extremely brutal. (John Downing/Getty Images)

policy of supporting Arab states against Israel and its Western allies. The war in the south was characterized by massacre and counter-massacre. Although southern reports of northern atrocities may have been exaggerated, outside journalists and aid workers confirmed that the army’s attacks were carried out with great brutality. Even when there were no orders to attack southern villages, it was clear that northern troops, often unable to find an enemy who hid in the rough countryside, took out their frustrations on the civilian population. The Anya-Nya fought back with massacres of their own; when northern outposts were taken, northern civilians would often be killed. During the repressive Abboud administration (1958–1964), such attacks became government policy—Abboud wanted to Islamicize and Arabize the south. Villages that refused to cooperate were often bombed by government planes. An estimated 500,000 died during the seventeen years of fighting, most of them civilians. Hundreds of thousands more were forced to flee their homes, some going

to refugee camps in neighboring Congo, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Abboud’s Arabization policies were an attempt at cultural genocide. Politically, the southern Sudanese were handicapped by their lack of a unified organization. Tribal and political differences among southerners led to the creation, disbanding, and re-creation of a plethora of political organizations, including the SANU, the Anzania Liberation Front, and a southern Sudan provisional government. These groups often refused to cooperate with each other. In the field, the Anya-Nya were theoretically united, but in practice they fought as small, uncoordinated units. Their troops dominated the countryside of the south, while the government held the major towns. In 1970, this chaos among the insurgents was ended when the various southern opposition groups agreed to form the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, with the Anya-Nya as their military arm. General Joseph Lagu, a longtime fighter in the AnyaNya, was put in charge of both organizations. This

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reorganization made the southerners more effective fighters; it also made it easier to carry out negotiations with the north.

Peace Interval The drawn-out war in the south helped to undercut Abboud’s power in the north, and he was overthrown in a 1964 civilian uprising. The change in administration led to a brief pause in the fighting, but the new civilian-led government was equally unwilling to compromise with southern rebels. The fighting resumed. The new government did not attack southern civilians as a matter of policy, but government soldiers continued to occasionally attack opposition villages. The government also expelled all Christian missionaries, whom many northerners held responsible for originally stirring up anti-Arab sentiments among southerners. In 1969, a group of military officers, tired of Sudan’s stagnant economy and frustrated by the lack of success in the war, led a coup against the civilian government. The leader of the military coup was Colonel Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri, a relative moderate. Nimeiri continued the war against the south, but he believed that some kind of compromise would eventually be necessary, and so he also attempted to open negotiations with southern leaders. General Lagu’s rise to power in the south made negotiations possible. The south now had one spokesman with whom Nimeiri could discuss terms. The two sides met for peace talks in 1971. The result of these talks was the Addis Ababa Agreement, signed on February 28, 1972. Nimeiri agreed to merge the three provinces of the south into one regional state, which would be allowed limited autonomy. The south was given its own legislature, and religious freedom was to be permitted. Nimeiri’s government was as Islamic in outlook as its predecessors, but it was willing to be tolerant toward southern beliefs. This peace lasted until 1983.

Turn to Islam and the Second Civil War The peace between north and south held during the 1970s, but relations between the two regions began to cool after 1980. Southerners worried about Sudan’s 1980 alliance with Egypt, which seemed to move the country closer to the Arab world. The early 1980s

also saw an increase in the influence of the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the Muslim Brotherhood, both led by Hassan al-Turabi; during the 1970s and 1980s, the NIF infiltrated its members into Sudan’s bureaucracy and military. In 1983, reacting to the growing power of these Islamic organizations, Nimeiri appointed Turabi attorney general of Sudan, and concurred when Turabi ruled that in the future, Sharia (Islamic law) would be the basis of Sudanese law. This decision was especially worrisome for the non-Muslim south; among other harsh penalties, Sharia called for amputating the hands of petty thieves. Already disturbed, the south was outraged by Nimeiri’s June 1983 decree that redivided the southern region into its original three provinces. Nimeiri claimed that he only wished to reduce the power of the Dinka (the south’s largest ethnic group), but southerners, particularly the Dinka, saw this move as an attempt to repeal the Addis Ababa Agreement. In May 1983, two army garrisons in the south, angry about Nimeiri’s Islamic policies (and worried that they might be transferred to the north), mutinied in protest. When the government sent Colonel John Garang, a Dinka, south to put down the mutiny, he joined it. Garang had been born into a Christian family and had spent time in the United States (he graduated from Grinnell College and earned a Ph.D. in economics at the University of Iowa), and he was not happy with the Islamic direction of the Nimeiri government. Instead of putting down the mutineers, he encouraged other units in the region to rise up against the government, then took control of the rebels and led them into the bush, beginning a new guerrilla war against the government. To prosecute the war, Garang created a political organization, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and a military wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In many ways, the second Sudanese civil war resembled the first. Again the southerners dominated the countryside, and again the northerners controlled the towns. However, unlike the Anya-Nya, which had had a broad base of support, Garang’s army was grounded in ethnic and personal loyalties. Because Garang was a Dinka, most of the top jobs in the SPLA were occupied by Dinkas. Garang also demanded a level of personal loyalty that disturbed his more idealistic followers. Southerners who opposed his methods might find themselves imprisoned in a

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pit for months. The treatment meted out to the civilian population by the SPLA was harsh. Garang’s troops often acted like an occupying army, acquiring their supplies by theft and killing those who objected. Despite Garang’s authoritarian behavior, most southerners stayed loyal to his cause. To them, the threat of the north required the south to unite behind one leader, even if they disliked his methods.

Islamic Fundamentalism Throughout the 1980s, the hard-line Islamists gained in power and influence. There was a temporary abatement in this trend in 1985, when Nimeiri was overthrown—the SPLA even opened up negotiations with the new government—but a 1989 military coup put a new pro-Islamist government into power. The new government was led by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS), whose leader was General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. Much of the support for the new regime, however, came from Turabi and his National Islamic Front. Many observers considered Turabi and his Islamists to be the real powers in Sudan. Turabi’s goal was to bring all of Sudan, including the south, into line with his fundamentalist Islamic views. Al-Bashir and Turabi broke off negotiations with the SPLA and launched a full-scale offensive against the southern rebels. The attacks on the south were carried out with a ruthlessness that the war had not seen before. Planes bombed rebel villages, while government-supported Arab militias (called “popular defense forces”) raided African villages in southern Sudan. International aid agencies accused the government of carrying out a war of genocide against the African south. Certainly much of the south was depopulated, with hundreds of thousands fleeing across Sudan’s borders or north to the relative safety of Khartoum. Those who reached Khartoum were not harmed; the Sudanese government was clearly bent not on killing all southerners, but on destroying their ability to resist as a culture. Khartoum’s goal was the Islamization of the entire south.

International Support The new Sudanese government soon managed to alienate much of the world, including many Arab states, by its extreme fundamentalist Islamic policies. The United States and others accused Sudan of sup-

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porting Islamic terrorist groups around the world. It was accused of being connected to both the 1993 bombing of New York’s World Trade Center and the 1995 attempt to assassinate Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak. Sudan also maintained close ties with Iraq and Libya, two states that were pariahs in the eyes of much of the world. Because of the international animosity the Sudanese government had inspired, Garang and the SPLA received substantial amounts of foreign military support. The countries providing this support included Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea. Ethiopia, an ally of the Soviet Union, had been the most important supporter in the 1980s, providing arms and equipment to Garang’s SPLA, which portrayed itself as a Marxist-Leninist movement. It maintained large training camps in southern Ethiopia. In 1991, however, the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam collapsed. At that point, Uganda and Eritrea became the primary supporters of the SPLA. Both nations aided the rebel movement in Sudan because the Khartoum regime was supporting Islamic rebels inside their borders. In addition, all of Sudan’s southern neighbors were black African states that sympathized with the plight of the African Sudanese. The SPLA may also have received covert military aid from the United States and Israel. The press reported rumors that special U.S. Army detachments carried out clandestine operations in Sudan.

Internal Fissures and the Widening Civil War One of the key handicaps for the south was its divided aspect. There were five major ethnic groups— Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, and Azande—and traditional ethnic hostilities among them complicated efforts to join forces against the north. This tendency was exacerbated by Garang’s policy of favoring his own Dinka people. In 1991, frustration with Garang’s dictatorial leadership style led Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, to break away and form his own SPLA United (SPLA-U) faction, in which a number of further splits led to the establishment of a new group, the Southern Sudanese Independence Movement (SSIM). On the surface, the motivation for the breakup was policy disagreement— Machar wanted to create an independent south Sudan, while Garang favored remaining in Sudan as a secular autonomous province. Much of the animosity

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between the two, however, seemed to be fueled by personal rivalry and competition for power. Whatever its causes, the intra-SPLA conflict was a disaster for the south. Garang and Machar spent as much of their effort attacking each other and raiding villages suspected of supporting the opposition as they did the government. Other, lesser leaders broke away from the SPLA and formed their own guerrilla bands. The government in Khartoum took advantage of this conflict, occasionally providing support to Machar and the SSIM. In 1996–1997, the SPLA-U and SSIM signed a political agreement with the government in which they gave up their demand for independence. On his part, Garang had managed by 1997 to mend some of the breaks in the SPLA, and many of his former opponents had rejoined his army. Omar Hassan al-Bashir’s government in Khartoum had its own problems. Within Khartoum’s Arab society, many Muslims opposed the rigidity of the government and the power of Turabi and the NIF. The NIF was reported to have persecuted Muslim sects that differed with the official Muslim ideology of Sudan. Outside greater Khartoum, other regions resented the government’s behavior. The western state of Darfur was predominantly Muslim, but many of its people were black Africans, not Arabs, and some of them voiced dissatisfaction with the way the central government treated them. These strains had the potential of undercutting Khartoum’s war efforts in the south. In February 1992, a coalition of northern opposition parties led by the Democratic Unionist Party, the Umma Party, and the SPLM created the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as an antigovernment umbrella group. It called for a multiparty democracy and the preservation of cultural and ethnic diversity in Sudan. In 1995 the NDA members agreed on the secular character of future government and on a referendum on self-determination for the south. In October 1996, a joint NDA military command under John Garang was established. These developments opened a northeastern front in the civil war, transforming what had been a predominantly ethnic and religious conflict into a center-periphery conflict. While the SPLA remained suspicious about the long-term goals of their new allies, in 1997 the NDA successfully coordinated military operations in areas along the borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea. There were even rumors about preparations for a joint NDA march on Khartoum.

Stalemate and Cease-fire By 1998, the war in south Sudan was a continuing stalemate in which neither side appeared capable of mounting a decisive military effort. Government forces conducted indiscriminate aerial bombardments and used helicopter gunships to attack insurgents, supply bases, and civilian targets, with particularly devastating effects. In 1999, those same forces carried out sixty-five aerial attacks on civil targets, mostly in Bahr El Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria, and the Southern Blue Nile regions; in 2000, the number of such attacks grew to 132, and in 2001 to 195. The Islamic government controlled the major cities of the Nile River valley, although it was tightly besieged by insurgents. The rebels dominated the villages and smaller towns of the countryside. Garang and the SPLA were estimated to have about 25,000 hard-core fighters, with tens of thousands more who joined the fighting when it threatened their own districts. The SPLM had established some government functions in the areas it controlled, setting up an administration, collecting taxes, creating a judicial system, and training a police force. Under pressure from his supporters in Eritrea and Uganda, Garang had altered his dictatorial leadership style, allowing public criticism of his policies and sharing power with members of other tribes (although Dinkas still tended to dominate the higher ranks of the SPLA). Perhaps for these reasons, or because of increased foreign aid, Garang was able to recover from the splits that damaged his movement after 1991. By 1998, the SPLA had regained control of most of Equatoria and had the provincial capital of Juba almost completely cut off from the north. His improved circumstances and well-equipped fighting force, which had evolved into a conventional army, gave him a better chance of being able to seize most of the south. In addition, political support from the United States had become more open. In January 1998, Garang and other rebel leaders met with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Uganda. Washington still denied providing military aid, but Garang’s 1998 offensives were backed by heavy artillery and Russian-made tanks. These were obviously not built in south Sudan. The war had also turned southern Sudan into one large refugee camp, according to international monitors. Millions of villagers had fled government

Sudan: Civil Wars in South, 1955–1972; 19 83–2005

attacks or been forced to leave by fighting between rebel factions. The refugee crisis was aggravated by widespread food shortages. The United Nations set up a special relief effort to help the starving population in the south. On average, the UN delivered (mainly by air drops) about 70, 000 tons of food supplies per year. The grim irony of the Sudanese war was that, because of the shortage of competent local pilots, the UN hired Russian airmen to carry out the risky food drops in war-torn areas. Meanwhile, the government also hired Russians to bomb the same areas. A few, it was rumored in the media, performed both jobs in turn. Some of the southern refugees moved north to Khartoum, filling shantytowns around the city; others spilled into neighboring countries, taking the conflict with them. Khartoum was accused of supporting Islamic rebels in Uganda and Eritrea.

Steps Toward Peace As early as 1993, the antagonists in the long war were seeking a political solution. The military stalemate continued, and the south was overwhelmed by a humanitarian crisis in which hundreds of thousands of refugees were at risk of death by starvation or disease. Sudan’s neighbors, fearing that the conflict could spread, took a strong role in seeking a comprehensive peace agreement. Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya collaborated within the regional association— the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which includes also Sudan and Somalia—to promote the peace initiative based on a settlement of the relationship between mosque and state in Sudan, power sharing between the government and the opposition, and resource sharing between Khartoum and the provinces. The southerners, who made up only 25 percent of Sudan’s population, still faced formidable problems. Fortunately, they could achieve many of their goals without invading the north or overthrowing the Sudanese government. Even the SPLA was ready for a political settlement. At first, the Khartoum government tried to maneuver, signing agreements with some rebel factions in a framework it called “peace from within.” After significant battle losses to the SPLA in 1997, however, the regime agreed to a more comprehensive framework for ending the war. This plan included the separation of mosque and state in Sudan and self-determination for the southern region,

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as proposed by the IGAD. The government hoped that by making peace it could improve the country’s relations with other nations in the region. In December 1999, Sudan and Uganda also signed an accord agreeing not to provide support to rebel forces in each other’s countries. The IGAD mediation efforts were strongly supported by the United States and Great Britain. These countries, as well as Italy and Norway, formed an international observer group to help find a peaceful solution. In September 2001, President George W. Bush appointed former senator John Danforth as his envoy to Sudan to explore a prospective U.S. role in the peace process. The widespread U.S. perception of the Sudanese civil war as religious (Islamists vs. Christians) and ethnic (Arabs vs. black Africans) prompted an informal and unlikely alliance of the religious right and the Congressional Black Caucus in support of an active American role in seeking a settlement. In January 2002 a tentative cease-fire agreement between the parties was negotiated under U.S. mediation, although sporadic fighting continued for the first half of the year. Particularly fierce fighting occurred in the oil-rich Western Upper Nile region on the contested border between north and south, where government forces tried to grab as many oil fields as they could. Following further negotiations, a preliminary peace agreement was concluded between the SPLA and Sudanese government on July 20, 2002, in Machakos, Kenya. The agreement provided a framework for future talks on ending the conflict: a six-year interim period preceding a referendum on southern self-determination and the exemption of the south from Islamic law. On July 27, 2002, Omar al-Bashir and John Garang met for the first time in Kampala, Uganda. In talks that ran through 2004, the parties agreed on a complete cessation of hostilities, a powersharing arrangement, and economic cooperation. The comprehensive agreement was signed in Naivisha, Kenya, on May 26, 2004.

Peace and the Future The final peace accord between the Sudanese government and the SPLM marked the end of Africa’s longest civil war and one of the most devastating wars in its history. It was signed on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya. The document confirmed all political

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provisions agreed by the parties in the 2002–2004 talks. Additionally, it called for national elections within four years, the drafting of a new constitution within six years, the creation of a transitional, powersharing government in Khartoum, making Garang first vice president of the country, and a 70–30 northsouth member ratio in a new national assembly. The agreement also stipulated a 50–50 split of oil profits between the north and south. As first vice president, Garang was to head a separate administration for the south; the SPLA would keep its forces in the south and withdraw from the east, while the government would withdraw from the south in two-and-a-half years. A UN peacekeeping force of 10,000 was to be deployed in Sudan to oversee the agreement. The African Union also agreed to provide up to 4,000 peacekeeping troops. Thus ended a war that had lasted more than two decades, claimed some 2 million lives by combat, starvation, and disease, and led to the dislocation of 4 million people. Prospects for peace in Sudan were overshadowed after 2003 by still another internal war, this one in the country’s western Darfur region. By 2006, additional hundreds of thousands had died, and the conflict threatened to engulf neighboring Chad as well. As for the south, the ruined region remained one of the poorest in the world. There was no electricity and not a single stretch of paved road across an area the size of France and Germany combined. The south remained unstable and deeply divided along ethnic lines and by tribal, political, and personal loyalties. In late 2004, there was a failed revolt against Garang by some SPLA officers who favored immediate and complete independence for the south. Western media often portrayed the Sudanese conflict as one of a Christian David in the south fighting

an oppressive Muslim Goliath in the north. Although there was an element of truth to this characterization, it ignored the complexity of the conflict, which was fueled by not only historic and religious issues but also by the ambitions of Sudanese leaders and the actions of outside forces. The prospects for peace in Sudan were dealt yet another serious blow with the death of John Garang in a helicopter crash on July 30, 2005. His entrance into Khartoum months earlier had attracted a crowd of more than 1 million, and his death was mourned throughout the south. It also touched off a new wave of violence, as southerners in Khartoum, suspecting foul play, began riots in which some 130 people were killed. Carl Skutsch and Peter Jacob Rainow See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Sudan: Conflict in Darfur Since 2002; Uganda: Civil Conflict Since 1980.

Bibliography Abdel-Rahim, M., et al. Sudan Since Independence. Brookfield, VT: Gower, 1986. Eprile, Cecil. War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955–1972. Newton Abbot, UK: David and Charles, 1974. Hold, Peter Malcom, and Michele W. Daly. A History of the Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day. New York: Longman, 1988. Johnson, Douglas Hamilton. The Root Cases of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. Jok, Madok Jok. War and Slavery in Sudan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. O’Balance, Edgar. Sudan Civil War and Terrorism, 1956–1999. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Voll, John Obert. Historical Dictionary of the Sudan. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1992. Woodward, Peter. Sudan 1898–1989: The Unstable State. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990.

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Sudan is geographically the largest nation in Africa. Approximately one-fourth the size of the United States, it shares borders with nine countries: Chad, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. Its population of nearly 40 million people is among the most diverse in Africa, representing some 130 languages and dialects. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), about 52 percent of the population may be classified as nonArab. The non-Arab population is often referred to as “black Africans.” This term can be misleading, however, as all Sudanese are dark-skinned. The vast

majority of the population (some 75 percent) is Muslim, though 20 percent practice indigenous religions, and 5 percent, mainly in the southern region, are Christian. Most Sudanese (68 percent) live in rural areas, while 32 percent are urban dwellers, and about 7 percent are nomadic. Sudan is also one of the poorest nations in the world; it ranks 139 out of 177 nations on the UN Human Development Index. Since achieving independence from the United Kingdom and Egypt in 1956, Sudan has been wracked by civil war and despotic governments for all but approximately ten years. President Omar Hassan al-Bashir took power in June 1989, when, along with other military officers, he carried out a coup d’état against the democratically elected government of Sadiqu Al-Mahdi. A former paratrooper, Bashir had fought with Egypt against Israel in the 1973 war. On his return to Sudan, he served as the commander of numerous assaults on the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), fighting an independence struggle in the south in the early 1980s. As for the reason behind the coup, al-Bashir asserted that his purpose was to “save the country from rotten political parties.” In collaboration with Hassan al-Turabi, the fundamentalist leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), al-Bashir made Sudan an “Islamic state.” In doing so, al-Turabi dissolved parliament, placed a ban on all political parties, and closed down all media outlets except that of the government of Sudan. However, suspicious of the ever-increasing power of al-Turabi, al-Bashir in December 1999 issued a state of emergency and kicked al-Turabi out of the government. In a rigged election, in which most of the opposition party members were fearful of running, Bashir easily won the presidency. Shortly thereafter, the military arrested al-Turabi. Accused of planning a coup and, later, interfering with government matters, al-Turabi has been imprisoned off and on since 2000.

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KEY DATES 1956

Sudan wins its independence from joint British-Egyptian rule.

1983

Civil war breaks out in the south of the country between rebels of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the government of Sudan.

1989

General Omar Hassan al-Bashir takes power in a military coup; he governs in collaboration with National Islamic front leader Hassan alTurabi.

1991

Arab militias begin attacking non-Arab villagers in the Darfur region in western Sudan.

1999

Al-Bashir forces al-Turabi out of power and declares a state of emergency.

2001

Two non-Arab rebel groups begin fighting the Arab-dominated government in the Darfur region.

2003 Various rebel groups join forces to form the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF); government forces and Arab militias known as Janjaweed engage in widespread attacks on non-Arab villagers in Darfur. 2004 The U.S. House of Representatives declares that government and janjaweed attacks in Darfur constitute genocide; the African Union begins its deployment of peacekeepers to the region. 2005 The UN Commission of Inquiry concludes that crimes against humanity are being perpetrated in Darfur by the government of Sudan and the janjaweed it supports; a peace agreement is signed between southern Sudanese rebels and the government of Sudan.

A civil war between the Khartoum-based government forces and rebels in the south, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), lasted from 1983 to 2005, constituting the longest-running conflict in Africa. The resulting violence cost the lives of about 4 million people. As many as 4 million others were forcibly displaced from their homes. After the al-Qaeda terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States began cultivating relations with Sudan as a potential ally in the war against terrorism. (Osama bin Laden lived in Sudan for several years and used the country as a base, but had been expelled by the Sudanese government in 1996). The United States led an effort, with the United Kingdom and Norway, to promote negotiations to end the north-south conflict. After a series

of talks during 2002 and 2003, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Nairobi on January 9, 2005. The CPA provided for the sharing of power between the government of Sudan and leaders of the SPLA/M and determined that the main rebel leader, John Garang, would become first vice president of Sudan. Another important provision of the CPA called for the sharing of revenues from oil, which had begun to be pumped from the south in 1999, between the north and the south. Six years after the signing of the CPA, the south would be permitted to hold a referendum for selfdetermination and independence. A shadow was cast over the prospects for lasting peace when John Garang was killed in an unexplained helicopter crash on July 30, 2005.

Sudan: Conflict in Darfur Since 2002

Emergence of Genocidal Conflict Although Darfur—a region in northwestern Sudan sharing borders with Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic—was not directly involved in the north-south civil war, festering problems in that region were to lead to an ongoing conflict there that has been labeled “genocide” by the government of the United States, other nations, and a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Prior to the conflict, Darfur was home to approximately 6 million people, virtually all of them Muslim. Darfur shares the ethnic diversity of Sudan, containing between forty and ninety ethnic groups or tribes, depending on how one defines what constitutes an ethnic group. Darfur is one of the most underdeveloped and isolated regions of Sudan, with very few roads, schools, or hospitals. It is also an area that has often been wracked by conflict. According to some observers, the seeds of the conflict in Darfur were sown in the 1980s, when fighting in neighboring Chad’s civil war spilled into western Darfur. More specifically, while Darfur was comprised of people who were largely Muslim, roughly 40 percent were not Arab and felt closer ethnic ties to groups in Chad. This aggravated traditional tensions between the non-Arab Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups. Further, many Fur felt that Khartoum not only encouraged but also supported their enemies, a feeling that sparked Fur attacks on government installations in Darfur. Adding to the unrest was the ongoing drought and near famine that began to plague the Darfur region in the mid-1980s, and the fact that Khartoum virtually ignored the plight of the Darfurians. While much of the region is dry, burning desert (except during a short rainy season), there are areas where crops are cultivated and cattle grazed. The productive land is occupied, in the main, by sedentary farmers and cattle owners, who have tended to be black African. At certain times of the year, however, the farmland has traditionally been used by seminomadic Arab peoples for grazing their cattle and camels, which in turn fertilized and renewed the soil for subsequent growing seasons. Disputes among the two groups were traditionally settled by local leaders of the African and Arab tribal groups. This symbiotic relationship, however, began to disintegrate during the 1970s and 1980s, when drought and spreading

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desertification intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources. The drought also affected other countries in the region, and nomads from Chad and Libya migrated to Darfur in search of grazing land, which put further pressure on the available resources. At the same time, weapons began to flow into Darfur from neighboring countries, as well as from the civil war raging in the south of Sudan. Tensions between non-Arabs and Arabs were also aggravated by the political ideology of Arab supremacy that emanated from Khartoum during the early 1980s. These factors, along with the fact that Khartoum put little or no money into the infrastructure of Darfur (such as roads, schools, water systems), angered various tribal groups (including the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa). This anger continued to simmer and grew increasingly volatile as the drought and famine took an ever-greater toll on residents. By the 1990s, traditional dispute resolution approaches proved inadequate, and non-Arabs and Arabs alike began to form local armed self-defense units to protect land and animals. As early as 1991, armed Arab militias formed and engaged in attacks against non-Arab villages and settlements. In August 1995, for example, Arab raiders attacked and burned the non-Arab village of Mejmeri in west Darfur, stealing 40,000 cattle and massacring 23 civilians. By late 1998, more than 100,000 non-Arab Masalit had fled to Chad to escape the violent attacks. Adding to this mix of issues was the general notion held by many Darfurians that, while the conflict in the south was being attended to and resulting in shared governance and shared resources, Darfur continued to be neglected and ignored. The commixture of all these factors induced the formation of rebel groups and attacks on the Sudanese government. In 2001 and 2002, before the conflict became widely known to the outside world, a rebel movement began to form among non-Arabs in Darfur, largely drawn from the self-defense forces that had been formed previously. Two main rebel groups emerged—the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—both of which, in addition to wanting to provide local security for non-Arabs, protested against the economic and political marginalization of Darfur and claimed to speak on behalf of

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all Darfurians, both Arab and non-Arab. Members of both rebel groups came primarily (but by no means exclusively) from three non-Arab tribes—the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa—that had been attacked by Arab militias. Leaders of both groups closely observed the ongoing peace negotiations between the government and the southern rebels and realized that armed insurrection eventually led to concessions by the government, including power sharing and access to economic resources. As is often the case, the history of the diverse rebel groups is a messy affair. In February 2003, various rebels formed the Darfur Liberation Front, which declared its opposition to the government of Sudan. Not a month later, in mid-March, the Darfur Liberation Front changed its name to the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/ SLA). While the Darfur Liberation Front called for the secession of Darfur from Sudan, the SLA’s secretary general, Mini Arkoi Minawi, asserted that its aim was to “create a united, democratic Sudan.”

The other major rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), was said to be supported by Sudanese opposition leader Hassan al-Turabi, who once served as the speaker of Sudan’s parliament and was considered the main ideologue of Sudan’s Islamist revolution. In May 2000, he was unceremoniously kicked out of the government and imprisoned. The first rebel attack involving Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa forces against a government military base is generally believed to have taken place on February 25, 2002. Alarmed by the violence spreading in Darfur, but with its military forces stretched thin by the northsouth civil war, the Sudanese government recruited, trained, and equipped Arab militias to suppress the rebellion in the province. According to Gerard Prunier, a veteran journalist of African civil wars, the so-called Janjaweed (meaning, variously, “hordes,” “ruffians,” or “men or devils on horseback”) had been used by the Sudanese leadership since the late 1980s to supplement government troops in the fight against southern rebels.

Members of the Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel group in the western Sudanese province of Darfur, travel to base camp in May 2004. Fighting escalated between government-backed Arab “Janjaweed” militia and largely nonArab rebel factions in the province. (Daniel Pepper/Getty Images News)

Sudan: Conflict in Darfur Since 2002

On May 1, 2002, a group of Fur politicians complained to Sudanese president al-Bashir that 181 villages had been attacked by Arab militias, with hundreds of people killed and thousands of animals stolen. In early 2003, a series of attacks by rebels forces against government installations and troops caused humiliation, alarm, and anger in Khartoum. On April 25, 2003, which some experts have called a critical turning point in the war, the SLA and JEM forces struck the government air force base at Al Fashir. The rebels killed at least 75 people at the base, destroyed several airplanes and bombers, and captured the base commander. Then in May, the SLA attacked a Sudanese battalion and killed 500 soldiers. Other successful attacks followed. According to Western journalists in mid-2003, the rebels were winning most of the encounters, and the government feared it would lose the province. In response to rebel victories, government leaders put the Darfur crisis in the hands of its powerful Military Intelligence agency, which directed government soldiers and the Janjaweed militias to expand the counterinsurgency campaign from rebel forces to civilians from the three main tribes—Fur, Masalit, and Zagahawa—from which the rebels came. The man heading up the Sudanese intelligence agency was Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, who, according to a United Nations document leaked in February 2006, was one of seventeen individuals whom the UN was considering for possible prosecution for his involvement in the Darfur conflict. The escalating violence led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of people forcibly displaced from their homes and forced to eke out an existence in camps within Darfur or, if they were lucky, across the border in neighboring Chad. Tribal leaders targeted by the government and Janjaweed asserted, time and again, that, as journalist John Pike quoted them, “the depopulation of villages and consequent changes in land ownership are part of a government strategy to change the whole democracy of the region of Darfur.” Beginning in early 2003, the Janjaweed and government troops engaged in widespread and systematic attacks against non-Arab villages in Darfur, slaughtering men, raping women, abducting or killing children, looting household goods and animals, and burning the villages to the ground. The initial attacks were often carried out in the early hours of the morning, thereby catching the victims off-guard. Many,

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if not most, of the ground attacks were preceded by aerial bombardment from Antonov bombers, government military aircraft. Apparently running out of ordnance at times, the government reportedly resorted to dropping heavy pieces of metal, including old appliances. A few survivors reported that a yellow, wet substance was dropped on them from the planes, and that it caused great sickness among the people. The bombings were generally followed by attacks by hundreds of Janjaweed racing into the village on horseback and camels, followed close behind by fourwheeled vehicles, many with mounted guns. As of early 2006, tens of thousands of Darfurians had been forced into internally displaced person (IDP) camps in the region; others had made their way to refugee camps in Chad, not knowing whether their loved ones had survived. Some young women were reportedly kidnapped and forced to become concubines of the Janjaweed and soldiers. Not content with terrorizing the population, chasing them off, and looting their villages, the government troops and Janjaweed would frequently follow black Africans into the hills and mountains, shoot the men, and rape the women and girls. Wells, critical to human life and essential livestock, were poisoned by tossing in dead bodies. As many as 2,000 black African villages had been destroyed by early 2006. Close to 2 million people were residing in poorly equipped IDP camps, which were attacked at will. Although the government of Sudan repeatedly denied sponsoring or supporting the Janjaweed, the 2005 UN Commission of Inquiry in Darfur found that “the large majority of attacks on villages conducted by the [Janjaweed] militia have been undertaken with the acquiescence of State officials.”

International Awareness By late 2003, the world began to take notice of the escalating carnage in Darfur, as hundreds of thousands of civilians were forcibly displaced from their homes and villages. In December, Jan Egeland, UN undersecretary for humanitarian affairs, asserted that the Darfur crisis was possibly the “worst in the world today.” In the same month, Tom Vraalsen, the UN security general’s special envoy for humanitarian affairs for Sudan, claimed that the situation in Darfur was “nothing less than the organized destruction of sedentary African agriculturalists—the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa.”

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In 2004, the government and citizens of the United States, which was engaged in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, began to express alarm over the situation in Darfur. On June 16, members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate issued a warning to Sudan to desist from its violent actions or face financial sanctions or legal consequences. On June 24, the House unanimously declared that the situation in Darfur constituted genocide. A week later, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited an IDP camp in the province and a refugee camp in Chad. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also made a personal visit. In July and August 2004, the United States—in a joint effort of the U.S. State Department, the Coalition of International Justice (CIJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Aid (USAID)—sent a team of investigators, the Atrocities Documentation Team (ADT), to conduct interviews with Sudanese refugees from Darfur and collect evidence to ascertain whether genocide had been perpetrated by the Sudanese government and Janjaweed on the black population. Upon analyzing the data, the U.S. government declared that genocide indeed had been perpetrated in Darfur. The United States referred the matter to the UN Security Council. The Commission of Inquiry (COI), established by Security Council Resolution 1564 on September 18, 2004, conducted in-depth investigations in Khartoum, Darfur, Chad, Ethiopia, and Eritrea from November 2004 through January 2005. The commission declared that crimes against humanity had been perpetrated in Darfur. Although it did not come to a finding of genocide, further investigations might reveal that genocidal activity in fact had been committed. In its report, the COI stated, “The pillaging and destruction of villages, being conducted on a systematic as well as widespread basis in a discriminatory fashion, appears to have been directed to bring about the destruction of the livelihoods and means of survival of these populations.”

Failed Peace Talks, Limited International Intervention The rebel groups (SPLA/M and JEM) and government of Sudan began a series of peace talks in mid-2004, the chief results of which have been recrimination and

walkouts. Making the process even more difficult was the splintering of rebel groups, with each new offshoot claiming a place at the peace talks. Meanwhile, the government, the Janjaweed, and the rebels continued to battle one another viciously. The African Union deployed peacekeeping troops to Darfur in 2004, but the number proved too small to make a difference. The initial force was just 150 soldiers, followed by another three hundred. The total eventually reached about 7,000, but most analysts believed that at least two or three times that number was needed to quell the violence. Moreover, the peacekeepers were undertrained, underarmed, and working under a mandate that did not allow them to engage in battle. Instead, they were allowed only to protect the human rights monitors on the ground and to act in self-defense. The AU, meanwhile, insisted that Darfur is an “African problem” that must be solved by African nations, and it refused to allow the UN to send in troops to assist with the effort. Recognizing that it was severely outmanned and outgunned, however, the AU did begin to consider suggestions that UN troops ought to be deployed in Darfur. As of March 2006, the UN, along with various nations, was exploring the possibility of replacing African Union troops with a more robust international peacekeeping force. The Sudanese government, of course, balked at the suggestion, and the conflict raged on. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Sudan: Civil War in South, 1955–1972; 1983–2005.

Bibliography De Waal, Alex, and Alexander De Waal. Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Flint, Julie, and Alex de Waal. Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. New York: Zed Books, 2005. Power, Samantha. “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Prunier, Gerard. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. United Nations. UN Commission of Inquiry: Darfur Conflict. New York: United Nations, 2005. U.S. State Department. “Documenting Atrocities in Darfur.” State Publication 11182. Washington, DC, September 9, 2004.

TOGO: Coups and Political Unrest, 1963–1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups; Ethnic and Religious BURKINA FASO

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Mango

BENIN

Kara Bassar

GHANA

Sokodé Soutouboua

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Atakpamé Lake Volta

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Notsé Tsévié

Vol t a Ri ve r

Kpémé Lomé

Aného

Bight of Benin

Until the establishment of a German protectorate in the 1880s, the territory of what is now Togo served as a buffer zone between the often-warring Asante and Dahomey states. In 1914, Togo was seized by British and French colonial troops in neighboring Gold Coast and Dahomey, now Benin. Following World War I, the colony was divided into Frenchand British-administered zones under a League of Nations mandate. This partition divided the Ewe people.

Following World War II, the British and French governments placed their spheres under a UN trusteeship. The Ewe’s pleas to have their territory united were refused since much of their territory lay in the British colony of the Gold Coast. Following a plebiscite in 1957, however, the British sphere was incorporated into the newly independent state of Ghana, while the French territory became an independent nation within the French Community. Politics during the last years of French control and the early years of independence were dominated by one family. The two major parties—the United Togolese Committee and the Togolese Progress Party— were headed by brothers-in-law Nicolas Grunitzky and Sylvanus Olympio, respectively. Grunitzky won the first election for prime minister in 1956, while Olympio succeeded him in the 1958 elections, on a platform of Ewe unification. The Olympio regime, however, became increasingly authoritarian during the first years of independence, forcing Grunitzky and other opponents into jail or exile. Olympio was overthrown and killed in the first military coup in postcolonial Africa, in 1963. The coup leader, Sergeant Etienne Eyadéma, asked Grunitzky to return from exile to become head of state. Grunitzky’s efforts to achieve constitutional multiparty democracy failed, however, and Eyadéma assumed full power in 1967.

Eyadéma’s Rule Over the course of the next ten years, Eyadéma attempted to create a one-party state around the Togolese People’s Assembly (RPT). Numerous attempts to overthrow him, however, including an alleged mercenary invasion headed by several sons of Olympio, kept the nation in a state of political turmoil

307

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KEY DATES 1960

Togo wins its independence from France.

1963

President Sylvanus Olympio is overthrown and killed in a military coup led by Sergeant Etienne Eyadéma, who calls on former opposition leader Nicolas Grunitzky to form a new government.

1967

After Grunitzky fails to establish a multiparty democracy, Eyadema assumes full power.

1985

First multiparty elections are held under the 1980 constitution.

1986

An effort to seize the government in a coup is thwarted; the government blames foreign governments for the coup attempt and seals the borders.

1990

Opposition parties denounce government efforts to restore democracy as a sham.

1991–1997

Prodemocracy protests against Eyadéma rule grow in size and intensity.

throughout most of the 1970s. During those years, Eyadéma kept firm control over the politics of the country, while the main opposition group—the Togolese Movement for Democracy (MTD)—remained in exile in Ghana. In March 1985, the first general elections were held under the 1980 constitution, though the RPT was the only party permitted to field candidates for office. Two months later, however, other parties were permitted to form. Nevertheless, this reform came too late to prevent more political unrest, including a series of bomb attacks in the capital of Lomé. The government blamed the MTD and Ghanaian authorities, who responded with charges that the RPT had used the bomb attacks as a pretext for political repression, including the arrests of a number of MTD activists. In September 1986, some nineteen persons were detained after an attempt to seize the main army barracks in Lomé, the RPT headquarters, and the national radio station. More than a dozen persons, including six civilians, were killed in the attack. The RPT once again blamed foreign governments for the attempted coup, including Ghana and Burkina Faso. The borders of the country were sealed, and some 600 French and Zairean troops were flown in to protect

the government. Several opposition leaders, including Gilchrist Olympio, son of the former president, were sentenced to death in absentia. Efforts to restore constitutional rule in 1990 were denounced by the opposition as a sham, leading to student boycotts and clashes between protesters and troops. Continuing demonstrations led to the closing of all schools in April 1991, a government announcement of a general amnesty, and the legalization of political parties. The news, however, was overshadowed by the discovery of twenty-six bodies in a Lomé lagoon, which the opposition claimed were those of protesters killed by security forces.

Continuing Political and Ethnic Unrest In August 1991, a national conference—with a rehabilitated Gilchrist Olympio in attendance—was convened to offer constitutional and political reforms and to find a way of cooling tensions between the Ewe and Kabiye ethnic groups, the former largely in the opposition and the latter generally supporting the government. When the conference voted to suspend most of Eyadéma’s powers, however, the head of state canceled the meetings and established an interim

Togo: Coups and Political Unrest, 19 63–19 9 0s

government under the control of the High Council of the Republic (HCR). Eyadéma then agreed to relinquish control of the government, though he remained head of the military. This arrangement was a recipe for further political discord. Loyal to Eyadéma, the army seized control of the state broadcasting services in Lomé on October 1, after the government had failed to pay their salaries. The troops demanded the resignation of the HCR, but Eyadéma ordered them to return to their barracks. Some five people were killed in the unrest. A week later, the presidential guards, under the command of Eyadéma’s half-brother, attempted to arrest the prime minister and head of the HCR, Joseph Kokou Koffigoh. This move resulted in more deaths and the arrests of Eyadéma’s half-brother and several other officers. Unrest between Eyadéma and Koffigoh supporters continued throughout the fall of 1991, as a committee attempted to draft a new constitution. In November, troops were called out to put down the protests and impose a curfew on the capital, but outbreaks of violence continued into the early part of 1992. In early May, an assassination attempt against Olympio was blamed on the army, resulting in a twoday general strike in Lomé. Continued unrest prevented the scheduling of elections for the rest of the year and into 1993. In March, an attack on the military camp in Lomé, where Eyadéma kept his residence, was blamed on supporters of Olympio. In April, an announcement of June elections for president was made, but the poll was delayed after a series of bomb attacks on both government and opposition targets in May. New elections were scheduled for January 1994, but another armed attack on Eyadéma’s

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military base—again blamed on Olympio and the Ghana government—forced their postponement until February. The elections resulted in the victory of a coalition of opposition parties but did not resolve the political violence plaguing the country. In October came an attack on the Togolese Office of Phosphates, the government agency that administered the country’s main industry. Continued unrest marred the transition to democracy, especially after the opposition coalition fell apart through defections to the party of Eyadéma. This led to a rally of some 100,000 supporters of the opposition in the capital in May 1997, at which Eyadéma was accused of manipulating the political system. Eyadéma ran for reelection in 1998 and won, but there were reports that thousands were killed in postelection violence. Eyedéma was expected to retire in 2003, but he decided to run still again. He died in 2003 after thirtyeight years in power in Togo. The military installed his son, Faure Gnassingbe, causing violent protests by opposition parties. Soon afterward, Gnassinbe was elected to the presidency to succeed his father. James Ciment See also: Coups.

Bibliography Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Togo, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1986–1996. Greene, Sandra. Gender, Ethnicity, and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast: A History of the Anlo-Ewe. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996. Verdon, Michel. The Abutia Ewe of West Africa: A Chiefdom That Never Was. New York: Mouton, 1983.

UGANDA: Anti-Amin Struggle,1971–1979 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups PARTICIPANT: Tanzania LANGI

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Lake Albert

Fort Portal Lake Edward

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ACHOLI

UGANDA Gulu Lira

O Mbarara

Moroto Soroti

N GA BU Kampala

Masaka

ETHIOPIA

DA

Mbale Jinja

KENYA

Entebbe

Lake Victoria

RWANDA

BURUNDI

TANZANIA

Like other countries in the Great Lakes region of East Africa, Uganda is a mélange of ethnic groups, largely divided between Nilotic-Sudanese people in the north and Bantu-speakers in the south. Also like the other small Great Lakes states of Rwanda and Burundi, densely populated Uganda was ruled by a centralized monarchy during the immediate precolonial period—the royal house of Buganda, with a king, a council of ministers, and a parliament. Dominated by the Buganda people of the southern half of the country, Uganda’s population had extensive contacts with the outside world, primarily for purposes of trade. The first British explorers arrived in Uganda in the 1860s, searching for the source of the Nile. A decade later, missionaries both Protestant and Catholic followed and succeeded in converting many Ugandans to Christianity. Rallying around

their new faith, two contending political factions led the country into a brief civil war in 1892, largely over the issue of naming a successor to the throne. The fighting led the British to impose a protectorate over the country in 1894. Challenged by the Bunyoro kingdom to the north, the British sided with the Buganda, extending both colonial rule and the Bugandan monarchy to the north of the country. The British also utilized the Christianized Buganda as their administrative agents and security force throughout the Muslim and animist areas of the country, inflaming ethnic divisions within the country that persist to this day. At the same time, under an agreement signed between the Buganda monarchy and the British government, new forms of land ownership were instituted. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the Buganda monarchy had held all lands in trust for the people, but the new dispensation created private ownership, and much of the land fell into the hands of the Buganda elite. The British also established an educational system that disproportionately benefited the Buganda. Despite these benefits, it was the Buganda who first began to agitate for more power within the colonial system and then for independence. In the 1930s and 1940s, Buganda workers and peasants began to organize unions, leading to demonstrations against both British and royal rule and, increasingly, calls for independence. These demands caused concern among the leaders of other ethnic groups, who feared that an independent Uganda would be largely controlled by the Buganda. Indeed, the first two political parties in the country—the Uganda National Congress (UNC), founded in 1952, and the Democratic Party (DP), established two years later—were Buganda-controlled, though both included members of other ethnic groups. Thus began a lasting conceit among the Buganda that the interests of their ethnic

310

Uganda: Anti-Amin Struggle, 1971–1979

311

KEY DATES 1962 Uganda wins its independence from Great Britain, with Milton Obote as president. 1966 With the national assembly demanding an investigation into corruption in the Obote administration, the president declares a state of emergency and postpones elections until 1971. 1971

Army second-in-command Idi Amin, one of the figures targeted for corruption investigation in 1966, seizes power while Obote is out of the country.

1972 Amin orders all 45,000 Asian residents of Uganda to leave the country; as this group represents much of the business class of the country, the economy is devastated as a result; former members of the military, led by former officers David Oyite-Ojok and Yuweri Museveni, form an anti-Amin guerrilla army and invade the country from Tanzania. 1978

To counteract Tanzanian support for the rebels, Amin invades Tanzania.

1979 The Tanzanian army and the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) invade the country in January; they quickly defeat the demoralized Ugandan army and force Amin into exile in Saudi Arabia; it is estimated that between 300,000 and 500,000 persons were killed by Amin’s forces during the eight-year dictatorship.

group coincided with the interests of the country at large. The rise of the Buganda independence movement sparked political organizing in the largely non-Buganda north of the country. There, Milton Obote helped to organize the Uganda People’s Union in 1958, which later merged with renegades from the UNC to form the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC). Still, the Buganda were not entirely united. Divided between Protestant and Catholic wings, the Buganda split over the question of whether to secede and form their own independent country. When the secession plan failed, the opposition Buganda group formed the Kabaka Yekka (KY), which sought to ensure the continued presence and power of the royal house within a federated state. To achieve this goal, it united with the UPC, and together the coalition swept to power in the pre-independence elections of April 1962, with Obote serving as the new country’s first prime minister.

Obote Regime The ruling UPC-KY alliance faced a number of major internal problems during the early years of independence, most revolving around the question of central versus local government power. Moreover, agitation among the Bunyoro to win back two districts lost to the Buganda after the 1892 civil war led to a plebiscite in which the local residents voted to return the districts to Bunyoro County in 1964, a decision ignored by the government. Meanwhile, the UPC was increasing its control over all district councils and legislatures outside of Buganda. Despite these local successes, the UPC was facing political problems in the capital. Its KY partners dropped out of the coalition, and the UPC grew increasingly divided over economic policies, with Obote attempting to nationalize much of the commercial and industrial sector. In April 1966, the national assembly approved a motion demanding an investigation into a goldsmuggling operation conducted by two of Obote’s

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top officials, one of whom was the army’s second-incommand, Idi Amin. Obote used the tense situation to launch a preemptive coup, arresting a number of ministers, suspending the constitution, and granting himself all executive powers. A month later, after elements of the armed forces loyal to the royal house demanded autonomy for the Buganda, the rest of the army, under Amin’s command, seized the royal palace—the king had fled the country—and Obote declared a state of emergency, postponing elections until 1971. During these years, Uganda slipped increasingly into a state of repressive dictatorship. Relying on Amin’s forces, Obote arrested anyone who challenged his rule. But Amin was not entirely reliable. A northerner, he was sympathetic to the rebels in Sudan— related to his own ethnic group—who were fighting for autonomy. When Obote demanded that Amin stop funneling arms to the Sudanese rebels in 1969, Amin attempted a coup but was forced to flee to a base in his home district. There, he plotted his return to power, and when Obote left the country on a diplomatic mission in January 1971, Amin seized power.

Amin’s Dictatorship Both the people of Uganda and the international community welcomed the coup, the former because it promised national unity and the latter because Obote was seen as too dictatorial. But Amin soon showed his true colors. An uneducated man who had risen in the ranks of the colonial army through his skills as a boxer, Amin immediately purged the army and police of Obote supporters by massacring them. Suspending all political activity and most civil rights, Amin dissolved the national assembly and ruled by fiat. Military courts were given expanded jurisdiction over all citizens, and several new security agencies were established to keep an eye on any possible dissent or challenge to Amin’s rule. Though Amin was already responsible for hundreds of murders, it was his decision to expel Uganda’s substantial Asian community that earned him international condemnation and a severing of diplomatic and commercial relations with Britain, then Uganda’s number-one trading partner. Like other East African countries, Uganda had had a large population of Asians—largely from India—since the turn of the century, when they were brought in as labor to build the colonial railroads.

President Idi Amin ruled Uganda ruthlessly from 1971 to 1979. The armed forces and national police attacked civilians and looted indiscriminately. An estimated halfmillion Ugandans died from violence during his eight years of dictatorship. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Many then moved into small business, succeeding because they were often favored by the British and because, as a tightly knit community, they provided capital to one another. In the process, they had earned a certain degree of resentment from the African community. Uganda had seen anti-Asian riots in the 1940s, but both the British colonial administration and the Obote regime recognized the Indian community’s importance and so offered a degree of protection. But Amin, unfamiliar with the crucial economic role they played, accepted the populist notion that they were parasites, feeding off the African people. Following his August announcement that all noncitizen Asians—later expanded to all Asians—must leave his country, troops and police took over businesses and other Asian property, often at gunpoint or for pennies on the dollar. Harassed and even murdered as they tried to leave the country, all but 4,000 Asians fled the country, most to Britain. In the hands

Uganda: Anti-Amin Struggle, 1971–1979

of cronies and military officers, the businesses were plundered and soon disappeared. The Ugandan economy went into a tailspin and would not revive until the late 1980s. Meanwhile, Amin conducted a reign of terror and folly. He murdered virtually any figure in the country who represented a challenge to his rule, including politicians, religious officials, businesspersons, and intellectuals. The police and military were given carte blanche to attack individuals and loot property, which they did with zeal. Despite these illgotten gains made possible by Amin, the dictator faced several army challenges to his rule, mostly from ethnic groups that he had attacked early in his regime. When the Anglican archbishop and several ministers criticized the massacres of Langi and Acholi peoples, Amin ordered their assassinations. All in all, it is estimated that some 500,000 Ugandans died from violence during the eight years of dictatorship. But it was Amin’s comically misguided foreign policy ventures that spelled his doom. In September 1972, former members of Obote’s military and security forces—now organized into a guerrilla army under the command of David OyiteOjok and Yuweri Museveni, both former military officers—invaded the country from neighboring Tanzania, intending to overthrow the Amin regime. Amin, supplied with weapons by the Soviet Union and Libya—for which he had paid with the property stolen from the exiled Asian community, sent his air force to bomb Tanzanian towns, provoking Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere to sever diplomatic relations and begin organizing a coalition of East African heads of state to oppose Amin. Amin also managed to offend the United States by making scandalous charges against President Jimmy Carter and threatening the American ambassador and his family. The United States cut off relations with Uganda as well. Uganda’s diplomatic isolation soon had detrimental effects on its economy. Much of the commercial and industrial sector was in ruins. Most of the commercial agricultural plantations had closed down. What little international trade Uganda still engaged in was mostly conducted by smugglers. Unemployment in the cities skyrocketed, and people began to grow hungry in a country that once had been a food exporter. Having purged his government of any and all competent administrators, Amin now surrounded himself with sycophants who catered to his every paranoid fantasy. His regime soon reached new levels

313

of depravity as Amin took personal charge of the torture and murder of supposed opponents, going so far as to store their body parts in huge refrigerators in his compound, where he would examine them and show them off to visitors. The morass the country was sinking into was evident even to formerly loyal officers in the military. Soon Amin’s many enemies were hatching clandestine plots to overthrow him; popular unrest grew. In response, Amin cooked up a desperate and fantastical plan to divert the army and public’s attention from the troubles he had inflicted on the country. In October 1978, Amin launched an invasion of Tanzania, with the aim of seizing the Kagera area, which would give landlocked Uganda access to the Indian Ocean. The invasion was easily turned back by the Tanzanian army, but Tanzanian president Nyerere was infuriated. He came to the conclusion that Amin had to go. Lining up his fellow East African heads of state and encouraging Ugandan exiles to form a united anti-Amin front, Nyerere made his move in January 1979. Meeting little resistance from the demoralized Ugandan army and their 1,500 Libyan allies, the Tanzanian army and the new Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) quickly rolled across the country and captured the capital, Kampala, in April. Amin fled the country for Saudi Arabia, where he lived until his death in 2003.

Aftermath Even before Kampala was taken, the political parties of the early years of independence began to organize an interim government. In early March, they organized a conference, establishing a new political party—the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF)—and a thirty-member national consultative committee to serve as a temporary legislature. Obote, responding to Nyerere’s suggestion that he would antagonize delegates, agreed not to participate, and a former academic named Yusufu Lule was picked to run the national executive committee and serve as president until general elections could be held. After attempting to reorganize the executive committee, however, the consultative committee ousted Lule in favor of former attorney general Godfrey Binaisa. Meanwhile, post-Amin Uganda was descending into anarchy. Relations between Tanzanian soldiers and guerrillas of the UNLA deteriorated as the latter

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began to fight amongst themselves along ethnic lines, often at the instigation of the many untrained recruits brought into the army during its reconquest of Uganda. Moreover, many of the new troops began to engage in the same kind of looting of property and violence against civilians that marked the Amin regime. In late 1979, Obote convinced Binaisa to dismiss both Oyite-Ojok and Museveni from their respective positions of chief of staff and defense minister, resulting in an army mutiny that placed the two back in power. A year later, in December 1980, the promised general elections were held, with all of the old parties participating. While the Democratic Party was prevented from registering its candidates because of supposed technical violations of the electoral law, the Uganda People’s Conference (Obote’s old party) split into a mainstream faction, headed by Obote, and a radical group under Museveni. In the end, the mainstream UPC faction swept the elections, return-

ing Obote to the presidency after some nine years in exile. James Ciment See also: Coups; Uganda: Civil Conflict Since 1980.

Bibliography Hansen, Holger Bernt, and Michael Twaddle, eds. Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1988. Kasfir, Nelson. The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of Uganda. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. Kyemba, Henry. A State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin. New York: Ace Books, 1977. Mamdani, Mahmood. Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. Mazrui, Ali Al’Amin. Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1975. Mittelman, James H. Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From Obote to Amin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975.

UGANDA: Civil Conflict Since 1980 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Religious and Ethnic; Coups PARTICIPANT: Rwanda 0 0

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N GA BU Kampala

Masaka

O OR Mbarara NY

Moroto

DA

Mbale Jinja

KENYA

Entebbe

Lake Victoria

RWANDA

BURUNDI

TANZANIA

After former dictator Milton Obote was elected its president in 1980, Uganda settled into several years of tension and low-level violence. The former dictator, Idi Amin, who had been ousted from power by Ugandan rebels and the Tanzanian army in 1979, had left a legacy of corruption and rule by terror that was difficult to eradicate. Obote’s security forces, though not as extensive or violent as those under Amin, engaged in many of the same oppressive and destructive tactics, acting as a law unto themselves. Meanwhile, several small guerrilla groups opposed Obote and his United People’s Congress (UPC). The groups included the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), former Amin supporters operating out of the former dictator’s home district in the west; the Ugandan Freedom Movement (UFM); and the National Resistance Army (NRA), led by former defense minister and radical UPC politician Yuweri Museveni, operating out of the Luwero Triangle north of the capital.

Obote was a northerner whose coalition included southern Buganda people (precolonial rulers of Uganda) in addition to the Acholi and Langi of the north. He was disliked by the radical and disaffected Buganda. The opposition also won the support of the Banyarwanda Tutsi, exiles from Rwanda who were fleeing from an anti-Tutsi Hutu government. To counter the increasingly powerful NRA, Obote and his Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) launched massive raids on Luwero. The attacks succeeded in driving tens of thousands of civilians into refugee camps; thousands of others became NRA supporters. Obote also faced serious economic problems. After spending the International Monetary Fund loans it received upon coming to power in 1980, the government found itself unable to provide the subsidies for basic food and fuel. Further loans were not forthcoming because investigations conducted by the U.S. Congress and Amnesty International in 1984 found the UPC government guilty of gross violations of human rights and the deaths of tens of thousands of Ugandan citizens. While not as flamboyant as Amin, Obote was proving himself a dictator of the worst kind.

Museveni Takes Power Meanwhile, ethnic divisions in the army were coming to a head. In 1985, the two largest groups—the Acholi and the Langi—began to fire upon each other within the Kampala barracks. The Acholi left the barracks and marched northward, where they joined forces with the UNRF, even though their traditional rivals, the West Nile people, dominated the latter. Together, the two forces returned to Kampala, forcing Obote to flee to Kenya and later to Zambia. But even as the new Acholi-dominated government, headed by Tito Okello, tried to assert its control over

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KEY DATES 1979

Dictator Idi Amin is overthrown in an invasion by the Tanzanian Army and guerrillas of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA).

1980

Former dictator Milton Obote is elected president; several factions of parties defeated in the election form small guerrilla groups in opposition to the ruling Uganda People’s Congress (UPC).

1985

Ethnic divisions within the national army lead to violence in the Kampala barracks; Obote is overthrown in a military coup.

1986

Yuweri Museveni, head of the National Resistance Army (NRA) guerrilla organization, seizes power.

1991

Museveni dispatches the NRA to destroy various guerrilla forces in the north of the country.

1994

Uganda-based Tutsi rebels invade neighboring Rwanda and end the Hutu genocide of Tutsi in that country.

1996

Museveni is overwhelmingly elected president.

1999

Uganda and Sudan sign an agreement whereby each side promises to stop aiding or providing sanctuary for rebel movements in the other country.

2003–2004

The Ugandan army conducts a major offensive against rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), but the group’s attacks on refugee camps continue.

the country, it faced the same challenge that Obote had—the NRA, which had expanded its territory to include much of the south and west of the country. At the end of 1985, the Okello government agreed to meet with Museveni, head of the NRA, to arrange a cease-fire and a possible power-sharing arrangement. In fact, Okello was using the talks as a cover for disarming his West Nile allies, who were threatening a coup d’état. The West Nile people fled to their homeland in the northwest, destroying everything in their path. Museveni, realizing that the power-sharing agreement with Okello was meaningless, broke off the talks and returned to the NRA in the southwest to plan an offensive to take the capital. He attacked and drove Okello out of power in January 1986. Museveni invited civilians into his government and promised an administration of national reconcili-

ation. He established a commission to investigate the abuses of the Amin, Obote, and Okello regimes; the report they issued was horrifying. As many as 800,000 Ugandans had been killed by the violence that had torn apart the country since Obote’s original coup in 1966. Museveni dismissed 2,500 police officers who were suspected of committing human rights violations and created a nationwide network of resistance committees, made up of local civilians. The committees were charged with preventing official abuses and corruption and protecting villages against guerrilla and bandit attacks.

Continuing Violence Guerilla threats were especially challenging in the early years of the Museveni administration. Various

Uganda: Civil Conflict Since 19 8 0

guerrilla armies—including loyalists of the former Amin and Obote regimes—were wreaking havoc throughout the north of the country. Often nothing more than lawless bands, they looted property, raped women, and forced peasants to work for them. Often they assassinated officials, teachers, and anyone else they perceived as working for the Museveni government. Among the strangest of these groups was the Holy Spirit Movement, led by a charismatic cult leader named Alice Lakwena and manned by Acholi peasants. Virtually unarmed, they attacked the NRA with machetes and spears. Not surprisingly, they were easily overcome by the army, which killed several thousand. The survivors fled to neighboring Kenya, where they organized themselves as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). A more serious challenge were the remnants of the antigovernment guerrillas operating in the north and northwest of the country. In April 1991, the NRA launched a sweep of the area, hoping to wipe out the guerrilla armies. By July, the army reported having killed 1,500 and arresting 1,000 more, though human rights organizations cited the army for abuses against civilians. Though facing guerrilla challenges, as well as several coup plots within his own army, Museveni was also making conciliatory gestures. To appease the opposition, he offered cabinet positions and other favors. To gain support from the international community, he formally invited the Asian Ugandans—brutally expelled by Amin in 1972—to come back to Uganda and, where possible, recoup the property that had been seized from them. Gradually Museveni introduced more stability and prosperity than Uganda had seen since the early years of independence. Though he claimed that political parties antagonize ethnic divisions, he slowly allowed the introduction of opposition parties. His efforts were rewarded by the Ugandan people, who elected him president in 1996 with nearly threequarters of the vote, and by the international community. International lending agencies, governments, and nongovernmental organizations, pleased by the progress he had made in reestablishing a degree of democracy and reviving the economy, offered financial and other forms of help. Less satisfactory to outsiders—particularly the French—was the support he offered the Banyarwanda Tutsi exiles from Rwanda in their attacks on the French-supported Hutu government there in the 1980s. In 1994, however, Museveni helped the Tutsi launch the invasion that

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helped end the slaughter of Tutsis by Hutu forces. In 1997, the Museveni government supported the military campaign of Laurent Kabila in the Congo to oust Mobutu Sese Seko from power. The next year, Museveni supported the campaign to remove Kabila himself. One remaining challenge for the Museveni government was the Lord’s Resistance Army. Having moved from Kenya to southern Sudan, it reputedly received arms and assistance from the Islamist government there. The Sudanese were said to provide the assistance to counter Uganda’s supposed support of black Christian rebels in Sudan. Whatever the truth of these assertions, the LRA mounted major attacks on villages in northwestern Uganda during 1995 and 1996, killing, torturing, raping, and abducting civilians (for training as guerrilla fighters), while also virtually enslaving numerous children. The LRA was mystical and secretive, claiming to seek the establishment of a government founded on the Bible’s Ten Commandments, yet it lacked any real political agenda. It proved difficult to negotiate with and difficult to eradicate by force. While the Ugandan army conducted extensive sweeps of the northwest, the LRA continued to launch attacks on civilians and military outposts. Some 10,000 people were killed in the fighting, and the unrest in the region led to food shortages among a population of some 230,000 Ugandan refugees. In 1999, Uganda and Sudan signed an agreement by which Sudan agreed to stop funding the LRA and Uganda agreed to end support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The agreement reduced the level of LRA attacks, but the group remained a threat to Ugandan civilians in the north and west. In early 2003, there was hope that peace talks would resume. Later that year, Ugandan troops conduced another massive roundup of LRA rebels, resulting in the rescue of over 7,000 abductees and the killing or arrest of 1,700 rebels, according to the Ugandan Defense Ministry. These intermittent roundups were setbacks for future LRA terror campaigns, but the group continued its attacks. It also seems likely that the LRA continues to receive supplies and assistance from groups outside Uganda.

Uganda in the Twenty-first Centur y By the early 2000s, Uganda had 27 million inhabitants. Approximately one-third were Catholic, another

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third Protestant, and the balance split nearly evenly between Muslims and those holding indigenous beliefs. The Buganda people remained the largest ethnic group, representing approximately 17 percent of the population; the remaining population represented more than two dozen ethnic groups. With so many ethnic groups, one alone often controls the government, security organizations, and much of the economy. This is often unacceptable to other ethnic groups and leads to conflict along ethnic lines. When these rivalries persist, they pose a challenge to peace and stability in the region. Often conflicts spill over into neighboring countries, since larger ethnic groups commonly straddle borders. Thus, the continuing challenge for Uganda continued to be addressing the diversity and inequality between different ethnic groups. To complicate matters, the Museveni government was often accused of nepotism and corruption. Ministers were censored in Parliament on charges of influence peddling and corruption. The World Bank mission to Uganda in 1998 revealed widespread secrecy, insider dealings, and corruption, even at the highest levels of government. Cases of large-scale embezzlement were common, including the theft of donor funds disbursed to the ministries of health and education and to the Ugandan Electoral Commission. Despite Uganda’s vast natural resources, its people remained in the grip of poverty, squalor, and destitution. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan frequently lashed out at corrupt African leaders, noting that the UN Security Council spends the majority of its time working on issues related to Africa. In Uganda, the Political Organizations Bill, passed by Parliament in 2001, aimed to remove restrictions on political par-

ties and open up more space for new reform-minded movements. President Museveni’s government opposed these measures and further consolidated its position. In the March 2001 presidential election, Museveni captured 69.3 percent of the vote, and his opponent, Colonel Kizza Besigye, went into selfimposed exile. Besigye’s wife, Winnie Byanyima, an outspoken opposition member of Parliament, remained in her government post during the elections, but soon afterward she was dismissed for speaking out against government corruption. Later she was charged with illegally possessing a handgun. Although additional political reforms aimed at reducing ethnic conflict were being considered by a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), the government remained opposed to empowering real opposition parties. In general, the Museveni era brought some stability and economic improvement to the country. As long as effective political opposition is forbidden, however, the situation in Uganda will remain tense. James Ciment and Luke Nichter See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Sudan: Civil War in South, 1955–1972; 1983–2005; Uganda: Anti-Amin Struggle, 1971–1979.

Bibliography Ayittey, George B.N. Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005. Bastian, Sunil, and Robin Luckham, eds. Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003. Hansen, Bernt Holder, and Michael Twaddle, eds. From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitutionmaking in Uganda. London: J. Currey, 1995.

WESTERN SAHARA: Polisario-Moroccan War,1975–1991 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: Morocco; Mauritania SPAIN

El-Hamra (the “Red River”) valley. It is the only important river in the country, but it flows only in the wet season. Western Sahara’s southern region is known as the Río de Oro. From time immemorial, the territory of the Western Sahara has been inhabited by nomadic ethnic groups. Because of the harshness of the desert climate, the population is thin and widely dispersed over some 100,000 square miles of territory. The native people are Arabs, Berbers, Tuaregs, Reguibat, Delim, and Izarguen. The people today are collectively referred to as Saharawis. While all are Muslim and under leaders who claim descent from the prophet Muhammad, no supratribal government had ever established authority in the region, though an elaborate caste system rates some groups as higher in status than others. These castes contain various groups of nomads within them, each group related by complicated kinship ties to a ruling family. The tribes remain independent of each other and engage in generations-long blood feuds.

AT L A N T I C OCEAN

Rabat

MADEIRA (PORTUGAL)

MOROCCO

CANARY ISLANDS (SPAIN) ALGERIA El Aaiún

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c an roc

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Mo

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Río de Oro

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100 100

MALI

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Historical Background

200 Kilometers

Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara) is located at the extreme western edge of the Sahara Desert. One of the harshest environments on earth, it averages only about two inches of rain per year. Much of its territory is gravel desert with sparse vegetation. It borders Morocco in the north, Algeria in the northeast, and Mauritania to the south and east. Its long Atlantic coastline is rocky, lined with sandbars, and largely bereft of natural harbors. Along the coast is a narrow belt of sand dunes about ten to twenty miles wide. Much of the interior is windswept gravel plains. The Western Sahara has two major regions. In the north is the Saguia El-Hamra region of the Saguia

The Spanish established their first settlement in the region at Río de Oro Bay in 1884 but were unable to pacify the interior of the region until the 1930s. As late as the early 1950s, the Spanish presence was minimal: a few villages and several hundred settlers. But the discovery of vast phosphate deposits—critical in the production of chemical fertilizers—in the latter years of the decade changed all that. In 1962, the Spanish established their first major phosphate-processing plant in the Western Sahara, and by the early 1970s, the territory had become the sixth largest producer of the mineral in the world. Within these same years, some 20,000 Spanish workers and administrators settled in the region.

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KEY DATES 1884

Spain takes over control of the region that will become the Western Sahara.

1958

Numerous Saharawis, or people of the Western Sahara, are forced to flee to Morocco after their uprising against Spanish rule is put down.

1973

Saharawi nationalists, exiled in Morocco, form the Polisario Front to fight for Western Saharan independence from Spain.

1974

Spain announces it will offer the Saharawi a referendum on independence in 1975.

1975

Citing prior claims to the mineral-rich territory, Morocco and Mauritania launch an invasion of the Western Sahara; in response to the invasion, the Polisario announces the formation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and the formation of the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA).

1978

Backed by Algeria, guerrillas of the SPLA launch an invasion of Mauritania, forcing that country to give up its claims to territory in the Western Sahara.

1978–1982

The SPLA establishes control over 90 percent of the territory of the Western Sahara.

1991

UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar negotiates a ceasefire between the SPLA and Morocco, but the fighting continues.

2000

Talks are held between Polisario and Morocco in London and Berlin.

2003

International energy corporations begin exploring for oil in the Western Sahara.

2005

The Algerian president declares that the Western Sahara conflict can only be resolved through the mediation of the UN.

These developments, along with several prolonged droughts, encouraged thousands of Saharawis to settle on the outskirts of Spanish settlements in the 1960s, where they were given some access to education and paid employment. By 1974, roughly half the population was living in towns. The Spanish also offered limited self-rule in a territorial assembly. While Spain occupied the Western Sahara from 1884 to 1975, two neighboring African countries— Morocco to the north and Mauritania to the east and

south—have had claims on the territory since their own independence. Morocco’s independence from France in 1958 inspired the first anticolonial guerrilla movement in Western Sahara, known as the Saharawi wing of Morocco’s Army of Liberation. But this force was quickly subdued by a Spanish-French expeditionary force. With the support of Algeria— Morocco’s chief rival for political dominance in northwestern Africa—Mauritania claimed the right to rule through an ethnic affinity with the Saharawi people.

Western Sahara: Polisario-Moroccan War, 1975–19 91

Meanwhile, both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) began pushing for self-determination of the Saharawi nation in the mid-1960s. Spain agreed, but threw up delay after delay, arguing that the nomadic nature of the inhabitants made self-government difficult to establish. Finally, in August 1974, as the Francisco Franco regime entered its final, senescent days, Madrid announced it would offer the Saharawi a referendum on independence sometime during the first half of 1975. To maintain its control over the mineral resources of the territory, Spain began grooming a compliant new leader for Western Sahara, Kahlihenna Ould Rachid and his Partido de la Unión Nacional Saharaui (PUNS). The announcement angered Morocco’s King Hassan, who believed he had a tacit understanding with the Spanish that the territory would be turned over to his government rather than being given independence. His threats forced Spain to announce yet another delay in the referendum.

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Saharawi Nationalism Developing a national consciousness out of a collection of dispersed and mutually antagonistic nomadic groups was not an easy task. Two factors, however, were key. First, Spain and Morocco—both hoping to develop a pliable local elite who could run the territory for them—permitted hundreds of children of tribal leaders to receive an education at schools and universities in the two countries. Many more Saharawis, forced to migrate to Morocco after the failed uprising of 1958, also became educated. But, as is often the case, these educated elites came to serve as the core of a Saharawi nationalist movement. While studying in Morocco, a group of Saharawi students began organizing around a refugee student named El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed. At first, they allied themselves with Moroccan opposition parties, hoping they could pressure the king to push for independence for the Western Sahara. But after anti-Spanish

Commandos of the Polisario Front independence group in Western Sahara scramble to take positions near the front line with Morocco in June 1988. As of the mid-2000s, the conflict over sovereignty defied resolution. (AFP/Getty Images)

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demonstrations were broken up by Moroccan police, Sayed and other Saharawi leaders decided that the struggle had to be based in the Western Sahara. In May 1973, these leaders organized the Polisario Front (a Spanish acronym for the Popular Liberation of Sahara and Río de Oro) on the border of Western Sahara and Mauritania. The second event contributing to a development of a Saharawi nationalism, one that permeated the masses as well as the elites, was the MauritanianMoroccan invasion of 1975. While the former country merely sent in troops to occupy a strip along its northern border with Western Sahara, Morocco launched its so-called Green March, whereby some 350,000 civilians marched across the sands in a “peaceful” occupation, with the clear indication that Morocco was there to stay. Pressured by this stunt, Spain negotiated with Hassan. Then, having worked out a deal to retain economic rights, Madrid reversed itself in November 1975, allowing troops from Morocco and Mauritania to occupy the Western Sahara upon its departure. In response to the occupation, the Polisario declared the establishment of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and launched the Saharawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA). Armed by its Algerian allies, the SPLA launched an invasion of Mauritania, quickly overwhelming that country’s tiny military and forcing its government in Nouakchott to give up its claims on Western Sahara and pull out its remaining troops in 1978.

War Between the Polisario and Morocco Morocco—with one of the largest and most modern armies in northern Africa—proved much harder to dislodge. Still, from 1978 to 1982, the SPLA was able to establish control over about nine-tenths of the territory of Western Sahara, launch guerrilla attacks that paralyzed the phosphate mining industry, and drive Moroccan troops from most of their posts. In response, Morocco decided to change tactics. It began construction of huge defensive sand berms—augmented by minefields, heavy armaments, and electronic sensing equipment—around much of the settled and economically crucial parts of the territory. The strategy worked, after a fashion. The SPLA found it extremely difficult to establish permanent

control over territories inside these defenses, and the phosphate industry not only returned to production but actually expanded under Moroccan protection. At the same time, the cost of these defenses—which include some 150,000 troops—is staggering, offsetting much of the profits from the mining industry. Indeed, the conflict settled into a war of attrition through much of the 1980s. The Polisario was unable to stop the mining operations or drive the Moroccans out, but it continued to breach the defenses almost at will, inflicting heavy casualties on Moroccan units. Meanwhile, the SADR supplemented its battlefield efforts in the diplomatic arena, where it won the recognition of most African states as well as twentyfive more in the rest of the world.

Negotiations and Elections By the late 1980s, however, both sides were indicating that they might be willing to find a negotiated solution. The Moroccans were tired of the war, and, because of increased instability in Algeria, the Polisario has lost much of the support it received from its main ally. In 1988 and again in 1991, UN SecretaryGeneral Javier Pérez de Cuéllar worked to win an agreement from both sides, calling for the gradual withdrawal of Moroccan troops and the demobilization of SPLA fighters under UN auspices. These moves would precede a referendum in which the residents of the territory would be offered three choices: continued Moroccan rule, full independence, or a compromise federated status with Morocco. Despite sporadic fighting and violations of the cease-fire arranged in 1991, progress toward a peaceful settlement has proceeded. The main sticking point, however, was the election or, more specifically, registration for the election. While the UN mission in the territory based the voter rolls on a 1974 Spanish census, Morocco has continued to claim that some 400,000 people are eligible to vote, more than half of whom have been living in Morocco for over two decades. The Polisario, knowing that many of these refugees will vote for continued Moroccan sovereignty, insists on a smaller and tighter registration list.

Events Since 2000 The official Arabic name for Western Sahara used by the Polisario is al-Jumhuriya as-Sahrawiya ad-Dimuqratiya

Western Sahara: Polisario-Moroccan War, 1975–19 91

al-’Arabiya (Democratic Arab Republic of Sahara). In 2000 talks were held in London and Berlin between the Polisario and Morocco, in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1309. Both Morocco and the Polisario were intransigent, however, and no progress was made in resolving the conflict. Tension mounted, with a referendum on independence delayed as a result. In April 2001 Morocco proposed the “Third Option,” a ten-year transition period for studying a way to implement a self-determination referendum. Mohamed Abdelaziz, the leader of the Polisario, renewed its declaration that the conflict could only be resolved by respecting the right of the Saharawi to self-determination. In recent decades, the leadership of the Polisario has become more skilled at diplomacy and public relations, as they have sought to present their case in a growing number of public forums. The Polisario Front proposed its own peace plan (June 4, 2001), which was essentially a renewal of its call for a referendum leading to independence for Western Sahara. It accepted the UN secretary-general’s special envoy, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, as a mediator, but his efforts produced little in the way of agreement. In 2002, both the Organization for African Unity (now the African Union) and Spain renewed their positions that the solution to the conflict lay in selfdetermination. However, in November the king of Morocco, Mohamed VI, rejected the United Nations Settlement Plan for Western Sahara. The king said that autonomy was possible but not independence. France supported Morocco in this position. In 2003 and 2004, Kerr-McGee and other oil companies began exploring Western Sahara for oil, but the deal was opposed by a coalition of more than twenty

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activist groups spread across four continents. Activists in Norway were able to pressure the state-owned oil company to dissolve its ties with Kerr-McGree. These groups sided with Western Sahara, viewing the Moroccan occupation as illegal; thus, any oil deals Morocco makes for exploration in Western Sahara are also illegal. The struggle continued in 2005, with the Polisario charging Morocco with engaging in human rights abuses because of harsh treatment of its supporters at the hands of Moroccan police. Amnesty International also accused Morocco of mistreating civil society activists who were working for Western Saharan independence. As of the mid-2000s, no resolution of the conflict appeared imminent. Because of the very small Saharawi population, the weight of numbers and of power seemed to favor Morocco in the long term. James Ciment and Andrew J. Waskey See also: People’s Wars; Invasions and Border Disputes; Mauritania: Coups Since 1978.

Bibliography Hodges, Tony. Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War. Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1983. Jensen, Erik. Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Kamil, Leo. Fueling the Fire: U.S. Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987. Shelly, Toby. Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa’s Last Colony? New York: Zed Books, 2004. Thobhani, Akbarali. Western Sahara Since 1975 Under Moroccan Administration: Social, Economic and Political Transformation. Lewiston, NY: Lampeter, 2002. Volman, Daniel, and Yahia Zoubir, eds. International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

ZIMBABWE: Struggle for Majority Rule, 1965–1980 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism

Lake Cabora Bassa

ZAMBIA NAMIBIA

Lake Kariba

D

E

Salisbury (Harare after 1980)

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BOTSWANA SHONA

EB

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N

D

MALAWI

E EL

A

200 Kilometers

N

100

200 Miles

Ethnic group

E

H

0

100

Bulawayo

L

S

0

E

Limpo p o

River

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SOUTH AFRICA

The first civilizations in what is now Zimbabwe date back roughly a thousand years to the building of the stone city of Great Zimbabwe. Under the authority of their kings, the people of Zimbabwe engaged in iron making, cattle raising, and trade that extended to both the southwestern and southeastern coasts of Africa. By the second half of the fifteenth century, Great Zimbabwe had been abruptly abandoned, probably because of climatic change; long-lasting droughts are a frequent occurrence in the region. Great Zimbabwe’s extensive territories were divided between several different civilizations, including the Mutapa, Ndebele, and Torwa kingdoms, the latter giving way to the Rozwi dynasty around 1700. The Mutapa, Ndebele, and Rozwi kingdoms continued until well into the nineteenth century and the arrival of large numbers of white settlers from South Africa. The predominant ethnic groups during this period and down to the present are the Shona, Ndebele, and Tonga.

Until the arrival of British and Boer settlers in the late nineteenth century, the peoples of Zimbabwe had little contact with the outside world, though they conducted trade with the coastal settlements on the Indian Ocean, first with the Arabs and then, after the 1500s, with the Portuguese. Indeed, Portuguese settlement of coastal southwest and southeast South Africa (now Angola and Mozambique, respectively) led to the creation of a mixed caste of Afro-Portuguese asimilados, who acted as middlemen between the cattle-raising kingdoms of highland Zimbabwe and port cities on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. But, by and large, European settlement in southern Africa remained confined to a few coastal settlements and the Cape Colony of Boers, descendants of early Dutch settlers, until the late nineteenth century. Europeans largely stayed out for several reasons. First, the climate along the coasts was not particularly conducive to European settlement, with malaria taking its toll on humans and the tsetse fly making livestock raising impossible. Moreover, the presence of well-organized and well-defended African kingdoms in the region discouraged all but the most intrepid explorers. Yet, early explorers like David Livingstone and Henry Stanley did penetrate the region, reporting that the interior of southern Africa was much different from the coasts, with the highlands offering a benign climate free of the malarial mosquito and the tsetse fly.

White Settlement The most dramatic event in modern southern African history, however, had to do with a different kind of finding. The discoveries first of diamonds and then of gold in the 1870s and 1880s in the Transvaal region of South Africa vastly accelerated settlement south of the Limpopo River, which now divides

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KEY DATES 1963 Divisions within the African nationalist opposition to colonial rule lead to the formation of two competing black resistance groups, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). 1964 Britain grants independence to Zambia, the former Northern Rhodesia. 1965 Fearing Britain will turn over power to the black majority, the minority white population of Rhodesia (formerly Southern Rhodesia) unilaterally declares the country independent, with themselves in power. 1974

The victory of black nationalists over Portuguese colonists in neighboring Mozambique gives a major boost to ZANU forces, which establish bases there.

1976

ZANU and ZAPU form an uneasy alliance, leading to intensification of the struggle against the white minority regime.

1979

Negotiations between the white minority regime and ZANU/ZAPU representatives lead to a cease-fire and agreement for nonracial national elections to be held in 1980.

1980 Nonracial elections lead to the victory of ZANU leader Robert Mugabe as president of the newly renamed Zimbabwe.

South Africa and Zimbabwe. As mining concession hunters poured into Ndebele lands, the British high commissioner for the Cape colony declared what is now present-day Zimbabwe a British sphere of influence. In 1888, Cecil Rhodes, organizer of the De Beers diamond conglomerate and future prime minister of the Cape, sent his agents to the Ndebele king to secure exclusive mining rights for his British South Africa Company. At the same time, he received a royal charter to administer a vast area north of the Limpopo, later divided into Northern and Southern Rhodesia (which ultimately became Zambia and Zimbabwe). Local rulers agreed to allow this administration, as long as it applied largely to nonAfricans. In 1890, Rhodes sent a “pioneer column” into Shona territory. Three years later, he provoked and won a war against the Ndebele. But when the initial goal of discovering more gold deposits failed, the settlers were granted extensive farmlands, which soon passed into the hands of speculators. A combined

Ndebele-Shona revolt in 1896, brutally put down by the British, represented the last major African challenge to British rule until after World War II. In the meantime, white colonists continued to pour into the colony as news spread of its agricultural potential and benign climate. In 1923, the British government took over administration of what was now referred to as Southern Rhodesia from Rhodes’s British South Africa Company, allowing white settlers a large margin of autonomous rule, but virtually no political power to blacks. In 1930, the foundations of Southern Rhodesia’s segregated and white-supremacist society were laid with the passage of the Land Apportionments Act. Under this law, the colony was divided into two territories, one set aside for each race. The territory for whites was far larger and more fertile than the one for blacks. Statutes were also passed that restricted black access to education, jobs, and agricultural commerce, so that they could not compete with white workers and farmers. Like South Africa, Rhodesia enacted pass laws, which limited blacks to working as migrant laborers in the white areas.

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The period immediately following World War II represented a time of great economic growth in Rhodesia and renewed black agitation. By 1960, Rhodesia’s population of 200,000 whites and 4,000,000 blacks was becoming increasingly urbanized, as the colony developed an industrial economy second on the continent only to South Africa. Needing a bettertrained workforce, the government expanded educational opportunities for blacks. But the economic prosperity was very unequally shared, producing a wave of strikes and rural protests throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, just at the time other sub-Saharan countries were winning their independence. The British responded with a plan to create a Central African Federation out of what is now Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi, in which both races would govern equally. But the two latter countries, which had never been heavily settled by whites, rejected the plan, forcing London to break up the federation and grant Malawi and Zambia independence in 1964. The move terrified the white settlers in Rhodesia, who feared they would be handed over to a black government. Under the white-supremacist Rhodesian Front party, the colonists demanded independence from Britain under a minority-rule constitution. When Britain refused, the Front elected the intransigent Ian Smith as prime minister. In November 1965, Smith and the Front carried out their long-threatened Universal Declaration of Independence from Britain. Though shunned by the international community, Rhodesia prospered over the next decade, protected by the white minority regime in South Africa and by the Portuguese presence in Mozambique.

Struggle for Majority Rule During the ferment of the late 1950s, several major black political organizations demanding majority rule were formed in Rhodesia. Largely confined to urban areas, they were infiltrated by security agents of the white colonial regime. In 1963, the African nationalist opposition experienced internal divisions, which led to the formation of two competing organizations: the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The former, led by Joshua Nkomo and popular among the Ndebele people, was the more conservative of the two organizations, advocating a

power-sharing relationship with whites in the country. Based in Zambia, it received assistance from the Soviet Union and several East European countries and launched guerrilla raids inside Rhodesia, hoping to spark a confrontation between the black majority states in the region and Rhodesia and force the latter to accept a power-sharing agreement. ZANU was the more radical organization, demanding black majority rule for Zimbabwe. Headed first by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and, after 1975, by Robert Mugabe, ZANU’s strength lay in the Shona community of eastern Zimbabwe. It operated from bases inside Portuguese Mozambique in zones controlled by its ally, the Mozambique Liberation Front (known by its Portuguese abbreviation, Frelimo). ZANU received aid from China in its attempts to infiltrate Rhodesia and mobilize the poor blacks against the white regime. ZANU was immensely bolstered in 1974, when Mozambique became independent, and Frelimo took power the following year. Indeed, the independence of Mozambique under the radical Frelimo represented a watershed in the history of the Zimbabwe struggle. Under Portuguese rule, Mozambique had largely provided convenient ports for shipment of Rhodesian goods and had ignored international pressure to close the ports and rail lines to isolate Rhodesia. Mozambique’s colonial military forces had worked closely with those in Rhodesia against both Frelimo and ZANU guerrillas. The new Frelimo government, on the other hand, imposed the full weight of economic sanctions against the white minority government in Rhodesia and gave its full support to the ZANU guerrillas. In response, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization created the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) to destabilize the Frelimo government with the help of disaffected Mozambicans (including many of Portuguese descent). (Renamo would develop into one of the most destructive and vicious guerrilla movements in all of Africa and would outlast the white minority government in Rhodesia that had created it.) Still, efforts were made to find a negotiated settlement in the mid-1970s. Fearful of the rise of proCommunist regimes in southern Africa, both the United States and Britain hoped to prevent the radical forces of ZANU from taking over in Rhodesia. The white regime in South Africa, too, became a close ally of the Rhodesian government. Even Kenneth

Zimbabwe: Struggle for Majority Rule, 19 65–19 8 0

Kaunda, leader of the conservative black regime in Zambia, was worried about radicalism in the region (and among his own people). Rhodesia’s Ian Smith proved a difficult leader to support, however. After several years of fruitless talks, the guerrilla war resumed with a new intensity in 1976. The insurgent forces gained strength when ZANU and ZAPU formed an uneasy alliance called the Patriotic Front (PF) and began to receive support from the so-called frontline states of black Africa: Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia. Between 1972 and 1979, the combined forces of the PF grew from a few hundred guerrillas to more than 10,000. Meanwhile, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF)—divided into a quasi-military police force to guard the cities and areas of white settlement and an army trained in bush warfare—numbered about 100,000 well-equipped soldiers and reservists by 1979, most of whom by then were black. The war between the RSF and the PF took on the character of a classic guerrilla struggle. Using its superior firepower and air resources—largely provided by South Africa—the RSF conducted search-anddestroy missions against PF guerrillas. Strong as it was, however, the RSF was hampered by growing rivalries in its own organization and the development of private militias in Rhodesia that became laws unto themselves, conducting looting operations and brutally attacking black villages. Among these militias were some made up of black warriors, who claimed to fight under the banner of Bishop Abel Murozewa, Smith’s closest ally in the African community, but were really little more than criminal gangs. Foreign mercenaries—hired by wealthy white farmers to protect their persons and their property—also made an appearance as law and order began disintegrating in the late 1970s. For its part, the PF tried to avoid direct encounters with the better-armed RSF, preferring instead to conduct hit-and-run attacks on isolated outposts and acts of sabotage and assassination against white settlers, before fading back into Mozambique. They also conducted a low-level bombing campaign in the capital, Salisbury (now Harare), and other whitecontrolled cities. By 1979, the PF had established control over large sections of eastern Zimbabwe, where they conducted political mobilization campaigns among the masses of peasants. The war had essentially become a stalemate between two roughly equivalent forces.

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Negotiations As the struggle between black and white forces intensified, outside groups were attempting to achieve a negotiated settlement. South Africa led the way. Prime Minister John Vorster believed that the Smith regime was losing the war and failing to find creative solutions to the problem of black majority rule. Vorster feared that an intransigent white minority regime in Rhodesia might help bring on its own defeat, resulting in the rise to power of a radical black regime, much like that in Mozambique and Angola. Vorster and his hard-line successor, P.W. Botha, did not want Rhodesia’s skilled security apparatus and army falling into radical black hands. Instead, Pretoria wanted to see a negotiated settlement in which the black majority would be represented by a manageable black leader who would acquiesce in continuing white domination. Calling on the United States—which, in 1976, still maintained close relations with South Africa— Vorster persuaded Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to come to Africa and mediate. After consultations with the British, who still considered themselves responsible for the Rhodesian situation, Kissinger tried to persuade the Smith regime to accept black majority rule, and to get the frontline states’ leaders to realize the difference between immediate majority rule and immediate black power. Kissinger tried to fudge the difference but failed to convince black African leaders to go along. The Kissinger negotiations and similar Anglo-American initiatives in 1977 failed to find a negotiated solution that would satisfy black aspirations for power and white demands for continued dominance. Still, Kissinger did reach a deal with Smith in which Smith would ceremonially step down and allow a black prime minister to take his place. In March 1978, Smith reached an agreement with the conservative black leader Bishop Able Murozewa, and on June 1, 1979, Murozewa became the first black prime minister of the new state of ZimbabweRhodesia. But the facade of black rule was not convincing. The PF and most of the international community refused to take seriously a “black majority government” in which whites held all key ministerial posts, only a handful of blacks served as military officers, land reform was not carried out, and most of the segregation laws remained on the books.

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Time was running out for the white regime. With much of its budget devoted to defense, falling prices for its major mineral exports, and stiffening international sanctions, Rhodesia was going bankrupt even as it descended into anarchy. The administration was unable to end the war, lift the international sanctions, or improve the lives of ordinary blacks in the country. Meanwhile, the guerrilla forces of the PF, now secure in their liberated territories, still proved unable to deliver the knockout blow to the white-controlled regime. During the summer of 1979, the various parties to the conflict—under pressure from their respective allies—agreed that a negotiated settlement was in everyone’s interest. The frontline states— increasingly under attack by Rhodesian forces pursuing Zimbabwe guerrillas—pushed the PF to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, hoping to involve the PF in the talks without guaranteeing them control of a new government, Britain and South Africa worked to push the Murozewa government to accept a deal in which a prime-minister-type system—rather than an

executive-dominated one—would continue in a new government that would guarantee the white community a disproportionate (though not majority) voice in the legislature. This plan, it was hoped, would prevent the rise of a powerful and radical black regime in Zimbabwe. Under the chairmanship of the British foreign minister, peace talks began at Lancaster House in London on September 10. After fourteen weeks, an agreement was signed in a form largely reflecting British and South African wishes. A cease-fire was immediately declared and plans for the demobilization of guerrilla forces put into action. Lord Soames, a senior British diplomat, replaced the Murozewa regime and directed the transition in preparation for democratic elections including all of Zimbabwe’s black and white citizens in February 1980. As the largest guerrilla movement in control of the most territory, ZANU decided to run its candidates under a banner separate from ZAPU. Several other parties—including Murozewa’s and Smith’s—

Black nationalist guerrillas loyal to the Zimbabwe African National Union of Robert Mugabe cheer a victory in the field in early 1980. Black majority rule came in April, with Mugabe installed as prime minister of the new republic. (Pierre Haski/AFP/Getty Images)

Zimbabwe: Struggle for Majority Rule, 19 65–19 8 0

also contested the election. While white Rhodesians, South Africans, and the British hoped that antiZANU forces would win and form a coalition government, they were surprised and disappointed by the results. ZANU won 63 percent of the vote and 57 of the 100 seats in parliament. (Of the latter figure, twenty had been guaranteed to the white community.) On April 18, 1980, the new black majority state of Zimbabwe was officially declared, with ZANU leader Robert Mugabe as prime minister.

Zimbabwe Under Majority Rule The new governing coalition of ZANU and ZAPU faced a host of problems, the trickiest of which was land reform. For most Zimbabwean peasants, the struggle of the last twenty years had largely been about winning back the lands they believed had been stolen from them by white farmers. But due to restrictions of the Lancaster House accords, continuing drought in the region, and the need to maintain the foreign earnings brought to the country by whitecontrolled commercial farming, Mugabe’s government hesitated. Other problems included ethnic tensions between the ruling Shona people and other black groups in Zimbabwe, leading to a break-up of the ZANU and ZAPU coalition and a turn to banditry by some of the demobilized guerrilla forces that had served under ZAPU. International problems also continued. Across one border, in Mozambique, the war between Frelimo and Renamo continued, and across another border, the struggle against the apartheid system in South Africa intensified. To deal with these problems, the Mugabe government adopted a more authoritarian style of rule. In 1987, it eliminated the seats reserved for whites and enacted constitutional changes that turned the presidency—once ceremonial—into a powerful executive branch. But the key question of land reform continued to bedevil the government. Efforts in 1997

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to distribute the large estates of white landowners to black small-scale farmers produced a storm of controversy inside the country and led to a deterioration in value of the Zimbabwean currency abroad. The resulting inflation set off food riots in several cities, including the capital. As the economy continued its downward spiral, thousands of Zimbabweans emigrated in search of better conditions. Only Robert Mugabe remained seemingly unchanged. He gained still another re-election in 2002 in an election widely believed to be rigged. In 2005 elections, his party gained a two-thirds majority in the parliament. Twenty-five years after independence, Mugabe was among the longest-serving political leaders in Africa. James Ciment See also: People’s Wars; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Mozambique: Renamo War, 1976–1992; South Africa: AntiApartheid Struggle, 1948–1994.

Bibliography Astrow, André. Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way? Totowa, NJ: Zed Press, 1983. Caute, David. Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia. London: Allen Lane, 1983. Chidoda, A.M. Understanding ZANU and the Armed Struggle to Liberate Zimbabwe. Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, 1977. Flower, Ken. Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981. London: J. Murray, 1987. Gann, Lewis H. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush. New York: Praeger, 1981. Godwin, Peter. “Rhodesians Never Die”: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, 1970–1980. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Mungazi, Dickson A. Colonial Policy and Conflict in Zimbabwe: A Study of Cultures in Collision, 1890–1979. New York: Crane Russak, 1992. Verrier, Anthony. The Road to Zimbabwe, 1890–1980. London: J. Cape, 1986.

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guerrilla movements signed a British-brokered treaty calling for a democratic vote. The following year, Mugabe was elected president, and the country was renamed Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s administration began with great promise for economic and social success. By the mid1990s, however, much of the promise had evaporated, as the country sank into a severe economic depression and experienced widespread human rights violations. As Mugabe continued to use violence to impose his less than effective policies, opposition grew, bringing increased violence and economic dislocation. Students, trade unionists, and homeless people mounted widespread protests and were in turn suppressed by government forces.

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Early Conflicts Zimbabwe, a land-locked country in southern Africa, is known for its scenic beauty and the historic ruins of a native civilization dating to the twelfth century. It also gained notoriety in the postwar era for violent clashes between white colonizers and native Africans and for later violent conflicts among its African peoples. Zimbabwe has an area of about 150,000 square miles and a population approaching 13 million. Until 1965, Zimbabwe was known as Southern Rhodesia and was a colony of Britain. In negotiations leading toward independence, the British government urged Rhodesian leaders to allow full voting rights for the colony’s black majority. The white minority, which controlled much of the valuable farmland and the colony’s main businesses, resisted. Finally, under Ian Smith, the white minority issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, establishing the white minority state of Rhodesia, resembling white-ruled South Africa, with which it shared a border. For the next fifteen years, black nationalists fought a guerrilla war to bring majority rule to Rhodesia. One of the leaders of the insurgency was the Zimbabwe National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe. In 1979, the white minority government and the black

Opposition to Mugabe emerged soon after he assumed power in 1980. During the following year, the government discovered large stores of arms and ammunition built up by the Patriotic FrontZimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU), an opposition party led by Joshua Nkomo, one of the leaders in the liberation struggle against white minority rule. Mugabe charged PF-ZAPU of plotting to overthrow his government, and Nkomo and his closest associates were removed from the presidential cabinet. In response, Nkomo and PF-ZAPU launched a political protest campaign against the government. It had its center in Matabeleland in the southwest part of the country, home of the Ndebele people, who represented a minority (about 15 percent) of Zimbabwe’s population and were devoted followers of Nkomo and his party. The protests included violent attacks on government personnel and property, armed theft and economic disruption, and harassment of Mugabe’s ZANU party members. In addition to insisting that Nkomo and his associates be returned to the cabinet, PF-ZAPU members demanded that the government

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KEY DATES 1980

After years of fighting, the white minority government of Rhodesia is replaced by a black majority government, with Zimbabwe African National Union leader Robert Mugabe as president; the country is renamed Zimbabwe.

1983

The government launches a military campaign in Matabeleland, center of political opposition to the Mugabe government.

1987

The leader of the opposition Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), Joshua Nkomo, signs an agreement to merge his party with ZANU, ending the conflict with the government.

1996

Civil servants strike against the government to protest economic policies that strike leaders say are bankrupting the country and impoverishing its people.

1999

Opposition groups form the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

2000 A referendum granting government officials immunity from prosecution and sanctioning seizure of white-owned farms fails at the polls; in response, the government launches a crackdown against opposition groups. 2005 With poverty spreading and unemployment estimated at almost 80 percent, the government launches Operation Murambatsvina (“Sweep Out the Trash”), targeting informal shanty towns around the capital of Harare.

return farms and other properties it had taken from PF-ZAPU members. Mugabe was a member of the majority Shona people, who made up more than 80 percent of the country’s population. Their homeland was in the north and east of the country, where the capital, Harare, is located. Mugabe encouraged a continuing conflict between the Ndebele and the Shona, though before he came to power, there had been little conflict between the two groups. In fact, they had cooperated in the long struggle for majority rule after 1965. In 1983 and 1984, the government declared a curfew in parts of Matabelaland and launched a military campaign against dissidents. The so-called pacification campaign, Gukuruhundi (“Strong Wind”), was in fact marked by widespread violence and human rights abuses, including at least 20,000 civilian deaths. The conflict was resolved when Nkomo agreed to merge his PF-ZAPU party into ZANU in

1987. The enlarged party took the name Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

Economic Crisis In January 1992, Mugabe’s government announced a five-year economic plan designed to liberalize the economy and reduce the huge budget deficit. Among the broad cuts to public spending were major reductions in the funding of education, including the elimination of free post-secondary education. In response, massive student demonstrations were held, resulting in the expulsion of 10,000 students from the University of Zimbabwe. The expulsions brought on even larger demonstrations, which in turn were put down severely by police. As the economy worsened and unemployment rose to disastrous levels, the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions became a second supporter of mass protest. It declared a general strike,

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which gained widespread support but was unsuccessful in forcing changes in government policies. In August 1996, civil servants went on strike over economic losses that had caused wages to fall by approximately 40 percent in four years. The job action eventually won wage gains of 20 percent, a dramatic increase over government proposals of 9 percent. Still, rapidly growing unemployment, to more than 45 percent, sparked new opposition movements and increased tension throughout the society. In January 1998, price increases on staple goods set off days of rioting as thousands of residents raided shops and businesses in Harare’s suburbs. The army was eventually called in to regain control. In 1999, after the death of Joshua Nkomo and with social and economic conditions continuing to deteriorate, opposition to Mugabe and his one-party government escalated. In 2000, the government offered a referendum that would grant government officials immunity from prosecution and would sanction the government seizure of remaining white-owned farms. Voters defeated the referendum, causing another violent clampdown on opposition groups. The “no” vote on the referendum reflected widespread anger against a network of Zimbabwean army veterans who had been forcibly expropriating farmland previously owned by white farmers. The program had brought death or violence not only to white farmers but also to black farmworkers and opposition activists. Critics charged that the veterans land expropriation campaign was an attempt by the government to divert attention from the failure of earlier land redistribution projects. They pointed out that the government controlled approximately 2 million acres of farmland that had been promised to small farmers for resettlement but never delivered. Instead, it had been given to Mugabe’s allies and supporters. The main public opposition to the Mugabe government came from the Ndebele-based Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which ran candidates against the government’s candidates beginning in September 1999. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF accused MDC of being a front for Western interests, especially the British. Mugabe publicly referred to MDC members as traitors, and in 2005 his government passed legislation to prevent party members from traveling abroad to meet with supporters in other countries.

Among the strongest opposition groups was the 200,000-member Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), which repeatedly held mass political rallies in defiance of the government’s Public Order and Security Act. Under that measure, Zimbabweans were required to apply for police permission for any meeting of three or more people to discuss politics. Despite government surveillance and violent police repression, ZINASU demonstrated openly against government policies on behalf of the poor. In fact, ZINASU advocated more radical policies than the MDC did, urging that Zimbabwe adopt a kind of internationalist socialism. By 2005, unemployment in Zimbabwe stood at almost 80 percent. As the official economy ground to a halt, millions of Zimbabweans became dependent on the unofficial economy, in which barter took the place of money. Tens of thousands of Zimbabweans fled the country for both economic and political reasons, most heading to neighboring South Africa. Meanwhile, international observers urged the South African government of Thabo Mbeki to take a harder line against Mugabe. Mbeki replied that quiet diplomacy rather than tougher measures was more likely to bring needed reforms to Zimbabwe. In early 2005, the Mugabe government launched Operation Murambatsvina (“Sweep Out the Trash”), a massive project to demolish the shantytowns surrounding Harare. By the end of the year, more than 1 million people had lost their homes or jobs as a result of the campaign and had become internal refugees. More than 22,000 poor people who survived on illegal trade were arrested and their goods confiscated. UN-Habitat, the United Nations agency for human settlements, declared the campaign a violation of international law; opposition groups contended that it specifically targeted people who voted against the ruling party in March 31 parliamentary elections. Police also rounded up homeless people and beggars and put them on forced labor farms. Opponents of the government suggested that the underlying aim of Operation Murambatsvina was precisely to take away people’s livelihoods and force them into state labor. Eventually the humanitarian crisis grew so large that the government allowed relief agencies into the camps to avoid thousands of deaths from disease and starvation. Meanwhile, Operation Murambatsvina met with stiff resistance. Residents of the townships outside Harare put up barricades and fought pitched battles

Zimbabwe: Anti-Mugabe Struggle

with police. Organizations such as Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trades Unions (ZCTU) organized peaceful demonstrations and mass protests. In response, Senior Assistant Police Commissioner Edmore Veterai ordered his officers to treat the campaign as a war and to respond with violence. Amid the political strife and economic despair, Zimbabweans could not help looking to the future. While it seemed unlikely that Mugabe’s hold on power would soon be shaken, he had turned eighty years old in 2004, and the people began to ask what

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would come of their troubled homeland when he was no longer on the scene. Jeffrey A. Shantz See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Zimbabwe: Struggle for Majority Rule, 1965–1980.

Bibliography Hill, Geoff. What Happens After Mugabe? Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005. Raftopoulos, Brian, and Tyrone Savage, eds. Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004.

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ARGENTINA: Dirty War,1960s–1970s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Terrorism estancias. The population is almost entirely European, principally of Spanish and Italian descent. During the colonial period, most of Spain’s imperial trade was with Mexico, through Vera Cruz, and Peru, via the Isthmus of Panama. In the eighteenth century, Spain liberalized its trade policies, and Argentina’s salt beef and leather were shipped to Europe from Buenos Aires, giving the city a European orientation and a culture quite different from the interior, which was ruled by provincial cattlemen, caudillos, employing private armies of gauchos and with an economy traditionally linked to that of Peru.

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Argentina is a huge country covering 1,073,399 square miles and a population of approximately 40,000,000. The capital, Buenos Aires, has more than 10 million people, and is also the country’s center of industry and finance. Geographically, Argentina is defined by the huge plains, pampas, which support its traditional activities of stock raising, particularly beef cattle and sheep, and wheat growing on huge ranches or

This distinction between the interior and the port provided the dynamic for much of Argentina’s nineteenth-century history. By the 1850s, Buenos Aires established political control over the interior, and there was a rush to modernization. Railroads were built, and with the development of the refrigerator ship in the 1870s, an enormous export trade in beef with Europe, particularly England, emerged. Cattlemen and, later, wheat growers and sheep ranchers, owning tens of thousands of acres of land were able to amass huge fortunes. By the end of the nineteenth century, Argentina’s economy was estimated to be among the top fifteen in the world. Buenos Aires had become a cosmopolitan city of more than a million people, and immigrants—principally Italian—were pouring in by the hundreds of thousands, forming a new urban working class, many of whose members espoused Marxism or anarchosyndicalism. Politically, Argentina was an oligarchy with a severely restricted suffrage. A growing middle class, organized as the Radical Party, protested the system and boycotted the elections until 1916 when universal male suffrage was introduced. The Radical leader, Hipolito Yrigoyen, became president in 1916 and was reelected in 1928. A master

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KEY DATES 1965 Right-wing military officers overthrow the civilian government of President Arturo Ilia and establish a military regime. 1966 On the so-called “Night of the Long Batons,” police and military forces raid university campuses around the country, beating and arresting dissident students and faculty. 1969 In the wake of widespread student protests, General Juan Carlos Ongania resigns the presidency. 1971

A labor strike in the city of Córdoba is put down violently, leading to shuffling in the military leadership of the country.

1972 Leftist guerrillas conduct a raid on Rawson Maximum Security Prison, freeing 100 political prisoners. 1973

Peronist candidate Hector Campora wins the presidency and frees hundreds of political prisoners.

1974

Several million people rally to greet the return of Evita Perón at Buenos Aires’ airport on June 20; the army opens fire and kills more than 200; Evita Perón dies two months later.

1976

Montanero guerrillas engage in a number of skirmishes with the military; 100 guerrillas are killed in a raid on Monte Chingolo barracks in Buenos Aires; the attack represents the last major military operation of the Montaneros.

political intriguer and organizer, Yrigoyen unfortunately had no coherent legislative program and was an abominable administrator. When the Great Depression struck in the 1930s, he was at a loss. The country was essentially leaderless and the constitutional political process discredited. At this point two army leaders, Generals Jose Uriburu and Agustin P. Justo, both with close links to the old oligarchy, overthrew the aged Yrigoyen. Uriburu served briefly as provisional president, and in 1932, Justo was elected for a six-year term. In 1938 Justo imposed a successor, a civilian lawyer named Roberto Ortiz, who died in office to be replaced by Ramon Castillo, a notoriously corrupt provincial politician. Although electoral forms had been followed, the political system seemed worn out, incapable of dealing with either the economic crisis or the social changes arising from the enormous migration of impoverished peasants and small farmers from the countryside into urban slums.

Rise and Fall of Perón As Castillo’s term came to an end in 1943, he tried to impose a successor, one Robustiano Patron Costas, a notoriously corrupt politician and an immensely wealthy sugar plantation owner infamous for his atrocious treatment of labor. A young colonel named Juan Domingo Perón organized the Group of United Officers (GOU) with the aim of preventing this. Another set of officers under General Arturo Rawson was also working toward the same end. Together they removed Castillo on June 3, 1943, and established a military government, the first in Argentina’s history. The coup had been carried out in haste, and most of the officers had no goal beyond blocking Patron Costas. The ambitious Perón, though, much influenced by Mussolini, believed the answer to Argentina’s future, and his own, was a social revolution based on a military–working-class alliance and took

Argentina: Dirty War, 19 6 0s–1970s

the post of minister of labor. A genius at organizing and a master of public relations, Perón overcame traditional labor-military hostility, eliminated Communist and Socialist union leadership, and built a powerful working-class political base. In 1945 the military government decreed new elections. Perón, who during this period had met and married his second wife, a radio actress named Evita Duarte, became the candidate of a Labor Party and Radical coalition. Holding elections was not easy. The United States had identified Perón as the dominant figure in the military government, which it disliked tremendously because of its leanings toward the Axis powers in World War II. U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden mounted an all-out public campaign against Perón’s candidacy. Many Argentine conservatives, both in and out of the military, also feared Perón and his underclass constituency. Shortly before the election, senior officers arrested him. As news of his arrest circulated on October 16, hundreds of thousands of common people, the descamisados (shirtless ones), walked into the center of Buenos Aires and demanded his release. Faced with this demonstration, Perón’s opponents gave way. The presidential campaign featured extraordinary public attacks on Perón by U.S. ambassador Braden. These backfired, as Perón used the nationalistic slogan, “Braden or Perón.” It was the cleanest election in Argentine history, and Perón won with 52 percent of the vote, despite the opposition of nearly all the major newspapers. Once in office, Perón, ably assisted by Evita, who quickly emerged as a dynamic political force in her own right, set about creating an authoritarian, personalistic, populist political system. His Peronist party was highly disciplined and instilled with devotion to Perón personally. A new constitution granted the right to vote to women, and Evita organized a Peronist Women’s Party that quickly became the second largest political organization in the country. Through the ostensibly private Eva Perón Foundation, she managed a highly effective extragovernmental welfare system whose clientele was rabidly loyal to her and Perón. She was also the directing force in the national labor organization, the CGT (Confederacion General de los Trabajadores). The years 1946 to 1948 were flush times economically. Argentina’s exports brought in huge quantities of foreign exchange, and the absence of competition from Europe’s ruined economies allowed

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Argentina’s industries to flourish. Perón and Evita saw to it that the workers got their fair share of the wealth. Relations with the United States improved, as Washington now saw Perón not as pro-Axis but as anticommunist. In fact, as the United States itself now embraced former Nazis as allies against Moscow, it used Argentina as a convenient refuge for useful members of the Hitler regime. Perón’s nationalism led to one major economic error. He believed it was a matter of pride to recover for Argentina the railway lines and electric power companies owned by Great Britain. Unfortunately, Perón paid inflated prices for outdated and brokendown plants and equipment, which the state then ran at tremendous losses. All this contributed to the end of the economic boom in 1949 and a rise in inflation that largely destroyed the value of the wage increases that workers had received after 1946. Elections were scheduled for 1951, and by popular demand Evita was persuaded to run for vice president. The elections produced a 61 percent vote for them. However, Evita was already dying of cancer, and barely survived until inauguration day. Perón failed to understand how the growing cult of Evita, in which she was compared to the Virgin Mary, offended the Catholic Church and outraged conservative Catholic laymen. Moreover, he upset nationalist sentiment when he agreed to allow U.S. oil companies to operate in Argentina. It did not help his standing with the military or the upper classes that he took a teenage mistress, Nelly Rivas, and zoomed around Buenos Aires on his motorcycle. In June 1955 a crowd of Catholic fanatics ran the Vatican flag up over the Congress building, crying “Death to Evita” and destroying her memorials. Perón ordered two bishops into exile and, in turn, was excommunicated from the Roman Catholic Church. Admiral Toranzo Calderon, who had been plotting a coup, launched a naval air strike and a marine assault on the presidential palace, killing more than 200 people. The next day, despite Perón’s call for calm, Peronista mobs took their revenge by burning the cathedral in Buenos Aires and a dozen other churches. Tension continued, and in September, army units under General Eduardo Lonardi joined Admiral Isaac Rojas in a combined attack against troops loyal to Perón. Rojas’s cruisers shelled oil storage facilities and threatened to destroy the main oil refinery if Perón did not step down. On September 20, he took asylum in the Paraguayan embassy.

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Perón’s Exile Perón’s descamisados had called for weapons to defeat the coup, and loyal army units were heading for Buenos Aires when he agreed to resign. His reasoning was that he did not want to subject the country to civil war and revolution. However, many of the Peronist rank and file began to organize for an underground struggle against the new military rulers. General Lonardi became president in Perón’s absence and was succeeded by General Pedro Aramburu in November 1955. Aramburu began a wave of repression. Congress was closed and all the Peronist deputies arrested on charges of treason. The memorials to Evita were destroyed, and her embalmed body was secretly taken out of the country and reburied in Italy. The trade union political organizations were disbanded. In June 1956 a retired Peronist general, Juan Jose Valle, tried to organize an uprising. It failed, but Aramburu shocked the country by sending twenty-seven of the participants before a firing squad, something previously unheard of in Argentina. Despite all this, the Peronists remained the largest political force in the country. This inspired Arturo Frondizi, leader of one branch of the Radical Party, to seek Peronist backing for his election in 1958. However, his efforts to work with the Peronists resulted in his ouster by another military coup in 1962. In the meantime, the Peronists, denied open participation, used tactics of resistance—protests and industrial sabotage. Participants formed a left wing of peronismo, student groups and union combativos, who united with the remnants of the old Marxist left and prepared for revolution as the only way to bring back Perón and create a new political order they called the “justicialist” state. Perón, who eventually settled in Spain with his third wife, Isabel (Maria Estela Martinez), was aware of these activities and encouraged them to the extent that they might help his return. The resistance became an essentially messianic movement believing simply that Perón was the answer to every problem. Elections in 1963 produced another minority president, Arturo Illia. In June 1965 with the country still politically paralyzed, the army moved again, establishing an openly military government that was to stay in power for at least fifteen years in order to

completely remake Argentina as a moral society based on Catholic values.

Beginning of Violence Unfortunately for the new president, General Juan Carlos Ongania, the appeal to Catholic values came at a time when the Latin American Church was moving to the left, even admitting that armed revolution might be necessary to correct deep-rooted social injustice. The combination of Catholic Action and the emerging underground Peronist Revolutionary Movement (MRP) was to prove explosive. In the late 1960s, various groups appeared, using such names as the Peronista Armed Forces (FAP) and the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP), with roots in the old Trotskyite movement, and the Descamisado Command, originating in the Christian Democratic youth movement. In 1968, Mario Fermenich, a young leader of the social movement Catholic Action, organized the most important of the armed revolutionary groups, the Montaneros. As the resistance grew during the next few years, the various groups coalesced under the general leadership of the FAP. At first these were largely spontaneous movements of young people responding to Ongania’s assaults on the universities, regarded as hotbeds of subversion and immorality. On July 29, 1966, the “night of the long batons,” police and military forces invaded campuses all over the country, beating and arresting students and faculty members. By May 1969, a time of student unrest throughout the world, Argentine students were marching and demonstrating. In Cordoba, on May 29, students joined workers at the local Renault factory protesting layoffs. There was rioting and destruction of property. Then Ongania sent the army in. Fourteen demonstrators were killed. The military government closed the university and court-martialed the rioters. This action, known as the cordobazo, did much to discredit the military rulers and help justify armed action against them. Ongania was forced to resign, but his successors were just as heavy-handed. In 1970, there was a sitdown strike at the Fiat plant in Cordoba. Again the military moved in. The result was 2 deaths, 30 injuries, and more than 300 arrested. The growing underground armed opposition was not idle, either. When New York governor Nelson Rockefeller visited Buenos Aires in June 1969, mem-

Argentina: Dirty War, 19 6 0s–1970s

bers of the FAR burned fifteen Mini-Max stores, part of a Rockefeller-owned grocery chain. On June 30, a hit squad from the Descamisado Command murdered Agusto Vandor, a CGT official accused of cooperating with the military. In May 1970, two Montaneros, disguised as military officers, came to the Buenos Aires apartment of General Arumburu, who was blamed for taking the body of Eva Perón; they captured and executed him. In the next two months, eluding the 22,000 troops sent to capture them, the Montaneros carried out two more spectacular actions. In one they took over the town of La Calera, robbing the bank and capturing the weapons in the police station. However, two were captured, and the information they supplied caused the group to return to basically political action. In fact, this was the beginning of successful military intelligence penetration of the guerrilla forces, resulting eventually in effective manipulation of those forces for political ends.

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Throughout the late 1960s the pace of guerrilla action quickened. There were 114 armed actions reported in 1969, 434 in 1970, and 654 in 1971. The political impact of these acts was heightened because the majority of them were committed by members of middle- and upper-class families, including children of military officers. Public opinion polls taken at the time showed that half the Argentine people believed armed revolutionary action was justified and that a clear majority of the middle and upper classes supported that view.

Perón Returns to More Violence In March 1971 another strike in Cordoba was bloodily put down, causing another military president to resign and another general, this time Alejandro Lanusse, to take his place. Lanusse concluded that the only way to end the violence was to bring Perón back and restore the alliance between the right-wing Peronists and the

Argentinian citizens hang silhouettes against a wall to remember the desaparecidos, “those who disappeared” in the purge of dissidents by the nation’s military regime in the late 1970s. Between 10,000 and 30,000 Argentinians were illegally arrested and never heard from again. (Enrique Shore/Woodfin Camp/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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military. He began secret negotiations with Perón in Madrid and returned Evita’s mummified body—which had been concealed in an Italian cemetery—to the aging former dictator as a sign of good faith. At the same time, Lanusse, relying on military intelligence penetration, began to severely hurt the guerrilla organizations. In 1972 there were only 352 armed actions, and a significant number of guerrillas were killed and captured. Special prisons were established for the political activists, where they were subjected to physical and psychological torture. On August 17, 1972, the guerrillas responded by staging a raid on the Rawson Maximum Security Prison and rescuing 100 prisoners. A hijacked plane was waiting at a nearby airfield to transport them to Chile, but before all the escapees could board, security forces moved in. Six of the leaders were able to take off. Nineteen others were recaptured and killed “trying to escape.” The killings were part of a deliberate campaign of ruthlessness designed to intimidate not only the guerrillas, but all who might be thinking of joining them. Within the next few weeks guerrillas killed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and two ranking military intelligence generals in reprisal. While Perón pretended to support the armed resistance, he and Lanusse quietly worked out a political deal. The Peronist parties could run in elections scheduled for March 1973 and Perón could return. Perón would claim that the goal of the armed resistance had been achieved and would work with the military to suppress any further guerrilla action. For the elections, the Peronists united to form the Justicialist Liberation Front and won convincingly. Their candidate, Hector Campora, took office in May and surprised both Perón and Lanusse by aligning himself with the Peronists’ so-called Revolutionary Tendency Party. He established diplomatic relations with Cuba, North Vietnam, and North Korea, closed down the federal police intelligence office, and ordered its files destroyed. He then pardoned all 371 guerrilla prisoners then in government custody. Lanusse and the military made no objection, simply waiting for Perón, who returned to Argentina on June 20. A crowd of several million people gathered at Buenos Aires Ezeiza Airport. Security, for some reason, was handled not by the police but by Peronist security forces controlled by a right-wing Colonel Jorge Osinde. As left-wing Peronist columns carrying their banners approached the highway overpass from which Perón was to speak, Osinde ordered them

back and, when they kept coming, had his men open fire. Before it was over perhaps 200 had been killed and thousands wounded. Perón landed elsewhere and the next day addressed the nation, condemning the left for causing the violence and stressing the need for national discipline and public order. In a strange and nonconstitutional procedure, Campora and his vice president resigned in favor of Perón as president and his wife, Isabel Perón, as vice president. Isabel Perón had no political experience and was of only modest intelligence. Since Perón was seventy-eight years old and in poor health, this should have caused concern. However, the national rapture at the return of Perón overcame everything else. Isabel was completely controlled by the man she had made Perón’s private secretary, Jose Lopez Rega, a believer in the occult. Lopez Rega was also a member of the notorious P-2 Masonic Lodge in Milan, Italy, a center of far-right-wing activity connected with both Italian and U.S. intelligence agencies. One of P-2’s directors, Licio Gelli, came to Argentina shortly after Perón returned and helped Lopez Rega organize the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA), a death squad largely made up of off-duty policemen and covertly financed by the government. The true dirty war in Argentina began after Perón’s May Day speech in 1974. When the left-wing Peronists began chanting that if Evita were alive she would be with them, Perón lost his temper, accused them of being traitors in the pay of foreign powers, and promised to eliminate them. With that, the guerrillas and their sympathizers, some 60,000 strong, marched out of the plaza, their illusions about Perón now completely destroyed, and resolved to renew the armed struggle.

The Dirty War Within two months Perón was dead. Isabel was president, but Lopez Rega, holding the office of social welfare minister, was actually in control. Perón, before he died, had suppressed the publications of the leftist Peronist groups, dismissed governors believed to be tolerant of them, and issued harsh new laws against terrorism. The AAA went into action. During the first two weeks of 1974 there were twelve assassinations, and two dozen left-wing Peronist offices were destroyed. The Montaneros and other groups mobilized. By the end of 1973 they had an estimated 5,000 men

Argentina: Dirty War, 19 6 0s–1970s

and women in arms. Between 1973 and 1975 they financed themselves with a series of kidnappings for ransom that netted an astonishing $105 million. While the AAA could kill leftists—by 1976 a political assassination was reported every five hours—it could not destroy the main guerrilla forces. The army, which under Lanusse had hoped that the return of Perón would lead to peace, now saw the situation as worse than it had been in 1973. On March 25, General Jorge Videla formed a junta that arrested Isabel and established yet another military government, which began what was euphemistically called the Process of National Reorganization. This time the military leadership was determined to eliminate not only those in arms but all those who supported them either materially or intellectually and to use every means at their disposal without regard to law. The AAA now came under direct and open military control. By the end of 1976, an average of fifteen people a day “disappeared.” Secret prisons were established, and torture became routine. The most notorious detention center was the Naval Mechanics School. Victims were buried in mass graves or simply thrown out of airplanes, alive or dead, into the Atlantic. The idea, very simply, was to destroy, absolutely and pitilessly, the social base on which the guerrillas depended. On the purely military front, the Montaneros— which by 1976 had incorporated almost all the other armed factions—engaged in some spectacular battles with regular army units. However, they paid a heavy price; 100 were killed in a single assault on the Monte Chingolo barracks near Buenos Aires in December 1975. This was their last major offensive military action. One guerrilla survivor estimated that of the 5,000 mobilized in 1975, 4,000 died during the next year. According to one theory, the Argentine army had placed many of its own operatives in guerrilla leadership positions, inducing the Montaneros to carry out suicidal attacks and also, by continuing their guerrilla activity, to justify the continuation of military rule.

End of the War By 1979 the Argentine politico-military struggle that had begun with the emergence of Juan Perón and the GOU in 1942 was essentially over. Perón himself, and his legend, had been almost totally discredited except among a few faithful labor diehards. The messianic

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hopes he had raised for creating a new, socially just and vital Argentina had been dashed. However, in the process of defeating peronismo, the victors—the military and the economic elites—had established a tyrannical regime, and even though the majority of Argentines had acquiesced in its establishment or even supported it, public morale was destroyed. Almost 2 million Argentines emigrated during the 1960s and 1970s. Nor had the generals been able to resolve the economic malaise that had turned Argentina into a thirdworld country. Videla’s economics minister, Jose de la Hoz, a strict conservative, succeeded in bringing inflation under control in 1976 and 1977, but by 1980 the economy was once again on the point of collapse. There was growing public demand for an accounting of the 10,000 to 30,000 who had disappeared, and discontent with the continuing suppression of civil and human rights. Something had to be done to restore the prestige of the military government and the honor of an army now associated with the perpetration of atrocities. Likewise something had to be done to take people’s minds off the dreadful state of the economy. Thus, under the third military president directing the Process of National Reorganization, Leopoldo Galtieri, the decision was made to invade the Britishheld Falkland Islands off the Argentine coast, territory long claimed by Argentina. The resounding defeat suffered by the Argentine armed forces in June 1982 brought the whole structure crashing down. Civil government was restored, but the process of accounting for the victims of the dirty war and dealing with its perpetrators continues to dog Argentina. Only after 2000 did the full story of the dirty war begin to emerge. Some of the most damning documents were released by the U.S. State Department. David MacMichael See also: Coups; Argentina: Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982.

Bibliography Andersen, Martin Edward. Dossier Secreto: Argentina’s Desaparecidos and the Myth of the “Dirty War.” Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Crassweiler, Robert. Perón and the Enigmas of Argentina. New York: Norton, 1987. Moyano, Mario Jose. Argentina’s Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle 1969–1979. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995. Poneman, Daniel. Argentina: Democracy on Trial. New York: Paragon, 1987.

ARGENTINA: Falklands/Malvinas War,1982 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: United Kingdom Historical Background

un So

Port Howard

d

EAST FALKLAND

Stanley Bluff Cove

an

d

Weddell

San Carlos Goose Green

l lk Fa

WEST FALKLAND

PARAGUAY

FALKLAND ISLANDS SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN

CHILE BRAZIL ARGENTINA URUGUAY

ATLANTIC OCEAN FALKLAND ISLANDS (GREAT BRITAIN)

0 0

25 25

50 Miles 50 Kilometers

The Falkland Islands (as they are called by the United Kingdom), or the Malvinas (as they are called by Argentina), are a group of approximately 200 islands in the South Atlantic about 400 miles northeast of Tierra del Fuego, the southern tip of South America. The possession of the islands has been disputed historically by Britain and Argentina. There are two main islands, East Falkland and West Falkland, and the whole group has an area of about 4,700 square miles. The population is about 5,000, mostly people of Scotch or Welsh descent. The capital, Port Stanley, is on the south coast of East Falkland. The only economic activity on the treeless islands is sheep-raising. The Falkland Islands Company owns most of the grazing land, and the majority of islanders are employees of the company.

Which European explorer first discovered the barren and unpopulated islands is a matter of historical dispute. Spain, France, and England all claimed them, principally for their presumed strategic situation guarding the approaches to Cape Horn and the Straits of Magellan. From time to time, each nation would establish a colony or a small naval station, only to abandon it. A British navy captain named the islands Falklands in 1690 for the then commissioner of the admiralty; French settlers called them the Malouines, after St. Malo in France. The Spanish, after purchasing the islands from France in 1767, used a Spanish version of the French name—Malvinas. Despite the sale, the British still maintained their claim. After declaring independence from Spain in 1816, Argentina promptly declared the Malvinas its territory and in 1823 established a settlement there to exploit the fisheries. In 1831 the Argentine governor seized two American sealing vessels and charged their captains with poaching. In retaliation, the USS Lexington, which was nearby, bombarded the Argentine settlement, razing it to the ground. U.S. sailors took all the inhabitants prisoner and declared that the United States recognized no government there. A year later, as Argentina was rebuilding the settlement as a penal colony, a British naval ship arrived, ordered the Argentines off the island, and took possession for England. Argentina protested in vain, beginning an argument that was to last for 150 years.

Effort for a Diplomatic Solution In the years after World War II, as Britain divested itself of its empire, Argentina pressed its case in the United Nations and in direct negotiation with

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Argentina: Falklands/ Malvinas War, 19 82

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KEY DATES 1832 Britain seizes control of the Falklands/Malvinas from Argentina, which never relinquishes its claims to the islands, as well to South Georgia, another South Atlantic island under British rule but claimed by Argentina. 1980 The military government in Argentina begins to press its claim on the islands more vigorously in international forums and in its domestic rhetoric. 1982 On April 1, Argentine troops seize Port Stanley, the administrative capital of the islands; on April 25, British Royal Marines take South Georgia back from Argentine forces; on April 28, British forces begin the attack on the Falklands with an air attack on Port Stanley airport; on May 1, British forces land in the Falklands; on May 2, a British submarine sinks an Argentine cruiser, with the loss of 368 crewmen; on May 4, Argentina retaliates, sinking a British destroyer; on May 25 and 26, more Argentine and British ships are sunk; on June 12, the main British forces in Falklands/Malvinas launch an attack on Port Stanley; on June 14, the Argentine commander surrenders with 9,000 troops; Argentine president General Leopoldo Galtieri resigns, paving the way for elections and a return to civilian government the following year.

England. The Falklands, 8,000 miles from London and essentially an enormous sheep ranch, were of insignificant strategic or economic value to the British government, and certainly of little concern to the British public. For Argentina, however, the Malvinas were, however irrationally, a matter of enormous national interest. The British seizure of the islands was cited in school textbooks as an intolerable insult to national pride, especially in the 1930s, when Argentine resentment of British economic dealings reached a high point. Recovery of the islands became a highly emotional goal. Britain made it clear during negotiations with Argentina that it was prepared to relinquish the territory. The problem was the people living in the islands. They were all British subjects—there was no indigenous population—and they objected strenuously to any idea of their becoming Argentine citizens. The directors of the Falklands Company were also opposed to coming under Argentine control and maintained a strong political lobby in Britain. The Argentine cause was not helped during the 1970s, when its military government became an interna-

tional pariah because of its suppression of dissidence through state terror. Then in 1980, the government of General Roberto Eduardo Viola stepped up the campaign for recovery of the islands. He and his successor, General Leopoldo Galtieri, believed conditions favored them. The administration of U.S. president Ronald Reagan had made Argentina a favorite Latin American ally. Argentina was providing military trainers and other support for U.S.-backed contra rebels attacking the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Argentina was a key factor in U.S. global strategy. There were plans for a combined Argentine–South African–U.S. naval force to control the “South Atlantic Narrows”—the area between Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope. Moreover, Argentina had a powerful friend in Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who made no secret of her preference for strong authoritarian regimes. Under these circumstances, Galtieri convinced himself that the United States would pressure Britain to cede the Falklands or that it would side with Argentina if it resorted to force. There was also a long history in the United States,

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stretching back to the Monroe Doctrine, which opposed European colonial holdings in the Americas. A bonus for Argentina would be its own restoration to the good graces of Latin America, where many disliked both its repressive domestic policies and its intervention in the affairs of neighboring countries, with and without U.S. participation. Another factor that pushed the Argentine military government to take drastic action in the Malvinas was its own lack of support among the citizens at home. The government had a history of ruling by fear, and now the country’s economy had collapsed, inflation was running at 150 percent a year, and unemployment was high and growing. The government believed that asserting Argentina’s claims to the islands and taking issue with the United Kingdom would bring people to its support, make them forget their economic problems, and restore the prestige of the armed forces. The government had just suffered a significant diplomatic setback in a dispute with Chile over the Beagle Islands in the Strait of Magellan. After that argument almost escalated into war, it was submitted to international arbitration, and the arbitrators had ruled against Argentina. This result made a victory in the Falklands all the more necessary, and in fact influenced the conduct of the war. Argentina was afraid that Chile might attack while its forces were occupied in the Falklands, so was forced to keep some of its best troops near the disputed Beagle Channel in case of a Chilean attack. The generals were further encouraged by public debate in Britain itself. By 1980, the British government had little real interest in the Falklands and found that the cost of keeping security and naval forces there was an unnecessary expense. There had been discussion of acknowledging Argentine sovereignty in the Falklands on the condition that Britain would take a longterm lease on the islands and continue to administer them until the lease ran out. Then Argentina would take full possession. This solution should have pleased everyone: Argentine sovereignty would be recognized; the islanders would have twenty-five to fifty years either to adjust to the new situation or to leave; and England would be rid of a nagging controversy.

Argentine Invasion Argentine navy chief Admiral Jorge Anaya had been particularly unhappy with the resolution of the Beagle Channel matter and was eager for a direct action

in which the Argentine navy would reap glory. His counterpart in the air force, General Basilio Lami Dozo, had developed a modern force built around missile-firing U.S.-supplied Skyhawk jet fighters and the even more modern French-supplied Mirage. They were armed with the French-built Exocet, considered the best air-to-ground missile in the world. The pilots had been trained in the United States, France, and Israel, and were supremely confident. England was 8,000 miles away and had no way to prevent a takeover. Once the seizure had taken place, London might protest, but the odds were that the United Nations would support Argentina— which did have a recognized legal claim. A purely military factor in Argentina’s favor was that in April the Antarctic winter was beginning, which would make naval and amphibious operations almost impossible, and the British had no operations base in the region. The nearest British possession was Ascension Island, a tiny speck of land 4,000 miles to the north. Argentine troops landed on the Falkland Islands on April 1, 1982, and seized Port Stanley. They were essentially unopposed by the forty-odd Royal Marines that made up the British security force, although three Argentine commandos were killed when they broke into the British governor’s house. A week earlier, Argentine marines had landed on South Georgia, an almost uninhabited island about 800 miles east of the Falklands where Great Britain maintained an Antarctic research station, ostensibly to protect the salvage operations of an Argentine businessman. With the invasion of the Falklands, the Argentines raised their flag and claimed South Georgia, too. The squad of Royal Marines there put up a futile resistance, killing four of the invaders, downing a helicopter, and damaging an Argentine naval frigate before surrendering. While the Argentine forces were consolidating their hold on the Falklands and crowds were celebrating the triumph in Buenos Aires, the British government, taken by surprise by the Argentine action, debated a response. Argentine expectations that Britain would accept the takeover as a fait accompli were dashed. Both sides in the British parliament were outraged and demanded military action to retake the islands. The foreign minister, Lord Carrington, was forced to resign for failure to foresee the invasion and take effective steps to prevent it. Orders went to the Defense Ministry to prepare the largest

Argentina: Falklands/ Malvinas War, 19 82

military force Britain had deployed since the Suez invasion in 1956. In the United States, the Reagan administration was torn. President Reagan had a long and inconclusive telephone conversation with Galtieri. UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick seemed clearly on the Argentine side when she not only attended a banquet at the Argentine embassy on April 2 but excused her abstention on the UN Security Council vote on Resolution 502 (which called on Argentina to withdraw) in a television interview saying that, because of Argentina’s legal claims to the Falklands, its landing of troops was not technically an invasion. But Secretary of State Alexander Haig, although personally friendly with Galtieri and reliant on Argentina’s support for U.S. Central American policy, was a former commander of NATO and understood that the United States was honor-bound to support its closest ally in Europe and fellow NATO member. Even while Britain was assembling its forces for retaking the Falklands, Haig, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Tom Enders and Ambassador-at-Large Vernon Walters (a former deputy director of central intelligence and a key figure in Latin American operations) flew back and forth between London and Buenos Aires seeking a compromise. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was not inclined to compromise. Given the public and parliamentary mood in Britain, her government would have fallen if she had accepted a peaceful settlement. In Buenos Aires, a combination of military confidence, particularly on the part of Admiral Anaya and General Lami Dozo, and the patriotic fervor that Galtieri kept stirring up with his public speeches made it impossible for the Argentines even to consider withdrawal or negotiations. If war came, they believed, they would win. The U.S. effort to mediate failed and was a major cause of Haig’s resignation as secretary of state. Still, UN ambassador Kirkpatrick argued that the United States should take a position of “public neutrality.” She was overruled, and the Reagan administration joined Britain in denouncing Argentine “aggression.” It embargoed arms deliveries to Argentina and withdrew its military advisers. (The U.S. Air Force adviser remained in Buenos Aires, however, and helped the Argentines correct problems they were having with U.S.-supplied aircraft during the fighting.)

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The Empire Strikes Back By April 9, advance elements of the British task force were already at sea. On April 25 a British Royal Marine unit of 110 men, supported by air strikes and naval gunfire, went ashore in severe winter weather on South Georgia. The Argentine garrison promptly surrendered, and an Argentine submarine caught on the surface was destroyed. There were few casualties on either side. The news caught the overconfident Argentine military leaders by surprise. Galtieri wanted to accept UN Resolution 502 and withdraw. Anaya and Lami Dozo would not hear of it. They argued that if the troops were withdrawn, the government would be overthrown by a popular revolution. The South Georgia operation had relatively little military significance. It was designed mostly to boost public morale (and public support for the Thatcher government) in Britain, although it also provided a base for operations against the Falklands. On April 28 the real war got under way. The British military command was concerned about the Argentine air threat to their invasion fleet. They ruled out raids on Argentine mainland bases, calculating that the mainland bases were so far from the Falklands that Argentine pilots attacking from there would have little fuel left for combat once they reached the battle area. The primary target, then, was the airfield at Port Stanley, the Falklands’ largest settlement. While the main task force was steaming toward the Falklands by sea, British long-range bombers took off from Ascension Island 4,000 miles to the north. Refueling in the air, they attacked Port Stanley and severely damaged the airfield. There was also concern about the Argentine navy. On May 2, the British nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror, patrolling off the Argentine coast, spotted the cruiser Belgrano and its two destroyer escorts. The Conqueror put two torpedoes into the Belgrano, which went down with the loss of 368 crewmen. The action was controversial because it took place several hundred miles from the Falklands and near the coast of mainland Argentina. The British were unapologetic, though, and the Argentine fleet did not venture out of port again during the remainder of the war. Argentine naval aircraft did continue the fight. On May 4, an Argentine Étendarde, one of the Frenchsupplied attack planes, sank the British destroyer HMS Sheffield. Argentine morale soared, but in Britain both public and official determination only increased. In

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Attacked by Argentinian fighter planes, the British frigate HMS Antelope explodes off East Falkland Island during the Falklands/Malvinas War in spring 1982. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the British prevailed in the two-month conflict over possession of the South Atlantic islands. (Central Press/Getty Images)

fact, the two naval actions sank not only ships but the last chance to end the fighting by diplomacy. The UN secretary-general, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, proposed a cease-fire, the mutual withdrawal of forces, UN administration of the Falklands/Malvinas with British and Argentine participation, and goodfaith negotiations to be completed by the end of 1982. The British were noncommittal, and Argentina, angry over the loss of the Belgrano and made overly confident by their sinking of the Sheffield, rejected the plan on May 18. Even Jeane Kirkpatrick, who pleaded with her Argentine friends to accept, called the rejection “sheer madness.” Already on May 1, the first British amphibious reconnaissance patrols had gone ashore at the proposed landing site at San Carlos in the Falklands, sixty-five miles from Port Stanley on the opposite side of East Falkland Island. On May 11 a commando

raiding party had destroyed eleven Argentine aircraft on Pebble Island without losing a man. On May 21, after the Argentine rejection of the peace plan, a 3,000-man British force—principally Royal Marine commandos and paratroopers—landed at San Carlos, meeting very light resistance but losing two helicopters in the process. The next day, Lami Dozo’s pilots carried out mass attacks on the British fleet. They sank the destroyer escort HMS Antrim, severely damaged HMS Argonaut, and would have sunk three other destroyers except that their overage U.S.supplied bombs failed to explode when they hit their targets. Two days later, another Argentine air attack sank HMS Antelope, and the day after that (May 25), Argentine planes damaged the landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot. They were not done yet. On May 26, they sank the destroyer HMS Coventry, killing nineteen British sailors, and the supply ship

Argentina: Falklands/ Malvinas War, 19 82

and reserve aircraft carrier Atlantic Conveyor, which was a heavy logistical blow, as it carried ten helicopters that were to have transported the landing force from San Carlos to Port Stanley. The result was that the British troops had to march across the island. There was momentary panic in London. If the losses continued, and especially if the British flagship, the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible, was lost (and there were rumors that it had been), the whole expedition might have to be called off. The British now began their attack on Port Stanley. Except at Goose Green, there was little resistance from the 10,000 Argentine ground troops. They were ill-trained and poorly equipped for the bitter winter weather. Even at Goose Green, where there were a few hours of stiff resistance, from both artillery and Argentine close-air-support planes, the issue was never in doubt. Over 1,600 demoralized Argentine draftees surrendered to the 450 British attackers. The British were to suffer further losses from air and missile attacks, though. HMS Galahad, previously damaged by a bomb that failed to explode, was transporting Welsh Guardsmen for a landing at Bluff Cove, 10 miles southwest of Port Stanley, when it was hit again; fifty-one British soldiers and sailors died, and another forty-six were wounded. The ship was lost, and another landing ship, HMS Tristram, was also hit and suffered two dead. The following day, a shore-based Exocet missile hit the destroyer HMS Glamorgan, killing thirteen crewmen. On June 12, the main British force, now consisting largely of regular infantry and Guards battalions,

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began the advance on Port Stanley from the heights above. They captured the settlement after light Argentine resistance with a loss of about thirty British lives. That was the last serious resistance. On June 14, the Argentine commander, General Mario Benjamin Menendez, surrendered his remaining 9,000 demoralized soldiers, and the fighting part of the war was over. The British victory was an enormous boost for Margaret Thatcher’s government. It was also a sobering warning to the major powers about the effect high-technology weapons could have in the hands of countries like Argentina, and it provided lessons that were applied by U.S. military planners a few years later in the first Gulf War (1991). The most dramatic result of the war was the total discrediting of the Argentine military and military government. Within a month, the military junta was overthrown, and angry crowds were threatening to attack the barracks. David MacMichael See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Argentina: Dirty War, 1960s–1970s.

Bibliography Ethell, Jeffrey, and Alfred Price. Air War South Atlantic. New York: Macmillan, 1983. Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falklands. New York: W.W. Norton, 1983. London Sunday Times Insight Team. War in the Falklands: The Full Story. London: Times Publishing Company, 1982.

BOLIVIA: Revolution,1952 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups,Left and Right 0 0

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Historical Background

300 Miles

YUNGAS

300 Kilometers

Ethnic group

BRAZIL PERU

La Paz Oruro

AS NG YU

Lake Titicaca

BOLIVIA

Santa Cruz

ALTIPLANO PACIFIC OCEAN

CHACO

Sucre Potosí Tarija

CHILE

ARGENTINA

PARAGUAY

Bolivia is a landlocked Andean country with an area of 424,164 square miles and a population of nearly 9 million. Less than 10 percent of the population is of European descent. The rest are Indians (the main groups are the Aymaras and Quechuas) and mestizos (people of mixed parentage, known in Bolivia as cholos). The national territory is divided between the altiplano, the Andean highlands where the majority of the population lives, and the montana, forested tropical lowlands leading down into the Amazon Valley. The valleys of the montana, known as yungas, are warm and humid and increasingly important to the Bolivian economy for the production of tropical crops and the coca leaf, used for production of both legal drugs and illegal cocaine. The yungas increasingly attract settlement from the overcrowded highlands. A third region in far southeastern Bolivia is the Chaco, a scrub forest area that Bolivia shares with Paraguay and northern Argentina. Bolivia is unusual in having two capital cities. Sucre, the ceremonial capital, is home to the nation’s supreme court. The administrative capital, seat of government, is La Paz, which has a metropolitan area population of about 1.5 million.

In pre-Columbian times, Bolivia was a part of the Inca Empire. During the colonial period it was known as Upper Peru and was ruled from Lima as part of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru. The native Indian highland population, the Aymaras, who had only recently been conquered by the Incas, put up little resistance initially and were soon converted into what was practically a slave labor force to work the silver mines that made Bolivia—at least for the nonIndians—one of the richest places on earth well into the eighteenth century. Indians not drafted for labor in the mines held their communal lands in a form of serfdom. Bolivia gained its independence in 1823, led by one of Simón Bolívar’s generals, Antonio Jose de Sucre, and was named for Bolivar himself. General Sucre originally proposed to liberate the Indians, but he changed his mind when he learned that the new nation’s economy, with silver mining in decline and the colonial trade disrupted, could not survive without the traditional head tax collected from the Indian communities. Thus, little changed for most Bolivians. The nineteenth century was a period of unrelieved political and economic disasters for the country. The silver mines were exhausted, and the once-great cities of Potosí and Oruro dwindled to villages. The country was ruled by a series of feckless dictators, mostly drawn from the handful of Bolivians of Spanish descent who, desperate for revenue, sought foreign loans on ruinous terms. In the 1880s, the economy recovered when huge tin mines were opened and foreign entrepreneurs came in to build railroads. Another source of wealth was nitrates, natural fertilizer plentiful in the deserts on Bolivia’s then Pacific Coast. Unfortunately, Bolivia and Peru lost a war with Chile in the 1880s and Bolivia lost its access to the Pacific shore. A few years later, during the natural-rubber boom of the early twentieth century, Bolivia’s Amazon territories produced great wealth.

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KEY DATES 1823 Bolivia wins independence from the Spanish Empire. 1936 A general strike brings down the Bolivian government; military officers David Toro and German Busch take power. 1939 Busch pushes Toro out of power, declares a dictatorship, outlaws political parties, cancels general elections, and imposes new labor laws favorable to tin miners; Busch commits suicide in August. 1943 Left-wing politicians and junior military officers seize control of the government; one of the officers, Gualberto Villaroel, becomes president. 1946 Citizens of La Paz, tired of government repression, storm the presidential palace and lynch Villaroel; new left-wing politicians take power. 1949 The right-wing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR, its Spanish acronym) organizes strikes and protests throughout the country. 1951

The MNR wins an overwhelming victory in national elections; ends the literacy requirement for voting, increasing polling lists by 500 percent; 500 army officers are dismissed as the army is cut to a bare minimum.

1952 Bolivian Workers Central (COB), a national mining union federation, takes control of much of the government; peasants seize lands across the country. 1953 The government passes land reform law, giving ownership rights to lands that peasants occupied during the revolution of the previous year.

However, Bolivia again lost a war, this time to Brazil, and handed over more land. In the twentieth century Bolivia took on more of the attributes of a modern country. A multiparty electoral system was established, although voting was restricted to only a few among the population. Indians were denied the vote. The tin mines—almost all owned by three Bolivian families, the Patinos, Aramayos, and Hochschilds—required a large skilled labor force, and a significant union movement grew up. To counter the political threat posed by the unions and by a growing educated urban population, the old political elites created a professional army and brought in a German general to train it.

The Chaco War In 1932, in the midst of the world depression, which reduced the demand for tin and all but wrecked the

Bolivian economy, President Daniel Salamanca was fearful of a social revolution led by the unemployed tin miners and urban radicals. His solution was to rouse patriotic fervor by fighting a war with a neighboring country in which he was certain that, for once, Bolivia would prevail. The neighbor, Paraguay, with which Bolivia shared the Chaco, was also poor and mainly Indian. Making the adventure even more tempting was that the Chaco held Bolivia’s oil reserves, and Salamanca believed that he could capture even more oil fields in Paraguay. Yet another benefit was that he could conscript all his potential radical opponents and send them to the front. The Chaco War, which lasted for three years, was an unmitigated disaster for Bolivia. At first all went well. On July 18, 1932, Salamanca announced that Paraguay had attacked a Bolivian border fort. It was, in fact, a Paraguayan fort that Bolivian troops had seized a few weeks earlier. However, the Paraguayan

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attack was denounced, and, as planned, patriotic fervor gripped the nation. Then victory was proclaimed; Bolivian troops had captured three Paraguayan forts. Paraguay, assuming this was nothing more than relatively minor border skirmishing, appealed to the United States to arrange a cease-fire and mediate an end to it. However, Salamanca, seeking a major triumph, sent reinforcements and ordered an offensive. The Paraguayans, fighting on their own terrain, were more than equal to the occasion. In late September they retook the fortress of Boqueron, capturing more than 1,500 Bolivian troops, and pressed on. Within days they had retaken all the territory Bolivia had captured and invaded Bolivia itself, taking the fortress of Arze and routing the Bolivians. Panic gripped La Paz. Rioters demanded that Salamanca resign. Instead, he brought back the German general, Hans Kundt, and declared a state of siege, outlawing all labor unions. Kundt, for all his military efficiency, proved a wretched combat leader. By January he had organized a new army of 77,000 men and led it against the Paraguayan fortress of Nanawa. The campaign lasted until July 1933. The Paraguayans held Nanawa and carried out successful attacks of their own on other Bolivian positions. By the time it was over, 14,000 Bolivian soldiers had been killed, 10,000 had been captured, 6,000 had deserted or were missing, and an astonishing 32,000 had been evacuated because of wounds or sickness. Anger at Kundt was so great that he had to be smuggled out of Bolivia dressed in women’s clothes to save him from lynch mobs. Two relatively junior officers, Enrique Penaranda and David Toro, took command, raised a new army of 55,000 men, and succeeded in stemming the Paraguayan advance for six months. Then the Paraguayan general, Estigarribia, broke through to the Andean foothills, into Bolivia’s oil fields, where he captured the departmental capitals of Santa Cruz and Tarija. At this point, Penaranda and Toro arrested Salamanca. Vice President Jose Luis Tejada Sorzano took office, and the war dragged on. The overextended Paraguayans could not take the main Bolivian headquarters, and a young officer, Major German Busch, led a counteroffensive that drove the Paraguayans out of the oil fields. Both sides were ready to make peace. Bolivian losses were extraordinary—at least 65,000 were dead or missing in a country whose population was then only about 2 million. The trauma went deeper than mere loss of life, however. The old

Bolivian elite had been totally discredited. The cowardice and ineptitude of the officer corps was the subject of numerous postwar novels. Ironically, the war that Salamanca had begun in an effort to destroy the small left-wing opposition resulted in the growth of a powerful radical movement demanding that the big estates be broken up, that the land be given to the Indians, and that the tin mines and oil fields— especially those of Standard Oil—be nationalized. A general strike in May 1936 paralyzed the country, and the authorities did not dare try to interfere. Tejada resigned, and the two officers who had come out of the war with any credit, David Toro and German Busch, took power.

Road to Revolution Toro and Busch proclaimed a regime of “military socialism.” Their first major act in 1937 was to nationalize Standard Oil. A ministry of labor was established. A new constitution written in 1938 created the framework for a rudimentary welfare state, even though it attempted no real land reform and did not give Indians the vote. Busch, though, was impatient with the constitutional political system. In April 1939 he pushed Toro aside and declared himself dictator, abolishing all political parties, canceling scheduled congressional elections, and suspending the just-adopted constitution. He introduced an advanced labor law, giving previously unheard-of protection to workers, and defied the tin barons by imposing new production taxes. Frustrated by the magnitude of his self-imposed task of remaking the nation and the slow pace at which things changed, Busch committed suicide in August 1939, and it looked as though the old elites—the mine owners, the hacendados (major ranchers), and the conservative generals—would take over again. Although the conservatives tried, and in 1940 indeed elected their candidate, General Enrique Penaranda—a relatively unstained Chaco War veteran—they were unable to rig the polls, and three radical parties—the fascist National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the Leninist Left Revolutionary Party (PIR), and the Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Party (POR)—joined in the Bolivian Leftist Front (FIB) to dominate the new congress. Washington was cool to the Bolivian government, partly because of the pro-Axis stance of the MNR but mostly because of the nationalization of Standard Oil,

Bolivia: Revolution, 1952

which had been founded by John D. Rockefeller and was still dominated by the Rockefeller family. Then in December 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, and the next day the United States entered World War II. Facing daunting challenges in the war, the United States recognized its need for Bolivia’s tin. It negotiated a token compensation for the nationalization of Standard Oil in Bolivia and recognized the Bolivian government. The war brought prosperity to Bolivia through its sale of tin and other raw materials. The funds aided Bolivia’s leftist reformers in their program. Increasingly, many middle-class and upper-class Bolivians supported the leftist parties, often as a way to register their resistance to the United States and the major U.S. companies that had called the tune in Bolivia in the past. Hence, they approved of the growing strength of the miners’ union led by Juan Lechin, a Trotskyite and leader of the POR, and were outraged by the Penaranda government’s massacre of hundreds of strikers and their families at the Patinoowned Catavi mine in 1942. This event led to the overthrow of Penaranda in 1943 by the MNR, allied with a group of junior officers and the installation of one of these officers, Gualberto Villaroel. Villaroel turned out to be a tyrant. Lechin and the miners stood behind him as he executed most of the leaders of the PIR (who were orthodox Communists) and did the same to many of the traditional politicians. Oppression became so bad that on July 14, 1946, the citizens of La Paz stormed the presidential palace, dragged out Villaroel, and hanged him from a lamp post. Whatever hopes Busch had raised for transformation of Bolivia seemed over, and it appeared that the nation was heading for anarchy.

The Revolution of 1952 Strange alliances were formed. The PIR joined with the traditional parties in the post-Villaroel government. That government called for suppression of the miners’ union. The union’s leader, Lechin, had called for a worker–peasant alliance and worker control of government and demanded arming of the workers and peasants, abolition of the army, and worker participation in management. In early 1947 it was a PIR labor minister who ordered troops into Catavi to carry out another massacre of miners and their families. The originally fascist MNR now found itself relying on the miners and the POR for organized

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support, even as it attracted more middle-class voters disgusted by the repressive measures of the traditional parties that made up the governing Democratic Alliance. Despite its past links with the army, it now broke with the military and committed itself to the miners’ revolutionary platform. The MNR task was made easier by the postwar depression and the drop in tin prices, which had resulted in widespread economic hardship and discontent. In September 1949, the MNR made its move. Under the leadership of Hernan Siles Zuazo, it organized an entirely civilian armed revolt. Miners, students, and middle-class professionals fought the army for three bloody months before surrendering. Defeat, though, was not final. In May 1950, the factory workers of La Paz, once adherents of the PIR, revolted under the MNR banner. This time the military used aircraft and artillery on working-class neighborhoods before the fighting stopped. Afterward, many army officers quietly arranged to leave the country. It was clear that that MNR forces were near victory. Presidential elections were held in 1951. The MNR vote was so overwhelming that the government could not disguise the fact that Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernan Siles Zuazo, both running from exile, had been the winners. Outgoing president Mamerto Urriolagotia resigned and illegally handed the office over to General Hugo Ballivian. Ballivian announced that the election had been annulled and that the MNR was being outlawed as a Communist organization. Once again the MNR resorted to arms. This time it broke into government armories and armed the whole population. After three days of heavy fighting, and at a cost of at least 600 lives, the army was totally defeated, and the MNR, which only six years before had been a moderately reformist party with a fascist ideology, now represented a popular revolution. At that time, the United States was covertly intervening in Guatemala to overthrow a much less radical regime, but it did not move to oppose the MNR because it still associated the party and its leader, Paz Estenssoro, with its old conservative (some said fascist) ideology. Since all the competing parties and institutions had been overwhelmed by the armed victory, the MNR had no need to compromise or make deals. The workers and peasants—both cholos and Indians— were armed. The police and army were disorganized, and it became possible to begin carrying out the most

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thorough social and economic revolution in the history of the hemisphere.

The Revolution in Power Paz Estenssoro and Siles Zuazo were somewhat cautious about proceeding, but they were forced to respond to the demands of their followers, or they would soon have found themselves replaced. The first moves were political. The literacy requirement for voting was abolished, quintupling the voting rolls and giving the vote to Indians for the first time. The army was reduced to a bare minimum, and 500 officers were dismissed. A remnant remained, though, the source of future trouble. Temporarily, the armed MNR cadres took over the tasks of both the army and the police. The miners, while retaining their old union, set up a new Bolivian Workers Central (COB) of which Juan Lechin, who also became minister of mines and petroleum, was the head. Immediately the COB demanded nationalization of all mines without compensation to the owners, total liquidation of the army and its replacement by militias, and agrarian reform to abolish the latifundia (plantation) system and the traditional unpaid work obligations still demanded of Indians. In the fall of 1952, COB practically became the government. In October a state-run enterprise, the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (COMIBOL), was set up, and the Patino, Aramayo, and Hochschild mines were nationalized. Fearful of U.S. intervention, Paz Estenssoro and Siles Zuazo promised compensation and left U.S.-owned mines alone. The miners’ union effectively controlled COMIBOL, getting veto power over any decision that affected the workers, and set up a system of state-subsidized stores at the mines. At the same time, the revolution was proceeding even more rapidly in the rural areas. Armed peasants, cholo and Indian, took matters into their own hands. They seized the haciendas, driving off, and in some cases killing, the old owners and their overseers, and destroyed the hated compulsory work records. They organized their own militias, taking over police functions, and created a system of peasant unions, called sindicatos. The government had no choice but to accept the situation. In August 1953 it passed an agrarian reform law that essentially recognized what the peasants had done, although it provided compensation for

the old landowners in the form of bonds that were to be paid for by those who now had title to the lands. In the event, the peasants simply refused to pay, ignoring all aspects of the agrarian law with which they did not agree. The Aymara and Quechua Indian communities rapidly organized themselves politically, becoming a powerful force, independent of the MNR, POR, or PIR, all of which tried to control them. In fact, over the following years the peasant sindicatos and their political arms became, as landholding peasants usually do, an essentially conservative element. Their concerns were security in their land titles and the extension of health and education services to rural areas.

The Revolution Cools Down While the miners and peasants were consolidating their revolutionary gains, the urban areas, where the traditional MNR political base was located, were suffering. Inflation had reached enormous levels, and urban property values were destroyed. To carry out its ambitious industrial modernization and infrastructural investment programs, Paz Estenssoro was forced to turn to the United States. Surprisingly, at a time when the United States was intervening militarily and politically to overthrow what it saw as dangerously leftist regimes in Guatemala and Guyana, the Eisenhower administration responded with large-scale economic assistance in Bolivia. It believed that Paz Estenssoro and the MNR were anticommunist, resembling the Peronist movement in Argentina, but in danger of being ousted by the Marxist elements in the ruling coalition. When Siles Zuazo succeeded Paz Estenssoro as president in 1956, however, the United States demanded that Bolivia accept an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization plan, which required a balanced budget, ending food subsidies for the miners, a wage freeze, and allowing private investment in the petroleum industry. Washington threatened to terminate its minerals purchase agreement, effectively stopping Bolivian international tin sales, if the Bolivians refused the IMF terms. Even more importantly, as another condition of U.S. aid, Siles agreed to allow a U.S. military mission to rebuild the army. Gradually, the power of Lechin and the COB was reduced. In 1960, Paz Estenssoro was reelected with Lechin as vice president. Lechin, trying to overcome U.S. hostility, went to Washington to meet with the

Bolivia: Revolution, 1952

Kennedy administration, pledged support for the United States in the Cold War, and even agreed to end worker co-government in the mines as the price for major U.S. and German investment in modernization of the tin industry. By this time, it was too late. The army had been rebuilt and rearmed and was totally under U.S. control. The worker militias had been disarmed, and the peasants, now secure in their lands, were no longer supportive of the miners or workers. With support from the new army, Paz Estenssoro was easily able to crush miner and worker uprisings in 1963. In 1964, he was reelected as president, this time with General Rene Barrientos as his vice president, a symbol of how much things had changed. Paz Estenssoro, however great his concessions, had unfortunately made one mistake that Washington would not forgive. He had voted against Cuba’s expulsion from the Organization of American States and continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Havana. He also had made one egregious domestic political mistake in naming Barrientos his vice president. Shortly after the election, Barrientos offered Paz Estenssoro the choice of leaving office alive or dead.

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Paz Estenssoro chose to leave alive, and Barrientos, effectively a U.S. agent under the control of Colonel Edward Fox, the senior U.S. military adviser, promptly moved against the unions. COB was dismantled, and Lechin sent into exile. Fifty percent pay cuts were ordered, and when the miners resisted, the Barrientos army crushed them in a series of bloody battles. The revolution was over. Bolivia was back to normal—except that the peasant land reform could not be undone—and was to have twenty years of unbroken military rule until the restoration of a much older and much chastened Paz Estenssoro in 1985. David MacMichael See also: Coups.

Bibliography Blaisier, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976. Blum, William. The CIA: A Forgotten History. London: Zed Books, 1986. Klein, Herbert S. Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

BRAZIL: General’s Coup,1964 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coup

COLOMBIA

OCEAN

RORAIMA

AMAPA

AMAZONAS

ILHA DE MARAJÓ RIO GRANDE DO NORTE

PARÁ

MARANHÃO CEARÁ

PARAÍBA PIAUÍ PERNAMBUCO

BRAZIL

ACRE RONDÔNIA

MATO GROSSO

PERU BOLIVIA

MATO GROSSO DO SUL

PARAGUAY CHILE ARGENTINA

Most of Brazil’s population is a mixture of Portuguese, native Indian, and African. This mixture extends through all social classes, and while class and regional tensions are major factors in Brazilian political life, race carries less political weight. Despite its huge economy, Brazil continues to be classified as a developing nation. While the modern sector is dynamic, it is still a minor part of the overall Brazilian economy, which is largely dependent on commodity exports. Brazil’s international balance-ofpayments problems have been exacerbated by its need to import fuel for its economic development programs.

GUYANA SURINAME ATLANTIC FRENCH GUIANA

VENEZUELA

BAHIA

GOIÁS Brasilia (DF)

MINAS GERAIS

ALAGOAS SERGIPE

ESPÍRITO SANTO

SÃO PAULO

PARANÁ

RIO GRANDE DO SUL

URUGUAY

TOCANTINS

Historical Background

RIO DE JANEIRO Rio de Janeiro São Paulo

SANTA CATARINA 0 0

500 500

1000 Miles

1000 Kilometers

Brazil is the largest country in South America in area and the fifth largest country in the world. With a population of nearly 190 million, it is the second most populous country in the western hemisphere (next to the United States) and the only Portuguese-speaking country. The capital is Brasilia, a federal city in the interior state of Goiás, which was constructed after World War II and which replaced the former capital, Rio de Janeiro. Brazil has the world’s tenth-largest economy. However, wealth is poorly distributed, with the top 10 percent of the population controlling the majority of the national income. Wealth is also unequally distributed regionally. The coffee-growing and manufacturing states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Guanabara and the cattle-raising and wheat-growing regions of the south have modern economies, while the old sugar-growing regions of the northeast are infamous for their poverty and their social and political distortions, as are the interior frontier states of Amazonia. The major cities, especially Rio de Janeiro, are notorious for their impoverished slums ( favelas).

After establishment of the Brazilian republic in the 1880s, its leaders sought to establish a special partnership with the United States. Seeing Brazil as separate from the rest of Latin America, yet an intrinsic part of it, they believed that it would eventually dominate in South America as the United States dominated in North America. Following this reasoning, the Brazilian leaders hoped to play a special role in influencing U.S. policies in South America and in helping interpret those policies to Brazil’s Spanishspeaking neighbors. In return, Brazil expected that the United States would give special consideration to its views and needs. In pursuing this policy, Brazil was the only Latin American country to send troops to fight the Axis in World War II. Its close military contacts with the United States continued after the war. The United States established its largest Latin American military mission in Brazil, and helped establish and run the Brazilian War College (ESG), where ranking officers and civilian elites were exposed to U.S. military doctrines and strategic policy views. During the 1950s, Brazil’s elites soon displayed deep disagreements over how to reach their goals of economic development and gaining international stature. They were also disappointed by the failure of

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Brazil: General’s Coup, 19 6 4

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KEY DATES 1960

Pro-U.S. moderate candidate Janio Quadros wins election for president; leftist João Goulart becomes vice president; Quadros resigns after seven months in office, and Goulart becomes president.

1962

Goulart refuses to vote for Cuba’s ouster from the Organization of American States, outraging the United States; conservatives in the military and politics threaten a coup if Goulart is given full presidential powers in a national referendum.

1963–1964

Brazilian voters give Goulart full presidential powers in a January plebiscite; right-wing military officers begin to plot a coup.

1964

A mass anti-Goulart rally is held in Rio de Janeiro on March 19; a coup begins on April 1; new Brazilian leader General Artur da Costa e Silva seizes power, and his government is quickly recognized by the United States.

their presumed special relationship with the United States following the end of World War II in 1945. Far from growing toward co-equal status, Brazil’s leaders felt ignored by North American leaders, who were preoccupied by Cold War problems with the Soviet Union and China. As the Brazilian leaders saw it, their economic development plans were dismissed as impractical and were denied financial support, and their suggestions for hemispheric policies were disregarded. One particular broken promise rankled especially with political leaders. In the mid-1940s, when the postwar United Nations was being planned, U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt promised Brazil wartime leader, Getulio Vargas, that Brazil would have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Roosevelt also promised Vargas massive postwar U.S. economic assistance. Roosevelt died in April 1945, and neither promise was kept by later U.S. administrations. Brazilian resentment was expressed, particularly during the Dwight D. Eisenhower years, in increasingly open opposition to North American initiatives in the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as, on a global scale, in taking a neutralist position in the Cold War and in seeking expanded trade and economic ties with the Soviet Union and China. During the early 1960s the Soviet Union regularly bought up Brazil’s coffee surplus, while China became its largest

sugar buyer. Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, equated Brazil’s neutralism with Communism. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, an ardent free marketer, found Brazil’s state economic planning intolerable. U.S. disagreement with Brazil’s foreign and economic policies was compounded by understandable frustration in dealing with its complicated politics, which were intensely personal and involved rapidly shifting alliances and frequent crises, many of which were incomprehensible to outsiders. Vargas, who had returned to power as elected president in 1950, refused to send Brazilian troops to Korea and, to Washington’s alarm, sought to normalize Brazil’s relations with the Soviet Union and to nationalize oil and mineral extraction. In 1954, beset by scandals in his administration, Vargas killed himself rather than resign as demanded by army leaders. In the popular mind, however, Vargas became a martyr to democracy. His designated political heir, Juscelino Kubitschek, was elected in 1955, with a supposed communist sympathizer, former minister of labor João “Jango” Goulart, as vice president. (Goulart was, in fact, a very wealthy cattle rancher and a strong supporter of the Roman Catholic Church.) Kubitschek had as little luck as Vargas in getting financial aid from a U.S. government outraged by, among other things, the seizure by the state of São

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Paulo of a U.S.-owned electric generating plant. He had even less luck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which insisted on economic reforms that were opposed by rich and poor alike. Finally, Kubitschek reversed Brazil’s traditional policy, seeking not to broker U.S. policies with the rest of Latin America, but to lead Latin America in changing U.S. policies.

19 6 0 Election The election of 1960 pitted the strongly anticommunist war minister, Army Marshal Henrique Lott, against the governor of São Paulo, Janio Quadros, a neutralist who had praised and visited Fidel Castro. Paradoxically, Lott was a strong supporter of Kubitschek’s economic policies, anathema to the United States, while Quadros, like Goulart a wealthy cattleman and candidate of the “conservative” National Democratic Union (UDN, its Portuguese acronym) party, pledged to exercise fiscal restraint and to clean up corruption. What further perplexed observers was that Lott had the support of the outlawed but still active Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). The two parties that nominated him, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Brazilian Workers Party (PTB), also nominated the supposedly Communist-leaning Goulart for vice president. The United States favored Quadros, who won in a landslide, but Goulart, under the Brazilian system, was elected vice president. Quadros took office just as John F. Kennedy assumed power in Washington, and there was a brief easing of tension between the two countries as the new U.S. administration sought a fresh approach. Quadros, however, even while pronouncing against corruption and Communism, committed the cardinal sin of refusing to endorse the U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Further, he completely puzzled Washington when, after only seven months in office, unable to get support in the faction-ridden Brazilian congress, he resigned, possibly hoping to return to office after a plebiscite that would grant him emergency powers. In any event, his constitutional successor was Goulart, who was en route back home from an official visit to China at the time. Right-wing elements in the military and civilian conservatives threatened a coup if Goulart succeeded to the presidency. A split in the military prevented the coup, and the crisis was temporarily resolved by allowing Goulart to take office but amending the

constitution to create a parliamentary government with a prime minister assuming much of the presidential power. This lasted only until January 1963 when, in a plebiscite, Brazilians voted overwhelmingly to restore full presidential powers to Goulart. Although Goulart backed the United States during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, he outraged Washington by joining with the other major Latin American states in refusing to vote for the ouster of Cuba from the Organization of American States at the second Punta del Este conference in January 1962. It was clear his days were numbered.

The United States Opposes Goulart In the meantime, the United States had sent a new ambassador to Brazil. Lincoln Gordon had been a Harvard economics professor and a Marshall Plan administrator. Just as important, the United States also sent a new head of the military mission, Colonel Vernon Walters. Walters was a former liaison with Brazilian forces in Italy, and a staunch conservative who would later become deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Working closely with the CIA and the U.S. military mission, Gordon and Walters labored first to deny Goulart a majority in the congressional elections of October 1962 and then to defeat him in the 1963 plebiscite. They failed partially but not for lack of financial resources. They admitted spending $5 million in covert funds on the campaign against the president, and millions more were paid out by the Agency for International Development (USAID) to state governors considered antiGoulart. The only reliable element in the country, as the State Department and the Pentagon saw it, was the Brazilian military—”an island of sanity.” In 1958, Eisenhower had appointed retired Army Major General William Draper to study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). With regard to Latin America in general and Brazil in particular, Draper recommended abandoning the old rationale for military assistance—defense of the hemisphere against outside attack—and urged preparing the Latin American armed forces for suppression of subversion and revolution. In addition, the CIA began covert activities funded through a political front called the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (IBAD) to organize business groups, women’s organizations, labor unions,

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and peasant leagues responsive to U.S. direction. The CIA’s major propaganda effort was to create a “red scare,” a belief that Brazil was facing imminent Communist revolution. The effort was directed principally at the military, especially younger officers. Political tensions remained high in Brazil even after the 1963 plebiscite. The “red scare” propaganda had done its work well. Goulart, although he had won at the polls, was unable to carry out effective social and economic programs. He was not helped by the fact that the U.S. Embassy was now working closely with opposition political groups that were seeking his ouster. Armed bands funded by the CIA and claiming to be Communist revolutionaries staged raids on latifundias (plantations) in the northeast to increase tensions. The police were thoroughly infiltrated by USAID’s Public Safety Office, a CIA front. Labor unions, penetrated by another CIA front, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), added to the confusion. Especially effective were middle-class women, organized through IBAD as Women for Democracy (CAMDE), who used their telephones to spread rumors and, with the backing of Cardinal Jaime Camara de Barros, held meetings to denounce the atheist Goulart. What tipped the balance, however, was Goulart’s support for forming unions among naval and military enlisted men. This thoroughly frightened the officer corps and turned it against him. (Ironically, the leader of the navy enlisted men’s union was a CIA agent and provocateur.) Rumors spread that Goulart was going to replace the military with a Castro-style popular militia. Indeed, by agreeing to address a mass rally of the military union on March 13, 1964, he sealed his fate.

The Coup The army chief of staff, General Adhemar Castelo Branco—who had been promoted to general and appointed chief of staff by Goulart in 1963—was a frequent lecturer on the danger of Communist subversion and takeover. He was also known as an opponent of coups. However, in January 1964 he had already joined the coup-plotting group headed by retired general Golbery de Couto e Silva, convinced that the only way to save the constitution was to overthrow the elected government that was subverting it. Golbery was a leading figure at the War College (ESG) and also a member of the CIA-funded think tank, the Institute for Social Research and Studies (IPES).

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On March 19 a mass anti-Goulart rally, organized by Women for Democracy (CAMDE), was held in Rio. On March 20, Castelo sent a memo to all army commanders saying that Goulart’s policies were leading to Brazil’s subjugation by the Soviet Union and that if the military defended him, they would be betraying the country. Goulart, although aware of Castelo’s memo, took no action. He told advisers he was certain of the army’s loyalty, and interrupted his Easter holiday to come to Rio to address the enlisted men’s rally. While events spiraled downward for Goulart in Brazil, things had been changing in Washington. President Kennedy had been assassinated in November 1963, and the new President was Lyndon Johnson, who was preoccupied with passing major social programs at home and dealing with the growing war in Vietnam. He was not prepared to spend much time on Latin America, and he relied on his appointee, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann. Mann had little tolerance for Latin leaders who were unresponsive to U.S. wishes and believed with General Draper that in Brazil the military represented an island of sanity. On March 13 U.S. Ambassador Gordon flew to Washington to consult with Mann and President Johnson. He was advised that the United States would not object to a military coup and would in fact support it. A U.S. naval task force was ready to steam for Rio in Operation Brother Sam to support the anti-Goulart forces. An interagency task force was set up at the State Department to plan for provision of post-coup aid to whatever Brazilian government was established. As it turned out, the Brother Sam task force was not needed. Once the coup began on April 1, 1964, the military forces on whose loyalty Goulart counted did not act to preserve his power. Goulart himself, who had no stomach for civil war, refused to order out loyal state militias or call for the arming of the masses. For several days, he flew aimlessly from one of his ranches to another, then finally crossed the border into exile in Uruguay. Meanwhile, General Artur da Costa e Silva, who had been running a separate net of coup conspirators, had the head of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzilli, sworn in as president at two o’clock in the morning, and Lyndon Johnson officially recognized him within twenty-four hours. There was no organized resistance to the coup. Officers strapped on their side-arms and waited for assaults by the red mobs, but the best they could do

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General Artur da Costa e Silva (seated, right) headed the coup that ousted Brazil’s President João Goulart in April 1964. He installed the head of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzilli (seated, left), as temporary president. (John Loengard/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

was fire on unarmed student demonstrators outside the military club, killing three. The fanatically antiGoulart governor of Guanabara (Rio), Carlos Lacerda, armed with a submachine gun, barricaded himself in the governor’s palace, screaming defiance against nonexistent attackers over a loudspeaker for several hours.

Aftermath The fact that the supposed arms caches and trained Communist and Castroite forces did not exist did not keep the Brazilian generals or their American supporters from proclaiming that they had saved the nation from Communist revolt in the nick of time. Now the task was to make sure the danger did not arise again. Hastily organized military investigation forces, sent into the field as part of “Operation Cleanup,” arrested thousands, including numerous office holders. Reports of torture and execution of suspects soon circulated. However, as Cardinal Adhe-

mar de Barros commented, “without punishment of the guilty, we risk . . . the salvation of the fatherland. . . . [T]o punish those who were [guilty] is an act of mercy also.” The civilian political leaders who had hoped to lead the post-Goulart regime were soon pushed aside. At a meeting in early April, the military informed the civilians that da Costa e Silva would exercise power until General Castelo e Branco was installed as president by the Congress on April 15, responding to pressure from the CIA-supported anticommunist groups, including CAMDE. Once in office, Castelo e Branco issued Institutional Act Number One, annulling the constitution. This granted the executive power a ten-year mandate to restore economic and financial order, eliminate Communist infiltration, and purge corrupt and subversive elements; to cancel the mandates of elected officials; to dismiss civil servants at will; and to revoke, on his own authority, the political rights of anyone found guilty of subversion or misuse of public

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funds. Former presidents Kubitschek, Quadros, and Goulart were among those found guilty. The new government also repaid the United States for its support of the coup. Brazil broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and sent troops to support the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in April 1965, even taking command of the OAS occupying force that gave an inter-American cover to Washington’s unilateral action. New state elections were held in October 1965, but Castelo e Branco annulled the victories of anticoup parties. The Second Institutional Act of that month suspended all existing political parties and decreed two official new parties, the only ones allowed to compete in future elections. Branco ruled by emergency decree for the remainder of his term. As candidate of one of the official parties, General da Costa e Silva took his turn as president in 1967 under a new constitution that called for indirect election of the president and vice president on a single ticket, trial by court martial for civilians charged

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with national security offenses, and presidential power to rule by emergency decree without consulting the congress. Not content with this, in December 1968, da Costa e Silva issued the Fifth Institutional Act, suspending all legislative bodies indefinitely, authorizing rule by decree, and prohibiting public political criticism. David MacMichael See also: Coups.

Bibliography Black, Jan Knippers. United States Penetration of Brazil. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977. Dulles, John F. Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1978. ———. Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955–1964. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970. Leacock, Ruth. Requiem for Revolutions: The United States and Brazil, 1961–1969. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990. Schneider, Ronald M. The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a “Modernizing” Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

CANADA: Quebec Separatist Movement, 1960–1987 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious LABRADOR SEA NEWFOUNDLAND

HUDSON BAY

QUEBEC PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

C A N A D A ONTARIO

Quebec City Shawinigan Montreal

NOVA SCOTIA

Ottawa

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Canada, the northern neighbor of the United States, is the second-largest country in the world, after Russia, with a land area of 3,852,000 square miles. With a population of about 31.7 million, it is also the least densely populated of any major country, averaging fewer than nine people per square mile. About 85 percent of Canada’s people live within 100 miles of its southern border with the United States, leaving much of its northern territory uninhabited. Canada is a member of the British Commonwealth, and the British monarch is the constitutional head of state. It is an independent country organized federally, with ten provinces and three northern territories. In general, the provinces have more independence than the states of the United States, but the national government does have the constitutional right to intervene in the provinces to carry out any “works declared by the Parliament to be for the general advantage of Canada,” and it can override provin-

cial civil powers “in time of dire necessity or grave national peril.” This power was used in wartime and after the Quebec separatist kidnappings in 1970. By far the most populous province is Ontario, with more than 12 million people, 5 million of whom live in or near Toronto. Quebec, to Ontario’s east, is the second most populous province with 7.5 million people, 3.6 million of whom live in or near Montreal. The country is heavily urbanized—almost two-thirds of its residents live in metropolitan areas. The Canadian economy is closely linked to that of the United States. Its strength is in natural resources, including timber, petroleum, nickel, copper, potash, and a huge potential for producing hydroelectric power. Canada is also the world’s largest exporter of fish and seafood. In the eighteenth century, eastern Canada (together with parts of the present-day United States) became an object of conflict between Britain and France, then the two leading European colonial powers. The conflict came to a climax between 1756 and 1763 in the Seven Years’ War (known to Americans as the French and Indian War). In 1763, the British were victorious, and France gave up its claims in North America. Thousands of French-speaking residents of Canada were uncomfortable from the beginning under the rule of the British government. The French in Acadia left their homes for more congenial surroundings, settling in Louisiana, where they came to be known as Cajuns. Many others remained in Canada, especially in the sprawling region along the St. Lawrence River known as Quebec. A serious rebellion against British rule broke out in 1837–1838 and was crushed mercilessly, but the rebellion remains the patriotic legend behind the modern Quebec separatist movement. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thousands of immigrants arrived in Quebec, most of them speakers of English. By the end of this

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KEY DATES 1756–1763

The British defeat the French in the Seven Years’ War and take possession of French territories in Canada. 1867 Canada, including Quebec, becomes independent of Britain. 1960 The “Quiet Revolution” begins as Quebec nationalists begin to organize politically; intellectuals in Montreal establish the Rally for National Independence (RIN, its French acronym). 1963 Radicals within RIN break away to form the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ), a group dedicated to the use of violence to achieve independence; on March 7, FLQ launches its first action, the bombing of three military barracks. 1963–1968 FLQ launches a sporadic bombing campaign; the Canadian government responds with arrests; FLQ establishes links with the Black Power movement in the United States. 1968 Pierre Trudeau is elected prime minister of Canada and says he is willing to talk to separatists. 1970 FLQ commandos begin a kidnapping campaign to force the government to release FLQ partisans; on October 5, the FLQ kidnaps British commercial attaché James Cross and demands the release of twenty-three FLQ prisoners, a $500,000 ransom, and broadcast of their manifesto; Trudeau and Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa agree to the broadcast and allowing the kidnappers to leave the country; the War Measures Act goes into effect, putting Quebec under martial law, and army troops occupy government buildings in Quebec City and Montreal; on October 10, the FLQ kidnaps Quebec unemployment minister Pierre Laporte, executing him on October 16; in late November, police surround the house where the FLQ is holding Cross; on December 3, the kidnappers agree to release Cross and are allowed to leave the country the following day. 1980 The Quebec independence plebiscite is narrowly defeated. 1987 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and provincial premiers negotiate the Meech Lake Accord, giving increased autonomy to Quebec. The Accord is eventually defeated when some of the provincial legislators vote it down.

age of immigration, French-speakers were a minority in what they considered their own country. Business and finance in Quebec, as well as in the rest of Canada, were controlled by English-speakers, leading to a conviction among many in the province that Quebec was a conquered territory and an exploited colony. These feelings led many Quebec natives to identify with the post–World War II anticolonial

movement in other parts of the world. Some felt they had just cause themselves to rebel.

The Quiet Revolution From the end of World War II until 1960, Quebec politics was controlled by the National Union Party of Premier Maurice Duplessis. Intensely conservative,

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Duplessis was in many ways almost a model of the native ruler who accepts colonial economic domination so long as the traditional local ruling class is not interfered with. On June 22, 1960, what is called the Quiet Revolution began in Quebec with the election of Jean Lesage and the Liberal Party. The party’s Quebec nationalist wing was led by a popular television personality, Rene Levesque, who proclaimed, “The day of liberation has arrived.” Three months later, a group of Montreal intellectuals organized the Rally for National Independence (RIN), whose manifesto referred to the worldwide anticolonial movement and declared that “the ideal of national independence . . . is as valid here as anywhere else.” Its leaders spoke openly of national revolution and organized demonstrations and strikes for the nationalist cause. To the left of RIN was Socialist Action for Quebec Independence (ASIQ), which emphasized not only independence but also the need for independent Quebec to become a socialist state, noting that French speakers controlled less than 20 percent of the economy of the province. In the national elections of 1962, the Conservative Party under Prime Minister John Diefenbaker campaigned on the slogan “One Canada, one nation.” In response, graffiti in French began to appear not only in Montreal but in Ottawa saying, “Down with the Confederation. Long live free Quebec.” The Conservatives lost seats, and Liberals gained, but Diefenbaker remained prime minister. In Quebec the Liberals achieved a resounding victory with the slogan “Masters in our own house.” In 1963, Quebec activists began a series of massive demonstrations against English-speakers’ domination of the Quebec economy. Activists in RIN began to insist that the goal of a free Quebec could not be achieved without violence. In the spring of 1963, a group that called itself the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) broke off from the RIN. It had been studying the revolutions in the rest of the world and had found applicable models in the insurgencies in Northern Ireland and the Basque country of Spain. The Irish Republican Army and the Basque ETA used small groups to carry out spectacular acts of violence. These actions were intended to provoke violence and repression by the authorities, which would lead to broader resistance and eventually revolution. On March 7, 1963, the FLQ carried out its first action, fire-bombing three military barracks. A week later, its activists—all of them very young—began stealing dynamite from Montreal construction sites.

On April 1, during another federal election campaign, they blew up tracks on the Canadian National Railway (CNR) line just before Diefenbaker’s campaign train was to come through. The authorities responded as expected. On Good Friday, April 12, provincial police and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) carried out mass arrests of RIN and ASIQ members, then made the situation worse by manhandling demonstrators protesting the arrests. Exactly a week later, an FLQ bomb went off at the RCMP headquarters in Montreal. On April 16, the FLQ published its manifesto, which concluded: “To arms, patriots of Quebec! The hour of revolutions has struck! Independence or death.” The first death came days later when a security guard at a Canadian Army recruiting center was killed by an FLQ bomb. The bombings continued throughout May. The police soon penetrated the organization, and in early June, twenty-three FLQ members, essentially the whole organization, were arrested and charged with the murder of the security guard. Most of them received long prison terms. Levesque, while condemning violence, argued that it was the neocolonial status of Quebec that drove people to it. He cautioned that separatism should not be confused with terrorism.

Revival of the F LQ The violence had caught the attention of the federal government. Prime Minister Lester Pearson, elected in 1962, responded to the conflict by forming the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Its report called the situation in Quebec the greatest crisis in Canada’s history. Commissions were not enough for Quebec’s impatient youth. The FLQ began to reorganize almost immediately, founding a military branch, the Quebec Liberation Army (ALQ), and a propaganda section that published an underground weekly, La Cognée (The Axe). In the summer of 1963, the bombings began again, and in September, an ALQ commando was caught while attempting a bank robbery. Again the authorities congratulated themselves that they had hurt the movement. Again they were proved wrong. Despite the heavy sentences, more young volunteers came forward and, in January 1964, carried out their most spectacular actions to date, ransacking a Canadian military armory in Montreal and then, three weeks later, duplicating the feat in the town of Shawinigan.

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As evidenced by this demonstration in 2003, strong pro-separation sentiment persisted in Quebec even after the failure of the 1987 Meech Lake Accord and the defeat of sovereignty referenda in 1980 and 1995. (Steve Liss/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Once more, the Canadian security services were equal to the challenge. By May, they had tracked down and recovered all the stolen military equipment, and ALQ members were under arrest. Over the next several years, the same scenario was repeated. Arrests, usually followed by long prison sentences, would apparently destroy the violent organizations. Yet the groups would reconstitute themselves and begin another wave of bombings. Each time, too, the actions became more sophisticated, and in the mid-1960s, FLQ members established strong links with the Black Power movement in the United States. One of the FLQ’s principal leaders, Pierre Vallieres, wrote a bestselling book titled White Niggers of America, which emphasized the similar situations of U.S. blacks and Canadian French-speakers. The FLQ also established ties with Quebec’s radical unions, intervening forcefully in strikes against, among others, the 7-Up bottling company. Members made frequent trips to Cuba as well, and their connections both to Black Power

groups and to Cuba attracted the interest of U.S. authorities, especially after 1967, when numerous U.S. Vietnam War draft evaders fled to Canada. In 1968, Pierre Trudeau became prime minister of Canada, becoming the first French-speaking person to hold the post. Soon after his election, he established a secret commission to deal with Quebec separatism. Trudeau was willing to consider the demands of Quebec nationalists on the issue of language, but he was unalterably opposed to separatism. The commission, which conferred with the FBI and the CIA in the United States, seemed to make little distinction between separatism and terrorism.

Crisis of 1970 In 1970, the FLQ deliberately adopted the tactics of the Tupamaro urban guerrillas in Uruguay, taking hostages to force the government to meet their demands. On October 5, 1970, an FLQ commando unit

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kidnapped James Cross, the British commercial attaché in Montreal. They demanded publication of their manifesto, the release of twenty-three FLQ prisoners, a plane to take them to Cuba or Algeria, the rehiring of dismissed strikers, $500,000 in ransom, and the name of a police informer. Trudeau and Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa agreed to take a hard line. They would broadcast the manifesto and let the kidnappers leave the country in exchange for Cross’s return. That was it. In the meantime, the War Measures Act—in effect placing Quebec under martial law—was put in force. On October 15, Canadian army troops occupied the government buildings in Quebec City (the province’s capital) and a force of 8,000 men was sent into Montreal. Eventually, more than 500 persons suspected of being FLQ members or sympathizers were rounded up. The FLQ decided to raise the ante. On October 10, they kidnapped Quebec’s unemployment minister, Pierre Laporte, and, after he attempted to escape and it was clear that the government was not going to negotiate, they executed him on October 16. They still held James Cross, though, and promised not to harm him. In late November, the police located the house where Cross was being kept and surrounded it. On December 3, the kidnappers agreed to release him in return for their safe conduct and a flight to Cuba for themselves and their families. This was done, and on December 4, the crisis was over.

Aftermath Violence in Quebec did not come to an end, and the political struggle of some seeking independence in Quebec would continue for years. The radical FLQ lost most of its public support, however, because of the murder of Laporte. Trudeau and Bourassa were vindicated in taking the hard line. In 1980, Quebec governor Levesque arranged for a plebiscite in Quebec on independence. It was narrowly defeated. Then in 1987, under Trudeau’s leadership, the provincial premiers met at Meech Lake in Ontario and agreed on a constitutional amendment that would recognize Quebec as a distinct society. However, this solution required approval by the voters of all provinces, and Manitoba and Alberta voted against it. David MacMichael See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Bothwell, Robert Bothwell. Canada and Quebec: One Country, Two Histories. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995. Fournier, Louis Fournier. F.L.Q.: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement. Toronto: NC Press, 1984. Sawatsky, John. Men in the Shadows: The RCMP Security Service. Toronto. Canada: Doubleday, 1980. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Canada, 1995–1996. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1996.

CHILE: Coup Against Allende,1973 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups,Left and Right PARTICIPANT: United States PERU

BOLIVIA

military rose up, overthrowing and killing Allende in a bloody coup in September 1973.

BRAZIL

Copper mine

C

Historical Background

Major highway PARAGUAY

C

CHILE

PACIFIC

C

OCEAN Santiago

URUGUAY ARGENTINA

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ATLANTIC OCEAN

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500 Kilometers

Until the early 1970s, Chile enjoyed one of the most stable political and democratic histories of any country in Latin America. With the rise of the leftist politician Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular (UP) party in 1970, however, the political climate in Chile grew increasingly polarized. As Allende’s government moved to implement land reform and other economically redistributive measures, it alienated much of the middle and upper classes. Its nationalization schemes in the all-important copper mining sector and other industries angered U.S. corporations, which urged President Richard Nixon to intervene. With violence breaking out in many parts of the country, the Chilean

Chile in the 1960s was one of the more prosperous and peaceful countries in Latin America. With a population of 7.5 million at the beginning of the decade, it boasted one of the largest middle classes in the hemisphere. Still, the country was prone to the ups and downs of the international marketplace, since so much of its economy depended on imports and exports. This susceptibility to international finance was reflected in the radical swings in the inflation rate throughout the decade. In particular, the Chilean economy was closely tied to that of the United States. Chile received 40 percent of its imports and most of its overseas credits from the United States. Major U.S. corporations, including International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and the copper companies Anaconda and Kennecott, were heavily invested in Chile. Chile received more U.S. aid money per capita than any other country in the Western Hemisphere during the 1960s. From 1958 to 1964, the country was ruled by a conservative technocrat named Jorge Alessandri, an elderly and respected leader in Chilean politics, who maintained a majority in Congress through a coalition of centrist and rightist parties. Alessandri’s government made modest efforts to push land reform— a key issue in the Chilean countryside—but also presided over an economic recession, with real wages falling and inflation running at 50 percent in 1964. Not surprisingly, the Alessandri government lost the national elections that year and was replaced by Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Frei and the PDC won a significant plurality in the popular vote and a majority of seats in the lower house of Congress, allowing them to rule without forming

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KEY DATES 1970

Left-wing politician Salvador Allende and his Popular Unity (UP, its Spanish acronym) party win elections with a plurality of the vote; Commander-in-Chief Rene Schneider is killed in a kidnapping attempt.

1971

Assassination of a conservative Christian Democratic Party (PDC) politician by an extreme leftist group creates political uncertainty in the country.

1972

Attempting to assuage anger in the military at his government, Allende offers pay raises to officers and an increase in the defense budget.

1973

With the country in political turmoil, some of it fomented by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, military officers led by General Augusto Pinochet overthrow and kill Allende in a coup on September 11.

1989

Pinochet turns over power to a civilian government.

2005 The Chilean Supreme Court confirms the government indictment of Pinochet for human rights violations during his regime, including the deaths of several thousand political prisoners.

a coalition, a rare event in the fractured history of Chilean party politics. Still, internally, the PDC was like a coalition, having drawn into its ranks a broad cross section of the middle class and some urban poor, who were suspicious of socialists and communists. Because these varied groups had very different economic interests, the party was inherently unstable. Some elements demanded modernization of the existing capitalist system, others called for income redistribution, and more radical groups demanded the establishment of worker-owned and -run agricultural and industrial cooperatives. Frei tried to reconcile these different groups by providing programs that dealt with all three demands, but implemented them in moderate forms. Instead of nationalizing the copper industry, he moved to “Chileanize” it—that is, he tried to buy out 51 percent of the foreign corporations’ assets. Rather than expropriating large landholdings, he attempted to enhance the power of poor rural workers through unionization. He also moved to set up organizations to defend the interests of the urban proletariat living in the shantytowns of Chile’s larger cities. These half-measures, however, only seemed to antagonize forces on both the right and the left. Those

on the right were angry about government’s modest agrarian reforms, believing that they went too far; those on the left were angry that the government had given such favorable terms to the giant U.S. copper companies. Both sides felt frustrated and angry. As the 1970 elections approached, political polarization and political violence were rising. The three candidates were former president Alessandri on the right, Frei in the center, and Salvador Allende and his UP party on the left. The three were so evenly matched that Allende found himself the winner— with only 36 percent of the vote. As it became clear that Allende was going to win, there were ominous moves from external forces. ITT, the American company that owned the Chilean phone company, was afraid that Allende would nationalize its holdings. The company had powerful friends in the administration of President Richard Nixon, and they urged Nixon to take action to destabilize Allende’s new government. With U.S. help, right-wing forces in Chile kidnapped Rene Schneider, the commander-inchief of the Chilean army. They hoped to hold him and plant information that Allende’s followers had planned the kidnapping. The plan went disastrously wrong, however, when Schneider resisted his abduction and was killed.

Chile: Coup Against Allende, 1973

The Allende Government Allende’s election to the presidency did not represent a radical swing in political sentiment among the Chilean people. He was, after all, a minority president whose election reflected gradual shifts in voter preferences and other shifts in party alliances. Though Allende himself was not responsible for it, his victory further polarized the political scene. Party membership became more than a sign of mere electoral preference; it identified which side of the class war one was on. At the same time, political violence—which had previously been rare in Chile—became the norm. The situation was made worse by Allende’s own Socialist Party, which was the main component of the UP coalition. The party itself was divided between those who believed in a peaceful transition to a socialist economy and those who insisted that a violent revolution was necessary to achieve that aim. In 1971, the assassination of a leading politician of the rival Christian Democratic Party by an extreme leftist group intensified the climate of political uncertainty and anger. Still, Allende tried to live up to his campaign promises. He instituted a massive wage increase in those sectors of the economy controlled by the government. Since the government controlled more than 50 percent of the economy, the wage increase had the effect of driving up wages—and prices—across the board. Yet this did not represent a great redistribution of wealth, since all classes saw their incomes go up dramatically. At the same time, the Allende government moved to accelerate land reform. During his first year in office, almost as many farms were expropriated from large landholders as during the entire six-year administration of Frei. More potentially inflammatory was Allende’s decision to move from the “Chileanization” of the copper mines to outright nationalization. Antagonizing the copper corporations even more was the way in which the Allende government assessed the price they would pay for this nationalization. Factoring in “excessive profits” from the past, Allende offered the copper giants less than the book value of their operations. Anaconda and other U.S. corporations responded angrily, persuading the U.S. government to cut off loans and use its influence to block credits from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. While loans from the Soviet Union, Eastern

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Europe, and other Latin American countries made up for some of this credit, it could not help Chile overcome what was increasingly becoming a U.S. boycott of Chilean exports. Given how closely tied it was to the U.S. economy, these moves by Washington were catastrophic for Chile. By 1972, the Chilean political scene was even more polarized. On the one side were the people’s power committees ( poder populares), which had been organized by the government in rural and urban areas to defend the interests of peasants and workers. On the other side were the professional associations (gremios), which represented the interests of small business owners and professional groups, who leaned toward the right politically. Despite Allende’s insistence that his government would never do anything to harm the interests of the middle class, his moves to nationalize large businesses and expropriate large landholdings led the membership of the gremios to fear that their businesses would be next, as Chile headed down the road to Cuban-style Communism. When the association of truck drivers and owners went on strike to protest the government’s decision to nationalize the truck parts and supplies industry, the poder populares responded with a massive mobilization to keep the economy afloat by setting up their own transport network. This was seen as threatening the truckers’ interests, and violence broke out between the two groups. The following year, other people’s committees responded to threats against the Allende government by taking over some 250 factories in the Santiago area.

The Anti-Allende Coup While political polarization and violence spread throughout Chilean society during the first two years of the Allende administration, the military was becoming increasingly nervous. Though Chile had a history of cooperative civilian-military relations—in which each side allowed the other to run its own affairs—politicians on the right, frustrated by the power of Allende’s popular supporters, were establishing an alliance with the generals. In this, they received the aid and support of the United States, through the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, by the time of the coup in 1973, the CIA had spent some $40 million supporting organizations— including the truckers’ gremio—that were eager to rid the country of Allende. There were also direct CIA

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contacts with key figures in the military, including one of the chiefs of staff, General Augusto Pinochet. Recognizing the danger, Allende offered pay raises to the officers and increased military spending. He also moved in 1972 to incorporate the military brass into his administration by appointing Chief of Staff General Carlos Prats to his cabinet. But when the moderate Prats proved unable to resolve the truckers’ strike of 1972, he resigned both from his cabinet position and his military position, to be replaced in the latter post by the hard-line Pinochet. By mid-1973 (winter in Chile), the country was in political and economic turmoil. Efforts to bring about a reconciliation between Allende’s UP and the increasingly right-wing Christian Democrats failed. Rumors of a military coup or a declaration of emergency rule by Allende flew around the capital. In August, Allende dismissed the heads of the air force, navy, and army and brought Prats back into his cabinet. Prats, however, quickly resigned after a bizarre protest in which the wives of military officers surrounded his house. The

dismissal of the heads of the military services was the final straw for most officers. By early September, they had made their plans and enlisted Pinochet. On September 11, 1973, the military made its move, launching a coordinated attack on government buildings throughout Santiago, including La Moneda, the presidential palace. Defended by armed supporters known as the Group of Friends of the President, Allende tried to protect himself against the assault on La Moneda. But air force jets were called in to strafe the palace, resulting in the total destruction of the house and the death of Allende.

Aftermath and Legacy The aftermath of the coup was one of the bloodiest purges in twentieth-century Latin America. Exact figures are impossible to find because the incoming Pinochet regime covered up the facts and destroyed much of the documentation, but it is estimated that within the first six months after the coup, between

Chilean Army troops led by General Augusto Pinochet fire on La Moneda, the presidential palace in Santiago, during the coup against Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. Allende died in the attack. (AFP/Getty Images)

Chile: Coup Against Allende, 1973

3,000 and 30,000 politically suspect persons were executed, and another 80,000 placed in prison. While this kind of mass killing and imprisonment was largely over in the first year, the government kept a tight lid on political protest of any kind, using torture, exile, and assassination against its political opponents. The aim of the government, most outside experts agreed, was to eliminate the left altogether as a political force in Chile. Following the example of the Brazilian generals after their coup in 1964, Pinochet himself would become a model for further killing in neighboring Argentina in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. The Pinochet government moved to reverse the nationalization policies of the Allende regime, returning assets to multinational corporations—ironically excepting the copper companies. More than that, Pinochet was determined to undo the trend in Chile of increasing government ownership of the means of production. Instead, with the advice and cooperation of experts from the University of Chicago’s Department of Economics (known for its conservative economic stance), Pinochet embarked on a radical privatization scheme. This had mixed results. Chile experienced an economic boom in the 1980s, but the gains did not filter down to the poor and working classes. A modest democratization of Chilean politics also occurred in the 1980s. After promising to turn over power to a civilian government since the 1970s,

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Pinochet finally did so in 1989. Even then, he maintained control over the military and guaranteed himself a senatorial post for life. According to Chilean law, this made him immune to any prosecution for human and civil rights violations conducted by his government. In 1998, the Chilean Supreme Court stripped Pinochet of his immunity. He was indicted in Chile, arrested in London, and sent back to Chile to stand trial. The trial never took place after a judge ruled that Pinochet was too old and too ill to aid in his defense. In 2004, however, Pinochet was stripped of his immunity a second time, his assets were frozen, and he was accused of new crimes. Late that year, a new report on the great repression was presented to Chilean president Ricardo Lagos. It was prepared by a government commission that had interviewed 35,000 former prisoners about events between 1973 and 1990. James Ciment See also: Coups.

Bibliography Allende Gossens, Salvador. Chile’s Road to Socialism. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973. Davis, Nathaniel. The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985. Kaufman, Edy. Crisis in Allende’s Chile: A New Perspective. New York: Praeger, 1988. White, Judy, ed. Chile’s Days of Terror: Eyewitness Accounts of the Military Coup. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974.

COLOMBIA: Internal Insurgencies, 1970s–2000s TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War 0 0

250 250

500 Miles

CARIBBEAN

Historical Background

SEA

500 Kilometers

PANAMA VENEZUELA Medellin

COLOMBIA

PACIFIC OCEAN

Bogota Cali

ECUADOR

DMZ

BRAZIL PERU

Coca growing areas DMZ

Demilitarized zone

Colombia, with an area of 439,733 square miles and a population of about 35 million, is situated on the northwest corner of South America and shares boundaries with Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama. It is unique among Latin American countries in having both an Atlantic and a Pacific coastline. The centrally located capital, Bogotá, has over 5 million people. This huge country is divided by three branches of the Andes Mountains. Surface travel is difficult, which historically has hindered government control in remote areas. The economy, despite a considerable amount of industrialization, is still mainly agrarian, traditionally based on coffee, bananas, and cattle. Colombia has major oilfields and coal mines and is famous for its gems, particularly emeralds. In recent years the country has been notorious as a major processor and exporter of cocaine.

After independence from Spain in 1826, political development followed the usual Latin American pattern of elite rule, with great landholders organizing as the Conservative Party, and business and professional classes as the Liberal Party. However, as landholders developed business interests and businessmen acquired lands, economic distinctions dwindled and the two parties essentially competed for personal political power and for ideological reasons, while closing ranks to maintain economic and social dominance. Between 1899 and 1902, in the Thousand Days War, the two parties fought over a Liberal attempt to broaden suffrage and reduce the arbitrary powers of the president. More than 100,000 lives were lost. Meanwhile, the coffee boom that began in the 1870s was transforming the country’s economy. As industry and the cities grew in the early 1900s, a Marxist union movement appeared. In the depression year of 1934, Liberals used labor’s support and an alliance with the recently formed Communist and Socialist parties to win the presidency under Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo. Union activity, including Communist Party organization of plantation laborers, resulted in some limited land reform and in wage and hour laws to protect farmworkers. While the Liberals in power embraced communism, the Conservatives under Laureano Gomez openly embraced fascism, organizing blue-shirted street gangs on the German and Italian model and calling for armed resistance to the Liberal “bolsheviks.” When Lopez proposed a new constitution that would end special privileges for the Catholic Church, the Church threw its support to Gomez. In 1945, with the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war, Lopez turned away from his Communist and Socialist allies. This defection

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KEY DATES 1958

The National Front agreement brings an end to the decade-long period of violence, returning Colombia to civilian rule.

1980

Illegal cocaine and marijuana exports are estimated to be worth more than legal exports like coffee and fruit.

1982–1990

Negotiations between leftist guerrillas and various government administrations lead to a truce.

1994

President Ernesto Samper promulgates a decree permitting formation of “self-defense groups” to partake in the fight against leftist guerrillas.

2000

By this year, an estimated 35,000 Colombians have died in fighting between government and right-wing paramilitaries on the one hand and leftist guerrillas on the other.

2003

Voters elect Alvaro Uribe president; Uribe vows to take a hard line against leftist guerrillas.

alienated his heir apparent, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, who represented the left wing of the party, the National Left Revolutionary Union (UNIR, its Spanish acronym). In the 1946 election the Liberal Party split, with Gaitan running a separate candidacy. This allowed the Conservatives to elect Mariano Ospina Perez, who promptly began to undo the Lopez reforms and used police to put down a wave of strikes, killing many union leaders and workers. In April 1948, the Organization of American States (OAS) held its founding meeting in Bogotá. U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall had two items on his agenda. One was to break the news that there would not be any large-scale U.S. economic assistance for Latin America; the second was to enlist Latin American countries in a hemispheric defense plan against Soviet penetration. The U.S. proposals were wildly unpopular among Gaitan’s followers, and crowds came out to demonstrate against them. On April 9, while the OAS meeting was still going on, Gaitan was assassinated. Immediately the capital erupted in bogatazo, or wild rioting.

La Violencia The rioting soon spread through the country. Peasants and workers were convinced that the Conserva-

tives had murdered their hero Gaitan, and he became a martyr. In 1949, Conservatives and mainstream Liberals elected Laureano Gomez president. He promptly declared a state of siege and embarked on a crusade to eliminate all Communists, Masons, and Liberals, proposing a corporate state like Franco’s Spain. His ideologically extreme program helped turn the rioting that had followed Gaitan’s assassination into a civil war that lasted for five years, la violencia, in which traditionally Liberal and Conservative villagers slaughtered each other. The country was out of control, and the frightened centrists in each party asked the army to take over. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla deposed Gomez on June 7, 1953, and Congress declared Rojas president until 1958. His first act was to declare amnesty for everyone who turned in arms. Thousands of peasants accepted, and la violencia came to an end, but many of Gaitan’s followers remained in the field as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The coup had been supported by the centrist elements of both parties in the hope of restoring the bipartisan elite status quo. Rojas, though, planned to get rid of both parties and set up his own political movement, the National Action Movement (MAN), which looked to a partnership between the people and the army, a sort of military-led socialism. This

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proposal pleased neither the left nor the right nor the army itself, which by the mid-1950s was controlled by veterans of the battalion that had served in Korea. These officers were extremely anti-Communist and had been trained in U.S. national security doctrine. On May 10, 1957, a carefully coordinated general strike of business and labor, together with street demonstrations by students, served as the excuse for the army general staff to order Rojas to step down and go into exile. A military junta served as a temporary government until civil government was restored under a National Front agreement worked out by the two parties and the military. The agreement called for regular elections every four years, but it further provided that the presidency would rotate between the two major parties regardless of the vote. The army would stay out of the civil branch of government but was given broad power to deal with subversives and other threats to national security as it saw fit.

The National Front The National front agreement lasted for sixteen years. Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo served two terms—1958 to 1962 and 1966 to 1970. For the Conservatives, Guillermo Leon Valencia served from 1962 to 1966 and Misael Pastrana from 1970 to 1974. Lleras had the good fortune to be president when the Kennedy administration took office in the United States. The Alliance for Progress, a U.S. program to improve social conditions in Latin America, had been inaugurated, and Colombia, having just ousted a military dictatorship and with a guerrilla movement in the field, was selected by the Kennedy administration to be the Alliance showcase of development and national security. Thus, Lleras was encouraged to embark on a program of land reform, social justice, and counterinsurgency all at once. This directive did not last long. After Kennedy’s death, the United States embraced an alternative to land redistribution in which large estates, instead of being broken up, would be farmed more efficiently and should specialize in export crops. The earnings would be invested in industry, providing jobs for the landless, an alternative much more satisfactory to landowners in both parties. However, the jobs failed to emerge in sufficient numbers, which worsened the problem of rural poverty and encouraged displaced peasants to migrate to cities, where they were often unemployed and living in poverty.

Discontent grew, reflected in the appearance of two significant guerrilla groups. The first, the National Liberation Army (ELN), drew its inspiration from Cuba and had an early hero in the priest intellectual Camilo Torres, who defied the Church and his aristocratic family to take up arms. He was subsequently killed in action. The ELN specialized in economic terrorism and kidnappings. The second guerrilla group was the People’s Liberation Army (EPL), a Maoist group. The largest and most powerful insurgent group was still the FARC, which had been organized in the 1950s. Frustration with the status quo policies of the National Front and its inability to deal with unemployment and inflation burst open in the elections of 1970. It was the Conservatives’ turn, and Misael Pastrana was the candidate. However, Rojas Pinilla ran as a dissident Conservative. Despite the controlled nature of the polling, the protest vote against the National Front gave Rojas the victory. Briefly it looked as though there would be a coup. Rojas declined to fight, however, and the army stood by the National Front. Pastrana was installed as president. Under Pastrana, however, the National Front system was further discredited. It lost even more legitimacy under his inept successor, Liberal Party leader Julio Cesar Turbay. Violence increased, and more and more the army and the police acted on their own authority. Also, some of Rojas’s younger followers, led by Jaime Bateman Cayon, formed an urban guerrilla force, M-19, which carried out some spectacular feats, including a raid on a major army weapons depot.

After the National Front By the end of Turbay’s term in 1978, Colombia was almost in a state of anarchy. The major guerrilla groups had effective control in wide areas of the countryside. M-19 seemed likely to crystallize the latent urban discontent. In addition, the drug traffic had grown to enormous dimensions. By 1980 the value of exports of cocaine and marijuana far exceeded legitimate earnings from coffee and bananas. The Cali and Medellín cartels essentially were the government in their respective departments. The murder rate in the country was astonishing. In 1996 there were 26,778 reported homicides, compared to 26,523 in the United States, where the population is seven times larger. Most of these were common

Colombia: Internal Insurgencies, 1970s–2000s

crimes, but between 1988 and 1992, an estimated 3,500 a year were believed to be political murders, carried out by the military, the police, so-called selfdefense forces allied with the police, military intelligence (some tied to the drug cartels), or guerrillas. This figure does not include the several hundred soldiers and guerrillas killed in armed clashes each year. President Belisario Betancur, a Conservative elected in 1982, was the first president in more than a decade to try to address the situation. Like most Colombian politicians, his first concern was the possibility of a military coup. The anti-Communist military was worried about the ongoing revolutions in Central America and the existence of the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The United States intensified these worries, eager to have Colombia support its anti-Sandinista policies in Nicaragua. U.S. representatives suggested that the Sandinistas were supporting one of the guerrilla forces in Colombia or trying to reopen old territorial disputes. Betancur, unlike most of the political class, came from a poor working-class background and sympathized with the increasingly desperate situation of most Colombians. He saw the first priority for Colombia as peace within the regions and within the country. He was one of the organizers of the Contadora peace process in Central America. Because the process offered de facto recognition of the left-wing Sandinista government, which the United States opposed, Betancur incurred U.S. disfavor as a result. He began negotiations with the guerrilla groups within the country, but because of mutual suspicions, the talks broke down. However, one result was that the FARC established an open political wing, the Patriotic Union (UP), which continued to participate in national politics for many years. Talks were renewed in 1988 under President Virgilio Barco. He proposed a three-step process: a period of mutual pullback (détente), then the gathering of the guerrillas into designated zones, and finally an incorporation phase in which the government would provide protection for ex-guerrillas as they reintegrated into open political life. The Barco plan was continued under his successor, President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, and in January 1990, M-19 turned in its weapons and participated in March elections for the Constituent Assembly, electing a large number of representatives. At about this time the FARC and the ELN also formed a political organization, the Simon Bolívar

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Guerrilla Coordinator (CGSB). Talks with the government stalled because the CGSB would not agree to a unilateral cease-fire by its members. Then, on the day of the Constituent Assembly elections, the Colombian air force bombed the FARC headquarters and the army mounted a major attack. The FARC response was to open its largest offensive in years and keep up a high level of attacks throughout 1990 and 1991. The government and the CGSB resumed talks in Caracas, Venezuela, in May 1991, but these failed too, when the army refused the CGSB’s proposal that it withdraw from territory designated as under FARC control. In the meantime, UP and M-19 political figures were being targeted. In 1987, Jaime Pardo Leal, the UP’s first presidential candidate, was murdered by a paramilitary gang supposedly hired by the Medellín drug cartel. The next UP candidate, Bernardo Jaramillo, was also murdered, allegedly by a cartel hired gun in March 1990. In May 1990 Carlos Pizarro, the AD/M-19 (Democratic Alliance/M-19) presidential candidate, was gunned down. Again the government blamed the killing on the drug cartel.

The Killing Continues By the mid-1990s, hopes for an end to insurgency (or at least to political killings) had largely evaporated. Under the presidency of Ernesto Samper, guerrilla and military activity increased, and neither the FARC nor the ELN showed any sign of weakening. In fact, with the decline of the Cali and Medellín drug cartels, the FARC capitalized on the power vacuum in the drug trade, and by the early 2000s earned $250 million annually in concessions related to drug trafficking, a substantial income to fund its activities. Both guerrillas and paramilitary groups continued to commit atrocities. Among the most prominent of paramilitary forces were Convivir, Accu, and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). These groups, sometimes referred to as civilian death squads, were essentially locally organized militias, financed by large landowners and sometimes drug dealers. Perceiving the military as impotent in opposing the guerrillas, the paramilitary groups assumed responsibility for cleansing villages of suspected guerrillas themselves. In 1994, President Ernesto Samper promulgated an official decree permitting the formation of “selfdefense groups” to partake in the fight against the

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guerrillas. This policy only increased bloodshed, with beheadings, stabbings, and abductions becoming almost commonplace in highly contested areas of the country. Massacres of peasants became frequent. The paramilitary groups made it even more difficult to find a resolution to the crisis in Colombia. While rebel groups often expressed a willingness to negotiate with the government and military, they refused to talk to paramilitary organizations. In 1995 President Samper gained attention by proposing a safe haven for the FARC within Colombia. Unfortunately, allegations that Samper had received financial support from drug cartels reduced his leverage and doomed the negotiations. New hope for bringing peace to Colombia arrived with the election of Andrea Pastrana to the presidency in June 1998. Some 35,000 Colombians had lost their lives in the conflict between the government and the rebels in the 1990s alone. Even before his inauguration, Pastrana became the first Colombian president to hold face-to-face talks with the FARC leaders. During these discussions, Pastrana revived a concept originally introduced by Samper, proposing a demilitarized zone in Colombia. This proposal pleased the FARC but evoked criticism of Pastrana by those who perceived the proposal as handing over five of the countries’ provinces to the rebels. Meanwhile, the U.S. government had become increasingly concerned about the ties between the FARC and the drug trade. It opposed the demilitarized zone, which proponents called a “laboratory for peace,” claiming that it could simply become a region for processing cocaine without hindrance. At the same time, the outgoing Samper met with ELN leaders in Germany. They reached an agreement known as the Puerto del Cielo, in which the ELN agreed to further peace talks with government and business leaders and to end its kidnapping campaigns and limit the use of violence near civilians. Also, in July 1998, paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño met with business and civic leaders and, through the Nudo de Paramillo Accord, pledged the end to paramilitary attacks on civilians. By the end of 1998, the Colombian government and the FARC agreed to create the demilitarized zone. The government recalled the military and police forces from five provinces southeast of Cali, while the FARC agreed to lay down its arms in this region, thus providing a safe haven for the rebels and a site for further peace talks. Formal peace talks between

the government and the FARC were scheduled for January 1999, but when the paramilitary AUC carried out violent attacks, the FARC refused to meet, citing security concerns. Meanwhile, ELN violence escalated because the government had refused to provide a four-province safe haven for the ELN to mirror the one provided for the FARC. In July 1999, just days before peace talks were again scheduled to begin, the FARC launched an offensive in fifteen cities, which resulted in the death of 180 people. Later that month, while announcing $1 billion in emergency aid for Colombia to combat the drug trade, U.S. drug czar Barry McCaffrey indicated that the rebels and drug traffickers were “indistinguishable.” FARC offensives continued throughout 1999. Peace talks did begin between the government and the FARC in January 2000, but the FARC continued its violent attacks. The ELN soon gained attention of its own. In February it blockaded the main road between Medellín and Bogotá, demanding the demilitarization of the Bolívar department. Peasants in the Bolívar department erected roadblocks between Bogotá and the coast to protest any thoughts the government had of allowing the ELN free rein in their province. Despite this resistance, the government agreed in April to create a demilitarized zone for the ELN. U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Colombia in August 2000 to pledge support for Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia,” designed to fight insurgency and drug trafficking and to bring peace to Colombia. Clinton announced the passage of a foreign aid bill that would provide more than $800 million in aid to Colombia. But in September, a FARC rebel alleged by the organization to have been acting on his own accord hijacked a commercial airliner, forcing it to land in the FARC demilitarized zone, and the ELN kidnapped fifty people on a main road leading into Cali. Although all the hostages were freed within weeks, these actions symbolized the resolve of the rebel groups and the difficulty of trusting them at the negotiating tables. With kidnappings of political leaders by both rebels and paramilitary groups on the rise, the FARC called off peace talks with the government in November until the government made better efforts to rein in the paramilitaries. Meanwhile, political assassinations were frequent, with many local and national politicians falling to assassins’ bullets in November and December, further disrupting efforts to return to the peace table.

Colombia: Internal Insurgencies, 1970s–2000s

In 2001, both the FARC and the ELN returned to peace negotiations, but by midyear the FARC seemed to have embraced a more aggressive posture toward the Colombian and U.S. governments. It renewed its kidnappings of high-profile government officials, including the wife of the attorney general and a United Nations official accused of aiding paramilitary groups. In August, Pastrana cut off talks with the ELN, and in September, FARC leader Carlos Arturo Marulanda ordered his subordinates to stay away from negotiations until government surveillance and infiltration of the demilitarized zone ceased. At the same time, the U.S. stance on events in Colombia became more severe. While the new U.S. administration of George W. Bush viewed the insurgency and the drug trafficking through the same lens. U.S. trade representative Robert Zoellick said that any differentiation between the FARC and drug dealers was a “false distinction.” Another official called the FARC the “most dangerous terrorist organization in the hemisphere.” The U.S. ambassador to Colombia insisted that the United States would go after both guerrilla and paramilitary leaders who participated in or profited from drug trafficking. In February 2002, FARC rebels hijacked a passenger airliner, freeing all hostages except for Senator Jorge Gechem Trubay. They also kidnapped presidential candidate Senator Ingrid Bentancourt, who had written critically of the FARC’s commitment to the peace process. In response, Pastrana launched a massive military incursion to reclaim the FARC safe haven. With peace talks all but abandoned, and Colombian and U.S. government anti-narcotic and anti-insurgency efforts increasing, violence continued. Nearly 400 Americans had been dispatched to Colombia to aid in counterinsurgency training by early 2003. In response, in February 2003, FARC rebels shot down a Cessna carrying three U.S. citizens and Colombian government officials surveying coca eradication efforts.

Uribe Administration Efforts In May 2003, Colombians voted for a more aggressive approach to fighting the rebels, electing Alvaro Uribe to the presidency, even though the FARC had warned voters not to vote for him. Uribe campaigned in opposition to Pastrana’s soft line of negotiation with the rebels and in favor of a more militant stance. In an attempt to impress their power and resilience

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upon the new president, the FARC, now numbering 18,000 members, quickly issued ultimatums to 16 mayors in the former demilitarized zone, calling for their immediate resignation. When the mayors did nothing, the FARC killed one, and the others promptly resigned. The FARC extended their efforts to completely destabilize local politics by demanding the resignations of 600 other mayors. For emphasis, they kidnapped the children of local politicians and assassinated their spouses. By mid-2003, 200 mayors had resigned, and 13 mayors and 70 town councilmen had been assassinated. Uribe increased “war taxes” and increased military spending, with the goal of doubling the size of the military. Just as he pledged to deal more harshly with rebels, so he also promised to deal aggressively with the paramilitary groups running rampant in Colombia. He entered negotiations with paramilitary groups almost immediately, with the goal of demobilizing these forces by 2005. Although negotiations were complicated, with questions of amnesty and ties with drug trafficking at the heart of the issue, by the end of 2003, several paramilitary groups had agreed to gradual demobilization, as long as the national army promised to provide protection for peasant villages that had previously been preyed on by the FARC and other rebel groups. Meanwhile, the FARC and the ELN agreed to join forces in June 2003. Kidnappings and homicides fell by 20 percent during the first years of Uribe’s term, and he launched “Plan Patriot,” a series of military offensives against the rebels that was aimed at capturing or killing rebel leaders. It began in Bogotá and moved outward toward the FARC strongholds throughout the country. In the summer of 2003, a top rebel leader, “Commandante Sonia,” was apprehended, along with her computers, which contained secret FARC information. In early 2004, Ricardo Palmera (also known as Simon Trinidad), among the top five most wanted FARC leaders, was arrested in Ecuador and extradited to Colombia. In June 2004, Uribe sent an army of 15,000 troops into southern Colombia to begin a campaign to reclaim lands that had been controlled by the FARC since the days of the demilitarized zone. By 2005, 1,000 government soldiers had been killed in Plan Patriot, and the FARC had launched offensives suggesting that it retained much of its capacity for creating terror and unrest. In February

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50 soldiers and a dozen civilians were killed by FARC bomb explosions. Although Uribe maintained that FARC forces had been reduced by onethird to 12,000, the new FARC offensives caused many to doubt that Plan Patriot was really working. In July, 300 FARC guerrillas killed 35 soldiers in Putumayo province in an ambush, and a peasant massacre killed 13 civilians on a coca plantation in August amid a feud between the FARC and a paramilitary group over the drug trade. Uribe also began to evoke criticism for his plan to disarm the paramilitaries—the plan’s generous amnesty provisions sparked protests, especially from international observers who claimed that the president was essentially forgiving the human rights abuses and terror of the paramilitaries in exchange for laying down their arms. Moreover, Colombians themselves, amid an upsurge in rebel violence and economic stagna-

tion, began to express their own discontent with the president. David MacMichael and John A. King Jr. See also: People’s Wars; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s.

Bibliography Bergquist, Charles, et al., eds. Violence in Colombia, 1990–2000. New York: SR Books, 2003. Dix, Robert. The Politics of Colombia. New York: Praeger, 1987. Dudley, Steven. Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. New York: Routledge, 2004. Giraldo, Javier. Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1996. Kline, Harvey. Colombia: Democracy under Assault. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Oquist, Paul. Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia. New York: Academic Press, 1980.

CUBA: Communist Revolution,1956–1959 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s Wars; Coups BAHAMAS

FLORIDA

Havana

CUBA Bay of Pigs ORIENTE Bayamo

CARIBBEAN SEA 0 0

50 50

100 Miles

100 Kilometers

SIERRA MAESTRA

Santiago Guantánamo de Cuba

Cuba was explored by Columbus in 1492 and became a Spanish colony in 1511. The local Indians, eliminated by disease, abuse, and war, were replaced by Spanish and African immigrants. The latter were involuntary arrivals, brought to Cuba to work the increasingly lucrative sugar plantations. Cuba, unlike the rest of Spanish America, remained loyal to Spain during much of the nineteenth century. By the 1860s, however, many locals, angry at what they felt was Spanish mismanagement, were agitating for independence. There was a revolt in mid-century (1868–1878) and another beginning in 1895. This last revolt was countered by harsh Spanish measures. Spain sent more than 200,000 troops to Cuba; its soldiers burned rebel farms and forced civilian sympathizers into concentration camps. Some Cubans appealed to the United States to stop the war, and, in 1898, America responded. Cuba had long attracted American attention. Before the American Civil War, some Southerners had advocated annexing the island and making it another slave state. After the war, talk of annexation continued, and ties between the United States and Cuba were strengthened by burgeoning trade. The United States bought Cuban sugar and sold it grain and manufactured goods. By 1893, Cuba was sending exports to the United States worth ten times more than the exports it was sending to Spain.

Beginning in 1897, the Cuban insurrection was covered closely in the sensational American newspapers, especially those in New York City. Many Americans were sympathetic to the hardships suffered by the Cuban rebels. American leaders, filled with the idea that it was the “manifest destiny” of the United States to expand throughout the region, were eager to acquire more territories. Spain’s possessions looked to be easy targets. Then on February 15, 1898, the USS Maine exploded and sank in the harbor of Havana, Cuba’s capital. Who or what caused the blast remains unclear, but the newspapers blamed it on Spain. The grim disaster, which resulted in the deaths of many U.S. sailors, aroused public opinion to a fever pitch against Spain and in favor of independence for Cuba under U.S. protection. The United States declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898, ten weeks after the blast. The resulting war was over quickly. Spain’s armies had been battle-bruised by the Cuban rebels, and its navy was no match for the newly built American fleet. Most fighting ended in August, and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, ending the war, in December 1898. The treaty gave Cuba its independence under the supervision of the United States and further granted Puerto Rico, as well as the Philippine Islands halfway around the world, to the United States. The Cubans, who had fought by themselves for three years to gain their independence, saw it snatched away by its much larger neighbor to the north. Cuba would soon gain independence in name, but for the next sixty years, it could take no significant action without U.S. approval.

Independent Cuba Some Cubans, particularly the wealthier classes who profited from the trade with the United States, were happy with Cuba’s new status. Others, especially those who had fought to free Cuba from Spain, saw the Americans not as rescuers but merely as new oppressors. The Americans were quite clear that Cubans were not ready for full independence. As the American

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KEY DATES 1933

Sergeant Fulgencio Batista takes power in the wake of a military coup.

1952

After leaving government in 1944, Batista seizes power in another military coup; Fidel Castro leads 160 followers in an attack on military barracks; Castro and most of the others are captured and sentenced to long prison terms.

1955

Batista grants amnesty to Castro and other political prisoners; Castro leaves the country for Mexico, where he joins with other revolutionaries, including Argentine Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

1956

Castro and Guevara lead a small invasion force that lands in Oriente Province; most are killed and captured; Castro, Guevara, and a few others escape to the Sierra Maestra mountains.

1956–1958

Thousands of Cubans, angry at the corruption and repression of the Batista government, join Castro’s rebel forces; on December 31 of the latter year, Batista and his followers flee the country.

1959

A Castro-led revolutionary government is established in Havana on January 2.

governor general put it, “These people cannot now, or I believe in the immediate future, be entrusted with their own government.” Despite U.S. attempts to keep Cubans friendly to the United States, already elections held in 1900 gave substantial majorities to Cubans who advocated complete independence. American leaders realized that they would be forced to give Cuba its freedom, but they were determined to keep a strong hand on the reins. In 1901, Congress passed the Platt Amendment, which gave the United States the right to supervise Cuba’s government and allowed it to intervene in the island’s internal affairs if the United States judged that political disorder was threatening Cuba’s stability. The United States also gained control over a naval base at Guantánamo Bay, which it occupies to this day. The Platt Amendment aroused widespread protests among Cubans. On May 20, 1902, the United States ended its occupation of Cuba and turned over power to a Cuban government headed by Tomas Estrada Palma. Soon the Americans were back, however. Acting under the Platt Amendment, the United States sent its army into Cuba four times: from 1906 to 1909, in

1912, in 1917, and from 1920 to 1923. The Americans were intervening to protect their growing economic interests in Cuba. Already by 1905, as much as half of the rural land in Cuba may have been owned by American individuals and corporations. American Sugar Company and United Fruit Company were two huge landholders. Foreign investors— mostly American, but also Spanish, British, and French—moved into the Cuban market and bought factories, mines, railways, and utility companies. Very little was left for the Cubans. The economy was dominated by Americans, other foreigners, and an elite of rich Cubans and Spaniards, whose interests were protected by the American army. With the help of American money and soldiers, a succession of corrupt Cuban governments ruled the country from 1902 to 1958. Elections were rigged to keep the ruling elites in power. Politicians used their monopoly of government offices to line their own pockets with bribes and kickbacks. To forestall criminal prosecution of corrupt politicians, the Cuban congress passed numerous amnesty bills, and presidents granted pardons to their friends and supporters.

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Revolutionar y Directions Resistance to the oligarchy of rich Cubans who ruled the country began with the American occupation, but after the 1920s it became widespread and vocal. Student groups (such as the Federation of University Students [FEU]) protested against corruption and American influence. Also by the 1920s, the Cuban labor movement was becoming larger, better organized, and more radical in its views. In 1925, a collection of Cuban anarcho-syndicalist trade unions formed the Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba (CNOC). The CNOC, which represented 200,000 workers, was dedicated to advancing workers’ interests and opposing foreign domination of Cuba’s economy. In August 1925, some of the intellectuals connected to the CNOC formed the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). At its founding, the PCC had only a few hundred members at most, but by 1930 it had a membership of thousands, with many more sympathizers and allies. The PCC was awarded provisional membership in the International Communist Party Confederation (Comintern) in 1927 and full membership in 1928. As the CNOC and PCC grew in power, they organized large and effective strikes in an attempt to gain social and political change. Meanwhile, Cuba’s president from 1924 to 1933, General Gerardo Machado, was working to establish a dictatorship along the path already traced by Benito Mussolini in Italy. He reacted to the union activity with great brutality: Secret police hunted dissidents, and political opponents were kidnapped, tortured, and killed. In 1933, fearing for Cuba’s stability (and America business interests), the United States orchestrated the overthrow of Machado. But the hand-picked replacement, Carlos Manuel de Céspides, was in turn overthrown by Fulgencio Batista, a sergeant in the army who promoted himself to colonel and led the soldiers against Céspides. Batista was supported in his coup by middle-class opposition to Machado, and at first his government included political leaders sympathetic to them. These idealists worked to eradicate corruption in the bureaucracy and instituted economic reforms designed to reduce the vast inequities of wealth in Cuba. The United States objected to these reformist tendencies, however, considering them too radical. Their concerns were soon expressed to Batista, and he responded by organizing a second coup to consolidate power, putting his own ally, Carlos Mendieta, into power. The reformers, Commu-

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nists, workers, and students had all hoped to create a new Cuba; instead, Cuba was being governed by yet another strongman.

Batista Batista had been born to a poor farming family and had joined the army as a means of climbing up from poverty. He was popular among his fellow soldiers, and so was able to lead the “sergeants revolt” that overthrew Céspides’s government. Batista dominated the Cuban political scene for the next twenty-five years. At first, he worked behind the scenes, using puppet presidents to exert control, but the real power was clearly with Batista and the military. His government was strong and effective, and although it was corrupt, the corruption did not get in the way of economic progress. Batista also introduced reforms designed to satisfy at least some of the workers’ and farmers’ complaints. Finally, he was able to get the Platt Amendment repealed in 1934, which greatly increased his popularity. Batista’s position was so unassailable that the leftist opposition became completely demoralized. The PCC renamed itself the Revolutionary Union Party (PUR) and, in this more moderate incarnation, cooperated with Batista. Batista took a leave from Cuban politics in 1944. In his absence, the country slowly fell apart, with corruption swamping all levels of the government bureaucracy. Batista returned in 1952, again overthrowing the government in a military coup, this time with American approval. In the intervening years Batista had changed for the worse. He was both lazier and more arbitrary in his actions. Unwilling to do the necessary politicking to maintain a base of support, he ruthlessly crushed all opposition. He also was more tolerant of corruption. In 1957, at least twenty members of his government had Swiss bank accounts with deposits over $1 million each. Much of the illicit profits flowing into these bank accounts came from Havana’s seamy nightlife. The city was filled with casinos and nightclubs, patronized by rich Cubans, American businessmen, and American gangsters. Havana was a pleasure retreat for the rich where anything could be bought. The city had 11,500 prostitutes, but it was also surrounded by ghettos and filled with hungry beggars. In support of this corrupt system, Batista received military aid from the United States, which viewed him as a bulwark of democratic values in the region.

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Growing Opposition Opposition to Batista came from a variety of directions; all classes of Cuban society contained people who did not like the depths to which their country was sinking. The students in the FEU organized protests that gradually escalated into violent confrontations. In 1955, some students formed the Directorio Revolucionario, a secret revolutionary group dedicated to expanding student resistance to include workers and other classes. In March 1957, the Directorio Revolucionario organized a frontal assault on Batista’s palace by eighty men armed with rifles and submachine guns. The attack was a bloody nearsuccess and resulted in another wave of arrests, torture, and executions. The pre-Batista political groupings, the Ortodoxos (the nickname of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano) and the Auténticos (Partido Revolucionario Cubano Auténtico), tried to form resistance organizations. However, they were handicapped by their previous history with the government and by their participation in the corruption during the late 1940s. The premier leader of these mainstream opposition groups was Carlos Prío Socarrás, the Auténticos’ leader whose presidency had been overthrown by Batista in 1952. Prío had a number of loosely organized followers in Cuba, and he had contacts with and provided funds to other anti-Batista groups, including the Directorio Revolucionario and Fidel Castro’s July 26 Movement. Some attempts against Batista were led by officers within his army. An April 1956 coup attempt by officers who were sympathetic to the Auténtico political faction (the officers were called Puros) was only foiled when one Puro betrayed the rest. Other officers, known as tanquistas, thought that Batista was too weak and wanted either to force him to use tougher measures or to oust him. These internal conspiracies made it difficult for Batista to deal with the threats coming from outside his government.

Castro Fidel Castro was born in eastern Cuba to a rich farming family who sent him to be educated at Havana University. There he became politically radicalized and joined in the violent conflicts that characterized university life in the late 1940s. Although he had Communist friends and connections, he joined the

Ortodoxo party in 1948. In 1950, he graduated and became a lawyer, but not a very dedicated one; he was far too involved in politics. With the Batista coup of 1952, Castro became a leader of a small group of like-minded students, workers, and farmers. He was frustrated by the inactivity of the Ortodoxo leadership and decided to form his own activist organization. On July 26, 1952, he and about 160 followers attacked the Moncada military barracks at Santiago de Cuba. The barracks housed more than 1,000 soldiers, and the attack was a disaster. Most of the attackers were captured over the next few days, and many of them were executed without trial. Castro was captured and sentenced to fifteen years in jail. Both the repression that followed Castro’s ill-conceived revolt and the trial of the surviving revolutionaries helped to give Castro and his movement widespread recognition and support. The Moncada attack had been a military failure but a political success. In May 1955, Batista, overconfident and secure in his power, declared an amnesty for political prisoners. Among those freed was Fidel Castro. Many others who were released gave up their radical activities, but Castro used his freedom to organize a new revolutionary party called the July 26 Movement (named for the date of the attack on the Moncada barracks). The movement was dedicated to overthrowing Batista and creating a more just society in Cuba. The July 26 Movement’s program included redistribution of land to the landless poor and nationalization of industries. Although Castro was familiar with Marxist ideology, he was not yet a Communist. In July 1955, he traveled to Mexico, where he could organize and train a new guerrilla army. His supporters in Cuba continued to build a secret organization there. In Mexico, Castro met Ernesto “Che” Guevara, an Argentinean revolutionary who joined Castro’s small army-in-training. Despite harassment from the Mexican police, Castro was able to acquire weapons and give his men some training in their use. On December 2, 1956, using a small yacht as transportation, Castro landed his army of eighty men on Cuba’s eastern tip, as he had often promised he would do. Castro’s “invasion” was a disaster. It had been planned to coincide with an uprising throughout the Oriente province, led by supporters who had remained in Cuba. Unfortunately, due to miscommunication, the planned uprising had begun three days earlier, on November 30, and the rebels had been

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dispersed by army reinforcements. Castro’s own small army was ambushed on December 5 and nearly destroyed. Only about a dozen men, including Castro and Che Guevara, managed to escape the trap and retreat into the hills of the Sierra Maestra. Once in the Sierra Maestra, the rebels began rebuilding their army. With the help of local bandits, they eluded (or defeated) government patrols while gaining peasant recruits. At the same time, members of the July 26 Movement carried out bombing attacks on random Cuban cities. Batista responded to these bombing attacks with massive repression. Batista’s police saw enemies everywhere, and each bombing led to more arrests and government-sponsored assassinations. As in the countryside, these brutal tactics were counterproductive; each Batista atrocity added to the ranks of those actively opposing his regime. In the Sierra Maestra region, the government forced peasants to move to detention camps. Those who stayed behind were considered enemies and were fired upon when discovered. These harsh tactics gained Castro many peasant recruits. That the Sierra Maestra was one of Cuba’s poorest regions did not hurt Castro’s cause; many peasants joined him in the hopes that Castro could help in their battle against rapacious landlords. During 1957 and 1958, goaded by Batista’s heavy-handed methods, Castro’s armies steadily increased in size. Batista’s attempts to corner and defeat Castro’s troops were unsuccessful, because his army of 40,000 was poorly trained and often lacked the motivation to search out the dangerous rebels.

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a pact dedicating itself to overthrowing Batista and replacing him with a government of “full constitutional and democratic procedures.” The United States had also cooled toward Batista. His brutal and incompetent methods outraged and disgusted all but his most loyal supporters. On March 13, shortly after the bishops’ proclamation, the United States stopped shipping weapons to the Cuban army. In May 1958, Batista mounted his only largescale operation targeting the guerrillas, sending 12,000 troops against Castro’s few hundreds. At first the offensive was a success, with government troops moving deep into the Sierra Maestra, but by July the attack had bogged down, defeated by exhaustion and the rough terrain as much as by Castro’s troops. Although outnumbered, Castro’s forces were better motivated and led than Batista’s troops. By July, Batista’s large, ill-prepared, and poorly led army was in full retreat, pursued by rebel columns. The rebels captured arms and ammunition and acquired recruits from the retreating government army. In August, Castro joined forces with the Communists—now renamed the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP)—for the first time. It was clear that Batista was doomed, and all parties wanted to be a part of the victorious coalition. By the end of December, Castro had 3,000 men under arms and was about to capture Santiago de Cuba; after Santiago de Cuba, the way would be clear to Havana. On December 31, Batista and his supporters left the country, taking with them large sums of money. Che Guevara and a small rebel army arrived to take control of Havana during the night of January 1, 1959.

The Revolution Communist Cuba By 1958, many Cubans wished to see Batista removed. Even the businessmen, Cuban and American, who had once supported him now were frustrated with his inability to stop the violence. Some of these men even began to supply Castro with funds. In March 1958, a council of Catholic bishops issued a call for both sides to stop fighting and for Batista to form a government of national unity. In July 1958, opposition groups gathered in Caracas, Venezuela, to form a rebel coalition. Castro was chosen as the leader of the coalition, which included representatives from the student groups (Directorio Revolucionario and FEU), trade unions, and political liberals (including Prío), but not the Communists. The coalition signed

The new revolutionary government that took charge on January 2, 1959, was a coalition of all the forces that had opposed Batista. At its head was an obscure jurist, President Manuel Urrutia, and the cabinet included men from mainstream, radical, and socialist parties. Castro, with only 3,000 men behind him, could not rule Cuba without these allies. Nevertheless, the real power remained with Castro and his July 26 Movement. They remained in command of the victorious rebel army, and the army controlled the country. They also had the adulation of most workers and farmers. Castro and his lieutenants had been the source of the romantic ideals of the

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revolutionaries, fighting for two years to bring about Batista’s downfall. With this support, and his army, it was easy for Castro to replace his allies gradually with committed followers. Between 1959 and 1963, Castro and his allies gained a complete monopoly of power. It was not clear at the beginning that Castro would take Cuba toward Communism. He had never called himself a Marxist even though two of his leading lieutenants, his brother Raúl Castro and his comrade Che Guevara, were more committed to Marxist ideas. Like Fidel, however, Raul and Che were revolutionaries before they were Marxists. On May 21, 1959, Castro said in a television interview that he planned to take a third route, choosing neither Communism nor capitalism. As Castro met increasing resistance to his radical reform policies, however, he turned to more radical allies, and when the United States became increasingly hostile, he looked to the Communist Soviet Union for needed

support. Many Cubans had long resented the power of U.S. money and military intervention, and they did not forget that the United States had supported Batista for most of his time in power. The break between Cuba and the United States may have been inevitable. As the revolution turned away from democracy and toward Communist dictatorship, the United States became seriously alarmed. On February 7, 1959, Castro’s cabinet issued a decree giving itself full powers to legislate; since Castro dominated the cabinet, this gave him the ability to rule by decree. On February 16, he was appointed prime minister of Cuba. From that position, he steadily maneuvered the government to the left, as well as increasing his own personal power. Castro’s early promises to restore democracy were forgotten. He and his supporters claimed that he was exercising “direct democracy,” which he said was a truer way of reflecting the will of the people than “false democracies, which use all

Cuba’s newly installed President Fidel Castro, with leaders of his 26th of July Revolutionary Movement, addresses a crowd in Camaguey on January 4, 1959, three days after dictator Fulgencio Batista fled the island. (Hulton Archive/ Getty Images)

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means of corruption and fraud to betray the will of the people.” By May 1960, the revolution had closed down the last major independent newspapers in Cuba. Laws were passed restricting capitalism in Cuba. The May 1959 Agrarian Reform law allowed plantation owners to own no more than 3,333 acres of land (about five square miles); the rest was nationalized. Incomes for the poor rose, while the rich businessmen and planters suffered. American businesses with heavy landholdings in Cuba lost their investments. At the same time, Castro and the July 26 Movement began to work more closely with the Communists of the PSP, the only party they felt they could trust in their confrontations with the United States. Liberals were forced out of government and replaced with Castro loyalists and Communists. Castro regularly appeared on Cuban television to denounce the threat of American imperialism. Trade with the Soviet Union increased, and formal diplomatic relations were established in May 1960. By 1961, the United States and Cuba were engaged in open economic war and a covert military conflict. In October 1960, Castro had nationalized most American property in Cuba, while the United States had imposed a trade embargo on Cuba. Opposition to Castro within Cuba grew. Hundreds of thousands left the country, including most-small business owners. Others took up arms to overthrow Castro’s revolution. In April 1961 a group of Cuban exiles, trained and armed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, landed on Cuban soil at the Bay of Pigs. They had expected the people to greet them with flowers and help overthrow the government. Instead, the exiles were shot at. Some were killed, and most were taken prisoner. This bald attack pushed Cuba even closer into the Soviet camp and the newly inaugurated U.S. administration of John F. Kennedy was embarrassed. Finally, in November 1961, Castro declared: “I am a Marxist-Leninist.” The Soviet Union moved troops and long-range missiles into Cuba. When the United States discovered the missiles (some of which had nuclear warheads) in 1962, President Kennedy delivered an ultimatum to the Soviet Union: remove the missiles or face reprisals. This Cuban missile crisis was perhaps the closest the two superpowers of the Cold War years ever came to nuclear war. Finally, in 1965, Castro unified all revolutionary parties in a newly reborn Cuban Communist Party.

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In many ways, the Cuban Revolution of 1959 resembled the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Castro, like Lenin, was not victorious because of his strength, he was victorious because of the government’s weakness. Years of corruption in the Cuban political system had led to general disgust with politics as usual. Batista’s government was only a more brutal copy of its predecessors, and even his own supporters were more interested in increasing their Swiss bank accounts than in fighting and dying for his government. It is only because of this internal weakness that Castro’s few hundred guerrillas could defeat Batista’s army of 40,000 after a few small-scale skirmishes. (Government losses from combat were probably not much more than 300 killed.) Once in power, Castro moved away from politics as usual and away from an American government that was perceived by many Cubans to have fostered the corruption within Cuba. With many of his coalition allies deserting him, and with the United States resisting his nationalization policies, it was natural for Castro to seek the help of the Communists in Cuba and in the Soviet Union. A different American policy toward Cuba might have prevented its entering the Communist camp, or perhaps a leader with a less autocratic personality than Castro might have taken a more democratic approach once Batista was defeated. But perhaps not. The Cuban Revolution did not begin in 1959; it was the product of more than sixty years of unequal American-Cuban relations. For Cuba, the revolution resulted in a complete transformation of economic and social life. The rich planters and businessmen went away, literacy rose, and health care improved. The casinos were eliminated, and prostitution disappeared. The price, however, was a Cuba lacking democracy and political freedom, one all too eager to imprison those who disagreed with Castro’s vision. Some of the Cuban prosperity was artificial: much of the bill for Cuba’s physical and economic improvement was paid by the Soviet Union, which was eager to support its most loyal ally in the Americas. When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Cubans suffered serious poverty and hardship. Although Castro was a dashing and appealing figure, he ultimately became a pawn in the Cold War conflict between the Soviets and the Americans. He became a point of pride for Soviet Communism and a thorn in the side of capitalist America, which has

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failed to unseat him for nearly fifty years. Cuba attempted with little success to export its revolution to other Latin American countries, including the Dominican Republic and Bolivia (where Che Guevara died in 1967). It also sent troops to Angola and Ethiopia in support of Communist movements in those countries. Although Castro’s Cuba had paid a heavy price, it had succeeded in providing a different model for small countries in the Western Hemisphere, reminding them that following the promptings of the United States was not the only possible path. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; People’s Wars; Cuba: Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961; Cuba: Missile Crisis, 1962.

Bibliography Bonachea, Ramón, and Marta San Martin. The Cuban Insurrection, 1952–1959. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1974. Morley, Morris. Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Perez, Louis A. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Ruiz, Ramon Eduardo. Cuba: The Making of a Revolution. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968. Suchlicki, Jaime. Cuba: From Columbus to Castro. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985. Szulc, Tad. Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: William Morrow, 1986. Thomas, Hugh. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Da Capo Press, 1998.

CUBA: Bay of Pigs Invasion,1961 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes; Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: United States BAHAMAS

FLORIDA

Jagüey Grande

CUBA Laguna del Tesoro CARIBBEAN SEA

Soplillar

Playa Larga

CIENAGA ORIENTAL DE ZAPATA

ZAPATA PENINSULA

Jocuma

Jiqui

Bay of Pigs

Cayo Ramona

San Biás

Helechal

Playa Girón

Airfield Battle site Troop movement

CARIBBEAN SEA

At the time of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Cuba had been a client of the United States for sixty years. American corporations and individuals invested their money in Cuba, giving them control over much of Cuba’s agricultural and industrial capacity, particularly in the sugar plantations and mills—sugar was Cuba’s main cash crop. These substantial economic interests had led the United States to interfere almost continuously in Cuba’s internal politics, even to the extent of sending troops as late as the 1920s to deal with civil unrest and threats to U.S. property. After the 1920s, America ceased to intervene directly, but still provided aid and support for leaders who were sympathetic to U.S. financial interests. Cuba also was a popular tourist destination for North Americans. Havana was filled with casinos and nightclubs, many of them owned by American gangsters and American corporations.

With Fidel Castro’s successful overthrow of the Batista dictatorship in 1959, this cozy relationship ended. Castro and his chief lieutenants, his brother Raúl and the Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara, believed that Cuban society needed to be altered and the disparities between rich and poor reduced. They passed a series of laws that raised taxes on the rich in order to provide social and educational programs for the poor. These laws disturbed the United States. American leaders were suspicious of Castro’s ties to communist and socialist parties in Cuba and feared that Castro would move Cuba closer to the Soviet Union. The Agrarian Reform law passed in May 1959 was a turning point in Cuban-American relations. The bill confiscated and nationalized all land that a farmer or corporation owned over 1,000 acres (or 3,333 acres for some types of land). This meant a great financial loss for American corporations. Some, such as United Fruit Company, had owned tens of thousands of acres of Cuban land. The Agrarian Reform law was followed by a closer alliance between Castro and the Cuban Communist Party, which was the only party other than Castro’s own July 26 Movement that supported his economic reforms. In late 1959, Cuba was increasing its economic ties with the Soviet Union, and in May 1960, diplomatic relations between the two countries were reestablished (they had been broken off by the Batista government). Trade between Cuba and the Soviet camp went from 2 percent of Cuba’s trade to 80 percent by the end of 1961.

American Reaction For many Cubans, the laws attacking the property of American corporations were merely the rightful assertion of Cuban national interest after decades of submitting to the economic demands of the United States. For the United States, however, it seemed a

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KEY DATES 1959

Leftist revolutionary Fidel Castro takes power in Havana on January 2; the Cuban government passes the Agrarian Reform Law confiscating and nationalizing large landholdings, including those owned by Americans.

1960 On March 17, President Dwight Eisenhower instructs the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to begin training and arming a Cuban exile army; in May, Cuba angers the U.S. government by establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 1961

American newspapers report on “secret” CIA-run Cuban exile military camps in Guatemala in January; that same month, John F. Kennedy is inaugurated as president and is told about plans for an exile invasion of Cuba; the attack against Cuba begins on April 15, as exile planes bomb Cuban airfields, causing very little damage; a 1,300-strong invasion force lands at Bay of Pigs on April 16 and is attacked by the Cuban air force the next day; with no U.S. air cover, survivors of the exile army are forced to surrender to Cuban military forces on April 19.

1962

Soviet Union is discovered placing nuclear missiles in Cuba; the Soviet Union agrees to remove missiles in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.

clear sign that Castro was turning Cuba into an outpost of Communism in the Western Hemisphere— particularly combined with his steady replacement of non-Communist officials in his government with Communists or Communist sympathizers. By March 1960, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower had authorized the U.S. government to begin secret operations intended to overthrow Castro’s regime. The United States already had experience in overthrowing unfriendly regimes. In 1953, the CIA had helped to overthrow Mohammed Mossadegh’s nationalist government in Iran, and in 1954, a CIA-backed movement had expelled Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán’s left-leaning government from Guatemala. There had also been covert attempts to destabilize Indonesia, Albania, and other countries viewed as hostile to U.S. interests. A 1956 statement by the National Security Council made clear America’s intent to use force if necessary to prevent Latin American countries from moving to the left: “If a Latin American State should establish with the Soviet Bloc close ties of such a nature as seriously to prejudice our vital interests . . . [the United States must] be prepared to diminish

Governmental economic and financial cooperation with that country and to take any other policy, economic or military actions deemed appropriate.” On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower ordered the CIA to begin secret training and arming of a Cuban exile army. Tens of thousands of Cuban exiles, mostly from the middle and upper classes, had fled Castro’s revolution. While most of them were simply seeking a safe haven from the revolutionary turmoil, some were already working to overthrow Castro. Operating from their refuge in Florida, these exiles tried to smuggle guns and agents into Cuba in an attempt to destabilize Castro’s regime. After Eisenhower’s March decision, these forays became better coordinated, better equipped, and largely directed by the CIA. There were also a number of Cuban resistance groups based in Cuba itself. The most important of these was the Movimiento de Rescate Revolucionario (MRR), which was backed by many former Castro supporters who did not like his alliance with the Communists. The MRR organized small guerrilla groups and published a secret newspaper within Cuba. After March 1960, the

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CIA began providing the MRR with funds and assistance. In Miami, the CIA managed to bring together the various anti-Castro exiles into a coalition called the Frente Revolucionario Democrático, which included pre-Castro politicians, Batista supporters, and the MRR. In Guatemala, with the approval of Guatemala’s pro-American president, the CIA set up a training camp for Cuban exiles, including Cuban officers who had served under Batista. This was the beginning of the army that would invade Cuba. At first, the plan was to support a guerrilla movement in Cuba. By November 1960, however, it became more and more difficult to support the few anti-Castro guerrillas remaining in Cuba. Consequently, the CIA had altered its plans and had begun to train the Cubans in conventional warfare techniques, planning for a full-scale invasion of Cuba.

Cuban Preparations How much Castro knew about these preparations and how much he inferred is unclear, but by May 1960, he was warning the Cuban people that the United States was planning an invasion of the country from bases in Guatemala. In July, after Cuba had expropriated the American oil refineries and the United States had stopped buying Cuban sugar, Castro announced that Cuba would arm a people’s militia to defend itself against any American invasion. The Cubans bought Belgian and Czech rifles to arm this militia, which numbered 150,000 by early 1961. As a backbone for this militia, Castro could rely on the regular Cuban army, which had been purged of its Batista officers. Although the army had only some 12,000 soldiers, it was better equipped than the militia, having both tanks and artillery. An article in a Guatemalan newspaper published in October 1960 confirmed that an invasion was being prepared in Guatemala. By January 1961, even American newspapers were reporting on the “secret” CIA bases in Guatemala.

Kennedy’s Decision Meanwhile, John F. Kennedy had won election as president in November 1960 and took office in January 1961. He inherited Eisenhower’s CIA plans to invade Cuba. Kennedy’s policies were also affected by his campaign promise to “not be content until

Cuban exiles trained and financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the regime of Cuba’s President Fidel Castro are lined up by Castro’s soldiers after being captured in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. (Three Lions/Getty Images)

democracy is restored to Cuba.” This seemed to commit Kennedy to overthrowing Castro’s regime. Kennedy received conflicting recommendations from his advisers about the invasion plans, but in the end he approved continuing preparations. The invasion force was deeply divided by political rivalries and conflicts. Anti-Castro leftists found it difficult to work beside ex-Batista officers, and even leaders with similar political views engaged in competition for power and influence. Despite these difficulties, the CIA managed to recruit about 1,300 men for their invasion brigade. The brigade’s morale was generally high, partly because the exiles believed that the upcoming invasion would have the full support of the United States. This belief, perhaps fostered by their CIA trainers, turned out to be mistaken. The final decision to invade was made in the midst of much confusion and miscommunication. Kennedy and his advisers assumed that the CIA was planning for a general Cuban uprising, while the CIA invasion organizers thought that the invasion would receive substantial American support once ashore. Moreover, the CIA agents planning the invasion had not coordinated their actions with the agents responsible for supporting the guerrilla movements inside

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Cuba. Miscommunication between Kennedy and the CIA was probably increased by Kennedy’s ambivalence concerning the invasion. He seemed reluctant to inquire too closely into what his security service was planning. When he expressed doubts, CIA Chief Allen Dulles assured him that the invasion would appear to be a purely Cuban affair and that the United States would be able to deny all responsibility. At an April 4, 1961, meeting, Kennedy accepted the advice of Dulles and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and gave the Cuban brigade its final permission to invade.

Bay of Pigs The invasion force, named Brigade 2506 after the serial number of an exile who had died during training, was moved to Nicaragua, where, on April 14, it set sail for Cuba. Its target was to be Cochinos Bay (the Bay of Pigs). On April 15, eight American B-26 bombers flown by Cuban pilots from a Nicaraguan base began bombing Cuban airfields and military headquarters. The attack did little to harm the Cuban air force— which Castro had dispersed—but it did alert the Cubans that something was happening. Castro responded by rounding up all persons suspected of harboring antirevolutionary sentiments. This preemptive action effectively eliminated any remote possibility that the invasion would inspire a Cuban uprising. Throughout the invasion, the CIA and the leaders of the Cuban exile coalition—renamed the Cuban Revolutionary Council—attempted to maintain the deception that the invasion was an entirely Cuban affair. It was claimed, for example, that the B-26s doing the bombing were defectors from the Cuban air force. These claims, contradicted by the evidence (Cuban and American B-26s looked somewhat different), did not convince Cuba, the United Nations, or the American public. The Cuban brigade, some 1,300 strong, began landing during the night of April 16. In the morning of April 17, Cuban air force planes began attacking the small invasion fleet, demoralizing the Cuban exiles who had been assured by the CIA that the regular Cuban air force had been destroyed. Particularly damaging were the attacks of two T-33 trainer jets, which could outperform the Cuban exiles’ B-26s. Two of the ships, the Houston and the Rio Escondido, were hit and sunk, killing a number of their passen-

gers and disrupting the landing. The rest of the fleet, carrying most of the invaders’ supplies and ammunition, fled from the Bay of Pigs. On April 18, Brigade 2506 came under attack by about 2,000 Castro troops, mostly militia, but with some regular and police units supporting. The exiles’ attack was completely halted. They had only managed to seize two villages before being stopped by increasing resistance. Their only hope was direct American support, and this President Kennedy was unwilling to offer. By April 19, Castro’s forces were further reinforced, and the Brigade 2506 was being attacked by 20,000 militia and regulars. In the afternoon, the exiles, their invasion completely defeated, split into small groups and attempted to escape into the countryside. Of the 1,300 invaders, 1,180 were captured, 110 killed, while only a dozen or so escaped. Nine of their B-26s had been shot down (taking with them four American volunteers). The prisoners were eventually exchanged (after being shown to the world on Cuban television) for medical supplies or monetary ransoms, paid by the United States government.

Evaluation and Consequences The United States embarked on the Bay of Pigs in a cloud of indecision and confusion. The Cuban exiles had been assured by their CIA handlers that America would provide support, but President Kennedy had been assured by his advisers that the United States could disavow all connection to the invasion if it failed. Both the exiles and Kennedy had hoped for a general uprising of Cubans, but the CIA had done almost nothing to prepare such an uprising—the early air strikes by the B-26s had warned Castro of the impending invasion and allowed him time to arrest those Cubans whom he felt were unreliable. The Americans (and Cubans) who had assumed that the invasion would spark a massive anti-Castro uprising had not understood how popular Castro’s revolution was among Cubans. Hundreds of thousands of middle-class Cubans did want to get rid of Castro, but most of them had already left Cuba; those who remained behind were too isolated and disorganized to mount an effective resistance campaign. Without a popular uprising to support it, the Bay of Pigs was merely a conventional invasion pitting 1,300 soldiers against a militia and army of 250,000. It was doomed to failure from the beginning.

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In the court of international opinion, the Bay of Pigs invasion badly damaged the reputation of the United States. It made the country appear to be both a bully and a weakling at the same time. In Cuba, the failed invasion increased Castro’s popularity—he was seen as the hero who had held off the northern giant—and pushed him closer to the Soviet Union. Perhaps most important, the invasion led the Soviets to increase their commitment to Cuba. Only eighteen months later, the United States and the Soviet Union would face each other directly over the issue of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban soil. Carl Skutsch

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See also: Cold War Confrontations; Cuba: Communist Revolution, 1956–1959; Cuba: Missile Crisis, 1962.

Bibliography Beschloss, Michael. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963. New York: Burlingame, 1991. Higgins, Trumbull. The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs. New York: W.W. Norton, 1987. Morley, Morris. Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Thomas, Hugh. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Da Capo Press, 1998. Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.

CUBA: Missile Crisis,1962 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Union; United States

FLORIDA Sagua la Grande Guanajay San Cristóbal MRBM site IRBM site MRBM site

phisticated weapons, and technical assistance. They also began to build a base in Cuba that would be capable of launching nuclear missiles at the United States.

nge ate ra ed i

rm New York nte BAHAMAS Salt Lake I Chicago City Denver Washington, D.C. ge Dallas ran New Orleans Miami Havana Mexico City Med ium

MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

Soviet Goals

Havana

C U BA

Bay of Pigs

CARIBBEAN SEA 0 0

50 50

100 Miles

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Guantánamo

When Fidel Castro succeeded in overthrowing Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorship in Cuba in January 1959, Cuba and the United States were set on a collision course leading to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Until Castro’s revolution, Cuba had been a long-time dependency of the United States. American companies and individuals had invested millions of dollars in the country and dominated its economy. Castro, like many Cubans, resented this dominance and embarked on a policy of breaking away from the U.S. influence. Castro nationalized American companies and redistributed land owned by wealthy Cubans and Americans. As the United States responded with economic sanctions, Castro moved Cuba closer to the Soviet Union, establishing close economic ties with the Communist superpower in early 1960. Fearing that Cuba was turning into a Communist outpost in the Caribbean, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the authorization of President John F. Kennedy, organized the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles in an attempt to overthrow Castro’s government. The invasion was a dismal failure and pushed Cuba to establish even stronger ties to the Soviet Union. The Soviets supplied Cuba with economic aid, so-

The reasons for Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to build a missile base in Cuba probably arose from his desire to bolster and defend Castro’s Cuba from any future Bay of Pigs–style invasions and his eagerness to balance the advantage the United States had in positioning nuclear weapons elsewhere in the world, especially in Central Europe and Turkey. The second reason was probably the most important to Khrushchev. In 1957, the Soviets had been the first superpower to develop a ballistic missile delivery system for nuclear warheads, the SS-6, which had a range of 3,500 miles. However, to reach the United States, the SS-6 had to be deployed in the northernmost areas of the Soviet Union where severe weather conditions made the SS-6 almost completely ineffective. The United States, on the other hand, had reacted by accelerating the deployment of its Thor and Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) to England, Italy, and Turkey. By 1961, therefore, the Soviets had the ability to target the United States with only a few missiles at most, while the United States could strike the entire Soviet Union with missiles or bombers. America’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program was also far ahead of the Soviet Union’s; in 1962 the United States had approximately 200 ICBMs, compared to a Soviet total of about 50—and many of the Soviet missiles may have been compromised by mechanical problems. By building a missile base in Cuba, Khrushchev could provide a balance to the threatening American bases in Europe. In 1961, Khrushchev, with Castro’s agreement, ordered a missile base to be built in Cuba. He planned

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395

KEY DATES 1959

Leftist revolutionary Fidel Castro takes power in Havana on January 2; the Cuban government passes the Agrarian Reform Law confiscating and nationalizing large landholdings, including those owned by Americans.

1961

President Dwight Eisenhower breaks diplomatic ties with the Cuban government in January, days before John F. Kennedy is inaugurated as president; Kennedy orders a CIA-backed Cuban exile army to invade the island in April; the exile army is quickly defeated and captured by the Cuban military; Castro agrees to allow the Soviet Union to build an intermediate-range nuclear missile base in Cuba.

1962

U.S. spy planes reveal ballistic missile base construction in Cuba on October 14; on October 18, Kennedy orders the Defense Department to prepare for a possible attack on Cuba; Kennedy announces to Soviets and the American people that the U.S. government has discovered Soviet missile bases in Cuba and is placing a naval embargo on the island; on October 28, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agrees to remove the missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba; Kennedy also pledges in a secret agreement with Khrushchev to remove U.S. nuclear missiles from Turkey; by November 20, the last of the Soviet nuclear missiles have been removed from Cuba.

1963

To prevent a future miscommunication between the superpowers that might lead to a nuclear exchange, the United States and the Soviet Union set up a direct phone line between the Kremlin and the White House; the press dubs it the “hotline.”

to station forty-two SS-4 IRBMs and an unknown number of longer-range missiles in Cuba. Each SS-4 could deliver a one-megaton warhead up to 1,000 miles from its base, allowing the Soviets to strike the entire east coast of the United States—including Washington, D.C. It was a cheap way for the Soviets to achieve nuclear parity.

Cuban Goals Castro’s main reason for allowing the Soviet missile base to be built on Cuban soil was his fear of American power. The United States had attempted one proxy invasion of Cuba in 1961, and Castro suspected it might be planning other attacks. These suspicions were not simply based upon traditional Cuban suspicions. President Kennedy continued to express his support for the Cuban exile community, suggesting

that he might be willing to support a second, larger invasion of Cuba. Kennedy’s motivation was purely political—if he seemed soft on Communism, he might hurt the Democratic Party’s chances in the 1962 congressional elections. It was later revealed that the CIA had been working on a number of plans to assassinate Castro. Castro also had increasing problems at home. The economic embargo maintained by the United States since 1960 had resulted in public protests in Cuba as its economy struggled. Clashes between protesters and government troops made Castro question whether he could rely on his militia in case of a second invasion. To calm these fears, Fidel Castro sent his brother Raúl to Moscow in July 1961 to request Soviet military support. Khrushchev, for his own reasons, agreed to provide military equipment,

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including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and to build a nuclear missile base in Cuba. Whether Castro actually wanted these missiles was unclear. He has told different stories, sometimes suggesting that the missiles came at Cuban request, at other times saying that it was the Soviets who first proposed the idea. It is clear, however, that he agreed to their placement.

America Discovers Missiles The United States was carrying out an aerial surveillance of Cuba using the U-2 spy plane, which flew at altitudes up to 70,000 feet. In July 1962, the U-2’s cameras recorded an increase in Soviet sea-borne traffic to Cuba, and in August they spotted surface-toair missile sites. These findings persuaded President Kennedy to authorize an increased schedule of spy flights over Cuba. On September 4, Kennedy announced that the United States had seen the SAM sites and the United States would act if any “offensive ground-to-ground missiles” were placed in Cuba. On September 7, Congress authorized mobilization of 150,000 military reservists as a show of American force. As tensions rose during September, Khrushchev passed word to Kennedy that the Soviets would not send surface-to-surface missiles to Cuba. At the same time, however, U.S. agencies began to receive reports that offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba. On October 14, a U-2 flight revealed an SS-4 missile site under construction at San Cristóbal, Cuba. Further U-2 flights revealed other missile bases housing a total of at least thirty nuclear-capable missiles (the actual total was more than forty-two). The discovery came as a surprise. Despite Kennedy’s public warning, most of Kennedy’s advisers did not believe the Soviets would try anything as risky as placing offensive missiles in Cuba. The realization they had been wrong shook Kennedy and his advisers. Not only would the SS-4s increase the Soviet Union’s ability to strike directly at the United States, but their proximity to the United States meant that Washington would have only a few minutes to react to any nuclear threat. Complicating the U.S. position was the Americans’ lack of information on Soviet intentions. On October 16, Kennedy created an emergency executive committee—EXCOM—to plan the Amer-

ican response to the missiles. The Kennedy administration was under heavy pressure to decide quickly on its reaction. The longer it waited, the nearer the missile bases would be to completion. EXCOM was divided in its opinions. The “fast track” group, including the military chiefs of staff, favored immediate air strikes against the bases, possibly to be followed by a ground invasion. The “slow track” recommended a naval blockade to stop any further shipment of missiles to Cuba, arguing that an air attack could not guarantee that all the missiles would be destroyed, and that a ground attack would be costly and cause worldwide political repercussions. Kennedy decided to follow the advice of the slowtrack group: an immediate attack might lead to a world war, while a limited response allowed for a more nuanced approach and left open the possibility of an attack later.

The Crisis On October 18, 1962, Kennedy ordered the Defense Department to prepare for a possible attack on Cuba. Rumors of troop movements began to reach the American press. On October 22 Kennedy announced to the Soviet and the American people that U-2 planes had discovered missile bases on Cuban soil. Kennedy denounced “this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace” and explained that he had placed Cuba under a quarantine to prevent more military equipment from being brought into Cuba. He added that the United States would “regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union.” This announcement seemed to bring the world to the brink of nuclear war. Immediately after Kennedy’s announcement, both superpowers went on full alert. American naval vessels were given orders to inspect all ships heading for Cuba, and nuclear arsenals were readied by both sides. The United States made preparations for air strikes against the missile sites before they could be equipped with nuclear warheads; the air strikes were scheduled to begin on October 30. American newspapers published lists of “approved fall-out shelters” in case U.S. cities were attacked.

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397

A political cartoon in October 1962 dramatizes the global threat posed by the nuclear showdown of the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Library of Congress, CD 1–Crockett, no. 274)

International opinion was nervously supportive of Kennedy’s actions. The Organization of American States (OAS) voted on October 23 to support the U.S. quarantine, and the U.S. European allies also offered their support. Privately, European allies resented not being consulted by the president, and they expressed some doubt about the severity of the crisis; after all, they had been targets of Soviet missiles for many years.

Castro responded with a mobilization of Cuba’s militia, and a speech condemning Kennedy’s “piracy,” calling on all Cubans to prepare to fight another invasion. The Soviets responded at first with belligerence, denying that there were any offensive missiles in Cuba and demanding that the United States retract its proposed quarantine. Behind closed doors, however, the

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Soviets seemed as unsure of American intentions as the Americans had been of theirs. They felt that the American reaction was excessive—were not American missiles stationed on the Soviet Union’s borders?— and wondered whether the crisis and the quarantine were simply an excuse for an invasion that would overthrow Castro’s regime. The Soviet actions were confused and contradictory, probably reflecting uncertainty and conflicting views among top leaders. On October 24, two days after Kennedy’s announcement, the Soviets turned around the ships that had been heading toward Cuba before they encountered U.S. ships enforcing the embargo. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a message offering to remove the missiles if Kennedy would promise not to invade Cuba. This seemed to offer a solution to the crisis. The next day, however, Khrushchev increased his demands, insisting that the United States withdraw American Jupiter missiles from Turkey to balance the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. That same day an American U-2 was shot down and its pilot killed by a surface-to-air missile battery in Cuba. On that day, October 27, Kennedy responded in a public note to Khrushchev, promising that the United States would never invade Cuba in return for the Soviet Union’s withdrawing its missiles. Privately, he also let the Soviets know that the Jupiter missiles were already scheduled to be withdrawn from Turkey. (Submarine-launched Polaris missiles had, in fact, made the Jupiters obsolete.) Kennedy’s public note also warned, however, that the Soviets must respond within twenty-four hours or the United States would use military force on October 30. On October 28, Khrushchev, who seemed to be truly shocked at how close the two powers had come to open war, accepted Kennedy’s offer. The world breathed a sigh of relief. The Missile Crisis did not end immediately, but its tensest moments were over. Khrushchev ordered the dismantling and withdrawal of the IRBMs, and agreed to allow UN inspectors to check to make sure that the missiles had truly been removed. Castro, thinking himself abandoned by the Soviet withdrawal (when he first heard of the October 28 agreement, he cursed and kicked a wall), refused to allow these inspections, but the Soviet Union was able to reassure the United States, with the help of more U-2 flights, that all missiles had been removed by November 20.

Impact and Analysis The United States’s victory in the Cuban Missile Crisis led to an increase in the pace of the nuclear arms race. Khrushchev’s strategy of countering American nuclear superiority with a missile force in Cuba had been proved bankrupt. Instead, the Soviets began building a large fleet of ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States. The United States responded in kind. By the 1980s each side had more than 30,000 nuclear warheads in its stockpiles. The Cuban Missile Crisis was also probably one of the factors that led to Khrushchev’s eventual ouster from the Politburo of the Soviet Union in October 1964. Khrushchev had appeared both foolish and weak—foolish for having put missiles into Cuba, weak for having allowed Kennedy to face him down in their game of nuclear chicken. Khrushchev’s ouster may have helped to prolong the Cold War; his successors lacked his brashness, but also his willingness to be flexible. The Missile Crisis had little effect on the overall balance of power in the Cold War. While it prevented the Soviets from having land-based missiles stationed near the United States, the Soviets soon had submarines equipped with nuclear missiles that could approach the U.S. coastline, achieving the same “quick strike” capability. The closeness to which the world had come to the nuclear brink, partly through miscommunication and misunderstandings, led the United States and the Soviet Union to set up a special dedicated phone line—the so-called hot line—which, it was hoped, would help to defuse future crises. As a first step in limiting nuclear proliferation, the United States and the Soviet Union also agreed to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963. The treaty prohibited above-ground nuclear tests and was the beginning of a long series of attempts to limit nuclear weaponry. The Cuban Missile Crisis may have brought the world as close as it had ever been to a nuclear war. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War had ended, it was revealed that, contrary to U. S. belief, the Soviets actually had missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Cuba during the crisis. They also had tactical nuclear weapons to use against any invasion of Cuba. When Kennedy’s secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, heard this new information in 1992, he was horrified. He said, “Had a U.S. invasion

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been carried out . . . there was a 99 percent probability that a nuclear war would have been initiated.” Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Cuba: Communist Revolution, 1956–1959; Cuba: Bay of Pigs Invasion, 1961.

Bibliography Beschloss, Michael. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963. New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991.

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Dinerstein, Herbert. The Making of a Missile Crisis: October, 1962. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988. Garthoff, Raymond L. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989. May, Ernest R., and Philip D. Zelikow, eds. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Thomas, Hugh. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Da Capo Press, 1998.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Coup and U.S. Invasion,1965 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups; Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: United States CUBA

AT L A N T I C O C E A N

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CARIBBEAN SEA

The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern twothirds of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which it shares with Haiti. Its area is 18,815 square miles, and its population is approximately 9 million people, of whom nearly 2 million live in or near the capital city of Santo Domingo. The economy is based traditionally on sugar and tobacco. However, in recent years light manufacturing has become more important, principally in the free trade zone of La Romana, near the capital. Tourism is important to the economy. Because economic growth has not kept up with population increases, Dominican migration to the United States in recent years has been very large. The national language is Spanish, and the population is almost all black or of mixed African and Spanish ancestry. However, Dominicans consider themselves distinct from the French-speaking Haitians with whom they share the island. Haitian-Dominican rivalry led to periods of open warfare and an era of Haitian occupation during the nineteenth century.

Historical Background The Dominican Republic first became independent in 1844 after centuries as a colony of Spain and twenty-three years of occupation by neighboring

Haiti. In a strange turn, Dominicans agreed to Spanish rule again in 1861, but four years later regained independence. During the administration of U.S. president Ulysses S. Grant (1869–1877), the United States negotiated a treaty with the restored Dominican Republic, calling for its annexation to the United States. The treaty lapsed, however, when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it. In following years, the U.S. government showed little interest in Santo Domingo, as it was called. But American businessmen, principally sugar planters and steamship owners, came to dominate the country’s economy and trade. Under longtime dictator Ulises Heureaux there was relative peace, but foreign indebtedness, mostly to European bondholders, produced a series of crises that threatened foreign intervention to ensure payment. The threats seemed serious enough in the early 1890s for the United States to arrange to have Dominican government finances controlled by an American bank. The situation worsened after Heureaux’s overthrow in 1899. Succeeding governments rose and fell with bewildering rapidity, and European warships appeared to back up demands for payment. The result in 1904 was proclamation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This said basically that if the United States were to prohibit foreign powers from intervening in the hemisphere to protect the rights of their nationals, then the United States had the duty and right to intervene on behalf of these nationals. As applied to the Dominican Republic, this resulted in the treaty of 1907, in which a U.S.-run customs receivership collected the country’s taxes, paid its creditors, and doled out money to the Dominican government to cover national expenses. Theodore Roosevelt boasted that the arrangement would end the cycle of revolutions, since there would

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401

KEY DATES 1924

The United States ends its eight-year occupation of the Dominican Republic, leaving the Dominican National Guard in control.

1930

National Guard head Rafael Trujillo refuses to put down protests against President Horacio Vásquez; Trujillo is elected president.

1958

Fearing a possible left-wing revolt against the increasingly autocratic Trujillo, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) begins to cultivate rivals to Trujillo within the military.

1961

Disgruntled military officers assassinate Trujillo.

1962

Despite U.S. efforts to tip the elections to conservative candidate Joaquín Balaguer for president, left-of-center candidate Juan Bosch wins.

1963

Military leaders led by Colonel Elían Wessin y Wessin overthrow the Bosch government in a coup.

1965

A pro-Bosch uprising leads to fighting in the capital in April and prompts U.S. president Lyndon Johnson, fearing a Communist takeover of the country, to send in thousands of troops.

1966 Balaguer defeats Bosch in national elections.

be no spoils for the victors. He was wrong. Political turmoil continued. President Woodrow Wilson, although he was the apostle of democracy and a backer of the PanAmerican Union, firmly believed Negroes were incapable of self-government. In 1915 he sent marines to occupy Haiti, and the following year he sent more Marines to establish a military government in the Dominican Republic. Since the United States was soon to enter the World War, a convenient rationale for the takeover was that it was necessary to forestall a German attack. The war ended in 1918, but the Marines remained in Santo Domingo until 1924. Even after the Marines withdrew, the United States continued to supervise Dominican financial affairs. The most significant legacy of the military occupation turned out to be the National Guard, which the Marines established to keep internal peace. After 1924, its Dominican commander was Rafael Trujillo. He continued to keep the peace under President Horacio Vásquez, but in 1930, Trujillo himself backed a revolt and refused to let the Guard protect the

government. Trujillo arranged to gain election as president at age thirty-seven. Trujillo was capable, efficient, and outspokenly pro-American. He had the backing of the National Guard, now converted into the national army, and strong support among the U.S. Marine officers who had organized it and selected him as its commander. At the same time, however, Trujillo’s brutality, ruthlessness, and greed were well known. In 1936, he ordered the massacre of thousands of Haitian squatters along the Dominican border, causing an international outcry. Yet he continued to receive support at home, where he designated himself “benefactor of the fatherland” who renamed the capital city Trujillo. He also cultivated continued support in the United States. During the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, Trujillo negotiated an end to the old U.S. financial receivership. As World War II approached, he was outspokenly anti-Nazi and, almost alone among the countries of the hemisphere, welcomed Jewish refugees from the Nazi regime in significant numbers. Roosevelt is said to have commented about

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him that while he was a son of a bitch, he was “our son of a bitch.”

Cold War Complications As the Cold War began, Trujillo continued as a staunch U.S. ally, fully supportive of Washington’s policies in the Western Hemisphere. However, as civil governments began to replace dictatorships in the region, Trujillo became an embarrassment to an Eisenhower administration under attack in Latin America for its apparent favoritism toward military rulers. When Dwight Eisenhower approved the plan to overthrow Fidel Castro, later to become known as the Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington knew that in order to get support among such democracies as Costa Rica and Venezuela, both of which were bitter enemies of Trujillo, it would have to take an anti-dictatorship stance. In considering how to remove him from power after thirty years, U.S. representatives developed closer relations with Trujillo’s enemies, hoping to select one as an appropriate successor. The problem was to avoid any candidate who might be another Fidel Castro. Indeed, shortly after Castro overthrew dictator Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, a group of Dominican exiles operating from Puerto Rico with apparent support from Castro mounted an unsuccessful invasion on the Dominican Republic’s north coast. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to cultivate military rivals to Trujillo. It began to broadcast anti-Trujillo propaganda from a clandestine radio station that had been established as part of a project to overthrow Castro. In April 1960, President Eisenhower approved a National Security Council (NSC) contingency plan for aid to anti-Trujillo Dominicans. If they could not remove the dictator themselves, the plan stated, the United States should identify a “suitable” successor regime, take steps to remove Trujillo “politically,” and then give economic, political, and military support to the new government. On May 30, 1961, a few disgruntled army officers assassinated the dictator.

After Trujillo Despite plans for a suitable successor regime, the United States had no candidates, and the assassins had acted out of personal revenge with no intention of setting up any government, let alone a revolution-

ary regime. The military wanted trujillismo without Trujillo. Trujillo’s playboy son, Rafael Junior, known as Ramfis, flew back from Paris immediately and seized control. Bloody vengeance was wreaked on the assassins and any of their supporters he could capture. The new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, felt disinclined to take any action, pointing out that the figurehead president, Joaquín Balaguer, was still in office, making it possible to claim that the Dominican government remained in control. Kennedy’s hand was forced in October 1961 when popular demand for elections and reforms turned into rioting in the streets of the capital. Ramfis returned to Europe, leaving his father’s brothers—“the two wicked uncles”—to run things behind the front of President Balaguer. As Kennedy saw it, there were three possibilities: a democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo system, and a Castro. The United States should aim at the first, but could not renounce the second until it was sure it could avoid the third. It was decided to back Balaguer until elections scheduled for December 1962. The uncles were induced to go to Miami, and the capital, Ciudad Trujillo, took back its old name, Santo Domingo. Attorney General Robert Kennedy (the president’s brother) was directing the continuing U.S. operations against Castro and was determined no Castro should emerge in the Dominican Republic. He arranged for the U.S. Justice Department to provide the Dominican government with riot-control equipment and the services of two Spanish-speaking Los Angeles police detectives trained in controlling protests in the barrios of East Los Angeles. To make sure potential Castroites understood the situation, Ambassador John Bartlow Martin pressed Balaguer to establish strict controls on their activities. This included use of what he called “Chicago police methods”—harassment of suspected leftists by arbitrary arrests, midnight raids on their homes, and beatings. The U.S. military assistance advisory group (MAAG) was reestablished and began to retrain the Dominican army as a counterinsurgency- and subversion-suppression force. Likewise, the United States closely monitored the electoral process. Two major political parties were formed, the rightist Union Civica Nacional (UCN), with Balaguer as its candidate, and the left-of-center Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), backing the anti-Trujillo writer Juan Bosch, who was returning from long exile in Puerto Rico to run for president.

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Balaguer was the U.S. choice, and to make sure things went well for him, Martin persuaded the authorities to use an “emergency law” to deport some 125 suspected trujillistas and Castro sympathizers for the electoral period. The elaborate tactics backfired. Bosch and the PRD won by a 2 to 1 margin. On the surface, Washington welcomed the result. Bosch got a White House reception and public best wishes. The welcome did not last, however. Economic assistance was limited, but the MAAG staff was increased from five to forty-five military personnel. Senior White House security adviser George Ball declared Bosch to be arrogant and unimpressive, without the ability “to run a small social club, let alone a nation in turmoil.” Bosch set about his liberal program. His proposals included land reform, chiefly distribution of the vast Trujillo holdings; nationalization of many of the former dictator’s business enterprises; a public works program to deal with the massive unemployment; and a reduction in the importation of luxury goods in order to reduce the balance-of-payments problem. He was also serious about civil liberties. Among other actions, he endorsed a constitutional amendment prohibiting the deportation of Dominican citizens. His proposed constitution also did not grant special status to the Roman Catholic Church, a fact that turned the Church hierarchy against him and started rumors of atheistic Communism. He also ended the “Chicagostyle” police tactics favored by Ambassador Martin. Even though Martin acknowledged that there were far fewer Communists in the Dominican Republic than the CIA station claimed, he was still disturbed that Bosch refused to crack down on them. Likewise, the MAAG and its clients were unhappy with Bosch’s attempts to reduce the political power of the military. In Cuba, Fidel Castro publicly declared Bosch to be “a Yankee puppet,” but it was soon clear that, if so, Bosch was not a good enough puppet. In Washington, land reform and nationalization clearly were seen as creeping socialism; refusal to crack down on suspected communists and Castroites was even worse. Even though no one could name a single Communist in the Bosch government, Newsweek reported in October 1963 that “Communist penetration of the Dominican Republic is progressing with incredible speed and efficiency.” The Dominican military assessed the situation correctly and understood that the United States would not seriously object to the overthrow of the Bosch government.

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In July 1963 senior officers met with Bosch and told him their support was contingent on his adopting a more rigorous anticommunist program. Bosch responded in an August television address, lecturing the military on staying out of politics in a democratic state. The response to this was a public demand from CIA-created labor unions for the army to save the nation from Communism. One week later, in September, Colonel Elías Wessin y Wessin led a coup that overthrew Bosch and sent him back to Puerto Rico. A so-called triumvirate headed by businessman Donald Reid Cabral formed a provisional government. After a decent interval of two months, the United States recognized the new government

Revolt and Intervention, 19 65 While the Dominican Republic appeared to acquiesce in the results of the coup, the surface calm was deceptive. The economy worsened, and Reid, who had no personal political following, grew more and more unpopular as a result. Importantly, the hopes for genuine political freedom that had been kindled by Bosch had not been extinguished, and popular resentment against Reid smoldered. Resumption of “Chicago-style” police methods increased popular anger. A very important factor was a deep-rooted anti-American sentiment in the Dominican population, a leftover from the 1916–1924 occupation. Reid came to be known scornfully as el Americano because of his close relationship with new U.S. ambassador William Tapley Bennett. Important elements in the military, both officers and enlisted men, had genuinely supported Bosch and shared civilians’ hopes for a more liberal regime. Many junior and middle-grade officers with these sentiments had been fired after the coup, but they retained ties with like-minded colleagues who remained in the service. They, and other officers who did not necessarily share their political views, resented the power now wielded by Wessin y Wessin, who had been promoted to general and was commanding the elite Dominican forces stationed at the San Isidro base. They saw him as a potential Trujillo. These military elements joined with PRD leaders and began to plan to restore Bosch to the presidency. Despite clear signs of unrest, it appears that no one in the Reid government, the U.S. embassy, or the large CIA and U.S. military delegation was prepared

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U.S. Marines search civilians in the Dominican Republic during the military intervention of 1965. U.S. troops were sent in to restore order—and the political status quo—after the installation of leftist leader Juan Bosch. (Harry Benson/ Getty Images)

for the uprising of April 1965. Reid and Wessin y Wessin believed they had eliminated the last of the disloyal officers when on April 22 they arrested seven lieutenants. However, on April 24, when army chief of staff General Marco Rivera Cuesta attempted to arrest four more suspected officers, he was seized instead. The pro-Bosch uprising had been scheduled for April 26, but with the taking of Rivera, its leaders moved immediately. Within hours, over 1,500 proBosch troops seized key installations and encouraged other units to join them. PRD leader Jose Francisco Peña Gomez was coincidentally making a radio address at the time. When he learned what had happened, he immediately announced the fall of the Reid government and called on the people to take to the streets. They did so in the tens of thousands, completely intimidating the police, who made no effort to interfere. Ambassador Bennett was temporarily out of the country, and his chargé d’affaires,

William Connett, sent off the first of a series of panicky and inaccurate cables describing a “Communist” or “Communist-inspired” revolt. Reid made a radio appeal for calm, but it had no effect. The pro-Bosch forces, now calling themselves Constitutionalists, grew rapidly. They took control of Radio Santo Domingo, their military sympathizers passed out arms to the civilians, and more and more military units joined them. The hated police went into hiding. Reid gave Wessin y Wessin full powers to suppress the revolt. However, when the commander of the air force refused Wessin’s orders to use his planes against the rebels, Wessin decided to remain in his San Isidro base. The U.S. embassy sent military attachés to tell the rebellious officers that they had been duped by Communists and should join with other officers in a military junta. They were not persuasive. On Sunday, April 25, Constitutionalist forces under Colonel Francisco Caamaño seized the presidential palace and

Dominican Republic: Coup and U.S. Invasion, 19 65

arrested Reid. PRD civilian leaders called on Bosch to return and named Jose Rafael Molina Urena as temporary president. At this, the air force commander, Colonel Jose Benoit, a Balaguer supporter, with embassy permission and encouragement, sent F-51s to bomb and strafe the palace, and the uprising became a civil war. Outraged civilians poured into the streets to support the Constitutionalists and threatened the lives of the families of air force pilots if the bombing should be repeated. The embassy cabled Washington its total opposition to any return of Bosch, again because of “Communist” advocacy of his cause. It urged support for a “Loyalist” attack on what it described as “rebel headquarters.” These included the presidential palace. The embassy also arranged with Constitutionalist and Loyalist commanders for the safe conduct out of the country of all foreigners. Over 1,000 were removed without difficulty. However, some Constitutionalist supporters appeared at the gathering place for departing foreigners, the Hotel Embajador, seeking to arrest a Loyalist journalist. They fired a few shots in the air, and the embassy reported the incident as a Constitutionalist threat to Americans, an excuse for later intervention to protect American citizens. Ambassador Bennett returned on April 27, and Wessin with his tanks, now assured of air support, left San Isidro to attack the Constitutionalists. He quickly retook the palace after a bloody battle that produced hundreds of casualties on both sides. Temporary president Molina Urena and about fifteen other Constitutionalist civilian leaders sought asylum in the U.S. embassy. Bennett then informed Washington that the Constitutionalists were now being led by Communists and were also on the verge of defeat by a Loyalist junta headed by air force commander Benoit, which the United States recognized as the legal government. Bennett was wrong on both counts. Colonel Caamaño, after an unsatisfactory meeting with Bennett on the afternoon of April 27, rallied his troops to capture two police stations and distribute the weapons to supporters in the old city. Wessin’s tanks were useless in the narrow streets, and the Loyalist junta’s infantry was decimated by Caamaño’s armed civilians, who had converted many houses into fortresses. Late Wednesday afternoon, the U.S. MAAG chief visited the Loyalist military headquarters at San Isidro and found its leaders completely demoralized. Benoit told him

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that, unless he got immediate, direct U.S. military support, he would have to surrender. At this point, Bennett advised Washington to land the marine battalion, with the naval task force to help evacuate foreigners.

Dominican Civil War Becomes a U.S. Invasion By six o’clock that evening U.S. President Lyndon Johnson had authorized the landing of 500 marines “for defensive purposes.” He so notified the Organization of American States (OAS), and then prepared a statement saying the reason for the move was to protect U.S. citizens, of whom a few, feeling themselves in no danger, had not yet left the Hotel Embajador and thus could be protected. Johnson demanded that Bennett get a statement from Benoit to the effect that he could no longer protect American lives. This Benoit could truthfully say, although it was beside the point. In fact, the marines landed some hours before presidential permission was received. Bennett justified this on the entirely fictional grounds that the hotel and the embassy were receiving hostile sniper fire. At nine o’clock that evening, President Johnson addressed the nation to inform them that U.S. Marines had landed to protect American citizens in the Dominican Republic. However, U.S. reporters who went aboard the task force flagship in Santo Domingo, the USS Boxer, were told by Commodore James Dare that the marines had gone ashore “to keep this a nonCommunist government.” Even as he spoke, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), designating the operation as “Power Pack,” had ordered a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division to the Dominican Republic, alerted the rest of the 82nd to deploy there, and designated the 101st Airborne Division to act as a reserve if needed. The marines had already begun airlifting rations and other supplies to the demoralized Loyalist forces besieged in San Isidro. Shortly thereafter, the remaining 1,500 marines with the task force began going ashore. Bennett, in the meantime, kept up a stream of fictitious atrocity stories to Washington—for instance, mobs of Communists were parading in the streets with the heads of their enemies on poles. He estimated the total Constitutionalist strength at about 7,000, consisting of 1,500 Communists, 1,000 military under Caamaño, and 4,000 or so “hangers-on.” The junta

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(Loyalist) forces he now reported at about 1,700, only continuing because Bennett had told them without Washington’s authorization that the marines would fight beside them. At any rate, he was hopeful, and perhaps believed, that the Loyalists were now ready to resume the offensive. In fact, the Loyalists correctly reckoned that the “gringos” would do any fighting and they could reserve their forces for seizing power and punishing the Constitutionalists after the triumph. They were content to wait. By the evening of April 30, the 82nd Airborne Brigade had landed at San Isidro. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer arrived to command the U.S. forces, and President Johnson sent former ambassador John Bartlow Martin to act as his personal envoy and replace, informally, the unfortunate Bennett, who, by this time, had lost all credibility. Palmer, increasingly in charge of all U.S. activities in the country, ran what in U.S. doctrine was then known as a “stability operation.” As Palmer put it, the objective was not to support any particular group but “to establish a climate of order in which political, psychological, economic, sociological and other forces can work in a peaceful environment.” Of one thing, though, he was supremely certain, as was President Johnson. Such an environment could not include the presence of any individuals or groups designated by the U.S. government as Communist, pro-Communist, or even tolerant of Communists, as the Constitutionalists were believed to be. So, despite the neutral phraseology, Palmer’s plan was to use the marines and paratroopers to establish a cordon between the opposing Dominican forces, protect the Loyalists, and eliminate the military capabilities of the Constitutionalists with a series of block-by-block operations using superior numbers and firepower. Caamaño immediately recognized the situation, and on the evening of April 30, responding to a cease-fire appeal by the OAS, had the papal nuncio call a meeting at which he, Loyalist representatives, Martin, and the nuncio signed a cease-fire agreement. However, Palmer, on his own authority, declared he would not recognize it until he had his troops in the desired position. Johnson repudiated Martin and backed Palmer, and the fighting resumed. Johnson, in his radio address of May 2, openly declared the purpose of the intervention was to prevent a Communist takeover. By the next day, at the cost of a few dozen U.S. casualties, the airborne and marines had 80 percent of the Constitutionalist force trapped in

the old quarter of the city. U.S. Special Forces, disguised as civilians, and psychological warfare units spread out through the rest of the country but found few signs of militancy for either faction. The revolt had been largely confined to the capital. Report of a Cuban arms shipment at Samana Bay in the east of the country proved false. A boat in the Ozama River, which flows through Santo Domingo city, was suspected of carrying Cuban arms, and was sunk. The five Dominicans on board were killed, and their cargo, five cases of Carling Black Label beer, was captured. Puerto Rican GIs, used for interrogating prisoners, in several cases became so sympathetic to the Constitutionalists that they had to be relieved, according to an official U.S. Army study. On May 6 the OAS approved dispatch of an inter-American military force. On the following day, the United States recognized the Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) headed by General Antonio Imbert, who also took command of the Loyalist, now GNR, forces. A last military objective was Radio Santo Domingo, still in Constitutionalist hands. Palmer and the CIA station chief feared the power of “communist propaganda” and believed that until the Constitutionalist broadcasts were stopped, the Communist threat was still alive. Several Special Forces attacks failed, but on May 20, after a GNR strafing attack, Imbert’s troops took over the station. On the following day a new cease-fire was declared, and a week later the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) troops began to arrive. Brazilian General Hugo Lima assumed nominal command. Shortly afterward, U.S. Ambassador to the OAS Ellsworth Bunker arrived at the head of an OAS committee to arrange a final political settlement. Caamaño, acting for the Constitutionalists, accepted the Act of Reconciliation, which named Héctor García Godoy as provisional president pending elections scheduled for June 1966. Bosch protested, but by remaining in Puerto Rico during the fighting he had lost some legitimacy. In mid-June there was a last outbreak of fighting when Constitutionalist diehards attacked the Latin American IAPF troops, whose presence they regarded as an insult and a betrayal of Latin American solidarity. For the last time U.S. troops intervened and, although suffering some casualties, suppressed the last Constitutionalist strongholds. As part of the peace agreement, Caamaño and his chief lieutenants

Dominican Republic: Coup and U.S. Invasion, 19 65

accepted posts outside the country. Wessin attempted one last coup, but eventually left to become Dominican consul in Miami. The political finale was the presidential campaign between March and June 1966. Again, it was Balaguer versus Bosch. This time, though, Bosch seemed intimidated and made few public appearances. Also, unlike 1963, when Kennedy’s advisers were divided about supporting the Trujillo-tainted Balaguer, this time there was no doubt either in the White House or among the Dominican electorate about who was supposed to win. The voters chose Balaguer by a 57 to 43 percent margin.

In Retrospect The events in the Dominican Republic from 1961 to 1966 culminating in the U.S. invasion resulted largely from the predictable rush to fill the political vacuum left by the fall of the Trujillo regime. The privileged military caste that had been Trujillo’s instrument naturally resisted strenuously the attempt by previously suppressed civilian sectors to reduce its power and cut back on its advantages. This probably would have happened under any circumstances, but the social and economic situation of the country resembled a volcano waiting to explode. Underlying everything was unchecked population growth. The population had almost quadrupled in the previous twenty years, while the economy stagnated. Poverty in an ordinarily poor country had reached un-heard-of proportions and there was a demand for rapid and radical solutions. This helps to explain the overwhelming vote for Juan Bosch in December 1962 and the depth of popular frustration and anger after his military overthrow in September 1963, an anger that finally exploded in 1965. American armed intervention in Dominican affairs had a historical precedent, but none had occurred since the departure of the marines in 1924. The Good Neighbor Policy and the creation of the

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OAS on the basis of nonintervention meant that there had to be an overwhelming reason for Washington to act as it did. In the Cold War atmosphere of the 1960s such a reason was found in the political and strategic need to prevent the rise of Communist, or even neutralist, regimes in the hemisphere. To put it bluntly, there were to be no more Cubas. The United States had been humiliated at the Bay of Pigs and was genuinely frightened by the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy had been attacked politically over both these affairs for failing to use American military force to achieve complete victory. After Kennedy’s assassination in late 1963, President Johnson was determined he would never face such charges. Thus, he was prepared to believe the worst about Bosch and his supporters, even when little or no evidence could be presented to make a credible case for the feared Communist takeover, and he responded with overwhelming force to dictate a madein-America solution, setting the pattern for two more decades of open U.S. military involvement in Latin America. David MacMichael See also: Coups; Invasions and Border Disputes; Cuba: Communist Revolution, 1956–1959.

Bibliography Gleijeses, Peiro. The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978. Kurzman, Dan. Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned. New York: Putnam, 1965. Palmer, Bruce. Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989. Schoonmaker, Herbert Garrettson. Military Crisis Management: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. Yates, Lawrence A. Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966. Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988.

ECUADOR: Border Dispute with Peru,1941– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Peru 0 0

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Peru and Ecuador, both of which formed part of the pre-Columbian Incan empire, are similar in many ways. Both have large Indian populations; both share the same geography—a Pacific coastal plain where the major agricultural and commercial activities of the countries are concentrated; an Andean mountain center, home to the majority of the indigenous population; and a trans-montane frontier region in the lowlands of the Amazon basin. Ecuador, as the name implies, is nearer the equator and has a more tropical climate. It is a major producer of bananas. Otherwise, the economies of the two countries are nearly identical, based on agriculture (commercial sugar and cotton on the coast and subsistence peasant farming in the highlands), fishing, lumbering, and mining. There is great disparity in size, however. Peru has an area of 496,223 square miles and a population of approximately 25 million compared to Ecuador’s 109,483 square miles and 11.5 million people.

Historical Background Since 1830, when today’s Ecuador declared independence from Gran Colombia (originally composed of

present-day Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador), Ecuador and Peru disputed their boundary in the Amazon basin, in what is now the Peruvian province of Loreto. Ecuador claimed it was entitled to territory on the north bank of the Maranon River, a boundary established by an 1829 treaty between Gran Colombia and Peru, before Ecuador became a separate country. Peru argued that when Ecuador became independent from Gran Colombia, its boundaries reverted to those established by Spain for the old Audiencia of Quito and Peru, which gave the territories in the Amazon basin to Peru. Without territory either on the Amazon River or on its major tributary, the Maranon, Ecuador would have no access to the Atlantic Ocean through Brazil. Several times during the nineteenth century the two countries almost went to war over the issue, but Ecuador lacked the military power to successfully confront the much larger Peru. Ecuador’s diplomatic attempts also failed. In July 1941 the two countries did, in fact, go to war. Some Peruvian farmers, accompanied by a civil guard unit, had crossed the disputed frontier in May. An Ecuadoran border unit fired on the Peruvians. Each country denounced the act of the other. Peruvian troops under General Manuel Odria (later to become president of Peru) massed on the border, and Ecuador responded in kind. Then student demonstrators in the Ecuadoran capital, Quito, burned a Peruvian flag, and, using this “provocation” as the reason, the Peruvian troops attacked and overran all the Ecuadoran border posts and bombed Ecuadoran cities. Over the next two months, while Ecuador called for a cease-fire and frantically sought diplomatic help from the United States, Odria’s army continued advancing, occupying most of the Ecuadoran province of El Oro. The United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, acting as mediators, arranged a cease-fire in October, establishing a demilitarized zone and requiring the belligerents to withdraw to the frontier as last established in 1936. Negotiations in Brazil produced the

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Peru and Ecuador go to war over borders established in the early nineteenth century, when the two countries won their independence from Spain.

1977

Major oil discoveries are made in a region disputed between Peru and Ecuador.

1981

Fighting breaks out again over the border after Ecuador claims that a Peruvian helicopter shot at its border posts.

1995

A Peruvian patrol is captured by an Ecuadoran battalion in January, leading to fighting between the two countries; in October, the United States and several Latin American countries broker a peace deal between Peru and Ecuador.

1998

The presidents of Peru and Ecuador sign an agreement ending the conflict over the border.

Rio Pact of 1942, signed and ratified by both Peru and Ecuador in January of that year, restoring the prewar frontier but providing for an international commission to demarcate it exactly. Peru hailed the result as vindication of its position. Ecuador would later claim the pact was invalid because it had been the result of Peruvian use of armed force and that Ecuador had been pressured into signing by Peru and the United States, determined to have no distractions in the hemisphere as it entered World War II.

Dispute Revived In 1947 aerial photography revealed that a portion of the frontier had been wrongly described on previous maps, allowing Ecuador to claim it was entitled to some territory occupied by Peru on what was known as the Condor Ridge line. The Peruvians refused to withdraw. Ecuadoran President Galo Plaza Lasso declared in 1951 that based on the new information, Ecuador had “a proper and sovereign right to the Maranon River.” Peru rejected Ecuador’s request, backed by the Rio Protocol guarantors (the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). It called for a special commission to study the geographic findings or for international mediation of the question. Consequently, in 1960, President José Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador declared the Rio Protocol null and void.

The guarantors, however, rejected Ibarra’s declaration, stating the protocol was still in force. There the matter rested. Peru and Ecuador even cooperated in the organization of the 1969 Andean Pact and the 1978 Amazon Cooperation Treaty. Ecuador’s sense of grievance did not go away, however, and it was heightened when major oil discoveries were made in 1977 in the territory it claimed. Ecuador’s hopes were probably raised because relations between the United States and Peru were chilly, making it more likely that Ecuador might gain U.S. support. In 1963, President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of Peru had nationalized the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of Standard Oil, and had begun a modest program of land reform. This move was not looked on favorably by the United States, which cut off official loans to Peru. Washington’s concern and disapproval grew considerably in 1968 when the Peruvian army, newly confident after its defeat of the Tupac Amaru insurgent movement, overthrew Belaúnde, and under General Juan Velasco Alvarado declared an end to dependency on the United States. It then set up a worker-managed economy based on humanistic principles that were “neither Communist nor capitalist” and established diplomatic relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union. When the United States refused to sell arms to Peru, Velasco and his successor, General Francisco Morales Bermudez, bought

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aircraft and heavy weapons from the Soviets, and the Peruvian navy supplied itself from France, Germany, and Holland. In 1980 the Peruvian military permitted elections, and Belaúnde was elected and restored to office. However, Peru’s policy on the Ecuadoran border issue had not changed. In 1980, Belaúnde rejected Ecuador’s declaration that the two countries had “a territorial conflict.” Ecuador continued to press the point. Its foreign minister, Alfonso Barrera, made a speech on October 28, 1980, stressing that Ecuador needed direct access to the Maranon River to ship its goods down the Amazon.

19 81 Conflict On January 23, 1981, fighting broke out again. Ecuador claimed that a Peruvian helicopter had fired on one of its frontier posts. Peru responded that its helicopter had been fired on in Peruvian airspace while on a routine flight. Ecuadoran troops moved east of the Condor Ridge line to set up three outposts on territory claimed by Peru. Both countries declared states of emergency and rushed troops to the border. At the end of five days of fighting, Peru announced it had driven the Ecuadorans back to the other side of Condor Ridge. The Rio Treaty guarantors met in Brasilia on February 1 and asked for a cease-fire. Peru and Ecuador agreed to allow a military commission formed by the guarantors to monitor the disputed area. However, fighting flared again on February 20 when Ecuadorian troops shot down a Peruvian helicopter. President Belaúnde warned that any more such acts would result in a declaration of war. On February 26, Peru and Ecuador agreed to pull their troops back fifteen kilometers from the frontier, ending the brief border skirmish.

Aftermath The troop pullback led to an easing of tensions between the two countries for more than ten years.

Then, on January 9, 1995, a Peruvian patrol was captured by an Ecuadoran battalion while the latter was on maneuvers just over the Peruvian border in the Cenepa River basin, at the disputed Tiwinzta military outpost. Both sides immediately sent reinforcements by air. On January 28, Peruvian forces counterattacked with air power against the Ecuadoran position at Tiwintza and several other disputed outposts in the area. Heavy fighting continued through the first week of February, then halted while negotiations commenced between commanders on both sides. When the talks failed, fighting resumed on February 9, becoming increasingly fierce as both sides sent their fighter aircraft to lend support to troops on the ground. After another week of fighting, Peru drove the Ecuadorans out of the disputed area as Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori declared victory. While both sides had a number of aircraft shot down, it was Peru that suffered a larger number of casualties, with some 300 dead compared to Ecuador’s 100 lost. In October, both Fujimori and Ecuadoran President Jamil Mahuad asked Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States to broker an agreement. The coalition established a permanent border along the peaks of the Condor Ridge or Cordillera, which confirmed the boundary Peru had historically claimed. For its part, Ecuador won control over the disputed area around Tiwintza. The two presidents signed the agreement in 1998. As of 2006, the agreement had held as both sides appeared content with the agreement brokered after the 1995 conflict. David MacMichael See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Peru: Shining Path Rebellion, 1970s–1997.

Bibliography Day, Alan J., ed. Border and Territorial Disputes. 2nd ed. Essex, UK: Longman House, Keesling’s, 1987. De Zevallos, Felipe Ortiz. The Peruvian Puzzle. New York: Priority Press, Twentieth Century Fund, 1989.

EL SALVADOR: Soccer War with Honduras,1969 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Honduras BELIZE

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El Salvador air base Honduran air base

GUATEMALA HONDURAS Inter American Highway Tegucigalpa

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The two Central American countries of Honduras and El Salvador share a 215-mile frontier that has been in dispute since the two countries became independent from Spain in 1821. After lengthy negotiations, a treaty known as the Bonilla-Velasco border convention was signed in 1895, providing for a joint SalvadoranHonduran commission to demarcate the boundary. However, the legislature of neither country ratified the agreement, and although the period for ratification was extended for twenty years, the Bonilla-Velasco treaty lapsed and the issue lay dormant. It was inevitable, however, that it would arise again. Although sharing a common border, Honduras and El Salvador are dissimilar. Honduras is the second largest country in Central America, with an area of 43,278 square miles. Its population is currently about 7 million. El Salvador, with a total area of only 8,124 square miles, has roughly the same population, making it five times as densely populated as Honduras. Moreover, land holdings in El Salvador are concentrated in fewer hands than in Honduras,

resulting in a far higher percentage of landless people. Through the twentieth century, more and more Salvadorans emigrated, legally or illegally, to Honduras in search of land. By the mid-1960s there were an estimated 300,000 Salvadoran immigrants in Honduras. Although the two countries had signed an agreement to regularize the migration flow, many Salvadoran crossed the border without the required documentation. The attraction of Honduras increased greatly after 1962, when the Liberal Party government of Carlos Villeda Morales established a land reform program in Honduras, opening the unused portions of major land holdings to settlement and encouraging the sale of large estates by increasing land taxes. Many Salvadoran immigrants who had married Honduran women acquired or attempted to acquire land under the new program. Others took advantage of the inefficient bureaucracy to get property titles. The land reform program, backed by the United States under the Alliance for Progress, was extremely unpopular with large landowners, who were busily trying to expand their holdings to take advantage of the cotton and cattle booms of the 1960s. They were also disturbed by the growth of peasant unions and federations, some of which organized invasions of major estates and simply took over the land. Several of these invasions were later legalized by the land reform agency, the National Agrarian Institute (INA). Landowner anger with Villeda Morales was growing, and a vigilante group known as Mancha Brava appeared to fight the peasant squatters.

Coup in Honduras Villeda Morales had also become extremely unpopular with the Honduran armed forces. The military had

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KEY DATES 1967

Tensions between the two countries increase as border patrols exchange charges of frontier violations.

1969

In January, a ranchers’ federation in Honduras blames Salvador immigrants for the nation’s economic problems; that same month, Honduras announces it will not renew the 1967 immigration treaty with El Salvador; in May, thousands of Salvadorans flee Honduras recounting tales of brutality; in June, Salvadoran and Honduran soccer teams play a World Cup qualifying match; demonstrations at the game lead to heightened tensions between the two countries; on July 14, the Salvadoran air force conducts raids on Honduran cities; the Honduran air force responds with attacks on Salvadoran refineries; after 100 hours of fighting, the Salvadoran military runs out of fuel; on July 18, both sides agree to a truce negotiated by the Organization of American States.

1979

Honduras and El Salvador sign an agreement establishing final borders between the two countries.

only recently become professionalized, under United States auspices, and was extremely concerned for its institutional perquisites. As part of an Alliance for Progress program, Villeda had authorized establishment of a separate police constabulary force, which the military saw as threatening its monopoly of armed force. He was also backing legislation that would have given the president direct authority over the military. Elections were scheduled for 1963, and this time the Liberals chose a candidate believed to be even farther to the left than Villeda Morales. In October 1963, the commander of the air force, Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano, claiming the need to rid the country of pro-Castro Communists, led a military coup, with open backing from the big landowners, overthrowing the Villeda government. Lopez called a constitutional assembly that arranged new elections in which he himself became president for a six-year term. Agrarian reforms were essentially abandoned, and the Mancha Brava vigilantes strong-armed the peasant federations into submission. The problem of landlessness remained, of course, and the Lopez government insisted that the root of the problem was the presence of the Salvadorans, who it claimed were taking land that should go to native Hondurans.

Salvadorans were also made the scapegoats for other economic problems. Honduras had joined the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1961 and had hoped for great things when the Central American Bank set up its headquarters in Tegucigalpa, the Honduran capital. However, Honduras, traditionally the poorest country in Central America, soon found itself running a negative balance of trade with its CACM partners and unable to compete with them in attracting foreign capital. El Salvador was seen as an unfair competitor. In 1967, tensions increased as Salvadoran and Honduran border patrols exchanged charges of frontier violations. In May of that year, Honduran forces captured a Salvadoran military truck convoy with two officers and thirty-nine enlisted men that had somehow strayed almost two miles inside Honduras. The Salvadorans were confined and not returned for more than year, to the great anger of El Salvador, which called the border incursion an honest mistake. In January 1969, the Honduran anti-Salvadoran campaign intensified. The ranchers’ federation charged that the Salvadoran presence was a primary cause of the country’s economic ills. In the same month, Tegucigalpa announced it would not renew the 1967 immigration treaty with El Salvador. In April, the

El Salvador: Soccer War with Honduras, 19 6 9

Honduran land management agency began to evict all non-native Hondurans from properties they occupied under the old agrarian reform program. In May, many thousands of Salvadorans returned to El Salvador, bringing stories of brutal treatment, including murders and rapes, suffered at the hands of Honduran military and police and their Mancha Brava allies. The Salvadoran press reported all this and called for revenge.

The Soccer War El Salvador’s president was an army colonel, Julio Adalberto Rivera, who, like Honduras’s Lopez Arellano, had seized power in a coup. He was also a strong anticommunist and was dealing with agrarian unrest. The return of several hundred thousand more landless peasants complicated his problems. He was also angry with Honduras over the seizure of the Salvadoran lost patrol and was under pressure from street mobs to do something about the Honduran mistreatment of Salvadorans. As luck would have it, in June 1969 the Salvadoran and Honduran national soccer teams were playing a three-game World Cup qualifying match in the Salvadoran capital, San Salvador. A large number of Honduran fans accompanied their team. The usual feverish intensity of the competition was heightened by the mutual national ill feeling over the expulsion of the Salvadoran immigrants. Fights broke out and quickly escalated into riots. The Honduran flag was desecrated. Rivera’s government broke off diplomatic relations with Honduras. Over the next two weeks there were a series of incidents and minor clashes along the border. In Honduras, violence against the remaining Salvadorans escalated, and thousands more fled back into El Salvador. Several Salvadoran vice consuls reported they had been beaten. Then, on July 14, the Salvadoran air force bombed Honduran cities, and its army crossed the frontier, advancing almost ten miles against little opposition and taking the departmental capital of Nuevo Ocotepeque. El Salvador’s forces also occupied Honduran islands in the Gulf of Fonseca. The superior Honduran air force responded by bombing El Salvador’s major petroleum storage facilities, and it destroyed most of the Salvadoran air force on the ground. After 100 hours of fighting, the Salvadoran army stalled, out of fuel and ammunition. The war only worsened the situation of the remaining

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Salvadoran nationals, called by the disparaging term guanacos. Many were rounded up and held in soccer stadiums without shelter or adequate food. Honduran villagers, egged on by the Mancha Brava and government propaganda broadcasts, turned on their Salvadoran neighbors, driving them from their homes and taking their property. On the battlefield, both sides reportedly killed their prisoners. More than 2,000 people died in the short conflict, most of them Honduran civilians. Many thousands of Hondurans were left homeless. The Organization of American States (OAS) had called for a cease-fire on the first day of hostilities, but El Salvador refused, demanding that Honduras be charged with genocide and made to pay reparations to the Salvadoran immigrants. On July 18, when it was clear that his offensive had stalled and that the Hondurans had air supremacy, Rivera agreed to a truce. Under threat of OAS economic sanctions, El Salvador withdrew its troops from Honduras two days later. It would be ten years before a final border agreement was reached. In the short run, one result of the war was the near destruction of the CACM, which never fully resumed functioning. Bilateral trade between El Salvador and Honduras was completely disrupted for several years. Both Honduras and El Salvador felt that they had won. El Salvador had occupied Honduran territory. Honduras had destroyed El Salvador’s air force and could boast that it had repulsed the invader. In Honduras there was a great and surprising expression of patriotism and national pride in the armed forces; this worked to the benefit of Lopez Arellano, and may have helped him remain in control of the Honduran government until 1975. David MacMichael See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; El Salvador: Civil Wars, 1970s–1980s.

Bibliography Carney, J. Guadalupe. To Be a Revolutionary. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985. Day, Alan J., ed. Border and Territorial Disputes. 2nd ed. Essex, UK: Longman House, Keeslings Reference Publications, 1987. Montgomery, Tommie Sue. Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982. Rudolph, James D., ed. Honduras: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, DA Pam 550–151, 1984.

EL SALVADOR: Civil Wars,1970s–1980s TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War; Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: United States GUATEMALA

HONDURAS

EL SALVADOR San Salvador

Tegucigalpa

El Paraiso Army Base Ilopango Air Base

El Mozote

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Coffee Cotton

El Salvador is the smallest country in Central America, with a land area of 8,124 square miles, about the size of Massachusetts. It is also the most densely populated, with nearly 7 million people, about 1.5 million of whom live in the capital city, San Salvador. The population is almost uniformly mestizo (of mixed Indian and European heritage). The last significant Indian population was killed in the famous matanza, the massacre of Indian rebels in 1932. Except for a narrow coastal strip along the Pacific, El Salvador is mountainous, with many active and extinct volcanoes. Some cotton and cattle are raised on the coast, but the main crop of the country is coffee, almost to the extent of being the only crop. Even more than in the rest of Central America, land ownership is concentrated in very few hands. In 1979, less than 1 percent of landowners owned over 77 percent of the land, and concentration of ownership continued to increase. The same could be said for distribution of wealth. Eighty percent of Salvadoran families in 1975 earned less than the $704 estimated as necessary to provide basic necessities. In that same year, the World Health Organization (WHO)

calculated that 73 percent of Salvadoran children suffered from malnutrition. Only 37 percent of families in the country had access to potable water. The economy is tightly controlled by a small elite, popularly called the Fourteen Families. Other prominent families are often related to the Fourteen by marriage. They support and are, in turn, supported by the national army, the militarized national police, the national guard, and the treasury police. The officers of these security forces typically do not come from elite families but are responsive to their direction. The same can be said about government officials. Politicians usually come from the middle class and have backgrounds in law, engineering, or an academic subject. Historically, Salvadoran political figures must be responsive to the desires of the dominant economic elite, who are strongly opposed to any programs, such as land reform or progressive taxation, that threaten their monopoly of the national wealth. The elite are also opposed to the prerogatives of the officer caste in the military organizations. These officer groups resist being brought under the control of a civilian government and any reductions in their privileges. The majority of the population has little ability to influence the political direction of the country. If citizens elect leaders who offend the economic or military elite, those leaders are removed from office by a coup d’état. If citizens resort to force, their rebellions will be crushed by well-armed and well-trained military units, and rebellion leaders are imprisoned, tortured, or killed. El Salvador also suffers from the destruction of its natural environment. Having no mineral resources and little industrialization, the growing population has overcultivated the land, causing erosion and destruction of soil.

Historical Background What is now El Salvador was conquered by Spain in 1523, and the native Pipil Indians were reduced to

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KEY DATES 1979

Left-wing Sandinistas take power in a revolution in nearby Nicaragua, inspiring Salvadoran radicals.

1980

Various left-wing Salvadoran parties join forces to create the Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN), named after an early-twentieth-century Salvadoran revolutionary; violence between military forces and FMLN guerrillas breaks out.

1981

The government violently breaks a general strike, leading to 129 dead.

1983

FMLN forces capture a key military base at El Paraiso.

1984

By the end of 1984, the human rights group Americas Watch estimates that nearly 750,000 Salvadorans have been forced to flee their homes because of the fighting.

1989

FMLN guerrillas conduct one major final offensive in November, taking parts of the capital of San Salvador.

1992

After two years of negotiations, the government and FMLN representatives sign a peace agreement in Mexico City, calling for the disarmament of the FMLN and its integration into the political system.

serfdom. The colonial economy was first based on cacao (chocolate), and when the market for that crop declined in the seventeenth century, the planters turned to growing indigo, necessary for blue dye. After independence in 1821, the market for indigo failed, as chemical dyes came into use. After a long depression, the economy was revived by the coffee boom that began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. By this time the modern Salvadoran state began to emerge. The elite families extended their control as the remaining church and tribal lands were taken over by the government and sold to private buyers— almost always to the large landholders—and planted with coffee. A military academy was established, and a self-conscious officer caste, responsive to upper-class direction, emerged. The National Police and National Guard (established in 1912) also appeared. The impoverishment of the majority of the population, with consequent malnutrition and disease, alcoholism and family breakdown, was already apparent by the end of the nineteenth century. The same conditions prevail today. Rule by the civilian presidents selected by the elites continued undisturbed, despite the growth of

cities and an increasingly organized working class. However, in 1927, a reformer sympathetic to the needs of the urban and rural poor, Pio Romero Bosque, became president and, after surviving a coup, supervised free elections in which Arturo Araujo, a wealthy landowner but a decided liberal, gained office. Expectations were high, but as the world depression devastated the economy, Araujo was unable to carry out any of his plans. Frustrated peasants and workers rallied to the Marxist leader, Farabundo Martí. Martí’s attempt at a general insurrection in 1932 was put down by General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, who had deposed Araujo a few weeks earlier. In what came to be known as the matanza—the massacre— Hernández’s troops slaughtered at least 30,000 of the mostly unarmed Indian rebels and executed Martí. Contemporary Salvadoran history begins with the matanza.

Prelude to Revolution Hernández was overthrown by a group of young officers in 1944, and for the next sixteen years a series of colonels, all of them committed to the status quo and

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distinguishable only by the severity of their policies, replaced each other by means of bloodless coups. However, in 1960, a reform-minded group of junior officers ousted the latest colonel and installed a militarycivilian junta that proposed free elections and some modest economic changes. The United States, fearing the possible influence of Cuba’s new leader, Fidel Castro, refused to recognize the junta, and the familiar alliance of conservative senior officers and the Fourteen Families replaced the junta with Colonel Julio Adalberto Rivera. The U.S. administration of President John Kennedy promptly recognized the new head of state. Rivera, to disguise the reality of continued military rule, established an ostensibly civilian National Conciliation Party (PCN) and held elections in 1961 and 1967. In 1967 the center-left Authentic Revolutionary Party and the Christian Democrats (PDC) competed and captured a combined 36 percent of the vote. Encouraged by this, the Christian Democratic candidate, José Napoleon Duarte, entered into a coalition for the 1972 elections with the moderate socialist National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), headed by Guillermo Ungo, and the communist National Democratic Union (UDN). The coalition ran as the National Opposition Union (UNO). When early returns showed UNO leading, the government simply declared the PCN candidate, Colonel Arturo Armando Molina, the winner. A proUNO colonel attempted a coup, but Duarte, opposed to violence, refused to call on his civilian supporters. Molina, with the help of air strikes by the Nicaraguan air force, put down the uprising, killing some 200 people, mostly civilians. Duarte himself was arrested and badly beaten, then sent into exile. Despite the fraud and violence that brought Molina to office, the United States recognized his administration. He proceeded to move against any political opposition, calling it Communist. Students and professionals began to organize resistance groups, reaching out to peasant and labor unions, and getting significant support from the growing number of liberal Catholic priests in the country. Molina’s response was more violence. Troops fired on student demonstrators and invaded the national university, arresting and exiling forty teachers. The 1977 election was a better-organized fraud, and Colonel Carlos Humberto Romero became the new president. His first act was to order the army to disperse UNO supporters silently protesting the

fraud. Two hundred of the peaceful demonstrators were killed. In testimony before the U.S. Congress, UNO leaders protested the use of U.S. military equipment, relying on the announced human rights policy of President Jimmy Carter, but to no avail. The Carter administration recognized Romero. The new U.S. ambassador declared he did not think El Salvador could be held to U.S. standards of human rights. Romero’s Law for the Defense of Public Order criminalized almost any form of protest—words, speech, or action—as a means to combat terrorism. The year was also marked by the appearance of El Salvador’s death squads and the Organization for Democratic Order (ORDEN), and by the escalation of attacks on liberal Catholic priests, denounced as Communists.

The Junta and the Last Chance for Compromise In 1979 many young officers and other moderates were startled by the victory of the left-leaning Sandinista party in neighboring Nicaragua, and they believed Romero’s policies would lead to the same result. The new civil-military junta assembled by Romero took power in October, and seemed prepared to make serious reforms. It soon split, though, along militarycivilian lines. The defense minister, Colonel José Guillermo Garcia, and another conservative senior officer, Jaime Gutierrez, forced their way onto the junta, overriding the liberal Colonel Adolfo Majano. Most of the civilians in the leadership resigned, and in January 1980 a second junta, largely controlled by senior officers, took power. José Napoleon Duarte joined the junta. He had abandoned his old colleagues and become firmly aligned with the military. Meanwhile the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was under siege. On January 17, the army had invaded PDC headquarters. Later, they murdered prominent PDC leader Mario Zamora at his home. After these assaults, the PDC split. One faction, including Zamora’s brother, Ruben, and Guillermo Ungo, went into alliance with the five armed revolutionary groups. After a series of meetings throughout the year, the groups put aside their ideological differences and formed the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN, its Spanish acronym). The FMLN became the political wing of the guerrilla movement in El Salvador. In 1979 the U.S. Carter administration had worked feverishly in Nicaragua to get dictator Anastasio Somoza to resign in order to allow the moderate

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A U.S. military adviser looks on as a Salvadoran soldier practices with an American-made grenade launcher in 1983. The United States gave heavy military support to the government of José Napoleon Duarte in its fight against leftist guerrillas. (John Hoagland/Getty Images News)

reformist middle-class opposition to take power before the leftist Sandinista party could defeat Somoza themselves. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the Sandinistas took power. In El Salvador, however, the Carter administration supported the hard-line second junta, ignoring its repressive tendencies and increasing human rights violations. Facing a difficult reelection campaign, Carter was under attack from the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan for being “soft on communism” in Central America and having “lost Nicaragua.” The tactical political situation in the United States under Carter thus helped make armed confrontation in El Salvador inevitable. Reagan defeated Carter in November 1980, and Reagan’s administration routinely supported right-wing military regimes. Throughout, the United States was a major factor in the Salvadoran civil war, as supplier of weapons, military trainer, provider of economic support, and, to a great extent, political director of the Salvadoran government.

Civil War Begins Violence in El Salvador increased drastically in early 1980 as the army attempted to crush the emerging guerrilla forces and to terrorize the population into withholding support from the insurgents. In March a gunman, hired by right-wing leader Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, murdered Archbishop Oscar Romero at the altar of his cathedral church. Romero, the titular leader of the regime, was horrified by the death squad assassination of the Jesuit liberation theology priest, Rutillo Grande, and had been preaching against government violence, going so far as to order government soldiers to disobey orders to kill. Within the next few months nineteen priests were arrested or exiled. Churches and convents were bombed, and crude flyers saying, “Be a patriot. Kill a priest” were circulated. Government partisans hated the radical priests, believing that their work with the poor was at the root of popular discontent. The campaign culminated

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in the rape and murder by national guard forces of three U.S. nuns and a woman lay worker on December 2, 1980. The horrific deed caused President Carter to suspend military aid to El Salvador during his last month in office. In August 1981, government forces put down a general strike in San Salvador at a cost of 129 dead. At the same time revolutionary groups carried out a series of kidnappings and bank robberies that netted at least $40 million to use for arms purchases abroad. After the murder of Archbishop Romero, foreign support for the emerging FDR/FMLN also grew. West German supporters alone donated more than $1 million in 1980. Much of the foreign support was organized through the FMLN’s Political Diplomatic Commission (CPD), headed by Guillermo Ungo, Ruben Zamora, and former education minister Salvador Samoyoa. Ungo gained the support of the Socialist International, and the CPD scored a diplomatic triumph when, in August 1981, France and Mexico recognized the FMLN as a legitimate combatant force. In January 1981 the FMLN, knowing that the incoming Reagan administration in the United States was committed to supporting the Salvadoran administration, sought to win a quick military victory before the military could be reinforced and reorganized. The guerrillas overran several major towns in eastern El Salvador, but the offensive failed because it lacked the heavy weapons to get at government troops inside the walled garrisons. On January 3, as the Reagan administration was preparing to take office, in El Salvador army assassins murdered two USAID officials and the Salvadoran chief of the government Agrarian Reform Institute while they met in a San Salvador hotel. The land reform program instituted by the junta, under pressure from the Carter administration, was opposed by major landowners. The assassins were not prosecuted, and the failure of the Reagan administration even to make an effective protest was widely regarded in El Salvador as a sign of U.S. commitment to the antiguerrilla cause, no matter what methods were used. On January 14 the United States restored military aid to El Salvador. For the next seven years the FMLN and the army fought to a bloody standstill. The FMLN was unable to capture any large population centers, but it controlled significant rural areas, particularly in the east, and inflicted severe losses on the army, both in men and materiel. The army was able to penetrate

the guerrilla areas but, despite massive military support from the United States, failed in its efforts to destroy the major guerrilla formations or to break their control of the rural population. Throughout, there was huge displacement of the population from the combat zones and infliction of scores of thousands of civilian casualties. According to the UN Peace Commission that investigated the conduct of the war in 1992, the vast majority of civilian deaths and human rights violations were committed by the army, although guerrilla forces were also guilty of atrocities, including assassination of government officials and the random distribution of land mines.

Guerrilla Strategy The FMLN, relying on popular support, largely those people who did not participate in or benefit from the formal economy, pursued a strategy of destroying major economic targets, such as the Puente de Oro Bridge in October 1981. During the first three months of 1982 alone, ten bridges were destroyed, and over that year the U.S. embassy estimated the economic loss due to FMLN sabotage attacks at $98 million. In January 1984 the guerrillas destroyed the Cuscutalan Bridge, the main east-west road link in the country, and six months later they destroyed the nation’s largest hydroelectric dam. The national railway system was put out of service for more than three months in the same year. Salvadoran authorities estimated the damage at over $600 million. The pain and disruption, of course, were felt chiefly by the landowning and business establishment, the FMLN’s enemy. The FMLN also saw the military establishment as its most immediate enemy. Guerrillas attacked army garrisons and ambushed army patrols. In February 1982, FMLN forces entered the Ilopango air base outside San Salvador and destroyed nearly half the Salvadoran air force on the ground, prompting the United States to deliver $55 million in emergency military aid. In December 1983, the FMLN captured the major government military base of El Paraiso, killing more than 100 government soldiers and capturing so much ammunition and weaponry that they could not carry it all away. (Despite government and U.S. claims that guerrillas got their arms from Nicaragua and Cuba, the main source of supply was the Salvadoran army, either by capture or purchase.) In another spectacular action in October 1984,

El Salvador: Civil Wars, 1970s–19 8 0s

Colonel Domingo Monterosa, commander of the Salvadoran army’s Third Brigade, was lured into a staged battle in which he was allowed to capture what he took to be the transmitter of the FMLN’s Radio Venceremos. As he was flying back to San Salvador with his prize, the bomb concealed in the transmitter exploded, destroying his helicopter and killing him and its crew. The objective, of course, was to destroy the morale of the army and damage its prestige. In this, the FMLN largely succeeded. U.S. aid ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and the army reached a peak strength of over 50,000 by 1985 (not including the national guard), but even U.S. advisers found little good to say about the army’s performance. Another part of the FMLN strategy was to attack the government infrastructure in the areas in which it operated, resulting in the assassinations of numerous alcaldes (mayors) appointed by the government in San Salvador. These were clear human rights violations, but the strategic purpose was to establish clearly controlled FMLN zones with the intent of later negotiating a settlement with the government. The FMLN also considered U.S. military personnel within the country to be legitimate targets. On May 25, 1983, the deputy chief of the U.S. military advisory mission, Lieutenant Commander Albert Schaufelberger, was assassinated in San Salvador. In January 1991 a U.S. army helicopter was shot down, and the two surviving crew members were killed by their FMLN captors. In still another incident, four members of the U.S. Marine embassy guard were gunned down in a San Salvador restaurant.

Salvadoran Army Strategy Throughout the war, the Salvadoran military followed a conscious strategy of avoiding combat with the FMLN forces. Its leaders believed, probably correctly, that the strength of the FMLN was not in its armed units, which could continually be replaced, but in its mass popular support base. During past peasant and worker uprisings, the military had always succeeded by making indiscriminate attacks on the population. This was its basic response throughout the war, despite the contrary urgings of its U.S. advisers. In 1982 the general staff declared that the civilian population in rebel zones was a “legitimate objective of attack.” Massive aerial bombardment and artillery attacks were used. By the end of 1984,

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the human rights group Americas Watch estimated the campaign had produced 500,000 internal displaced persons and 245,000 refugees who had fled to other countries. There was no measurable military effect. Despite the army’s annual reporting of thousands of guerrillas killed, the number of FMLN fighters always seemed to remain steady at 5,000 to 6,000. Thus, the whole long period of the war was marked by such events as the massacre of refugees trying to cross the Sumpul River into Honduras in the spring of 1981 and the better-known slaughter of women and children in El Mozote in December 1981, carried out by the supposedly elite U.S.-trained Atlacatl Battalion. These were not aberrations. What the army hoped to do was remain intact at the end of the war while destroying and demoralizing the guerrillas’ popular base by constant attack.

The War Ends The war finally came to an end as a result of the Esquipulas Peace Accords, the Central American agreement designed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and signed in 1987. The accords required each government to set up a peace commission to conduct negotiations between the warring parties. The FMLN conducted one great final offensive on November 10, 1989, in which it penetrated San Salvador, occupying large areas of the capital until December 12. There were more than 2,000 casualties on both sides and immense destruction. Likewise, the military, once the prospects of negotiations were clear, indulged in massive killings. On November 16, 1989, soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion invaded the campus of the Jesuit University of Central America and murdered six priests, their housekeeper, and her six-year-old child. The army rationalized that this was a legitimate attack on those whom they regarded as the intellectual authors of the rebellion. After lengthy negotiations throughout 1990 and 1991, the final peace agreement was signed in Mexico City on February 16, 1992. The FMLN disarmed and was reintegrated into the Salvadoran political system, holding a strong minority position in the national legislature after the 1997 elections. The military was cut back to about 20,000 officers and men, and its political role was apparently reduced. The right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA)

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party continued to control the executive branch, as it had done since the late 1980s. While El Salvador was formally at peace, the crime rate has soared. In 1995 there were 7,877 homicides, an average of 21 a day. Thus, the death rate was higher than it was during the war, when a total of 75,000 people were killed—an average of only 6,500 annually. The country’s economic problems remain grave and are complicated by rapid environmental degradation. By most accounts, the fact that the war ended without producing any real change created general apathy and alienation. David MacMichael See also: Cold War Confrontations; People’s Wars; El Salvador: Soccer War with Honduras, 1969; Nicaragua: Revolution, 1970s; Nicaragua: Contra War, 1980s.

Bibliography Lungo, Mario. El Salvador in the Eighties: Counterinsurgency and Revolution. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996. Menzel, Sewall. Bullets Versus Ballots: Political Violence and Revolutionary War in El Salvador, 1979–1991. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994. Montgomery, Tommie Sue. Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Moroni Bracamonte, Jose’ Angel. Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Tula, Maria Teresa. Hear My Testimony: The Story of Mara Teresa Tula, Human Rights Activist of El Salvador. Boston: South End Press, 1994. Wright, Scott. Promised Land: Death and Life in El Salvador. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994.

GRENADA: U.S. Invasion,1983 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: United States 0 0

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rently is around 12 percent. Health services are poor, and the education system is weak. The government is a British-style parliamentary system, restored after the nonelectoral, popular consultative method employed from 1979 to 1983 was ended.

50 Miles 50 Kilometers

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

C A R I B B E A N S E A

ATLANTIC St. George’s St. George’s Medical School

GRENADA

Historical Background

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Point Salines Air Field

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TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TRINIDAD

Grenada is a Caribbean island in the Lesser Antilles. With an area of 133 square miles, including the main island and two much smaller islands, Carriacou and Petit Martinique, it has a population of approximately 90,000. The capital, St. George’s, has about 11,000 people. More than 90 percent of the people are of African descent. Whites constitute about 3 percent; the rest are East Indians or Syrians. Grenada is a former British possession, and its official language is English. However, Grenada is unique among the former British Antilles in that the majority religion is Roman Catholic. The economy is based on raising and exporting nutmeg and mace. Other export crops are bananas and cacao. There is some light manufacturing, principally of rum and clothing. Tourism, as is the case throughout the Caribbean, is of increasing importance. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is about $5,000 annually, but income distribution and landownership is badly skewed. Unemployment cur-

Originally a French colony, Grenada was ceded to England in 1763. A sugar-based plantation economy worked by slave labor, Grenada endured a major slave revolt in 1795 and 1796. Slavery was not ended until 1838, and shortly thereafter cacao and spices replaced sugar as the main crop. Land remained in the hands of the small white planter class, however. As late as 1950, 1.5 percent of landowners owned 45 percent of the arable land. Eighty percent of the island’s housing was mud and wattle huts. The population was wracked by venereal disease, hookworms, tuberculosis, yaws, and gastric diseases. Grenada was described as the slum of the British Empire. In 1951, Britain introduced limited local selfgovernment to the island. A mercurial labor union leader, Eric Gairy, and his Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) alternated in power on the island with a conservative party, the Grenada National Party (GNP) led by Herbert Blaize. After 1967, Gairy introduced a major land reform program, taking large underused estates for distribution to landless peasants. The program, like much else in the Gairy administration, was marked by massive corruption, with land belonging to GULP loyalists being purchased at hugely inflated prices. Gairy declared full independence for Grenada in 1974, although under the British Commonwealth system a royal governor-general, Sir Paul Scoon, a native Grenadian, continued in his ceremonial office. Increasingly eccentric, obsessed with flying saucers, Gairy became an authoritarian leader, jailing his

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KEY DATES 1974

Grenada wins its independence from colonial ruler Great Britain, under the leadership of Eric Gairy and the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP); the Marxist party New Jewel Movement (NJM) declares national strikes that lead to the imprisonment of its head, Maurice Bishop.

1979

Responding to allegations that Gairy planned to have Bishop assassinated, the NJM launches a successful coup, declaring the formation of the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG).

1982

As the PRG launches major education and health initiatives, U.S. president Ronald Reagan denounces Grenada as a “Marxist virus” in the Caribbean, threatening the Panama Canal; Reagan also warns that Cubans are building a runway capable of landing large military planes, allowing for increased Soviet influence on the sea-lanes to the Panama Canal.

1983

Internal divisions within the NJM turn violent, as ultra-leftist Bernard Coard seizes power, and Bishop is murdered on October 19; on October 22, member states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) call for outside intervention in Grenada; on October 25, 7,000 U.S. troops land in Grenada; by December, fighting comes to an end, with 19 U.S., 29 Cuban, and 49 Grenadian dead.

opponents, silencing dissent with strong-arm squads— the Mongoose Gang—and in the process enriching himself and his cronies. The GNP had too narrow a social base to compete against GULP, and in the mid-1970s entered into a loose alliance with a self-proclaimed Marxist group, the New Jewel Movement (NJM), which became the major opposition party. (Jewel was an acronym for Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education, and Liberation.) The NJM leaders were Maurice Bishop, a London-trained lawyer, and Bernard Coard, a Brandeis University–educated economist and sociologist, much influenced by the American Black Power movement. The New Jewel manifesto of 1973 was far from communist or even socialistic. The manifesto focused on problems of health, education, food, and housing. Its closest approaches to radicalism were proposals for a system of collective political decisionmaking and the nationalization of banking and insurance. An NJM-led general strike against Gairy in 1973 and 1974 resulted in Bishop’s imprisonment and his father’s death when police fired on a demonstration. The events further discredited Gairy, gained

greater support for the NJM, and especially enhanced Bishop’s personal popularity. In the 1976 elections the NJM ran in a coalition with the GNP and a GNP splinter party, the United People’s Party (UPP), as the People’s Alliance. The Alliance won almost half the vote despite Gairy’s control of the electoral machinery. Although GULP still controlled the government, NJM made good use of its parliamentary status to popularize its program and denounce Gairy. At the same time it developed a clandestine armed wing of the party. In March 1979, after allegedly receiving reports that Gairy, who was out of the country, had ordered the assassination of the NJM leadership, Bishop and his followers struck. On March 13 the NJM used its military wing to seize the main army barracks, all the island’s police stations, and the radio station. It proclaimed a People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG).

New Jewel Government While the removal of Gairy was applauded, many of the NJM’s partners in the Popular Alliance were

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upset by the resort to force and alarmed by features of the new political order. The NJM did away with representative government and established a system of popular consultative meetings. While these were well attended at first, participation rapidly fell off. In addition, the popular meetings could only respond to the agenda presented by the small NJM leadership group, composed of only sixty-five persons, most of them Marxist adherents of the revolutionary vanguard principle. Nevertheless, there was a high level of cooperation between the business community and the NJM, particularly in the areas of construction, road building, and tourism. A special case was the building of the Point Salines airfield, considered crucial to development of the tourist industry. In programmatic terms, the NJM concentrated on housing, health care, education, and employment. Major improvements were made in housing through

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construction of low-cost housing for the poor and government loans to poor homeowners for improvements. Medical and dental care were made free, and new medical centers were built. Much of the expanded medical care came from Cuban doctors and other medical personnel who arrived in significant numbers. By 1982, 14 percent of the government budget was devoted to health care. For the first time in the island’s history, primary and secondary education were made free. Books and school uniforms were provided to poor families. In 1982, 22 percent of the budget was devoted to education. Expansion of state-sector jobs cut the 1979 estimated unemployment rate of 49 percent to 14 percent by 1983. Women’s rights became a priority. A Ministry of Women’s Affairs was established; paid maternity leave was introduced; and preschool and day care centers were provided.

U.S. troops guard suspected members of the People’s Revolutionary Army of Grenada during the 1983 invasion. The Reagan administration launched Operation Urgent Fury to halt an alleged Cuban and Soviet military buildup on the tiny Caribbean island. (Sundberg/Department of Defense/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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In the area of finance, the PRG relied on progressive income taxation. Poorer earners paid no tax while rates for the highest earners reached 40 percent. Additionally, business profits were heavily taxed, and duties were levied on major exports. Price controls were placed on basic goods. In the agricultural area, the PRG undertook a modest land reform, leasing unused arable land for development of agricultural cooperatives under the Grenada Farms Corporation (GFC). This policy, among other things, allowed employment of landless laborers with guaranteed minimum wage, health benefits, and pensions. The GFC also introduced new export crops and established, with a World Bank loan, the Spice Isle food processing plant that produced juices, jams, and nectars. The NJM’s civil and human rights record was subject to legitimate criticism. During its four-anda-half-year rule, an average of seventy-five individuals per year were jailed for political or security reasons. The press was censored, and one anti-NJM journalist, Alistair Hughes, was jailed. Petty criminals and delinquents were routinely confined during visits by foreign dignitaries, and Rastafarians were harassed. The 600-man army established by the NJM, the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA), gained a reputation for arrogance and overzealousness in enforcing “revolutionary manners.” The refusal to hold elections and reliance on direct nonelectoral democracy brought the legitimacy of the government into question regionally (in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States or OECS) and internationally. Internally, as popular participation in the consultative process diminished, more and more power was concentrated in the hands of the PRG Central Committee. With the pragmatic Bishop spending more time traveling outside the country, the committee increasingly came under the influence of the doctrinaire Coard, who was impatient with what he saw as Bishop’s betrayal of true Leninist principles. The NJM foreign policy was what earned it the enmity of the United States. Bishop openly proclaimed his friendship and admiration for Fidel Castro’s Cuba and welcomed Cuban assistance. That, in Washington’s eyes, was bad enough, but its establishment of friendly relations with Libya, its active involvement in the nonaligned movement, its strident denunciations of imperialism, and its UN vote against censure of the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan (a vote on which even Cuba abstained), was sufficient proof that Grenada was an enemy.

The Carter administration, already under attack by Republicans for losing Nicaragua to the Sandinistas and giving up the Panama Canal to the supposedly leftist Torrijos government, felt strong pressure to do something. It already had a CIA-run destabilization effort going against the left-wing Michael Manley government in Jamaica and employed the same tactics in Grenada. Manley’s government fell early in 1980, and right-wing, pro-U.S. governments soon took office in the rest of the OECS countries. Grenada was isolated, and it could not miss the point of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps exercises in early 1981 in which the scenario was the invasion of the mythical islands of “Amber and the Amberines” to overthrow a Communist dictatorship.

Operation Urgent Fur y When the Reagan administration took office in 1981, it made no secret of its intentions toward Grenada. Bishop’s attempts to meet with President Reagan or even to talk with responsible administration officials were turned aside. U.S. propaganda was stepped up. Charges were made that Grenada was planning to establish a Soviet submarine base and that the tourist airport at Point Salines was really to be a Soviet bomber base for attacks on the Panama Canal. Grenada, according to the administration, was the new hub for revolution and subversion in the Caribbean, a Communist dictatorship where private enterprise was crushed, religion suppressed, and human and civil rights trampled. It was not even Grenadian, because the NJM was nothing more than a tool of Fidel Castro. In his 1982 address to Caribbean leaders, Reagan denounced Grenada as “a Marxist virus” that had to be eliminated. The implosion of the NJM in October 1983, resulting in the killing of Bishop and the taking of power by the ultra-left Coard faction, paralyzed the island, threatened civil war, and gave the United States an excuse to intervene to protect its citizens, principally students at St. George’s medical school. On October 8, Bishop returned from a trip to Eastern Europe to find the Central Committee had turned against him. On October 13, he was called before the committee, expelled from the NJM, and ordered into house arrest. Four days later, the army commander, Hudson Austin, read a statement over Radio Grenada justifying the committee’s action. The public was having none of it. A crowd of thousands came to Bishop’s house and took him to Fort

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Rupert. While Bishop and his supporters were planning their next move, Austin sent three armored personnel carriers to the fort and began firing. Bishop and many others were killed, their bodies later thrown into the sea. The country was stunned. The Central Committee, organizing itself as the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) with Austin as head of state, immediately declared a curfew, prohibiting anyone from even leaving their houses, and began using the army to disarm the militia. Outside, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) called an emergency meeting on October 21 and 22. The heads of government agreed that intervention in Grenada was necessary to prevent more bloodshed, and that, despite misgivings expressed by some, the United States should be asked to undertake the task. In fact, the decision had been made before the meeting. The four OECS countries, joined by Jamaica, now led by the pro-American Edward Seaga, and Barbados had already informed Washington that they would support a U.S. invasion. The whole process of CARICOM consultation had been stage-managed from Washington. Altogether, approximately 7,000 U.S. troops were landed. Air cover was provided by the aircraft carrier Independence and helicopter gunships. To give an international tinge, about 400 auxiliary troops from Caribbean nations were included in the force. Despite the claim that the intervention was necessary to protect foreign nationals, the United States rejected offers from the RMC and from Cuba to guarantee the peaceful departure of any foreigners who wished to leave. Meanwhile, both Coard and Austin had told Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, head of the medical school, that the students would not be disturbed, but if they wanted to leave the island, safe passage would be arranged. Two Canadian planes arrived in Barbados with clearance to land in Grenada to evacuate foreigners, but the Barbadian government, acting at U.S. request, refused to allow them to leave. Simultaneously, Reagan administration officials were urging Bourne to declare the students in danger and request troops for their protection. To make even a stronger case for the legality of the intervention, the first order of business after landing was to take GovernorGeneral Scoon out to the flagship where, after two days, a letter was produced in which Scoon requested U.S. troops. The United States also promoted the Cuban menace, declaring that some 1,200 Cuban troops were on

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the island. Havana responded, correctly, that there were precisely 784 Cubans in Grenada, including diplomatic personnel and their wives and children. Forty-three were military personnel, and the remainder were construction workers at the airfield. Their orders were not to interfere in any fighting, but to defend themselves if fired on. The haste with which Operation Urgent Fury had been planned showed up in faulty execution. The SEAL teams suffered heavy casualties in attempted landings. Likewise, army rangers attempting to secure the airfield blundered into Cuban positions and suffered almost 50 percent casualties before being relieved. At least ten helicopters were shot down. Altogether, the United States officially acknowledged nineteen killed and more than 100 wounded. It was later reported that a U.S. Army Delta Force team had suffered an unacknowledged six killed and sixteen wounded. Some U.S. units had to use tourist maps to find their way, and communications between units did not work. In one tragic incident, a U.S. pilot mistook the island’s mental hospital for a fortified building and bombed it, killing at least thirty patients. The brief campaign—it was all over within 96 hours—also provided a look at Pentagon information management. Newspaper correspondents were not allowed ashore until after the fighting had stopped, and naval authorities threatened to sink any unauthorized boats trying to take journalists ashore. Despite the unexpectedly strong resistance by the remnants of the PRA and by the Cubans, the majority of Grenadians welcomed the Americans. They thought they had come to avenge the murder of Bishop. Coard and the rest of the Central Committee were arrested and charged with murder. Their trials, which would end in death sentences for Coard and others, dragged on for years. The Cuban prisoners disappointed American hopes by electing to return to Cuba.

Aftermath There was instant and almost unanimous international condemnation of the U.S. intervention. Only four OECS states and the military dictatorships of Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay voted in support of the U.S. action in the Organization of American States, while all others condemned it. In the UN General Assembly, the vote was 108 to 9 condemning the invasion as a violation of the UN Charter.

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The interim government set up under U.S. auspices began dismantling the economic and social structures established by the New Jewel regime. Recent studies indicate that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs, with their emphasis on the private sector, have not produced the hoped-for economic growth, and Grenada, like most of its Caribbean neighbors, remains mired in poverty with high unemployment and inadequate social services. David MacMichael

See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; Cuba: Communist Revolution, 1956–1959.

Bibliography Blum, William. The CIA: A Forgotten History: US Global Interventions Since World War 2. London: Zed Books, 1988. Ferguson, James. Grenada: Revolution in Reverse. London: Latin American Bureau, 1991. Lewis, Gordon K. Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.

GUATEMALA: Coup Against Arbenz,1954 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups PARTICIPANT: United States

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Economic and Historical Background

Banana growing area

MEXICO BELIZE

CARIBBEAN SEA

GU A T EMA L A

Puerto Barrios

International Railway of Central America

Guatemala City

PACIFIC OCEAN

HONDURAS

E L S A L VA D O R

Guatemala is the third largest country in Central America, with a land area of just over 42,000 square miles, about the size of Tennessee. Its population, 14.7 million, is by far the largest in the region. The capital, Guatemala City, has a population of about 2 million. Ethnically the population is about 60 percent mestizo, people of mixed Indian and European (mainly Spanish) ancestry. Another 40 percent is Indian, descendants of the original Maya inhabitants. Culturally, the situation is less clear-cut. Regardless of ancestry, those who speak Spanish and have a Europeanized lifestyle are referred to as ladinos. Those who speak tribal languages and maintain indigenous ways are called indios. The ethnic division is a major factor in Guatemalan political, economic, and social life.

Economically, Guatemala, especially during the period under discussion, was the classic banana republic. United Fruit Company (UFCO) dominated the country, owning well over half a million acres of prime agricultural land and also the principal railway, the International Railway of Central America (IRCA). Another U.S. firm, Electric Bond and Share, took over the former German utilities company, Empresa Electrica de Guatemala (EEG), in 1920 and gained a monopoly over power services. Prior to World War II, German capital was important in coffee growing, but during the war German property was seized by the government. Since the 1950s, sugar, cotton, and cattle have become increasingly important in agriculture. Nickel mining, controlled by subsidiaries of the International Nickel Company (INCO), is the principal mineral extraction activity. Like many low-wage Central American countries, Guatemala has attracted numerous light manufacturing operations in recent years. As “the land of eternal spring,” Guatemala also has a thriving tourist industry, attracting visitors both with its climate and with spectacular ruins of the Mayan civilization. Land and income are badly distributed. In the mid-1960s, 3 percent of the nation’s farms and ranches (latifundios) had 62 percent of the arable land; 87 percent of the farms (minifundios) occupied less than 19 percent. In 1980 over 57 percent of peasants owned no land at all, and the percentage of landless farmers continued to increase. The majority of small holdings are Indian lands in the less fertile highlands. The plantations of the big landholders are concentrated in the coastal plains. Each year more than a million

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KEY DATES 1944

Military officers, including Jacobo Arbenz, along with students and workers, overthrow the government in a revolution.

1945

Juan Jose Arevalo, an educator, is overwhelmingly elected president in first open elections in nation’s history.

1947

In response to government demands that they negotiate with unions and pay their share of taxes, United Fruit Company paralyzes the country by closing its port facilities.

1950

Arbenz is elected president and promises to continue the reforms of the Arevalo government.

1952

The Arbenz government passes the land reform act, expropriating unused landholdings of major landowners, including United Fruit Company.

1954

After several years’ preparation, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency helps anti-Arbenz Guatemalan exiles in Nicaragua overthrow the Guatemalan government in a military coup.

Indian peasants descend to work on the plantations under abominable conditions. The land reforms of the 1944–1954 period were reversed after 1954. Interestingly, despite the central role played by UFCO in the events of 1954, in the following twenty years, through a combination of mismanagement and changes in the international commodity market, it gradually lost most of its holdings. It is no longer a major factor in Guatemala. As in much of Central America, the main growth in Guatemala’s agricultural production has been in export crops—sugar, cotton, cattle, cinchona, and rubber—even as production of food for its own population decreases. This chiefly affects Indians, whose tiny holdings are devoted to production of corn and beans, and city dwellers, a considerable portion of whom are landless peasants who have migrated to urban areas in search of jobs, and who are increasingly forced to rely on more expensive imported foods. Historically, Guatemala’s political structure has been a function of its ethnic makeup and the sharp distinction between ladinos and indios. Well into the nineteenth century, both before and after independence from Spain, periodic Indian revolts threatened ladino control. After independence, Guatemala tried but failed to establish dominance over the

other new Central American states. It also failed to prevent Great Britain from taking control over portions of its Atlantic coast to create British Honduras, today Belize. Guatemala still has claims on the territory. In the 1870s, under the liberal government of Justino Rufino Barrios, church and traditional Indian tribal lands were confiscated and distributed to big landholders and to German investors, who were arriving to establish the coffee industry that dominated the economy until the rise of United Fruit in the 1890s. The rule of big landholders and German and U.S. investors was maintained by a series of dictators who, beginning in the 1880s, created the modern Guatemalan army and its professional officer corps. Following World War I there was a brief period of electoral government, which was ended by the military coup in 1930 of General Jorge Ubico, one of a series of military coups throughout Latin America that followed the onset of the Great Depression. In response to the collapse of coffee prices and the need of the growers to cut costs, Ubico, under a so-called vagrancy law, established a system of virtual Indian slavery. He also extended the monopolistic privileges of UFCO, IRCA, and EEG. Popular dissent was crushed by censorship, a pervasive secret police system,

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and military force. In 1933, Ubico executed 100 labor leaders, students, and political opponents. The 1934 anti-vagrancy law authorized landowners to kill trespassers and squatters—that is, any of the thousands of unemployed and landless people roaming the country seeking food and shelter. Not even controlled elections were allowed. World War II finally put an end to Ubico’s rule. The deportation of German coffee planters who had been pillars of his regime weakened him, and the presence of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the country, many horrified by his Nazi-like practices, created an atmosphere in which opposition was able to organize. In June 1944, following the fall of the dictatorship in neighboring El Salvador, Guatemalan students demanded autonomy for the university. Ubico’s attempts to suppress the student movement led to a general strike, convincing the ruling sectors that if the old system were to be preserved, he had to go. He resigned in favor of a military junta, but nothing changed except that political opponents who had been identified during the general strike now felt increased oppression. Particularly targeted were military officers who had supported the popular movement. The renewed repression combined with continuing economic stagnation resulted in a revolution in October 1944 in which dissident army officers joined armed students and workers. Two army colonels, Francisco Arana and Jacobo Arbenz, and a civilian, Jorge Toriello, formed a provisional government. In March 1945, educator and intellectual Juan Jose Arevalo, a self-described “spiritual socialist,” was overwhelmingly elected president in the first open election in Guatemalan history. The new president began an extraordinary process of political and economic change.

Revolutionar y Government Indians took almost no part in the election since the franchise was restricted to literate males. The ladino coalition backing Arevalo was essentially middle class, consisting of small businessmen, professionals, government employees and military officers, students, and workers, especially employees of United Fruit, IRCA, and EEG. Arevalo’s program, under a new constitution guaranteeing absolute political freedom (except for “parties under international control,” such as the Communist Party, which was banned), was one of social welfare and national economic development

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under a capitalist system. As Samuel Guy Inman, a respected U.S. student of the hemispheric economy, reported in 1951, while the program was revolutionary for Guatemala, it was far less radical than the U.S. New Deal or Great Britain’s Labour Party legislation. Although the new social welfare activities— social security, literacy, public health, housing, and sanitation—received both UN and U.S. technical support, Arevalo’s efforts to develop an independent national, albeit capitalist, economy aroused strenuous opposition, not only from United Fruit but from U.S. mining and oil interests, angry about legislation restricting control of subsoil resources to Guatemalan companies or foreign contractors under government direction. Even worse, from the viewpoint of U.S. firms, was that the government insisted they not only bargain collectively with their workers, but pay their taxes and submit to government auditing to ensure that they did so. They fought back hard. In 1947 United Fruit paralyzed the entire country when it closed its dock facilities at Puerto Barrios rather than submit to government arbitration of workers’ wage demands. IRCA, which, according to the World Bank, charged the highest freight rates in the world (except to UFCO, which paid only one-eighth the tariff charged to other shippers), was particularly offended by government efforts to build a highway that would compete with the railroad. UFCO, IRCA, and EEG had friends in high places in the United States, to whom they made their unhappiness known. Arevalo’s government was studiously supportive of the United States in the United Nations, and it welcomed foreign investment—which increased by over 30 percent between 1945 and 1950. It also spoke out emphatically against both domestic and international communism. Even so, a high-powered public relations campaign in the United States defined Arevalo’s government as Communist-oriented and anti–United States. The campaign was orchestrated by renowned public relations specialist Edward L. Bernays, who worked for United Fruit and had enormous influence in the U.S. media. In 1950 new elections were held. The opponents were Colonels Francisco Arana and Jacobo Arbenz. Arana was chief of staff of the army, and Arbenz was minister of defense. Both had formed part of the revolutionary provisional government in 1944, but Arana was considered more moderate. By 1950 divisions in the formerly solid anti-Ubico front were evident. Middle-class professionals and businessmen, many

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dependent to some extent on UFCO, IRCA, and the big landholders, were less than enthusiastic about social and economic reforms benefiting small farmers and workers. Although most of the military supported the government, the U.S. military mission worked actively, and with some success, to convince the officer corps that Guatemala was being led down the Communist path. The very conservative Catholic clergy loathed Arbenz. All these groups favored Arana. Arbenz, backed by Arevalo, was determined to continue the latter’s programs. He was, if anything, more of an economic nationalist, and he promised large-scale land redistribution. He had the enthusiastic backing of the increasingly organized labor movement, intellectuals, many professionals, and a growing peasant electorate, which was significant for the first time since the literacy requirement for voting had been removed. Shortly before the election, Arana was assassinated. The murderer was never found, but Arana’s supporters blamed Arbenz. Pro-Arana military units mounted a coup, but Arevalo passed out arms to civilian protesters who suppressed the attempt. With Arana gone, two new opponents emerged. General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, an old supporter of Ubico, represented the right-wing conservatives and had the backing of the U.S. Embassy. Moderate Arevalo backers nominated Jorge Garcia Granados, an aristocrat and a diplomat who had drafted the 1945 constitution. After still another abortive military coup attempt led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, a recent graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and Staff College, the election was held on schedule. It was universally considered honest, and Arbenz won with 63 percent of the total vote, taking 77 percent of the illiterate vote. Clearly, his margin of victory came from the lower class and less educated part of the electorate, indicating a sharp class division. His inaugural speech set forth three goals: to convert Guatemala from semi-colonial status to an economically independent country; to transform it to a modern capitalist economy; and to do this in a way that would raise the standard of living of the great majority of his people. This was a popular program, but it clearly threatened the position of the chiefly U.S. foreign monopolies, the big landowners, and those dependent on them. The strategy was not to nationalize foreign companies but to compete with them. This was done, first, by inviting more foreign investment in locally controlled enterprises and, second, by con-

structing a government-run hydroelectric system to compete with EEG, an Atlantic highway to compete with IRCA, and a new Atlantic port to compete with the UFCO-controlled and -owned Puerto Barrios. In another reform, the government began seriously to enforce wage laws and the payment of taxes. This policy cast a burden on businessmen and big landholders, who had often skirted the wage laws and paid little or no taxes. Matters came to a head, however, with the passage of the land reform act of 1952. The law expropriated all unused holdings over 223 acres for distribution to eligible recipients in parcels not to exceed 42.5 acres. Those from whom the land was taken were paid the value of the land, as they themselves had declared it for tax purposes, in 3 percent twenty-five-year government bonds; recipients paid the same price to the government by assessments of 5 percent of annual production. The former German lands, the fincas nacionales, were distributed in the same way. While those from whom land was expropriated predictably denounced the law as communism, the law itself announced its purpose as replacing “feudal property . . . in order to develop capitalistic methods of production in agriculture.” By 1954 approximately 100,000 peasant families had received land and titles. Contrary to predictions of disaster, the program was an economic success, with great increases in agricultural production, subsequent reductions in food imports, and an improved national balance of payments. UFCO, as a landholder with 550,000 acres of which only 75,000 were being cultivated, was naturally affected. The company argued it needed to keep all its land for reserves in case disease wiped out its existing plantations. Nevertheless, it was forced to surrender 400,000 acres and was offered, in accordance with the law, $1,185,115—the value it had stated itself for tax purposes. The company demanded payment of $16 million and received strong support from the U.S. State Department.

Covert Counterrevolution Even before Arbenz took office, the Truman administration had been making its displeasure known to President Arevalo. Ambassador Richard Patterson met with the outgoing president to complain about the 1949 petroleum law’s restrictions on Standard Oil explorations and to demand that he dismiss several cabinet ministers and arrest seventeen “known

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Communists.” Arevalo, insulted by this interference in Guatemalan affairs, demanded the ambassador’s recall. Back in the United States, Patterson accused Arevalo of being a Communist on the grounds that “if it quacked like a duck, it must be a duck.” State Department policy chief George Kennan made his first tour of Latin America in early 1950 and saw in nationalism and economic reform the seeds of a Communist takeover. Adolph A. Berle, an influential figure in business circles, a former assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and a former ambassador to Brazil, recommended strong action, including recruiting other Central American nations to invade Guatemala. All U.S. economic assistance was cut off over the issue of the Atlantic highway, and U.S. control of the World Bank, under its president Eugene Black, ended international credit. Fortunately for Guatemala, a boom in coffee prices caused by the Korean War eased the crunch, but even this caused Maine’s Senator Margaret Chase Smith to charge on the Senate floor that high coffee prices for U.S. consumers were the result of a Guatemalan Communist plot. When Dwight Eisenhower became president in 1953, American fears of Communism were at their height, fueled by the accusations of Senator Joseph McCarthy. In Central America, the fear that Guatemala was about to turn Communist became a conviction. Advertising executive Bernays had done his work well. Regardless of the Communist issue, the Eisenhower administration was closely tied to United Fruit (UFCO). Eisenhower’s private secretary, Anne Whitman, was married to UFCO’s public affairs director. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, was the legal representative for UFCO. The secretary of state’s brother, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Allen Dulles, likewise had ties to UFCO through his client, the Schroder Banking Corporation. Assistant Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith subsequently became a member of UFCO’s board of directors. The assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs, John Moors Cabot, was a large UFCO shareholder. The Boston-based UFCO also had strong congressional support. Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Democratic Speaker of the House John McCormack, both of Massachusetts, demanded action to protect their banana-growing constituent.

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Eisenhower and his advisers decided to overthrow the Guatemalan government, even though intelligence assessments found little threat to U.S. security and little evidence that the Soviet Union controlled or was even interested in Guatemala. However, Eisenhower, having accepted a Korean settlement short of victory in Asia and pressed by McCarthyite elements in his Republican Party to show more anticommunist zeal, was easily persuaded by Secretary of State Dulles to make an example of Guatemala. Eisenhower’s own pro–big business sentiments were also a factor in the decision. The method chosen was a covert operation to be run by the CIA, headed by Allen Dulles. Eisenhower was trying to cut military budgets and reduce the influence of what he later called the militaryindustrial complex. The Dulles brothers were both promoters of CIA covert action. The agency had in 1953 claimed credit for the overthrow of the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, which, like that of Arbenz in Guatemala, was fighting against foreign control of its economy. This had been the CIA’s first demonstrable and highly publicized accomplishment.

Operation Success In May 1953 the CIA, after attempts to bribe or assassinate Arbenz were unsuccessful, got orders to plan and conduct an operation to remove him and install a new government. Operation Success was to form an exile army under the nominal leadership of Carlos Castillo Armas. A training camp was set up on an UFCO plantation in Honduras. There was no lack of candidates to replace Arbenz. Castillo Armas, leader of the failed coup in 1950, was living in Nicaragua and plotting with Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who had run unsuccessfully for president that year. In January 1954, some of their correspondence was discovered by the Guatemalan government and published. It revealed that the men were both funded by the U.S. government, that both had dealings with the CIA, and that they were already discussing how to divide power after Arbenz was overthrown. The United States dismissed the letters as Communist propaganda, and when Guatemala asked the United Nations to condemn this evidence of U.S. aggression, the U.S. government vetoed the action. It did not help Guatemala that Henry Cabot Lodge, who was now the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was acting president of the Security Council at the time.

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Troops of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas parade in Guatemala after their successful coup against the Jacobo Arbenz government in July 1954. The revolt was supported and directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. (National Archives)

Likewise, the Organization of American States (OAS) at its March 1954 foreign ministers meeting in Caracas, under intense U.S. economic pressure, had refused to respond to Guatemala’s appeals, and meekly voted a resolution condemning Communist aggression in the hemisphere. To further prepare the ground, Washington sent John Peurifoy as ambassador to Guatemala in November 1953. Peurifoy had been ambassador to Greece during the suppression of the Communist revolution there in the late 1940s. At his first meeting with the Guatemalan foreign minister, he bluntly denounced the agrarian reform as unacceptable communism. In the meantime, the CIA’s operation leaders, Richard Bissell and Tracy Barnes, had set up headquarters in Opalocka, Florida. Their plan was create

the front of an exile liberation army under the command of Castillo Armas, but to rely mainly on a propaganda apparatus; on an air force of U.S.-piloted World War II surplus P-47s, P-51s, and transports; and on the cooperation of disaffected military officers in Guatemala. (Most of the officers ultimately failed to cooperate.) Other sources of support were Guatemalan businessmen and middle-class professionals, and the Roman Catholic Church. New York’s Francis Cardinal Spellman, a well-known anticommunist, funneled money to the Guatemalan archbishop, encouraging him to order pastors to preach sermons against the “Communist government.” The CIA also framed the Guatemalan government, dumping quantities of Communist-bloc weapons on the neighboring coast of Nicaragua. There they could

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be discovered by Nicaraguan dictator (and U.S. ally) Anastasio Somoza and displayed as evidence that the Soviet Union was supporting Guatemalan aggression. CIA planes dropped similar weapons (marked with the hammer and sickle, should anyone not get the point) in Guatemala to be found by outraged citizens and displayed to U.S. journalists. Arbenz, rightly convinced that his country was facing invasion, found it impossible to get weapons for Guatemala’s own military. A U.S. arms embargo in force since 1948 had been successful. In desperation, he purchased a shipload of what proved to be nearly useless weapons from Czechoslovakia, then part of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. They arrived on the Swedish freighter Alfhem in May 1954. This proved to be a propaganda bonanza for the United States. What more proof of the establishment of a Soviet Communist beachhead was needed? On June 15, Eisenhower authorized sending Castillo Armas’s force of 150 or so men across the border. Their first mission was to blow up the railway tracks over which the Czech arms were being shipped to the capital. This they failed to do, and then they stalled a few miles inside Guatemala. The mercenary air force dropped propaganda leaflets and Molotov cocktails, and attacked government transmitters (mistakenly hitting the broadcast facilities of an American Protestant missionary group). In the process they lost three planes, one of which crashed in Mexico. In the meantime, Guatemalan security had rounded up most of the CIA underground apparatus, arresting some 450 suspects and allegedly executing as many as 75. It appeared the operation had fizzled, and CIA operation leader Richard Bissell began planning to withdraw the invasion force. CIA director Allen Dulles, however, told Eisenhower that with more planes there was still a 20 percent chance of success, and the president told him to proceed, that once the U.S. flag had been committed, there should be no turning back. This was a clear indication that Eisenhower was prepared to use regular U.S. forces to make Operation Success succeed. More planes were provided, and bombing began in earnest. The almost nonexistent Guatemalan air force was unable to do anything. In one incident, a bomb was dropped on a ship suspected of bringing in fuel for the government. It turned out to be a British freighter, and the CIA had to pay $1.6 million to the insurers. The unopposed raids, combined with propa-

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ganda broadcasts about rebel advances and forces of thousands of men closing in on the capital, caused many in the government and military to begin to lose their nerve. A turning point came after a skirmish near the border wounded some government fighters. When they arrived in Guatemala City, they seemed to give credence to the propaganda. Arbenz faced a dilemma. He still had the capability to move and defeat Castillo Armas’s force. Yet he and his military commanders were convinced that if they did so, the next step would be a full-scale U.S. military invasion. He could have distributed arms to the populace to mount a last-ditch defense, but that would have meant useless slaughter. Besides, the army opposed arming the populace. He met with senior officers on the night of June 27 and agreed to resign in favor of a military junta headed by Carlos Enrique Diaz. Diaz proposed to negotiate with the Americans, not surrender unconditionally. The CIA would not accept negotiations and sent a P-47 to bomb the chief military barracks. A CIA officer told Diaz, who protested that the ambassador had promised to negotiate, that there was diplomacy and then there was reality. The bomb was the reality. Castillo Armas arrived in Guatemala City on July 8 to an impressive welcome, complete with firecrackers thoughtfully provided by the CIA. The new president moved swiftly and to the complete satisfaction of Washington. Hundreds of alleged Communists were executed by firing squad. The agrarian reform laws were voided, and UFCO’s lands were promptly returned. Peasants were evicted from their new holdings, many executed by vengeful landlords in the process. The labor laws were overturned, and unions were suppressed. The petroleum legislation was likewise discarded, and foreign oil companies were welcomed. On July 4, Secretary of State Dulles hailed the return of democracy to Guatemala in a stirring address cheered by the major media. Castillo Armas did not survive his triumph long. He was murdered by a member of his personal guard in 1957 and succeeded by his longtime rival and sometime colleague Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes in a notoriously fraudulent election that year. The Guatemalan revolution went underground once more, and the U.S.-backed governments fought bitterly to repress it. That battle, which was to last thirty-five years, would cost the lives of more than 250,000 Guatemalans.

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The Coup in Perspective The U.S. covert invasion of Guatemala in 1954 has probably been studied more than any other CIA action except the Bay of Pigs, for which it was the model. It was a product of several influences. Basic to understanding it is that traditional American policy in the Caribbean and Central America was intolerance for any government of which it disapproved. Before World War II, the main executors of this policy were the U.S. Marines; after the war, the main executors were the CIA. To the Cold War governments of the United States, a threat to U.S. control in the region was actually or potentially a threat to U.S. security. A second element was the Cold War atmosphere of the 1940s and 1950s, the time when U.S. national security doctrine was created in response to the perceived Soviet ambition for world conquest. In the minds of people like John Foster Dulles, a country’s failure to support any U.S. position was the same as being a U.S. enemy preparing to enter the Soviet camp. He believed that intervention, especially in the Americas, was simply a form of self-defense and needed no further justification. That same Cold War atmosphere had a domestic political dimension for which the shorthand term is McCarthyism. No politician or political party could afford to be called soft on Communism. In the foreign policy area, no one wanted to be charged with losing China, or Guatemala. Better safe than sorry. In that atmosphere, a public relations operator like Bernays, regardless of the personal interests that some leading policymakers had in UFCO, was able to manipulate both public opinion and policy in support of his clients. Most importantly, in 1954, the U.S. leaders believed that the country had sustained a long series of foreign policy defeats at the hands of the Soviet Union, during which Eastern Europe and China had fallen to Communism. Countries in other parts of the world remained at grave risk. It seemed natural to intervene to end any danger of Communism in an area like Central America, where America had always prevailed. The CIA itself had suffered through one intelligence and covert action fiasco after another before 1954. Its operations in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Baltic states had been disasters. During the Korean War (which the agency failed to predict), its vaunted intelligence network in North Korea had been shown to be completely penetrated

by the enemy and providing false information. Its attempt to raise an insurrection in Manchuria had been an utter failure, and the Nationalist Chinese division it had set up in Burma to harass the Chinese Communists had instead settled down to run the southeast Asian opium trade. Only the Iranian venture of 1953 in removing the government of Mossadegh and restoring the Shah of Iran to power had been a success (and had restored the power of Western oil companies in the region). CIA director Alan Dulles, himself a master of public relations, may have urged the Guatemalan operation in part because he saw another opportunity to revive the agency’s fortunes. In fact, he was quick to publish an account of the Guatemalan operation in the Saturday Evening Post, then among the most popular magazines in America. While the immediate objectives of those involved were served, the long-term results for the United States in Latin America were not advantageous. Among those who witnessed and became totally radicalized by the intervention was a young Argentine medical student in Guatemala named Ernesto “Che” Guevara. While many in the traditional Latin American elite simply accepted the fact that it was impossible to defy the United States, a younger generation drew a different lesson from Guatemala—that the motives of the United States were not to be trusted. These younger observers became increasingly open to radical appeals, and even to welcoming Soviet assistance. On the U.S. side, one unfortunate result was the conviction, particularly in the CIA, that Latin Americans were pushovers. Faced with a show of U.S. resolve, Latin opponents would lose their nerve and quit. It was on those assumptions that the Bay of Pigs operation was planned and carried out in 1961—by Richard Bissell and Tracy Barnes, the directors of the Guatemalan operation. The results of that intervention, seeking to overturn Fidel Castro, would be a grave defeat for the agency. David MacMichael See also: Cold War Confrontations; Coups; Guatemala: Civil War, 1970s–1990s.

Bibliography Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. Handy, Jim. Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict & Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944–1954. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

GUATEMALA: Civil War,1970s–1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War 0 0

50 Miles 50 Kilometers

Provinces with 50% or more indigenous population

MEXICO BELIZE

CARIBBEAN SEA

G U A T E M A L A

Guatemala City

PACIFIC OCEAN

HONDURAS

E L S A L VA D O R

Guatemala, with a land area of just over 42,000 square miles, is about the size of Tennessee. Its population, approaching 11 million, is by far the largest of any Central American country. The capital, Guatemala City, has approximately 2 million people. Ethnically, the population is about 60 percent mestizo, people of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry, and 40 percent Indian (indio), descendants of the original Mayan inhabitants. Culturally, regardless of ancestry, those who speak Spanish and have a European lifestyle are referred to as ladinos. Those who speak tribal languages and maintain indigenous ways are called indios. Indians tend to be discriminated against, and ethnic division is a major factor in Guatemalan political, economic, and social life.

Economic and Historical Background Economically, for much of its modern history Guatemala was the classic “banana republic.” The U.S.-

owned United Fruit Company (UFCO) dominated the country, owning more than half a million acres of the best agricultural land and the main railway, International Railway Company of Central America (IRCA). UFCO was popularly known as El Pulpo (the Octopus). Another U.S. firm, Electric Bond and Share, monopolized electricity services through its ownership of Empresa Electra de Guatemala (EEG). Coffee, cacao, and sugar were the traditional export crops, but cotton and beef became increasingly important beginning in the 1950s. EXIMBAL, a subsidiary of International Nickel Company, in partnership with Hanna Mining Corporation of Ohio, runs one of the world’s largest nickel mining operations in Guatemala. There are also significant petroleum fields, mainly operated by major U.S. oil companies. Land and income are maldistributed. Three percent of the nation’s farms and ranches (latifundios) occupy 62 percent of the arable land. At the other end of the spectrum, 87 percent of the farms (minifundios) occupy less than 19 percent of arable land. In 1980 nearly 60 percent of peasant families owned no land at all. The majority of small holdings in the less fertile highlands are held by Indians. The large farms and ranches occupy the superior coastal regions and are under the control of the Guatemalan elite or foreign corporations. At harvest time each year, more than a million Indians come from their villages to bring in the crops of cotton and sugar under abominable conditions. The use of pesticides is unrestricted. Land reforms and rural labor laws were passed between 1944 and 1954 but were repealed in later years. United Fruit Company, through a combination of mismanagement and changes in international markets, lost most of its holdings and is no longer a dominant factor in Guatemala. The lack of improvement in poorer Guatemalans’ living standards is caused partly by the pattern of increasing agricultural production mainly for such export

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KEY DATES 1954

The leftist government of Jacobo Arbenz is overthrown in a coup organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

1962

Police and army troops massacre antigovernment demonstrators in the capital.

1970s

Fighting between the military government and guerrillas intensifies.

1987

The Guatemalan government begins peace negotiations with the main rebel coalition, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG, its Spanish acronym).

1996

The Guatemalan government and various rebel groups sign a peace accord, granting amnesty to all parties involved in the conflict.

1999

The UN-sponsored Commission for Historical Clarification, also known as the Truth Commission, issues a report saying that 200,000 persons died in the two-decade-long conflict, 90 percent of them at the hands of government forces.

crops as sugar, cotton, cattle, cinchona, rubber, and vegetables for the U.S. market. The focus on export crops displaced many peasants from the land. Poor Guatemalans, especially among the growing urban population, could afford less food in 2000 than they could fifty years earlier. Historically, Guatemala’s political structure has been a function of its ethnic makeup. During the colonial period, Indians were essentially serfs on lands owned by Spanish conquerors or the Roman Catholic Church, but they did retain certain tribal lands. After Guatemala gained independence in 1823, the situation remained much the same until the 1870s. Then, under the liberal government of Justino Rufino Barrios, the state confiscated both tribal and church lands and made them private property. Most of this land was sold to the large landholders and to German investors, who were establishing the country’s coffee industry and who dominated the nation’s economy. (The government confiscated the German holdings during World War I and World War II.) Following World War I there was a period of elective government. It ended with a coup in 1930, led by General Jorge Ubico, one of a series of military coups throughout Latin America in response to the onset of the Great Depression. Ubico extended the privileges of United Fruit and the railroad and elec-

tricity monopolies. Popular dissent was crushed by censorship, a pervasive secret police system, and open use of military force. World War II brought an end to Ubico’s rule. The regime was shaken by the departure of the German coffee planters, and the presence of thousands of U.S. troops in the country created an atmosphere in which opposition forces were able to organize. In June 1944, following the overthrow of the dictatorship in neighboring El Salvador, Guatemalan students demonstrated for university autonomy. Ubico’s attempts to suppress the student movement led to a general strike. He resigned in favor of a military junta. Little changed except that the new military leaders made the demonstrators and their supporters targets of oppression. The renewed repression resulted in a revolution in October 1944. Dissident army officers and student activists joined to oust the junta. Two army colonels, Francisco Arana and Jacobo Arbenz, and a civilian, Jorge Toriello, formed a provisional government and scheduled elections for the following year. In March 1945, in the first free elections in Guatemala’s history, Juan Jose Arevalo, a self-described “spiritual socialist,” returned from exile in Argentina to become president and begin a process of extraordinary political and social change.

Guatemala: Civil War, 1970s–19 9 0s

Arevalo and his successor, Arbenz, elected in 1950, carried out land and tax reforms and a program of national economic development. These actions threatened United Fruit and other local monopolies and were condemned by potential foreign investors in oil and mineral projects. Legalization of the Communist and Socialist parties alarmed the U.S. government, then in the early stages of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. U.S. officials in the Eisenhower administration also listened to the complaints of United Fruit executives.

U.S. Intervention and Its Aftermath In 1954 a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert operation overthrew Arbenz and installed Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, the front man for the operation, as president. Castillo revoked the land reforms, returned expropriated properties, banned the Communist Party, and had approximately 300 suspected Communists executed by firing squad. Thousands of peasant families were evicted from properties granted under the land reform. Labor unions and peasant organizations were suppressed and their leaders murdered. Castillo’s corruption and ineptitude alienated his right-wing supporters, and they assassinated him in 1957. He was replaced by conservative politician Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes. The reformers in the old Revolutionary Party (PR) were encouraged by the fall of Castillo. Together with the Communist Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT), they established a “national conciliation” movement. Soon afterward, the success of the Cuban revolution aroused popular enthusiasm in Guatemala. Many Guatemalans, including nationalist army officers, opposed Ydigoras for letting the United States train anti-Castro Cuban forces in Guatemala. On November 13, 1960, elements of the reform parties, supported by many in the army, tried to overthrow the Ydigoras government. The government, assisted by Cuban exiles, bloodily put down the revolt. Leaders of the revolt were killed, imprisoned, or driven into exile. Two of the leaders, Lieutenants Marcos Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Turcio Lima, went into Honduran exile but were allowed to return to Guatemala the following year. Yon Sosa and Turcio, together with Alejandro Leon, organized the November 13 Revolutionary Movement (M13), attracting many peasant

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supporters. M13 became the nucleus for the Armed Forces of the Revolution (FAR), which became a serious threat to the succession of military governments that followed Ydigoras. In Guatemala City, the PR and the PGT were attracting wide public support. In early 1962, police and army troops massacred PR demonstrators, and public anger against Ydigoras rose. Former president Juan Jose Arevalo, who had led the reform government from 1945 to 1950, announced that he would run for president in the March 1963 elections. Faced with the prospect of the return to reform government, Defense Minister Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia staged a coup. He was declared president, and his administration began twenty years of direct military rule.

Militar y Rule and Guerrilla Insurgency Peralta was a hard-line military leader, but he was also a nationalist. He resented the attempts by the growing U.S. military advisory contingent in Guatemala to control him. U.S. officers, hoping to make Guatemala a laboratory for new strategies and tactics in fighting against insurgents, were impatient with Peralta’s passive approach to the presence of guerrilla forces. In March 1965, FAR guerrillas assassinated the chief U.S. military adviser, Colonel Harold Hauser, and U.S. advisers stepped up their efforts to ease Peralta out of office. (Two more U.S. military advisers would be executed by the guerrillas in the 1970s.) Peralta responded by instituting a state of siege and calling presidential elections for March 1966. The candidate of the Revolutionary Party (PR), Julio Menendez Montenegro, got the guerrillas to agree to a cease-fire. Menendez was elected, but his defense minister, Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, was a counterinsurgency advocate and the real power in the government. After careful intelligence preparation, he launched a massive ground operation with heavy air support against the FAR base areas. The guerrillas and their peasant supporters were nearly wiped out. Then, using the newly organized Mano Blanco (White Hand) death squads, Arana began murdering urban guerrilla supporters. In retaliation, FAR kidnapped U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein, who was killed trying to escape. A wave of terrorism swept over the country. Mario Sundoval Alarcon, the

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leader of the Mano Blanco squads, declared that if it was necessary to kill half the people in the country to protect the other half from Communism, he would, with regret, do it. Arana himself was elected president in 1970, followed by General Eugenio Kjell Laugerud Garcia in 1974 and General Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia in 1978. All the elections were fraudulent, and many voters did not bother to take part. During the 1970s, Guatemala became a byword for terrorism and repression. (The terror was interrupted only by a huge natural disaster, an earthquake on February 4, 1976, which killed 22,000 people, destroyed much of Guatemala City, and left more than a million Guatemalans homeless.) Between 1970 and 1982, tens of thousands of peasants, both ladino and Indian, were killed in military sweeps and by police and death squads. Thousands more simply disappeared, and others fled as refugees to Mexico. However, new guerrilla groups kept appearing. Since the repression was so widespread and indiscriminate, many came to feel they had no choice but to resist. By 1981 more than 6,000 armed guerrillas were in the field, and they had the support of approximately 250,000 poor people. Significantly, almost 90 percent of the guerrillas were now Indian. Under Lucas Garcia the repression reached perhaps its greatest intensity. In early 1979 two of Guatemala’s leading civilian politicians—Social Democratic Party (PSD) head Alberto Fuentes Mohr and United Front of the Revolution (FUR) chief Manuel Colom Argueta—were murdered by the secret police within two months of each other. Nearly a quarter of a million people marched in Colom’s funeral procession. By 1981, thirty-six PSD and FUR leaders had been assassinated. On May 1, 1980, Lucas Garcia’s police attacked the annual Workers Day demonstration, abducting and killing an estimated 200 participants, whose bodies were being picked up from roadsides for days after the event. Another Lucas Garcia target was the University of San Carlos, the national university. According to the rector of the university at that time, between 1980 and 1981, 300 faculty members and students were murdered and another 1,000 either disappeared or went into exile. Mass slayings in the countryside were even greater. A Guatemalan government official estimated that during Lucas Garcia’s presidency at least 25,000 peasants were slaughtered. In 1977, incoming U.S.

president Jimmy Carter cut off military aid to Guatemala, but the military advisory group (MAAG) remained in the country. Guatemalan factories and Argentine shipments made up for any arms shortages, and Guatemalan officers continued to be trained in the United States. One Lucas Garcia innovation was the introduction of Armed Civilian Patrols (CAPs). All adult males in the peasant villages were required to accompany army patrols and serve as informers. In September 1980, Lucas Garcia’s vice president, Francisco Villagran Kramer, a civilian who had hoped he could help put some limits on the terror, resigned. He went into exile in the United States, where he warned publicly that the situation in Guatemala was out of control. His first-hand reports had no influence, however, either in Guatemala or in the United States, which elected Ronald Reagan president in November 1980. The Reagan administration became even more supportive of Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaigns.

More Coups Another general, Angel Aníbal Guevara Rodriguez, was put up for the presidency in 1982 to succeed Lucas Garcia, and the openly fraudulent ballot count declared him the winner. However, many military officers had lost confidence in the counterinsurgency tactics being followed. Two weeks after the election, a military coup turned Guevara out of office and replaced him with retired General Efrain Rios Montt, who had been the victim of electoral fraud when he ran in 1974 and had been a candidate in the most recent elections. Rios Montt had been converted to evangelical Protestantism during a visit to the United States in 1978. He was extremely conservative and very pro-American. His military and business backers and the United States had supported the coup and believed that Rios Montt had a plan to restore peace and still maintain the traditional system. They were disappointed on both counts. Not only did Rios Montt resume the killings and disappearances, he stepped up military activity and formed more Armed Civilian Patrols, forcing civilians into the counterinsurgency. At the same time, he proposed far-reaching actions to help end the insurgency and deal with the country’s financial crisis. He outlined a plan to redistribute land, and proposed strict enforcement of tax collections. These liberal proposals did

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A government soldier guards a group of Guatemalan women at a traffic stop in October 1982, during the military dictatorship of General Efrain Rios Montt. Montt’s presidency marked some of the worst atrocities of the nation’s decades-long civil war. (John Hoagland/Getty Images News)

more to shorten his presidency than the slaughter in the countryside. His support among the Guatemalan elite and the international business community evaporated. Then he offended the army by showing open favoritism to officers who were members of the Word of God sect, to which he belonged. The military stepped in again to end Rios Montt’s presidency in August 1983, and General Oscar Mejia Victoria, the defense minister, took over. He put aside land reform and tax proposals and dismissed the Word of God adherents from their new positions. After that, his main aim was to stay in office until the next election. Nothing else changed. The killings and “disappearances” continued, as did the civil patrols and the refugee flow to Mexico. The war continued, although the impact of the CAPs did cut reported guerrilla strength, especially as the government began a massive resettlement program. One new development in 1984 was the organization of the Mutual Aid Group (GAM) by relatives of

the thousands of desaparecidos, those who had disappeared without a trace and were believed to be dead. GAM held meetings and public demonstrations demanding that authorities give relatives information on persons whose whereabouts were unknown. Predictably, the government denounced them as subversives, and GAM members themselves were “disappeared.” However, the resulting international publicity did worry the government and its supporters in the U.S. government.

Return to Civilian Rule The 1985 election was especially important for the United States because it occurred in the same year as the elections in Nicaragua, where the left-leaning Sandinistas were in power. The United States was hoping to discredit those elections (where the Sandinistas were certain to win) and to showcase elections in Guatemala as a victory for the U.S. policy of

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protecting and/or restoring democracy. The winner was Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo, who had spent the previous five years in exile in the United States. Many Guatemalans expressed satisfaction at having a civilian president after a succession of military officers, but their major concern was the deepening economic crisis. Inflation was running at 500–600 percent a year, and urban unemployment was over 50 percent. Treasury officials charged that previous administrations had embezzled over a billion dollars from the treasury. The country was broke. Cerezo made it clear that he was not going to challenge the army or seek to bring to justice those responsible for crimes and disappearances, nor was he going to propose economic or social reforms. As he saw it, his job was to establish a normal political governing process and let his successors deal with other problems. Cerezo also had to deal with foreign relations. The Central American peace plan was being negotiated, and, despite strong U.S. opposition, Cerezo supported it. In 1988 he played host to the final meeting of Central American presidents at which the plan was approved. In accordance with the Esquipulas II Treaty, Cerezo’s government began the process of negotiating an internal peace agreement with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the organization representing the main opponents of the counterinsurgency. The talks broke down almost immediately because the Guatemalan army was opposed to any settlement. Talks resumed in the succeeding administration of President Jorge Serrano. In January 1993, Serrano presented a plan for a cease-fire and guerrilla demobilization under international supervision, in accordance with preliminary agreements signed in Mexico City. However, the army, and later Serrano’s successor, Ramiro de Leon, rejected any international participation or supervision, especially any provision that would call military or government leaders to account for crimes against insurgents or would even allow investigation of their past actions. After the end of the struggle, hundreds of mass graves were discovered. The Roman Catholic Church in Guatemala identified 422 massacre sites. Evidence has been collected, and the skeletons of the victims were turned over to family members or friends for proper burial. In 1995 a United Nations’ human rights commission in Guatemala had sharply criticized the human rights record of the government of President

Ramiro de Leon Carpio. While not directly implicating the government, it presented extensive evidence of military involvement in human rights violations such as torture, and it cited complicity in cases of harassment, torture and murder. It particularly noted that authorities frequently and systematically failed to investigate such cases. In June 1996, a United States presidential panel, the Intelligence Oversight Board, issued a report on the actions and responsibilities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It concluded that the CIA “did not keep Congress adequately informed of its activities in Guatemala and was insensitive to human right abuses there.” Further, the report asserted that “several CIA assets [agents] were credibly alleged to have ordered, planned, or participated in serious human rights violations such as assassination, extrajudicial execution, torture or kidnapping while they were assets—and that the CIA was contemporaneously aware of many of the allegations.” On December 29, 1996, after nearly ten years of often-interrupted negotiation, an agreement granting amnesty to all parties was finally signed in Guatemala City. The guerrillas disarmed, and the long insurgent struggle ended.

Truth Commission In February 1999, a truth commission sponsored by the United Nations (formally called the Commission for Historical Clarification) issued a report on the tragedy that befell Guatemala over a period of some thirty-six years. It concluded that more than 200,000 people were killed, more than 90 percent of them by government forces, and it found that some of the state’s counterinsurgency operations could be legally deemed genocide—the attempt to wipe out an entire race or people. The report dismissed the Guatemalan military’s assertion that the massacres were the result of rogue soldiers. On the contrary, it reported that there was a “strategy to provoke terror in the population” directed from the very top echelons of government. It further asserted that the state “had become an instrument to protect a racist and unjust economic order.” Only minor progress was made in bringing alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide to justice. In the early 2000s, one army lieutenant and thirteen soldiers were sentenced to prison for forty years for carrying out the extrajudicial executions of

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eleven returned indigenous refugees in Xamán, Alta Verapaz, in 1995. Despite these convictions, international rights agencies warned that the justice system in Guatemala remains frail and unreliable. In the mid-2000s, the governments of Presidents Alfonso Portillo (2000–2003) and Oscar Berger Perdomo (2004– ) were accused by human rights groups of carrying out forced violent evictions in rural areas, allowing human rights activists to be violently attacked and killed, and not holding alleged violators of human rights responsible for their actions. Observers on both sides in Guatemala remained worried about the future. Landowners, military leaders, and peasant groups warned that the peace accords might not hold and that a breakdown could lead to apocalyptic battles. David MacMichael and Samuel Totten See also: People’s Wars; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; El Salvador: Civil Wars, 1970s–1980s; Guatemala: Coup Against

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Arbenz, 1954; Nicaragua: Revolution, 1970s; Nicaragua: Contra War, 1980s.

Bibliography Amnesty International. “Guatemala–2005 Annual Report Summary.” 2005. www.amnestyusa.org/countries/ guatemala/index.do. Fauriol, Georges A. Guatemala’s Political Puzzle. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988. Goldston, James. Shattered Hope: Guatemalan Workers and the Promise of Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. Jonas, Susanne. The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Landau, Saul. The Guerrilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. Perera, Victor. Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Trudeau, Robert. Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

GUYANA: Ethnic Conflict,1960–1992 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious Historical Background

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO SOUTH AMERICA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

VENEZUELA

Georgetown

G U YA N A SURINAME

BRAZIL 0 0

100 100

200 Miles 200 Kilometers

Guyana, the former British colony of British Guiana, became an independent country on May 26, 1966. On the northeast coast of South America, bounded by Brazil, Suriname (the former Dutch Guiana), and Venezuela, Guyana has a land area of 83,000 square miles, much of it rain forest, and a population estimated at about 750,000. The ethnic composition of the population is the country’s defining political feature. People of East Indian descent make up slightly more than half, and are the great majority in rural areas. Those of African origin constitute about 35 percent, and are the majority in the capital, Georgetown, a city of approximately 200,000. Slightly over 10 percent are of mixed parentage, and 5 percent are Amerindian. The economy is based on sugar growing, rice farming, and bauxite mining. Lumbering and mining for gold and diamonds are also important.

In 1814 Holland ceded the present territory of Guyana to Great Britain. Slavery was abolished in 1834, and to replace black slaves, the British began bringing East Indians into the colony as indentured workers in 1838. Approximately 238,000 Indians had arrived by 1917. About 32,000 Portuguese and 14,000 Chinese laborers came during the same general period, giving Guyana its current ethnic mix. Before World War II the only means for political expression for the majority of the population was through labor union activity. Unions were legalized in 1921, and became widespread in the 1930s. Strikes were frequent and often brutally suppressed by the government, with frequent killings of strikers. Unions formed the basis for the popular political parties that emerged after the war. Guyanese history since World War II is essentially the story of the lives of two men: Cheddi Jagan, an East Indian, and Forbes Burnham, a black. Jagan, born in 1918, the son of a sugar plantation worker, grew up in extreme poverty. He won a scholarship to Howard University in Washington, D.C. From there he went to dental school at Northwestern University in Illinois, where he married Janet Rosenberg. By his own account, he was appalled at the racist nature of U.S. society. He returned to British Guiana with Janet in 1943 and became an officer of the sugar workers union, Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA), in 1945. After a year he left, complaining that its leaders were corrupt and collaborated with the growers. He helped organize a rival union and in 1947 was elected to the Legislative Council, where he worked to diminish the influence of the Sugar Producers Association (SPA). His political reputation was made in 1948 when, as a leader of the Guyanese Industrial Workers Union (GIWU), he took on the SPA and the MPCA in a dispute over plantation labor practices. The workers rejected the MPCA’s agreement with the

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KEY DATES 1834

Slavery is prohibited in Guyana and the rest of the British Empire, prompting landlords to bring in East Indian indentured servants to work on plantations.

1950 Cheddi Jagan, a union leader of East Indian background, and Forbes Burnham, a lawyer of African origin, form the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) as a political organization that can overcome ethnic divisions within the country. 1957 Following a British intervention to prevent the Communist-oriented PPP from taking power, Burnham breaks from the party, and Jagan is jailed by the British. 1961

Fearing defeat in national elections, Burnham and members of his People’s National Congress Party attack PPP speakers in African areas.

1966 Guyana wins its independence from Britain. 1973 Following national elections, fighting breaks out between black supporters of the PNC and East Indian supporters of the PPP. 1985 Burnham dies during the 1985 elections. 1992 An alliance of the PPP and CIVIC, a businessman’s organization, wins the November election. 1997 Jagan dies in office and is succeeded by his American-born wife, Janet Jagan.

SPA and stayed out on strike. In June the police shot and killed five Indian workers and wounded fourteen others at a plantation. The Jagans led the funeral procession of the deceased from the plantation to Georgetown as thousands followed. Building on this event, they organized British Guiana’s first mass political party, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), in 1950. Seeking to cut across racial lines, they enlisted a brilliant young, British-educated black lawyer, Forbes Burnham. Jagan was head of the party, Burnham chairman. Janet Jagan was named general secretary. The PPP’s manifesto called for establishing an independent and socialist Guyana. (The spelling of the country’s name was changed at independence in 1966.) Almost immediately, though, there were divisions. The Jagans were internationalists, and sought alignment with similar parties worldwide. Burnham, more attuned to the Cold War mood in both the British Conservative Party and in the United States,

was afraid that the Jagan tendency would hinder achievement of the main goal, independence, or even result in proscription of the party. In the first elections under the new constitution in 1953, the PPP was opposed by a hastily organized National Democratic Party (NDP), a businessmen’s group to which the increasingly conservative MPCA allied itself. The PPP won eighteen seats, the NDP only two, while independents got the remaining four. The NDP campaigned on anticommunism, and its charges against Jagan and the PPP set off Cold War alarm bells in London and Washington. In London, Winston Churchill declared he would not see a part of the empire turn red, sent the British army into Guyana, and suspended the constitution. The official statement said this was necessary to “prevent Communist subversion and a dangerous crisis both in public order and economic affairs.” The Jagans and some of their adherents were imprisoned without trial for six months.

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Racial Split and Violence The British intervention caused Burnham to finally break with Jagan. Initially, the division was ideological rather than ethnic. Some Indians followed Burnham; some blacks stayed with Jagan. When new elections were permitted in 1957, both campaigned as the PPP, presenting separate slates of candidates. The results were a clear victory for the Jagan faction, 9 to 3 for the fourteen seats under the revised constitution, with two going to the NDP. Jagan became prime minister again, and Burnham formed the People’s National Congress (PNC), an openly black party. Although some blacks remained in the PPP, it became known as the Indian party. In preparation for full independence, the British Colonial Office issued a new constitution in 1960 and scheduled election of the new thirty-five-seat Legislative Assembly for August 21, 1961. Burnham and the PNC, smelling inevitable defeat, turned to terror. Black mobs attacked PPP speakers in African areas; to a lesser extent Indians responded in kind. The PPP took twenty seats, the PNC eleven. The businessoriented United Force Party (UFP) got the rest. Jagan again became prime minister, the third time in eight years he had prevailed in open, British-supervised elections.

C IA Involvement However, in the United States, the Kennedy administration, still smarting from its defeat at the Bay of Pigs, was not disposed to see establishment of a socialist government, however it reached office. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), at presidential order, organized Jagan’s overthrow. It was thought that Burnham would “cause . . . fewer . . . problems than Jagan.” The CIA was already at work in British Guiana. Jagan had engaged the distinguished British economist Nicholas Kaldor to prepare an austerity budget plan. Burnham and the UFP denounced the budget. So did the Trade Union Council (TUC)—whose leaders by then were on the CIA payroll through the AFL-CIO–CIA front organization, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Jagan withdrew the budget proposal, but the TUC called a general strike and, with PNC assistance, organized riots in which large sections of Georgetown were burned down; five people, including a police officer,

were killed. Next came negotiations for independence. Burnham and UFP leader Peter D’Aguiar insisted that there first had to be new elections under a proportional representation system since the PPP, under the existing British-style first-past-the-post system, had a large majority of the seats in the legislature, but only a 42.6 percent plurality of the popular vote. Jagan agreed to new elections and invited Burnham into a coalition government. Burnham, knowing that both the British and the U.S. governments were determined to oust Jagan and that he would be the ultimate beneficiary, refused. Meanwhile, the PPP had proposed a labor reform bill allowing the government to conduct a binding poll of workers where there was a jurisdictional dispute. The TUC and the MPCA (as well as the PSA) were opposed because the first poll would be of sugar workers, who were sure to vote out the corrupt MPCA and endorse the PPP-affiliated Guyanese Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU). MPCA called a sugar workers strike, but fewer than 10 percent of the 20,000 workers responded. No matter, the PSA locked the rest of them out. Burnham then called on the largely black Civil Service Association (CSA) government workers union to join a general strike. CIA officer Howard McCabe, using his cover as an officer of the Public Service International (PSI), arrived in Georgetown to coordinate activities. The CIA, through McCabe, paid the wages of the CSA members throughout the eighty-day strike. This alone cost the CIA a million dollars. AIFLDtrained goons terrorized the country. Negotiation was a farce. Every concession offered by Jagan was refused. Before the strike was over on July 8, with the labor bill withdrawn, nine people had been killed, hundreds injured, and huge amounts of property destroyed. In October, Jagan, Burnham, and D’Aguiar met with the British colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, in London to negotiate a new constitution, but they deadlocked on the issue of proportional representation. Finally, Jagan agreed to accept Sandys’ proposal, which granted everything Burnham had asked, especially proportional representation, with elections to be held in December 1964. Back in British Guiana, Jagan called a sugar strike, and this time the mostly Indian workers genuinely walked out. Burnham’s black mobs responded with renewed terror. By August 1964, when the strike was finally called off, 176 people were dead and 920

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injured. More than 1,400 homes had been destroyed. The British governor, a rigorously anticommunist South African, Sir Richard Luyt, openly sided with Jagan’s foes. In June, he ordered the detention of thirty-two PPP members, some of them members of the legislature. Elections in December were held under the new rules. The PPP increased its share of the vote to 45.8 percent, but only got twenty-four of the fifty-three seats. The PNC, with 40.5 percent, took twenty-two, and the ULF, with 12.4 percent, got seven. The PNC and the ULF formed a coalition, and Forbes Burnham became prime minister. Covert U.S. intervention had achieved its goal of getting rid of Jagan. It had also succeeded in intensifying the racial divide in Guyana and in getting the new country accustomed to the politics of fraud and violence. Burnham would prove a master at both.

Racial Politics in Independent Guyana In the elections of 1968 fraud was widespread. The number of registered voters in PNC strongholds magically increased by as much as 109 percent over 1964. Even more suspicious was Burnham’s device of making people born in Guyana but who had moved elsewhere eligible to vote. More than 45,000 votes, 95 percent for the PNC, were cast in the United Kingdom, where census figures showed only 20,000 Guyanese natives living. The elections of 1968 were nothing compared to the 1973 elections. The overseas roll was reduced by 50 percent, but somehow the number of domestic voters had increased by 25 percent. Proxy voting was made more efficient by simply forging signatures on the proxy forms, as many voters found to their surprise when they came to the polls and were told they had already voted by proxy. Postal voting was similarly abused. The PNC got over 90 percent of overseas, proxy, and postal votes. In 1973, votes were no longer counted at polling places, but all were sent to three central stations for tallying. Two Indian PPP poll-watchers who protested removal of the ballot boxes were shot dead by black Guyanese Defense Force soldiers. Conduct of the referendum on a new constitution in 1978 was just as bad. The opposition boycotted the voting, and observers estimated the turnout at no more than 15 percent. The government

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announced a 71.4 percent turnout and a 90 percent vote for the constitution. Jagan and the PPP were totally frustrated. Burnham would not play by the rules and, moreover, had concentrated all the armed power in the country in his hands—the police, the Guyana Defense Force, the People’s Militia, and the paramilitary National Service Corps, all overwhelmingly black in composition. Burnham, who had dutifully followed Washington’s antileft, anti-Castro line for the first few years after his installation, felt secure enough to revert to a third-world leftist line, even nationalizing the bauxite facility owned by Reynolds Aluminum. Jagan felt he could support this. Besides, the alternative was to drop out of politics altogether. It was a risky choice, and many of the old PPP members quit rather than cooperate with Burnham. One of these was the distinguished black historian Walter Rodney, then teaching at the local university. Rodney organized the Working People’s Alliance (WPA) and, despite assaults on himself and his followers, kept up a drumbeat of attacks on Burnham who, by 1980, had taken to calling himself Kabaka—meaning king, in Swahili. Rodney paid the ultimate price in June 1980 when someone killed him with a booby-trapped mobile phone. His followers were intimidated, harassed, and fired from their jobs. In the December elections following promulgation of the constitution and Burnham’s declaration of himself as president, the PNC again took almost all the seats. Foreign observers were shocked at the fraud. In the midst of the 1985 campaign, Burnham, aged sixty-three, died suddenly. The scheduled elections went on, but Burnham’s successor as PNC leader, Desmond Hoyte, proved as adept at fraud as his predecessor. Hoyte, however, lacked Burnham’s charisma, and this time all the opposition groups, including the PPP, denounced the fraud and formed the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD), which boycotted the 1988 municipal elections. Looking to the elections of 1990, Hoyte tried to brazen it out, organizing his own group of thugs, the Committee to Reelect the President, which attacked opposition rallies and tried to foment racial unrest. In the post–Cold War situation, the PNC government could no longer play off East against West to secure financial support. Western donors demanded

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that Guyana clean up its political act. Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter came to Guyana and explained the new situation to Hoyte. After numerous delays, while the voting rolls were finally put in order, national elections took place almost eighteen months late in November 1992. An alliance of the PPP and CIVIC, a clean government group of businessmen and professionals, took 53.5 percent of the vote to 42.3 percent for the PNC. Angry black mobs, seeing the end of twenty-eight years of rule, rioted, leaving two dead and hundreds injured. However, a transfer of government took place, with Cheddi Jagan resuming the place at its head from which he had been ousted in a U.S.-engineered coup in 1964. He became president and appointed CIVIC member Sam Hinds, a black Georgetown businessman, as prime minister. Jagan almost completed this term, dying in office in March 1997. In accordance with the consti-

tution, Hinds became president and appointed Janet Jagan prime minister. David MacMichael See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Guyana, 1995–1996. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1996. Jagan, Cheddi. The West on Trial. Berlin: Seven Seas, 1975. Manley, Robert H. Guyana Emergent: The Post-Independence Struggle for Nondependent Development. Cambridge, MA: G.K. Hall, 1979. Radosh, Ronald. American Labor and United States Foreign Policy. New York: Random House, 1969. Romualdi, Serafino. Presidents and Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967. Singh, Chaitram. Guyana: Politics in a Plantation Society. New York: Praeger, 1988.

HAITI: Civil Conflict,1990s– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups Île de la Tortue

CUBA

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Gonaïves Golfe de la Gonâve

Miragoâne

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HISPANIOLA

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Île de la Gonâve Jérémie

Historical Background

CapHaïtien

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Port-au-Prince

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Haiti occupies the western third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. It has an area of 10,714 square miles and a population estimated at 8.1 million, more than 700,000 of whom live in the capital, Port-au-Prince. It has two official languages, French and the local patois, Creole. Ethnically, Haiti is almost entirely African. The elite in business and government were traditionally drawn from the mulatto (mixed white and black) minority, and much of Haitian history is the conflict between black peasants and mulatto elites. The majority of Haitians are Roman Catholic, but the folk religion, Voudon (voodoo), is almost universally practiced. In recent years various Protestant churches, mostly conservative evangelical denominations, have gained many members. About two-thirds of the population are employed in agriculture. The majority are peasant farmers who grow maize, rice, sugar, and sweet potatoes for subsistence and coffee for export. Increasingly, with its low wages and unorganized working force, Haiti has attracted U.S. light industry, principally in textiles and assembly operations but also in data processing. By 1980 about 60,000 Haitians, mostly women and girls, were employed in factories, mostly in Port-auPrince.

Christopher Columbus discovered Hispaniola on his first voyage. Within a few decades, the Indian population was wiped out by the conquistadores and by diseases introduced by Europeans. Spain ceded present-day Haiti to France in 1697. Over the next century the French imported hundreds of thousands of African slaves, whose work helped make the sugar and coffee plantations of Saint-Domingue the richest in the world and gave Haiti its present racial characteristics. During the French Revolution, Haiti’s Toussaint L’Ouverture led a successful slave revolt against the French. By 1801, his forces had conquered the whole island and declared independence. The following year Napoleon’s forces attempted to reclaim Haiti for France. They captured Toussaint but were ultimately defeated by a combination of yellow fever and Toussaint’s general, Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Dessalines then took power. He and his successor, Henri Christophe, tried to maintain the plantation system that made Haiti prosperous and to enforce racial equality between blacks (noirs) and mulattos (clairs) at the same time. Their efforts failed because the newly emancipated blacks insisted on becoming small peasant farmers, while the mulattos (about 5 percent of the total population), who had been free under the French system, clung to their sense of racial and cultural superiority. During the nineteenth century this conflict contributed to both the impoverishment of Haiti and its division into two antagonistic ethnic groups—a black peasant, Creole-speaking majority that had little influence in national life, and a mulatto, French-speaking minority that monopolized civil and military government positions. The mulattos tried to maintain a distinct French culture, and supported themselves largely through customs duties paid mostly by the peasants and through heavy export taxes, particularly on the coffee those peasants produced.

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KEY DATES 1804

Haiti becomes first black-ruled republic, after defeating France and the slaveholding regime.

1986

Long-time dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier is forced to flee the country in the face of massive popular protests.

1990

Left-wing priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide wins the presidency in national elections.

1991

Aristide is overthrown in a bloody military coup.

1994

U.S. and UN peacekeeping forces ease military rulers out of Haiti and bring Aristide back to the country.

1996

Aristide steps down from power when his term is up and is replaced by supporter René Préval.

2000

Aristide wins the presidential election amidst violence.

2000–2004

Anti-Aristide violence continues; Aristide is forced to flee the country after a military coup; U.S., Canadian, Brazilian, and other troops under UN command land in Haiti to maintain peace.

2006

René Préval wins the presidency again in national elections supervised by the UN.

The United States, the major slave power of the Western Hemisphere in the first half of the nineteenth century, was horrified by the Haitian revolution against France. The U.S. government did not recognize Haiti as a nation until 1862, during the U.S. Civil War, when the Southern slave-holding states had seceded from the Union. After the Civil War, the United States began intervening in Haitian affairs, usually defending its actions on strategic grounds. In 1915, early in World War I, Woodrow Wilson’s administration invaded Haiti, explaining that the breakdown in public order in Haiti might lead to a growth of German influence. The Marine force that arrived in 1915 did not leave Haiti until 1934. The long occupation had two important results. First, its policy of placing only mulattos in responsible positions in the occupation government intensified ethnic divisions. Second, the occupation government disbanded the national army and created the Garde d’Haiti (national guard) for use as an auxiliary force against the largely peasant resistance. The Garde came to see itself primarily as an

internal security force reliant on a foreign power (the United States) for equipment, training, and direction.

From Occupation to Duvalier After 1934, three light-skinned presidents in a row held power, and Haiti remained generally orderly. Then in 1946, students mounted demonstrations against President Elie Lescot, who was considered too conservative, too favorable to the mulatto ruling class, and too much under U.S. influence. Taking advantage of the unrest, a Garde major named Paul Magloire led a military coup. In the following elections, Dumarsasis Estime, a member of the emerging black middle class, became president. Estime put more noirs in government, but he disappointed those looking for more substantial social change. In 1950, Magloire led another coup, this time making himself president. Soon he was faced with economic and demographic crises. After 1953, coffee prices sagged. With a rapidly growing population, per capita exports fell to less than a quarter of

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what they had been a century before. Displaced and unemployed peasants flooded the cities, especially Port-au-Prince. Attempting to control the situation, Magloire resorted to increasingly repressive tactics. To meet the expenses of government and pay interest on the skyrocketing public debt, he raised taxes on coffee exports, further squeezing the peasantry. The situation was exacerbated by environmental destruction, as the growing population was denuding the hillsides of any forest that remained to create more farmland. Magloire hoped to stay in power, but in 1956, a general strike led to increased violence and instability. In 1957, the military, in effect, took over. Its candidate for president was the noir medical doctor, François Duvalier, who won election. Duvalier proved an extraordinary politician and a ruthless leader, acquiring the nickname “Papa Doc.” Using bribery with state funds, he quickly built up a private security force (the infamous Tontons Macoutes) and subverted the army by dismissing the older mulatto senior officers and promoting junior officers loyal to him. He closed the military academy to discourage loyalty to the army and enforce loyalty to himself. When bribery did not suffice, terror was substituted. Business was placated by diversion of a greater share of coffee sale profits from peasant producers to merchants. Duvalier even ordered the expulsion of foreignborn bishops of the powerful Roman Catholic Church. At first the Church reacted with anger, but when Duvalier persuaded the Vatican to name native Haitian bishops in place of those expelled, he regained Church support. By 1963 Duvalier’s control was so complete that he could declare himself president-for-life. In effect, the state had come to exist for his personal enrichment and power. That power was used arbitrarily and without stint. François Duvalier died in April 1971, and his son, Jean-Claude, then nineteen years old, succeeded him. The succession proceeded without a hitch, and the younger Duvalier became known as “Baby Doc.” He was promptly recognized by the Organization of American States (OAS) and most governments throughout the world. Baby Doc promised an economic revolution, and there was a great spurt of electrification, road building, and expansion of the telephone network. These projects created temporary construction jobs, but they failed to increase manufacturing and quintupled the national debt. This outcome required new taxes

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on the hard-pressed peasantry and led to devaluation of the currency. The resulting inflation more than doubled the cost of living. In the late 1970s, the U.S. administration of President Jimmy Carter placed a strong emphasis on human rights. It persuaded Baby Doc, whose government was increasingly dependent on U.S.-controlled international loans and economic aid, to liberalize his regime. A limited amnesty was declared in Haiti, and an official human rights organization was chartered. In the new atmosphere, radio stations, liberal clergy, and others were free to criticize the government openly. Much of the criticism focused on Duvalier’s lavish lifestyle. In 1980, he married Michèle Bennet, a member of a wealthy elite mulatto business family, and she soon was notorious for spending huge sums on clothing and luxuries. Her liberality offended a public whose already wretched standard of living was deteriorating. In addition, Baby Doc’s marriage to a mulatto undercut his support among the noir peasantry. At the same time, Baby Doc began to lose control over senior military officers who owed their positions to his father and felt no personal loyalty to him. Some of them now had connections of their own to U.S. agencies, including the Defense Department, and these contacts were telling them that the Reagan administration, which succeeded Carter and was under attack for its Caribbean policies, might not be sorry to see Duvalier replaced by a reliable military government. In November 1985 the Haitian army killed four young children at a demonstration in the provincial city of Gonaïves. The killings set off huge protests. Apparently intimidated, Duvalier announced that he would disband the political police corps and cut prices of basic commodities. It was too little, too late. On February 7, 1986, a U.S. Air Force transport arrived in Port-au-Prince, and Duvalier, his wife and family, and most of the national treasury were flown to Paris. Army Chief of Staff General Henri Namphy, at the head of the National Council of Government (CNG), took charge and pronounced the advent of democracy.

Post-Duvalier After Baby Doc’s departure, mobs in Haiti took their revenge on the Duvalierists. During 1986, members of the Tontons Macoutes were hunted down and lynched, villas were looted, and strikes and protests

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forced those associated with the old regime out of office and into hiding. Peasants refused to pay taxes. Through all this disturbance, Namphy and the CNG kept a low profile, preparing for elections for a constituent assembly in October. The new constitution severely limited presidential powers, creating a prime minister with extensive executive authority. By the summer of 1987, the old order reasserted itself. Despite the new constitution, Namphy’s CNG fired liberal cabinet ministers in the temporary government and tried to take over the independent electoral tribunal (CEP). This move produced a general strike in Port-au-Prince. Namphy sent in troops, who killed more than 30 people. In July the army killed 300 peasants demonstrating for land reform. Namphy claimed he had put down an attempted Communist insurrection directed from Cuba. The elections scheduled for November 1987 were declared void after troops fired on citizens waiting in line at voting places. In the rescheduled election, a returned exile intellectual, Leslie Manigat, was elected president. Only 5 percent of voters came to the polls, so the new president took office without a popular mandate. In an effort to gain support in the army, Manigat tried to protect Colonel Jean-Claude Paul from extradition to the United States to be tried on charges of trafficking in cocaine. The effort backfired, however. Former president Namphy unceremoniously ousted Manigat from power after less than six months in office. When Manigat supporters protested, they were met with military violence. On September 11, troops burst into the parish church where liberal priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was celebrating Mass. They hacked a dozen people to death, then burned the church down. Soon afterward, Aristide was dismissed from the priesthood by his conservative Salesian order for “inciting violence and disorder.” A week after the church attack, the army rank and file—the “little soldiers”—mutinied, overthrowing Namphy. Colonel Prosper Avril and Sergeant Joseph Hébreaux became co-presidents, pledging establishment of true democracy. In an attempt to retain support and aid from the United States, Avril moved against the growing number of officers involved in the drug trade, which alienated powerful leaders in the army. At the same time, Avril angered civilian politicians by refusing to hold elections. He survived one coup attempt and began a harsh crackdown on political activity in January 1990. The U.S. government responded by cutting off desperately

needed economic aid to Avril’s government. When U.S. ambassador Alvin Adams threatened to have Avril’s personal U.S. bank accounts frozen, he gave up his office and fled the country.

President Aristide UN-supervised elections in 1990 were underwritten by the United States, which expected that the conservative former Duvalier finance minister and World Bank official Marc Bazin would be the winner. Bazin’s main opponent appeared to be Roger Lafontant, a former head of the Tontons Macoutes, who was strongly backed by hard-line elements in the military. The reformist democratic National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD) and its lackluster candidate, Victor Benoît, were lagging badly in the polls. Haiti’s traditional middle classes, mostly merchants and financial middlemen, were equally frightened of Bazin, who they saw as the representative of foreign capital, and of Lafontant, who represented the worst of the bad old days of Duvalier. They saw Benoît as a loser, and they persuaded the charismatic former priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to replace Benoît as the FNCD candidate. On December 16, 1990, Aristide won 67 percent of the vote; Bazin got only 14 percent. (As a member of the discredited Duvalier regime, Lafontant was disqualified as a candidate by the country’s Provisional Electoral Council.) Before Aristide’s inauguration, Lafontant and a group of officers seized the presidential palace. Loyal troops, backed by thousands of people, fought back and arrested Lafontant, but not before at least seventy people were killed. Aristide was duly inaugurated on February 7, 1991, choosing fellow FNCD member René Garcia Préval as prime minister. Referring to his victory in his inaugural address as lavalas, a Creole word meaning “cleansing flood,” Aristide appealed for justice and solidarity and promised food and education for all. Lavalas then became the popular definition for the movement that put Aristide in power. It was later adopted as the official name of Aristide’s political party. Then he challenged the army by announcing the dismissal of all general officers except the chief of staff, General Hérard Abraham. A month later he replaced Abraham with General Raoul Cédras. Aristide had overwhelming popular support, but he lacked a reliable majority in the national assembly,

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support from Haiti’s wealthy classes, and broad support in the nation’s powerful army or police. His program was designed to meet public expectations by rooting out corruption, ending the traditional system where holding public office was the means of personal enrichment. In a symbolic gesture, he cut his own salary and that of cabinet ministers to $4,000 a year from the previous $10,000. At the same time, he moved to reduce smuggling and maximize collection of customs duties and taxes according to law. This maneuver vastly increased government revenues without imposing new taxes on the general population. He also directed a major effort against the drug mafia that had rooted itself in the police and army. He was impatient with the legislature, which he rightly believed was full of politicians with little interest in revolutionary change. And if his dismissal of senior officers had rattled the army, his organization of a presidential security guard, trained by a Swiss mission, infuriated the military, who charged that he was building his own force of macoutes. On September 21, 1991, Aristide warned Haiti’s rich that he would soon launch a program for sharing the wealth and that if they did not cooperate “it would not be good for [them].” A few days later, on September 25, he addressed the UN General Assembly, advocating the right of all to eat and work and saying that everyone should be at the same table, “not a minority on the table and a majority under the table.” Back in Haiti, on September 27, he told his followers that if they were poor and hungry, they should demand relief from the rich. There were rumors of a coup, but Cédras, his chief of staff, told Aristide not to worry. To his later regret, Aristide did not call the people to rally in defense of lavalas. On the evening of September 30, army units attacked his home, and scores of people coming to his defense were massacred. He was taken to army headquarters, where Cédras and other officers debated whether they should kill him on the spot. Finally, they put him on a plane sent by Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, and he went into exile after eight months in office.

The Long Crisis While Aristide supporters in Haiti were strongarmed into submission, reaction of the international community was one of outrage. OAS general secretary João Baeno Soares called a meeting of the organi-

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zation at which the United States joined in a condemnation of the coup and demanded Aristide’s restoration. On October 2, the OAS voted a diplomatic and economic embargo of Haiti. On October 11, the UN General Assembly unanimously voted that the Cédras government and any government it might set up was illegal. However, it soon became clear that the U.S. administration of President George H.W. Bush saw the situation as an opportunity to install its favorite, Bazin. On October 7, the White House announced that its policy was to restore democracy in Haiti, not necessarily to bring back Aristide, who had relied on “mob rule.” The U.S. press began to report on alleged human rights abuses that had occurred during Aristide’s presidency. The United States did not announce its adherence to the OAS oil and economic embargo on Haiti until November 5. Even then, it did little to enforce the embargo. In November and December 1991, the U.S. ambassador to Haiti, Alvin Adams—an outspoken critic of Aristide—and OAS special envoy Augusto Ramirez Ocampo met in Cartagena, Colombia, with representatives of the Haitian parliament and with Aristide. Essentially, Adams and Ocampo gave Aristide an ultimatum. If he wished to return as Haiti’s president, he must dismiss his prime minister, Préval, and name either Bazin or Haiti’s tame Communist leader, René Theodore, instead. If he refused, negotiations would end, new elections would be scheduled, and the embargo would be lifted. Reluctantly, Aristide agreed to appoint Theodore. Following the Cartagena meetings, Aristide went to Washington and met again with U.S. legislators, most of whom had supported the coup. In February 1992, he signed a protocol that made his return as president conditional on granting amnesty to the army for its role in the coup, and accepting all parliamentary legislation since the coup. It specified that the crippling economic embargo would only be lifted when a new prime minister was installed. Aristide only insisted that the amnesty not apply to Cédras, whom he called a common criminal. The press in the United States condemned Aristide’s concessions; meanwhile, the parliament in Haiti rejected the accord Aristide has agreed to. It named Bazin to set up a “government of consensus.” Bazin, in response to demands that he do something to end the violent repression of Aristide supporters, agreed to accept OAS observers. The United

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Nations sent a 250-member civilian observer mission in March 1993. In part as a result of the observers’ negative report, in June the UN voted a global embargo on the sale of oil or arms to Haiti. Bazin resigned. While the political skirmishing continued, thousands of Haitians were voting with their feet (or oars) against the coup government by setting sail from Haiti’s coasts in hopes of reaching the United States. The Bush administration refused to recognize Haitian “boat people” as refugees entitled to asylum and ordered the Coast Guard to turn them back. Candidate Bill Clinton denounced this practice during the 1992 presidential campaign, but when he became president, he continued it. A camp for interviewing those claiming entitlement to political asylum was set up at the U.S. base in Guantánamo, Cuba, but almost all applicants were summarily returned to Haiti. The camp itself became an international scandal for its substandard conditions. At the same time, the U.S. embassy issued reports claiming that charges of terror and repression in Haiti were only propaganda from Aristide partisans being circulated by poorly informed human rights groups. The chief analyst of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for Latin America, Brian Latell, visited Haiti in June 1992. Latell prepared a classified document that somehow became public, asserting that reports of military repression were greatly overstated, that there was no systematic campaign, and that Cédras and his associates were the most promising group of Haitian leaders to appear since the downfall of Duvalier. In July, the former U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzullo, aided by former Argentine foreign minister Dante Caputo, brokered a new agreement between Aristide, the Cédras government, and the United Nations: Aristide would name a new prime minister; the United Nations would lift sanctions; a UN force would supervise reforms of the army and police; Aristide would decree total amnesty for participants in the coup; and Cédras would retire at some time before Aristide’s return, set for October 30, 1993. Even this near-total surrender by Aristide was not enough for the hard-liners in Haiti and in the U.S. government. In September, thugs dragged millionaire businessman Antoine Izméry, an Aristide supporter, out of church during Sunday Mass and shot him to death on the sidewalk. While Aristide’s new prime minister, businessman Robert Malval, was being installed on September 2, plainclothes police clubbed a crowd

of 150 people chanting pro-Aristide slogans. Prime Minister Malval was helpless. The army refused even to allow him to occupy his assigned office space, and he had to work from home. The police would not obey his orders, and the parliament ignored him. The low point came on October 11. The USS Harlan County, an amphibious landing ship loaded with the police and military advisers Cédras had agreed to accept, arrived at Port-au-Prince and was greeted by a demonstration of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH). The Harlan County backed off as the demonstrators jeered. FRAPH had been organized by Cédras and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Michel François, and its leader, Benjamin Constant, boasted of his links to the CIA and U.S. political figures, including members of Congress who opposed Aristide and the sending of any U.S. peacekeepers to Haiti. Two days later, Haiti’s minister of justice, François Guy Malary, was shot to death along with his driver and bodyguard. FRAPH was suspected. Cédras openly called the government’s agreement with Aristide a dead letter. He did not resign on October 15, as he had promised. October 30 arrived, and Aristide did not return. In October, the CIA’s Latell gave a classified briefing to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (presided over by the leader of the anti-Aristide forces, Republican Jesse Helms). Latell described Aristide as a psychopath who had been treated in a mental hospital, but the report was soon exposed as untrue. Clearly there were powerful forces that preferred the existing military rule in Haiti to Aristide’s return. The stalemate continued into 1994. In March, congressional Democrats and members of the Congressional Black Caucus, angered by the Malary murder and the differential treatment given to Haitian and Cuban boat people, expressed strong dissatisfaction with the Clinton administration’s Haitian policy. Six members of Congress picketed the White House and were arrested. Clinton was further embarrassed when Randall Robinson, head of the lobbying group TransAfrica, went on a month-long hunger strike to protest the refugee policy. On April 27, Lawrence Pezzullo resigned as U.S. special envoy to Haiti. President Clinton called on Cédras and other military leaders to leave Haiti forthwith. The Haitian response was to declare the presidency vacant, to appoint Emile Jonaissant acting president, and to schedule presidential elections for December. Cédras announced that he might run.

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Thereafter it was tit for tat. Clinton announced cessation of U.S.-Haiti commercial air flights and the freezing of Haitian military leaders’ U.S. assets. Haiti declared Florida Senator Bob Graham persona non grata, restricted movements of foreigners, and played old films of the 1915 U.S. invasion on national television. The United States leaked details of contingency plans for an invasion of Haiti and held Marine maneuvers in the Bahamas. Jonaissant declared a state of emergency and paraded combat-equipped troops through Port-au-Prince. Cédras declared he would resign only if the international community recognized Jonaissant as the legal president. If that was not done, he said, he would remain in his post and then run for president. When the United States began to protest human rights abuses, Haiti ordered all the UN and OAS human rights monitors out of the country. The various death squads then began dumping their mutilated victims on the streets. U.S. Congressman Bill Richardson went to see Cédras and told him that Congress was behind Clinton. Cédras laughed and boasted of his contacts with

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Senators Dole and Helms, both of whom opposed any use of U.S. troops in Haiti.

Intervention On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to raise a multinational force to force the dictatorship out of Haiti. It organized the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) with 6,000 personnel to keep the peace and retrain the Haitian army and police in preparation for new elections. Cédras ignored the UN move. On August 28, a Haitian priest who was a supporter of Aristide was murdered, and pressure on Cédras increased. Six Caribbean island nations agreed to provide troops to act as military police after any invasion. On September 16, a U.S. team composed of former president Jimmy Carter, former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) went to Haiti with instructions to negotiate the departure of Cédras; his assistant, General Philippe Biamby; and the police chief, Michel François.

U.S. President Bill Clinton and Haiti’s President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (standing side by side at center) attend the transfer of peacekeeping responsibility in Haiti from the United States to the United Nations in March 1995. (Cynthia Johnson/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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The talks stalled after three days, and planes carrying the Eighty-second Airborne Division headed for Haiti. After hearing the news, the three officers promised to resign on October 15, and the planes turned back. On September 19, troops of the U.S. Tenth Mountain Division landed peacefully at Port-auPrince, welcomed by cheering crowds of civilians. The United States eased Cédras out of the country on October 13, chartering a private luxury jet to fly him, General Biamby, and their families to Panama. The government also leased three buildings Cédras owned for $12,000 a month, paid in advance for a year. As a further bonus, Cédras’s assets in U.S. accounts, reportedly $100 million, were unfrozen. François fled to the Dominican Republic. Estimates are that 5,000 murders occurred in Haiti under the military regime of Cédras, along with innumerable instances of rape and other violence. On October 15, Aristide returned to Haiti and resumed office, while 2,000 UN peacekeeping troops remained in the country, along with a contingent of 600 U.S. “mentors” to help retrain the national police force. Aristide’s speech on the occasion was an appeal for reconciliation and a renunciation of violence. There was no more talk about the rich having to share with the poor. At the same time, little progress was made on questions of political reconciliation or economic development. Unemployment remained at levels as high as 60 percent, violence was still common, and international economic aid was slow in coming, largely because Aristide went back on promises he had made to international lenders to begin efforts to privatize some of the state-owned industries that were believed to be corrupt or inefficiently managed by the state. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established, but it received little financial support. In addition, it soon found that many key documents were missing (many of them removed from Haiti by the CIA). The commission produced few results.

Departure of Aristide Aristide stepped down when his term was over in January 1996, even though his supporters urged him to stay in office for three more years, making up for his long exile. Among his last acts in office were to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba and to propose a constitutional amendment abolishing the army.

His successor, René Preval, representing the Aristide party FNCD, won the election with 87.5 percent of the vote. The huge victory was possible because all opposition parties boycotted the election. Even many in the FNCD may not have voted, preferring Aristide to his successor. On the positive side, the transition from Aristide to Preval marked the first time in Haiti that one democratically elected president succeeded another. Even though Preval did not enter office with the mandate of the people, his election marked the beginning of a new period of political stability (or at least a period absent of coup d’états). Even so, little headway was made in solving Haiti’s major problems. Preval had promised to follow through with the privatization of state-owned enterprises that had been introduced in fits and starts during Aristide’s presidency and to begin land reform, enforce tax codes, carry out new public works projects, and restructure the army and national police. Yet he was plagued by the same ills that had doomed earlier governments in Haiti. Money and resources were in short supply, and opposition was rampant. In June, a plot was uncovered that would have assassinated both Preval and Aristide. In August, twenty men were arrested for a separate scheme to have Preval killed. Bureaucrats worried that privatizing government businesses would mean the end of their jobs. Elites feared land reforms and actually paying their taxes. Opposition parties brought stalemate to legislative bodies and undermined democracy by attacking the validity of elections. Perhaps most problematic for Preval, former president Aristide quickly became his constant critic. In fact, Aristide even attacked privatization plans that he himself had put forth. Prime Minister Rosny Smarth resigned in June 1997 amid persistent criticism of government reform programs. International lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were withholding much needed aid, which was contingent on privatization of state-run utilities companies, foodprocessing plants, two banks, and the main airport and seaport. Labor strikes were commonplace, serving to further undermine efforts to revive Haiti’s economy. Meanwhile, violence on the streets surged, largely the work of the rival drug gangs in Haiti’s major cities. With increased bloodshed, high unemployment (as much as 80 percent in the capital Port-au-Prince), and

Haiti: Civil Conflict, 19 9 0s–

a per capita annual income of just over $200, Haiti’s population began to turn against Preval. It seemed that no one was immune to the violence being perpetrated in Haiti. Senators, police, civilians, protestors, those in political power, and those in opposition were all victims of brutal murders, including drive-by shootings with machine guns and the infamous necklacing technique (placing a burning tire around the neck of a victim) for which both Haitian thugs and police had become well known. Law, order, and democracy had all but disappeared in Haiti. Several rounds of parliamentary elections had been held, but all were disputed by one party or another. The claims and counterclaims were so confusing that international organizations would not take a position on the validity of elections. The Lavalas Party had split in two: the pro-Aristide Lavalas Family Party against the anti-Aristide Organization of People in Struggle. Preval made several attempts to name a new prime minister but never succeeded. Finally, in January 1999, Preval refused to extend the term of the parliament. He dissolved the legislative body and began ruling by decree, effectively setting aside the democratic process in Haiti. As a result, as much as $800 million in international assistance was withheld.

2000 Elections and the Return of Aristide Parliamentary elections were held in March and May 2000. When violence flared up in the days preceding the elections, opposition candidates stopped campaigning. Speculation began that Preval and Aristide were now planning to install a dictatorship by ensuring Lavalas Family victories in parliament and an Aristide win in the presidential elections in December. Lavalas Family won by a landslide in the parliamentary elections, but opposition parties, international organizations, and the U.S. government all alleged that the elections were unfair. Among the facts they offered was that voting stations were staffed almost exclusively by Aristide supporters, because Haiti’s electoral council had certified only the identity cards of Lavalas Family members. Moreover, in the March senatorial elections, Lavalas Family was awarded eighteen of the nineteen seats contested, even though in nine of those cases, Lavalas candidates

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won less than 50 percent of the vote, which should have set up runoff elections. These irregularities would prove to be a major thorn in the side of the new Lavalas government, laying the groundwork for toppling it. In presidential elections in November 2000, Aristide won easily, a result that was guaranteed when all significant opposition parties boycotted the election. The official report of the Haitian government said that 60 percent of Haiti’s eligible voters participated, but international observers estimated that less than 10 percent voted. Annoyed that what he had once called a “foreign policy triumph” had now turned into a mess, and having spent nearly $2 billion in Haiti, President Clinton sought and received assurance from Aristide that in his second term he would implement reforms in the national security forces, recognize and include the opposition in government, respect human rights, and work more cooperatively with international lending institutions. Clinton also signed legislation that made further U.S. economic aid contingent on State Department certification of fair elections and on certification from the Drug Enforcement Agency that Haiti was cooperating in the war on drugs. It was not long before Aristide’s legitimacy began to be attacked. In February 2001, opposition parties such as the Democratic Convergence called for new elections, alleging that the May and November elections were illegitimate due to the lack of opposition candidates, low voter turnout, and fraudulent conduct of the elections. When negotiations with Lavalas broke down, Convergence created its own provisional government, headed by Gerard Gorgue, who had been instrumental in the civilian government that replaced the regime of Baby Doc Duvalier in the 1980s. Naturally, the Convergence government received no recognition from Aristide or from other nations. Discussions continued between Aristide and Convergence, but the atmosphere was poisoned by seemingly random arrests by the national police and unpredictable violence in the streets. With no agreement over the contested elections, $500 million in international aid was withheld, and Haiti’s economy was in shambles. In December 2001, former police and army officers raided the presidential palace in an attempted coup d’état. Aristide’s palace guard turned back the assault, and his supporters took to the streets wielding machetes and setting fire to opposition homes, offices, and radio

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stations. Despite calls from the OAS and Caribbean Community (Caricom) urging international economic assistance for Haiti, the United States and the European Union continued to withhold aid. Throughout the first half of 2002, talks continued with little success between the Aristide government and the opposition. By now, even the poor, the core of Aristide’s support, were becoming restless. They had celebrated his return to the presidency in February 2001, but eighteen months later they were realizing that Aristide was doing little to improve the quality of their lives. The poor began to respond to opposition calls for Aristide’s ouster. Increasingly, peasants, the urban poor, and students were attacking his government for its dishonesty and incompetence. In November, students occupied the state university in Cap-Haitian, and 8,000 to 10,000 took to the streets on one Sunday in protests orchestrated by Convergence. Aristide supporters, some of whom were simply bands of armed thugs, squared off against opponents in gun battles in the streets.

commanded death squads during the Duvalier regime, worked under the military regime of Cédras, and later helped found FRAPH; and Guy Philippe, Aristide’s former police chief and a top security officer under Preval. With little semblance of governmental control in Haiti, looting became a regular occurrence, death squads ran rampant, and corpses littered the streets. The United States, Canada, and France all urged a defiant Aristide to resign. By March 1, it was clear that his regime was doomed. He resigned and flew into exile in the Central African Republic. (He claimed at first that U.S. special forces abducted him to remove him from power.) In Haiti, rebel leaders pledged an end to the fighting. Boniface Alexander, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, was named interim president. His first act was to ask for a UN peacekeeping force. The United States and France agreed to send military support to help ensure peace in Haiti. The thirty-third coup d’état in Haiti’s history had come to fruition.

Continued Political Deadlock and Violence

New Foreign Intervention

Political deadlock, economic stagnation, and violence continued throughout 2002 and 2003, and the international community all but abandoned Haiti. Still citing unrest and corruption, foreign lenders continued to refuse economic aid to Haiti. Aristide blamed Haiti’s economic woes on the lack of assistance from abroad. He become so desperate for both foreign aid and a nationalist rallying point that he even demanded that France repay Haiti more than $21.5 billion, the price (with interest) Haiti had paid France for its independence in the early nineteenth century. Serious unrest began again in February 2004, and this time Aristide and his palace guard of 5,000 could not control it. In cities across Haiti, rock throwing, gunfire, and arson became commonplace. Opposition leaders and the government claimed no responsibility; even as the houses of both government and opposition leaders were torched. By the middle of February, chaos reigned. Rebels calling themselves the Anti-Aristide Resistance Group gained control of Gonaïves and other smaller cities. By the end of February, it controlled half of the country. Among the leaders of the newly organized rebel group were Louis-Jodel Chamberlain, who had

United States Marines arrived in Haiti on March 2, 2004, and ultimately were joined by Canadian, Chilean, Brazilian, and French forces under United Nations command. In spite of the presence of these peacekeepers, violence continued. The rebels never did put down their guns, and Aristide supporters did not give up their fight to restore the deposed president. The majority of Haitians, especially those in the major cities, continue to live in fear and poverty. The new government began arresting former Aristide officials, accusing them of crimes of brutality in the days leading up to the coup. Fearing for his life, Aristide’s last appointee as prime minister, Yvon Neptune, lived in hiding. In turn, while Aristide continued to insist that he was the only legitimate president of Haiti, Aristide supporters continued to make and carry out threats against government officials, insisting that Aristide was Haiti’s only hope. More than 1,000 people were killed by political violence in Haiti in the year after Aristide left the country. Presidential elections scheduled for November 2005 were postponed because the political scene remained so splintered and chaotic. Eventually, however, more than thirty Haitians had announced their candidacy for the presidency, including many former executives, including René Preval, Marc Bazin, and

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Leslie Manigat. Preval won the February 7, 2006, election decisively, but there was still controversy. Election officials claimed that he failed to win 50 percent-plus-one, thereby forcing a second round. Supporters, suspecting opponents were trying to steal the election, held massive protests around the country. The protests ceased when the electoral council issued a recount wherein Preval had won 51.1 percent of the vote and the presidency. David MacMichael and John A. King Jr. See also: Coups.

Bibliography Chomsky, Noam, Paul Farmer, and Amy Goodman. Getting Haiti Right This Time: The U.S. and the Coup. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004.

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Fatton, Robert, Jr. Haiti’s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. McFadden, Deirdre, and Pierre LaRamee, eds. Haiti: Dangerous Crossroads. Boston: South End Press, 1995. Perusee, Henry. Haitian Democracy Restored. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995. Pezzullo, Ralph. Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2006. Ridgeway, James, ed. The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis. Washington, DC: Essential Books, 1994. Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Haiti: State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990. Washington Office on Latin America. “The Human Rights Record of the Haitian National Police.” Washington, DC: January 1997.

MEXICO: Zapatista Uprising Since 1994 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War UNITED STATES

BAHÍA DE CAMPECHE

GULF OF MEXICO

MEXICO

PACIFIC

BELIZE

OCEAN

GUATEMALA

MEXICO

Huistán Tuxtla Gutiérrez

San Cristóbal

Ocosingo Altamirano Chanal Area of rebellion

C H I A PA S

GUATEMALA City occupied by Zapatistas

0 0

50 50

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

Mexico, which borders the United States to its north and Guatemala and Belize to the south, covers an area of 756,066 square miles. The southern portions are wet and tropical, the central plateau is temperate, and much of the north and west is desert. Mexico’s population passed 100 million in the early 2000s, making it the third most populous nation in the Americas, after the United States and Brazil. Ethnically, the majority of Mexicans are mestizo (of mixed Indian and European heritage). Indians account for about 10 percent of the population. Spanish is the official language, and Mexico City, with a population of 8.5 million, is the capital. Economically, Mexico is the world’s fourth-largest oil producer and is increasingly a major producer of natural gas. The country is also rich in minerals. It has a large manufacturing sector, employing almost a quarter of the labor force. An increasingly important part of this sector is located on the U.S. border, where maquiladoras (foreign-owned firms operating under

special tax regimes) carry out light manufacturing and assembly work. However, a series of severe financial crises since 1982—most recently in 1994—have hobbled its economic development. Much of Mexico’s most profitable agriculture— the growing of tomatoes and other vegetables for export to the U.S. market—is located on irrigated land near the border as well. In the south and central portions of the country, where the ejido system of small, individual plots of communally owned land predominates, agriculture is inefficient and farm incomes are very low. However, Mexico, with almost a quarter of the population working in agriculture, feeds itself and exports food as well. Together with the United States and Canada, Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Politically, Mexico is a federal union of thirty-one states plus the federal district of Mexico. Both the president and the bicameral national legislature are chosen through multiparty elections. In reality, for much of the twentieth century, Mexico was a oneparty state in which control was vested in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and direction of the government was in the hands of the president, who was ineligible for reelection after a single six-year term. The most significant event of recent Mexican history was the breaking of the PRI hold on power.

Historical Background Spanish conquistadores conquered the Aztec empire in present-day Mexico in 1519. For the next 300 years, the viceroyalty of Mexico, or New Spain, was Spain’s largest possession in the hemisphere. Finally, in 1821, Mexico gained independence. Much of its nineteenth-century history was an unrelieved tale of disastrous dictatorships and defeat. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna lost the northern region of Texas to rebels from nearby territories of the United States in 1835. In 1846, the United States went to war against Mexico, seeking its North American holdings. At the end

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KEY DATES 1929

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, its Spanish acronym) takes power; it will remain in power until 2000.

1988

PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari wins the presidency in national elections; opponents and many international observers charge massive fraud.

1993

The U.S. Congress ratifies the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), overcoming the last obstacle to creation of a free trade zone encompassing Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

1994

On January 1, the previously little known Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), formed in the 1980s, seizes the capital of the southern state of Chiapas and several other towns to protest NAFTA and government land policies; two days later, the government sends in troops; Salinas declares a cease-fire with EZLN on January 10.

1995–1998

Negotiations continue between the government and EZLN.

1996–1998

Right-wing paramilitary groups attack peasants, EZLN, and EZLN supporters in southern Mexico.

2000

Vicente Fox of the rival National Action Party (PAN) wins elections, ending seventy-one years of PRI rule; Fox vows to ease tensions.

2001

Upon becoming president, Fox pulls army units out of villages in Chiapas; Commandante Marcos, head of the EZLN, goes on a national bus tour to highlight indigenous rights issues.

2004–2005

After a long hiatus from the public eye, Marcos and EZLN issue communiqués, but the public pays little attention.

of the Mexican-American War, Mexico gave up more than half its territory (including the present-day U.S. states of California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and New Mexico). In the 1850s, Benito Juarez conducted a campaign for liberal reform (including independence of the government from the Roman Catholic Church). His movement led to civil war. Napoleon III of France intervened in the war against Juarez, and when his troops gained the upper hand, they designated the Hapsburg Archduke Maximilian as emperor. Maximilian accepted the position in 1864 and sailed to Mexico. Soon afterward, however, the French government withdrew its military assistance, and Maximilian was

left defenseless. He was overthrown and executed in 1867. Porfirio Díaz took power in Mexico in 1876 and remained in office until 1911. During his long administration, Mexico turned control of much of its economy over to foreign capital (both European and U.S.) in hopes of speeding up economic development. Although the country lost control of many of its resources and continued to oppress the poor, business interests did direct the development of railroads, telegraph systems, and other infrastructure. In Díaz’s last years in power, opposition to his dictatorship increased. Finally, in 1911, a rebellion organized by Francisco Madero was successful, and

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Díaz was ousted from power. Madero’s revolt soon turned into a broad-based social revolution, with Indians and peasants under Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa demanding land and bread. Nationalists sought an end to foreign control of Mexico’s economy. U.S. business interests favored Victoriano Huerta, another Díaz-style dictator, who overthrew and killed Madero and declared himself provisional president in 1913. After only eighteen months, however, Huerta was forced to flee Mexico, reeling under the attack of revolutionaries and criticism from U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Finally, the civil war in Mexico ended in 1917 with the victory of Venustiano Carranza, whose forces basically represented nationalist elites and middle classes, and the defeat of the revolutionaries Zapata and Villa, who, broadly speaking, represented the aspirations of Mexico’s small but radical urban working class, its landless peasants, and its long-abused Indians. The constitution of 1917 is famous for ejidos, lands set aside for Indian and traditional peasant communities, nationalizing oil and mineral deposits, and restricting foreign ownership of business. During the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (1934–1940), U.S.-owned oil properties were nationalized, and significant land reform occurred. Cárdenas’s conservative successor, Manuel Ávila Camacho, used wartime export earnings to build up Mexican industry. Mexican governments during the Cold War maintained more independence from the United States than most countries of the hemisphere but posed no security threat to the United States. U.S. leaders soon recognized that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), despite its revolutionary rhetoric, was a conservative one-party dictatorship almost immune to subversion. By 1968, the PRI was under siege by reformers and revolutionaries alike, but it demonstrated its determination and ability to keep control. Just before the Olympic Games were to begin in Mexico City, thousands of university students massed in Tlateloco Plaza for an antigovernment demonstration. They were dispersed by army rifle fire. Hundreds were killed, yet, despite the presence in Mexico of thousands of Olympic spectators and the foreign press, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz kept so tight a lid on the massacre that it remained almost a nonevent. Still, public memory of the slaughter would one day play an important role in the party’s decline.

1976–19 9 4 In the 1970s, Mexico was concerned about both the increasing level of insurgencies in Central and South America and the growing propensity of the United States to intervene. The overthrow of Chile’s socialist government in 1973 under the sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was troubling. Closer to home, so was the Sandinista insurgency in Nicaragua and the rising of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. In 1981, the U.S. administration of President Ronald Reagan began military intervention in Central America. At the same time, it threatened Mexico for its neutralist policy, leaked supposed intelligence estimates by the CIA predicting the imminent fall of the PRI, and endorsed the pro-business opposition National Action Party (PAN). The government of President José López Portillo (1976–1982), reaping the benefits of record petroleum prices induced by the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), embarked on a program of accelerated industrialization, borrowing heavily abroad to finance it. The collapse of the OPEC cartel and the subsequent decline in oil revenues left López Portillo’s successor, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, with massive debts to pay and no income to pay them with. Tough austerity measures hurt the middle class and workers. Unemployment rose, and so did inflation. The PAN began to win elections in the northern states. There were defections from the PRI, too. The most important was the governor of Michoacan, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the revered former president Lázaro Cárdenas. The younger Cárdenas formed a left-wing alliance, the Democratic National Front (FDN), and became its presidential candidate in the 1988 election against the PRI’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Massive fraud gave the victory to Salinas. Salinas began his term in 1988 facing charges questioning the legitimacy of his election. Combined with the steep government debt and need for economic austerity, the charges presented a daunting challenge for the PRI government. In addition, there were now two dynamic opposition parties—the PAN, representing the moneyed class, and the FDN, representing discontented workers, peasants, and the unemployed. Salinas chose to court the PAN, which could help him gain concessions from Mexico’s international creditors. As a reward for making the alliance, the PAN

Mexico: Zapatista Uprising Since 19 9 4

received opportunities to buy state-owned companies, which were being privatized to please international business. Workers had to hold the line on wage increases and endure layoffs. Reforms of the ejido guarantees in the constitution were proposed to create more efficient and productive agriculture, but their immediate result would be to force peasants off the land. Broadening foreign trade in foodstuffs also promoted efficiency but ruined many small Mexican farmers who could not compete with cheaper foreign produce. On the surface, Salinas and the PRI made a comeback in the first four years of his term. Boosted by the foreign loans and promised future benefits from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which Salinas had helped frame, the economy grew substantially, and inflation declined from 159 percent in 1987 to only 23 percent in 1991 (although real wages were still 25 percent below the level reached in 1980). A number of big businessmen defected from the PAN to the PRI and showed their new loyalty with huge campaign donations. In November 1993, the U.S. Congress passed NAFTA, and Salinas was hailed as the savior of Mexico. By the end of 1993, though, the Mexican economy had stopped growing. Commodity prices all but collapsed, with coffee growers in Chiapas particularly hard hit. Reports of guerrilla activity and land seizures by desperate peasants and Indians began to circulate, leading rural landowners to organize death squads (guardias blancas). Despite official reform initiatives, corruption in all areas of the PRI administration was coming to light. Police corruption and brutality were legendary in Mexico, but by the 1990s the large-scale drug trafficking produced an unprecedented situation. Marijuana had become the country’s largest cash crop, and Mexican heroin supplied most of the U.S. market. Police and army units were protecting drug barons or even running drugs themselves. Despite the magnitude of the situation, neither the Mexican nor the U.S. government wanted to call attention to it. Both governments were intent on getting NAFTA approved in the U.S. Congress and did not want to have questions about Mexico’s stability raised.

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Chiapas, calling themselves the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN, its Spanish acronym), seized four towns, including the tourist center of San Cristóbal de las Casas. In the takeover, five policemen were killed. At San Cristóbal, a Mayan Indian, Comandante Felipe, read a statement in front of the seized municipal palace. The fighters had come, he said, “to do a revolution against capitalism.” The government had never wanted to solve the problems of land rights, he said, so the EZLN would march to Mexico City to overthrow the corrupt and illegitimate government. However, Comandante Felipe spoke no English, and when frightened U.S. tourists approached to ask if they were free to leave, he had to call on a ski-masked individual, obviously not an Indian, nearby. This was the mysterious so-called Subcomandante Marcos. Marcos did speak English, and with his mask and ready wit, he became a favorite of U.S. journalists. The Zapatistas dominated the news. The army counterattacked on January 3, and the guerrillas melted back into the Lacandon jungle. On January 10, Salinas announced a cease-fire after a toll of 145 dead, many hundreds more wounded— the vast majority of them civilians—and about 25,000 refugees. The Mexican army received a barrage of international condemnation for the evident human rights violations that fitted neatly with the EZLN message about the mistreatment of the Indians that had caused the revolt in the first place. The Roman Catholic bishop of San Cristóbal de las Casas, the liberation theologian Samuel Ruiz García, was also loud in his condemnation of military violence.

The Zapatistas For Mexico, 1994 would be “the year of living dangerously.” The opening event occurred on New Year’s Day, when Indian guerrillas in the southern state of

Subcomandante Marcos, a spokesman for the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), reads a statement during peace talks with the Mexican government at San Cristóbal in February 1994. (Arturo Fuentes/ AFP/Getty Images)

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The military phase of the revolt was essentially over, but for Salinas and the PRI, the questions were what to do about it and how to do it. In his first public response, Salinas had condemned the Zapatistas as being “neither popular, nor Indian, nor from Chiapas” but foreign “professionals of violence.” He was wrong about their not being Indians. The Zapatistas numbered about 4,000, drawn from the various Mayan tribal groups in the Lacandon region. He was also wrong about their being controlled or financed by foreigners. The EZLN had, in fact, been organized and trained since the early 1980s by a small Mexican revolutionary group, the National Liberation Forces (FLN), which had been in existence since the late 1960s. Its leader, Fernando Yañez Muñoz (Comandante German), a Mexico City architect, had founded the group with his brother, Cesar, who was killed by government forces in Chiapas in 1973, and its main source of funding came from a radical bus drivers’ union in Mexico City. Subcomandante Marcos, was, in actuality, Rafael Guillen, son of a furniture store owner from Tampico and a former professor of graphic design at Mexico City’s National Autonomous University (UNAM). Forty-three years old, he had been recruited by Comandante German in the early 1980s and had been working in Chiapas since then. Nor were there any foreigners in the revolt. Yañez had sought assistance for the EZLN from Cuba, Nicaragua, and the FMLN guerrilla movement in El Salvador, but all of these, relying on Mexican diplomatic support, had refused to become involved. Marcos’s New Year’s Eve attack had jumped the gun. Comandante German was planning a series of countrywide actions timed to coincide with the national elections that summer. Marcos had argued that the Indians were desperate and eager for action, ready to drift back to their villages unless something was done. He also believed the uprising would be an appropriate response to the signing of the NAFTA treaty. Marcos’s talent for propaganda, however, turned out to be the EZLN’s most effective weapon. When Salinas offered pardons on January 10 to those who laid down their arms, Marcos, to considerable public applause, responded that the government should be asking the Indians to pardon it for its crimes and neglect. After the first few days of futile and counterproductive military action, Salinas was approached by Foreign Secretary Manuel Camacho Solís, who urged negotiations and a positive response to the EZLN’s legitimate demands. Mexico was getting a bad inter-

national reaction over the affair and, rather than have to defend a policy of repression, he was prepared to resign from the government. Instead, he asked that he be appointed peace negotiator. This was done on January 10, following which Salinas announced his cease-fire and offer of amnesty. Camacho immediately went to Chiapas and enlisted Bishop Ruiz, who arranged for communications between him and Marcos. The talks concluded on March 2 with the publication of thirty-four EZLN demands and government promises to increase social spending in the region, to recognize tribal systems of justice and political organizations, and to investigate the impact both of NAFTA and of the recent constitutional changes affecting ejido landholdings. In June Marcos reported that the EZLN political high command had rejected the government’s offer. ELZN demanded Salinas’s resignation and restructuring of the whole political system. At the same time, though, the EZLN promised not to resume hostilities—probably a wise choice since by this time the Mexican army had deployed over 20,000 troops in Chiapas. Instead, Marcos issued an invitation to distinguished Mexicans to come to a “democracy convention” in Chiapas in August prior to the national elections and ponder the future of democracy in Mexico. Some 5,000 mostly leftist delegates eventually attended. (The affair was surreptitiously funded by the government, which hoped to influence the EZLN at least not to disrupt the voting.) The convention denounced the PRI, called for massive civil disobedience in the event of electoral fraud, and pledged to work for a peaceful transition to democracy. Between January and March, the Zapatistas had been front-page news in Mexico, a symbol of the struggle between a PRI that in its drive for modernization was turning its back on the goals of the Mexican Revolution, and the EZLN, which, however naively, represented the social and national goals expressed in the constitution of 1917. Then, on March 23, PRI presidential candidate Colosio was assassinated during a campaign appearance in Tijuana. Suddenly public attention turned to the selection of the new PRI candidate. The party chose Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, who had been serving as Colosio’s campaign manager. The election itself was the first to which Mexico had invited international observers. Zedillo won with just under 50 percent of the vote, and observers reported that the voting was relatively free of fraud or corruption. The

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Zapatistas were suddenly old news, no longer a threat, since there had been no fighting since January. In fact, they had a generally negative image among Mexican voters, according to public opinion polls.

The Zapatistas and Zedillo The vote that put Zedillo into the presidency also elected a PRI candidate as governor of Chiapas, Eduardo Robledo Rincón, a result that made the EZLN unhappy. In addition, they were suspicious of the continuing military buildup in the region and the increase in paramilitary groups organized by local landlords, apparently with the assistance and approval of the army. Clashes increased in the weeks before the inauguration of the new governor, and a second EZLN convention voted for a civil disobedience action to show disapproval at his inauguration. However, renewed negotiations between the ELZN and the government in January 1995 produced an agreement to establish a national mediation commission. In fact, the government was preparing a new offensive. Zedillo was under pressure to do something dramatic. In December, the Mexican stock market had collapsed, and the peso was being devalued. The Clinton administration in the United States was frantically trying to put together a financial rescue package, but congressional opponents were pointing to Chiapas as a sign that the Mexican government might be overthrown. At the same time, Zedillo was under attack from his own generals. As education minister under Salinas, he had authorized printing of school textbooks that described the army’s role in the Tlateloco massacre of students in 1968. The books had been withdrawn, but the army still regarded Zedillo with suspicion. His advisers, after consultations with Clinton administration officials, recommended a military strike against the Zapatistas. A success would make Zedillo look strong and would help secure the financial bailout by reassuring the U.S. government and Wall Street bankers. It would also appease the restive military, who felt they had been unfairly blamed for allowing the EZLN to emerge in the first place. Moreover, Mexican intelligence had discovered an aggrieved former EZLN member who provided the true identities of Marcos and Comandante German and revealed the location of EZLN safe houses and weapons caches in Mexico City and Vera Cruz. With this information in hand, Zedillo’s government and military leaders planned Operation Rainbow.

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The plan involved having the government publicly offer the EZLN incentives to make peace, framed in such a way that they would be turned down. Then the informer would be brought into court to make his revelations. Zedillo would go on national television, reveal the existence of the “arsenals” (which in fact contained only a handful of small arms) as proof of the threat posed by the Zapatistas, reveal the true identity of their non-Indian leaders, and announce their capture. On February 8, 1995, the peso hit its all-time low against the dollar, and Zedillo gave the order to execute Operation Rainbow. In Chiapas, 2,000 soldiers stormed Marcos’s jungle headquarters in a dawn helicopter assault. At noon, Zedillo planned to appear on TV to announce the victory. All went as planned except that Marcos had been tipped off, and when the troops landed, the headquarters was empty. Zedillo delayed his TV appearance until 6:00 p.m., when he was able to announce at least the identity of the mysterious Subcomandante Marcos. While the mystery had finally been dispelled, Marcos’s escape made the army and the administration look inept and the EZLN perhaps even more competent and dangerous. With the failure of Rainbow, the government again reversed course. Within a week it withdrew the warrant for Marcos’s arrest. At the same time, Robledo Rincón announced he was temporarily withdrawing as governor of Chiapas, and further offensive military operations were suspended. In March, the PRI majority in the Mexican Congress sponsored, and all other parties supported, the Law for Reconciliation, Peace, and a Just Dialogue in Chiapas. The law looked to further negotiations and establishment of commissions to monitor the peace process. In August, the EZLN held a plebiscite in Chiapas and Mexico City in which about 1.2 million voters split evenly on whether the EZLN should become an independent political body operating within the Mexican system, aligned with some existing party— probably the FDN. In September the government and the EZLN signed an agreement laying out the agenda and the form for future formal negotiations. In January 1996, the EZLN announced formation of the Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN) as a political force, but one that would not field candidates of its own. Scheduled talks between the two sides went on through 1996, with mutually satisfactory progress made on issues of cultural and local

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governmental rights but no agreement on the underlying issue of land rights. The EZLN eventually withdrew from the talks because of the increasing military presence in the region, but the government coaxed it back early in 1997 by releasing from prison most of the EZLN members captured in the safehouse raids of February 1995.

Developments of the Mid-19 9 0s Most outside observers judged the EZLN no longer a military threat of any significance after 1996 and wondered how the FZLN would function politically. Nevertheless, PRI hard-liners and elements within the army were clearly concerned about the appearance of another revolutionary but smaller armed group in the state of Guerrero and unhappy that they had not been allowed to pursue the situation in Chiapas to a military conclusion. Local elites were dissatisfied with the semi-autonomy given to the Indian population. During 1996 and 1997 there were continuing reports of paramilitary action against Indian communities in Chiapas, with evident military complicity. In July 1997, the Chiapas state government made a 4.5 million–peso grant to a paramilitary organization, the Ruiz Ferro Government with Peace and Justice. The adviser to this group was a retired Mexican army general who had been relieved of his command in Chiapas the previous year after being charged with human rights violations. In August the EZLN condemned the transaction, noting it was an example of military involvement in the training of paramilitaries. The Mexican newspaper La Jornada charged in January 1997 that the Peace and Justice group was largely composed of discharged soldiers. Guatemalan, Argentine, and Israeli counterinsurgency specialists had visited the region, and, noting the increased number of Mexican military personnel receiving counterinsurgency training in the United States— particularly at the School of the Americas at Fort Benning—these specialists speculated that the paramilitary groups, operating with army assistance and at PRI direction, would become the equivalent of Nicaraguan contras, organized to defeat the indigenous community governments established in Chiapas under agreements of 1995 and 1996. Concerns escalated at the end of 1997. On December 22, a PRI-affiliated paramilitary group entered the Mayan village of Acteal, near Ocosingo.

After four hours of firing, forty-five people were dead. Chiapas police reportedly blocked access to the village during the attack and afterward assisted in removing corpses and other evidence of the assault. In the wake of the public outcry, both the minister of the interior and the governor of Chiapas resigned. Using the excuse of the danger to public security posed by the Acteal massacre, the army began a series of sweeps through indigenous villages in January 1998, arresting suspected EZLN members and confiscating weapons, although both actions violated the Law for Reconciliation, Peace, and a Just Dialogue in Chiapas.

Zapatistas and Fox In 2000, Vicente Fox of the PAN party defeated PRI candidate Francisco Labastida for the presidency, breaking the PRI’s seventy-one-year grip on power. Mexican voters had expressed broad dissatisfaction with the PRI’s insufficiencies. Among these failings was the party’s clumsy handling of the Zapatista uprising. Soon after Fox took office in December 2000, he moved army units away from villages in Chiapas, helping to ease tensions in the area. In 2001, Marcos and other Zapatista leaders undertook a national bus tour from Chiapas to Mexico City. Their purpose was to gather support for the enforcement of the 1996 San Andres accords and to promote adoption of a national bill protecting the rights of indigenous peoples. The Mexican Congress passed its own version of this bill later in 2001, which some complained had been unacceptably watered down. The Fox government did show some interest in addressing the major issue of land ownership claims. In addition, it allowed greater autonomy to state governments and funded public works projects in Chiapas. These actions helped slow the momentum of the Zapatista movement. The EZLN still discouraged its followers from using government-constructed facilities such as schools and health clinics or accepting financial aid from the federal government. Still, the ELZN showed some signs of softening its approach, removing its system of checkpoints and tolls in Zapatista-occupied territories. After a long absence from the public eye, Subcomandante Marcos reappeared in 2004–2005 to issue a series of intellectual communiqués. The new manifestos were met with general indifference. This reaction was taken as a further sign that the Fox government’s

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steps to recognize indigenous land issues, grant local autonomy, and provide local investment in Chiapas had eased the people’s sense of crisis. David MacMichael and Charles Allan See also: People’s Wars; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Guatemala: Civil War, 1970s–1990s.

Bibliography Hayden, Tom, ed. The Zapatista Reader. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/NationBooks, 2002.

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Oppenheimer, Andres. Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and Mexico’s Road to Prosperity. Boston: Little, Brown, 1996. Rus, Jan, Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo, and Shannan L. Mattiace. Mayan Lives, Mayan Utopias: The Indigenous Peoples of Chiapas and the Zapatista Rebellion. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. Russell, Philip L. Mexico Under Salinas. Austin, TX: Mexico Resource Center, 1995. Schultz, Donald E., and Edward J. Williams, eds. Mexico Faces the 21st Century. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995.

NICARAGUA: Revolution,1970s TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War While the beef and cotton boom made fortunes for landholders, the social effect was to displace peasants from their farms. Coffee was and is the mainstay for the mountainous interior, and the forests are commercially logged. There are also some significant gold deposits in the north-central area. Nicaragua was never a rich country. Today it has the second lowest standard of living in the western hemisphere, after Haiti. The country has been plagued by revolution and war beginning in the 1970s, the devastating earthquake that destroyed Managua in 1972, the looting of the national treasury by the departing Somozas in 1979, the U.S. economic blockade of the 1980s, the collapse of the cotton and cattle booms, low coffee prices, and unprecedented droughts in the 1990s.

Coffee growing area

HONDURAS

NICARAGUA Estelí

León Managua Masaya Jinotepe

PACIFIC OCEAN

CARIBBEAN SEA

Matagalpa

Chinandega

Lake Managua

Granada

Lake Nicaragua

Rivas Peñas Blancas n Sa

nR Jua

iver

San Juan del Norte

COSTA RICA 0 0

50 50

100 Miles 100 Kilometers

Nicaragua, covering 50,193 square miles, has the largest area of any country in Central America. Its population is approximately 5.5 million, up from an estimated 2.5 million in 1970. Managua, the capital, has about 975,000 people. Ethnically, the vast majority are of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry, mestizos, concentrated in the central and western portions of the country near the Pacific coast. The Atlantic coast to the west is thinly settled by so-called Miskito Indians—indigenous people organized as a single “tribe” by the British in the nineteenth century as part of their strategy to dominate possible routes for a trans-oceanic canal—and Caribbean blacks. The English-speaking Atlantic coast people resent rule by the “Spaniards” of Managua, and during the period of Sandinista rule received a significant amount of autonomy. The economy was traditionally based on Caribbean agricultural staples—coffee, sugar, bananas, and tobacco, with peasants growing maize, beans, rice, and other crops for consumption and sale within the country. In the 1950s, in common with the rest of Central America, Nicaragua vastly expanded cotton planting and cattle raising for the U.S. market.

Historical Background Nicaragua, whose native Amerindian population was almost completely destroyed during the Spanish conquest, was a colonial backwater during most of the period of Spanish rule. Two centers of power developed during this time. The landowners and cattle raisers of Granada, on the great central lake of Nicaragua, competed with the merchants and professionals of León, the colonial capital on the Pacific coast. With the coming of independence in 1821, the rival cities vied for political power. León was the citadel of the Liberal party and Granada of the Conservatives. Both parties of the elite, with little difference in policies or programs, they nonetheless competed fiercely and often bloodily for control of the country. As a sign of their incompatibility, neither would accept the other’s city as the capital, leading to the establishment of Managua as a neutral site in 1846. Nicaragua was distinct from the other Central American countries in that it offered the possibility of a sea-level canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, utilizing the great Lake of Nicaragua. For this reason, Britain laid claim to much of Nicaragua’s

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KEY DATES 1934

With the help of the U.S. military, which has occupied the country since 1912, National Guard head Anastasio Somoza García takes effective power; he lures leftist guerilla leader Augusto Sandino to the capital, Managua, and has him murdered.

1961

The leftist, anti-Somoza Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN, its Spanish acronym) is organized.

1972

A massive earthquake destroys Managua, killing 10,000 persons; an ineffective government response, including the theft of millions in international aid, turns large sectors of the population against the Somoza dictatorship.

1974

Newspaper publisher Joaquín Chamorro organizes the ideologically broad-based anti-Somoza Union of National Liberation (UDEL) political party; FSLN guerrillas kidnap high government officials and diplomats, demanding money and the release of FSLN guerrillas held by the government.

1977

The FSLN and UDEL meet in Costa Rica and form a unified front in opposition to the Somoza dictatorship.

1978

The FSLN launches a major offensive against the Nicaraguan National Guard.

1979

As Somoza flees to Miami and National Guard members slip across the border to Honduras, the FSLN takes power on July 19.

Atlantic coast, creating the fictional Kingdom of Miskitia that stretched from today’s Belize (once British Honduras) along the Atlantic coasts of Nicaragua and Honduras. The United States, once it had annexed California, also developed a proprietary interest. Nicaragua was the favored route for prospectors from the eastern United States to reach the California gold rush country in 1849 and after. American entrepreneurs built a railroad across Nicaragua from the Atlantic port of Greytown and operated steamers across the lake. In the 1850s the American filibusterer William Walker took advantage of one of the Liberal-Conservative civil wars to seize power, establish slavery, and get recognition from the Franklin Pierce administration. Walker’s defeat and ouster by combined Central American forces is part of Nicaraguan legend and the basis of popular hatred for los machos—the Yankees. During the same period, U.S. warships shelled and destroyed Greytown (San

Juan del Norte) for alleged insults to the U.S. consul there. Eventually England gave up its canal plans in favor of the United States and recognized Nicaragua’s claims to Miskitia. Nicaragua remained the favored prospective route, but after French efforts to build a Panama canal failed, U.S. interests purchased the French rights—over the objections of Colombia, which then owned Panama—and subsidized the Panamanian revolution for independence. Panamanian promoters then persuaded Congress that Nicaragua had too many volcanoes and would be an unsafe locale for the canal. Even after the Panama Canal was completed, the United States feared that a competing sea-level canal might be built across Nicaragua. To prevent this, they bribed the Nicaraguan foreign minister to sign the BryanChamorro Treaty of 1915, which gave any and all possible Nicaraguan canal construction rights to the United States.

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The canal route had been the main concern of the United States in Nicaragua, but the government also sought to protect U.S. holders of Nicaraguan bonds or other business interests in the country. Marines arrived in 1912, ostensibly to punish the government for executing two American citizens for blowing up a Nicaraguan naval vessel while in the employ of a rebel force. The Marines remained, in varying strength, until 1934, vigorously opposed by Augusto Sandino, whose “crazy little army” refused to be bought off or defeated. The occupation’s lasting legacy was the Somoza dynasty. Anastasio Somoza García came to power in 1934 through his command of the National Guard that the U.S. Marines had established to help fight Sandino. Somoza’s first act after the U.S. departure was to lure Sandino to Managua and murder him. His next was to seize the presidency in 1936. Identified with the Liberal Party, he used the Guard to crush Conservative opposition, provoking continual uprisings and plots, which he easily suppressed. Meanwhile, Somoza enriched himself by various means. His fortune received an enormous boost during World War II, when, as a staunch U.S. ally, he declared war on Germany and seized and kept for himself all German-owned property in the country. By 1944 he owned fifty-one cattle ranches and fortysix coffee fincas. Four years later he was the biggest property owner in the country, with millions of dollars in the bank and profitable investments in the United States, Mexico, and Costa Rica. He bought off the Conservatives by guaranteeing them a percentage of congressional seats and political offices. Meaningless elections were held regularly with two-party participation, and Nicaragua continued to be the best friend of the United States in the hemisphere, with a 100 percent record of support for U.S. positions in the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). The government also provided training facilities and other assistance to the CIA when it was working to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954.

Sandinista Revolution The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) grew out of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. Under Carlos Fonseca’s direction, the FSLN developed a program of clandestine social and political organization while constructing a military force on the model of

Sandino’s earlier guerrilla army. Despite repeated early military defeats and the arrest and execution of its political cadres by Somoza’s efficient security services, the movement grew throughout the 1960s, apparently learning lessons from each setback and gaining wide public respect for the heroism and sacrifice of its members. The FSLN also had the benefit of Fidel Castro’s example and advice. At the same time, members of the traditional political establishment were growing restive under Somoza rule. (Anastasio Somoza García had been assassinated in 1956, but family rule continued as the presidency was passed to his son Luis. Luis died in 1967, and his brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, known as “Tacho,” took the reins.) Conservatives resented being in a perpetual minority in the Somoza two-party system. Their discontent had been reduced during the cattle and cotton boom of the 1950s and early 1960s when the middle and upper classes prospered. With the end of the cotton boom and the simultaneous collapse of coffee prices, though, there was less tolerance for their brutality and greed, especially when the Somoza family expanded into banking, manufacturing, and retailing, driving established businesses into bankruptcy. Discontent turned to anger following the devastating earthquake of 1972, which all but destroyed Managua and caused more than 10,000 deaths. Most of the millions of dollars in international relief found their way into the Somozas’ hands, and their construction firms monopolized the contracts for rebuilding the city. In December 1974, the Conservative leader and publisher of the newspaper La Prensa, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, organized Conservatives, disgruntled Liberals, Christian Democrats, the Socialist Party, labor unions, business organizations, and civic groups into the broad Union of National Liberation (UDEL) demanding free elections and an end to human rights violations. The Somozas’ political base was eroding, as was their ability to use their vast wealth to buy off enemies. Still, the dictator enjoyed the continuing support of the United States, which, following the rise of Castro, saw Somoza as its most reliable ally in Central America. A few weeks later, on December 27, in a daring raid on an official reception, a masked Sandinista commando took hostage high government officials and numerous members of the diplomatic corps. After negotiations, the Somoza government agreed to a ransom of $1 million, release of numerous FSLN

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prisoners, including future president Daniel Ortega, permission to broadcast denunciations of the regime and calls for its overthrow, and free passage of the raiders and the released prisoners to Cuba. This was a brilliant propaganda stroke and an enormous humiliation for the Somozas, who responded by declaring a state of siege that remained in force for the next three years and by redoubling military attacks on Sandinista encampments in the northern mountains. The hostage operation also gained enormous international publicity for the Sandinistas. Support committees established in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, and especially Costa Rica, where Somoza was enormously unpopular, provided increasing amounts of money and arms. At the same time, the state of siege and Somoza’s brutal military campaign in the north, where thousands of campesinos were killed for supporting the Sandinista guerrilla forces, caused denunciations the government by the churches, particularly Roman Catholic missionary orders. Nevertheless, the military situation seemed to favor the regime, and by the end of 1976, U.S. intelligence predicted an imminent Sandinista defeat. In June 1977 the U.S. Congress, despite opposing testimony from international human rights groups, overwhelmingly supported continuing military assistance for the Nicaraguan government. Indeed, the situation caused the Sandinista leadership after Fonseca’s death to split into three “tendencies.” The “Proletarian” tendency de-emphasized the guerrilla struggle in favor of organizing workers and the urban masses looking to a traditional Marxist class struggle; the “Terceristas” tendency, headed by Daniel and Humberto Ortega, argued for cementing political alliances with such groups as the United Democratic Liberation Army (UDEL), building stronger international connections, and replanning the military strategy; the “Prolonged Popular War” tendency, headed by Henry Ruiz (Modesto), the northern guerrilla force leader, believed in intensification of the armed struggle in the mountains while at the same time preparing for urban uprisings. In the event, no single tendency prevailed. The potential splintering of the movement was prevented, largely by the diplomacy of Daniel Ortega, and all three strategies were pursued simultaneously. In 1977, there were four important developments. At a June meeting in San José, Costa Rica, UDEL and the FSLN agreed to form the Group of Twelve, representing all the political and social groups demanding

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an end to the rule of the Somozas. In the same month, the Sandinista military command prepared its plans for an all-out offensive to begin in October. In July, Somoza suffered a massive heart attack that put “the last marine,” as he liked to call himself, in a Miami hospital for more than two months, completely disrupting his government. Perhaps the most significant of the four, though, was election of the human rights–oriented administration of Jimmy Carter in the United States. Just as Carter was taking office, publisher Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the organizer of UDEL, was assassinated, apparently by agents of Somoza. Somoza still had well-paid lobbyists and powerful friends in Washington, among them his West Point classmate, New York Republican Congressman John Murphy. Charles Wilson, a Texas Democrat, was a powerful supporter as well. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman, who argued for continued military aid to Somoza for combating “terrorism,” and Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, also insisted Somoza was a critical anticommunist ally who had earned U.S. support. Carter did replace Ambassador Mauricio Solaum, an extremely conservative naturalized Cuban, with James Theberge, but Theberge, former ambassador to Chile, was also a hard-liner and not kindly disposed to revolutionaries or reformers. Somoza could also count on determined allies in the Pentagon and the CIA. Now, however, the insurgent alliance in Nicaragua also had access to high administration circles, and over the next two years U.S. policy gradually changed from all-out support for Somoza, as a necessary ally, to trying to get him to leave so that the more conservative UDEL groups, with the support of a still intact National Guard, could form a successor government rather than the suspect Sandinistas. The confident Somoza, recovered from the heart attack and regaining control of his subordinates, rejected all negotiations and compromise solutions that involved his stepping down. He boasted that he would be in office in 1981 and did not believe that Carter would.

Campaign of 1978 Humberto Ortega, now chief of staff of the increasingly well-organized and growing Sandinista forces, had already planned a 1978 campaign to shift from guerrilla tactics to striking at National Guard main forces. However, the campaign was given fresh impetus by the explosion of popular rage that followed

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Chamorro’s assassination. Urban unrest, including a spontaneous insurrection that raged for a week in February in Monimbo, a largely Indian section of Masaya, a city fifteen miles south of Managua, kept significant Guard forces tied down while Sandinista columns attacked Guard garrisons around the country. A critical blow to Somoza’s prestige, and an equivalent boost to that of the FSLN, was the seizure of the National Palace on August 22. Twenty-eight Sandinista commandos, led by Dora Maria Tellez and Eden Pastora (Comandante Cero), broke into the palace while the congress was in session, taking sixtyseven hostages, including Somoza’s nephew and halfbrother, and held them for more than 48 hours while a negotiating party led by Managua’s Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo and the Costa Rican and Venezuelan ambassadors arranged their release. A ransom of $500,000 was paid, fifty-nine political prisoners were released, and the Sandinista proclamation was broadcast over the national radio network. It called for a general insurrection to overthrow the somocista system, establishment of a popular democratic government, expropriation of all the Somoza family properties, and replacement of the National Guard by a new army. Somoza freed the prisoners and paid the money. Hundreds of thousands of people lined the road to the airport, where the Sandinistas and the released prisoners boarded a Venezuelan airliner and were flown to freedom in Panama. Meanwhile, more Sandinista-ordered insurrections flared in Estelí, Matagalpa, León, Granada, and other cities. These insurrections, like that in Monimbo, were put down, but not before the Guard suffered significant losses. The largely teenaged urban rebels proved adept in manufacturing Molotov cocktails and homemade hand grenades, and in destroying military vehicles. Many were incorporated into regular Sandinista formations. On September 9, the FSLN unleashed a coordinated series of attacks on Guard positions in all areas of the country—Esteli, León, Chinandega, Diriamba, Jinotepe, Rivas, Peñas Blancas, and Managua itself. The attacking forces were aided by the insurrectionary groups formed during the previous uprisings, and Guard reinforcements were ambushed, providing the Sandinistas with muchneeded weaponry. The attacks were unsuccessful, in that the Sandinistas did not hold any of the cities. However, they had not planned to. The objectives were to bloody the Guard, to raise revolutionary consciousness among the

urban population, organize them politically for the next phase, and gain recruits and weapons. All these objectives were attained, although not without a heavy cost in lives. In October, Somoza launched Operation Cleanup, a major sweep through the guerrilla areas. This failed to yield significant results, despite use of artillery, tanks, helicopters, fighter planes, and white phosphorus bombs.

Negotiations Meanwhile, Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica had been demanding that the OAS take action to end the fighting in Nicaragua. Costa Rica was particularly upset because Somoza’s air force had machine-gunned a convoy of Costa Rican government boats on the San Juan River, alleging that it thought they were a Sandinista supply operation. The United States felt obliged to act and early in October 1978 sent State Department planning chief William Bowdler as part of a three-member OAS mediating team—the other members were from Guatemala and the Dominican Republic—to discuss a settlement with representatives of Somoza’s National Liberal Party (PLN) and the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) that had absorbed Chamorro’s UDEL. Somoza welcomed the mediators but rejected accusations of brutality, claiming that the situation had gotten as bad as it was because he had been too soft. He was agreeable to elections, but they had to be held after he had completed his term in 1981. Anything else was “unconstitutional.” The FAO, for its part, demanded nothing less than Somoza’s immediate departure and establishment of provisional government to hold new elections. The Sandinistas and their allies denounced the mediation as merely a scheme to prevent their military victory and planned reorganization of the country. In an effort to end the impasse, the FAO, probably at Bowdler’s suggestion, tried to get the military to abandon Somoza. It emphasized that the National Guard was necessary to keep the peace and that its commanders would be technical advisers to the proposed provisional government. At this, the Group of Twelve, after urging in vain that the FSLN had to be a part of any provisional government, announced their withdrawal from the FAO, specifically denouncing the United States for backing an unacceptable solution that would leave, in its words, “the whole corrupt Somocista system intact.” Following this, the

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Socialist Party, the labor unions, and one branch of the Conservative Party all left the FAO. The State Department then proposed the Washington Plan, a plebiscite to determine whether Somoza should remain in office for the remainder of his term. The rump FAO rejected this plan on grounds that the Nicaraguan constitution had no provision for a plebiscite. Its members wanted Somoza out, and wanted a provisional government. Somoza himself opposed the plebiscite on the same constitutional grounds and was adamant that he would finish his term. OAS negotiations ended in November, leaving Somoza still in power but relying for support almost entirely on the National Guard and his own Liberal Party. He still had his vast wealth and powerful U.S. allies, particularly in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA. U.S. military assistance was ended, but Argentina and Israel made up any shortages in weapons and ammunition. The FSLN had denounced the negotiations, considering them a U.S. maneuver to deny them victory and new evidence of the sort of yanqui intervention that had brought Somoza to power in the first place. Their evident military strength and mass popular backing brought them recruits from groups that had left the FAO, forming a new alliance in February 1979 called the National Patriotic Front (FPN). The FPN’s guiding principles were national sovereignty, effective democracy, and justice and social progress. Somoza was isolated, and the middle-class opposition was split. The once-ignored Sandinistas now had united the majority of the country behind them, at least for the time being. Just as important, the leaders of the three Sandinista “tendencies” were finally able to meet and settle their ideological and tactical differences, unifying themselves behind Daniel Ortega, while still preserving a collective leadership.

Sandinista Victor y The final Sandinista military drive began in March 1979. Despite his loss of political backing and the near financial collapse of the country, Somoza was still a formidable opponent. He had tanks, artillery, and planes; the Sandinistas had none. Argentina and Israel were supplying weapons to Somoza, and he had used the period of negotiations to reinforce the Guard, bringing its strength to more than 9,000 men. Moreover, he had been able to maintain the loyalty of the Guard. There had been few defections,

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Daniel Ortega, the leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), announces the overthrow of the Anastasio Somoza Debayle regime in Nicaragua in July 1979. (Matthew Naythons/Getty Images News)

despite the best efforts of the FAO and the United States to have the Guard, in its own interest, oust Somoza and become part of the proposed provisional government. Somoza himself was confident. U.S. intelligence still believed that once the Sandinistas abandoned guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run attacks for a sustained offensive, the weight of Somoza’s weaponry would prevail. Also helping Somoza’s confidence was the belief, fostered by the State Department, that if all else failed, an inter-American armed force intervention, on the model of the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965, would take place. The Sandinista offensive largely hit the same targets that had been attacked the previous fall. Estelí was taken for good after a week-long battle in which over 120 members of the Guard were killed, two planes shot down, and several tanks destroyed. At about the same time, the coffee-growing town of Jinotega was also captured and held for four days before the 200 Sandinista troops abandoned it to a tank-led counterattack by more than 1,000 Guardsmen. The main action, though, took place in the

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south, where the largest Sandinista columns were advancing from the Costa Rican frontier. Somoza believed that if he could wipe out this force, which was largely being supplied from bases in Costa Rica, he could then deal with the columns in the north, which would be pressed against the hostile frontier with Honduras. His concentration of forces in the south, however, left the rest of the country exposed to the Sandinista attacks. A Sandinista-called general strike, which began on June 4, led to a new round of urban insurrections. The frantic Somoza began bombing the workers’ barrios in Managua, causing a Sandinista-led retreat of thousands of people to Masaya, where they reinforced the rebels holding that city. One city after another fell to the combination of Sandinista-led popular rebellions that pinned down the Guard until the FSLN columns entered and finished them off. The southern front had held, and by the end of June the Guard forces there found themselves isolated and threatened by Sandinista columns advancing from the north. By the end of June they were deserting in droves. The military phase of the Nicaraguan civil war was essentially over. On the political side, on June 16 in San José, Costa Rica, the FSLN announced formation of the Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction. The five members were Daniel Ortega of the FSLN; Moises Hassan, director of the FPN; Violeta Chamorro, widow of the slain publisher; Alfonso Robelo, a director of the FAO; and Sergio Ramirez, a novelist and member of the Group of Twelve. Meanwhile, most of the major Latin American countries had followed Mexico’s lead and broken relations with the Somoza government. The OAS, in an unusual display of independence, almost unanimously rejected Washington’s proposal for dispatching a peacekeeping force. Jimmy Carter’s new ambassador in Managua, Lawrence Pezzullo, pleaded with Somoza to resign while there was still time to keep the National Guard intact, and to form some sort of government before the Sandinistas arrived. In Costa Rica, Bowdler was

demanding that the Junta be expanded by adding two additional moderate members, again to no avail. By July 17, 1979, the Guard had evaporated as its members either surrendered or fled across the Honduran border. On that day, Somoza gave up and made his way to Miami, leaving Managua to Sandinista troops and supporters. Two days later the FSLN leaders arrived with the members of the junta, and the war was over. The Sandinista overthrow of the Somoza government of Nicaragua was a nearly perfect model of political organization and the development and application of military force. The Sandinista achievement was the more remarkable in that it was accomplished in the face of the determined opposition, not only of Somoza, but most of the dominant political and economic sectors of Nicaraguan society, to say nothing of the efforts of the U.S. government. The Sandinistas were fortunate that Somoza, by his unwillingness to compromise, caused many in the middle classes to rally to the Sandinistas or, at least, to consider them as the lesser evil. They were also fortunate that when the issue was in the balance, the post-Vietnam Carter administration in the United States hesitated to use the traditional means of overt or covert intervention by which Washington usually achieved its will against regimes considered disloyal or unreliable in Central America and the Caribbean. David MacMichael See also: People’s Wars; El Salvador: Civil Wars, 1970s–1980s; Nicaragua: Contra War, 1980s.

Bibliography Hart, Dianne Walta. Thanks to God and the Revolution: The Oral History of a Nicaraguan Family. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. Hodges, Donald Clark. Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. Tijerino, Doris. Inside the Nicaraguan Revolution. Vancouver, BC: New Star Books, 1978. Zwerling, Philip. Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution. Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1985.

NICARAGUA: Contra War,1980s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: Honduras; United States Historical Background iv e

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Nicaragua is the largest country in Central America, with an area of 50,193 square miles. Its population is approximately 5.5 million, the vast majority of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry, but the Atlantic coast is thinly peopled by Indian tribes and Caribbean blacks. Managua, the capital, has about 975,000 people. The main export crop is coffee, with bananas, tobacco, beef, and cotton also important. Nicaragua has some gold deposits, as well as large forested areas producing tropical hardwoods and pulp. In recent years, light manufacturing in special tax-free zones has sprung up to take advantage of cheap labor. Much of the rural population depends on subsistence farming, but rapid population growth and concentration of land ownership in the hands of big farmers have pauperized many peasants. The economy was devastated during the revolution of the 1970s and collapsed as a result of the Contra war and concomitant U.S. economic pressure. Nicaragua is now the second-poorest country in the western hemisphere.

After independence in 1823, Nicaragua endured continual civil wars between the contending elites of Granada and León, the two major cities, organized politically as Conservatives and Liberals, respectively. As the potential site for a sea-level isthmian canal, Nicaragua was always of great strategic interest to the United States. Even after construction of the Panama Canal, the United States feared Nicaragua might allow a competing sea-level canal. In 1915 the Bryan-Chamorro treaty gave all rights for any Nicaraguan canal to the United States. Concern over the canal route led to repeated U.S. Marine interventions. The intervention of 1912 became an occupation that lasted until 1934. In the 1920s the marines were baffled by the opposition of Augusto Sandino, the guerrilla leader who became legendary for his refusal to surrender or be bought off. The occupation’s lasting legacy was the Somoza dictatorship. Anastasio Somoza García came to power through his command of the U.S.-established National Guard. In 1934 he murdered Sandino, then seized the presidency in 1936. A Liberal, he used the Guard to crush Conservative uprisings and eventually established political peace by guaranteeing the Conservatives a percentage of congressional seats and government offices. While monopolizing political power, Somoza also became the principal economic force in Nicaragua. During World War II he seized all German assets in the country and kept them for himself. After the war he and his family expanded their landholdings and branched out into banking and commerce. Eventually, the family owned a quarter of the land in Nicaragua and had a fortune estimated at over $2.5 billion. The Somozas enjoyed Washington’s favor in return for their support for U.S. positions in the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS), and

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KEY DATES 1979

The left-wing rebel Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN, its Spanish acronym) overthrows the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle and takes power after years of guerrilla warfare.

1980

Conservative Republican Ronald Reagan wins election as president of the United States; his platform includes a call for the overthrow of the Sandinista government.

1981

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) meets with former Nicaraguan National Guard members to organize a counterrevolutionary army in states bordering Nicaragua; the force will come to be called the “Contras”; the Contras launch their first offensive against the Sandinista government from Honduras.

1983

With the Contras unable to topple the Sandinista government, oversight of the Contras shifts from the CIA to the National Security Council, with Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North in charge of the operation.

1984

The Contras mine Nicaragua ports; Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega wins internationally monitored elections as president of Nicaragua; the Reagan administration calls the electoral process a fraud; the U.S. Congress passes the second Boland Amendment banning U.S. aid to the Contras; North and other Reagan administration officials organize a secret operation to fund the Contras in violation of the Boland Amendment; the operation will later include secretly selling arms to Iran and using the proceeds to fund the Contra war.

1986

A U.S.-crewed Contra supply flight is shot down by the Nicaraguan government, exposing a secret Contra supply operation; a Lebanese newspaper exposes secret U.S. arms sales to Iran; the so-called IranContra affair becomes a major political scandal for the Reagan administration.

1987

Led by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, several Latin American countries, known as the Contadora Group, negotiate peace between the Contras and the Sandinista government.

1988

The last Contra offensive fails, ending the war.

1990

With extensive U.S. interference in the electoral process, Nicaraguan voters, fearing revival of the Contra war, vote the Sandinistas out of power.

for providing bases and troops for U.S. operations in Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, and the Dominican intervention in 1965. Somoza García was assassinated in 1956. The dynasty continued under his sons, Luis Somoza Debayle

and Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza Debayle, but there was growing discontent with their rule. Conservatives resented their continuing minority political status, and businessmen complained of unfair Somoza competition. Moreover, the Castro revolution and the U.S. defeat at the Bay of Pigs aroused revolutionary

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sentiments. In 1961 student radicals, led by Carlos Fonseca Amador and inspired by memories of Sandino, organized the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a guerrilla force and political movement that capitalized on the general discontent with the Somozas and overthrew them in 1979, forming a radical reformist government that established close ties with Cuba. In the spring of 1979, as it suddenly became clear that the Sandinista guerrilla army was going to defeat the National Guard, U.S. Army and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers met secretly in Managua with Guard leaders to plan for a post-Somoza armed opposition to the Sandinistas. CIA officers disguised as diplomats or Red Cross workers spirited Guard officers out of the country. Secret arrangements were made with the Honduran military for establishment of training camps and safe havens. Guard Colonel Enrique Bermudez Varela, Somoza’s military attaché in Washington and a longtime CIA agent, was sent to Honduras to organize the 15th of September Legion. Eventually, several thousand former Guard members were enrolled in training centers in Honduras, Guatemala, and Argentina, and in Florida and other U.S. locations. It is unclear how much of the early Contra activity was approved by or reported to senior officials in the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, which was pursuing an officially correct policy toward Managua even while it continued to work secretly with political groups in Nicaragua to destabilize the new regime. As early as 1978, the CIA had begun subsidizing non-Sandinista political and business groups, and in January 1980 Carter authorized the CIA to make a $1 million payment to the Chamorro-owned newspaper, La Prensa. Shortly after this, La Prensa’s owner, Violeta Chamorro, resigned from the governing junta, denouncing Sandinista authoritarianism. The Carter policy, despite the covert military organizing then going on, did not envision using armed force. It relied on political and economic pressures. For example, of its $75 million aid package, 60 percent was to go directly to private business organizations and none of it could be used for projects—such as public health or education—where there was any Cuban participation.

War Begins The succeeding administration of President Ronald Reagan denounced the Sandinistas as creatures of

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Moscow and Havana, a beachhead of the Soviet “evil empire.” The Carter administration had felt restrained because of post-Vietnam public distaste for armed intervention and revulsion against earlier CIA actions in Latin America revealed by the Church Committee in 1978. By contrast, Reagan’s advisers, particularly Secretary of State Alexander Haig and CIA Director William Casey, believed that the cure for the so-called Vietnam syndrome was to build on popular anger over America’s humiliation in 1979–81, when Iranian revolutionaries captured the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held U.S. government workers hostage for 444 days. They believed that the U.S. public would welcome a quick foreign policy victory won by the use of force. The easiest place to do this was in Latin America, where Washington traditionally had been able to impose its will and where its actions were sanctioned, at least in the U.S. mind, by the Monroe Doctrine. The Reagan hard-line policy in Nicaragua—and elsewhere in Latin America— was part of a global strategy to end détente with the Soviet Union and restore the pre-Vietnam policy of confrontation with the Soviets and efforts to roll back its “evil empire.” The 1980 Republican platform called for the overthrow of the Sandinistas before they could consolidate their power. Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, former deputy director of Central Intelligence, was sent to Argentina to arrange for officers to take charge of training an anti-Sandinista force. On August 11, 1981, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs Thomas Enders told Nicaraguan government leaders in Managua that unless they cooperated, they would face armed counterrevolution and that they could not hope to oppose the United States. On that same day CIA officers met in Miami with leaders of the 15th of September Legion and other members of the old National Guard to organize the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). In October, Reagan signed a “finding” that Sandinista support for the FMLN, the insurgent party in El Salvador, threatened U.S. national security. He got $19 million from Congress to establish an armed force of Nicaraguan exiles in Honduras to block an alleged “flow of arms” from Nicaragua to the FMLN. The “flow of arms” was only a pretext. The FDN (whose members were unofficially known as Contras) was told that its mission was to go to Managua, not to intercept arms shipments. Throughout 1981, about 6,000 men, almost all former National Guard

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members, were recruited and trained by U.S., Argentine, exiled Cuban, and Honduran instructors. While the Contras were getting ready for military action, political action and propaganda were not neglected. U.S. funds continued to go to La Prensa (whose editor, along with most of the staff, became so angry about the propaganda they were being forced to write that they resigned and founded the independent El Nuevo Diario) and to the Superior Council on Private Enterprise (COSEP), a businessmen’s group whose leaders lobbied Congress against U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua. Conservative elements in the Roman Catholic Church were also enlisted. The Nicaraguan primate, Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, was outraged that priests such as Miguel D’Escoto (the foreign minister), Ernesto Cardenal and Fernando Cardenal (education and cultural ministers), and Edgar Parrales (ambassador to the United Nations) ignored his orders to resign from the Sandinista government. Most of the bishops, equally conservative, supported Obando y Bravo, but many parish priests, particu-

larly in the foreign missionary community, were enthusiastic supporters of the government. The laity was also split, with many middle- and upper-class Catholics and their parish priests supporting Obando, while working-class parishes were enthusiastically pro-Sandinista. The Pentecostal churches were generally “anticommunist,” and the Moravian Church, the main religious force on the Atlantic coast, shared the regional suspicion of any Managua government. All these conservative and potentially anti-Sandinista religious groups were recipients, through one channel or another, of U.S. funding and assistance.

Contra Offensive A key element in the U.S. strategy was Contra seizure of some Nicaraguan territory in which a “provisional government” could establish itself and gain U.S. recognition and open military support. The ethnically distinct and remote Atlantic coast, occupied by the Miskito people, with its history of independence

Nicaraguan Contra rebels, counterrevolutionaries opposed to the Sandinista regime, failed in several strategic missions in 1983, leading to stepped-up covert support by the United States. (John Hoagland/Getty Images News)

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and general dislike for any Managua government, seemed to offer ideal terrain. In 1980, the flow of Sandinista government literacy volunteers, health workers (often Cuban), and new officials inevitably created suspicion and hostility. A young Miskito named Fagoth Steadman Muller, who led the group representing Miskitos and other indigenous groups in the new National Assembly, was recruited by the United States to organize a separatist movement that would welcome the Contra “liberators” and allow establishment of the desired provisional government. The plot was discovered and Steadman was arrested. Released after two months and given a scholarship to study abroad, Steadman instead went to Honduras. In November 1981, Steadman’s Indians, reinforced by Contra troops, crossed the frontier with the aim of seizing Puerto Cabezas. Once the government was established, the plan was for the United States to recognize it; blockade Puerto Cabezas with U.S. Navy forces; and use, if necessary, U.S. airpower to defend against any Sandinista attempt to retake the city from the land side. The CIA dubbed this “Operation Red Christmas.” The military offensive was easily defeated by Sandinista forces, and the Contra forces retreated back into Honduras but continued to raid across the Coco River frontier. The government evacuated the Miskito villages on the river and resettled the 10,000 inhabitants about thirty miles to the south, appealing to the OAS and Honduras to set up patrols on both sides of the border. Although Red Christmas was a military fiasco, the United States reaped a propaganda bonanza. The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, charged that the Sandinistas had put 250,000 Indians in concentration camps. Secretary of State Alexander Haig presented photographs of dead bodies being burned as evidence of Sandinista atrocities. He was unfazed when the pictures proved to be photos of Somoza’s troops incinerating corpses during the siege of Esteli in 1978. The next phase of the Contra campaign was a period of sabotage and terrorist attacks designed to cause the government to react with mass arrests and crackdowns on civil liberties that would show the Sandinistas as totalitarians and undermine their popular and international support. In December 1981, Sandinista intelligence thwarted attempts to blow up the country’s only oil refinery and a major cement factory. That same month the FDN blew up a Nicaraguan civilian airliner in Mexico City moments

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before passengers were to board. In February 1982, FDN bombs placed in luggage arriving from Miami exploded in Managua’s airport, killing four workers and wounding many others. The next month, FDN commandos blew up two major bridges in the north of the country. When Nicaragua protested to the United Nations, Kirkpatrick accused them of “paranoia,” and President Reagan condemned Nicaragua’s declaration of a state of emergency as evidence of their “totalitarian tendencies.” While terrorist attacks and sabotage were supposedly softening up the Nicaraguan population, the main Contra forces, in heavily armed columns of 200 men, crossed the Honduran border with the goal of taking Managua by the end of 1983. The immediate objective was to seize some frontier town and declare the provisional government. The larger strategy was to force the government to commit its embryonic army, still in the process of formation and training, before it was ready. The Sandinistas refused the bait and relied on popular militias (MPS), which, while poorly armed and trained, denied the Contra territorial objective. Nor did the Sandinistas yield to the temptation, also part of the U.S. plan, to attack the Contra bases in Honduras and allow themselves to be charged with aggression, even when Honduran artillery and aircraft were used in direct support of Contra attacks. The international press was now closely following events in Nicaragua, and well-documented reports of gruesome Contra atrocities began to appear in European and, occasionally, U.S. newspapers. In 1984 a CIA Contra training manual was discovered, revealing that terrorism, with its accompanying atrocities, was part of the operations plan for undercutting Sandinista support and that U.S. instructors were involved. Still seeking to establish a provisional government, the United States began Plan C in December 1982, by organizing a seven-person civilian FDN political directorate. Named as leader was longtime CIA agent and former head of the Coca-Cola operation in Nicaragua Adolfo Calero Portocarrero. The public affairs director was Edgar Chamorro, a former Jesuit priest and an advertising man who had been living in Miami since 1978. Two years later Chamorro broke with the Contras because of their reliance on terrorism and exposed embarrassing details of the U.S. involvement. With most of the new political directorate on a propaganda tour of Europe, the military part of Plan

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C began. A 700-man battalion under a former National Guard sergeant nicknamed El Suicida attacked Ocotal. Other Contras, a total of 3,300 of them in small units, dispersed widely through the northwest part of the country, attacking small towns and killing Sandinista officials, especially targeting public health clinics, schools, and agricultural stations. Peasants were forced to carry supplies for the invaders, and many were kidnapped, taken to Honduras, and forced into the Contra ranks. A concurrent plot to carry out urban terror bombings in Managua was penetrated and blocked by Sandinista intelligence. Still following the plan for capturing Jalapa or Ocotal, or some significant town in the north so as to install Calero as president, the Contras crossed the border again in March 1983 in Operation Siembra. Seven 250-man task forces were to conduct diversionary attacks on major population centers while 500 Contras, supported by mortar barrages and heavy machine gun fire, captured Jalapa. Again the Sandinistas refused to give up Jalapa, and the battered Contras retreated across the border, covered by Honduran artillery that almost destroyed the nearby frontier town of Teotacacinte. The Contra failures greatly improved Sandinista prestige. Popular morale, far from being damaged by the attacks as the CIA had planned, soared. Hundreds of thousands of people jammed the Plaza of the Revolution in Managua on the fourth anniversary of Somoza’s overthrow, July 19, 1983, to shout, “No pasaran” (“They will not pass”).

Eden Pastora and the Southern Front The FDN military failures and the Somoza political taint inspired the CIA to seek an alternative leader. Eden Pastora, who had led the famous raid on the National Palace in 1978; he broke with the Sandinistas in 1981. He offered his services to other revolutionary movements in Central America, but he was widely regarded as unstable and found no takers. In early 1982 he met with CIA officer Duane Clarridge, who was directing the Contra operation. After an elaborate campaign to disguise his U.S. support, Pastora emerged in San José, Costa Rica, in April 1982 to denounce his old comrades as corrupt dictators and to announce a “third way”: the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE), which would form a guerrilla force of patriotic Nicaraguans to rid the country

of Communist, U.S., and Somoza influence. Shortly thereafter, while U.S.-financed weapons and money flowed into Costa Rica, and U.S. agents near the Nicaraguan border prepared bases for the ARDE force, the CIA sent Pastora to Europe and Latin America to meet with Social Democratic and Christian Democratic political leaders, and to urge them to withdraw their support of the Sandinistas. Subsequently, he went to Honduras and met secretly with the FDN to coordinate FDN and ARDE strategies. The United States heavily pressured Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge to cooperate. Costa Rica, with the highest per capita foreign debt in the world, was deep in depression and dependent on U.S. financial aid to meet its obligations. Monge caved in, and ARDE began openly to operate from Costa Rican territory. In April and May 1983 Pastora’s troops, made up of followers of some of the smaller groups from the old anti-Somoza coalition plus a breakaway Miskito faction headed by Brooklyn Rivera, launched forays into southern Nicaragua while the main Sandinista forces were occupied with the FDN’s Operation Siembra. ARDE had some slight initial success, but by the end of May its troops were back in Costa Rica, having lost more than fifty dead and almost an equal number of prisoners.

Rethinking Strategy By mid-1983 it was clear to CIA Director Casey that the Contras would not be in Managua by Christmas. The three offensives had all been costly failures, and the Sandinistas had neither folded, resorted to a state of siege and counterterrorism, nor attacked the Honduran bases. They retained their support, and public morale was still high. In August Casey ordered Operation Black September, consisting of new ground attacks plus a campaign against major economic targets, specifically authorizing the use of U.S. forces if necessary. In early September another attack on Ocotal was beaten back, but small Contra units rampaged through northern Nicaragua, again attacking small villages and government installations, and kidnapping campesinos, or peasants. The new dimension was a series of air and sea attacks against critical targets. On September 8, 1983, an ARDE plane dropped two 500-pound bombs on Managua’s airport before being shot down and crashing into the control tower. The attack, which caused

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extensive damage and killed one airport worker, came just hours before two U.S. senators were to arrive. Documents in the plane revealed it had come from San José, and Pastora immediately claimed credit. The next day, two T-28 jet fighter-bombers launched from a U.S. Navy vessel bombed the main petroleum port at Corinto, narrowly missing a Soviet merchant ship. During the next week there were continued air raids, and Honduran navy ships and military aircraft fired on Nicaraguan coast guard vessels. Another ARDE plane was shot down near the Costa Rican border as it fired on Nicaraguan troops. Black September climaxed on October 10, 1983, when a U.S. Navy SEAL team roared into Corinto harbor in a rocket-firing speedboat. Two storage tanks with almost 3 million gallons of diesel fuel exploded. Flames spread to a third tank as the whole city was evacuated. After forty-eight hours, with the help of firefighting experts from Mexico, Colombia, and Cuba, the blaze was finally contained. Four fuel tanks were destroyed, along with 660 tons of imported foodstuffs and 40 tons of UN-donated medical supplies. By the end of 1983 the original Contra plan was still not working. Overall direction of the campaign was taken away from the CIA and given to the U.S. National Security Council (NSC). U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North assumed direction of the Contra effort, working with a small interagency group involving the State Department and the Pentagon as well as the CIA. The strategy was now to wage a war of attrition, with the United States confident it had the power to wear down the Sandinistas. With Congress already reluctant to vote more funds and U.S. public opinion increasingly opposing the Nicaraguan policy, the Reagan administration bungled badly early in 1984 when it sent U.S. Navy SEAL teams to mine Nicaragua’s harbors. The objective, as in the attacks on Corinto, was to frighten international shipping away from Nicaragua, further injuring its economy. The use of mines, which damaged British, Soviet, Japanese, and Dutch vessels, was a blatant violation of international law—and the planners had not even provided advance word to congressional oversight committees. When the mission was revealed, Congress passed the Boland amendment, specifically limiting funds for further support of the Contras. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration continued. It dared not use U.S. forces directly, but clandestine U.S. Army helicopters were still used to supply

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Contra units inside Nicaragua. Contingent funds from the CIA were still used for political opposition to the Sandinistas. Lieutenant Colonel North organized a complex “private” funding effort that included major donations from such countries as Saudi Arabia and Brunei (close and wealthy U.S. allies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia), and the proceeds from the illegal sale of U.S. weapons to Iran, which was deeply embroiled in its war with Iraq. When this web of connections was later made public, it was known as the Iran-Contra scandal. It was further revealed that major drug smugglers, who could use the clandestine delivery of arms for the Contras to ferry drugs and money, had also contributed to the Contra cause. In January 1983, four Latin American countries moved, at Nicaragua’s request, to develop a diplomatic solution to the conflicts in Central America. The foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela met at Contadora Island, Panama, and proposed a set of mutual nonaggression agreements among the Central American states, including elimination of foreign military bases and stationing on national soil of forces like the Contras. Later, five other major hemispheric countries—the Lima Group— joined Contadora. Nicaragua accepted all of Contadora’s terms, but under U.S. pressure, the other Central American countries refused. Secretary of State George Shultz even refused to meet Contadora representatives. Nicaragua and the United States did hold bilateral talks in Manzanillo, Mexico, beginning in 1984, but the United States unilaterally withdrew in 1985, at the same time that President Reagan voided the existing commerce treaty with Nicaragua and forbade the entry of Nicaraguan products into the U.S. market, a severe economic blow to the tiny Central American republic.

Nicaragua’s Counteroffensive While the United States settled for a war of attrition, using principally economic and diplomatic means to diminish the role of the Contras, the Sandinistas were not idle. On the military side, the new Sandinista People’s Army (EPS) was increasingly a force to be reckoned with. Conscription began in 1983, and the army was built up to a strength of nearly 50,000 and equipped with modern Soviet arms, from AK-47 rifles to HIND helicopters and tanks. The heavily armed units formed a reserve to meet any direct U.S. invasion, always a real threat. Light irregular warfare

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battalions, officered by regulars and with the ranks filled by conscripts, replaced the militia (MPS) in meeting Contra attacks. Between 1984 and 1987 the Contras were almost eliminated as a serious armed threat and were capable only of occasional terror raids. ARDE disappeared when the mercurial Pastora refused to cooperate with the FDN, and the CIA dropped him. In 1984, one year ahead of the announced schedule, national elections were held. The CIA employed its internal network to sabotage and discredit the process, and the United States attempted to force cancellation by creating a war scare. Thousands of U.S. troops poured into Honduras to conduct maneuvers; a large U.S. fleet stood offshore; and several times a day SR-71 supersonic spy planes flew overhead, causing loud sonic booms. Arturo Cruz returned from the United States to campaign as head of the Democratic Coalition, but, as part of the sabotage plan, he withdrew, charging unfair conditions. U.S. Ambassador Harry Bergold offered bribes to other candidates to join Cruz, and Virgilio Godoy, the Independent Liberal candidate, accepted a bribe, but his party repudiated him and stayed in the race. Altogether seven parties, including the FSLN, competed, with the Sandinistas taking two-thirds of the slightly over 1 million votes cast. International observers unanimously declared the process fair and open, and although the United States denounced it as a fraud, the Sandinistas clearly established their legitimacy and democratic credentials.

Iran- Contra Despite military, political, and legal success, the Sandinista government still faced the unending U.S. war of attrition. The economy, which from 1979 to 1983 had been the fastest growing in Latin America, was collapsing under the weight of the economic embargo and the burden of military expenditures. Inflation was rampant, and there was a shortage of consumer goods. With no end in sight to the war, the military draft grew increasingly unpopular. The vaunted health system was breaking down. Then in October 1986 an EPS patrol shot down a U.S.-crewed Contra supply flight. Crew member Eugene Hasenfus parachuted to safety and was captured. His statements and documents found on the plane led to congressional investigations establishing that the Reagan administration had committed wholesale

violations of law and lied repeatedly to Congress. The supposed private Contra support network was revealed as a government front, and, worst of all, the Contras had been financed in part by the illegal sale of arms to Iran by the U.S. government. The political fallout at first threatened the ability of the administration to continue the Nicaragua policy. New Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, who had won election by promising to get the Contras out of Costa Rica and to restore the country’s traditional neutrality, also saw Iran-Contra as a chance to take the diplomatic initiative. Not only Nicaragua, but all the Central American countries, were under severe economic stress and were suffering from the military burden imposed by the U.S. policy in both Nicaragua and El Salvador. Throughout the region, there was real fear of social breakdown and revolution. In August 1987, drawing on the Contadora experience, Arias called a meeting of all Central American presidents, including Daniel Ortega, at Esquipulas in Guatemala. The Esquipulas agreement called for a regional cease-fire. Irregular forces, such as the Contras, were to disarm, accept amnesty, and take part in constitutional political processes observed by the United Nations and the OAS. The Sandinistas immediately signed and began implementing the agreement— ending the state of emergency, freeing all Contra prisoners of war and ex-Somoza guard members, forming an amnesty commission (with Obando y Bravo at its head), and offering direct negotiations with the Contras. The United States denounced the agreement, and the Contra response was to try another offensive. In March 1988 the EPS counterattacked in its largest operation of the war. The Contras suffered over 1,000 casualties in a week; on March 21, faced with annihilation, they agreed to a cease-fire at the little town of Sapoa.

The War Ends This was the end of the Contra war. Reagan diehards in Washington were opposed, but the Iran-Contra scandal and the approaching 1988 presidential elections dictated an end to the military effort to overthrow the Sandinistas. The new Bush administration would devote its efforts to controlling the next Nicaraguan national elections held in February 1990. Even here the Contras played a role. Despite the Sapoa agreement, several thousand Contras remained in their Honduran camps. In late 1989, they began

Nicaragua: Contra War, 19 8 0s

re-infiltrating, making small attacks and distributing propaganda leaflets declaring that if the Sandinistas remained in office, there would never be peace; they would continue to attack. The same message was repeated by the heavily U.S.-funded opposition and the American Embassy. Any Sandinista victory would mean that economic sanctions would continue, and the military option remained. Faced with this threat, the government announced it would not end the unpopular military draft. This was a political mistake. In February a war-weary electorate, a people that had endured nearly fifteen straight years of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary war, chose United Nicaraguan Opposition presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro

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over the Sandinistas’ Daniel Ortega by a 55 to 45 percent margin. David MacMichael See also: Cold War Confrontations; El Salvador: Civil Wars, 1970s–1980s; Nicaragua: Revolution, 1970s.

Bibliography Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua, Revolution in the Family. New York: Random House, 1985. Girardi, Giulio. Faith and Revolution in Nicaragua: Convergence and Contradictions. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989. Kinzer, Stephen. Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: Putnam, 1991. Zwerling, Philip. Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution. Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1985.

PANAMA: Torrijos Coup,1969 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups COSTA RICA

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Panama occupies the narrow isthmus in Central America between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, bordering Costa Rica on the north and Colombia on the south. With an area of 29,761 square miles, it is the third largest of the Central American countries, but also the most lightly populated, with only about 2,700,000 people, most of them mestizo, but with significant black (14 percent) and American Indian (7 percent) minorities. Whites make up about 9 percent of the population, including much of the political and economic elite. The capital is Panama City. Since its discovery in 1513 by Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, who first crossed its approximately twentymile width, Panama was important as the natural bridge between the two oceans, and from the beginning there were schemes for uniting them with a canal. Mainly a commercial center and transportation hub, colonial Panama never developed the great landowner class typical of most of Spanish America. Wealth and political influence belonged to a mercantile and financial elite, as is still the case today.

Historical Background After Colombia gained its independence in the 1820s, Panama was a reluctant province of Colombia. Over the next eighty years there were sporadic attempts to secede. During the California gold rush,

New York capitalists built a railway across Panama. In 1880 a French company bought the railway and began to build a canal. In charge of the project was Ferdinand de Lesseps, famous as the builder of the Suez Canal. Due largely to the ravages of yellow fever, the Panama project was an expensive failure and was abandoned by 1889. After the Spanish-American War in 1898, U.S. interest in a Panama canal intensified, since it now had territories in the Caribbean (Puerto Rico) and in Asia (the Philippines). Finding a way for large ships to cross from the Atlantic to the Pacific became important both for military and commercial purposes. In 1903 the United States and Colombia signed the Hay-Herrán Treaty, giving the United States the absolute and exclusive right to build and operate a canal across Panama within ninety-nine years. Colombian sovereignty was recognized, and Colombia would have responsibility for military defense of the canal. The Colombian senate refused to ratify the treaty on the terms offered. U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt was outraged. U.S. agents persuaded some prominent Panamanian leaders to declare independence, and U.S. warships and marines arrived to prevent the Colombian landing force from interfering. Washington immediately recognized Panama’s independence and negotiated a canal treaty with the new government. The Panamanian negotiator, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was a French citizen who represented not only Panama but also the shareholders of the former French canal company. The treaty he negotiated was enormously favorable to the United States and the shareholders. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 gave the United States the right not only to construct a canal, but to occupy, with all sovereign rights, a zone ten miles wide, and to have in perpetuity the right to intervene anywhere in Panama to maintain order—all in return for one $10 million payment and a $250,000 annual rental. Moreover, Panamanians found themselves second-class citizens in their new country. For work on the canal, completed in 1914, there were two

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KEY DATES 1903 The United States helps Panamanian nationalists revolt against Colombia; the new country of Panama quickly signs the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, giving the United States the right to build a canal and occupy a zone around the canal in perpetuity. 1964 Rioting breaks out between Panamanians and American residents of the Canal Zone after the United States allows Panama to raise its flag in the zone. 1968 Arnulfo Arias is reelected president; after promising liberal reforms, he supports business interests and denounces supporters of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone as Communists; leftist lieutenantcolonel Omar Torrijos overthrows the Arias government and sets up a military junta with himself and fellow lieutenant colonel Boris Martinez as leaders; the junta promises elections within three months. 1969 When elections are not held on schedule and demonstrations begin, junta forces, led by Manuel Noriega, violently suppress Arias supporters; after Martinez unilaterally announces a land reform program in February, Torrijos has him arrested and sent into U.S. exile; in December, National Guard officers announce that Torrijos, who is vacationing in Mexico, has been overthrown; Torrijos returns to Panama and suppresses the overthrow attempt. 1981

Torrijos dies in a plane crash and is succeeded by Noriega as president of Panama.

pay scales, one in gold for North Americans, another in silver for Panamanians—a difference in value of four to one. North Americans, soon known as “Zonians,” monopolized the skilled and high-paying jobs and had extraterritorial privileges. The standard of living of the white Zonians contrasted with the general poverty of Panamanians, and within the zone there was strict racial segregation. Nominally a country, Panama was in effect a U.S. colony. U.S. military forces maintained the peace with nine interventions between 1903 and 1936, and U.S. officials controlled the nearly meaningless elections that regularly gave the presidency to the elite-run Liberal Party.

Nationalism Nevertheless, Panamanian national feeling, among both the elite and the masses, demanded more control over the canal. The Panamanian political figure

who came to symbolize nationalist feeling was Arnulfo Arias, a wealthy landowner with populist notions. Elected president in 1941, he was removed in a U.S.-managed coup primarily out of concern for wartime security of the canal, and because of the opposition of Panama’s elite to his populist reforms. Despite his removal, the nationalist issue would not go away. One of its aspects was the national police force. Until 1936 the force, by U.S. order, was small and armed only with handguns. Then it was changed into a sort of constabulary or civil guard and armed with rifles. During World War II, again at U.S. direction, it was further militarized and in 1953 designated as the National Guard. The United States saw the Guard as an auxiliary to its own troops and trained them at the School of the Americas. The upper classes welcomed the Guard as a protection against popular unrest and saw to it that the officers were either drawn from the elite or responsive to it.

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Moreover, since 1958, it was U.S. policy to encourage Latin American military forces, considered to be the most reliable anticommunist element, to play a more direct role in their countries’ politics. Panama’s National Guard became the dominant force in Panamanian politics, but after 1964, it broke free from its U.S. military support role to pursue the nationalistic goal of gaining Panamanian control of the canal. It also ignored the traditional leadership of the elite and undertook social and economic reform programs. The leader in this effort was General Omar Torrijos, one of a number of Latin American military reformers in the 1960s. General Torrijos would take power in Panama as the result of an apparently minor conflict, the flag riot of 1964. In 1963 the U.S. administration of President John Kennedy granted Panama the right to fly its national flag in the Panama Canal Zone, which previously had been illegal. On January 9, 1964, a group of Panamanian students tried to raise the flag over the Canal Zone high school. A mob of Zonians promptly tore it down, starting a three-day riot that eventually had U.S. troops firing on the Panamanian demonstrators and demonstrators firing back. Before it was over, twenty-one Panamanians were dead and hundreds injured. Four U.S. soldiers also died. Panama broke diplomatic relations with the United States; after relations were restored, the United States agreed to negotiate a new canal treaty. In 1967, it proposed a new treaty that would extend U.S. rights another hundred years, until 2067, and also give the United States exclusive rights to construct any new sea-level canal in the isthmus. Neither side ratified the treaty.

19 6 8 Coup and Its Consequences In 1968 Arnulfo Arias was again elected president of Panama. Although running as a reformer, he had actually promised the business community that he would repeal taxes on business imposed by his predecessor, Roberto Chiari. Although known as a nationalist, he now denounced those who had taken part in the flag riots as Communists. He also made clear his determination to destroy the National Guard as a competing political force. His first act as president was to reassign Omar Torrijos, then a lieutenant colonel, to be military attaché in El Salvador and fire other top Guard officers in order to install his own men. Within eleven days a Torrijosled coup deposed Arias and sent him into exile. Torri-

jos and Lieutenant Colonel Boris Martínez led a military junta that promised elections within three months. When elections were not held, pro-Arias partisans began a revolt in Chiriquí Province. This was repressed by Manuel Noriega, a captain in the National Guard, with a brutality never before seen in Panama. Scores of Arias supporters were killed or imprisoned. Meanwhile, Martínez and Torrijos fought for power. When Martínez, acting on his own, announced a radical land reform program on February 24, 1969, Torrijos arrested him and sent him into exile in Miami. Torrijos feared that Martínez would be considered pro-Communist by the United States, putting in jeopardy his own plan for getting Panamanian control of the canal. Torrijos’s political program concentrated on bridging the racial and social barriers in Panamanian society and on Panamanian nationalism, with the Canal Zone as its focus. Obviously, the Torrijos program was not favored by the United States, which had its own agents in the National Guard. On December 15, 1969, while Torrijos was vacationing in Mexico, the two senior Guard officers at its headquarters in Panama City announced they were deposing him for his supposed Communist and dictatorial tendencies. While most Guard commanders refused to declare themselves for one side or the other, waiting to see if Torrijos could make an effective response, Captain Noriega in Chiriquí informed Torrijos he was ready to fight for him. The next morning Torrijos arrived in Chiriqui in a hired plane. When word of his return reached his supporters in Panama City, they arrested the coup leaders, and Torrijos made a triumphal entry into the capital, cheered by tens of thousands. Torrijos, the champion of nationalism, was now the unchallenged leader of Panama. He had become someone to be reckoned with, a leader compared to Cuba’s Fidel Castro or Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. The date of his arrival in Panama City became a national holiday, Loyalty Day, marking the beginning of the nationalist revolution. David MacMichael See also: Coups; Panama: U.S. Invasion, 1989.

Bibliography Buckley, Kevin. Panama: The Whole Story. New York: Random House, 1991. Dinges, John. Our Man in Panama. New York: Random House, 1990. Weeks, John, and Phil Gunson. Panama: Made in the USA. London: Latin America Bureau, 1991.

PANAMA: U.S. Invasion,1989 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: United States COSTA RICA

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CA

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100 Miles 100 Kilometers

El Porvenir

Colón Panama City

COLÓN

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La Palma DARIÉN

LOS SANTOS

COLOMBIA

Since 1903 Panama had been a quasi-colony of the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt was angry when the Colombian senate rejected the HayHerrán Treaty, which would have given the United States the right to build a canal through what was then the Colombian province of Panama, creating a passage between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in Central America. The U.S. government, working with dissidents in Panama, engineered a Panamanian declaration of independence from Colombia, then sent U.S. warships and marines to prevent Colombia from interfering in the organization of a new Panamanian government. The United States promptly recognized Panama, and soon afterward, the two countries signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, giving the United States the right to build the canal, and to have perpetual sovereign rights over a canal zone 10 miles wide, occupying 400 square miles of Panamanian territory. The treaty also gave the United States the right to use its armed forces in all of Panama to preserve peace and order. Panama, in return, received a flat $10 million payment and, after ten years, an annual payment of $250,000. Many Panamanians were outraged by the treaty, believing they had been sold out by their

negotiator, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French citizen who also represented the interests of the shareholders of the bankrupt French company that had tried and failed to construct a canal across Panama in the 1880s. The treaty he helped negotiate provided generous payment to the shareholders of the old French company for work it had accomplished. The United States intervened in Panama for the first time in 1904 to suppress anti-treaty rioting. U.S. troops remained to supervise writing of a Panamanian constitution that incorporated the right of the United States to intervene at any time to preserve peace and order, disbanded the Panamanian army, and established the U.S. dollar as the official currency. Construction went forward, and the canal was completed in 1914. Finally, in 1936, the United States and Panama signed a General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in which the United States abandoned the right to intervene. It was still understood, however, that there were limits to Panama’s independence. The Canal Zone remained a foreign enclave where the U.S. citizen residents—known as Zonians—enjoyed exemption from Panamanian laws, monopolized the skilled and high-paying jobs on the canal (with a two-tiered wage scale that paid Zonians almost four times as much as Panamanians doing equivalent work), and installed a strict system of U.S.-style racial segregation. Even though all Panamanians benefited economically from the presence of the canal, and incomes were measurably higher than in other countries of Central America, the situation still rankled. Among the white elite in Panama, politically ambitious leaders adopted a nationalist stance, urging greater independence for Panama. Chief among them was Arnulfo Arias. A wealthy landowner and leader of the dominant Liberal Party, Arias mixed his nationalism with public admiration for the fascism of Italy’s

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KEY DATES 1903

The United States helps Panamanian nationalists revolt against Colombia; the new country of Panama quickly signs the HayBunau-Varilla Treaty, giving the United States the right to build a canal and occupy a zone around the canal in perpetuity.

1968–1969 Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos takes and consolidates power in a military coup. 1977

Torrijos and U.S. president Jimmy Carter sign a treaty calling for the surrender of the canal and Canal Zone to Panama as of December 31, 1999; many U.S. conservatives oppose the treaty.

1981

Torrijos dies in a plane crash in July and is succeeded by chief of intelligence Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Antonio Noriega.

1984–1987

Noreiga allows the United States to use Panamanian territory to support the Contras fighting the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua; the United States ignores evidence of Noriega’s connections to Colombian drug cartels.

1987

The U.S. government begins to turn against Noriega, cutting off economic aid.

1989

Noriega wins election as president in May in a poll that is widely denounced as fraudulent by international observers; citing the Panamanian military killing of a U.S. marine and Noriega’s drug connections and political repression, the United States launches an invasion of the country with 26,000 troops on December 19; according to the U.S. government, approximately 23 U.S. servicemen, 314 Panamanian military personnel, and 202 Panamanian civilians died in the invasion; human rights organizations later claim as many as 7,000 Panamanians died in the invasion.

1990

After holding out in the residence of the papal nuncio, the Vatican’s ambassador to Panama, Noriega surrenders to U.S. forces on January 3.

1992

A U.S. federal court sentences Noriega to forty years in prison on charges of drug smuggling, conspiracy, and racketeering.

leader, Benito Mussolini. As World War II approached, the United States took a close look at security for the canal, a vital wartime link, allowing military and supply ships to travel quickly from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The loyalty of Arias, who had been elected president in 1940, was in doubt, because of both his fascist sympathies and his demand for revisions in the canal treaty with the United States.

Shortly after Arias took office, a coup d’état removed him, and Adifo de la Guardia, a president more responsive to U.S. concerns, took office. De la Guardia was very cooperative. In 1942 he signed a new treaty allowing construction of U.S. military bases and airfields in Panama outside the Canal Zone. His successor, Enrique Jiménez, made no protest when the U.S. Army established the School of

Panama: U.S. Invasion, 19 8 9

the Americas to train military personnel from Latin American countries, even though this violated the canal treaty, which allowed U.S. bases only for defense of the canal.

Canal Zone Becomes Hemispheric The opening of the School of the Americas symbolized a shift in the way U.S. strategists viewed Panama. Before and during World War II, the purpose of keeping bases and troops in Panama was to defend the canal, a lifeline for the U.S. fleet and a route on which vital supplies could be shipped quickly and safely, free from the risk of foreign attack. By the end of the war, many U.S. Navy warships were too large to pass through the canal and, increasingly, so were tankers and merchant ships. Moreover, it was accepted that in the age of the long-range bomber, it was no longer really possible to prevent a determined enemy from destroying the canal or making it inoperable. The new threat, as Washington saw it, was Communism, promoted by the Soviet Union and its allies around the world. The main fear was not of a Russian military attack but of political subversion, possibly revolution, which would install unfriendly governments in the Western Hemisphere. Such governments could limit or block U.S. access to raw materials and cause losses to the widespread business interests of American companies. Some might even allow a Soviet military presence. The people and government of Panama seemed to be the most reliable anticommunist element in the hemisphere. U.S. bases in the Canal Zone closely monitored all events, so Panama seemed an ideal location from which to train, support, and guide the Latin American armed forces. Latin American officers were also invited to attend U.S. command and staff schools, where they were further indoctrinated in U.S. military and political doctrine and ideology. The Canal Zone bases were also home to as many as nine different U.S. intelligence organizations, including the CIA and a range of military intelligence bodies. In addition, U.S. military and civilian intelligence organizations actively recruited Latin American military personnel as agents. Serving as the home to all these organizations, Panama’s own government was deeply affected. In 1953, its National Police were converted into a militarized National Guard. Thereafter, every new officer and recruit was trained at the School of the Americas.

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Rise of Manuel Antonio Noriega By 1968, Arnulfo Arias had returned to Panama and been elected president. But that year, National Guard commander Omar Torrijos staged a coup to overthrow Arias with U.S. approval. Torrijos did not continue to follow the U.S. line, however. As head of the Panamanian government, he led the nationalistic struggle to get the United States to sign a new canal treaty. He succeeded in 1977. The Carter-Torrijos Treaty, signed that year, provided that the United States would surrender the canal and the Canal Zone to Panama in 1999. In 1978, Torrijos founded the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD, its Spanish acronym), devoted to making social and economic reforms in partnership with Panama’s military. Earlier, he had angered the United States by supporting and supplying the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in their successful guerrilla campaign against the longtime dictatorship of the Somoza family and had established diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro’s Cuba. And Torrijos also supported FMLN insurgents in El Salvador with military supplies after 1979. Torrijos’s chief of intelligence was Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Antonio Noriega. Noriega was also serving the United States secretly as a CIA agent at a salary of $110,000 per year. He had been recruited while a cadet at the Peruvian Military Academy in 1958. During the Carter administration in the United States, however, Noriega had been removed from the CIA payroll, perhaps because of his involvement in drug trafficking or because of continued support for Torrijos. When Ronald Reagan ran for president in 1981, he condemned the new canal treaty, declaring that it gave control of the canal to the “Communist” Torrijos. Reagan’s CIA director, William Casey, rehired Noriega and increased his salary to $185,000. On July 30, 1981, General Torrijos was killed in a plane crash. Two years later Noriega became commander of the National Guard, now renamed the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), with the rank of major general, effectively becoming the head of government.

United States–Noriega Honeymoon Whether Noriega had any part in the crash that took Torrijos’s life is a hotly debated subject. It is clear that he worked secretly for the United States against

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Nicaragua’s left-leaning Sandinista government, even as Panama publicly supported the Contadora process calling for a negotiated end to the armed conflicts in Central America. Noriega offered to train Nicaraguan antigovernment fighters (Contras) in Panama and helped organize a sabotage team that blew up a Nicaraguan military installation in Managua in 1985. During a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, U.S. head of the Contra effort, Noriega even offered to arrange for the assassination of Sandinista leaders. He also organized a system of arms supply flights from Panama to support Contra armed forces in Costa Rica. Between 1984 and 1987 Panama allowed use of its territory for the largest U.S. military maneuvers ever held in the country. In return, the United States officially ignored the mounting evidence of Noriega’s close relations with the Colombian drug cartels, even issuing public statements praising him for his cooperation with U.S. antidrug efforts. In 1984 there was another presidential election in Panama. Once again Arnulfo Arias, then eightyone years old, was running in opposition to Nicolas Ardito Barletta, the PRD candidate supported by Noriega. Arias denounced the open corruption under Noriega, particularly his involvement in narcotics, and pledged a thorough reform of the PDF. During his periods of exile in the United States, Arias had established close relations with the Republican Party and had made private assurances that he supported U.S. Central American policy and was open to compromise on implementation of the canal treaty. Arias’s opponent Barletta was declared the winner in a patently fraudulent election. Rioters took to the streets in Panama City, but the United States promptly recognized Barletta (by then known as el fraudito), and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz attended his inauguration to praise Panamanian democracy.

Road to Ruin Noriega seemed secure. The United States had endorsed his candidate, Barletta. Yet within two years he became persona non grata with the Reagan administration, and by the end of 1989, the administration of George H.W. Bush (formerly Reagan’s vice president) would invade Panama to overthrow him and bring him to trial as a common criminal. In September 1985 the decapitated body of Dr. Hugo Spadafora was found on the Costa Rican

side of the Panamanian border. Spadafora, a close friend of Torrijos and a romantic revolutionary who had fought against Nicaragua’s Somoza, had been an outspoken enemy of Noriega. He had last been seen in custody of the PDF. The opposition demanded a special investigation. President Barletta resisted, referring the matter to the PDF-controlled Ministry of Justice. Barletta did not support the military warmly enough, however, and Noriega forced him to resign, replacing him with Vice President Eric del Valle. Despite the outcry, the Reagan administration continued to back the Panamanian dictator. Then Noriega, apparently overconfident, made a serious error. He had an agreement with the PDF chief of staff, Roberto Díaz Herrera, that he would retire in 1989 and that Díaz would replace him. However, in June 1987 he reneged, telling Díaz to retire. The angry Díaz retaliated, giving press interviews detailing the rigging of the 1984 election, charging Noriega with direct responsibility for the Spadafora murder, and, most shockingly, alleging that Noriega had conspired with the CIA in 1981 to have Torrijos killed in the supposedly accidental plane crash. In response to Díaz’s charges, rioting—chiefly by the middle and upper classes, who had supported Arias and loathed Noriega and the PDF—broke out in Panama City. Del Valle declared a state of emergency, suspending all constitutional guarantees. Díaz was placed under arrest, and many of the opposition leaders were sent into exile. Meanwhile, in Washington the Iran-Contra hearings were under way, in which it was revealed that the Reagan administration had secretly delivered arms to the Nicaraguan Contras seeking to overthrow the government, disobeying a congressional mandate. Worse, some of the arms were bought with money received from the illegal sale of arms to Iran, a sworn U.S. enemy. Even worse for Noriega, his friend and supporter in Washington, CIA Director William Casey, had died. Noriega had become an embarrassment and had to go. In July 1987 the United States cut off economic aid to Panama, and in December it suspended Panama’s sugar quota, ending its export of this important crop to the United States. Noriega refused to take the hint. In February 1988, Noriega himself was indicted in U.S. federal court in Florida on drug trafficking charges. The Department of State then met

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A U.S. military helicopter passes over the Panama Canal during the December 1989 invasion of that country. Operation Just Cause, whose chief purpose was to depose the dictator and indicted drug trafficker Manuel Noriega, took only about two weeks. (Cynthia Johnson/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

secretly with del Valle and told him that if he removed Noriega, the United States would support him. Del Valle returned to Panama and announced Noriega’s dismissal, but instead was himself removed by the National Assembly, which named an interim president. At this, the United States announced that it continued to recognize del Valle as the legitimate president, froze Panamanian assets in U.S. banks, and suspended payments from the Canal Commission to Panama. In Panama the economy came to a halt. Depositors hurried to banks to withdraw their savings, and workers declared a general strike. Still Noriega refused to step down. The economic sanctions began to work in his favor, as even his opponents blamed the United States for growing hardships in Panama. The U.S. government could not negotiate Noriega’s resignation publicly, since it would appear it was cutting a deal with a dictator and indicted drug trafficker. The administration’s critics were already asking why the United

States had supported, and even employed, Noriega all these years. Republican presidential candidate George Bush was particularly vulnerable on this score. As CIA director in 1976, he had dealt directly with Noriega. The presidential elections Panama scheduled for May 1989 seemed to offer an opportunity for Noriega to step aside gracefully. Again, though, he was defiant. The anti-PRD coalition, the Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADOC), ran Guillermo Endara for president. Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter led 400 foreign election observers, who reported blatant fraud in the election of PRD candidate Carlos Duque. Injury was added to insult when PRD mobs attacked ADOC protest demonstrators, severely beating Endara and his two running mates, Ricardo Arias Alarçon and Guillermo Ford, and killing their chauffeur. At this point the Organization of American States (OAS) attempted to resolve the crisis. In September it

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recommended that new elections be held and the U.S. sanctions lifted. The OAS believed that the sanctions only hurt the Panamanian people and made resolution more difficult. Both the opposition and the PRD tentatively agreed, but the United States was opposed. The Bush administration felt it necessary to take some decisive action, especially after the Central American presidents had defied Washington and signed the Esquipulas II peace agreement in August 1987, leaving the Sandinistas in power in Nicaragua and condemning the U.S.-supported Contras. Even while the OAS talks were going on, the United States sent an additional 2,000 troops to the Canal Zone. It seemed clear that U.S. policy was now to force Noriega from power openly. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told the OAS that if Panama’s government did not act on the OAS proposal by September 1, it would be considered an outlaw government and would be treated accordingly. The only questions by October 1989 were when the United States would act and what form the action would take. One last chance to remove Noriega without direct U.S. intervention arose. Major Moises Giroldi, chief of security for the PDF headquarters, was convinced that a U.S. military intervention was pending and that its result would be the destruction of the PDF. He made contact with the CIA and said that he planned to capture Noriega in his office and persuade him to resign. All he wanted the United States to do was to block the roads leading to the headquarters building, the comandancia. Giroldi thought he had an agreement and arranged the coup for October 3. General Maxwell Thurman, the U.S. commander in Panama, did not trust Giroldi, and consequently the roadblocks were not established. The plan itself went awry when Noriega arrived at headquarters early, before Giroldi had his men in place. Consequently, Noriega and his aides were able to barricade themselves in his office and call for help from loyal units before Giroldi and his fellow conspirators could break in. When it became clear that Noriega would not resign, Giroldi finally agreed to hand him over to the Americans. Thurman’s deputy, Major General Mark Cisneros, hesitated. Messages flew back and forth from Panama to Washington. No clear orders were given, and shortly after noon Noriega’s loyal troops burst into the headquarters and captured

Giroldi and his men. They were all executed on the spot. There has been much debate over this affair. Many believe that the Bush administration had already decided on an invasion and did not want to have Panamanians resolve the issue by removing Noriega. Others argue that responsible officers in the CIA and the military were inhibited by the revelations of the Iran-Contra hearings and did not want to expose themselves to possible censure or prosecution for taking part in a covert action that might result in Noriega’s death. Still others believe that the apparent reluctance to help Giroldi and instead mount an invasion that would destroy the PDF was part of a larger strategy to invalidate the canal treaty and ensure continued U.S. control of the Canal Zone and its military bases. The immediate aftermath was a major embarrassment for the Bush administration. In Panama, Noriega celebrated his victory over what he described as a Yankee coup attempt abetted by traitors, and compared his survival to the U.S. defeat at the Bay of Pigs. Belatedly the CIA was authorized to help mount a coup against Noriega, even if it meant his death. This plan, despite an expenditure of $3 million, also failed. General Thurman came to Washington to present his invasion plan. It was to be an all-out effort employing maximum firepower and the latest weaponry. The plan was accepted, and the invasion was set for the last week in December 1989. The timing had the additional advantage that the U.S. could avoid turning over the chairmanship of the Canal Commission to a Panamanian, as provided in the CarterTorrijos Treaty of 1977.

Operation Just Cause During the last half of 1989, there were frequent incidents between U.S. and Panamanian troops. Some of these were staged provocations intended to build up tension and provide justification for a later intervention. However, others were the result of PDF heavy-handedness and arrogance. One of these was the incident on December 15, 1989, when four U.S. marines were stopped at a PDF roadblock and tried to drive away. The PDF opened fire and a marine lieutenant was killed. A U.S. navy lieutenant and his wife who had been stopped at the same roadblock

Panama: U.S. Invasion, 19 8 9

witnessed the incident. The PDF took them into custody, beat the officer, and roughed up his wife. These incidents were used by President Bush as the immediate cause for ordering the invasion—Operation Just Cause. Noriega himself provided a further excuse when he told the National Assembly on December 15 that due to U.S. aggression, Panama and the United States were in a “state of war.” This was interpreted as a Panamanian declaration of war. On December 17 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were briefed on Thurman’s invasion plan, then called “Blue Spoon.” There were some reservations—the chief of naval operations thought it was overkill; the air force chief of staff worried about the effect on U.S. military relations with Latin America. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, gave his approval to the plan and then went to brief President Bush, who had just presided over a White House children’s Christmas party. Bush said, “Let’s just do it.” D-day was Tuesday, December 19, and H-hour was midnight. In the invasion, about 26,000 U.S. troops were deployed against the 15,000-man PDF, of which fewer than 5,000 were actually military troops. The Panamanians also had an unknown number of men in “dignity battalions,” lightly armed and essentially untrained PRD adherents mobilized earlier in the year. The war itself was no contest. PDF units were caught by surprise and offered little organized resistance. Despite the difficulties attendant on night operations, particularly airborne operations, the U.S. troops performed nearly flawlessly. Astonishingly, especially considering that the preparations for the invasion were carried out almost in plain view and that the PDF intelligence apparatus was supposedly excellent, the invasion achieved almost complete surprise. The PDF commander, Manuel Noriega, was out drinking with a girlfriend and made no attempt to take command or join in the resistance. He spent the night driving aimlessly about and finally sought asylum in the residence of the papal nuncio. Endara, Arias, and Ford spent the night of D-day at Fort Clayton as guests of General Thurman and were promptly recognized by Washington as the legal government of Panama. According to official U.S. figures, 23 U.S. servicemen were killed and 324 were wounded. Panamanian military losses were given as 314 killed and 124 wounded. Officially, civilian casualties were 202

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killed and 1,508 wounded. The Panamanian casualty figures are much disputed. Investigations by international human rights groups have put the figure as high as 7,000 dead. The generally accepted figure, given by Americas Watch, is that the number of civilian dead was about 300. Most of these casualties were incurred in the slum area of El Chorillo in Panama City, in the center of which was located the PDF comandancia. Probably the greatest controversy over the conduct of the invasion was that El Chorillo was intensely shelled and bombed without any warning to the civilian population as the invasion commenced.

Aftermath After some weeks, Noriega left the nuncio’s residence and surrendered to U.S. authorities. He was taken to Miami, where he was tried and convicted on the drug charges for which he had been indicted in 1988. Surprisingly, he and his attorneys did not try to claim that he had been working for U.S. intelligence. Panama was in ruins. The invasion itself had caused well over a billion dollars in direct damages. The indirect costs of prior economic sanctions were even greater. The breakdown of law and order, anticipated by some generals but ignored by General Thurman, had resulted in massive looting in the days following the invasion. There is little doubt that the invasion was initially welcomed by a majority of Panamanians, especially those in the upper and middle classes who had suffered most from PDF tyranny. However, Endara proved inept and the promised U.S. financial assistance was reduced and delayed. Enthusiasm dwindled, and within a year, polls showed Endara’s approval ratings in the low teens. The greatest effect was probably in the destruction of public morale. The great effort to develop a Panamanian sense of nationality epitomized by Torrijos’s negotiation of the canal treaty had failed. The national military force and the political movement he had created had, under Noriega, degenerated into a sink of corruption. Then, when the United States took action, the swaggering macho elements of the PDF showed themselves cowardly and inept. As for the people, their response to the invasion was to seize the opportunity for looting.

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The U.S. bases remained in Panama. In later years, Panamanians demonstrated against the U.S. plans to close the bases. No longer concerned for national sovereignty, they feared the loss of jobs. As per the treaty, control of the canal and sovereignty over the Canal Zone were turned over to Panama in December 1999. David MacMichael See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Panama: Torrijos Coup, 1969.

Bibliography Buckley, Kevin. Panama: The Whole Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Dinges, John. Our Man in Panama: How General Noriega Used the U.S. and Made Millions in Drugs and Arms. New York: Random House, 1990. Flanagan, Edward M., Jr. Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just Cause. McLean, VA: Brassey’s, 1993. Weeks, John, and Phil Gunson. Panama: Made in the USA. London: Latin America Bureau, 1991.

PERU: Shining Path Rebellion, 1970s–1997 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War; Terrorism and International Incidents COLOMBIA

ECUADOR

A m az

LORETO

TUMBES

RCA

AMA LAMBAYEQUE

on

er Riv

r Rive ga lla

Hu a

AMAZONAS

CAJ

PIURA

zinc, provides most of Peru’s legal export earnings. Fish products, cotton, and sugar are the most important nonmineral exports. In the past thirty years, Peru’s illegal exports of coca leaves and, increasingly, coca paste, for processing into cocaine have been a very important source of income for Indian peasants in the mountains and settlers in the eastern valleys. Illegal coca production probably accounts for half of Peru’s export earnings, and control or elimination of the traffic is the major issue in Peru’s foreign policy, especially in relations with the United States.

BRAZIL

SAN MARTÍN

LA LIBERTAD

PERU HUÁNUCO

ANCASH

UCAYALI

PASCO

Historical Background

JUNÍN MADRE LIMA Huancayo DE Callao DIOS Lima CUSCO HUANCAVELICA Machupicchu Huancavelica Ayacucho Cusco

PACIFIC OCEAN

APURÍMAC

ICA

Pan American Highway

0

150 150

Lake Titicaca

AREQUIPA Arequipa

MOQUEGUA 0

PUNO

AYACUCHO

TACNA

BOLIVIA

300 Miles 300 Kilometers

CHILE

Peru has an area of 496,225 square miles and a population estimated at 28 million. Situated on the west coast of South America, Peru has a narrow coastal plain, the site of its best and most accessible agricultural areas; a mountainous interior, with the Andes stretching the whole length of the country and averaging over 15,000 feet in elevation; and, on the east, great jungle valleys that link the country to the Amazon basin. The capital, Lima, has a population of just under 6 million. There are three official languages, Spanish and the two major Indian tongues, Aymara and Quechua. The coastal plain has a relatively modern economy controlled by an elite largely of European descent. The mountainous interior maintains a bare subsistence economy and is populated largely by Indians. Mining, particularly of copper, silver, lead, and

Peru was the center of the Inca Empire of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which stretched from Chile to Ecuador and included the present area of Bolivia. Spain overthrew the Incas in 1532, establishing the viceroyalty of Peru, whose gold and silver mines financed Spain’s global empire for more than two centuries. Peru declared independence from Spain in 1821, with Bolivia seceding and becoming an independent state during the liberation struggle. At independence, Peru also included much of what is now northern Chile, but lost that territory, then valued for its nitrate deposits, to Chile in the 1879–1883 War of the Pacific. The loss of the war traumatized the nation, discrediting both the traditional political elite and the military. Nationalistic resentment was exacerbated by the increasing control of the Peruvian economy by foreign capital, particularly in the mining sector and in the growing commercial agricultural sector—cotton and sugar—in the northern coastal regions. In the 1920s, nationalism found its twentieth-century expression in the establishment of the Alianza Popular Revolucionario Americana (APRA) by Raul Haya de la Torre, who diagnosed Peru’s social and economic problems as rooted in foreign ownership.

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KEY DATES 1968

The Peruvian military defeats the rebels of the Left Revolutionary Movement (IMR, its Spanish acronym), a radical anti-urban guerrilla group.

1979

Influenced by Maoist ideas about peasant-based revolution, radical philosophy professor and head of the Peruvian Communist Party (also known as the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path) Abimael Guzman Reynoso begins training military units among the poor of rural Andean Peru.

1980

Sendero Luminoso (SL) conducts its first armed attack, against an electoral office in a remote village in the Ayacucho area of the country.

1984

An urban-based guerrilla group called the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) tries to form a unified leftist alliance with SL; as MRTA is mostly composed of middle-class students, SL leaders reject their overtures and target MRTA guerrillas as another enemy.

1990

University rector Alberto Fujimori wins the presidency in an upset victory; the police conduct a raid that captures many top SL leaders.

1992

Confronted by continuing rebellion and an economic crisis, Fujimori suspends congress and closes courts in April in what critics come to call an autogolpe, or self-imposed coup; police capture Guzman in a raid on a Lima apartment.

1994

SL is largely defeated; the fourteen-year-long conflict has left an estimated 25,000 dead.

1996–1997

A remnant of MRTA seizes the residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru during a reception in December, taking 600 government officials and diplomats hostage; all but 72 are quickly released; in April 1997, Peruvian security forces raid the residence, killing all 14 guerrillas; all but one hostage, who dies of a heart attack, are rescued.

2000

Fearing arrest for corruption, Fujimori resigns the presidency and takes asylum in Japan, where he holds dual citizenship.

From World War I I to the Insurgencies of the 19 6 0s Like many Latin American countries during the Depression and World War II, Peru was headed by authoritarian rulers—Colonel Luis Sanchez Cerro and, after his assassination by an APRA fanatic in

1933, General Oscar Benavides. It had a brief encounter with postwar political liberalism under the 1945–1948 presidency of Jose Luis Bustamente y Rivera. Bustamente, though, was overthrown in a classic early Cold War “anticommunist” coup by General Manuel Odria, who headed the country until 1956, when a conservative president, Manuel Prado y

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Ugarteche, was elected. Prado served out his term, but the armed forces intervened again in the 1962 elections, establishing a military junta that rationalized its actions on the need to fight Castro-inspired Communism. The junta departed in June 1963 after the election of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry. Belaúnde, a U.S.-backed moderate, favored private enterprise and foreign investment. He tried without notable success to regularize the ongoing peasant land seizures and to present them as land reform. He also had little success in dealing with the problem of collecting back taxes claimed from the U.S.-owned International Petroleum Company (IPC). His friendly stance toward other U.S.-owned firms, notably Cerro de Pasco Mining and International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), earned him the enmity not only of the Peruvian left, but also of the growing nationalist element within the military. At the same time, an insurgent movement had begun in the Andes, led by the Left Revolutionary Movement (IMR), a group made up mostly of young urban intellectuals who, following the foco (hub) theory associated with Che Guevara, believed that a small armed group, by attacking the state military and police structure at its fringes, could grow into a mass movement and produce a successful revolution. The army failed to gain major U.S. military assistance because U.S attention was focused on its war in Vietnam, but the Peruvian military did take advantage of counterinsurgency training provided by the CIA. The Peruvian army roundly defeated the insurgents, giving it an immense boost in self-confidence. Army chief of staff General Juan Velasco Alvarado was a nationalist disgusted by Belaúnde’s compromises with IPC and other U.S. corporations. He was also a graduate of Peru’s Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), which had influenced his thought on the strong role the military could play in national development and protecting against popular revolution. In October 1968, Velasco led a military coup that ousted Belaúnde and began a period of military rule that lasted until 1980.

Militar y Radicals The regime that Velasco and the CAEM-influenced military radicals put into place attempted to nationalize foreign-owned enterprises and gain state ownership of basic industries with a large measure of

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worker management. It made rules that no bank in Peru could be more than 25 percent foreign-owned, and established a state central bank to regulate the banking sector. In agriculture, the government expropriated all large plantations. On the sugar and cotton plantations, state-run cooperatives were established that soon came under control of the APRAdominated unions. The cattle and sheep ranches of the interior, mostly domestically owned, were likewise formed into state-run cooperatives. The traditional Indian highland agricultural system was transformed. The land was taken from private owners and granted to Indian communities (comunidades), which were organized for self-management under state supervision. The reform program, even the nationalization of foreign property, produced surprisingly little resistance from the United States, which was preoccupied with Vietnam and domestic political problems. The only real sign of U.S. displeasure was curtailment of military aid. This resulted in Peru’s purchasing aircraft and other armaments from the Soviet Union. Even that, and diplomatic recognition from the USSR, China, and Cuba, did not produce a severe U.S. reaction. Had these same actions been carried out by a civilian government, they might well have produced the same negative response from the United States that Salvador Allende’s socialist government in Chile received, as well as being overthrown with CIA assistance in 1973. The military leadership was divided between developmentalists, who saw reforms as necessary to jolt Peru out of its economic backwardness and create a sort of high-energy state capitalism; and radicals, who believed the development policy could not rally popular support without a significant redistribution of power and income among all social classes and regions. For most of the eleven years of military rule, the radicals were generally in control. Interestingly, the orthodox Communist party (PCP) supported Velasco, while the newer, more radical left parties, notably the emerging Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), attacked the military regime. Upper-class youth also organized often violent antimilitary demonstrations in Lima. The urban middle and professional classes protested the shift of government resources and support services from the cities to the impoverished provinces. Organized labor, often APRA-affiliated and principally representing skilled workers, was opposed, sometimes violently, to government policies that limited their gains in order to raise the incomes

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of the unorganized and unskilled. Ironically, resistance was most widespread and determined in the rural areas that were supposed to benefit from the reforms. There, provincial bureaucrats and Indian communal leaders resented attempts of the officials sent from Lima to direct their activities. As the economy went into a downturn in the mid-1970s, opposition in all sectors increased, especially after Velasco became ill in 1973. The country fell behind on payment of foreign debt. And after twelve years, hard times could no longer be blamed on former president Belaúnde and the formerly dominant business classes. By 1975, Velasco was terminally ill; foreign currency reserves were almost exhausted; food and fuel prices were up sharply. In February 1975 antigovernment riots shook Lima. These were suppressed, but it was clear that the experiment in radical military rule had failed to accelerate economic development and achieve broad popular support.

End of Militar y Rule On August 8, 1975, General Francisco Morales Bermudez, considered a moderate, overthrew Velasco in a coup supported by radical officers who feared a takeover by more conservative generals. Morales pledged to maintain the essence of Velasco’s policies, but he was soon engaged in negotiations with APRA (the country’s oldest political party, which had shown renewed strength in the 1975 riots), what was left of the old oligarchy, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on how to undo the work of his predecessor. Price increases and wage stabilization were introduced in June 1976, producing new riots and protests, this time opposed by APRA, throughout the country. The government response was the establishment of a state of emergency, the closing down of opposition newspapers, and a ban on strikes. The popular response—again opposed by APRA—was a massive one-day national strike. Morales backpedaled in the face of this opposition, but calculated that it was time for the military to bow out and let a civilian regime take the rising heat. He announced a plan for transition to civilian rule by 1980, with APRA clearly the intended beneficiary. A military government spokesman declared that “APRA’s non-Marxist democratic-left politics were what best suited the country and the armed forces.” Yet, when elections were held in 1980, it was Popular Action (AP) candi-

date and former president Fernando Belaúnde Terry who won once again, offering the same policies that had led to the coup of 1968.

Reform Efforts Belaúnde immediately turned over economic policy to his team of free-market technocrats, who dismantled the nationalistic policies of the military regime to establish a free-market, export-led system with maxiumum participation of foreign capital. Tariffs were cut drastically, and foreign imports flooded the country. Agrarian reform was effectively destroyed by legislation permitting the privatization of agricultural cooperatives and individual sale of lands. At the same time, Belaúnde pushed ahead with his old schemes for colonization of the Amazon—an attempt to solve the problem of Andean poverty by coaxing its inhabitants to go east to the jungles, instead of flocking to Lima’s shantytowns. Unfortunately, his term coincided with a severe decline in commodity prices. International borrowing to fund his projects pushed the foreign debt to $11.5 billion by 1983. A new team of economic advisers raised interest rates, eliminated food subsidies, and cut government expenditures, producing a depression that saw a negative 12 percent growth rate in 1983. At the same time, inflation rose to an annual rate exceeding 150 percent in 1985, the year Belaúnde left office. Belaúnde’s successor, APRA’s Alan Garcia, tried to turn the situation around by decreeing that debt payment would be limited to 10 percent of export earnings, with the rest going to investment in the national economy. There was a temporary upsurge in production and employment, but the 10 percent policy alienated foreign lenders. As the situation worsened, with economic growth again turning negative and both inflation and unemployment spiraling out of control, Garcia resorted to ever less orthodox and desperate measures, gradually destroying his and APRA’s credibility.

The Shining Path After the government crushed the IMR insurgency in 1968, most of Peru’s Marxist parties supported the radical program of Velasco’s military government, and some individuals gained influential positions within the new structure. However, the Peruvian Communist party—Sendero Luminoso (SL, the Shining

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Path)—headed by Abimael Guzman Reynoso, a philosophy professor at Huamanga University in Ayacucho—was fanatically committed to peasant war, as interpreted from the writings of Mao Zedong, as the only way to revolutionary change. Beginning in the early 1970s, Guzman indoctrinated other faculty members and university students, many of them the urbanized children of peasant families, with his ideas. A formidable personality, he inspired and demanded fanatical loyalty. In 1979 he began training military units, and Sendero Luminoso carried out its first armed action on May 17, 1980, with an attack on the electoral office in the remote Ayacucho village of Chuschi. This was followed by a series of other small-scale attacks. Through the rest of 1980, the Shining Path bombed banks, blew up electricity pylons, assaulted government offices, and pilfered arms from isolated police stations. Mining sites were robbed for dynamite. By the end of the year, more than 200 actions had been reported, and 100 SL suspects arrested. In January 1981 Belaúnde sent police reinforcements to Ayacucho, including 120 sinchis, members of the special Civil Guard antiterrorist unit. In March 1981 the government issued a decree declaring terrorism a special crime to be handled by military courts and subjecting to prosecution any person who supported or apologized for terrorist acts. It was the beginning of the government’s “dirty war” on the Argentine or Uruguayan model—making the population more terrified of the government than of the terrorists. On December 26, 1982, Belaúnde declared a state of emergency in Ayacucho and in two other Andean departments, Huancavelica and Apurímac. Constitutional rights and freedom of movement were suspended. Army general Clemente Noel considered all Quechua-speaking peasants to be terrorists or terrorist supporters. Thousands were killed, and thousands fled to Lima. The Peruvian Senate reported that, during Noel’s 1983–1984 incumbency, 2,507 civilians and 4,428 “presumed subversives” had been killed by police or military forces; 191 police and soldiers had been killed during the same period. In the single month of January 1985, according to Amnesty International, there were more than 1,000 “disappearances.” In 1989 Minister of Defense General Luis Cisneros explained that to win the war, the government forces would have to kill both senderistas and non-senderistas. Out of 60 people killed, he said, at best 3 would be members of the Shining Path, and that ratio was satisfactory.

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On the other side, the Shining Path pursued, on a considerably lesser scale, exactly the same dirty war tactics. Those in its area of operations who refused to obey SL dictates or professed neutrality were treated as enemies and often murdered. In April 1983, SL publicly executed 130 peasants in small towns in Ayacucho for opposing an SL presence. Guzman explained that the executions were necessary to make the peasants understand that the SL “would stop at nothing . . . absolutely nothing.” So wedded was Guzman to his vision of the Chinese revolutionary experience and its applicability to Peru, and to his vision of Peru’s peasant society, that after a few early successes in gaining cooperation from villagers, SL destroyed any possibility of developing a mass support base. It compounded its problems by attempting to prohibit local customs and rituals Guzman regarded as backward or immoral, and to interfere with marketing practices that clashed with his ideal of the village community as completely self-sufficient. Guzman rationalized the situation by declaring that PCP-SL was not a mass party but “a party of militants, of leaders, a war machine.” Alan Garcia was elected to the presidency in 1985, pledging that the war against the SL would be fought without barbarism. Instead, the situation worsened. Shortly after Garcia’s inaugural, an army lieutenant led his troops into the Ayacucho village of Accomarca and forced the inhabitants into a single house. Then, raking the building with machine-gun fire, he set it ablaze. Sixty-two people, including twenty-three small children, were killed. The lieutenant was court-martialed but defended his actions as militarily correct. After all, he said, Shining Path begins to indoctrinate children at the age of two or three. Generals praised him as a hero. He got ten days in jail. And, finally, the inevitable death squads began to operate. The most notorious was the Rodrigo Franco Commando (CRF), allegedly linked to APRA, which assassinated lawyers who defended SL suspects, vowing it would kill two senderistas for every police officer or soldier who died in the war. Garcia and Peru suffered further loss of reputation in the eyes of the international human rights community in June 1986 when Lima was the site of the meeting of world social democratic parties. SL prisoners at three penitentiaries staged mutinies to coincide with the meeting. The military response was immediate and overwhelming. Using air attacks and artillery, troops stormed the prisons of El Fronton,

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Lurigancho, and Santa Barbara. Of 154 prisoners at El Fronton, 119 were killed; at Lurigancho all 124 were killed. At both places, most of the dead had been killed or “disappeared” after surrendering. Throughout the rest of Garcia’s term, the situation continued to worsen, in terms of both insurgent activity and government repression. SL expanded into other areas of the country, most notably the cocagrowing regions of the Huallaga Valley, and, beginning in 1984, a more conventional guerrilla force resembling Uruguay’s Tupamaros or Colombia’s M-19 appeared. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) was composed chiefly of middleand upper-class youth. It sought to unify the left in a traditional worker-peasant alliance to establish a socialist state. Not surprisingly, SL viewed it as part of the enemy and, especially in the coca-growing regions, staged armed attacks on MRTA forces. The vast majority of Peruvians merely wanted peace and respite from their economic woes. By 1989 almost a third of the nation’s 185 provinces, including Lima, were under emergency law. In ten years, more than 12,000 people had been killed in insurgentrelated violence, and a crime wave of unprecedented proportions particularly affected Lima. During the same period more than 3,200 people were “disappeared,” compared to an estimated 2,500 in the whole seventeen-year period of Pinochet’s rule in Chile. Arrest and torture were almost synonymous. A whole new dimension was added by the growth of coca production in the Huallaga Valley. In 1980 about 10,000

Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori shakes hands with members of the Shining Path guerrilla organization who surrendered in the fall of 1992. The Maoist insurgency movement went into decline after the capture of founder Abimael Guzman that September. (Jaime Razuri/AFP/ Getty Images)

hectares (25,000 acres) were planted in coca. By 1986 over 195,000 hectares (nearly 500,000 acres) were given over to coca bushes. The drug war had become Peru’s second front.

Fujimori Under the circumstances, it seems miraculous that Peru was able to hold national elections in 1990. All the major political parties had been discredited, and the military, given unlimited authority without any governmental responsibility, had no interest in taking control. The favored presidential candidate was the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, a strong conservative, heading the Democratic Front (FREDEMO). His chief economic adviser, Hernan de Soto, believed that bureaucracy was the real cause of Peru’s economic and political problems. He and Vargas prescribed free market “shock therapy”—an immediate end to all government controls and restrictions on business. The pain, they promised, would be intense but mercifully brief. Vargas seemed an easy winner. His opponents were the United Left (UI), APRA, and Cambio ‘90, a small business and middle-class professional grouping with important support from Peru’s growing Protestant evangelical churches, headed by Alberto Fujimori, rector of the national agricultural university. Cambio had no clear ideological message; its platform stressed hard work and individual morality. The war against SL would be fought, not by more repression, but by programs of economic aid to the countryside and the slums. Apparently this was what Peruvian voters wanted to hear, and Fujimori won handily. However, once in office Fujimori borrowed Vargas’s economic team and traveled to Washington and Tokyo. He returned calling for a drastic anti-inflationary program and for an intensified antinarcotics drive with U.S. participation. Using emergency powers, he removed price controls on basic commodities. Prices of staples immediately shot up 600 percent. A year after he took office, inflation was up almost 1,100 percent. Fujimori met the wave of protests and strikes with force. Women marching to demand resumption of the vaso de leche (glass of milk) program for impoverished children were turned back by tear gas and water cannon; strike leaders were jailed and were sometimes “disappeared.” Demonstrators were fired

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on and killed. Meanwhile, the war in the countryside was pressed ever more vigorously. By 1992, the death toll had risen to 25,000, almost double what it had been at the end of 1989. In April 1992, Fujimori went on television from the well-guarded defense ministry building to announce what became known as the autogolpe (selfimposed coup). He declared congress disbanded and the courts closed, pending reorganization, because of incompetence and corruption that hindered not only economic reform but also the struggle against terrorism. The twelve regional governments were dismissed, and all articles of the constitution “not compatible with the government’s goals” were suspended. He concluded by ordering the armed forces and police to enforce his orders. Numerous legislators were arrested, and ex-president Alan Garcia barely escaped, going into exile in Colombia. The international community was shocked by Fujimori’s coup against himself, but by all indications, his action was approved by a majority of Peruvians. People exhausted by a dozen years of violence, massive unemployment, unbearable inflation, and the collapse of public services frankly found constitutional government a luxury, and Fujimori—so obviously an outsider—was credible when he blamed congress, the judiciary, and the “partyocracy” for the situation in which they found themselves.

Ending the Sendero War Even before the April autogolpe, security forces had dealt some hard blows to the SL. Early in 1990 police had rounded up most of the SL’s leading cadres in Lima. In May of that year they raided SL’s headquarters in a wealthy Lima district, capturing documents and videotapes. So many prisoners were taken that the maximum-security Castro Castro prison in Lima was overcrowded, and, in fact, the highly disciplined SL personnel in custody had effectively taken control of the place. In May 1992, authorities decided to transfer the 180 women SL held there to a separate institution, and to regain control of the 450 men. A police force of 650 men spent four days fighting their way into Castro Castro, where the prisoners had dug tunnels from one cellblock to another and armed themselves with homemade crossbows, bombs, and acid. About 50 leading SL members were killed. In retaliation, SL embarked on a summer-long campaign of terrorist bombings in Lima, killing and

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injuring hundreds of people and destroying millions of dollars worth of property. On September 12, police raided an apartment in Lima and captured Guzman himself and his chief aides. He surrendered without a fight. Although there was a certain amount of violent reaction in response, the display of Chairman Gonzalo on national television with a prison placard around his neck renouncing the armed struggle effectively destroyed the highly personalized movement. To all intents and purposes, the Shining Path was finished. Although small-scale terrorist activities continued to be reported in the highlands and the Huallaga Valley, numerous arrests and surrenders throughout 1993 and 1994 indicated decreasing effectiveness and falling morale. That still left MRTA and the drug war. Compared to SL, MRTA was a relatively minor affair. Responding to a “repentance law” decreed in May 1992, numerous members surrendered in October 1993, and the movement was reported near collapse. In December 1995, its second in command, Miguel Rincon, was captured, along with fifteen others, and later sentenced to life imprisonment for plotting to take hostages to secure the release of MRTA’s founder, Victor Polay Campos, who had been captured in 1992. The final spectacular chapter in Peru’s insurgent war was written between December 1996 and April 1997. A remnant of MRTA, 14 guerrillas led by Nestor Cerpa Certolini, seized the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima during a diplomatic reception. Some 600 ranking government officials, diplomats, and business leaders were taken, although all but 72 were released. The guerrillas sought release of their imprisoned comrades, relief for Peru’s poor, and payment of a “war tax.” Negotiations dragged on for months, with the Canadian ambassador and the archbishop of Ayacucho acting as intermediaries. Meanwhile, the security forces were preparing an assault, which they carried out successfully on April 22, 1997. All 14 guerrillas were killed, as were two soldiers. One hostage died of a heart attack. David MacMichael See also: People’s Wars; Ecuador: Border Dispute with Peru, 1941– ; China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949.

Bibliography Crabtree, John. Peru Under Garcia: An Opportunity Lost. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Peru, 1997–1998. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997.

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Palmer, David Scott, ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Philip, George D.E. The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals: 1968–1976. London: Athlone Press, 1978. Poole, Deborah, and Gerardo Renique. Peru: Time of Fear. London: Latin American Bureau, 1992.

Simpson, John. In the Forest of the Night: Encounters in Peru with Terrorism, Drug-Running, and Military Oppression. New York: Random House, 1993. Vargas Llosa, Alvaro. The Madness of Things Peruvian: Democracy Under Siege. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994.

PUERTO RICO: Anti-U.S. Terrorism, 1934–1954 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Terrorism and International Incidents; Anticolonialism PARTICIPANT: United States 0

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United States, the Puerto Rican population has the greatest poverty index of any minority group. Politically, Puerto Rico is an autonomous U.S. commonwealth that elects its governor and a bicameral legislature. The overriding political issue, one largely dependent on what the U.S. government decides, is the status of the island—U.S. statehood, remaining a commonwealth, or independence.

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Arecibo

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Puerto Rico, a mountainous, nearly rectangular Caribbean island about 100 miles long and 35 miles wide, lies just east of Cuba and Hispaniola (the island containing Haiti and the Dominican Republic). Its people, mostly Spanish-speaking and of AfricanSpanish ancestry, number about 3.9 million and are U.S. citizens. At any given time, approximately 2.5 million Puerto Ricans reside in the United States, either permanently or temporarily. The economy, once entirely agricultural, still produces sugar, coffee, and tobacco for export. Attracted by tax exemptions and low-wage labor, many U.S. corporations have manufacturing and assembly plants on the island. Tourism is a major industry. Major U.S. military and naval installations are also important to the economy. Nevertheless, unemployment is usually between 15 and 20 percent, and, although the standard of living is higher than in most neighboring Caribbean islands, poverty is widespread, with over half the population receiving food stamps and other forms of U.S. federal assistance. The cost of living is also high. In the

Puerto Rico was a Spanish colony from its conquest in 1508 until 1897, when Spain granted it selfgoverning status within the Spanish Empire, promising not to cede or sell the island to any foreign power without the consent of the people of Puerto Rico. The following year, Spain was defeated in the SpanishAmerican War. By the Treaty of Paris, signed in December 1898, Spain ignored Puerto Rico’s charter and ceded the island to the United States, despite the protest of Puerto Rican leaders, including Eugenio Mario de Hostos. From 1900 to 1948, U.S. governors ruled Puerto Rico under the Foraker Act. This setup established a weak bicameral legislature and non-voting representation in the U.S. Congress. In 1917, the Jones Act made Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens (over the unanimous objection of the Puerto Rican House of Delegates), and thus subject to military conscription, but also extending to them the privileges of the U.S. Bill of Rights. In 1948, with the expiration of the Foraker Act, Luis Muñoz Marín became the first native governor. Support for Puerto Rican independence was rooted in the emerging labor movement headed by Santiago Iglesias, who affiliated his Free Labor Movement (FLT) with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Business groups allied themselves with the U.S.

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KEY DATES 1898

The United States seizes Puerto Rico from Spain.

1917

The Jones Act makes Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens.

1934

The pro-independence Nationalist Party (PN, its Spanish acronym) organizes a general strike that is broken by U.S. troops.

1935

Many PN leaders are killed by police, while founder Pedro Albizu Campos is sentenced to ten years imprisonment for attempting to overthrow the government of Puerto Rico.

1948

The chancellor of National University in San Juan rejects students’ request that the recently released Campos speak on campus; when the students protest, police occupy the campus, and student organizations are banned.

1950

The U.S. Congress allows Puerto Rico to write its own constitution but only within the framework of a “compact” between Puerto Rico and the United States; radical Puerto Rican advocates of independence attempt to assassinate U.S. President Harry Truman.

1952

The pro-commonwealth party wins the Puerto Rican elections.

1954

Puerto Rican nationalists open fire on the U.S. House of Representatives, wounding five congressmen.

Republican Party and worked for statehood. By the 1920s, Iglesias and the FLT, fearing that an independent Puerto Rico would be dominated by antilabor traditional elites, also endorsed statehood. In 1928, a Harvard-trained lawyer, Pedro Albizu Campos, founded the pro-independence Nationalist Party (PN). It boycotted the 1932 elections, claiming there could be no fair vote under U.S. military occupation, and concentrated on organizing landless peasants and the urban unemployed. As unemployment reached 60 percent in the 1930s, desperate Puerto Ricans flocked to the PN.

Terror and Counterterror In 1934, the PN helped organize a general strike that was broken by U.S. troops. The FLT, which had grown more conservative, opposed the strike. A new labororiented party, the nationalistic and more radical General Confederation of Workers (CGT), was organized to take its place. As the PN increased in popularity, official repression, directed by the FBI, increased. In 1935,

Puerto Rican police commanded by a U.S. officer named Francis Riggs killed the PN labor secretary and three students at the Puerto Rican National University. The following year, Riggs was assassinated by two Puerto Rican youths. Immediately, on orders of the FBI, Albizu Campos and the whole PN leadership were arrested on charges of conspiring to overthrow the “government of the United States established in Puerto Rico.” Albizu Campos was tried and sentenced to ten years in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. On release, he was charged and imprisoned again. He died in federal prison in 1965, being at liberty for a total of only four years from the time of his first arrest. At a 1937 Palm Sunday demonstration in Ponce calling for Albizu Campos’s release and honoring the independence advocates killed by Riggs, U.S. troops opened fire on the marchers as they approached the cathedral. Twenty were killed and scores wounded. A subsequent official investigation found none of the dead were armed, many were children, and most had been shot in the back. After the march, more than 2,000 PN members had been arrested.

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Puerto Rican nationalists lie dead in the courtyard of La Fortaleza, the governor’s mansion in San Juan, after an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Gov. Luis Muñoz Marín, a close friend of the U.S. administration, on October 30, 1950. (National Archives)

Muñoz believed that Puerto Rican nationalism was a dead-end policy. His Popular Democratic Party (PPD) advocated economic and social reform in partnership with the United States through Operation Bootstrap, a program of urbanization and industrialization designed to attract U.S. investment. Wartime prosperity allowed investment in new roads and electricity networks. Tens of thousands of Puerto Rican young men who had served in the U.S. forces during the war formed an important constituency on the island that strongly favored closer ties with the United States. In the late 1940s, Muñoz pushed through Law 53, modeled on the U.S. Smith Act, making it a crime to advocate overthrow of the government, and applied it liberally. In 1948, students at the National University invited Albizu Campos, who was just out of prison, to

speak. The chancellor refused to allow him to appear. When the students protested, police occupied the campus, and the administration dissolved the student organizations. The students, joined by CGT and proindependence militants who had been expelled from the PPD, founded the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), which later merged with the PN. In response, the U.S. Congress passed a law in July 1950, authorizing Puerto Rico to write its own constitution, but only within the framework of “the compact” with the United States. The PIP denounced this as a fraud, and repression intensified. In October 1950, police attacked a PN meeting, killing three. Nationalists responded with attacks on police stations throughout the country. Muñoz declared a state of siege, and with the aid of U.S. troops,

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the police restored order and many Nationalists were jailed. Two desperate Nationalists, Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola, attempted to assassinate U.S. president Harry Truman on November 1, 1950. Torresola was killed, as was one U.S. Secret Service guard. Collazo was sentenced to death, a sentence Truman commuted to life imprisonment. Americans and Puerto Ricans condemned the attempted assassination, but the independence issue remained alive. In the 1952 Puerto Rican elections, the PIP placed second, gaining many fewer votes than the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), but finishing ahead of the pro-statehood party. The new constitution was approved in the same election. Later, it was unilaterally amended by the U.S. Congress to provide that Puerto Rico remain subject to U.S. statutory law except for the internal revenue laws. This concession pleased U.S. business in Puerto Rico because it helped keep wages low; it also avoided the danger that Puerto Ricans might demand the right to have voting representatives in Congress, under the equalrepresentation clause of the U.S. Constitution. Again in 1954, frustrated Nationalists resorted to terror. Three Nationalists entered the visitors’

gallery of the U.S. House of Representatives and opened fire. Five congressmen were wounded. As in 1950, this led to a roundup of Nationalists in Puerto Rico and in the immigrant community in the United States. Many received long prison terms and declared themselves “prisoners of war.” In 1979, President Jimmy Carter granted amnesty to Collazo and the three involved in the congressional shooting. David MacMichael See also: Anticolonialism; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s.

Bibliography Carr, Raymond. Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experience. New York: New York University Press, 1984. Carrion, Arturo Morales. Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History. New York: W.W. Norton, 1983. Cockroft, James D. Neighbors in Turmoil: Latin America. New York: Harper and Row, 1989. Falk, Pamela S. The Political Status of Puerto Rico. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986. Heine, Jorge. Time for Decision: The United States and Puerto Rico. Lanham, MD: North South, 1983.

UNITED STATES: War on Terrorism,1990s– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Terrorism PARTICIPANTS: al-Qaeda; Iraq; Saudi Arabia; United Kingdom; Numerous Other Nations

Los Angeles, 2000 (thwarted)

New York City, 1993 & 2001 Washington, D.C. 2001

Iraq, 2003

Afghanistan, 2001

Khobar, 1996

Guantanamo Prison

Sudan, 1998

Yemen, 2002 Aden, 2000 (USS Cole) Nairobi, 1998 Dar-es-Salaam, 1998

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The War on Terrorism is the name given to the conflict between the United States and its allies on one side and fundamentalist Islamic extremists on the other, notably Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. It began without wide notice in the early 1990s and took definitive shape after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. While the United States fought the war in several particular locales, the overall war was conceptualized as open-ended, to be concluded only when terrorists no longer targeted the United States or its allies. The United States has a long history of dealing with violent terrorism. After the Civil War, the Ku

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Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups engaged in a long-running series of attacks against African-Americans, Catholics, Jews, and their sympathizers. An outgrowth of these actions was the lynch mobs and race riots for decades afterward. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, anarchists and those who agreed with their cause participated in a variety of violent activities, including the assassination of President William McKinley. In the late twentieth century, militia groups and other rightwing organizations hoarded weapons, bombed abortion clinics, and, most notably, blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1996. Terrorist activity in America is neither new nor original.

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Terrorists connected to al-Qaeda bomb the World Trade Center in New York, killing five people.

1995

Domestic right-wing terrorists blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 persons.

1998

Al-Qaeda suicide bombers attack the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 persons, most of them African.

1999

Terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda attack the destroyer USS Cole in Aden harbor, Yemen, killing 17 sailors.

2001

Timothy McVeigh, mastermind of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, is executed on June 11; on September 11, 19 al-Qaeda members hijack four U.S. commercial jets and crash two of them into the World Trade Center in New York, causing the buildings to collapse, and one into the Pentagon in Washington, while the fourth plane crashes in a Pennsylvania field; nearly 3,000 people are killed in the attacks; in October, the United States launches an invasion of Afghanistan, whose Taliban-led government had given sanctuary to al-Qaeda’s leadership.

2003

In the largest restructuring of the federal bureaucracy in more than fifty years, the Department of Homeland Security comes into being, taking charge of a number of agencies responsible for protecting the United States against terrorist attack, illegal immigration, and natural disaster; claiming that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and had connections with the terrorists responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, the United States, along with Great Britain and a small coalition of allies, invades Iraq.

2003–2006

Fighting between U.S. and Iraqi forces on one side and Iraqi insurgents and foreign terrorists on the other continue in Iraq.

2004

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, issues its official report, citing major intelligence failures at preventing the 9/11 attacks.

Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism After September 11, 2001, terrorism carried out by Islamist militants rose to the top of the agenda of the U.S. government. Terrorists associated with fundamentalist Islamic sects had attacked American targets

earlier, beginning with the kidnapping of Americans in Lebanon in the 1970s. Attacks on United States soil began in the 1990s. In fact, the group destined to become a leading target in the War on Terrorism, known as al-Qaeda, was behind an elaborate plot to explode a powerful bomb in a subterranean parking

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garage in the World Trade Center complex in 1993. The blast killed five people, injured hundreds, and terrified thousands more, who were forced to evacuate the huge twin office towers. The prime force behind al-Qaeda was Osama bin Laden. He was born in Saudi Arabia and adopted the militant jihad theology of Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb while in college. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, he rushed to join the Islamist resistance forces, working primarily as a fundraiser. Ten years later, when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned home to Saudi Arabia. When the secularist leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden offered his assistance to the Saudi royal family in forcing Hussein out of the oil-rich country on Saudi Arabia’s northeast border. The Saudis rejected bin Laden, and soon afterward agreed to work with the United States and other Western nations to deal with the Iraqis. The rejection of his offer made bin Laden bitter toward both the Saudi government and the United States. Bin Laden had formed al-Qaeda in 1988. He saw the organization of disciplined and devoted operatives as an instrument to help expel all Westerners and Western-influenced governments from the Middle East. In their place, bin Laden hoped to establish fundamentalist Islamic regimes under strict rule of Sharia, or Islamic holy law. Over the next decade, al-Qaeda targeted the United States in various places. It bombed a hotel in Yemen where American forces were staying, but killed only a hotel employee and an Austrian national. In 1995, al-Qaeda attacked Americans in Riyadh and Dhahran, both in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who had also been targets of these attacks, stripped bin Laden of his Saudi citizenship. By that time, he was living in the Islamist-dominated state of Sudan. In 1993, al-Qaeda initiated its first attack on American soil with the bombing of the World Trade Center, which was masterminded by Islamist terrorist Ramzi Yousef and others. It would be several years, though, before the United States connected this attack and others to bin Laden and his organization. Bin Laden may also have provided training and support for the Somali warlords and insurgents behind the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed. Al-Qaeda also targeted Middle Easterners allied to the West, notably attempting to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995.

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Declaration of War In 1996, pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia forced the Islamist government in Sudan to expel bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization. At that point, bin Laden sought refuge in Afghanistan, which had just recently come under the control of the radical Islamist Taliban regime. There, bin Laden began issuing a series of fatwas, or religious decrees, that asserted it was the duty of devout Muslims throughout the world to attack and kill any and all Americans, both military and civilian, whenever and wherever they could be found. In these decrees, he specifically listed the reasons that he targeted Western nations in general, and the United States in particular. First was the Western presence in Saudi Arabia, the holy land of Islam. Second was Western support for jahaliyya or apostate regimes in the Middle East. By this, the Islamists meant regimes whose secularism or corruption violates the principles of Islamic teaching about good government. A third reason was Western exploitation of Arab resources, primarily oil, for economic betterment of the West, at the expense of the Arab poor. And finally, bin Laden and al-Qaeda criticized the West’s strong and uncritical support of Israel, which had occupied Palestinian lands. Not long after the fatwas were issued, al-Qaeda began a campaign of terror that included more highprofile attacks. The first was the near-simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in August 1998. The blasts killed 225 persons, mostly Africans. By this time, America was well aware of the threat that bin Laden posed. President Bill Clinton launched missile strikes at suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and at a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that Washington accused of manufacturing chemical weapons. The attacks failed, and Clinton was distracted throughout the remainder of his presidency by other matters, including his threatened impeachment in the Monica Lewinsky scandal. However, U.S. intelligence agencies did manage to thwart a planned attack on U.S. soil during celebrations of the new millennium, on January 1, 2000. In October 2000, al-Qaeda attacked an American ship, the USS Cole, which had made a routine fuel stop in Aden, Yemen; seventeen Americans were killed.

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Attack on America All of this, of course, was prelude to the deadliest terrorist attack in American history. On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers took control of four commercial passenger airliners. Two of the planes were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the fourth crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. The target of the fourth plane was believed to be the White House, the Capitol building, or some other major landmark in Washington. Not long after the planes hit the World Trade Center, both towers collapsed. In the end, nearly 3,000 people were killed in the attacks. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government determined that bin Laden’s alQaeda organization had planned and carried them out. Even though the organization never directly took credit for the hijackings, bin Laden and his allies openly celebrated the attacks, claiming they were revenge for American policies in the Middle East. International and American intelligence agencies quickly discovered that al-Qaeda had based its operations and training in Afghanistan, with the full knowledge and cooperation of the fundamentalist Islamic regime of the Taliban. The United States gave the Taliban an ultimatum—hand over bin Laden and anyone else involved in the 9/11 plot or face military action. The Taliban refused, and the United States and a number of allies attacked Afghanistan on October 7. Allied air forces and firepower overmatched the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Americans quickly gained total air superiority and completely wiped out local air defenses. Within two months, American and allied forces had taken control of virtually the entire country, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda were driven from power. Most leaders of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, including bin Laden, eluded capture.

War in Iraq Early in 2003, the U.S. administration of George W. Bush determined that the next front in the War on Terrorism would be Iraq. Several rationales were behind the decision. In the wake of 9/11, there was some concern that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had supported al-Qaeda and might have had some

connection to 9/11. Hussein had long supported anti-Israeli terrorists in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States was also concerned that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and that it might sell or give these weapons to terrorist organizations. Finally, there was also the belief that if Hussein’s authoritarian regime were taken down and replaced by a more democratic government, Iraq would have improved relations with the West and might inspire democratic change in other Middle Eastern countries, helping to deter terrorism in the region. In the years since the Gulf War of 1991, Hussein had violated or failed to fully cooperate with a number of United Nations resolutions, and Bush sent his secretary of state, Colin Powell, to address the UN to persuade the international body to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. Powell’s argument and evidence failed to persuade the UN, however. Instead, the U.S. recruited a “coalition of the willing,” in which nearly all combat troops were supplied by the United States and Britain, while other allies, including South Korea, Australia, Denmark, and Poland, sent small troop contingents, and several dozen more nations provided support in other forms. At the same time, many prominent American allies, including Canada, Germany, Russia, and France, opposed the war, arguing that it was unnecessary and illegal under international law. Even in the countries whose leaders supported the war, public opinion was often overwhelmingly against it. Although the majority of Americans at first supported the invasion, the public became sharply divided; the Iraq War would spawn the largest antiwar protests since the Vietnam era. The initial phase of the war was a massive aerial bombing campaign, called “shock and awe,” meant to demoralize the opposition and make the ground war easier for the troops that would come in after the bombing campaign. There is some dispute as to how heavy the U.S. bombing was or what the overall effect on Iraqi morale was, but once American and allied troops entered the country, they found an Iraqi resistance that suffered from a huge disadvantage in technology and morale. By the beginning of May, most of the country had fallen under the control of either the United States and its foreign allies or forces from the Iraqi Kurds, who lived in northern provinces of the country and were staunch opponents of Hussein’s

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regime. President Bush declared “major combat operations” to be concluded at that point, and the war force was largely transformed into an occupation force while attempts were made to move Iraq in a more democratic direction. Postwar evidence cast significant doubt on many of the rationales for the war. No evidence was found for either connections to al-Qaeda or Hussein having WMDs. Most troubling was the insufficiency of the postwar planning. Initially, most Iraqi citizens welcomed the fall of Hussein’s regime and supported American efforts. While the war phase of the Iraqi invasion had been well planned and quickly ended in success, the United States failed to prevent widespread looting and found the reconstruction efforts to be slow and beset by problems, the most significant of which was an insurgent opposition that sabotaged attempts to revive Iraqi oil production. The insurgents attacked and killed numerous American and allied troops and later broadened their targets to include Iraqis who were sympathetic to the American cause or worked with the Americans. As the insurgency gained power, numerous Islamic fundamentalists from outside Iraq entered the country to fight against America and its allies, including many members of al-Qaeda, such as high-ranking member Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The arrival of these outside forces led to a change in insurgent tactics. Use of suicide bombers increased. Influential leaders were targeted and killed, including a top United Nations envoy to Iraq. American contractors and foreign civilians were kidnapped and held for ransom or killed, sometimes by beheading. Intelligence agencies concluded that the Iraq war had increased recruiting for alQaeda and other anti-Western terrorist organizations. As of the end of August 2006, the American death toll in Iraq passed 2,500, while Iraqi deaths were estimated to be between 30,000 and 100,000.

Worldwide Terror Campaign Bin Laden and al-Qaeda did not confine their activities to Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether it was direct action by bin Laden or his subordinates or indirect action by surrogates dedicated to the cause, al-Qaeda and its sympathizers became active around the world. Al-Qaeda differed from most other terrorist organizations in that it had many more operatives and was much more decentralized. Dozens or hundreds of al-

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Qaeda cells were apparently at work without strong central decision-making. Many members of alQaeda worldwide would never meet or have direct communication with bin Laden or any of his top lieutenants. Targets were often chosen either because of the presence of American troops or civilians or because a country had allied itself with the United States, particularly in the Iraqi War. One of the first notable post-9/11 attacks was on a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, on October 12, 2002, which killed more than 200 people, including many Australians and 7 Americans. Bali was the site of an al-Qaeda related bombing again in 2005, where 23 people were killed. On May 12, 2003, bin Laden’s organization used suicide bombers to attack a residential district in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that housed many foreign nationals. Of the 26 killed in the attack, 9 were Americans. Later that year, several attempts were made to assassinate moderate Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, though none succeeded. After 9/11, alQaeda or related organizations were also responsible for various minor attacks in Tunisia, Kuwait, Yemen, Kenya, Indonesia, and other places. Two post-9/11 terrorist attacks stood out: the attacks in Madrid and London. On March 11, 2004, improvised explosive devices were set off aboard four commuter trains during rush-hour traffic in Madrid. In the end, more than 190 people were killed in an attack that was believed to be in retaliation for Spain’s support for the war in Iraq. The bombings occurred exactly 911 days after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. As with a number of the other attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda, the symbolism of the date was significant. On July 7, 2005, four explosions rocked London’s underground transit system and a public bus within a few minutes. In all, 56 people died in the attacks. Two weeks later, a second series of four explosions took place, although that attack failed to kill anyone. It turned out that those who carried out the London attacks were killed in the explosions, becoming the first suicide bombers in Western Europe. In a few short years, al-Qaeda claimed the worst terrorist attacks in the history of the United States, Indonesia, and Spain. No country, it made clear, was safe from its terrorist activities, though an alleged plot to blow up ten U.S.-bound airliners was discovered and thwarted by British authorities in August 2006.

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A U.S. soldier stands guard at the entrance to Camp Delta, the military detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where suspected terrorists and other illegal enemy combatants are held. (Joe Raedle/Getty Images News)

Tactics in the War on Terrorism For the most part, al-Qaeda used tactics similar to those of other modern terrorist organizations. They mainly involved the use of whatever weapons could be improvised and could defeat security precautions against them. The 9/11 hijackers used nothing more than box cutters and nail files to take control of the planes they hijacked. Al-Qaeda also widely used suicide bombers, something that separated them from many terrorist organizations outside of the Sri Lankan and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. In Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda was likely to use conventional weapons of war, such as assault rifles or rocket-propelled grenades, but it was just as likely to also use less sophisticated weapons, such as improvised explosive devices—the most common cause of American combat deaths in Iraq and a technology that al-Qaeda would use elsewhere as well. Significant evidence showed that bin Laden and oth-

ers were seeking to obtain more deadly firepower, including weapons of mass destruction. The United States has employed a variety of tactics and strategies in conducting the War on Terrorism. In some instances, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, America has relied on conventional military tactics, coupled quite frequently with military special forces. U.S. intelligence agencies have also attempted to infiltrate al-Qaeda and to obtain information from sources familiar with the organization. International cooperation on military and intelligence operations was necessary in fighting international terrorism. Legal systems in various countries were frequently used to prosecute terrorists, although many countries were reluctant to extradite prisoners to the United States because they opposed America’s use of the death penalty. In addition, the United States made it a policy to extradite suspected al-Qaeda operatives to third-party countries where coercive interrogation methods are often employed,

United States: War on Terrorism, 19 9 0s–

though the U.S. government argued that it did not send detainees to countries that they believed practiced torture.

Effects of the War on Terrorism The War on Terrorism may have long-term effects on what is considered acceptable in terms of tactics used and actions taken in attempts to defeat the terrorist threat. Federal agencies have assumed increased powers to act in secrecy; searches of luggage and individuals at airports and borders have become more intrusive; and detainees suspected of having terrorist information may be subjected to humiliation or torture in order to extract that information. Before 9/11 most Americans denounced such extreme measures, but after 9/11, a growing number were willing to support them. In 2005, President Bush threatened to veto a bill that would eliminate the use of most such tactics. Many Americans also supported the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, prisons without allowing many of the suspects access to lawyers or the legal system. On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled in Hamden v. Rumsfeld, striking down the military commissions the Bush administration had set up to try suspected al-Qaeda members. The Court also ruled that the government had to abide by the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war in its treatment of suspects incarcerated at Guantanamo. Republicans and Democrats alike supported the law known as the USA PATRIOT Act, which expanded law enforcement powers in investigating potential terrorists and included some controversial measures that potentially limited the privacy rights of American citizens. In 2005, it also came to light that the National Security Agency (NSA), the topsecret agency set up after World War II to eavesdrop on foreign communications, was monitoring phone calls between persons in the United States and persons abroad. Critics contended this action violated U.S. law against domestic spying by the NSA. More significantly, it was learned that the Bush administration had authorized such eavesdropping without obtaining a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a secret court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. While President Bush admitted the allegations were true, he insisted that his actions were both legal and proper.

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War on Terrorism in Historical Context Most experts in the field have concluded that the War on Terrorism, like the Cold War before it, is an unconventional conflict that is likely to last for decades. Also like the Cold War, the War on Terrorism has led to a far-reaching bureaucratic reorganization of America’s defenses, with the establishment of a large new cabinetlevel Department of Homeland Security with a mandate to run the nation’s borders, its immigration service, its Coast Guard, and its transportation security. In other ways, the War on Terrorism is quite different from the Cold War. The Cold War pitted nation-states and blocs of nations against each other; the War on Terrorism targets a more amorphous foe and a more complicated set of alliances. This situation has led to significant disagreements between the United States and its allies, many of which offer support for certain elements of the new conflict but withhold support for other elements. While much of the world worked with U.S. intelligence services on tracking terrorists around the world and supported the conventional invasion of Afghanistan, they strongly disapproved of Washington’s decision to invade Iraq, and they refused to participate. As for the enemy, al-Qaeda is not a nation-state at all and very different from earlier terrorist groups. Preceding terrorist organizations—such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization—were hierarchical organizations with specified goals. They could be combated by targeting political leaders or, in some cases, dealt with through negotiations. Al-Qaeda, however, is more of an ideological grouping of independent terrorist cells. Capturing or killing the leadership may have little effect on it. Moreover, its demands, which include the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and the destruction of Israel, would be very difficult for the United States to meet even if it was inclined to try. While all terrorism uses violence to achieve political ends, al Qaeda’s methods appear more nihilistic—to kill the maximum number of people, partly to extort political concessions but also as a form of revenge for alleged crimes committed against Muslims by the West. Kenneth Quinnell and James Ciment See also: Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Philippines: War on Islamic Militants Since 1990; Afghanistan: U.S. Invasion, 2001– ; Iraq: U.S. Invasion, 2003– .

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Bibliography Barber, Benjamin. Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World. New York: Crown, 1995. Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Hooks, Gregory, and Clayton Mosher. “Outrages Against Personal Dignity: Rationalizing Abuse and Torture in the War on Terror.” Social Forces 83, no. 4 (2005): 1627–45. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Re-

making of World Order. Riverside, NJ: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: Modern Library, 2003. Pillar, P.R. “Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda.” Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (June 2004): 101–13. Piszkiewicz, Dennis. Terrorism’s War with America: A History. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and John Kaltner. “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11.” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2 (June 2003): 76.

URUGUAY: Tupumaro Uprising,1967–1985 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War 0

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Treinta y Tres

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Punta del Este

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Uruguay, one of South America’s “Southern Cone” countries, along with Argentina and Chile, is bordered on the north by Brazil and on the south and west by Argentina. Its land area is 68,037 square miles, of which almost 90 percent is suitable for agriculture. The population is about 3.4 million, just less than half of whom live in the capital, Montevideo. The economy is based on sheep and cattle raising, but the great majority of the workforce is employed in manufacturing, service, or governmental positions. Ethnically, Uruguay is almost entirely of European stock, principally Italian or Spanish. The official language is Spanish. Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion.

Historical Background During the colonial era, Uruguay was alternately controlled by Spain and Portugal, passing finally to Spanish control under the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata (Argentina) in 1776. Argentina declared inde-

pendence in 1816, but Uruguay, aided by Great Britain, seceded in 1825 under the leadership of its national hero, Jose Artigas. Brazil and Argentina immediately invaded and fought a three-year war, ending in a British-brokered peace that finally established Uruguayan independence. Politically and ideologically, Uruguay followed the Latin American pattern, dividing into conservatives—usually the big landowners—and liberals—usually merchants and professionals in the capital. In Uruguay, the conservatives became the Blanco (white) Party; the liberals were Colorados (reds). By the end of the nineteenth century, both groups agreed on the need for economic development and free markets. Differences crystallized around the role of the state and nationalism versus federalism. However, Colorado party president Jose Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–1907 and 1911–1915) established a sort of Uruguayan social-democratic welfare state, complete with public ownership of most utilities, strong labor unions, expansion of the civil service, and (in 1921) the first women’s suffrage in Latin America. Throughout the 1920s, Uruguay, “the Switzerland of South America,” enjoyed political peace and economic growth under the Batlle system. The Blancos regained power during the 1930s depression and established a brief dictatorship, but the Batlle system was left relatively untouched. World War II brought renewed prosperity and restoration of Colorado rule. However, the postwar slump in commodity prices produced a permanent economic decline, with negative growth every year between 1945 and 1960. Real incomes declined, and inflation in the 1960s often exceeded 100 percent per year. The state welfare system, the huge civil service, and government pensions for retirees were increasingly difficult to finance but politically impossible to change. In 1966, popular protests and strikes against the worsening economic situation almost paralyzed the country. A conservative Colorado president, Jorge Pacheco Areco, froze wages and prices and used

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KEY DATES 1967

Farm labor organizer Raul Sendic organizes the National Liberation Movement (MLN, its Spanish acronym); the group also calls itself the Tupumaros, in honor of a sixteenth-century Inca rebel against Spanish rule in Peru.

1968

Some 2,000 Tupumaros conduct raids on government armories, bank robberies, and seizures of radio stations, in an effort to disrupt society and spark revolution.

1970

Tupumaros kidnap and kill Uruguay’s chief of police intelligence.

1971

Changing tactics, Sendic joins a left-of-center political coalition in order to compete in elections.

1972

The Uruguayan military launches an offensive against Tupumaros and, by the end of the year, claims the organization has been effectively destroyed.

1973

The military takes control of the government.

1980

Military rulers of Uruguay announce plans to restore civilian rule.

1984

Elections ending military rule are held; constitutional rule begins the following year.

“emergency security measures” to ban strikes, censor the press, and crack down on “leftists,” jailing persons suspected of subversive tendencies or advocating strikes. Frequent torture was reported.

The Tupumaros Part of the fear and the harshness of the response can be attributed to the emergence in 1967 of the National Liberation Movement (MLN), known as the Tupumaros in honor of an Inca Indian who had led a native revolt against Spanish rule in Peru in the eighteenth century. MLN founder Raul Sendic, a union organizer of farmworkers, came to Montevideo in 1962 and gathered a group of disaffected middle- and upperclass intellectuals who believed that only armed revolution could break the power of the traditional parties and their supporters. The party held big landowners and foreign capital responsible for the country’s decline. Their strategy was to carry out spectacular actions—kidnappings, bank robberies, propaganda— that would provoke the authorities into overreacting, eventually leading to a mass popular revolution.

Initially, the strategy was successful. Proceeds from well-publicized bank robberies were distributed to the poor, gaining new supporters. By 1968, with as many as 2,000 activists, the Tupumaros were routinely stealing weapons from government armories, seizing government radio stations, robbing major banks, and organizing riots. The government appeared helpless. In August, the Tupumaros began a series of kidnappings. Its first victim was Ulises Pereira Reverbel, head of the state telephone and electrical corporations, who was known as a ruthless enemy of striking workers. After releasing him unharmed, they said this was a warning to those who collaborated with President Pacheco’s policies. As the Tupumaros hoped, the government overreacted. Pacheco sent the police into the national university, violating its autonomy and setting off days of street fighting in which one student was killed and hundreds injured. In protest, 50,000 people took to the streets, and a general strike closed down Uruguay for twenty-four hours. On September 22, Pacheco called out the army and closed the university and all secondary schools. By June 1969, more strikes pro-

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duced a political crisis when Pacheco ordered that strikers be drafted into the army. Congress threatened to impeach him, and Pacheco responded by imposing a state of siege and threatening to dissolve the legislature. Rumors spread of a military coup, possibly accompanied by a Brazilian intervention. In September, the Tupumaros kidnapped a prominent banker and publisher involved in a dispute with his employees and held him for over two months. He was released after paying a huge ransom to a welfare organization. Police officers believed to be involved in torture were killed, including the chief of police intelligence, who died in April 1970. In July, a judge was kidnapped and released after promising not to hear any more guerrilla cases. In the same month, the Tupumaros carried out their best-known abduction, taking U.S. AID (Agency for International Development) police adviser Dan Mitrione. For his release, they demanded that the government free 150 political prisoners. Pacheco refused, and Mitrione was killed. The Brazilian consul in Montevideo, kidnapped the same day as Mitrione, was released in February 1971 after his family paid a $250,000 ransom. On August 7, 1970, the Tupumaros kidnapped an American agricultural adviser, Claude Fly. On the same day, Sendic and twelve Tupumaro leaders were captured. A massive police and army search resulted in the arrest of 200 suspected Tupumaros or sympathizers. In return, the Tupumaros kidnapped British ambassador Geoffrey Jackson, demanding freedom for Sendic and 150 other political prisoners. Pacheco refused. They released Fly in March, but followed with two more sensational abductions: the Uruguayan attorney general, Guido Berro Oribe and strikebreaker Ulises Pereira for a second time. In July and September, Sendic and the other Tupumaro prisoners made sensational escapes from maximum-security penitentiaries. Then they promptly released the British ambassador, unharmed after 245 days in captivity. In 1971, Sendic switched tactics and joined the left-of-center political coalition, Frente Amplio (the Broad Front), composed of the Socialist, Communist, and Christian Democratic parties and dissident Colorados and Blancos. Its presidential candidate was retired army general Liber Seregni Mosquera, and its program called for further nationalization of banks and industry, government control of foreign trade, and a neutralist foreign policy, including recognition of Cuba. Polls showed the Broad Front had much

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popular support, although some who favored its platform feared that the Communist Party would control the government if it won. There was also an entirely reasonable fear that if the Broad Front won, there would be a military coup. In the November election, widely criticized for fraud, Seregni got only 20 percent of the vote. The Blanco candidate, conservative rancher and former Colorado member Juan María Bordaberry, was the eventual winner, nosing out the liberal Wilson Ferreira Aldunate. In the Congress, Ferreira refused to cooperate with President Bordaberry in any way. Effectively, this gave the Broad Front minority in the Congress veto power. Working with the Blancos, it succeeded in electing a Blanco president of the Chamber of Deputies and in repealing all the Pacheco limitations on personal rights.

Defeat of the Tupumaros Despite their gain of political leverage, the Tupumaro leadership made a strategic error by resuming the armed struggle. In April, fifteen more Tupumaros escaped from prison. Two days later, the guerrillas killed four government security officials. The government responded with a declaration of limited martial law, giving military courts authority over all suspected of being members or supporters of the Tupumaros. Troops assaulted the headquarters of the Communist Party and killed eight of its leaders. Arrested Tupumaro suspects were tortured, and eventually one revealed the location of most of the group’s safe houses. By September, over 1,000 were in military prisons, and 20 others had been killed. Sendic was captured in a shootout in which he was seriously wounded on September 1. By the beginning of 1973, the military high command announced that the Tupumaros had been destroyed.

Coup on the Installment Plan With the emergency over, it soon became clear that the military had no intention of returning to the old constitutional system that, in their view, had not only tolerated the Tupumaros but had given rise to the economic and social conditions that provoked their revolt. One group, mostly in the navy and marine corps, was identified as “Peruvianists,” social reformers in uniform who believed that only the military could root out civilian corruption and carry out necessary changes, such as land reform. The central labor federation and

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even the Communist Party expressed interest in working with them. The second, and eventually dominant, faction favored the Brazilian model. There the military believed its task was not to reform the system, but to take it over and maintain law and order. On February 12, President Bordaberry agreed to the establishment of a military-dominated National Security Council. The next installment came in June, when Bordaberry bowed to the army and abolished Congress and the municipal councils. All political parties were declared “in recess.” A general strike seemed to be succeeding, but with Brazilian help it was put down, and labor unions were dissolved. The university was closed and press censorship introduced. Eventually, with 5,000 political prisoners, Uruguay had the distinction of having the greatest percentage of its population jailed for political reasons of any country in the hemisphere. Among them was the Broad Front candidate in 1970, General Seregni. To avoid the same fate, the Blanco candidate, Wilson Ferreira, went into exile, along with approximately 300,000 of his fellow citizens. Bordaberry lasted until 1976, when the generals, disagreeing with his plan to end all elective government, deposed him, as they said, “to preserve democratic traditions.” In 1980, army commander-in-chief General Gregorio Alvarez, under strong international pressure to restore civil rule, had a new constitution drawn up that would permit military-controlled elections and permanent military supervision of the political process. The proposed constitution was submitted to a plebiscite on November 30, 1980. The voters repudiated it, much to the surprise and discomfiture of the army commanders. Alvarez was made provisional president in 1981 and directed by the Council of State to prepare for elections in 1985.

Restoration of Civil Rule The next four years were ones of complex political maneuvering. It was clear the military had lost whatever mandate they had, and Alvarez’s attempts to ex-

tend his term in office were unpopular both with the public and with many of his fellow officers. Eventually, it became clear to the military that they had to accept a return to civilian rule unless they wanted to face a genuine revolution. The most they could hope for was that they would not face civil court trials for human rights abuses. As soon as they received a guarantee on this point, elections were scheduled for November 25, 1984. Colorado Julian Sanguinetti won and was installed on March 1, 1985, beginning a period of constitutional rule. Among his first acts was to legalize the Tupumaros. They gave up the armed struggle, eventually were readmitted into the Broad Front, opened a radio station, and published one of Uruguay’s most popular magazines. Raul Sendic remained a party leader until his death in 1989. One final issue from the Tupumaro era had to be resolved. With the end of censorship, released prisoners, most of whom had not been Tupumaros, told their stories of torture and mistreatment, and there was a public outcry for punishment of the torturers. Sanguinetti urged an amnesty, and after a bitter debate the Congress approved an amnesty law. Opponents, though, campaigned successfully for a referendum to overturn the law. The referendum was narrowly defeated in a vote on April 16, 1989. David MacMichael See also: Argentina: Dirty War, 1960s–1970s.

Bibliography Cockroft, James D. Neighbors in Turmoil: Latin America. New York: Harper and Row, 1989. Davis, William Columbus. Warnings from the Far South: Democracy Versus Dictatorship in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. Langguth, A.J. Hidden Terrors. New York: Pantheon, 1978. Sosnowski, Saul, and Louise B. Popkin, eds. Repression, Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993. Whitaker, Arthur P. The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.

VENEZUELA: Anti-Chávez Movement Since 1999 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Uprisings Background CARIBBEAN SEA Amuay

Maracaibo

Puerto La Cruz Puerto Cabello Valencia

Lake Maracaibo

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO

Caracas

VENEZUELA GUYANA

Bogotá

COLOMBIA Oil field Pipeline

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The year 1998 was a pivotal one in Venezuela’s history, including the most significant presidential election in the country’s history since that of Romulo Betancourt in 1958, which ended over a decade of military dictatorship. The 1958 election elevated the Democratic Action (AD, the Spanish acronym) and Social Christian parties (COPEI, the Spanish acronym) to dominance in Venezuela; the election of 1998 essentially signified their demise. In December 1998, enduring the consequences of a sluggish economy and a depreciating currency, Venezuelans elected the left-wing candidate Hugo Chávez to the presidency. Chávez assumed power in February 1999 and changed the name of the country to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. For the first time since 1961, Venezuela’s constitution was rewritten, this time to reflect the leftist ideas of the Chávez platform, inspired by the nineteenth-century Venezuelan revolutionary Simón Bolívar.

Like most countries in Latin America, Venezuela earned its independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century and struggled to form a stable and consolidated national state throughout the century. The political history of Venezuela has not been unlike that of many of its neighbors: a battle between liberal and conservative, or federalist and centrist, political forces in the nineteenth century, followed by the dominance of military strongmen during the first half of the twentieth century. The creation of new regimes often came as a result of coups rather than elections. In the late 1950s, the two major political parties of Venezuela—Democratic Action and the Social Christian party, or Christian Democrats—came together to sign the Punto Fijo agreement, which they hoped would lay the groundwork for the transition to, and success of, democracy. The Punto Fijo essentially excluded parties with radical reform platforms, such as the Venezuelan Communist Party, thereby earning the support of the United States. With the election of Betancourt and his Democratic Action Party in December 1958, Venezuelans established a working democracy that has functioned uninterrupted ever since. Many historians point out, however, that in spite of regular elections and the Punto Fijo agreement, in the last half century partisanship among Venezuela’s political parties has been so bitter, rhetoric so demonizing, and political tactics based so much on exclusion rather than inclusion that it has been nearly impossible for opposition parties and minority factions to exist, participate, and contribute to civic life in meaningful ways. In fact, the Punto Fijo, for all of its democracy rhetoric, essentially ensured that either the AD or the COPEI party would remain in power,

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KEY DATES 1958

The Punto Fijo pact returns Venezuela to civilian rule but bans parties with radical reform agendas.

1992

Former Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez tries to overthrow President Carlos Andres Perez, but the coup fails and Chávez is imprisoned through 1995.

1998

Chávez wins the presidential election in a landslide.

2000

Chávez is reelected to a six-year presidential term while his leftist Fifth Republic Movement and other left-leaning parties sweep state and local elections; Chávez issues the antipoverty Plan Bolivar; meeting with Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries officials, Chávez insists that the organization resist U.S. pressure to increase production.

2001–2003 The Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV, its Spanish acronym), the nation’s trade union federation, organizes several general strikes to protest the Chávez government’s economic program. 2002

A military coup on April 11 fails to topple the Chávez government after millions of Chávez supporters take to the streets.

2004

Chávez wins a referendum and stays in power.

effectively excluding all other political parties from participation in Venezuelan politics, and ostracizing and marginalizing all but centrist ideas. Moreover, the stability of the Punto Fijo was based largely on the ability of the government to distribute the immense profits from Venezuela’s petroleum industry, which was nationalized in 1976. When oil revenues were good, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, political, social, and economic stability prevailed, even if not all political parties—or all Venezuelan people—were participating equally. After 1993, when oil revenues began to plummet because of a decline in world prices, Venezuelan politicians and institutions, including the state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), proved unable to adapt to changing economic and social circumstances. Sparring between political parties became more frequent and more bitter, riots erupted in several cities in 1989, two coups were attempted in 1992 (including one led by Hugo Chávez), and the economic crisis became chronic in 1994. Thus, some

analysts insist that many of the political problems facing Venezuela under Chávez, including political polarization, corruption, and ineffective political institutions, have deep roots in the history of the country and should not be pinned solely on the Chávez administration.

Election of Hugo Chávez With an educational background in political science and engineering, Chávez became a career military man after earning two master’s degrees. In addition to his work in the military’s counter-insurgency department, he served as a lecturer at the Military Academy of Venezuela. Retiring with the rank of lieutenant colonel, Chávez led an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1992 against President Carlos Andres Perez. The failed coup was the culmination of efforts by a secret group, the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement, established by Chávez and other disenchanted military officers. Chávez was sent to jail after the

Venezuela: Anti- Chávez Movement Since 19 9 9

coup attempt, but released in 1995. He continued to oppose the Punto Fijo structure of government and promised a populist program of political, social, and economic reforms that would redistribute wealth, end government corruption, and make Venezuela more autonomous, particularly vis-à-vis the United States. Seizing the opportunity to capitalize on the disenchantment of a population struggling with a failing economy and an unresponsive political system, Chávez ran for president in 1998 and won in a landslide—the largest margin of victory since 1958. He became the nation’s first president since the 1940s to come from outside one of the main political parties. In July 2000, Chávez was reelected to a sixyear term in office; a coalition of his Fifth Republic Movement (MVP) and other left-leaning parties controlled the National Assembly and better than half of the twenty-three governorships in the country. In December 2000 local elections, his coalition held 72 percent of seats on municipal and parish councils. Supporters hailed Chávez as a hero and defender of the poor and a champion of Venezuelan independence. To the nation’s poor, Chávista policies were perceived as offering opportunity, hope, and an improved quality of life. For the first time, they began to reap benefits from the nation’s oil, gas, and mineral resources, rather than merely watch them enhance the lavish lifestyles of elite Caraqueños (residents of the capital Caracas), who were viewed as having a stranglehold on power, influence, and wealth. Chávez’s appeal to the poor was evident in his very first program of reform, Plan Bolivar 2000, which including housing, health care, and road building programs. Opponents, most notably the business group Fedecamaras, the labor organization Venezuelan Workers Confederation, and a right-leaning political coalition called the Democratic Coordinating Committee, declared him authoritarian in the tradition of the Latin American caudillo and accused him of trying to impose a Castrostyle Communist regime. Opponents claimed that private property rights were being threatened by the Chávez regime (even though they are explicitly protected in the Bolivarian constitution) and that reckless government spending and inept management would lead to economic crisis. While these were the publicly stated reasons for the elite opposition to Chávez’s policies, his efforts to reform tax collection, thereby forcing the well-off to pay a larger share, and to end the forty-year system of political patronage that locked the elites in power also clearly had riled the nation’s

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upper class, who accused Chávez of human rights abuses and authoritarianism.

Foreign Policy and the United States Among Chávez’s campaign promises was a new stance in foreign policy, attempting to distance Venezuela from the United States and to carve out its own path in world affairs. In 2000, he met with OPEC leaders in a show of unity against American pressures to increase oil output and reduce the price of crude. In February 2006, Venezuela’s oil minister threatened to stop oil shipments to the United States altogether. Unless Washington ended its “aggression” against Caracas, Venezuelan officials said, the 1.5 million barrels of oil it sent daily to the United States would be sold instead to China. Chávez also spoke out against international organizations, condemning the policies of the World Trade Organization and opposing the Free Trade Association of the Americas. Chávez spoke out as well against the United States and the Colombian government in their efforts to put down a guerrilla insurgency and fight narcotrafficking in Colombia, and he refused to grant Venezuelan airspace for monitoring the drug trade. Most provocatively, as far as U.S. officials were concerned, Chávez established close ties with the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba, praising that country’s revolution, its social and economic programs, and its independent foreign policy. Chávez also launched a close trading relationship with Cuba, including a swap of 160,000 barrels of oil per day in exchange for Cuban products. Hugo Chávez continued to be a thorn in the side of the United States, opposing American military activities in Afghanistan and Iraq and establishing closer relationships with enemies of the United States, including Iran. Repeatedly and with greater frequency beginning in 2005, Chávez and officials of his government accused the U.S. administration of George W. Bush of attempting to orchestrate the overthrow of the Venezuelan government. Chávez claimed that the United States had been behind the coup that removed him from office for two days in 2002.

Domestic Agenda The Venezuelan president also had an ambitious domestic agenda. He pledged to end the Punto

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Fijo—which, he argued, ignored the interests of the majority and excluded their participation in politics—and to replace it with a political structure more responsive to the needs of the masses. Among its specific promises, Chávez’s “Bolivarian Revolution” included more federal control of education and other social services, as well as a number of economic initiatives, labor reforms, and land reforms that would give poor landowners titles to their homes for the first time and convert unused lands to industrial and agricultural production through expropriation. The most notable social programs were Chávista “missions,” outreach initiatives for social reform that targeted Venezuela’s poor and disenfranchised. The Mission Robinson, for example, taught 1.2 million Venezuelans to read, according to the government, and the Barrio Adentro dispatched more than 13,000 Cuban doctors to rural and less developed parts of Venezuela. The Mission Zamora’s goal was the expropriation and redistribution of unused land, while other missions—such as Mission Guaicaipuro, Mission Hábitat, and Mission Mercal—targeted the needs of indigenous peoples, housing concerns, and food distribution, respectively. Opponents argued that these programs were shortsighted and did not address the roots of the country’s poverty. Furthermore, the opposition contended, funding for the programs, which was easy to come by during the years of high oil prices, will collapse when the world market price for crude falls and government petroleum revenues decline. It was pointed out, for example, that while government spending increased by 47 percent in 2004, largely to fund education and health campaigns, government debt rose from $2 billion to $27 billion over the previous four years. With oil prices still high, by mid2006 Chávez’s social programs seemed to have produced solid results. The nation’s literacy rate was dramatically on the rise, farm and business cooperatives were increasing production, state-owned banks were established in rural areas to facilitate investment, and state-run clinics were providing health care where there was none before.

Anti- Chávez Protests Chávez’s election had significant repercussions on many fronts, not least of which was the way that the election politicized traditionally nonpolitical groups. Fedecameras, Venezuela’s national chamber of com-

merce, immediately opposed his proposals to increase nationalization, expand government regulations on businesses, and embark on a program of land redistribution. The middle class, too, worried about the threats to private property, both explicit and implicit, in the Chávez reform proposals. The media, a traditionally neutral institution in Venezuela, also established itself as a constant critic of the Chávez regime, going so far as to call him a “totalitarian.” Even the Catholic Church, long past its days as an important political player, suggested that the wrath of God would be visited upon Venezuela for the “arrogance” of the president. Despite his populist appeal, labor support for Chávez was mixed. The country’s major labor union, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), traditionally part of the AD coalition, consistently opposed the president, accusing him of interfering in internal union affairs by requiring state monitoring of union elections. On the other hand, much of the rank and file responded favorably to his policies, forming the pro-Chávez National Union of Workers (UNT). One of Chávez’s major initiatives, an ongoing effort to rein in the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, also contributed to the rift between his administration and the CTV. President Perez had nationalized the company in 1976, but it remained largely autonomous from the state, its coffers a source of enrichment for union and business elites. In 1999, after a half-decade of slumping oil prices and wages, workers demanded raises and threatened to strike. Although the government gave in to their demands, Venezuelans subsequently voted to allow President Chávez to suspend union leaders and hold new union elections. In 2001, the CTV led a strike of 1 million workers to protest new economic regulations on agriculture, fishing, and petroleum. In December 2002, labor unions, business federations, and middle-class civic groups demanded Chávez’s resignation and called a general strike, which lasted until February 2003. The work stoppage cost the government $10 billion, but little came of the effort; Chávez’s opponents from the middle and working classes were met in the streets (generally without violence) by throngs of urban poor who supported the reformist policies. In the most disruptive anti-Chávezista event to date, business and labor groups called another general strike in April 2002, this time to protest the appointment of five new administrators at PDVSA. The

Venezuela: Anti- Chávez Movement Since 19 9 9

president was accused of cronyism, and workers resented what they alleged were his attempts to control them; indeed, the strikes led to an attempt to remove Chávez from office. In September 2004, after nearly 6 million Venezuelans voted for him to remain in power in a recall election, a new round of strikes was called. The Democratic Coordinating Committee alleged fraud in the elections and led protests of caravanning automobiles through the streets of Caracas. Strikes have been a common type of resistance to Chávez, but opposition has taken many forms. Despite the many allegations of authoritarianism from international observers and domestic critics, the tactics of both the Chávez government and the opposition have remained largely within the democratic framework. The media, criticized by international observers for being overly politicized, remained staunchly anti-Chávez but was left largely untrammeled by the government. The media protested laws allowing the government to preempt programming—a power invoked during times of strike and the coup attempt of April 2002— and 2005 legislation restricting media broadcasts critical of the government, as well as sexually explicit programming. Although there were no arrests, critics argued that the legislation was vague and subjective, and that it effectively censored the media by forcing excessive caution. The jailing of opposition leaders— even those who declared themselves in open rebellion against the government—was also rare. In fact, none of the leaders of the April 2002 coup attempt were imprisoned (though military men who defected to support the coup were arrested). Chávez opponents often resorted to democratic means—the ballot box—to express their disapproval of government policies and effect change. Despite the widespread electoral victories of the leftist parties in 2000, workers overwhelmingly rejected pro-Chávez candidates in union leadership elections the following year. Beginning in November 2002 and throughout 2003, anti-Chávistas gathered millions of signatures demanding a referendum on whether he should stay in power. The referendum was granted by the government and held in August 2004. Seventy percent of Venezuela’s eligible voters turned out, some waiting all day in poll lines. Although opposition parties initially pronounced the vote free and fair (when they thought they had won), they alleged fraud when the final results were announced by the government, indicating a significant victory for Chávez, and in spite of certifications by at least three

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international observing organizations. Chávez’s opponents were surprised enough by his victory but even more shocked by the level of support—59 percent voted to keep him in power. As if this were not enough, Chàvez’s opponents were dealt another blow in October 2004, when voters gave his ruling coalition twenty of the twenty-three governorships in the country and control of 80 percent of municipalities. Although he increased the pace of his Bolivarian Revolution to shore up support before the recall vote, his overwhelming victories at the polls in 2004, along with an economic rebound (largely due to the rising price of oil), served to embolden Chávez and his supporters to accelerate reform programs.

Retaliation The most dramatic demonstration of anti-Chávez sentiment came on April 11, 2002, when opponents attempted to remove him from office through a coup d’état. In response to Chávez’s attempts to centralize control of PDVSA by replacing the company brass, worker groups (including the CTV) and middle-class groups staged protests against his leftist programs in general and sought to impeach the legitimacy of his government. According to estimates, anywhere from half a million to a million people took to the streets, and they were soon joined by Fedecamaras. Violence ensued. With rumors that Chávez had ordered his supporters to fire on the protesters, high-ranking military officials intervened. They installed an interim president, Pedro Carmona Estanga, the leader of Fedecamaras, who dissolved both the National Assembly and the Supreme Court. Carmona also issued a spate of decrees, voiding the 1999 constitution and reversing much of the work Chávez had done to centralize government control of the economy. Carmona’s abrupt actions divided Chávez’s opponents, leading some to fear that he would be even more authoritarian than the ousted president. This led Chávez’s supporters, especially from middle levels of the armed forces, to launch an effort to restore him to power. The countercoup lasted only two days, ending successfully. The failure of the 2002 ouster attempt illustrated a major obstacle for Chávez opponents: the division among themselves. With everyone from workers to business leaders to the middle class acting on their own, they were never able to set aside their respective interests in order to come together to achieve their

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common political goal of removing Chávez. For example, while business owners resented government meddling in the private sector, workers wanted a government that does regulate business, so long as that regulation is in their economic interest. And while many of those in the middle class (representing 40–50 percent of the population) do not embrace the policies or tactics of the Chávez regime—analysts suggest that they are neither strongly pro- nor strongly anti-Chávez—they tend to vote for him in the absence of a viable and appealing alternative.

Continuing Fears President Chávez has done little to directly attack those who oppose him. The most significant threat to his opponents—largely from the wealthy, middle, and to some extent working classes—has been his empowerment of the poor. In fact, many observers have noted that his relationship with Cuban leader Fidel Castro, rather than anything specific he has done in Venezuela, has been the catalyst for political opposition. Despite limited evidence of Castro-style Communist tendencies in the Chávez regime, many wealthy Venezuelans fear that he will eventually

adopt Castro’s socialist policies of nationalization and redistribution of land and wealth. In some ways, however, the very nature and means of opposition have provided evidence that President Hugo Chávez was never as authoritarian or autocratic as his opponents alleged. John A. King Jr. See also: Coups; Colombia: Internal Insurgencies, 1970s– 2000s.

Bibliography Gott, Richard. Hugo Chávez: The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela. New York: Verso, 2005 Hellinger, Daniel, and Steve Ellner, eds. Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Lombardi, John V. Venezuela: The Search for Order, the Dream of Progress. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. McCoy, Jennifer L., and David J. Meyers, eds. The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. Myers, David J. “Venezuelan Politics in the Chavez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict.” Latin American Politics & Society 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 187–92. Niemeyer, Ralph T. Under Attack: Morning Dawn in Venezuela. Lincoln, NE: Universe, 2004.

ASIA,EAST AND SOUTHEAST

East and Southeast Asia

ARAL SEA

MONGOLIA SEA OF

NORTH JAPAN KOREA

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H

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SOUTH KOREA

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JAPAN

EAST CHINA SEA

TAIWAN

PA C I F I C

MYANMAR Bay of Bengal

LAOS THAILAND VIETNAM

OCEAN

SOUTH CHINA SEA

PHILIPPINES

CAMBODIA

BRUNEI

INDIAN OCEAN

M A L A Y S I A

I 0 0

250 250

N

D

O

N

E

S

I

A

500 Miles

500 Kilometers

Countries in East and Southeast Asia that have experienced conflict on their own soil since World War II

EAST TIMOR

CAMBODIA: Civil Wars,1968–1998 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s Wars; Coups,Left and Right PARTICIPANTS: United States; Vietnam (North and South)

CAMBODIA Tonle Sap

Phnom Penh

GULF OF THAILAND

0

50 50

iM Ch Ho

in

ra hT

il

M ekong River

KHMER ROUGECONTROLLED AREA AFTER 1979 Angkor Wat

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ministration in charge of governing the colony until early 1945, when it was replaced by Japanese administrators. When Cambodia’s old king, Sisowath Monivong, died in 1941, the French replaced him with his eighteen-year-old grandson, Norodom Sihanouk, probably with the hope that he would be a more pliant monarch—a hope that turned out to be misplaced.

LAOS

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VIETNAM (South Vietnam until 1975)

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Until the thirteenth century, Cambodia was the center of the powerful Khmer Empire, which ruled over an area covering modern Cambodia and large parts of Thailand and Vietnam (Khmer is the ethnic label of the vast majority of Cambodians). After the fourteenth century, however, the Khmer Empire collapsed, and subsequent Cambodian kingdoms fell under the sway of either the Thais or the Vietnamese. After 1700, Cambodia was at the mercy of its then stronger neighbors (as it would be again in the twentieth century). What little independence Cambodia had was ended by the French conquest, which was largely complete by 1884. While maintaining complete control of Cambodia’s internal affairs, the French kept the Cambodian monarchy as a useful figurehead to aid in their governance of the country. Cambodia’s monarchs cooperated, perhaps realizing that French control had saved Cambodia from being divided up by Thailand and Vietnam. Unlike Vietnam, Cambodia offered only minimal resistance to French rule. In 1940, the Japanese occupied all of Indochina, including Cambodia, but left the Vichy French ad-

For most of his life, Sihanouk led the life of a playboy—enjoying such pastimes as leading a jazz band and directing his own films—but he gradually became a canny politician. He was vain and imperious, allowing no criticism and jailing those who opposed him, but he was also genuinely popular among Cambodia’s peasantry, who liked his sudden trips into the countryside, where he would hand out food and clothing and exchange bawdy jokes with village leaders. He was less popular among Cambodia’s intelligentsia, left and right, who resented his arrogance and erratic style of leadership. King Sihanouk’s chief lifetime political goal was achieving and maintaining Cambodian independence. Except for a brief period in late 1945 when the Japanese had asked him to declare Cambodia’s independence, Sihanouk appeared to cooperate with his French puppet masters, all the while pressing for greater autonomy for his country. Gradually, and reluctantly, the French obliged. In 1946, France allowed the creation of the Cambodian National Assembly, although it was given little power. In 1949, Cambodia was granted limited autonomy, with France remaining in charge of taxation, the military, and internal security. In October 1953, Sihanouk used the threat of an opposition movement against the colonial government to convince France to grant almost complete

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KEY DATES 1949

Cambodia becomes independent of France.

1954

In the wake of the Geneva Accords ending the war between Vietnamese Communist-nationalists and French colonialists in neighboring Vietnam, members of the Cambodian Communist opposition organization, the Khmer People’s Revolutionary (KPRP), flee to Communist-controlled North Vietnam.

1955

King Norodom Sihanouk abdicates and establishes his own political party, which sweeps elections.

1970

In March, Sihanouk’s government is overthrown in a military coup; U.S. and South Vietnamese troops invade the country in search of Viet Cong headquarters in April; civil war between the Khmer Rouge and the Lon Nol government breaks out; the government receives large amounts of military aid from the United States.

1973

United States resumes heavy bombing of suspected Viet Cong and Khmer Rouge positions in Cambodia.

1975

The Lon Nol government falls to Khmer Rouge forces in April.

1975–1979

The Khmer Rouge launches a campaign to purify Cambodian society of alleged counterrevolutionary elements by evacuating cities and forcing Cambodians into labor camps; up to 2 million Cambodians are executed or starve to death in the process.

1978–1979

To end the genocide, Vietnamese forces invade Cambodia and overthrow the Khmer Rouge government; Vietnamese forces leave the country in 1989.

1979–1997 The Khmer Rouge forces, allied with other parties, conduct guerilla warfare against Vietnamese forces and Cambodian government forces from bases in the western part of the country. 1997

The Khmer Rouge splinters; their effectiveness as a military force diminishes.

1998

Long-time Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot dies.

2004

Following stalemated national elections, leading Cambodian politicians form a coalition government.

independence to Cambodia. Deeply embroiled in its war in Vietnam, France agreed, since it had no desire to start a second conflict in neighboring Cambodia. Even as he was carrying out his drive for Cambodian independence, Sihanouk worked to suppress

the independent political forces within the country. The chief political opposition to Sihanouk came from the Democratic Party, which had dominated the Cambodian National Assembly since the 1946 elections. The Democratic Party favored an accelerated French withdrawal from Cambodia and the

Cambodia: Civil Wars, 19 6 8–19 9 8

creation of free democratic institutions in Cambodia. While Sihanouk was happy to see the French go, he had no desire to share power with a democratic legislature. In June 1952, with the help of French troops, Sihanouk organized a coup against the government chosen by the Democrats in the National Assembly. In January 1953, when the assembly refused to pass his budget, he dissolved it and declared martial law. These actions led to protests by radical students in Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital. By October, Sihanouk had succeeded in gaining independence from France, undercutting the protesters and greatly increasing his own popularity. Sihanouk still had to deal with an indigenous Communist opposition led by the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) and supported by the Vietnamese Communists. However, in 1954, after Vietnam’s landmark victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords provided for French withdrawal from Indochina, and so the Vietnamese and most of the KPRP guerrillas withdrew to North Vietnam. In 1955, Sihanouk solidified his position by abdicating as king, designating his father, Norodom Suramarit, the new king, and creating a political movement called the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People’s Socialist Community), which would become his new base of political power. In the September elections, the Sangkum won all of the reconstituted Cambodian Assembly’s seats—amid widespread reports of police abuses and campaign fraud—and from then until 1970, Sihanouk remained in complete charge of Cambodia’s government. Opposition leaders were harassed into silence, or exile; newspapers were censored; and Sihanouk’s secret police kept a close watch on antigovernment intellectuals. Prince Sihanouk, as he now referred to himself, became a royal dictator. Until the mid-1960s, Sihanouk was a genuinely popular ruler. The peasants did not miss democratic forms that had never meant anything to them, and they liked Sihanouk’s flamboyant style and royal aura. Conservative elites in Cambodia—landlords, businessmen, and the military—all supported Sihanouk’s attacks on leftists. The Democratic Party, faced with Sihanouk’s harassment, soon dissolved itself. The only substantial group to oppose Sihanouk was the Communists, and they remained weak until well into the 1960s.

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Cambodia’s Communists The Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP) was born out of a merging of two leftist Cambodian movements, the KPRP and the Khmer Students’ Union (KSU). The KPRP was a direct offshoot of the Vietnamese-backed Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), which had been founded by Ho Chi Minh, the leader of Vietnam’s Communists. In 1951, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh declared that the ICP was to be transformed into three separate national parties: the Workers’ Party of Vietnam, the People’s Revolutionary Party of Laos, and the KPRP. Not surprisingly, considering its heritage, the KPRP retained strong ties to Vietnam’s Communists. In its early days, many KPRP cadres were Vietnamese, and, even after the Vietnamese were replaced by ethnic Khmer, the KPRP continued to work closely with the Vietnamese Communists. When Sihanouk began persecuting the KPRP after 1954, they found a safe haven across the border in Vietnam. The other component of the future KCP developed from a movement of Cambodian students in Paris. These students, most of whom came from privileged backgrounds, had won scholarships to study in France. Once there, they became radicalized by their exposure to the freedom of debate allowed in France and by their encounter with the leftist movements in Europe, especially the French Communist Party. The Paris students formed a fraternal association called the Khmer Students’ Association (KSA), which tended toward left-wing political views, and its successor, the Khmer Students’ Union (KSU), was completely Marxist in outlook. The KSU, founded in 1956, was dominated by extreme Communists who admired the achievements of Joseph Stalin. Among them were Ieng Sary, Son Sann, and Saloth Sar, later known as Pol Pot, the men who would eventually lead Cambodia’s bloody Communist revolution. Saloth Sar and the other young Paris-educated students returned to Cambodia in the late 1950s and joined the KPRP. They soon concluded, however, that the Vietnamese-friendly leadership of the KPRP was too moderate in its views. The KPRP wanted to support Sihanouk’s neutralist policies, while putting pressure on him to make domestic reforms. Saloth Sar and his fellow KSU alumni advocated a more radical policy of attacking both U.S. imperialism and Sihanouk, whom they accused of perpetuating an unjust class structure within Cambodia.

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Saloth Sar and his associates worked from within to change the direction of the KPRP. They formed their own clique within the party, operating as a secret, separate organization to bring the KPRP around to their more radical way of thinking—this was the beginning of the Khmer Rouge. Success came in 1963 when the Paris clique pushed the KPRP to change its name to the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP) and chose Saloth Sar to be the general secretary of the party, replacing Touch Samouth, who had disappeared. At the time, it was assumed that Sihanouk’s secret police had eliminated Touch Samouth, but later observers speculated that Saloth Sar, who soon developed a reputation for ruthless brutality, may have gotten rid of his predecessor himself. From 1963 on, the radical Saloth Sar faction dominated the KCP. At the same time, it operated as an independent movement with its own agenda. There were, in effect, two Cambodian Communist parties: one, the KCP, which usually did as Saloth Sar wished, and the other, the clique of ex-students, who were completely under his control. For most of the 1960s, the KCP did not have much success in winning over the people of Cambodia to its radical political and social agenda. Sihanouk remained popular among the peasants; military aid from the United States helped him to suppress the local Communists; and careful diplomacy allowed Sihanouk to maintain fairly good relations with both China and the North Vietnamese. Beginning in the late 1960s, however, the rising tempo of the Vietnam War began to undercut Sihanouk’s power and greatly enhance that of Saloth Sar and the KCP.

Vietnam Wa r As fighting between the U.S.-supported government of South Vietnam and Vietnamese Communist guerrillas escalated, it became hard for Sihanouk not to become involved. The United States was funneling billions of dollars and tens of thousands of troops into Vietnam in support of the South Vietnamese. North Vietnam, supported by China and the Soviet Union, was doing the same for the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. To reach their comrades in the South, the North Vietnamese created supply lines that passed through the dense jungles running along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, a route that came to be called the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Sihanouk tried to play a double game, maintaining good relations with Communist North Vietnam while continuing to suppress Communists within Cambodia. In 1965, as American troops poured into Vietnam, Sihanouk broke off diplomatic relations with the United States (he had refused any more American military aid in 1963). He also gave the Vietnamese Communists secret permission to use bases along the eastern Cambodian border for the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to bring in supplies via the Cambodian port city of Sihanoukville. Sihanouk seemed to be making the best of a bad situation. He believed that the Communists would win in Vietnam, and so as not to alienate them, he allowed them to make limited use of Cambodian territory. He probably could not have stopped the Vietnamese activities in any case. His quiet concession to the Communist side temporarily kept the violence of the Vietnam War from spilling over into Cambodia itself, and to further solidify his position, Sihanouk worked to build a friendship with Communist China. At first Sihanouk’s policies were effective. Saloth Sar and the other Cambodian hard-line Communists had fled to the border areas occupied by the Vietnamese Communists in order to build a guerrilla movement, but the Vietnamese Communists, not wishing to risk their use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, encouraged their Cambodian colleagues to keep a low profile. By 1967, however, Sihanouk’s methods had begun to fail in politically marginalizing Cambodia’s Communists.

The Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot As the North Vietnamese expanded their bases along Cambodia’s border, Cambodia’s economy began to suffer. Large-scale smuggling of grain to the Vietnamese Communists—who paid better prices than Sihanouk’s government—was reducing government income. In 1967, when the Cambodian army tried to stop the grain smuggling, the result was a large-scale uprising by peasants in Battambang province. Sihanouk’s troops suppressed the uprising, but more than 10,000 peasants died. The brutal actions of Sihanouk’s troops gained the KCP many supporters. Starting in 1968, the Khmer Rouge, as Sihanouk dubbed them, began to conduct a hit-and-run guerrilla campaign against his government. They were still not a threat to Sihanouk’s regime, but the Battambang uprising had transformed them into a respectable

Cambodia: Civil Wars, 19 6 8–19 9 8

force. By 1970, the Khmer Rouge probably had at least 1,000 armed men in the field, as well as many sympathizers, and were active in 20 percent of Cambodia’s territory. The Khmer Rouge led by Saloth Sar, now going by the nom de guerre of Pol Pot, had developed an insular and xenophobic ideology that distrusted both class enemies and other Communist movements, particularly the Vietnamese Communists, who they felt had never provided sufficient aid against Sihanouk. Pol Pot and his colleagues admired Mao Zedong’s idea of a people’s revolution based entirely on the peasant class. Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1971) with its attacks on intellectuals and better-off peasants also appealed to the Khmer Rouge leadership; they regarded cities as parasitical and counterrevolutionary. These attitudes, combined with the bloody-minded Stalinism that characterized Pol Pot, boded ill for Cambodia.

Lon Nol’s 1970 Coup As Khmer Rouge activity increased, conservative Cambodians became more and more dissatisfied with Sihanouk’s policies. His neutrality in the Vietnam War no longer was keeping Communist raids from disturbing Cambodia’s tranquillity. Moreover, under increasing pressure from the U.S. army, the Vietnamese Communists were retreating farther into Cambodia and building fortifications from which to base their attacks on South Vietnam. Eastern Cambodia was becoming a staging base for the Vietnamese Communist effort in South Vietnam, and tons of supplies were moving through the country on their way to support the battle against the United States and South Vietnamese armies. This heavy Communist activity disturbed both the United States and conservatives in Cambodia. Both were worried about the degree to which the North Vietnamese were using Cambodian territory. On the other hand, the Cambodian military were upset that Sihanouk was providing tacit support to the Communist insurgents in Vietnam. And many people from all social classes were angered by Sihanouk’s financial excesses (which included awarding himself gold statues from the central bank) and haphazard governing style. In 1969, military officers and conservative leaders within Sihanouk’s cabinet began to plot his overthrow. In March 1970, Sihanouk’s cousin, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, with the help of Sihanouk’s prime minis-

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ter, General Lon Nol, led a coup against Sihanouk while he was visiting the Soviet Union (Sihanouk was trying to convince the Soviets to help him evict the North Vietnamese). In Phnom Penh there was almost no resistance to the coup, although a few pro-Sihanouk riots took place in late March. Lon Nol became the leader of the new government, assisted by Sirik Matak. The plotters may have received encouragement and support from the United States, which considered Sihanouk an unsatisfactory leader because of his neutralist stance. While Phnom Penh accepted the coup, Sihanouk and his supporters did not. After some waffling—and under pressure from his allies in China—Sihanouk issued a declaration denouncing the coup and establishing a resistance movement and government-inexile. This movement, called the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK, its French acronym), was to be an umbrella movement taking in all those opposed to the Lon Nol government, including the Cambodian Communists whom Sihanouk had been attacking just a few weeks earlier. Sihanouk’s call for resistance was heeded in the countryside, where he had always been popular; thousands of Cambodians joined the KCP in attacking the Lon Nol government. Most educated Cambodians in Phnom Penh, however, supported the coup. They were tired of Sihanouk’s excesses and were eager to see something done about the large Vietnamese presence in their country. Despite the weakness of the Cambodian army, Lon Nol promised his new constituents that he would throw all the Vietnamese out.

U.S. Intervention The United States, which had long been frustrated by Sihanouk’s passive support of the Communist guerrillas in his border provinces, saw the Lon Nol coup as an opportunity to eliminate the Communist presence on South Vietnam’s flank. The Americans immediately began supplying Lon Nol’s army with U.S. military equipment, along with advisers to help train the poorly organized Cambodian army. They also planned a military operation designed to eliminate the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In late April 1970, American and South Vietnamese troops pushed across the border into Cambodia in an attempt to destroy the Vietnamese Communist bases. The American troops remained only until the end of June because of growing antiwar

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sentiment at home, but South Vietnamese troops remained until 1973. For South Vietnam, the invasion was a moderate success. A number of bases were discovered and destroyed, along with many tons of war material. The pressure of the Vietnamese Communist forces was lessened by the incursion and the subsequent occupation of some of the bases. For Cambodia, however, the invasion was a disaster. The Vietnamese Communists reacted to the U.S.Vietnamese invasion by retreating more deeply into Cambodia and bringing the Khmer Rouge along with them. The North Vietnamese assumed (incorrectly) that Lon Nol’s government approved the American incursion. Furious, they ended their policy of neutrality in Cambodia and began to provide extensive support and training for the growing armies of the Khmer Rouge. The American invasion had taken the pressure off the South Vietnamese and transferred it to the Cambodians.

War and Civil War From 1970 to 1971, Cambodia was engulfed by a brutal civil war, during which both sides were supported by foreign governments. Lon Nol’s administration, although initially popular, had neither the competence nor the equipment to fight the North Vietnamese and their Khmer Rouge allies. His goal of ridding Cambodia of the North Vietnamese presence was initially very popular: 40,000 Cambodians joined the army in response to his call, more than doubling its size. The army’s two offensives, however, in July 1970 and August 1971, were cut to pieces by the North Vietnamese troops supported by Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The second offensive was particularly costly—12,000 of Lon Nol’s best troops were killed. The defeat should not have been a surprise; the Cambodian soldiers were inexperienced, poorly trained, and badly equipped, while some of the Vietnamese had been fighting for twenty years. After 1971, the Cambodian military engaged in no more offensives against the North Vietnamese or the Khmer Rouge. Instead, they concentrated on maintaining their control over Phnom Penh and the major provincial capitals. Many officers also used their positions to line their own pockets. Lon Nol, not wanting to alienate the officers who had brought

him to power, did nothing to halt the increasing corruption within the military and government. By 1972, the only thing keeping Lon Nol in power was large amounts of American aid, along with American-trained ethnic Khmer troops. South Vietnam had a large minority of ethnic Khmer, and the Americans had recruited them and formed elite special-forces units. These experienced units became the backbone of Cambodia’s army. In 1973, the United States inaugurated a massive bombing campaign—using B-52 strategic bombers— which kept the Khmer Rouge at bay. The United States had bombed Communist bases on the border intermittently since 1969, but the 1973 campaign dropped more bombs than the previous campaigns and was waged over the whole of Cambodia. Between 1969 and 1973, the U.S. Air Force dropped more than 1 billion pounds of explosives on Cambodia— more than three times the tonnage that was dropped on Japan during World War II. The bombings succeeded in slowing the Khmer Rouge’s advance, but they destroyed many villages and towns and killed thousands of Cambodian civilians. The guerrillas facing the Cambodian army and its American backers were united under a coalition front of opposition groups, the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK), including both the Khmer Rouge and the alliance sponsored by the expatriate Prince Sihanouk. In theory, all Cambodian forces opposed to the government were equal and were under Sihanouk’s authority, but in reality all the key positions were held by the Khmer Rouge, which followed its own agenda. The presence of Sihanouk as the figurehead of the alliance did succeed in attracting many peasant recruits who still admired the absent prince, greatly increasing the number of troops available to the Khmer Rouge. (After their victory in 1975, the Khmer Rouge disbanded those whose loyalty they were not sure of and executed many of these Sihanouk loyalists.) The Khmer Rouge themselves gained increasing popularity during the struggle against the American and South Vietnamese invasion. In the spring of 1970, a joint American-South Vietnamese force invaded Cambodia in an effort to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines to Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Many villages had been destroyed in the brief campaign, and the villagers blamed Lon Nol and his government. The indiscriminate American bombing campaign, particularly in 1973, killed many civilians

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and gained the Khmer Rouge more recruits. According to Sihanouk, the bombing was a critical factor in putting Cambodia under Khmer Rouge control: “With his bombs [President Nixon] performed the miracle of turning our people into revolutionaries within weeks.” By 1972, FUNK had more than 40,000 regular troops, supported by as many as 100,000 guerrilla irregulars. The North Vietnamese, satisfied that Lon Nol would no longer trouble their supply lines, withdrew most of their soldiers from Cambodia. Lon Nol, his army greatly weakened by the failed Chenla offensives and the growing corruption within the Cambodian officer corps, was in control of only about 15 percent of Cambodia’s territory, which included the larger cities and the land around them. From 1973 to 1975, the FUNK coalition maintained a steady pressure on the Cambodian government, particularly on its lines of communication and supply. With most of Cambodia’s farmland under Khmer Rouge control, Lon Nol was hard-pressed to feed the people in Phnom Penh and other Cambodian cities. It was only with constant effort, aided by American forces, that the key Mekong River was kept open as a supply conduit. The end of America’s bombing campaign in August 1973 spelled the beginning of the end of Lon Nol’s Cambodia. In February 1975, the Khmer Rouge closed a vise on Lon Nol’s government by successfully seizing and mining the Mekong River approaches to Phnom Penh. With the river planted in mines, the only way to bring supplies into the capital was by air, and the United States was unwilling to commit sufficient planes to supply Phnom Penh’s 2 million people (1 million of whom were refugees from the fighting) with food. In March, the Cambodian army began to collapse. On April 1, Lon Nol fled the country, taking with him a large sum of gold from the Cambodian treasury. On April 12, the U.S. Embassy evacuated its personnel by helicopter, taking along a number of Cambodian government officials. An attempt by Cambodia’s newly appointed president, Sak Sutsakhan, to preserve the old government was ignored by Pol Pot and Sihanouk. On April 17, the Cambodian army surrendered, and Khmer Rouge troops began entering the city. About 600,000 people had been killed during the five years since Lon Nol’s coup; many more would die during the three years that the Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia.

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Year Zero The bitter years of warfare, combined with their own paranoid inclinations, had molded the Khmer Rouge leadership into a group of like-minded fanatics dedicated to creating their vision of a new Cambodia, free from the corruptions of bourgeois urban decadence. Their attempt to bring about the new Cambodia would lead directly or indirectly to the deaths of more than 1 million Cambodians. When Pol Pot’s soldiers marched into Phnom Penh, they declared that it was “Year Zero,” a new beginning for Cambodia, which they renamed Democratic Kampuchea. As part of their policy of eliminating parasitic city dwellers, they forcibly evacuated all of Cambodia’s major urban centers. The Khmer Rouge leaders later suggested that the evacuation was also designed to eliminate any possible resistance to Khmer Rouge power by breaking up any anticommunist political or spy networks; the cities had been the main opponents of the rurally based Khmer Rouge. Whatever the reasons, Phnom Penh’s 2 million citizens were marched at gunpoint into the surrounding provinces and ordered to start farming. The capital was left almost completely empty. Over the next few months, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge supervised the execution of most of the elite of the old regime. Officers, midlevel bureaucrats, teachers, and doctors were separated and led off to mass executions. The Khmer Rouge also targeted educated people for systematic extermination as threats to the new Democratic Kampuchea. Simply wearing a pair of glasses—proof of being able to read—might be sufficient cause for execution by a fifteen-year-old Khmer Rouge soldier. The rest of the population, the “new people,” were forced into the countryside, organized into work camps, and supervised by Khmer Rouge soldiers, who executed anyone whom they believed to be malingering. Food shortages, partly caused by incompetent Khmer Rouge distribution systems, killed hundreds of thousands; disease and overwork killed more. Finally, the Khmer Rouge created interrogation centers where tens of thousands were tortured and murdered. Under the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia was turned into a giant charnel house. The total number killed can only be estimated, but the number was certainly more than 1 million, and quite possibly more than 2 million. (Cambodia’s population in 1970 had been only 7.2 million.)

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Khmer Rouge forces make a triumphant entrance into Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, on April 17, 1975, after the surrender of the government army. The Communist regime of Pol Pot declared it “Year Zero” for the new nation of Kampuchea. (Claude Juvenal/AFP/Getty Images)

For most of this period, the Khmer Rouge leadership kept a low profile. At first, Pol Pot neither announced that he was in charge nor admitted that Democratic Kampuchea was a Communist state. Instead, the Khmer Rouge invited Sihanouk, as the leader of the FUNK coalition, to return to Cambodia. He arrived on September 9, 1975, to become Democratic Kampuchea’s new head of state, but he was allowed no power. After the death of Chinese leader Zhou Enlai, who had been Sihanouk’s patron in China, in early 1976, the Khmer Rouge put the prince under house arrest. He remained there until January 1979, when he was allowed to leave the country. Most foreign observers assumed that Khieu Samphan, the most mentioned leader, was leading Democratic Kampuchea. Gradually, the invisible leaders of the Cambodian revolution came out from behind their shield of anonymity. Part of the secrecy within the KCP was probably motivated by the internal struggles that went on during 1975 and 1976. Although Pol Pot and his allies were dominant from the

beginning, they probably gained complete control of the Khmer Rouge only in October 1976. After that point, they became both more open about their identities and more brutal in their treatment of regular Cambodians. They saw enemies everywhere, and killed enemies everywhere. As one almost-victim put it, “Anyone they didn’t like, they would accuse of being a teacher or a student or a former Lon Nol soldier, and that was the end.” The Khmer Rouge saw enemies outside Cambodia’s borders as well. Most of the world was viewed with hostility, and diplomatic relations were maintained with only a few countries, including China, North Korea, and Albania. Of all Cambodia’s neighbors, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was the country the Khmer Rouge distrusted the most. (After the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, North Vietnamese troops gained control of the South and unified Vietnam in 1975 under the longtime Communist government in the North.) Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge had welcomed Vietnamese aid during their war, but they had never

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ceased to regard their larger neighbor with suspicion. They were sure that Vietnam’s Communists planned to dominate Democratic Kampuchea. Not all Cambodian Communists felt this way, but those who disagreed with Pol Pot were removed from leadership positions, often by execution or assassination. Starting in 1976, Democratic Kampuchea’s animus toward Vietnam was expressed through crossborder raids by uncoordinated bands of Khmer Rouge troops. Pol Pot hoped to inspire a rebellion among Vietnam’s ethnic Khmer and seize the lands that had once belonged to the old Khmer empire. The Khmer Rouge were supported in these military skirmishes by China, which disliked Vietnam’s close ties with the Soviet Union. By 1977, Democratic Kampuchea was receiving large quantities of Chinese weapons and using division-sized units to assault Vietnamese border regions.

Vietnamese Intervention In September 1977, Vietnam reacted to the Khmer Rouge incursions by staging an invasion of Cambodia’s border regions. In January 1978, after a few months of intermittent fighting between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese army, the Vietnamese withdrew their forces. Cross-border skirmishes, however, continued. At the same time, the increasing repressiveness of Pol Pot’s regime led to an increase in the flow of Cambodian refugees escaping into Vietnam. Hanoi took advantage of this diaspora to recruit Cambodians for an anti–Khmer Rouge coalition. In December 1978, with the number of executions in Cambodia steadily rising, Vietnam announced the creation of the Khmer National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge leader. On December 25, twelve Vietnamese divisions poured into Cambodia, supported by a small army of Cambodian expatriates. By the end of January, most of the country, including Phnom Penh, was under Vietnamese control. Pol Pot and a remnant of his army fled into the dense jungles and hills of northern and western Cambodia. In Phnom Penh, a new Cambodian government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was established, with Heng Samrin as its president. The leadership was entirely made up of Communists, many of them former allies of Pol Pot who had become disenchanted with his regime, and the constitution was

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modeled on that of Vietnam. Although the world condemned the invasion, there was also secret relief that the bloodthirsty Khmer Rouge regime had been defeated. Most Cambodians were also glad to see Pol Pot chased out of the capital, but they were not pleased to see a Vietnamese puppet government take his place. Resistance to the Heng Samrin government coalesced around three guerrilla groups. Leading the resistance were the Khmer Rouge. Although widely hated, they still had a dedicated core of experienced fighters who remained loyal to Pol Pot into the 1990s. Of the resistance groups, theirs was the most militarily effective. The other two groups—one led by Son Sann, who was a former prime minister during Sihanouk’s days, and the other composed of followers of Sihanouk himself—were both anticommunist and much smaller. All the groups drew supporters from among the large refugee population settled in camps along the Thai border. In 1982, the three formed an uneasy coalition to oppose the Vietnamese occupation. Most of the world supported the coalition, which accepted Sihanouk as its nominal head. Thailand, China, and the United States all provided military aid to the guerrillas. Thailand and the United States were motivated by a desire to keep Vietnamesedominated Cambodia weak—a policy that disturbed many Americans. Even though American aid was directed toward the noncommunist guerrillas, its support for the coalition still put the United States in the questionable position of being allied to the murderous Khmer Rouge. China continued to support the Khmer Rouge as a way of keeping Vietnam off balance and thereby reducing the threat to its own southern border. It was foreign aid that helped to maintain the level of violence in Cambodia. The rebels could do little except inconvenience Vietnam’s 160,000-man occupation force by mounting raids from their bases on the Thai side of the Thai-Cambodian border. Gradually, the PRK government was able to gain a degree of legitimacy among Cambodians. Its army, with Vietnamese help, was strengthened and by 1988 had about 45,000 men—which were opposed by some 40,000 guerrillas, at least half of whom were Khmer Rouge. Under the leadership of Hun Sen, another former Khmer Rouge who had replaced Heng Samrin as the PRK’s central figure, the PRK grew into a viable government. And as Hun Sen grew stronger, it became easier for Vietnam to control the country.

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However, Vietnam suffered from its occupation. In February 1979, China launched a brief invasion into North Vietnam as a way of expressing its displeasure with Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. More conventionally, Vietnam found itself economically isolated in a world that was becoming more and more open to free trade. In the 1980s, while Communist China profited from international investment, Vietnam stagnated. Furthermore, as the Soviet Union moved away from its Cold War foreign policy, it was less inclined to support Vietnam’s aggressive foreign entanglements. As Soviet aid declined, Vietnam had more difficulty maintaining its presence in Cambodia. In 1989, Vietnam agreed to withdraw its forces from Cambodia; the last troops left in September of that year.

Cambodia After the Vietnamese Vietnam’s withdrawal did not end the fighting in Cambodia. Hun Sen’s government, renamed the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989, continued its war against the guerrilla coalition, which, now that the Vietnamese army was gone, had greater military success. The guerrillas, still receiving American, Thai, and Chinese aid, were able to move out of their bases in Thailand and began to retake control of parts of northern and western Cambodia. Hun Sen’s troops, however, maintained control of Cambodia’s cities and most of the countryside. Both sides made extensive use of land mines, and an average of eighty land mine victims, mostly civilians, were brought to Cambodian clinics and hospitals each week. Tired of the stalemate, the international community met in Paris in October 1991 in an attempt to settle the Cambodian problem. With the United States pushing the Son Sann and Sihanouk factions, and with China pressuring the Khmer Rouge, the three guerrilla factions and the Hun Sen government agreed to end the war. Together, with United Nations help, they would create a coalition government to prepare Cambodia for a new, elected government. It was agreed that Prince Sihanouk would be the symbolic head of state of the new Cambodia. In 1992, the United Nations sent 13,000 soldiers from more than a dozen nations to help keep the peace while elections were held. The whole operation, which also sent 7,000 UN civilians to supervise the elections, cost $2 billion and was plagued with corruption and incompetence. It was only moderately

successful at preventing fighting—skirmishes and assassinations continued throughout the process—but it did succeed in creating enough stability so that reasonably fair elections could be held. In the May 1993 elections there were two victors. The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the royalist party led by Prince Sihanouk’s son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, won 45 percent of the vote, and the Cambodian People’s Party, the political party of Hun Sen, won 39 percent. (The Khmer Rouge had refused to take part in elections that they would clearly lose.) In an attempt to forge a compromise, Ranariddh was named first prime minister, and Hun Sen second prime minister. As Cambodia settled down to only a moderate level of violence, the Khmer Rouge steadily lost influence. After 1993, their guerrillas continued to harass villages, but their numbers steadily dwindled as the fighters realized that most of Cambodia and the world (including their old patron China) wished the Khmer Rouge to disappear. Their only support came from corrupt Thai generals who profited from buying gems and lumber from Khmer Rouge–occupied territories in Cambodia. Pol Pot still commanded 15,000 soldiers in 1993, but a steady stream of defections, including that of his brother-in-law, Ieng Sary, who took some 5,000 fighters with him, left Pol Pot with only about 5,000 by 1996. Finally, factional fighting turned some leaders against Pol Pot, who was captured in June 1997. On April 15, 1998, while still in captivity, he died of a heart attack. After the withdrawal of UN forces in October 1993, the coalition soon fell apart, with Hun Sen using his control of the military and the police to harass and intimidate supporters of Ranariddh. In July 1997, fighting broke out in Phnom Penh. Ranariddh left the country, and his military supporters retreated to the jungles (allying themselves with some of the remnants of the Khmer Rouge). In March 1998, Ranariddh returned to Cambodia to run against Hun Sen, who was pressured to hold new elections by a partial cutoff of foreign aid and a rejection of Cambodian membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unlike the contest in 1993, which was run by the UN, the 1998 contest was a largely Cambodian affair, although paid for by international donors and monitored by election observers from abroad. Despite a few Khmer Rouge attacks on polling places in northern

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Cambodia, which left ten people dead, the voting went smoothly, according to international monitors, and the turnout was heavy. This time, Hun Sen’s CPP won 41 percent of the vote to Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC’s 31.5 percent, and Hun Sen took office as the nation’s sole prime minister. Both Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy, leader of the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), the other main opposition party, claimed that Hun Sen’s government had intimidated the opposition and used fraudulent ballots. Still, international observers declared the election “fair enough to reflect the broad will of the people.” In 2003, another set of elections was held, with the CPP winning a plurality. It took a year to form a coalition government, with Ranariddh serving as prime minister. In October 2004, King Nordom Sihanouk abdicated, and Prince Norodom Sihamoni was chosen as his successor. Meanwhile, in the months following the 2003 election, what remained of the Khmer Rouge collapsed. In December, Khieu Samphan, the head of the group since the capture and death of Pol Pot, surrendered to Cambodian authorities. At that time, the remaining leaders of the organization offered a formal apology for their role in the genocide of the 1970s. A year later, virtually the entire remaining leadership surrendered. Thus, in the early 2000s, Cambodia remained largely at peace, with the country pursuing two main goals: to integrate itself back into the global and economic order and to come to terms with its bloody past. On the former front, the country made slow but steady progress. After the economic downturn caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, Cambodia experienced moderate growth rates of 5 percent, with tourism—fueled by fascination with the magnificent ruins at Angkor Wat—leading the way. The number of tourists visiting the country grew to more than 1 million in 2005. Cambodia joined ASEAN in 1999 and the World Trade Organization in 2004. To help the nation come to terms with the past, the Cambodian government set up the Khmer Rouge Task Force in 1997. Its mission was to try the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders for their roles in the genocide and war crimes. But economic shortfalls, including a lack of funds from an impoverished government in Phnom Penh and a failure of international donors to make good on pledges of support, delayed the task force’s work. A court was built on a military base outside the capital, however, and judges and other tribunal members were being trained.

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Summar y and Legacy The primary cause of Cambodia’s tragic civil wars was the war in Vietnam. Once North Vietnam’s Communist government began using Laotian and Cambodian territory to set up the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a supply conduit for the Communist guerrillas of the South, it was inevitable that Cambodia would be drawn into the war. Sihanouk’s attempts to maintain Cambodian neutrality were only moderately successful. They kept North Vietnam from trying to destabilize his regime, but at the cost of turning much of the eastern part of Cambodia over to the Vietnamese. This Vietnamese presence disturbed many Cambodians and led directly to the Lon Nol coup of 1970. The Vietnam War had drawn Cambodia into its circle of violence, but it was the Lon Nol coup, and Sihanouk’s reaction to it, that made the success of the Khmer Rouge possible. When Sihanouk threw his support behind the FUNK coalition, he convinced tens of thousands of Cambodians to ally themselves with the Khmer Rouge. Those who were not converted to the Khmer Rouge’s extreme version of Marxism were used as cannon fodder in the war against Lon Nol’s government, and then eliminated after the 1975 victory. The Khmer Rouge had used Sihanouk’s popularity and political naïveté to turn themselves into a major fighting force. The final nail in the Cambodian coffin was the intervention of the United States. The 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia helped the U.S. position in Vietnam but pushed the North Vietnamese Communists deeper into Cambodia, where they provided extensive aid for Pol Pot’s growing armies. The American bombing campaigns, while they did damage the Khmer Rouge, probably had the long-term counterproductive effect of bringing the Khmer Rouge even more recruits. Peace began to return to Cambodia only when the various international players who had interfered in its affairs—Vietnam, China, the United States, and Thailand—agreed to stop supporting their proxies and began pressing for a peaceful resolution of Cambodia’s problems. Without China’s support, the Khmer Rouge steadily dwindled in number, and Cambodians were left with the task of putting their shattered country back together. For Cambodia, the main result of more than twenty years of fighting was a death toll of more than 2 million, many killed in fighting or by American bombs, but most by the bloody policies of the Khmer

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Rouge. The war also left behind more than 6 million land mines. Disarmament experts estimated that it would take more than twenty years to remove and disable the remaining mines. In the meantime, they would continue to kill and maim innocent civilians. Already, there was one amputee for every 200 or so Cambodians. Despite these obstacles, Cambodians were beginning to rebuild their country, even as they came to terms with their tragic past. Carl Skutsch and Patit Paban Mishra See also: Cold War Confrontations; People’s Wars; Cambodia: U.S. Interventions, 1969–1973; Cambodia: Vietnamese Invasion, 1978–1979; Vietnam: Second Indochina War, 1959– 1975.

Bibliography Becker, Elizabeth. When the War Is Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and Its People. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. Chandler, David P. A History of Cambodia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. ———. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991.

Etcheson, Craig. After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2006. ———. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Hinton, Alexander L., ed. The Anthropology of Genocide. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996. Ledgerwood, L., ed. Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays. DeKalb: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 2002. Ponchaud, François. Cambodia: Year Zero. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1978. Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. Ung, Bunhaeng, and Martin Stuart Fox. The Murderous Revolution. Bangkok: Orchid Press, 1998. Vickery, Michael. Cambodia, 1975–1982. Boston: South End Press, 1984. Walter, Barbara F., and Jack Snyder, eds. Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

CAMBODIA: U.S. Interventions,1969–1973 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: United States; Vietnam (North and South)

CAMBODIA Tonle Sap

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Until 1963, the United States had a good relationship with Cambodia. American military aid, totaling some $12 million, had covered about 30 percent of Cambodia’s modest military and police expenses. But as the U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam escalated, it began to spill across the Cambodian border. Cambodia’s head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, began to cool toward the United States. Sihanouk was worried that the Communist state in North Vietnam might target Cambodia because it was accepting American military aid. He was especially concerned because he believed that North Vietnam was likely to win the war. In August 1963, as American troops began to appear in Vietnam in large numbers, Sihanouk canceled the American aid package. China replaced the United States as Cambodia’s main arms supplier, although it provided smaller quantities of poorer quality equipment. In 1965, as part of his shift toward the left, Sihanouk broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, protesting that U.S. planes were

constantly violating Cambodian airspace. At the same time, Sihanouk gave the North Vietnamese permission to establish bases in eastern Cambodia. These bases allowed North Vietnam to develop a more direct supply route, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to bring men and weapons to the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. The increasing North Vietnamese presence in Cambodia during 1966 and 1967 attracted the attention of the United States and South Vietnam. Communist guerrillas were using Cambodia not only as a supply route, but as a base to stage attacks against South Vietnam. North Vietnamese troops based in Svay Rieng province—called the Parrot’s Beak because its unusual shape made it look like a beak thrust into Vietnam from Cambodia— were only 50 miles from the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon. The Vietnamese Communists also helped encourage Cambodia’s own small Communist movement, the Khmer Rouge. In 1967, Sihanouk, worried about the growing strength of the Khmer Rouge in the areas occupied by North Vietnam, turned once more to the United States, this time for protection against the Communist threat to his government. In a meeting with Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India, in January 1968, Sihanouk asked for help in dealing with the North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. Sihanouk was clearly seeking help against North Vietnam and reassurances that this help would not involve cross-border attacks that might endanger Cambodian civilians. The details of the meeting remain in dispute, but Sihanouk probably agreed that cross-border incursions might be unavoidable if U.S. or South Vietnamese forces were in “hot pursuit” of Communist guerrillas. President Richard Nixon (elected in November 1968) and his national security adviser Henry

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KEY DATES 1964

The United States begins a bombing campaign against North Vietnam and Viet Cong rebels in South Vietnam.

1965

U.S. ground forces begin fighting in South Vietnam.

1966–1967

North Vietnam begins using routes in Cambodia to bring soldiers and war materiel into South Vietnam.

1969

In March, American B-52s begin bombing suspected North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia.

1970

Pro-U.S. Cambodian general Lon Nol overthrows Sihanouk in military coup on March 18 and makes a secret request for U.S. troops to drive North Vietnamese forces out of Cambodia; on April 30, 12,000 U.S. and 8,000 South Vietnamese troops cross into Cambodia; the troops withdraw by June 30; U.S. President Richard Nixon claims great success, but the invasion sparks mass protests in United States.

1973

The United States pulls its last troops out of South Vietnam; Communist Khmer Rouge forces control most of Cambodia.

1975

The government of Lon Nol falls to Khmer Rouge forces.

Kissinger would use this qualified permission (if it was actually given) to justify first a bombing campaign of Cambodian territory and later a full-scale invasion.

U.S. Bombing The Vietnamese bases in Cambodia created great difficulties for U.S. operations in South Vietnam. To diminish North Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, the U.S. military requested permission to bomb selected targets in a campaign given the name “MENU”—the target areas were given the names “Breakfast,” “Lunch,” “Snack,” “Dinner,” “Dessert,” and “Supper.” Nixon approved the attacks, but, in a move of questionable legality, kept them secret from both the public and the U.S. Congress (although a few congressmen who were considered sympathetic were privately informed). Starting on March 18, 1969, American B-52s— each one of which could deliver a 60,000-pound bomb load—began to attack the MENU targets. The 29,000 tons of bombs dropped during the MENU campaign damaged, but did not eliminate, the Vietnamese Communist bases. The attacks also killed

Cambodian civilians and convinced other Cambodians to join the Khmer Rouge guerrillas who were trying to overthrow Sihanouk’s regime. Dissatisfied with the limited results of the bombing campaign, the U.S. military campaigned for permission to launch a ground invasion of Cambodia to destroy the North Vietnamese bases. On March 18, 1970, just a year after the first bombings, Cambodian general Lon Nol ousted Sihanouk in a coup. Lon Nol had been a consistent opponent of the North Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, and he was considered to be friendly toward the United States. With a more sympathetic leader in power, American planners renewed their request for permission to invade eastern Cambodia. Even after permission was received, however, the invasion plans were kept secret from the new Cambodian prime minister, who was quite disturbed once the invasion began.

Invasion On April 30, 1970, 12,000 U.S. and 8,000 South Vietnamese soldiers crossed over the border into

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U.S. troops patrol a shopping center in Cambodia destroyed in a 1970 bombing mission. The U.S. invasion brought modest benefits in prosecuting the Vietnam War but damaging long-term effects with respect to Cambodia itself. (William Lovelace/Evening Standard/Getty Images)

Cambodia. The units participating in the attack included the First Cavalry Division (an airmobile division, which used helicopters to transport soldiers to the front), the Eleventh Armored Cavalry, and a South Vietnamese airborne division. The attacking troops, backed by overwhelming air power, targeted what U.S. intelligence believed to be the headquarters of the entire North Vietnamese command in Cambodia. The U.S. and South Vietnamese troops went only 20 miles into Cambodia and found relatively small numbers of Communist troops in the area. Most of the Vietnamese forces had moved deeper into Cambodia, driven there by the MENU bombings and rumors of a major American attack. Because of these retreats, the U.S.–South Vietnamese attack missed its main target, the headquarters of the North Vietnamese army, which had moved to the Cambodian town of Kratie. Still, the invasion damaged the Communist war effort. The United States military reported the capture of 155 tons of weapons, 1,786 tons of ammunition, and 6,877 tons of rice. During the fighting 388 Americans were

killed, and another 1,525 were wounded. Their South Vietnamese allies had 638 killed and 3,000 wounded. The North Vietnamese were estimated to have lost 4,766—although body counts during the Vietnam War were notoriously unreliable. From the point of view of the war in Vietnam, the Cambodian incursion was a modest success. The North Vietnamese were forced to limit their operations along the South Vietnamese border, and casualties from guerrilla raids in the region declined. From the point of view of Cambodia, however, the American incursion was extremely damaging. The Vietnamese Communists who had retreated deep into Cambodia brought their Cambodian colleagues, the Khmer Rouge, along with them. Up to that point, the Vietnamese had encouraged the Khmer Rouge to keep a low profile so that the Ho Chi Minh Trail could continue to operate. After the Lon Nol coup and the American invasion, however, the North Vietnamese decided that their best interests were served by supporting the Khmer Rouge efforts to overthrow the Cambodian government.

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The result was a steadily escalating guerrilla war that Cambodia’s poorly trained troops were ill equipped to handle. By 1973, Lon Nol’s government troops were in control of only 15 percent of the country and were being kept afloat by heavy American aid combined with a large-scale American bombing campaign (eventually more than 500,000 tons of bombs would be dropped on Cambodia by the United States). Lon Nol’s regime was even less stable and more in need of support than the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam. U.S. aid to Cambodia totaled more than $2.3 billion between 1970 and 1975. The Cambodian incursion also had serious repercussions in the United States. Unlike the bombing campaigns, which could be hidden, the invasion of Cambodia had to be explained to the American public. Nixon told the United States about the operation in a televised address on April 30. He defended it as necessary to the security of the regime in South Vietnam and to the prestige of the United States. Using Cold War language, Nixon said, “If, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.” Most Americans listening to Nixon’s speech continued to support him, but a large minority reacted with outrage. The growing antiwar movement saw the invasion of Cambodia as a contradiction of Nixon’s campaign pledges to end the war in Vietnam. University students were particularly aroused by the invasion. In May 1970 there were more than 1,000 campus demonstrations, often involving attacks on

reserve officer training corps (ROTC) buildings. On May 4, during a demonstration at Kent State University in Ohio, national guardsmen opened fire on the students, killing four and wounding eight others. In reaction, 100,000 protesters came to Washington to demand an end to American involvement in Cambodia and Vietnam. By June 30, American troops were withdrawn from Cambodia. However, South Vietnamese troops continued intermittent attacks in the region until the signing of peace accords ending the conflict in 1973.

Legacy The U.S. incursion into Cambodia slightly slowed the decline of the South Vietnamese government but at the cost of bringing five years of bloody warfare to Cambodia. In April 1975, despite American aid, Lon Nol’s government collapsed and the Khmer Rouge captured the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, completing their conquest of the country. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; Cambodia: Civil Wars, 1968–1998; Vietnam: Second Indochina War, 1959–1975.

Bibliography Chandler, David P. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. Shawcross, William. Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. Vickery, Michael. Cambodia, 1975–1982. Boston: South End Press, 1984.

CAMBODIA: Vietnamese Invasion, 1978–1979 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Vietnam

CAMBODIA Tonle Sap

Phnom Penh

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Rouge had been helped by the Communist government of North Vietnam, but after their victory the Cambodian Communists turned against their patrons. The inner circle of the Khmer Rouge—Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan—had never trusted the Vietnamese Communists and had always suspected them of plans to absorb Cambodia into an Indochinese empire whose capital would be Hanoi. Even while accepting Vietnamese aid in their war against Lon Nol’s government, the Khmer Rouge were maneuvering to maintain Cambodian Communists’ distrust of Vietnam. Khieu Samphan was quoted as saying that the Khmer Rouge “never once stopped considering Vietnam and its army as Enemy Number One.”

LAOS

THAILAND

KAMPONG CHAM (FISHHOOK)

VIETNAM SVAY RIENG (PARROT’S BEAK) Ho Chi Minh TAKEO City (Saigon) KAMPOT Chau Doc Ha Tien SOUTH

CHINA SEA

Mekong Delta

The causes of the conflict between the Communist Khmer Rouge and the Communists in Vietnam lay in both the distant and recent past. Cambodia had a long history of strife with both its larger neighbors, Vietnam and Thailand, going back to the era of the Khmer Empire in the thirteenth century. The Khmer (the ethnic label of most Cambodians) and the Vietnamese fought for dominance; however, the Khmer were gradually overshadowed by, and lost territory to, the more numerous Vietnamese. The French conquest of the region in the nineteenth century saved Cambodia from further losses to Vietnam but did not end the legacy of distrust. Cambodia achieved independence in 1954, but it remained suspicious of Vietnamese intentions. In 1975, when the Cambodian Communist movement known as the Khmer Rouge captured the capital of Phnom Penh and declared itself the ruler of a new state, Democratic Kampuchea, distrust toward Vietnam reached paranoid dimensions. During their war against the Lon Nol government, the Khmer

Border Clashes Part of the hostility of the Khmer Rouge toward the Vietnamese was motivated by their belief that the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam should rightfully be a part of Cambodia. After Vietnam refused to consider the border adjustments demanded by Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge launched small-scale invasions into Vietnam in an attempt to raise a rebellion among the ethnic Khmer who lived around the Mekong Delta. These attacks began in 1975 and picked up in number and intensity in late 1976. They were characterized by the brutality that was to become synonymous with the Khmer Rouge: Vietnamese women were raped and mutilated, and men were tortured and decapitated. By 1977, the clashes had escalated to full-scale attacks by division-sized units against the Chau Doc and Ha Tien regions (located on the southern border of Vietnam near the Gulf of Thailand). By this time, the former North Vietnam had taken over the whole

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KEY DATES 1975

The anticommunist Lon Nol government falls to Communist Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia; South Vietnam falls to North Vietnamese forces; the Khmer Rouge government begins a radical restructuring of Cambodian society, resulting in the genocide of up to 2 million people by 1978; the Khmer Rouge launch small-scale raids into the Mekong Delta area of southern Vietnam, attempting to trigger rebellion by ethnic Khmers in region.

1977–1978 As clashes escalate between Vietnamese and Cambodian forces, Vietnam launches an invasion of Cambodia in September 1977 but pulls troops out by January 1978. 1978

Following more raids by the Khmer Rouge into its territory, Vietnam announces the creation of the anti-Khmer Rouge Khmer National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS); on December 25, 120,000 Vietnamese troops, assisted by 20,000 antiKhmer Rouge Cambodian troops, invade the country.

1979

The Khmer Rouge government flees the capital of Phnom Penh as Vietnamese forces enter the city.

1989

The last Vietnamese forces leave Cambodia.

1991

Cambodia and Vietnam sign the Paris Peace Accords, formally ending hostilities between the two countries.

of prewar Vietnam, driving out the South Vietnamese government and its last western supporters. Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge were aided in their attacks by a heavy influx of Chinese weapons and supplies. China, which since 1969 had been carrying on its own cold war with the Soviet Union, was disturbed by the close ties between Vietnam and the Soviet Union and wished to balance Vietnam’s power in Indochina by supporting Kampuchea. The growing conflict between Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam became a kind of proxy war between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In September 1977, Vietnam countered the Khmer Rouge attacks with an invasion along the entire Cambodian-Vietnamese border. The attack eventually involved 60,000 Vietnamese troops, many of whom were in mechanized units, opposed by 30,000 less well-armed Khmer Rouge soldiers. Heavy fighting took place in Takeo and Kampot provinces to the south of Phnom Penh.

In January 1978, the Vietnamese withdrew their troops from Cambodia, taking with them a number of Cambodians who were eager to see Pol Pot’s bloody regime overthrown. Throughout 1978, these Cambodian exiles were joined by refugees fleeing the mass executions that were taking place throughout Cambodia (caused by the Khmer Rouge’s constant search for internal enemies). During the year, Vietnam used these Cambodian exiles to create a coalition of anti-Khmer leaders—many of them former members of the Khmer Rouge.

Invasion On December 3, 1978, with Khmer Rouge raids continuing despite Vietnam’s invasion (and requests by Hanoi for a ceasefire), Vietnam announced the creation of the Khmer National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), a Cambodian government-in-exile headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge leader.

Cambodia: Vietnamese Invasion, 1978–1979

On December 25, 1978, twelve Vietnamese divisions under the command of Vo Nguyen Giap and supported by a small army of Cambodian exiles, crossed the border into Democratic Kampuchea. The invasion was a quick success. The 120,000 Vietnamese and their 20,000 Cambodian allies were easily able to defeat Pol Pot’s approximately 40,000-man army. Many Khmer Rouge units were based in the far-forward Svay Rieng (Parrot’s Beak) and Kampong Cham (Fishhook) provinces and were therefore caught in an encircling movement by Vietnamese mechanized units. Superior Vietnamese artillery fire control allowed the Vietnamese to quickly target and destroy what little armor the Khmer Rouge had. The Khmer Rouge were also handicapped by revolts among their own troops, who were angry at the bloody excesses of the previous three years. On January 6, 1979, Pol Pot and his colleagues evacuated Phnom Penh. On January 7, Vietnamese troops rolled into the city and declared the creation of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a new Cambodian government led by Heng Samrin. As the Vietnamese occupied Cambodia’s major cities, the Khmer Rouge retreated to their traditional jungle strongholds in northern and western Cambodia.

Legacy The Vietnamese-backed PRK maintained power until the withdrawal of Vietnam’s army in 1989. The PRK was replaced by the State of Cambodia (SOC), led by Hun Sen, another former Khmer Rouge protégé of Vietnam. The PRK and the SOC managed to gain a measure of legitimacy, but resistance to their government led to continued civil war in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge retained a powerful guerrilla army into the 1990s, while non-Communist resistance grew around the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Cambodia’s former king), and Son Sann (a former Cambodian prime minister). Vietnam’s invasion also received almost universal condemnation from the international community.

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While many countries were happy to see the mass executions of the Khmer Rouge era come to an end, they had no desire to have Vietnam turn Cambodia into a puppet state. Some nations, including China, Thailand, and the United States, provided military aid to the Cambodian guerrilla resistance—China continued its patronage of the Khmer Rouge, while the United States and Thailand supported Sihanouk and Son Sann. The Vietnam invasion of Cambodia also led directly to a brief Chinese incursion into Vietnam in February 1979, which was designed to punish the Vietnamese for their removal of the Chinese allies in Phnom Penh. Vietnam’s invasion did not end the fighting in Cambodia, which continued at a moderate level until peace accords were signed in Paris in 1991 and at a lower level through 1998. Vietnam did, however, achieve its goal of ending Khmer Rouge raids into Vietnam. The invasion also marked the beginning of the Khmer Rouge’s decline as a force in Cambodian politics. During the 1980s, Pol Pot retained the loyalty of the fanatical elements within the Khmer Rouge, and China kept their forces supplied with weapons. In 1993, however, China stopped supporting the Khmer Rouge, and gradually its numbers dwindled, partly from combat but mostly from desertions. By 1998, Pol Pot was dead, and there were only a few Khmer Rouge left in Cambodia’s jungles. Carl Skutsch See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Cambodia: Civil Wars, 1968–1998; China: War with Vietnam, 1979.

Bibliography Chandler, David P. The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. Etcheson, Craig. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Vickery, Michael. Cambodia, 1975–1982. Boston: South End Press, 1984.

CHINA: Chinese Civil War,1927–1949 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War PARTICIPANTS: Japan; United States 0 0

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strengthen the backward country and allow it to stand up to the Europeans. In 1911 their resentment led to a revolt that overthrew the Qing Dynasty. Even after they had thrown off the Qing, however, the progressive forces in China were unable to seize power for themselves. The country was divided between warring factions, many of them headed by military strongmen known as warlords. The first of these was Yuan Shikai, a general who ruled Beijing and most of China until his death in 1916. Out of this chaos, two competing parties arose and attempted to displace the warlords and create a new government for China: the Nationalists and the Communists.

SOVIET UNION

1000 Kilometers

Harbin Shenyang (Mukden) Beijing

C H I N A BHUTAN

Long March Chongqing FRENCH INDOCHINA

BURMA THAILAND

KOREA

Yan’an

Nanjing Shanghai Wuhan JAPAN Guangzhou (Canton) Hong Kong

TAIWAN

PACIFIC OCEAN

The Chinese Civil War of 1945–1949 was a continuation of a struggle begun in the 1920s between the Communist party, led primarily by Mao Zedong, and the Guomindang Nationalists, led by Chiang Kaishek. The origins of the struggle itself go back even further. Both the Communist and the Nationalist parties grew out of the chaos of a China that was attempting to reject the humiliation of almost a century of Western domination. For most of the past 4,000 years China had been ruled by a succession of great imperial dynasties. Even when traders from the West began arriving in large numbers, the Qing (or Manchu) Empire (1644–1912) treated them with arrogant condescension. In 1842, however, the British, using modern gunboats and artillery, were able to defeat the Qing armies, and the peace treaty forced the Qing to hand over the port of Hong Kong and open China’s borders to trade. Other European nations followed the British. By 1900, other Chinese coastal cities had been taken over, and the empire was forced to do the bidding of European ambassadors. Many Chinese were angry about their subservient status and pressed for reforms in China that would

The Nationalists and Chiang Kai-shek The Nationalist Party was the brainchild of Sun Yatsen, a long-time Chinese revolutionary who is considered by many Chinese to be the father of the 1911 revolution. With the fall of the Qing Dynasty, Sun Yat-sen ordered his followers to create a new political party. The result was the Nationalist Party, or Guomindang. The Guomindang used Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles—nationalism first, democracy second, and people’s livelihood third—as the basis for its ideology, each principle being a stage through which the planned Chinese revolution must travel. The Guomindang won the 1912 elections in China and became the main vehicle for progressive Chinese hopes. However, after the collapse of the Chinese imperial government, the Guomindang had difficulty asserting its own right to rule the country. Warlords in Beijing and the provinces resisted any attempts to reduce their power. Only in February 1923 was Guomindang able to establish itself in Canton, with the support of a group of southern warlords.

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KEY DATES 1911

The Qing Dynasty is overthrown and the Chinese republic established.

1921

The Chinese Communist Party is formed.

1927–1937

Nationalist or Guomindang politicians, fearing the strength of the Communist movement, launch assaults against it; the two forces engage in fighting for the next decade.

1934–1935 Suffering from intense Guomindang attacks, Chinese Communists withdraw to the isolated Yenan region in the so-called Long March. 1937–1945 Japanese imperial forces invade China; Guomindang and Chinese Communists come to an uneasy agreement to cease fighting between them and pursue the struggle against the Japanese invaders. 1945–1949 The Japanese are defeated in World War II and withdraw their troops from China; Communist and Guomindang forces renew their armed struggle; the Soviet Union invades Manchuria and provides aid to Chinese Communist forces. 1949

Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong are victorious over Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek, which retreat to the island of Taiwan.

Under Sun Yat-sen, the Guomindang’s ideology was a mix of leftism, authoritarianism, and Chinese nationalism. Its leftism led many Guomindang members to be friendly to the overtures of the Soviet Union— like the Soviets, they saw themselves as engaged in a struggle against Western capitalism and imperialism. However, Sun Yat-sen’s ties to the warlords, and his own title of grand marshal, pushed his movement in more militaristic and reactionary directions. At first the Guomindang was willing to work with the Chinese Communist Party. The Guomindang even formed an alliance with the Communists in 1923. With the aid of Soviet agents, the Guomindang was able to reorganize itself into a more disciplined party. In fact, the newly reforged Guomindang greatly resembled the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with a single strong leader (Sun Yat-sen), an executive committee that coordinated the party’s activities, and a broader party membership that followed orders.

This turn to the left by the Guomindang slowed after the 1925 death of Sun Yat-sen. His successor was Chiang Kai-shek, the young leader of the Guomindang’s growing Nationalist army. Chiang Kaishek and his armies, aided by the Communists, made great progress against the warlords, conquering most of southern China by 1927, but relations between the Guomindang and the Communists were gradually deteriorating. Chiang Kai-shek had been born (in 1887) to a relatively prosperous family of salt merchants. As a young man he had attended the new military academies that the Qing had created in an attempt to modernize the Chinese army, and he later received military training in Japan. It was in Japan that he first encountered and joined Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance (the precursor to the Guomindang), which was dedicated to overthrowing the Qing dynasty. He joined and fought in the 1911 revolution and, after spending some time studying in Revolutionary Russia, became a military

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aide to Sun Yat-sen. Upon Sun Yat-sen’s death, he quickly rose to greater prominence, becoming first leader of the Guomindang’s army and then of the entire movement.

The Communists and Mao Zedong In July 1921, a group of Chinese radicals, many of them professors and students at Peking (Beijing) University, formed the Chinese Communist Party (among them was the young Mao Zedong). The Chinese who came together to form the Communist Party had been inspired by the 1917 Russian Revolution, which brought Lenin and the Russian Communist Party to power. They had also received some assistance from Soviet agents who had been sent to China. At first, the Communists were closely linked to the Guomindang—the leaders of the party, counseled by their Soviet advisers, decided that their party was too small to survive on its own. In 1923, the two parties formally allied themselves, and by 1925 many of the Guomindang’s top posts were held by Communist Party members. During their alliance, the Communists supported Nationalist efforts to free China from its many warlords. Communist officers fought in the Nationalist army, while Communist political agents helped to raise support among the workers of the large southern cities. At the same time, the Communist Party grew rapidly, gaining members throughout China. These left-wing successes worried conservatives in the Guomindang, particularly businessmen in southern China’s larger cities. These elements allied themselves to Chiang Kai-shek, who also feared the growing power of the Communists, and worked to reduce their influence within the Nationalist movement. In 1927, Chiang’s concerns about the Communist Party’s power led him to engage in a full-scale assault against it. From April to December 1927, troops loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, helped by warlord armies and urban gangsters, attacked the forces of the Chinese Communist Party. Thousands of party members were killed and its urban bases of support were destroyed. The surviving Communists, led by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, retreated into the remote western regions of China to regroup and reorganize. The Guomindang became more and more conservative, turning away from its original left-wing roots.

Chiang Kai-shek found his best supporters among businessmen of China, along with the ex-warlords, many of whom he absorbed into his growing armies. Mao Zedong was born (1893) in a peasant family but received a classical Chinese education. As a student he became involved in the 1911 uprising, although without having any strong ideological position as yet. Later he studied Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and Emmanuel Kant at a modern Chinese school. In 1918, he went to Beijing to work as a librarian at the university and encountered professors and students who introduced him to Marxist ideas; it was because of them that he joined the Communist Party in 1921. He became a leader of the party in the late 1920s and consolidated his position as its master in the mid-1930s.

Civil War, 1927–1937 From 1927 to 1937, the Nationalists and the Communists engaged in a struggle for power, in which the Nationalists seemed to be slowly winning. While the Communists retreated to the west, Chiang Kaishek’s armies advanced on the last northern warlords and seized Beijing. By 1930, most of China was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang, who established their capital at Nanjing. Mao Zedong, who was developing into the Chinese Communists’ premier leader, retreated to the rural province of Jiangxi and attempted to create a Communist soviet (state) on the periphery of Nationalist-controlled China. Going against traditional Marxist ideology, Mao Zedong advocated finding support for the Chinese Communist Party among the peasantry in the countryside rather than the workers in the cities. He worked to convince Chinese peasants, who made up the vast majority of China’s population, that their best interests lay with the Communist Party, not with the Nationalists. Mao Zedong argued that Chiang Kai-shek, supported by landlords, businessmen, and warlords, was not truly the peasants’ friend. His efforts were successful, and the Communists were able to recruit increasing numbers of peasants to their cause. By 1932, the Jiangxi soviet was a thriving Communist state in southern China. Beginning in 1933, however, Chiang Kai-shek and his improving Nationalist army attacked the Jiangxi soviet. Realizing that their forces could not hold Jiangxi, the Communists decided to abandon

China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–19 4 9

the province and to relocate to a more secure base in northern China. Starting in October 1934, the Communists broke through the Guomindang army’s lines and marched northward to safety. A year later, after a circuitous 6,000-mile trek, the Communists arrived at their safe haven and new base of operations, Yan’an, in Shaanxi province. This was the famous “Long March.” Of the 80,000 who began the Long March, only about 10,000 survived to the end. For the Communists, the Long March was a winnowing tool that left behind the men who would lead China for the next fifty years. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping traveled along the Long March. The cost was very high, however, severely damaging the party even as it demonstrated the members’ courage and determination. Gradually, the story of the Long March became an effective propaganda tool in gaining broader support. This was particularly so among Chinese who remained disenchanted with Chiang Kai-shek’s rule. Many Chinese had been happy to see the warlords’ power eclipsed but were bothered when they saw some warlords simply incorporated into Chiang’s political structure. Ex-warlords were transformed into Nationalist generals and heroes, and corruption remained rampant under Chiang Kai-shek. Unwilling to offend the powerful business interests that supported his regime, Chiang avoided any attempts to reform China’s chaotic and inefficient economy. Peasants in particular suffered under the Guomindang’s rule. Peasants were drafted and forced to work in road-building projects or, worse, conscripted into the Nationalist army. Chiang Kai-shek’s regime was also taking on fascist overtones. In the 1930s, the Nationalists hired Nazi German advisers to help train their army. Some of Chiang Kai-shek’s more dedicated followers organized themselves into a paramilitary political organization known as the “Blue Shirts,” echoing the Black Shirts of Italian fascist dictator Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler’s Brown Shirts. Although Chiang Kai-shek had some success waging war against the Communists, he was able to do nothing to stop the Japanese incursions that were starting to dominate the thoughts of most Chinese in the 1930s. Many people had supported Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang because they wished to see a strong China, one that was able to stand up in the face of foreign threats. As Japanese aggression in China increased, however, Chiang Kai-shek’s failure

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to take decisive action lost him the loyalty of many Chinese.

Japanese Pressure Japan had begun the nineteenth century like China, an Asian country vulnerable to Western exploitation, but by the twentieth century Japan had managed to industrialize and transform itself into another imperial power. China became one of the main targets of Japanese imperial ambitions. In 1895, Japan had defeated China and conquered Korea and the island of Formosa. In 1915, Japan had issued the Twenty-One Demands, an ultimatum that gained Japan more influence over China’s internal affairs. During the confusion of the 1920s, Japan had continued its efforts to control events in China. Some Japanese officers dreamed of expanding the Japanese Empire into China as part of a Greater East Asian Empire that would be ruled from Tokyo. In 1931, the Japanese military invaded Manchuria, expelling the Chinese warlord who had controlled the province and setting up its own puppet state (Manchukuo) under the last Qing emperor, Pu Yi. From its bases in Manchuria, the Japanese staged large-scale military raids across the border, forcing Chiang Kai-shek’s government to accede to a humiliating peace that gave Japan some control over the border regions of northern China. Faced with dissension within his party and the continuing challenge of the Communist Party, Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers decided that the Guomindang should focus on its internal problems before it confronted the Japanese. Mao Zedong and the Communists took a much stronger position against the Japanese incursions, arguing that all parties, Nationalists and Communists included, must unite against the outside menace. Their slogan was “Chinese don’t fight Chinese.” The Nationalists’ inaction damaged their popularity while the Communists’ activism was very popular. By 1936, Japanese incursions were becoming so blatant that even some of Chiang Kai-shek’s warlord allies supported making peace with the Communists. When Chiang Kai-shek refused, one of these warlords, Zhang Xueliang, kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and attempted to force him to agree to a united front against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was released without fully committing himself, but the positive reaction of much the nation led him to lessen his attacks on the Communists.

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War with Japan, 1937–19 45 In July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek’s hand was forced by the outbreak of open war between Japan and China. Japanese troops used the excuse of an accidental skirmish between Nationalist and Japanese troops to open a full-scale invasion of China itself. This time, Chiang Kai-shek and his armies fought back. In bloody battles they tried to stand up to the Japanese army, but despite great bravery, they were neither as well equipped nor as well organized as the Japanese. In July Japan captured the old Chinese capital of Beijing, and in November it took Shanghai. Some of Chiang Kai-shek’s best troops were killed trying to hold off the Japanese. Finally, in December 1937, the Japanese took Chiang Kai-shek’s capital of Nanjing, which inaugurated a seven-week slaughter of Chinese civilians by rampaging Japanese soldiers, known as the “Rape of Nanjing,” in which more than 100,000 Chinese died. At last, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to make peace with Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party. In September 1937, the Communists agreed to support Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles, to cease confiscating the property of landlords, and to support the Guomindang in its war against Japan. The alliance did little to stop the Japanese. By 1938 they had conquered all of northern China as well as most of the coastal regions. In the center, their troops advanced as far as Wuhan, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to retreat to Chongqing, deep within China’s eastern province of Sichuan. From 1938 until the end of the war, China was divided into three parts. In the south, Chiang Kaishek led the Guomindang forces from Chongqing, in the northeast, Mao Zedong and the Communists operated out of Yan’an in Shaanxi, and in the east and northeast, the Japanese (supported by a collection of puppet governments) controlled the heart of China, a swath of territory stretching from Beijing to Canton.

Nationalists and Communists During the War In general, the war hurt Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists far more than it did Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party. The Guomindang had lost its main bases of support in the cities of southern and eastern China. Its best military units had been badly mauled in the fighting of 1938 and never fully

recovered their efficiency. In addition, the Guomindang’s many internal problems and rivalries were intensified by the struggle against Japan. While many Nationalist generals fought bravely, others used their positions to feather their own nests by shoring up their bases of support within the Nationalist government. Because the Japanese had taken over most of the rail lines in China, it was difficult for Chiang Kaishek to control the various generals theoretically under his command. Many of these men, some of whom had been warlords before they joined the Guomindang, operated what were in effect private fiefdoms. The Communists, on the other hand, began the war with a much more disciplined party that had suffered and survived the Long March. The war gave the Communists the chance to regroup and rebuild, while continuing to support the idea of a united front against Japan. By 1940, hundreds of thousands of Communist guerrillas were operating behind Japanese lines, while Communist Party membership had reached 800,000 (up from only 40,000 just three years earlier). Communist guerrillas, using tactics perfected in the war against the Nationalists, infiltrated Japanese-held territory and recruited large numbers of peasants behind Japanese lines. These recruits widened the pool of Communist sympathizers within China. Many Chinese began to believe that Mao Zedong and his followers were doing much more to fight against Japan than was Chiang Kai-shek, who spent much of his time in his new capital of Chongqing. The belief, which was quietly fostered by the Communists, was not entirely accurate. Even while fighting the Japanese, both Nationalists and Communists had constant disagreements over spheres of influence. The Communist armies were put under nominal Guomindang control, but in reality operated as separate entities, taking their orders from Mao Zedong and the other Communist leaders. In the confused war against Japan, Communist and the Nationalist forces sometimes tried to seize the same area, leading to disputes and sometimes open warfare between the two sides. The alliance against the Japanese had clearly not ended their mutual hostility.

The United States and World War I I During the late 1930s, the United States watched the Japanese invasion of China with growing disquiet.

China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–19 4 9

President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to stop Japan, but he knew that most Americans would not support U.S. involvement in an Asian war. For that reason, until 1940, American support was limited to small loans given to the Nationalist government. In 1940, Roosevelt agreed to ship modern American fighter planes to China and provided volunteer army–air force pilots to fly them. After Japan attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, the United States joined the war against Japan, and the war that China had been fighting for four years became a part of the greater conflict that was World War II. With China an ally, the United States funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to help the Chinese war effort. All the aid, however, went to Chiang Kaishek and the Nationalists. Mao Zedong and his troops were forced to fight with whatever they could find, including knives and spears. To make the Communists’ job even more difficult, the Nationalists imposed a blockade on their supposed allies, allowing no military supplies to be shipped to the north. Some American officers in the aid mission to China quickly became frustrated with what they saw as Nationalist incompetence and corruption. The American military liaison to the Guomindang was General Joseph Stilwell, known as “Vinegar Joe” for his acid tongue. His job was to coordinate the influx of American supplies and help train the Nationalist army. Stilwell came to loathe Chiang Kai-shek, once describing him as “a vacillating tricky undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word.” Stilwell was especially disturbed because Chiang Kai-shek kept his best troops facing the Communists, while only second-rate units were used against the Japanese. Stilwell also objected to Nationalists’ unwillingness to ship weapons and supplies to the Communist north, arguing that this interfered with the war against Japan—which it did. In 1944, Chiang Kaishek convinced the Americans to replace Stilwell, but Stilwell’s criticisms remained valid and were shared by other Americans. In early 1945, Japan, under attack from all sides by the American navy, was on the road to defeat, but in China the Nationalists were actually growing weaker. Corruption among the Guomindang elite continued. The problems within the Nationalist armies that Stilwell had pointed out went uncorrected, and abuses against the peasantry escalated.

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The Nationalists collected exorbitant taxes in the areas under their control yet offered no protection for the peasants against the demands of local landowners. Often the taxes collected went astray, and Chongqing was filled with men who had made great fortunes while not fighting the Japanese. The Communists collected high peasant taxes in their areas, but they also imposed rent limitations, which gave peasants some financial protection from their landlords. Furthermore, Mao Zedong emphasized the necessity of converting peasants to the Communist cause, and Communist soldiers tended to be much more respectful than their Nationalist counterparts. While the Guomindang’s position in southern China was stagnant, the Communists were establishing underground support throughout northern China, including those areas under Japanese control. The Communists also dropped some of their previous pretense of working with the Nationalists. While they still spoke of a coalition against the Japanese, in the areas under their control the Communist leaders attacked local landlords (natural supporters of the Nationalists), confiscating their land to give to poorer peasants. Communists and Nationalists alike were preparing for the end of the war.

After World War I I The dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan by the United States on August 6 and August 9, 1945, contributed to the Japanese high command’s decision to surrender. The surrender was announced on August 14 and formalized on September 2. In the meantime, the Communists and Nationalists in China began to maneuver for their final confrontation. Despite the damage their army and bureaucratic structure had suffered during the war, the Nationalists still had many advantages over their Communist opponents. Their army, at 2.7 million, had three times as many soldiers as the Communists (although, in addition to 900,000 regulars, the Communists also had the support of large numbers of informal village militias). In addition, the best Nationalist units were better equipped than any Communist units. Chiang Kai-shek also had the support of the United States, which was increasingly concerned that China might fall to Communism. The Americans provided extensive logistical support to Chiang Kaishek’s army. American planes airlifted his troops to

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cities under Japanese control so that the Nationalists, not the Communists, could accept Japanese surrenders and take control of the territory that the Japanese had been occupying. The defeated Japanese high command cooperated with the Americans, issuing orders that its troops in China surrender only to Nationalist officers. The United States also sent its own troops to occupy Chinese ports in order to turn them over to the Nationalist army. While the Nationalists occupied all of southern China, Communist forces led by Lin Biao were able to march into Manchuria and acquire large stockpiles of Japanese weapons there. The Communists were able to gain these critical supplies because Soviet troops had accepted the Japanese surrender in Manchuria. Just as the Nationalists were being helped by the United States, the Communists received some assistance from the Soviet Union. Overall, however, in the race to retake Chinese territory from the Japanese, the Nationalists—with American help—were the winners. While the two sides were maneuvering for advantage, the United States organized last-minute negotiations in an attempt to avoid a civil war. Under the escort of the American ambassador, Patrick Hurley, Mao Zedong flew to Chongqing for a face-to-face meeting with Chiang Kai-shek. The negotiations lasted from August to October 1945 and settled nothing. The parting between the two men was amicable on the surface, but neither would concede any ground. Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the Nationalist Guomindang government was the proper ruler of all China, while Mao Zedong refused to agree to disband his army or to renounce the right of his troops to accept the surrender of the Japanese within their sphere of influence. It is probable that neither man went into the negotiations with any serious commitment to peace. For both, it was a public relations ploy directed at the United States and the Chinese populace. As soon as the meetings were over, Chiang Kaishek planned an offensive against Communist forces in Manchuria, which was launched in November 1945. The Nationalists had some success, and Mao Zedong’s troops were forced to retreat from some areas in the north. Another attempt at negotiating a settlement came in January 1946, when George Marshall, President Truman’s new envoy to China, was able to arrange a cease-fire and further negotiations. Both

sides agreed to send delegates to a consultative conference in Nanjing. The conference met January 11–21, 1946, and included Guomindang members, Communists, and representatives of several non-affiliated smaller parties. At the end, the delegates appeared to have reached a consensus. The Communists agreed to accept a constitutional government, and both sides agreed to troop reductions. Again, the negotiations proved to be in vain. The Nationalist government, confident of its superior military position, did not abide by the agreement’s terms, and fighting quickly broke out again. Whether either side was truly sincere or was merely posturing remains unclear. Marshall, admitting failure, left China in January 1947. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong and his Communist Party were struggling to gain significant support from the Soviet Union. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and his advisers doubted that Mao Zedong was strong enough to succeed in China, and they preferred to back a winning horse. To solidify the Soviet diplomatic position, Stalin signed a treaty of friendship with Chiang Kai-shek on August 14, 1945. Stalin also advised Mao Zedong to negotiate a powersharing deal with the Nationalists. Even though the Soviets did allow Chinese Communist forces to capture military equipment in Manchuria, they withdrew from the region carrying half of the heavy industrial equipment left by the Japanese. Stalin’s main focus was on rebuilding the Soviet Union, and the success of China’s Communist revolution was a low priority. The United States remained interested in seeing Chiang Kai-shek defeat the Communists but was unwilling to expend great amounts of money to do so. In 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer was sent to China to see if anything could be salvaged from Marshall’s failure the previous year. He recommended that Chiang Kai-shek be given substantial military aid, including 10,000 U.S. military officers and men to help train the Nationalist army. Wedemeyer’s suggestions were largely ignored. The United States was busy disbanding its wartime forces, and there was little support for deploying large numbers of troops abroad. The United States did give some funds to Nationalist China but much less than Chiang Kai-shek believed he needed. It also sent a small advisory team to help with military planning but not the 10,000 officers and men that General Wedemeyer had recommended. The U.S. position was influenced by the

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anti–Chiang Kai-shek opinions held by a number of American soldiers and foreign service officers who had served in China. The corruption of the Guomindang had led many to believe that Chiang Kai-shek was unfit to be China’s leader and that America’s money would be wasted supporting him.

Civil War, 19 4 6–19 47 For most of 1946, the fighting continued. Further negotiations were discussed—again pushed by the United States—and one more cease-fire was negotiated in June. The leaders of both the Guomindang and the Communists also continued to express their willingness to come to terms, but neither side stopped fighting. Fighting in 1946 was on a limited scale, but it appeared that both sides were regrouping and preparing for more intensive fighting the following year. On the surface, the Nationalists continued to gain ground during 1946 and 1947. Their armies slowly advanced into Manchuria, now the main base of Communist operations, and they were even able to capture Yan’an, the Communist base in Shaanxi province. While the Guomindang managed to gain control of a majority of China, however, their management of their territories alienated many Chinese. Guomindang soldiers and bureaucrats often used the confusion of the transition from Japanese to Chinese control to line their own pockets with property confiscated from Chinese businessmen or farmers. Once in control, Guomindang tax collectors treated the peasants, many of whom had suffered greatly during the Japanese occupation, with contempt. The Guomindang also spent too much time pursuing the Communists and too little trying to reform its own corrupt administration. Many of Chiang Kaishek’s closest allies were making themselves wealthy on the backs of the peasants. The Guomindang had never shed its connections with warlord-era China, and many Nationalist generals behaved more like conquerors than rescuers when they moved into Communist-held provinces. Chiang Kai-shek refused to see this as a liability. He valued his generals’ loyalty over their honesty (even though many turned out to be neither loyal nor honest). The Communists, on the other hand, behaved with great frugality. Idealists dedicated to their vision of a Marxist revolution, they lived among the

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peasants, sharing, to a degree, their hardships. The Communists also initiated land-reform programs in the territories under their control. Rich landlords and better-off peasants were targeted by poorer peasants— the majority—who, with the help of Communist troops, confiscated and redistributed their lands and possessions. (Thousands of landlords and richer peasants died during these Communist-organized redistributions.) China had always been a land of great inequalities of wealth, and the Communist efforts to redress these imbalances gained them the support of many peasants. The Communist Party functionaries seemed both more honest and more concerned than their Guomindang counterparts. Militarily, the Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) divided itself into two distinct parts. The larger part of the PLA focused on using guerrilla warfare to dominate the countryside of northern China, avoiding the Guomindang-dominated cities with their large, well-equipped garrisons. Mao Zedong was willing to concede control of the cities temporarily so long as he could dominate the countryside, where the bulk of the population lived. In Manchuria, however, the PLA established a strong territorial presence. Aided by the captured Japanese, Lin Biao built up the Communist army in northern Manchuria. The center of his power was the town of Harbin, an industrial center with a population of 800,000. From Harbin, Lin Biao trained the PLA, transforming it into an effective conventional fighting force, while Chiang Kai-shek’s troops slowly moved up from the south.

Communist Counterattack In mid-1947 the tide began to turn in the Communists’ favor. Chiang Kai-shek had sent his best troops to fight in Manchuria, but after some initial successes the Nationalist forces were halted by Lin Biao’s forces and subject to threatening counterattacks. Meanwhile, in the rest of China, the Guomindang’s mismanagement of the economy was leading to increased discontent. Most disturbing was the high inflation rate. Constantly rising food prices led to worker unrest in the cities, hundreds of strikes (often encouraged by Communist agents), and growing anger at the corrupt Nationalist bureaucrats. Chiang Kai-shek tried various financial reforms designed to stop the debilitating inflationary spiral, including introducing an entirely new currency in August 1948,

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but the measures failed, and faith in the government plummeted along with faith in the value of its money. Chiang Kai-shek still controlled the turbulent cities, but Mao Zedong’s followers remained active in the countryside, supporting peasants against their landlords, and building an effective guerrilla army. By mid-1947, Mao Zedong controlled most of the rural areas in the north—although Chiang Kai-shek remained stronger in the south. The PLA was also growing in size. In 1945, the Nationalists had outnumbered the Communists by at least three to one, but by June 1947, the Communists had almost 2 million troops, compared to the 3.7 million under Guomindang control, and the Communists were better motivated, if not yet better equipped. In late 1947, Lin Biao’s Manchurian army began a counterattack that overwhelmed a large part of Chiang Kai-shek’s northern army, killing or capturing 150,000 men. The remaining 200,000 were besieged in the city of Mukden, surrounded by Communist troops and cut off from supplies. Mukden finally fell on November 2, 1948. The entire Manchurian campaign had cost Chiang Kai-shek more than 400,000 of his best troops. After the fall of Manchuria, the Communist forces slightly outnumbered the Nationalists, 3 million to 2.9 million. In addition, the Communists gained large amounts of war equipment, including trucks and artillery. After these victories in Manchuria, Mao Zedong ordered his troops to switch from guerrilla warfare to conventional attacks against Nationalist positions. The PLA moved steadily southward, countering the Nationalist superiority in tanks and planes with more effective leadership and better-motivated troops. From September to December 1948, the Nationalist and Communist forces engaged in massive battles involving more than half a million soldiers on each side, in an attempt to control the Xuzhou railroads that led to Shanghai, China’s most important trading port. The Communists were victorious. Some Nationalist commanders began defecting to the PLA.

Nationalist Defeat In January 1949, with almost the entire rural area of northern China under PLA control, the general in charge of Beijing had no choice but to surrender. Those North China cities that had not yet surrendered

quickly followed Beijing, and the entire Nationalist edifice was beginning to collapse. On January 21, 1949, desperate to stem the rising tide of Communist successes, the Guomindang forced Chiang Kai-shek to resign as president of China, replacing him with Li Zongren—although Chiang Kai-shek remained commander of the Nationalist army. During the spring Li Zongren attempted to negotiate a peace with Mao Zedong, suggesting that the two sides divide China into two parts, with the Yangzi River as its dividing line. But Mao Zedong saw no reason to compromise now that victory was within his grasp. In April 1949, Mao Zedong and the PLA renewed the offensive, and the rest of China quickly fell. Nanjing was taken in April, Shanghai and Wuhan in May, and Canton in October. The outlying regions had all fallen by November. The Communists were completely victorious. Part of the reason for the quick Communist victory was that Chiang Kai-shek had already retreated across the Taiwan Strait to the island of Taiwan, taking with him 300,000 of the best and most loyal Nationalist troops. From Taiwan he planned to rebuild his forces and come back across the straits to retake the mainland. He never did. On October 1, 1949, with almost every corner of China under Communist control, Mao Zedong and other Communist Party leaders went to Beijing, which they declared to be China’s capital once again, and they announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese Civil War was over.

Consequences The victory of the Communist Party in China put an end to civil war but not to continued chaos within China. The Communists, led by Mao Zedong, were determined to transform China into their image of a socialist state. The result was continued upheaval for the next 25 years. Millions had died during the civil war, and millions more probably died in its immediate aftermath, as the Communists organized attacks on the landlords and bourgeoisie within China. Then millions of peasants and loyal Communists died during the failed Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. Only in the 1970s, as Mao Zedong grew old and died, did China begin to settle and relax.

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Members of the communist People’s Liberation Army near Shanghai receive good news in May 1949, the final stage of the Chinese civil war. The People’s Republic was declared on October 1. (Keystone/Getty Images)

Internationally, the fall of China to the Communists was a milestone in the Cold War. Both sides saw it as a victory for the Soviet Union and world communism. China became a center of Communist influence in Asia, supporting the North Koreans in their war against the South in the 1950s, and providing aid to the Vietnamese Communists during the long Vietnam War. Cold War pessimists saw the fall of China as the first step in a complete Communist takeover of Asia. Chiang Kai-shek, despite his defeats, remained in control of Taiwan, which became the Guomindang’s final home. The Chinese Communists considered invading Taiwan in 1950 but were forestalled by U.S. President Harry Truman’s deployment of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang continued to insist that they were the only legitimate government of China, while Communist China remained equally insistent

that Taiwan was a province that would eventually be reabsorbed. The disagreement persisted into the twenty-first century. For the United States, the Communist victory in China led to political repercussions at home. Some American politicians claimed that China had been deliberately “lost” because of the efforts of American Communists hidden at the highest levels of the government. During the 1950s, these politicians, the most prominent of whom was Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, led witch hunts searching for Communist subversives in and out of the U.S. government. Similarly, the American “loss” of China helped convince many Americans that it was necessary to prevent Communist takeovers in other Asian countries. The United States was willing to make large troop commitments in Korea (1950–1953) and Vietnam (1963–1973)—successfully in Korea but unsuccessfully Vietnam.

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Analysis Of the many reasons for the Guomindang’s defeat, the Japanese invasions are highest on the list. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and China in 1937 put pressure on a Nationalist government that was only just recovering from the conflicts of the 1920s. The 1931 invasion, and the cross-border incursions that followed it, forced Chiang Kai-shek to make one of two unpleasant choices: either ignore the invasion and lose face among many Chinese for not standing up to Japanese imperialism or challenge the Japanese actions and risk a humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan’s better-equipped army. As it turned out, Chiang Kai-shek followed first one course and then the other, losing prestige both times. The war itself hurt the Nationalists more than the Communists. With the southern Chinese cities (their main base of support) under Japanese control, the Guomindang found it difficult to maintain an effective government. Its tendency to rely on warlords for support was increased, while its move toward a more centralized government, which had been well under way in 1937, was halted. Furthermore, many Chinese gained the impression that the Nationalists were more interested in fighting Mao Zedong than the Japanese. This hurt their reputation, particularly in the north. The Nationalists also lacked a clear ideological vision—unless unwavering hostility to Communism counts as a vision—and so failed to provide their troops with a sufficiently strong reason to fight and die. The Nationalists often seemed more interested in power for its own sake and in lining their own pockets, while the Communist troops seemed more idealistic, pursuing dreams of a Marxist future. Militarily, Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy was poor and helped to lose the war. His decision to send his best troops into Manchuria before he had secured the north led to their eventual isolation and elimination.

With the Manchurian army defeated, the rest of China became nearly impossible to hold. Similarly, Lin Biao’s quick move into Manchuria to grab the weapons from the surrendering Japanese gave the PLA a base from which they would eventually destroy Chiang Kai-shek’s army. Finally, the corruption and incompetence that characterized the Nationalist government did much to reduce its base of support—as well as to handicap its war effort against Mao Zedong. The Communists were able to gain the loyalty of many Chinese peasants by supporting them against rapacious landlords, while the Nationalists often victimized the peasants with unfair taxes collected by corrupt bureaucrats. Mao Zedong’s deserves credit for understanding that contrary to earlier Communist theory, winning the support of China’s peasants (not its urban workers) was the key to winning the civil war. Carl Skutsch See also: People’s Wars; China: Invasion of Tibet, 1950–1959; China: Quemoy and Matsu, 1954–1958; China: Tiananmen Violence, 1989.

Bibliography Chassin, Lionel Max. The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War, 1945–49. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. Ch’i Hsi-sheng. Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937–45. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982. Fairbank, John. China: A New History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1992. Guillermaz, Jacques. A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–49. New York: Random House, 1972. Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. The Rise of Modern China. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Pepper, Suzanne. Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–49. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Spence, Jonathan. The Search for Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton, 1990. Terrill, Ross. Mao: A Bibliography. New York: Harper and Row, 1980.

CHINA: Invasion of Tibet,1950–1959 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes XINJIANG

SOVIET UNION

AUTONOMOUS NORTH KOREA

CHINA TIBET BHUTAN NEPAL

CHINA

FRENCH INDOCHINA INDIA BURMA EAST PAKISTAN

Gan

INDIA

200

300 Miles

300 Kilometers

SOUTH KOREA

CHINA TAIWAN

g

Golmud

QINGHAI

TIB E T AUTONOMOUS RE GION B ra h N E PA L

100

0

maputra R. Shigatse

R.

SICHUAN Chamdo Lhasa

KHAM REGION

gzi R. Yan

. sR ge

0

REGION

Huan

MONGOLIA PAKISTAN

Gyangtse

Kathmandu

Tibet had a long history of independence or autonomy, aided by its remote location on a plateau in south central Asia averaging some 16,000 feet above sea level, surrounded by high, difficult-to-cross mountains on all sides, including Mount Everest, the highest mountain on Earth. The region has been cut off from outside influences for much of its history. Ethnically, its people are distant cousins to the Han Chinese, and their languages belong to the same linguistic family but are entirely unintelligible to each other. Originally, Tibet was a land divided into small kingdoms. In the eighth century c.e., its most important king adopted Buddhism as the state religion, and the faith gradually spread over the entire region. In 1578, with the help of a Mongol Khan, the Gelugpa sect, or Followers of the Virtuous Way, began to establish its primacy within Tibet. (They were called the “Yellow Hats,” because of their distinctive ceremonial costumes.) The Gelugpa leader was called the Dalai Lama, a priest believed to have both deep knowledge and great power. When a Dalai Lama died, his successor was always a young boy chosen by a committee of Buddhist monks. The new Dalai Lama was declared to be a reincarnation of the previous one.

After 1720, Tibet came under the very loose control of the Qing (Manchu) Empire in China. The Qing stationed a small garrison in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, which was under the control of an official known as the amban. The Dalai Lamas and their advisers remained in control of Tibet’s internal affairs, but the amban regulated contacts with the outside world, occasionally summoning troops to defend Tibet from attacks by outsiders or to suppress internal dissent. After 1792, the Tibetans, supported by the amban, excluded all non-Chinese foreigners from Tibet. In the twentieth century, the declining power of the Qing Empire meant that it was able to exercise only nominal control over Tibet. In 1904, a British expeditionary force marched into Lhasa and forced Tibetan officials (the thirteenth Dalai Lama had fled to China) to sign a treaty granting Britain favorable trade rights, while China could only protest this violation of its traditional control over Tibet. In 1910, the Qing made one last effort to regain dominance in Tibet, sending a 2,000-man army to Lhasa. This forced the Dalai Lama to flee again, this time to India.

Independent Tibet The Chinese Revolution of 1911 brought an end to the Qing Dynasty and led to a collapse of central authority across China. This chaos spread to Tibet. After some fighting between pro-Revolution and pro-Qing forces in Tibet (in which Tibetans fought on both sides), the Chinese, unable to maintain their authority, left Tibet in 1913. The Dalai Lama, who had returned in 1912, declared that Tibet was now an independent nation. Independent Tibet remained a politically and economically backward land, and the Dalai Lama’s authority, although firm in Lhasa, did not extend to every part of the vast region. Local clan fights and feuds continued as they had for thousands of years. In addition, the Dalai Lama found it politic to listen to

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KEY DATES 1949

Chinese Communists take power in Beijing; new Chinese leader Mao Zedong declares that Tibet will be “liberated” by the People’s Liberation Army.

1950

In May, the Chinese army crosses the Yangzi River into the traditional Tibetan area of Dengkog, skirmishes with Tibetan forces; by October, Chinese forces move deeper into Tibet; on November 17, the Tibetan cabinet makes the fifteen-year-old Dalai Lama the spiritual and secular leader of Tibet; the Dalai Lama flees the Tibetan capital of Lhasa for a remote border town.

1951

Tibetan authorities agree to allow Tibet’s incorporation into China and posting of Chinese garrison in Lhasa in exchange for guarantees of Tibetan autonomous status and religious freedom; the Dalai Lama returns to Lhasa.

1955

An anti-Chinese rebellion breaks out in the Kham region of Tibet; it is quickly put down by Chinese military.

1958

Tibetan and Khampa rebels rise up against the Chinese and march to within thirty miles of Lhasa.

1959

Huge crowds of demonstrators march in defense of the Dalai Lama and are fired upon by Chinese troops; the Dalai Lama flees Tibet for exile in India.

the advice offered by British emissaries from the south and Chinese visitors from the east. Tibet’s independence depended in large degree on the weakness within China: From the 1920s until 1949, the ruling Nationalist party in China was locked in battles with the Communists and the Japanese and could do little to assert control over Tibet. Both Nationalists and Communists agreed, however, that Tibet was a part of China and that China had the right to intervene in Tibetan affairs. Tibet’s situation was complicated by the 1933 death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama. The search for the fourteenth Dalai Lama led, in 1937, to a welloff farmer’s son named Lhamo Dhondrub. After various tests, the young child was proclaimed the Dalai Lama reincarnated, and in 1938, the threeyear-old was renamed Tenzin Gyatso and brought to Lhasa. Until the child came of age, Tibet was ruled by a series of priest regents aided by a council of monks.

Communist Threat In 1949, after years of civil war, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party defeated the Nationalist forces and declared the new Democratic Republic of China. Tibet’s tenuous independence was put into question. With no serious threats to their power, the Communists could turn their whole attention, backed by the weight of China’s population of 500 million, against Tibet and its 3 million people. Realizing that their independence was in danger, the Tibetan elite, speaking for the still underage Dalai Lama, attempted a two-fold strategy to forestall China from reasserting control. First, they eliminated all symbols of Chinese control, most important of which was the 133-man Chinese mission to Lhasa (the mission was ordered to leave in August 1949, which it did). Next, the Tibetans sought aid from the outside world. In this they were handicapped by their tradition

China: Invasion of Tibet, 195 0–195 9

of isolation. For most of their history they had ignored the outside world and actively discouraged visits by foreigners. In the 1940s, realizing the dangers of isolation, they began opening doors to the world, but it was too late. In 1949, Tibet appealed to Britain, India, and the United States to defend its independence as a nation. After the huge exertions of World War II, Britain was not in shape to extend any military aid, but it did secretly encourage India to help the Tibetans. India, which had just achieved its independence from Britain in August 1947, was ambivalent about supporting Tibet. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru liked the idea of an independent Tibet as a buffer between India and China, but his main goal was not to offend China. As a compromise, Nehru offered some weapons to the Tibetans, but he also recognized China’s rights in Tibet. The United States, in supporting the Chinese Nationalists, had long asserted that Tibet was a part of China. When it became clear that the Communists were about to take power in China, the Americans were eager to cut their losses in East Asia and offered no help for Tibet. During 1949, Tibetan officials met with the American ambassador to India but received nothing more than sympathy. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared that Tibet would be liberated by the forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Premier Mao Zedong also demanded that a Tibetan delegation visit the Chinese capital to discuss reunification of Tibet and China. The Tibetan delegation took a roundabout route, passing through India and Hong Kong, hoping to enlist Indian or British aid, but without success— neither Britain nor India was willing to have a direct confrontation with Communist China. As the Tibetans searched for supporters, the PLA moved up from its bases in the plains of China into the upper reaches of the Yangzi River, to the vaguely defined border of eastern Tibet. By the fall of 1950, the United States was more willing to help the Tibetans; in June 1950, the Communist army of North Korea (with Chinese support) had invaded South Korea, a U.S. ally. The Americans did not wish to lose Tibet and Korea to Communism as they had lost China. Even so, American diplomats told the Tibetans that they could not provide active assistance without the support of India. Without India’s cooperation it would be almost impossible to transport supplies to Tibet.

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In November 1950, a Tibetan delegation was able to convince El Salvador to put its case for independence before the UN General Assembly. Once again, however, India was unwilling to offer any support, and the motion to vote on support for Tibet was unanimously delayed for later consideration, effectively ending Tibet’s hopes for international support. Both the United States and Britain said privately once again that they would vote for UN support of Tibet, but only if India also did so—otherwise, they believed, they would be perceived as imperialist bullies.

Invasion By the time of the UN vote, it was already too late to save Tibet. Tibetan and Chinese forces had been fighting since May 1950. Chinese troops had crossed the Yangzi and seized the town of Dengkog. There was some bloody skirmishing in the area, but the Tibetan troops were unable to match the training and equipment of the Chinese and were quickly pushed out of the area. The Tibetan army was handicapped in many ways. It was a small force—perhaps 8,500 men—and unused to serious military maneuvers. It had some outdated pieces of artillery and a few hundred machine guns and mortars. Wives and children often traveled with their soldier husbands and fathers, which made fast marching difficult. Finally, the Tibetan clan nobles who officered the army had no professional military training. The Tibetan army was more of a glorified border guard than a real military force. To counter the Tibetan force, the PLA had millions of men at its disposal. Most of these, of course, were needed elsewhere—facing Taiwan or on the North Korean border—but the PLA was easily able to mount an invasion army that probably totaled some 90,000 experienced soldiers. Tibet’s only hope was to use its rough geography to its advantage, holding the high mountain passes to the west of Chamdo and encouraging the Buddhist Kham hill people to carry out a guerrilla campaign against the PLA’s supply lines. Instead, the Tibetans stationed their troops in the lower, less defensible, valleys. Worse, Tibetan officers alienated Kham tribesmen, many of whom chose to work with the invading Chinese. On October 7, 1950, Chinese forces, having built up their supplies, moved more deeply into Tibet. In

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a few weeks of fighting, they managed to seize Chamdo and destroyed most of Tibet’s fighting forces. Some Tibetans had fought bravely, but most, badly led by incompetent and inexperienced officers, were quickly overwhelmed.

Chinese Occupation With the entire Kham region under Chinese control, its army destroyed, and foreign aid non-existent, Tibet was in desperate straits. Reacting to the demands of mobs in Lhasa, the Tibetan cabinet agreed to invest the Dalai Lama with full powers over the nation. On November 17, 1950, the 15-year-old Dalai Lama was made the religious and temporal ruler of his country. He immediately moved to a town near the Indian border—in case a quick escape across the border was necessary—and authorized a delegation to open negotiations with the Chinese government. The talks began in April 1951 and left Tibet with very few of its previous freedoms. The Chinese forced the Tibetans to

agree to a treaty that made Tibet a part of China and allowed for the establishment of a Chinese military garrison at Lhasa. Tibetans were guaranteed autonomous status and religious freedom, but the Chinese rearranged Tibet’s governing structures so that its autonomy was nearly meaningless. In reality, the local Communist Party officials would make the decisions in Lhasa. In August 1951, the Dalai Lama was persuaded to return to Lhasa by promises from the Chinese that he would have some influence in the new Tibetan government. In September, the first Chinese troops, some 3,000 soldiers, arrived in Lhasa, having made the arduous overland march. The Chinese garrison’s numbers eventually rose to 20,000. From 1951 to 1959, the Dalai Lama attempted to abide by the Chinese demands, but it soon became clear that the Communist leadership of China had no intention of allowing Tibet any real autonomy. The Dalai Lama was to be a figurehead through whom the Communists would rule. In 1954, the Dalai Lama was brought before Mao Zedong in Beijing. Although

Tibetan monks lay down their arms after an unsuccessful uprising against Chinese rule in March 1959. The revolt led to the exile of the Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibetan Buddhism and head of the Tibetan government. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)

China: Invasion of Tibet, 195 0–195 9

Mao Zedong treated the Tibetan leader with remarkable courtesy, he made it quite clear that he intended to absorb Tibet completely into China, militarily, politically, and culturally. The Dalai Lama returned to Tibet enlightened and deeply concerned—he and his advisers had no desire to see Tibet turned into another province of greater China. The Tibetan people were also unhappy with the changes being imposed by Communist officials. In 1955, revolts broke out in the Kham region. Chinese garrisons were attacked, and Kham tribesmen— armed with rifles, knives, and charm boxes to protect them from bullets—retreated into the mountains to conduct guerrilla attacks against the PLA. The guerrillas received secret assistance from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which airdropped weapons into the country and smuggled Tibetans out for training in modern tactics. The CIA’s help, however, did not balance the 150,000 troops that China devoted to putting down the guerrilla uprising. The Chinese operated with great brutality, shelling villages and executing hundreds, perhaps thousands, in putting down the revolt. The revolt in Kham was crushed, but refugees moving westward helped to inspire the Tibetans in central Tibet to rise up against the Chinese. In 1958, Tibetan and Khampa rebels advanced to within thirty miles of Lhasa. In March 1959, huge crowds of demonstrators, fearful for the Dalai Lama’s safety, gathered in Lhasa’s streets to demand that the Chinese leave. Realizing that resistance was useless, the Dalai Lama and his entourage were smuggled out of Lhasa on March 18. Two days later, the PLA garrison in Lhasa opened fire on the rebel crowds with mortars and machine guns killing thousands and dispersing thousands more into the mountains. On March 31, as the Chinese soldiers searched for the Dalai Lama’s corpse among the bodies, the Dalai Lama crossed the border into India and permanent exile. With the suppression of the March 1959 revolt, the Chinese hold on Tibet was confirmed. Further disturbances occurred in the 1960s, particularly in reaction to the Chinese Cultural Revolution with its

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attacks on religion. Thousands of monks were forced out of their monasteries and forced to earn a living in other trades. In the 1970s, the Chinese relaxed some of their restrictions on religion. Semi-official persecution continued, however, and further disturbances in the 1980s and early 1990s were suppressed with great firmness. Ethnic Chinese immigration also helped to alter the political situation in parts of Tibet. The Kham region received thousands of Chinese immigrants and by the 1990s became more than 50 percent non-Tibetan. From his exile in northern India, the Dalai Lama continued to insist on his right to lead his people and became an internationally recognized figure. His books on Buddhism were published in many languages, and he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for his attempts to free Tibet from China through non-violent means. Although some unofficial negotiations were carried out between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese, it seemed that he would never be allowed to return to Tibet. The defeat of Tibet was inevitable. With its primitive political system, poorly equipped army, and naively well-intentioned leadership, it was no match for the rigorously professional PLA, which had just succeeded in conquering all of China in a civil war involving millions of combatants. Tibet’s only slim hope was foreign intervention, and none of the three possible supporters—Britain, India, and the United States—was willing to offer more than covert assistance to the Tibetan people. Carl Skutsch See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949; China: Border War with India, 1962.

Bibliography Goldstein, Melyvn. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–51. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Grunfeld, Tom. The Making of Modern Tibet. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1987. Richardson, Hugh. Tibet and Its History. Boston: Shambhala, 1984. Spence, Jonathan. The Search for Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton, 1990.

CHINA: Quemoy and Matsu,1954–1958 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Taiwan 0 0

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Republic of China (PRC), whose capital city is Beijing. In the meantime, Nationalist forces led by Chiang Kai-shek fled the mainland and established a new republic on Taiwan, which took the name Republic of China (ROC). The new ROC consisted of Taiwan, the Pescadores (a group of small islets), and some other islands located between the mainland and Taiwan. Its capital is Taipei. In this entry, the name Taiwan will be used for the main island of the ROC. The name China always refers to the geographical mainland or to the PRC.

50 Miles 50 Kilometers

MATSU TAO (MATSU)

CHINA

FORMOSA STRAIT

Taipei

KINMEN DAO (QUEMOY) PENGHU LIEH-TAO (PESCADORES)

Historical Background TAIWAN

SOUTH CHINA SEA SOVIET UNION MONGOLIA PAKISTAN

BHUTAN

CHINA

NEPAL FRENCH INDOCHINA INDIA BURMA EAST PAKISTAN

NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA TAIWAN

Note: The literature dealing with Taiwan is sometimes confusing because of name changes and different spellings for the same designation. Before the 1950s, Western references to the island of Taiwan were to Formosa, the name given to the island by the Portuguese at the end of the sixteenth century. Taiwan has always been the Chinese name for the island, and today it is generally referred to as such. The Republic of China was the name of mainland China from the 1920s to 1949. When the Chinese Communist Party took uncontested control of the mainland in 1949, it changed the country’s name to People’s

When Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of China’s Nationalist forces, left the mainland of China in defeat in 1949, his military troops occupied Taiwan, the Pescadores, and offshore islands including Quemoy, Matsu, and the Tachens. Quemoy, the most important of the offshore islands, is located about five miles off the mainland coast. Matsu is smaller than Quemoy and is located about ten miles off the coast. The Pescadores Islands are a chain of about sixtyfour islets in the Strait of Formosa located about seventy-five miles from the mainland. The island of Taiwan is approximately 100 miles off the coast of China. Chiang and his Nationalist Chinese followers, including an army of some 300,000, took over Taiwan from its native peoples and established its own government, which continued to rule the island for more than fifty years. In 1954, the ROC had a population of about 10 million. Especially in the early years, Chiang and his government claimed to be the only legitimate government of all China and refused to recognize the Communist regime. The ROC remained a state deeply influenced by its military because of its publicly announced intention to return to the

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KEY DATES 1949

As Chinese Communists take power in mainland China, Nationalist (or Guomindang) forces flee to the island of Taiwan, establishing the Republic of China; Communist forces try to seize the island of Quemoy but are driven off by the Guomindang.

1950

At the beginning of the Korean War, the U.S. Seventh Fleet is dispatched to the Taiwan straits to prevent Communist and Guomindang forces from attacking each other.

1954

On September 3, Chinese Communist forces begin shelling Quemoy and Little Quemoy islands; the Republic of China and the United States sign a mutual defense treaty on December 2.

1955

The Formosa Resolution, calling for the United States to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores, and “related positions and territories” from Chinese Communist attack, passes Congress; President Dwight Eisenhower asks the UN for help in defusing the crisis; Chinese Communist leaders reject UN mediation.

1957

As Chinese Communist shelling and threats against Quemoy and Matsu continue, the United States sends missiles to the islands.

1958

Mainland China announces campaign to take Taiwan; on August 23, Communist forces resume shelling Quemoy and Little Quemoy islands; in an attempt to ease tensions, U.S. leaders say they will not help Taiwan retake the mainland militarily; in October, Chinese Communists announce a cease-fire and that there will be no new shelling.

mainland one day and reclaim its rightful place as the government of all China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claimed that Taiwan was a province of China, rightfully under the control of the PRC government. It refused to recognize the ROC as an independent government and demanded that it cede its de facto control of the islands to the PRC. The issue between the two Chinas received widespread coverage in part because in organizing the United Nations in 1945, China had been designated one of the Big Five nations with a permanent seat in the Security Council and the power to veto any Security Council resolution. The arrangement had been made when Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists remained in control of the mainland. After 1949, through the pressure of the United States and its allies, the ROC kept its important UN pow-

ers even though it no longer controlled the vast majority of China’s land or its peoples.

War in Korea and Indochina After taking power in 1949, the PRC government wanted to win control over the offshore islands nearest to the mainland even though they were claimed by Chiang’s government. PRC forces did attack Quemoy in October 1949, but the Nationalists drove them back. Given the poor performance of the Nationalist army in the recently ended civil war, it seemed only a matter of time before the Communist PRC achieved its goal of unifying China. In January 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman announced that additional military assistance would not be provided to the Nationalist forces on Taiwan and that it did not plan to

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establish military bases there. He did not want the United States to become involved in any future warfare between the two contending governments. In June 1950, the forces of North Korea, a Communist state suppored by the PRC, invaded South Korea, a non-Communist ally of the United States and other western nations. President Truman took immediate steps to condemn the invasion and to urge UN intervention against North Korea’s aggression. Within days, he also reversed the policy of nonintervention in the China dispute over the offshore islands. On June 27, 1950, he ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China from attacking each other. He also called upon the ROC government in Taipei to “cease all sea and air operations against the mainland.” His policy neutralized Taiwan, involved the United States in China’s civil war, and prevented the mainland government from reclaiming Taiwan and the other islands off its coast. President Truman’s advisers had urged this change of policy because they believed that Taiwan was more important to the United States strategically than South Korea. Defending South Korea while abandoning Taiwan made little sense. In October 1950, the PRC sent Chinese forces into the Korean conflict head-to-head with U.S. forces. This made the defense of Taiwan an even greater imperative. All discussion about normalizing relations between mainland China and the United States ended. The Korean War ended in 1953 with a negotiated settlement, leaving the boundary between the two Koreas roughly where it had been when fighting began. By this time, world attention had shifted to Indochina, where the French, formerly colonial masters of the region, were fighting the Communistdominated Viet Minh coalition led by Ho Chi Minh. Like North Korea, the Viet Minh, centered in North Vietnam, received substantial assistance from the Beijing government. In 1954, the French suffered a galling defeat at Dien Bien Phu and announced that it would withdraw from Indochina. The People’s Republic of China turned its attention once again to the offshore islands. In 1954, the PRC was not militarily strong enough to win control of Taiwan and the Pescadores— moving troops and supplies as much as a hundred miles over water presented great difficulties. On the other hand, the PRC leaders believed they could take possession of the nearby offshore islands without pay-

ing too high a price. The Tachen Islands, Quemoy, and Matsu were all within ten miles of the Chinese mainland. Military plans were drawn up to seize one island at a time. After winning control of the offshore islands, the PRC could then try to win control of Formosa and the Pescadores. On August 11, 1954, about a month after the signing of the Geneva accords ending the war in Indochina, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. On September 3, the PRC began shelling Quemoy and Little Quemoy islands in apparent preparation for an invasion. The call to liberate Taiwan and the attack on the offshore islands appeared to be linked. Diplomats in the United States were alarmed and were unwilling to accept a series of attacks by the PRC leading to an attack on Taiwan itself. The ROC government in Taipei responded to the attacks by bombing military installations on the mainland. Tensions rose steeply. One factor that helped raise tensions had occurred 18 months earlier. On February 2, 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower had announced that the United States would no longer exercise a veto over the actions of the Republic of China in Taiwan. This suggested that the Nationalist government was free to attack the mainland whenever it chose. Newspapers described Eisenhower’s statement as “unleashing” Chiang Kai-shek. Another factor contributing to escalating tensions was the American response to the French defeat in Indochina in 1954. The United States expressed willingness to take some of the responsibility formerly exercised by France for fighting Communist insurgencies in Asia. It created a new military alliance to help prevent further Communist gains in the region. When Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Manila on September 8, 1954, for the signing ceremonies creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), China continued to bomb the offshore islands. The bombardment threatened an invasion, but it also succeeded in embarrassing the United States at the signing ceremonies. In November 1954, Sino-American relations became more hostile when a Chinese military tribunal sentenced eleven American airmen shot down during the Korean War to prison terms ranging from four years to life. Two American civilians accused of espionage received long jail sentences: Richard George Fecteau received a twenty-year jail term and John Thomas Downey received a life sentence.

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U.S.–R O C Defense Treaty President Eisenhower did not want to go to war with the PRC in defense of the offshore islands. He was determined, however, to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores. He was willing to defend some of the offshore islands but only if they became essential to defending Taiwan. President Eisenhower thought defending Taiwan was in America’s national interest. U.S. spokesmen described the island as part of a chain of islands and territories in the Western Pacific linked to U.S. national security. The chain included Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. The administration also subscribed to the domino theory—the doctrine that if one nation in Asia fell to Communism, the fall of others became likely. Under this doctrine, Communist control of Taiwan would endanger Japan and Korea to the north and the Philippines to the south. Another important factor in the U.S. policy was the role of overseas Chinese—millions of Chinese who lived in other Asian nations, where they often dominated trade. These expatriate Chinese maintained close cultural ties to China but were deeply opposed to the Communist government. The Nationalist government in Taiwan provided an alternative to the PRC that overseas Chinese could look to and support. In parts of Asia, overseas Chinese could influence whether a government extended diplomatic recognition to Beijing or continued to recognize the Nationalists as the legitimate Chinese government. Finally, the U.S. administration pointed out that Nationalist China still represented all of China in the United Nations. In fact, many nations had not yet extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC. To help dissuade China from escalating the conflict, the United States and the Republic of China signed a mutual defense treaty on December 2, 1954. President Eisenhower hoped the signing of a military treaty with the ROC would encourage Soviet leaders to dissuade China’s Communist leaders from using military force against the offshore islands. The leaders of mainland China and the Soviet Union recognized that the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan extended U.S. protection to Formosa, the Pescadores, and possibly the offshore islands. This increased the risk that any military action by the Beijing government could start a major war. If a war began, the United States

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might also use atomic weapons. The U.S.–ROC treaty made the United States a major player in the dispute between the two Chinas, internationalizing the conflict between Taiwan and China. In Beijing, Communist foreign minister Zhou Enlai declared that any treaty concluded between the United States and the Republic of China was illegal because Taiwan was a part of China, not a sovereign nation. In his view, the Beijing government was within its rights to use force to compel Taiwan to recognize the Communist regime. The United States, on the other hand, insisted that the conflict between Taipei and Beijing had international ramifications and was a part of the international Cold War between democratic states and world Communism. The U.S.–ROC treaty was part of a larger U.S. plan to contain China in much the same way it was containing the Soviet Union. The treaty complemented other U.S. defense arrangements including the 1951 ANZUS treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; the defense treaty with the Philippines; the 1953 treaty with the Republic of Korea; and the 1954 SEATO treaty. Finally, the U.S.–ROC treaty seemed to make it more likely that Taiwan would gain recognition as an independent nation and achieve a status similar to that of West Germany, South Korea, or South Vietnam—all parts of countries divided between non-Communist and Communist governments. The hostility that characterized the Sino-American relationship was fueled by their differences regarding the legitimacy of using force to achieve foreign policy goals. The United States wanted the PRC to renounce the use of force in the Formosa Strait, but the PRC refused. This issue would vex relationships between the United States and the PRC for more than half a century.

Chiang Kai-shek Of all the major actors in the 1954 crisis, the Republic of China had the most to lose. It was the only actor that could be eliminated. Chiang Kai-shek needed to keep alive the promise that his forces would someday return to the mainland. To the extent he was able to do so, he might win the support of those opposed to Communism. Failing that, he still wanted to retain control over as much territory as possible to shore up the legitimacy of the Taipei government.

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Although Taiwan was dependent on American support and assistance, the relationship between the two was never an easy one. Some American policymakers and politicians considered Chiang Kai-shek to be a dictator who often abused his power. Corruption and incompetence had characterized his regime on the mainland and was one reason he lost the civil war. When he and his forces fled to Taiwan, they ruthlessly imposed their authority on the native population. The Nationalists made up about 15 percent of the population, but they subordinated the interests of the indigenous Taiwanese people to the goals of Chiang Kai-shek. His rule was often brutal and arbitrary. Chiang Kai-shek and President Eisenhower disagreed on the deployment of Nationalist forces on the offshore islands. In 1954, more than a third of Chiang’s troops were stationed on the offshore islands. If PRC forces invaded the islands in force, they could wipe out a large percentage of his army, leaving him with too few troops to defend Taiwan. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles believed that Quemoy and Matsu should not become heavily fortified garrisons, but should be used for radar and other equipment to gain useful intelligence. Chiang, on the other hand, saw the islands as stepping-stones to the mainland. He viewed them as a major military asset. Another factor that contributed to the uneasy U.S.–ROC relationship was President Eisenhower’s habit of making ambiguous statements about what the United States would do in certain circumstances. He liked to keep his options open to retain a degree of flexibility. His purpose was to keep the Beijing leaders off-guard, but he often kept America’s allies, including Chiang Kai-shek off-guard as well. The Eisenhower administration did not enjoy broad international support for its actions in the China dispute. Some U.S. allies urged Eisenhower to persuade Chiang to abandon the offshore islands to help avoid the possibility of a major war. In Britain, Winston Churchill, serving for the last time as prime minister, continued to support the United States, but warned that many members of Parliament in both major parties believed that Chiang Kai-shek should abandon the offshore islands. In fact, members of the Labour Party went a step further, encouraging the United States to extend diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic in Beijing and allow it to represent China in the United Nations. Many allied nations also opposed the “unleashing” of Chiang Kai-shek

because of the fear that he might manipulate events to cause a major Sino-American conflict.

Formosa Resolution The mutual defense treaty between the United States and the ROC, signed in December 1954, did not end the dispute. On January 10, 1955, before the treaty had been ratified by the U.S. Senate, China launched a major air attack on the Tachen Islands. President Eisenhower wanted to send a clear signal to the Beijing leaders that such military action would bring an American response even before the treaty was ratified. On January 24, 1955, he asked Congress to approve a resolution giving him the authority to defend Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores, and “related positions and territories.” He asked for authority to attack Communist military installations on nearby islands and the mainland, if necessary. In fact, the so-called Formosa resolution went further than the unratified mutual defense treaty. The resolution authorized the president to attack targets on the mainland, and it was much more explicit in linking the defense of Taiwan to that of the offshore islands. The resolution was passed by the House of Representatives on January 25, 1955, by a vote of 409–3. The Senate approved it three days later by a vote of 85–3. To placate those opposed to his policies, President Eisenhower announced that he would seek help from the United Nations to defuse the crisis. Premier Zhou Enlai thought the Formosa resolution would legitimize a Nationalist or U.S. attack on the mainland. He also rejected UN mediation regarding the offshore islands. He claimed once again that the conflict with Taiwan was an internal affair, and thus the United Nations lacked jurisdiction. He added that the Beijing government would never accept UN mediation efforts as long as the Nationalist government represented China in the world body. President Eisenhower hoped that a formal defense treaty with Formosa plus the Formosa resolution would deliver a powerful message to Beijing, leaving no doubt that the United States would defend its ally. He wanted to avoid the kind of situation that led to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. In effect, the resolution drew a line and threatened retaliation if the Chinese Communists crossed over it. It clearly implied that the United States would defend the offshore islands. The Formosa resolution also demonstrated congressional support for Eisenhower’s

China: Quemoy and Matsu, 195 4–195 8

policies. Even though the Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party, it provided overwhelming support to the Republican president. Finally, the Formosa resolution and the defense treaty were designed to boost the morale of the Nationalist forces on Taiwan. This was a major concern of American officials at the time. They feared that some of Chiang’s military forces might defect to the Communist side if its victory appeared inevitable. Such defections had helped the Communists win control of the mainland.

Tensions Increase In early January 1955, when the Formosa resolution was being crafted, the PRC continued to bomb the Tachen Islands, just a few miles from the mainland. President Eisenhower repeated his commitment to defend the islands but would not commit American troops to the effort. In Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek knew that his forces could not defend the islands without direct American involvement. Eisenhower and Chiang agreed that voluntarily evacuating the islands would be preferable. Militarily, the Tachens were not essential to the defense of Taiwan or the Pescadores. Chiang agreed to evacuate the Tachens and assumed that President Eisenhower would then be more willing to defend Quemoy and Matsu. Eisenhower, however, was unwilling to make a public statement specifically committing the United States to do so. He made it clear to his advisers that if the United States did defend Quemoy and Matsu the defense would be limited to air and naval power. He would not use American ground troops. On February 5, 1955, the State Department announced that the Seventh Fleet would help the Nationalist forces evacuate the Tachens. The United States assembled a massive naval and air presence as a demonstration of strength. The American escort vessels could defend themselves if attacked, but they could not attack bases on the mainland without first receiving the president’s permission. By February 11, the evacuation of all civilian and military personnel was completed without any interference from the PRC. More than 10,000 military personnel and about 15,000 civilians were evacuated. On February 9, 1955, by a vote of 64–6, the Senate ratified the mutual defense treaty. During the ratification debate, it became clear that some senators opposed the treaty because it committed the United

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States to defend the offshore islands. Both Chinese governments claimed sovereignty over all the islands. This created a situation in which the United States might find itself at war with China over an inconsequential territorial dispute. To address these concerns, the Eisenhower administration revised the treaty to apply explicitly to defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, but to omit any specific reference to the smaller offshore islands. As a part of the negotiations leading to the mutual defense treaty, Nationalist president Chiang Kaishek also agreed in an exchange of notes, signed on December 10, 1954, not to attack the Chinese mainland without first receiving American approval. This understanding, which was not made public at the time, gave the United States the right to veto a Nationalist attack and thereby gave the treaty a more defensive character. America’s allies who learned of the promise welcomed this development because it diminished the possibility that Chiang Kai-shek might do something to provoke a major war. In effect, Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces were no longer a threat to the mainland. After the U.S. Senate ratified the defense treaty, Zhou Enlai again accused the United States of interfering in China’s internal affairs. He said, “To liberate Taiwan and liquidate the Chiang Kai-shek gang of traitors is entirely within the purview of China’s sovereignty and a purely internal affair of China.”

Crisis Subsides In April 1955, China reduced its shelling of the offshore islands, and a month later the attacks ceased. The crisis subsided for a number of reasons. The Seventh Fleet was a formidable military force that China could not hope to challenge. If a war did occur, the military balance would have greatly favored the United States. There was, moreover, no guarantee American naval and air power would refrain from attacking the mainland. The United States had contingency plans to do so. There was also the possibility that atomic weapons would be used if war did occur. On March 16, 1955, President Eisenhower, in response to a question at a news conference, said he saw no reason why atomic weapons “shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” China’s desire to improve relations with other Asian nations played a role in the easing of tensions with the Nationalists and the United States. Many

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A Nationalist Chinese soldier on Quemoy Island watches for a possible Communist attack in August 1958. (John Dominis/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Asian nations disapproved of China’s willingness to use military force to achieve foreign policy objectives. In April 1955, a conference of Afro-Asian nations convened in Bandung, Indonesia. Twenty-nine nations, including China, sent delegates. The purpose of the conference was to promote cooperation between and among the Afro-Asian states. The Beijing government thought improving relations with its neighbors was a major priority, and at Bandung, it had the cooperation of India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, one of Asia’s most prominent leaders. China accepted the principles in the final communiqué of the conference. The communiqué called for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. On April 23, 1955, Zhou Enlai issued a statement at Bandung in which he expressed a willingness to negotiate with the United States to reduce Sino-American tensions. Because of Zhou’s initiative, U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and China’s Wang Ping-nan met in Geneva on August 1,

1955. On the day the talks began, China announced it was releasing from prison eleven American fliers shot down in Korea in January 1953. In the spring of 1955, China’s foreign policy entered a new cycle, one that emphasized peaceful relations particularly with neighboring nations. Meeting with American officials in Geneva was a way of demonstrating China’s commitment to try to resolve problems by diplomacy rather than the use of force. The Formosa crisis lasted about eight months. At the end of that time, there was no substantial change in the status quo.

Brief Interlude Between 1954 and 1958, little progress was made in resolving underlying issues between the two Chinas. In May 1956, China expressed an interest in having Zhou Enlai meet with Secretary of State Dulles, but the United States rejected the offer. In November 1956, Zhou Enlai suggested that if Taiwan were

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reunified with China, Chiang Kai-shek could have an important government position on the mainland. Zhou’s suggestion did not receive much serious consideration. On a number of occasions, the Beijing government expressed a willingness to negotiate with the leaders on Taiwan, but the Nationalists refused all such offers. During the bilateral ambassadorial talks that took place in Geneva in 1956 and 1957, the PRC refused to accept a plan for renouncing the use of force in the Formosa Straits area. The American position was that agreements relating to other matters could not be resolved if China did not change its policies. The United States pointed out that a renunciation of force would not compromise China’s claim to Taiwan and the Pescadores. The claim could still be negotiated. Tensions increased in May 1957 when the United States decided to send a Matador missile unit to Formosa. Matador missiles could carry either conventional or atomic warheads and had a range of about 600 miles. They were capable of hitting targets in mainland China.

The 195 8 Crisis On July 7, 1958, the Taiwan crisis resurfaced. The Beijing government announced the beginning of a campaign to liberate the island. On August 11, the U.S. Department of State made public a memorandum sent to all American missions abroad detailing the reasons why the United States would not extend diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek was an important ally of the United States in the battle to contain Communism. American officials feared that recognition of the mainland government could cause the collapse of the Nationalist government. China was depicted as being part of the Soviet bloc dedicated to eliminating those values America cherished. The government in Beijing was accused of not caring about the welfare of the Chinese people and endangering international peace. The memorandum declared that “communism’s rule in China is not permanent and that one day it will pass.” Such statements further embittered Sino-American relations. On August 23, 1958, the Chinese Communists began shelling Quemoy and Little Quemoy islands and introduced measures to blockade both of them. The actions by the PRC again created a situation

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fraught with danger. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, in a letter to the acting chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, said he was disturbed by the buildup of Chinese Communist forces and the possibility they might attempt to seize Quemoy or Matsu. On August 27, Beijing Radio broadcast a message stating that the “Chinese People’s Liberation Army has determined to liberate Taiwan . . . as well as the offshore islands.” On August 31, an article in Pravda, the leading newspaper in the Soviet Union, said that the Soviet government would assist China. The article gave no indication what type of assistance would be offered. The article did say that an attack on China would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union. The problem in the Formosa Strait in 1958 was not much different from that in 1954, but because of changed circumstances the new crisis was potentially more dangerous. The military garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu were now much larger than in the past. Chiang Kai-shek had about 100,000 Nationalist troops on Quemoy. On August 8, 1958, President Eisenhower issued a statement at a news conference declaring that the offshore islands were now more important because their defense systems were integrated with those of Taiwan. American officials continued to regard the protection of Taiwan as a part of the overall policy of containment. American officials continued to insist that the conflict between Taiwan and the mainland was similar to that of other divided countries (then including Germany, Korea, and Vietnam). Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had asserted that the problem of a divided Germany must be solved through peaceful means. After three bitter years of war, the same approach was being applied to Korea. President Eisenhower wanted the “two-China” problem treated in the same fashion. America’s attitude regarding military raids against mainland China by the Nationalist forces had undergone a change since 1954. The United States came to view these raids as unnecessary and provocative. The raids invited retaliation. American officials wanted the Communist and Nationalist governments to renounce the use of force. This argument had been weakened with time as it became ever clearer that the Nationalist government in Taiwan would never regain control of the mainland. As Taiwan’s claims weakened, a renunciation of force would increasingly favor the Nationalists.

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The PRC may have renewed the crisis over Taiwan for several reasons. The balance of power in the Cold War seemed to have shifted in favor of the SinoSoviet bloc. In August 1957, the Soviet Union successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, and in October the Soviets launched Sputnik, the first Earth satellite. The success of Sputnik had a dramatic impact on American public opinion because it gave the impression that the Soviet Union might have passed the United States in some areas of science and technology. A consistent theme in Premier Khrushchev’s speeches at the time was the growing might of the Communist nations in economics and science as well as military capabilities. China’s leaders were also aware that some allies of the United States continued to oppose its policies. There was virtually no support for American efforts to defend the offshore islands. Within the British Commonwealth, there was much support for the PRC’s position that reclaiming Taiwan would reunify China. The Commonwealth nations saw the Nationalist government in Taiwan and its support by the United States as a remnant of colonialism and imperialism rather than a question of Communism and anticommunism. In addition, they considered it unlikely that the PRC would ever renounce the use of force as long as Chiang Kai-shek publicly vowed to return to the Chinese mainland. President Eisenhower publicly supported a sharp reduction in the number of Nationalist troops on Quemoy and Matsu, and he believed that such a reduction would moderate the policies of the Beijing government. But the president was reluctant to force his views on Chiang Kai-shek. The president found himself in an awkward situation. He opposed having a large number of troops on Quemoy and Matsu, but he was prepared to help defend the islands if that proved to be necessary. On September 4, 1958, Secretary of State Dulles issued two statements. He made it clear that the United States was determined to prevent the Chinese Communists from seizing the offshore islands. The United States had assembled a massive military force in the Formosa Strait, and this made America’s commitment to defend the offshore islands much more credible. He indicated that if China attempted to seize the islands, the result might be a general war. Dulles, however, also expressed a desire to try to resolve the crisis by diplomacy.

That same day, the danger of an armed conflict seemed to increase. The People’s Republic extended its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles. This put the offshore islands within its boundaries and threatened to keep them from being resupplied. If they could not be resupplied, they could not be defended. The United States rejected the twelve-mile claim. On September 6, 1958, China offered to resume negotiations with the United States in Poland at the ambassadorial level. American officials were quick to accept the offer, but they were not optimistic about the prospects for success. Between August 1955 and December 1957, American and Chinese negotiators met 73 times, but they had made little progress in resolving differences. On September 7, President Eisenhower received a letter from Premier Khrushchev, who expressed support for the PRC, expressed the hope that a peaceful solution could be found, and placed the blame for the crisis solely on the United States. He called upon the United States to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing and to remove American military forces from the Formosa Strait. President Eisenhower, in a reply to Khrushchev, urged him to encourage China’s leaders to renounce the use of force. China’s blockade of Quemoy was effective. On September 7, the United States responded by having its warships escort Nationalist supply ships to Quemoy. The American ships had entered China’s claimed twelve-mile limit but carefully remained outside the old three-mile limit of the mainland. Mainland forces did not offer resistance, and the islands were resupplied successfully. This made it clear that to win control of Quemoy, the PRC would have to invade the island and risk confronting the United States. On September 11, 1958, President Eisenhower addressed the American people to inform them about the nature and the seriousness of the crisis. He expressed a willingness to negotiate with the PRC but categorically rejected a policy of appeasement. He was firm in asserting that the United States would use military force if that proved to be necessary. The president’s address did not convince all his critics. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that risking war with China over the offshore islands was not worth “a single American life.” Public opinion polls suggested only weak support for the president’s

China: Quemoy and Matsu, 195 4–195 8

policies. For many, the offshore islands did not seem to justify the risk of war. India’s Prime Minister Nehru thought China should win control of the islands. The French and British governments agreed with Nehru. Despite international and domestic opposition, President Eisenhower remained firm. He would not abandon Chiang Kai-shek nor would he be made to vacate the offshore islands.

The Crisis Eases At a news conference on September 30, 1958, Secretary of State Dulles made a number of comments that were less supportive of Chiang Kai-shek than earlier U.S. pronouncements. Dulles said that there were too many troops on the offshore islands, that Chiang Kaishek’s return to the mainland was “highly hypothetical,” and that a renunciation of force should apply to both Chinese governments. He said the United States had no commitment to help Chiang reclaim the mainland. On October 5, 1958, the crisis appeared to ease. The Beijing government announced a one-week cease-fire. On October 12, it was extended for another two weeks. On October 23, Chiang Kai-shek publicly renounced the use of force as a means of returning to the mainland. Secretary of State Dulles thought the renunciation clearly put the ROC in the same category as other divided countries. Chiang Kai-shek also agreed to reduce the size of his forces on Quemoy and Matsu, but this action would not begin until mainland China ceased shelling the two islands. On October 25, China’s minister of defense Peng Dehuai announced there would be no bombing of the Quemoy area on even days of the month. Secretary of State Dulles accused China of engaging in “promiscuous killing,” but the announcement signaled the scaling down of the crisis. Several factors helped end the crisis. Dulles believed that the Beijing government realized it could not win control of Quemoy or Matsu without risking war with the United States. Besides America’s military might, both Quemoy and Matsu were heavily fortified, much more than in 1954. The ROC air force had prevented China from dominating the airspace between Quemoy and the mainland, and this proved to be a major factor in the defense of the islands.

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Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited Beijing in 1958. He refused unconditional support of Beijing’s objectives in the Formosa Strait. This disagreement was one factor leading to a momentous split between the two leading Communist powers, which became public in 1969. During his visit, Khrushchev warned Chinese leader Mao Zedong not to underestimate America’s power and emphasized his doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The communiqué issued at the end of Khrushchev’s visit emphasized the importance of “the common struggle for the peaceful settlement of international issues and the maintenance of world peace.” The statement extolled the virtues of peaceful coexistence, but we now know that Mao Zedong rejected the doctrine. The communiqué omitted any mention of the crisis in the Formosa Straits, a sure sign that the two Communist nations could not find any common ground on that issue. Throughout 1958, Khrushchev was maneuvering to convene a summit conference with President Eisenhower. The two leaders exchanged much correspondence regarding such things as nuclear testing, preventing a surprise military attack, events in Jordan and Lebanon, the Western presence in Berlin, and Soviet-American trade. Khrushchev did not want to have a summit meeting blocked because of problems in Asia. Mao Zedong must have realized that China could find itself without allies if there was a war with the United States. Although the 1958 crisis ended peacefully, the problems that brought it about remained unchanged and would surface again. The Beijing government continued to insist that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of China. The passing of time did not diminish Beijing government’s desire to regain control of the islands. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations; China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949.

Bibliography Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Alexander, Charles. Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952–1961. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Beal, John. John Foster Dulles. New York: Harper and Row, 1956.

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Broadwater, Jeff. Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Chiu, Hungdah, ed. China and the Taiwan Issue. New York: Praeger, 1979. Divine, Robert. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Dulles, Foster R. American Policy Towards Communist China, 1949–1969. New York: Crowell, 1972. Melanson, Richard. Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987. Oksenberg, Michel. China and America, Past and Future. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1977.

CHINA: Border War with India,1962 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: India 0 0

500 Miles 500 Kilometers

C H I N A

KASHMIR

AKSAI CHIN PLATEAU

PAKISTAN

250 250

TIBET AUTONOMOUS REGION

NE

McMahon Line

BHUTAN

PA

L ASSAM

INDIA

EAST PAKISTAN

BAY OF BENGAL

BURMA

The Sino-Indian War was a result of disputes concerning the unclear borders drawn by the British in the nineteenth century. The British had wanted to push the border of their Indian colonial territories as far northward as possible. This was made both easy and difficult by the nature of the lands to India’s north. Afghanistan, the Turkic lands, and Tibet were all inhabited by backward societies with weak central governments and little knowledge of modern cartography. Borders were flexible, often determined by who had the most armed men at a given moment. In two of these areas, British aggressiveness in advancing India’s northern border led to later controversy and conflict. In the northwest, the British conquest of the Sikh Kingdom in 1849 gave them control of Kashmir, which was directly adjacent to Tibet and Xinjiang. Both regions were theoretically under Chinese control, but the empire often found it difficult to exert much more than a nominal oversight, especially over Tibet, which was ruled by a theocracy headed by the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, the borders be-

tween Tibet and the minor kingdoms of northern India had never been clearly defined. Particularly problematic was the Buddhist kingdom of Ladakh. Although usually under Tibetan authority—and hence a part of the Chinese empire—Ladakh had been conquered by the Indian Mogul empire in the sixteenth century and by the Sikhs in the nineteenth century. So, when the British acquired the Sikh territories, they also acquired the controversial Ladakh Kingdom. Ladakh lies between the Himalayan and the Karakoram Mountains, and the average elevation of the area, below the mountain peaks, is about 13,500 feet above sea level. In this rugged icy terrain, determining exact borders was difficult, particularly as neither Britain nor China wished to give away any territorial advantage. In particular, the British claimed Aksai Chin (the name means “desert of the white stones”), a barren plateau lying some 17,000 feet above sea level, while the Chinese never agreed to the claim. This meant that when India became independent in 1947, it inherited a border that was still vague and unresolved. (A 1948 border war between India and Pakistan left Pakistan with a northern slice of Kashmir and therefore a section of the disputed border.) In the northeast, the British conquest of Assam in 1826 gave them a problematic border, this one on Tibet’s southeastern frontier. In between Tibet and Assam was a mountainous region, now called Arunachal Pradesh, filled with thickly forested valleys and bordered at its north by the eastern reaches of the Himalayan Mountains. Again, Arunachal Pradesh had traditionally been under Tibetan, and thus Chinese, control, but for much of its history the region was a power vacuum, occupied by tribal peoples who acknowledged no overlord. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the British steadily moved their border

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Asia, East and Southeast

KEY DATES 1914

British officer Henry McMahon establishes a frontier line—named after him—dividing British India from China; the line is never accepted by the Chinese government.

1947

India wins independence from Britain; Pakistan separates from India.

1949

Chinese Communists seize control of the mainland and form the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

1957–1959

An anti-Chinese rebellion in Tibet raises tensions along the border, especially after Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, flees into exile in India.

1961

Indian troops establish small outposts in the disputed Aksai Chin region.

1962

Indian troops push the Chinese back from the McMahon Line in October; Chinese troops counterattack; by late November, the Chinese have taken the entire Aksan Chin region and pushed south over the McMahon Line; on November 21, China announces a cease-fire and that its troops would move back north over the McMahon Line but continue to hold Aksai Chin.

northward, until they hit the vaguely defined border of the Qing (Manchu) Empire. In a 1914 conference organized by a British officer, Henry McMahon, Britain offered China a map that divided Tibet from Assam at the crest of the Himalayan Mountains. This McMahon Line gave the British control over a large piece of territory to the east of Bhutan which had been traditionally under Tibetan rule—with the help of McMahon’s pen, the border had moved approximately sixty miles to the north. The Chinese refused to sign the agreement, but their government, in the midst of a revolution, was too weak to contest its practical application. Here again, therefore, India inherited a border that was not accepted by China.

India and China When India achieved its independence from Britain in 1947, it was determined to use the most beneficial interpretation of British actions to calculate its northern border. National pride pushed India’s first president, Jawaharlal Nehru, to reassert India’s claims over

both the Aksai Chin plateau and the northern reaches of Assam up to the McMahon Line. When questioned on this issue, Nehru responded by saying, “Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary and that is our boundary. . . . We will not allow anybody to come across that boundary.” China, however, was no longer the helpless giant that it had been under the Qing or during the long period of turmoil following the 1911 revolution. The victory of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 meant that henceforth China would be ruled by a united and powerful government, well able to defend its interests. At first, relations between India and China remained good. Although China invaded Tibet in 1950 and forced that hitherto semi-independent state to acknowledge China’s complete authority, it did nothing to dispute Tibet’s southern and western borders. In 1954, India and China signed a trade agreement that promised “peaceful coexistence,” and the two met on good terms at the 1955 Bandung Conference, which brought together nations from Asia and Africa

China: Border War with India, 19 62

to discuss areas of mutual interest. At that point, Nehru believed that China and India could be allies in the face of imperialist threats from the wealthy industrialized states. Tensions increased in the late 1950s, however. India had moved to complete her occupation of the northern Assam region by building a number of border posts, while in the west, China had built a road through the Aksai Chin plateau. (India, although it claimed the Aksai Chin, had no outposts there and only found out about the road by seeing a map published in a Chinese magazine.) Thus, of the two regions claimed by India, China occupied the western area and India the eastern. When India objected to Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin, China responded by denying India’s claims over the area while pointing out that the McMahon Line was of equally questionable legality, as China had never agreed to any of the border adjustments decreed by the British. The situation between the two nations was complicated by the 1957–1959 uprising by Tibetans against Chinese rule. Refugees poured across the Indian border, and the Indian public was outraged. Any compromise with China on the border issue became impossible. Similarly, China was offended that India had given political asylum to the Dalai Lama when he fled across the border in March 1959. In late 1959, there were shots fired between border patrols operating along both the ill-defined McMahon Line and in the Aksai Chin.

War In spite of the border skirmishes, China repeatedly expressed its willingness to accept the de facto division of the border, with India controlling the eastern disputed territories and China the western. However, Nehru, with Indian public opinion aroused, could not do this. (Nehru had also received signals from the Soviet Union, with whom he was trying to maintain good relations, that it would not take China’s side on the border dispute.) India and China quickly moved from being friendly powers to suspicious neighbors. To back up India’s claims, Nehru authorized Indian patrols to move deep into the disputed territories and establish bases behind the Chinese border posts—he hoped that this would cut off Chinese supply lines and force them to withdraw. By late 1961, Indian troops, braving terrible Himalayan weather, had established small outposts deep within the Aksai

573

Chin. The Chinese, instead of withdrawing, copied the Indian tactics and moved to surround the Indian posts in an attempt to force them to retreat. In the east, the Indians also pushed their patrols forward, even establishing some border posts that went beyond the McMahon Line. In October 1962, Indian officers, under orders to push the Chinese entirely beyond the McMahon Line, advanced deep into the Himalayas. On October 10, the Chinese reacted by attacking the Indian troops at both the McMahon Line and in the Aksai Chin. In the fighting, all the advantages were on the side of the Chinese. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was a professional and experienced fighting force that had fought against the Japanese during World War II and the Americans during the Korean War. The Indian army had little fighting experience, and most of its units were understrength and missing much of their heavy equipment. The Chinese also had a logistical advantage: In both the eastern and western sectors, they were operating from the Tibetan plateau, which provided comparatively easy access to the disputed border areas, while the Indians were forced to bring troops and supplies up the bad roads and almost impossible trails that characterized the southern face of the Himalayan Mountains—terrain and gravity were on the side of the Chinese. Finally, since the Chinese had stationed troops in Tibet for more than ten years, they were well acclimated to the heights. The Indians, however, were moving up from the valleys below, and many of their soldiers and officers were incapacitated by altitude sickness. On both fronts, the PLA advanced against poorly organized Indian resistance. When pockets of Indian troops held firm, overwhelming Chinese artillery fire was brought to bear, backed up by human wave assaults. By November 20, China had taken the entire Aksai Chin and almost the whole of the disputed territory south of the McMahon Line. On November 21, 1962, Zhou Enlai announced a cease-fire and declared that Chinese troops would withdraw behind the de facto borders that had existed as of November 1959. In other words, China would remain in control of the Aksai Chin, while allowing India to reoccupy the area to the south of the McMahon Line.

Analysis The Sino-Indian War had been small and, in many ways, pointless. In a month of fighting, India had lost

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1,300 men, with another 5,500 wounded or captured. China’s losses were unreported, but were probably significantly less. When the fighting was over, China controlled both disputed territories but withdrew its forces to the preconflict status quo border. All that had been proved was that India’s army was completely unequal to the task of facing a war with a modern opponent. China’s decision not to take advantage of the strong military position achieved by the PLA was probably motivated by its desire to end the conflict without leaving a festering sore of resentment between India and China. From the beginning, China (which almost certainly had the stronger legal claim to both areas) had attempted to negotiate a compromise peace. It was Nehru, under the whip of Indian public opinion roused by nationalistic chestthumping, who escalated the border dispute into an international crisis and military confrontation. Once China had proved that the preponderance of power lay on its side of the border, it was willing to with-

draw its forces back across the McMahon Line—and that line remained the unofficial border between the two nations. Although, in the end, the Sino-Indian War did nothing to alter the de facto border between China and India, the far-from-impressive performance of India’s army alerted the world to India’s vulnerability. In particular, it is probable that the Chinese victory in 1962 helped to convince Pakistan to move against India in 1965. Carl Skutsch See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949; China: Invasion of Tibet, 1950–1959; India: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 1947; India: War with Pakistan, 1965.

Bibliography Hoffmann, Steven A. India and the China Crisis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Maxwell, Neville. India’s China War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970.

CHINA: Border Clash with the Soviet Union,1969 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Soviet Union 0 0

500 500

1000 Miles

1000 Kilometers

Amur

er Riv

E T V I O S

O N U N I

MONGOLIA

Ussuri River Vladivostock

XINJIANG

CHINA

JAPAN N. KOREA S. KOREA

Lost to Russia in Treaty of Aigun, 1858 Lost to Russia in Treaty of Peking, 1860

One of the great mistakes made by the West during the Cold War was not to recognize the growing rift between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Some China watchers even thought that the growing animosity between the two Communist states was a ploy designed to deceive the West. Only in 1969, when the hostility between the two countries resulted in a series of border skirmishes, did the last doubters accept that the split between the Soviets and the Chinese was real.

Historical Background The genesis of the 1969 border war goes back even before the open break of the late 1950s. As early as the Chinese Civil War, which brought Mao Zedong and the Communist Party to power in China, the Soviet Union and its Chinese protégé had serious differences. In the early days of the Chinese Communist Party’s struggle to gain support, accepted Soviet doctrine followed the traditional Marxist belief that a Communist revolution had to be grounded in the support of the urban proletariat. Mao Zedong, however, faced with China’s small urban working class and a huge number of poor farmers, decided to rein-

terpret Marx and focus his efforts on raising the revolutionary consciousness of the peasants. For years the Soviet Union doubted the efficacy of this strategy and, therefore, of the Chinese Communists’ chances of success. Indeed, in 1945, the Soviets signed a treaty of friendship with Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong’s Nationalist enemy, on the assumption that he was likely to be victorious over Mao Zedong. For the same reason, Stalin advised Mao to cooperate with the Nationalists. During the Chinese Civil War, Stalin had also supported various rivals to Mao Zedong’s primacy within the Chinese Communist Party, successfully maneuvering to keep Mao out of the Central Committee until the Long March. Stalin and Mao Zedong also had a poor personal rapport. As late as 1945, Stalin hoped that Moscow-trained Communists, such as Li Lisan and Wang Ming, might replace Mao Zedong. Stalin called Mao a peschany marksist (“margarine Marxist”—not a real Marxist). The first treaty signed between the Communist allies reflected the ambivalence between the two parties and the two men. Signed February 14, 1950, the pact provided China with a modest amount of aid and offered the assistance of Soviet technical advisers to help build a Chinese industrial sector but at the cost of signing away China’s rights over Outer Mongolia and giving the Soviet Union a strong financial stake in China’s new industrial enterprises. It was clearly a treaty between a patron and client, not between two equals.

After Stalin—Friction Mao Zedong and the other Chinese Communist leaders did not enjoy the snubs they received from Stalin, but they were willing to take them, both because

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Asia, East and Southeast

KEY DATES 1858–1860

Treaties between the Russian and Chinese empires cede large amounts of territory to Moscow, angering Chinese officials.

1949

With help from the Soviet Union, Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong seize power in mainland China and form the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

1958–1960

Nikita Khrushchev alienates Chinese leaders by refusing to back them in a dispute with Taiwan and reneging on a promise to help China develop its own nuclear weapons.

1964

Relations between the Soviet Union and China briefly warm up again following Khrushchev’s ouster from power by hard-liners in Moscow; both governments, however, begin moving troops into the border region.

1966

China takes a radical turn with the Cultural Revolution; Chinese leaders once again denounce the Soviet Union as deviating from true Communist principles.

1968

The first skirmishes on the border break out between Chinese and Soviet troops.

1969

Larger skirmishes over islands in the Ussuri River, on the two nations’ border, break out in March; fighting intensifies through August; in September, foreign ministers from the two nations meet to defuse the crisis.

they needed Soviet aid and because they felt that Stalin, as the Communist world’s elder statesman, deserved a large measure of respect. With Stalin’s death in 1953, however, the Chinese felt the situation had changed. Now Mao Zedong was the elder statesman of the Communist world, and the Chinese expected to be treated with greater consideration. Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, did nothing to fulfill these expectations. Khrushchev treated Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai with arrogant condescension, ignoring their requests for border readjustments and denying China an equal place within the leadership of the Communist world. Khrushchev’s 1956 attack on Stalin’s legacy at the twentieth Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union shook Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders. As much as his arrogance had been resented, Stalin was seen as second only to Lenin in his importance in advancing Communism in the twentieth century. An

attack on Stalin, with whom Mao Zedong had had a personal relationship (however rocky), could also be seen as an indirect attack on Mao himself. The Chinese also were disturbed by Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate with Yugoslavia’s Marshal Tito, a revisionist traitor in their eyes. For a few years after Stalin’s death, China and the Soviet Union continued the appearance of being good allies—China still had great need of Soviet technical assistance. After 1958, however, relations steadily deteriorated. Khrushchev was not as hostile to the West as Mao Zedong, arguing for a policy of “peaceful coexistence.” This difference of attitude led the Soviets to provide only tepid support for China’s more aggressive anti-Western stance. In 1958, when China attempted to seize Quemoy and Matsu islands from the Nationalist government of Taiwan, the Soviets offered no support. The United States, however, sent an American fleet to protect

China: Border Clash with the Soviet Union, 19 6 9

Taiwan. In 1959, Khrushchev reneged on his promise to help China build its own nuclear bombs, withdrawing the Soviet advisers who had been assisting China in its nuclear program. That same year, Khrushchev also failed to back China in a border confrontation with India and even went so far as to offer India loans.

Open Break In 1960, angered by these Soviet betrayals, China attacked Khrushchev, accusing him of “emasculating, betraying, and revising” Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev responded by saying that Mao was “like Stalin . . . oblivious of any interests but his own . . . detached from the realities of the modern world.” In September, the Soviets withdrew all their advisers from China. The rift between the two was temporarily patched over in a November 1960 conference of Communist parties, but the animosity remained very near the surface. In 1964, as tensions grew, Khrushchev even considered using nuclear weapons to eliminate China’s own nuclear program. When rumors of this reached Mao Zedong, the latter threatened to send troops into Outer Mongolia. This march toward war was ended when Khrushchev was removed from power by his colleagues in the Politburo, led by Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. China tested its first atomic bomb on October 16, 1964. Khrushchev’s 1964 ouster improved relations for a short time, but by 1966, with the Chinese Communist Party going through its radical Cultural Revolution, attacks on the Soviet Union continued. In 1966, Mao Zedong stated that the major threats to Chinese Communism were “American imperialism” and “Russian revisionism.”

Territorial Dispute Adding to the resentment caused by ideological disputes was China’s festering bitterness concerning a long history of what the Chinese considered unjust Russian-Chinese border adjustments. From the first seventeenth-century encounters between Czarist and Qing troops, China had lost territory to the more technologically advanced newcomers from the west. Particularly galling were the 1858 Treaty of Aigun, which gave Russia a huge slice of territory along the northern bank of the Amur River, and the 1860

577

Treaty of Peking, which added another large province along the Sea of Japan stretching down to the newly established Russian outpost of Vladivostok. In 1912, Russia encouraged Outer Mongolia to break away and declare its independence. China regained the province in 1919 but was pushed out again, this time by Soviet troops, in 1921. In 1924, Mongolia declared itself to be the Mongolian People’s Republic and became a protected client of the Soviet Union. Communist China refused to accept the treaties that had been forced upon the country when it was weak and vulnerable. In 1963, China—already angered by Soviet actions in the international arena— listed the territories that had been unjustly taken from it, including the Amur and Vladivostok territories, as well as a large part of Central Asia, and demanded that the Soviets acknowledge the illegal nature of the current border. Khrushchev denied that there was any problem with the border between the two nations. Border negotiations begun in 1964 collapsed the same year because of mutual intransigence.

Border Clashes, War Fears From 1964 to 1969, both the Soviets and the Chinese moved additional forces into the disputed border regions. In 1966, the Soviets also moved troops into Mongolia (with the permission of the Mongolian government) to counter any attempt at annexation by the Chinese. In 1967, China tested its first hydrogen bomb, raising regional tensions even further. In 1968, the Soviet Union’s crushing of the Czechoslovakian uprising led to the declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated that the Soviet Union would intervene to correct any problems in Communist states that had strayed from true MarxistLeninist dogma. Since the Soviets had consistently criticized the Chinese leadership’s understanding of Marxism, Soviet troop movements raised fears of a possible Soviet invasion in Beijing. In this heightened atmosphere of tension, China protested what it claimed were thousands of Soviet violations of its borders. In 1968, Soviet and Chinese patrols engaged in a series of border clashes where shots were fired. In early 1969, China increased the number and size of its border patrols. On March 2, 1969, the two armies had the largest skirmish to date. On a tiny island in the middle of the Ussuri River (not far from Vladivostok), Soviet and

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Asia, East and Southeast

Chinese troops (backs to camera) confront a band of Soviet soldiers on the disputed Ussuri River island of Chen Pao— which the Soviets called Damansky—in February 1969. The two sides opened fire on each other the following month. (AFP/Getty Images)

Chinese patrols met and exchanged shots. With the arrival of a second, back-up Chinese patrol, the Chinese dispersed the Soviet unit, which in turn was rescued by the arrival of more Soviet soldiers. Casualties were unclear, but dozens were probably killed. Each side blamed the other for the clash while claiming victory for its own troops. A second clash occurred on March 15, when Soviet troops equipped with tanks attacked a Chinese Ussuri River patrol with overwhelming force. The Chinese losses from the nine-hour battle numbered in the hundreds. Further clashes occurred in August along the far eastern border where the Soviets staged a large-scale cross-border raid into Xinjiang. Again, casualties probably numbered in the hundreds. After the Xinjiang clashes, the Soviets seemed to be seriously considering the possibility of a nuclear first-strike against China. Public hints were made by Soviet leaders, and the United States was consulted to

determine its possible reaction to such an attack. President Richard Nixon issued a note to the Soviets condemning any such action as a threat to world peace. Whether the Soviets had been serious, or were merely attempting to intimidate China, no further suggestion of a nuclear attack was made.

After the Fighting After the August 1969 fighting, the tension along the Sino-Soviet border decreased. In a September 1969 meeting, chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin and Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai met and agreed both to maintain the status quo along the border and to schedule negotiations for their possible readjustment. These negotiations, which opened in October 1969, did nothing to solve the problem—neither side was willing to alter its stance— but did serve to lessen the probability of open conflict.

China: Border Clash with the Soviet Union, 19 6 9

The possibility, however, did remain. After 1969, both sides continued to increase their border troops until, by 1973, they both had more than one million men facing one another along what had been in 1960 a largely demilitarized border. The Soviets kept intermediate-range nuclear weapons near the SinoSoviet border, while the Chinese worked to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could reach Moscow and Leningrad. The border clashes had ended and had been replaced by a second cold war, this one between the world’s two largest Communist states. The main beneficiary of this conflict was the United States. China’s Communist leadership, in need of support in the face of the more powerful Soviet Union, ended their traditional hostility to America. An April 1971 invitation to an American ping-pong team currently touring Japan to come to China on a good-will visit opened the door to high-level talks between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. The result was the visit of U.S. president Richard Nixon to China in February 1972. The belated U.S. recognition of the SinoSoviet split gave it the ability to play one Communist state against the other. In international maneuver-

579

ings, it no longer had to fear a united Communist front. The main loser of the Sino-Soviet conflict was, strangely enough, Nationalist Taiwan. In October 1971, Mainland China replaced Taiwan in the United Nations (each still claimed to be the only legitimate government of all China). In subsequent years, the rest of the world, including the United States, gradually transferred their embassies from Taipei to Beijing. Without U.S. support, few countries were willing to offend China by recognizing Taiwan. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes.

Bibliography An, Tai Sung. The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. London: Westminster Press, 1973. Borisov, Oleg Borisovich. Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945–1970. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Low, Alfred. The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics. Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976.

CHINA: War with Vietnam,1979 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Vietnam 0 0

C H I N A

100 Miles

50

50 100 Kilometers

Ha Giang Lao Cai

Cao Bang

Cities taken by the Chinese

Lang Son Hanoi

Me k o n

GULF OF TONKIN

g

HAINAN

River

LAOS

VIETNAM T H AC IH LI NA AN D Canton

S

O

LA

THAILAND CAMBODIA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

r Rive

HONG KONG

o ng Mek

BURMA

Hanoi

SOUTH CHINA SEA

Shanghai

CAMBODIA

VIETNAM

PHILIPPINES

Ho Chi Minh City

Saigon

Vietnam has spent much of its history fighting off the domination of China, and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 was merely the latest chapter in this long struggle. The northern half of Vietnam was first conquered by the Chinese Han Empire in 111 b.c.e. For the next thousand years Vietnam was a Chinese province. In 939 c.e., it achieved its independence and remained independent (except for a brief occupation by the Ming Empire) until the French conquest of the nineteenth century. Starting in 1945, the Vietnamese Communist Party led a war of independence against first the French and then, after the French withdrawal in 1954, against the American-backed government of South Vietnam. During this war, North (Commu-

nist) Vietnam received military aid from both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. When peace talks came in 1972, however, it became clear to North Vietnam that China was more interested in advancing its own interests than those of the Vietnamese Communists. In 1969, border skirmishes between the Chinese and Soviet armies led to an open diplomatic break between the two Communist giants. After the SinoSoviet break, China and the Soviet Union, rather than being allies, became competitors for power and influence. As part of their war for influence, both countries tried to improve relations with the United States. For North Vietnam, this meant that both its patrons put increasing pressure on it to come to terms with the Americans. There was also the suspicion in Hanoi that the Chinese were not particularly eager to see a united Vietnam since a strong Vietnam might become a threat to Chinese influence in the region. So, when the Vietnamese Communists finally succeeded in unifying North and South Vietnam in 1975, they already felt alienated from China. This brought Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union, which, despite its diplomatic maneuvers, had continued to provide North Vietnam with substantial military support. The closer Soviet-Vietnamese ties further disturbed China, which was facing more than 1 million Soviet troops on its northern borders and had no desire to face any threat from the south.

Cambodia Relations between Vietnam and China were complicated by events in Cambodia. A Communist guerrilla movement called the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer) had fought a war against Cambodia’s governments since 1967, finally achieving victory in 1975.

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China: War with Vietnam, 1979

581

KEY DATES 1954

The French negotiate an end to the first Indo-China war, establishing a Communist regime in the northern half of Vietnam.

1964–1975 Chinese Communists aid North Vietnam in its struggle against the United States and South Vietnam. 1975

The second Indochina War ends as Communist North Vietnam takes control of South Vietnam; Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge Communists seize control of Cambodia.

1975–1979

In an effort to remake Cambodian society, the Khmer Rouge government engages in genocide, killing up to 2 million people.

1979

In response to border clashes with Cambodian forces and to put an end to the genocide, Vietnamese forces invade Cambodia in January; the Chinese government sees the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as an effort to diminish Chinese influence in the region; Chinese forces move across the Vietnamese border, seizing several provincial capitals; in March, Chinese troops withdraw from Vietnam.

Although Vietnam’s Communists had provided support for the Khmer Rouge during their struggle, the leadership of the Khmer Rouge, most especially Pol Pot, had long been both resentful and suspicious of Vietnam’s intentions. After 1975, Democratic Kampuchea—the Khmer Rouge’s newly minted name for Cambodia—immediately moved to improve relations with China in order to counterbalance Vietnam’s influence—much as Vietnam had moved closer to the Soviet Union to balance China’s power in the region. However, the paranoia that inspired Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge went far beyond geopolitical maneuverings. The Khmer Rouge embarked on a policy of de-urbanization, which forced millions of Cambodians to leave the cities to struggle as best they could in the countryside. This policy, combined with widespread killing of perceived enemies, left more than 1 million Cambodians dead. In its foreign policy, Cambodia was equally erratic, staging cross-border raids into Vietnam in 1975, 1976, and 1977. In late 1977, Vietnam reacted by staging a limited incursion into Cambodia’s border regions. In 1978, with the border incidents continuing, Vietnam led a full-scale invasion, which, in January

1979, forced Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge to flee to the hills. Vietnam then installed a Pol Pot opponent, Heng Samrin, as head of a pro-Vietnamese Cambodian government. Heng Samrin’s government was kept in power by the occupying Vietnamese army.

The Chinese Invade Whatever the excesses of the Pol Pot government, China considered Vietnam’s invasion and overthrow of the Khmer Rouge unacceptable. Democratic Kampuchea had been a Chinese client, and China viewed the invasion as an attempt to curtail its influence in Indochina. Combined with Vietnam’s moves to tighten ties with the Soviet Union—a military alliance had been concluded in 1978—the invasion seemed to represent a threat to China’s security. On February 17, 1979, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops moved across Vietnam’s northern border in five major columns. The attacking army contained 250,000 soldiers, backed by tanks, planes, and artillery (more than half of the army never actually crossed into Vietnam, operating only in a supporting role). After nine days the Chinese had advanced twenty-five miles into Vietnam and captured four

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provincial capitals, although at a great cost in troops and materiel. The Chinese seemed to have planned a fast assault to teach Vietnam a lesson and to convince it to withdraw from Cambodia (public statements were made promising a quick Chinese withdrawal, probably to preclude any armed Soviet response). As the fighting bogged down in Vietnam’s northern hills, however, China’s effort appeared less than successful. Vietnam had been surprised by the attack, having only border guards and militia in the area. Even so, its troops were able to slow the attack to almost a standstill. As the PLA advanced, they were also handicapped by their weak logistical support system— supplies were brought forward by trucks, donkeys, and human porters. After a week more of fighting, much of it house to house, the Chinese were finally able to capture a fifth provincial capital, Lang Son (85 miles from Hanoi). At that point, China declared that it had attained its goals of punishing what it called the “ceaseless armed provocations and incursions of the Vietnamese aggressors against China.” On March 5, Chinese troops began their withdrawal from North Vietnam, and by March 18, all their troops had departed. Although at least 20,000 soldiers on each side had been killed in less than three weeks of fighting, it was unclear who “won” the short Sino-Vietnamese War. China succeeded in demonstrating that continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia might have damaging consequences, but the punitive lesson cost China the lives of thousands of men, as well as 400

tanks and armored vehicles. The total financial cost to China was an estimated $1.36 billion. The war was a clear demonstration of China’s military weakness, particularly its lack of modern armored vehicles. Two hundred fifty thousand front-line PLA soldiers, attacking with surprise, had been greatly pressed to push aside 150,000 Vietnamese militiamen, supported by only a few regular regiments. If China had engaged large numbers of Vietnamese regulars— which were gathering in the plains just to the south of the invasion area—they probably would have been even more badly bloodied. While China, with a population more than ten times larger than that of Vietnam, was clearly capable of badly, perhaps fatally, damaging Vietnam, the Sino-Vietnamese War showed that to be successful a Chinese invasion would require the commitment of a much larger portion of the Chinese army. Any such commitment would drain resources from other regions in China, weakening China’s ability to counter threats from the Soviet Union or Taiwan. The Chinese had underestimated Vietnam’s ability to resist a punitive invasion. Carl Skutsch See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Cambodia: Vietnamese Invasion, 1978–1979.

Bibliography Chang, Pao-Min. The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1986. Hood, Steven J. Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the ChinaVietnam War. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

CHINA: Tiananmen Violence,1989 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Uprisings fruits, vegetables, and sugar cane. In the central river valleys—the Yangtze and the Yellow—most farmers grow two crops of wheat and rice, and on the dry, cold northern plains one crop of wheat. Ever since the European encounter by the Venetian Marco Polo in the thirteenth century, China has fascinated the West, at various times being an object of admiration and respect, fear and loathing, colonialist ambition and missionary fervor, and, especially since the success of its Communist revolution in 1949, persistent incomprehension and hostility on the part of foreigners, East and West.

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Historical Background The People’s Republic of China, approximately the size of the United States, has a land area of 3,950,500 square miles (not counting Taiwan) and the world’s largest population, slightly over 1.25 billion people. About 92 percent of the population consists of Han Chinese who live chiefly in the eastern and northeastern parts of the country. China has some of the world’s largest cities. Over 13.5 million people live in the metropolitan area of the capital, Beijing. Shanghai, the country’s financial and industrial center, has 11 million. Much of China’s interior and far western territories consist of desert. The climate ranges from continental (brief, hot summers and long, very cold winters) in the northern regions to subtropical in the southeast. The official language is putonghua (Mandarin Chinese). Although a wide variety of local and regional dialects are used, the ideographic written system allows universal comprehension. Despite its immense cities and rapid industrialization, China remains a basically agrarian society, with almost 70 percent of the population residing in rural areas. Since only 7 percent of China’s vast territory is arable, farming is intensive. Per acre production is the highest in the world. In the subtropical southeast, peasants produce two crops of rice and one of spring wheat each year, in addition to a variety of

The history of the Han Chinese goes back 5,000 years and takes on the characteristics that generally endure today with the founding of the Qin (pronounced “Chin”) Dynasty in 221 b.c.e. Strong, highly centralized governments have repeatedly been established and then proceed through a “dynastic cycle” of expansion, flourish, decay, and overthrow, either by insurrection or foreign invasion. In between dynasties have been periods of disunity and disorder, with warlords holding regional power. The last imperial dynasty, the Qing (1644–1912), was Manchurian in origin and fell in the Nationalist revolution of Sun Yat-sen, largely because of its inability to defend China against the incursions of Western powers— principally Great Britain, which, through the Opium Wars of the 1840s, not only opened the country to foreign trade but began the process of territorial dismantling by taking full control of Hong Kong. The Nationalist government that took power in the 1920s was never able to gain firm control over the country. Warlords abounded, and the foreign presence remained, along with foreigner privileges. Japanese incursions in Manchuria expanded into a full-scale invasion in the 1930s, and the Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT) government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, had to compete with a persistent Communist movement

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KEY DATES 1949

Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong take power, forming the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

1966–1970

The Cultural Revolution breaks out, as radicals purge moderates from positions of power within Chinese society and government.

1976

Mao Zedong dies.

1977

Supporters of Deng Xiaoping take control of the Chinese Communist Party, emphasizing economic development over ideological purity.

1979–1989

The Chinese government allows private businesses to flourish, but rural areas suffer and millions of peasants flock to cities; the population of university students grows.

1989

Communist Party general secretary Hu Yaobang, a supporter of individual freedoms, dies in April; students at Beijing University organize memorials to Hu; on April 17, 4,000 students march to Tiananmen Square demanding that the National People’s Congress make democratic reforms; the government announces that the square will be closed on April 22, but 200,000 people crowd into the square the night before; students and democratic reformers lead a march of tens of thousands through Beijing on May 4; on May 16, Soviet reform leader Mikhail Gorbachev visits Beijing, inspiring protesters; by late May, it becomes apparent that most of the protesters in Tiananmen Square are from outside Beijing and that most of the students have left the square; up to several thousand protesters are killed on June 4 as army troops use live ammunition to clear the square.

directed by the peasant leader, Mao Zedong. During World War II, the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cooperated to a degree against the Japanese, but after the Japanese defeat, they engaged in a great civil war ending with the CCP triumph in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist followers fled to the island of Taiwan. The creation of the People’s Republic of China as a Communist state was one of the major events of the Cold War. For at least twenty years the Western powers, particularly the United States, persisted in believing that Mao was controlled by the Soviet Union (USSR), not realizing that Mao’s China was a highly nationalistic state, which not only opposed the USSR’s territorial ambitions in Asia but, ideologi-

cally, was the Kremlin’s most bitter rival for influence in the third world. Internally, the CCP established the strongest government in the last few hundred years of Chinese history, despite fierce periodic internal struggles among the party leadership over the policy direction of the country. Mao was clearly the leading figure until his death in 1976, and although his major domestic policy initiatives—the Great Leap Forward of the 1950s (an attempt at accelerated industrialization using indigenous resources) and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s (mobilization of the masses, particularly youth, against emergence of a new privileged class in the party and state bureaucracies)—were at best qualified successes, they did at least partially

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achieve Mao’s goal of keeping China a dynamic and revolutionary society with the populace encouraged to believe that their participation and initiative were meaningful.

Post-Mao Years The Cultural Revolution, especially the unleashing of the youthful Red Guards against entrenched power centers in the CCP itself, naturally produced a counterreaction. In 1970, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) quietly intervened to restore order, and two of Mao’s top lieutenants—Liu Shaoqi and the veteran leader, Deng Xiaoping, general secretary of the CCP—were dismissed from party leadership. However, Chairman Mao and the universally respected foreign secretary and premier, Zhou Enlai, maintained the top posts and were apparently able to withstand a military coup attempt led by the defense minister, Lin Biao, who fled into exile. In 1975, Mao restored Deng, making him vice premier and chief of the general staff. This was Mao’s last gasp. Both he and Zhou died the following year. Mao’s widow, Jiang Qing, and three radical members of the politburo—the Gang of Four—tried to take control, using the power of Mao’s name and appealing to the Red Guard tradition, even while they seemingly represented the abuse of privilege that the Cultural Revolution opposed. Whether Jiang Qing’s effort represented an attempt, in the Chinese tradition, to form a dynasty or not, this attempt to bypass the CCP’s collective decision-making system was strongly opposed. She and her followers were ousted and imprisoned. Hua Guofeng, who succeeded Mao as party chairman and commander in chief of the PLA, called the eleventh congress of the CCP in August 1977. The congress was dominated by supporters of Deng, who insisted that questions of ideology—except for agreement on the necessity of firm CCP control of the political system—be put aside for pragmatic concentration on economic development. Deng became famous for saying that it did not matter whether a cat was black or white so long as it caught mice and that “to become rich is glorious.” In 1981, Hua was replaced as chairman by Hu Yaobang, who, when the post of chairman was abolished in the next year, became general secretary of the party. Hu, one of Deng’s men, was an ardent supporter of economic modernization but differed from his elderly mentor in being more supportive of relaxing social and intellectual party controls.

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This stance made him a hero to China’s growing population of intellectuals and professionals. At the same time, his period as general secretary coincided with massive crackdowns on crime and official corruption, resulting in thousands of executions, a phenomenon that caused expressions of concern from international human rights organizations and made Hu more than a few enemies within the party. Obvious contradictions were introduced in China’s three major policies of the early and mid-1980s: economic modernization with significant opportunities for an increased degree of private entrepreneurship, and even encouragement of self-enrichment as a positive good; a tolerance for visibly increased free expression and individual choice of lifestyle; and a vigorous exercise of police power against corruption (at a time when economic expansion and the inflow of foreign capital offered unparalleled temptations) and common crime (at a time when rationalization of agricultural practice and the breaking up of the rural communes sent millions of displaced farm workers to face unemployment in the cities). Also, Deng and other older CCP leaders were not entirely comfortable with the Western-style freedoms that Hu tolerated. They spoke out against “spiritual pollution” and called for stricter censorship. These contradictions were politically expressed in Hu’s dismissal in April 1987. He was charged with embracing “mistaken issues of political principles.” His replacement, Zhao Ziyang, represented those who thought “bourgeois liberalization” had gone too far. Deng himself retired from the CCP central committee in October. This apparently signaled some further loss of influence for the reformers and modernizers, but the new politburo appointed the next month was dominated by younger party officials identified with Deng’s policies. Zhao Ziyang was replaced by Li Peng. It was also clear that the PLA was quietly exerting more political influence. The army had no expressed ideological position, and it is probable that it was primarily concerned with protecting its institutional interests during the period of economic modernization. Among these concerns was the restructuring of the traditional PLA infantry force into a modern, high-technology defense force.

Student Movement Most discussions of the events of 1989 that led up to the killings in Tiananmen Square (the huge plaza in

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front of the government buildings in Beijing) start with the death on April 15 of Hu Yaobang, who as party general secretary had symbolized the policy of greater individual freedom. Although Hu had been succeeded by another champion (in the CCP context) of human rights and political freedoms, Zhao Ziyang, Hu’s death was the occasion for students at the campus of Beijing University to hold meetings mourning his death and for the posting of declarations calling for democracy and freedom. Incidentally, it is clear from the firsthand accounts of student participants that neither university nor other authorities tried in any way to interfere with these meetings and activities. On April 17, about 4,000 students marched to Tiananmen Square, demanding that the National People’s Congress clear Hu posthumously of the charges made at the time of his dismissal and end press censorship. For the next week, there were repeated student demonstrations in Tiananmen and other places, especially in front of CCP headquarters. Additional demands were made, including full exposure of the private property holdings of government and party leaders and, more parochially, an increase in student benefits. Police security guards at CCP headquarters were attacked and several were injured by the students. The situation escalated on April 22. The authorities had closed Tiananmen Square while memorial services were being held for Hu inside the Great Hall of the People. Student organizers mobilized a crowd of 200,000 people who crowded the square the night before and defied police to remove them. Again, no action was taken against them. By this time, similar student demonstrations were taking place in other cities, and in Beijing, student leaders formed the Beijing College Autonomous Association (BCAA) to coordinate activities, first among the educational institutions in Beijing and later nationwide. Neither the CCP nor the government seemed particularly concerned. Zhao declined requests from central committee members to hold a meeting on the matter and went on an official visit to North Korea. In his absence, on April 24 and 25, Li Peng presided over a politburo standing committee meeting to study the student movement and reported to Premier Deng Xiaoping. Deng ordered the movement suppressed, even if force had to be used and blood shed. The following day the official People’s Daily published an editorial calling the student movement “turmoil.” Essentially, this was the Chinese equivalent of reading the Riot Act, a formal

order to disperse or be dispersed by force. The BCAA response was to call for a march on the following day to protest the editorial. The march by 30,000 to 200,000 students (estimates of crowd numbers throughout the crisis tend to vary widely, depending on the source), cheered by thousands of onlookers, broke through police blockades on the way to the square. Police made no effort to stop them, and the State Council (headed by Li Peng) agreed to meet with student representatives and the BCAA conditionally accepted. At the meeting, on April 29, government representatives met with forty-five student leaders from the sixteen Beijing colleges and argued that the charge of turmoil was aimed at only a few students, not at the student movement. In a pattern that would be repeated throughout the next few months, mass meetings of students promptly repudiated those representatives who had assumed a conciliatory posture at the meeting. Further, the BCAA refused to recognize the legitimacy of the official university students association. By this time, Zhao had returned from Korea and told the central committee he supported Deng’s analysis and decision.

The Crisis Heightens On May 1, the BCAA sent an ultimatum—direct dialogue on their demands within three days or mass demonstrations on May 4. The date was tactically significant because Beijing was hosting the meeting of the Asian Development Bank on that day, a powerful symbol of international recognition of China’s economic accomplishments. There would be hundreds of foreign participants and journalists in the city. The march took place (again estimates vary from 30,000 to 300,000 participants, including about 200 foreign journalists), again without interference by the authorities. Inside the hall, Zhao told the delegates that the student grievances should be resolved lawfully and democratically. Over the next few weeks, there were meetings between student and government representatives. Although no announcement was made, these meetings were covered by both domestic and foreign journalists and, as per the students’ demand, reporting, locally and nationally, was relatively free. This encouraged Chinese journalists to establish links with the students and to demonstrate jointly for complete press freedom. Central committee member Hu Qili openly stated that press reform was now inevitable.

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Army tanks guard a strategic avenue leading to Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in the aftermath of the violent confrontation with pro-democracy student demonstrators in early June 1989. (Manuel Ceneta/AFP/Getty Images)

The next student escalation focused on the forthcoming visit of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to confer with Deng. On May 13, up to 1,000 students, and some non-student supporters, including pop music star Hou Dejian, began a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. Zhao and other government leaders visited the hunger strikers and asked them to postpone the protest until after Gorbachev’s visit, scheduled for May 16. They refused. The point was to be there when Gorbachev arrived. The strike was fully reported (although later in May the government barred live foreign press interviews with the strikers), and sympathetic chords reverberated not only in Beijing and around the country, but internationally, as well. The government did its best to respond in kind, sending national Red Cross groups with tents and cots and keeping medical personnel on hand. Flush toilets were provided, and special sanitation crews were assigned to keep the area clean. As hunger strikers began to faint in the heat, government ambulances transported them to hospitals. Leading government figures, including Zhao and Li Peng, made a point of visiting those in the hospitals, telling them they had made their point and should not injure themselves

further. Trainloads of people came in from all over the country to join the strikers. By May 24, it was estimated that the majority of those occupying the square were from out of the city, and most of the students had quietly returned to the campuses. During and after Gorbachev’s visit, it became clear that demonstrators, both students and others, had made Deng personally the symbolic target. He was assailed as the “last emperor,” and there were demands that he resign. Yet, as Zhao told Gorbachev, Deng was firmly in control, if not of the situation at least of the party and government, and he had already ordered troops to be moved into the outskirts of the capital. Zhao was convinced by mid-May that steps had to be taken to meet the student demands, especially since the extent of their public support was evident. On May 17, he issued a written statement saying the students’ positions on the administration of law and the need for democracy, political reform, and an end to corruption were valid. Again he urged an end to the hunger strike and promised there would be no reprisals against individual students or their organizations. The same day, a massive demonstration of

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intellectuals, scientists, university professors, journalists, trade unionists, and even government bureaucrats marched in Beijing demanding an end to “old man” rule and specifically that Deng and Li Peng, seen as his protégé, resign. This, of course, only stiffened Deng’s resolve. At age eighty-five, a survivor of the Long March and much more, he was not going to be forced out by the college kids whose future, he firmly believed, his economic policies were going to ensure. Zhao, aware of what was coming, made one last tearful visit to the students in Tiananmen Square. He urged them to desist—their demands would be met, if not right away, in the near future. But he was too late. Even when the original student leaders, among them the outspoken Wuer Kaixi, urged ending the strike, they were shouted down by new arrivals from the provinces who arrived in what seems to have been almost a holiday mood—spring break in Tiananmen Square. Zhao, after his speech, was cut out of party decision-making. Li Peng, acting for Deng, who had brought many old party veterans out of retirement to support him in his decision to use force, made a harsh and counterproductive speech on the night of May 19, saying that the students were the tools of persons with “ulterior motives” and threatened severe consequences. The following day martial law was declared in Beijing. The citizens were outraged, and thirty members of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress, Zhao among them, urged revocation of the decree and that Li Peng resign. Predictably that went nowhere and only further estranged Zhao from Deng.

Suppression and Massacre Clearly, the government plan to remove the demonstrators and restore normal order stipulated the use of troops only if absolutely necessary and for the use of their weapons as the absolute last resort. The idea was to organize counterdemonstrations of government supporters who would march into the city and occupy the square themselves. This proved unworkable. The government either was unable to round up sufficient people—which is probable—or, given the fact that it was known that the students had been stockpiling arms at Tiananmen, feared exposing unarmed civilians to possible physical harm. The final plan was to send troops, unarmed and in civilian clothes but carrying uniforms in tote bags, to infiltrate the city

on foot and confront the strikers in overwhelming numbers. Shortly after midnight on Saturday, June 3, troops started to move into central Beijing. The plan was to retake Tiananmen Square by 2:00 a.m. Surprise and stealth were essential to success. Unfortunately, shortly before 11:00 p.m., an army jeep that had been on loan to a government broadcasting station and was being driven out of the city back to its unit, skidded off the road and killed three people. Rumors spread that the jeep had been a command vehicle for a military convoy moving in and that the victims of the accident in fact had been killed by the troops. Angry citizens, who simply could not accept that the PLA was being used to attack the capital of China, set up roadblocks and stopped the movement of the trucks and armored personnel carriers that were moving in behind the infiltrating troops. Those trucks that did make it into the central city were stopped by demonstrators who beat up the soldiers and took the weapons from the trucks. Meanwhile, the troops in civilian clothes entering on foot, who were easily recognizable because of their military haircuts and army-issue sneakers, were likewise confronted by residents and manhandled. Many, unfamiliar with the city, simply got lost. The situation worsened when one of the army trucks was taken by the populace directly across from a police and military barracks protecting the party headquarters. The security forces, seeing their comrades being manhandled and the weapons falling into the hands of the crowd, charged out throwing tear gas grenades and recovered the weapons. This, the first recorded use of tear gas by the security forces of the People’s Republic of China, was a tremendous shock and caused violence against the troops to increase. However, more units pressed in toward the city center. At 11:00 p.m., the troops got orders to take Tiananmen Square by midnight. If their vehicles were blocked, they were authorized to fire warning shots. It was almost 2:00 a.m. when the PLA trucks and armored personnel carriers finally forced their way past the roadblocks. People refused to believe the warning shots were real bullets and rushed the vehicles— slashing tires, pulling the passengers out, and setting fire to them. Inevitably people were killed. Even when the mechanical units reached the square and linked up with the forces that had infiltrated on foot, there was no assault. After negotiations

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with the students, during which the students agreed to surrender their weapons—a machine gun and some assault rifles—additional troops began entering at 4:30 a.m., while the approximately 1,500 students left through an escape route opened for them by the PLA. At 5:30 a.m. the occupation was complete. There was some scattered firing as troops shot out the loudspeakers the students had mounted, but few accounts state convincingly that there were any casualties in Tiananmen Square itself. However, fighting continued throughout the city, and hundreds of troop transports were left burning. Some of the students who evacuated the square safely blundered into areas of fighting on the way back to their campuses and became the majority of the student casualties of Tiananmen.

Aftermath Estimates of the total casualties vary—as do all figures published about Tiananmen Square. Immediately after June 4, hospital and Red Cross personnel speaking to journalists estimated about 2,600 deaths. Student leaders declared more than 4,000 had died. Not surprisingly, official government figures were much lower—300 dead, including 20 soldiers. The rest were civilians, including 23 students, either killed in the crossfire or actively combating the troops. The government also reported 9,000 injured—6,000 soldiers and 3,000 civilians. Other estimates give the death toll at between 1,000 and 5,000, a divergence so large as to be meaningless. It took several days to clear the roads and to restore bus service. In one incident, demonstrators attempted to block a passenger train arriving from Shanghai. Six people were run over and killed, and the train was set on fire. On June 9, Deng appeared on television to congratulate the armed forces for their conduct in the affair. However, the commander of the Thirty-eighth PLA Division was disciplined for his failure to get his troops into Beijing according to plan and for allowing vehicles and arms to fall into the hands of the crowds. Perhaps surprisingly, given the extent of the violence in Beijing on June 3 and 4, and the enormous publicity given to the event, the party was able to restore the situation remarkably quickly and smoothly. Zhao was dismissed from his party posts and placed under house arrest. His replacement as general secretary of the CCP was Jiang Zemin of the Shanghai

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Party committee. In November, Deng resigned his last party position, and in January martial law was lifted. Two months later, 573 individuals detained for their part in the affair were released. The economic modernization drive went on unabated.

Afternote What is truly astonishing about the Tiananmen Square affair, certainly not the first nor the worst use of force by a government against protesters in the decade—for example, hundreds of demonstrators protesting price increases were killed in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1989, without attracting much attention—is how it has remained such a large issue, especially in the context of U.S. relations with China. On June 24, 1989, Chinese ambassador to the United States Han Xu (pronounced “Shu”) gave a speech in Florida in which he said: “My government believes it confronted a serious insurrection in Beijing. My government has stated that a mob led by a small number of people prevented the normal conduct of affairs of state. . . . And, after a protracted period of patience, with considerable advance warning, military forces dispersed the mob. There was, I regret to say, loss of life on both sides. I wonder whether any other government confronting such an unprecedented challenge would have handled the situation any better than mine did.” David MacMichael See also: China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949.

Bibliography Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). China, Basic Data, 1994– 1995. Kane, Anthony J., ed. China Briefing, 1990. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Lin, Nan. The Struggle for Tiananmen: Analysis of the 1989 Mass Movement. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992. Liu, Binyan. China’s Crisis, China’s Hope. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. Mu, Yi, and Mark V. Thompson. Crisis at Tiananmen: Reform and Reality in Modern China. San Francisco: China Books, 1989. Salisbury, Harrison. Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June. Boston: Little, Brown, 1989. Schell, Orville. Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. Shen, Tong, with Marianne Yen. Almost a Revolution. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989.

EAST TIMOR: Independence Struggle, 1974–2002 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Portugal 0 0

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The island of Timor in the Indian Ocean is at the far southeastern edge of the Malay Archipelago, most of which makes up the country of Indonesia. Timor is the largest and easternmost of the Lesser Sunda Islands. It is situated about 300 miles northwest of Australia. The island was settled by people of Malay descent in the west and by Papuans in the east. From the seventeenth century, it was divided between colonizers from the Netherlands (West Timor) and from Portugal (East Timor). After World War II, West Timor became a province of Indonesia, but East Timor declared its independence from Portugal in 1975. This declaration began a tumultuous period of internecine warfare between forces favoring joining with Indonesia and those favoring full independence. In 1999, the citizens of East Timor voted by a large margin to become an independent nation, setting off further violence and reprisals and destroying much of the poor country’s infrastructure. Finally, in 2002, East Timor was recognized by the world’s nations as a fully independent state.

In 1520, Portuguese colonizers arrived and claimed Timor. In 1613, the Dutch also established a colony there. During the next 300 years, these two colonial powers fought for control of the island; the Netherlands kept control of the west, while the Portuguese retained control of the east. This division of the island was made official by treaty in 1914 and helped to push its peoples in different cultural directions. In East Timor, Portuguese administration and Roman Catholic churches and schools helped to mold the attitudes of the East Timorese. The Portuguese influence only served to intensify the sense of difference the East Timorese had felt even before the Europeans’ arrival. The people of East Timor were predominantly Papuan, while West Timorese were Malay. Many West Timorese had converted to Islam as it swept across present-day Indonesia in the 1400s. The East Timorese remained attached to old animist beliefs until the arrival of the Portuguese. After more than four centuries of Portuguese rule, 90 percent of the population was Christian. Still, the East Timorese never ceased resenting Portuguese control. The fascist dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar (1932–1968) treated Portugal’s colonies harshly, seeking to exploit them ruthlessly for the benefit of Portugal. Salazar initiated modernization programs, but only in the hope of increasing East Timor’s usefulness or profitability. In 1959, the East Timorese rebelled against harsh colonial treatment but were easily defeated. Even so, the better-educated East Timorese were aware of the waves of decolonization sweeping across Africa and Asia, and they remained eager to free East Timor from Portuguese control. At the same time, the East Timorese showed little interest in tying themselves to neighboring

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KEY DATES 1949

Indonesia wins its independence from the Netherlands after a four-year struggle.

1974

A left-wing coup d’état in colonial power Portugal leads to talk of independence for the country’s far-flung colonies; the East Timorese respond by setting up political parties to push for independence.

1975

The socialist-oriented Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucioná ria do Timor Leste Independente, FRETILIN) wins a brief conflict with other political groups, taking power when Portuguese colonial rule ends on November 28; 10,000 Indonesian troops invade East Timor on December 7.

1976

By February, organized armed resistance against Indonesian forces ends, after some 60,000 East Timorese die in the Indonesian invasion; on May 31, the Indonesian-picked East Timorese assembly votes to merge East Timor with Indonesia.

1981

A secret congress of FRETILIN chooses José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão as its commander in chief in the struggle against Indonesians.

1998

Facing growing protests, long-time Indonesian dictator Sukarno—who had launched the original invasion of East Timor—steps down.

1999

A referendum on independence passes with 79 percent of the East Timorese voting in August; anti-independence militia groups, backed by Indonesian security forces, commit atrocities; a UN peacekeeping force arrives in September; in October, authority over East Timor passes from Indonesia to the UN.

2002

Gusmão is elected the first president of East Timor on April 14; on May 20, East Timor becomes independent.

Indonesia. The Indonesians had gained their independence from the Netherlands in 1950 after an ugly civil war and had created a unified state out of the Malay Archipelago. West Timor had become part of Indonesia. Still Portugal held onto its colony of East Timor.

Independence The status quo in East Timor was ended in April 1974 when army officers in Portugal led a coup d’état against the dictatorship of Marcello Caetano, the successor of Salazar, who had been incapacitated by a stroke in 1968. Among the causes of the Portuguese coup was the army’s dissatisfaction with Portugal’s

conduct of colonial wars in Africa. The coup leaders favored negotiating with colonial revolutionary movements as a first step to granting them independence. Their main focus was on Portugal’s African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, but their policies would also apply to East Timor. The new Portuguese government offered East Timor the choice of full independence or autonomy under Portugal’s supervision, but it set no timetable for pursuing either option. The East Timorese responded by founding three new political parties. The largest of these was the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente, or FRETILIN), a socialist party that advocated immediate and complete independence. The

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more moderate Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) favored autonomy with continued ties to Portugal. The smallest party, the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti), favored unification with Indonesia. Many in East Timor suspected Apodeti of being a puppet party supported by Indonesian military intelligence as part of a plan to bring East Timor into the Indonesian Republic. At first FRETILIN and UDT cooperated in opposition to Apodeti, but increasing friction between the socialist FRETILIN and the conservative UDT led to a brief civil war in August and September 1975. The civil war was encouraged by the Indonesians, who hoped to discredit FRETILIN, but FRETILIN won a complete victory. Portuguese officials in East Timor did not interfere in the small-scale war; in fact, many fled the country. They were replaced by FRETILIN party members, and FRETILIN became the de facto rulers of East Timor. Party leader Francisco Xavier do Amaral was named East Timor’s president, and independence was officially declared on November 28, 1975.

Indonesian Invasion Indonesia did not allow FRETILIN any time to create an independent East Timor. Even before the FRETILIN declared independence, Indonesian troops were staging cross-border raids from West Timor. The Indonesian government attempted to convince the world that these raids were part of the fighting between FRETILIN and UDT, but it was clear that the attacks were an attempt to destabilize the new government of East Timor. Indonesia also carried out a propaganda campaign in the world’s press, insisting that FRETILIN was a Communist movement and that most East Timorese wished to be united with Indonesia. The East Timorese declaration of independence, however, showed these assertions to be false. On December 7, 1975, 10,000 Indonesian troops opened an attack on Dili, the capital of East Timor. Using overwhelming force, including modern warships and paratroopers, they easily captured the city. Many civilian men were rounded up and shot because they were suspected of being connected with FRETILIN. Some were killed for no reason at all. Indonesians were also reported to be conducting mass rapes of East Timor women. By February 1976, resistance had been eliminated in all East Timor cities; as many as 60,000 East Timorese may have died as a result of the invasion.

On May 31, 1976, an East Timorese assembly whose members had been chosen by the Indonesian military voted to merge East Timor with Indonesia. In July, Indonesian President Suharto declared that East Timor had become the twenty-seventh province of the Indonesian Republic.

International Response Portugal, which felt a sense of obligation toward its former colony, condemned Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. The Portuguese were joined by many other nations and by human rights groups. On the other hand, the major Western powers gave the Indonesian action their tacit approval. The United States and its allies considered President Suharto a useful friend. He was hostile to Communism— having presided over the slaughter of half a million alleged Communists after his 1965 coup—and was a member of the ASEAN alliance, which had supported the United States during the Vietnam War. FRETILIN, on the other hand, was believed to be a Communist-oriented movement and a threat to Indonesia’s stability. If East Timor was allowed to become independent, other peoples in Indonesia, such as the Achinese in Aceh province, might also push for greater freedom, weakening Indonesia and reducing its value as an ally. The United States also had substantial economic investments in the Indonesian economy, which would suffer if Indonesia were destabilized. The UN General Assembly repeatedly condemned the Indonesian takeover, but the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan either abstained or voted against resolutions designed to defend the rights of East Timor. The Western powers did vote in favor of a UN Security Council resolution in late 1975, offered by Portugal, which condemned the Indonesian attack and called for East Timorese self-determination. This resolution provided no threat of economic or military sanctions, however, and had only symbolic value. It allowed the Western powers to appear to defend the rights of East Timor without changing the outcome. The issue of East Timor languished for the next few years, but gradually word of the brutality of the Indonesian takeover leaked out, shocking individuals, human rights organizations, and eventually world leaders. Some accounts put the number killed in the original attack and in later repressions at

East Timor: Independence Struggle, 1974–2002

100,000, or approximately one-sixth of East Timor’s population. The U.S. Congress held hearings on the invasion during 1977 to determine whether American weapons had been used in a crime against humanity—much of the Indonesian army’s equipment was supplied by the United States. These hearings, however, came to no conclusion. Indonesia denied that an invasion had even taken place. The Indonesian government claimed that “volunteers” from the Indonesian army had come to the aid of the East Timorese in their fight against the “Marxist” FRETILIN government. The Indonesians said they were simply helping the East Timorese achieve their goal of union with Indonesia. Reports of bombings, mass executions, rapes, and torture were all denied.

Guerrilla War After the Indonesians took control of all East Timor cities in mid-1976, the FRETILIN government retreated into the countryside to wage a guerrilla war. The Indonesian occupying army averaged around 30,000 soldiers; FRETILIN had at most 2,500 fulltime guerrillas. Unlike the Indonesian army, however, FRETILIN had the loyalty of a large part of the population, which gave it the ability to carry out hitand-run raids against the occupying Indonesians. The Indonesian army countered with air strikes carried out by sophisticated American-supplied planes. The FRETILIN resistance was led by José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão, a minor military commander who had managed to avoid capture during the conquest of East Timor. In 1981, a secret congress of FRETILIN leaders named Gusmão head of FRETILIN and commander in chief of its guerrilla forces. Gusmão’s ability to operate behind Indonesian lines, often within East Timor’s cities, helped to inspire the resistance to continue its fight against the Indonesian army. Indonesia attempted to counter FRETILIN’s guerrilla tactics by rounding up and relocating the civilian population upon whom the guerrillas depended for supplies and recruits. This policy had some success, but at the expense of the population, which was pulled off its farms and dragged back and forth across East Timor. The result was widespread famine as many fields went unharvested. Tens of thousands died because of these dislocations. The Indonesian government also attempted to “Indonesianize”

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East Timor’s population. Schools were only allowed to teach in Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesia’s official language) and ignored East Timor’s unique history. Students were forced to memorize Indonesian national songs and Indonesia’s official ideology of Pantja Sila. Indonesia also encouraged the immigration of ethnic Malays into East Timor in an attempt to dilute FRETILIN’s base of support. By the late 1990s, an estimated 15 percent of East Timor’s population was made up of immigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia.

F R ETI LI N Defeated By the 1990s, the violence in East Timor had caught the attention of the some of the world’s press agencies, which allowed humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International to raise international awareness about East Timor’s ongoing war. Particularly important for drawing the world’s attention to East Timor’s plight was the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in which hundreds of East Timorese were shot down in the streets while attending the funeral of a FRETILIN activist. The event was not unusual. The Indonesian army had carried out other massacres, but this one had been witnessed by a number of Western journalists. Further international attention was attracted by a 1994 incident in which East Timorese students stormed the United States embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital, during a visit to Indonesia by U.S. President Bill Clinton. The students did not succeed in getting Clinton’s support, but they did attract wide press coverage. Finally, in 1996, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two East Timorese activists: exiled political leader José Ramos-Horta and Catholic Bishop Carlos Belo. It was clear that the prize was awarded to draw attention to East Timor’s plight. The court of international public opinion was FRETILIN’s best hope for achieving independence. By the mid-1990s, its guerrilla forces, badly mauled by Indonesia’s successive campaigns, were unable to mount serious military operations. The leadership of the movement was damaged by the 1992 capture of Gusmão; the FRETILIN leader was sentenced to life imprisonment, which President Suharto commuted to twenty years in prison. Without Gusmão, and with most of its soldiers dead or imprisoned, the FRETILIN movement was unable to carry on its armed struggle.

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Pro-independence students in East Timor demonstrate against violence at the hands of pro-integration forces in April 1999. Two months later, the East Timorese voted in favor of independence from Indonesia—setting off a new round of attacks. (Agus Sutedjo/Getty Images News)

International Pressure The East Timor unrest remained a public relations sore spot for Indonesia. Some estimates suggested that the total number killed had risen as high as 200,000 from the repression and the famines that followed. If these estimates are accurate, the Indonesian occupation of East Timor killed one-third of the preinvasion population. On the Indonesian side, 20,000 members of the military had died. Under pressure from the United Nations and humanitarian groups, including Amnesty International and Asia Watch, the Indonesian government allowed human rights observers to enter East Timor. These observers, however, could do little but issue reports on Indonesia’s continued use of torture and “disappearances”—some East Timorese suspected of having FRETILIN sympathies had apparently been kidnapped and murdered by government agents.

A change in East Timor’s situation came with the May 1998 ouster of President Suharto after a wave of student unrest in Jakarta. The new president, Bacharuddin J. Habibie, took a softer stance on East Timor than his predecessor did. Some Timorese prisoners were set free (although not Gusmão), and Habibie permitted East Timorese students to demonstrate for independence. Habibie met with Bishop Belo and discussed the possibility of troop withdrawals and autonomy for East Timor, but he still ruled out full independence. Habibie’s willingness to negotiate stemmed from his desire to reduce international criticism concerning the occupation. Such criticism even affected U.S. attitudes toward Indonesia. Beginning in 1992, the United States made moderate cuts in economic and military aid to Indonesia and called for an end to human rights abuses in East Timor. Western states followed the U.S. lead in criticizing Indonesia’s East Timor policies. Portugal, in particular, used its position within the European Community to

East Timor: Independence Struggle, 1974–2002

push for cuts in aid as long as human rights abuses continued.

Referendum on Independence and Renewed Violence In January 1999, Indonesian president Habibie proposed a referendum offering East Timorese a choice between greater autonomy within Indonesia or full independence. The referendum took place on August 30, 1999. The voting was supervised by the United Nations, and Indonesia took responsibility for ensuring security during the vote. It also promised that Indonesia’s supreme legislative body, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), would ratify the result. Leading up to the vote, militia leaders in East Timor (supplied and organized by Indonesia) openly warned voters not to choose independence. The results were overwhelming: 79 percent of the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia, rejecting Habibie’s autonomy proposal. Although the referendum was held in relative peace, the announcement of the results unleashed an unprecedented wave of violence against the civilian population. Between the referendum and the arrival of a multinational peacekeeping force in late September 1999, anti-independence Timorese militias, organized and supported by the Indonesian military, carried out a large-scale campaign of retribution. Beginning only hours after the referendum results were announced, the militias descended on villages, burning, looting, and destroying. The militias killed approximately 1,300 Timorese and forced between 200,000 and 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees from the militias’ continued systematic destruction. The majority of the country’s infrastructure, including irrigation systems, water supply systems, schools, and nearly all of the country’s electrical grid, was destroyed. Although some post-referendum violence was expected, no one had expected devastation on this scale. In September 1999 the Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (Interfet) moved into the country and brought the violence to an end. Under UN occupation, the transition to independence occurred quickly. At the same time, Habibie was under fire in Indonesia for “losing” East Timor, and the armed forces were humiliated by their inability to force a positive result in the rebellious territory. In October 1999, the MPR approved the transfer of authority over

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East Timor from Indonesia to a temporary UN body that would oversee the gradual transfer of power to an independent East Timorese government. Around the same time, Xanana Gusmão, the FRETILIN leader, was released from prison and returned triumphantly to East Timor. The newly elected Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid, gave his support to East Timor’s independence and offered his nation’s full cooperation during East Timor’s transition to independence, a welcome change from earlier administrations.

Independence In May 2002, East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent state. Official UN involvement ended, although Unmiset, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor, maintained about 1,000 peacekeepers in East Timor. The territory’s long history of violence left scars that would take decades to heal. Divisions in society reflecting differences in social class, economic and political power, and ideology are the lasting legacies of the years of foreign rule and have significantly contributed to current conflict and risks of conflict in the future. For example, even the nationalist groups were deeply divided between those who cooperated with and were paid and protected by the Indonesian intelligence forces and those who were truly nationalists. The newly independent nation was also burdened with political conflicts rooted in the years of turmoil and occupation. One prominent pressure group, the Popular Council for the Defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (CDP-RDTL), rejected the legitimacy of the UN administration and continued to demand a return to the 1975 constitution. In response, Xanana Gusmão, who was elected president in May 2002, organized a national dialogue in 2003, bringing together representatives of the government and representatives of CPD-RDTL to discuss and address their political demands. Although there were no major breakthroughs, the discussion did serve to build trust between the two sides. It would take years to develop the skills and organizations of an effective civil society, for after centuries of domination by colonial administrators and then by Indonesians, East Timor had never developed the institutions of a sovereign state. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) contributed to building a functioning new nation, working on such issues as humanitarian assistance, education,

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health services, communication, and governmental administration. These groups hoped to provide training and assistance both for citizens and for officeholders. Carl Skutsch and Luke Nichter See also: Anticolonialism; People’s Wars; Invasions and Border Disputes; Indonesia: Communist and Suharto Coups, 1965– 1966; Indonesia: Aceh Separatist Conflict Since 1976; Indonesia: Irian Jaya Separatist Conflict Since 1964.

Bibliography Bertrand, Jacques. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Cribb, R.B. Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945. New York and London: Longman, 1995. Heijmans, Annelies, et al., eds. Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Jardine, Matthew. East Timor: Genocide in Paradise. London: Odonian Press, 1995. Pinto, Constancio, and Matthew Jardine. East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle. Boston: South End Press, 1997. Sriram, Chandra Lekha, and Karin Wermester. From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.

INDONESIA: Wars of Independence, 1945–1949 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism PARTICIPANTS: Japan; Netherlands

PA C I F I C OCEAN S U M A

BORNEO

T R A

SULAWESI

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Jakarta

INDIAN OCEAN 0

100

200

JAVA

D

MADURA

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Surabaya Yogyakarta

S

I

A

Dutch until 1962

NEW GUINEA

300 Miles

0 100 200 300 Kilometers

Although Europeans arrived in Indonesia in the early sixteenth century, it was not until the founding of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde OoostIndische Compaignie, or VOC) in 1602 that Indonesia began to be put under European control. In the seventeenth century the Dutch established trading posts in the region, in the eighteenth century they conquered the central island of Java, and in the nineteenth century they took the rest of the Indonesian archipelago. By this time the Dutch government had replaced the VOC as the ruler of the Indonesian territories. By 1910 all of Indonesia was under Dutch control. The Indonesia they conquered was a multiethnic, multi-religious collection of cultures of peoples inhabiting 6,000 islands stretching across more than 3,000 miles, and divided into a number of small competing kingdoms. Most of its population belonged to the Malay family of ethnic groups, which was divided into many subcategories. The Javanese of

the island of Java were the largest of these ethnic families, making up almost half of Indonesia’s population. Most of the population spoke one of the many languages in the Malayo-Polynesian family, but these languages were often mutually unintelligible. (The current official language of Indonesia is BahasaIndonesia, a Malay dialect commonly used as a trade lingua franca.) Most Indonesians were Muslims, although the practice of Islam in Indonesia was strongly influenced by earlier Hindu, Buddhist, and animist traditions. The colonial state forged by the Dutch was extremely profitable. In the nineteenth century Dutch law required that the Indonesians grow sugar, coffee, tea, tobacco, and pepper for export, and taxes on this trade covered a third of the Netherlands government’s budget. In the twentieth century the Indonesian economy was liberalized and expanded into other areas. Exports were dominated by rubber, tin, and oil. Oil

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KEY DATES 1910

After three centuries of struggle, the Netherlands gains full colonial control over what was then called the Dutch East Indies.

1921

Independence leader Sukarno organizes the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI, its Indonesian acronym).

1942

The Japanese invade and take control over Java.

1945

Facing defeat in World War II, the Japanese appoint Sukarno to head the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence; Dutch troops try to reassert control over the colony.

1946

The Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic sign an agreement, giving the latter control over populous Java and the western islands of the archipelago and Dutch control over the mineral-rich eastern islands.

1947

The Dutch break the 1946 agreement by launching an offensive to conquer Java and Sumatra in July; in August, the UN brokers a new cease-fire.

1948

The Dutch launch a new offensive to crush the republic.

1949

Facing continued guerrilla resistance, the Dutch agree to negotiate a peace agreement in April; a final peace agreement ending Dutch rule over most of Indonesia is signed in November.

1950

Indonesia achieves formal independence on August 17.

exports were the foundation upon which the multinational company Royal Dutch Shell was built. The twentieth century also saw the growth of large cities in Java and Sumatra. These cities were inhabited by a small new class of educated Indonesians (literacy in the 1930s was around 7 percent) and dominated economically by the Dutch and an immigrant community of ethnic Chinese. The Dutch had hoped that by providing a Western-style education to some Indonesians, they would bind Indonesia closer to the Netherlands. Instead, the Westernized Indonesians were inspired by their broader view of the world to demand greater rights and a greater share of the wealth for all Indonesians. It was this educated class of Indonesians that would lead Indonesia’s independence movement.

Independence Movements The kingdoms of Indonesia had fought to avoid the Dutch conquest, and, after their failure, the archipel-

ago experienced intermittent uprisings against Dutch rule. Some, such as the Java War of 1825–1830, were led by local rulers who resented Dutch usurpation of their power, while others, including the Padri War of 1821–1838, were motivated by religious resentments. These movements, however, were merely attempts to defend local prerogatives in the face of Dutch dominance. A truly national independence movement did not come until the twentieth century. Dutch rule in Indonesia had created a fertile ground for revolutionary movements. The plantation system introduced by Dutch capitalists had made millions of guldens for Dutch shareholders but had disrupted the traditional life of poor Indonesians. Forced by changing economic circumstances to work long hours on European-owned plantations, these plantation workers were filled with resentments. The leadership of the newly educated elite would eventually channel these resentments into a successful revolution against Dutch rule. Early political organizations

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included the Budi Utomo (Beautiful Endeavor), founded in 1908, a moderate party devoted to cultural rejuvenation, and the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Commercial Union), founded in 1911, a party devoted to advancing Indonesian business interests. The latter, which changed its name to Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1912 to broaden its appeal, reached a membership of half a million. These groups were soon joined by other ethnically or geographically based groups, including Sarekat Ambon (Ambonese Union), Jong Java (Young Java), Sarekat Sumatra (Sumatran Union), and Timorsch Verbond (Timorese Alliance). The first radical political party was the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging (Indies SocialDemocratic Association, ISDV), founded in 1914 by a Dutchman. This socialist party soon transformed itself into an Indonesia-dominated party, which, in 1924, renamed itself the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI). Unlike the more regionally focused Indonesian parties, the PKI was dedicated to creating a national independence movement, including all the ethnic and religious groups in Indonesia. The PKI grew rapidly, stealing members from the more moderate SI. In 1926 the PKI led a revolt in Java and Sumatra—against the advice of the Soviet Union and many of the PKI’s own leaders—which was crushed by the Dutch authorities. The failed revolt weakened the PKI and left it ineffective until after World War II.

Sukarno With the PKI temporarily weakened, the field was open for other radical political parties. In 1927 the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party, or PNI) was founded by a Javanese schoolteacher’s son named Sukarno. Sukarno had received a European-style education and been exposed to many anticolonial ideas. As a young man he wrote for an SI newspaper and was active in the SI movement, but he soon began to see the SI and similar groups as too narrow in their outlook. Sukarno wanted Indonesians to unite under an inclusive banner, not to divide along class, religious, or ethnic lines. Rather than constantly squabbling, Sukarno felt Islamic and Communist groups should dedicate themselves to the nationalist goal of a united Indonesia—under his leadership. Sukarno, a charismatic speaker and leader, immediately attracted a sizable following. Like Gandhi,

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he advocated a policy of non-cooperation. His popularity, his advocacy of passive resistance to the Dutch colonial government, and his verbal attacks on the colonial system disturbed the Dutch authorities. In 1929, they had him arrested and sentenced to four years in prison. He was released in 1931, but by that time the PNI had begun to fall apart under Dutch pressure. Sukarno continued to be politically active and was arrested again in 1933 and exiled to Sumatra. In the mid and late 1930s, Indonesian resistance to Dutch rule was suppressed by the increasingly rigid colonial authorities. The Dutch, particularly those who had lived in Indonesia for some generations, were unwilling to let go of their valuable prize.

Japanese Occupation World War II ended Dutch dominance in Indonesia and marked the beginning of the end of colonial rule. The Japanese, who had begun the war in part to gain access to Indonesian oil, invaded the archipelago in January 1942. In March 1942 Java fell to the Japanese army, and Indonesia came under Japanese control. The Japanese occupation (1942–1945) had a critical effect on the Indonesian independence movement. The Dutch authorities were either forced to flee or were imprisoned. For the first time since the seventeenth century Indonesia was free from European dominance. Although Japanese rule was harsher than that of the Netherlands ever had been, it also gave the Indonesians more political opportunities than they had ever had and thereby laid the groundwork for eventual independence. The Japanese wished to exploit Indonesia for its abundant raw materials, especially oil, but in their propaganda they also claimed to want to build “a new order in East Asia,” a “co-prosperity sphere” that would give East Asia to the Asians. In reality this meant little—Japan’s co-prosperity sphere was an empire wrapped in the rhetoric of pan-Asian cooperation, and thousands of Indonesians died working for it as forced laborers. Yet Japan did attempt to gain the support of its new subjects by encouraging the growth of cooperative (obedient) political organizations. Sukarno and other leaders were asked to join the military government and were allowed to create political parties as long as they worked with the Japanese occupation force. Many Indonesians were employed by the Japanese as minor bureaucrats,

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replacing the absent Dutch. Others were enlisted in the Pembaela Tanah Air (Protectors of the Fatherland, or Peta), a military defense force trained by the Japanese but officered by Indonesians. The Peta reached a strength of over 50,000. In August 1945, on the eve of the Japanese surrender to the United States, Japanese authorities in Indonesia appointed Sukarno chairman of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence, with another nationalist, Mohammed Hatta, named vice chairman. A day later, on August 15, Japan surrendered unconditionally. Sukarno and Hatta were then under pressure by nationalists to declare Indonesia’s independence, but they hesitated, afraid of what the Japanese occupation troops might do. On the evening of August 15 Sukarno was kidnapped by Peta leaders who wished to pressure him into declaring Indonesia’s independence. On August 17, assured of Japanese quiescence, Sukarno acquiesced to his kidnappers’ demands and issued Indonesia’s declaration of independence. A republican government was set up at Jakarta, Indonesia’s largest city, with Sukarno named president and Hatta vice president, and a Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee, or KNIP) was appointed to help provide political leadership throughout Indonesia—in effect, the KNIP became Indonesia’s de facto parliament. Peta was to serve as the new government’s army, but it was supported by large numbers of irregular forces organized by local leaders.

Dutch Reoccupation The Netherlands refused to accept an independent Republic of Indonesia. It viewed Sukarno and his colleagues as collaborators who had helped the Japanese war effort, and it was determined to suppress the Indonesian rebellion. Fighting began as the Dutch attempted to reoccupy Indonesia. Because there were far too few Dutch troops to quickly replace the Japanese who had surrendered, much of the task of disarming the Japanese garrisons and “liberating” Indonesia was given to British and Australian soldiers. These troops were reluctant to fight Indonesians and in some areas treated them as the de facto local administration. In other locations, particularly East Indonesia, the Allied troops forcibly disarmed the Indonesians and turned the territory over to Dutch administrators and the Dutch

army. Fighting also occasionally broke out between the Japanese, who according to their surrender terms were supposed to assist in the Dutch reoccupation of Indonesia, and Indonesian Republicans. There was no consistency to these conflicts. On some Indonesian islands, the rebels were forced to disarm by Allied armies, while on others, they were allowed to govern unmolested. Some Japanese commanders attempted to live up to their surrender obligations and maintain their control of Indonesia’s towns and cities until the Dutch could arrive. Others looked the other way as Republican troops seized weapons and equipment. Fighting also broke out between Indonesian nationalists and Dutch civilians who had been released from Japanese internment. During the Japanese occupation, 150,000 Dutch civilians and soldiers had been interned under terrible conditions. Upon their release, they were eager to reassert their prerogatives. They felt that their suffering deserved some reward, and they were particularly hostile toward the Indonesian rebels, whom they considered to be Japanese collaborators. The fighting was complicated by the differing responses of Indonesians in various parts of the archipelago. Most liked the idea of independence, but some rajahs (princes) in outlying islands who had profited under Dutch rule and were suspicious of the left-wing leanings of the Republic’s leadership decided to support the return of the colonial authorities. Even among Indonesians who wanted independence, coordination was difficult. Politically the resistance was divided between the Communists (PKI) and other left-wing groups, the Islamic parties, led by the Masyumi party, and the Indonesian nationalist parties, particularly the reborn Indonesian Nationalist party (PNI). The new government had had no chance to create a well-organized political structure—each region and each party had a tendency to act on its own, ignoring, or unaware of, the desires of their leaders. And those leaders were constantly changing: in October 1945, Sutan Sjahrir was appointed prime minister by the KNIP, which thought Sukarno too cautious but allowed him to remain as a figurehead president. Other prime ministers would follow Sjahrir as the war continued. Many of the battles were unplanned by central leaders. One of the bloodiest of the occupation battles, at Surabaya, Java, during October and November 1945, was a completely local affair in which 6,000 British troops attempted to disarm an irregular

Indonesia: Wars of Independence, 19 45–19 4 9

Indonesian army of more than 100,000. Urged on by local leaders, the poorly equipped Indonesians lost thousands in three weeks of fighting, but proved to the British and themselves that they were ready to fight for their independence. After Surabaya the British attempted to walk a more neutral line between the Dutch and the Indonesians. So, even though it was clear that most Indonesians did not wish the Dutch to return, their uncoordinated resistance made it possible for the Dutch, with the reluctant help of the British and Australians, to reoccupy their colonial possessions. Throughout late 1945 and early 1946, the Dutch moved troops to occupy Indonesia’s major cities, replacing the British and Australians, who were eager to depart. When resisted, these occupations were carried out with much brutality. Thousands of innocent civilians suffered during the fighting. In January 1946, Dutch troops drove the independent Indonesian government out of Jakarta. The leaders retreated to the city of Yogyakarta, which became the capital of the Indonesian Republic for the remainder of the struggle. Although the Dutch succeeded in occupying most of Indonesia’s cities, they were unable to reassert control over the entire archipelago, and the smaller towns and countryside remained under Indonesian control.

Final Phase of Independence Struggle In an attempt to end the fighting, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic signed an agreement at Linggajati on November 12, 1946, in which the Dutch acknowledged the Republic’s authority over Java, Sumatra, and Madura (Western Indonesia), while maintaining control over the mineral-rich islands of Eastern Indonesia. The Linggajati agreement pledged both sides to work toward creating a federal union of all Indonesian states, including the Indonesian Republic. The Linggajati federation would have the Queen of the Netherlands as its symbolic head. The agreement was a compromise between Indonesians who hoped it would be a first step toward complete independence and the Dutch who saw it as the beginning of bringing Indonesia back under their control. Flawed from the beginning, the Linggajati agreement satisfied neither side. Many Indonesian revolutionaries were angry because their leaders had given

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away the eastern islands, while the Dutch, frustrated by the continued unrest in the territories under their authority, still hoped to bring all of Indonesia under their control again. To achieve this goal, the Dutch broke the Linggajati agreement with an offensive to conquer Java and Sumatra in July 1947. The offensive (which the Dutch called a “police action”) was successful, capturing many of the Republican-held cities, but stopped short of taking Yogyakarta—partly because of pressure from the United Nations, the United States, and Great Britain, all of whom objected to the complete elimination of the Republic. A UN–brokered cease-fire was agreed to on August 4, 1947, and a new peace agreement was signed aboard the United States warship Renville, establishing a new border between Dutch and Republican territories (the latter consisting mostly of isolated sections in the interior of Java). The stalemate between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic continued through 1948. The Republic, again dominated by Sukarno, bloodily suppressed a September 1948 revolt by the PKI. This event gained new sympathy from the United States for Indonesian independence by demonstrating the Republic’s anticommunist credentials. In the meantime, 350,000 Indonesian Republic troops faced 100,000 Dutch soldiers across the “van Mook line” (named for the Dutch governor of Indonesia). During the stalemate, the Dutch continued their attempts to create federal states sympathetic to their goal of a Dutch Indonesian Federation. These efforts were handicapped by the loyalty most Indonesians continued to show to the isolated Republican government in Yogyakarta. On December 18, 1948, the Dutch began a second police action in an attempt to crush the Republic. Armed columns moved out from Dutch-held cities and quickly pushed aside the poorly equipped Indonesian army. Yogyakarta fell on December 19, with Sukarno and most of Indonesia’s leaders being taken captive. The Republican army retreated into the countryside to carry out a guerrilla war against the Dutch. Successful as it was on the ground, the Dutch military victory was a defeat in the forum of world opinion. Members of the United Nations were almost universally hostile to the Dutch attack. The United States suspended some of its economic aid to the Netherlands and warned that it was considering suspending all aid—a harsh threat to a country that was

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still recovering from its devastation during World War II. In January 1949, the UN Security Council demanded an end to Dutch occupation of Indonesia by July 1950. Guerrilla fighting continued throughout the spring of 1949, further wearing down the Dutch will to continue the war. Finally, in April 1949, the Dutch agreed to negotiate peace. Sukarno and Hatta were allowed to return to Yogyakarta in July, and a final cease-fire was agreed to in August. Skirmishing continued until a final peace agreement was signed on November 2. It granted the Republic of the United States of Indonesia full independence, but it remained a federal state under the symbolic authority of the Dutch crown. This concession to Dutch sensibilities was soon swept away in a tide of pro-Republic political turmoil. All the federal states, artificially created by the Dutch, petitioned to be included in the Indonesian Republic. This movement toward unity and centralization culminated in the declaration of August 17, 1950, establishing the unitary Republic of Indonesia, with Sukarno as its president. Indonesia had achieved its independence after 350 years of Dutch rule.

Analysis Tens of thousands died because of the Netherlands’ refusal to give up its extremely profitable colony. Although the fighting went on for four years, and at one point the Dutch controlled almost every major city, the end result was never in doubt. The colonial era was over. Even before World War II, the Indonesians had been pressing for greater independence. The war itself accelerated the process by replacing Dutch rule with that of the Japanese. Once that war was over, the Indonesians were unwilling to be handed back to their former Dutch masters. That the war went on as long as it did owed as much to Indonesian weakness as to Dutch determina-

tion. The Indonesian forces fighting the Dutch had been divided between factions—Muslims, Nationalists, Communists—that sometimes spent as much time struggling with each other as they did fighting the Dutch. The divisions that characterized the Indonesian independence movement were exacerbated by four years of fighting and would long plague the newly independent state. In particular, hostility between the army and the PKI was rooted in the September 1948 Communist uprising and would continue until a military coup in 1965 destroyed the Communist Party of Indonesia. After independence, Indonesia went through a period of political turmoil before ending up under the de facto dictatorship of President Sukarno, who retained immense popularity because of his long-time fight for independence. It was Sukarno who had been able to keep the hostile factions united in opposition to the Dutch, and it was Sukarno who would be able to continue to play them off against one another until he was replaced by the 1965 military coup of General Suharto. It was the Netherlands, which had done little to foster democracy in Indonesia—rather, had fought to suppress it—that bore much of the responsibility for the rise of these two dictators. Carl Skutsch See also: Anticolonialism; Indonesia: Communist and Suharto Coups, 1965–1966.

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972. Cribb, R.B. Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945. New York: Longman, 1995. Frederick, William H. Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989. Kahin, George McT. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952.

INDONESIA: Irian Jaya Separatist Conflict Since 1964. See Oceania, volume 4, page 1085.

INDONESIA: Communist and Suharto Coups,1965–1966 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups

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When Indonesia achieved its independence from the Netherlands on August 17, 1950, it had suffered four years of bloody warfare complicated by political, ethnic, and religious divisions. In this postwar era there were four leading political parties: the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI), a Nationalist party connected to President Sukarno; the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist party, PKI), a Marxist party; Masyumi, an Islamic party; and Nahdatul Ulama, a smaller Islamic party. (Most Indonesians were Muslims, but many were not particularly devout.) These parties waged a constant political struggle for power that led to a series of revolving governments. Once in power, each government used its position to reward its followers with jobs and contracts. This political instability and corruption did much to disillusion many Indonesians with their new democracy (and in paternalistic Indonesia, democracy was an alien concept for all but the European educated elite). The economic upheavals,

which accompanied the political instability, also created widespread dissatisfaction. Indonesia also faced internal unrest. An Islamic resistance movement calling itself Darul Islam (House of Islam) had been active since May 1948. Led by a Javanese holy man, S.M. Kartosuwirjo, the movement controlled rural areas in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. Also of concern to many Indonesians was the rapid growth of the PKI. The Communists had been suppressed after a 1926 uprising against the Dutch, and again after a 1948 uprising against the Indonesian Republic, but had managed a third rebirth under a new, younger leadership. Apart from a brief period of repression in 1951, the party had been allowed to operate freely—the PNI found it to be a useful ally against the larger Masyumi party. Led by Dipa Nusantara Aidit, the PKI played down its Marxism and emphasized its social utility. The PKI expanded its support base by providing help

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KEY DATES 1950

After four years of conflict and one year of negotiations, Indonesia wins its independence from Dutch colonizers, with long-time independence leader Sukarno as president.

1951

The Community Party of Indonesia (PKI, its Indonesian acronym) is legalized.

1955

National elections continue the political impasse, with four parties, including the PKI, winning major portions of the vote.

1957

In the face of regional revolts, Sukarno, backed by Communists and the military, declares martial law.

1964

Sukarno restarts his campaign to militarily seize parts of neighboring Malaysia, sparking unrest in the military.

1965

With internal unrest on the rise, a small group of soldiers allied with the PKI launch a coup on September 30; they claim the coup is designed to thwart another coup by right-wing officers, backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; on October 2, other military officers, backing General Suharto, seize power; the new government launches purges against Communists that kill an estimated half million persons.

to village communities, repairing village buildings, erecting dams, and organizing schools. This made the party popular among rural teachers and village leaders, as well as many peasant farmers. From the beginning of 1952 to the end of 1955, the party’s membership grew from 100,000 to 1 million. The elections of 1955 confirmed Indonesia’s political impasse. The four largest parties, PNI, Masyumi, NU, and PKI, each received between 15 and 23 percent of the vote. This made it impossible for any one party to form a government, leading to more coalitions between patronage-hungry political partners. Corruption also spread to the military, some commanders of which operated smuggling operations in the outlying islands. The government, paralyzed by the lack of consensus in parliament, was helpless to stop this corruption— more often than not it was sharing in the spoils.

Sukarno Into this power gap stepped Sukarno. President of Indonesia after 1945, Sukarno had been an admired figure within the country since he had helped found

the PNI in 1927. He was a charismatic politician who was able to sway crowds with his oratory. Time and again, from the 1920s onward, he had been able to resolve differences between competing factions, aided by the force of his personality and his widespread popularity. A Nationalist, Sukarno did not trust the political parties that had ruled Indonesia after independence. During World War II he had argued that the Indonesian state should be based upon what he called the Pantja Sila, the five principles: Kebangsaan (nationalism), Kemanusiaan (internationalism), Kerakjatan (consent, or democracy), Keadilan Sosial (social justice), and Ketuhanan (belief in one god). These principles were vague enough to satisfy all but the most rigid Islamists and became the core of the Indonesian constitution. By 1956, with Indonesia nearing political chaos, Sukarno was viewed as the only man who could bring the country back together. Sukarno called for the burying of the political parties as a means of achieving consensus and prosperity. He criticized Western-style democracy as the tyranny of 50 percent plus 1, and called instead for “guided democracy.” On March 14,

Indonesia: Communist and Suharto Coups, 19 65–19 6 6

1957, with regional revolts breaking out across the country, Sukarno, supported by the military and the PKI, proclaimed martial law and an end of parliamentary democracy. In practice, guided democracy was a poor substitute for the real thing. Sukarno ruled neither as a dictator nor as a popularly chosen leader, but rather as something in between. He appointed a puppet “cooperative parliament” which was supposed to achieve consensus but in practice simply did as Sukarno wished. Sukarno ran Indonesia by playing off factions against each other while attempting to project an image of greatness through grandiose symbols, stadiums, and statues. Sukarno focused on foreign policy in an attempt to distract from domestic issues, which were tedious and difficult to solve. He put Indonesia on the international scene by becoming a leader of the non-aligned movement, adopting an anti-Western stance, and hosting events such as the 1962 Asian Games. But he solved neither Indonesia’s economic problems nor its endemic corruption. Sukarno’s flamboyant style cost more than the country could pay— inflation shot up and the economy stagnated.

P K I and the Army At the center of Sukarno’s regime was the political conflict between the army and the PKI. The military had helped put Sukarno in power, but Sukarno balanced the military’s power by consistently favoring the Communists and shielding them from attacks by other parties and the army. Under the umbrella of Sukarno’s protection, the PKI continued to grow, reaching a membership of more than 3 million in the early 1960s. In support of his left-leaning politics, Sukarno received substantial military and economic aid from the Soviet Union and China. The latter also secretly supplied the PKI with cash and weapons. The army observed the growing strength of the Communists with disquiet. The army’s officer corps had long resented civilian politicians, who they felt had done little to achieve independence from the Dutch. The army considered itself to be the protector of the spirit of the 1945–1949 revolution and felt that it had not been treated with proper respect. After a half-hearted attempt at a coup in October 1952, the army’s budgets and troop strength had been steadily reduced, making it difficult to fight against the minor rebellions that plagued Indonesia. Sukarno’s dictatorship had seemed to offer an improvement in the army’s

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position—the army grew in size from 1960 to 1962, reaching 330,000 men—but the army grew more and more angry about many of Sukarno’s policies, which seemed both ineffective and pro-Communist. As the army and the PKI watched each other warily, tensions rose over Sukarno’s confrontational foreign policy. From 1960 to 1962 he ordered the army to wage a low-level war against the Dutch, who continued to control Irian Jaya (Western New Guinea). After the 1962 agreement that brought Irian Jaya into Indonesia, Sukarno targeted the Malaysian Federation, attempting to subvert the new state and bring it also into Indonesia. This only succeeded in further strengthening the army and the PKI, both of which profited from Sukarno’s dependence on their support, while alienating the international community. In 1963, Aidit and the PKI took advantage of the confused domestic and international situation to begin pushing for greater power. Peasants backed by the PKI attempted to seize land owned by rich landlords while engaging in armed brawls with those who opposed them. Sukarno and his government continued to support the Communists, and some observers thought that Sukarno was attempting to turn Indonesia into a Communist state. In 1964, Sukarno, backed by the PKI, continued his campaign to seize part of Malaysia, but the army grew more and more reluctant to support this guerrilla war. It wanted to maintain its strength for any possible confrontation with the PKI. The Malaysians, backed by the British, were also winning most of the skirmishes with Indonesian forces. The army opened up secret negotiations with Malaysia and began to try and infiltrate the PKI. At the same time, the PKI was attempting, probably with more success, to bring officers and soldiers over to its side. In 1964 and 1965 conspiracies and counter-conspiracies abounded, with Sukarno losing his ability to maintain control over the escalating internal conflict. In 1965 the situation reached a fever pitch when Aidit and the PKI suggested creating a “fifth force” of armed workers and peasants. This was a direct threat to the army’s monopoly of military power. In July 1965, the air force, which was closely aligned to Sukarno and sympathetic to the PKI, began training PKI civilian volunteers. In further moves favoring the PKI, Sukarno banned a number of anti-PKI newspapers and purged political leaders who opposed the PKI’s growing strength. In August 1965 the PKI

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claimed to have 27 million supporters in Indonesia. This figure, which included both Communist Party members and persons connected to associated organizations, was probably exaggerated. Still, it worried the army and the more conservative parties. Between them, the PKI and Sukarno seemed to have enough mass support to seize control of the entire country. Everywhere, the streets were filled with chanting Sukarno and PKI supporters. Finally, on August 17, Sukarno announced the creation of an anti-imperialist alliance with Cambodia, North Vietnam, China, and North Korea—the latter three leading Communist states in Asia. He had already withdrawn Indonesia from the World Bank and the United Nations.

Coups On the evening of September 30, 1965, a small group of soldiers supported by PKI party loyalists attempted to seize seven of the most senior generals in

the Indonesian army. Three were killed and three were captured, but the seventh, Commander in Chief Abdul Nasution, escaped over his back wall. The three captured generals were brutally tortured and killed. On October 1, the coup leaders went on the radio and, calling themselves the “September 30 Movement,” declared that they had acted to defend Sukarno from an attempted military coup organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It was unclear whether Sukarno knew of this “counter-coup,” but while it was under way, he moved to Halim air force base, which was the coup plotters’ headquarters. Aidit, who was also at Halim, was almost certainly involved in planning the coup. The coup fell apart because the plotters had failed to capture General Suharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command. They had perhaps assumed that Suharto, an officer who had avoided the political maneuvering of the previous months, would remain neutral during the coup. They were incorrect. Suharto moved to quickly regain control of Jakarta

Indonesian troops patrol the streets of Jakarta after an abortive Communist coup against President Sukarno on September 30, 1965. The counterattack was led by General Suharto, who proceeded to consolidate power and assume the presidency in 1967. (Carol Goldstein/Keystone/Getty Images)

Indonesia: Communist and Suharto Coups, 19 65–19 6 6

from the coup leaders. He deployed the reserve units under his command to garrison key parts of Jakarta and then contacted other senior officers in the region and convinced them to accept his orders during the crisis. If the coup plotters had moved quickly during the early hours after the murder of the six generals, they might have been able to seize the city in spite of Suharto, who at first wasn’t sure what had happened. After the first 24 hours, however, the initiative was in the hands of Suharto and his supporters. Suharto’s position was improved when Nasution came out of hiding and joined him. Suharto, having retaken the radio station from the coup forces, announced that he was in command of the army and that he would protect Sukarno from the traitorous September 30 Movement. On October 2, forces loyal to Suharto seized Halim air base. The coup leaders had already fled, while Sukarno had returned to his palace.

Suharto Suharto was a product of the Indonesian military establishment. Before World War II he had been trained to serve in the Dutch colonial army. During the war he had served in the Japanese-created Pembaela Tanah Air (Protectors of the Fatherland, or Peta) defensive force. After the war he was active in the war of independence against the Dutch. By 1962 Suharto was a major general and had gained a reputation as an honest and loyal officer, untainted by the corruption that characterized most of the military and the bureaucracy. Suharto was admired by many officers, and this helped him consolidate his position over the army and the country after 1965. Despite his reputation for loyalty, Suharto seems to have been involved in some of the military and PKI intrigues that were being carried on up until the 1965 coup— among other roles, Suharto supervised the secret negotiations between the military and Malaysia, which were designed to undercut Sukarno’s anti-Malaysia stance. There have even been suggestions that Suharto was involved or aware of the September 30 coup, but this seems unlikely. After October 2, Suharto proceeded to slowly solidify his control over the army and the nation. The coup had eliminated most senior officers, and the army looked to Suharto to guide it and deal with the problem of the Communists. Sukarno was allowed to remain as president, but he was a figurehead after October 1. The military never ceased to suspect

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that Sukarno had been involved in planning the September 30 coup attempt. Suharto and the other conservative generals organized a mass purge of all Indonesian Communists. Crowds of anticommunist students, mostly Muslim or Nationalist Party members, attacked Communists with the approval of the army. The Communists attempted to fight back but were outnumbered by the army and its mobs of supporters. Most Indonesians, shocked at the attempted PKI coup, seemed to support Suharto and the army’s actions. The number of people killed in the anticommunist purge is unknown, but it was probably in the general area of 500,000—including Aidit and most of the Party leadership. The Indonesian countryside was filled with mass graves, and the rivers and streams were clogged by bodies. The pro-Sukarno/ PKI mobs who had marched through Jakarta during August were replaced by pro-Suharto demonstrators after October. By the time the PKI had been officially outlawed, in March 1966, it was already destroyed as an effective political organization. Along with the Communists, ethnic Chinese were targeted by the rioters. The Chinese, who made up 2 percent of Indonesia’s population, had long been resented because of their financial success. China’s support for the PKI may have contributed to the attacks on the Chinese, but for the most part the anticommunist purges simply gave Indonesians a chance to attack a long-hated minority group—most ethnic Chinese had had nothing to do with the PKI. (The 1998 riots which forced Suharto out of power also saw attacks on ethnic Chinese, although on a much smaller scale.) Suharto gradually consolidated his power in 1966 and 1967. Sukarno’s attempts to reassert control were countered by pro-Suharto mobs. After March 1966, Sukarno was forced to grant extensive powers to Suharto. In March 1967 Suharto was appointed acting president, and in March 1968 he was made president of Indonesia. Sukarno was kept under house arrest until his death in 1970.

Legacy Suharto reversed the anti-Western and pro-Communist policies of Sukarno. Indonesia rejoined the United Nations and worked to align itself more closely with the West, while still retaining a great deal of political independence. Peace was concluded with the new government of Malaysia, and Suharto disavowed all

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claims on Malaysian territory. Suharto also joined the pro-Western ASEAN alliance, which was created as an American-sponsored anticommunist counterbalance in the region. Domestically, Suharto opened the door to international investment. Proper economic practices brought the country’s rampant inflation under control. Politically, Suharto built a pseudodemocracy that was dominated by a government-sanctioned party known as “Sekber Golkar.” Golkar won every election held in Indonesia, and Suharto was reelected president in six successive presidential elections. Indonesia prospered under Suharto’s rule, as did his family and friends, who received key jobs or were granted economic monopolies which they used to fill their Swiss bank accounts. Indonesia under Suharto did not cease being corrupt, but the corruption was kept within bounds and was not allowed to harm the country’s economy. This family dictatorship continued until student unrest in 1998 forced Suharto into retirement. The bloodshed of 1965–1966 was perhaps the inevitable result of two clashing forces in Indonesian politics. The progressive PKI, supported by Sukarno,

faced the traditional Muslim and Nationalist forces that were backed by the military. If the struggle was inevitable, the result was probably not. The 1965 coup was poorly planned but might still have succeeded if Suharto and Nasution had been killed along with the other senior generals in Jakarta. Much of the blame for the 1965 violence should probably be given to Sukarno. His fiery rhetoric and expensive gestures did little to strengthen Indonesia and much to divide it. Carl Skutsch See also: Coups; Indonesia: Wars of Independence, 1945– 1949.

Bibliography Anderson, Benedict, and Ruth T. McVey. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971. Cribb, R.B. Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945. New York: Longman, 1995. Crouch, Harold A. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Ricklefs, M.C. A History of Modern Indonesia, c. 1300 to the Present. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.

INDONESIA: Aceh Separatist Conflict Since 1976 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious

MALAYSIA

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la cc a

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Langsa

Kutacane

UMATRA

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INDIAN OCEAN Tapaktuan

SIMEULUE ISLAND BANYAK ISLAND

Singkil

The Indonesian province of Aceh, formally known as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalem, is located on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. With a distinctive culture and a history of resistance to foreign and outside rule, the oil- and gas-rich province of 4.3 million persons began its separatist struggle with Indonesia in 1976. Since the fall of the repressive Suharto regime in Jakarta in 1998, and particularly in the wake of the devastating tsunami of 2004, Acehnese separatists negotiated with the Indonesian government for formal autonomy, culminating in a 2005 agreement. The first independent Islamic kingdom in Aceh dates back to the ninth century c.e. and reached its

cultural golden age in the thirteenth century. With the expansion of European powers into Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century came war, as Acehnese battled first against the Portuguese and later the British and Dutch. As the Dutch extended their control over the East Indies from the seventeenth century, the Acehnese continued their resistance, and the province was the last in the East Indies to fall to Dutch control, in 1904. Still, sporadic guerrilla fighting continued through the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia in 1949. Indeed, the Acehnese resisted incorporation into the new Indonesian republic until 1959, when the province was granted autonomous rule as a daerah istimewa (special territory). Soon the grievances of the Acehnese began to accumulate. The most compelling complaint was that the Indonesian government in Jakarta allowed multinational energy companies to extract gas and oil from Aceh and sell them at handsome profits while not providing tangible benefits to the locals. The Acehnese also resented the arrival of ethnic Javanese in Aceh. This problem was aggravated by religious differences. The people of Aceh practiced orthodox Islam with its roots in southwest Asia, whereas the Javanese and many others in Indonesia followed a more liberal form of Islam. The Acehnese also looked with suspicion upon Indonesian culture, which was dominated by the Javanese. When Suharto came to power in a bloody 1965 coup and proclaimed his New Order for Indonesia, with an emphasis on Indonesian nationalism, the Acehnese suspected a plant for Javanese expansionism. A new Acehnese separatist movement began to take shape. The founder of the movement was Teungku Hasan Muhammed di Tiro. A successful businessman, Tiro came from a family of prominent clerics who traced their ancestry to the sultans who had ruled an independent Aceh before the onset of Dutch

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KEY DATES 1949

After years of struggle, Indonesia wins its independence from the Netherlands.

1965

Suharto takes power in a bloody coup, vowing to increase central control over the provinces; the coup leads to establishment of the Aceh separatist movement.

1998

Push for Acehnese independence intensifies after the fall of the Suharto government.

2001

The Indonesian House of Representatives passes a special autonomy law for Aceh, but sporadic fighting continues between government forces and separatist guerrillas.

2004 A tsunami hits Aceh, killing over 120,000 persons and leaving the provincial capital of Banda in ruins; massive death and destruction prompts both independents and government forces to halt their fighting. 2005 The government and the main separatist group sign peace accord; observers from the European Union and various Southeast Asian countries arrive to monitor the cease-fire; the thirty years of fighting between the two sides has left roughly 15,000 dead.

rule. On December 4, 1976, Tiro announced the formation of the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), which became popularly known in Bahasa, Indonesia’s national language, as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement). GAM’s military wing was called the Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (AGAM, or Armed Forces of the Free Aceh Movement). AGAM engaged in sporadic attacks on Indonesian forces in the late 1970s, prompting the Jakarta government to arrest GAM leaders. Tiro was forced to leave Aceh in 1979 and took up residence in Sweden, where he formed a government in exile. Continued economic exploitation and government repression led to renewed resistance in the late 1980s. A security force of some 30,000 national police and military personnel, including members of the elite, U.S.trained Kopassus commandos, was dispatched to the province, where it conducted a brutal anti-insurgency campaign that Amnesty International estimated killed more than 2,000 civilians and guerrillas. The government declared Aceh a Daerah Operasi Militer, or military operations zone.

Widespread human right violations, including the killing of civilians, torture, rape, and illegal confinement by security forces, intensified the Acehnese desire for independence. The clamor for freedom was renewed with greater vigor after the fall of Suharto in 1998. The restoration of Indonesian democracy and the rise of human rights groups in the country, including the Koalisi NGO HAM (Coalition of Human Rights) and Forum Peduli Hak Asasi Manusia (Human Rights Investigation Forum) led to revelations of abuse and repression in the province that were acknowledged by Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid when he took office in 1999. Wahid wanted to avoid another East Timor in Aceh. East Timor, also a province of Indonesia, had been fighting rule from Jakarta since the 1970s and had forced Indonesia to grant it independence after decades of bitter fighting. Wahid believed that regional autonomy was a means for Jakarta to maintain control of its far-flung island possessions. He did not want to see the resource-rich province of Aceh go the way of East Timor, so he opened up negotiations with GAM over autonomy for the province, including a

Indonesia: Aceh Separatist Conflict Since 1976

degree of local control of natural resources and lessening of the Indonesian security presence. Even as the negotiations moved forward, so did the fighting, with both sides using military means to strengthen their negotiating position. Meanwhile, numerous political organizations in Aceh were demanding a referendum on independence, organizing a massive demonstration in the capital of Banda in November 1999. It was a prospect the government in Jakarta refused even to consider. Finally, in July 2001, the Indonesian House of Representatives passed a special autonomy law for Aceh, allowing the direct election of a provincial governor, the setting up of local Sharia (traditional Islamic law) courts, and an arrangement whereby 70 percent of government revenues from gas and oil in the province would go into provincial coffers. In December 2002, a cease-fire was arranged under the auspices of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, an international non-governmental organization (NGO).

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Still, fighting persisted between the 40,000strong national security force in the province and the guerrilla movement, estimated at 5,000 strong. The guerrillas engaged in human rights violations, abducting family members of security forces and attacking Javanese settlers in the province. The Indonesian army responded with tough repressive measures, and, in May 2003, the new Indonesian president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, declared martial law in the province after the failure of the Tokyo Conference for Peace and Reconstruction of Aceh. The establishment of a Civil Emergency Situation in late 2003 banned both foreign journalists and international NGOs from the province. Sporadic fighting continued all through 2004. Then on December 26, 2004, a devastating tsunami struck the province—and much of the Indian Ocean basin. The tsunami killed more than 120,000 persons in Aceh alone and left the capital of Banda in ruins, making it one of the most destructive natural

In a show of strength by police in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, captive members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are paraded in public in 2003. An August 2005 agreement brought peace to the province. (Hotli Simanjuntak/AFP/Getty Images)

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disasters in history. It did have one positive result, however, in bringing both sides, the government of Indonesia and GAM, back to the negotiating table. For his part, newly elected Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono renewed Jakarta’s offer of autonomy and an amnesty for rebels. As for GAM, it had come to the conclusion that autonomy was the best it could hope for from the government. An agreement between the two sides was signed in Helsinki on August 15, 2005, ending the three decades of insurgency, which had left a trail of destruction, human right abuses, and about 15,000 dead. Under the agreement, approximately 250 observers from the European Union and various Southeast Asian nations came to Aceh to monitor the cease-fire. Patit Paban Mishra See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; East Timor: Independence Struggle, 1974–2002; Indonesia: Wars of Independence, 1945–1949; Indonesia: Communist and Suharto

Coups, 1965–1966; Indonesia: Irian Jaya Separatist Conflict Since 1964.

Bibliography Christie, Clive J. “Nationalism and the ‘House of Islam’: The Acehnese Revolt and the Republic of Indonesia.” In Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism, and Separatism, ed. C.J. Christie. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996. Kell, Tim. The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion 1989–92. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1995. Schulze, Kirsten E. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization. Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004. Siapno, Jacqueline Aquino. Gender, Islam, Nationalism and the State in Aceh: The Paradox of Power, Co-optation and Resistance. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002. Siegel, James T. The Rope of God. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Sukma, Rizal. Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons. Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004.

KOREA,NORTH: Seizure of the Pueblo,1968 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Terrorism and International Incidents PARTICIPANT: United States The government in Pyongyang accused the Pueblo crew of entering North Korea’s territorial waters. The Pueblo, according to American officials, was approximately 25 miles from the North Korean coast, a safe distance from the 12-mile territorial limit claimed by North Korea. The Pueblo was under orders to remain at least 13 miles off the Korean coast at all times. For reasons that were unclear at the time, the Pueblo crew was unable to destroy all the secret files on board. The North Koreans captured some files and some sophisticated equipment including radio, sonar, and other intelligence-gathering instruments. The day after the seizure, North Korea announced that U.S. Commander Lloyd Bucher had admitted that the Pueblo was in North Korea’s territorial waters when it was captured. American officials labeled the confession a fraud. False confessions had been used often by North Korea and China during the Korean War. There was uncertainty about the motivation of North Korea. There was the possibility that the capture of the Pueblo was meant as a diversion related to the Vietnam conflict. If the United States had to increase its military presence along the Korean peninsula, this could reduce military pressure on North Vietnam. There was also the possibility that North Korea simply wanted to embarrass the Western superpower and its South Korean ally. South Korea had sent more than 40,000 troops to fight in South Vietnam.

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U.S. Options

On January 23, 1968, North Korea seized the Pueblo, a U.S. Navy ship with a crew of eighty-three on an intelligence-gathering mission off the coast of North Korea. During the seizure, a number of crew members were injured and one was killed. At the time of the incident, the use of intelligence ships to gather sensitive information was widely used by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Pueblo incident occurred during a major offensive by Communist guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars against South Vietnam, which was scheduled to coincide with the Vietnamese New Year celebration called Tet. This Tet offensive struck at dozens of targets throughout South Vietnam, even the outskirts of Saigon, the South Vietnamese capital. As a result of the offensive, American officials began to

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KEY DATES 1945

With the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II, Soviet forces occupy Korea north of the 38th parallel, and U.S. forces occupy the peninsula below the parallel; this leads to establishment of a Communist North Korea and a capitalist South Korea.

1950

North Korea invades South Korea, leading to a bloody three-year conflict that draws in a U.S-led UN coalition force to protect the south.

1968 On January 23, North Korean forces seize the U.S. naval spy vessel Pueblo; North Korea claims the ship is within its twelve-mile territorial limits; the U.S. government says the ship was twenty-five miles off the coast and thus in international waters; on December 22, the eightytwo-member crew of the Pueblo is released by North Korea. 1969 A U.S. naval court of inquiry recommends that Pueblo commander Lloyd Bucher be put on trial for failure to destroy sensitive equipment on ship before capture; Navy secretary John Chafee rejects the court recommendation.

give serious consideration to finding some method to end the conflict. America’s options in responding to the Pueblo incident were limited because of the Vietnam War. President Lyndon Johnson did not want to take any action that would involve the United States in another Asian conflict. Johnson’s commitment to South Vietnam was increasingly unpopular, and demands were being made for the United States to disengage. The material costs of the war, the casualties, and the lack of progress in bringing the war to an end took a toll on Johnson’s popularity and that of the Democratic Party. The situation was made worse by the fact that the United States and North Korea had no formal diplomatic ties, so they could not negotiate directly with one another. The only international group in which the two nations communicated was the Korean Armistice Commission. When the commission met after the seizure of the Pueblo, however, the North Korean delegates used the meeting to denounce the United States and to repeat the accusation that the ship had violated North Korea’s territorial waters. On January 26, 1968, the United States took the issue to the United Nations Security Council, but there was little hope that the council could re-

solve the crisis. North Korea was not a member of the United Nations (UN) and had been declared an aggressor during the Korean War. North Korean officials declared they would not recognize or abide by any UN resolutions dealing with the American complaint. China, also branded an aggressor by the UN during the Korean War, supported North Korea’s refusal to accept the authority of the UN. Arthur Goldberg, the American ambassador to the UN, claimed that the Pueblo was in international waters and accused North Korea of committing a premeditated act of aggression. The Soviet delegate to the UN, Platon Morozov, defended North Korea’s actions. He accepted as valid the alleged confession of Commander Bucher made the day after the Pueblo was captured. The Soviets made it clear they would veto any Security Council resolution critical of North Korea. The United States hoped the Soviet Union would help to bring about the release of the captured ship and seamen. American officials, however, realized there was little incentive for the Soviet leaders to intervene on America’s behalf. The Soviets did not want to antagonize North Korea’s premier Kim Il Sung. They hoped he would remain neutral in any conflict between the Soviet Union and China. The Soviets in-

Korea, North: Seizure of the Pueblo, 19 6 8

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The USS Pueblo, a Navy intelligence-gathering ship seized by North Korea in its territorial waters on January 23, 1968, remains prominently anchored in Pyongyang today. (Peter Parks/AFP/Getty Images)

sisted that the United States deal directly with the North Korean government, knowing that any direct contacts between the United States and North Korea would drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. The Soviets also hoped to be allowed to examine the Pueblo and its equipment to evaluate America’s spying capabilities. The United States could have bombed North Korea or imposed a limited blockade, but these options were discarded because of the fear that the American crew would suffer the consequences. Even without any retaliatory action, there was the possibility that North Korea would put the Pueblo crew on trial. President Johnson would have been under a good deal of pressure to take some military action if a trial did occur.

Unanswered Questions The Pueblo initially encountered a single North Korean patrol boat. Three additional patrol boats

arrived about an hour and forty-five minutes later. Why American fighter planes stationed in South Korea and Japan were not dispatched to assist the Pueblo was unclear. The ship was equipped with two fiftycaliber machine guns, but none of them was fired. In fact, the ship offered no resistance. Some critics wanted to know why the Pueblo was not better armed and why there were no escort vessels to protect the intelligence ship. A number of congressmen, including Senator Karl Mundt, were critical of the Pueblo incident. They thought there should have been either air cover or escort vessels to protect the spy-ship. Some congressmen thought the United States might be militarily overextended as a result of the Indochina conflict. There was, nevertheless, some demand for military action. Senator John Stennis even suggested that the United States consider using nuclear weapons against North Korea. Senators William Fulbright and Mike Mansfield urged President Johnson to seek a diplomatic remedy. President

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Johnson’s dilemma was evident in his address to the American people on January 26, 1968. He said he would continue to use every means to free the men and the ship, but it was clear that his options were limited. Above all else, he wanted to avoid starting another war in Asia. North Korea had consistently threatened to renew the Korean War, and those threats were taken seriously by American and South Korean officials. Just ten years earlier, in fact, North Korea had announced a ten-year plan to prepare for a new war. President Johnson decided not to take any military action against North Korea. His decision contrasted with his reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 when an American destroyer was allegedly attacked by three North Vietnamese gunboats and the United States retaliated by launching air attacks against North Vietnam. President Johnson convinced Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which authorized him to exercise broad powers in the Vietnam conflict.

Crew Released On December 22, 1968, eleven months after their capture, the crew of the Pueblo was released. To obtain the release, the United States agreed to sign a “false confession” acknowledging that the Pueblo had violated North Korea’s territorial waters. The confession included a “solemn apology.” Before the confession was signed, however, it was repudiated by American officials, but the repudiation did not offend the North Korean officials.

Eighty-two Americans were released plus the body of one American killed when the Pueblo was seized. Commander Bucher said he and his men were beaten and threatened with death. He insisted that the Pueblo had never violated North Korea’s territorial waters and was 15 to 16 miles off the coast of Korea when it was seized. The statement he signed after his capture stating that the Pueblo had violated North Korea’s territorial waters was the result of a North Korean threat that one American would be killed every day until he signed the confession. When Bucher and the crew returned, the Navy convened a court of inquiry to investigate the situation that existed when the Pueblo was captured. In March 1969, the court of inquiry recommended that Bucher be put on trial because sensitive equipment on the Pueblo was not destroyed before the ship was captured. Bucher claimed that the ship did not have a mechanism for destroying the equipment and that he and his crew did the best they could under the circumstances. Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee rejected the recommendation of the court of inquiry, saying that Bucher and his men had suffered enough during their period of captivity. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations; Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 1950–1953.

Bibliography Brandt, Edward. The Last Voyage of the USS Pueblo. New York: Popular Library, 1968. Bucher, Lloyd. Bucher: My Story. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970.

KOREA,NORTH: Nuclear Standoff Since the 1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: China; Japan; North Korea; Russia; South Korea; United States entered into trilateral discussions aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The discussions became known as the Six-Party talks with the addition of South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The talks ended in September 2005, with all parties signing a Statement of Principles, in which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program, cooperate with IAEA safeguards, and reenter the NonProliferation Treaty.

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Hwaedae-Gun Missile Range Taechon Reactor Pakchon Plant Pyongyang Production Facility

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In February 2005, North Korea acknowledged to the world that it had manufactured nuclear weapons. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the United States, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, Australia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had negotiated with the Pyongyang regime to abandon its nuclear weapon ambitions. The Agreed Framework signed by North Korea and the United States in 1994 seemed to provide the instrument under which the government of Kim Jong Il would cease production of the materials—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—necessary to build working nuclear weapons. In 2002, however, North Korea acknowledged that it had continued, clandestinely, to produce highly enriched uranium. The United States scrapped the Agreed Framework later that year, and in 2003 the United States, North Korea, and China

Although its culture is one of the world’s oldest, Korea has enjoyed independence for only a relatively brief period. It was a vassal state of China from the seventeenth century through the Sino-Chinese War of 1895–1896 and was largely sealed off from the outside world. The nation became independent after the latter conflict, only to be taken over by Japan in 1910. Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Korea was occupied by Soviet and American forces, with the former taking control of territory above the 38th parallel and the Americans taking control below it. In 1948, the division was made permanent, and separate governments were established for North and South Korea. In 1950, North Korean Communist leader Kim Il Sung launched an invasion of South Korea. After three years of bitter fighting—pitting North Korean and Chinese troops on one side and UN and South Korean forces on the other—an armistice was signed, establishing a boundary roughly along the same 38th parallel. Although both sides remained heavily armed and the line between them one of the most fortified in the world, the two countries have maintained an uneasy peace for more than half a century, broken only by

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KEY DATES 1952

The Soviet Union and North Korea sign a nuclear agreement, and North Korea begins its nuclear program.

1959

North Korea signs a civilian nuclear agreement with the Soviet Union.

1977

North Korea signs an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to put its reactor under safeguards.

1991

The United States pulls its nuclear weapons out of South Korea.

1994

North Korea signs the “Agreed Framework,” requiring the country to freeze its reactors and permit IAEA inspections in exchange for U.S. help in developing commercial nuclear power in the country.

2003

United States, North Korea, and China entered into trilateral discussion aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

2005

In February, North Korea acknowledges publicly that it has manufactured nuclear weapons; six-party talks (United States, Russia, China, North Korea, Japan, and South Korea) end in September with all parties signing a Statement of Principles committing North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program.

2006

Pyongyang fires off seven missiles in the face of international criticism, but the single long-range missile among the seven fails and is destroyed by the North Koreans less than a minute after its launch.

a few minor incidents and skirmishes. The United States—which had supplied the bulk of the troops and equipment for the UN force in the 1950–1953 conflict—stationed tens of thousands of troops and tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Origins of North Korea’s Nuclear Program North Korean interest in developing nuclear weapons dates back to the 1950s, when the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons to end the war and actually deployed them in the region later that decade. Pyongyang initiated its nuclear program with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Research Institute as part of the Academy of Sciences in 1952. The same year, North Korea joined the Soviet Union in a cooperative nuclear agreement, which enabled North Korean physicists and technicians to train in the USSR. In 1959, the Kim Il Sung regime signed another pact with the Soviet Union, whereby the

latter assisted in the establishment of a nuclear reactor complex at Yongbyong; two years later, the Soviets installed an IRT-2000 graphite-moderated research reactor at the site. North Korea expanded its nuclear program through the 1960s and early 1970s, when it increased the capabilities of the IRT-2000 reactor and acquired plutonium reprocessing technologies from the USSR. In 1977 North Korea signed a bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the USSR placing the Yongbyong reactor under IAEA safeguards. In the 1980s, North Korea either acquired or developed indigenous nuclear technologies, most of which had the capability to produce nuclear power or weapon materials. In the early 1980s, North Korea established uranium mining and milling facilities, a fuel-rod fabrication complex, and a five-megawatt (MW) thermal reactor. The Pyongyang regime indicated an interest in weapons development by conducting the highly explosive tests necessary to design the triggers. In the mid-1980s, North Korea began construction of a fifty-MW reactor and expanded its

Korea, North: Nuclear Standoff Since the 19 9 0s

uranium-processing facilities at Yongbyong. Seeking to acquire light water power reactors, it agreed to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 in exchange for Soviet assistance in the construction of four light water reactors. Normally nations have eighteen months to prepare their nuclear facilities for NPT safeguard inspections, but the IAEA provided North Korea with the wrong documents to initiate the agreement. Although it was granted another eighteen months to complete the process, North Korea refused to comply, insisting that the United States remove its nuclear weapons from the region and terminate its joint military exercise, Team Spirit, with South Korea. In December 1991, the United States removed its nuclear weapons from the region, a move that led North and South Korea to discuss the future of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. These talks led the Koreas to sign the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which they agreed “not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, deploy, or store nuclear weapons.” The declaration also required both sides to dismantle uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, and provided for bilateral inspection of facilities. But the declaration was never enforced, and the inspections were never carried out. On January 30, 1992, North Korea signed an IAEA safeguards agreement, which Pyongyang ratified on April 9, 1992. From May 1992 to February 1993, the IAEA conducted six rounds of inspections of the North Korean nuclear complex. But while North Korean officials provided the IAEA with a small plutonium sample, saying it was obtained from the reprocessing of a damaged fuel rod removed from the five-MW reactor at Yongbyong, the IAEA determined that North Korea had reprocessed plutonium three times, in 1989, 1990, and 1991. In 1993 the IAEA requested access to two nuclear waste sites, a request the North Koreans denied, claiming the sites were military installations and off-limits to foreigners. Denied access to the waste sites, the IAEA went to the UN Security Council to request the authority to conduct special ad hoc inspections. This, in turn, led to Pyongyang’s announcement that it would withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993. After nearly three months of bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea, Pyongyang declared it would suspend its withdrawal from the treaty. At the same time, however, it claimed special status within the NPT regarding its safeguard commit-

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ments; inspections of current but not past activities would be permitted. In the meantime, North Korea continued to operate its five-MW reactor and, in May 1994, with the reactor core burned up, removed the spent fuel rods without IAEA supervision. The latter action aggravated an already tense situation between Pyongyang and IAEA, as it compromised the IAEA’s ability to reconstruct the operational history of the reactor and thereby analyze discrepancies in North Korea’s inventory of reprocessed plutonium. Washington asked the UN Security Council to impose economic sanctions on North Korea, but Pyongyang protested, declaring that it would consider the imposition of economic sanctions an act of war.

Agreed Framework The intervention of former U.S. president Jimmy Carter in June 1994 led to Pyongyang’s acceptance of a broad proposal of concessions and assistance known as the “Agreed Framework.” Finalized in October 1994, the agreement called for North Korea to freeze its reactors, permit the IAEA to monitor the freeze, implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and remain party to the NPT. In exchange, the United States would assist North Korea in developing a commercial nuclear power infrastructure, leading an international consortium to construct two light water power reactors and providing 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until 2003, the target date for the first reactor to go online. It also formally assured Pyongyang that it would not threaten or use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Although North Korea froze its reactors for nearly a year under the Agreed Framework, neither party was satisfied with the compromise and its implementation. The continued postponement of safeguards inspections to verify North Korea’s past activities displeased the United States, while the delayed construction of the light water power reactors displeased North Korea. The Pyongyang regime demanded compensation from the United States, but Washington argued that 2003 was only a target date and not a firm commitment. In June 2001, the United States revised its policy toward North Korea with regard to the Agreed Framework. Washington now demanded verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture. Although the original framework

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did not require North Korea to submit to full verification until construction of the light water power reactors was nearly complete, the United States now insisted on accelerated safeguards inspections. Bilateral talks resumed in October 2002, during which the United States revealed that it had evidence of a clandestine North Korean uranium enrichment program. Acknowledging the claims, Pyongyang maintained that it had every right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense. Washington responded in December 2002 by suspending heavy oil shipments, which led North Korea to lift the freeze on reactor operations, expelling IAEA inspectors monitoring the freeze, and announcing withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003. North Korea later insisted that it had no intention of actually producing nuclear weapons and had resumed reactor operations for power production only. Then, on February 10, 2005, the Koreans announced that they had manufactured nuclear weapons in the past. In April 2005, North Korea shut down its five-MW reactor and extracted the spent fuel rods, which if reprocessed would provide enough plutonium for one to three weapons. While North Koreans had never tested a nuclear device, U.S. satellite imagery indicated that it may have been preparing to do so in June 2005. In September 2005, the fourth round of sixparty talks among North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States ended with all parties signing a Statement of Principles in which North Korea pledged to abandon all nuclear activities, rejoin the NPT, and allow the IAEA to resume inspections of nuclear facilities at “an early date.” In exchange, the United States assured North Korea that it had no intention of attacking it with conventional or nuclear weapons and reaffirmed that it has no nuclear weapons deployed to the region. Although North Korea still insisted on having a light water nuclear reactor for power production, the United States did not let that demand stand in the way of reaching a compromise, insisting that the issue could be addressed at a later date. The other parties pledged to offer North Korea assistance in power production as well as other forms of foreign aid.

North Korean Motives, U.S. Opposition Having relied on the support of Moscow for much of its economic and military aid since the 1950s,

Pyongyang was particularly hard-hit by the collapse and disappearance of the Soviet Union—and Soviet aid—in 1991. Indeed, the Soviet regime of Mikhail Gorbachev had been reducing aid to North Korea since the late 1980s, while trying to open it up to South Korea and the rest of the world. Diplomatically, then, Pyongyang was feeling increasingly isolated. The loss of Soviet aid, along with mismanagement of the economy and massive flooding, led to a series of devastating famines in the mid-1990s. At the time, the government—which normally bars foreigners from visiting the impoverished countryside—was forced to allow UN food aid workers into some of the more distressed parts of the country. At the same time, the North Korean leadership could look across the demilitarized zone and see the economic miracle taking place in South Korea. While the North’s economy stagnated after the 1960s, the South’s boomed. Indeed, South Korea became one of the so-called economic “tigers” of Asia. Moreover, South Korea made an effective transition from military dictatorship to democracy in the late 1980s. While all of this was unknown to the North Korean people—the nation’s media are strictly controlled— the leadership in Pyongyang was surely aware that they were being left behind economically by their rivals below the 38th parallel. Isolated, secretive, economically backward, and facing the ongoing threat of famine, North Korea has sought nuclear weapons, say experts, for either of two reasons: to defend itself against an attack from the United States that it has convinced itself is imminent, and to serve as a bargaining chip—or form of blackmail—in negotiations with the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and other interested parties. Fearful that North Korea would develop weapons, potentially use them, or sell them to other dangerous regimes or terrorist groups, outside parties proved willing to provide economic aid and even a civilian nuclear energy program. As for the United States, South Korea, and other powers, the North Korean regime appeared eminently—and dangerously—unstable. In the view of many U.S. officials, decisions in Pyongyang policy were being made by paranoid leaders capable of acting against the nation’s own best interests and putting it at grave risk. And the instability was regarded in some circles as potentially political as well. The North Korean people are among the poorest in Asia, with a standard of living well below that of their

Korea, North: Nuclear Standoff Since the 19 9 0s

South Korean counterparts. Although Pyongyang maintained a highly effective internal security system, cracks in it appeared to be growing. More and more North Koreans were traveling to China, where they were exposed to life in a more open and economically dynamic country. Prolonged economic deterioration, meanwhile, poses an inherent threat to the entrenched power. In the face of such instabilities, U.S. policymakers fear that a desperate Pyongyang regime could resort to a nuclear attack on South Korea, Japan, or even its own people to prop itself up. Some even fear that North Korea’s missile program could evolve to the point of becoming capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the U.S. mainland. Some of those fears were allayed a bit in July 2006, when North Korea—in the face of international criticism—fired off seven missiles. But the only long-range missile in that group—the Taepodong-2—had to be destroyed within less than a minute of its launch. The failure of the Taepodong-2 showed that Pyongyang may still be some time away from developing the capacity to seriously threaten the United States with long-range missiles—though the test firings demonstrated once again that Kim Jong Il remains an unpredictable and provocative leader. Another concern for Washington is the threat of terrorism. Not only has Pyongyang been accused of engaging in acts of terrorism itself—blowing up 17 South Korean officials in Myanmar in 1983, and

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bombing a South Korean airliner in 1987, killing 119 people—but, according to Bush administration officials, it allegedly has harbored left-wing terrorists and has had contacts with Islamist terrorists. In 2004, the IAEA announced there was strong evidence that North Korea supplied uranium to Libya, once considered a major sponsor of terrorism. Although Libya agreed to dismantle its own nuclear weapons program, the Bush administration remained concerned that Pyongyang might provide nuclear weapons or radioactive materials to anti-U.S. terrorist organizations. As of early 2006, however, there did not appear much the United States could do to punish or control North Korea. Most experts agreed that Pyongyang had already built several bombs and that any U.S. effort to neutralize, dismantle, or destroy them would risk a potentially grave and irrational response. Adam Hornbuckle and James Ciment See also: International Arms Trade; Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 1950–1953.

Bibliography Chang, Gordon G. Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World. New York: Random House, 2006. Khil, Young Whan, and Hong Nack Kim, eds. North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006. O’Hanlon, Michael, and Mike Mochizuki. Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003.

KOREA,SOUTH: Invasion by the North, 1950–1953 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: China; United Nations; United States the unification of Korea was one of the issues that heightened Soviet-American tensions after 1945. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was a defining event in the Cold War. That conflict brought about a fundamental reassessment of American policies with respect to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

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Korea, because of its geographic location, has been a major influence on Northeast Asian politics. After World War II, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States were dominant actors in shaping Korea’s internal and external policies. Disagreement regarding

At the Cairo conference in November 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China made plans for Asia after Japan was defeated in World War II. They agreed to strip Japan of all the territory it had acquired since 1894, including Korea. The three nations decided that Korea would become free and independent “in due course.” That phrase was used because President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted Korea governed by a trusteeship. He did not consult with Korean leaders, and thus he was unaware that many of them opposed this idea—they wanted immediate independence once Japan was defeated. At the 1945 Yalta conference, the Soviet Union agreed to the decisions made at the Cairo conference, but no detailed plans were made for a trusteeship. At the Potsdam conference in July 1945, the Allied powers repeated the pledge made in Cairo regarding Japan’s territorial possessions. When Japan was about to surrender, the United States and the Soviet Union hastily agreed to divide Korea along the 38th parallel to accept the surrender of Japanese military forces. At the time, the United States had no troops near Korea, and American officials feared that without an agreement to divide the region, the Soviet Union would deploy its military forces throughout Korea. The 38th parallel was intended as a temporary demarcation line, not a permanent

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KEY DATES 1945

In the wake of the Japanese defeat in World War II, Korea is occupied by Soviet forces above the 38th parallel and by U.S. forces below it.

1950

After several years of efforts to unify the country diplomatically, war breaks out when North Korean forces massively invade South Korea on June 25; on June 27, the UN Security Council, with the Soviet Union absent, votes to send troops to defend South Korea; first American troops are ordered into action on June 30; on September 15, UN troops counterattack with amphibious landing at Inchon; in October, UN forces cross 38th parallel into North Korea; that same month, Chinese forces cross Yalu River into North Korea.

1951

In early part of year, battle lines become fixed around 38th parallel.

1952

In United States, Republican presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower campaigns on platform of ending war in Korea.

1953

After settling thorny question of returning prisoners of war, UN and North Korea sign armistice on July 27.

boundary. When Korea was occupied, however, Soviet military commanders refused to cooperate with their American counterparts until an agreement was reached between Washington and Moscow to establish a provisional government.

Great Power Negotiations In December 1945, Secretary of State James Byrnes traveled to Moscow to determine if the Big Three— Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—could negotiate some agreements for the postwar era. One month earlier, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman had reported to Washington that Soviet leaders considered Korea similar to Finland, Poland, and Romania, routes that could be used to invade the Soviet Union. He suspected that because the Soviet Union shared a common border with Korea, Moscow might want to retain control over North Korea either directly or indirectly. During the December 1945 Moscow meeting, the foreign ministers decided to establish a trusteeship for no more than five years. They also established a Soviet-American commission to lay the foundation for a provisional government for a unified Korea. The agreements made in Moscow were general in nature

and provided little guidance for the negotiators in Korea. No date was given for holding national elections nor were the powers of the proposed provisional government delineated. There were no discussions about the possibility of extending or shortening the trusteeship period nor were any provisions made for the paralysis that could result if the veto power was abused. Each of the trusteeship powers—China, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—had the right of veto. The foreign ministers did not discuss the necessity for a trusteeship nor did they consult with Korean leaders. Those leaders opposed a trusteeship, viewing it as replacing one foreign authority with another. Although China and Great Britain were to be a part of the trusteeship system, neither country played a significant role in the negotiations that took place after the 1945 Moscow meeting. China was engaged in a civil war, and Great Britain was coping with a financial crisis and the dissolution of its empire. Two groups were given responsibility for resolving Korea’s problem: the Soviet-American Conference and the Joint U.S.–Soviet Commission. The former convened in Seoul on January 16, 1946, to discuss such things as the supply of electric power, commodity trading, railroad and motor transportation,

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the movement of Korean citizens from one zone to the other, and communication issues. There was a fundamental difference between the Soviet and American approaches to the conference. The United States wanted to remove all barriers between the North and South, whereas the Soviets wanted to improve coordination between the two zones. Representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union held fifteen formal sessions, the last one on February 5, 1946. They reached some minor agreements but none regarding any of the major economic issues. The Soviets refused to permit establishing a combined radio network, would not allow travel across the 38th parallel without prior permission, and would not allow newspapers from the South to be distributed in the Soviet zone. The lack of success convinced some American officials that the Soviets intended to remain in North Korea long enough to establish a proSoviet government there. After the Moscow conference and before the first meeting of the Joint U.S.–Soviet Commission, the Soviet press consistently criticized political leaders in South Korea such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, who they claimed opposed the trusteeship and organized protest demonstrations. The South Korean political leaders were accused of being anti-Soviet, and American military commanders were suspected of permitting and encouraging the demonstrations. In fact, many South Korean leaders opposed both the United States and the Soviet Union because of the trusteeship decision made in Moscow in 1945. The leaders in North Korea had no choice—they could not oppose the policy preferences of the Soviet leaders. In February 1946, Russian military authorities announced the formation of an all-Korean government in North Korea. It was composed of known Communists and Koreans brought back from the Soviet Union and Manchuria where they had fled to escape Japanese rule. Kim Il Sung returned to Korea and soon emerged as the most important North Korean leader who willingly cooperated with the Soviet military and political leaders.

Unification Efforts The first session of the Joint U.S.–Soviet Commission on Korea met in Seoul in March 1946. Its primary responsibility was to lay the groundwork for establishing a provisional government. Colonel General Teren-

tyi Shtykov, the chief Soviet delegate, said the Soviets wanted a friendly Korea so it would not be used as a base for attacking the Soviet Union. The commission remained in session until May and then adjourned. It made no progress in establishing a provisional government. The most difficult issue confronting the commission was to determine which political and social groups to consult before organizing a provisional government. The United States wanted many groups consulted, while the Soviet Union wanted to consult few. The Soviets insisted that those leaders and groups opposing the trusteeship should not be a part of the consulting process because they were anti-Soviet. American officials rejected this claim. They said the demonstrations against the trusteeship were simply a form of free speech. The United States would not punish demonstrators for exercising a right that should be protected throughout Korea. The Soviets wanted to manipulate the consultations to guarantee that those groups that were friendly toward the Soviet Union would have a preponderant voice. The techniques used in the North were similar to those used to install Communist governments in Eastern Europe after World War II. The Communists in North Korea controlled those agencies responsible for security, fused political parties, and established a popular front government controlled by the Communists. At a news conference on August 30, 1947, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson said the United States was willing to have the Joint Commission resume negotiations. Its last meeting had been in May. He said the United States intended to remain in Korea as long as necessary to help create an independent Korea. He wanted the Soviet leaders to know that the United States did not intend to abandon South Korea. The Soviets did not respond to the American initiative. In 1947, the United States made several efforts to reconvene the commission. Finally, on April 19, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov announced his willingness to have the commission again meet. U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall welcomed the Soviet decision to resume the talks. In a letter to Molotov, Marshall insisted on the principle of freedom of expression and the need for the commission to consult with a wide range of groups. On the surface it appeared that the two sides agreed on how the Joint Commission should proceed. The commission was ordered by the two countries to report back by July

Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 195 0–1953

or August on progress made or the lack of it. It reconvened in May 1947 in Seoul. Initially, the negotiations seemed to be going well, but Soviet-American differences on the question of consultations with political and social groups again emerged. On June 27, 1947, the Soviets insisted on excluding those groups that had opposed a trusteeship. The Soviets wanted parties or organizations affiliated with the Representative Democratic Council, a coalition of conservative political groups headed by Syngman Rhee, barred from consultations. The Soviet reversion appeared to violate the understanding between Marshall and Molotov reached in April. The reversion reflected the fact that Communist influence would be diluted if all the nonCommunist groups were consulted. The groups in North Korea would do whatever the Soviets wanted them to, but there were many more groups in the South than in the North. At the time, South Korea had a population of approximately 20 million, North Korea about 9 million. In August 1947, an ad hoc committee on Korea, composed of American policy experts from various government departments, recommended to President Harry Truman that the United States take the Korean issue to the United Nations. They also recommended granting independence to South Korea if the Joint Commission failed to reach an agreement. On August 11, Marshall wrote to Molotov requesting that the Joint Commission issue a report by August 21. Marshall did not want the talks to continue indefinitely. In August 1947, Foreign Minister Molotov agreed that the Joint Commission should issue a report. By this time, it was evident that the commission was hopelessly divided. Colonel General Terentyi F. Shtykov accused South Korea of carrying out a pogrom against “leftists” with the support of the United States. Major General Albert Brown, head of the American delegation to the commission, angrily denounced the Soviet Union for its accusation. He accused the Soviets of interfering in South Korea’s internal politics. On September 8, 1947, the American delegation to the commission reported that the two sides were unable to agree on a joint report. Each side wrote its own report. The Soviets rejected an American proposal to conduct a plebiscite as part of the process for establishing a provisional government. They labeled the proposal “pure propaganda.” The Soviets also rejected

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an American proposal to convene a four-power conference to try to find a formula for resolving the Korean issue. In 1947, some policymakers in Washington were beginning to question the value of the American presence in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought South Korea was a strategic liability and recommended withdrawing American military forces. South Korea was also a burden because of its many political, social, and economic problems, some of which were the result of partition. Syngman Rhee and many of his followers often opposed American policies and sought to undermine them. He accused the United States of being responsible for the division of Korea and for failing to consult with Korean leaders at those conferences where decisions vital to Korea’s future were made. American officials were often frustrated because they were unable to get the various political factions in South Korea to cooperate with each other. The left-wing and right-wing political factions were polarized, and there was a good deal of fragmentation within each faction. Many Koreans viewed the United States as just another occupying power that denied South Korea the freedom and independence they expected once Japan was defeated. Other policymakers in Washington did not want to abandon South Korea because of the SovietAmerican ideological conflict. They feared that such a policy could produce an adverse reaction throughout Asia. In a report to President Truman, after a trip to Korea in the summer of 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer recommended that the United States maintain its presence in South Korea. He emphasized that political factors could be just as important as military factors in shaping American policies with respect to Asia. President Truman accepted Wedemeyer’s recommendations. The United States decided to take the Korean issue to the United Nations. On September 17, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall, in an address to the General Assembly, called upon the world organization to try to bring about the unification of Korea. On September 23, the General Assembly, over the opposition of the Soviet Union, voted to place the Korean question on its agenda. In November, the General Assembly established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, which was to oversee elections leading to a provisional government and national unification. The Soviet Union announced it would not cooperate with the commission.

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Soviet-American differences regarding Korea contributed to the deterioration of the SovietAmerican relationship. In January 1947, the Soviets had conducted a rigged election in Poland, a violation of the Yalta agreements. In March, President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to articulate what became the Truman Doctrine, a response to Communist activities in Greece and Turkey. He considered extending the doctrine to Korea but decided not to do so because of the financial costs. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, contributed to the division of Europe and further polarized Soviet-American relations. In October 1947, the Soviets established the Cominform, a Communist Information Bureau, as an instrument for exercising greater control over the Soviet bloc nations in Eastern Europe and Communist political parties. During the first meeting of the Cominform, Andrei Zhdanov, a high-ranking Soviet official and a member of the Politburo, said the world was divided into two camps: the imperialists and the anti-imperialists. All nations were in one camp or the other; nations could not be neutral. By 1947, the question of Korea’s unification became enmeshed in the Cold War environment. The division between the United States and the Soviet Union cut across Korea, Austria, Berlin, Germany, and Europe. Events in 1948 made it apparent that Korea would remain divided. In April, Soviet troops began digging fortifications along the 38th parallel, something they would not have done if they expected Korea to be unified. That same month President Truman approved NSC-8, a National Security Council study of America’s relations with Korea. The study recommended that South Korea receive military assistance but that the United States would not be responsible for its defense. South Korea was not a vital American interest. The United States had demobilized its military forces in Korea after World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the 45,000 American troops could be more usefully deployed elsewhere.

Korea Divided In May 1948, elections were held in South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission. Supporters of Syngman Rhee won a majority of the seats to the National Assembly. In July, South Korea adopted a constitution and the National Assembly elected Syngman Rhee president.

On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established. In September, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formally established north of the 38th parallel, and Kim Il Sung became premier. In December, the United Nations General Assembly approved a report of the United Nations Temporary Commission recognizing the legality of the South Korean government. That same month the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from the DPRK. On January 1, 1949, the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the ROK. In March, President Truman approved NSC-8/2, a National Security Council study that was similar to NSC-8 approved the previous year. The major difference between the two was that the 1949 study called for withdrawal of American occupation forces by June. The troops departed according to schedule, but the departure left South Korea vulnerable. The ROK did not have a stable political system in 1949, and in many respects, its military could not match that of North Korea. President Rhee was an authoritarian leader who did not welcome opposition. Political forces in South Korea were often polarized and engaged in violent clashes with each other. Demonstrations against the government were ruthlessly suppressed. The division of the country along the 38th parallel resulted in economic hardships for the ROK that would take years to correct. North Korea’s military capabilities were greater than those of the ROK. North Korea had a larger army and was better equipped with tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery. American policies also weakened South Korea because the amount and type of aid South Korea received was limited. American officials feared that President Rhee might use the aid to begin a war with the North to unify the country. On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a speech to the National Press Club, defined America’s defense perimeter in Asia. South Korea was excluded. Neither the Congress nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed much interest in defending South Korea. On January 19, Congress rejected a $60 million supplementary aid bill for South Korea.

War Begins On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. That decision obviously had the approval of Soviet Marshal Josef

Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 195 0–1953

U.S. Marines head toward the beaches of Inchon during the Allied amphibious landing of September 1950. The Inchon Landing proved to be a major turning point in the Korean War. (Hank Walter/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Stalin, and because of this, American officials viewed the conflict within the parameters of the Cold War. Kim Il Sung, however, viewed the conflict as a civil war that could be won before the United States intervened. As a Nationalist, he wanted to unify the country under Communist rule. Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union from 1954 until his ouster in 1964, claimed that it was Kim Il Sung who initiated the idea of going to war. Stalin simply acquiesced. He did, however, provide North Korea with massive amounts of military aid necessary for the war effort. China, according to Khrushchev, also gave its support to the undertaking. The North Korean invasion had a dramatic impact on American policy. South Korea suddenly became much more important. President Truman’s response to the aggression was influenced by events in the 1930s that led to World War II. The unwillingness of the League of Nations to respond to the early acts of aggression by Italy and Germany led to all-encompassing war in 1939. Truman was determined that the mistakes of the 1930s would not be repeated. There were, however, some critics who did not think the events that led to World War II were relevant to Korea.

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On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council approved an American-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire in Korea. The Soviet Union was boycotting the council to protest its failure to seat the People’s Republic of China. As a result it could not exercise its right of veto. On June 27, the Security Council approved a resolution requesting members to commit military forces to help repel the aggression. On that same day, President Truman ordered American air and sea forces to come to the assistance of South Korea. On June 30, American ground forces were ordered into action. On July 8, the United Nations Security Council appointed General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the UN forces. Most of President Truman’s advisers supported the decision to repel the attack. Secretary of State Acheson believed the aggression had to be resisted because of the importance of Korea in relation to Japan. He also feared that American prestige would be severely damaged both in Europe and Asia if nothing was done to check North Korea’s actions. There was some opposition. Senator Robert A. Taft, a Republican leader in the Senate, opposed the dispatch of American forces without congressional authorization. He was critical of American policies that he thought were responsible for the North Korean attack, including the failure to arm South Korea adequately. He believed there was a connection between the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the decision of North Korea to cross the 38th parallel. Taft was one of those Republicans who blamed the Democrats for “losing” China. The American response to the aggression was surprising given its past policies. Throughout 1946, American officials did not believe South Korea could be defended if attacked. In September, the Department of State agreed that South Korea was not vital to American interests. A year later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that South Korea was not important enough to keep 45,000 American troops there. In February 1948, they recommended removing the troops. In January 1949, General MacArthur said the United States should not commit troops to defend South Korea if it was attacked by the North. In May 1950, Tom Connally, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, publicly stated that the United States would not defend South Korea if it was attacked by the North. Despite all these negative decisions, there were indications that fundamental change was occurring

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in America’s approach to containing the Soviet Union. In April 1950, President Truman had received a draft of NSC-68, another study by the National Security Council. It proposed a number of steps the United States should take to meet the global Communist challenge, including an increase in America’s conventional and nuclear capabilities. President Truman was in the process of evaluating the recommendations when the Korean War began. From 1945 to 1950, America was primarily concerned with protecting the free nations of Europe. The Korean War enlarged the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Communist invasion was initially successful. On June 28, 1950, three days after the invasion began, North Korean troops occupied South Korea’s capital, Seoul. Within weeks, North Korean forces had driven the South Korean and U.S. forces to the extreme southeastern tip of the Korean peninsula at Pusan. General MacArthur began a powerful counterattack on September 15, landing a UN force at Inchon, near Seoul, and threatening the supply lines of North Koreans fighting further south on the peninsula. The new UN contingent recaptured Seoul on September 27, then attacked the retreating North Korean forces, driving them across the 38th parallel and deep into North Korea. In September 1950, President Truman approved NSC-81, a plan for the UN forces to cross the 38th parallel to unify the country. Only South Korean troops, however, were to be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union and China. Truman wanted to reassure the Soviet Union and China that the UN forces wanted only to unify Korea. It was expected that American and other UN troops would leave the area north of the 38th parallel as quickly as possible, leaving only South Korean military units as the occupiers.

Truman and MacArthur President Truman decided he should meet with General MacArthur for a briefing to make sure MacArthur understood American aims in Korea. They met in October 1950 on Wake Island. Among other things, Truman wanted to be certain that MacArthur did nothing that would encourage China to enter the war. MacArthur disagreed with the Truman administration’s cautious policy toward Taiwan, believing that the Nationalist forces there should

receive stronger support. In fact MacArthur had visited Taiwan in August 1950, and afterward, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek said his talks with MacArthur had laid the foundation for a joint defense and a final victory over the Communists. Later in August, MacArthur issued his own statement urging that Taiwan be turned into a U.S. defense stronghold. Two days later, President Truman ordered him to withdraw the statement. Many of Truman’s advisers believed that the Communists had won the civil war in China because of the incompetence and corruption of Chiang’s Nationalist regime and warned against getting enmeshed in Chiang’s plans to attack mainland China from his refuge on the island of Taiwan. At Wake Island, MacArthur told Truman that he expected the war to be over by Thanksgiving and that national elections in a reunited Korea could take place as early as January 1951. He doubted that China would enter the war and surmised that if it did, the result would not be massive casualties. He estimated the number of Chinese that might enter the conflict at fewer than 125,000. Meanwhile, officials in China had surmised that the meeting between MacArthur and Truman on Wake Island was to review plans for attacking China.

China Enters the War The initial goal of American policy in June 1950 was to repel the aggression and protect South Korea. When the UN forces reached the 38th parallel, the goal of American policy became unifying the country. The Beijing government warned Washington that China would intervene in the conflict if the UN troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7. The warning was disregarded. China’s leaders could not tolerate the possibility that American troops might be stationed along the border between Korea and China. On October 14, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, the border between China and North Korea, to help North Koreans defend their territory. On October 19, General MacArthur’s army captured the northern capital, Pyongyang, and began driving the North Korean and Chinese defenders to the northern reaches of their territory, near the Soviet and Chinese borders. At this point he issued orders removing all restrictions on the use of UN forces north of the border, allowing U.S. troops and those from other countries as well as South Koreans to

Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 195 0–1953

enter the provinces adjacent to the international borders. This allegedly violated the instructions he had received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur claimed that lifting the restrictions was a military necessity. China’s entry into the war raised a number of questions. The United States had to decide how to respond to the intervention and to predict the reaction of the Soviet Union. China and the Soviet Union had signed a military treaty in February 1950 in which they pledged to come to each other’s assistance in case of a military attack. American officials did not want the defense of Korea to lead to World War III. There was also the question of how much of a commitment the United States should make to the war effort, since protecting the free nations of Europe remained America’s highest overseas priority. What the Chinese hoped to achieve by entering the conflict was unclear. Initially, General MacArthur did not believe China was making a major military commitment to defend North Korea. He thought China might only want to create a buffer zone within North Korea so that UN troops would not be stationed along China’s border. MacArthur continued to assume, despite the presence of China’s troops, that he could win control over all Korea by the end of November. His views radically changed when it became evident that China’s goals were much more ambitious. On November 28, 1950, he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his forces were insufficient to cope with the massive Chinese intervention. It was estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 Chinese military troops had crossed over into Korea in about three weeks and that more military units were at the border. MacArthur proposed blockading China, bombing military targets in China, and encouraging Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist army to launch attacks against mainland China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought MacArthur’s proposals would dangerously enlarge the war and also sow sharp disagreements between the United States and its allies, who opposed the war and were urging a negotiated settlement. Fear that the war could escalate was fanned by a careless comment made by President Truman at a news conference on November 30. In response to a question, he said the United States would consider using atomic weapons if necessary. China’s military effort proved to be successful on a number of fronts. Their counterattack drove UN forces back south of the 38th parallel and so threat-

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ened them that in January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered evacuating the whole force. North Korean and Chinese troops captured Seoul for the second time. UN forces launched a series of counterattacks and succeeded in pushing the Communists back across the 38th parallel and recapturing Seoul. At this point, the fighting slowed and became a standoff, within a few miles of the prewar border. The Truman administration decided to work for an armistice. The UN forces had tried to unify Korea and failed. They would not try again. China’s entry into the war and its initial success exacerbated the differences between President Truman and General MacArthur. The president was unwilling to invade the north a second time to try again to unify Korea. He was willing to end the war along the 38th parallel where it began. MacArthur, on the other hand, believed a greater military effort would not only liberate North Korea but defeat the Chinese army. On March 24, 1951, without authorization, MacArthur issued a warlike call on leaders in China and North Korea to negotiate an end to the hostilities or suffer the consequences. He warned that if the war was carried to the mainland, China’s military would be crushed. On April 5, 1951, Representative Joseph Martin, the Republican minority leader in the House of Representatives, read a letter from General MacArthur that was openly critical of President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On April 11, President Truman relieved General MacArthur of his command for insubordination—disobeying orders.

Negotiating an End to the Conflict In June 1951, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Representative to the United Nations, proposed that cease-fire negotiations begin in Korea, and they got underway in July. In October, the talks were moved to Panmunjom. The two sides agreed on a four-part agenda that included establishing a demarcation line, supervision of a cease-fire agreement, the exchange of prisoners of war (POWs), and recommendations for the future. In 1952, China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union initiated a “hate America” campaign, charging that the United States was guilty of using biological weapons in Korea and China. The United States was also accused of mistreating prisoners of war that included the use of torture. Chinese officials claimed

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that on March 6 three American planes dropped canisters containing biological weapons on China. The Communists rejected efforts to have the International Red Cross investigate the charges. The hostility between the United States and China was made evident by the lack of progress in the truce negotiations. By 1952, the most important issue blocking a truce was the repatriation of POWs. The United Nations Command (UNC) refused to consider repatriating those prisoners who did not want to return to China or North Korea, while China and North Korea insisted that all prisoners be repatriated. In September 1952, the UNC presented the Communists with three proposals for resolving the prisoner issue and a warning that rejection of the three would end the negotiations. The proposals were rejected, and the United States suspended the talks.

The War Ends In the meantime, the Korean War became an issue in the 1952 U.S. presidential campaign. In a speech in Detroit in November 1952, General Dwight Eisenhower, the Republican presidential nominee, announced that if elected he would go to Korea to help determine how the war could be ended. He won the election and, in December, visited Korea. He was determined to end the war as quickly as possible. On February 2, 1953, in his State of the Union address, President Eisenhower said the U.S. Seventh Fleet would no longer shield mainland China from the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. He thus ended the policy put into place by President Truman at the outbreak of the Korean War. The media referred to President Eisenhower’s decision as the “unleashing” of Chiang Kai-shek. This overstated the effect of Eisenhower’s policy—in effect, it permitted the Nationalist forces to carry out attacks against the mainland but offered no assistance. The new policy did not make a Nationalist invasion of the mainland any more probable. Two factors contributed to the end of the Korean conflict. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin died in March 1953. The Soviet leaders knew there would be a transition period before new leadership could be established, and thus, there was the possibility of political instability. On March 15, 1953, Premier Georgi Malenkov voiced support for a cease-fire agreement. In April, peace talks resumed in Panmunjom. The second factor was the possibility that atomic weapons

would be used to facilitate an end to the conflict. In May, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and informed him that if the negotiations to end the Korean conflict failed, the United States would increase its military effort. The increased military effort involved bombing bases in Manchuria and using tactical atomic weapons. In February 1953, President Eisenhower organized an ad hoc committee to analyze how nuclear weapons could be used in Korea. On February 11, 1953, he and Secretary of State Dulles discussed the use of nuclear weapons at a meeting with the National Security Council. On May 23, 1953, Lieutenant General William Harrison presented the North Koreans with America’s last proposal for ending the impasse regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war, the one issue preventing the conclusion of an armistice. The POW issue was finally settled, and an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. Besides the death of Stalin and the possible use of atomic weapons, both sides in the Korean conflict recognized that efforts to achieve a total victory would be costly and could lead to World War III.

Consequences The war had an enormous impact on American foreign policy. In September 1950, President Truman approved NSC-68, one of the most important documents in the Cold War. Its basic thrust was the necessity of containing Communism, not just the Soviet Union. NSC-68 defined the Communist threat in universal terms, and therefore, the United States had to be prepared to make a global response. In that sense, NSC-68 complemented the 1947 Truman Doctrine. The Korean War also had an impact on American policies with respect to Europe. In 1952, the NATO nations agreed to create a European defense force, to re-arm West Germany, and to end the occupation of that country. The Allied nations wanted to make certain that West Germany did not suffer the same fate as South Korea. Until the Korean War, American troops in West Germany were there as occupation forces. In 1949, when the U.S. Senate was in the process of ratifying the NATO treaty, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the Senate that the United States had no plans to station forces in Europe. After the invasion of Korea, plans were changed, and U.S. troops

Korea, South: Invasion by the North, 195 0–1953

remained in Europe to defend against any attack from the Soviet Union and its allies. The NATO nations set a goal to create fifty divisions by the end of 1952. All these decisions were influenced by the conflict in Korea. NSC-68 depicted the Communist bloc as being monolithic and controlled by Moscow. After the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949, Secretary of State Acheson suggested that China and the Soviet Union might clash one day because of conflicting interests. When the Soviets and China collaborated in sponsoring the invasion of South Korea, however, that line of reasoning was abandoned. The idea of a monolithic Communist bloc remained a basic assumption of American foreign policy even after the Soviets and Chinese quietly split and pursued their own foreign policies. Another result of the Korean conflict was an extension of the containment doctrine to Asia. This influenced subsequent decisions to intervene in the Indochina War and eventually to support South Vietnam against a guerrilla war sponsored by the Communist regime of North Vietnam. In this way, the Korean and Vietnam wars were linked. For all practical purposes, NSC-68 eliminated the idea of peripheral areas that were of little importance. If a Communist victory in one area could lead to a Communist victory elsewhere, it would not make much sense to discriminate between vital and peripheral interests. If, as explained in NSC-68, American policy was to contain Communism and not just the Soviet Union, then helping the French war effort in Indochina had a certain logic. When the French were defeated in 1954, the United States organized the SEATO treaty designed to protect the Indochina states from the Communist threat. In the 1960s, the United States began to play a more active role in Indochina, and this eventually led to a massive American military effort to defeat North Vietnam. The Korean War also had an impact on relations between China and the United States. Although the Soviet Union and the United States suffered casualties during the Cold War, they were not involved in a “hot” war with each other. American casualties in the Korean War numbered approximately 150,000, and this left a bitter heritage. The Communists returned less than 13,000 prisoners of war, including about 3,000 Americans. U.S. officials estimated that about 11,000 Americans were missing in action in Korea and that many of them had been taken pris-

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oner. Many of these prisoners died in captivity because of maltreatment, and some were subjected to brainwashing. When China entered the Korean conflict, America’s relations with Taiwan also underwent a fundamental change. The Nationalist regime there became a major player in America’s efforts to contain the Communist regime on the mainland. The United States provided Taiwan with substantial amounts of military aid, and in 1954, they signed a mutual defense treaty. The leaders in Beijing accused the United States of interfering in China’s internal affairs by supporting the Nationalists, much as Western colonial nations had supported compliant regimes in the past. American officials used support of the Nationalists as a pretext to refuse to extend diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. Relations between the two countries did not begin to thaw until the early 1970s, and full diplomatic relations were not established until 1979, thirty years after the Communists won control of the mainland. The United States also took the lead in keeping the Beijing regime out of the United Nations from 1949 until 1971. During that time, China continued to be represented by the Nationalist government in Taiwan even though its claim to legitimacy has steeply declined over the years. The American goal was to isolate and contain China, and this was in part accomplished by keeping the Beijing regime out of the United Nations. When NSC-68 was being studied, President Truman had to decide whether the United States should increase its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, including the building of the hydrogen bomb. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea helped convince him that America’s military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, needed strengthening. Finally, the Korean War seemed to confirm that part of NSC-68 that cast doubt about the utility of negotiating with the Communists. The results of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences were controversial, and negotiating with the Soviet Union after World War II often proved frustrating. When the Korean truce negotiations began in July 1951, the UNC assumed an agreement would be reached in no more than a few months. The negotiations dragged on for two years. This experience, combined with the negotiations with the Soviet Union after 1945 to establish a provisional government in Korea, seemed to confirm

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the futility of using diplomacy as a means of resolving outstanding issues. Korea remained divided long after the conflict between the North and South ended in 1953. Austria was united in 1955, Vietnam in 1975, Germany in 1990. More than half a century after the Korean conflict ended, Korea was still divided, and the relationship between North and South remained unstable and difficult. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; China: Chinese Civil War, 1927–1949.

Bibliography Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Akira, Iriye. The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Chen, Jian. China’s Road to the Korean War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Creation of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Foot, Rosemary. The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985. Goncharov, S. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993. Hastings, Max. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Lowe, Peter. The Origins of the Korean War. New York: Longman, 1986. Simmons, Robert. The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1975. Whelan, Richard. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950– 1953. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990.

LAOS: Pathet Lao War,1960s–1970s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: North Vietnam; United States of the Thai race, speaking a dialect of Thai. At the same time, about 5 million residents of northeast Thailand are ethnically Lao. About half of the population of Laos proper is composed of various hill tribes—Hmong (or Meo), Yao, and Akha. Another considerable percentage is Vietnamese, particularly in the cities. Buddhism, with a considerable admixture of animism, is the almost universal religion. Economically underdeveloped, Laos depends principally on subsistence agriculture. Paddy rice is grown in the Mekong lowlands, and upland rice and corn (maize) are grown in the mountainous interior. There is some tin mining and lumbering, but the traditional cash crop, especially for the hill tribe people, is opium.

CHINA

NORTH VIETNAM

BURMA Phu Pha Thi Luang Prabang

SOUTH CHINA SEA

PLAIN OF JARS Vientiane

LAOS THAILAND

Historical Background

Ho Chi Minh Trail

Hmong areas 0 0

50 50

100 Miles

100 Kilometers

CAMBODIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

Laos, one of the three Southeast Asian nations that once made up French Indochina, covers 91,245 square miles and has a population of more than 6 million. It is shaped something like a hatchet. The top of the broad head in the north borders on Myanmar (formerly Burma) and China. The ends of the head touch Thailand on the west and Vietnam on the east. The handle travels south along the Mekong River, forming long borders with Thailand on the west and Vietnam on the east. In the far south, the butt of the hatchet handle rests on Cambodia. As the land dividing two major powers in Southeast Asia, Thailand and Vietnam, Laos has a long history as a battleground. The people of the Mekong Valley, along the border with Thailand, are a branch

The French conquest of Laos was carried out in the 1880s and 1890s on the mistaken assumption that the Mekong River would provide a trade route into China. Once the impracticality of this was demonstrated, Laos became the backwater of the French Indochinese empire. Administered from the city of Vientiane by a corps of largely Vietnamese functionaries under French supervision, Laos served mainly as an opium production center, with proceeds from the traffic paying most of the costs of administering the otherwise unprofitable colony. During World War II, Japan occupied Laos but allowed Vichy France to continue to administer the country. In March 1945, however, Japan declared Laos independent under the rule of King Sissavang Vong. Even before the end of the war, France was infiltrating its forces back into Laos, organizing a military strike against the embryonic Laotian national forces. In a foreshadowing of the later wars, first for the final independence of Laos from French rule and then between Communist and non-Communist forces for control of the country, the French relied on

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KEY DATES 1890s

France completes its conquest of Laos, incorporating it into the colony of French Indochina.

1945

Japan, which effectively controls Laos, grants the country independence in March.

1946

Returning French forces defeat Lao insurgents and reassume control of the colony.

1949

The Pathet Lao organization is formed.

1954

The Royal Laotian government is recognized as the authority in Laos, following the Geneva conference that ends the French occupation of Indochina.

1960

Fighting breaks out between government and Communist Pathet Lao forces.

1973

Along with a settlement that ends the war in neighboring Vietnam, government and Pathet Lao negotiators agree to incorporate Pathet Lao forces into its army and create a coalition government, ending the conflict in Laos.

the Hmong (or Meo) tribes, their partners in the opium trade. One faction of the Lao Issara independence forces, under Prince Souphanouvong (a son of Sissavang), had the backing of Ho Chi Minh and the anti-French Vietminh in Vietnam. Other elements of Lao Issara, headed by his half-brothers, Prince Phethsarat and Prince Souvanna Phouma, distrusted the Vietnamese and hoped to negotiate either complete independence or some form of Lao autonomy without radical political and economic changes or Vietnamese influence. In April 1946, the French defeated the Lao Issara in bloody battles along the Mekong River, and its leaders fled to Thailand. Pethsarat and Souvanna Phouma argued that the best strategy would be to negotiate with France for independence, relying on Thailand and the Western powers for assistance. Souphanouvong rejected this as merely accepting a new form of colonial rule and opted for armed revolution against France in association with Vietnam. By 1949 Lao Issara had split, with Souphanouvong and his followers eventually forming the Pathet Lao, which later became the Lao Patriotic Front or Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX). Pethsarat and Souvanna

Phouma returned to Vientiane to take positions in the Royal Laotian Government (RLG), which, by agreement with France, would now form part of the French Union. Lao Issara was disbanded, and by the end of 1951, Souvanna Phouma became prime minister of the new government of Laos, which was recognized by most non-Communist nations.

The Long War Begins— Political Phase Between 1946 and 1949 the Laotian exile forces in Thailand had made occasional armed forays across the Mekong. However, Souphanouvong was making more serious preparations for war in the eastern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, with the support of the Vietminh. It was a mutually advantageous relationship. The Vietminh, who were fighting for Vietnamese independence from France, used the rugged and sparsely populated area as a secure base for their operations in Vietnam proper. Souphanouvong, with troops and supplies from the Vietminh, began expanding his political and military activities in Laos.

Laos: Pathet Lao War, 19 6 0s–1970s

Both France and the Vietminh had a different view of Laos. For the French, who controlled the government in Vientiane, Laos seemed a secure rear base to support its armies in Vietnam, the main theater of the war. The Vietminh saw Laos as an area where the French were particularly vulnerable. Relatively small forces of guerrillas could force the French military to respond, extending the region they had to protect and stretching their resources to the breaking point. Souphanaouvong’s Pathet Lao willingly supported the Vietminh in seeking the defeat of the French and as a means for strengthening their own military forces for future battles. The first successful application of the combined Pathet Lao–Vietminh strategy came in the spring of 1953. With Pathet Lao guerrillas acting as guides and auxiliaries, a major Vietminh force advanced through the Plain of Jars (the important lowland area that provides the main route through the Annamite Mountain chain dividing western and eastern Laos) to threaten Vientiane and Luang Prabang. The French response, as the Vietminh leaders had expected, was to extend its line of outposts, eventually resulting in their concentration near the Laotian border at Dien Bien Phu in the following year. There the French suffered the overwhelming defeat that resulted in their final withdrawal from Indochina. The more immediate results for Laos were that the French abandoned the city of Sam Neua. Souphanouvong quickly established his capital there, declaring the Pathet Lao the legitimate government of Laos. However, the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) was recognized as the legitimate regime at the Geneva Conference of July 1954, which established the terms under which France withdrew from Indochina. The peace agreement declared that there would be a cessation of hostilities in Laos and national elections in 1955. Until the elections were held and a new government formed, the RLG agreed not to accept foreign military aid except in case of invasion. The International Control and Supervisory Commission (ICSC), made up of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland, was to oversee the process. The United States reluctantly signed the Geneva Accords, but it had already agreed secretly with Great Britain that neither nation would accept a Laotian government considered to be Communist. In September 1954, the United States established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), made up of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Great

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Britain, France, and the United States. SEATO declared that Laos was “within its protective orbit” and reserved the right to intervene there. Souvanna Phouma was the head of the royal government. He was a moderate and a neutralist, but U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles considered him too sympathetic to Communist influence. On August 18, 1954, Souvanna’s defense minister was murdered and, under severe U.S. pressure, he resigned. He was replaced by the pro-American Katay Don Sasorith, and U.S. economic aid and military and political advisers poured into the country. In March 1955, Katay agreed to allow the Communist Pathet Lao to compete in the national elections. In exchange, they agreed to integrate 1,500 men of their armed forces into the Royal Laotian Army and to demobilize the rest. The United States was dubious about this move toward a coalition government and became alarmed when Katay attended the Bandung Conference of non-aligned nations in Indonesia in April. There he indicated that he would sign a non-aggression pact with China. Even as he lost favor with his U.S. allies, he was losing support at home. In elections in December, the openly neutralist Souvanna Phouma received a huge majority. Katay resigned. In response to his half-brother’s victory, Souphanouvong agreed to recognize the authority of the royal government, both over Pathet Lao troops and over his strongholds in Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces. The Pathet Lao’s political wing, the NLHX, would participate in by-elections to fill new seats for the expanded National Assembly and would also take part in the Government of National Union, pledged to peace and neutrality. Both China and North Vietnam endorsed the coalition agreement. With National Assembly approval, Souvanna Phouma took Souphanouvong and a second NLHX leader into his cabinet. In March 1958 the promised by-elections were held. The NLHX and its neutralist ally, the Santiphab Party, won 13 of the 21 seats contested. Soon afterward, Souphanavong returned to Vientiane, where he received a hero’s welcome. The United States was deeply upset, being forced to contend with what it had bitterly opposed—a coalition government with Communist participation openly pursuing a neutralist policy. The coalition lasted only eight months. Even as the United States opposed its neutrality policy, Souvanna Phouma made enemies at home by campaigning

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vigorously against corruption, threatening the futures of the politicians and army officers who were growing rich off the flow of U.S. aid money. In response to the revelations of corruption, the United States threatened to cut off further aid, injuring the government in the process. At the same time, the U.S. embassy secretly financed the groups accused of corruption, called the Committee for Defense of the National Interest (CDNI). The group forced a noconfidence vote against Souvanna Phouma in August 1958. Souvanna Phouma stepped down and was replaced by the conservative Phoui Sananikone. Phoui denounced the November coalition agreement, dismissed the NLHX members from the cabinet, and placed them under house arrest. He immediately began talks with the South Vietnamese government led by Ngo Dinh Diem and with the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan led by Chiang Kai-shek. He also appealed to Washington for increased assistance to combat alleged aggression by North Vietnam. Finally, he attempted to disarm the two Pathet Lao battalions that had been integrated into the Royal Laotian Army (RLA). One battalion escaped into the jungle and was joined by individual deserters from the other. In July 1959, Phoui outlawed the NLHX and imprisoned Souphanouvong and all the NLHX members of the National Assembly. As a result of the new government’s actions, the Pathet Lao once again took up armed activity in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces. Phoui charged that the provinces were victims of North Vietnamese aggression, but a UN fact-finding team could find no evidence to support the accusations. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarjskold met with Phoui in Vientiane in November 1959 and urged him to show restraint. Yet when Phoui attempted to moderate his actions, he was overthrown in a military coup by minister of defense, General Phoumi Novasan. Phoumi was a particular favorite of the CIA and of the U.S. military mission in Vientiane. Fraudulent elections on April 24, 1960, gave Phoumi’s candidates all fifty-nine National Assembly seats. He continued as prime minister, but his days in power were numbered. First, Souphanouvong and his companions escaped from prison and made their way back to Pathet Lao territory. Then, on August 9, a young, U.S.-trained commander of a royal army paratroop battalion, Captain Kong Le, declared himself a neutralist and staged a revolt against what he saw as his corrupt, U.S.-controlled commanders. He took

over Vientiane and forced the National Assembly to name Souvanna Phouma as premier again. Souvanna promptly declared he would resume the policy of neutrality and restore the coalition. Phoumi and his U.S. advisers rallied the rest of the army and besieged Vientiane in December 1960. After enduring an artillery bombardment that killed 700 or 800 civilians, Kong Le and Souvanna withdrew to the Plain of Jars, where, in response to Souvanna’s request, the Soviet Union began an airlift of military supplies. The National Assembly now named Prince Boun Oum as prime minister, and he was promptly recognized by Washington. Moscow and Beijing, however, continued to recognize Souvanna Phouma as the legal head of government.

Fighting Begins The Eisenhower administration had considered Laos to be critical. Eisenhower described it to presidentelect John F. Kennedy as “the cork in the bottle.” If Laos fell, he said, then Thailand and South Vietnam

Laotian government troops train with U.S.-supplied equipment to fight Pathet Lao leftist rebels in June 1962. The Pathet Lao prevailed in 1975 and established a Communist regime. (National Archives)

Laos: Pathet Lao War, 19 6 0s–1970s

would fall, then the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had drawn up plans for large-scale U.S. military intervention. Kennedy was surprised to find that with the situation supposedly so grave, none of the members of SEATO allies (with the possible exception of Thailand) supported intervention. The new president was also somewhat embarrassed that most of the world’s nations continued to recognize Souvanna Phouma as the legal head of the Laotian government, not Boun Oum. Nevertheless, the new U.S. administration felt it could not abandon the policies of the last administration and stepped up its military assistance to the Boun Oum government, which ordered the royal army to wipe out Kong Le and the Pathet Lao forces. Although the royal army had been built up to 40,000 troops, was supplied with specially equipped aircraft, and was accompanied by up to 400 U.S. Special Forces advisers, the expedition was a disaster. By May 1961, as royal army troops fled back toward the Mekong, Boun Oum asked for a cease-fire and the reconstitution of the ICSC. The ICSC sponsored negotiations among Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and the Pathet Lao, producing still another coalition government. These negotiations were followed by the new Geneva Conference on Laos in June and July of 1962. While the conference was formally a success, and while China, the Soviet Union, and the United States all endorsed a cease-fire, Laotian neutrality, and nonintervention by outside forces in Laotian affairs, the coalition government was doomed from the start. Beginning in 1961, North Vietnam—realizing that the unification of Vietnam through political means, as envisioned in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, would not occur because of U.S. opposition and support of the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem—began to violate the Geneva Accords by infiltrating political cadres, troops, and supplies into South Vietnam. The principal route for this was the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, which wound along the Vietnam-Laos border through territory controlled by the Pathet Lao. At the same time, the United States also began to violate the Geneva Accords by organizing (under the leadership of the CIA) a “Clandestine Army” of Hmong (or Meo) tribesmen to oppose the Pathet Lao in the region. The Hmong army, led by Vang Pao, was charged with gathering intelligence for the United States about traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and, as it gained strength, to begin to obstruct the

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passage of men and supplies to the south. The Hmong buildup had actually been in progress for several years, increasing from about 1,000 men in 1960 to more than 30,000 by 1963, about a third of the tribe’s adult male population. In the meantime, the royal army attempted another offensive in the summer of 1962 and once again failed miserably. President Kennedy’s ambassador to Laos, Averill Harriman, determined that the army was totally ineffective and reduced U.S. support to it. As if there was not already enough discord in Laos, the American advisers introduced still more through disagreements among themselves. The training of the Hmong army had been set in motion by the CIA, but as the U.S. military role in Vietnam increased, many of the CIA’s programs there were taken over by the U.S. Army. The Kennedy administration also continued to acquiesce in the CIA buildup of the Hmong army, but at the same time, it was much more supportive of the Laotian government’s neutralist policy. This reflected disagreements in the administration about the wisdom of increasing U.S. involvement in the region. In November 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson was sworn in to take his place. Johnson worked tirelessly to continue Kennedy’s policies at home, but overseas he and his advisers took a much harder line. They enthusiastically embraced plans to destroy the Pathet Lao as one means to cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail and assure victory in Vietnam. This meant, of course, ending the coalition government. Souvanna Phouma was already under pressure. In April 1963, his leftneutralist foreign minister, Quinim Pholsena, was assassinated, and NLHX assemblymen and government ministers were being threatened and harassed by royal army forces. As a consequence, Souphanouvong and most of his NLHX adherents left Vientiane for Sam Neua for their own safety, and Souvanna Phouma was isolated in the capital under increasing right-wing pressure to intensify military activity.

Cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail The departure of Souphanouvong and the abandonment of coalition government and neutrality made clear the basic difference between the Pathet Lao and the Kong Le–Souvanna Phouma factions. Souphanouvong was an ideological and strategic ally of Ho Chi

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Minh. Both had as their objective the establishment of Communist regimes in all of Indochina, independent of Chinese or Soviet control. Both leaders planned to remove all U.S. and European influence from their regimes. In the tradition of Southeast Asian history, Souphanouvong accepted that Laos, as a borderland, would be dependent on either Vietnam or Thailand. Ideologically committed to Communism, and distrusting Thailand as a reactionary, militarized monarchy serving as the agent of Western interests in the region, he turned to Vietnam. Souvanna Phouma, on the other hand, wanted to maintain the traditional society of Laos and to be independent of both Thai and Vietnamese influence. Thus, the major partners in the coalition were basically incompatible. Even though Souvanna personally disliked Americans, he was utterly reliant on U.S. economic support and came more and more to regard the United States as the lesser evil. With the Laotian political situation increasingly under its control, the United States, operating both within Laos and from bases in Thailand, built up its capacity to destroy the North Vietnamese resupply lines in eastern Laos. In the spring and summer of 1961, the CIA carried out a massive relocation of 70,000 Hmong from their scattered mountain villages to secure sites outside the Pathet Lao areas of control. U.S. Air Force special warfare units set up a system of mountaintop airfields (Lima Sites) guarded by Hmong troops from which radar installations monitored traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and guided U.S. air strikes from bases in Thailand. The Lima Sites also served as bases for Hmong ground attacks on Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troop concentrations. By 1965 the cost of the Hmong operations to the United States was at least $300 million a year. The first major campaign under the new system was Operation Triangle in 1964. The Royal Laotian Army, now beefed up with Thai recruits, joined the secret Hmong army in a rainy-season attack, recapturing much of the Plain of Jars from the Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces. However, in a pattern that would be repeated for the next eight years, Pathet Lao troops, reinforced by North Vietnamese units, counterattacked during the dry season and retook the lost territory. Later, even the heavily defended Lima Sites became targets for the insurgents. In March 1968, the major installation at Phu Pha Thi, on top of a 5,600foot mountain in Sam Neua, was overrun. The Hmong

took heavy casualties, and thirteen Americans also died. The next year’s dry season offensive captured the CIA airfield at Muong Soi. A huge Hmong counterattack ordered by the U.S. Embassy succeeded in retaking some of the lost ground, but even with massive U.S. close air support, the costs were heavy. The clandestine army, which had reached a strength of almost 60,000 men, was decimated. Thereafter it dwindled, filling its ranks with Thai mercenaries and Hmong boys as young as thirteen. By 1971 over 100,000 Hmong refugees were heading west toward the Mekong. At the time of the Indochina cease-fire in 1973, Vang Pao had only about 6,000 troops left. The Hmong had been promised that their services would be rewarded with an autonomous homeland in Laos. Now those hopes had been dashed, and the tribe itself was essentially destroyed, its remnants scattered throughout Southeast Asia and parts of the United States. Aside from the CIA’s logistic support to the Hmong, which was enormous, the main direct U.S. involvement in the war in Laos was aerial bombing. From 1964 to 1972, U.S. planes dropped more than 2 billion tons of bombs on Laos alone, a greater tonnage than they had dropped during all of World War II. A portion of this tonnage was intended to interdict North Vietnamese supply operations and support the operations of the Royal Laotian Army and the Clandestine Army. However, the vast majority was dropped on non-military targets in Pathet Laocontrolled areas to terrorize the population into leaving, to prevent agricultural production, and to cause the population to turn against the Pathet Lao. According to most accounts, these objectives were not achieved. The bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail destroyed less than 20 percent of the supplies sent down it, and popular support for the Pathet Lao actually increased. The monetary cost, though, was enormous. At the peak of the bombing campaign in 1969 and 1970, the United States was flying about 1,500 sorties a day in Laos, at an average cost of about $3,190 per sortie, or approximately $2 billion a year.

End of the War Just as the war in Laos was incidental to the main conflict in Vietnam, the Paris Agreement of October 1972 ending the war dealt with Laos almost as an aside. Hanoi’s negotiator, Le Duc Tho, and U.S. national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, merely agreed that all

Laos: Pathet Lao War, 19 6 0s–1970s

foreign troops would be withdrawn from Laos and that the Laotian parties would make their own political settlement. Souvanna Phouma contacted Souphanouvong, and both sent negotiators to Vientiane on October 17. The two sides agreed that, unlike the previous coalition government in which there were three sides—the Pathet Lao, the neutralists, and the “rightists”—this time there would be two equal parties, the Pathet Lao and the rest. Kissinger, who briefly visited Vientiane in February 1973, let Souvanna Phouma know that he was now on his own and could expect no further help from the United States. Under the Vientiane Agreement, signed in February 1973, Souvanna remained the head of government, but Souphanouvong was in charge of the National Political Consultative Council (NPCC), which effectively replaced the National Assembly. Each side continued to administer the territory it controlled at the time of the cease-fire. There was one significant exception: Pathet Lao troops formed part of the security force in Vientiane and Luang Prabang, the two main cities. On April 3, 1974, Souphanouvong received a hero’s welcome once again in Vientiane and soon succeeded in imposing his own eighteen-point program for the new Laos. In March 1975, just as North Vietnamese troops were overrunning South Vietnam, Pathet Lao troops attacked Vang Pao’s Hmong forces, destroying the Clandestine Army. Survivors fled into Thailand or scattered in the hills. On May 1 huge crowds in Vientiane, denouncing corruption and inflation, demanded implementation of Souphanouvong’s eighteenpoint program. A week later even larger crowds demonstrated against the Royal Laotian Army and the police. Most of the non-NLHX cabinet ministers went into self-imposed exile and were replaced by Souphanouvong supporters. Events moved quickly after that. Special elections in November 1975 established new village councils under NLHX control. On November 28, a huge popular demonstration in Vientiane called for the end of the coalition government. Souvanna Phouma resigned, and the king abdicated. On December 2,

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the Congress of People’s Representatives was convened in Vientiane and proclaimed the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) with Souphanouvong as president and Kaysone Phomvihane as prime minister. Souvanna Phouma accepted the result and took the post of governmental adviser. He died in Vientiane in 1984. Souphanouvong and the Pathet Lao were genuinely popular at first, but their attempt to introduce a new system modeled on that of Vietnam soon produced serious resistance, especially in rural areas. Farmers opposed the introduction of “cooperatized” agriculture and were angered when local leaders were ignored by NLHX cadres. Much of the goodwill that had been developed during the war was lost. By 1979, in the face of growing, sometimes armed, opposition, the new revolutionary policies were considerably relaxed. David MacMichael See also: Cold War Confrontations; People’s Wars; Vietnam: First Indochina War, 1946–1954; Vietnam: Second Indochina War, 1959–1975.

Bibliography Adams, Nina S., and Alfred W. McCoy, eds. Laos: War and Revolution. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. Burchett, Wilfred G. The Furtive War: The United States in Vietnam and Laos. New York: International, 1963. Day, Alan J., ed. Border and Territorial Disputes. 2nd ed. Essex, UK: Longman Group, 1987. Dommen, Arthur J. Laos: Keystone of Indochina. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. XXIV, The Laos Crisis, 1961–1963. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994. Prados, John. Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through Iranscam. New York: Quill, William Morrow, 1986. Stuart-Fox, Martin, ed. Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. Zasloff, Joseph J. The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, RAND Corporation, 1973.

MALAYSIA: Communist Uprising, 1948–1960 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War PARTICIPANT: United Kingdom T

Tin

THAILAND

SOUTH CHINA SEA

BRUNEI

T T T Kuala Lumpur

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M A L A Y S I A

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BORNEO

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200 Miles

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100

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INDIAN OCEAN

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0 100 200 Kilometers

The Communist uprising in Malaya was rooted in the Chinese community of Malaya, who were relative newcomers to the peninsula. (Malaya is the original name of the region. The country became Malaysia in 1963 after Malaya merged with Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo.) Before the arrival of the Europeans, the Malay Peninsula was inhabited by ethnic Malays, who were a fairly homogenous people, sharing a cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage. Almost all Malays spoke Malay (today called Bahasa Malaysia) and were practicing Muslims. Politically, the Malay were divided among a dozen small sultanates, each competing for power with its neighbors. The first Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century but made only minor incursions into the peninsula, which was politically divided among small kingdoms, each ruled by its own sultan. The British were the first to develop a strong presence in Malaya, establishing bases at Penang in 1786, Singapore in 1819, and Malacca (which had been controlled by the Dutch) in 1824. By the 1870s, the British dominated political life in the peninsula, forcing the sultans to accept British residents (advisers) who guided the sultanates’ policies in directions

acceptable to Britain. By 1914, all of Malaya was under British control. The Chinese started to arrive in Malaya in the mid-nineteenth century, seeking economic opportunity. They settled throughout Malaya but were particularly prominent along its west coast. Malayan rulers hired some Chinese to mine tin, while others settled in the towns and became merchants and bankers, if lucky, or laborers, if not. During the same period, a large Indian community settled in Malaya, operating in the same economic areas as the Chinese. After the 1870s, many of the poorer individuals in both communities became workers in the newly introduced rubber plantations. (In the twentieth century, Malaya would become the world’s leading exporter of rubber.) There was some tension among these three communities—Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Malays had made up 90 percent of the population in 1800, but by 1911 they made up only about 60 percent. The remainder were divided between Chinese, about 30 percent, and Indians, about 10 percent. Malays worried about the success of Chinese and Indian merchants, while the immigrant communities resented the abuse suffered by their poorer members who labored on the rubber or coffee plantations. The three groups were kept in order by the British colonial authorities.

World War I I and the Chinese Communists World War II ended this period of British domination. The Japanese invaded the peninsula in December 1941 and had conquered it all by February 1942. For the next three years the Japanese ruled over Malaya, imposing their own system of government.

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KEY DATES 1914

Malaya comes fully under British colonial control.

1930

Inspired by the Chinese Communist Party, Malayan radicals and nationalists form the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).

1941–1942

Japanese imperial forces conquer and occupy Malaya.

1945

British reoccupy Malaya, taking territory from the collapsing Japanese empire at the end of World War II.

1947

British issue a constitution for Malaya that gives native sultans predominant power, alienating large Indian and Chinese immigrant communities.

1948

The MCP uprising begins; British colonial authorities declare a state of emergency.

1948–1960

Thousands of guerrillas of the Malayan People’s Liberation Army (MPLA), the armed wing of the MCP, battle 60,000 police and soldiers of the British Malayan government; some 6,700 MPLA members are killed in the fighting, as well as 2,300 members of government forces.

1960

The MPLA surrenders to British authorities.

1963

Malaysia wins its independence from Britain.

The primary resistance to the Japanese occupation came from the Chinese community, and the primary organizer of that resistance was the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Established in 1930 (although its roots went back to the 1920s), the MCP was created in emulation of the Communist Party in China. It had gained strength within the Chinese laboring community during the 1930s, and by the time of the Japanese invasion it was a substantial force. The party’s members were nearly all poor and Chinese. The Chinese, both Communist and Nationalist, were already hostile toward the Japanese because of the Japanese invasions of China in the 1930s. The Communists, because of their tight party organization, were best able to fight against the Japanese. During the Japanese occupation, many MCP members retreated into the jungles and formed the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). This guerrilla force harassed the occupiers with occasional hitand-run raids. The British helped it by airdropping weapons and supplies and by providing British liai-

son officers to help coordinate strategy with the Allies. When the war ended, the MPAJA returned from its exile, but many of its members had hidden their guns away in the jungle, caching them until they would be needed. It was these ex-MPAJA members, and their hidden arms caches, that would be the backbone of the Communist uprising of 1948.

Postwar Tensions When the British returned to power in August 1945, they had lost much of their prestige. The Malayans, having seen the British run in 1942, were less inclined to accord them their prewar respect. And most Malayans now wanted their country to become an independent nation. The British, recognizing that change was necessary, attempted to impose a new Malayan union that would create a unified state in which all inhabitants of Malaya—Malays, Chinese, and Indians—would have equal rights. The union satisfied the Chinese and

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Indians but was attacked by Malays who saw their rights being sacrificed for the benefit of foreigners (even though these “foreigners” had lived in Malaya for generations). Native Malayans also objected to the diminished status that the sultans, the traditional Malay rulers, would hold in the new government. The British backed down before this outcry and, in 1947, offered an alternative constitution that gave the Malay sultans back many of their prerogatives, while limiting the political rights of the immigrant communities (for example, only individuals whose grandparents had come to Malaya were allowed a vote). The British still retained supreme power, but the constitution was clearly viewed by both Britain and the Malays as a steppingstone to full independence. This constitution, which took effect on February 1, 1948, angered the Chinese community. It was at this point that the Chinese Communist leadership,

headed by Chin Peng, decided that it was time to lead a rebellion against the British in an attempt to overthrow the new government before it had time to settle in.

Communist Uprising It seems clear that the Communists were planning an uprising of some kind even before the 1948 constitution. The preparations of the MPAJA combined with a high level of postwar antigovernment political propaganda point toward a long-laid plan, particularly when considered in the context of the growing Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. The Communists began their activities with guerrilla actions directed toward disrupting the tin mines and rubber plantations upon which Malaya’s

Malayan police and British army regulars seek out Communist rebels and sympathizers during the antigovernment uprising of 1948. Plantations and villages were centers of guerrilla activity. (Jack Birns/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Malaysia: Communist Uprising, 19 4 8–19 6 0

economy depended. The MCP had always been powerful in the Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, and it used its influence over the unions to orchestrate strikes and riots. After the February 1948 constitution, the MCP escalated the tempo of its activities, attacking plantations in an attempt to discredit and paralyze the government by destroying its economic foundations. In June 1948, the murder of three European plantation managers in the sultanate of Perak caused the hitherto complacent British government to realize that it was facing a dangerous threat to its power. The government declared a state of emergency on June 16 that would remain in effect for more than twelve years, until July 31, 1960. The government’s action forced the Communists to move from hidden to open attacks on the government. Thousands of MCP guerrillas took to the jungles of Malaya, formed military bands, and began to attack plantations, mines, and small government outposts. The MCP named its military arm the Malayan People’s Liberation Army (MPLA). At first the MPLA had great success. The British were completely unprepared for an armed insurrection and had great difficulty in defending the isolated plantations and mines, much less hunting down the guerrillas hidden in the jungles. The primary targets of the MPLA were the plantations—by the end of the emergency, about one in ten plantation owners or managers had been killed—but bands of a hundred or more would also attack and overwhelm small village police stations. With only 10,000 police and a slightly larger number of army regulars, the British could barely defend the major towns of Malaya from the MPLA’s 6,000 to 8,000 guerrillas. By mid-1950, guerrilla attacks were running at an average rate of 400 a month. When the army did send patrols into the jungle, it was easy for the guerrillas to avoid them, slipping away in the dense vegetation. The guerrillas were supported in their jungle activities by a large community of Chinese squatter farmers. The Chinese squatters were those immigrants who had left the plantations and mines to start farms along the edges of the jungle. Often this was done during economic slumps when there was not enough work to go around. Both the economic slump of 1932–1934 and the Japanese occupation of 1942– 1945 increased the number of squatter communities. The Chinese squatters chose land that no one else wanted, but their occupation had no legal basis. And

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many of them, poor and struggling, were sympathetic to the political goals of the MCP. The British helped to increase this sympathy by their heavy-handed anticommunist policies. Thousands of squatter Chinese were interned and expelled from Malaya. This alienated those Chinese who might not otherwise have helped the MPLA. The squatter farmers were formed into the Min Yuen, a civilian logistical network which helped to supply the MPLA soldiers. Many squatters, perhaps a majority, would have preferred not to be a part of the Min Yuen, but living in small villages near the jungle, they were afraid not to help the guerrillas. The MPLA often killed recalcitrant peasants as an example to the rest.

British Counterattack By 1950, the British had realized that their tactics were failing to defeat the MPLA, and they began to change their methods. They started by vastly increasing the forces at their disposal. The police force was doubled, to some 20,000 men. To augment their strength, the government raised a force of Special Constables, which eventually was 40,000 men strong. Added to this was a force of more than 100,000 parttime volunteers who could be called upon in an emergency. Almost all of these troops were Malays, led by British officers. Their job was to defend the villages, plantations, and mines scattered through the Malay Peninsula. These locations were turned into minifortresses, guarded by searchlights and barbed wire. To break the link between the MPLA and the Min Yuen support network, the British forced the squatter Chinese—as well as legal villagers—to relocate into specially created New Villages. By the end of the emergency the British had relocated more than 500,000 peasants (of whom 300,000 had been squatters) into New Villages, and regrouped another halfmillion mine and plantation workers into more concentrated communities. The forced relocations often upset those who were resettled, but they made it far easier for the British to protect the farmers from the MPLA and meant that the Communists found it harder to get recruits and supplies. The British also tried, with moderate success, to provide improved sanitation and electrical service to the New Villages, and this helped win over some poor Chinese to an anticommunist position. For offensive operations, the British increased the number of regular army troops in Malaya from about

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12,000 to 40,000. The British army in Malaya included British, Gurkha, and Malay battalions. These troops focused on methodically clearing districts of the MPLA, while relocating the peasants that had been the guerrillas’ main source of supplies. Once an area was declared cleared or “white,” the British would move on to their next target, leaving it to the newly increased police force to defend the area. The British also improved their ability to wage jungle warfare. Special army units were trained to spend weeks in the field hunting for MPLA guerrillas, keeping supplied by airdrop or helicopter. These long patrols were much harder for the MPLA to avoid. By 1955, the guerrillas had clearly been defeated. Thousands were dead and many more had surrendered. Small bands still remained in the countryside, and although the state of emergency would continue until 1960, the MPLA was fighting a losing campaign.

Communist Defeat Part of the defeat of the MPLA should be credited to political developments within Malaya. By 1954, the British and Malays had succeeded in mobilizing much of the Chinese community against the MPLA. Conservative Chinese leaders had long opposed the MPLA, but they had not had a political alternative to offer the Chinese community. In 1952, when the main Malay Nationalist party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, allied itself with Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), a conservative Chinese movement led by Tan Cheng Lock, a wealthy businessman, the alternative to supporting the MPLA was created. The MCA’s alliance with the UMNO legitimized the Chinese community’s presence in Malaya and helped to encourage increasing numbers of Chinese to support the government crackdown on the MPLA. The two-party alliance was joined by the main Indian party in Malaya, the Malayan Indian Congress, which further stabilized Malaya’s political scene. With the Communists losing their war, the British felt able to hold elections in 1955 for a Malay legislative council. The three-party alliance won the election and, with the British, began to make arrange-

ments for independence. This was achieved on August 31, 1957, when Malaya became an independent constitutional monarchy (the monarchy was rotated every five years among Malaya’s hereditary sultans). The campaign against the Communists continued, but, as there were only 1,500 guerrillas left in the jungles, it was largely a mopping-up operation. The Communist leadership, including Chin Peng, had fled to Thailand by the time the emergency was declared over. From there they would continue to attempt to subvert Malaya, but with little effect.

Analysis By the end of the fighting, 6,700 MPLA had been killed, and another 2,700 had surrendered. The government had lost 2,300 men, not including a number of civilian casualties. These figures suggest a great victory, but considering that the Communist MPLA had no more than 8,000 troops at the height of their strength, while the British were forced to marshal more than 200,000 to defeat them, the Communist defeat was not incredibly impressive. The Communist defeat was probably inevitable. With their strength based almost exclusively in the Chinese community, the Communists could never gain the support of more than a minority of Malaya’s population. Most Malays were eager to join the British in the fight against the MPLA. And once the British New Village campaign was under way, most Chinese, led by conservative business leaders, were able to express their opposition to the MPLA. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Anticolonialism; People’s Wars.

Bibliography Andaya, Barbara Watson, and Y. Leonard. A History of Malaysia. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. Clutterbuck, Richard L. Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1963. Winchester, MA: Faber, 1973. Short, Anthony. The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948– 1960. London: Muller, 1975. Turnbull, C.M. A History of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei. London: Allen and Unwin, 1989.

MYANMAR (BURMA): Civil Wars and Coups Since 1948 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Thailand

SHAN

Ethnic group

BHUTAN INDIA SHAN

CHINA

BANGLADESH MON

MON

Mandalay

CHIN

SHAN

M YA N M A R (BURMA)

BENGAL

KAREN

r i ve Irrawaddy R

B AY O F

Taunggyi

iv en R

Salw e

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Yangon (Rangoon)

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ANDAMAN SEA

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In 1885, the independent kingdom of Burma was forcibly brought into the British Empire. It remained under British control for the next fifty-five years, until World War II, when the Japanese invaded and conquered Burma. After the Japanese pushed the British out, they attempted to enlist the support of the Burmese people by appealing to their desire for independence. Using slogans such as “Asia for the Asiatics,” the Japanese organized a puppet government in Burma under the leadership of Ba Maw, a Burmese politician, with Aung San commanding the Burma Defense Army. Aung San, a longtime Burmese nationalist, grew dissatisfied with the behavior of the Japanese, who treated the Burmese with callous brutality, and he began to secretly cooperate with the British in forming a Burmese guerrilla resistance to Japanese occupation. In March 1945, Aung San, as head of the newly formed Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), led a revolt against the Japanese, which, together with a British invasion, forced the Japanese army out of Burma. After World War II, Aung San pressured the British into agreeing to grant Burma its complete independence, but he was assassinated before Burma officially declared its independence. A political rival, U Nu, arranged for Aung San and six colleagues to be killed on July 19, 1947. Nevertheless, Aung San was widely hailed as the father of the modern Burmese state. The new government took control of Burma on January 4, 1948.

Civil War The AFPFL, now led by U Nu, had to deal with a plethora of internal problems, beginning with a Communist insurgency. The Communist rebellion 645

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KEY DATES 1948

Burma (the former name for Myanmar) wins its independence from Great Britain; the Communists launch nationwide strikes to overthrow the government of U Nu; although failing in the attempt, the Communist insurgency continues into mid-1950s.

1958

The military overthrows U Nu in a coup and puts Ne Win in power.

1960

Elections return U Nu to leadership of the country.

1962

Responding to efforts to make Buddhism the national religion of Burma, the Christian Karen people, joined by the Shan people, revolt against the government; in response, the military overthrows the government in coup, putting Ne Win back in power.

1988

Police try to suppress protests over the Ne Win government’s handling of the country’s economic crisis, killing dozens of demonstrators; protests continue, bringing down the military government; U Nu and his National League for Democracy (NLD) briefly form a provisional civilian government on September 9; on September 24, the military intervenes and overthrows the provisional government, creating what it calls the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); they rename the country Myanmar the following year.

1989

SLORC puts down the democracy protesters rallying around Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the leader of Myanmar’s independence struggle against Britain, killing hundreds.

1990

Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD overwhelmingly win national elections in May; SLORC nullifies the election results and cracks down on protesters, throwing thousands into prison.

1991

Although under house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi wins the Nobel Peace Prize.

1997

SLORC renames itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

2001

Fighting between government and rebel groups triggers a brief artillery exchange between Myanmar and neighboring Thailand.

2004 A shake-up occurs among the military leadership within the SPDC.

began on March 27, 1948, after the Communist Party organized a series of industrial strikes designed to destabilize the new government. The Communists were led by Thakin Than Tun, who had been in Ba Maw’s wartime government and then joined Aung San in the AFPFL. In July, the Communists were joined by left-leaning elements within Aung San’s postwar military organization, who formed the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO). These Com-

munist sympathizers were called the White Band faction, while the smaller Yellow Band faction supported the Burmese government. The Communist uprising was joined by an uprising of the Karen ethnic minority in Burma. Approximately 30 percent of Burma’s population consists of ethnic minorities, the three most important of which are the Karen, Shan, and Chin. These minorities had long been concerned about their place within the new

Myanmar (Burma): Civil Wars and Coups Since 19 4 8

Burmese state, and the Karen, who had a prominent place in the postwar Burmese army, were in a particularly strong position to assert their claims to autonomy. They also had an independent military force that they had created after World War II, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO). When the Burmese government appeared to be attempting to whittle away the Karen’s autonomy, the KNDO began trying to seize control over those areas of southeastern Burma in which the Karen were a majority of the population. This low-level resistance was transformed into open revolt after elements of the Burmese army carried out a Christmas Eve 1948 massacre of Karen in the Mergui district. The Karen units in the army revolted; they were joined by some Shan groups in eastern Burma. By March 1949, the insurgent coalition, an unstable mix of Communists, PVO White Band loyalists, and Karen ethnic soldiers, controlled most of Burma, including the cities of Mandalay and Taunggyi. The coalition was strong enough to make several attempts to take Rangoon itself. Gradually, however, U Nu’s government, aided by the vigorous leadership of General Ne Win, commander-in-chief of the army, was able to reassert its control over most of the country. Mandalay was recovered in late April 1949, and the Karen were pushed across the Salween River. A smoldering peace was achieved with the Karen after they were granted, in 1951, limited autonomy over their own state of Kawthule. The Communists were suppressed with the help of Indian and British arms and supplies. The Communists had found it difficult to attract support in strongly Buddhist Burma, particularly after they were deserted by the PVO White Band in 1950. Communist insurgency continued into the mid-1950s, however, adding to the instability of the Burmese state.

Golden Triangle An outside threat to Burma came as a result of the Chinese civil war. Some of the Chinese Nationalists, defeated by Mao Zedong’s Communist armies, fled across the border into northern Burma and established bases from which they staged raids against the Communists. The commanders of these Chinese troops created petty fiefdoms on Burmese territory, using both Chinese soldiers and recruits from the Shan ethnic minority. By 1953, the effort to keep these Chinese invaders in check was occupying more than half of Burma’s armed forces. The rough terrain of north-

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ern Burma made it difficult to completely defeat the Chinese, who were divided among different factions and leaders. Despite their political roots, the Chinese leaders were more interested in carving out a base of power for themselves than fighting for the Nationalist cause. The new Chinese warlords of Burma soon switched from attacking the Communists in China to creating a business empire based upon the sale of opium for export. This lucrative drug trade spread to western Laos and northern Thailand, creating what would become known as the “Golden Triangle.” Eventually heroin would replace opium as the most profitable derivative of the poppy plant.

Militar y Rule The internal insurgencies troubling the Burmese government were complicated by economic difficulties. U Nu, as leader of the AFPFL, led the country from 1948 to 1958. He and his colleagues were dedicated to creating a socialist state in Burma, but their badly planned nationalization policies—combined with a fall in the international price of rice, one of Burma’s main exports—led to a decline in the country’s economy. Economic weakness along with political factionalism within the AFPFL increased the strength of the left-wing and ethnic parties within Burma’s parliament. To remain in power, U Nu was forced to offer concessions to both these groups. This disturbed the military, still headed by General Ne Win, which had fought so hard during the late 1940s and early 1950s to defeat the Communist and ethnic insurgents. In 1958, the military stepped in to force a constitutional coup that gave Ne Win the job of prime minister. Ne Win held power for two years and then allowed open elections to be held in 1960. During those two years, he and the Burmese army had some success in cracking down on the ethnic minorities who still controlled some parts of eastern Burma. In 1960, Ne Win was convinced that the country was stable enough to permit a return to elections and civilian rule. U Nu won the 1960 elections and returned to power in February. Nevertheless, the internal unrest that troubled Burma continued, exacerbated by some of U Nu’s policies. U Nu committed a serious political misstep in 1961 when he declared that Buddhism was the state religion of Burma, a policy that alienated the large minority of ethnic Karen who were Christians. By 1962, it seemed that the Karen, joined by the Shan, were readying a revolt against the government.

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To prevent this outcome, the military staged a second coup d’état. On March 2, 1962, Ne Win’s troops seized control of Rangoon and created a seventeenman military council that would rule the country under Ne Win’s supervision. The military council created a Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) through which they would rule the country for the next twenty-six years. The BSPP was modeled on the Communist parties of the Soviet bloc and was designed to be an obedient tool of Ne Win and his military supporters. Ne Win’s government was more radically socialist than that of U Nu. Almost every economic sector was put under the control of the government, which meant the military. Indian and Chinese merchants, who had previously been the backbone of Burma’s mercantile economy, were expelled from the country. Ne Win also isolated Burma, closing off trade with the rest of the world. The BSPP declared that it was attempting to create a “Burmese Way of Socialism,” but it was transforming the country into a hermit kingdom dominated by a narrow-minded military elite. As a result, Burma’s economy stagnated. Insurgencies, led both by Communists and by ethnic Karen and Shan, continued to plague the country, as did the profit-making activities of the warlords of the Golden Triangle.

S LO R C Coup A growing trade deficit in the late 1980s led to rampant inflation. In 1988, the worsening economic situation, together with the resentment felt by most of the country toward the military government, ignited a mass protest movement against the Ne Win regime. In March 1988, while the government attempted futile currency reforms, crowds of students and middleclass demonstrators, many wearing masks to hide their identities, gathered in the streets of Rangoon. Riot police attacked the demonstrators, and dozens were killed, many of them beaten to death. Some women protesters were raped, and thousands of protesters were arrested. The crackdown simply raised tensions and brought more protesters into the streets. The protests continued through July, attracting international attention to Burma. It seemed to the world as if Burma were in the midst of a revolution. In July, Ne Win resigned as chairman of the BSPP. After seventeen days in power, and with hundreds of thousands of protesters gathering at Buddhist pagodas, his replacement also resigned.

On September 9, 1988, with the ruling BSPP in disarray, prominent opponents, led by former prime minister U Nu, announced the creation of a provisional government backed by a new party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). Prominent among the leaders of the NLD was Aung San Suu Kyi, the only daughter of Burma’s post–World War II leader Aung San. Aung San Suu Kyi gained popularity both because of the respect with which her father was regarded and because of her own personal charisma and obvious dedication to Burma’s fate. Although she had spent much of her life in exile in England, when she returned to Burma in 1988 (to care for her ailing mother), she moved to the forefront of the protest movement, leading crowds of joyous students. It seemed likely that if open elections were held, she would win them. On September 24, the military intervened and overthrew the crumbling BSPP government. Led by General Saw Maung, senior officers created what would be called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Saw Maung was declared SLORC’s chairman as well as prime minister of Burma—which was renamed the Union of Myanmar in 1989. SLORC ordered the army to brutally repress the prodemocracy protesters who were gathered in Rangoon (renamed Yangon). Soldiers fired from the rooftops into crowds, breaking them up and forcing them back into their homes. Thousands of unarmed demonstrators were killed, while others were forced, at gunpoint, to wash away the prodemocracy graffiti that had been

Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of Myanmar’s prodemocracy movement (and 1991 Nobel Peace laureate), addresses supporters at her Rangoon compound in 1977. Despite her party’s 1990 election victory, the military junta remained firmly in control. (David van der Veen/ AFP/Getty Images)

Myanmar (Burma): Civil Wars and Coups Since 19 4 8

spread across Rangoon’s walls and city buses. Universities were closed in 1988 (and would not open again for at least a generation), severely limiting the ability of the student opposition to organize. SLORC declared that it had intervened to save Myanmar from “Communists, malcontents, and criminals.” However, in spite of the government’s denials that the protests had a popular basis, Aung San Suu Kyi continued to draw cheering crowds wherever she went. She ridiculed the government’s attempts to stop democratization. In a January 1989 interview, she said: “The authorities are still trying to deceive themselves. They must know that this is a great upsurge of popular feeling against an oppressive regime. Yet they keep going on about a Communist conspiracy. There is no such thing. Once the waters of a revolution start flowing, you can’t push them back forever.” In an attempt to reduce her effectiveness, SLORC ordered that crowds neither throw flowers at her car nor cheer her as she passed by. These directives were ignored; her trips continued to be showered with brightly colored blossoms. She had become the symbol of the prodemocracy movement. In an attempt to reduce her popularity, the military had her put under house arrest in July 1989—not even family members were allowed to visit her. With Aung San Suu Kyi confined and the media under state control, the government felt confident enough to hold elections on May 27, 1990. The result was an overwhelming victory for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. Out of 485 seats in the legislature, 392 went to NLD supporters. SLORC responded by declaring the elections invalid and initiated a second crackdown on dissent. Thousands were put into prison, including many NLD leaders and legislators. Some NLD leaders fled to Thailand; others, along with thousands of students, joined the ethnic Karen and Shan resistance in eastern Myanmar. The political resistance to SLORC went underground after the 1990 elections. Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest until 1995, and, for a time, there were rumors that she had been killed— which is perhaps why she was allowed to have visitors after May 1992. SLORC may also have been responding to international pressure and attention—she was awarded the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize as a sign of international support. After 1992, political repression was relaxed slightly. Some political prisoners were released, but many remained behind bars, and torture of political prisoners continued. Rangoon remained un-

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der a military-controlled peace, with political protest impossible. The one exception was that Aung San Suu Kyi was able to stage weekend meetings at her home, which were attended by thousands of supporters. At these meetings she called for SLORC to bow to the results of the 1990 elections. Her demand was ignored by SLORC, which arrested (or rearrested) hundreds of supporters in 1996. Aung San Suu Kyi’s relative freedom after 1995 probably resulted as much from her status as the daughter of a national hero as from any slight relaxation of SLORC’s repressive tactics. In eastern Myanmar, SLORC carried out a military and diplomatic campaign to eliminate the ethnic resistance to Burmese unity. Assaults were launched on tribal groups such as the Karen, Mon, and Shan. Thousands were forced to retreat across the border into Thailand (where some tribes charged village admission to tourists in order to gain currency with which to buy weapons—this was particularly true for the Padaung, or Long-Necked, Karen). Others stayed and fought the Burmese army. In the north, the Shan also fought against SLORC. Here the resistance was led by the half-Chinese drug warlord Khun Sa, who maintained an army of 10,000 (the Mong Tai Army) to defend his poppy fields, which produced more than $1 billion worth of heroin, much of which was exported to the United States. Despite the Karen and Khun Sa’s resistance, SLORC was successful in retaking most of Myanmar from the ethnic minorities. The Karen border headquarters of Manerplaw was captured in January 1995, while Khun Sa was convinced to retire by a combination of military pressure and the offer of a government amnesty. As of 1997 he was living happily in Rangoon as a “retired” drug lord.

From S LO R C to S P D C By the mid-1990s, the international community hoped that Myanmar’s domestic politics could be normalized through constructive engagement with external associations. This was in part the Indian and Chinese motive for pressuring the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to permit Myanmar membership in July 1997. Even so, there was little liberalization in succeeding years. Subsequent conflict between Mynamar and Thailand demonstrated how insulated the military (tatmadaw) leadership was. In 2001, the Myanmar military pursued guerrilla groups into neighboring Thailand, which

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responded with a brief artillery fury. Rather than acknowledge accidentally crossing the border, the Myanmar military leadership responded with its own brief artillery barrage, causing further casualties. Meanwhile, in 1997, the military renamed itself from SLORC to SPDC (the State Peace and Development Council). However, thousands of NLD political prisoners remained incarcerated under extremely harsh conditions, while Aung San Suu Kyi, although not under house arrest, remained cut off from much of the outside world (her husband was not allowed to see her after 1996, and she was not permitted to attend his funeral in 1999). The military regime launched a domestic and international press campaign against Suu Kyi in August 1998 following her arrest while attempting to contact her supporters outside the capital. The press declared that she was the principal threat to the regime and threatened anyone who met her with death. Suu Kyi was the implied target when, in March 2000, Than Shew of the military regime warned during a military parade that the government would eliminate all opposition. Facing international pressure, however, Myanmar’s military began negotiate with Aung San Suu Kyi, but this move was largely viewed by the outside as a means to avert condemnation. Most notable among these supposed attempts at negotiations was the October 2000 release of Suu Kyi from house arrest, a move that was due in large part to the costs of the U.S. trade embargo in oil, natural gas, wood products, and minerals. Nevertheless, in May 2003, military supporters attacked Suu Kyi’s motorcade in Depeyin, in northern Myanmar, killing seventy-five of her supporters. She was immediately detained by the government. International condemnation followed, as did further sanctions from the United States and the European Union, and aid was suspended by Japan. Thailand offered a plan to break the domestic deadlock in July 2003, which was countered in August by the Yangon government with its own plan for national reconciliation. The regime convened a national convention from May to July 2004, excluding most political parties including the NLD, but involving twenty-eight ethnic minorities. Of these, thirteen appealed for greater autonomy, though without tangible results. The main NLD headquarters was reopened in 2004, but its other offices remain closed, and its members are systematically harassed with detentions, denial of

driving licenses, and travel restrictions. Amnesty International estimated in 2004 that, despite the announcement of a prisoner release totaling more than 9,000 persons, there remained 1,100 political prisoners, which include many NLD representatives and prodemocracy activists. Myanmar’s military maintained a comprehensive system of controls over its citizens, but suffered from internal factionalism that can create abrupt changes in policy. In an attempt to shore up domestic military support, the regime announced in January 2002 that it would look into establishing a nuclear research facility (regardless of the international alarm it created). Myanmar was also identified as having a serious problem of terrorist infiltration; it was alleged by a number of foreign governments, including that of the United States, that terrorists used Myanmar’s territory as a transshipment point for personnel and materiel and for asylum, though it is not clear to what extent the military is complicit in this activity. In October 2004, Myanmar’s prime minister and intelligence head, Khin Nyunt, was removed from power and replaced by General Soe Win (the head of state remained General Than Shwe). Though the officially stated reason was for corruption, it was more likely an internal coup by the mainstream military against the very large state intelligence apparatus. Khin Hyunt was considered by some opposition groups to be relatively moderate, since he was pursuing negotiations with the ethnic minorities, which were halted after his departure. Some international experts suspected that retired dictator General Ne Win continued to wield influence from behind the curtain and that he wanted to rein in tendencies toward liberalization. It was equally likely that the intelligence forces were accumulating too much domestic economic influence. Khin Hyunt’s close associates were also removed, though the new regime committed itself to Hyunt’s August 2003 roadmap for democratization (of which holding the national convention was the first step). The reality on the ground, according to Amnesty International, was increased repression, suggesting that hard-liners had increased their influence on the SPDC.

Myanmar and Its Minorities The military regime did manage to secure cease-fires with most of Myanmar’s seventeen ethnic minorities and independent militias after 1988, though most of

Myanmar (Burma): Civil Wars and Coups Since 19 4 8

the groups remained armed and to varying degrees autonomous. The regime’s strategy was to obtain cease-fires with the smaller minorities and then leverage the success to secure cease-fires with the larger movements. Nevertheless, cease-fire negotiations begun by Khin Hyunt in the 1990s with the Karen National Union (KNU) were abandoned by the regime. Given the successful resistance of the Democratic Karen Burmese Army (DKBA) since a year after Burmese independence, it was highly improbable that Myanmar would secure a military victory over them. Occasional clashes continued with the KNU in the Kayin and Tanintharyi Divisions. In early 2006, the Shan State Army-South (SSASouth) mounted further resistance in southeastern Shan State, as did the Mon Hongsawati Party, a splinter from the New Mon State Party (NMSP) group that submitted to a cease-fire with Yangon. In May 2005, the SSA-South declared independence in lieu of obtaining autonomy. This declaration then prompted the Shan State National Army to break its cease-fire with Yangon and resume fighting when the latter began arresting its leaders for refusing to disarm. This reaction was in violation of their 1995 cease-fire agreement, which permitted the Shan State National Army to retain its weapons. Myanmar’s regime condemned the declaration, which highlights the strength of the Shan, who constitute 8 million of Myanmar’s 50 million persons. In the first few months of 2005, a deadly wave of bombings in Yangon seemed to indicate the increased sophistication of the Shan resistance. The continued inability of the Myanmar military regime to exercise control over its own territory, particularly the region occupied by the Shan, who fund their resistance with huge proceeds from narcotics cultivation, spilled over into conflict with Myanmar’s neighbors. In February 2001, Thai and Myanmar military forces fought a brief border war near the Shan territories, each accusing the other of supporting the local drug trade. Only the arrival of U.S. soldiers in Thailand deterred further clashes. A subsequent visit by Myanmar’s intelligence commander, Khin Nyunt, to Bangkok in September led to a commitment to make its antidrug efforts against the Golden Triangle more effective. The Myanmar military increasingly found itself cooperating with rebel militias in their drug businesses. The persistence of the drug trade can be traced to the huge amounts of money it can bring in to impoverished farmers, who are willing to share the

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profits with equally impoverished Myanmar military personnel in exchange for armed protection. Although the Myanmar government officially disapproved of the drug trade, the military command was either directly involved in it or was providing protection to those who do the heroin collection and production. For example, outside observers reported that the military command received kickbacks from the drug factories operated by the 20,000-strong “rebel” Wa Army. The Myanmar regime also relied on the Wa Army to counterbalance the Mong Tai Army (MTA), which dominated the drug trade routes along the Thai border. Thus, given that Myanmar’s main source of income came from its participation in the narcotics trade, and the fact that its soldiers were often paid with drugs rather than money, it seemed unlikely the government would put a stop to drug production in the foreseeable future. Human rights groups pointed out that the Myanmar government continued to commit gross abuses of human rights in its counterinsurgency operations in the Shan, Mon, and Kayin states. Historically these operations have also included mass relocations, such as 300,000 from southeastern Shan State, out of a total of over a million in the last decade. The fighting also produced large number of refugees. Some 135,000 mainly Kayin and Kayah refugees remained in camps in Thailand. Tens of thousands of Rohingyas remained in Bangladesh, and another 100,000 lived inside Bangladesh outside the camps. In addition, hundreds of thousands of migrant workers escaped to Thailand in search of employment. These flows revealed the implicitly genocidal policy against minorities, particularly in the way that the military deliberately employed tactics that led to economic hardship and starvation. The UN reported in 2005 that one-third of the children of Myanmar were undernourished. As well, the Rohingyas in northern Rakhine state were under severe movement restrictions imposed by the army, making farming and trade difficult. Ethnic minorities were also subject to forced labor and extortion of food production by what are effectively military fiefdoms. The number compelled to work (without compensation) on public works and plantations numbered at any one time in the tens of thousands. This practice was part of a military program, started in 1996, to achieve greater self-sufficiency as the economy contracted. There was little to suggest that the military was seriously considering stepping down in the

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foreseeable future, despite continued international sanctions and a weak economy. Coups from within the regime were possible but would not threaten the underlying hold of the military on power. However, the resurgence of violence by the Shan could presage increased resistance by other groups, which could drain the regime’s limited resources and weak legitimacy. Carl Skutsch and Julian Schofield See also: Coups; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Amnesty International. Myanmar: Human Rights After Seven Years of Military Rule. New York: Amnesty International, 1995.

———. Myanmar: “No Place to Hide”: Killings, Abductions and Other Abuses Against Ethnic Karen Villagers and Refugees. New York: Amnesty International, 1995. Aung San Suu Kyi, with Alan Clements. The Voice of Hope. New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997. Fink, Christina. Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule. New York: Zed, 2001. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey 1999–2005. London: IISS, 2000–2005. Myint-U, Thant. The Making of Modern Burma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Steinberg, David. Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002. Tucker, Shelby. Burma: The Curse of Independence. London: Pluto, 2001. Victor, Barbara. The Lady, Aung San Suu Kyi. London: Faber & Faber, 1998.

PHILIPPINES: Huk Rebellion,1948–1953 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s Wars PARTICIPANT: United States 0 0

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are twelve regions (plus the national capital region of Manila), divided into seventy-two provinces with elected municipal governments.

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Historical Background

Huk Rebellion area

PHILIPPINE SEA

Manila

PHILIPPINES

SULU SEA

CELEBES SEA

The Philippines is an archipelago consisting of thousands of islands stretching from the South China Sea south of Taiwan to Indonesia. The main islands are Luzon in the north, the largest and most populous island and site of the capital, Manila, and Mindanao in the south, separated by a narrow strait from the Malaysian state of Sabah on the island of Borneo. The total land area is 115,831 square miles. The majority of the nation’s 88 million people are Filipinos, a Malay race. Official languages are Tagalog, English, and Spanish. About 5 million aboriginal peoples such as the Igorot inhabit remote areas. The vast majority of the population is Roman Catholic, except in parts of Mindanao, where Muslims (moros) predominate. The national government is modeled on that of the United States, with a president, a vice president, and a bicameral legislature. Below the national level there

The Spanish explorer Ferdinand Magellan was the first European to reach the Philippines and was killed there in 1521. A few decades later, the Spanish conquered the islands, which they named after King Philip II. The Spanish set up an imperial superstructure over the existing indigenous feudal system in which chiefs (datos) ruled vast estates worked by peasant serfs (taos). New estates run by the conquerors and the Roman Catholic religious orders were established on basically the same system. The new and old ruling classes intermarried, and a homogeneous Filipino society on the Latin American model emerged, though the chief government posts were held by Spaniards. In the late nineteenth century, as Spanish imperial power declined, a revolution for Philippine independence headed by peasant leader Andrés Bonifacio and the landholder Emilio Aguinaldo broke out. By the end of 1897, the rebels controlled most of Luzon and besieged the Spanish in Manila. Spain, facing war in Cuba against the United States, offered terms to Aguinaldo, promising limited independence. As war in Cuba seemed more likely, Aguinaldo went to Hong Kong to speak with U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander George Dewey. Dewey promised assistance in defeating the Spanish and establishing full Philippine independence. However, after his fleet sailed victoriously into Manila Bay, Dewey took a different tack. Under instructions from Washington, U.S. naval forces joined with the Spanish army to disarm the independence forces and establish direct U.S. rule. Aguinaldo defiantly declared himself the leader of an independent Philippine Republic on February 4, 1899, and Dewey’s forces attacked. The Philippine insurrection

653

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Asia, East and Southeast

KEY DATES 1941–1944

Radical peasant organizations known as the Hukbalahap, or Huk, organize to fight for Filipino independence and land reform during the Japanese occupation.

1944–1945

U.S. and Filipino forces move to break up the Huk organizations as they recapture islands from the retreating Japanese.

1946

The United States grants the Philippines independence, with the new government led by urban elites; Huk forces reorganize.

1948

A cease-fire between government and Huk guerrillas breaks down.

1950

As the rebellion intensifies, the United States begins providing military support to the Filipino government.

1952

Huk rebels are largely defeated, though some sporadic fighting continues into 1953.

dragged on for six years. The scorched-earth tactics of the United States resulted in the death of more than half a million Filipinos before the fighting ended. While the military campaign against the largely peasant rebels went on, the U.S. colonial government under Governor William Howard Taft (later U.S. president) established friendly relations with the landlords, who were allowed to keep their property and expanded their holdings by selling them estates expropriated from the Roman Catholic Church (with compensation). As time went on, grants of limited participation in colonial administration further identified the elites with the new system. Establishment of a public education system using American teachers, the English language, and a curriculum that identified the Americans as liberators and Aguinaldo and the rebels as bandits was an important psychological tool for pacifying the country. The commercialization of agriculture under U.S. rule increased economic pressure on traditional peasant communities and also broke down the old paternalistic relationship between landholders and renters. The Great Depression of the 1930s worsened the situation, and peasant leagues, with support from the Communist and Socialist parties, engaged in strikes and demonstrations. In the United States, the government had tired of the perennial difficulties of administering the Philippines. The Tydings-McDuffie

Bill of 1934 mandated Philippine independence by 1946, and all political forces in the islands began to maneuver for position. The move to independence was soon interrupted by Japanese aggression in East Asia. Some landowners and capitalists in the Philippines were sympathetic to Japan, while the Philippine military prepared to resist any infringement of Filipino rights. In the meantime, the peasant leagues organized as the Hukbalahap, gaining broad peasant support and a strong position in the postwar independent nation. As Japan was defeated, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur (whose father had been an early military commander in the U.S.-controlled Philippines) returned at the head of U.S. forces in the Pacific. Not only did he drive out remaining Japanese troops, but he made a point of destroying the wartime Huk forces and helped rehabilitate Filipino elites who had collaborated with the Japanese. These turnabouts were a rude shock to leaders of the Philippines peasant masses. When peace returned, peasant leaders demanded that land rents be reduced from 55 percent of the crop to 40 percent. This relatively modest demand was rejected, and peaceful protests were met by assaults from the reorganized Philippine Constabulary, made up chiefly of Philippine military veterans. Important peasant leaders were assassinated.

Philippines: Huk Rebellion, 19 4 8–1953

The peasants organized as the Democratic Alliance for the first national elections in 1946, supporting Sergio Osmena, a wealthy landowner and politician who had spent the war in the United States, over Manuel Roxas, also a wealthy landholder and politician who was suspected of collaborating with the Japanese occupiers. Roxas, however, who had the support of General MacArthur and other U.S. authorities, was victorious in a corrupt and violent election. In 1947, wartime Huk leader Luis Taruc, an avowed Communist, was released from prison, where he had been held as a subversive. He became chief of the Huk armed units that were already taking to the field in central Luzon.

Huk War Roxas signed legislation ostensibly guaranteeing that peasants could keep 50 percent of their crops instead of 45 percent. At the same time, landlords were demanding and taking 70 percent, supported by local police and armed gangs. Roxas died in 1948, and his successor, Vice President Elpidio Quirino, negotiated a cease-fire with the Huks. The landlords and the police, however, continued their violence. By 1949, the Huks had taken control of the traditional peasant league areas in central Luzon, and the revolt was spreading. Quirino was elected president on his own in 1949, but the election was so violent and corrupt as to completely discredit him. In the United States, the administration of President Harry Truman was alarmed. Its official estimate of the situation, NSC-84/2 of November 1950, fully recognized that the Huks represented popular forces fighting against an admittedly corrupt and unjust system with which the United States was identified. However, in the context of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the administration argued that the Huks were instruments of the Soviet Union in its effort to control the Philippines. The Chinese minority in the Philippines was also seen as a threat to maintenance of a pro-U.S. government. Bad as the existing Filipino government was acknowledged to be, the report warned that its collapse would lead to a Communist seizure of power. The United States, it concluded, had to act. Direct military intervention, except as a last resort, was ruled out. However, under the agreement for maintenance of U.S. military bases, the United States could introduce as many troops as it consid-

655

ered necessary for the bases’ security. Bringing in more U.S. military personnel was expected to goad the Filipino government into making necessary reforms and providing that same government with military assistance in defeating the peasant insurgency of the Huks. The main U.S. military advocate was the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). In June 1950, arrangements were made for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) psychological warfare expert Colonel Edward Lansdale to join JUSMAG. The advisory group worked closely with Filipino Minister of Defense Ramon Magsaysay, a business executive and landholder who had traveled frequently to the United States to meet with Pentagon officials and members of Congress. He was a U.S. favorite, regarded as able and politically sound (pro-American). Under the direction of Major General Leland S. Hobbs of JUSMAG, the Philippine army and the constabulary were merged into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which could be dispatched in battalion combat teams of 1,100 men. With a $13 million special military assistance grant authorized in June 1950, the Filipino army was expanded with recruits from outside central Luzon, the Huk home ground. Lansdale, who had served as chief of U.S. Army intelligence in the Philippines during the war, moved into Magsaysay’s office. With American backing, Magsaysay was able to remove the most notoriously corrupt and ineffective army officers. He began a policy of paying cash rewards to soldiers who killed Huks. The standard rate was 5,000 pesos, about ten times the annual earnings of an average farm worker. Bounties ran as high as 100,000 pesos for the bodies of Huk leaders. Psychological operations were central to the Lansdale-Magsaysay strategy. By 1952, more than 13 million propaganda leaflets had been distributed. Under Lansdale’s Civil Affairs Office (CAO), as the “psywar” headquarters was known, mass public meetings were held, anticommunist forums were organized in universities and high schools, and forged Huk documents and false information were given to the media. Probably the most important element of the psywar campaign was the highly publicized “land to the landless” program, which promised farms to defecting Huks. Only about 1,000 grants, including only 246 to actual ex-Huks, were made, but propaganda films purportedly showed happy recipients of land grants denouncing their former Huk comrades. The propaganda was effective in eroding the Huk re-

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cruiting base. Another successful ploy was to encourage peasants who believed they had been denied their legal rights to send their complaints directly to Magsaysay and then to have army lawyers arrive for highly publicized visits to right the wrongs within twenty-four hours. Few wrongs got righted, but the visits showed that, contrary to Huk assertions, the government cared about poor Filipinos. JUSMAG-directed military intelligence was also important. In October 1950, as the result of an informant’s tip, the top leadership of the Communist Party was captured in Manila. Magsaysay, on JUSMAG’s advice, persuaded President Quirino to declare a state of emergency and allow the imprisonment of more than a thousand suspected Huk sympathizers without charges. Working with U.S. intelligence advisers, Philippine intelligence officers prepared lists of all known Huks and Huk sympathizers. Beginning in 1951, the officers cordoned off areas suspected of harboring those listed and began mass arrests. Within six months, over 15,000 people were arrested. The Huks had earlier been successful against small constabulary units, but they soon learned to avoid engaging the 1,100-member AFP battalion units. Then the government began to destroy Huk bases from the air. Between August 1950 and July 1952, the Philippine air force flew 2,600 sorties, dropping an estimated 250,000 tons of bombs. At the end of 1951, the United States began providing napalm, and fire raids were conducted on suspected Huk camps and farms. U.S. aircraft sometimes took part.

The War Ends By mid-1952 the Huk war was essentially over. Some Huk soldiers, who had not shared the revolutionary goals of their leaders, claimed that the Huk had won

when the government acknowledged their complaints and made some reforms. The national congressional elections of 1951, although bloody, had been relatively honest. Many Huk fighters had been in the field since 1942. It was time to go home and get back to work. The war, and Lansdale’s public relations work, had made Magsaysay the leading candidate for president in the 1953 elections. To enhance his reputation as an opponent of the Huks, he led troops in “battles” against AFP forces disguised as Huks. The Filipino chief of Lansdale’s Civil Affairs Office essentially converted the office into the Magsaysay for President organization. The United States openly backed him and sent naval forces to emphasize to President Quirino that fraud or a coup to remain in power would not be tolerated. With the election of Magsaysay, the pro-American and moderately reformist regime seen as necessary by NSC-84/2 had been created in the Philippines, and the Communist threat had been ended. David MacMichael See also: Cold War Confrontations; People’s Wars; Philippines: Moro Uprising, 1970s–1980s.

Bibliography Kerkvliet, Benedict J. The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Lachica, Eduardo. The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. New York: Praeger, 1971. Pomeroy, William J. The Forest: A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines. New York: International, 1963. Taruc, Luis. He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader. New York: Praeger, 1967. Valeriano, Napoleon. Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. New York: Praeger, 1962.

PHILIPPINES: Moro Uprising,1970s–1980s TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War; Ethnic and Religious

0 0

SOUTH CHINA SEA

100 100

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

PHILIPPINE SEA

Manila

PHILIPPINES

SULU SEA

MINDANAO

SULU ISLANDS BASILAN JOLO TAWI TAWI

CELEBES SEA

General Santos City

MORO TERRITORY

In 1898 the United States seized the Philippines, a vast archipelago in the South China Sea, from Spain. The early U.S. governors faced a bloody insurrection seeking Filipino independence but finally crushed it after six years of warfare. In 1934 the United States promised independence to the Philippines by 1946. Before then, however, Japan occupied the Philippines during World War II. The United States and the Philippines were allies in ending the occupation and defeating Japan. Soon after the war ended, independence was granted. Almost immediately, a peasant uprising, the Huk Rebellion, broke out to protest rural poverty and injustice. Because the Huks had Communist political leadership, the United States provided massive assistance to help the new Philippine gov-

ernment crush the movement. Some reforms were made, but after the death of U.S.-backed President Ramon Magsaysay in 1957, corruption and government oppression increased, and a new peasant insurgency called the New People’s Army began. In 1972 President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law and ruled by fiat until his overthrow in 1986 and replacement by Corazon Aquino, widow of Benigno Aquino, an opposition leader murdered by the Marcos government. Following independence in 1946, the position of the Muslim communities concentrated in parts of the large southern island of Mindanao worsened. The Muslims were a small minority nationally and were generally poorer and less educated than Christian Filipinos. Even in the areas where they formed a majority, they tended to form separate communities. Hence, they had little economic or political influence. When the government in Manila began establishing new colonies of Christian Filipino settlers in the Islamic regions, Muslims found themselves being forced off their lands. Without political strength they could get little relief in the courts, and their protests were often crushed by the Philippine Constabulary or by the gangs of thugs that formed private political armies. In response, Muslim private armies also sprang up. The situation came to a head during the Philippine presidential elections of 1971, in which Ferdinand Marcos was seeking a second term. There were increasingly violent clashes between Christian and Muslim (moro) armed groups. The Constabulary joined with the Christians to carry out several massacres of Muslims that received wide attention, particularly in the Islamic world. Things worsened further for Muslims after Marcos’s declaration of martial law in 1972. Centralization of power in Manila destroyed what little political influence Muslims had. The government then ordered all civilians to surrender their firearms, which meant that Muslims would

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Asia, East and Southeast

KEY DATES 1946

The Philippines wins independence from the United States.

1970

Radical Muslim separatists form the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

1972

Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos declares martial law, ending what little influence Filipino Muslims, or Moros, have within the government; fighting breaks out between the Filipino military and MNLF guerrillas.

1976–1977

The MNLF force is estimated at 30,000 guerrillas; representatives from the government and the MNLF meet in Libya to work out an agreement for autonomy for Muslims in the Philippines.

1986

Facing a popular protest movement, Marcos resigns the presidency and flees the country.

1996

The MNLF signs a peace agreement with the government; though smaller and more radical, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front continues fighting.

no longer have a means of self-defense against Christian and Constabulary attacks.

Moro Rebellion Large-scale fighting broke out in 1972 when Muslims, who previously had offered only piecemeal resistance under local district leaders, united in the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which had been formed in 1970. The founder of MNLF was Nur Misuari, a graduate of the Philippines National University with links to the leftist New People’s Army (NPA), a peasant-based insurgent movement that had resumed the old Huk struggle in the 1960s. Misuari also had contacts with Libya and Iran, which gave important monetary support to the movement. Closer to home and even more significant was the assistance given by the government of the neighboring Malaysian state of Sabah. The governor of Sabah, Tan Mustapha, was the heir to the old Sultanate of Sulu, which had dynastic claims to the Philippines’ Sulu Islands. The central government of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur also had a policy of protecting Muslim minorities in Southeast Asian countries—for example, maintaining a military presence in the Islamic southern provinces of Thailand.

Misuari’s adherents tended to be younger and more secular moros. A more religiously oriented, but still radical MNLF faction was led by Hashim Salamar, who had received his education at Cairo University in Egypt. Both the Misuari and Salamar factions were united in their determination to create an independent Muslim state in the Philippines and to make radical changes in the distribution of wealth and power. In addition to the MNLF there was a more politically conservative Islamic resistance group, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), under Rashid Lucman, Salipada Pendatum, and Macapatanon Abbas. All three were politicians whose goals were at least a measure of autonomy but without any social or economic reforms. They cooperated to a degree with the MNLF but also maintained a dialogue with the Marcos government and received financial backing from conservative Muslims in Saudi Arabia. Due to strict press censorship during the Marcos martial law era and the remoteness of the regions, there are few reliable details of actual combat during the Moro War. However, as arms and supplies poured in from Libya and elsewhere, and with Sabah providing a secure sanctuary, the MNLF made significant gains from 1973 to 1975. By mid-1975, MNLF armed strength, the Bangsa Moro Army, probably

Philippines: Moro Uprising, 1970s–19 8 0s

had about 30,000 fighters in the field. The movement controlled large areas in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Support for the MNLF in the Islamic world also grew. The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers established the Committee of Four to make regular reports on the Philippine situation. The MNLF position peaked in 1975. After this, a government amnesty program induced a significant number of defections. More important, Tan Mustapha lost control of the state government in Sabah, and the new administration there drastically curtailed its assistance, particularly the supply of arms. At this point Misuari proposed negotiations with Manila. Marcos was disinclined to negotiate and wanted to press what he saw as his military advantage. However, the MNLF’s Islamic Conference backers threatened to cut off oil shipments to the Philippines unless he went to the bargaining table. At the same time, the Islamic Conference prevailed on the MNLF to moderate its terms from independence to autonomy. The two sides held a preliminary meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 1975, where preparations were made for a peace conference to be held in Tripoli, Libya, the following year, with Muammar Qaddafi as the arbitrator. Marcos was represented in Tripoli by his wife Imelda.

Peace and Its Consequences The preliminary December 1976 Tripoli agreement went far to meet the MNLF objectives. Thirteen southern Philippine provinces, eight of which had current Christian majorities, were to be included in the autonomous Bangsa Moro State. Within this area of autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines, Muslims had the right to establish their own courts, schools, and administrative systems. The autonomous state was to have its own legislature, executive council, security forces, and economic and financial system. A cease-fire was agreed to, during which the Bangsa Moro Army would be allowed to regroup and resupply without interference by Philippine forces. It seemed a nearly complete MNLF victory. Marcos, however, had no intention of implementing the agreement. He used the cease-fire to reinforce his battered troops in the south, and, by appearing to approve the Tripoli agreement, he reduced the Islamic Conference and Libyan pressure. Then he pointed to the clause in the agreement stating that

659

his government would take “all necessary constitutional processes for implementation of the Agreement.” This sounded innocent enough, but in Marcos’s interpretation it meant that the agreement could not be put in force without a vote. The terms and date he set forth for the “constitutional processes” produced Muslim objections, and the plebiscite kept being postponed. This led to new meetings in Tripoli in 1977 and a new compromise, which Marcos again promptly violated. Over protests of the MNLF, the Islamic Conference, and Qaddafi, Marcos pushed ahead with his referendum. Its terms diminished the autonomous area agreed to at Tripoli, reduced the degree of autonomy in the area, and split the already diminished autonomous area into two separate regions under control of the central government. The vote, held under the martial law regime, predictably gave Marcos what he wanted. The disappointed MNLF leadership blamed Misuari for the debacle, and the movement fragmented. While Misuari’s followers continued the armed struggle, albeit at a reduced level, Salamar, who retained support from private Islamic international religious groups, counseled an end to fighting and direct negotiations with Manila. The older BMLO leaders, never enthusiastic about the social and political goals of the MNLF, openly moved toward accommodations with Marcos. The Islamic Conference still maintained formal support for the MNLF and its recognized leader, Misuari. However, the strategy of withholding oil supplies to influence policy had broken down, and there was less interest among the Arab oil states in backing up their support with action. At the May 1980 meeting of the Conference, at which Misuari spoke, the Conference foreign ministers only issued a statement calling on Marcos to live up to the Tripoli Agreement and referred to unspecified pressures it might apply to make him do this. Only Iran and Libya threatened to cut off oil shipments. The fact that the MNLF was now openly supported by these “rogue states” ensured that the United States would take no interest in the moro cause, even under President Carter’s human rights–oriented administration. After 1980 the Reagan administration was fully committed to Marcos, a safe, anticommunist ally. The Moro War in the Philippines was only one of a number of post-colonial minority struggles waged during the 1960s and 1970s. Like many others, this

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war has survived the end of the Cold War and is likely to continue in some form for decades to come. David MacMichael See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Philippines: Huk Rebellion, 1948–1953; Philippines: War on Islamic Militants Since 1990.

Bibliography Collins, Joseph. The Philippines: Fire on the Rim. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1989. Porter, Gareth. The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Military and Political Options. Honolulu: Center for Philippine Studies, Centers for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1987.

PHILIPPINES: War on Islamic Militants Since 1990 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anti-Terrorism; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: United States 0 0

100 100

200 Miles

200 Kilometers

LUZON

SOUTH CHINA SEA

PHILIPPINE SEA

Manila

PHILIPPINES

PALAWAN SULU SEA

MINDANAO

Zamboanga BASILAN JOLO

MALAYSIA

TAWI TAWI

SABAH

I

Jolo

SULU ISLANDS CELEBES SEA

BORNEO N

D

O

N

E

S

I

A

Since the 1970s, the Philippine government has been engaged in counterinsurgency warfare against Muslim separatists in the southwestern part of the national archipelago. Muslims, or Moros, who make up about 5 percent of the population of 88 million in the predominantly Catholic nation, have long felt that their region does not receive adequate services from the central government and that Manila is attempting to dilute the Muslim population by a systematic effort to settle Catholic Filipinos in the Sulu Islands, Basilan, and Western Mindanao, which have tradi-

tionally been the home to Filipino Muslims. The two major insurgency groups in this struggle have been the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and a more radical splinter group known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Moderates within the Moro community insist on autonomy for their region and an end to the government’s Catholic resettlement programs. Radicals insist on independence, with many MILF members also determined to create a Moro state that would abide by Islamic law. During the 1980s, a Moro teacher from Basilan named Abubakar Janjalani traveled to the Middle East, where he studied theology and Arabic in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. It is also believed that he fought in Afghanistan, where he may have met with Osama bin Laden, founder of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. In the Middle East, Janjalani made contact with the radical Islamic organization Al Islamic Tabligh—funded, in part, by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan—which were eager to spread fundamentalist Islam and Islamist politics to the Muslim populations of Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Back in the Philippines, Janjalani met with dissidents within MILF and with Filipino veterans of the Islamic struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He formed Abu Sayyaf, a radical and militant organization aimed at spreading Islam and Islamic law in the Philippines. Abu Sayyaf means “father of the sword” in Arabic. During the early 1990s, the organization, estimated to have included about 600 armed members, engaged in attacks largely against the Christian population of Basilan and Western Mindanao, including bombings, shootings, and kidnappings. The number of attacks was reduced in 1996, when the MNLF and the Filipino government reached a truce. Attacks

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Asia, East and Southeast

KEY DATES 1970s

The Philippines military conducts counterinsurgency operations against Muslim, or Moro, separatists in the southwestern part of the nation.

1980s

Islamic militants, some of whom are trained in the Middle East, form the radical organization Al Islamic Tabligh with funds from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

1990s

Fighting intensifies between Islamist militants and government forces.

1996

Moro separatists sign a truce with the government.

2000

Islamist militants begin to seize foreign hostages.

2002

The United States sends 650 military personnel to work with the Philippines armed forces in fighting Islamist militants.

2004

The Philippines withdraws its troops from Iraq but denies it is in response to threats from Islamist militants in the Philippines.

diminished further after Abubakar Janjalani was killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 1998. Abubakar’s brother Khadaffy and another militant named Ghalib Andang took command of Abu Sayyaf. Government raids like the one that led to the killing of Abubakar Janjalani actually helped Moro militants recruit new fighters and led them to employ a new tactic. Abu Sayyaf began kidnapping foreign nationals for ransom, using the ransom to recruit new members. Brandishing automatic weapons and traveling in speedboats, Abu Sayyaf militants crossed the Sulu Sea in April 2000 and kidnapped twenty tourists in the Malaysian state of Sabah. The hostages were released after an estimated $10–25 million was paid to the kidnappers, some of it allegedly from European governments. In May, Abu Sayyaf attacked the Filipino island of Palawan, capturing twenty foreigners, including three Americans. Eventually, the non-American victims were released for ransoms that ran to $1 million per person. The militants beheaded one American. The other two, who were Christian missionaries, died in the fighting when Filipino government forces attempted to rescue them. The Filipino government responded in force to the rise in Abu Sayyaf militancy. Between 2000 and 2001, more than 6,000 AFP troops were committed to Basilan and other regions where Abu Sayyaf was

active. The AFP claimed to have killed and captured many members of the organization, reducing Abu Sayyaf ’s numbers by about half. Still, AFP operations were hampered by the hostage situation, the rough terrain, civilian support for Abu Sayyaf, and a lack of counterinsurgency equipment and training. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States began providing antiterrorist assistance to the government of the Philippines to address the insurgency of Abu Sayyaf, acting on the belief that Abu Sayyaf was connected to the international schemes of al-Qaeda. Although it was clear that Abu Sayyaf founder Abubakar Janjalani met with future al-Qaeda operatives in the 1970s and 1980s, connections between Abu Sayyaf and al-Qaeda in the early 2000s were hard to establish. Reports by Filipino forces of finding “foreign terrorists” at Abu Sayyaf camps could not be confirmed. In early 2002, the Bush administration sent some 650 U.S. military personnel to the Philippines to work with the AFP combating Abu Sayyaf. The group included 150 special forces troops who would accompany the AFP on operations but would not engage in combat unless directly attacked. The U.S. assistance was welcomed by the administration of Filipino President Gloria Arroyo, but U.S. observers were concerned that the U.S. presence in the Philippines could cause an anti-American and antigovern-

Philippines: War on Islamic Militants Since 19 9 0

Muslim separatists of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) resume their insurrection in early 1988, after an autonomy agreement with the Philippine government fell through. Fighting has centered in the southern part of the country. (Romeo Gacad/AFP/Getty Images)

ment backlash, perhaps increasing support for Abu Sayyaf. In October 2002, Abu Sayyaf began a new bombing campaign, targeting civilians in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, and in the western Mindanao city of Zamboanga. On a positive note, the Filipino government reached a truce with the radical MILF

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guerillas. The agreement broke down in 2003, however, leading to a rebel attack on Mindanao that left thirty persons dead. Abu Sayyaf continued its kidnapping campaign, often capturing Filipinos as a way of forcing concessions from the government. One of its demands was that the Philippines withdraw its small contingent of peacekeeping troops from Iraq, which was aiding U.S. efforts there. In July 2004, the Arroyo government announced that it was withdrawing the troops, but denied that it was responding to Abu Sayyaf threats. On the military front, the government maintained its offensive against Abu Sayyaf militants. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; United States: War on Terrorism, 1990s– ; Philippines: Moro Uprising, 1970s– 1980s.

Bibliography Abuza, Zachary. Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005. Niksch, Larry. “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. AntiTerrorism Cooperation.” In Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 25, 2002.

THAILAND: Muslim Rebellion,2004– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Separatist VIETNAM

BURMA ( M YA N M A R ) LAOS

Udon Thani

THAILAND Bangkok

Sattahip

ANDAMAN SEA

Ubon Ratchathani

CAMBODIA

Gulf of Thailand

VIETNAM

Surat Thani Phuket 0 0

100 100

200

200

300 Miles

Hat Yai

Patani

PATANI NARATHIWAT

300 Kilometers

Malay area

YALA

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA

SOUTH CHINA SEA

Thailand is a predominantly Buddhist country of 65 million persons, situated in Southeast Asia. Unlike the rest of the region, Thailand—once known as Siam—was never colonized by Europeans but remained an independent kingdom throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thailand is a medium-income country, with a per capita income of about $8,300 annually. Despite a major financial crisis in the late 1990s, the country enjoyed rapid economic development, with a growth rate averaging nearly 5 percent in the early 2000s. Although nominally led by a king, Thailand was under military rule from the 1970s through the early 1990s, when it was returned to civilian government. Muslims make up approximately 5 percent of Thailand’s population, concentrated in the three south-

ern provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, and Yala, all situated near the country’s border with predominantly Muslim Malaysia. Most of these Muslims differ from the majority Thai population in that they are of Malay ethnic origin and speak Behasa Melayu, the national language of Malaysia, as their primary tongue. As with other parts of the Southeast Asian coastal region and in the nearby East Indies, Islam arrived in Thailand peacefully in the early part of the second millennium c.e., as Arab traders set up communities and intermarried with locals. Others soon converted, either because they appreciated Islam’s tenets or because the new religion gave them economic advantages with Islamic traders from the West. Beginning in the seventeenth century, Thai rulers sought to subjugate the Malay-speaking Muslims of the southern Malay Peninsula, ultimately in the early nineteenth century dividing the region with British colonialists, who took control of most of it. After the withdrawal of the British, the Thai government tried to win over the Muslim minority through cultural assimilation and financial incentives. Sometimes more forceful methods were also employed, including decrees banning native Malay dress and use of the Malay language in public, and, especially during military rule, they were forced to worship at Buddhist shrines. Beginning in the 1960s, various Malay separatist groups were based in southern Thailand, an area that separatists called Patani. One was the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, National Liberation Front of Patani). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the government launched military operations in the region. Several hundred suspected separatist guerrillas were killed in the seven-year-long government crackdown against Patani separatists. Following the Islamist revolution in Iran in 1979, the separatists in Thailand became radicalized, calling for an independent Islamic state in Patani. Other separatist groups lost support to the radical BNPP. In 1985, militant members of BNPP broke away to form the Barisan Bersatu Mujahideen Patani (BBMP,

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KEY DATES 1600s The Thai royal government begins to assert control over the Muslim population in the south of Thailand. 1960s The Muslim Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, National Liberation Front of Patani) launches attacks on government forces in an effort to gain independence for Muslim provinces in the south of the country. 1991

In the wake of a military coup, a civilian government is reinstated in Thailand.

1997

A major financial crisis strikes Thailand and much of Southeast Asia.

2004

After a lull in fighting since the late 1980s, conflict breaks out between government forces and Muslim separatists in January.

2005

The government declares emergency rule in three Muslim-dominated provinces in the south of the country.

A government soldier stands guard in front of a mosque in Thailand’s tense Yala province in early 2006. A growing Muslim separatist movement in a largely Buddhist nation brought increasing violence to southern provinces. (Muhammad Sabri/AFP/Getty Images)

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United Mujahideen Front of Patani). A year later, the remaining BNPP began to emphasize its own Islamic credentials as well, renaming itself the Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP, Islamic Liberation Front of Patani). During the 1980s, both groups, engaged in renewed clashes with government forces. By the end of the decade, the government seemed to have defeated the separatist groups. In the early 2000s, outside events—including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent U.S. war on terrorism— once again triggered fighting in the region. From the start of the fighting in January 2004 to early 2006, about 1,000 people met violent deaths due to the new Islamist rebellion. The government imposed martial law in several districts of Narathiwat province after separatist guerrillas stormed an arms depot and burned eighteen schools on January 4, 2004. During that year, separatists were responsible for the murder of a number of Thai officials and Buddhist civilians, and for the destruction of numerous structures. The government’s response was mixed, including both harsh crackdowns and gestures of reconciliation. Separatists held the government responsible for the deaths of 84 suspected militants who suffocated after they were loaded onto trucks in March 2005. The following month, more than 100 guerrillas were killed in clashes with some of the 30,000 Thai security

forces based in the rebellious region. On July 15, 2005, the government declared emergency rule in the three provinces. At the same time, the government moved to ease tensions. In August, General Sonthi Boonyarattakalin became the first Muslim to occupy the post of Thai army chief, while the head of the government’s National Reconciliation Commission, former prime minister Anand Panyarachun, called for the government to recognize and accept the cultural diversity of the nation. Despite these overtures, the violence continued. James Ciment and Patit Paban Mishra See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Che Man, W.K. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990. Forbes, Andrew D.W., ed. The Muslims of Thailand, 2 vols. Gaya, India: Centre for South East Asian Studies, 1989. Miniami, Ryoshin, and others, eds. Growth, Distribution and Political Change: Asia and the Wider World. Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1999. Mishra, Patit Paban. “Islam in Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Southern Thailand.” Asian Studies (Calcutta) 5, no. 1 (January–March1987): 1–9. Rubenstein, Colin, ed. Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001.

VIETNAM: First Indochina War,1946–1954 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Cold War Confrontation; People’s War PARTICIPANT: France Re

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The first Indochinese war represented one of the great anticolonial wars of the post–World War II era. Under the leadership of the Communist-Nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh, Vietnamese nationalists—known as the Vietminh, in his honor—battled the French for eight years, eventually driving them out of the northern half of Vietnam after the great victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Because of Ho’s Communist leanings and the support—more political than material—that he received from mainland China and the Soviet Union,

the United States saw the conflict as part of the Cold War struggle between East and West. By the end of the war, the United States was footing more than 80 percent of the costs of the French military in Vietnam. At the peace conference in Geneva in 1954, it was agreed to reunify Vietnam after elections, which were to be held within two years. The administration in the south—supported by the United States—refused to hold the elections, however, thereby setting the stage for the Second Indochina War or, as the Vietnamese refer to it, the American War. Situated as it is beneath the great belly of China, Vietnam has had an ambivalent relationship with its northern neighbor through much of its history. It adopted many aspects of Chinese culture, but it also created a history for itself in its efforts to maintain its independence. Vietnamese history and myth is, in part, a great saga of warriors and heroes who have struggled to throw the Chinese out of their kingdom. At the same time, Vietnamese nationalism—as powerful as it is—is cut through with its own inconsistencies. Much of today’s Vietnam was carved out of a conquered Khmer realm a thousand years ago. In addition, because of the odd shape of Vietnamese territory—often described as two buckets at each end of a long pole, like the device Vietnamese peasants use to haul water—two distinctive Vietnamese cultures emerged. Though maintaining one language and the same nationalist sentiments, the people of the Red River Valley in the north and those of the Mekong River Delta of the south viewed each other with suspicion throughout their long history.

French Conquest and Rule As in so many other regions of the third world, the coming of European colonialists—in this case the French in the mid-nineteenth century—arrested and redirected the normal historical process of nation-building

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KEY DATES 1883

French forces complete their conquest of Vietnam.

1927

Revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh organizes the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD, its Vietnamese acronym) to fight for an end to French colonial rule.

1941–1945 Japanese imperial forces drive out French colonizers, but face resistance from Ho Chi Minh and Vietnamese nationalists. 1945

French forces reoccupy Vietnam in the wake of Japan’s defeat in World War II.

1946

Fighting between French forces and Ho Chi Minh’s guerrilla army breaks out.

1954

Ho Chi Minh’s guerrilla army besieges French forces at Dien Bien Phu, forcing the French to surrender and abandon Vietnam; the country is divided in two at the 17th parallel, with Ho Chi Minh’s Communist forces in control of the northern half of the country and the pro-Western government of Bao Dai in control of the south; the Geneva Accords call for elections in 1956 to put the country under unified leadership.

and economic development in Vietnam. Though French and other European missionaries—as well as traders—had established settlements in Vietnam as early as the sixteenth century, it was not until the vast expansion of the French economy and military in the mid-nineteenth century that a full colonial conquest of Indochina was possible. In 1857, the Emperor Napoleon III dispatched a force that conquered the port city of Touraine (now Da Nang) the following year. It took the French some twenty-five years to conquer all resistance, and in 1883, an expedition put down the last nineteenth-century revolt in Hanoi. By the end of the century, the French colonial power extended across most of Southeast Asia. The colony was called Cochin-china, and it consisted of four protectorates coinciding with the modern regions of Laos and Cambodia, as well as southern and northern Vietnam (called Annam and Tonkin, respectively). French colonial rule in Vietnam was harsh and exploitive. Virtually the entire administrative bureaucracy—except at the lowest and most menial levels—was staffed by Frenchmen. Vietnamese emperors remained figureheads whom the French disposed of at will, whenever the former voiced any kind

of complaint. After the turn of the century, the French began to build a modern transport and industrial infrastructure, but it was entirely geared toward French interests. Maximum profits were the main aim of all industrial enterprises, and thus little profit was reinvested in further modernization. In the countryside, the French moved gradually to exploit the land and the peasantry for their own profit and that of the wealthier Vietnamese and Chinese landlords who cooperated with the colonial rulers. While rice output in the rich river deltas of the country quadrupled between 1880 and 1930, average rice consumption among the peasantry fell. One of the main reasons for this anomaly was that land was becoming increasingly consolidated into fewer hands. By the early twentieth century, a huge new class of landless tenants was forced to pay nearly 60 percent of their crops to landlords. By World War II, about half the peasantry was landless, and those peasants who owned their land were forced to pay high taxes, while receiving below-market prices from Chinese middlemen. Finally, to create the infrastructure necessary to exploit the colony—and to staff the huge new rubber and other commercial crop plantations and mines—the

Vietnam: First Indochina War, 19 4 6–195 4

colonial government required peasants who could not pay their taxes to work at forced labor instead. Meanwhile, the average Vietnamese enjoyed little in the way of civil rights or economic opportunities. French citizens were tried in French courts, but the Vietnamese were not even allowed to testify. Even the small Vietnamese middle class in the colony was not allowed to be involved in the more lucrative agricultural, mining, or industrial ventures. The French controlled all such businesses, and if they dealt with non-French contractors, these were usually the Chinese. Thus, Vietnam failed to develop an indigenous entrepreneurial or landlord class during the colonial period. At the same time, the French justified their presence in the country by pointing to the educational and health facilities they were building for the Vietnamese, although actual data from the government bureaucracy belied this. Whereas the majority of the population possessed some kind of literacy before the French conquest, barely 20 percent could read and write by 1939. In that same year, there were but two physicians per 100,000 residents, significantly below the ratio in the U.S. colony of the Philippines where there were 25 physicians per 100,000 residents.

Resistance to French Rule Given the record of French exploitation and abuse, it is not surprising that nationalist resistance began as early as colonial rule itself. In the nineteenth century, much of that resistance came from the old guard, who wanted to eliminate the European interlopers in order to reestablish the old Vietnamese imperial rule. In the early twentieth century, a more modern nationalist leadership—inspired by the Chinese revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911—rallied around Phan Boi Chau, an educated Vietnamese who believed that his people must adopt European methods, including a modern army and administration, to rid themselves of the Europeans. Chau, who established a government in exile in republican China, was captured by the French in 1925 and imprisoned until his death in 1940. Chau, who had hoped to appeal to the French for political concessions that would gradually lead to selfgovernment, was replaced after World War I by a more militant group of nationalists, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, or VNQDD), founded in 1927. The VNQDD advocated vi-

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olent resistance, including terrorist actions and the mutiny of Vietnamese troops under French command. The VNQDD, however, was quickly crushed, leaving the way open for a more politically radical nationalist movement led by the Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh (born Nguyen That Thanh). Ho had traveled widely before settling in Paris in 1917. He appealed for Vietnamese independence at the Versailles Peace Conference after World War I but was rebuffed. In 1920, he joined the Communist Party of France, the only French political organization critical of colonial rule. He then traveled to the Soviet Union and the Communist-controlled areas of China in the service of the Communist International (a Soviet-led alliance of national Communist parties worldwide). In 1925, he established the Revolutionary Youth League of Vietnam, predecessor of the Indochinese Communist Party, which he also founded in 1930. That very same year, Ho’s organization, taking advantage of a famine in the countryside, staged a broad uprising, executing a number of officials and landlords and establishing “soviet” peasant ruling councils in various areas, before being suppressed by the French the following year. Unlike the elitist VNQDD, the Communists were a more disciplined and coherent group, retreating into the jungle where they carried on their campaign against the French and later against the invading Japanese.

World War I I and After During World War II, Indochina was a Frenchadministered possession of the Japanese Empire. Meanwhile, the Communists, under Ho’s prodding, took the leadership of a broad front of nationalist forces known as the League for the Independence of Vietnam, or Vietminh. At the same time, Ho cooperated with the Allies, hoping that he would win their support for independence after the war. When the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the Vietminh seized power in Hanoi, forcing the nominal emperor Bao Dai to abdicate his throne. The French, however, now free of Nazi domination, were determined to reestablish their empire in Southeast Asia. On August 26, 1945, Ho arrived in Hanoi. It had taken him nearly thirty years to get there, though he had been born just 200 miles to the south. Recognizing the importance of winning Western allies in his political struggle to prevent the French from returning, he turned to the United States, even going so far

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as to adapt phrases from the American Declaration of Independence into his Vietnamese Declaration of Independence. The French complained that the Americans in Hanoi—largely representatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—were working with Ho, as they had during the anti-Japanese struggle. But, in fact, the Americans were ambivalent, finding a revival of French colonialism distasteful but fearing Ho’s Communist affiliations. The situation in Vietnam during the first months after the Japanese surrender was fluid and uncertain. Under the Potsdam Agreement—signed in July— British forces occupied the southern half of the country, disarming the Japanese soldiers there and releasing French soldiers who had been imprisoned by the Japanese. In October, the British turned administration in the south back to the French. Ho and his government in the north were in an untenable position. They had few weapons or troops and faced not only a British–French presence in the South but a 200,000man Chinese army, under the command of anticommunist Chiang Kai-shek, in the north. Adding to Ho’s dilemma was the fact that none of the great powers were willing to recognize his new government, though none were willing to recognize continued French rule either. Desperate to rid his territory of the hated Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek, Ho chose the lesser of two evils, arranging to have French troops return temporarily to the north to restore order and win a Chinese withdrawal. In March 1946, Ho and the French signed an agreement calling for Paris to recognize Vietnam as a “free state.” The agreement also spelled out a withdrawal of the 15,000 French troops from the north in five annual installments ending in 1952. This, of course, meant that there would be two governments in Vietnam, but the agreement also called for negotiations in Paris to deal with this. Altogether, the agreement seemed to satisfy both sides, but that was because each had chosen to interpret the term “free state” in its own way. For Ho, it meant complete independence, while for France, it meant a limited form of selfgovernment within the French overseas community. The first indication that the two sides had ignored their differences came even before the agreement was signed, with the appointment of Admiral d’Argenlieu (“Admiral” was his name, not his title)—a strict Gaullist who believed that the “pearl” of the French empire must remain French—as High

Commissioner in Saigon. In August, d’Argenlieu moved to reincorporate Laos into French Indochina. Moreover, when Vo Nguyen Giap, head of the northern Vietnamese forces, demanded that the French hold a referendum on the issue of reunification, the High Commissioner refused, insisting instead that Ho go to Paris and negotiate with d’Argenlieu’s superiors. The negotiations, which lasted through much of the summer of 1946, proved frustrating for Ho, especially after Charles de Gaulle—the former French president who was still the major political figure in the country—issued noisy declarations about France’s need to maintain its empire. As Ho sailed home aboard a French warship with little more than an agreement to continue the talks in early 1947, Giap—ruling the north while Ho was away—organized a mass demonstration of the Vietminh’s strength in Hanoi on September 2, the first anniversary of Ho’s declaration of Vietnamese independence.

Wounded French soldiers are evacuated during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in March 1954. The French surrendered after a two-month Vietnamese siege, effectively ending their colonial rule in Indochina. (RDA/Getty Images)

Vietnam: First Indochina War, 19 4 6–195 4

The War By November 1947, tensions between French troops and the Vietminh government were at the breaking point. During a November 20 dispute over control of the Haiphong customs house—and, thus, the flow of arms into the country—shots were fired between French and Vietminh troops. As street fighting broke out throughout the city, French forces bombed the city and then occupied it. Several weeks later, the French dispatched a major expeditionary army to Vietnam, while Ho and his Vietminh comrades fled to the mountains along the Chinese border. It was the perfect place from which to launch the kind of war they had to fight—a guerrilla struggle with a better-armed foe. Not only was it mountainous and largely inaccessible but it was familiar to the Vietminh commanders, including Giap. During the Japanese occupation, Ho’s forces had used these mountains as a base for their struggle and a route for smuggling in arms from China. Indeed, some of their old bases were still there. At the same time, Giap organized self-defense cadres in every village, town, and factory, placing them under the strict control of the Vietminh. The French sent many of the 15,000 troops dispatched in December into the mountains along the Chinese border, but the Vietminh proved elusive. Through 1948 and 1949, the struggle between the French and the Vietminh remained desultory, with neither side able to deliver a serious blow against the other. Indeed, neither had the weapons nor the men to do so. But events outside the country were conspiring to escalate the conflict immensely in the early 1950s. The victory of the Communists in the Chinese civil war in 1949 and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 steered the attention of Cold War policymakers at the U.S. State Department and Pentagon toward the situation in Indochina. In light of the new developments, the fighting in Indochina was seen not simply as an anticolonial struggle, but as a Cold War confrontation between the Communist East and the anticommunist West. At first, the United States provided modest aid to France, just $10 million in military equipment. It was a start, however, and it helped commit the government to a French victory. By 1954, U.S. commitment had grown to $1 billion, roughly 80 percent of

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the cost of the war. Yet, it remained France’s war to fight. By early 1954, France’s troop presence amounted to 190,000 men, and it had already lost some 74,000 troops. But the worst was yet to come. In 1953, General Henri Navarre was sent by Paris to bring the debilitating quagmire of a war to an end. Notably, Navarre had no illusions that the French could actually defeat the Vietminh. Instead, he simply hoped to deliver a strong blow that would force the enemy to negotiate seriously. Frustrated by France’s inability to engage the Vietminh in the kind of set-piece battle the French were most suited to fighting, Navarre proposed an audacious and, some would say, arrogant plan. He would set a trap for Giap and the Vietminh, baiting it with thousands of French troops. The location was a small group of villages near the Laotian border, Dien Bien Phu. Almost every preparation made by Navarre was a blunder. The location was disastrous. Situated in a valley surrounded by hills, it was vulnerable to being surrounded. Moreover, it was constantly draped in thick clouds, virtually eliminating France’s U.S.supplied air advantage. Navarre also seriously underestimated both the size of the Vietminh forces and the ingenuity of its commanders. The French general believed they had only one or two divisions, when in fact they possessed five. At the same time, Navarre did not believe that Giap’s army—given its lack of heavy transport and the almost impassable jungles and mountains—could bring heavy artillery to bear on the French forces. On November 20, 1953, the first French forces parachuted into Dien Bien Phu. Soon there were some 10,000 troops in place, with 5,000 more in reserve. The trap had been set. Giap was getting ready, too. Using bicycles and some 100,000 peasant porters—most of whom volunteered for the nationalist crusade—the Vietnamese commander was able to move dozens of heavy artillery pieces up the mountains and then dig them into place, so that French artillery and bombs would prove futile in knocking them out. He also managed to place an army of some 50,000 men into position, three times more than Navarre expected. On March 13, 1954, the siege of Dien Bien Phu began. The French now had their set-piece battle, and it was a disaster. As an unexpected volume of artillery fire poured in, the French proved unable to even locate where it was coming from. Nor could they resupply their forces or move out the wounded. Between the bad weather—which also made bombing

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difficult—and the constant artillery pounding, no aircraft of any kind could get in. The situation in the underground bunkers was horrendous. The wounded lay in the mud, and the dead went unburied. In Washington, there was talk of helping the French with saturation bombing of Vietminh positions, even of dropping atomic bombs. But in the end, the recent memories of Korea (which had ended in a stalemate in 1953), the fear of Chinese intervention, and British unwillingness to support the Americans nixed such plans. On May 7, the commander of the French forces surrendered to the Vietminh. France had lost the first Indochina War.

Aftermath Later that year, the Vietminh and the French met in Geneva to negotiate an internationally monitored cease-fire in Vietnam. The Geneva Accords called for the French to recognize the independence of the government in Hanoi and to pull their troops south of the seventeenth parallel, while the Vietminh would bring their troops back above that line. The parallel was to serve as a temporary military demarcation line only, surrounded by a narrow demilitarized zone. Under the agreement, civilians were free to move back and forth. A large number of Catholic Vietnamese and others with property headed south to escape the Communist government, while many Vietminh supporters in the south headed north. A temporary non-Communist government was established in the south under the Emperor Bao

Dai, who had returned from exile in France. The Geneva Accords called for an internationally monitored election in all of Vietnam to determine its future status within two years. The election would never be held. By 1956, Bao Dai had been displaced by a hardened anticommunist nationalist, Ngo Dinh Diem. Supported clandestinely by the United States and fearing a Vietminh victory in any election, Diem canceled the poll. Soon, he was crushing all opposition to his regime, forcing Communists and other opponents to go underground and eventually begin their guerrilla war against his government in Saigon. James Ciment See also: Cold War Confrontations; Anticolonialism; People’s Wars; Laos: Pathet Lao War, 1960s–1970s; Vietnam: Second Indochina War, 1959–1975.

Bibliography Dalloz, Jacques. The War in Indo-China, 1945–54. Savage, MD: Gill and Macmillan, 1990. Davidson, Phillip B. Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988. Devillers, Philippe. End of a War: Indochina, 1954. New York: Praeger, 1969. Dunn, Peter M. The First Vietnam War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983. Maclear, Michael. The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam, 1945–1975. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981. Wintle, Justin. The Vietnam Wars. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

VIETNAM: Second Indochina War, 1959–1975 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; People’s War PARTICIPANT: United States a civil war between the Communist north and the anticommunist south. For Americans, it was a Cold War battleground between the United States and the Communist world, as represented by North Vietnam. The costs of the war were enormous for all concerned. While North Vietnam ultimately won the war and united the two halves of Vietnam into a single Communist state, the Vietnamese people suffered tremendously. A million combatants died on all sides, several million more civilians were killed, and the country’s environment was ravaged. For the United States, the costs were registered in both human and political terms. Some 57,000 soldiers died, and the war—the longest in American history—divided the nation bitterly, helping to bring down a presidency, halting progress in social welfare programs, and, some sociologists say, escalating the violence in daily life.

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The Second Indochina War (or, as the Vietnamese call it, the American War) was one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts of the post–World War II era. The Vietnam War, as it is known in America, was really several wars, depending on one’s perspective. For the Vietnamese, it was both a struggle between Communist guerrillas and government forces in South Vietnam and

The 1954 Geneva Accords that ended the first Indochina war between the Vietminh—a Nationalist– Communist front government headed by Ho Chi Minh—and France, the colonial power in Indochina, called for a division of Vietnam into two military districts, divided at the 17th parallel. Under the agreement, all French and pro-French forces relocated to the southern half of the country, while all Vietminh forces moved north of the dividing parallel. The accords also called for the free movement of people across the line. Nearly a million Catholic and propertied Vietnamese in the north—fearing Communist rule—fled south, while about a tenth that number of Vietminh sympathizers in the south moved to the north. The division of Vietnam was meant to be only temporary. In the Final Declaration of the accords, both sides committed themselves to an internationally

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KEY DATES 1956 Elections intended to unify the two halves of Vietnam under unified leadership, per the 1954 Geneva Accords ending the first Indochina war, are canceled by Ngo Dinh Diem, leader of South Vietnam. 1960 North Vietnam organizes various South Vietnamese guerrilla forces into the National Liberation Front (NLF), known pejoratively as the Viet Cong. 1963 Diem is overthrown and assassinated by military officers, who then seize power; by the end of the year, the United States has roughly 17,000 military advisers in South Vietnam. 1964 Claiming its warships have been attacked by North Vietnamese forces, the United States launches a bombing campaign against North Vietnam. 1965 The first U.S. ground troops arrive in Vietnam. 1968 North Vietnamese and NLF forces launch a massive offensive on Tet, the Vietnamese new year; by the end of the year, the United States has more than 500,000 ground troops in Vietnam. 1970

To destroy North Vietnamese and NLF sanctuaries, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces invade neighboring Cambodia.

1973

North Vietnam and the United States sign a peace treaty, ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict.

1975

North Vietnamese and the NLF launch a massive offensive that brings down the South Vietnamese government; Vietnam is unified under Communist rule as nearly 1 million refugees flee the country.

supervised election within two years. In this poll, all of the Vietnamese people would be asked to elect a single government for the whole country. The elections, however, would never be held. France, which was the nominal power in the south, quickly abdicated its role. Struck by yet another colonial uprising in Algeria, the French chose to withdraw from Vietnam on January 1, 1956, turning over power to Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem had serious nationalist credentials. Equally important, his deep Catholicism and virulent anticommunism appealed to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The United States—which had backed France in its war with the Vietminh to the tune of more than $1 billion—now transferred its support to Diem, who was not sullied with the taint of French colonialism. With America’s backing, Diem quickly moved to consolidate his power in the southern half of the coun-

try, going so far as to declare the region a sovereign state, the Republic of South Vietnam, with its capital at Saigon. Diem and the Americans had no intention of holding nationwide elections. They understood that Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh had widespread support—having brought a successful conclusion to the nationalist struggle against the hated French—and would certainly win the elections. In fact, the government of the north controlled the populace so firmly that it could easily control the outcome of the polling there.

Diem Years At first, Hanoi tried to press its case for elections with the international commission established to implement the Geneva Accords. It soon became clear, however, that the body was powerless in the face of

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Diem’s intransigence and the clear support of the United States. As both sides tried to rebuild their war-ravaged regions—the north along Communist lines and the south along capitalist ones—tensions mounted. Despite his strong anti-French nationalism, Diem was neither popular nor in touch with his constituents. First, his efforts to Christianize the country and his decision to fill the bureaucracy and army with fellow Catholics alienated the new country’s Buddhist majority. Worse were his agricultural and political policies. While he instituted land reforms, much of the effort was undermined by the corruption of the officials chosen to implement them. Very little land was handed over to the peasantry, and most ended up back in the hands of the old elite or those connected with the Diem regime. The north’s own efforts at land reform—collectivization—proved even more disastrous, setting off a regional famine that killed tens of thousands. Meanwhile, many of the southern Vietminh who had fled north after the Geneva Accords were heading south again. They had been trained and armed by Hanoi to conduct both political and military work in the south, proselytizing peasants and establishing clandestine administrative networks in villages that they controlled, ambushing army patrols, sabotaging infrastructure, and assassinating agents of the Diem regime. The Diem government derisively labeled the guerrillas Viet Cong, for Vietnamese Communists. As dissent rose against the government in the south, the regime developed a vast security system— under the leadership of Diem’s brother Nhu Can Lao—assassinating thousands of dissidents and forcing hundreds of thousands of ordinary peasants to relocate into what the government called “agrovilles,” which would later be known as “strategic hamlets.” Intended to be modern, well-serviced agricultural centers, the agrovilles were overcrowded, disease-filled camps. Peasants had to hike miles to their fields, were disconnected from the lands of their ancestors, and were thus unable to fulfill the religious rites that were so much a part of traditional Vietnamese peasant life. Despite the security measures, the Viet Cong continued to make inroads throughout South Vietnam. In December 1960, the North Vietnamese moved to unify the often-fractured Viet Cong units into a single organization, the National Liberation Front (NLF). With the national police and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) unable to cope

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with the crisis, the Americans increased their support for Diem. The Eisenhower administration had begun to send in U.S. advisers to help train the ARVN in counterinsurgency tactics. Beginning in 1961, President John F. Kennedy vastly increased the number of advisers. Between 1960 and 1963, the number rose from 900 to 17,000. Although the U.S. advisers were supposed to serve in a training capacity only, many were involved in combat missions. For all the support Washington was providing Saigon, the Diem government was growing increasingly unpopular. Leading the non-violent protests against the regime were the Buddhist monks. Convinced of the corruption and anti-Buddhist bias of the government, the monks used their considerable moral weight to criticize the regime. The situation was so charged that a minor dispute over the flying of a Buddhist flag on the Buddha’s birthday ended up in an army raid on monasteries that left forty Buddhist demonstrators, including a number of monks, dead. In June, a Buddhist monk performed the ultimate sacrifice, dousing himself with gasoline and set himself afire in front of news cameras. Soon, other monks followed his lead. At the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and in Washington, a decision was gradually made to get rid of the unpopular Diem. Some advisers argued that a coup against Diem with no viable replacement for him would lead to anarchy and play into the Communists’ hands. The majority, however, supported a plan to oust Diem with a coup. Thus, with U.S. support, several ARVN generals launched their coup against Diem and his brother. Much to Washington’s chagrin, both were unceremoniously executed while trying to escape. Three weeks later, the death of South Vietnam’s leaders was overshadowed in the United States when Kennedy himself was assassinated in Dallas.

Tonkin Gulf Incident and Arrival of U.S. Troops The twin assassinations of Diem and Kennedy had very different results in the capitals of the two countries. In Saigon, the coup against Diem led to several years of political turmoil, as various generals jockeyed for position and governments fell with depressing regularity. In Washington, stability reigned. Lyndon Johnson—determined to carry on his predecessor’s legacy both at home and abroad—largely retained Kennedy’s foreign policy team and committed himself

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to the continued support of the government of South Vietnam. Johnson was in a political bind, however. On the one hand, he wanted to portray himself as a man of peace, especially in the 1964 election year in which his opponent was the ultra-hawk Barry Goldwater. At the same time, the new president—like other Democrats—feared being tarred with the brush of being too soft on Communism, as had happened to the Truman administration in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Still, the fighting was escalating throughout the south, and it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Viet Cong were receiving enormous amounts of aid from Hanoi. As a means of retaliation, the United States clandestinely aided South Vietnamese sabotage teams in raids on the north. The teams caused little damage but provoked the Hanoi government, which sent out naval patrols to try and stop them. By the summer of 1964, North Vietnamese patrols and U.S. warships in the Gulf of Tonkin were coming closer and closer to each other. On August 2, North Vietnamese patrol boats fired on the U.S. destroyer Maddox but caused no damage. Washington sent a warning to Hanoi, claiming that its ships were in international waters (a much disputed claim, then and later). Then, on August 4, the administration claimed the Maddox had been fired on again (a charge that was later admitted to be false). Johnson responded to the second, unprovoked “attack” by asking Congress for immediate authorization to take “all necessary measures to repel attacks . . . and prevent further aggression.” Congress responded overwhelmingly in favor of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (only two senators dissented), thereby giving Johnson almost unlimited and unchecked authority to wage war in Vietnam without seeking a formal declaration of war. The president immediately used that authority to launch air attacks on various military installations in North Vietnam. Still, Johnson refrained from sending in U.S. combat troops. Johnson was elected to a full term as president in November 1964 by a landslide. With the election behind him, the president escalated U.S. bombing in response to escalated attacks by the Viet Cong. Then, on the night of February 7, 1965, the enemy launched a raid on a U.S. base at Pleiku, near Da Nang, killing eight American advisers and wounding 126 more. Johnson ordered a reprisal bombing attack on targets in the north. More Viet Cong raids and reprisal bomb-

ings followed. On March 2, the second phase of the air war—sustained bombing—began. Known as Operation Rolling Thunder, it would continue virtually without a break until Johnson ordered a halt three years later in March 1968. Because of the large number of aircraft involved, the Pentagon insisted that more fighter-bombers would have to be based on South Vietnamese soil. Since the American command did not fully trust ARVN soldiers to protect the planes and pilots, it was decided to bring in battalions of marines. On March 6, they waded ashore near Da Nang and were met by Vietnamese girls who offered them flower garlands. Though mandated simply to protect the bases, the marines soon concluded that a static defense in a hit-and-run guerrilla conflict was next to useless. Soon, the marines were being sent on so-called search-and-destroy missions against the Viet Cong. The American phase of the war had now fully begun. By June, some 50,000 American soldiers were fighting with ARVN units. At the same time, Hanoi began to infiltrate regular units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and increasingly along a set of paths and tracks through neighboring Laos, which the Americans came to call the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Escalation and Tet Like the Vietminh before them, the Viet Cong refused to fight a conventional war, knowing full well that the Americans’ vast superiority in weaponry and mobility made such a course suicidal. Instead, they chose their targets carefully, launching attacks on isolated patrols and outposts, and then quickly retreating before the Americans could bring the full weight of their military machine to bear. To deal with the constant bombing, napalming, and herbicide-spraying that the Americans employed—the latter two weapons were largely designed to destroy the jungle cover the guerrillas used to conceal their men and supplies— the Viet Cong built vast tunnel networks. In response, the Americans—under the command of General William Westmoreland in Vietnam and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in Washington—sent in ever more soldiers. There were 180,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam by the end of 1965, nearly 400,000 by 1967, and over 500,000 by early 1968. At the same time, the Americans began to engage in a new kind of warfare with new goals. Capturing

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and holding land area—as in previous conflicts—was no longer the main objective since the guerrilla Viet Cong did not fight that way. Instead, killing became not only the means of warfare, but its end as well. The term “body count”—meaning enemy dead— entered the American lexicon as the Pentagon decided on a strategy to bleed the enemy to death until they could no longer replace their losses and would be forced to surrender or sue for peace. As reasonable as the strategy seemed, the United States and its ARVN allies were never quite able to accomplish their goal despite the vast commitment of human and technological resources. Direct combat was just one part—albeit the most apparent and destructive part—of the war. There was also a battle for the “hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese people. The Viet Cong had recognized this early. They made it a point to send political cadres into captured villages to “educate” the peasantry in the need for revolution and to recruit them for support tasks. At the same time, the Viet Cong also used intimidation and assassination when per-

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suasion failed. By 1967, members of the American foreign policy establishment—particularly the CIA— recognized that they would have to do the same. They launched a series of “pacification” programs that included both aid (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support) and intimidation and assassination (Operation Phoenix). Meanwhile in Saigon, U.S. representatives tried to end the string of coups, the political unrest, and the political chaos. In September 1967, they held nationwide elections, leading to the victory of a Vietnamese general named Nguyen Van Thieu, who would remain as president of South Vietnam until its fall to the Communists in April 1975. Together, the pacification programs and the increased troop levels were having some effect on curbing the growth of the Viet Cong by late 1967. As the Vietnamese later admitted, the widespread assassinations of Viet Cong supporters (along with many innocent persons) were undermining the critical peasant support the guerrillas needed to withstand the everintensifying application of U.S. military power. Both

A female Viet Cong soldier aims an antitank gun during the Tet Offensive of spring 1968. The series of attacks, beginning on the Tet lunar holiday, came as a shock to the U.S. military establishment and general public. (AFP/Getty Images)

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in the Viet Cong command and in Hanoi, it was decided that a major shift away from hit-and-run tactics was needed to break the debilitating deadlock of the conflict. Thus, beginning in mid-1967, the north increased its infiltration of men and materiel to the south, preparing for a massive nationwide offensive which they hoped would spark a peasant uprising, overthrow the Thieu government, and force the Americans out of the country. The offensive was launched at the end of January 1968, during Tet, the lunar new year. During this celebration of the biggest holiday on the Vietnamese calendar, Saigon’s defenses would be at their weakest. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched attacks on no fewer than 36 South Vietnamese towns and cities, something they had largely avoided before. The fighting was fiercest around Saigon (where several Viet Cong temporarily occupied the American Embassy) and Hue, the old imperial capital. In the latter city, the Communists held off American forces for weeks. The street fighting—unusual in this war—left the city in ruins. Tet became a major turning point in the war even though it was difficult to tell which side was hurt the worst. On the battlefield, the North Vietnamese and particularly the Viet Cong had been devastated, suffering as many as 30,000 killed. Indeed, from this point on, North Vietnamese regulars would carry the brunt of the war for the north. Making things worse, the pacification programs—though set back by Tet— went into high gear in the months and years that followed, further undermining the Viet Cong’s peasant support network. Back in America, however, the impact of Tet proved to be decisive. Having been lulled into the belief that large portions of South Vietnam were safe against attack, the American public was shocked to learn about the massive coordinated attacks on dozens of cities and towns. (It was unclear whether the North Vietnamese were aware of this aspect of the offensive, though Ho had publicly warned Americans that his people’s morale and staying power could outlast that of any country attempting to occupy Vietnam.) The shock of the Tet offensive had special impact because it fed public opposition to the war in the United States, which had been growing slowly with the rising commitment of U.S. troops. Even after Tet, however, a majority of Americans continued to support their president and his conduct of the war, encouraged by optimistic reports from government

and military leaders that claimed there was “light at the end of the tunnel.” Perhaps the most significant impact of the Tet offensive was on the group of dedicated U.S. advisers to the president who were beginning to question the foundations of Vietnam policy. The fact that the enemy, even after three years of an ever-increasing U.S. commitment, could launch such a devastating attack suggested that America could not win the war the way it was currently fighting it. That left two options: massive escalation—including a ground invasion of the north and the possible use of nuclear weapons—or withdrawal. An invasion risked the direct involvement of the Communist Chinese, who shared a border with North Vietnam, while the use of nuclear weapons might lead to nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the involvement of these two Communist giants had always been considered in the decisionmaking behind the U.S. commitment in Vietnam. Rather than seeing the struggle as a civil war between politically antagonistic forces in Vietnam, U.S. policymakers chose to see North Vietnamese and Viet Cong aggression as directed by Beijing and/or Moscow as part of a vast international Communist conspiracy. Johnson, it seemed, was unable to make the critical decision. He eventually turned down the Pentagon’s request for 200,000 more troops—largely on the advice of the old foreign policy hands known popularly as the “wise men.” At the same time, he refused to consider a U.S. withdrawal of ground troops. The president was deeply aware that the war had taken over his presidency and that it had dealt a blow to his political future. Soon after the Tet offensive, he had nearly lost a presidential primary in New Hampshire to Senator Eugene McCarthy, an antiwar candidate. On March 31, 1968, Johnson addressed the nation. He announced a halt to the long bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Then, in a surprise coda, he announced that he would not run for reelection and would devote his remaining months in office to finding a solution to the war.

Nixon and Vietnamization During the rest of 1968, both America and the Democratic Party seemed to be coming apart at the seams over Vietnam. At the Democratic Convention in Chicago that summer, delegates chose Johnson’s

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vice president and Vietnam War supporter Hubert Humphrey as their candidate, while antiwar demonstrators clashed violently with police in the streets outside. Humphrey seemed unable to separate himself from President Johnson or to enunciate a clear policy on Vietnam. The Republicans had nominated Richard Nixon, long known as a determined antiCommunist hawk. Even so, Nixon responded more clearly to voters’ concerns, suggesting that he had a “secret” plan for ending the war. Nixon won a close election over Humphrey. Nixon’s plan was Vietnamization. While America would arm and train a vastly expanded ARVN and provide critical air and logistical support, the 540,000 U.S. troops then in Vietnam would be gradually withdrawn. At the same time, Nixon would open secret channels to the North Vietnamese through his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. He hoped that these channels would prove more fruitful than the stalled peace talks in Paris that had begun a year earlier. The exhaustion of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the wake of Tet gave the Nixon administration the breathing room it needed to begin its Vietnamization policy. Within a few months of taking office, it announced the first withdrawal, a small but significant 25,000 troops. American involvement in Vietnam had reached its peak and was now declining. The withdrawals accelerated, leaving 335,000 troops in Vietnam at the end of 1970 and only 160,000 at the end of 1971. At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger were planning and implementing a major escalation in the geographic extent of the conflict. While the Johnson administration had bombed parts of the Ho Chi Minh Trail outside of Vietnam, Nixon ordered aerial attacks on the northern parts of Laos, itself involved in a conflict between Communist Pathet Lao guerrillas and a U.S.-supported regime. This was done in secret, as was the bombing of Viet Cong sanctuaries in neutral Cambodia. (These secret bombing campaigns were later exposed and served as one of the charges of impeachment leveled against Nixon during the Watergate crisis in 1974.) Despite all the bombing of their bases and supply routes, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese continued to use Cambodia as a base for operations deep in southern South Vietnam. Nixon and his advisers believed that there was a general Viet Cong headquarters somewhere inside Cambodia and were deter-

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mined to destroy it. Nixon launched a massive U.S. and ARVN invasion of Cambodia, announcing the action in a televised address. The attack never unearthed the suspected headquarters, and it sparked a wave of protests in the United States. Within weeks, the U.S. troops pulled out of Cambodia, while the Nixon administration claimed a major success. In 1971, Washington and Saigon planned an invasion of southern Laos in order to destroy the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This attack, led primarily by ARVN troops, turned into a disastrous defeat, revealing significant weakness in the Vietnamization program. Nixon and Kissinger seemed determined to end the American ground war in Southeast Asia, if only to allow them to focus on what they considered to be more critical foreign policy issues, such as easing Soviet-American tensions and establishing relations with Communist China. Nixon also wanted to eliminate Vietnam as a possible political issue during his reelection campaign in 1972. Thus, by the spring of that year, the number of U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam fell below 100,000 for the first time since mid-1965. The North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies had their own concerns in the early 1970s. Fearing that a heavily armed and expanded ARVN— supported by continuing U.S. bombing—might drag the conflict on for years to come, they decided once again to deliver a knockout blow in South Vietnam. Once again, they chose a major holiday—in this case, Easter 1972—to launch their offensive. At first, the assault appeared to be successful for the Communists. ARVN troops, now lacking American ground support, quickly retreated, allowing the enemy to capture a provincial capital, Quang Tri. Gradually, however, the ARVN regrouped with the help of massive American bombing, recapturing Quang Tri and proving the legitimacy of the Vietnamization program.

Negotiations and Bombing In Paris, the secret negotiations between Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart Le Duc Tho were reaching the final stretch. Given the fact that it could no longer fight the war on the ground, the United States had accepted the key element in North Vietnam’s negotiating position—its right to maintain troops in South Vietnam. According to Hanoi, this assured them a role in protecting their Viet Cong

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allies as the latter turned themselves into a political party that could run against President Thieu and the government in Saigon in future elections. The United States and Saigon felt it was merely a ruse for maintaining a combat infrastructure ready to launch an assault once the United States was out of the picture. Still, Washington agreed to this stipulation in exchange for the north’s willingness to allow the Thieu government to remain in power after the war. Kissinger told Le that the United States could hardly cooperate in the ouster of a regime it had supported militarily and politically for five years. By late October 1972, Kissinger was ready to announce that the United States had reached a comprehensive settlement to the Vietnam War. The agreement, he hinted to the press, allowed the United States to withdraw its ground troops, set up a ceasefire between Saigon, the Viet Cong, and the NVA, and establish the means—heavily weighted in Saigon’s favor—to resolve the political divisions within South Vietnam by electoral means. Nixon, however, did not want to make the announcement until after the elections, fearing that it might be seen as a blatant preelection ploy or that it might be sabotaged by Thieu’s refusal to go along. The president proved prescient on the last point. Thieu did refuse to go along, saying that continued NVA presence in South Vietnam made a mockery of that country’s sovereignty and undermined a peaceful solution to the conflict. In fact, Thieu was positioning himself to extract more from the Americans before they fully pulled out, which he knew was now inevitable. Indeed, Nixon had made it clear to Thieu in a secret understanding that any aggression by Hanoi would be met with the severest American countermeasures, including direct bombing of the north. But Thieu remained obstinate, forcing Kissinger to reopen the talks and renegotiate an agreement that the North Vietnamese considered a done deal. Tho refused to have anything to do with it. The American war in Vietnam, it seemed, still had one final chapter to be written, and it proved to be a brutal one. Furious at the rebuff he had received from Hanoi and determined to convince Thieu that he meant what he said about applying American pressure on the north, Nixon ordered the most massive bombing campaign of the war. It was called the “Christmas bombing,” and more explosives were dropped on Hanoi and Haiphong—the north’s main port, which the Americans mined as well—than the nuclear

blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. The bombing produced outrage across the United States and around the world—though muted responses were elicited from Moscow and Beijing, both of whom were courting U.S. favor and secretly telling Hanoi to back down. The bombing—and pressure from its allies—forced the north back to the negotiating table and convinced Thieu to sign on. President Nixon was reelected by a landslide in November 1972. On January 27, 1973, soon after his second inauguration, he could announce an agreement between the United States and North Vietnam that called for a cease-fire the next morning and the release of all prisoners of war. Under the agreement, the 17th parallel would remain the dividing line between the two Vietnams until the two could be reunited “peacefully.” In August, the U.S. Congress— unaware of Nixon’s secret understanding with Thieu—passed a bill proscribing any further U.S. military activity in Indochina. The American phase of the war was over. In all, some 57,000 Americans had died, and the war had cost around $200 billion. For the Vietnamese, the losses were much higher—as many as 1 million combatants were dead on all sides and, according to some estimates, 6 million civilians. In addition, much of Vietnam was in ruins and over 10 percent of the country had been poisoned by defoliants and napalm.

Final Collapse of South Vietnam Still the war went on. Throughout 1973 and 1974, numerous cease-fire violations were announced by both sides, and casualties remained as high as ever. In the latter half of 1974, both sides seemed to be preparing for a major military showdown. The North was encouraged by Congress’s August decision to cut back military aid to South Vietnam dramatically, a move that severely undermined South Vietnamese morale. (Nixon had resigned rather than face impeachment in the Watergate scandal, and his successor, Gerald Ford, was in no position to contest the congressional action.) In December 1974, the north launched an attack on Phuoc Binh, a provincial capital near Saigon. The ease with which it fell—and the lack of a U.S. response—convinced Hanoi that a major offensive against the south was now possible. By early March, North Vietnamese forces were in position, launching their first assault in the Central Highlands, designed

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to cut Vietnam in half. Thieu panicked and ordered a withdrawal not just from the highlands but from the country’s two northernmost provinces as well. The retreat quickly turned into a rout. Back in Washington, President Ford pleaded with Congress to send $300 million in military aid to Saigon, but was rebuffed. On April 21, as ARVN forces melted away, individuals stripped off their uniforms and attempted to blend in with the civilian population. Thieu resigned in favor of an interim government. As North Vietnamese forces approached the capital, the United States hurriedly moved to evacuate remaining personnel and as many South Vietnamese supporters as it could. On April 30, 1975, Saigon surrendered. The wars in Indochina—beginning in 1946—had come to an end. Vietnam was independent and united for the first time in its modern history.

Aftermath Sadly, conflict continued to plague Vietnam and much of Southeast Asia for the rest of the decade. By 1978, tensions between the Soviet-supported Hanoi regime and the genocidal Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia had reached the breaking point, after the latter refused to accept an alliance with the Vietnamese. (Cambodians had always been wary of their more powerful and aggressive neighbors.) As fierce fighting broke out along the border, the Vietnamese launched an invasion of Cambodia. The invasion brought an end to the genocide there, but it also alienated Vietnam from its Southeast Asian neighbors and from China, which had supported the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, with the Americans gone, old disputes between Hanoi and Beijing resurfaced, leading to a border war between the two countries in 1979 and a brief but bloody Chinese incursion, during which hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens of Vietnam fled the country on foot or by boat. The loss of the Chinese and the flight of nearly 100,000 refugees during the American exodus robbed Vietnam of some of its most educated and skilled citizens, thereby retarding the nation’s recovery from war. Adding to the country’s woes was a U.S. embargo. Meanwhile, efforts to collectivize agriculture and nationalize industry met widespread resistance in the more entrepreneurial south. The costs of maintaining troops in Cambodia and keeping them on alert along the Chinese border

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sapped the Vietnamese economy. Then in the early 1990s, the Soviet Union was dissolved, ending decades of Soviet aid to Vietnam. The loss of these subsidies accelerated changes in economic policy that allowed increased private market activity. Though far behind its East Asian neighbors in the early 1990s, Vietnam was beginning to recover economically, even as it rejoined the world community—first by becoming a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and then gaining the diplomatic recognition of the United States. In the United States, the costs of the Vietnam War were more subtle but just as profound. Traumatized by having lost a war for the first time in its history, Americans proved far less willing to commit troops in foreign engagements, a political sentiment dubbed the “Vietnam syndrome.” Despite efforts by Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush to rally support for new U.S. combat efforts abroad, the Vietnam experience remained a powerful influence on U.S. foreign policy. James Ciment See also: Cold War Confrontations; People’s Wars; Invasions and Border Disputes; Cambodia: Civil Wars, 1968–1998; Cambodia: U.S. Interventions, 1969–1973; Vietnam: First Indochina War, 1946–1954.

Bibliography Baritz, Loren. Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did. New York: Ballantine, 1985. Ehrhart, William D., ed. In the Shadow of Vietnam: Essays, 1977–1991. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1991. Fitzgerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1972. Grant, Zalin. Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Vietnam War Anthology. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. Hess, Gary R. Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking, 1983. Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience. New York: New Press, 1994. Maclear, Michael. The Ten Thousand Day War: Vietnam, 1945– 1975. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981. Werner, Jayne S., and Luu Doan Huynh, eds. The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993. Young, Marilyn Blatt. The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.

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A F G H A N I S TA N BHUTAN NEPAL BANGLADESH

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ARABIAN SEA NICOBAR ISLANDS

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AFGHANISTAN: Soviet Invasion,1979–1989 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: Soviet Union TAJIKS

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One million refugees

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Ethnic group

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J TA

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Bagram Air Base

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Kabul

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Shindand Air Field

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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had its roots in 60 years of close Afghan-Soviet relations. In early 1919 Afghanistan was the first nation to recognize the new Communist state in Russia, and this recognition helped to create a “special relationship” that would last until Afghanistan was destroyed after ten years of war begun by the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan’s initial reason for allying itself to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the name the Russian Communists adopted for their nation in 1922) was to counterbalance the power of the British to the south. Rulers of the entire Indian subcontinent, the British had often threatened Afghanistan’s autonomy, invading twice in the nineteenth century. Playing the Soviet Union to the north against the British Empire in the south allowed Afghanistan to remain independent of them both. After World War II, however, the withdrawal of the British from India left the Afghans facing the Soviets without a counterweight. In the 1950s, Afghanistan—still a monarchy— established limited economic and military ties with the Soviet Union. This policy was partly motivated by the refusal of the United States to offer military assistance

to the Afghans. The United States saw Afghanistan as irrelevant to its Cold War calculations, and it was worried that any aid to Afghanistan might alienate neighboring Pakistan, a country with which the Americans were more eager to maintain good relations. In spite of their Soviet ties, and American neglect, Afghanistan tried to remain neutral in the Cold War, attempting to maintain good relations with both East and West. A 1973 coup (carried out while the king of Afghanistan was vacationing in Italy) brought the country still closer to the Soviet Union. Led by a former prime minister, Mohammed Daoud, the coup was supported by leftist military officers and members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist party founded in 1965. Daoud himself was not a Communist, but he did initiate some social reforms and accept Soviet military aid. At the same time, Daoud attempted with some success to improve relations with Pakistan and other Western-aligned nations, gradually replacing Communist sympathizers in his government with more traditional, conservative politicians. He clearly hoped to create a nationalist dictatorship that would keep Afghanistan neutral and him in power. These actions pleased neither the Afghan Communists who had supported Daoud’s coup nor the Soviets who had thought he would be a more cooperative leader. During Daoud’s five years in power, he faced increasing opposition. His drift to the right angered those elements of the PDPA which had initially supported his coup, his strong-arm methods disturbed those who wished to see a more democratic Afghanistan, and the immoderate nepotism of his administration alienated those Afghans who were not in his circle of family and friends.

Pro- Soviet Coup Discontent with Daoud’s rule flared into open revolt following the April 1978 murder of Mir Akbar

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KEY DATES 1973

A military coup by left-wing officers ousts the king and puts Marxist, pro-Soviet prime minister Mohammed Daoud in power.

1978

Having lost trust in Daoud, Soviets back a coup led by Nur Mohammed Taraki; Daoud is killed.

1979

Uprisings against the pro-Soviet government in various provinces and the capital trigger a Soviet military invasion on December 24.

1981

With more than 100,000 troops in the country, the Soviets find they still cannot control the countryside; their new strategy involves concentrating forces in the cites and conducting attacks on rebel positions and supply lines in the rural areas.

1985 Reformer Mikhail Gorbachev comes to power in the Soviet Union. 1986 The United States supplies mujahideen rebels with Stinger missiles capable of shooting down Soviet helicopters and planes; ineffective prime minister Babrak Kamal is replaced by the more forceful Mohammed Najibullah. 1988 Facing heavy troop losses and economic costs, Gorbachev announces plans for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. 1989 The last Soviet troops pull out on February 15.

Khyber, a prominent member of the Parcham (Banner) wing of the PDPA. Although some Afghans later suggested that the murder had been carried out by rivals from the competing Khalq (People’s) wing, most blamed Daoud and his increasingly repressive secret police. Mobs of anti-Daoud demonstrators thronged the streets of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital. By the time Daoud realized his danger, it was too late. His orders to arrest the PDPA leadership did not come in time to stop Hafizullah Amin, a Khalq leader, from organizing an attack on the presidential palace with the aid of sympathetic military units (including bombing attacks by Soviet-built MiG fighters). Daoud was killed early on April 28, 1978, and the PDPA, led by its founder Nur Mohammed Taraki, took control of the new government. It is unclear whether the Soviets knew about the PDPA coup in advance, but they certainly helped it to prevail—Soviet advisers helped orchestrate the rebel air attacks and accompanied some of the tank columns that rode through Kabul—and they benefited from its success. Even though Taraki denied that

his was a Communist government—Communism was viewed with hostility by most religious Muslims in Afghanistan—it was clear that he and his associates saw themselves as Socialists in the Marxist tradition. Afghanistan’s neighbors also had few doubts about the nature of the new regime: both the Shah of Iran and General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan claimed that Afghanistan had become a client of the Soviets. Overall, therefore, the coup seemed a victory for the Soviet Union. The Soviet victory soon began to turn sour. After a brief honeymoon of popularity, the new government pursued harsh measures that soon made it even more disliked than Daoud’s regime. Taraki’s government was viewed both as Communist and as a tool of the Soviet Union, damaging it in the eyes of the Afghan people. The PDPA also suffered a split within its own ranks. The hard-line Khalq faction, to which Taraki belonged, became increasingly dominant, while members of Parcham were forced to go into exile as ambassadors. Opposition to the regime increased.

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In an attempt to crush the opposition, Taraki ordered the arrest of thousands of Afghans. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, were killed. The educated elites of Kabul were decimated. These attacks on the educated classes of Kabul made it difficult to find enough qualified people to work for the government, and PDPA leaders became even more dependent on the more than 3,000 Soviet advisers who had flocked to Kabul in the three months since the coup. This influx of outsiders further alienated the more traditional groups of Afghan society from the government. Afghanistan is primarily a nation of small villages, traditionally led by mullahs—religious teachers. The mullahs looked with suspicion on a government that seemed to be advocating godless Communism. That the new rulers were primarily members of an urban minority who looked down upon the rural masses did nothing to improve relations. Encouraged by their mullahs, Afghan men began to take up arms against the PDPA government. By March 1979 these rebels were strong enough to seize control of Herat, the administrative center of western Afghanistan, before being forced out by government reinforcements. The PDPA responded to the unrest by making Hafizullah Amin the new prime minister. Amin, who had a master’s degree from Columbia University, was a Khalq hard-liner who was determined to crush the rebels. He asked for and received increased amounts of Soviet military aid, including advanced helicopter gunships and jet fighters. The new weapons were accompanied by substantial numbers of Soviet troops, and many of these troops went beyond advising Afghan troops and began to fly combat missions on their own. As the Soviets became more involved in the dayto-day direction of antiguerrilla operations, they became increasingly dissatisfied with Amin’s leadership. Amin’s troops behaved with excessive violence, destroying villages and murdering opponents, both among their fellow leftists and among the mullahs of the countryside. Their actions only increased the resistance they were trying to suppress. The situation was exacerbated by a high rate of desertion from the Afghan army, whose peasant draftees were reluctant to fire on the rebels. The crisis reached a climax in September 1979, when Amin had former president Taraki arrested and shot. Amin claimed that Taraki had been planning to assassinate him and take power with Soviet help and that he acted out of self-defense. Over the next few

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months, as part of this program of self-defense, Amin ordered the arrest and execution of at least hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Afghans whom he suspected of plotting against him. Whether or not the Soviets had actually planned to replace Amin with Taraki, Amin’s actions after Taraki’s murder convinced them that Amin had to be replaced if they did not wish to see their client state overwhelmed by the growing opposition.

The Invasion On December 24, 1979, the Soviets began flying elements of the 105th Airborne Division into Kabul International Airport. Other airborne units landed at Bagram, Shindand, and Herat. Although the buildup was portrayed as a military exercise, it soon became clear that Soviets intended to remove Amin by force. Fighting broke out on December 27, and by the following day Amin was dead and the Russians were in control of Kabul. That same day, four motorized rifle divisions crossed the Soviet border into Afghanistan. Officially the fighting in Kabul and the Soviet cross-border troop movements were not part of an invasion but a response to an Afghan request for support. On the day the fighting began, the Soviets had broadcast via radio a recording from exiled PDPA leader Babrak Karmal, one of the leaders of the more moderate Parcham wing of the party. In the recording, Karmal announced the defeat of Amin and asked Afghans to rally to his cause. The following day, Kabul radio, now under Soviet control, issued a demand that “the USSR render military aid to Afghanistan.” The Soviets happily obeyed this orchestrated “demand.” Within a month the Soviets had 40,000 troops in Afghanistan and had occupied all its major cities. If the Soviets had expected Afghanistan to calmly accept Karmal as its new ruler, they were soon disappointed. In January, in his first public appearance after gaining power, Karmal called on the people of Afghanistan to “come together and support our glorious revolution.” Instead, they came together in an attempt to kick Karmal and the Soviets out of the country. Resistance to the central government became even more widespread than it had been under Amin. The Afghan army, already badly damaged by desertions, almost completely disappeared as an effective fighting force. Some troops simply refused to

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fight for what they perceived as Soviet conquerors. Others deserted directly to the rebels, bringing with them valuable weapons and supplies. By the end of 1980, the government could count on only some 30,000 troops, and no more than half of these were considered reliable. The rebels, on the other hand, saw an explosion in strength and support. Simmering unrest was transformed into nationwide guerrilla war. Every province of Afghanistan contributed soldiers to this war, with the result that Soviet and Afghan government control did not reliably extend outside the major urban areas. The Afghan freedom fighters took upon themselves the name mujahideen, or holy warriors. Despite being divided among four major ethnic groups and two different branches of Islam, the mujahideen were united in wanting the Soviets to leave. Given the informal nature of their recruitment, the mujahideen were difficult to count, but it seems certain that there were at least 100,000 involved in the war against the Soviets, and at times—during the summer campaigning season—their numbers may have risen to at least twice that figure.

The Struggle Unwilling to abandon Karmal, the Soviets responded to Afghan resistance by steadily increasing the number of Soviet soldiers in the country. By the end of 1980 they had 80,000 troops in Afghanistan, and that number would rise to over 100,000 by the end of 1981. At its height, the Soviet occupation force probably numbered 120,000. At first this increased Soviet presence had only a marginal effect on the resistance. The rough mountainous Afghan countryside made conventional Soviet tactics ineffective. Soviet armored columns could sweep through Afghan valleys with ease, but the mujahideen would simply retreat up into their mountain strongholds. As soon as the Soviets had departed, the mujahideen would then return and retake control. Afghanistan’s 15,000 villages, therefore, remained dominated by the rebels. Even the major cities were not completely under Soviet control. The mujahideen were able to infiltrate units into Kabul and other major cities to carry out assassinations of Afghan and Soviet officials. The rebels also used Pakistan as a base of

Afghan mujahideen took advantage of the country’s rugged mountain terrain in resisting the Soviet invasion. With foreign help, resistance groups finally forced a Soviet withdrawal in 1989. (AFP/Getty Images)

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operations, crossing the border to raid Soviet outposts and then retreating back to Pakistan—with the permission of the Pakistani government—for supplies and reunions with their families, who had resettled in refugee camps on the Pakistani side of the border. In 1981, accepting the impossibility of controlling rural Afghanistan, the Soviets changed their strategy. Concentrating most of the troops in the cities, they used special mechanized and airborne units to carry out hit-and-run raids on rebel supply lines leading from Pakistan and to attack those villages that continued to support the mujahideen. Since most villages at least tacitly supported the mujahideen, this meant that almost all of rural Afghanistan became a free-fire zone. Because they could not control the villages, the Soviets seemed intent on destroying them. The result of this new strategy was to force millions of Afghan farmers to flee, either to the cities where the Soviets could more easily control them or outside the country to Iran or Pakistan. By 1985 one-third of Afghanistan’s 15 million people were refugees or internally displaced: 3 million in Pakistan, 1 million in Iran, and 1 million in the major cities of Afghanistan itself. In the face of these tactics, with no safe areas in the countryside, the mujahideen found it extremely difficult to operate. The mujahideen also found it difficult to counter superior Soviet weaponry. Soviet air strikes could hit mujahideen-controlled villages with little risk of counterattack. Particularly deadly was the Soviet Mi24 Hind helicopter gunship. Equipped with machine guns, rockets, and antitank missiles, the armored Hind could hover above a rebel force and destroy it while being in very little danger from Afghan smallarms fire. A 1982 New York Times reporter quoted a mujahideen leader as saying, “We are not afraid of the Russians, but we are afraid of their helicopters.” Afghan difficulties were exacerbated by the lack of coordination between the various mujahideen groups. At least six major and numerous minor groups were fighting against the Soviet presence. Shi’a Muslims and Sunni Muslims fought under separate banners. Traditionalists did not wish to fight alongside Western-oriented leftists. Units led by a Pashtun leader might not include Tajik, Uzbek, or Hazara soldiers (the Pashtun were the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, and most mujahideen groups were dominated by the Pashtun). This disunity made cooperation against the Soviets difficult. Occasionally rebel groups would even fight each other.

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By 1985 Soviet scorched-earth tactics and sophisticated technology, aided by Afghan disunity, had badly crippled the mujahideen resistance.

Foreign Reaction As a counterbalance to Afghan disunity, the international community condemned the Soviet invasion almost unanimously. In 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter vigorously denounced the Soviet attack, calling it “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” Carter imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union and ordered U.S. athletes to boycott the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow. The UN General Assembly followed Carter’s lead and voted for a resolution demanding that all foreign troops withdraw from Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s regional neighbors were equally hostile. General Mohammed Zia al-Haq of Pakistan immediately condemned the invasion. Iran, distracted by its hostility to America, at first seemed willing to turn a blind eye to the invasion, but by March 1980 the Ayatollah Khomeini was condemning “the brutal intervention in Afghanistan by looters and occupiers,” saying that the Soviet Union was as bad as the United States. Verbal condemnation was followed by military support. The United States, Iran, China, and many Middle Eastern Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, attempted to funnel supplies and weapons into Afghanistan. At first these supplies were limited to small arms, but, as the war went on, the supply expanded to include anti-aircraft guns and Sovietdesigned surface-to-air missiles (donated by the Egyptians from their stockpile of Soviet-supplied weaponry). The Arab states also sent 6,000 volunteers to join the jihad, or holy war, against the Soviet invader. Finally, in 1986, the United States began supplying the mujahideen with one of the best weapons in its arsenal, Stinger surface-to-air missiles. The Stinger was a shoulder-launched missile that weighed only thirty-four pounds but could reach speeds of more than a thousand miles an hour. With the Stinger in their hands, the mujahideen began to shoot down Soviet planes and helicopters at the rate of more than one a day. This made the battlefield much more dangerous for Soviet aircraft and therefore forced the Soviets to give up indiscriminate attacks on mujahideen strongholds. Under the umbrella of the Stinger, rebels began to operate much more freely.

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The mujahideen also made innovative use of nonmilitary equipment. Piling their weapons on top of four-wheel-drive Toyota pickup trucks, they were able to travel roads that were too difficult for the slower and more cumbersome Soviet tanks and armored personal carriers. Looking back, one mujahideen leader said, “Stingers and Toyotas helped us win the war.”

Soviet Withdrawal Along with better weapons came more cooperation. In May 1985 the major rebel groups based in Pakistan agreed to work as a united front. While this had a limited effect on the behavior of fighters in Afghanistan— the political groups in Pakistan did not really control the military leaders in Afghanistan—it did help to streamline the weapons supply process, and it was matched by increased cooperation in the field. In 1985 there were also changes in the Soviet Union. With the coming to power of reformist premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet policies began to alter. Gorbachev’s introduction of glasnost (openness) to Soviet public life was designed to shake up the overly rigid Soviet society, but it also had the effect of opening the regime to public criticism. One of the things most criticized was the war in Afghanistan. Mothers complained about sons coming home in body bags or coming home alive but burdened with physical or psychological wounds. Public opinion was becoming important in the Soviet Union, and it was increasingly opposed to keeping Soviet troops involved in the Afghan war. In 1986 the Soviet war effort was somewhat reinvigorated when Karmal, who had become an alcoholic embarrassment as Afghan leader, was replaced by the much more competent Mohammed Najibullah, the former chief of political police, and, like Karmal, a member of the moderate Parcham wing of the PDPA. Najibullah attempted to revitalize the government by inviting in ministers from other political parties and attempting to distance himself as much as possible from his Soviet backers. His attempts to portray himself as an Afghan nationalist first, and a Communist second, had some success. Under Najibullah’s command the Afghan army was rejuvenated and was able to win some battles against the mujahideen in late 1987 and early 1988. This success, however, came too late for the Soviets. In February 1988 Gorbachev announced on

Soviet television that he was willing to withdraw all Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—which had been dragging on slowly— suddenly took on a new urgency. An international agreement was signed in April, and the Soviet troops began leaving in May. The last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan on February 15, 1989. In spite of the Soviet troop withdrawal, Najibullah, still receiving Soviet economic and military aid, was able to hold on for three more years. He was helped by the rebels’ inability to agree on a consistent or coordinated strategy. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Najibullah was doomed. In April 1992 a combined mujahideen army marched into Kabul, and Najibullah sought sanctuary in a UN-controlled compound. Four years later he would be dragged out and executed. The government the Soviets had created was gone, and the war they had begun was over—even as a new war, this one between the various mujahideen factions, was just starting. Approximately 1 million Afghans had died during the war, along with 15,000 Soviet soldiers.

Aftermath Although the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the effects of their invasion continued to be felt long after. The Soviet Union itself was the worst hurt by its own invasion. The war cost it dearly in economic terms and in prestige. The inability of the huge Soviet empire, containing 265 million citizens, to defeat 15 million Afghans was damaging to opinion at home and abroad. The defeat in Afghanistan probably accelerated the fall of Gorbachev’s regime and helped to bring an end to seventy years of Communist rule in Russia. In Afghanistan itself, the fighting continued even after Najibullah’s defeat. The mujahideen coalition split along ethnic and religious lines and immediately began to struggle for control of the capital, Kabul, and the country. Islamic fundamentalism also received a boost from its success in Afghanistan. Many young men from the Islamic world who went to Afghanistan to fight as mujahideen returned to their home countries eager to continue the fight—in opposition to their own governments. Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia all had difficulties with these

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“Afghanis.” Other Afghanis went on to Bosnia and contributed to the violence there. The bombers of the World Trade Center in New York City and of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were also alleged to have had Afghani connections. The disputes among the mujahideen ended only in the fall of 2001, after Islamist terrorist attacks destroyed the World Trade Center in New York and damaged the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The plot was soon traced to Osama bin Laden, a Saudi extremist who had been funding and directing terror attacks for years. At the time of the U.S. attacks, he was a guest of the mujahideen government in Afghanistan. When the government refused demands to give up bin Laden, the United States invaded, drove out the government, and established another occupation. Carl Skutsch

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See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Afghanistan: Civil War, 1989.

Bibliography Bradsher, Henry. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985. Galeotti, Mark. Afghanistan, the Soviet Union’s Last War. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1995. Hyman, Anthony. Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Roy, Olivier. Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Pennington, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995. Rubin, Barnett R. The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

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cult, and opposing mujahideen would occasionally fight one another. After Najibullah’s defeat, these occasional skirmishes were transformed into full-scale war, as the mujahideen fought among themselves to determine who would rule Afghanistan. Hence, the civil wars in Afghanistan were broken into two distinct phases. The first was the war against Najibullah, who was attempting to legitimize his regime in the eyes of the Afghan people, while the mujahideen spent most, but not all, of their energies attempting to defeat him. The second phase began with the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, to the rebels and the defeat of Najibullah, whereupon the various mujahideen groups turned on each other and began the fight for Afghanistan.

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In 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support a Communist government that was in danger of overthrow by Islamic militants. Angered by the presence of foreign troops on their soil, the Afghan people rose up in a long war to expel the Soviets. By 1988, the Soviets had concluded that they could not win the war and began to withdraw, and by February 1989, the Soviet forces had returned home. The Soviet withdrawal did not end the fighting in Afghanistan, however. The Islamist rebels dominated the rural areas, but the major cities were still controlled by the Communist government of Mohammed Najibullah, which continued to receive economic and military aid from the Soviets. It would take the Afghan rebels, known as mujahideen (holy warriors), three more years to defeat Najibullah. Najibullah was able to hold on to power partly because of his own talents, but mostly because of the conflicts among his opponents. In the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen had been divided into half a dozen major groups and numerous minor ones. These rebel groups were often separated by ethnicity or religious affiliation or simply because of animosity between individual leaders. During the war against Najibullah, these divisions made cooperation diffi-

Mohammed Najibullah In 1986, after he replaced Babrak Karmal as the leader of Afghanistan’s Communist government, Najibullah began a radical series of policy shifts designed to strengthen his position in the country. Even though the country was still occupied by Soviet troops, Najibullah worked diligently to distance himself from his Soviet patrons and demonstrate that he was an Afghan nationalist first and a Communist second. He brought non-Communists into his government and, unlike his predecessors, proved willing to accept some criticism from the press. These policy changes were accelerated after the Soviets withdrew in 1989. By 1991, a majority of Najibullah’s cabinet were non-Communists. Najibullah also worked to gain support among progressives in Afghanistan. Women, for example, were treated as equals—a radical departure from traditional practice in Islamic Afghanistan—and even served in Najibullah’s cabinet. While this appealed to those who admired the West, it also further alienated traditional Muslims, who did not believe women had a place in political life. Finally, Najibullah improved the pay and training of his army, turning it into a relatively efficient fighting force.

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KEY DATES 1989

The last Soviet troops pull out of Afghanistan, after a ten-year occupation.

1992

Various rebel mujahideen forces drive pro-Soviet Afghan leader Mohammed Najibullah out of power; Najibullah seeks refuge in the UN compound in Kabul, where he remains for four years.

1993–1996 Fighting between various warlords and ethnic groups continues throughout the country. 1994

Radical Islamic seminary students and teachers form the Taliban movement; they gather many mujahideen under their leadership.

1996

After a two-year offensive, the Taliban seize Kabul and execute Najibullah.

1998

The Taliban control 80 percent of the country; the remaining portion is largely controlled by a group of anti-Taliban forces known as the Northern Alliance.

2001

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States, working with the Northern Alliance, ousts the Taliban from power.

The success of Najibullah’s policies led some of the mujahideen to doubt that they could overthrow him, particularly as long as he continued to receive aid from the Soviet Union. By the end of 1991, Iran and Pakistan, which supported the war against the Soviets since its beginning in 1979, were urging the mujahideen to make peace with Najibullah. In return for small subsidies and local autonomy, some mujahideen groups began to sign cease-fire agreements with the Afghan government. In 1991, however, the possibility of a Najibullah victory was ended by the collapse of the Soviet Union, ending once and for all the Soviet aid that had been necessary to his regime’s survival. Despite his success at winning support at home, Najibullah could not survive this loss of economic and military aid. Soon the rebels began their advance on Kabul.

The Mujahideen The war against Najibullah, like that against the Soviets before him, was complicated by the divided nature of the mujahideen movement. The rebel mujahideen were divided into a half-dozen different ma-

jor factions, each with dozens of independent-minded local leaders. The divisions within the mujahideen arose from Afghanistan’s extremely complex ethnic and religious makeup. Afghanistan has four major ethnic groups, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Pashtuns make up slightly less than half the population, followed in numbers by Tajiks. The country is also split religiously: about 15 percent of the population follows the Shi’a branch of Islam, while the remainder are Sunni Muslims. Finally, Afghans are divided between those who favor the creation of an Islamic state, those who are ethnic nationalists, and those who believe in a pan-Afghan nationalism. The hostilities that resulted from this patchwork mix of identities made cooperation difficult and contributed to Najibullah’s surprisingly long stay in power. Still, by 1992 two major Afghan leaders had managed to create coalitions of mujahideen that were able to face Najibullah’s weakening army on better than equal terms. The first was Ahmad Shah Massoud, known as the Lion of Panjshir because of his longtime dominance of the Panjshir valley area (located northeast of Kabul). Massoud was the military leader of the

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Jamiat-i-Islam faction, whose political leader was Burhanuddin Rabbani—an Islamic scholar who left the business of leading Jamiat-i-Islam to Massoud. Jamiat-i-Islam drew its support primarily from the Tajiks of the north (both Massoud and Rabbani were Tajiks) as well as from some Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Persian-speaking Pashtuns. (Dari Persian is the dialect of Tajiks, Hazaras, and many urbanized Pashtuns, while Pashtu is the language of most Pashtuns.) While Massoud and Rabbani were believers in an Islamic state, they were considered more moderate than their rivals and were therefore regarded with greater favor by the Western countries that helped supply the mujahideen during the war against the Soviets. The second mujahideen leader was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the Hizb-i-Islam faction. Hekmatyar was an ethnic Pashtun who followed an extremely fundamentalist brand of Islam and advocated the creation of an Islamic state. (As part of his defense of Islamic values, it is said, Hekmatyar threw acid on unveiled Afghan women in the 1970s.) During the war against the Soviets he received aid from Pakistan and Iran and had ties with the extremist Muslim Brotherhood. His support came primarily from the Pashtuns of the south and west. A third successful, although smaller, group was the Hizb-i-Wahdat-i-Islam. Made up of Shi’a Muslims, the faction drew its strength mainly from the Hazara ethnic minority. (Most Shi’a Muslims in Afghanistan are Hazara.)

Najibullah Overthrown In early 1992, with Soviet aid cut off, the Najibullah regime began to fall apart under mujahideen pressure. The collapse was accelerated in March 1992 when General Abdul Rashid Dostam, one of Najibullah’s most important supporters, decided that the regime was doomed and switched to the side of the mujahideen. Dostam was an Uzbek with strong support within that ethnic group. Between them, the three main opponents of Najibullah—Massoud, Hekmatyar, and Dostam—had enough strength to force their way into Kabul. In April 1992 Massoud and Dostam did exactly that. As the mujahideen entered the city, Najibullah went into hiding, eventually finding refuge in a UN compound where he would spend the next four years, unable to leave the country.

Even though Najibullah had been defeated, the civil war did not end. The rivalries that had simmered during the war against Najibullah boiled over into open conflict. The personal hostility between Hekmatyar and Massoud was particularly strong (in 1976 followers of Hekmatyar had tortured and killed a friend of Massoud’s during a political struggle between the two factions). When the forces of Hekmatyar were prevented from entering the city, they began to drop artillery shells on Kabul.

War Between the Mujahideen Broken up by intermittent peace talks, the shelling went on into 1993. In an attempt to create a stable Afghan government, Massoud and Dostam managed to get a number of mujahideen commanders to support a new government in which Rabbani would be president, with Massoud as his minister of defense. This government took office in December 1993, but Hekmatyar refused to accept the agreement. Arguing that he could not work with a government that included General Dostam among its supporters, he continued to shell Kabul from his mountain strongholds, while attempting to cut the city off from outside supplies. Many Pashtun leaders supported Hekmatyar on ethnic grounds. Even though Rabbani and Massoud claimed to be Muslims first and Tajiks second, they were accused by their opponents of trying to set up a Tajik-dominated Afghanistan. This was particularly galling to Pashtuns, who had traditionally been the dominant ethnic group in the country. Some Pashtuns went so far as to say they would refuse to support a government that was led by a non-Pashtun. These attitudes increasingly helped to make the conflict one of ethnic rivalry, with Pashtuns of the south supporting Hekmatyar, while Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks supported Tajik, Massoud, and his Uzbek ally, Dostam. In some ways, the fall of Najibullah marked the end of a Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan and introduced a new era in which the minorities of the north would have an equal, or perhaps even a greater, say in how the country would be governed. The patchwork nature of Afghan loyalties, however, made it impossible to characterize the fighting as merely ethnic based. Many Pashtun, particularly Persian speakers, supported Massoud or simply refused to help Hekmatyar, while not all Tajiks were loyal to Massoud. In addition, Hekmatyar also received help

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from the Shi’a Wahdat faction, a Hazara group. So, while the fighting did take on a more ethnic character after 1992, ethnicity was never the sole factor in determining factional loyalty. In 1993, further attempts at forging an agreement between the three strongmen continued to fail, and the fighting staggered on, with intermittent cease-fires. A March agreement among the three leaders led to the appointment of Hekmatyar as prime minister but fell apart a few weeks later when Massoud, still minister of defense, again refused to allow Hekmatyar’s troops into Kabul. Although Massoud seemed to be the strongest of the three, the balance of power was maintained by General Dostam’s repeated switches of loyalty. If Massoud was winning the battle for Kabul, Dostam would join Hekmatyar, and when the fighting went in Hekmatyar’s favor, Dostam would return to his alliance with Massoud.

Foreign Support The civil war in Afghanistan was also complicated by the interest of the nations surrounding it. During Soviet occupation (1979–1989), Afghanistan’s neighbors consistently supported any mujahideen group that was willing to fight the Soviets, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, loyalties shifted. By 1994, each of the three main Afghan leaders had his own patrons. Hekmatyar received aid from Pakistan, specifically from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which had backed him since the days of the Soviet war and viewed him as a kind of protégé. The ISI considered Hekmatyar to be the most likely Afghan leader to cooperate with their goal of keeping the Afghan conflict from spilling over into Pakistan itself. (A large Pashtun minority lives in the border regions of Pakistan.) Massoud drew some support from Russia, which considered him a bulwark against the spread of a more radical Islamic movement. The continued fighting in Afghanistan was bleeding into and helping to destabilize neighboring Tajikistan, one of the states in the old Soviet Union, but now struggling to form its own independent government. Massoud also received aid from India, which was probably a reaction to Pakistani aid for Hekmatyar. (Indian and Pakistani rivalry dates back to the birth of both countries.) Dostam, an Uzbek, received his outside supplies from Uzbekistan, while the Shi’a Wahdat faction received their backing from Shi’a Iran.

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The Taliban In January 1994 the fighting for Kabul continued. On New Year’s Day, Dostam, again switching sides, attempted a coup d’état against Massoud. (Dostam was supported by both Hekmatyar and the Pakistani ISI.) The coup failed to take Kabul but reignited the war in Afghanistan. More fighting in Kabul led to thousands of civilian deaths and many more injuries. The fighting spread throughout Afghanistan (most of the battles in 1993 had centered on Kabul) but without substantially changing the battle lines. At the end of 1994, Dostam continued to dominate the northwest, Massoud the northeast, Hekmatyar the south, and the Hizb-i-Wahdat central Afghanistan. This stalemate began to be overturned in the fall of 1994 with the rise of a new force in the Afghanistan civil war, the Taliban. The Taliban was a movement led by Islamic seminary students and teachers from the schools that dot the Afghan landscape. These religious leaders and their followers were disgusted with the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and proposed to sweep away the warring factions and create a new, pure Islamic state. Within a few months, starting from a small group of men in the southern province of Kandahar, they had achieved incredible results, conquering most of the southern provinces by January 1995. The intellectual origins of the Taliban lay in the Deoband Islamic seminary of northern India. The Deoband had been a center of fundamentalist Islamic thought since its establishment in the nineteenth century, and it was dedicated to purging Islam of impurities. Its students, taught to hew to the strict letter of Koranic law, had spread throughout the Middle East, including Afghanistan. It was the Deobandis of Afghanistan who came together to form the Taliban in late 1994. And it was the Deoband advocacy of Islamic traditionalism that inspired the new Afghan movement. The support for the Taliban, however, was not merely religious. While many Afghan mujahideen bands surrendered to the Taliban without a fight because of their respect for the Taliban’s holy mission, others joined because they saw the Taliban as the one hope for ending Afghanistan’s unending wars. And although the Taliban denied being a force for any one ethnic group, they attracted the support of many Pashtun, who were willing to back a movement that looked as if it could counter the strength of the northern Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.

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Taliban Victorious? In February 1995, Hizb-i-Islam leader Hekmatyar responded to the growing strength of the Taliban by saying, “In the past twenty-seven years I have been engaged in the struggle to form a true Islamic government for Afghanistan and faced battles people said I would never survive. I am not worried about the Taliban now.” The following day the Taliban army overran Hekmatyar’s headquarters, and the former warlord fled into the countryside, eventually ending up in Iran. Although the Kabul government of Rabbani and Massoud had at first welcomed this new force, they soon also found themselves under attack. Unlike Hekmatyar’s army, Massoud’s troops did not desert to the Taliban, but they were hard pressed to hold their ground. Massoud and his allies defeated a March 1995 assault on Kabul but lost the western city of Herat in September of the same year. The Taliban’s drive was then somewhat slowed, but by September of 1996 they had taken the eastern city of Jalalabad. Later that month, Massoud, his army almost surrounded, pulled out of Kabul and retreated to his northern strongholds. The Taliban followed the withdrawal and seized the city. In two years of fighting they had succeeded in conquering more than twothirds of the country. (They also ended the life of former Communist leader Mohammed Najibullah: when the Taliban entered the city, they dragged Najibullah out from his hiding place in a UN compound and had him executed.) After the fall of Kabul the Taliban drive slowed to a near halt. Although by March 1998 they controlled 80 percent of the country, a loose-knit Northern Alliance had managed to hold on to the remainder of Afghanistan. At the center of the alliance was still Massoud’s Tajik army. He was joined by Dostam’s Uzbeks, the Hazaran Hizb-i-Wahdat faction, and Hekmatyar’s Hizb-iIslam faction. (Hekmatyar, his supporters greatly reduced in numbers, had returned to Afghanistan by early 1998.) Although the Taliban continued its attempts to reunite the country, Kabul was the last important stronghold to be successfully taken by their armies. (Mazar-i-Sharif, the northern stronghold of General Dostam, fell briefly in May 1997, but was immediately retaken.) Part of the Taliban’s later failures are probably attributable to its traditional Islamic approach to governance. Many Afghans were disturbed by the

degree of extremism that they saw in the fanatical Taliban forces. Upon taking control of Kabul, the Taliban demanded that women quit their jobs, closed schools for girls, and required women to wear the burqa (a traditional black robe that covers the body from head to toe). They also established the Department to Prevent Vice, whose members searched city streets looking for those who were disobeying Islamic law. Men were beaten for flying kites and women for wearing high heels under their traditional robes. This extremism did not fit in with northern Afghanistan’s more relaxed approach to Islam, particularly in more cosmopolitan cities such as Kabul or Herat. (When Massoud’s troops took Kabul, they forced women to wear less revealing clothing but did not object if their faces showed or if they continued to work.) The Taliban’s actions also alienated Westerners, particularly the aid workers who were sent to try and put the country’s shattered infrastructure back together. Women from international organizations were often attacked by Taliban extremists for violating Islamic morality, and some aid agencies responded by withdrawing their workers from Taliban-controlled areas. On the other hand, the Taliban received substantial support from Pakistan, whose leaders were sympathetic to a Pashtun-dominated regime.

Stalemate By early 1998, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance were locked in a stalemate. The Taliban controlled most of the country but were having difficulty advancing further. Still backed by Pakistan, they had also received economic aid from Saudi Arabia. The Northern Alliance was receiving help from a variety of sources that feared an increase in Islamic fundamentalism in the region, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Russia. Iran, although no foe of Islamic movements, opposed the Taliban because its Sunni extremism had led it to attack the Shi’a minority in Afghanistan. Iran, therefore, was supplying arms to the Hizb-i-Wahdat, who were members of the Northern Alliance. The turmoil in Afghanistan had also spread to surrounding countries. In neighboring Tajikistan the war in Afghanistan had spilled over and merged with an ongoing local civil war. Tajiks from Tajikistan had fought in Afghanistan and had also used Afghanistan as a base for their attempts to defeat the Tajikistan

Afghanistan: Civil War, 19 8 9

government, which was dominated by old Communist apparatchiks. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban also had local repercussions: anti-Shi’a Pakistanis who fought on the side of the Taliban sometimes returned to Pakistan to continue their religious war by targeting Shi’as within Pakistan (20 percent of Pakistan’s population are Shi’a Muslims). Finally, Iran and Pakistan were still home to millions of Afghan refugees, whose presence had the potential for causing additional instability in the future. Carl Skutsch

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See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion, 1979– 1989; Afghanistan: U.S. Invasion, 2001– .

Bibliography Roy, Olivier. Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995. ———. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Rubin, Barnett R. The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

AFGHANISTAN: U.S. Invasion,2001– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anti-Terrorist PARTICIPANTS: Afghanistan; United States and Western Allies; al-Qaeda UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

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The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, or Operation Enduring Freedom, began on October 7, 2001, when forces from a coalition of nations led by the United States launched a combined offensive to oust the Taliban government as well as eliminate al-Qaeda’s base of operations in the country. This invasion marked the first offensive carried out in the U.S.-led War on Terrorism, resulting directly from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since the completion of these objectives, Operation Enduring Freedom has expanded into a peacekeeping mission, allowing for the establishment of democratic institutions and the resumption of reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.

Historical Background After ten years of war, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving a weak pro-socialist government led by Mohammad Najibullah. When Najibullah lost power in 1992, competing elements of the Afghan resistance waged a bitter civil war. By late 1994, a fundamentalist Muslim group called the Taliban entered the fighting near the southern

Afghan city of Kandahar. Over the next two years, the Taliban overwhelmed government forces and other warring factions of the former Afghan resistance. The Taliban imposed a regime based on fundamentalist Islam in the areas they conquered, but they were largely ignored by the international community, which in some cases viewed them as a force for stability in Afghanistan. While the Taliban increased their rule over Afghanistan, several thousand miles away in Sudan, Saudi-born terrorist Osama bin Laden was expanding the operations of his terror organization, alQaeda. In the early 1990s, bin Laden was an ardent critic of the Saudi regime, condemning it for allowing U.S. forces in the Arabian Peninsula in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The Saudi Arabian government attempted to expel bin Laden and finally withdrew his Saudi citizenship. In 1991, bin Laden moved to Sudan, where he further established alQaeda as an umbrella organization for other likeminded terrorists, providing funds and arms for a number of groups. Under pressure from the United States, the Sudanese government expelled bin Laden from the country in May 1996, forcing him to seek refuge in Afghanistan, where he had spent several years during the 1980s participating in the Soviet-Afghan war as both a financier and a recruiter for the Afghan resistance. Upon arriving in Afghanistan, bin Laden formed a loose alliance with the Taliban, offering the services of his fighters—primarily veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war—and bribing local Afghan warlords to allow the Taliban unrestricted access in their drive toward the capital. The Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 and established a Taliban government. With protection and support from the regime, bin Laden set up training camps for Islamist extremists from across the Islamic world and expanded al-Qaeda into a force capable of committing mass acts of terror. The first

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KEY DATES 1996

The Taliban, an extreme radical Islamist group, take power in Afghanistan, ending years of internal ethnic conflict; the Taliban impose a puritanical and repressive regime; top al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, flee Sudan to set up headquarters in remote areas of Afghanistan.

2001

On September 11, terrorists from the Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda organization launch attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in New York, killing nearly 3,000; U.S. President George W. Bush demands that Afghanistan’s Taliban government hand over top al-Qaeda leaders; when the Taliban refuse, the United States launches an offensive— code-named Operation Enduring Freedom—on October 7; U.S. and local anti-Taliban forces launch attacks on al-Qaeda strongholds in the mountainous Tora Bora region of eastern Afghanistan; the Bonn agreement for a post-Taliban government is signed by Afghan leaders in Germany; by the end of the year, the Taliban have been ousted from most of the country.

2002 U.S., multinational, and Afghan forces launch Operation Anaconda to wipe out the last pockets of Taliban control, but many Taliban members, including former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, escape. 2003 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formally takes control of military operations from the United States on August 11. 2004 Afghans go to the polls to ratify a constitution and elect Hamid Karzai as president. 2005 Afghans vote for a new parliament.

major attacks attributed to al-Qaeda were the 1998 bombings of American embassies in Africa, establishing the organization’s reputation as a significant threat to the United States and its interests. The continued response of the United States, apart from cruise missile strikes against suspected alQaeda training camps in Afghanistan, was to pressure the Taliban government to expel bin Laden from Afghanistan. The Taliban resisted all pressure. During this same period, bin Laden merged a number of smaller terrorist organizations under the umbrella of al-Qaeda, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Egyptian Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. The new, reinforced al-Qaeda openly declared jihad against the United States, Israel, and governments in the Islamic world deemed to be “un-Islamic.”

On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda accomplished a spectacular attack on the United States, crashing two hijacked passenger airplanes into the World Trade Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon (headquarters of the U.S. Defense Department) in Washington, D.C. A fourth plane crashed in western Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people were killed, including the 19 al-Qaeda operatives who hijacked the planes. In a speech to Congress on September 21, 2001, President George W. Bush issued an ultimatum to the Taliban government, demanding that they hand over the leadership of al-Qaeda and grant the United States full access to the terrorist training camps. If they refused, Bush suggested, the United States would invade Afghanistan. The Taliban rejected Bush’s demands.

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The United States rallied the support of a host of nations to remove the Taliban from Afghanistan, with many of them contributing to the initial military operation. The United States also demanded the support of Afghanistan’s neighbors, and some agreed to the use of their territory and airspace. At the same time, American and British Special Forces secretly made contact in Afghanistan with members of the Northern Alliance, a loose organization of former antiSoviet resistance fighters who controlled the northern portion of the country. The Northern Alliance was, in essence, the government-in-exile of Afghanistan, as its leadership had formed the first post-Soviet administration in 1992, but it had suffered defeat at the hands of the Taliban in 1996. The alliance continued waging war against the Taliban from its bases in the north. The U.S. plan for the Afghan war was to decimate Taliban military installations, infrastructure, and lines of communication, in a sustained bombing campaign. Then it hoped to support the Northern Alliance in overwhelming the remains of the Taliban. The U.S. government also hoped that the Northern Alliance would form the basis for a new democratic government in Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban, allowing the “reintegration of Afghanistan into the international community.”

Militar y Operations Operation Enduring Freedom began on the evening of October 7, 2001, with the primary objective being the removal and elimination of both the Taliban and al-Qaeda within Afghanistan. The sustained air campaign began with fifty cruise missiles being launched from U.S. ships and British submarines, followed by the use of twenty-five carrier-based aircraft and fifteen land-based bombers, which, according to U.S. military sources, “destroyed Taliban air defenses, communications infrastructure, and airports in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat using ‘smart bombs.’ ” At the same time, American and British planes began to drop thousands of tons of desperately needed food and other necessities to the Afghan people, whose suffering was sure to increase with the complete shutdown of the country to outside assistance due to the conflict. Once the bombing began, forces of the Northern Alliance launched attacks against Taliban positions.

These assaults failed because bombing had not been focused on outlying Taliban positions. Two weeks into the war, the bombing campaign intensified, while at the same time U.S. Special Forces detachments linked up with anti-Taliban leaders and coordinated operational fire and logistics support on multiple fronts. This cooperation allowed Northern Alliance forces to go on the offensive, reaching the city of Mazer-i-Sharif on November 9. After a relatively short battle, the Northern Alliance captured Mazer-i-Sharif in north-central Afghanistan. The city, however, later became the scene of one of the war’s infamous incidents, as several hundred Taliban prisoners revolted against their Northern Alliance captors at a prison near the city, killing dozens of Northern Alliance soldiers and a CIA operative. Within days, Northern Alliance forces swept into Kabul, the Afghan capital, which had been abandoned by the Taliban, and soon they occupied Herat and Jalalabad. Meanwhile, combatants noticed the presence of non-Aghan fighters from alQaeda fighting alongside Taliban troops. After six weeks, the only significant resistance was centered in the cities of Kunduz and Kandahar. The Taliban forces in Kunduz were annihilated, leading the majority of Taliban forces to surrender on November 25. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, however, urged his forces to continue the fight from the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. At the end of November, the United States deployed ground forces in Afghanistan. Although the United States had directed the war, its role up to this point had been limited. Now U.S. Marines, almost a thousand-strong, established a base south of Kandahar, the only remaining Taliban stronghold and the birthplace of the Taliban movement. U.S. forces were also focusing on a cave complex in Tora Bora in the rugged eastern mountains, which had been one of the last outposts of al-Qaeda resistance. U.S. warplanes and tanks bombarded the caves and surrounding countryside to dislodge al-Qaeda fighters, while U.S. commandos and Afghan forces battled the fighters. On December 7, Kandahar fell, ending the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden slipped through the hands of U.S. and allied forces and disappeared. From secure hideouts, they vowed to continue the war against the “occupiers.”

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Soldiers in the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division storm a dwelling in eastern Afghanistan in 2002. Villages in the area, suspected of being al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds, came under heavy attack. (Joe Raedle/AFP/Getty Images)

Post-Taliban Afghanistan In December 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban regime, members of the Afghan opposition and representatives of the United Nations met in Bonn, Germany. There they worked out an agreement setting the framework and timetable for the postTaliban government of Afghanistan. The agreement called for the establishment of a six-month Afghan Transitional Authority, headed by anti-Taliban commander Hamid Karzai, which was to be followed by a two-year transitional government. The agreement also provided for a “UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority.” The mission of this International Security Force (ISAF) was to maintain security in and around Kabul while the security of the reminder of the country was left to U.S. forces and the forces of local warlords. The soldiers in ISAF came from many countries, including Canada, France, and Turkey, as well as the United States and Britain.

During the early months of 2002, remaining elements of the Taliban began regrouping in the east of the country, requiring the immediate attention of U.S. and allied forces. On March 1, 2002, U.S. forces launched Operation Anaconda to crush any attempts at a renewed Taliban offensive. The operation, using mostly American troops, succeeded in dislodging Taliban militants from their bases in the mountains near the city of Gardez, but it came to be seen as a failure in many ways because allied casualties were high and hundreds of the Taliban escaped. After Operation Anaconda, small Taliban forces staged ambushes and other guerrilla attacks, but they did not mount any major offensives. They remained just active enough to remind Afghanis that they remained a threat to the government in Kabul, and meanwhile they actively recruited young men from southern Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. After serving as the interim leader of Afghanistan for six months, Hamid Karzai was elected head of the transitional government of Afghanistan for two years.

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Karzai’s election—following a loya jirga, or tribal assembly of Afghan tribal leaders—gave credibility to his government and created the appearance of unity among the various Afghan tribal factions. However, while Karzai was supported by a majority of Afghan tribal leaders, his rule was largely confined to Kabul, leaving most of the country under the rule of various warlords, each running his territory as he saw fit. On August 11, 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formally replaced the United Nations as the sponsor of the ISAF. Prior to NATO’s taking up this role, control of the ISAF rotated between a number of countries. Three months later, the United Nations Security Council voted to expand the ISAF’s mandate to include the entire country of Afghanistan, not just Kabul and the immediate vicinity. By 2005, the ISAF pursued its peacekeeping role in about half of the country. It proved to be of immeasurable service in the ongoing campaigns of Operation Enduring Freedom and gave the government of Hamid Karzai, who was elected president of the permanent government in 2004, the ability to begin restoring law, order, and governance to Afghanistan. Humanitarian aid, which had largely been provided via the United Nations under the Taliban regime, became the responsibility of the United States during the war. Critics claimed after the fighting eased that the U.S. aid effort failed to provide adequately for the Afghan people. Conditions of “banditry and lawlessness,” partly brought on by the war itself, often made delivery of aid difficult or impossible. The International Red Cross and others have also censured both the United States and the Northern Alliance, charging human rights abuses and massacres, as well as criticizing the establishment of the prison at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to detain suspected al-Qaeda militants as “enemy combatants” without charge or access to counsel, in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions. With the relative security provided by U.S. and ISAF forces, the Afghan provisional government of Hamid Karzai fashioned and implemented a constitution for Afghanistan, which came into effect in January 2004. In the presidential election held in October 2004, Karzai was elected president for a fiveyear term. National Assembly elections were held in September 2005. The new legislative body was the first for Afghanistan in more than thirty years. It

remained to be seen, however, how effective the Assembly would be in helping to reestablish sound government in the country. And while Kabul itself remained relatively secure under the Karzai government, remnants of the Taliban reorganized in the country’s fractious southern provinces. In the first half of 2006, coalition and Afghan government forces launched Operation Mountain Thrust, which aimed at rolling back Taliban gains in those areas. Even Kabul was rocked by violent antiAmerican rioting in May, after a U.S. military vehicle crashed on a crowded street and killed several people.

Conclusion Militarily, Operation Enduring Freedom proved to be a success for the U.S. military and its allies as part of the War on Terrorism. The primary objectives of the operation were achieved at an astonishing pace: within four months of the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, according to experts, the “al-Qaeda presence was practically eliminated in Afghanistan,” and “the Taliban as a political force evaporated virtually into thin air, leaving room for an interim government.” After the establishment of the post-Taliban government, Afghanistan began to rebuild its government, infrastructure, and economy. Within three years it had established the forms of a democratic government, but much of the country was still not fully under the control of the central administration, and low-level violence continued. It was too early to assess the long-term success of this “nation-building” effort by the United States and its allies in a country that had experienced invasions by two world powers and the rule of a repressive fundamentalist regime, all in less than thirty years. Daniel F. Cuthbertson See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; United States: War on Terrorism, 1990s– ; Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion, 1979–1989; Afghanistan: Civil War, 1989.

Bibliography Bergen, Peter L. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. New York: Free Press, 2001. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. Conetta, Carl. “Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Project on

Afghanistan: U.S. Invasion, 2001– Defense Alternatives. Research Monograph #6 (January 30, 2002). Luong, Pauline Jones, and Erika Weinthal. “New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (March-April 2002): 61. Magnus, Ralph H., and Eden Naby. Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.

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O’Hanlon, Michael. “A Flawed Masterpiece.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May-June 2002). Rasanayagam, Angelo. Afghanistan: A Modern History. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003. Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002.

INDIA: Partition Violence,1947 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Anticolonialism PARTICIPANTS: Pakistan; United Kingdom JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Occupied by Pakistan and claimed by India

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any political dissent and restructured the subcontinent’s economy to fit the needs of the mother country. This involved both destructive and constructive measures. They effectively destroyed the region’s handloom textile industry—once the largest in the world—in order to force India’s millions to buy machine-woven cloth from England. They also confiscated vast acreage in order to grow commercial crops such as cotton, tea, and even opium. At the same time, however, they developed the most extensive railway system in Asia and established an effective bureaucracy that—while ruled by British officials at the top—also employed thousands of Indian civil servants, educated in British-run schools.

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Origins of Hindu-Muslim Divisions Beginning in the seventeenth century, the British established trading posts in India—under the aegis of the royally chartered British East India Company— first in Bengal and later in other parts of the subcontinent. In the late eighteenth century, the British had effectively eliminated French colonialists as a threat to their imperial holdings. At the same time, the diminishing power of the Moghul Muslim rulers of India—who had conquered much of the northern part of the subcontinent in the sixteenth century— allowed the British to consolidate their holdings across the region. After putting down the great Indian uprising of 1857, Britain made much of the subcontinent a crown colony under the rule of the British monarchy and parliament. By the latter half of the century, India had become the “jewel in the crown” of the vast British Empire, its most important and lucrative colony. The British ruled India with a mixture of ruthlessness and paternalism. They largely allowed the people of India to follow their own faiths and practice their own cultures, but they ruthlessly suppressed

During the last twenty-five or so years of British rule, the Indian subcontinent was caught up in two great struggles. One was the movement to liberate the region from imperial rule, and the other was a growing religious conflict between Muslims and Hindus. Indeed, the first mass awakening of the former struggle was a direct outgrowth of divisions implied by the latter. In 1905, the first mass agitation—anticipating the non-violence, non-cooperation movement of future liberation leader Mohandas Gandhi—broke out in Bengal, after the British decided to divide the single province containing both Hindus and Muslims into two religiously based provinces. Britain based its decision on the region’s history. India has been conquered several times in its long history. Several thousand years before Christ, a people known to historians as the Aryans, a light-skinned Euro-Asiatic people, conquered the darker-skinned, native Dravidian peoples of the subcontinent. They introduced their holy books—the Vedas—and elaborated the caste system that would dominate Indian social life to the present day. Other significant invasions,

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KEY DATES 1857 In the wake of a great rebellion, Britain establishes control over much of India. 1905 Mass agitation against British rule begins. 1930 Mohammed Jinnah and other Muslim intellectuals agree that Muslims of India should have their own country after independence. 1935 British parliament passes the Government of India Act, allowing a degree of self-rule to India. 1941

With Japan threatening India, Britain promises the militarily crucial Muslim population the possibility of opting out of a future Indian state.

1946 Britain proposes the Cabinet Mission Plan, dividing India into Hindu, Muslim, and mixed-religion areas, but with one central government for finance and defense; the plan falls apart over the problem of the position of the minority Sikh population; Jinnah and Muslim leaders withdraw their support for the plan; rioting breaks out in the religiously mixed city of Calcutta; religious massacres occur across northern India. 1947 Britain declares the division of the subcontinent into two sovereign nations as of midnight, August 14; a demarcation committee draws up borders in an effort to place most Hindus in India and most Muslims in Pakistan; millions flee the violence, with Hindus fleeing Pakistani areas for India and Muslims fleeing India for East and West Pakistan.

including those of Alexander the Great and later the Mongols, followed. The most significant in recent centuries was the great Moghul conquest beginning in the fourteenth century. Conquering northeastern and northwestern India, the Moghuls converted tens of millions to the Islamic faith. The conquest also left a substantial minority of Muslims throughout the great Ganges Valley. The decline of the Moghul Empire was hastened by Britain’s gradual conquest of the subcontinent in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Just as Hindus resented living under Muslim rulers—who often passed discriminatory legislation and committed the occasional act of sacrilege against Hindu holy places—so too did Muslims increasingly fear Hindu dominance. As the movement toward independence from Britain picked up steam in the early 1920s, Mohammed Ali Jinnah—a British-educated Muslim intellectual—pulled his Muslim forces out of Gandhi’s Hindu-dominated, Hindi-speaking Con-

gress Party movement. Around the same time, other Muslim leaders formed the Muslim League, a radical Muslim nationalist organization. Though Jinnah— a secular Muslim but a strong believer—thought that a unified, secular India was still the best option for the post-imperial order—sporadic violence kept breaking out between members of the two great religions over the next twenty-five years. The British responded to both the independence movement and the deepening Hindu-Muslim divisions with a series of constitutional reforms that usually proved to be too little and too late. The reforms were largely designed to wean India’s elites and its religious minorities—including Muslims, Sikhs (a hybrid religion of Muslim and Hindu teachings), and Christians—away from nationalist mass movements. For example, they established a national assembly (with few real powers) after 1900 in which Muslims and other minorities were guaranteed a certain number of seats. Under the last great reform of the British

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era—the Government of India Act of 1935—the franchise to the two houses of the national assembly was extended to about 30 million educated and/or propertied persons, roughly one in ten inhabitants of the subcontinent. Whether by religion or class, the British were using their tried-and-true method of colonial domination: divide and rule.

Rise of Muslim Separatism By the 1920s, the Muslim minority of India was feeling increasingly restless for both internal and external reasons. Internally, the independence movement was increasingly identified with Hindu nationalism. Externally, the Muslim caliphate had been dissolved in Turkey with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The caliphate had served as an overarching politico-religious leadership of international Islam and had existed in some form since the seventh century c.e. When the secular government of the new state of Turkey decided to dissolve the caliphate in the early 1920s, India’s Muslims felt exposed and cut off from other Muslims. At the same time, the end of the caliphate left Indian Muslims free to pursue their own nationalist yearnings, since they were less securely tied to international Islam. In the year following the dissolution of the caliphate, rioting between Muslims and Hindus broke out in the Malabar section of northwest India, claiming hundreds of lives and spreading across the Ganges Valley. Usually sparked by some act or rumor of dietary outrage (Muslims killing the holy cows of Hindus or Hindus depositing unclean pigs in Islamic mosques), the violence was largely confined to rural areas and the poorer sections of the cities. By 1930, a number of Muslim intellectuals (not including Jinnah) had decided that their religious brethren in the subcontinent should have nationstates of their own, which would include the great Muslim population centers in the northwest and in Bengal in the northeast. They subsequently formed the Muslim League. The Hindu leadership of the Indian independence movement remained fearful of Muslim participation, however. In 1937, Jawaharlal Nehru—Gandhi’s practical right-hand man—ruled that the Congress Party would not form coalition ministries with the Muslim League in mixed-religion provinces. His decision helped alienate Jinnah and other Muslim moderates, who had been counting on an alliance with the Hindu-dominated Congress

Party. Muslims began to fear that an independent Hindu India might be as tyrannical as the British one. World War II only exacerbated the differences between Hindus and Muslims. On September 3, 1939, just days after Britain declared war on Germany, British Viceroy of India Lord Linlithgow informed Nehru and Gandhi that India too was at war. The two Hindu leaders were outraged that this decision was made without including them, and they refused to cooperate, demanding instead that Britain commit to India’s independence at war’s end before Indians would fight. Muslim leaders took a different tack, and this had much to do with the history of British rule in India. Traditionally, the British had always recruited their Indian military and police forces largely from Muslim ranks. This was part of a larger imperial policy of using minorities against majorities and reflected Muslims’ more martial cultural traditions. The general Muslim leadership pledged cooperation in the British war effort, outraging Gandhi, Nehru, and the Congress Party. The Muslim League’s support for the British war effort had also come with a postwar demand, however. The Muslim leadership demanded that the British agree to establish a single Muslim state that would include the vast majority of Muslim Indians in the northwest and in Bengal. By late 1941, Japan was threatening to invade India, and Britain was more than ready to make promises to the Muslims, allowing any Muslim area to opt out of a future Indian “dominion.” In response, Gandhi announced his “quit India” movement. He told the British that their presence was provoking a Japanese invasion and that they should leave. The British responded by throwing Gandhi and other “quit India” leaders in jail.

Partition In June 1945, as World War II came to an end, the British moved to shore up their position in India and to resolve the conflict between Hindus and Muslims. They convened a conference in Simla, a hill town in the north of India, but the conferees failed to resolve either of the two main issues. Within weeks of the conference, the Conservative government of Winston Churchill was defeated in British elections and replaced by a Labour Party government under Clement Attlee. The new government had no illusions that Britain could maintain its authority in India. Instead,

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Victims of sectarian rioting are removed from the streets of Delhi in September 1947, a month after the partitioning of the subcontinent into Hindu (India) and Muslim (Pakistan) states. Up to 1 million died in partition violence. (Keystone/Getty Images)

it tried to hand over power to a single, pro-British government entity in New Delhi, long the capital of British India. The solution soon foundered. In Indian elections in the winter of 1945–1946, the Muslim League showed great strength and once again demanded an independent Muslim state. Britain then proposed the Cabinet Mission Plan in which an independent India would be governed under a complicated, three-tier system, dividing the subcontinent into three parts: an area dominated by Hindus, an area dominated by Muslims, and a mixed area. The central government would only deal with issues such as national finance and defense. This proposal failed mainly because of the Sikhs. The Sikhs practiced their own unique religion and lived in an agriculturally rich area of northwest India known as the Punjab. They had an even more illustrious military tradition than the Muslims, having contributed to Britain’s imperial defenses in India and throughout the world. Sikh leaders even hoped they would be granted their own mini-state after World War II. Instead, they found the Punjab divided into Hindu and Muslim zones. They rejected the Cabinet plan, threatening the delicate balance

between Congress Party leaders and the ailing Jinnah, who represented the Muslim interest. In the early summer of 1946, there was still hope for a secular, multireligious, multiethnic Indian state, but these hopes were soon dashed by the Congress Party. Nehru had just gained reelection to the presidency of the party, and he announced that the party would not commit to any prearranged constitutional format for an independent India. In effect, as leader of the majority party, he was rejecting the carefully balanced Cabinet plan. Jinnah and other leaders of the Muslim League were outraged. They withdrew from the Cabinet plan in August 1946 and called upon the “Muslim Nation” to launch “direct action” to carve out a Muslim state. Rioting broke out in Calcutta, the mixed HinduMuslim capital of Bengal. Fear and hatred spread throughout northern India, as thousands on both sides were massacred. Britain responded by appointing Lord Mountbatten viceroy of India. After assessing the situation, Mountbatten decided to act quickly to partition India. It was, he decided, too dangerous— especially for departing British troops, officials, and civilians—to convene another conference to resolve

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the differences between the polarized Muslim and Hindu communities. In July 1947, the British passed the Indian Independence Act, declaring the division of the subcontinent into two sovereign nations, effective at midnight on August 14, 1947. Hindu India was to occupy the broad subcontinent, while Muslim Pakistan was to occupy large areas in the northeast and northwest, separated by 1,500 miles of Indian territory. The demarcation committee established by the Independence Act quickly drew the borders between the two future nations so that a majority of Hindus would fall on the Indian side and a majority of Muslims on the Pakistani side. Three areas were extremely difficult. These were crowded Bengal in the northeast, multireligious Punjab in the northwest, and distant Kashmir and Jammu in the far north. At all three sites, horrific massacres would soon occur. With fear and hatred among the different religious groups reaching a peak in the days following independence, no fewer than 10 million Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs fled across borders to the new nations where they hoped to find shelter. Most traveled by foot, others used trains. In both cases, many were harassed and assaulted by mobs of civilians and even members of the police. Overall, it is estimated that some 1 million persons died in the partition violence. The British, having largely pulled out, did almost nothing to stop the massacres.

Aftermath and Legacy The partition and violence that accompanied it left a legacy of anger and paranoia between the two great nations of the subcontinent. India and Pakistan would fight numerous skirmishes along the Kashmiri border and two major wars in the years that followed—one

over Kashmir and Jammu in 1965, the other leading to the independence of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. Moreover, India accused Pakistan of fomenting unrest and sponsoring guerrilla fighting in the Muslim-dominated but Indian-governed Kashmir. The rivalry between the two countries kept much of South Asia tense over the next half-century. To defend itself against the much larger, richer, and more powerful India, Pakistan formed a close alliance with India’s great Asian rival, China. This in turn led India to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union. The continuing tensions between India and Pakistan also caused the two countries to make the great leap in arms escalation to nuclear weaponry. In 1974, India set off a small nuclear test device but insisted it was for peaceful purposes. With the election of a Hindu nationalist government a quarter of a century later, India set off as many as five nuclear tests in 1998, followed quickly by a series of tests by Pakistan. The national and religious antagonisms and fears of nuclear war continued to haunt the region into the twenty-first century. James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; India: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 1947; India: War with Pakistan, 1965; India: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence, 1971; India: Sikh Uprising Since 1973; India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 1998.

Bibliography French, Patrick. Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Ganguly, Sumit. The Origins of War in South Asia: The IndoPakistani Conflicts Since 1947. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Hamid, Shahid. Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition of India. New York: Secker and Warburg, 1986. Inder Singh, Anita. The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936–1947. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

INDIA: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 1947 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Pakistan NISTAN HA G AF

Historical Background Territory ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963; claimed by India

NORTHERN AREAS Siachen Glacier

AZAD KASHMIR Islamabad

PA K I S TA N SOUTHWEST

Line of C

ont

AKSAI CHIN

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Line of Kargil actual Srinagar control JAMMU AND KASHMIR Vale of Kashmir Jammu

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Traditional boundary claimed by the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir

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100 100

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The 1947 partitioning of British India into the independent states of a secular but Hindu-dominated India and Muslim Pakistan left the status of Jammu and Kashmir, a province in the far north of the subcontinent, unresolved. Although largely occupied by India, the territory was inhabited mostly by Muslims. In later decades, India and Pakistan fought several skirmishes and, in 1965, one full-scale war over the disputed region. Beginning in the mid-1980s, a new antagonist emerged: the indigenous Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Supported clandestinely by Pakistan, JKLF militants engaged in repeated armed confrontations with Indian police and troops. The continuing tensions over the region were magnified in 1998, when both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons clearly intended to influence the conflict between the two countries.

Under British colonial rule, the Indian subcontinent (now consisting of the independent states of Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) was largely divided into two types of territories: those ruled directly by the British government and those ruled indirectly by the British through quasi-independent local leaders—usually maharaji, nawabs, or other traditional princely governors. As the British prepared to withdraw from India after World War II, they divided the mainland of the subcontinent into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten pressured the princes ruling quasi-independent states to proclaim their allegiance either to India or Pakistan. All but three agreed. Two principalities—Junagadh and Hyderabad—were almost or completely surrounded by India and were forced to join the new country within a year of independence. The third— Kashmir—presented bigger problems. Kashmir was ruled by a Hindu maharaja, but the population was three-quarters Muslim. Moreover, the territory bordered both Pakistan and India, as well as China, which would also lay claim to parts of it. At first, Maharaja Hari Singh tried to remain independent. But in October 1947, just a month after Indian and Pakistani independence, Pathan fighters from northeast Pakistan invaded, heading toward the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar. With help from the British, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, airlifted troops into the region, where they stopped the Pakistani attack and secured most of Kashmir and Jammu (including Srinagar) for India. Despite the outcome, Pakistan continued to lay claim to Jammu and Kashmir. In early 1949, the region was divided into Pakistani- and Indian-administered areas. The two

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KEY DATES 1947

India and Pakistan win independence from Great Britain, but much of the Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir provinces are incorporated into Hindu-dominated India; the border between India and Pakistan remains disputed.

1965

India and Pakistan fight a brief but bloody war over Kashmir.

1982

Long-time Kashmiri leader Sheik Abdullah dies.

1998

India and Pakistan test nuclear weapons; it is Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test; for India, it is the first such test since 1974.

1999

Prime ministers of India and Pakistan meet and sign the Lahore Accord, calling for efforts to resolve the conflict over Kashmir.

2001

Pakistan cooperates with the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan in October; Kashmiri militants attack the Indian parliament in December.

2005 India offers and Pakistan accepts Indian aid in the wake of a massive earthquake in Pakistan-controlled areas of Kashmir.

most populous areas, Ladakh and the Vale of Kashmir, were part of the Indian region. Under United Nations supervision, a plebiscite was planned in which the inhabitants could vote for the country they wished to belong to. India’s claim to the region was supported by Sheik Abdullah, the political and spiritual leader of the Muslim peoples in Jammu and Kashmir. After 1952, however, Sheik Abdullah’s thinking changed, and he began to speak in favor of a Jammu and Kashmir independent of both India and Pakistan. The Indian government removed him from office and imprisoned him without trial. Afterward, only pro-India candidates gained positions of power in the region. The long-planned plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir was put off from year to year because of continuing tensions. One disagreement between India and Pakistan was what stance to take in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru worked to keep India neutral in the conflict. In 1954, however, Pakistan chose to align itself with the United States and accept military aid. Nehru immediately withdrew his support for the plebiscite in Kashmir. Gradually the people of Jammu and Kashmir were integrated administratively into India. Their

participation in Indian elections was seen by New Delhi as clear evidence that they had chosen to be a part of India. Pakistan disputed this claim. In 1965, the two countries went to war over the region, but the conflict did little to resolve the dispute or shift the borders.

Renewed Violence In the early 1970s, several breakthroughs occurred that seemed to bode well for resolving the conflict. At the Simla conference of 1972, Pakistan and India agreed to resolve all disputes between them— including Jammu and Kashmir—in bilateral negotiations. Meanwhile, Sheik Abdullah accepted Indian rule, was released from prison, and became Kashmir’s chief minister from 1975 until his death in 1982. Abdullah’s popularity with the people of the region helped to quell dissent. His son and successor, Farooq Abdullah, proved less capable. After he rose to power, a new and more militant movement emerged in the region, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which challenged his authority. At first the JKLF called for Kashmir to join Pakistan, but soon it was campaigning for Kashmiri independence. (Most observers

India: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 19 47

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The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a militant secular organization established in 1977, seeks the restoration of the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed before the partition of 1947. (Robert Nickelsberg/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

believed that the JKLF would unite Kashmir to Pakistan if it succeeded in gaining independence.) Through a mixture of violent intimidation and popular outreach, the JKLF was able to convince the vast majority of the region’s electorate to boycott the Indian elections of November 1989, helping to undermine one of India’s main claims to sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir. Other Muslim militant groups soon arose. They include the Pakistani-backed Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Righteous), founded in 1990; the Hizbul Mujahideen, which had been founded to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, but operated in Kashmir after the Soviet war ended in the late 1980s; and the Jaishe-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed), founded in 2000. Together with the JKLF, these groups intensified their campaign of terrorism, strikes, and civil unrest. India charged that Pakistan was training and arming the guerrillas on its territory to destabilize Kashmir. Pakistan denied the allegations and renewed its insistence that the dispute in Jammu and Kashmir be decided in a UN-administered plebiscite,

as agreed in 1949. As it had done for decades, India rejected the plebiscite and insisted on direct negotiations with Pakistan as agreed in the 1972 Simla agreement. In 1989, India sent troops into Jammu and Kashmir and declared a state of emergency in the region. Pakistan accused India of complicity in the deaths of three Pakistani nationals who had tried to cross the border into Kashmir. It also charged the Indian government with committing acts of brutality and suppressing human rights. Protesters in Pakistan began demanding that the government aid the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir. At this point, both the Pakistani and Indian governments moved to defuse the crisis. Negotiators from both sides met and helped to resolve direct Pakistani-Indian disputes over water rights and the border in a small corner of Kashmir, along the Siachen Glacier. Yet these small gains did little to defuse the fighting between the Indian military and JKLF militants. In February and March 1991, JKLF supporters in the Pakistani-controlled

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parts of Kashmir planned mass marches into Indiancontrolled areas but were stopped by Pakistani troops. Several of the marchers were killed. In January 1992, the Bharatiya Janata, India’s Hindu nationalist party, organized a march to the Kashmiri capital, Srinagar, on Republic Day, to hoist the Indian flag. The march antagonized Kashmiri Muslims, setting off new violence between militants and security forces that culminated in the killing of forty Muslim civilians in the town of Bijbehara by security forces in October 1993. That same month, other militants seized the revered Hazrat Bal Mosque in Srinagar, hoping to provoke a confrontation with the army. But restraint by Indian officials forced the militants to give up without further violence. In May 1995, however, things did not work out quite as well, when soldiers stormed an occupied shrine in the town of Charar-e-Sharief. Both sides blamed the other for the destruction of the holy site.

Arms Race and Elections Even as Indian soldiers and JKLF militants engaged in guerrilla fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, broader relations between Pakistan and India took a turn for the worse, and both countries intensified their arms race. Each developed missiles that would allow them to target major cities in the opposing country. In addition, Pakistan announced that it was prepared to develop nuclear weapons to match India’s nuclear weapons program. In the United Nations, India was able to force Pakistani demands for an investigation into Indian human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir off the agenda. On the first and second anniversaries of the UN decision, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto called for nationwide strikes to protest India’s occupation of Jammu and Kashmir and continuing human rights violations there. During the winter of 1996, tensions between the two countries moved from words to deeds. In January, Pakistan accused Indian forces of launching a rocket attack into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, killing twenty. Indian authorities responded that the deaths were caused by a Pakistani rocket that misfired. India’s decision to hold elections in September 1996 in Jammu and Kashmir—elections that Bhutto described as “farcical”—further poisoned relations, as did India’s unwillingness to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, promising not to continue testing of

nuclear weapons. In fact, the elections attracted a reasonably large turnout, though JKLF militants and the Pakistani government claimed that the Indian military had pressured citizens to vote. By the end of 1996, it was estimated that the disturbances in Jammu and Kashmir had left tens of thousands of dead—including civilians, militants, and security personnel—since the renewed violence of the late 1980s. Fighting continued. In September and October 1997, the disturbances once again pitted Indian and Pakistani forces against one another, with both sides shelling the other, resulting in some forty civilian casualties. By the middle of 1998, little progress had been made between Pakistan and India on the issue of Kashmir. An annual conference of South Asian leaders in July failed to bring the parties together. Even as the conference was going on, the two countries were exchanging artillery duels along the 550-mile “line of control” between Indian and Pakistani areas of Jammu and Kashmir. Some 100 people died on both sides in these exchanges, bringing the total casualties to at least 30,000. Unable to challenge the Indian army, the JKLF and other Muslim rebels moved their activities to less fortified parts of the region to the south. Many of these forays were designed to instill fear in the Hindu population through acts of terror. In the nearby state of Himachal Pradesh, Muslim militants cut the throats of dozens of Hindu villagers during the course of 1998. India continued to blame the attacks on Pakistan, which they charged with arming and training the “terrorists.” Largely outside the world’s attention, the conflict between India and Pakistan took on a new urgency in 1998. By the middle of that year, the two countries had detonated no fewer than ten nuclear devices. Now that the dispute was between two nuclear powers, the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir was recognized as a potential flashpoint for a possibly devastating regional war between nations armed with missiles capable of delivering nuclear devices. Another development during 1998 made the situation seem even more threatening. In national elections in India, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata became the nation’s ruling party, which appeared to rule out any possible compromise in India’s position on Kashmir. In fact, tensions soon eased between the two countries when Indian prime minister Atal Vajpayee

India: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 19 47

traveled to Pakistan in February 1999 to meet with his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif. The two leaders signed the Lahore accord, which pledged again to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.” Only three months later, these hopes were dashed. In May, India launched air attacks against what New Delhi called Pakistani-backed forces infiltrating mountainous areas of Indian-controlled Kashmir. Pakistan denied it was aiding the rebels and put its forces on high alert. A major artillery duel then ensued as both sides exchanged thousands of shells. India also launched air strikes on Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir, forcing tens of thousands from their homes. Under pressure from the United States, both sides agreed to a cease-fire that summer. In October 1999, Pakistani prime minister Sharif was overthrown in a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. Skirmishing continued between India and Pakistan through 2000 and 2001, despite temporary cease-fires between the Indian military and the Hizbul Mujahideen, one of the Islamist militant groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir.

Impact of 9/11 The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, had a major ripple effect on the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. In October, the United States launched an invasion of Islamist Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, which harbored the al-Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the attacks. Because it shares a long border with Afghanistan to its northwest, Pakistan was drawn into the fight. It cooperated with U.S. and anti-Taliban Afghan forces that overthrew the Afghan government and continued searching for al-Qaeda operatives, including leader Osama bin Laden, along the mountainous border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Musharraf government, previously shunned by the United States for its violent coup, was embraced by Washington and promised to cooperate in the U.S. war on terrorism. Meanwhile, Islamist militants continued to launch guerrilla and terrorist attacks both in Indiancontrolled Kashmir and in India itself. In October, thirty-eight people were killed in an attack on the Kashmiri assembly in Srinigar. Two months later, an armed attack by unidentified militants on India’s par-

713

liament building in New Delhi left fourteen dead. India demanded that Pakistan take action against the Islamists, and, in January 2002, Musharraf responded with a major speech pledging to fight any terrorists operating on Pakistani soil. India, demanding action as well as words, continued to threaten retaliation. War between the two nuclear-armed regional powers appeared imminent, as Islamist attacks in Kashmir continued through 2002, including a May attack on an Indian army camp that left more than thirty persons dead. Tensions between Pakistan and India began to ease in 2003. In April, Vajpayee made a major speech in Kashmir, offering a “hand of friendship.” This gesture was followed a month later by the resumption of bus service between the two countries. In November, the two sides declared an official cease-fire along their informal border in Kashmir. Over the course of the following year, air links between the two countries were resumed and the leaders met to discuss the many issues dividing them, with Kashmir at the top of the list. There were also small but symbolic troop withdrawals from the tense border. The situation was changed by outside forces again in 2005. On October 8, 2005, a devastating earthquake struck a part of the Pakistani-controlled portion of Kashmir. Prime Minister Musharraf called for an opening of the cease-fire line in Kashmir to allow easier movement of relief workers and supplies. India agreed, bringing a small sign of hope out of tragedy. The moment of easing tensions soon passed, however, and by early 2006 skirmishing between Islamic separatists and the Indian army continued. Once again, India accused Pakistan of violating cease-fire agreements. Longtime observers of the Kashmiri conflict said that it would take more than an act of God to bring peace to this religiously torn region. But the Indian government reacted with a certain degree of calm in the wake of a series of bombings on Mumbai commuter trains in July 2006, which left 186 persons dead. While most experts believed that Kashmiri separatists, particularly the Pakistani-backed Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Righteous) organization, were responsible, Indian president Manmohan Singh refused to implicate Pakistan in the bombings. James Ciment

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See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; China: Border War with India, 1962; India: Partition Violence, 1947; India: War with Pakistan, 1965; India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 1998.

Bibliography French, Patrick. Liberty or Death: India’s Journey to Independence and Division. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. Ganguly, Sumit. The Origins of War in South Asia: The IndoPakistani Conflicts Since 1947. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

Ganguly, Sumit, ed. The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003. Koithara, Verghese. Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through a Realist Lens. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004. Lamb, Alastair. Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947. Hertingfoldbury, UK: Roxford, 1994. Leather, Kaia. Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict. New York: Novinka, 2003. Wirsing, Robert G. Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003.

INDIA: Invasion of Goa,1961 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonial; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Portugal 0

AFGHANISTAN

0

250 250

live much like their Hindu brethren across the border in British India. Second, by the late 1920s, Portugal itself had been taken over by the Fascist dictator Antonio Salazar. Under Fascist rule, civil rights meant little in Portugal or in its overseas territories. The only respect in which Portuguese rule had a significant impact on the people of Goa was in religion. Over the centuries, the majority of Goa’s people became Roman Catholics, and they represented a significant Christian enclave in the heart of Hindu and Muslim India.

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Diu (Portuguese)

INDIA Bombay (Mumbai)

ARABIAN SEA

BURMA

Daman (Portuguese)

BAY

Goa and Independent India

OF

Goa (Portuguese)

BENGAL

SRI LANKA INDIAN

OCEAN

The Portuguese enclave of Goa was situated on the west coast of India, approximately 300 miles south of Mumbai (Bombay). Once a major post in the Muslim trading empire that circled the Indian Ocean, the territory was conquered by the Portuguese in 1510, following an uprising by the Hindu inhabitants. While the territory was rocked by a number of rebellions against Portuguese rule through the end of the nineteenth century, it was also protected by various treaties signed with local maharaji (princes). For the most part, violent resistance to Portuguese rule ended by the early twentieth century. Under the 1911 Portuguese Republican Constitution, residents of all overseas Portuguese territories, including Goa, were given full citizenship. Portuguese citizenship did not mean much, however. First, impoverished Portugal did little to develop the social or economic infrastructure of Goa. Most of the colony’s inhabitants, in fact, continued to

During the struggle for independent India in the 1930s and 1940s, Goa was kept largely on the sidelines, despite occasional demonstrations calling for both Indian independence and Goa’s return to a sovereign India. The British declared in 1946 that India would receive its independence within a year. Goans began to agitate for inclusion in a newly sovereign India, but the Salazar dictatorship refused to consider these demands. Instead, protests and demonstrations were crushed by police and military action. In 1947, when Goan representatives met with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, leaders of the newly independent India, they were told that the Indian government had more important things to deal with. Goans could expect moral and political support in their demands to be returned to India, but for the most part, they would have to fight or negotiate with the Salazar dictatorship on their own. India did try to open diplomatic relations with Portugal but was told that the issue of who ruled Goa was not negotiable. By 1950, relations had been established between India and Portugal, but discussions about Goa’s future made little progress. The Portuguese believed that discussions should be restricted to economic and social matters such as migration and trade. The Indian

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KEY DATES 1510

Goa is conquered by the Portuguese.

1947

India wins its independence from Britain; pro-Indian Goan representatives speak with Indian leaders about the future of Goa but are told that India cannot absorb colonies at this time and should negotiate with, or fight, the Portuguese government.

1954

Nonviolent demonstrations against Portuguese rule in Goa begin.

1960

Tensions rise throughout the far-flung Portuguese empire, as local peoples demand independence.

1961

In August, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tells parliament of the possibility of using Indian troops to liberate Goa from Portuguese rule; on December 18, Indian troops invade Goa, as well as the smaller Portuguese enclaves of Daman and Diu, meeting little resistance, as more than 400 years of Portuguese rule come to an end.

government, on the other hand, thought that diplomatic ties would be a prelude to negotiations about transferring Goa from Portuguese to Indian rule. In the early 1950s, there were rumors that Goa might be used as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base, since Portugal was a member of the alliance. This alarmed Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who was pursuing a neutralist foreign policy, refusing to support either the Western nations or the Soviet Union in their Cold War confrontation. These rumors of militarizing Goa together with no progress on talks about the colony’s future led Nehru to withdraw the Indian diplomatic mission from Lisbon in 1953. In 1954, it appeared that there might be a breakthrough in the logjam over Goa. Peaceful non-violent demonstrations were organized by anti-Portugal demonstrators in Goa. By 1955, these had taken a more militant turn, as demonstrators attempted to block railroads and conducted boycotts, much in the style of Gandhi’s successful non-violent methods against the British decades earlier. The protests set off sympathy demonstrations across India, heightening tensions between India and Portugal and forcing the severing of all diplomatic ties. Each side lined up its allies. Nehru won the endorsement for an Indiancontrolled Goa at the first non-aligned summit in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, while Portugal was

quietly winning the support of the United States and other NATO allies, who feared Indian neutralism was really a cover for closer ties with the Soviet Union.

Invasion of Goa By 1960, tensions were growing throughout the Portuguese empire. Within Portugal itself, there were signs of increasing unrest against the Salazar dictatorship. More importantly, in Africa, Portugal’s possessions were being buffeted by the winds of anticolonialism, which would see a large part of Africa liberated from colonial rule by the end of the year. Indeed, the liberation movements in nearby countries would soon set off rebellions against Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Meanwhile, many of Portugal’s NATO allies, including the United States, were turning against Lisbon regarding Goa. As the anticommunist West struggled to win the support of developing nations, old-fashioned colonialism like that in Goa was an embarrassment. Feeling that the tide was turning in his favor, Nehru announced the possibility of using the Indian army to liberate Goa in a speech to parliament in August 1961. Portugal had only 5,500 troops stationed in Goa, as well as another 1,500 in the tiny enclaves of Daman and Diu, north and northwest of Mumbai. At

India: Invasion of Goa, 19 61

the same time, Nehru called his military command together to draw up contingency plans for the invasion of these Portuguese territories under the code name: Operation Vijay (Vijay being the last Hindu prince of Goa). In early November, Nehru traveled to Washington to discuss Goa and other issues with the American government. But the aged leader seemed distracted during his talks with the new American president, John Kennedy, and Goa came up only in passing. Still, Portugal was convinced that Kennedy gave Nehru a green light. By late November, Portugal was alleging that an Indian naval invasion force was situated off the coast of Goa. On December 2, the first Indian ground troops were transported to the assembly sites for the invasion. These included a full division for Goa and smaller contingents for Daman and Diu. The plan called for all troops to be in position by December 11. “D-day” was set first for December 16, then moved back to December 18. Meanwhile, Portuguese diplomats frantically toured world capitals, trying to win backing for its proposal to send international observers to the enclave and condemn any use of force in settling the Goa issue. Salazar issued a statement saying that Portugal would never initiate hostilities and expressed his country’s desire to negotiate in good faith with New Delhi. This had some effect. Kennedy sent a message to Nehru pleading with the Indian prime minister not to use force. But Nehru felt that the time had long since passed for negotiations and that Kennedy’s message was little more than a formal statement in order to shore up U.S.-Portuguese relations.

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The invasion went ahead as planned on December 18, 1961. In Goa, there was little resistance. The vast size of the invading force persuaded the Portuguese garrison there that an armed response would be futile. Beyond blowing up a few bridges to slow the progress of the Indian invasion, the Portuguese forces did little. In Daman and Diu, the smaller size of the invasion force led the Portuguese to conclude that fighting was an option. Because India cut the Portuguese radio links with Goa in the first few hours of the invasion, the defenders of Daman and Diu did not know that Goa was surrendering and would not be able to send troops to the smaller enclaves’ aid. Still, the fighting in Daman and Diu was over by the evening of December 19, and casualties were light— about a dozen soldiers dead on each side. For India, the conquest of Goa provided a psychological boost, especially given the unsettled state of affairs with Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir and rising tensions with China. The Goa invasion worried Pakistan, however, prompting it to establish closer relations with China and raising the level of tensions in South Asia. James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; Invasions and Border Disputes.

Bibliography Gaitonde, P.D. The Liberation of Goa: A Participation View of History. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987. Lawrence, Leo. Nehru Seizes Goa. New York: Pageant Press, 1963. Pearson, Michael N. The Portuguese in India. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

INDIA: War with Pakistan,1965 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Pakistan JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Occupied by Pakistan and claimed by India

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In 1947, Great Britain partitioned the Indian subcontinent, creating two countries, India and Pakistan. Indian leaders bitterly opposed the partition. They wanted to inherit the territory ruled by Great Britain and develop it into a single secular state. The partition was supported by Muslim leaders, particularly those identified with the All-India Muslim League, who wanted Pakistan to develop as an Islamic state. The British, unable to reconcile these views, announced the partition of its Indian colony into India and Pakistan. As soon as independence was granted, India and Pakistan went to war. The war was the result of territorial disputes, conflicting ideologies, religious animosities, and rival ambitions. The war ended in 1949, but the animosities remained. These animosities were increasingly focused on the disputed state of Kashmir.

The Kashmir Problem Kashmir is located on the northern borders of India and Pakistan in the Himalayan Mountains. When the 1947 war ended, India controlled about 65 percent of the disputed area even though more than 70 percent

of its population of 5 million was Muslim. At the time of independence, Kashmir was one of 600 princely states that had to choose to become a part of India or Pakistan. The leader of Kashmir, Hari Singh, was a Hindu, and he opted to integrate Kashmir with India even though most of his subjects were Muslims. His decision was supposed to be ratified by a vote of the residents, but no vote was ever held. Military forces representing India and Pakistan raced to occupy as much of Kashmir as possible. Indian forces won control of most of Kashmir. The New Delhi government would not allow the people in Kashmir to vote, knowing they would undoubtedly vote to unite with Pakistan. Azad (Free) Kashmir is the area controlled by Pakistan. Economically, it is the poorest part of the region. Although a cease-fire agreement was signed in 1949, military clashes continued. The problem of Kashmir was placed on the United Nations agenda during the 1947 war. In January 1948, the Security Council created the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). Its function was to monitor a cease-fire once the belligerents agreed to stop fighting. It was also responsible for investigating alleged violations of the cease-fire. In April 1948, the United Nations Security Council approved a three-part resolution. It called for a cease-fire, a truce between India and Pakistan, and the establishment of machinery to determine the will of the Kashmiri people. The Security Council hoped that during the truce both sides would substantially reduce their military presence in Kashmir. Many Pakistani leaders thought the best way to determine the will of the people in Kashmir was to hold a plebiscite. Those parts of the resolution dealing with a truce, demilitarization, and creating the machinery to determine the will of the people were ineffective. There was no progress on demilitarization or the holding of a plebiscite because of India’s opposition. India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was willing

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KEY DATES 1947

As independence comes to India and Pakistan, millions of Hindus in Pakistan flee to India and millions of Muslims in India flee to Pakistan; hundreds of thousands are killed in sectarian violence; parts of Muslimmajority Kashmir remain under Indian control, in spite of protests by Kashmiri Muslims and the Pakistani officials.

1948 The UN Security Council develops a resolution plan for the Kashmiri problem. 1962 India and China fight a war over a disputed border; China wins the war and continues to occupy territory claimed by India. 1965 In August, Pakistan sends troops into Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir and fighting erupts between the two countries; in September, UN Secretary-General U Thant flies to the region to resolve the conflict, and a cease-fire is arranged.

to consider demilitarization if the Pakistani-sponsored military incursions ceased. India opposed a plebiscite because of the sympathies of the large Muslim population. India justified its opposition by claiming that Pakistan illegally occupied parts of Kashmir and declared there could be no plebiscite until the occupation ended. Pakistan labeled that demand completely unacceptable. In addition to the UN mediation efforts, there were also bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan, but they too ended in failure. The hostility between the two countries made it difficult for either government to compromise. The leaders were often driven by public opinion, which was shaped largely by religious and nationalist animosities. The Indian government claimed that its determination to retain control of Kashmir was a demonstration of India’s commitment to a secular state composed of different religions enjoying religious freedoms. In 1965, there were about 50 million Muslims living in India, and there was always the possibility of communal riots that could turn bloody, as occurred in 1947 and 1948. If Pakistan were to wrest control of Kashmir from India, the Muslims living in India would be in immediate danger from angry Hindu mobs. India also did not want to establish what could be a dangerous precedent. If New Delhi lost control

of Kashmir, other Indian states might demand independence. It was ironic that India would do anything necessary to retain control of Kashmir as a way of proving its commitment to a democratic form of government. Pakistan wanted control of Kashmir because its population was overwhelmingly Muslim. Pakistani leaders often expressed a willingness to have the issue settled by conducting a plebiscite, but India would never agree. Most of the population of Kashmir preferred to join with Pakistan.

The 19 65 War In August 1965, Pakistan sent its military troops into the Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir. Fighting eventually spread to the Pakistani areas of Kashmir. In September, the fighting escalated into a fullfledged war. On September 6, UN Secretary General U Thant announced that he would travel to India and Pakistan in an effort to end the fighting. He wanted to visit both countries because he feared that if the war did not end, it would escalate into a major confrontation and draw in other nations. China, the United States, and the Soviet Union were all involved in the politics of the subcontinent. The UN Security Council had already approved two cease-fire resolutions, which had been ignored. Pakistan was reluctant to accept

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a cease-fire because the resolutions said nothing about a plebiscite. Pakistani leaders were angry because India had ignored previous UN resolutions that expressed the need to determine the will of the people of Kashmir. The Pakistani leaders were confident that, given a choice, the people of Kashmir would want union with Pakistan. U Thant left New York on September 7, 1965, for India and Pakistan. He met with leaders of both countries, but they simply reiterated positions previously stated. India wanted some guarantee that raids by Pakistani troops into Kashmir would cease. Pakistan insisted that a plebiscite be conducted. On September 15, U Thant left New Delhi and returned to New York. On that same day, Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan called on the United States to use its influence to help resolve the Kashmir conflict. The United States refused to act unilaterally. President Lyndon B. Johnson insisted that the United States was neutral in the conflict and wanted the United Nations to play the leading role in seeking a solution. On September 20, the UN Security Council approved a third cease-fire resolution demanding that India and Pakistan comply with the Security Council resolution. The belligerents accepted the resolution. At the time of the cease-fire, the Indian army controlled parts of Pakistan. The Pakistani army controlled parts of India. Kashmir remained divided, but India retained control of most of the disputed state. The cease-fire order required that Indian and Pakistani forces withdraw to the positions they held before the war started. The Security Council had agreed to take up the political factors that caused the war once the troops had withdrawn. This last promise made the cease-fire resolution acceptable to Pakistan. Although Pakistan accepted the cease-fire resolution, Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto threatened that Pakistan might withdraw from the United Nations if it did not resolve the Kashmir dispute. Previous UN efforts had ended in failure. India gave no indication that it would be any more willing in the future to reach a political accommodation than it had been in the past. Indian Prime Minister Shastri confirmed this. On September 24, he announced that India would not reopen talks on Kashmir. He told the Indian parliament that the status of Kashmir was settled. It was, he said, an integral part of India. India was satisfied with the status quo, but Pakistan was

not. The Security Council was limited in what it could do because the Soviet Union sided with India in its dispute with Pakistan. The Soviets were willing to veto any Security Council resolution opposed by the Indian government.

India and China The conflict between India and Pakistan was potentially dangerous in part because it affected the rivalry between China and the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union supported many of India’s foreign policy goals, China generally sided with Pakistan. In 1962, China and India had fought a war along their border. Until the outbreak of that conflict, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had made good relations with China a pillar of his foreign policy. In the 1962 war, India suffered a humiliating military and political defeat. Because of that defeat, India had to contend with both China and Pakistan as possible adversaries. To deal with this situation, Nehru substantially increased spending on defense. This had the effect of strengthening India’s military capability with respect to Pakistan and was a decisive factor when they went to war in 1965. Even before the United Nations passed its third cease-fire resolution, China had sent India an ultimatum on September 17, 1965, demanding that India dismantle its military posts along the China-Sikkim border within three days. China said the military posts were on its side of the border. At the time, Sikkim was under India’s military protection. The ultimatum raised the possibility that China might attack India to relieve pressure on Pakistan. Although India rejected the ultimatum, the New Delhi government did agree to joint inspections of the military sites allegedly violating the territory of China. On September 19, China extended the deadline by three days. Two days later, it announced that India had dismantled the disputed military sites, thus eliminating the need for joint inspection teams. Indian officials continued to insist there were no such sites. The probability of a Sino-Indian conflict diminished when India and Pakistan accepted the September 20 UN cease-fire resolution.

Ending the Conflict On September 19, the Soviet Union offered to mediate the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Although the Soviet

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Pakistani ground troops stake out a position in the disputed Rann of Kutch border area of western India, where fighting broke out in spring 1968. The conflict spread to Kashmir in August of that year and escalated into full-scale war in September. (Eveready Studio/AFP/Getty Images)

Union had better relations with India than with Pakistan, the leaders in Moscow feared that a prolonged war would only strengthen China. From a geopolitical perspective, the Soviets wanted the war ended as quickly as possible. On September 23, after Pakistan and India agreed to abide by the ceasefire resolution, the Soviet Union explicitly criticized China for massing its troops along the Indian border. This was the first time the Soviet Union supported a non-Communist state in a conflict with a Communist state, and it further embittered the SinoSoviet relationship. On December 8, India and Pakistan formally accepted the Soviet mediation offer. Leaders of the three nations agreed to meet on January 4, 1966, in Tashkent, in Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Union had never before attempted to mediate an international dispute.

The mediation effort was successful. On January 10, 1966, the representatives of India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union reached an agreement. India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their military forces to where they were when the conflict began, and February 25 was set as the deadline to complete the military withdrawal. Both sides agreed to resolve their dispute using peaceful means.

Role of the Soviet Union The Soviet effort to end the Indo-Pakistani conflict built upon some of the changes in Soviet policy first put into place by Nikita Khrushchev. In 1947, Soviet premier Josef Stalin had embraced the so-called Zhdanov thesis that divided all the nations of the world into two camps, socialism and capitalism. There was to be no middle or neutral ground. All nations were

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in one camp or the other. When Khrushchev came to power after the death of Stalin in March 1953, the non-aligned nations were growing in number and influence. They held their first formal meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961. Twenty-five nations sent representatives to the meeting. Khrushchev made a determined effort to win the friendship of as many non-aligned leaders as possible. He had a particularly cordial relationship with India’s prime minister Nehru, one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement. Khrushchev supported Nehru’s claim that Kashmir was a part of India. In January 1957, the Soviet Union had vetoed a Security Council resolution requesting that the president of the Security Council, Gunnar Jarring, try his hand at finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute. Even after the death of Nehru in 1964 and Khrushchev’s ouster from power that same year, Soviet-Indian relations remained friendly. The Soviets, for example, were the major supplier of military aid to India. The Soviet effort to mediate the Indo-Pakistani conflict did not imply any substantial modification in the Soviet relationship with India and Pakistan. India could continue to rely on Soviet support.

Role of the United States American officials were somewhat ambivalent in their response to the 1965 war. Pakistan had violated its agreement with the United States by using American-supplied military hardware against India. The weapons sold to Pakistan, such as F-86 Saber jets and Patton tanks, were to be used only for defense. Washington also accepted the view that Pakistan was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the 1965 war. Another source of discord was Pakistan’s close relationship with China. The United States had no diplomatic relations with China and was a major force in keeping the Beijing government out of the United Nations. In 1965, Indian-American relations were also strained. As a member of the nonaligned movement, India was often critical of American policies. India opposed America’s intervention in Vietnam and its efforts to keep the Beijing regime out of the United Nations. India supported China’s desire to regain control of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands. In 1956, Nehru was only mildly critical of the

Soviet intervention in Hungary. Nehru seemed to have a double standard, one that ordinarily favored the Soviet Union. Pakistani leaders did not think they received enough support from the United States. When the Indo-Pakistani war broke out, the United States assumed a posture of neutrality despite the fact that Pakistan was aligned with the United States. Pakistan had joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955. India had also received substantial American military aid as a result of the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Pakistan opposed the granting of this aid. Indian leaders claimed that Pakistan would never have gone to war if it did not have American military equipment. Pakistani leaders made the same claim against India. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson suspended the delivery of military equipment to both countries in the hope this would prevent an escalation of the conflict. He was concerned, as were the Soviets, that if the war did not end quickly, China might get involved, thus vastly complicating an already difficult situation. In 1965, President Johnson was preoccupied with the Vietnam War, and he saw no reason to get deeply involved in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. He decided to work through the United Nations because there was little the United States could do unilaterally.

Consequences The 1965 war brought a further deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations and had an adverse impact on the economies of both countries. In addition, neither the war nor the negotiated peace resolved the underlying issues. The Tashkent agreement did little more than reflect provisions in many of the resolutions passed by the Security Council. India and Pakistan agreed to restore diplomatic relations, repatriate prisoners of war, and discuss the refugee problem. The Tashkent agreement was acceptable to India because there was no change in the status quo. The agreement was acceptable to Pakistan because it could not expect to win a prolonged war with India. Failure to resolve these differences contributed to the outbreak of the third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971. India’s Prime Minister Shastri played a major role in negotiating the Tashkent agreement. On the

India: War with Pakistan, 19 65

day the agreement was signed, he died of a heart attack. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; India: Partition Violence, 1947; India: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence, 1971; India: Sikh Uprising Since 1973; India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 1998.

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Bibliography Brass, Paul. The Politics of India Since Independence. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Lamb, Alistair. The Kashmir Problem. New York: Praeger, 1966. Sinha, Janki. Pakistan and Indo-U.S. Relations. Patina, India: Associated Book Agency, 1978.

INDIA: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence,1971 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: Bangladesh; Pakistan 0

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Friction and tension between India and Pakistan have characterized their relations ever since Great Britain divided the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and granted independence to India, a predominantly Hindu nation, and Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim nation. After independence was granted, India and Pakistan went to war. The war was the result of territorial disputes, conflicting ideologies, religious animosities, and rival ambitions. In 1965, the two countries went to war over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The war ended without any substantive changes in the conditions that brought about the conflict. The third Indian-Pakistani war in 1971, however, was the result of a civil war within Pakistan. Kashmir was not a major factor. When Pakistan became independent in 1947, it consisted of two distinct geographical areas, East and West Pakistan, divided by a thousand miles of Indian territory. In addition to the geographical separation, the people in East and West Pakistan spoke different languages, had different historical experiences, and

were at different levels of economic development. A political elite in West Pakistan dominated the government and often seemed indifferent to the needs of the people in East Pakistan. During its 1965 war with India, the Pakistani government had put into place a series of measures drastically limiting democratic freedoms. When the war ended, these measures were not repealed and were used by the government to eliminate dissent or opposition, particularly in East Pakistan. The result was more animosity by the people of East Pakistan against the government in Dhaka, the capital of the region. In West Pakistan, no issue was more important than Kashmir. Control of Kashmir had been a primary cause of the 1947 and 1965 wars with India. For the people of East Pakistan, the Kashmir question was not worth going to war over, and they resented the economic and political costs of the war. The two halves of Pakistan also differed about relations with India. For the people of West Pakistan India was the enemy. In contrast, relations between East Pakistan and India were harmonious. The people on both sides of the Indian–East Pakistani border had much in common despite their different religions. For many political leaders in East Pakistan, the enemy was not India but the national Pakistani government, dominated by the military leaders in West Pakistan. As the national government became more corrupt and repressive, the people in East Pakistan demonstrated their discontent by resorting to violent outbursts that were brutally suppressed. In March 1969, the government, responding to the growing violence in both East and West Pakistan, imposed martial law. President Ayub Kahn resigned, and General Yahya Khan took control of the government. One of his primary goals was to create a new political order based on democratic freedoms. He believed that some

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KEY DATES 1947

As independence comes to India and Pakistan, which is divided into two parts in the east and west of the subcontinent, millions of Hindus in Pakistan flee to India and millions of Muslims in India flee to Pakistan; hundreds of thousands are killed in sectarian violence; parts of Muslim-majority Kashmir remain under Indian control, in spite of protests by Kashmiri Muslims and the Pakistani officials.

1965

India and Pakistan fight a brief but bloody war over the disputed Kashmir region.

1969

East Pakistanis’ discontent over neglect by the government in West Pakistan leads to mass protests.

1970

A massive cyclone kills hundreds of thousands of people in East Pakistan; East Pakistanis complain of an inadequate and incompetent government response to the emergency.

1971

Mass protests against the West Pakistan government break out across East Pakistan in March and are met with violent repression from troops; with the country descending into civil war and millions of East Pakistani refugees fleeing into India, the latter country attacks Pakistan in December; the war ends before the end of the month.

1974

Pakistan recognizes an independent Bangladesh, the country that replaced East Pakistan.

political formula could be devised to unite the people in East and West Pakistan. In August 1969, President Yahya Khan began preparations for a national election to create a constituent assembly, which would then be responsible for writing a constitution. The basic constitutional issue was how to grant sufficient autonomy to East Pakistan without endangering the integrity of the national union. This proved to be an impossible task since the two sides could not agree on the question of how power should be distributed. After some initial successes in dealing with problems such as corruption and political instability, the military government proved to be no more competent than previous governments. Economic and political conditions continued to deteriorate, and the government became more intolerant of dissent. In East Pakistan, there was a growing demand for independence, not just autonomy. It became increasingly evident that the people of East and West Pakistan had too little in common.

Civil War in Pakistan In November 1970, just before the scheduled national elections, a devastating cyclone struck East Pakistan. The death toll was estimated to be anywhere from 200,000 to 1 million. There could be no accurate count because no one knew how many people lived or worked in the area struck by the cyclone. The economic loss was incalculable. Millions of people were left homeless and destitute. The cyclone had a significant impact on Pakistani politics and was a major factor leading to civil war. The Pakistani government responded to the emergency with incompetence and indifference. Emergency measures were poorly organized and were implemented only after long delays. The government seemed unaware of the magnitude of the disaster and insensitive to the suffering of the people. There were accusations that massive amounts of aid from foreign countries were illegally diverted. Rampant corruption further inflamed the situation. Relatives, for

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example, had to pay a bribe to have their dead buried. Officials often demanded bribes before they would distribute aid. The government’s response to the disaster deepened the divide between East and West. Violence prevented the government from responding to the crisis more effectively. Those favoring independence for East Pakistan exploited the dissatisfaction of the people and encouraged the use of violence. The national government was also attempting to deal with violent incidents along the Indian–East Pakistani border. The Indian government was training rebels and returning them to East Pakistan. Indian military units often crossed the border to assist the rebels. Members of the Awami League, most of whom favored independence, welcomed the aid provided by India. There was widespread recognition, except among some military leaders in West Pakistan, that if East Pakistan had the support of India in its campaign for independence, the Pakistani government would be helpless to prevent it. India was just across the border from East Pakistan, while West Pakistan was a thousand miles away. The national election took place in December, one month later than scheduled. The Awami League, made up of individuals who wanted either greater autonomy or independence for East Pakistan, won a majority of East Pakistan’s seats in the Pakistani Constituent Assembly. It was significant, however, that the Awami League did not win a single seat in West Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistan People’s Party, the dominant party in West Pakistan, did not run a single candidate for a seat in East Pakistan. The election demonstrated that Pakistan had two regional political parties, the Awami League in the East and the Pakistan People’s Party in the West. There was no genuine national political party. The obvious solution to this situation was to create a coalition made up of the two parties, but they had too little in common. Their differences were fundamental. The Awami League demanded a degree of autonomy for East Pakistan that would make it virtually independent. The Pakistan People’s Party, backed by the military, favored a federal form of government with centralized powers. These differences were never resolved. After the election, President Yahya Khan did not convene the Constituent Assembly because there was no consensus on writing a new constitution. He feared that a meeting of the assembly would only make the differences more acute. Neither major political party was willing to compromise. The inability to write a constitution meant that the military would remain in

power. What the people in East Pakistan disliked most was a military government dominated by the leaders in West Pakistan. This set the stage for the civil war. The one essential goal of the military government was to maintain national unity. If necessary, they would use force to keep the country united even if that required suppressing the Awami League. The national government began infiltrating military units into East Pakistan in the early months of 1971. Yahya Khan, despite the absence of a consensus, announced that the Constituent Assembly would convene in March. In February, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, announced he would not attend the assembly because he could see no possibility of reaching an agreement with the leaders of East Pakistan. The political process was collapsing. Following Bhutto’s announcement, the military took complete control of the government. General Yahya Khan dismissed all the civilians in his cabinet and and announced a delay in convening the Constituent Assembly. The creation of a military government caused an immediate upsurge of unrest in East Pakistan. Leaders of the Awami League anticipated the use of military force to restore order. The situation was becoming chaotic. The ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan began attacking individuals suspected of being from West Pakistan. Many were killed, often in the most brutal manner. Thousands of West Pakistanis living and working in East Pakistan tried to leave. The violence escalated, and the death toll increased. On March 25, 1971, the Pakistan military massively intervened in East Pakistan and launched a campaign of terror. The soldiers burned houses, shot individuals thought to be supporters of independence, and behaved in a generally brutal fashion. The killing was indiscriminate. Villages were burned and the inhabitants murdered. This behavior confirmed the worst fears of the people of East Pakistan. A clandestine radio station in East Pakistan proclaimed itself independent under the name of Bangladesh. Sheik Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, called for a general strike. He was then arrested and imprisoned in West Pakistan. The government outlawed the Awami League. For the moment, it appeared as though the government had succeeded in crushing the rebellion.

War with India The civil war in Pakistan created a condition that the Indian government could not ignore. In 1947,

India: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence, 1971

many leaders of the Indian Congress Party had opposed partition of the subcontinent. They opposed the creation of an Islamic state because of the threat of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims. About 50 million Muslims still lived in India, and they were vulnerable to attacks from angry Hindus each time India got involved in a controversy with Pakistan. At the time of partition, Hindus and Muslims slaughtered each other as Hindus in Pakistan fled to India and the Muslims in India fled to Pakistan. There was also the lingering resentment of Indian leaders because Pakistan was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the 1965 war. In addition, Pakistan had cooperated willingly with China, raising the possibility that India might have to fight a war on two fronts. Having two enemies rather than one caused the Indian government to use more of its scarce resources for military purposes than for economic development.

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The civil war in Pakistan provided India with an opportunity to decisively reduce the power of Pakistan by supporting its division. The Indian government was also concerned that the conflict in Pakistan had brought as many as 10 million refugees into India, whom the government was hard-pressed to feed and house. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi entered the conflict on the side of East Pakistan. Fighting along the Indo-Pakistani border had been going on for some time, but full-scale war erupted on December 3, 1971. From the very beginning of the war, two things were evident. First, India was determined to continue the conflict until East Pakistan became independent. Second, Pakistan could not possibly win the war. The balance of power clearly favored India, as it could send its armies across the 1,350-mile-long border with East Pakistan, while the Pakistani troops would have to be flown in from West Pakistan, a thousand miles away. India would find it easy to resupply

Indian soldiers pose on a captured Pakistani tank in the state of Rajasthan days after the start of the 1971 border war. India won a swift and decisive victory. (AFP/Getty Images)

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its troops, while the Pakistani army would have to fight not only Indian troops but also the angry and hostile East Pakistanis. On December 6, India formally recognized the rebels in East Pakistan as the official government of Bangladesh. India could count on support and assistance from its ally, the Soviet Union. It had to take a chance, however, that China, Pakistan’s ally, would not come to Pakistan’s assistance. If China did intervene, and the Soviet Union came to India’s assistance, the situation could begin a catastrophic war across Asia. It turned out that China was unwilling to risk war with the Soviet Union by intervening in an Indo-Pakistani conflict. In fact, the Indian-Pakistani war ended in a matter of days. On December 16, 1971, less than two weeks after major fighting began, India won a major military victory, and Pakistani forces suffered a humiliating defeat. The Pakistani government was forced to agree to East Pakistan’s independence. It took the name Bangladesh. With more than 75 million people, it was the seventh most populous nation in the world. By dividing, the state of Pakistan was so reduced in size that it could no longer threaten India in a conventional war, and India emerged as the dominant power on the subcontinent. The Simla agreement, signed in July 1972, formally brought the war to an end, and both sides agreed to try to resolve their differences through negotiations. The two countries also pledged not to use military force against each other.

Role of the U N The United Nations had proved ineffective in halting the conflict. The Soviet Union vetoed three resolutions in the Security Council calling for a cease-fire. Meanwhile, the General Assembly overwhelmingly

approved a cease-fire resolution on December 7, 1971, by a vote of 104–11. India ignored the call for a cease-fire. Indian leaders knew they could achieve a major goal in helping East Pakistan win independence, and they were willing to ignore the United Nations to achieve that goal. During the debate, representatives of India and China displayed open animosity. China and the United States found themselves on the same side, both voting to support the cease-fire resolutions. As supporters of Pakistan in the conflict, however, both had lost face. One of the diplomatic winners was the Soviet Union, which had supported India and the breakup of Pakistan. U.S. President Richard M. Nixon could do little to influence the course of events. Although his administration was sympathetic to Pakistan, the United States was too deeply involved in Vietnam to offer Pakistan significant help. Some in Washington feared that India might try to conquer all of Pakistan, East and West, but there was little evidence to support that claim. Nixon was also constrained by the fact that many members of the U.S. Congress were more sympathetic to India than to Pakistan. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; India: Partition Violence, 1947; India: War with Pakistan, 1965; India: Ethnic and Separatist Violence in Assam Since 1979; India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 1998.

Bibliography Ganguly, Sumit. The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. Jackson, Robert. South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, and Bangla Desh. New York: Praeger, 1975. Salid, Saddiq. Witness to Surrender. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1977.

INDIA: Sikh Uprising Since 1973 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Pakistan

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India, the subcontinent of South Asia, covers an area of 1,269,219 square miles and has a population just over 1 billion people. Triangular in shape, it thrusts into the Indian Ocean, with the Arabian Sea on the west and the Bay of Bengal on the east. The Himalaya Mountains form its northern boundary. Its neighbors on the north are the People’s Republic of China (Tibet), Bhutan, and Nepal, the last two essentially dependencies of India. To the northwest is Pakistan, and to the northeast, surrounded by India except for a coastline on the Bay of Bengal, is Bangladesh. Beyond Bangladesh, India shares a boundary with Myanmar (formerly Burma). India’s capital city is New Delhi. Ethnically, India is a diverse quilt of peoples and languages, making national identity and government complex. While Hinduism is the dominant religion

and has provided much of India’s traditional culture, including the caste system, there are other large religious groups. These groups often inhabit well-defined geographical areas and have strong cultural differences with the Hindu majority. Among these groups, Muslims and Sikhs are the most important. The Indian economy also presents a mixed picture. There is some heavy industry, particularly steel production, and a growing high-tech sector, which draws on traditional Indian educational strengths in mathematics and science. There is also a significant consumer industrial sector that serves the urban middle and upper classes. This sector is protected as part of the government’s long-term strategy of limiting imports by producing consumer goods at home. Unlike other developing Asian countries, India’s exports are also limited, and the country plays a small but growing role in international trade. The majority of the population lives in rural areas and is employed in agriculture. As much as 80 percent of rural dwellers are landless and are either renters, sharecroppers, or casual farm laborers. Land distribution is extremely inequitable, and the vast majority of the agrarian population exists below the extreme poverty level. Those who find it impossible to survive in the countryside swarm to India’s enormous cities whose slums are considered among the worst in the world. After 1970, the “Green Revolution” in agriculture helped India improve its agricultural production, but population grew faster than food production, and most Indians consumed fewer calories per day early in the twenty-first century than they did before the Green Revolution began. The worsening situation for the rural poor seemed not to threaten political leaders, and reforms in agriculture and land ownership were strenuously opposed by landlords and wealthy peasants. Frequently referred to as “the world’s largest democracy,” India employs an elected parliamentary system of national government based on the British

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KEY DATES 1947

The subcontinent of India wins its independence from Britain; the region is divided into two states, Hindu-dominated India and Muslim Pakistan; the Sikh religious group is divided between the two countries.

1973

Leaders of the Sikh political party Akali Dal call for autonomy for the Sikh-majority Indian province of Punjab.

1982

Massive civil disobedience breaks out across Punjab, as Sikhs demand more autonomy from the Indian government.

1983

Sikh militants murder Indian officials; Hindu armed groups respond in kind.

1984

Moderate Sikh leaders lose control of the autonomy movement to militants early in the year; militants occupy a Sikh holy site known as the Golden Temple in Amritsar; on June 4, Indian troops launch an attack on the temple, leaving 3,000 Sikh militants and 700 Indian troops dead in the fighting; in November, Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi, who ordered the attack, is murdered by her Sikh bodyguards.

1988 Facing more Sikh resistance, Indian troops once again surround the Golden Temple but refrain from attacking it. 1995

Moderate Sikh leader Beant Singh, who advocated cooperation with the Indian government, is assassinated by Sikh extremists.

model. In practice, a strong prime minister and his (or her) advisers usually rule without much regard either to parliament or the cabinet. India has a bicameral system, with the Lok Sabha (House of the People) functioning like the British House of Commons and the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) somewhat like the House of Lords. Unlike Great Britain, India is a federal union of 22 states, most of them organized on a linguistic basis. The states elect their own governments, which, like the national government, are parliamentary in form. While the national government was typically controlled by the Congress Party and the Nehru family, essentially representing Hindu nationalism, the state governments, reflecting the linguistic bases on which they are formed, show a wide variety of local party and ideological control. Most state parties represent dominant landholding interests, but in a number of cases, the southern state of Kerala being the most prominent, one of India’s two Communist parties usually governs. Still, state governments usually do not stray far from national

policy. If they do stray, the central government has the power to intervene and even dismiss the state government.

Historical Background Beginning in the eighteenth century, Great Britain began to conquer India, which for the previous 300 years had been ruled by the Moghul (Mongol) emperors, Muslim monarchs over an essentially Hindu population. It was a feudal empire in which native, principally Hindu, princes (rajahs) continued to rule their states (over 500 of them), paying tribute to the emperor at Delhi. The British succeeded in transplanting a good deal of their institutional culture in government, the military, education, law, language, and even sports, especially to the Indian upper classes. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, strong movements for independence began to emerge. Early in the twentieth century, these became identified with Mohandas

India: Sikh Uprising Since 1973

K. Gandhi and the All India Congress Party, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru for Hindus and by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League for British India’s large Islamic population. The British, whose monarch had become the Emperor (or Empress, in the case of Queen Victoria) of India and who ruled through a British viceroy, strongly repressed independence movements until after World War II. In its weakened postwar state, and under a Labour government that was ideologically anticolonial, Britain had neither the strength nor the inclination to suppress the independence movements headed by Nehru and Jinnah. Nehru and the Congress wanted a united India, but Jinnah and the Muslims insisted on their own state. With independence in 1947 came partition and a great uprooting of populations, as Hindus fled from areas granted to the new Muslim state of Pakistan, and Muslims departed from India. The movements were accompanied by communal violence that took hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides.

Sikhs and the Punjab Among the most affected regions during the partition was the Punjab, a fertile area in India’s far northwest where the population was divided between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Although accounting for only 18 percent of the population, the Sikhs were economically dominant and influential beyond their numbers. After the Punjab territory had been partitioned, with the western-most regions going to Pakistan, the Sikh representation in India’s Punjab state rose to 30 percent, and most of the remaining population was Hindu. The Sikhs are a religious sect that split from mainstream Hinduism in the fifteenth century. Frequently persecuted by the Moghul emperors, Sikhs developed a militaristic culture and, somewhat like Jewish Zionists, a belief in the need for a homeland, Khalistan, where their faith and values would be secure. Under British rule the Sikhs, numerically the smallest group in the Punjab, enjoyed a favored position. Their military reputation caused imperial authorities to give them leading posts in the Indian army, and their wealth and strong organization at home allowed them to take a disproportionately large share of civil offices in Punjabistan. Also, their political leaders were able to manipulate Hindu-Muslim antagonisms to their advantage.

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Following independence and partition in 1947, even though the percentage of Sikhs in the new Indian state of Punjab rose greatly, they faced a single large Hindu majority and a central government that was Hindu in its basic orientation. Sikh leaders complained that at the time of partition, Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru had promised them an autonomous Sikh homeland associated with India. A Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, emerged soon after independence and began to work toward establishing a Sikh homeland in the Punjab. The Akali first rallied support around the language issue, demanding that Punjabi, not Hindi, be declared the official language of the state. In 1966, the Congress Party prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in a gesture to the more secular Sikhs who remained in the Congress Party, divided the Punjab in two. The eastern portion formed the solidly Hindu state of Haryana, and the western portion remained Punjab. Within the new Punjab, Sikhs now had about a 60 percent majority. Shastri’s hope of keeping Sikhs in the Congress Party suffered a blow, however, when the Sikh nationalist party, the Akali Dal, formed a coalition with the anti-Congress Jan Sangh party to take control of the Punjab government. When the coalition proved unstable, more and more disappointed Sikhs rallied to the Akali Dal, which expressed their growing ethnonationalism. In the 1970s the new political issue for the Sikhs focused on water rights, Punjabis claiming that the central government was unduly favoring the Hindus of Haryana in the implementation of irrigation projects associated with the Green Revolution, then just getting under way in India. In 1973 the Akali Dal leader, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, presided over a party conference that issued the Anadpur Sahib resolutions. These expressed fear that Sikhs would lose their identity in the “ocean of overwhelming Hindu majority” and called for recognition of a Sikh “nation.” As the resolutions explained, this “nation” would exist as part of the Indian state, but Punjab would be self-governing except in the areas of foreign policy and defense. Further, all contiguous Punjabispeaking parts of India would be incorporated into the new Sikh Punjab, and there would be Sikh religious instruction in the schools. Finally, the resolutions demanded increased and cheaper irrigation facilities for Punjabi farmers. In Hindu India, the Anadpur Sahib document was seen as a secessionist challenge. Tensions between

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Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab and Haryana, particularly over water rights issues, increased. As none of the Anadpur Sahib goals were achieved, a new and more militant Akali Dal leader, Jarnail Singh Bindranwale, began to challenge Longowal, specifically calling for Sikh unity, the suppression of non-mainstream Sikh communities, and the establishment of the Sikh homeland, Khalistan. Originally, Bindranwale was secretly sponsored by Congress leaders as a means of undercutting Longowal. However, as Bindranwale’s followers increased, they began to resort to violence and terror. At the same time, Longowale, although disagreeing with Bindranwale’s extremist tactics, felt he had to join forces with Bindranwale or lose his own credibility in Alkali Dal. Beginning in August 1982, they mutually sponsored almost daily mass demonstrations (morchas) from the central Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Hundreds of participants were arrested by Indian police until the jails were overflowing. Faced with this massive civil disobedience, Congress Party prime minister Indira Gandhi finally agreed to negotiate on the irrigation and territorial issues. Little came of these talks, held in 1982 and 1983, except approval of the Akali Dal program for Sikh religious instruction. Longowal’s peaceful protest strategy was discredited, especially among younger Sikhs, who more and more followed Bindranwale and his encouragement of armed insurrection. As a sign of his determination, Bindranwale ordered the assassination of a senior Indian police officer on the steps of the Golden Temple. Random murders of Hindus and nonconforming Sikhs increased throughout 1983. Not surprisingly, Hindu armed groups responded in kind. Also not surprisingly, Bindranwale began to receive covert assistance from Pakistan, which was not unhappy to see one of India’s border states threaten secession.

Assault on the Golden Temple By the spring of 1984 the moderate Sikh leadership had been brushed aside by Bindranwale, who, with hundreds of armed followers, now occupied the Golden Temple. In New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi was under enormous political pressure to do something. Indian intelligence discovered the delivery of arms from Pakistan to Bindranwale’s men, and this gave the central government the excuse it needed. On June 2,

the Indian army surrounded the Golden Temple. Bindranwale, confident that the army, in which there were many Sikh officers, would never dare to assault the holy place, was hoping for a long siege during which his militants outside could rally and begin a civil war. On June 4, though, the army launched Operation Blue Star, an all-out attack which, before it was over, left 700 soldiers and over 3,000 Sikhs— militants and civilians—dead. Bindranwale apparently escaped to Pakistan. Many Sikhs, including army deserters, defected to Pakistan during the succeeding months, while the army carried out a massive roundup of militants in Operation Wood Rose. Sikhs who later returned from Pakistan said they were told by Pakistani intelligence officers that Bindranwale was alive and well. Aftershock from Operation Blue Star reverberated through India. The attack was compared to the British assault on independence demonstrators in another temple near Amritsar in 1919. The Indian army was shaken. Several Sikh regiments mutinied. In November 1984, Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated by her own Sikh bodyguards, and in an explosion of Hindu revenge, over 4,000 Sikhs were killed in rioting in New Delhi and other northern cities.

Rajiv Gandhi’s Solution Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his murdered mother as prime minister and moved quickly to try to restore peace in the Punjab. He quickly released Longowal and other moderate Akali Dal leaders from jail and appointed a non-Punjabi Sikh, Arjun Singh, as governor of the state, with orders to negotiate a settlement with Akali Dal. In July 1985 an agreement was reached to transfer one of the disputed areas (Chandigarh) from Haryana to Punjab, with some Hindispeaking regions of Punjab going to Haryana. The water rights issue was taken under review, and New Delhi agreed to prosecute and punish those guilty of leading the anti-Sikh riots after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. A new Akali Dal government was elected in the Punjab. Unfortunately, Hindu hard-liners in the Congress Party in Haryana and elsewhere were able to block implementation of the accords, and violence again broke out. Arms from Pakistan began to flow across the border, and resentful Sikhs took to dragging Hindus from buses and assassinating them. Security forces responded by staging encounters in

India: Sikh Uprising Since 1973

which suspected Sikh militants were summarily executed or “shot while trying to escape.” The state government was discredited on both sides and soon fell. Again well-armed militants occupied the Golden Temple. In May 1988, the government again sent troops to surround the temple in Operation Black Thunder. Despite the ominous name, though, this time there was no assault. Water and power were cut off, and after two weeks the starving militants surrendered. There were practically no casualties in the operation, and, most importantly, the government captured documents detailing the terrorist network and making it possible to locate terrorist members within the Punjab. Their roundup, an enormous operation in which the central government deployed over 200,000 troops and police, was a crushing blow to the militants and allowed the moderate Akalis to regain control, although many Sikhs deserted Akali Dal to found splinter parties. The immediate political result was to restore the state government to the Congress Party in the November 1988 elections, which were boycotted by Akali Dal. Beant Singh became governor, and over the next several years the situation calmed down. The calm was broken in August 1995 when Beant Singh

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was killed in a car-bomb explosion. The perpetrators were suspected Sikh extremists, but the act provoked neither new terrorism nor government repression. In the ensuing elections Akali Dal regained both the governorship and control of the parliament. Religious, ethnonationalist, and economic tensions continue in India today, exacerbated by the intensification of poverty, high population growth, and environmental deterioration. While there was no return to the perilous situation that existed in the Punjab in the 1970s and 1980s, the underlying causes of conflict were not resolved. David MacMichael See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; India: Partition Violence, 1947.

Bibliography Brass, Paul R. “The Politics of India Since Independence.” In The New Cambridge History of India, Vol. 1. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Chadda, Maya. Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Kapur, Rajiv. Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986. Nawar, Kuldip, and Khushwant Singh. Tragedy of Punjab. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1987.

INDIA: Ethnic and Separatist Violence in Assam Since 1979 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious 0 0

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NAGALAND MANIPUR

TRIPURA MIZORAM

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Kolkata (Calcutta)

MYANMAR

BANGLADESH Bay of Bengal

THAILAND

Assam, a state in the remote and ethnically mixed northeastern region of India with a culture distinct from that of the rest of the country, has been wracked by interethnic violence and a low-level guerrilla campaign for separation from the Indian union since the late 1970s.

Background Roughly 30,000 square miles in territory, Assam has a population of about 27 million people, of whom about 90 percent are rural. Approximately 75 percent of the Assamese are Hindu and represent a mix of, on the one hand, traditional residents who speak Assamese and whose families have lived in the region for centuries, and on the other hand, more recent migrants from other parts of India and Nepal. About 20 percent of the population is Muslim, largely made up of recent immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh. The original Assamese are ethnically an East Asian people, speaking a language of Tibeto-Burman origin

and tracing their history through a number of independent kingdoms with connections to dynasties in what is now Myanmar. The region came under British rule in the mid-nineteenth century. With partition and independence from Britain in 1947, most of Assam became part of the predominantly Hindu nation of India; one small area was annexed to East Pakistan. At that time, Assam was the only state in the northeastern corner of India, which was surrounded by East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and connected to the rest of India by only a narrow “isthmus of land.” The remote province incorporated a host of minority ethnic groups, who chafed under the dominant Assamese. When the Assamese legislature imposed Assamese as the state’s official language, rioting broke out in non-Assamese areas, leading to confrontations with police that resulted in the deaths of eleven protesters. From the 1960s through the 1980s, the Indian government responded to these minority demands by carving the large state of Assam into six separate states of which Assam remains the largest in area and population. Still, at least one more ethnic group, the Bodo, have been engaged in a low-level insurgency since the 1980s, demanding their own independent state. Yet it was not this process of carving new states from the original territory of Assam that triggered the violence against Indian policy and rule. The Assamese themselves have always viewed themselves as a distinctive people from the rest of Indians, based on their individual ethnicity, history, and language. Since India’s achievement of independence in 1947, the Assamese had been pushing peacefully for more autonomy from the central government in New Delhi. These demands for autonomy were intensified after the bloody war between India and Pakistan in 1971, which resulted in the establishment of the new

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India: Ethnic and Separatist Violence in Assam Since 1979

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KEY DATES 1947

India wins its independence from Great Britain.

1971

A struggle for independence in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) sends tens of thousands of refugees into the neighboring Assam region of India.

1979

The Assam Movement organizes mass protests against Bangladeshi and other immigrants.

1986

After nearly a decade of fighting, the Indian government and leaders of the separatist Assam Movement reach an accord whereby New Delhi pledges to stop illegal immigration and to keep illegal immigrants off the electoral rolls.

1990

After the fighting restarts between the government and Assam separatists in the late 1980s, India launches Operation Rhino, a major offensive against the separatists.

2003 Joint operations by the Indian and Bhutan armies wipe out Assamese independence rebel bases in Bhutan.

Muslim country of Bangladesh. The war caused thousands of Muslim Bengalis to flee from Bangladesh into Assam. The lush green hills and valleys of Assam were an inviting destination for impoverished farmers in overcrowded Bangladesh. Beginning in 1979, the so-called Assam Movement organized a peaceful mass protest campaign against those they called “foreigners”—which included Bangladeshis and migrants from other parts of India and nearby Nepal. The Assamese believed that the Indian government in New Delhi encouraged migrations into Assam to dilute the Assamese majority, which had always been ambivalent about union with the rest of India. Assamese nationalists pointed out that in some of the new states in northeastern India, the traditional ethnic groups had already become minorities in their own land.

Mass Violence and Separatist Fighting The agitation of the Assamese grew increasingly violent during the early 1980s, resulting in the killing of around 7,000 of the so-called “foreigners”—mostly Muslim Bengali immigrants—as well as widespread

property destruction. The Indian security forces responded by shooting down dozens of Assamese protesters. Ultimately, the leaders of the Assam Movement and the Indian government reached an accord in 1986, providing that the central government would work harder to prevent illegal immigration and keep immigrants off the electoral roles. Years after the accord, the two organizations that grew out of the Assam Movement—the current ruling party of Assam, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), and the militant separatist organization United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)—contended that the government had done little to implement its side of the accords. ULFA maintained its separatist agitation, conducting an assassination campaign against Indian government officials and political representatives of non-Assamese ethnic groups. By the late 1980s, ULFA had established contacts with rebel ethnic groups fighting the military government in neighboring Myanmar to obtain weapons and guerrilla training. It also established contacts with the leaders of Pakistan, who see the movement as a way to harass India, their long-time enemy. In the late 1980s and 1990s, ULFA began to kidnap prominent businessmen in Assam, particularly

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managers on tea plantations, the region’s major industry. The group held their captives for high ransom payments, using the proceeds to buy arms. ULFA also attacked and ambushed members of the Indian security forces. In 1990, the Indian army responded with Operation Rhino, a massive sweep of Assam that killed or captured hundreds of guerrillas, nearly breaking the back of ULFA. After this blow, ULFA went deeper underground, with most of its guerrilla cells operating independently of one another. Meanwhile, leaders of splinter groups from ULFA who tried to reconcile with the Indian government were targeted for assassination, leading to a murky situation in which murders and assassinations were difficult to ascribe to a specific group or government. Meanwhile, it was reported that the Indian government organized some ULFA defectors and other Assamese into death squads that targeted Assamese nationalists in ULFA and other organizations. Human rights groups cited the Indian security forces, ULFA, and other, smaller separatist groups for various human rights abuses. By the early 2000s, ULFA was a small, secretive, and elusive organization, yet was still capable of carrying out attacks on government forces. The Indian government believed that there were about

2,000 guerrillas currently hiding out in the Assamese jungle or in secret camps in neighboring Bangladesh. Camps in nearby Bhutan were destroyed in a joint Indian-Bhutan military campaign in 2003. Outside experts estimate that approximately 15,000 people have been killed in the fighting since 1979, the vast majority of them Assamese civilians and civilians from non-Assamese ethnic groups living in the state. Several hundred members of Indian security forces have also been killed in the fighting. In 2005, the United States government put ULFA on its official list of terrorist organizations, both as a gesture of support to the Indian government and as an indication of suspected ties between ULFA and Islamist terrorist organizations connected to al-Qaeda. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; India: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence, 1971.

Bibliography Baruah, Sanjib. India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1999. Chakrabarty, Bidyut. The Partition of Bengal and Assam: Contour of Freedom. New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2004.

INDIA: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 1998 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: India; Pakistan Occupied by Pakistan and claimed by India

AFGHANISTAN Islamabad Rawalpindi Kahuta Chasma Khusab

PAKISTAN

Pokhran

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

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New Delhi

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Madras

(MYANMAR) BURMA

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Nuclear facility Nuclear test site

What became a prolonged and dangerous nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan began in 1998, when both nations conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests and demonstrated to each other, and the world, a significant capability for regional nuclear exchange. The backdrop of the standoff is a long and contentious border dispute between the two nations, especially over the Jammu and Kashmir region in northern India. Further complicating matters in recent years is the need for the United States and Great Britain to retain Pakistan as an ally in the War on Terrorism—lest its nuclear arsenal fall into the hands of radical Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda—while at the same time supporting India’s desire to expand peaceful nuclear development for electrical power production.

Background Until 1947, both Pakistan and India were part of the British Empire in South Asia. Starting in the early

twentieth century, nationalists in the subcontinent began to push for independence. Led by Mohandas Gandhi, the movement was dominated by Hindus. Along with Britain’s traditional divide-and-rule colonial administration policies, the independence movement—with its emphasis on Hindu symbolism and its melding of religious and political messages— aggravated traditional rifts between the subcontinent’s Hindu majority and Muslim minority. By the late 1930s, a new Muslim League was pushing for a separate state for Muslims once India achieved independence. After last-minute attempts by Britain to maintain India’s unity after independence, two separate countries—predominantly Hindu India and predominantly Muslim Pakistan—came into being at midnight on August 14, 1947. But decades of bitterness were not so easy to resolve. Sectarian violence broke out across the subcontinent, as hundreds of thousands of Hindus and Muslims were killed and millions more fled their homelands: Hindus from Pakistan to India and Muslims from India to Pakistan. These political birth pangs were not the only source of antagonism between the two countries. There was also the matter of Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim-dominated state occupied by India after independence but claimed by Pakistan. In 1965, the two countries went to war over the region, but the conflict failed to resolve the fate of the state to the satisfaction of Pakistan or many of the local people. In 1971, India and Pakistan went to war again, this time over the fate of East Pakistan. Feeling neglected by West Pakistan—especially in the wake of a catastrophic cyclone in 1970—the Bengali people of East Pakistan rebelled against rule from Islamabad. India sided with the rebels, a kind of midwife to the birth of the independent nation of Bangladesh.

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KEY DATES 1947

India and Pakistan win their independence from Britain amidst sectarian violence and a mass movement of peoples from one country to the other.

1964

China conducts its first nuclear weapons test; India launches its program to develop nuclear weapons.

1972

Pakistan launches a program to develop nuclear weapons.

1974

India tests its first nuclear weapons.

1998

India once against tests a nuclear weapon on May 11; it sets off two more blasts on May 13; on May 28, Pakistan announces it has conducted five nuclear tests.

2006

Leaders of the United States and India sign an agreement whereby the United States will share civil nuclear technology with India in exchange for India’s willingness to allow inspections at some of its nuclear facilities.

By the early 1980s, the Jammu and Kashmir crisis was heating up once again, with the formation of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). Although the organization’s goal was and remains independence, rather than accession to Pakistan, it is supported by Islamabad. The organization ties up a portion of the Indian military, which gives Pakistan leverage in negotiations over other issues dividing the two countries. In sum, then, India and Pakistan—although sharing a culture and history—have remained tense neighbors, both maintaining large military establishments to counter threats from the other. Adding to these tensions have been two outside forces. One was the Cold War, with India allying itself to the Soviet Union and Pakistan to the United States. The other has been India’s uneasy history with its neighbor to the northeast, China. Beijing, in turn, has generally allied itself with Pakistan. India and China fought a brief border war in 1962, and China’s development of nuclear weapons in the 1960s was a major motive for India’s successful effort to build and test its first atomic bomb in 1974.

Arms Race India first acquired nuclear reactors in the 1950s under the U.S.-sponsored Atoms for Peace program,

which encouraged the civilian use of nuclear technology in exchange for assurances that it would not be used for weapons development. At the time, there was little evidence to suggest that India had an interest in pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Under the Atoms for Peace program, India acquired a CIRUS forty-megawatt thermal (MWt) heavy-watermoderated research reactor from Canada and purchased the heavy water required to operate it from the United States. India embarked on a nuclear weapons development program in 1964, largely in response to China’s explosion of a nuclear device that year. In 1964, New Delhi commissioned a plutonium reprocessing facility at Trombay, known as the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), the location of the CIRUS reactor. On May 18, 1974, India exploded a twelve–fifteen kiloton (KT) plutonium fission device, which the Indian government described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” In the 1980s, India began development of vastly more destructive thermonuclear weapons, or hydrogen bombs. By 1985, it had expanded its plutonium production capability with the addition of the Dhruva 100-MWt heavy water reactor at BARC. In 1989, William Webster, the director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), testified before the Senate Government Affairs Committee that India was

India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 19 9 8

advancing its thermonuclear capability by separating and purifying the lithium isotopes necessary for tritium production. India demonstrated its progress in nuclear weaponry on May 11, 1998, when it simultaneously exploded a twelve-kiloton fission device, a forty-three-kilton thermonuclear device, and a subkiloton device at the Pokhran underground testing site. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee authorized the detonations, collectively known as Operation Shakti, two days after Pakistan’s test of the Ghauri missile on April 8, 1998. On May 13, 1998, Operation Shakti continued with the simultaneous explosion of two sub-kiloton devices. Subsequent U.S. analysis of the May 11 detonations indicated the yield of the second device at between twelve and twentyfive kilotons, disputing India’s claim that the device was thermonuclear. Pakistan began a deliberate nuclear weapons development program after suffering military defeat at the hands of India in 1971. Started in 1972 under the direction of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then the minister for fuel, power, and natural resources, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program came under the direction of Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1975. A metallurgist trained

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in Germany, Khan returned to Pakistan with gas centrifuge technology acquired from the URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Under Khan’s direction, Pakistan established a gaseous centrifuge uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. In operation from the early 1980s, the Kahuta facility eventually grew to 3,000 centrifuges. With substantial foreign assistance, Pakistan embarked on a plutonium production program in the late 1980s. China furnished a forty-MWt heavy water research reactor, known as Khusab, at Joharabad. Operational since April 1998, the Khusab reactor produces up to ten kilograms of weapons grade plutonium annually; it is also capable of producing tritium from lithium-6. France aided in the development of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, but terminated its help after Pakistan refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on its nuclear program. China provided the technical and material support necessary to complete the Chasma project in the 1990s. In addition to the Chasma facility, plutonium separation takes place

The Agni II, a nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missile, passes in front of New Delhi’s India Gate during a military parade. Successful testing of the missile in 1998 drew condemnation from Pakistan—and the test of a rival missile. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)

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at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan’s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology in Rawalpindi, which also is not subject to IAEA inspection. On May 28, 1998, two weeks after India’s last test, Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear detonations. Obviously a response to India’s Shakti test series two weeks earlier, Pakistan successfully exploded a twenty-four-to-thirtysix-kiloton boosted fission device, a twelve-kilton fission device, and three unspecified sub-kiloton devices. Two days later, Pakistan tested another twelvekiloton fission device and buried another one but did not set it off. Analysis of atmospheric debris vented from the Pakistani tests revealed low levels of weapons-grade plutonium, which suggested that Pakistan had produced it without detection by the United States. Meanwhile, the arms race in South Asia was said to have a major impact on the global War on Terrorism, as Khan was implicated in the spread of nuclear weapons technologies to such so-called “rogue states” as Iran, Libya (which later renounced its nuclear weapons program), and North Korea. While Khan was dismissed as director of Pakistan’s nuclear program in March 2001, partly under pressure from the United States, many believe that his links to foreign states could not have occurred without the connivance of even higher-ranking officials in the Islamabad government. In 2005, Khan admitted to having sold nuclear technology to the three rogue states but insisted that he had acted without authorization from Pakistani officials.

Uneasy Moratorium Neither India nor Pakistan has conducted nuclear weapons testing since 1998, having agreed to a bilateral moratorium. In February 1999, the two nations negotiated the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to institute further confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear war. Among these was the establishment of a nuclear hotline between New Delhi and Islamabad, similar to the one connecting Moscow and Washington, D.C., during the Cold War. The hotline was intended to avoid miscommunication during a crisis. Compared with the major international treaties to stem the proliferation of nuclear technologies and ban nuclear testing, the Lahore MOU was little more than a gentleman’s

agreement. India and Pakistan both have signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty—which bans atmospheric, underwater, and outer space testing but permits underground testing—but neither nation has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the meantime, the two nations have proceeded to develop nuclear stockpiles. Official and unofficial sources have estimated that, by late 2003 or early 2004, the two nations possessed up to 70 weapons each; according to some sources, India may have had up to 200 weapons by that time. The Pakistani stockpile presents a special problem in the context of the global war on terror, as some of its leading technicians have been implicated in the sale of nuclear technology to states like Iran and Libya that have had links to terrorism. A further complication in the nuclear arms standoff on the subcontinent was added in early 2006, when U.S. president George W. Bush and Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh signed a deal giving India access to U.S. nonmilitary nuclear technology in exchange for India’s opening up some of its nuclear facilities to international inspectors. The deal caused dismay in Pakistan, the United States, and the rest of the world. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, while officially silent on the deal, was reportedly upset by the fact that Bush refused to sign a similar deal with his country. Musharraf, whom Bush has called a major ally in the War on Terrorism, was said to have taken a great political risk in aiding the United States in its efforts to destroy al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. Meanwhile, politicians in the United States and the rest of the world were troubled by the fact that India has yet to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that the deal might upset the balance of nuclear balance of power in the subcontinent. Such worries threatened to sink the deal, which was contingent on U.S. Senate approval. Adam Hornbuckle and James Ciment See also: India: Partition Violence, 1947; India: Jammu and Kashmir Violence Since 1947; India: War with Pakistan, 1965; India: War with Pakistan and Bangladeshi Independence, 1971; International Arms Trade.

Bibliography Dittmer, Lowell, ed. South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.

India: Nuclear Standoff with Pakistan Since 19 9 8 Ganguly, Sumit, and Devin T. Hagerty. Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005. Kapur, Ashok. Pokhran and Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behaviour. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

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Nizamani, Haider K. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000. Perkovich, George. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

NEPAL: Maoist Insurgency TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War Maoist controlled areas na li er

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In February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), declared a “People’s War” against the Nepalese government and proceeded to conduct steadily escalating guerrilla and terrorist actions against it. Over the course of the next ten years, the insurgency killed more than 11,000 people, displaced nearly 400,000 refugees, and caused billions of dollars in property damage. The violence also seriously affected tourism, Nepal’s primary source of hard-currency earnings. The insurgents remained active throughout the country, but neither they nor government forces seemed able to obtain military superiority. The insurgents seemed to be waiting for Nepal’s politically isolated monarchy to collapse, allowing the CPN(M) to dominate whatever government would then emerge. Nepal is one of the world’s poorest countries. More than 40 percent of the population lives in poverty, unemployment is near 50 percent, and roughly 80 percent of those employed work as small farmers. Only 20 percent of the country is arable, much of the rest being mountainous, and most of the population (19 million out of 27 million) lives in an area about onethird the size of Arkansas. Government expenditures and revenues are about $1 billion a year (less than the annual budget of many U.S. public school systems). Nepal is unattractive to foreign trade and investment because of its isolation, unskilled workforce, and political instability, and many Nepalese emigrate to find work. Hindus constitute 80 percent of the popu-

lation, but there are 60 caste and ethnic groups and 125 languages. The Brahman and Chhetri castes make up 25 percent of the population but dominate the army and the government. Officially, Nepal became a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy in 1990, but King Birendra strongly influenced government policy. In 2001, Birendra and seven other members of the royal family were shot by the crown prince, who then shot and killed himself. Birendra’s brother, Gyanendra, took the throne. Many Nepalese viewed Gyanendra’s regime as illegitimate, especially after he twice dissolved the government and declared a “state of emergency.” Between 1990 and 2005, the office of prime minister changed hands sixteen times, demonstrating the government’s lack of focus and efficiency. The origins of the CPN(M) insurgency lay in the nation’s dire social and political circumstances. The insurgents demanded the creation of a Maoist “People’s Republic” to solve Nepal’s social, economic, and political problems by ending the monarchy, “capitalist exploitation,” and caste, ethnic, religious, and linguistic discrimination. The Maoists hoped to create an alternative society, starting by transforming the regions of the country they controlled, where party cadres adjudicate local grievances, levy taxes, and serve in effect as the government. To defend these Maoist-controlled areas and “liberate” new ones, the CPN(M) conducted armed action and political warfare. The Maoists believed that armed action occurs in three phases: the strategic defensive, in which Maoist fighters use terrorism and guerrilla attacks; the strategic stalemate, in which Maoist “main force” units engage in mobile warfare; and the strategic offensive, in which “main force” units seize and hold territory. The CPN(M) was modeled on the Peruvian Shining Path movement and the Indian Naxalites, both of which were notable for their radicalism and extreme violence. The insurgency was largely funded through extortion (“revolutionary taxes”), looting,

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KEY DATES 1990

Nepal officially becomes a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy but King Birendra continues to have a major voice in government.

1996

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN[M]) declares a “people’s war” against Nepalese government.

2001

King Birendra is killed in a “royal massacre”; his brother Gyanendra takes the throne; the government agrees to a cease-fire with the CPN(M) and the opening of peace talks in July; in November, the CPN(M) abrogates the cease-fire and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), launches a series of attacks across the country.

2003 The PLA launches a new offensive throughout the country. 2005 King Gyanendra dismisses the government, declares a state of emergency, and refuses to hold elections; in the wake of its military defeat at the hands of the Nepalese army, CPN(M) declares a unilateral ceasefire.

bank robberies, the sale of illegal drugs, and forced collections from Nepalese abroad. From 1996 to 2001, the CPN(M) focused on attacking isolated police outposts and civil government facilities, but it also attacked roads, bridges, dams, aqueducts, power and telephone lines, and post offices. This strategy forced police to consolidate into a smaller number of defensible positions, abandoning much of the countryside to the insurgents. The insurgents, in turn, established base areas and trained larger forces for progressively larger attacks on government positions. In July 2001, the government agreed to a ceasefire and peace talks. The CPN(M) used the lull in fighting to regroup its forces and prepare for further offensives. In November it abrogated the cease-fire and staged a series of nationwide attacks, including the first on Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) bases. By 2002, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operated in battalion and brigade strength. CPN(M) rule extended across rural Nepal, while the government essentially controlled only district centers and the Kathmandu Valley. After another cease-fire from January to August 2003, the PLA launched further offensives, this time in strengths of 3,000 men at a time, and blockaded Kathmandu.

The PLA remained a potent force, continuing to attack district headquarters, communications facilities, and security forces. It was active in sixty-eight of Nepal’s seventy-five districts. At the same time, however, the PLA was suffering heavy casualties (2,000 in 2005 alone) and was facing difficulty in recruiting and morale. The CPN(M) announced a “final offensive” in August 2004, but actually lost ground in the following year. People’s Liberation Army strength in 2005 consisted of about 9,000 regulars, with another 5,000 to 10,000 local militia. The PLA was organized into three regional commands, each with three brigades, nominally of 1,000 fighters each but usually around 400–600. Each brigade had three battalions of three companies each. At the lowest level, local guerrilla groups of perhaps 10–15 fighters lived, worked, and recruited in rural villages, controlling and indoctrinating the community according to Maoist principles. For attacks on government positions, the PLA employed battalions consisting of regular fighters, porters, intelligence specialists, commissars, and conscripted locals (“martyrs”). Typically, PLA fighters used rifles captured from the police and a variety of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The PLA lacked mortars or crew-served weapons, and thus employed

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Female members of the People’s Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), prepare for a major new guerrilla offensive in late 2005. (Jonathan Alpeyrie/Getty Images News)

“martyrs” to break enemy defenses with human-wave attacks with heavy casualties. PLA regulars had excellent infantry skills, possibly indicating foreign training. The vast majority of the CPN(M)’s recruits come from so-called “lower” castes and “backward” ethnic groups, such as the Magars, who are traditional victims of discrimination. Women are prominent in the CPN(M), making up as much as a third of the combatants. Ironically, two key members of the CPN(M) Politburo—Pushba Kamal Dahal and Baburam Bhattarai—are highly educated Brahmans, a group the CPN(M) considers “class enemies.” Since August 2003, the PLA has increasingly employed IEDs as the most effective way to kill government troops and damage infrastructure. In the first six months of 2004 alone, IED explosions killed 280 people and injured 676 more. IEDs are also the main weapon the insurgents use against government forces, typically causing 35 percent of the deaths among RNA troops and 50 percent of the injuries. In

the year after August 2003, there were 571 bombings and 250 roadside ambushes with IEDs in Nepal, and government forces defused another 280 IEDs. Simple IEDs include the hand-thrown “socket bomb” made with black powder and shrapnel. Larger bombs are made from pressure cookers and steel pipes and are detonated by wire or remote control. Pressure cookers are so commonly used to make IEDs that the army has banned them. Bombs target government forces, but also radio masts, telecommunications offices and exchanges, government offices, and tourist hotels. The effectiveness of the IED campaign suggests foreign training, probably from the Indian Maoist groups who provide the PLA with much of their explosives. Initially, the government tried to combat the insurgency with poorly trained and equipped police forces. The force of more than 40,000 was essentially unarmed, and quite unprepared for counterinsurgency. The insurgents specifically targeted the police for attack—985 policemen died from February 1996

Nepal: Maoist Insurgency

to January 2003. This provoked heavy-handed police retaliation from 1996 to 1998, which only drove more villagers to join the insurgency. In early 2001, the government created a paramilitary “Armed Police Force” with a proposed strength of 15,000, but the APF was also poorly trained, and its effectiveness remained dubious. The Royal Nepalese Army was a poorly equipped static force for much of its history, although its Gurkha troops served with distinction in the British and Indian Armies. The RNA still contributes a relatively large number of troops to UN peacekeeping missions. It is fiercely loyal to the king, and senior officers regard parliamentary democracy and political leaders with open contempt. After the insurgency began, the government chose not to involve the RNA at first, instead using local police to fight the insurgents. Thus the RNA gained no experience with counterinsurgency tactics, including the development of an effective intelligence network, always an essential in counterinsurgency operations. In May 2001, the RNA began the Integrated Security and Development Program (ISDP) to counter insurgent control of the countryside. The ISDP sought to provide health care, development, and security to rural areas, and it was fairly successful even though poorly funded. The program was suspended due to lack of personnel and resources, but army engineering units continued to conduct development work. The RNA became directly involved in counterinsurgency operations in November 2001, but the 53,000-man force was inadequate to deal with the estimated 15,000 insurgents. Typically, government forces must outnumber insurgents by a ten-to-one margin in order to gain victory. Thus, the RNA began expanding, reaching a strength of 78,000 men in late 2005. The goal was to reach 100,000 men in 2010. India supplied the RNA with assault rifles and ammunition. India, Great Britain, and the United States provided training for the RNA in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics.

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The RNA took on increasing responsibility for the counterinsurgency war, mounting offensive operations against Maoist bases, supervising the demobilization and reintegration of Maoist guerrillas, and providing support for reconstruction and development. Even so, the RNA was often accused of committing human rights abuses against the rural population, driving people into the arms of the Maoists who depend on the locals for food, shelter, and information. In February 2005, King Gyanendra dismissed the government, declared a “state of emergency,” and refused to hold new elections. He was increasingly unpopular and isolated, and he depended solely on the loyalty of the RNA to remain in power. After a series of military successes, the CPN(M) declared a unilateral cease-fire in September 2005. This gave them the appearance of peacemakers, while the king and the army—which promised to continue military operations—seemed like stubborn warmongers to Nepal’s war-weary people. The CPN(M) sought to create and leverage popular unrest in Kathmandu in order to force the king to abdicate. If he remained obdurate or unleashed the army on the population of Kathmandu, his actions would only undercut his legitimacy and create new recruits for the Maoist cause. James D. Perry See also: People’s Wars; China: Chinese Civil War, 1927– 1949.

Bibliography David, Anthony. “Nepal’s Insurgents Play Peace Card from Position of Strength.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (December 2005). Hill, John. “Royal Nepalese Army Adapts to Counterinsurgency Role.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 2004). Mackinlay, John. “A Military Assessment of the Nepalese Maoist Movement.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (December 2002). Marks, Thomas A. Insurgency in Nepal. Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2003. Mehta, Major General Ashok K., and Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal. “Nepalese -Military Gears Up to Counter Escalating Insurgency.” Jane’s Intelligence Review (September 2005).

SRI LANKA: Tamil Uprising Since the Late 1970s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: India INDIA

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Sri Lanka (previously called Ceylon) is an island in the Indian Ocean off the southern tip of the Indian peninsula. Roughly 25,000 square miles in size, it largely consists of plains and low hills, with an 8,000foot-high mountain range in the south central part of the island. The country of Sri Lanka, which covers the entire island, is inhabited by two major ethnic groups. The majority—roughly 75 percent of the population—are Sinhalese Buddhists, descendants of India’s Aryan invaders who came to the island about 2,500 years ago. The other major ethnic group is the Tamil, a Hindu people of Dravidian origin, most of whom came to the island about 2,000 years ago and settled in its eastern half. These are often known as Sri Lankan Tamil to distinguish them from the Indian Tamil. This latter group consists of Tamils who were brought from their south Indian homeland by the

British in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work the tea plantations. Most of the Indian Tamil live in the northern part of the island, in and around the Jaffna peninsula. Most of the Sri Lankan Tamil are well integrated into Sri Lankan culture; many are well educated and hold professional or clerical positions. Most of the Indian Tamil are poor, working as either tenant farmers or laborers. They are generally looked down upon as ignorant foreigners by both Sri Lankan Tamil and Sinhalese Buddhists. They exist within a different caste system from the Sri Lankan Tamil and Sinhalese Buddhists, and there is very little social interaction between the Indian Tamils and much of the rest of the population. Other minority groups make up the rest of the population, including a small number of Muslims and Christians, the former descendants of the Arab traders who once ran posts on the island in the Middle Ages and intermarried with local inhabitants and the mission-educated Sinhalese and Tamil.

Historical Background Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), like India, was a colony of Britain until shortly after World War II, gaining its independence in 1948. For the first few years of its existence, Ceylon prospered in peace. World prices for its main exports of rubber, tea, and gems were high, providing solid economic growth. The country was governed by the United National Party (UNP), largely dominated by English-educated conservatives of Sinhalese background. As the party that had led the struggle for independence and Ceylonese nationalism, it advocated an ethnic inclusiveness as part of its political platform. But the UNP members were out of touch with the traditions of their people. Elitist

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Sri Lanka: Tamil Uprising Since the Late 1970s

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KEY DATES 1948

Sri Lanka gains its independence from Great Britain.

1976

A Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is formed as tensions increase in Tamil areas of eastern and northern Sri Lanka.

1987

Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi flies to the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo and signs a peace settlement with Sri Lankan prime minister Junius Richard Jayewardene; the Sri Lanka parliament moves to establish provincial councils, shifting power from central government to local areas.

1989

The government announces it will recognize the LTTE’s political wing as a legitimate party.

1990

The last Indian troops leave the country; the LTTE launches a new offensive, killing 600 police officers.

1996

The Sri Lankan army announces it is in control of all of the Jaffna Peninsula, previously an LTTE stronghold.

2004 A tsunami strikes the coastline of Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, killing tens of thousands; a cease-fire and an agreement to allow the unrestricted flow of aid to stricken areas is reached between the government and the LTTE.

advocates of Westernization, they increasingly lost control of the political situation by the early 1950s. When world prices for rubber and tea began to fall at the same time, new populist-style politicians began advocating Sinhalese nationalism and a return to Sinhalese cultural roots. In 1956, this upsurge in ethnically based politics produced a victory for S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and his Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SFLP). The new government quickly made Sinhalese the sole official language of the country, began official state support for the Buddhist faith, and provided funds for Sinhalese culture, while ignoring other cultures and faiths. At the same time, the SFLP nationalized much of the Sri Lankan economy, fusing Sinhalese cultural nationalism with state-administered socialism. These moves served to antagonize the island’s minorities, setting off a decade of protests, demonstrations, and riots by Tamils, Christians, and Muslims, as well as counterdemonstrations and reactive violence from the Sinhalese majority. More peacefully, the nationalist policies polarized the political landscape,

leading to the formation of the Tamil-dominated Federal Party. The assassination of Bandaranaike and the accession to power of his widow Sirimavo Bandaranaike in 1959 further polarized the political landscape. Sirimavo took her late husband’s policies even further, pushing for total government control of education and the thorough socialization of the economy. This drastic shift to the left—and the continuing economic malaise on the island—led to a longing for the more stable and prosperous days of UNP rule. In 1965, voters returned the party to power. Under the leadership of Don Stephen Senanayake, the UNP made ethnic reconciliation and private enterprise the two pillars of its government. These measures, while somewhat effective in resuscitating the Ceylonese economy, created widespread inflation and growing economic inequality. In 1970, the SFLP—in an alliance with several minor Marxist parties—swept the elections as the Tamil United Front. Back in power, Sirimavo once again restricted private enterprise, nationalized a number of

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private industries, and backed an ambitious land reform policy. The new government also changed the name of the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka in 1972. In addition, a new constitution enhanced the power of the executive, gave Buddhism “the foremost place,” and made Sinhalese the sole official language again (Tamil had been added in 1963). But neither the nationalistic rhetoric nor the economic reforms—aimed at reducing inequalities— was successful enough to deal with the problem of unemployment. With a rapidly growing population of educated young persons, frustrations ran high in the early 1970s. In 1971, a group of Sinhalese and Tamil youths—heavily influenced by Marxist political thought—launched an unsuccessful revolution under the banner of the People’s Liberation Front, or Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Still, the United Front did make a successful effort to resolve an ongoing discrepancy in Sri Lankan political life by granting full citizenship to the Indian Tamils, who had not enjoyed such equality since the days of the British. Nevertheless, the government continued to suffer from extremely strained relations with the leaders of the Indian Tamil labor movement, as well as representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamil community. But it was the continuing economic stagnation and the corruption associated with enhanced state power that led to the defeat of the United Front, and its replacement by the UNP once again, in 1977. And, once again, there was a shift to private enterprise economics and ethnic reconciliation. Tamil was again made an official language.

across the straits in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. By the early 1980s, the government felt compelled to send troops to the north and east to quell the guerrilla activities there. They had a hard time of it. In the jungles of the mountainous region, it was very difficult to root out the numerous bases operated by various Tamil separatist groups, the largest of which was called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), more commonly known as the Tamil Tigers. The insurgency sparked massive riots in much of Sri Lanka, in which various Sinhalese nationalist groups attacked Tamil communities in the capital, Colombo, and elsewhere. While the government opened negotiations with nonviolent leaders of the separatist Tamil community, the obstacles were great. The government refused a compromise offer of a power-sharing relationship and the consolidation of the two mainly Tamil states in the east and north into a single autonomous entity, seeing this latter demand as a prelude to a declaration of an independent Tamil state. At the same time, the government made it unconstitutional to advocate separatism, even by peaceful means. From 1984, the Tigers and other separatist guerrillas were conducting terrorist attacks on Sinhalese residents in the east and north, massacring hundreds at a time in rural villages. The Tigers also launched campaigns in urban areas, setting off bombs in bus stations and elsewhere. The government retaliated with massive sweeps of Tamil areas, killing hundreds of Tamil civilians and guerrillas every month. It is estimated that between 1983 and 1987 some 6,000 people on both sides were killed in the fighting.

Rising Violence India Intervenes Despite the reconciliation efforts, the new UNP government could not stem the rising violence between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. Its move to bring Indian Tamils into the cabinet for the first time was welcomed by leaders of that community, but the gesture did little to satisfy the increasingly radical youths of both the Indian Tamil and the Sri Lankan Tamil communities. By the late 1970s, there was a growing movement of Tamil separatists, who had set up guerrilla bases in the Tamildominated north and east of the island, where a great deal of separatist sentiment existed among the population. This was particularly true among the Indian Tamil of the Jaffna Peninsula, who felt a great deal of ethnic connectedness to the Tamils

It was a well-known “secret” that the Tamils of southern India had been supplying their separatist brethren with arms, money, and food since at least the late 1970s. To counter this flow of supplies, the Sri Lankan military launched a massive and successful offensive to capture the northeastern part of the Jaffna Peninsula, where much of the cross-strait traffic was occurring. The Tamils of India responded to this new threat against the Tamil separatists with an openly flaunted grant of $3.2 million to the LTTE. Expecting the Indian government to condemn such open meddling in the affairs of a sovereign state, the UNP government was dismayed to learn that New Delhi instead was planning on shipping food supplies,

Sri Lanka: Tamil Uprising Since the Late 1970s

ostensibly to feed the civilian Tamil population on the peninsula. When the effort was blocked by the Sri Lankan navy, the Indian air force, in an even more blatant violation of sovereignty, airdropped the supplies without the approval of Colombo. But just as tensions were reaching a peak between the two countries, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi flew to Colombo in July 1987. There, with his Sri Lankan counterpart, UNP head Junius Richard Jayewardene, he announced a peace settlement. Under the arrangement, a series of provincial councils would be established with extensive local powers and the east and north of the island would be united into a single administrative unit, two key demands of the nonviolent Tamil movement. At the same time, the LTTE and other guerrilla organizations would lay down their arms. The entire arrangement would be guaranteed by India, which would send a 7,000-man peacekeeping force. The accords set off rioting by the Sinhalese majority in Colombo and elsewhere in the south, as well as protests by the JVP, the SFLP, and the Sangha, the main order of Buddhist monks on the island. Still, despite the protests and violence, implementation of the accords preceded smoothly at first. As the Indian peacekeepers moved in, the Sri Lankan

749

military returned to its barracks and the LTTE began to disarm. But by September, the disarmament process had slowed to a crawl, largely due to internecine fighting between the various separatist factions. When the Indian army moved to separate the groups and enforce the disarmament process, the LTTE and other groups renewed their terrorist attacks on Sinhalese civilians in the eastern part of the island. Over the next year, the Indian force increased from 7,000 to nearly 100,000, as it successfully reduced the area of operations of the LTTE and other separatist groups to a few isolated areas in the northern hills. Still, as many as 45,000 Indian troops remained in early 1989. In late 1987, the Sri Lankan parliament moved to implement the establishment of provincial councils and began planning for nationwide elections in October 1988. But the announcement of the elections and the establishment of provincial councils was greeted by massive demonstrations organized by the JVP. In response, the government declared a state of emergency, imposing curfews and deploying armed riot police. The elections were held and the pro-agreement Tamil groups won control of the provincial councils in the north and east, while the LTTE, as well as the JVP, boycotted the elections.

Slain members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the largest Tamil separatist group opposing the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka, are memorialized in the northern city of Jaffna in 1994. (Robert Nickelsberg/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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The continuing presence of Indian troops now represented a sore point for Sinhalese nationalists. In an effort to defuse their anger, the UNP government—reelected in 1988—negotiated with the Indian government to speed the troop withdrawal, announcing that all the peacekeepers would be out by July 1989. When Gandhi hesitated, demanding assurances that the Tamil community would be protected before all Indian troops left, the JVP launched a new wave of demonstrations and rioting. In September, the two governments announced a plan for total withdrawal by the end of the year.

Post-Intervention Fighting However, before the Indians left, they moved to bolster their allies—the moderate, pro-Indian, pro-provincial council Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front—by helping them establish their own armed group, the Tamil National Army (TNA), both to defend Tamils and to destroy the LTTE. But the Tigers moved first, launching a brutal attack that thoroughly decimated the untrained TNA. Despite the violence, a resolution to the conflict appeared to be close. After months of peace talks, the government announced that it would recognize the political wing of the LTTE as a legitimate political party. In March 1990, the last Indian troops left. Encouraged by the lull in fighting, the Sri Lankan army once again returned to its barracks. The lull, as it turned out, did not last long. It is not certain why the LTTE launched a new offensive against the government in the spring of 1990— internal divisions are often cited as the cause—but the effect was devastating. The LTTE launched simultaneous attacks on twenty police stations, capturing and killing nearly 600 officers in June. There were also renewed LTTE attacks on Muslim civilians in the north and east that had left some 1,000 dead by August. Meanwhile, LTTE militants were believed to be behind a number of terrorist bombings and assassinations, including the murder of the Sri Lankan minister of defense and the May 1991 killing of Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi, then head of the main opposition party, had supposedly pressured the Indian government to oust the pro-LTTE government in Tamil Nadu. As for the LTTE’s return to armed insurrection in the summer of 1990, it was quickly met by a renewed government counteroffensive. For the next five years,

government forces and LTTE guerrillas engaged in almost continuous fighting, mostly in and around the Jaffna peninsula, though the LTTE launched a number of bombing attacks on Colombo and other areas of the south. Overall, the government was winning, forcing the Tigers to launch suicide bomb attacks on police installations and civilian targets. By 1995, the government was moving to permanently capture the Jaffna Peninsula and looked poised to do so by the fall. The LTTE forced tens of thousands of civilians to flee the area, in hopes of creating a humanitarian crisis that would force the international community to act. Rather than confronting the numerically superior Sri Lankan military, the Tigers also opted to blow up the country’s main oil installation on the peninsula in October. By mid-1996, the Sri Lankan army had declared itself in total control of the peninsula. This was largely true, though Tamil guerrillas and terrorists continued to launch sporadic attacks on civilian and military targets, mostly in the form of suicide bombings. Many of the LTTE guerrillas were forced to retreat to Elephant Pass, in the hills leading to the peninsula. In May 1997, the government launched an offensive to drive the LTTE from this position. Despite the fact that this was the largest military operation in Sri Lankan history, progress was slow. Meanwhile, negotiations with more moderate Tamil leaders to find a new plan for a devolution of power to the provinces and power-sharing in the central government were proceeding slowly as well. In August 1997, the government announced that it was submitting a report on devolution to parliament. But meanwhile the violence continued. In October, some twenty people were killed when a truck bomb exploded in a Colombo parking lot.

Renewed Hostilities The conflict worsened in March 1998 with violence claiming dozens of lives. A major government offensive in December 1998 forced the Tamil insurgents to retreat into the countryside and abandon several northern cities. However, LTTE forces won back the strategically important city of Oddusudan in November 1999. First elected to the presidency in 1994, Chadrika Kumaratunga overcame an assassination attempt to be reelected in an election with a 70 percent voter turnout in December 1999. Tamils largely supported Ranil

Sri Lanka: Tamil Uprising Since the Late 1970s

Wickremasinghe of the United National Party. Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe met in March 2000 to discuss a peace plan. The LTTE rejected the peace plan, claiming its political provisions were insufficient compensation for a cease-fire. The LTTE insisted on Norway acting as mediator for the negotiations, which the Sri Lankan government agreed to. The government suffered a series of defeats in the following months as the LTTE took control of the Jaffna region, the Tamil Tigers’ spiritual homeland. A suicide attack on Bandaranaike international airport in July 2001 killed seventeen people and caused the country major losses in tourist revenue. In November, Velupillai Prabhakaran, a spokesman for the LTTE, declared that they would now be satisfied with autonomy rather than outright independence. In the December elections Wickremasinghe was elected prime minister and soon brokered a peace treaty with the LTTE. In January 2002, the government, as a condition for the LTTE cease-fire, eased trade blockades with the Tamil-dominated Northern regions. In April 2003, the Tamil representatives withdrew from the peace talks, though the cease-fire held and informal talks continued. In January 2004, a new group, the United Peoples Freedom Alliance, gained control of parliament, with Mahinda Rajapaksa becoming prime minister. In May of that year, the government issued a joint declaration with the LTTE representatives committing themselves to peace. A brief period of relative stability followed until the foreign minister, Laksham Kadirgamar, was assassinated, allegedly by the LTTE, in August 2005. Government sources accused the LTTE of killing Kadirgamar because of his efforts to have the LTTE classified as a terrorist organization internationally. The LTTE officially denied responsibility for the assassination, blaming government forces seeking to destroy the peace process. Regardless of who was responsible, the assassination renewed the prospect of civil war. Negotiations, both overt and secret, continue, with Norway maintaining an active involvement as mediator. The civil war has claimed over 60,000 deaths and created over 100,000 refugees. The National Peace Commission estimated that by 2002 the

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Sri Lankan government had spent $2.6 million on the military. The cost was covered primarily by tax increases, which resulted in consistent high inflation. The tsunami that struck the Indian Ocean littoral in December 2004 had a huge impact on the country, causing millions of dollars worth of damage and claiming tens of thousands of lives. Government and Tamil forces came under renewed international pressure to work together in the wake of the tsunami and, with Norwegian diplomats acting as brokers, agreement was reached on the distribution of aid. Movement on more substantive issues remained slow, but the tentative cease-fire remained intact through February 2006, when representatives from the government and the LTTE reconfirmed their commitment to the cease-fire. But a renewed bombing offensive by the latter, including a suicide attack on Colombo’s main military compound in April, followed by an attack on a Sri Lankan naval convoy near Jaffa, signaled an end to the cease-fire. By August and September 2006, the two sides were engaged in major fighting in the northeast, which left hundreds of people dead and forced thousands from their homes. By late 2006, it appeared that the 2002 cease-fire and the peace imposed by the 2004 tsunami was coming to an end. James Ciment and Aidan Hehir See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s.

Bibliography Jayasuriya, Laksiri. Changing Face of Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka, 1994–2004. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2005. Little, David. Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994. Muni, S.D. Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993. Spencer, Jonathan, ed. Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict. New York: Routledge, 1990. Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988. Winslow, Deborah, and Michael D. Woost, eds. Economy, Culture and Civil War in Sri Lanka. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.

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ALBANIA: Civil Conflict,1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Civil; Post-Communist eign travel. He carried on disputes with Yugoslavia in 1948, the Soviet Union in 1961, and the Republic of China in 1976, isolating Albania even from other Communist countries. He ordered construction of a network of hundreds of thousands of bunkers and gun emplacements in expectation of a supposed “British-American-Soviet” invasion. During Hoxha’s long rule (1944–1985), literacy and educational levels rose in Albania, but the centralized forced-labor economy and tight control of political and cultural activities (including mandatory and universal atheism), combined with complete isolation from the rest of the world, hobbled development. Albanians had one of the lowest standards of living in Europe.

R BIA

MONTENEGRO

KOSOVO

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ees f ug e R

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Tiranë

A D R I AT I C R

Shku mb i n

SEA g Refu

ALBANIA ees

Vlorë

R ef

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TOSK DIALECT AREA Re fu g

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Albania was one of the most backward countries in early twentieth-century Europe. Until 1912, it was part of the Ottoman Empire, and a nationalist movement was late to develop. In 1924, Ahmed Zogu declared himself dictator of Albania and later crowned himself King Zog. Despite Zogu’s grand rhetoric, local tribal authorities retained most of the political power in their regions. In 1939, Benito Mussolini’s Italy annexed Albania, and later during World War II it was occupied by Hitler’s Germany. Albanian nationalists and antifascists formed resistance movements, and in 1944, with the encouragement of the Communist government in nearby Yugoslavia, the Communist National Liberation Army took control of the country. At the end of the war in 1945, Albania, led by Communist dictator Enver Hoxha, became a Stalinist state. Hoxha isolated Albania from most of the world, closing its borders and forbidding most for-

Hoxha died in 1985, but Albania remained in its self-imposed shell. By 1989, however, Ramiz Alia, Hoxha’s handpicked successor, began to make both economic and diplomatic changes. Contact with the Soviet Union and United States was reestablished in 1990. Even as Albania emerged from isolation, the political universe in Eastern Europe was changing rapidly. Communist states were liberalizing their political and economic systems, and the Soviet Union, the dominant power in the region, was unraveling. Under the influence of these events, Albanians mounted student and worker demonstrations throughout the second half of 1990, and in December, Alia agreed to the creation of a multiparty democracy. The birth of the new democracy was rocky; Alia and the Communist Party were reluctant to give up power completely. During the next two years, the country was torn by civil unrest, and tens of thousands of Albanians fled to Greece and Italy. In March 1992, Alia resigned and was replaced as president by Sali Berisha of the Democratic Party. Berisha later jailed Alia for his role in the Communist-era government.

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Europe and Former Soviet Union

KEY DATES 1985

Longtime Communist dictator Enver Hoxha dies.

1990

In the wake of Communism’s collapse in Eastern Europe, Hoxha successor Ramiz Alia proposes economic and political reforms.

1991–1992

With Communists unwilling to give up power, civil unrest breaks out across the country, forcing Alia to resign; he is replaced by Sali Berisha of the Democratic Party.

1996

Street fighting breaks out between Democratic Party and Socialist Party followers in the lead-up to May elections; Socialists charge the victorious Democratic Party with election fraud; civil unrest resumes.

1997

A failed get-rich-quick pyramid scheme bankrupts hundreds of thousands of Albanians, leading to mass rioting against the Berisha government; Berisha declares a national state of emergency in March; looting of armories leads to intensification of fighting; an Italian-led peacekeeping mission arrives in April; elections in June and July lead to a victory for the Socialist Party.

1998

Riots in Tirana follow the assassination of a senior Democratic Party leader.

2003

New national elections occur peacefully.

Internal Divisions The vast majority of Albanians share the same ethnic background, but other divisions are significant. Seventy percent of Albanians are Muslim, 20 percent Orthodox Christian, and 10 percent Roman Catholic. These religious differences were relatively unimportant during the long Communist dictatorship, since any religious practice was discouraged or forbidden, but after 1990, tensions between religious groups began to emerge. The country is also divided by a persistent linguistic social divide. In the southern part of the country, the Tosk dialect is spoken, and to the north the Gheg dialect. Tosks were substantially overrepresented during the Communist years, and influential families grew into “political clans.” This pattern persisted in postcommunist Albania. Patronage was deliberately used to foster support, and significant economic advantages were at risk in elections and political disputes. Through the 1990s politics were often divided along

north-south lines, Ghegs generally supporting the Democratic Party and Tosks the Socialist Party. Tribal links remained important, particularly in the north, and in the absence of a strong central government have historically exercised strong authority.

Corruption and Pyramid Schemes Upon taking power in 1992, Berisha immediately set out to bring Albania into the world economy. He opened the door to foreign investment, and Albania’s economy slowly began to recover from its long isolation. However, Berisha’s commitment to democracy did not prevent him from enriching himself. Keeping a strong hold on the police, army, and media, Berisha worked to keep himself and his party in power and to distribute political patronage to his followers. This patronage was particularly useful as the economy made its transition from centrally planned socialism to free-market capitalism. Although the

Albania: Civil Conflict, 19 9 0s

change brought widespread hardships to much of the population, it also brought opportunities to business and government leaders as government holdings were privatized. Seeking to keep himself and his associates in power, Berisha began a campaign against opposing politicians, especially those in the Socialist Party who had been active in earlier Communist administrations. The election campaign in 1996 brought violence between Democratic and Socialist Party supporters. The elections in May were won by the Democratic Party but were tainted by vote tampering and voter intimidation. Socialists refused to accept the results or take their seats in parliament. The country remained in turmoil throughout the rest of 1996. In January 1997, the violence grew worse when a group of informal savings-and-lending companies went bankrupt. These savings companies had competed to offer customers interest rates of 5 percent a month or more, which prompted more than half the Albanian population to deposit their savings with them. Only with the bankruptcies did it become clear that the companies were fraudulent pyramid schemes with no real investment. They used new de-

759

posits to pay high interest to earlier investors, but finally could no longer bring in enough new money. When individuals tried to withdraw their money, the companies were forced to admit that the money had been spent. Nearly two-thirds of all Albanians lost savings to the schemes. To make matters worse, prominent government officials were closely associated with some of the savings companies and may have profited from them. Anger and frustration drove citizens into the street, where they rioted and attacked government buildings. President Berisha was forced to resign, and the central government rapidly lost control of the country. Between January and March, major riots broke out in Tiranë and Vlorë. A state of emergency was declared on March 2. The army, police, and security service quickly dissolved in the face of the crisis, and their various armories were soon looted. Berisha himself issued government arms to his Democratic Party followers. In all, an estimated 1 million small arms, including Kalashnikov assault rifles and rocketpropelled grenade launchers, and even artillery and tanks, fell into private hands. Many of these weapons would be smuggled into neighboring Kosovo and

The collapse of government authority in Albania gave rise to rampant looting, blood feuds, and organized crime in 1997. The restoration of authority and civil order proved slow in coming. (Mark H. Milstein/Getty Images News)

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Macedonia, where ethnic Albanians were fighting against those governments. Tens of thousands of refugees fled from Albania to Kosovo, Macedonia, and Italy as the situation deteriorated and outright insurrection broke out. The collapse of government authority led to the reemergence of traditional codes of conduct—notably revenge killings relating to the medieval code of gjakmarrje (“blood feud”). Looters soon began to dismantle the country’s infrastructure. For example, some peasants cut down telephone lines to use as fence wiring. Perhaps 1,500 died in the unrest. The lack of government authority allowed a dramatic rise in organized crime, much of it directed by former members of the secret police and other government agencies. In April 1997, an Italian-led military mission known as “Operation Alba,” approved by the UN, arrived in order to stabilize the country. New elections were held in June and July, and Fatos Noli’s Socialist Party overwhelmingly defeated Berisha’s Democratic Party. Reestablishing government control over the entire country was a slow process, however. In September 1998 a senior member of the Democratic Party was assassinated, and riots broke out in Tiranë. Sporadic civil disturbances continued. Although the political climate remained acrimonious, successive Socialist Party governments were able to achieve a modicum of economic reform and growth. This progress was aided in 1999 by funds provided from the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe for the badly needed renovation of roads, railroads, ports, and utilities. Unemployment by 2001 had dropped below 14 percent. Although there were accusations of irregularities in the 2003 elections, there were also signs of distinct improvement. Despite economic recovery, organized crime remained a significant problem and a lasting legacy of the 1997 conflict. During the outbreak of ethnic conflict in neighboring Macedonia in 2001, there were indications that the Albanian government was largely unable to control the flow of arms and money to the Albanian guerrillas there. Albania became a significant factor in the regional arms trade, as well as a transshipment point in the European drug trade and a waypoint for the entry of illegal immigrants into Western Europe. These developments helped fuel a significant anti-Albanian sentiment in neighboring countries, where there was a widespread perception of

Albanians as drug-traffickers and illegal immigrants. The problem of immigration was particularly significant in Greece, where as many as 500,000 Albanians worked illegally during the 1990s. The general elections of July 3, 2005, were considered a step in the right direction in terms of Albania’s consolidation of democracy. The Democratic Party and its allies returned to power in a decisive victory, pledging to fight crime and corruption, decrease the size and scope of government, and promote economic growth. Their leader, Sali Berisha, was sworn in as prime minister on September 11, 2005.

Significance Neither King Zogu’s interwar dictatorship nor Enver Hoxha’s Stalinist state prepared Albania to become a modern democratic state. Persistent cronyism and corruption in the government not only reflected a lack of “civil society” but also was the product of persisting alternative social codes. Clan loyalties, particularly in the northern part of the country, still took priority over loyalty to a central government. In the south, the Socialist Party had had some success in reestablishing government authority, but it, too, had been hampered by the activities of powerful criminal gangs. These internal weaknesses help explain why the central government was often unable to control the smuggling of arms and money to Kosovo and Macedonia. Extreme nationalists in Albania called for attempts to unite a “Greater Albania,” which would include Kosovo and part of Macedonia. This expansive view remains a minority view; in any case, Albania remained too weak and internally divided to pursue such an ambitious scheme. Carl Skutsch and James Frusetta See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Macedonia: Ethnic Conflict, 1990s; Serbia: Kosovo Secessionist Movement, 1990s.

Bibliography Kola, Paulin. The Search for Greater Albania. London: Hurst & Co., 2003. Vickers, Miranda. The Albanians: A Modern History. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995. Vickers, Miranda, and James Pettifer. Albania: From Anarchy to Balkan Identity. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

ARMENIA: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Azerbaijan 0 0

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100 Miles 100 Kilometers

GEORGIA

Mingacevir Resevoir Lake Sevan

AZERBAIJAN

AR MEN IA Yerevan

Stepanakert

Agdam

NAGORNOKARABAKH

TURKEY

Fizoli

AZERBAIJAN

Lake Van

IRAN

As the fifteen republics of the Soviet Union gained independence in 1991, many faced demands from minority populations for self-determination. The boundaries of many of the republics had been drawn arbitrarily—Soviet dictator Josef Stalin had often redrawn boundaries to scatter members of the same ethnic group in different geographical areas, as part of a divide-and-rule strategy. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he was determined to bring about fundamental changes in the Soviet political system. To achieve his reforms, he instituted the policies of glasnost— ending the Soviet penchant for secrecy—and perestroika—economic and political reform. The first major test of glasnost and perestroika occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The hostility between the Christian Armenians and neighboring Muslims dates back hundreds of years, but it was exacerbated when the Ottoman Empire broke up after World War I. The Muslim Turks drove the Armenians out of the Turkish territory of Eastern Anatolia, and thousands were killed. Armenians describe this episode as genocide. Besides the Armenians in Turkey, another group of Armenians lived in Azerbaijan, surrounded by the Muslim Azeris in the region called NagornoKarabakh. In 1923, as he fashioned the Soviet Union, Stalin made Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Christians outnumbered Muslims in the region by about four to one, a situation that remained for sixty-five years. In 1988, the authority of the central government in the Soviet Union was weakening, and minority populations began demanding reforms. The Armenian Christians in Nagorno-Karabakh began demonstrating, demanding to be incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Republic, even though Nagorno-Karabakh did not share a common border with Armenia. This situation presented President Gorbachev with a difficult dilemma. If he yielded to the demands of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, minority groups in other parts of the Soviet Union would be encouraged to make similar demands. On the other hand, if Gorbachev ordered the military to suppress the uprising, his reform policies—already opposed by many Soviet leaders—would be compromised. Transparency and democratic freedoms had not been characteristic of Soviet rule, and Soviet leaders had dealt harshly with popular demonstrations. Gorbachev’s opponents urged him to put down the

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KEY DATES 1923

Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Josef Stalin makes NagornoKarabakh an autonomous region of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

1988

Christian Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh begin violent protests to have the region incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic; Armenians in other parts of Azerbaijan begin fleeing to NagornoKarabakh and Armenia, while Muslim Azeris flee Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia for Azerbaijan.

1991

The Soviet Union collapses, leading to independence for Armenia and Azerbaijan; military conflict begins between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

1994

Armenian forces seize 20 percent of Azerbaijan territory in an effort to establish a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) negotiates a cease-fire between belligerents.

1997

Russia admits it shipped $1 billion in arms to Armenia between 1992 and 1996.

2001

Talks involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, France, Russia, and the United States fail to reach a lasting agreement over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrations, warning that failure to act could help lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Their fears were justified. By August 1990, thirteen of the fifteen Soviet republics were demanding greater autonomy, if not outright independence.

Conflict Begins The demonstrations that began in Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1988 turned violent, and one result was a dramatic increase in the number of refugees. Armenians who lived in Azerbaijan proper fled either to Nagorno-Karabakh or to Armenia. The Muslims in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia fled to Azerbaijan. More than 1 million people became refugees. Those who fled and lost their homes demanded vengeance. With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan and Armenia became independent republics. The battle for control of Nagorno-Karabakh continued. Initially, the Azerbaijan government proved unable to cope with the insurrection within its borders. The Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh won complete control of the region and succeeded in estab-

lishing a corridor across Azerbaijan from NagornoKarabakh to Armenia. By 1994, the Armenians controlled about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Numerous efforts were made to resolve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, but none succeeded. In 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) tried to mediate the conflict, but its members could not reach a consensus on how best to deal with the issue. For a time, the Russian Federation wanted to play the dominant role in the dispute, but it was reluctant to take a decisive stand because any action would deepen the distrust of either Armenia or Azerbaijan. In 1994, the OSCE did succeed in establishing a cease-fire, but that was all that could be accomplished. It was difficult to do more because the Armenians and the Azeris approached negotiations from different perspectives. The Armenians were unwilling to accept a step-by-step approach to negotiations and insisted that the final status of NagornoKarabakh must be on the agenda. The Armenians wanted the Azeris to give up Nagorno-Karabakh and allow it to become part of Armenia. The Azeris

Armenia: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, 19 9 0s

would only agree to step-by-step negotiations. They wanted to find some formula to grant NagornoKarabakh autonomy while it was still a part of Azerbaijan. Negotiations were also difficult because the war had lasted six years and many people died in the fighting, instilling much bitterness on both sides.

Consequences of the Conflict After gaining independence, Armenia enjoyed a good relationship with Russia and welcomed the presence of Russian troops on its soil. On the other hand, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia were strained. The Azeris were determined to remain free of Russia’s influence and would not allow Russian troops or military bases in Azerbaijan. In fact, Russian military aid to Armenia was a major factor in the Armenians’ success in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian officials confirmed that between 1992 and 1996, it had arranged to ship $1 billion in arms to Armenia, including tanks, machine guns, and anti-aircraft missiles. Russia also supported Armenia because Azerbaijan is closely aligned with Turkey, which was Russia’s enemy in three wars in the nineteenth century. Despite the continuing hostility between Armenia and Azerbaijan, one factor may contribute to a resolution of the conflict. Azerbaijan has an abundance of oil and natural gas, which offers the prospect of a prosperous economy. Its one problem is to find an inexpensive route to transport the oil to a seaport. The most efficient route runs through Armenia to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, but that route would only become practical if Azerbaijan and Armenia could settle their differences over Nagorno-Karabakh and end their bitter feud. The only alternative route for Azerbaijan’s oil is a pipeline from the Caspian Sea through the republic of Georgia. The Azeris have been reluctant to build a pipeline through Georgia because of political unrest and Russia’s strong influence there. Armenia theoretically won the conflict with Azerbaijan when Nagorno-Karabakh gained its de facto independence, but the victory was costly. Armenia’s economy remained stagnant, and it had difficulty attracting foreign investment because of continuing tensions with Azerbaijan. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan closed their borders with Armenia, making it difficult to transport goods to the rest of the world and

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thus causing a devastating impact on the Armenian economy. Like other ethnic and religious disputes, emotions play a more important role than logic. Any Armenian leader proposing a compromise solution with Azerbaijan would quickly lose political support. Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian had to resign in 1998 because he supported a compromise solution. Yet because of the stagnant economy, Armenians are emigrating, in search of better economic opportunities. The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute remained unresolved into the early 2000s. Finding a solution is difficult because it affects so many actors—not only Armenia and Azerbaijan, but the Russian Republic, Georgia, Iran, and international banks and oil companies. The United States and other Western nations also have an interest in the region because of oil reserves held by Azerbaijan. Finally, the United Nations and the broader range of nations have a stake in the dispute because renewed fighting in the region could pose a serious threat to world peace. Meanwhile, the people of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh have continued to live in doubt and fear. Most Muslims had left Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and most Christians had left the Muslim heartland of Azerbaijan. Tensions still ran high, and political leaders on both sides still took unyielding positions. Nagorno-Karabakh continued its close relationship with Armenia but remained geographically isolated, an island in Azerbaijan. Kenneth L. Hill and Andrew J. Waskey See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Georgia: Civil War, 1990s; Russia: Chechen Uprising Since 1994.

Bibliography Brown, Cameron S. “Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their Neighbor’s Too: Azerbaijani Attitudes Towards Karabakh and Iranian Azerbaijan.” Middle East Journal 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 575–96. Griffin, Nicholas. Caucasus: A Journey to the Land Between Christianity and Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. International Crisis Group. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground.” Europe Report no. 116. Brussels, September 14, 2005. Wall, Thomas de. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press, 2004.

BOSNIA: Civil War,1992–1995 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Croatia; NATO; Serbia CROATIA

FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

Banja Luka

Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) (Dayton agreement line)

BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA Sarajevo

FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Mostar

Pale

SERBIA

REPUBLIKA SRPSKA

MONTENEGRO

ADRIATIC SEA

Srebrenica

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Of the four republics that broke away from Yugoslavia in 1991–1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the last and most reluctant to declare its independence. Trapped between the eager-to-leave republics of Croatia and Slovenia on one side and the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia on the other, Bosnia was forced by accelerating events to make a hasty break. The result was three years of war and brutality.

Historical Background Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 1992 declaration of independence was not motivated by the driving desire of the Bosnian people to have their own country but was rather a reaction to outside events. For most of Yugoslavia’s history, most Bosnians had been happy to be a part of the larger entity. Bosnia was a multiethnic republic within multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. In the other breakaway republics, one ethnic group was dominant—Croatia had a majority of Croatians, Slovenia of Slovenes, and Macedonia of Macedonians—but

in Bosnia, no ethnic group claimed a majority of the population. If Yugoslavia fell apart, Bosnia had the potential to do so also. After the end of World War II, the strong arm of Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s Communist dictatorship prevented the possibility of a breakup of Yugoslavia. With Tito’s death in 1980, the whole country began to slowly fall apart. By the middle 1980s, the Communist Party had lost most of its prestige, and nationalist leaders were able to gather support and demand greater rights for their particular ethnic group. The first to be successful at this was Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian Communist politician. Milosevic rose to power by playing on the fears of Serbs, who made up about 40 percent of Yugoslavia’s prebreakup population. Many Serbs felt that they did not have power in Yugoslavia in proportion to their numbers. Since 1987, Milosevic, the leader of the Republic of Serbia, had been agitating for greater power for the Serbs within Yugoslavia. Claiming that Serbs were being mistreated, he was able to put friendly governments into power in the states of Serbia and Montenegro and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. With Milosevic and the Serbs controlling four of the eight Yugoslav state governments, the rest of the republics felt the need to pull away and gain more freedom of action. As the Communist Party lost support throughout Yugoslavia, nationalist movements advocating independence rose up in Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. In January 1992, Macedonia became the third to secede. These secessions initiated a series of wars with the Serbs, who controlled what remained of the federal government and were unwilling at first to let the other three go. These declarations put

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Bosnia: Civil War, 19 92–19 95

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KEY DATES 1991

Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) breaks away from a collapsing Yugoslavia in December.

1992

On January 9, Orthodox Christian Bosnian Serbs led by Serbian Democratic Party leader Radovan Karadzic declare themselves to be an independent Serb republic, Republika Srpska; fighting between Serbs and Muslim Bosnians breaks out in March; Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic mobilizes territorial defense forces in April, as citizens of Sarajevo march for peace; in May, Serbian forces withdraw but leave Bosnian Serb partisans in Bosnia supplied with weaponry; reports of Serb atrocities against Bosnians show up in the world press; the UN imposes an economic embargo on Serbia; the UN Protection Force moves into parts of Bosnia.

1992–1993 Bosnian Serb forces seize most of east and south Bosnia. 1993

Bosnian Serb forces surround the city of Srebrenica in January; European Union representative Lord David Owen and former U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance propose a plan to divide Bosnia into ten provinces based on ethnicity; Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat groups reluctantly accept the plan, but Bosnian Serbs reject it; fighting between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian government forces breaks out in April and continues through early 1994; the UN declares a “safe area” around Srebrenica in April.

1994

Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims form an alliance against the Bosnian Serbs; in June, five countries—France, Germany, Russia, Britain, and the United States—form a Contact Group to coordinate the peace process.

1995

Bosnian Serbs rain down artillery fire on the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo; Bosnian Serbs attack the UN “safe area” around Srebrenica and murder up to 8,000 Muslim men; in August, the Muslim-Croat offensive begins; in October, Bosnian Serbs, under pressure from the Serbian government, agree to a cease-fire; on November 22, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia sign the Dayton Accords, dividing Bosnia into Muslim-Croat and Serbian enclaves and ending the war.

Bosnia-Herzegovina in a difficult position. With three republics opting out of the Yugoslav federation, Bosnia was left alone in a Yugoslavia completely dominated by Milosevic and his Serbian allies. Bosnia could either agree to be dominated by

Serb nationalists or to break away from Yugoslavia, risking the ethnic conflict that might ensue inside Bosnia. In March 1992, Bosnian citizens voted overwhelmingly for independence, and the following

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month Bosnia was recognized as a nation by governments around the world.

Ethnicity and Religion in Bosnia-Herzegovina Bosnia-Herzegovina was a truly multi-ethnic state. The population was divided between Muslims (44 percent), Serbs (31 percent), Croats (17 percent), and a mix of other nationalities, including Hungarians, Albanians, and Jews. Moreover, the various groups were not as segregated as they were elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Croats, Muslims, and Serbs often lived in neighboring villages, and sometimes even in the same village. Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, had about the same ethnic mix as the rest of Bosnia. And the ethnic barriers were not barriers to social intercourse: 18.6 percent of all Bosnian marriages from 1981 to 1991 were between people of different ethnicity. Bosnians were also the people most attached to the idea of a unified, multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. In polls taken in 1992, Bosnia was the only republic to have a significant percentage of its inhabitants defining themselves as “Yugoslavs,” rather than “Croats” or “Muslims.” The labels “Muslim,” “Serb,” or “Croat” were deceptive. All three peoples belonged to the same ethnic group, South Slav, and all three spoke SerboCroatian (although Serbs used the Cyrillic alphabet, while Muslims and Croats used the Latin alphabet). The major difference between them was religious. Centuries ago, the northern South Slavs (Croats) had been converted to Roman Catholicism. Those in the south (Serbs) had accepted Eastern Orthodox Christianity. The arrival of the Turks in the fourteenth century had convinced some Slavs to convert to Islam, and the Bosnian Muslims were born. Yet it would also be a mistake to define Bosnians by religion—most Yugoslavians were not faithful attendees at their local churches or mosques. A Croat was a Croat because he considered himself to be Croat. The Catholic faith of his ancestors might help make the definition more clear, but it was no more important than the fact that he used Latin instead of Cyrillic letters. Croats and Serbs saw themselves as separate races, and therefore they were. Of the three major groups, Muslims were the least attached to a separate identity for Bosnia. They were more urbanized than their neighbors. As city dwellers, they saw themselves as cosmopolitan, above

ethnic differences. Most were not observant Muslims: they ate pork and drank wine, and the younger generation liked to dance at the discos in Sarajevo. A 1989 survey found that only 34 percent of Bosnia’s Muslims were active believers. Bosnia’s Muslims were also forced to be more accepting in their ethnic attitudes: they lived in a state in which they were not a majority. Bosnian Croats could look north toward Croatia, while Bosnian Serbs could look east at Serbia, but Bosnian Muslims had only Bosnia. Bosnians who lived in the bigger cities—Sarajevo or Tuzla—valued their ethnic differences the least. It was the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats who lived in the small villages of the countryside who were more likely to view their neighbors with suspicion and distrust. It was from the countryside that the war in Bosnia drew its most dedicated fighters.

Independence Even before Bosnia declared its independence, its various ethnic groups had begun to form political parties based upon their ethnic identities. In May 1990, the Muslims, led by Alija Izetbegovic, formed the Party of Democratic Action (SDA). A few months later the Bosnian Serbs established a branch of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), led by Radovan Karadzic, and the Croats created a branch of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). (The Serb and Croat parties both had their roots in ethnic parties that had been created in neighboring Croatia.) Although some Bosnians, particularly in Sarajevo, deplored this rush toward identity politics, the majority of the republic’s voters declared their loyalty to one or the other ethnic party. In the November 1990 elections, these nationalist parties won 90 percent of the vote and created an uneasy coalition government, with Izetbegovic as its president. Throughout 1991, the SDA, SDS, and HDZ debated whether or not Bosnia should declare itself independent. The Muslims and Croats favored independence; the Serbs, wanting to stay connected to Serbia, opposed it. Tensions rose. Serbs claimed that Izetbegovic wanted to create an Islamic state (which was false), while Muslims accused Serbia and Croatia of cutting a deal to divide Bosnia between them (a possibility that had been discussed by Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, Croatia’s president). To add to their worries, Bosnians could look across the border into Croatia, where Croats and Croatian Serbs were engaged in a nasty ethnic shooting war.

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As Bosnia moved closer to declaring itself independent, Bosnian Serbs declared that parts of Bosnia were Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs), which would stay connected to Yugoslavia if Bosnia tried to secede. As Bosnia prepared to leave Yugoslavia, Serbs in Bosnia were preparing to leave Bosnia itself. In October 1991, they even declared their own separate parliament. In December 1991, Izetbegovic, with the support of the Muslims and Croats, declared Bosnia an independent nation.

Civil War On January 9, 1992, the Bosnian Serbs, led by Karadzic, declared themselves an independent Serb republic within Yugoslavia (the Republika Srpska). The borders of this new republic, as defined by Karadzic, included 65 percent of Bosnia’s territory, even though Serbs were only 31 percent of the population. It also included many Muslim and Croat villages. The Serbs, knowing that the Muslims and Croats would not accept this division, began to prepare to fight for their territory. With the help of Milosevic and neighboring Serbia, the Bosnian Serbs were able to create a sizable and well-equipped army. Many Serbs in the Yugoslav army were allowed to transfer to Bosnia, where they became the nucleus of the Bosnian Serb militias. (Although the Yugoslavian federal army had theoretically represented all the Yugoslav republics, by 1992 it had become almost completely Serb dominated and was fully under Milosevic’s control.) The first skirmishes occurred in March 1992, and open fighting began in April. Serbian militias, backed by elements of the Yugoslavian army that had stayed behind in Bosnia, began to attack selected Muslim villages in eastern Bosnia. The attacks were designed to remove Muslims and Croats from the parts of Bosnia that were claimed by the Republika Srpska. Serb militias moved into villages inhabited by Muslims and terrorized the population into leaving. Muslim community leaders who showed signs of resistance were executed (along with many who did not resist at all). The rest of the population was intimidated into fleeing for their lives. Those who stayed behind were killed. The whole process was the beginning of what would become known as “ethnic cleansing.” The Serb militias were attempting to carve out a Serb-only area of Bosnia on which they could build their own republic.

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On April 4, 1992, Izetbegovic, after hearing of the first attacks on Muslim villages, mobilized Bosnia’s territorial defense forces (a kind of national guard). Bosnia was at war. The fighting in Sarajevo began on the following day. Sarajevo, more than any other city, had symbolized the possibility of ethnic cooperation in Yugoslavia. The different ethnic groups had been friendliest in this city, and the nationalist parties had garnered the least votes here. So, on April 5, the citizens of Sarajevo spontaneously organized a march through their city to protest the approaching violence. The unarmed crowd—made up of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—was fired upon by Serb militiamen and forced to run for cover. From then until the end of the Bosnian Civil War, Sarajevo was in a state of siege. The Bosnian Territorials, the pro-government militias, were caught off guard and had allowed the Serb militias—helped by the Yugoslavian army—to seize the hills around the city. (Although Muslims dominated Sarajevo, the hills to the east were filled with Serb villages. The parochial villages were a fertile recruiting area for the Serb militias.) From these hills, the Serbs were able to drop a steady rain of artillery and mortar shells into Sarajevo. Serb snipers stationed in the heights surrounding the city waited until a target came into view, and then fired. As the siege wore on, the citizens of Sarajevo became used to going about their daily activities under the threat of random death. Men, women, and children were all possible sniper targets, and mortar shells killed indiscriminately. Gradually Sarajevo was turned into a city of rubble. Even though most of the fighting took place elsewhere in Bosnia, the world’s attention focused on Sarajevo. Television and newspaper journalists sent their correspondents to stay at the city’s shell-pocked Holiday Inn (one side of the hotel was left unoccupied because it could be, and was, fired upon by Serb snipers). From this surreal hotel they reported on the steady destruction of a once beautiful city.

“Ethnic Cleansing” In Sarajevo, the Bosnian Territorials and irregular troops were able to hold off the Serbs in the surrounding hills, but elsewhere in Bosnia the Serb militias made steady progress. Under international pressure, Milosevic had ordered the Yugoslavian army to leave Bosnia in May 1992. However, the army did not

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Historic Sarajevo became the focus and tragic symbol of the Bosnian civil war of 1992–1995, suffering physical and human devastation in a prolonged siege by Serb militia. (Françoise De Mulder/Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

evacuate the pro-Serbian native Bosnian soldiers, along with abundant supplies of weapons and ammunition. In effect, therefore, Milosevic had given the Bosnian Serb militias a well-equipped army of 80,000 men. In contrast, the Muslims and Croats had only poorly organized Territorials and irregular troops. For the first year of the fighting, the Serbs were almost always victorious. (Because of the settlement patterns in Bosnia, Muslim villages tended to be the main targets of Serb aggression.) The Serb militias escalated their policy of ethnic cleansing, that is, the deportation, imprisonment, and murder of soldiers and civilians based on their ethnicity. One by one, Muslim villages were surrounded, the men rounded up, the leaders shot (whether they resisted or not), and the entire population forced to take to the roads, looking for a safe haven. Heavily armed thugs would wander the empty streets, beating up any Muslims who had been foolish enough to stay behind. Using these methods, Bosnian Serbs steadily “digested” northern and eastern Bosnia, incorporating it into the Republika Srpska.

Sometimes the takeover of villages was much more violent, with Serb militiamen rounding up and shooting as many inhabitants as they could catch. Even when the takeover was peaceful, the Muslim men often were not allowed to leave but were instead forced to relocate to Serb-controlled detention centers. These centers resembled the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. In the camps, men were beaten, starved, and then often killed. Serb soldiers also practiced systematic rape of Muslim women, often in organized “rape camps.” These rapes were both an attempt to further terrorize the Muslim population into leaving and an expression of the growing hatred within Bosnia. The net result of these terror tactics was to make ethnic cleansing that much more effective. When Muslim villagers heard of the militia’s approach, they would quickly gather their possessions and depart without a fight. A steady stream of refugees moved from east to west. By the end of 1992, more than 2 million Bosnians—mostly Muslims, but also Croats and Serbs—had lost their homes.

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Radovan Karadzic and other Bosnian Serb leaders defended their actions in two ways. First, they denied that ethnic cleansing of any kind was occurring. The movement of Muslim civilians, they said, was entirely voluntary. When proof of the contrary became too overwhelming, the Serbs responded by arguing they were simply preempting a Muslim jihad. The Muslims, they claimed, had been planning to slaughter the Serbs, and so the Serbs were merely defending themselves. Few in the international community believed this, but they were still unsure what could be done about the Bosnian civil war.

International Inaction The international community was unhappy at the turmoil in Bosnia, particularly once refugees started streaming north into some European countries. They were unwilling, however, to use the only method that was likely to convince the Serbs to stop their offensives: military force. Using foreign troops to stop the fighting might result in casualties, and no nation’s leadership wished to risk the political fallout that soldiers returning in body bags might cause. After a visit to Serbia, James Baker, President George Bush’s secretary of state, said, “We got no dog in this fight.” As the United States was the leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the region’s most powerful military alliance, this statement made the use of combat troops unlikely. The European Community and the United Nations took on the job of trying to end the Bosnian civil war. But neither of these organizations was designed to (or desired to) threaten military force. UN peacekeeping troops were usually sent only to a region where all the parties in a conflict wished peace, which was not the case in Bosnia. So, while the Serbs cleared eastern Bosnia of Muslims, the international community did little to intervene. The United Nations did impose an arms embargo against all of former Yugoslavia, but this hurt the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia much more than it hurt the Serbs. The Serbs had the weapons from the Yugoslavian army, while the Muslims and Croats had no reliable source. As early as May 1992, reports of Serbian atrocities began reaching the world, but reaction was still limited until television cameras were able to film one of the detention centers where Muslim men were being held. The pictures of skeleton-thin Muslims were

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too reminiscent of the pictures of Jews in World War II concentration camps, and public opinion in Western countries began to push for some kind of action to help the Muslims of Bosnia. Izetbegovic and the Muslims wanted an end to the arms embargo, which would allow them to find arms to defend themselves, along with Western air strikes against Serb troop positions. Together, these actions were called “lift and strike.” In 1992, the West was willing to do neither. Either action would seem to be promoting the war, whereas the Western powers wished to convince the combatants to sign a peace agreement. What they did not realize was that Radovan Karadzic and the Republika Srpska had no desire to make peace as long as their armies continued to be successful in expelling Muslims and Croats from their homes.

U N Action In May 1992, the United Nations imposed an economic embargo on Serbia, in an attempt to force Milosevic to rein in his Bosnian Serb allies. Eventually this would have an effect on Milosevic’s policies, but in the short run, it did nothing to stop the advance of the Bosnian Serb forces, which continued to receive some support from Serbia. In June 1992, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow UN troops to take control of Sarajevo’s airport (which they had captured in April). This move provided a means of bringing food into a city that was rapidly filling up with hungry Muslim refugees, but it did nothing to stop the fighting that was causing the refugee problem. The airport was soon bringing in tons of food, and the United Nations felt able to expand its role. In 1992 and 1993, the United Nations moved more troops into other areas of Bosnia. The UN forces (known as UNPROFOR, or United Nations Protection Force) were under orders not to interfere in the fighting; their job was only to protect food supply lines. Eventually the United Nations would put almost 30,000 troops into Bosnia, but they had little effect on the war.

Enclaves By December 1992, the Bosnian Serbs had taken most of the east and south of Bosnia, with the exception of four enclaves: Sarajevo itself, Zepa, Gorazde,

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and Srebrenica. Serb efforts in 1993 focused on conquering the last three, which were entirely behind Serb lines, while maintaining the pressure on Sarajevo. Srebrenica was one of the most dangerous of the enclaves for the Serbs. It had been captured by the Serbs in 1992, but then retaken by a Muslim militia led by a former policeman, Naser Oric (who, before the war, had been one of Milosevic’s bodyguards). From April 1992 to January 1993, Oric organized raids on surrounding Serb villages, treating the Serbs with the same brutality that had been visited on the Muslims. But in January, the Serbs began a counteroffensive that slowly closed a noose around Srebrenica. This large city, with some 40,000 Muslims within its boundaries, seemed in danger of being cleansed. In March 1993, Srebrenica received a brief respite when UN Commander Philippe Morillon brought a couple of UN armored cars into Srebrenica. Morillon had only planned to investigate the situation, but once he arrived, the Muslims refused to let him leave. They assumed that with the UN commander in the town, the Serbs would hesitate to attack. Finally, the Muslims let Morillon leave, and the Serb attacks escalated. Although Morillon’s gesture had not worked, it had attracted the world’s attention to the situation in Srebrenica. The United States, impatient with the slow pace of peace talks and shocked by the pictures appearing on television sets, had been putting increasing pressure on the United Nations to do something about Srebrenica and the other endangered enclaves. On April 15, the United Nations Security Council declared Srebrenica to be a “United Nations safe area.” What this meant was unclear, but it seemed to commit the United Nations to protecting the Muslims from Serb attacks. Later, Tuzla, Bihac, Zepa, and Gorazde would also be declared “safe areas.” The Serb offensive was temporarily halted.

Vance- Owen Peace Plan The creation of safe areas allowed the UN negotiators to push forward a peace plan that had been worked out in January 1993. This plan, designed by European Community representative Lord David Owen and U.S. representative Cyrus Vance, would divide Bosnia into ten separate provinces. Three of these provinces would have a Serb majority, two a Croat

majority, three a Muslim majority, one a mixed Croat and Muslim population, and Sarajevo, the tenth province, would be left as a city shared by all three ethnic groups. The Bosnian Muslims reluctantly accepted the Vance-Owen plan as the best they could hope for. The Croats also supported Vance-Owen because it would have given them large pieces of Bosnia that they might not otherwise have won. However, Karadzic and the Republika Srpska rejected the plan because it would force them to give back some of the land they had already cleansed of Muslims. The precarious position in Srebrenica, however, had put more pressure on Milosevic and Serbia. Late in April 1993, the United Nations passed additional economic sanctions against Serbia that virtually isolated it from the rest of Europe. Responding to this renewed pressure, Milosevic agreed to accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Karadzic was browbeaten into agreeing. The Bosnia Serb hard-liners, however, including Vice President Biljana Plavzicic´ and military Commander in Chief General Ratko Mladic, argued against Vance-Owen, and the Bosnian Serb parliament followed their advice. By May 1993, Vance-Owen was again dead in the water. This was the first time Milosevic had lost control of the Bosnian Serbs. The defeat showed that although Milosevic had helped begin the violent battles in Bosnia, he might not be able to control them.

Croats and Muslims At first, the Muslims and Croats of BosniaHerzegovina had been allied in the face of Bosnian Serb attacks. In the north, the Croats and Muslims had a tradition of reasonably good relations, and here the alliance prospered. In Herzegovina (the southwest corner of Bosnia-Herzegovina), however, the Croats were more interested in carving out a Croat state in Bosnia than they were in working with the Muslims. Skirmishes occurred between Croats and Muslims troops in late 1992 and broke into open war in April 1993. Croat militias began ethnic cleansing operations against Muslim villages in Herzegovina. Muslims were murdered, raped, and forced to flee. Muslims responded by attacking Croat villages, which created more refugees. Gradually, southwestern Bosnia became largely Croat, while central Bosnia

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was made up mostly of Muslims. In the less contentious north, Muslims and Croats continued to cooperate against the Bosnian Serbs. The fighting continued throughout 1993, with Croatian army troops providing some help to the Bosnian Croat militias. Croatia’s leader, Franjo Tudjman, seemed interested in slicing off Herzegovina, the Croatian portion of the Bosnian state, and merging it with Croatia. By summer 1993, the Bosnian Muslims had begun to organize effective military units. Brigades were formed out of men who had been cleansed from other areas. Some of these units had an explicitly Islamic outlook. The troops greeted each other in Arabic, banned the sale of liquor in areas they controlled, and advocated the creation of some kind of Islamic state in Bosnia. Many Bosnian Muslims, particularly those from the cities, felt uncomfortable with these attitudes but were willing to accept support from wherever they could get it, including from their more religious-minded country cousins. The Bosnian Muslims also started to receive help from the rest of the Islamic world. Weapons and supplies were smuggled past the UN embargo, and experienced fighters from around the world trickled into Bosnia to help support the government. Some of these were mujahideen, veterans of the wars in Afghanistan. Iran, in particular, sent tons of weapons along with men to train Bosnians in their use. These outsiders increased the Islamization of the Bosnian Muslim government. With their improved army, Izetbegovic´ and the Bosnian government were able to stabilize the situation in central and northern Bosnia, but they could do little to help the isolated enclaves in the southeast. On March 2, 1994, the military situation in Bosnia changed when the Croats and Muslims agreed to rebuild the Muslim-Croat alliance and create a Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia. The negotiations between the two sides had been pushed forward by American mediators, who saw a Muslim-Croat alliance as the only hope for Bosnia. Tudjman was threatened with economic sanctions if he did not withdraw Croatia’s regular army from Bosnia and convince the Croats of Bosnia that a federation was necessary. Wanting to keep Croatia linked to the West, he agreed. With Tudjman behind the plan, the recalcitrant Croats of Herzegovina were forced to go along. The Croats of the north were already willing to work with the Muslims.

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Change in International Opinion Throughout 1993 and into 1994, the United States and Europe had offered up a series of peace plans that were turned down by one or another of the participants. The United States increasingly favored air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, but the Europeans opposed the idea, particularly those countries with UN troops stationed in the UN-designated safe areas. These nations were afraid that any bombing attacks on the Serbs would elicit retaliatory attacks on UN troops on the ground. The Europeans were still hoping to convince the Bosnian Muslims to accept a plan that left them with only a small fraction of the country. The alternative was to continue the war and risk further European involvement. The beginning of a strong shift in world opinion came on February 5, 1994, when a mortar shell landed in the middle of a Sarajevo market square, killing 69 and wounding more than 200. Many of those killed were women and children. Karadzic and other Serbs claimed that the shell had been fired by Muslims who wished to attract international sympathy, but few believed him. Pictures of the market square attack shocked the world, and the United States again pressed for NATO air strikes against the Serbs. This offensive was still resisted by many within the United Nations. The Soviet Union, a traditional friend to Serbia, had always opposed the idea of NATO intervention in Bosnia. However, other European countries, including France and Britain, agreed with the Americans. NATO air strikes were threatened if the Serbs did not agree to pull back their artillery from around Sarajevo. Under this pressure, the Bosnian Serbs backed down and withdrew their artillery. The heavy bombardment of Sarajevo, which had gone on for two years, was over. But Sarajevo was still almost completely surrounded by Serb forces, and occasional attacks, as well as sniper fire, against the city continued. In April 1994, in cooperation with the UN peacekeeping forces, NATO actually mounted some air strikes to defend the UN safe area in Gorazde. The strikes destroyed a few vehicles and may have convinced the Bosnian Serbs to halt an ongoing offensive. The West was becoming more aggressive but was still unwilling to envision more than token action against Bosnian Serb forces. By June 1994, the five countries most involved in the peace negotiations—Britain, France, Germany,

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the Soviet Union, and the United States—had formed a Contact Group to help coordinate the peace process. The Contact Group came up with another Bosnian peace plan, which would have divided the country between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska, with the Serbs getting somewhat more than half the territory. The MuslimCroat alliance reluctantly accepted the plan. Milosevic, still hurting under UN sanctions, also accepted the plan. The Bosnian Serbs, however, again rejected the plan. The war drifted on. On July 6, 1995, the Serbs attacked the UNdeclared safe area of Srebrenica. Surrounded and cut off from supplies, the Muslim defenders were overwhelmed in a few days. The Dutch UN peacekeepers located in Srebrenica were too few to do anything but watch. About 40,000 people were living in Srebrenica when it fell. The Serbs rounded up thousands of the men and drove them off to be executed. The women and children were allowed to flee to Muslimcontrolled territory; some of the men managed to do so as well. In all, 30,000 people were forcibly deported from the town, and between 7,000 and 8,000 men were murdered and buried in mass graves. This was the worst massacre to occur in Europe since World War II. Serb forces overran Zepa, a smaller safe area, two weeks later. Again, many were killed; again, UN troops watched helplessly. The slaughter of Srebrenica was the deciding moment for the West concerning the Bosnian civil war. President Clinton of the United States and President Jacques Chirac of France, reluctantly supported by Great Britain’s prime minister John Major, pushed through a plan that called for immediate air strikes in defense of the remaining major safe area of Gorazde. They also committed themselves to indirectly supporting a Muslim-Croat offensive against the Republika Srpska.

Muslim- Croat Offensive The Muslim-Croat counterattack began in Croatia, in August 1995, when Franjo Tudjman ordered his armies to attack and seize the Serb territories in Croatia known as the Krajina (which local Serbs had seized in 1991). This assault was coordinated with an attack against Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the Muslim-controlled town of Bihac. Aided by this Croatian attack, the Muslim army in Bihac was able to break out and push the Serbs back to the east.

While these attacks went on, NATO warplanes attacked Bosnian Serb positions. The NATO attacks were supposedly retaliatory—Serb radar had been detected locking onto NATO planes—but the attacks were so well timed that they were likely preplanned. On August 31, 1995, again supposedly responding to another mortar shell dropped near a Sarajevo market square (which killed thirty-seven people), NATO warplanes escalated their level of support and began attacking Serb positions all across Bosnia. The attacks continued for days and hit many Serb military and communications targets. At the same time, Muslim-Croat troops were advancing all across the north of Bosnia. By September 1995, the Muslim-Croat Federation had gone from controlling 30 percent of Bosnia to controlling about 50 percent. In October, the Bosnian Serbs, again pressured by Milosevic, finally agreed to a cease-fire in Bosnia.

Dayton and Its Aftermath In November 1995, the Americans organized talks among the three sides—Muslims, Croats, and Serbs— to discuss peace terms. The talks took place in Dayton, Ohio, and resulted in a peace agreement that was signed on November 22, 1995. The three presidents— Izetbegovic of Bosnia, Milosevic of Serbia, and Tudjman of Croatia—agreed to a peace that gave the Muslim-Croat federation 51 percent of Bosnia, including all of Sarajevo and a thin lifeline road to Gorazde, the last Muslim enclave in the southeast. To make sure that all parties to the Dayton Agreement kept their word, the Contact Group promised to send 60,000 combat soldiers to Bosnia. This army was dominated by NATO troops; the United States, Great Britain, and France provided the largest contingents, but soldiers from many other countries, including Russia, were also included. The troops moved in over the next two months, and the two sides in Bosnia moved their forces apart. The Bosnian civil war had ended. At least 200,000 Bosnians were dead, another 200,000 had been wounded, and more than 2 million had been forced to leave their homes. The war also destroyed $15–20 billion of Bosnian assets and reduced industrial production to 5–10 percent of prewar levels. The Dayton Agreement created a two-tiered government in Bosnia. The Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska each had their own presidents

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and parliaments. Bosnia as a whole had a government, which included a parliament and a presidency that was supposed to be annually rotated among the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. This complex system preserved the illusion of a unified Bosnia, but it was unclear whether it could function effectively. In practice, the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation operated as separate entities. Even within the federation, the Muslims and Croats largely kept control of their own territories, with only limited cooperation between these two groups. The peace allowed Izetbegovic’s Muslim troops to arm themselves with international support. Weapons and equipment were given by the United States and other countries; the United States also committed to supervise the training of a new federation army. Eventually, this army was supposed to allow the Bosnians to defend themselves without outside assistance. Ten years after the war’s end, the cease-fire still held, and control agreements in place between the three sections of Bosnia limited the types and number of arms each section can possess. Dayton was also supposed to allow citizens of different ethnicity to return to their old homes, but in this area, success was slow. Ten years after the war, there were an estimated 328,000 refugees seeking to return to their homes in Bosnia. Beginning in 1997, Bosnia held elections in which refugees were allowed to vote for mayors and city officials in their old homes. Many newly elected Muslim officials who tried to return to their old towns were attacked by mobs of Serbs or Croats who did not wish to see ethnic cleansing undone. Other measures were taken to establish ethnic tolerance. Automobile license plates, which once revealed the geographical home of the registrant, thereby providing clues to his or her ethnicity, were changed so that people could travel freely without fearing that their license plate might subject them to threats or violence. The measure was widely supported in Bosnian elections.

Ouster of Milosevic and International Criminal Tribunal Slobodan Milosevic continued as president of the remaining Yugoslav state, but in the late 1990s he helped begin still another ugly ethnic battle in the old Yugoslav territory of Kosovo, between ethnic Albanians, who were in the majority, and ethnic Serbs,

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who controlled the government. This time, NATO intervened promptly and carried out a long bombing campaign against Serbia to induce Milosevic to end the war. Under international attack, Milosevic saw his power over the Serbs begin to wane. In October 2000, he lost an election for the presidency. The official election commission, under Milosevic’s control, refused to ratify his opponent’s victory and tried to call a run-off election, but angry crowds took to the streets of Belgrade and other Serbian cities, forcing Milosevic to step down as Yugoslavia’s leader. He was replaced by a more moderate nationalist, Vojislav Kosˇtunica. To deal with atrocities committed in the Bosnian War and other violence in the former Yugoslavia, the UN had established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993. The tribunal was formed in response to the international realization that the new states that had emerged during the war were incapable of prosecuting war criminals. All sides had committed war crimes, but Serbs committed most of them. The issue of arresting and extraditing war criminals from Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia has proved a deeply divisive issue in these states. Between 1997 and 2001, twenty-one alleged war criminals were brought to justice. Figures such as Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, as well as Slobodan Milosevic, were all charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. After Milosevic’s election defeat, he surrendered to Serb police and was held in Belgrade on charges of corruption and abuse of power. Soon afterward, the Serbian state accepted $1.3 billion in exchange for extraditing Milosevic to the Netherlands for trial by the International Criminal Tribunal. There, Milosevic insisted on serving as his own defense attorney and continued to generate international attention through his open contempt for the court. He denied any wrongdoing and claimed to have brought peace to Bosnia. Rather than defending himself against the charges of crimes against humanity and genocide, he delivered long speeches accusing others of war crimes, including NATO. He tried to undermine the tribunal’s legitimacy, arguing that it was a political rather than judicial institution. Meanwhile, Bosnia applied for membership in the European Union. To qualify, it implemented fifteen of the sixteen EU conditions for opening talks on membership, including tax and customs reforms and the streamlining of public administration. The

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reform that remained undone involved police forces. Many police in Bosnia were still controlled by local politicians, and many were still tainted by accusations of war crime and ethnic cleansing. At the same time, disputes between powerful EU members seemed to reduce prospects of acceptance for new applicants, especially those from the Balkans.

Analysis The Bosnian civil war was caused by the inability of Bosnians of differing religious or ethnic backgrounds to rise above those differences and create a shared nationalism. The Bosnian Serbs, led by Karadzic and encouraged by Milosevic, bore the lion’s share of responsibility for the start of violence, but Muslims and Croats were quick to respond in kind. Once the fighting began, even the moderates in Sarajevo were eventually forced to take ethnic sides. The international community at first failed to recognize that the essential problem in Bosnia was military, not humanitarian. As long as any side within Bosnia could advance its aims by fighting, it would do so. Because they believed that Bosnia’s problems were largely solvable by food supplies and peace negotiations, the United States and Europe were unwilling to do more than watch as Bosnians killed each other. The UN peacekeepers were in some ways actually counterproductive. They gave the illusion of helping, while the reality was that their presence could discourage serious military action; NATO nations were reluctant to initiate air strikes for fear that the Serbs would attack lightly armed UN troops on the ground. Once NATO showed itself willing to use real military force, the fighting was brought to a halt, and the Dayton Agreement was signed. However, it remained unclear whether the agreement could last

once NATO troops had left Bosnia. Contact Group representatives were working to put an end to the animosities that led to the horror of ethnic cleansing, but it would be difficult to erase the hatreds raised by three years of killing. It remained possible that when NATO troops finally left Bosnia, the fighting might begin again, threatening its citizens with a new civil war and once again threatening wider conflict in the Balkan region. Carl Skutsch and Erika Quinn See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Invasions and Border Disputes; Croatia: War with Serbia, 1991–1995; Macedonia: Ethnic Conflict, 1990s; Serbia: Kosovo Secessionist Movement, 1990s.

Bibliography Cousens, Elizabeth M., and Charles K. Cater. Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. Drakulic, Slavenka. They Would Never Hurt a Fly: War Criminals on Trial in The Hague. New York: Viking, 2004. Glenny, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. New York: Penguin Books, 1996. Maass, Peter. Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. Owen, David. Balkan Odyssey. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1995. Pavkovic, Aleksandar. The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Rogel, Carole. The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Rohde, David. Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997. Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. Vulliamy, Ed. Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia’s War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.

CROATIA: War with Serbia,1991–1995 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Serbia AUSTRIA

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100 Miles 100 Kilometers

HUNGARY

SLOVENIA Zagreb

CROATIA

SLAVONIA

KRAJINA

KRAJINA

A D

Zadar

R I A

Knin

Vukovar

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SERBIA

T I C

MONTENEGRO

S

E A

ITALY

Dubrovnik

The roots of Croatia’s war for independence go back far into Balkan history, long before the establishment of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia in 1918. When the new state was established by the victors in World War I, many Croats had objected to its centralized nature. They felt that in a state where South Slavs were united under a government centered in Belgrade, the capital of prewar Serbia, Croats would suffer. They were correct. It was Serbs who held the best jobs and dominated the country’s administration. When Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia in 1941 during World War II, Croats seized the chance to take charge of their own destiny. The Germans helped Croat Fascist Ante Pavelic and his Ustase followers to create a Croat state. Pavelic and the Usase cooperated with the Nazi campaign to eradicate supposedly inferior races and were responsible for organizing the slaughter of perhaps as many as 700,000 Jews, Gypsies, and Serbs. Even though many Croats opposed Pavelic and the Nazis, these killings left behind a legacy of hatred and distrust between Croats and Serbs.

As Allied forces combined to defeat Germany in 1945, pro-Communist partisan Marshall Tito gained control of Yugoslavia. The Croats returned to their subordinate position. Tito, who was half-Croat and half-Slovene, worked to suppress all ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia in favor of building a Communist state. Croatia existed as a federal state within Yugoslavia, but any movement toward more autonomy was ruthlessly suppressed. More than twenty-five years later, in the early 1970s, Tito crushed “Croatian Spring,” the latest Croat bid for greater independence within Yugoslavia. With Tito’s death in 1980, Croatian nationalism began to recover. It was helped along by the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist who became the premier of Yugoslavia in 1987. Milosevic and his followers, playing on centuries of Serbian resentment against other nationalities in Yugoslavia, sought to impose Serb rule on the federation. Croatians reacted with alarm. In response to Serbian nationalism, they reasserted their own call for independence from Serbian control.

Franjo Tudjman The leader of this reborn Croatian nationalist movement was Franjo Tudjman. During World War II, Tudjman had fought side by side with Tito, but in the 1960s he fell out of favor because he advocated greater independence for Croatia. He was jailed twice but given relatively lenient treatment because of his wartime record. During the 1980s he traveled outside Yugoslavia, establishing connections with the Croatian exiles who lived abroad. In 1989, Tudjman founded the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which was dedicated to reviving an independent Croatia. The new party entered candidates in multiparty elections in Croatia in April 1990—the first such elections in half a century.

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KEY DATES 1980 Marshall Tito, longtime leader of Communist Yugoslavia, dies. 1987

Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milosevic becomes leader of Yugoslavia.

1990 In April, Croatian nationalist Franjo Tudjman wins elections to head the Yugoslav republic of Croatia; Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia secede. 1991

Croatia declares itself independent of Yugoslavia; Serbs in Krajina, backed by the Serbian army, battle Croatian forces; in September, the UN imposes an arms embargo on Serbia; in November, Serbia and Croatia sign a cease-fire.

1992

The Vance plan, calling for 12,000 UN peacekeepers to separate Croatian and Serbian rebel forces in Krajina and the other Serb breakaway province Slavonia, goes into effect in February; in April, Serb rebels, backed by the Serbian army, begin to seize Serbian sections of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia.

1993

While Serbian forces are preoccupied in Bosnia, the Croatian government launches an offensive against the western parts of Krajina.

1995

Croats launch a second offensive against the Serb enclave of Western Slavonia in May; Croats attack the central parts of Krajina in August; under fire from Croatian government forces, Serb rebels in Eastern Slavonia, the last area in rebel Serb hands, negotiate a truce with the government in November; under the truce, UN troops move in to supervise the cease-fire.

1998 Croats take control of Eastern Slavonia.

Tudjman and the HDZ won those elections and began moving Croatia toward complete independence. This put Croatia on a collision course with the central government of Yugoslavia, which was dominated by Milosevic and his Serbia First movement. The HDZ also excited protests from Serbs who lived in Croatia.

Croat- Serb Hostility The Serb minority in Croatia numbered some 600,000, about 12 percent of Croatia’s population. They were concentrated in two separate regions of Croatia—the Krajina and Slavonia—and were united in opposing Tudjman’s nationalist party and his campaign for an independent Croatia. The minority Serbs had history to justify their fears, remembering the ex-

cesses of the Croat Fascist leader Ante Pavelic and his Ustase during World War II. Now they could point to the speeches of Tudjman himself, who appealed to hard-line Croat nationalists by downplaying the crimes of the racist Ustase. He argued that they had not killed as many people as the Serbs claimed and that they had been patriots before anything else. Tudjman did not help allay Serb fears with remarks such as, “Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb.” Tudjman clearly had no qualms about appealing to the racists among his followers, and the Serbs in Croatia feared that if Tudjman’s campaign for independence succeeded, a new ethno-religious war would follow. On the surface, Serbs and Croats were nearly identical: both were ethnically South Slavs, and their spoken languages were practically identical. The main historical difference between the two groups

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was that the Croats were Roman Catholic Christians and the Serbs were Eastern Orthodox Christians. This meant that Croats wrote their language in the Roman alphabet, while Serbs wrote theirs in Cyrillic characters. These old religious and cultural differences had created a history of conflict and distrust, and nationalist leaders on both sides helped raise existing tensions. Croats and Serbs who argued for peace were drowned out by their more suspicious and combative neighbors.

Krajina and Slavonia Break Away As Croatia eased away from the Yugoslav federation, the Serbs in Croatia prepared a secession of their own. In August 1990, the Serbs of the Krajina region organized a non-official referendum and voted to declare their independence from Croatia. Croat police had attempted to stop the vote from occurring but were prevented from doing so by Serb militias, who were backed up by the Yugoslavian army. Most officers in the army of Yugoslavia were Serbs, and as the crises continued, the army would become a tool of Milosevic and the Serb nationalism. At this point the army did not intervene directly against Croatia, but it did help protect the Serb referendum and provided arms for the dissident Serbs in Croatia. Starting in February 1991, the Serbs of Krajina and Slavonia were almost in a state of war with the Croatian police. They seized Croat police stations and ambushed Croat policemen. Some towns in the Krajina and Slavonia regions were completely under local Serb control.

Croatian Independence While it skirmished with Serb militias, the Croatian government prepared to declare independence from Yugoslavia. It smuggled in arms for Croatia’s reserve police force and expected to secede in the fall of 1991. The Croatian schedule for secession was thrown off by another of Yugoslavia’s discontented republics. On June 25, 1991, the Slovene Republic announced its own secession from Yugoslavia. Tudjman and his allies were forced to secede as well or risk remaining in a Yugoslav federation even more completely dominated by the Serbs. They declared Croatia independent on June 26.

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On orders of Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslavian army made only token resistance against Slovenia’s secession. Slovenia had no significant Serb population, and Milosevic was focused solely on protecting and enlisting the Serb populations of Yugoslavia. After the Slovenians withdrew from the federation, the army of Yugoslavia became for all practical purposes the Serbian army, Milosevic’s army. Croatia was left alone to fight a war against the Serb militias in Croatia, which were receiving everincreasing aid from the Yugoslavian army.

War in the Krajina The Croatian army consisted mostly of poorly equipped police, while the Serb militias in the Krajina and Slavonia were well supplied by their friends in the Yugoslavian army. Gradually they expanded the territory they controlled. The Serbs had tanks while the Croats had mostly police vans. As the Serb militias advanced, Croat civilians fled from their homes. If they refused to leave, they were forced out. Even though the Krajina was mostly Serb, there were many Croat villages scattered among those of the Serbs. These villages were captured, and their inhabitants were turned into refugees. The policy of driving out all members of a minority became known as “ethnic cleansing,” a tactic that became widespread in the region’s wars for independence. The intimate nature of the war in the Krajina made it particularly ugly. Neighbors fought against neighbors. Sometimes, when Croats and Serbs had intermarried, members of the same family even fought on opposite sides. Serb propaganda called the Croats the reborn Fascist Ustase. Serb passions were raised by propaganda films that showed old footage of Ante Pavelic and Adolf Hitler standing side by side, followed by modern footage of Tudjman and Helmut Kohl, the current German chancellor, in the same position—suggesting that once again it was Germans and Croats who had united against the Serbs. By August 1991, the Yugoslavian army was cooperating fully with the Serb militias in Croatia. Together they waged an assault on Vukovar, one of the most beautiful cities in Yugoslavia. After three months of shelling, they succeeded in capturing the city on November 20. Most of the Croat civilians who had survived were driven out, but an undetermined number of men were simply rounded up and executed.

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While the Serbs made progress in Croatia’s border regions, the Croats were building an effective army. By November they had begun to slow the advance of the Serb militias and Yugoslavian soldiers. Soon the war reached a stalemate, with Serbs in the Krajina and Slavonia controlling some 30 percent of the Croatian republic but unable to conquer more. A total of 750,000 Serbs and Croats had been driven from their homes because of the fighting. In late November 1991, Milosevic and Tudjman agreed to a cease-fire. Croatia had achieved its independence but at a heavy price. Milosevic and the Serbs considered themselves victorious. By claiming the Krajina and Slavonia, they had taken a step toward creating a “Greater Serbia,” in which Yugoslavia would become a Serb-dominated state under the control of Milosevic.

International Intervention During most of the fighting, the rest of the world had remained unhelpful. Only in September 1991 did the United Nations impose an arms embargo on all of Yugoslavia, hoping to slow the fighting. In practice, however, the embargo was an advantage for the Serbs because they had access to the extensive military supplies of the old Yugoslavian army, while the Croats continued to struggle. The European Community (EC) had attempted to negotiate a settlement in which all the Yugoslav republics would break apart peacefully (the Carrington Plan), but Milosevic had no desire to make peace until he had achieved his

Croatian soldiers get a hero’s welcome near the capital of Zagreb after recapturing the Serb-occupied Krajina region in August 1995. (Ilie Bumbac/AFP/Getty Images)

goal of Serb dominance over most of Yugoslavia. Only after his Serb allies had conquered as much of Croatia as he thought possible did Milosevic agree to the UN peace plan negotiated by former U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance. The Vance plan put 12,000 UN troops into the Krajina and Slavonia to separate the combatants. Serbia agreed to withdraw the Yugoslavian army, while the Serb militias were supposed to (but did not) disarm. The plan took effect in February 1992, and the UN troops began to deploy in March. As the UN moved into place, the Yugoslavian army began its withdrawal from the Krajina and Slavonia. Milosevic seemed to think that with the UN troops there to protect his victory, there was no need for the regular Yugoslavian army to be present.

Bosnian War As the UN troops deployed in Croatia, another struggle was heating up in neighboring BosniaHerzegovina. In April 1992, militias of Serbs living in Bosnia, backed by Milosevic and the Yugoslavian army, had begun attacking their Muslim and Croat neighbors in an attempt to carve out Serb enclaves in Bosnia. At first, as in Croatia, the Serbs had great success, but gradually the Bosnian war began to bog down and required a greater and greater commitment of Serb resources. On January 22, 1993, Tudjman took advantage of Milosevic’s distraction to launch a brief offensive against the western parts of the Serb-held Krajina. The Croatian army had spent a year becoming a professional, reasonably well-equipped force and was able to fight on more than equal terms with the Serb militias of the Krajina (especially as the Yugoslavian army was no longer available to back them up). In about a month of fighting, the Croats were able to seize much of the area around the town of Zadar, which allowed them to link the capital of Zagreb with the Croatian cities of the Dalmatian coast. After the Croats had achieved their limited objectives, they halted their offensive. This January drive had proved two things: first, that the UN peacekeeping force would not intervene to stop fighting in the area and, second, that Milosevic was not willing to engage in another war to defend the Serbs of the Krajina or Slavonia.

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Two years later, in May 1995, the Croats launched a second offensive, this time against the Serb enclave of Western Slavonia, which it captured in a few days— forcing 18,000 Serbs to flee to Serbia. The only response the Serb militias could manage was a rocket attack on Zagreb that killed seven people. Milosevic, now eager to end the economic sanctions that had been placed on Serbia for its actions in Bosnia, did nothing to help the Serbs. The way was clear for Tudjman to take back the rest of Croatia. On August 4, 1995, the Croats attacked the Krajina itself, where most of the Croatian Serbs lived. Again, the Yugoslavian army did not intervene, and again the Croats easily defeated the local militias. By August 5 the Croats had taken Knin, capital of the Krajina. The local Serbs, realizing they could not defeat the improved Croat army, had already begun to evacuate. Within a few days, almost all the Krajina Serbs, more than 200,000, had fled to Serbia. Those who stayed behind were threatened, attacked, and even murdered by Croats who wished the Krajina to be free of all Serbs. This was the logic of ethnic cleansing. The Serbs of Slavonia and the Krajina had terrorized their Croat neighbors into leaving, and now the Croats were doing the same to them. In its attack, Croatia received indirect support from the West, particularly from the United States and Germany, who saw Croatia as a useful counterweight to Milosevic’s ambitions. The United States and the world were also outraged at the atrocities committed by the Serbs in Bosnia and were looking for ways to stop further Serb attacks. Western advisers had helped train the Croat army, and NATO warplanes even bombed Serb military installations in Bosnia while the Croats attacked the Krajina. Serb leaders in Eastern Slavonia—the last Serb enclave in Croatia—knowing that they were Croatia’s next target, negotiated a November 1995 settlement. The agreement brought in UN troops to supervise a gradual transfer of power from the local Serb militias to the Croat government. In January 1998, the Croats took final control of Eastern Slavonia. In the following months, steady harassment of the Serb population led more than half, some 60,000, to flee Croatia. It was likely that Croatia would become almost entirely free of Serbs.

The Serbs had initially been successful against Croatia because the fledgling Croatian army was no match for a Serb militia backed by the might of the wellequipped Yugoslavian army. Once Serbia became bogged down in supporting the Serbs of Bosnia, Croatia had the time to rebuild its army. Croat leader Franjo Tudjman also gained the support of a number of Western countries by agreeing to work with the Bosnian Muslims. When he attacked the Krajina in 1995, he knew that the West would do nothing to intervene and that Milosevic cared more about ending economic sanctions against Serbia than saving Serbs in the Krajina or Slavonia. The international community had relatively little impact on the war. Unwilling to intervene with military force, Europe and the United States remained on the sidelines of the conflicts. The attempts to negotiate a peace rested on the assumption that Croatia and Serbia wished to stop fighting. The reality was that neither was ready to quit. With all the Serb enclaves in Croatia eliminated, Tudjman had nearly eliminated the problem of ethnic minorities within his country’s borders. The only remaining possible conflict was across the border in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many Croats in Herzegovina (the southwestern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina) wanted to be united with Croatia, something also advocated by the right wing of the HDZ. However, any moves to achieve this might have involved Croatia in a war with Bosnia’s Muslims and made it vulnerable to international sanctions. Carl Skutsch See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Invasions and Border Disputes; Bosnia: Civil War, 1992–1995.

Bibliography Denitch, Bogdan Denis. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Glenny, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. New York: Penguin Books, 1996. Pavkovic, Aleksandar. The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York: Penguin, 1997. Tanner, Marcus. Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

CYPRUS: Communal Conflict Since 1955 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Greece; Turkey; United Kingdom; European Union; United Nations; Cyprus (including the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities) TURKEY

MEDITERRANEAN SEA Rizokarpaso U.N. buffer zone

CYPRUS

Turkish Cypriot-administered area U.N. buffer Nicosia zone Area controlled by Cyprus Government Dhekelia Sovereign (Greek Cypriot area) Paphos Base Area (U.K.) Vasilikos Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area (U.K.)

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The root of the Cyprus problem is the inability of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island to live in peace with each other. There are a number of reasons for this, including economic, religious, and historical factors. The communities are supported by external powers—Greece and Turkey—which also have a long history of animosity. The politics of the Cold War was another factor that helped to complicate the problem further, since Cyprus is in a strategic location. The communities in Cyprus were willing to exploit the superpower rivalry to advance their own agendas even though Greece and Turkey were both members of NATO. Cyprus, an island in the eastern Mediterranean, has been controlled by a variety of political powers through the course of history. In the late sixteenth century, it was a part of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Antipathy between Greek and Turkish communities on the island, which have been there for centuries, was intensified as fervent nationalism grew

in Greece in the nineteenth century and in Turkey in the early twentieth century. In 1878, Britain gained control of Cyprus in return for a pledge to help protect the Ottoman Empire from Russian encroachments. When the Ottoman Empire became an ally of Germany during the World War I, Britain, which was at war with the German alliance, annexed the island. After the war, Turkey formally recognized the annexation by signing the Treaty of Lausanne in 1925, and Cyprus became a British Crown Colony. When World War II ended, colonies across the globe began demanding independence. Nationalism, the desire for self-determination, and the idealism expressed by the victorious powers during the war brought into question the legitimacy of empires. Colonial powers such as Britain and France increasingly faced anticolonial revolts. Exhausted and economically depleted by World War II and responsive to anticolonial feeling in the world, they acquiesced in granting independence to many of their former colonies. They were driven out of others and forced to grant independence. In this rush to independence, Cyprus was one of the exceptions. After 1945, the Greek Cypriot nationalists demanded an end to British rule. Most Greek leaders were not seeking independence, however, but a union (or enosis) with nearby Greece. At the time, the Cypriot population was approximately 500,000, which included about 400,000 Greek Cypriots and fewer than 100,000 Turkish Cypriots. The British were reluctant to accede to demands for their departure because Cyprus had gained strategic importance for them. In 1954, they withdrew their troops from the Suez Canal in Egypt, which made Cyprus their main base and listening post in the eastern Mediterranean.

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KEY DATES 1955

Archibishop Makarios and Colonel George Grivas from the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters unite to drive British colonists from the island.

1960

Cyprus becomes independent of Great Britain, with government powers divided between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority.

1963

Efforts by the president, Archbishop Makarios, to amend the Cypriot constitution leads to violent protests by the Turkish minority and the Turkish government in Ankara.

1967

The military takes power in Greece in a coup.

1974

The military government in Greece organizes a coup in Cyprus, sending the moderate Makarios into exile and putting in power the more proGreek Cypriot leader Nicos Sampson on July 15; on July 20, Turkish troops land in Cyprus to protect minority interests; by August, the island is partitioned into Greek and Turkish enclaves; the Greek government backs down from the coup and allows Makarios to return to office in December.

1983

Turkish Cypriots form the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

2004 A plan by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for unifying the island is approved by Turkish Cypriots but voted down by Greeks in April; despite the failure to unify the island, the Greek part of Cyprus joins the European Union in May.

Anti-British Movement In January 1955, two leading Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios and Colonel George Grivas (who later became a general), organized a group called the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). In April, they launched a violent campaign to drive the British out of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot elite wanted to be free of British rule, but there was disagreement between those favoring immediate union with Greece and those who sought independence. The latter group understood that the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, and Britain all would oppose union with Greece and believed that independence could be achieved more easily. There was also disagreement between Greek Cypriots who favored negotiations to end British rule and those who were willing to use military force. Grivas thought the British were more likely to respond to Greek Cypriot demands for independence or union with Greece if confronted with an armed revolt.

The demand for British withdrawal soon caused clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus itself. These conflicts were encouraged by Greeks and Turks, whose animosity toward each other had existed for centuries. Turks pointed out that Cyprus had been a part of the (largely Turkish) Ottoman Empire for more than three centuries. If the island united with Greece, they said, the security, economic health, and very identity of the Turkish minority would be endangered. Moreover, Turkey’s southern flank would also be vulnerable to Greek pressure. The Turkish Cypriots preferred to remain a British colony rather than accept union with Greece. The Turkish government was determined to protect the Turkish community on Cyprus and was willing to use its military might to do so. In February 1959, after years of negotiations, Britain, Greece, and Turkey concluded three agreements, often referred to as the London-Zurich agreements, which laid the foundation for Cypriot

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independence. The Treaty of Establishment, between Cyprus and Britain, freed Cyprus from British rule, although the British retained sovereignty over two areas where they had military bases. Second was the Treaty of Alliance, negotiated by Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, which permitted Greece and Turkey to maintain military contingents on Cyprus. Third was the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and Britain, which guaranteed the permanence of the agreement reached. Cyprus could not be partitioned and could not unite with any other country; amending the constitution would require the approval of each of the three outside powers. Each had the right to intervene militarily in Cyprus to prevent changes in the agreed political settlement. Many Greek Cypriots were particularly resentful that some constitutional changes were prohibited absolutely and that those that were allowed required the approval of the Turkish Cypriot community. In fact, the treaties had been forced on the Cypriots by the outside powers and the international community. Despite the many reservations regarding the 1959 agreements, Cyprus became independent in August 1960.

Independent Cyprus The granting of independence did not end the internal discord. The Greek Cypriots believed that the 1959 constitution gave the Turkish Cypriot community a disproportionate share of power. The vice president had to be a Turkish Cypriot, elected exclusively by the Turkish Cypriot community, and have the authority to veto legislation regarding foreign affairs and defense policies. Fiscal legislation required a majority vote of the Turkish Cypriot members in the legislature. The Turkish Cypriot community was guaranteed a percentage of positions in the civil service, the police, and the army. Because of these protections, the Greek Cypriots were determined to amend the constitution one way or another. In November 1963, President Makarios, a bishop of the Greek Orthodox Church who had been elected to the office in 1959, proposed thirteen changes to the Cypriot constitution. The Turkish Cypriot community and the government in Ankara opposed the proposed changes. Tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, already at a dangerous level, escalated dramatically because of a relatively minor inci-

dent on December 21, 1963. The cause of the incident is unclear. Shots were fired, two Turkish Cypriots were killed, and the violence spread rapidly throughout the island. To restore order, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, with the approval of the Cypriot government, organized a joint force whose function was to implement a cease-fire and maintain order. This was done by separating the two communities by a buffer force. The British also arranged to convene a conference in London in January 1964 with representatives of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, Greece, and Turkey. The talks proved unsuccessful, however, and the violence in Cyprus continued unabated. Political instability was increasing, and both sides resorted to the use of violence, including kidnapping, acts of terror, and the taking of hostages. The British recommended the creation of a NATO peacekeeping force, but President Makarios, who had the backing of the Soviet Union, rejected this idea, insisting that such a force should be under the authority of the United Nations and be composed of non-NATO states. When it became evident that the London meeting would not succeed, the British requested a meeting of the UN Security Council. In March 1964, the Security Council approved a resolution to establish a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), which became operational on March 27 and soon numbered nearly 7,000 personnel. The UN secretary-general was also authorized to appoint a mediator to help establish a lasting peace. By now the constitutional government of Cyprus had collapsed. Turkish Cypriots retreated to, or were driven into, enclaves where they were able to protect themselves. The Greek Cypriots inherited the “Republic of Cyprus” in which the Turkish Cypriots either refused or were not allowed to play a part. The international community recognized the Greek Cypriot rump state as Cyprus. The efforts between 1964 and 1967 to find a solution satisfactory to both communities failed. Tensions increased when the government of Greece was overthrown by a military coup in April 1967. The new Greek government was committed to bringing about Cyprus’s union with Greece. This shift in leadership led to renewed fighting between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. The Cypriot National Guard, now under the control of General

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Grivas, thought the time was ripe to bring about the union of Cyprus with Greece. To achieve that goal, his forces attacked the Turkish enclaves. The government in Ankara threatened to intervene militarily if the National Guard continued its offensive. The fighting ceased, and General Grivas returned to Athens. In December 1967, Turkish Cypriot leaders began to organize their own government, a step in the direction of a permanent partition of the island.

Coup in Nicosia By 1971, President Makarios was distrusted by the military government in Athens and opposed by General Grivas. The latter secretly returned to Cyprus to renew the campaign for union with Greece. He organized military patrols into Turkish areas, resulting in violent clashes between the two communities. He also raided police stations and government offices to seize arms for his followers. On July 3, 1974, President Makarios wrote to the government in Athens and asked for the removal of the 650 Greek soldiers who were a part of the Cypriot National Guard. Rather than approve the request, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, who had seized power in Athens in November 1973, organized a coup to remove Makarios from power. The coup was carried out on July 15, 1974. President Makarios fled to London, narrowly escaping death, and Nicos Sampson, a known terrorist, became president. The danger to the security of the Turkish Cypriot community was evident. The government in Athens, however, had underestimated Turkey’s willingness to use military force to protect Turkish Cypriots and prevent the union of Cyprus with Greece. As a signatory to the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey had a legal basis for intervening militarily in Cyprus. Turkish troops landed in Cyprus on July 20, 1974, making rapid gains. Largely as a result of the Turks’ success in Cyprus, the humiliated military junta in Greece decided on July 24 to return government control in Athens to civilians. President Makarios returned to Cyprus in December 1974 and regained his office. By August 1974, there was a de facto partition of the island, with the Turkish Cypriot community controlling almost 40 percent of the land. Greeks who had lived in Turkish areas flocked to “safe” Greek regions; Turks in Greek areas fled to Turkish regions. Thou-

Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus during the summer of 1974 forced the partitioning of the island into Greek and Turkish sectors. (Reg Lancaster/Getty Images)

sands of Cypriots became homeless refugees, intensifying the hostility between the two communities.

The U N and the Quest for Peace While UN forces formed a barrier between the two communities, the secretary-general was empowered to use his good offices to bring about a negotiated solution. Earlier attempts by a mediator had failed, but after de facto partition, the quest was resumed. In 1977 and again in 1979, representatives of both sides came to a limited agreement to seek “an independent, unaligned, bi-communal federal republic” in which the central federal government would “safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.” This was as far as they got, however; on the practical details, there was no agreement. After 1979, there were many variations on this theme.

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On November 15, 1983, the Turkish Cypriots established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which was recognized only by Turkey. The TRNC was the counterpart of the Greek Cypriotcontrolled Republic of Cyprus, which was recognized by most other countries. The situation on the island remained tense, and the larger problem unresolved. In future years, the only prospects for breaking the impasse came from outside organizations, often with the strong support of the international community. This first effort to resolve the Cyprus issue was made by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuéllar between 1984 and 1986. It almost succeeded, but at the last minute, the Greek Cypriot leader Spyros Kyprianou refused to sign the agreement. Later, after a long series of negotiations between Greek Cypriot leader Georgios Vassiliou and Turkish Cypriot Rauf Denktash, new ideas for an agreement were presented in 1992. In the end, neither side formally accepted them. This time, international observers considered the Turkish Cypriots to be the most unbending.

The E U and the Cyprus Problem The situation was stalled again until the emergence of a new issue pressured Cypriots to consider compromise once again. This was the prospect of entering the European Union (EU), which offered important economic benefits to the island’s population. Once again, the issues centered on the security of both communities, their identities, their parity as constituent communities of the state, the rights of refugees and citizens in the respective zones of the island, and, above all, the lack of mutual trust between the two. Many observers wondered if membership in the EU would make a difference. Both Greece and Turkey had started their own quest for membership in the EU in the 1960s. Greece’s journey was relatively smooth, joining the EU in 1981. The course of Turkey’s negotiations was less satisfactory and continued into the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, Cyprus (along with nine other states) applied for EU membership on March 31, 1998. The negotiations between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus were recognized by all members of the international community except Turkey. The fundamental political question was whether the EU would require Cyprus to solve the problem of its divided government, which still represented only

Greek Cypriots and not Turkish Cypriots. If it did require that the problem be solved, Turkish Cypriots would gain a veto over EU entry unless the problem was solved to their satisfaction. If the EU did not require a solution, the control of Greek Cypriots over the island’s government would be confirmed. In 1999, the EU made it clear that resolution of the problem was not a precondition, thus favoring the Greek Cypriots. Greece had pressured its fellow EU members to make this ruling by threatening to veto the entry of the other eight new members whose entry was pending. Still, the EU question prompted yet another ambitious effort to reach a resolution of the conflict. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had the active support of Great Britain, the United States, the EU, and Greece and Turkey, whose relationship had recently improved. Glavcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot leader, and Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot, eventually considered five versions of the Annan Plan, which represented the best effort of the international community. The final version of the Annan Plan was put to separate votes among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on April 24, 2004. Just before the voting, there were changes in leadership in both communities. In the Greek community, Clerides had been defeated by Tassos Papadopoulos, a strong nationalist. In the Turkish community, Denktash, who had become ever more intransigent, was beaten by Mehmet Ali Talat, who seemed less inflexible. Turkey gave the plan significant support. There was a high turnout among Turkish Cypriots, and 65 percent of them accepted the Annan Plan. Among Greek Cypriots, however, 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots followed Papadopoulos’s advice and rejected the plan. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement stated bluntly, “I have been cheated by the Greek Cypriot Government”—a view widely shared in the international community. Nevertheless, the Greekcontrolled government of Cyprus was accepted into full EU membership in May 2004. The following year, the EU voted on opening formal negotiations with Turkey on full EU membership. Significantly, neither Greece nor Cyprus vetoed the negotiations. Cyprus itself remained a country divided. Greek Cypriots, now securely in the EU, were still not prepared to accept the Turkish Cypriots as an equal partner but only as a suitably protected minority. Kenneth L. Hill and A.J.R. Groom

Cyprus: Communal Conflict Since 1955 See also: Anticolonialism; Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Brewin, Christopher. The European Union and Cyprus. Huntingdon, UK: Eothen Press, 1999. Clerides, Glafkos. Cyprus: My Deposition. Nicosia: Alithia, 1989.

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Denktash, R.R. The Cyprus Triangle. London: K. Rustem, 1988. Foley, Charles. Legacy of Strife. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1964. Koumoulides, John T.A., ed. Cyprus in Transition 1960–1965. London: Trigraph, 1986. Richmond, Oliver. Mediating in Cyprus. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Coup,1948 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coup PARTICIPANT: Soviet Union EAST GERMANY

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At the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia was the odd country out in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union had installed Communist-dominated governments in the rest of Eastern Europe, but in Czechoslovakia it had allowed a non-Communist government with strong democratic roots. While this unusual situation lasted, it created hope among many Czechs and Slovaks that Czechoslovakia would avoid the fate of the other Eastern European states that had been “liberated” by the tanks of the Soviet Union. Much of the credit for Czechoslovakia’s brief postwar flirtation with democracy lies with its prewar president, Eduard Benes. Benes had been a Czechoslovakian leader since the country’s birth in 1918 and had always been a firm defender of democratic principles. Benes was Czechoslovakia’s president in 1938 when Adolf Hitler forced Czechoslovakia to give up the portion of its territory known as the Sudetenland. In the following year, Hitler absorbed the remainder of Czechoslovakia, and Benes fled the country. With the start of World War II, Benes formed a government in exile, located in London, which he hoped to lead back into power once the war was over. He felt that it was important to maintain the idea of Czechoslovakian democracy even while his country was under Nazi control.

By 1941, Benes’s government in exile was accepted as the legitimate Czechoslovakian government by Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Of the three, Benes considered the last to be the most important country for Czechoslovakia’s future. When Czechoslovakia was liberated, it was probably going to be by Soviet troops. Benes assumed, therefore, that the Soviet Union would have to play a key role in any postwar Czechoslovakian government. Throughout World War II he worked assiduously to build a strong relationship with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. In this respect, he was substantially different from the other major Eastern European government in exile, Poland. The Polish government in London was consistently hostile to the Soviets and hoped, unrealistically, to form a postwar government without Soviet interference. Benes was both more farsighted and more willing to compromise. Benes’s courting of Stalin paid off. In December 1943, the two men signed the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation. Stalin agreed to support the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia under Benes and promised not to interfere in its internal affairs. In return, Benes promised that any Czechoslovakian government would be a friendly ally to the Soviet Union. Benes also agreed to work closely with the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in the creation of the postwar government. In March 1945, Benes flew to Moscow and, together with the Czechoslovakian Communists, drew up the blueprints for the future government of Czechoslovakia, currently being liberated by Soviet soldiers. The new government was to have a strong left-wing bent, but it was by no means going to be dominated by the Czechoslovakian Communists. Out of twenty-five ministers, eight were Communists, and the rest belonged to Socialist and other leftleaning parties. Benes was to be president, and a Social Democrat with strong Communist sympathies

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KEY DATES 1918

Czechoslovakia is created out of provinces of the old AustroHungarian Empire.

1938–1939

Czechoslovakia is incorporated into Nazi Germany in a bloodless but hostile takeover.

1941

Czechoslovakian president Eduard Benes forms a government-inexile in London.

1943

Benes signs the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation with Soviet leader Josef Stalin, who pledges to support the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia after the war and to abstain from interference in internal Czechoslovakian affairs.

1945

Benes flies to Moscow and draws up plans for the postwar government with Czechoslovakian Communists.

1946

The Communists win a plurality of 38 percent in national assembly elections, though some complain that some noncommunist parties were not permitted to field candidates.

1947

Although both Communist and noncommunist politicians express an interest in accepting the U.S. Marshall Plan rebuilding funds, they are overruled by the Soviet Union.

1948

Clashes between Communists and noncommunists intensify both inside and outside of the government; in February, Communist militias force Benes to appoint their own people to government posts, effectively ending the postwar coalition government.

was to be his prime minister. Benes and his new ministers agreed that the new government would initiate a program of socialist reform.

Czechoslovakia Liberated Benes and his government arrived in Prague, Czechoslovakia’s capital, in May 1945, a few days after Soviet troops had taken the city. (Earlier in May, American troops under General Omar Bradley had come within fifty miles of Prague and probably could have taken it before the Soviets, an event that might have had some impact on the postwar political situation in Czechoslovakia. Bradley was told by his superiors to advance no farther because agreements made during the war had already conceded that the Soviets were to be given the honor of liberating Czechoslovakia.)

The government that Benes set up in Prague was a National Front government, which included all political parties under its wing. Czechoslovakia was to be a democracy without a democratic opposition. While this was contrary to Benes’s democratic principles, he felt that it was a reasonable alternative to the one-party government that Stalin might otherwise impose. In any case, the National Front government was generally popular and roughly represented a large proportion of the Czechoslovakian population. In May 1946, the new government held elections for a new National Assembly. The voting was largely free from interference, but it was somewhat tainted by the fact that only six political parties were allowed to put up candidates and that two of these were Communist parties (one for the Czech region and one in Slovakia). The result was a victory for the Communist

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Party, which won 38 percent of the vote, making it the largest single party in Czechoslovakia. There had already been a strong Communist Party in Czechoslovakia before the German conquest in 1938 and 1939, which Communists built on after the war. In addition, the Communist Party had gained prestige from its association with the Soviet Union. Many Czechoslovakians saw the Soviets as their saviors from German occupation and voted for the Communists out of a sense of gratitude. More significantly, the Communists had been put in charge of the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Information, which meant they controlled the radio and many of the newspapers. This domination of the press made it easier for them to spread pro-Communist political propaganda.

Coexistence with Communism In spite of the Communist victory, the new government remained democratic in nature. President Benes appointed the leader of the Communist Party, Klement Gottwald, prime minister, but the remaining ministries were divided fairly evenly, with the Communists receiving only nine out of twenty-five. Of the nine ministries controlled by Communists, however, were the critically important Interior ministries, in charge of the police, and the Information ministry, in charge of the press. For the next two years, the government functioned reasonably well. It embarked on a program of land reform and industrial nationalization, in line with its avowed socialist principles, but it did not eliminate all private property or suppress small businesses. Much like Lenin’s earlier New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovakian government seized the commanding heights of the economy by nationalizing most heavy industries, but it allowed small businessmen and farmers to continue to operate freely. In foreign policy, the Czechoslovakian government followed a pro-Soviet line on all major issues, but also tried to maintain ties of friendship with the Western nations. This was a difficult balancing act to maintain in the years when Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States were growing. Jan Masaryk, the non-Communist foreign minister, was convinced that Czechoslovakia had to work closely with the Soviet Union, but he also wanted to establish economic links with the wealthier Western world.

Both Benes and Masaryk felt that Czechoslovakia could be a bridge between West and East: a Socialist government, friendly to the Soviets, but willing to talk to the United States and its allies. Their views proved to be too optimistic. The dynamics of the Cold War would involve more dynamiting than building of bridges. The first clear sign that Czechoslovakia would not be able to walk a middle road between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds came in 1947. The Americans had just introduced the Marshall Plan to Europe and invited all European nations, including both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, to share in its benefits. The Czechoslovakians, their economy still recovering from the devastation caused by the war, expressed interest in being involved in the American program. Even the Czechoslovakian Communists voted, in July 1947, to send delegates to Paris to discuss the American proposal. In the Soviet Union, however, Stalin vetoed Czechoslovakian participation in the Marshall Plan. From the Soviet perspective, the Marshall Plan was a blatant attempt by the United States to use economic aid as a means of seducing the nations of Eastern Europe away from their Communist loyalties. Stalin ordered Czechoslovakia to turn down the American offer. Aware of the political realities, the government obeyed. Surrounded by pro-Soviet governments, and with many Soviet divisions located near Czechoslovakian borders, Czechoslovakia had little choice.

Communist Subversion Stalin’s abrupt command disturbed many of the nonCommunist ministers in Benes’s government, including Benes himself. They began to wonder whether the coalition with the Communists was truly workable. Some of the more strident of the nonCommunist leaders began to work toward a showdown with their Communist partners. There was an opposite reaction on the part of the Communist ministers. They saw the reluctance of their colleagues to follow the Soviet line as a warning to work toward a completely Communist Czechoslovakia without middle-of-the-road Socialist compromises. After July 1947, Communists and non-Communists increasingly confronted one another in a struggle for power.

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The pro-democratic forces of Czechoslovakia were hampered in their struggle by their belief in a democratic process, which had already become more a memory than a reality. The Communist party of Czechoslovakia was not so handicapped. Its leaders were willing to use whatever means seemed appropriate to wrest power from their opponents. In September 1947, bombs were delivered through the mail to three non-Communist ministers, including the popular Masaryk. The Communist Party was suspected of sending the bombs, but the Communist minister in charge of the police interfered with the investigation and prevented the discovery of any definitive proof. The bomb incident did raise suspicion about the Communists, however. The party was more successful in putting loyal party members into positions of authority. In all the government ministries controlled by Communists, non-Communists were systematically fired and replaced by Communists. This was particularly worrisome in the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the police. By 1948, more than half of the commanders of local police units were Communist party members. The Communists also worked to organize mass organizations of workers and students as a means of putting pressure upon Benes’s government. Action Committees were set up in factories and villages across Czechoslovakia. They were supposed to be ready to move if the Communist revolution seemed in danger. These organizations, completely controlled by a Communist leadership, were available to demonstrate in favor of programs that the Communists within the government wanted to pass. The prodemocracy parties had no similar mass organizations with which to counter the Communists. The ability to summon large crowds at short notice gave the Communists the advantage of appearing stronger than they really were.

allowed to participate in the Marshall Plan’s economic benefits. Polls suggested that the Communists might only win 28 percent of the vote, a drop of 10 percent from their victory in 1945. The Communists had also lost a political ally. In November 1947, the Social Democrats replaced their old chairman, Zdenek Fierlinger, a Communist sympathizer, with the more moderate Bohumil Lausman. In any future government, the Communists could no longer count on Social Democratic support. The Communists’ leader, Gottwald, was almost certainly aware that his chances of winning the election were slipping away. He began to work toward a more direct seizure of power. In late 1947, his rhetoric became more confrontational. He spoke of the danger of “foreign reactionaries” and “domestic reactionaries” who were threatening the future of Communism in Czechoslovakia. These phrases, which had been used by Communist leaders in Poland, East Germany, and Yugoslavia, were designed to provide justification for any extra-legal action that Gottwald might take to protect the Communists’ position in Czechoslovakia. The “reactionaries” he was referring to were the legally appointed pro-democracy Czechoslovakian government ministers. By February 1948, the Communists were using all their powers to disrupt the activities of their prodemocracy opponents. In particular, they were becoming extremely aggressive in their use of the police. Democrats were being arrested for no good reason, while the political police were spreading rumors of American espionage plots. These actions led to a confrontation within the Czechoslovakian cabinet. The non-Communist ministers attacked the Communists and demanded that they stop packing the police with their own party members. The Communists refused.

19 4 8 Election Campaign

At this point, the pro-democracy ministers made a fatal mistake. On February 20, 1948, in order to force the dismissal of the Communist minister of the interior, the non-Communists, as a group, handed in their resignations. Under a normal parliamentary government, this would have been a clever maneuver. It would have forced all ministers to resign and given the president (Benes, in this case) the ability to appoint new ministers. The pro-democracy leaders confidently expected

The final break came in early 1948. Both sides were preparing for the elections that were to be held in May, and tensions were high. It is probable that the Communists would have lost if they had allowed free elections to occur. The boost they had received from the postwar euphoria was gone, and many Czechoslovakians were resentful of their heavy-handed tactics. Some also resented that Czechoslovakia had not been

Communist Coup

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Communist Action Committees, parading in the streets of Prague in early 1948, intimidated pro-democracy Czech opponents and helped facilitate the coup of that February. (Walter Sanders/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Benes to put pro-democracy loyalists into the critical ministries, especially the Ministry of the Interior. But Czechoslovakia in 1948 was not a normal parliamentary system. While accepting their letters of resignation (although not the resignations themselves), Benes assured the ministers that he supported them completely: “It is necessary that the Communists capitulate. . . . You can count entirely on me. I will not compromise.” However, it soon became clear that the ministers had been out-maneuvered. As soon as the non-Communists handed in their resignations, Gottwald and the other Communist leaders took action. First, they themselves refused to resign. Second, they demanded that Benes accept the resignations of the non-Communists. Finally, they ordered party members throughout Czechoslovakia to mobilize for possible mass action. In preparation for the crisis, Gottwald had already ordered the creation of a People’s Militia, which was to be armed with the help of Communist workers in the defense factories. This militia was ordered to mobilize and march on Prague.

Over the next few days, Gottwald and the Communist leadership organized massive demonstrations in Prague, which were designed to intimidate both the non-Communists and President Benes. By February 23, there were thousands of armed People’s Militiamen patrolling the streets of Prague, supported by thousands more pro-Communist trade unionists, who had been trucked in from other parts of the country. Members of the pro-Communist Action Committees appeared in the offices of pro-democracy ministers and forced them to leave. Their aim was obviously to force those who had resigned to leave the government, using whatever means were necessary. They also took over the offices of newspapers that were not already loyal to the Communists. By February 24, the Communists were in control of almost every important newspaper, broadcasting service, and government office. Although the Communists did not have the support of a majority of the country, it was clear that they had a majority of the organized workers on their side. The only demonstration in opposition to the Communists was carried out by a few thousand

Czechoslovakia: Coup, 19 4 8

Czechoslovakian university students. They were easily dispersed by gunfire. The only force that could have saved democracy in Czechoslovakia was the army, but the army was under the firm control of a Communist sympathizer, General Lodvik Svoboda. On February 25, Gottwald met with President Benes and demanded that he appoint a group of Communist and pro-Communist ministers to replace those who had resigned. Benes, after some hesitation, agreed. With thousands of armed men marching through the streets of Prague, he had very little choice. After five days, the crisis ended with a complete Communist victory. In order to present a better appearance to the outside world, Gottwald convinced Benes to remain as president, but in June, the old patriot resigned, after repeatedly refusing to sign the new Communist constitution. Seven months after watching the Communist coup succeed, he died. The other popular non-Communist in the Czechoslovakian government, Jan Masaryk, had died only two weeks after the coup. On March 10, his body was discovered beneath the window of his office in the Foreign Ministry. The Communists claimed that he had committed suicide, but it was strongly suspected that Masaryk had been pushed to his death.

Analysis President Benes has been criticized by contemporaries and historians for being naive enough to think that he could work with the Soviet Union and still preserve some kind of democratic government in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps Benes had been naïve, but he had little choice in the matter. It was Soviet soldiers who had liberated Prague from German occupation in 1945. Czechoslovakia was surrounded by countries with Communist governments allied to the Soviets. Had Benes not been willing to work with the Czechoslovak Communists and the Soviet Union, it is likely that a Communist-sponsored coup would have been carried out three years earlier. In hindsight, it seems clear that Stalin had no intention of allowing Czechoslovakia any real freedom and that it considered the Benes government as a transition to a Communist-controlled government. Political leaders, however, do not have the benefit of hindsight. Benes had to consider the possibility that Stalin was undecided about what to do with Czecho-

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slovakia and that there really was an opportunity for the country to serve as a bridge between East and West. It is also worth noting that it was not Soviet troops that put Communism into power in Czechoslovakia, but Czechoslovakian Communists. It is true that without Stalin’s pressure, the Czechoslovakian Communists would not have been in such a strong position to stage a coup. And it is also true that all the Czechoslovakian politicians, from every party, were very aware that Czechoslovakia was surrounded on three sides by pro-Soviet governments. Any political result that met with Stalin’s disapproval was likely to bring tanks rolling across the border. Still, it was Czechoslovakia’s own people who bore a large share of the responsibility for actively promoting, or passively allowing, the destruction of its three-year experiment in democracy.

Aftermath After the February crisis, Gottwald very quickly worked to turn the country into a one-party state along the lines of the Soviet Union. In the elections that were held that May, only Communist-approved candidates were allowed to run for office. In June, after Benes’s resignation, Gottwald was elected president of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had been the only country in Eastern Europe to have a strong democratic tradition before World War II. After the war, it was natural that it should try to revive that tradition—but it failed. Czechoslovakia would not return to any kind of democratic society until the brief Prague Spring of 1968. The Czechoslovakian coup d’état became one more signpost on the road to the Cold War. For the West, the coup again demonstrated that the Soviet Union was unwilling to tolerate any real diversity of opinion within the ranks of its Eastern European satellite nations. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Coups; Czechoslovakia: Soviet Invasion, 1968; Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 1981–1983.

Bibliography Bloomfield, Jonathan. The Passive Revolution: Politics and the Czechoslovak Working Class, 1945–48. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979.

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Kaplan, Karel. The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 1945–1948. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987. Korbel, Josef. The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938– 1948. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959. ———. Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Luza, Radomir, and Victor S. Mamatey, eds. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973. Ripka, Hubert. Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d’état. New York: Hyperion, 1950. Zinner, Paul E. Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918–48. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1963.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Soviet Invasion,1968 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Soviet Union EAST GERMANY

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prague

WEST GERMANY Iron Curtain

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At the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia was the only Eastern European state to develop a democratic government. Beginning in 1945, Czechoslovak president Eduard Benes led a coalition of democratic and socialist parties. The government soon encountered interference from the Soviet Union, however, and in 1948, a Communist coup d’état ended the democratic government with a one-party dictatorship. Still, Czechoslovakia never completely lost its sympathy for democracy. In 1968, Czechoslovakia again attempted to create a more liberal government and society than existed elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. This attempt, known as the Prague Spring, was eventually crushed by the tanks of Czechoslovakia’s Communist neighbors, but not before it had managed to inspire the world by its attempt to achieve freedom from Soviet control.

Historical Background After the 1948 Communist coup, Czechoslovakia had settled into a long period of following the Soviet party line. In the 1950s, there had been some attempts by Czechoslovakian Communists to lessen the Stalinist severity of the regime, but they were suppressed by hard-liners within the party led by Antonin Novotny.

Novotny was the perfect Communist apparatchik. He had no desire to change the system, which he found himself leading, and Czechoslovakia continued its political and economic stagnation. By 1962, however, it was clear that there were serious problems with Czechoslovakia’s economy and Novotny’s uninspired leadership. Industrial production was growing slowly and in some areas was actually in decline. The quality of goods produced was also mediocre, even compared to the goods of the other Eastern European Communist states. Rigid state control of industry meant that no decisions could be made without approval from the party bosses, which resulted in stagnation and inefficiency. Czechoslovakia’s population was growing faster than housing production, and many young Czechoslovakians were finding it hard to find a place to live. Czechoslovakia was also producing less food than it had before World War II. Czechoslovakia seemed to be making only spotty progress. Compared to the prosperity of its next-door neighbor, capitalist West Germany, Czechoslovakia’s lack of economic progress was embarrassing. Czechoslovakia was also facing ethnic tensions. Slovakia had always been the poorer region of the partnership and usually received a smaller share of government patronage and Communist party influence. Even though Slovakia’s relative position had improved since 1948, the Slovaks were still resentful of the more prosperous Czechs. If anything, the improvements in the Slovak economy had helped to increase the levels of resentment. A richer Slovakia had a population that was better educated and more aware—and therefore better able to see just how far they still had to go. Finally, a large percentage of Czechoslovakia’s workforce was in white-collar occupations. These technocrats had come to expect a better standard of living and were in a particularly good position to

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KEY DATES 1948

Communists seize power in a coup.

1962

Deteriorating economic conditions force Czechoslovakian Communist Party first secretary Antonin Novotny to abandon the Communist economic five-year plan.

1964

Reformist Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev is deposed and replaced by Kremlin hard-liners; Novotny promises economic reforms and political liberalization.

1967

Students, intellectuals, and others complain about the government’s failure to initiate reforms promised three years earlier and begin to protest the Novotny government; Novotny resigns as Communist Party head.

1968

Alexander Dubcek takes over as head of the Communist Party in January; Novotny resigns as president in March, as new Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev and other Communist leaders warn Dubcek that Czechoslovakian reforms are going too far in undermining Communist rule in the country; in April, Dubcek adopts the Action Program, which calls for many of the economic and political reforms first promised by Novotny in 1964; on August 20, military units from the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact countries invade Czechoslovakia; civilian resistance is easily overcome.

1969

Although Dubcek rolls back reforms, he is forced to step down as head of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in April; demonstrations in Prague on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion are put down by troops.

1989

The Communist government falls in a peaceful “velvet” revolution.

note how much better their counterparts were doing in Western Europe. With Czechoslovakia’s economy stagnating, these young, ambitious Communists were increasingly resentful toward a leadership that was doing such a poor job. It was these three factors, economic problems, ethnic resentments, and the intellectual disquiet of young party members, which pushed Czechoslovakia toward the upheavals of 1968.

Pressure for Change In 1962, the economic situation had grown so bad that Novotny was forced to cancel the current Communist economic five-year plan because its goals had

nothing to do with the actual state of the Czechoslovakian economy. Under pressure both from the Soviet Union— which was going through its own anti-Stalinist period under Nikita Khrushchev—and from reformers within the Czechoslovakian Communist party, Novotny was forced to set up a series of commissions whose purpose was to find ways of improving the economic situation. These commissions, led by Ota Sik, a professor of economics, advocated that the Czechoslovakian government relax its rigid control of the economy and try to introduce a more mixed economy. Sik and his colleagues argued that Czechoslovakia needed to have more economic flexibility and that industries should compete with each

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other in an effort to improve both productivity and quality. Along similar lines, many Slovak Communist leaders argued that they needed to have more control over their own economic and political life. If decentralizing was good for the economy, then it ought to be good for Slovakia, too. After all, these leaders argued, wouldn’t Slovakians have clearer ideas about what was good for Slovakia than the party leadership in Prague? Starting in 1964, Novotny put forward a number of programs that followed some of Sik’s ideas regarding decentralization and also seemed to grant some of the freedoms the Slovaks were calling for. However, even though their stated program called for much less centralized control, Novotny and the other traditional party leaders were reluctant to initiate any real change. Real reform might put their own positions at risk. Too many of the reform programs, therefore, were merely window dressing, designed to quiet criticism rather than to actually shake up the system. The result was that by 1967 Novotny’s concessions had raised expectations of reform, but his delaying tactics were causing growing dissatisfaction with the actual pace of change.

Intellectual Renaissance Even as reforms were beginning in the Czechoslovakian economy, restrictions on writers and intellectuals were being loosened. As a result, many writers started saying things that would have been unthinkable in the 1950s. Here again, the de-Stalinization campaigns in the Soviet Union had encouraged less supervision of public debate and artistic expression. In the early 1960s, Khrushchev had made it clear to Novotny that Prague was expected to allow greater freedom of expression, especially criticism that was directed toward the Stalinist excesses of the past. Czechoslovakian intellectuals welcomed the new climate. Communist writers wrote poems subtly discrediting the Communist Party, the Slovak writers’ congress readmitted to its ranks writers who had been expelled for not following the party line, and playwrights felt able to write satires on the dissatisfactions of Communist life. (One young writer of satires was Vaclav Havel, who would one day lead post-Soviet Czechoslovakia.) Many restrictions on public expression remained, however, and the younger generation resented these limitations.

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Resentment exploded at the fourth writers’ congress of June 1967. Young writers began by making moderate attacks on old-fashioned ways of thinking, but by the second day of the congress, writers were attacking the Communist Party itself and calling for the creation of a democracy for Czechoslovakia. This was going too far for Novotny, and he ordered a crackdown against those writers who had been the most outspoken. Other writers took up their pens, and the literary battles continued into the winter.

Confrontation Amid the noise caused by the writers, party reformers also began to attack Novotny’s regime for being too slow to initiate needed changes in the Czechoslovakian economy. In November, a prominent Slovak official, Alexander Dubcek, wrote an article arguing for a new policy toward Slovakia. Dubcek’s criticisms were relatively mild, but to have a prominent party official criticize the party leader in that way was unprecedented. Dubcek was also not alone in criticizing Novotny’s failed policies. Novotny responded by attacking Dubcek, but this alienated other Slovak party members, as well as many reform-minded Czech party members. By December 1967, Novotny had lost the support of a majority of those in the party leadership, and he was forced to resign as first secretary of the Communist Party. He was replaced in early January 1968 by Dubcek. Novotny remained as president of Czechoslovakia and used his position to interfere with Dubcek’s actions, but it was clear that the party was behind Dubcek, not Novotny. Finally, when one of Novotny’s supporters defected to the West, Novotny was completely discredited. The Party called for an end to the press restrictions that Novotny had supported, and the party papers responded to their newfound freedom by firing off a barrage of attacks against Novotny. Deserted by all his former allies, attacked in the normally respectful Czechoslovakian papers, Novotny resigned as president on March 22, 1968. He was replaced by the relatively moderate General Ludvik Svoboda.

Prague Spring Even after Novotny’s departure, the Czechoslovakian press continued to exercise the freedom that the party had temporarily granted. Although some party

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regulars were disturbed by this openness, the reformers, led by Dubcek, were reluctant to stifle any of the forces they had helped to unleash. Dubcek and his fellow reformers had no desire to end Communism in Czechoslovakia, but even if they had, they knew the Soviet Union would not allow them to do so. Instead, they wanted to improve the system, to give it the flexibility it needed to function effectively, and to eliminate the worst kinds of repression that had existed under Novotny. In a phrase current at the time, they wanted to create “socialism with a human face.” But many Czechoslovakians, particularly students and intellectuals, were eager to push for far more freedom than Dubcek felt was either appropriate or advisable. All this put Dubcek in a difficult position. If he clamped down on the free and open debates that were occurring in Czechoslovakia’s newspapers, he would lose the popular support that had helped to put him in power. However, if he allowed Czechoslovakians to continue to speak freely, he would disturb the Communist leadership in the Soviet Union. Dubcek began to carry out mild reforms but kept a wary eye on Soviet reactions. In April 1968, Dubcek and the Central Committee adopted the Action Program, which incorporated most of the changes that the reformers had advocated during the 1960s. Small industrial enterprises were to be given more freedom to operate without central interference, farmers were to be allowed to organize as they wished and to sell to whomever they could, and Czechoslovakia was to open itself up to trade with the Western world. In politics, the Communist Party was to be separated from the government. The National Assembly, until then a body with no real power, was to be given the right to legislate on substantive issues. Finally, the Action Program granted full civil rights: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, even freedom to travel abroad. By June, Czechoslovakia had been transformed. Lively articles filled papers that had previously published only dull pieces on tractor production quotas. The news reporting was also much more honest than it had been under Novotny. Workers and farmers began to organize unions that were not under the direct control of the government. The new men in charge of the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Justice combed through old trial records in order to rehabilitate those who had been unfairly condemned by Novotny and his predecessors. In short, Czechoslovakia was experi-

encing more freedom than it had seen since the 1948 coup that brought the Communists to power.

Soviet Warnings The actions of the Czechoslovakian reformers had not gone unnoticed in the rest of the Communist world. Communist leaders in the Soviet Union and in its satellite states watched with increasing apprehension as Czechoslovakia’s leaders began dismantling the old Communist structure. In January 1968, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had met with Dubcek and declared himself completely satisfied with Czechoslovakia’s new leader. As the pace of change accelerated, however, Communist leaders withheld their praise and began to criticize. In late March, Brezhnev and the other Communist Party leaders of the Warsaw Pact had met with Dubcek and expressed concern that the Czechoslovakian reform movement was getting out of hand. By May, when Dubcek went on a one-day visit to Moscow, Soviet leaders were warning that “anti-socialist forces” were growing too strong, and that if necessary, the Soviets would be willing to intervene to protect “world socialism as a whole.” Dubcek assured them that he was still loyal to both Communism and his Soviet allies. The Communist leaders of East Germany and Poland were especially disturbed at the success of the Czechoslovakian reform movement at a time when they were having problems maintaining order in their own countries. They feared that the Czechoslovakian virus might be contagious. In Poland, students had met Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka with cries of “We want a Polish Dubcek.” Neither Gomulka nor Walter Ulbricht, East Germany’s Communist leader, wished to see the reforms progress any further. In May, the Soviets announced that the Warsaw Pact would conduct military maneuvers the following month in Poland and Czechoslovakia. These maneuvers had not previously been scheduled, and many Czechoslovakians feared that the troops, once on Czechoslovakian soil, would move to overthrow Dubcek’s government. This did not happen, but it seems likely that the maneuvers were designed to be a warning to Dubcek and the other reformers. In July, the Warsaw Pact leaders asked Dubcek to meet with them in Warsaw to discuss their concerns regarding Czechoslovakian Communism. Dubcek

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Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to quell what Moscow regarded as rampant liberalization. Czech armed forces were unprepared, but citizens mounted a nettlesome passive resistance campaign. (Bill Ray/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

politely declined. The other Communist rulers met without him, and, at the conclusion of the meeting, sent a strongly worded note demanding that Dubcek reverse the reforms and retake control of his country. Dubcek and his colleagues denied that they had lost control and refused to cancel their reforms.

Invasion On the evening of August 20, 1968, just before midnight, military units from five Warsaw Pact countries crossed into Czechoslovakia. The invasion force consisted primarily of Soviet troops but also included at least two Polish and two East German divisions, as well as small contingents of Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. Small units also landed at the Prague airport and moved to seize key points in the city. The total number of invaders was more than 200,000, enough to handle Czechoslovakia’s unprepared army of 175,000. The Czechoslovakians did not resist. The commander in chief, General Svoboda, issued orders for the Czechoslovakian army to remain in its barracks.

It was clear, considering Czechoslovakia’s geographical position in the middle of the other Communist states, that resistance would have been useless. The Soviets and their allies quickly seized the Czechoslovakian Communist leadership, sending Dubcek to Moscow to be interrogated, but then found themselves in a difficult position. Although the Czechoslovakians did not physically resist the invasion, they also did not cooperate. The majority of the country’s people had supported the reform movement, and they resented Soviet interference. Czechoslovakians fought back against the invaders primarily with words. Anti-Soviet graffiti was written on walls, secret newspapers were distributed, and clandestine radio stations kept the public informed about the behavior of the invading troops. Czechoslovakia also used passive resistance to annoy the invaders. Railway workers interfered with troop trains coming into the country. Crowds demonstrated peacefully at Czechoslovakian national monuments. The resistance did not force the Soviets to leave, but it may have made them reconsider any plans they had to replace Dubcek immediately (or even to kill him).

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International Reaction From the beginning of the Prague Spring, the United States had taken a stance of neutrality toward Dubcek’s government. President Lyndon Johnson and his advisers were working to improve the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and they feared that too much support for Czechoslovakia might imperil the success of détente. Therefore, they made it clear to Moscow that America had no intention of intervening in Czechoslovakia. While this served the purpose of maintaining good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, it also gave the Soviets the freedom, without fear of outside interference, to do as they pleased with Czechoslovakia. When the invasion actually occurred, the United States condemned it but offered no material assistance to the Czechoslovakians. U.S. allies in Europe also offered criticism but nothing more. A majority of the UN Security Council voted for a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all troops from Czechoslovakia, but the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet delegate. Czechoslovakia eventually received verbal support from two Communist nations. Yugoslavia and Romania—both of which had rocky relationships with Moscow—had supported Czechoslovakia throughout the Prague Spring and later criticized the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, but they were unable to do more.

Resolution For a week, Dubcek and other Czechoslovakian leaders were kept in Moscow, and some Czechoslovakians feared they might never be permitted to leave. They were treated harshly by their captors, not being allowed to wash, change their clothes, or shave. While this was happening, the Soviets attempted to convince some of Dubcek’s colleagues to open up negotiations, but most of the Czechoslovakian Communist leadership maintained a united front against negotiations, supported by the strong show of passive resistance being made by the Czechoslovakian people. A few days after the invasion, a Czechoslovakian delegation, headed by General Svoboda, went to Moscow to negotiate for Dubcek’s release. Svoboda refused to discuss any substantive issues with the Soviets until Dubcek and his fellow prisoners were in Svoboda’s presence. Later, Dubcek said that this had probably saved their lives.

On August 27, Dubcek returned to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets had decided that they still needed him temporarily. Before he was allowed to return, however, he had been forced to agree to a rollback of all the reforms. The Czechoslovakian Communist Party was to be put back in complete control of Czechoslovakian society. The most outspoken reformers were to be removed from office, and the Soviet Union was to be consulted on all major future policy decisions. While the Soviet army remained in Czechoslovakia, Dubcek’s government slowly revoked the earlier reforms. Censorship was restored, and Dubcek was forced to dismiss those colleagues whom the Soviets disliked. There was still a great deal of popular support for the reform movement, and the Czechoslovakian people organized a number of demonstrations throughout the remainder of the year to protest the end of reform. In January 1969, a Czechoslovakian student, Jan Palach, set himself on fire to protest the repression of dissent. His funeral turned into a national day of mourning. Then in March 1969, a Czechoslovakian ice-hockey victory over a Soviet team inspired days of unrest, with crowds of Czechoslovakians celebrating and attacking Soviet-controlled buildings. Gradually all resistance was eliminated, however, and those who refused to cooperate were imprisoned. In April 1969, Dubcek was finally forced to step down as party first secretary. He was replaced by a more cooperative leader, Gustav Husak. Dubcek was expelled from the Communist Party in early 1970. He was then sent back to Slovakia and put in charge of forestry inspection. In 1969, on the first anniversary of the invasion, there were huge demonstrations in Prague, but these were put down by Soviet tanks. They were the last serious expressions of resistance to the reimposition of hard-line Communist rule.

Legacy After 1969, Czechoslovakia was put firmly back under Soviet control. The old reforms disappeared. The Soviets had again shown themselves willing and able to use force to maintain Communism in their client states. This willingness was put into words in September 1968 when Brezhnev issued a statement defending the invasion and asserting that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene in any Communist state in order to protect Communism against both external and internal threats. This became known as

Czechoslovakia: Soviet Invasion, 19 6 8

the Brezhnev Doctrine, and it remained Soviet policy for the next twenty years. In 1979, the Brezhnev Doctrine was used to justify the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The lack of serious international interference with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated again that the United States and its allies tacitly accepted the Soviet Union’s right to do as it pleased to the nations within its sphere of influence. The events of 1968 did have the effect of inspiring a generation of Czechoslovakians with the hope of repeating their brief period of success. Finally, in 1989, as the Soviet Union began to loosen its grip on its client nations, Czechoslovakia became one of the first to escape Soviet control. The so-called “Velvet Revolution” was led by Vaclav Havel and others who had been active in the reforms of the Prague Spring in 1968. Carl Skutsch

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See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; Czechoslovakia: Coup, 1948; Hungary: Soviet Invasion, 1956.

Bibliography Dawisha, Karen. The Kremlin and the Prague Spring. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Korbel, Josef. Twentieth-century Czechoslovakia: The Meanings of Its History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Littell, Robert, ed. The Czech Black Book. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1969. Renner, Hans. A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945. New York: Routledge, 1989. Salomon, Michel. Prague Notebook: The Strangled Revolution. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. Svitak, Ivan. The Czechoslovak Experiment, 1968–1969. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Szulc, Tad. Czechoslovakia Since World War II. New York: Viking Press, 1971.

GEORGIA: Civil War,1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Russia

Gali

BLACK SEA

SOUTH OSSETIA

Poti AJARIA

GEORGIA

TURKEY 0 0

50 50

100 Miles

EA N S

Sukhumi

PIA

CHECHNYA

ABKHAZIA

fered the loss of cheap electrical power and cordial trade relations. Together with periods of ethnic violence, the struggling economy led to a net loss of population through the 1990s and early 2000s.

CA S

RUSSIA

Historical Background

Ergneti Market Tbilisi

ARMENIA

AZERBAIJAN

100 Kilometers

Formerly the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, Georgia declared independence from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990. In the Caucasus, Georgia borders Russia on the north. In the south and southwest, it abuts Turkey and has a Black Sea coastline. Directly south is Armenia, and to the southeast, Azerbaijan. Included within Georgia are two autonomous republics—Abkhazia, on the Black Sea coast, and Ajaria—and the autonomous region of South Ossetia. Each of these regions contains large numbers of ethnically non-Georgian or Islamic peoples who seek independence or greater autonomy from Georgia’s government; ethnic Georgians account for 68 percent of the nation’s population of approximately 5 million. The capital, Tbilisi (Tiflis), in mountainous eastern Georgia, has about 1.25 million people. The Black Sea coast and its adjoining valleys have a subtropical climate, but eastern Georgia’s mountainous terrain has cold winters and hot, dry summers. The economy is basically agricultural. Farming—largely citrus fruits and vegetables for export, as well as wine and tea—employs almost 60 percent of the working population. There is some industry, and mining and forestry are also important. After it became independent, Georgia’s economy suf-

Georgia, a powerful regional kingdom during the Middle Ages, was conquered by Russia in 1801 and remained under Moscow’s rule until the Russian Revolution in 1918, when it declared independence. After only three years, however, the new Soviet Union annexed Georgia as the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. During the whole period of Russian imperial and Soviet rule, Georgians retained a strong national identity. At the same time, individual Georgians became world famous as leaders in the Soviet Union. Josef Stalin was the shrewd and ruthless ruler of the Soviet Union from the mid-1920s until his death in 1953. One of Stalin’s close associates later in his rule was Georgian Lavrenti Beria, the notorious director of the Soviet secret police. During Stalin’s lifetime, Georgia, like the rest of the Soviet Union, experienced the rigors and upheavals of forced collectivization, but Stalin showed a certain tolerance for private activity in Georgia, allowing development of a significant unofficial private economic sector—and garnered the republic a reputation for both business and government corruption. After Stalin’s death, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was less tolerant of Georgian behavior. When Georgians demonstrated against Russification, Khrushchev sent in Soviet security forces, which put down the protests with the loss of about 150 lives. Another period of rioting over required use of the Russian language occurred in 1978. A major nationalist leader was the writer Konstantin Gamsakhurdia and later his son, Zviad.

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Georgia: Civil War, 19 9 0s

801

KEY DATES 1990

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigns his post in protest of the Soviet military’s use of force at a nationalist rally in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in 1989; Georgia declares itself independent as the Soviet Union begins to collapse; nationalist Georgians take power in the country, as nonethnic Georgians boycott elections.

1991

New Georgian ruler Zviad Gamsakhurdia fires commander of National Guard Tengiz Kitovani, who tells his 15,000 troops to disobey Gamsakhurdia; riots break out in the capital; Gamsakhurdia flees Georgia; Shevardnadze returns to lead Georgia but realizes he needs Russian forces to allow him to assume power; meanwhile, rebels in the Georgian province of Abkhazi mount armed resistance in the eastern mountains.

1993

Shevardnadze invites in Russian forces to help defeat the Abkhazi rebels.

1999

Abkhazi forces declare independence from Georgia.

2003 Mass protests force Shevardnadze from power after he is accused of trying to manipulate legislative elections.

The most prominent Georgian of the late Soviet period was Eduard Shevardnadze. Born in 1928, Shevardnadze made his career in the Communist Party. At age twenty-six he became, in effect, the attorney general for Georgia and embarked on an anticorruption campaign that toppled the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia (CPG) in 1972. Shevardnadze gained a national reputation and became first secretary of the CPG. He was ruthless in eliminating official corruption, making many enemies in the process. At the same time, he initiated reforms that gave Georgia the fastest-growing economy in the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s he sponsored a Georgian version of glasnost (openness), allowing a significant measure of intellectual freedom, and joined forces with another reformer, Mikhail Gorbachev, who became first secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985. After gaining that position, Gorbachev appointed Shevardnadze to be Soviet foreign minister, despite his lack of foreign policy experience. While Gorbachev and Shevardnadze worked well together, Shevardnadze resigned at the end of 1990 to protest the increasing influence of Russia’s military in Georgia. He was particularly angry over the

army’s excessive force in suppressing a nationalist demonstration in the capital, Tbilisi, in April 1989. Sixteen Georgians, mostly women, were killed by Soviet troops who beat them with entrenching tools and used riot control gas.

Perestroika in Georgia As Gorbachev relaxed Moscow’s hold over Georgia and other Soviet republics, nationalism began to flare up. Not only did Georgians begin to think about independence from the Soviet Union; at the same time, minorities within Georgia began agitating for independence from Georgia. After the riots and Shevardnadze’s resignation in 1989, the Georgian Supreme Soviet declared that the Soviet Union’s laws no longer applied in Georgia and that Georgia was an “occupied country.” The following year, multiparty elections for the Supreme Soviet were scheduled in October. A month earlier, however, radical Georgian groups organized as the National Forum and held their own elections to choose a rival government, which they called the National Congress.

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Thus, the political situation was confused and tense when the new Georgian Soviet convened in November. The Roundtable–Free Georgia bloc of parties, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia (son of the revered nationalist writer), held 155 of the 250 seats, while the Communist Party held only 64. The Soviet established a de facto army, the National Guard, and in March 1991 refused to take part in the all-union referendum on the future of the USSR. Only in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia, along the Black Sea coast, and South Ossetia, in the north-central region, did citizens insist on voting. The residents of these areas had firmer ties to Russia than to Georgia, and they voted by large majorities to remain within the Soviet Union. Later in March 1991, the Georgian Soviet organized a separate election, giving voters a choice between independence and remaining part of the Soviet Union. Almost 95 percent of those voting chose independence. This time the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia boycotted the vote. Georgia was the first non-Baltic Soviet republic to secede from the USSR. In May, Gamsakhurdia was elected executive president of Georgia with more than 85 percent of the vote. Again, South Ossetia and Abkhazia refused to vote. Gamsakhurdia’s autocratic rule soon produced opposition from both rival politicians and many in the educated and middle classes. In August 1991, he fired Tengiz Kitovani, the commander of the National Guard, who then led 15,000 guardsmen in declaring that they would refuse to obey Gamsakhurdia. By the end of September, rioters in Tbilisi demanding Gamsakhurdia’s resignation seized the television station, and a large number of people were killed in the fighting. Gamsakhurdia briefly regained control, declaring a state of emergency and arresting many of his opponents. Shevardnadze went into exile. In December, Kitovani led a revolt, joined by Jaba Ioseliani, an ex-convict, reputed head of the Georgian Mafia, and leader of a private underworld army called the Mkhedrioni or “horsemen.” Gamsakhurdia fled to Chechnya, where he began to plot his return. In January 1992 Sigua Tengiz, head of an interim government, invited Shevardnadze to return.

Shevardnadze Years Shevardnadze agreed. He understood the deep yearnings of Georgians to be independent, but he also real-

ized that Georgia would need Russian support to solve its economic, ethnic, and territorial problems. He negotiated that support from the new Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. The price he paid was to agree that Georgia would become a member of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (an alliance of old Soviet republics dominated by Russia); accept the establishment of four Russian military bases on Georgian soil; and accept a Russianbrokered settlement in Abkhazia, which gave the region broad autonomy and allowed for substantial Russian influence. Shevardnadze faced a host of threats. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which retained close ties to Russia, agitated for independence. The Muslim region of Ajaria, which controlled key ports on the Black Sea, lobbied for greater autonomy. And the followers of former president Gamsakhurdia were mounting armed resistance in the eastern mountains. Shevardnadze moved quickly to establish a reliable national armed force by merging Kitovani’s National Guard and Ioseliani’s outlaw “horsemen.” By April 1992, it appeared the government had put down the rural armed resistance of Gamsakhurdia’s supporters (the Zviadists). Then in July, the Zviadists, operating from Abkhazia, kidnapped several high-level Georgian officials. Shevardnadze sent 3,000 troops under Kitovani to the region. The kidnap victims were recovered after bloody fighting and a Georgian assault on the Abkhazian capital, Sukhumi, in which more than 300 people were killed. The attacks only intensified the fighting with the forces of Abkhazian independence leader Vladislav Arbinza. Shevardnadze had to send Ioseliani’s “horsemen” to rescue Kitovani, but the Abkhazian situation was far from resolved. Despite the turmoil, all-Georgian elections were held in October 1992. None of the thirty parties gained a majority, but Shevardnadze was overwhelmingly chosen as chairman of the legislature, the chief executive of the republic, and commander in chief of the armed forces.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia Meanwhile, the Abkhazian situation worsened, and Gamsakhurdia reemerged. Kitovani’s army was routed in August, and Shevardnadze went to Moscow in September to meet with Arbinza and Yeltsin to arrange a Russian-guaranteed cease-fire. However, Kitovani

Georgia: Civil War, 19 9 0s

broke the cease-fire agreement, and the Abkhazian forces, with tacit Russian support, counterattacked. Shevardnadze himself went to the Abkhazian capital, dramatically vowing to die with its Georgian government defenders. However, as Abkhazian forces closed in, he thought better of his promise and returned to Tbilisi. The Abkhazian forces took Sukhumi and most of the Black Sea coast. The defeat produced a political crisis, heightened when Shevardnadze dismissed Kitovani as defense minister, which triggered a wholesale cabinet resignation. Again, Shevardnadze offered his own resignation, but the Tbilisi crowds demanded that he stay. In the meantime, Gamsakhurdia, claiming that Shevardnadze had betrayed Georgia to the Russians and lost Abkhazia, captured the Black Sea port of Poti and blocked rail traffic to the capital, Tbilisi. Desperate, Shevardnadze went again to Moscow to ask for help. Once again, Yeltsin drove a hard bargain, insisting that Georgia take its place in the Commonwealth of Independent States and that the Russian navy be allowed to use Georgia’s Black Sea ports. On November 4, 1993, Russian warships, with marines and tanks, landed at Poti and routed the Abkhazi forces. The combined Russian and Georgian forces attacked Gamsakhurdia and his men. Faced with capture, Gamsakhurdia committed suicide on December 31, 1993. With the popular Georgian nationalist gone, the Russians intensified Shevardnadze’s problems, forcing him to agree to de facto independence for Abkhazia and the stationing of Russian peacekeeping forces there. Worst of all, the Abkhazian fighting also forced as many as 200,000 ethnic Georgian refugees to flee from Abkhazia, many of whom froze to death in the Caucasus Mountains. An “agreement of understanding” was signed at the United Nations in December 1993 between Georgian and Abkhazi representatives, providing a UN observer mission, but fighting continued. Finally, in October 1994, the last Georgian forces were driven out of Abkhazia. Abkhazia declared independence and held elections, but neither Georgia nor the United Nations nor any major country recognized the supposed new state. Effectively, Georgia lost nearly half of its Black Sea coast and almost 10 percent of its national territory. Meanwhile in the mountains along the Russian border, the people of South Ossetia also seceded from

803

Georgia and declared themselves independent. Ethnically related to the ancient Persians, the Ossetians had been settled in the Caucusus for centuries. Their territory was now divided by the border between Russia and Chechnya. North Ossetia was in Russia, and South Ossetia was in Georgia. Georgia refused to recognize the secession, but, after losing more than 400 troops there in 1992, the government agreed to live with the situation.

Fall of Shevardnadze These defeats caused many in Georgia to lose faith in their leader, Eduard Shevardnadze. Nationalists saw his compromises with Russia as a betrayal. Organized crime groups came to hate him for his efforts to root out corruption and establish law and order. On August 29, 1995, just before the ceremonial signing of the new Georgian constitution, Shevardnadze was slightly injured in a bomb attack. The leader of the plot, Minister of Security Igor Giorgadze, fled to Russia. Later, Ioseliani, the commander of the Horsemen, was arrested for his involvement in the assassination attempt. In November 1995, Shevardnadze won the presidential elections, and his party, the Union of Citizens of Georgia, won a majority in parliament. Shevardnadze survived two further assassination attempts in February 1998 and May 1999. Rumor suggested the attempts were orchestrated in Moscow and linked to Georgian cooperation with the United States in constructing a major oil pipeline across Georgia from oil fields in Azerbaijan to Turkey. Once again, in October 1999, the Abkhazi parliament sought recognition of its independence from the nations of the world, but the Georgian government successfully appealed to the international community to refuse recognition. Tensions lessened in the following year, however, and in March 2001 Georgia and Abkhazia signed an accord renouncing the use of force and agreeing to facilitate the safe return of refugees. Still, stability had not come to Georgia. When the private TV station Rustavi-2, which had often been critical of Shevardnadze, was taken over by Georgian security forces in late 2001, mass demonstrations in Tbilisi demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation. He responded by dismissing the entire Georgian government and appointing Nino Burdzhanadze as the country’s prime minister.

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In February 2002, U.S. military advisers began arriving in Georgia, ostensibly to help the government in its fight against Islamic terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda. Russia protested, and President Putin publicly denounced the Shevardnadze government. In November 2003, Shevardnadze was accused of attempting to manipulate legislative elections. Mass street protests followed, and Shevardnadze was forced to resign in what was called the “rose revolution.” In January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of the opposition National Movement Party, who had played a leading role in the November protests, was elected president with an overwhelming majority. Saakashvili, who had been educated in the United States and whose wife was from the Netherlands, was soon called on to address the attempted breakaway of a third Georgian region, Ajaria. This enclave, along the Black Sea coast in the southwest corner of the country, was controlled by people who shared the ethnic background of most Georgians, but who had become Muslims, standing out in a country where nearly 90 percent of the people are nominally Christian. But Ajaria was always the least intractable of Georgia’s territorial conflicts. It is far less clear that the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are so willing to rejoin Georgia. In May 2004, Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze warned his region that the Georgian army was preparing an attack. To thwart the aggression, he destroyed the bridges leading from Georgia to Ajaria and mobilized irregular military forces. Shaakashvili worked quickly to put pressure on the Ajarian leader and soon forced him to resign and go into exile. Shakaashvili also persuaded the Russians to close their military base in the port of Batumi, the largest city in Ajaria.

The disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued to trouble Georgia, and the problems were compounded by the maneuvering of major powers. On one hand, Russia arranged for residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to gain Russian citizenship and passports, resurrecting charges that they had been the initiator of revolts in these Georgian territories. On the other hand, the increasing involvement of the United States in the Georgian economy and military matters led to sharp criticism from Russia and its allies. Meanwhile, more than 200,000 ethnic Georgian refugees from Abkhazia remained displaced. Their leaders demanded that Georgia once again take up arms to recover Abkhazia and restore them to their homes. David MacMichael and Aidan Hehir See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Russia: Chechen Uprising Since 1994.

Bibliography Cornell, Svante. Small Nations and Great Powers: Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. London: Routledge, 2000. Duncan, W. Raymond, and Paul Holman, eds. Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Ekedahl, Carolyn McGiffert, and Melvin A. Goodman. The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Ginsburgs, George, Alvin Z. Rubenstein, and Oles M. Smolansky, eds. Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993. Herzig, Edmund. The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. London: Pinter Publishers, 1999. Jeffries, Ian. The Caucasus and Central Asian Republics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century. London: Routledge, 2003.

GERMANY: The Berlin Crises,1948–1949 and 1958–1962 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Union; United States EAST GERMANY

WEST FRENCH SECTOR

The Wall (erected 1960)

EAST RUSSIAN SECTOR

BERLIN

BRITISH SECTOR

BERLIN

EAST GERMANY

Tempelhof Airport

AMERICAN SECTOR

In 1948–1949, and again in 1958–1962, the city of Berlin became the center of the power struggle between the two superpowers of the Cold War: the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the outcomes of both crises can be characterized as U.S. victories, the result in each case was to increase Cold War tensions and widen the rift that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union (as well as between East and West Germany).

Historical Background At the end of World War II, the two great armies that had defeated Adolf Hitler’s Nazi empire faced each other across a line they had drawn down the center of the European map. On one side were the armed forces of Britain, France, and the United States, and on the other side were the soldiers of the Soviet Union. In the middle was Germany, divided into two halves by its occupiers. The division of Germany was not supposed to be permanent. It was a temporary postwar arrangement designed to be superseded by a postwar settlement.

During the war, the major powers had agreed that Germany would be put under military occupation for an indeterminate period of time. In order to show that the victory over Germany had been a shared one, the occupation would also be shared: each of the victors would occupy a region of the country. Accordingly, upon the final surrender of Germany’s armies, the country was divided into four separate occupation zones: British, French, American, and Soviet. Berlin, although located in the middle of the Soviet zone, was also partitioned into four sections. After border adjustments with Poland were taken into account, this put about three-quarters of Germany under the control of the Western Allies and the remainder under Soviet control. As postwar tensions between the Soviets and the Americans increased, it began to seem impossible that the former Allies would ever come to an agreement concerning the makeup of a new German government. The three Western Allies watched with growing concern as the Soviets turned client governments in Eastern Europe into single-party Communist states. In Romania, the king was forced to appoint a Communist government; in Poland, nonCommunists were arrested; in Bulgaria, 20,000 opponents of a Communist takeover were killed; and in Yugoslavia, the Communist resistance leader Tito took control of the government. For the Americans, these actions seemed to betray the promises of Soviet leader Josef Stalin to allow power-sharing in Eastern Europe; Stalin, on the other hand, felt that he was simply assuming control of those areas that properly belonged within the Soviet sphere of influence. The Potsdam Conference of July–August 1945 was the last major summit between the Big Three (Britain, America, and the Soviet Union), and it failed to settle the German question. While the division of

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KEY DATES 1945

On May 8, Germany surrenders to the Allied powers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, ending World War II in Europe.

1945–1947

As the Cold War intensifies, Germany is divided politically into two sectors, the occupation zones of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the western three-quarters of the country and the Soviet Union in the eastern fourth; although surrounded by Soviet-occupied territory, Berlin is similarly divided.

1948

In April, the Soviet Union insists that all freight going into Western-controlled zones of Berlin pass Soviet inspection; in June, Western occupation powers announce a new currency for West German zones under their control; on June 24, Soviets order the cutoff of all land transportation links between West Germany and West Berlin; on June 26, the allied airlift of supplies to West Berlin begins.

1949

Realizing they cannot block the airlift without risking war, Soviets agree to lift the blockade on West Berlin in May; on September 26, the last flight of the airlift lands in West Berlin.

1958

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ratchets up Cold War tensions by demanding a resolution to the Berlin division.

1961

To stem the mass emigration from East Germany to West Germany, East German authorities build a wall between East Berlin and West Berlin.

1989

The Berlin Wall is torn down by ordinary German citizens from West Germany and East Germany.

1990

Berlin and Germany are reunited politically.

Germany (and Berlin) into four parts was confirmed, and war-crime trials against the Nazis were scheduled, no agreement was reached concerning the final shape of postwar Germany. The Big Three did state that the new Germany, when it took shape, would have a “democratic” government, but the word did not have the same meaning for both sides, as would become clear.

Conflicting Goals What made a final resolution of the Germany question difficult was that the former allies entered into negotiations with substantially different goals.

For Stalin, the primary objective of a postwar settlement was to maintain the security of the Soviet Union. The Soviets had suffered more than 20 million deaths during the war and were determined to secure a peace that would protect them from invasion by a European force. Eastern Europe was to be kept under Soviet control to provide a buffer between the Soviets and any future enemy armies. In this context, Germany was particularly important. The Soviets wanted to dictate how Germany would be governed. A German state under Soviet influence would add to their buffer zone and would also address their great fear that a revived Germany might one day invade the Soviet homeland again.

Germany: The Berlin Crises, 19 4 8–19 4 9 and 195 8–19 62

The Americans, whose casualties during World War II had been relatively modest, did not understand the importance of security to the Soviets. They hoped to see Europe rebuilt along democratic lines, with its borders open to international trade. The imposition of Communist-backed governments on Eastern Europe, therefore, caused the Americans to watch Soviet behavior in Germany with increasing suspicion.

A Growing Divide, 19 45–19 47 Even before Berlin fell to Soviet armies in May 1945, Stalin had begun laying the groundwork for a Sovietdominated Germany. While Soviet troops fought to gain control of the city, a Soviet plane landed in Berlin carrying a group of German Communists who had spent the war in exile in the Soviet Union. One of them, Walter Ulbricht, was immediately put in charge of rebuilding the Communist Party within the Soviet zone of occupation. With the help of the Soviet occupation forces, Ulbricht had little difficulty making the German Communist Party (KPD) the strongest in the Soviet zone. Any resistance to the Communists was crushed. In April 1946, when local elections went against the Communists, the Soviets forced the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) to merge with Ulbricht’s Communists. The Soviet military permitted the creation of other political parties (the Christian Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Party) but allowed them no political freedom and removed any of their leaders who did not cooperate with the KPD. This open contempt for democratic values alienated the Americans. They, along with the British and the French, responded by encouraging the creation of German political parties in their own occupation zones. These new German parties in the Western zones were uniformly hostile toward the Soviets and their German Communist protégés. They strongly favored a Germany based on democracy and free enterprise. Perhaps inevitably, the occupying powers were creating within their respective zones two Germanies, which matched their own national ideologies. Under the circumstances a reunified Germany seemed impossible. Economic problems also divided the two sides. At Potsdam, the Americans and British had agreed to send German industrial materials eastward in order to help rebuild the damaged Soviet economy. In

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return, the Soviets had agreed to ship food westward. When the war ended, the Soviets refused to live up to their commitments because they claimed they were not receiving sufficient quantities of industrial goods. The Americans and British responded, in May 1946, by cutting off all industrial shipments to the east. During 1946, therefore, relations between the Soviets and the West became more and more acrimonious. In March of that year, Winston Churchill gave a speech in Fulton, Missouri, warning that “an iron curtain” was descending across Europe, separating East and West. In January 1947, deciding that cooperation with the Soviets was becoming impossible, the Americans and the British merged their zones into one jointly administered zone. This merger marked a clear turn away from earlier Western policies toward Germany. During the war, President Franklin Roosevelt had considered dismantling all German industry and turning the country into a helpless land of farmers. After the war ended, however, American leaders, including President Harry Truman, decided that a strong Germany was necessary in a Europe that seemed threatened by Soviet power. A weak Germany might be vulnerable to Communist subversion, while a strong Germany would be able to hold its own—and a strong Germany meant an industrialized Germany. (This was an added reason for the allies to stop shipping Germany’s industrial equipment to the east.) The French at first kept their zone separate— like the Soviets, the French also feared a revitalized Germany—but, in June 1948, they agreed to merge their zone with the Anglo-American zone.

Separate Germanies With the French agreement to merge, it was clear that Germany was being transformed from a single nation occupied by four powers into two separate nations. Although neither East Germany nor West Germany was officially a country, that final step was becoming a mere formality. With the creation of separate economies and separate political parties, the establishment of two separate nations seemed inevitable. The Western Allies were already busy drafting the plans that would determine the nature of the new West German state. In February 1948, six Western countries (Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and the United States) met in London to discuss how Germany might be more closely integrated into West-

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ern Europe. On March 6 they announced that they had reached agreements both on the shape a new German nation would take and on increasing the degree of economic integration within the Western zones. Stalin denounced these measures as being in clear violation of the Potsdam Agreements, which required that all four victorious powers must be involved in any settlement of Germany’s future. He decided that the time was appropriate to try and force the Western Allies to back down.

First Crisis: Berlin Blockade The event that triggered the first Berlin crisis was the Western powers’ decision in June 1948 to introduce a new currency into their newly unified West German zones. The new deutsche mark was a necessary ingredient in creating a strong, industrialized, and separate West Germany. In reaction to the announcement, Stalin decided to put pressure on allied occupied West Berlin. Like the rest of Germany, Berlin had been divided into four separate zones. Similarly, the three Western Allies had unified their zones into a single area, which was known as West Berlin. The Soviets well understood that West Berlin was vulnerable. Unlike Western-controlled Germany, West Berlin was surrounded by East German territory. It was more than 100 miles from the nearest point in West Germany, and it relied for food, fuel, and other supplies on one highway and one rail line through East Germany and two air corridors. If the Soviets chose to close the land routes, they could threaten to freeze and starve West Berlin’s residents and occupying troops. The Western powers might be forced to give up their occupation of a part of Germany’s most important city or grant other concessions. Even before the official beginning of the blockade, the Soviets had been putting pressure on the Western supply line. Shipments of supplies had been delayed, and American personnel were occasionally detained. Starting in April 1948, the Soviets put on more pressure by insisting that all military freight brought into Berlin be inspected and approved by the Soviet military command. This demand was not consistently enforced, however, and supplies continued to flow into Berlin. The currency crisis altered this status quo. When the Western powers announced the introduction of the new deutsche mark, the Soviets re-

sponded by introducing their own Eastern deutsche mark. In addition, they demanded that it become the legal currency of both East and West Berlin. This followed the Soviets’ standard claim that all of Berlin, West and East, was part of the Soviet zone. When the American military commander, General Lucius Clay, rejected the Soviet demand and starting circulating the new West deutsche mark in Berlin, the Soviets, on June 24, ordered that West Berlin be cut off from the rest of West Germany. The Soviets also cut off electricity to West Berlin and encouraged the Communist Party to begin a campaign of harassment and disruption directed against its municipal government.

Berlin Airlift The Americans and their allies believed that giving in to the Soviets’ currency demand was the same as giving up West Berlin to Soviet control, which they were unwilling to do. However, they were also very reluctant to use armed force to open a supply line to West Berlin, which would almost certainly have begun a war between the Soviet Union and the Western allies. With 25 divisions stationed in central Europe, the Soviets could easily defeat any attempt to break

The Berlin Airlift delivered food, medicine, and other critical supplies to beleaguered residents of the German capital during the Soviet land blockade of 1948–1949. (Walter Sanders/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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through to Berlin by the twelve Western divisions located in West Germany. The only weapon the Americans had that could even the odds was the atomic bomb, and any use of atomic weapons would have led to huge numbers of civilian casualties and almost guaranteed the beginning of a third world war. Ruling out a land campaign, General Clay, with the approval of President Truman, started to transport supplies to Berlin by air, using C-47 cargo planes. To supply a city the size of Berlin by air would be extremely difficult. Aircraft at the time could carry fairly small payloads, and West Berlin housed 2.4 million people. To transport just the bare necessities, the Americans, British, and French called in cargo planes from all over the world. They immediately went to work to expand the two airports in West Berlin and to build a third. The first planes started landing in Berlin on June 26, 1948, and at the height of the airlift, supply planes were landing in Berlin every minute. The massive airlift put Stalin in a difficult position. If the Soviets wished to stop the planes, they would have to shoot them down, taking the responsibility for starting a war. The Americans and their allies were gambling that this was a risk that Stalin would be unwilling to take. The American gamble paid off: the Soviets decided not to risk war by attacking the planes bringing supplies into West Berlin, but they continued to keep highway and rail supply routes closed for nearly a year. Finally, in May 1949, they began to lift the Berlin Blockade. The airlift continued to supply Berlin for four more months, until normal transportation routes could be brought back to their pre-blockade capacity. From June 26, 1948, to September 30, 1949, the allied airlift made 277,264 flights and brought 2,343,315 tons of food and coal into Berlin. Seventyfive British and American airmen lost their lives in crashes over the course of the entire campaign.

Results of the Blockade The Berlin Blockade and the subsequent Berlin Airlift had three main results. First, the division of Germany was confirmed. The decision of the Western powers not to back down in the face of the blockade guaranteed that the two Germanies would continue to develop into separate states. In fact, on May 21, soon after the Soviets lifted the blockade, the Western Allies and the major West German political parties an-

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nounced the creation of a German Federal Republic— an independent state often known as West Germany. In the first elections, West Germans elected a majority of representatives from the anticommunist Christian Democratic party. Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer became the country’s first chancellor. In October 1949, the Soviets responded by creating the Communist-controlled German Democratic Republic, with Walter Ulbricht as its first leader. The second result of the blockade was to confirm, at least for the moment, the continued occupation of West Berlin by the Western powers. Until the blockade, Berlin’s city government had been run as a unified whole, with non-Communists in charge, but assisted by Communists in some administrative positions. With the blockade, the Communists in Berlin, backed by their Soviet patrons, had attempted to force the Berlin municipal government to turn power over to the Communists through staged riots designed to disrupt normal government functions. The non-Communist administrators, with the support of Western troops, responded to this danger by withdrawing all their administrators from East Berlin and creating a government in the Western sector that completely excluded the Communists. In this process they were supported by the vast majority of civilians in West Berlin. By December 1948, West and East Berlin, like West and East Germany, had become separate entities. The enthusiasm with which the West Berliners had fought to maintain a nonCommunist government, combined with their stoicism in the face of the shortages caused by the blockade, helped to inspire the rest of West Germany with a renewed commitment to the idea of a democratic government free from Soviet influence. Finally, the Berlin Blockade was the first major confrontation of the Cold War. It demonstrated the willingness of the United States and its allies to stand up to perceived Soviet aggression. It also convinced many Europeans and Americans that a closer degree of cooperation would be necessary if the Soviets were to be successfully opposed in the future. As a result, the United States joined with eleven European nations to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance designed to coordinate its members’ armed forces in the event of war. The Western response to the Berlin Blockade helped make it a defeat for the Soviets. The crisis had helped broaden the three-power occupation force into

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a twelve-nation alliance dedicated to opposing Soviet force in Europe. The risks of war had been real. In July 1948, soon after the Berlin Blockade began, President Truman had ordered two groups of B-29 bombers flown to Britain. These planes were capable of carrying atomic bombs and were stationed in Britain in case war broke out over Berlin. Fortunately, the confrontation was resolved, and war was avoided.

Second Crisis: A Re-armed Germany For a few years after the Berlin Blockade, the situation in Germany remained relatively stable. The NATO alliance, backed by American nuclear weapons, protected West Germany, while Soviet troops maintained the German Communist Party in power across the border. In 1953, in fact, the Soviets sent in tanks and troops to suppress an uprising against the Communist government of Walter Ulbricht. After Stalin’s death in 1953 and the rise to power of Nikita Khrushchev, however, the Cold War entered a new era, and once again Berlin became a flashpoint. The origins of the second Berlin crisis lay in the Korean War (1950–1953). The Americans had sent hundreds of thousands of troops to Korea to defend its ally South Korea against an attack by Communist North Korea. With U.S. military forces stretched thin, planners began looking for ways to reduce military commitments elsewhere, particularly in Europe. American generals and politicians pointed out that it was strange that Germany was protected only by foreign troops. If Germany were allowed to re-arm, the United States would be more able to shift its resources to other parts of the world. Of the three Western powers that still controlled the military and foreign policy of Germany, the United States and Britain supported German rearmament. The French were doubtful, having suffered three catastrophic invasions by German forces in 80 years, but they agreed to go ahead. The Germans themselves had mixed feelings, but the Christian Democratic leadership under Adenauer was eager to have Germany take responsibility for its own defense. The result was the Paris protocols of 1954, which allowed the Germans to rebuild an army within the context of NATO. This change in the status quo upset Moscow, which had always been afraid of a re-armed Germany.

In addition, the Soviets were bothered by the Paris agreement’s claim that the West German government represented all Germans, including those in East Germany. The combination of these two elements—a rearmed western Germany that claimed political rights over the eastern zone—seemed to threaten Moscow’s position in Eastern Europe. The Soviets responded by beginning a diplomatic campaign to make all of Germany, East and West, a demilitarized zone. Khrushchev seemed to feel that a Germany without any troops—Soviet, American, or German—was better than a Germany with its own army. The Soviets tried to give legitimacy to their efforts by declaring, in 1954, that East Germany was now a sovereign nation and that the two nations should begin negotiations to bring about a Germany free of foreign troops.

Pressure on Berlin The Soviet initiative to make East Germany independent had a twofold benefit for the Soviets: it implicitly denied the West’s claim that the Federal Republic of Germany represented all Germans, and it forced West Germany to deal directly with East Germany over access to Berlin. Until then, West Germany had officially refused to acknowledge the existence of an East German government. When the Soviets gave the East Germans control over access to and from Berlin, this put the West German negotiating position under pressure. Access to Berlin was still a problem. By the late 1950s, West Berlin had become a showcase city. Helped by subsidies from West Germany (designed to encourage residence in a city that was surrounded by hostile territory), the western part of the city had prospered and was far richer than its eastern counterpart. It was still vulnerable, however, to outside interference, as it had been in 1948. The East Germans and Soviets could still cut off the land supply lines whenever they pleased, and it would be far more difficult to keep West Berlin supplied with its larger population and higher standard of living. From the Soviet point of view, therefore, putting West Berlin under pressure could have two possible benefits. First, it might force the West to postpone or halt the plans to re-arm Germany. Second, by putting East Germany in charge of access to Berlin, it would at least force West Germany to admit that a second Germany existed and that the division between East and West was real and permanent.

Germany: The Berlin Crises, 19 4 8–19 4 9 and 195 8–19 62

The Soviet efforts proved to be futile. The West Germans refused to admit that two legitimate Germanies existed, and they likewise refused to stop their re-armament. In 1957, the first West German soldiers were called up and put into uniform.

Soviet Deadlines Starting in 1958, Khrushchev raised the temperature of the crisis by issuing a series of ultimatums demanding a resolution of the Berlin problem. The reason for this escalation is unclear, but it may very well have been connected to announcements, in 1957, that the United States would be deploying nuclear weapons in West Germany and that some of these weapons might be made available to America’s allies. In Soviet minds this may have suggested the fearful possibility that the West German army might have access to nuclear armament. If a German army worried the Soviets, a nuclear-equipped German army was that much more disturbing. On November 27, 1958, Khrushchev issued the first diplomatic note of the crisis. It demanded that productive negotiations concerning the status of Berlin occur within six months or else access to West Berlin might be cut off. Khrushchev’s words were vague but ominous. The Americans reacted by agreeing to negotiate but refusing to be pressured by any threat of a second Berlin blockade. The following year the Soviet Union backed down slightly but continued to push for a resolution of the Berlin issue. From 1959 to 1962 the Soviets put increasing pressure on the West either to turn Berlin into an open city or to allow Soviet troops to occupy it alongside the Americans, British, and French. The Western powers and West Germany refused to give way on any of these demands. In the summer of 1961 the crisis reached a fever pitch, with Khrushchev hinting that a failure to resolve the Berlin problem might lead to a war, even to a nuclear war. This time, unlike 1948–1949, the Americans were not the only ones who had nuclear weapons—the Soviets were well supplied with their own.

Berlin Wall One reason the Soviets and East Germans were so eager to put pressure on Berlin was that Berlin was putting pressure on the Soviet Union and on East

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Germany. The borders between East and West Germany had been closed to passage by individuals without careful border checks since 1952. By contrast, the border between East and West Berlin was still open because the city was legally still under the authority of the four victorious powers in World War II. As a result, East and West Germans could move fairly freely from East to West and back again. Some even lived in one sector and had a job in the other. The problem came because economic conditions between East and West had become ever more starkly different. The East German economy had been languishing for years, and its residents were familiar with shortages of food, clothing, and other necessities. At the same time, West Berlin was prosperous. By 1961, huge numbers of East Germans were choosing to emigrate to the West by walking across the border in Berlin. Between 1949 and 1959, more than 2 million East Germans had emigrated to the West. As other routes were closed off, more and more emigrated through the crossings in Berlin. In 1960, 200,000 East Germans crossed over to the West, and in the early months of 1961 the rate had increased to almost 3,000 a day (which would add up to more than a million in a year). As 1961 wore on, the East German government was watching its manpower drain away to the West. To make matters worse, most of those who emigrated were young and skilled. East Germany was becoming a country of the old. East German president Walter Ulbricht was desperate to stop this flow of young, skilled emigrants, and in August 1961, he received permission from Khrushchev to build barriers at border crossings between East and West Berlin. Ulbricht went slightly further. Early on Sunday morning August 13, 1961, East German soldiers began erecting barbed wire fences along the entire length of the East–West Berlin border, demolishing buildings along the route to create free-fire zones. Western leaders denounced this action but felt there was nothing they could realistically do to prevent it. Soon after, the barbed wire barrier was replaced by concrete walls equipped with guard towers and machine-gun nests. The Berlin Wall divided families, friends, employers, and employees. Even the subway tunnels, which had continued to connect the city, were closed off. Henceforth, East Germans who attempted to flee to the West ran a high risk of being shot down. Three hundred died at the Wall between 1961 and 1989.

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Legacy The Berlin Wall ended the Berlin crisis and confirmed once again Berlin’s divided nature. The two halves of Berlin became integral parts of their respective countries, and the illusion of a united Berlin was over. Although the building of the Wall offended many in the West, it did have the beneficial effect of stabilizing a situation that had the possibility of exploding into war. The creation of the Wall symbolized the ideological contrasts between East and West, but it was also a humiliating propaganda defeat for the Communists to have to admit that their own citizens preferred to live elsewhere and had to be fenced in to keep them from escaping. Finally, the Berlin crisis again demonstrated the West’s commitment to keep West Berlin free of Communist control. Two years after the Wall went up, President Kennedy visited Berlin to show his support for a free Berlin. In a speech, on June 26, 1963, he said: “Two thousand years ago, the proudest boast was ‘Civis Romanus sum’ [I am a Roman citizen]. Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is, ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ [I am a Berliner].” Some Berliners smiled at the line—in Berlin, “ein Berliner” refers to a jelly-filled doughnut—but the president’s declaration was cheered by the large crowd. Twenty-four years later, in 1987, another U.S. president spoke in Berlin. By this time, the Soviet Union was beginning far-reaching reforms. President Ronald Reagan, standing in front of the his-

toric Brandenburg Gate, which made up part of the Berlin Wall, addressed the Soviet premier. He said, “Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” Two years later, in November 1989, as the Soviet empire was collapsing, East Germans overthrew their government, and German volunteers from East and West helped destroy the barrier. Eleven months later, Germany was reunified as the Cold War came to an end. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; Cuba: Missile Crisis, 1962; Germany: East German Uprising, 1953.

Bibliography Childs, D. The GDR: Moscow’s German Ally. London: Allen and Unwin, 1988. Fulbrook, Mary. Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. ———. The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Krisch, Henry. The German Democratic Republic: The Search for Identity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Morris, Eric. Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War. New York: Stein and Day, 1973. Schick, Jack. The Berlin Crisis 1958–1962. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. Shlaim, Avi. The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948–1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Tusa, Ann. The Last Division: A History of Berlin, 1945–1989. San Francisco: Addison-Wesley, 1997.

GERMANY: East German Uprising,1953 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: Soviet Union DENMARK

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World War II had left Europe divided in two. In the West, France, Italy, and the western two-thirds of Germany were under the control of American, British, and French armies, while all of Eastern Europe, including the eastern third of Germany, was under the control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). As the Soviet armies moved into Eastern Europe, they worked with local Communists to put Communist governments into power that would be friendly to the Soviet Union. Those who resisted these efforts were arrested or killed. The Soviets were determined to turn the Eastern European countries into client states whose interests would be subordinate to those of the Soviet Union. The Soviets maintained their control over Eastern European governments for more than forty years. There were, however, a number of revolts against the stern rule of the Soviets and the national governments

When the Soviets moved into Germany, they brought with them a number of German Communists who had spent World War II in exile. One of these men, Walter Ulbricht, was put in charge of rebuilding the Communist Party in the eastern sector of Germany. The Allied powers who had defeated Germany in World War II—the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France—agreed that the German territories would be divided into four zones, with one for each of them to administer. From the beginning of the occupation, the Soviets worked to ensure that Communists would be in charge of all key administrative positions in their zone. Both the Western Allies and the Soviets carried out a process known as de-nazification—which involved removing Nazi officials from their old jobs— but the Soviets, with their political agenda, took the opportunity provided by de-nazification to replace all previous officials with reliable Communist Party members. Judges, bureaucrats, and policemen were all chosen on the basis of their political reliability. The Soviets also made sure that the German Communist Party (KPD) would be the only party with any real political power. They forced the Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) into a merger with the KPD, despite the resistance of many German Socialists (the Socialists in Berlin voted 8 to 1 against merging). The newly merged party was called the Socialist Unity Party (SED). When elections in East Germany allowed non-Communist parties to win some votes, the Soviets responded by replacing the leadership of those parties with more cooperative men. Leaders who did not cooperate were put in prison. By 1948, East German politics was dominated

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KEY DATES 1945

On May 8, Germany surrenders to the Allied powers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, ending World War II in Europe.

1948–1949

Soviets attempt to blockade West Berlin; the United States and other allied powers overcome the blockade by launching an airlift.

1952

A large number of East German farmers flee to West Germany in response to government efforts to collectivize farms.

1953

On May 1, East German leader Walter Ulbricht increases factory production quotas by 10 percent, to take effect June 30; on June 15, Berlin construction workers demand that the government drop the quota increase, and, joined by students and other workers, they march on the Council of Ministers building the next day; on June 17, labor unrest breaks out all over East Germany, as 300,000 workers go on strike; Soviet occupation forces open fire on demonstrators, killing between 25 and 300 persons; over the next few weeks, thousands of demonstration leaders are arrested.

by men who were either Communists or willing frontmen for the Communists. When East Germany established its own government, it would be along the same totalitarian one-party model as that of the Soviet Union. In 1949, partly as a result of the Berlin Blockade (in which the Soviet Union closed off ground transport of supplies to West Berlin), the Western powers in cooperation with West German political leaders helped organize West Germany as an independent nation, officially called the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviets responded by establishing an independent Communist state in East Germany, officially called the German Democratic Republic.

Dissatisfaction in East Germany Germany was not a happy nation. Even though the official election returns for 1950 showed that 98.2 percent of eligible voters had voted for the Communist-controlled government, large numbers of Germans from the East were emigrating across the border into West Germany. This stream of refugees,

“voting with their feet,” suggested that the election results had not been an entirely accurate reflection of popular opinion. Many East Germans obviously resented the heavy-handed tactics of German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht and the Soviets. The problems in East Germany were economic as well as political. Before the war, East Germany had been one of the less industrialized parts of Germany, and the fighting during the war had destroyed many of the few factories it did have. To make matters worse, at the end of the war, the Soviets transported much of the valuable factory equipment, rail cars, and other industrial resources to the Soviet Union, as reparations—compensation for the devastation the Germans brought to the Soviet Union during the war. There were also constant food shortages. East German farmers had resisted the Communist government’s forced collectivization of their farms and had expressed their objections by crossing the border into West Germany. The East German government reacted by sealing its borders with West Germany in 1952, but because the city of Berlin was still legally

Germany: East German Uprising, 1953

one unit, jointly administered by the powers that had defeated Germany in 1945, its internal borders remained open. The refugees who wished to leave Germany could simply cross from East into West Berlin. By 1953, 13 percent of all agricultural land had been abandoned. Finally, the example of West Germany’s economic success created envy on the part of East German workers—and frustration among Ulbricht and his colleagues. West Germany’s success came partly from its free-wheeling capitalist economy and partly from the economic aid it was receiving from the United States as part of the Marshall Plan. In contrast, the Soviet Union was still confiscating a portion of East Germany’s industrial output as reparations.

Mixed Messages from Moscow In an effort to match the success of the West, Ulbricht pushed for longer working days and higher quotas for all industries. Trade unions—which by 1953 were dominated by the Communists—were forced to accept agreements that had their workers work longer for less pay. On May 1, 1953, two months after the death of Josef Stalin, Ulbricht announced that production quotas were to be raised another 10 percent. He had already put into effect more restrictions on political and religious freedoms. These policies, particularly the increased production quotas, aroused widespread discontent. They also disturbed the new rulers in Moscow. Stalin’s successors, Malenkov and Khrushchev, had hoped to loosen some of the social and economic fetters that had characterized Stalinism. Internationally, they hoped to find some way of resolving, to their own advantage, the issue of a divided Germany. A hard-line Communist position on the part of the East German government would not help them accomplish these goals. Orders came from Moscow insisting that Ulbricht reverse himself on many of his policies. He was told to allow some degree of religious freedom and to stop attacking small-scale private businesses. Ulbricht was forced to comply, but he held firm on the raised work quotas because he still wished to have East Germany’s industrial production catch up to that of its Communist neighbors and of West Germany. Ulbricht may also have resisted any policies that seemed to lead to reconciliation with West Germany. If Moscow could arrange a reunifica-

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tion of Germany, Ulbricht and his followers would probably be out of a job. The contradictory messages coming from the Soviets and Ulbricht—political leniency combined with economic harshness—increased unrest. East Germans were given the impression that Ulbricht was not fully in control of the government (which was almost certainly true), and they were still not looking forward to the raised quotas, which were scheduled to take effect on June 30, 1953.

Uprising On June 15, a group of Berlin construction workers demanded that the East German government rescind the work quotas, just as it had rescinded other unpopular policies. The government refused, and the next day, June 16, the construction workers started an impromptu march on the Council of Ministers—the headquarters of the government. They were joined first by other workers and then by students and passers-by. (The workers had originally planned to send only two delegates, but, after some discussion, they concluded that two men alone might be arrested, so they decided to march as a group.) The march began in a fairly apolitical mood—the workers’ banners read, “We demand lower quotas”— but soon took on a tone more directly hostile to the Communist government, as some of the marchers began to chant, “Free elections!” and “Down with the government!” When they reached the Council of Ministers, the marchers dispersed, but only after some of them had called for a general strike to take place on the following day. Word of the workers’ march spread quickly. West Berliners heard the news of the demonstration (some watched it happen), and reports were soon being broadcast by West German radio, which could be picked up all across East Germany. The following day, June 17, unrest broke out all over East Germany. More than 300,000 East German workers went on strike demanding changed policies in cities across the country. Although the workers were vague about exactly what changes they wanted, it was clear that their mood was hostile to the government. Communist Party posters were torn down, and party functionaries were roughed up. Toward the end of the day, the crowds of workers, now joined by many other citizens, started attacking party buildings and prisons, freeing whoever they

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found in the prisons, including both criminals and political prisoners. With the crowds getting increasingly out of control, the East German government found itself helpless to act. Some policemen joined the workers while others stood by and watched. By the end of June 17, it was not clear that Ulbricht’s government would be able to regain control. At their height, the disturbances had attracted perhaps 10 percent of the working population of East Germany. Unwilling to see events go any further, and unsure of the East German government’s ability to maintain order, the Soviets ordered their tanks into the streets of Berlin and the other cities where unrest was occurring. In Berlin, two Soviet divisions were ordered to break up the demonstrations. After some tense confrontations with the crowd, the tanks opened fire and the rioters fled. East German radio announced that 25 people had been killed, but Western sources suggest that the figure was closer to 300. In addition to the deaths caused by gunfire, there were also reports of striking workers being seized and summarily executed. Soviet intervention probably saved the regime. Within hours most of the unrest had been quelled. In the following weeks, the East German government arrested as many as 25,000 supposed ringleaders, and Berlin was again quiet. To support their claim that the riots had been caused by “outside agitators,” the Communists ordered the execution of one West Berliner, who they claimed had participated in the disturbances. There were reports that at least forty other Westerners had also been executed. The uprising failed for three reasons. First, the workers rose up spontaneously, without any kind of organization, and their actions were therefore uncoordinated and easy to suppress. Second, the nearby presence of Soviet forces, and their willingness to intervene, probably doomed any popular uprising in East Germany. Finally, while the unrest was occurring, Americans and West Germans across the border did nothing to interfere. Western troops would have been the only effective response to the Soviet tanks.

Reaction of the West The riots probably surprised the West as much as they surprised East Germany. If the Western allies had planned on intervening, the suddenness of the outbreak would have made such intervention difficult

to organize. Even with advance warning, however, the Western Allies probably would have done very little. West German and American radio stations did keep track of the events as they occurred across the border, reporting on them to audiences in West and East Germany—and this helped striking workers coordinate their activities—but the West was unwilling to provide military aid to the demonstrators. This decision was quite reasonable—any military confrontation contained too great a risk of nuclear war—but it certainly disappointed both East and West Germans. American cabinet officials had made claims that they would soon succeed in “rolling back Communism,” but Western inaction in 1953 suggested that their bark was louder than their bite. The West German government, also determined to avoid a confrontation with the East, even ordered West German police to disperse crowds of West Germans who were gathering near the border in reaction to the disturbances in East Berlin. Individual West Germans did join in the unrest—some crossed the border to join in demonstrations, while others helped to deliver messages between the various groups of strikers—but this was done without any kind of official approval. On the contrary, the government worked to actively discourage such behavior. In the only substantive American action, President Eisenhower ordered that large quantities of food be delivered to Berlin to help feed the struggling people of East Germany. The Soviets and the East Germans refused to distribute these supplies, but the West Germans set up distribution points and eventually an estimated 3 million East Germans crossed over for at least one ration of food. This action on the part of the United States scored a small propaganda victory by demonstrating the depth of the food shortages in the East, but it did no real harm to the East German government.

Aftermath After the 1953 uprising, the Soviets initiated a number of changes in their relationship with East Germany that were designed to shore up the strength of that regime. The most important of these changes were economic. The Soviet Union ended all demands for reparations, which meant that East Germany’s industrial products would no longer be shipped to the Soviets without payment. The Soviets even offered

Germany: East German Uprising, 1953

some temporary economic aid in order to help calm the East German’s resentments. In 1954, the East German government was also declared to be completely independent of Soviet control, and the following year it entered the new Warsaw Pact military alliance as a full member. Within a few years, East Germany would become the most prosperous of the Communist states of Eastern Europe. The riots also strengthened Walter Ulbricht’s position in East Germany. Before the riots, the Soviets seemed to be considering replacing him, but afterward, they worked with great success to shore up his power base, granting him the support he needed to stay in control. The Soviets probably believed that Germany was too unstable to stand a change in regime, so they decided to maintain Ulbricht in power rather than risk further unrest. (They were also aware that it was their own undercutting of Ulbricht’s authority that had helped to give the workers the courage to act.) It is possible that the uprising also convinced the Soviet leadership to reconsider any ideas they may have had regarding German unification. If the Communists’ position in East Germany was as weak as the uprising suggested, any merger with the more prosperous and more satisfied West Germany could only result in the sweeping away of all Communist Party influence.

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Finally, the 1953 riots showed that the Communist government of East Germany (and possibly the Communist governments of the other Eastern European satellites) depended on Soviet tanks to maintain itself in power. Of course, the riots also demonstrated that if those Soviet tanks opened fire, the armies of the West would only stand by and watch, as they did again during the uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Carl Skutsch See also: Cold War Confrontations; Czechoslovakia: Coup, 1948; Czechoslovakia: Soviet Invasion, 1968; Germany: The Berlin Crises, 1948–1949 and 1958–1962; Hungary: Soviet Invasion, 1956; Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 1981– 1983.

Bibliography Baring, Arfnulf. Uprising in East Germany: June 17, 1953. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972. Childs, D. The GDR: Moscow’s German Ally. London: Allen and Unwin, 1988. Fulbrook, Mary. Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Krisch, Henry. The German Democratic Republic: The Search for Identity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

GREECE: Civil War,1944–1949 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: United Kingdom; United States YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA ALBANIA

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Communist stronghold, 1946–1947

In October 1944, as World War II drew to a close, German armies retreated from Greece, leaving the small country connecting the Mediterranean and the Balkans with severe social, economic, and political problems. The strongest political force was the EAM (National Liberation Front), a coalition of left-wing political groups dominated by the Greek Communist Party. ELAS, the military arm of the EAM, had been the most effective force against the German occupation, gaining a degree of legitimacy and popularity. With the Germans in retreat, the Communists assumed they could win control of Greece through both political and military means. The Greek Communists did not know it, but a decision made by two world leaders the same month as the German withdrawal would make their task immeasurably more difficult. In October 1944, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had agreed that Greece would remain

within Britain’s sphere of influence, while neighboring Bulgaria would remain in the Soviet sphere of influence. This informal agreement would tie the hands of the Soviets when the political and military battle reached its climax in Greece. The British were determined to maintain their traditional role as a dominant Western power in Greece and the Balkans. In Greece, the EAM was equally determined to bring a Communist government to Greece. The result was a brutal civil war that began in December 1944. By February 1945, with help from British forces, anticommunists defeated the Communist guerrilla forces along Greece’s northern borders. Meanwhile, both the EAM and the anticommunist allies of Britain proved that they could be equally ruthless in dealing with political opponents in regions they controlled. As a result, the Greek political scene was polarized between Communist and anticommunist activists, and the political center lost its influence. The disputes between EAM and the Britishbacked anticommunists involved a number of issues, including rival territorial claims, treatment of ethnic minorities, and clashing ideologies. These disputes masked a huge common problem: the Greek economy was in ruins, wrecked by World War II, the civil war, and a string of corrupt and incompetent governments. Tens of thousands of Greeks had been driven from their homes, some by partisan bands and others by wartime destruction. An especially divisive issue among political leaders was the Greek monarchy. Right-wing forces and the British government wanted King George II to return from exile to become the ceremonial head of the Greek government. Left-wing forces and the Soviet Union wanted to abolish the monarchy, which they saw as a symbol of repression and anticommunism. As the war progressed, it also became a part of the larger global struggle between Western nations and the Communist world that

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KEY DATES 1944

Leaders of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom agree that Greece will fall under the British sphere of influence following the end of World War II; a civil war between the British-supported royal government and Communist insurgents of the National Liberation Front (EAM, its Greek acronym) begins in December.

1945

The conflict between the government and insurgents comes to a temporary end in February; World War II in Europe ends in May.

1946 National elections in March are boycotted by EAM, which claims victory because only 60 percent of eligible voters go to the polls; fighting between EAM and the government resumes. 1947

Informed that Britain can no longer afford to support the Greek government, the United States begins providing military aid as fighting with EAM forces intensifies; in July, the Soviet Union rejects a Security Council resolution calling for a closure of Greece’s northern border to prevent the influx of pro-Communist forces from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia; in August, Greek Communist leaders proclaim the establishment of the “Free Greek Government.”

1948 The Greek army carries out its first offensive operation under the guidance of American advisers in February; in June, Greek Communists offer to begin negotiations with the government. 1949 Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito closes the border between Greece and Yugoslavia, cutting off most outside aid to Greek Communists; in November, EAM-controlled “Free Greek” radio announces that Communist forces have been defeated.

became known as the Cold War. This ensured that the Greek partisans on both sides would receive worldwide attention and vast quantities of military and economic aid. In March 1946, Greece held national elections monitored by France, Great Britain, and the United States. The Populist Party, supporters of the monarchy and those allied with it, won the most seats. The monitors announced that the election had been free and fair, but it was clear that the results did not fully reflect public sentiment. For one thing, the EAM had boycotted the election, and it later claimed “victory” because 40 percent of eligible voters did not go to the polls. In addition, the chaotic conditions in Greece had made it nearly impossible to put together accurate voting lists. During the occupation, the Germans had destroyed many records.

Immediately after the election, party leaders announced they would carry out a plebiscite to determine if King George II should return from exile. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries denounced the results as invalid and accused Britain of interfering in Greece’s internal affairs. Perhaps most disheartening, the political center had shown no strength, as polarization between extreme left and right continued.

Civil War Resumes The civil war began again soon after the elections. Many Greeks were disappointed by the reactionary policies of the new government. Also, despite continued British aid, economic conditions in the country were still terrible, leaving many in want of shelter

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and food. Meanwhile, the EAM vowed to overthrow the Greek government, beginning a guerrilla war in the country’s northern provinces. The Communist leaders of the EAM received support from the three countries bordering Greece to the north—Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. All three had Communist governments claiming the support and friendship of the Soviet Union. These countries offered not only military and other supplies to the Greek partisans, but also sanctuary to which they could retreat if pursued by the Greek army. The mountainous topography favored guerrilla warfare and made it difficult for conventional forces to find or destroy partisan fighting groups. Behind the scenes, the Soviet Union remained the major decision-maker for Communists in the Balkans. It played a major role in the fortunes of the partisans in Greece.

had been vetoed by the Soviet Union would have given the commission a much broader mandate to investigate activities in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia as well as Greece. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet representative to the UN, claimed that Greek “monarchists” were responsible for the disorders in the Balkans and absolved the three Communist states of all blame. In December 1946, Greece formally submitted its border disputes to the UN Security Council. Greece claimed that its sovereignty was violated because of aid the pro-Communist forces were receiving from the three Communist nations. All four countries agreed that border violations were taking place but disagreed as to the cause. The Security Council approved a resolution creating a Commission of Investigation to look into the various charges. Given that Albania had called for the creation of such a commission, the Soviet Union abstained in the voting.

Role of the U N The Truman Doctrine In August 1946, the Ukrainian delegation at the United Nations accused the Greek government of pursuing policies that endangered international peace. (Ukraine was one of the Socialist republics that made up the Soviet Union.) Specifically, it accused Greece of fomenting war in the Balkans, making illegal claims on Albanian territory, persecuting minorities, and permitting British troops to remain in Greece. On September 3, the Security Council voted to place the Ukrainian complaint on its agenda. The United States countered by introducing a resolution to create a UN commission to investigate the allegations. The Soviet Union vetoed this resolution. In September 1946, the Greek government held a plebiscite to determine the future of the monarchy. Seventy percent of the voters supported the return of King George II. Left-wing political forces continued to oppose his return because of his anticommunist sentiments and his support of right-wing political groups. A few days after the plebiscite, the Albanian delegation at the United Nations issued a statement accusing the Greek government of provoking attacks along the Albanian–Greek border. Albania demanded that a United Nations commission go to Greece to investigate its responsibility for the continuing conflict. In the Security Council debates, it became clear that Albania wanted the commission to operate only in Greece. The American proposal that

In December 1946, the United States sent a team of experts to Greece to evaluate economic conditions and to advise President Harry S Truman on policy options. The United States was becoming more involved in Balkan affairs. In February 1947, Great Britain informed the United States that it could no longer provide financial or military assistance to Greece or Turkey. Britain, which had suffered great losses and damage during World War II, was nearly bankrupt, and its citizens were still in want of bare necessities. In March 1947, the Greek government petitioned the United States for economic and military aid. Now it was America’s turn to attempt to check the Soviet advances. On March 12, President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress. He appealed for aid to Greece and Turkey ($250 million for Greece alone). The crisis was immediate, he maintained, and without U.S. assistance, the Communists would soon win control of Greece. In May 1947, Congress appropriated the money he requested. The president closed his speech on March 12 with a broader statement of policy, saying that the United States must be willing to “help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.” This pronouncement, known as the Truman Doctrine, served notice that the United States would offer assistance to

Greece: Civil War, 19 4 4–19 4 9

any country threatened by Communist subversion. It had become clear that only the United States could effectively meet the varied Soviet threats. Truman worked hard to mobilize public opinion in favor of this active approach to foreign policy. Many Americans were not convinced the Soviet Union was a threat and believed that the United States should withdraw from the threat of future conflicts overseas.

The Civil War Worsens The fighting in Greece escalated, as both the government and the rebels intensified their efforts to achieve a decisive victory. The Greek government again appealed to the United Nations for relief. In May 1947, the UN Commission of Investigation received conflicting interpretations from the United States and Soviet Union regarding the cause of the conflict. After conducting its own investigation, the commission issued a report accusing Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia of aiding Communist forces in Greece. The report recommended establishing a permanent commission to monitor the northern borders of Greece to help reduce the number of violent incidents. The Soviet Union opposed the recommendation.

The bitterly fought Greek civil war, pitting government forces against one of the first Communist insurgencies of the post–World War II era, left parts of Athens—and towns across the country—in ruins. (Dmitri Kessel/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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In July 1947, the Greek Communists offered a new proposal: they would end military operations if all foreign troops left Greece, if a provisional government (including Communist representatives) was established, and if all political prisoners were released. If the proposal were not accepted, they said, they would declare their own government. The Greek government rejected the proposal, dismissing it as propaganda. The fighting continued. Large-scale military clashes took place along the Albanian border. The United States introduced a resolution to the UN Security Council based on the majority report of the Commission of Investigation. The resolution called for the creation of a new commission to continue functioning in the Balkans for two years. Its purpose was to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. On July 29, 1947, the Soviets vetoed the resolution, continuing to insist that the Balkan conflict was the result of British and American interference in the internal affairs of Greece and the activities of right-wing political groups supported by AngloAmerican allies. The deadlock in the Security Council reflected Soviet-American differences regarding the balance of power in the Balkans. There was little chance, given their contradictory goals, that a consensus could develop that was acceptable to the protagonists. The United States decided to take the issue to the UN General Assembly, where the Soviet Union would not be able to exercise its veto. The United States also reserved for itself the option of unilaterally intervening in Greece if that should prove necessary. The United States accepted the responsibility for protecting Greece’s independence and its territorial integrity. Speeches by American officials at the United Nations made it clear that even a Soviet veto would not deter the United States from doing whatever it thought was necessary. In July 1947, American advisers began arriving in Greece to administer the aid granted under the Truman Doctrine. The situation was extraordinarily complex. Establishing an honest, competent, fair government was a challenge. The primary task was to help organize a government that could address the needs of the Greek people. Previous governments had done poorly in this respect, and their failures had increased the effectiveness of Communist promises. American advisers hoped to change this situation. An effective and caring government would reduce the Communists’ appeal.

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In August 1947, the Greek Communist leader, General Markos, proclaimed the establishment of a “Free Greek Government.” He called for the overthrow of the government in Athens and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The Free Greek Government existed only on paper, having no capital and no subjects to govern. After the announcement, the fighting again escalated. Given Soviet-American differences, the UN could do little to stop it. In September 1947, under American pressure, the Populist and the Liberal parties formed a coalition government with Themistocles Sophoulis, the leader of the Liberal party, as president. American officials hoped the new coalition would have broad appeal and thereby make the government more effective. The Soviets were unsuccessful in their efforts to keep the Greek issues off the agenda of the UN General Assembly. In October 1947, it approved a resolution creating the Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), which replaced the Commission of Investigation created in December 1946. While the General Assembly was debating the Greek issue, the United States announced it was sending military advisers to Greece. Their mission was to advise, not fight. At the end of the year, UNSCOB agreed to establish a monitoring group on the Greek side of the northern border. The Soviets accused the United States of using the committee to gain control of Greece and use it as a military base. In December 1947, the Communists announced the formation of the First Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece led by General Markos. The announcement called once again for the overthrow of the government in Athens and the establishment of a Communist regime. The founders of the new paper government may have been planning to win control of a small region in Greece as a base for its government, but still had not succeeded. The United States was quick to denounce the proclamation, and it warned other countries, particularly the northern neighbors of Greece, not to recognize the rebel regime. None of them did, and even in the Soviet Union, newspapers refrained from praising the new government. In February 1948, the Greek army carried out its first operation under the guidance of U.S. military advisers. The government forces were encouraged to be much more aggressive in trying to defeat the rebels. Besides military advisers, the United States supplied the Greek military with modern equipment

to improve its effectiveness. The rebels were not intimidated, however, and proved particularly skillful at attacking towns that were isolated and difficult to defend. UNSCOB issued its first report in June 1948, accusing Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia of supporting the Greek rebels by providing financial and military aid. The three nations, it was said, also provided training facilities, medical care, and assistance with recruiting new fighters. None of the Communist nations on the northern border of Greece had cooperated with UNSCOB. Unfortunately, UN activities did little to diminish the fighting. The United States and Great Britain could only hope to use the United Nations to influence public opinion and to establish an official record charging Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia with actions that threatened the peace. American officials continued to warn the Greek government that it could not depend entirely on the United Nations to halt the rebel activity.

Tito and the Cominform In March 1948, events occurred outside Greece that would have a profound impact on the war. The Soviet Union publicly accused the government of Yugoslavia of committing major policy blunders. Marshal Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia, had been a hugely popular partisan leader in the war against Germany. He was a dedicated Communist but insisted on deviating from Soviet policy. Stalin could not tolerate independent Communists who might possibly serve as a model for others. The Soviet accusation was the beginning of a campaign to oust Yugoslavia from the alliance of Communist nations under Soviet control. In May 1948, the Soviets circulated additional accusations against Yugoslavia, accusing Tito of slandering the Soviet Union and incorrectly interpreting Communist ideology. The charge of “revisionism”—deviating from the correct interpretation of ideology—was a serious offense. In June 1948, the Greek Communists offered to begin negotiations with the Athens government to achieve a cease-fire. The tone of the offer indicated that the rebels were apprehensive about their future. The quarrel between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union threatened to undermine support for the Greek rebels. In addition, the military advantage was beginning to shift in favor of the improved Greek army. The Greek

Greece: Civil War, 19 4 4–19 4 9

government rejected the rebels’ offer to negotiate and demanded that the rebels surrender. In June 1948, Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist alliance and called for the overthrow of the Tito regime. Western nations speculated that Stalin might send Soviet troops if all else failed, but he did not. Tito remained in control in Yugoslavia, but at a price. His contacts with nearly all other Communist nations virtually ceased. He was forced to turn to the West for financial assistance. American officials welcomed the improvement of the Greek army but thought more needed to be accomplished. In December 1948, President Truman, in a report to Congress on military aid to Greece, expressed disappointment that the Greek army had not succeeded in winning the war. The report acknowledged, however, that the rebels continued to receive assistance from the three northern neighbors of Greece. The fighting had driven multitudes of Greek citizens from their homes. More than 400,000 became refugees in 1948 alone, and by January 1949 the total was approximately a million. The refugee problem proved a major impediment in establishing a healthy economy. Much of the aid the country received was used for relief rather than for economic projects. When refugees were driven from their farms, fewer crops were grown, reducing supplies of food. In January 1949, Communist leader Markos retired, allegedly for reasons of health. In fact, Stalin had forced him out of office. Nicolas Zachariades, a Moscow loyalist, replaced him. The Soviet Union ordered the Greek rebels to reorganize their forces to pursue conventional combat rather than guerrilla warfare. This proved to be a major blunder. The Greek army, now better trained and equipped, found it easier to fight conventional battles rather than guerrilla bands. Then in July 1949, Yugoslavia’s Marshall Tito dealt the rebels a crushing blow. He closed the Greek-Yugoslav border, effectively removing Yugoslavia as a major player in the war. He even forced the “Free Greece” radio station to leave Yugoslavia. Without Yugoslav supplies and support, the Greek rebels could not win. By ending Yugoslav involvement in the Greek war, Tito removed a major point of disagreement between Yugoslavia and the United States. He could

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not afford to make enemies of both the Soviet Union and the United States and was willing to make whatever adjustments were necessary to protect his government. Although he eventually received various forms of assistance from the West, his commitment to Communism never wavered.

Communist Defeat In July 1949, the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Henry F. Grady, notified Washington that Yugoslavia had closed its border with Greece, and a UNSCOB report in August confirmed the closing. Albania and Bulgaria continued to support the rebels, but their support was not enough to sustain the fight. In October 1949, the rebels announced their suspension of military operations against the government in Athens. The civil war was over. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson issued a statement pointing out that the Greek army now controlled the northern borders for the first time since the civil war began. In November 1949, Free Greek radio announced, “We have been defeated.” Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations.

Bibliography Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Byrnes, James F. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962. Howard, Harry. “The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits.” Middle East Journal (1947): 59–73. Kuniholm, Bruce. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Messer, Robert L. The End of an Alliance. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Resis, Albert. “The Churchill-Stalin Secret Percentages Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944.” American Historical Review 83 (1977–78): 368–87. Truman, Harry. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956. Wittner, Lawrence S. American Intervention in Greece 1943– 1949. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

HUNGARY: Soviet Invasion,1956 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: Soviet Union SOVIET UNION

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Iron Curtain Da

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Hungary followed the same postwar pattern as the rest of Eastern Europe. Soviet troops arrived in late 1944 and slowly pushed the German armies out of the country. By January 1945, Hungary was almost entirely free from German occupation. In the wake of their advancing armies, the Soviets set up a provisional government in Hungary filled with pro-Soviet Hungarian Communists. At first there was some pretense of democracy in Hungary, and the provisional government was led by an alliance of parties linked together in the National Front. Communists, Social Democrats, Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, National Peasants, and Civic Democrats were all partners in the National Front, but the Communists held the important government positions and had control of the police. Soviet leader Josef Stalin may have allowed a temporary period of democracy in Hungary to placate the Western allies who were concerned about the Soviet Union’s ruthless imposition of Communist rule on Poland, but in free elections held in November 1945, Stalin’s plans suffered a reverse when the Smallholders party won 57 percent of the vote, defeating an alliance of Communists and Social Democrats. The vote was a sign of the strong democratic sentiments held by many Hungarians.

Over the next two years, the Soviets and their Hungarian allies worked to overturn this defeat. The victorious Smallholders were pressured by the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary into allowing the Communists to share power in another coalition government. The Smallholders held the majority of government ministries, but the Communists were given control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which controlled the police. Gradually, the Communists, with the help of the Soviet army, forced the Smallholders to give up their power, piece by piece. This process came to be known as “salami tactics”: slice by slice, the Smallholders let their power be taken away. Finally, rigged elections in August 1947 cemented the Communists’ hold on the country.

Communist Hungar y From 1947 onward, the Communists proceeded to turn Hungary into a smaller version of the Stalinist Soviet Union. The State Security Police (AVO) searched for enemies of the state with brutal dedication. Those arrested were tortured, forced to confess, and then either killed or sentenced to life imprisonment. Hungary’s leader, Matyas Rakosi, liked to be called “the best pupil of Comrade Stalin,” and he worked to earn the name. Purge followed purge, and even Hungary’s own Communists were not immune to Rakosi’s attacks. Between 1949 and 1953 more than 150,000 people were sent to prisons or concentration camps. The Hungarian economy was also transformed into a model of Soviet-style Socialism. Peasants were forced into collective farms, all factories, banks, and businesses were nationalized, and education was made a tool for distributing bland Communist propaganda. While there were some increases in production, they were primarily in the area of heavy industrial output. The standard of living for the average Hungarian declined.

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Hungar y: Soviet Invasion, 195 6

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KEY DATES 1945

Hungary is liberated from Nazi control by the Soviet Red Army in January; Soviet-backed Communist and Socialist parties lose national elections in November.

1947

Elections rigged by the Soviet Union and its Hungarian allies lead to victory by the Communists.

1953

With the death of Josef Stalin in the Soviet Union, hard-line Communist Hungarian premier Matyas Rakosi loses his main backer and is replaced by Imre Nagy as prime minister; Nagy advocates a more independent course for Hungary, along with more market reforms; Rakosi remains head of the nation’s Communist Party.

1955

Rakosi and his allies in the party oust Nagy as prime minister.

1956

Revelations by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev of abuses by Stalin shake the Soviet bloc and further undermine Rakosi; in June, Khrushchev forces Rakosi to resign as Communist Party chairman, to be replaced by Erno Gero; by October, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians are protesting the government and demanding that Nagy be reinstated as prime minister; police fire on the protesters, and the capital, Budapest, descends into chaos; Gero names Nagy as prime minister and calls for Soviet intervention; Soviet tanks roll into the capital on October 23; from October 23 through the twenty-seventh, fighting breaks out between Hungarian protesters and Soviet forces; after reaching an agreement with Nagy, Soviet forces begin their withdrawal from Hungary on October 28; on November 1, however, 200,000 Soviet troops and 2,500 tanks move back into Hungary; on November 4, pro-Soviet Janos Kadar announces he is forming a new government; the Soviets agree to pull out forces, as more than 180,000 Hungarians flee to Austria.

In 1953, Rakosi’s position was undercut by the death of Stalin. Stalin’s successors, Malenkov and Khrushchev, wanted to move away from Stalinism, and therefore insisted in June 1953 that the Hungarian Communists remove Rakosi from power and replace him with Imre Nagy. Rakosi was allowed to keep his position as head of the Communist Party, but Nagy became the prime minister.

New Course Nagy was a true believer in Communism, but he had also opposed the oppression and forced collectivization of the Rakosi years. Nagy embarked on the

“New Course,” in which farms were allowed to operate on a for-profit basis, investment in consumeroriented industries rose, and thousands of victims of the purges were freed from prison. Nagy tried to recruit support from outside the Communist Party, arguing that “those who are not against us are with us.” Many Hungarians welcomed these changes, particularly when real income rose in 1954. However, most leaders in the Hungarian Communist Party distrusted Nagy, who was viewed as a trouble-making outsider. Taking advantage of the confusion caused by power struggles in Moscow, Rakosi and his allies orchestrated Nagy’s ouster in February 1955.

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Nagy’s ouster disturbed many Hungarians. They had grown used to the greater freedom allowed by Nagy and were concerned that Rakosi’s return to power would also mean a return to the harsher policies of the past. This anti-Rakosi feeling was helped along by all the victims of Rakosi’s purges whom Nagy had released. These former Communist Party stalwarts told their friends and associates what had happened to them, with the result that the Hungarian intelligentsia became more and more hostile to the idea of the return of such policies. Some party members began to openly criticize Rakosi. Rakosi was also weakened by the continued changes within Moscow’s leadership. By 1956, Khrushchev had come out on top in the Moscow power struggles, a result that hurt Rakosi badly. Khrushchev used his success as a platform from which to make his famous speech to the Soviet Communist Party’s twentieth congress, in which he denounced the crimes of the Stalin era. These attacks on Stalin were translated in Hungary into attacks on Stalin’s best pupil. In June 1956, Rakosi was forced by Khrushchev to step down as prime minister and party leader. He was replaced by one of his chief associates, Erno Gero. Gero, a clone of Rakosi in temperament and ideological outlook, was no more popular than his predecessor. Students and writers campaigned for an increase in open debate and for a reinstatement of Nagy. In an attempt to placate the dissidents within the Communist Party, Gero agreed to give a state funeral for Lazlo Rajk, a Party leader who had been wrongly executed in 1949. The move backfired when 200,000 Hungarians turned out for the funeral. It was a clear sign of the massive discontent in Hungary.

Uprising The trigger for the Hungarian uprising was the turbulence that was occurring in nearby Poland. Polish worker unrest had brought a reforming Communist regime to power under Wladyslaw Gomulka. On October 19, 1956, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders had flown into Warsaw, perhaps hoping to reverse Gomulka’s appointment, but after a tense night of debate (which went on while Soviet tanks confronted Polish security forces), they had agreed to let Gomulka remain in power. Hungarian dissidents took Gomulka’s victory as a sign that they should also try to force the old Communist guard from power. Hungarian university stu-

dents organized a massive rally, which was to take place on October 23. The students put forward a 16point manifesto, which included a demand that all Soviet troops withdraw from the country. By the afternoon there were more than 300,000 students and other Hungarians gathered in Budapest. The crowds were peaceful but boisterous. They toppled a statue of Stalin located in the city’s center and waved Hungarian flags and anti-Soviet placards. At 8 p.m., Gero made an angry speech, condemning the behavior of the crowds. Students marched to the state radio station, demanding the chance to make a rebuttal. As they banged on the doors, the state security police opened fire with machine guns. Within an hour all of Budapest was in chaos. Citizens demanded guns from nearby army and regular police units. Angry at the behavior of the hated security police, many units obliged, and some joined the demonstrators themselves. The radio station was seized, and the crowd, together with the sympathetic soldiers and policemen, moved out to attack other government buildings, particularly those occupied by the security police. Gero responded to the chaos by asking for Soviet aid. At the same time, he named Nagy as prime minister, hoping that his appointment would calm the crowds. Nagy made a speech asking the rebels to stay calm and return their weapons, but he was ignored. Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest. This enraged the rebels, already excited by their victories. They began attacking the tanks. The fighting against the Soviets and Hungarian security forces lasted from October 24 to October 27. Hungarians of all ages joined in the fighting. Teenage boys ran through the streets, their pockets bulging with hand grenades and ammunition. Using homemade bombs (“Molotov cocktails”), captured Soviet equipment, and Hungarian army equipment, the rebels—now styling themselves “freedom fighters”— were able to destroy 200 Soviet tanks. Their victory was made possible by the narrow streets of Budapest, which were unsuitable for armored warfare. Snipers and grenade throwers would fire on the tanks below them and then retreat into basements or down back alleyways before the tanks could manage to return fire.

Brief Victor y On October 28, 1956, the Soviets came to terms with Nagy, who had been a semi-prisoner in the

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Hungarian citizens demonstrate in front of the Parliament building in Budapest during the anti-Soviet uprising of late October 1956. By early November, the Soviets had reasserted control. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Communist Party headquarters. Nagy was able to announce that evening that the Soviets were withdrawing their tanks and had agreed to allow him to form a new government. Throughout Hungary the Communist Party came under attack. Collective farms were dismantled, Communists were expelled from their headquarters, and the security police went into hiding. Thousands of political prisoners were released. Old political parties began to recreate themselves, and Nagy announced that free elections would be held for a truly democratic government. Hungary began to put itself back together, confident that the Soviets were gone for good. As it turned out, the Soviet departure had merely been a tactical withdrawal. Starting on November 1, more than 200,000 Soviet troops, with 2,500 tanks, began rolling into Hungary. Nagy responded to this betrayal by announcing the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact alliance. He also sent a message

to the United Nations, begging for some kind of help against the Soviet assault.

Foreign Reaction Unfortunately for Nagy, the Western world was distracted by another crisis. On October 29, 1956, Israel, supported by Britain and France, had invaded Egypt in an attempt to seize the Suez Canal (which the Egyptian government had just nationalized). It was a foolish war, which angered President Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower saw the war as a last gasp of European imperialism, and he knew that attacking Egypt would alienate the rest of the Arab world. So, while Soviet troops rolled back into Hungary, Eisenhower spent most of his time pressuring the British and the French, his allies, into withdrawing from Egyptian soil. Western radio stations, including the Americancontrolled Radio Free Europe, had helped to encourage

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the freedom fighters by supportive broadcasts, but this was in some ways worse than no aid at all. Hungarian freedom fighters received the impression that the United States was willing to send military support in case the Soviets attacked. Many Hungarians died believing these implied promises. Even if the Suez Crisis had not occurred, however, it is unlikely that the United States or its allies would have committed troops to interfere in Hungary. The country was surrounded on four sides by Communist nations and on the fifth by neutral Austria. Any aid would have had to come by air, which would have been difficult to do effectively. In any case, the United States was clearly unwilling to risk starting World War III for the sake of the Hungarians.

Soviets Return As the Soviet army divisions moved to surround the major Hungarian cities, Nagy carried on desperate negotiations with the Soviet ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov. Andropov promised that the Soviet Union was willing to allow Hungary its freedom. Then, on November 3, Soviet KGB agents seized the Hungarian negotiators. On November 4, Nagy made a radio announcement to the Hungarian people and to the world, saying that “the legal Hungarian democratic government” was under attack. Soviet tanks had entered Budapest, this time supported by infantry. Over the course of the next few days the Soviets proceeded to crush all resistance with overwhelming force. Many Hungarians fought back, but the odds were hopeless. Sniper fire from a single Hungarian would result in the destruction of an entire building. The last two strongholds to fall were the Killian army barracks, which surrendered on November 7 (the forty men who surrendered were mowed down by machine guns), and the Csepel Island factories, from which armed workers held out until November 9. Long before the last Hungarians had stopped fighting, there was a new Hungarian government in place. Janos Kadar, who had formed part of Nagy’s cabinet, had slipped out of Budapest and joined the Soviets gathering around the city. On November 4, he announced on Soviet-controlled radio that he was the leader of a new government that, with Soviet help, he had rescued Hungary from “counter-revolutionary

elements.” On November 7, he arrived at the Parliament building to begin his rule of Hungary. In the weeks following the defeat, 180,000 Hungarian “counter-revolutionaries” fled across the border into Austria.

Aftermath With Soviet help, Kadar was able to reimpose a traditional Communist government on Hungary. Thousands who had fought against the Soviets were either executed or imprisoned for life. The Communist Party was completely rebuilt, with much of its former membership purged. Approximately 7,000 Soviets and 25,000 Hungarians died in the fighting during the uprising. Nagy, who had sought refuge in the Yugoslavian embassy, was tricked into coming out of hiding and captured by the Soviets. Two years later, after repeated efforts to get him to publicly admit his guilt, the Soviets executed him. Once firmly in power, Kadar relaxed government repression somewhat. The Hungarians were allowed limited economic freedom, and the security police generally stayed out of people’s lives as long as they made no actions hostile to the government. In the 1960s and 1970s, Hungary became one of the more prosperous of the Communist states in Eastern Europe. It did not, however, have any political freedom until the fall of the Hungarian Communist Party in 1989. Like Berlin in 1953, and like Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungary in 1956 was a demonstration that the Soviet Union would not allow its satellites to leave their obedient orbits. Likewise, it was proof that the United States would not interfere with Soviet activities within the Soviet sphere of influence. The failed Hungarian uprising did have an effect on Communist parties elsewhere in the world. Many Communists in Western countries had denied the reality of Soviet oppression, but the pictures of tanks rolling through the streets of Budapest made it difficult even for dedicated Communist Party members to close their eyes to the truth. Communism began to lose some of its luster in the eyes of many Europeans, and some longtime Communist sympathizers moved to distance themselves ideologically from the Soviet Union. Carl Skutsch

Hungar y: Soviet Invasion, 195 6 See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Czechoslovakia: Soviet Invasion, 1968; Germany: East German Uprising, 1953; Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 1981–1983.

Bibliography Barber, Noel. Seven Days of Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising 1956. New York: Stein and Day, 1974. Hoensch, Jorg. A History of Modern Hungary, 1867–1986. New York: Longman, 1988.

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Kopacsi, Sandor. In the Name of the Working Class: The Inside Story of the Hungarian Revolution. New York: Grove Press, 1987. Lomax, William. Hungary 1956. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976. Molnar, Miklos. Budapest 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution. London: Allen and Unwin, 1971. Zinner, Paul E. Revolution in Hungary. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.

IRELAND: The Troubles Since 1968 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Ethnic and Religious; Terrorism and International Incidents PARTICIPANT: United Kingdom NORTHERN IRELAND (UK)

AT L A N T I C OCEAN

Londonderry (Derry) DERRY ANTRIM TYRONE FERMANAGH

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Battle of the Boyne (1690)

Belfast DOWN

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REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

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In Northern Ireland, the violence that has wracked the province since the late 1960s is referred to as the “Troubles,” but in another sense, the whole of Ireland has been plagued by troubles for more than 1,000 years. The smaller island to the west of Great Britain was settled by a people of primarily Celtic descent in the first millennium b.c.e. Ireland was said to have been converted to Christianity by St. Patrick in the fifth century c.e., and its devout and learned monks are famous in Christendom.

Historical Background Ireland was raided by Norse marauders in the Dark Ages, but its troubles began in earnest after 1066, the year that neighboring England was conquered by the Normans. During the years of the Normans’ su-

premacy, they sent armies across the Irish Sea and brought the Celtic residents of Ireland under a loose kind of control, from which the Irish nobles constantly fought to free themselves. Later, during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), the English government encouraged Protestants from England and Scotland to settle in Ireland to help solidify English control over the island. Gradually, the north of Ireland became increasingly populated by these Protestant immigrants, while the south remained almost wholly Roman Catholic. In both north and south, Protestants held all government posts and controlled much of the Irish economy. Catholic Ireland became an English colony, governed by means of an imported ruling class. From the beginning of the English conquest, the Irish fought to expel the invaders. In the early nineteenth century, the Protestant immigrants, better educated and economically more secure, had led these Irish independence movements. However, by the late nineteenth century, most Protestants in Ireland saw their own security resting upon continued English control of Ireland. If Ireland became independent, it was clear that it would be dominated by the Catholics of the south, and this was something that the northerners were unwilling to accept. For more than 300 years, they had been the dominant class in Ireland, and Catholic rule would end that privileged position. In the 1880s, the British government seemed willing to give Ireland autonomy within the British Empire (known as “Home Rule”). In response, the Protestants of the north formed Ulster unionist organizations to pressure the British Parliament into keeping Ireland within the Union of Great Britain. (Ulster was the name of the Irish province in which most Protestants lived. When Northern Ireland was split away from the south, it included only six of the nine Ulster counties, but many northerners still used

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KEY DATES 1921

After centuries of British rule, Ireland wins its independence, but the six northern counties remain part of the United Kingdom.

1962

The Irish Republican Army (IRA), which has engaged British security forces in a low-level conflict since the 1920s, calls off its armed resistance campaign, citing lack of popular support.

1966–1967

Responding to British concessions to Catholics, Protestant extremists led by the Reverend Ian Paisley organize anti-Catholic marches.

1968–1969

Catholic protesters organize a civil rights campaign.

1972

With conflict between Protestants and Catholics on the rise, Britain imposes direct rule on Northern Ireland; on January 30, British troops fire on Catholic marchers, killing fourteen in an incident Catholics come to call “Bloody Sunday.”

1991–1993

The IRA intensifies its bombing campaign in London.

1994

By this year, some 3,000 persons have died in the conflict.

1998

The Good Friday Agreement brings the conflict to a peaceful resolution.

the name “Ulster” when referring to their home.) In 1912, when the British government passed a Home Rule bill for Ireland, the Ulster unionists formed paramilitary organizations, armed themselves, and threatened to go to war against Britain in defense of their right to stay connected to Britain. They were supported in their resistance by the British Conservative Party and many officers in the British army. World War I temporarily delayed the Home Rule crisis, as the Irish and English put aside their differences to fight against Germany. When World War I ended, however, the fighting continued. The proindependence Irish Republican Army (IRA), formed in 1919, led a brief but bloody guerrilla war against the British (1919–1921). Realizing that it could not keep all of Ireland, Britain responded to the violence by passing the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 and agreeing to an Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. Together, these two documents gave the twenty-six counties of the south their autonomy but maintained English control over the six northern counties that had Protestant majorities. Many Englishmen, particularly in the Liberal and Labour parties, would have

preferred to let the north go, but the Conservative Party was too emotionally committed to defending the Union to be willing to abandon Protestant allies in Belfast.

Before the Troubles In the newly separated Ireland, political turmoil died down. The independent Irish Free State (Republic of Ireland beginning in 1949) in the south was distracted by its own economic and political problems and was disinclined to intervene in northern politics. In Northern Ireland, the Protestants, who outnumbered Catholics by two to one, were able to maintain their control of government and society. The Government of Ireland Act gave Northern Ireland its own parliament, the Stormont, which had almost complete control over local affairs. Britain retained the legal authority to interfere in Northern Ireland but preferred to stay out of Ulster politics. The Protestant ruling class used blatant gerrymandering to make sure that it was overrepresented in the Stormont and in local city councils. Even in towns

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where Catholics were in the majority, the Protestants arranged electoral boundaries to assure themselves of a majority of city council seats. To further solidify its hold on power, the Protestant-controlled Stormont limited voting rights to homeowners or tenants of public authority housing. Because the city councils controlled access to this housing, the Protestants who dominated these councils could guarantee that Protestants would remain disproportionately represented in local elections simply by excluding Catholics from publicly owned housing. From 1921 to 1968, Northern Ireland was governed as a Protestant state whose purpose was to serve the interests of the Protestant majority. Catholics were discriminated against in housing, employment, education, and local government. Protestants and Catholics lived in separate neighborhoods, went to separate schools, and rarely intermarried. The average Protestant had a higher income than the average Catholic. Northern Ireland was made up of two unequal nations. As an added burden, the Catholic minority had to endure Protestant political rallies that were openly contemptuous of Catholicism and Irish Catholic traditions. Ulster unionists organized parades every July that marched through Catholic neighborhoods with music blaring in an effort to intimidate the Catholic minority and reassure the Protestant majority. Finally, in case any violent dissent arose, Northern Ireland’s Protestant government could invoke the Special Powers Act (passed in 1922), which would allow it, among other things, to detain suspects without trial and carry out searches without judicial warrants.

Civil Rights Movement During the early years of Protestant dominance, the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland engaged in little political agitation. The Irish Republican Army, an illegal revolutionary organization, carried out a lowlevel campaign of violence against Protestant police, British soldiers, and government officials, but it had an insignificant impact. In 1962, the IRA called off its campaign, saying that it had little popular support, which was true. Poorly educated and economically struggling, Catholics in Northern Ireland were both ill-equipped and disinclined to organize protests against the injustices under which they suffered. Only a few years later, however, this situation had changed. After World War II, Britain introduced a

number of social reforms that benefited the Catholics of Northern Ireland. Free education was provided up to the age of fifteen, and opportunities for a tuitionfree college education were opened for the most promising students. For the first time, young Catholics were introduced to a wider world, and they began to question the unfair conditions under which they and their parents lived. By the mid-1960s, a new generation of Catholics had come of age. Determined to change conditions in Northern Ireland, they began a civil rights movement consciously based on the movement being led by Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States. Organizations such as the Campaign for Social Justice and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association fought against the inequities that existed in Northern Ireland. Catholic members of Parliament organized sit-ins at housing projects to protest the exclusion of Catholics. These efforts had a small effect on some Protestants in the Stormont. Northern Ireland’s prime minister, Terence O’Neill, made some symbolic visits to Catholic churches and also received a visit from the Republic of Ireland’s prime minister in 1965. However, these minor gestures outraged the more extreme Protestants. In 1966 and 1967, extremists led by the Reverend Ian Paisley organized marches and rallies that attacked the Catholic efforts to achieve reforms and questioned Prime Minister O’Neill’s small moves toward compromise. O’Neill was eventually forced to resign. In 1968, the Catholic civil rights organizations organized counter-marches to show their desire for greater rights. These marches were designed to be peaceful affairs—in some the marchers sang the American civil rights standard “We Shall Overcome”—but on October 5, 1968, a march through the city of Londonderry led to violence. Four hundred marchers were attacked by nightstick-wielding members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC—the police force of Northern Ireland), who beat many of them bloody. The scene was caught on film and rebroadcast around the world. Riots broke out in the Catholic sections of Belfast, Northern Ireland’s capital. Despite the arrest of some of its leaders for disturbing public order, the civil rights movement continued into 1969 and was even supported by some Protestants. More marches took place, along with more clashes with the RUC and Protestant loyalists. Protestant thugs armed with nail-studded clubs attacked marchers while the police looked on. Riots in

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poor Catholic neighborhoods continued to flare up. In August 1969, the riots reached a new peak, with thousands injured and some killed. The RUC could not control the violence—often, instead, they contributed to it. The prime minister of Northern Ireland felt obliged to ask for British troops to help deal with the disturbances.

Participants While the Troubles in Northern Ireland pitted Catholics against Protestants, it is wrong to think of the conflict as primarily one of religion. Rather, Northern Ireland was inhabited by two different tribes, both of which used religion as a way of distinguishing themselves and their opponents. Even nonobservant Catholics fought for the rights of their people, while Protestants who were equally nonobservant worked to defend their prerogatives. Religion was a label that separated two classes or ethnic groups. In Belfast, there was an old joke about a man who identified himself as an atheist. “Yes,” his companion said, “but are you a Catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist?” Religion did play a significant role in the feelings of some in Northern Ireland. Many Protestants were suspicious of the influence that the Catholic Church had over government in the south. During the Troubles, extremists like Ian Paisley used apocalyptic terminology to paint the Catholics as servants of the devil. Many of the problems between Catholics and Protestants were traceable to economic insecurity. Northern Ireland was the poorest region in the United Kingdom, with a high unemployment rate and insufficient housing. Catholics were angry about the privileges and employment opportunities given to Protestants. Protestants feared losing their economic advantages and sinking to the level of the impoverished Catholics.

Protestants Much of the paranoia and oppressive behavior of the Ulster Protestants was motivated by their fear of the Catholic population, both those within Northern Ireland and those in the Irish Free State to the south. Although the Irish Republic was generally disinclined to become involved in northern problems, it still represented a potential threat to Protestant dominance. Protestants feared that someday the British

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government would allow Northern Ireland to be absorbed into the Republic. Protestants called themselves “unionists” or “loyalists” to emphasize their kinship with Protestant Great Britain and their loyalty to the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland was literally a growing danger for the unionists. By the 1990s, Catholics made up more than 40 percent of the population, and their higher birth rate suggested that eventually they would outnumber Protestants in the region. This realization made some moderate Protestants consider negotiations, but it made the extremists ever more radical and intransigent. At the heart of Protestant unionism was the Orange Order, a Protestant lodge founded in 1795. Its members met for both social and political purposes, but from the beginning, one important aim of the group was maintaining Protestant dominance in Northern Ireland. Almost every important Irish Protestant official or politician was also an Orangeman. One of the central duties of the various lodges was to organize the Orangeman marches that were held every July in celebration of various Protestant victories over Catholic forces. The most important was Protestant King William’s victory on July 12, 1690, over Catholics at the Battle of the Boyne. These loud marches with their waving banners and huge booming drums wound their way through Catholic neighborhoods and became a way of impressing the Catholic population with the power, energy, and dedication of the Protestant establishment. If the soul of Protestant power rested with the Orangemen, its military face was the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Established in 1922, the RUC was created as a paramilitary force designed to control the Catholic minority. It was equipped with militarystyle weapons, including machine guns. The RUC only began to lose this paramilitary character after the Troubles began, when the British government struggled to transform it into a traditional police force. Most Catholics continued to view the RUC as a tool of Protestant dominance. During the Troubles, the RUC often stood aside as Protestant militants attacked Catholic demonstrations, and occasionally RUC officers would join in these attacks. Long after the Troubles eased, the Royal Ulster Constabulary remained more than 95 percent Protestant. The political expression of Protestant unionism was the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP ruled

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Northern Ireland from its creation in 1921 until 1972 and continued to be the most important Unionist party into the 2000s. The UUP represented the mainstream among Northern Ireland Protestants. Although dedicated to protecting Protestant prerogatives, the UUP sometimes showed itself to be flexible in negotiating with Britain and the Catholic minority. The main opposition to the UUP in Northern Ireland was the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by the Reverend Ian Paisley. Among Protestants in Northern Ireland, a majority were Presbyterian, and Paisley was a Presbyterian minister who had made a career out of bigoted attacks on Catholics. The DUP, which Paisley helped to found in 1971, was dedicated to maintaining Protestant supremacy in Northern Ireland at all costs. Paisley worked to derail all the peace talks from the beginning of the Troubles. His rhetoric was always heated, and he was known for calling down the wrath of God on “the papist rats and their murdering scum.” Behind these official Protestant political parties were unofficial, and sometimes illegal, Protestant paramilitary organizations. The largest of these was the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), which was founded in 1971 as a neighborhood protection organization. Although its members claimed they only wished to defend Protestant neighborhoods, they were responsible for extreme anti-Catholic violence, including bombings and assassinations. More radical was the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which was founded in 1966 to fight against the IRA and other Catholic militants. The UVF was banned the year it was created, but it continued to thrive on the fringes of Protestant political life. The UVF was also responsible for numerous killings from its founding through the late 1990s. Beyond the UVF, there were even more extremist groups, such as the Loyalist Volunteer Force, which was closely associated with Paisley, and paramilitaries associated with the independent Ulster Democratic Party.

Britain Britain was viewed by much of the world as Northern Ireland’s oppressor, but it was often only the dog wagged by its Ulster tail. From Gladstone in the 1880s to Asquith in 1912, there was a long tradition among the British of wanting to wash their hands of the Irish problem. With the Troubles, this desire

grew. Increasing numbers wished to cut all ties with the Ulster Protestants. One of the strongest forces against giving up on Northern Ireland involved practical politics. As part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland nominated and elected members to Britain’s House of Commons. They were nearly all members of the Conservative Party, and the party (which was in power in 1951–1965, 1970–1974, and 1979–1997) often had a slim majority and depended on the votes of the Irish Protestants in Parliament to pass its legislation. Devotion to the cause of Northern Ireland was sorely tested in Britain during the Troubles. Every year soldiers from England (or Scotland or Wales) died while on duty in Northern Ireland, and every year peace efforts failed. Even Conservative members of Parliament became willing to seek some compromise solution there, but Conservative Party leaders, notably Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, remained staunch supporters of a continued connection between Britain and Northern Ireland.

Catholics Politically, the Catholics of Northern Ireland were divided into two main groups: moderate nationalists and radical nationalists. Both supported an eventual merger between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, but the moderates, represented by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), favored nonviolent means, while the radicals, Sinn Fein and the IRA, were willing to use violence. The SDLP was the most popular nationalist party in Northern Ireland, although it was less well known than Sinn Fein outside Ireland or Britain. Led by John Hume, a longtime Catholic civil rights leader, the SDLP always emphasized working through legal channels to achieve the goals of Catholic Northern Ireland. Unlike Sinn Fein and the IRA, the SDLP always renounced the use of violence to achieve its ends. For many years this pledge kept SDLP leaders from even talking to their more violence-prone Catholic rivals. Sinn Fein (which means “Ourselves Alone” in Gaelic) was the more controversial party. It was founded in 1902 as a party dedicated to throwing the British out of Ireland. After its success in 1921, the party faded away in the south. But in the north, it survived and became the political voice of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This position was informal

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rather than open—the IRA was a banned terrorist organization, and Sinn Fein had to deny any direct connection in order to remain a legal political party. And although Sinn Fein leader (since 1983) Gerry Adams clearly had contacts within the IRA (he was once a member), he had only a limited ability to control its actions. Sinn Fein received its strongest support from the poorer Catholic ghettos. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was the major Catholic paramilitary organization in Northern Ireland. The IRA was founded in 1919 as a force dedicated to expelling the British from Ireland. After the south achieved its independence, the IRA split into two. The larger portion was politically tamed and transformed, becoming the foundation of the Irish Republic’s army. The smaller faction continued to agitate for the unification of north and south Ireland. By the 1960s, the IRA was having little success in its small-scale hit-and-run attacks, received little popular support, and was losing membership. By the time the Troubles began, it was largely dormant. The Troubles brought the IRA back to life, and by 1970 it had been reborn as the first line of defense against Protestant attacks. During 1969, when Protestant mobs poured into Catholic neighborhoods, IRA irregulars manned barricades armed with a hodgepodge of small-caliber weapons. Young Catholics saw these soldiers as brave defenders of Catholic rights, and they joined the group in large numbers. By 1970, armed IRA irregulars walked the streets of Belfast’s Catholic neighborhoods and engaged in open gun battles with Protestant paramilitaries, the RUC, and the British army. The IRA was forced underground in the mid-1970s by increasing British military pressure. In response to the pressure, it became a much more professional organization, with covert cells operating throughout the province. Unable to face the British army in a head-to-head battle, the IRA chose to become a terrorist organization, carrying out bombings in Northern Ireland and England and assassinations against Protestants who were perceived as dangerous to the Catholic community. Many Catholics disapproved of the IRA’s violent tactics, but the group was still admired as the only armed force standing between Catholics and the Protestant paramilitary groups. The IRA supported its efforts with a combination of racketeering, bank robberies, and donations (particularly from the wealthy Irish community in America).

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There were also Catholic splinter paramilitary groups, such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). The politics and attitudes of these groups tended to be more extreme than those of the IRA. For all its violent tactics, the IRA viewed itself as a regular army and worked to maintain discipline within its own ranks.

Republic of Ireland From its foundation, the Republic of Ireland opposed the separation of Northern Ireland. However, most of the time its government was not eager to get involved with Northern Ireland’s bloody affairs. Any amalgamation with Northern Ireland would require the Republic to absorb more than a million northern Protestants. Still, there was a great deal of sympathy in the south for Catholics in the north, particularly after the Troubles began. Most southerners supported the idea of eventual union, and Irish governments made repeated overtures to Britain to try to achieve some kind of peace in the area. For many years, these attempts were clumsy because the Republic’s constitution claimed the whole of the Emerald Isle, north and south. In turn, the Protestants of Northern Ireland consistently refused to negotiate with a government that was legally pledged to eliminate the Protestant state.

The Troubles—The Beginning In the August 1969 riots, 7 people were killed, 750 injured, and almost 2,000 made homeless by rampaging mobs—the mobs were mostly Protestant, but Catholics also attacked their Protestant neighbors in revenge. Buildings were set ablaze, and the streets were filled with rioters. Armed men set up barricades in both Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods. The sight of such death and destruction convinced the British government to send in troops, and over the next few months, it moved 13,000 into Northern Ireland. At first, Northern Ireland’s Catholics saw the British troops as saviors, because they protected some Catholic neighborhoods from Protestants mobs. The British government also issued reports saying that the Protestant government had been complacent and unjust. It ordered the breakup of the police reserve force known as the “B-Specials,” which had a reputation for persecuting

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Catholics. Protestants, who viewed the B-Specials as their particular protectors, rioted to protest their loss. One of the stranger sights of 1969 was a crowd of Protestant unionists waving British flags while attacking British soldiers. In the wake of the violence, the IRA rose once more. First known as the Provisional wing of the IRA to differentiate itself from a more left-wing and less militant faction, the “Provos” soon were the dominant element within the IRA. At first they were poorly organized, but they were soon busily seeking out weapons and recruits. The recruits were not hard to find. By 1970, the British army’s welcome had worn thin among Catholics, who were beginning to believe that the British favored the Protestants, which was sometimes the case. Dozens of Catholics were injured in riots that year, often by British soldiers who were defending Orange Order parades. Others died in clashes between Protestant and Catholic mobs, the latter now backed up by units of the IRA. The harsh behavior of the British army helped IRA recruitment. Many who had not considered violence in 1969 were very willing to do so in 1970. The British were now viewed as another army fighting for the Protestants. The members of the IRA, who had lost the respect of most Catholics, were now treated as heroes. The following year, 1971, saw even more violence, as units of the IRA shot at British soldiers and bombed Protestant neighborhoods. The unionists responded by planting bombs in Catholic pubs. More than 180 were killed—mostly civilians. That year also saw the first British soldier killed—Robert Curtis, a twenty-year-old ensign in the Royal Artillery.

Bloody Sunday The worst year of violence was 1972. On January 30, a Sunday, a Catholic crowd marched through the town of Londonderry to protest the imprisonment of some Catholics by the Protestant government. All marching had been declared illegal, and British paratroopers were ordered to disperse the unarmed crowd. After some stone throwing by wilder elements in the crowd, the paratroopers opened fire with their rifles, killing fourteen civilians. The killings shocked the world and enraged the Catholic community. In Dublin, Irish crowds burned the British embassy in revenge. The IRA responded to Bloody Sunday with a March wave of bombings di-

rected against well-populated targets in Belfast. Six were killed and hundreds wounded. The British, tired of the intransigence of the Protestant leadership in Northern Ireland—intransigence that they felt had helped to cause the Bloody Sunday march— permanently suspended the Stormont, Northern Ireland’s parliament, and declared that henceforth Northern Ireland would be ruled directly from Britain. This decision led to short strikes and public protests by unionists, but their position was hampered by its inherent contradictions. It was hard for the Protestants to call themselves loyalists and unionists while protesting against the country to which they were supposed to be united and loyal. Protestant frustration expressed itself through UDA assassinations of Catholics. The IRA responded with more bombs. By the end of the year, 497 more had died in shootings and bombings in Northern Ireland.

Power Sharing At first, the 1972 assumption of direct rule by the British seemed to improve the chances of peace in Northern Ireland. The British eliminated some of the bias and self-serving that had characterized Protestant rule in the north, including the arbitrary internment of Catholics. More significantly, the British attempted to create a government that would allow Catholics to share power with Protestants. The British organized the Northern Ireland Assembly, which would be chosen by proportional representation—thereby ending Protestant gerrymandering. The eleven-person Executive Committee was formed, with power divided between Catholic and Protestant members, although the latter had a majority of places. On top of this structure was placed the Council of Ireland, which was to include members from the north and south and whose purpose was to promote closer cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This last innovation was particularly hateful to Protestant extremists, who had no desire to have any connection with the Catholic Republic of Ireland. For a few months the power-sharing agreement seemed to be working, but the arrangement eventually fell apart because of extremists on both sides. Among Protestants, only the most moderate unionists were willing to join the new government, while extremists led by Paisley viciously attacked the compromise. The Catholic Social Democratic and

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A British soldier drags a Catholic protestor in the streets of Londonderry, Northern Ireland, on January 30, 1972— known as Bloody Sunday. Fourteen Catholics were killed as British paratroopers opened fire on a civil rights march. (Thopson/AFP/Getty Images)

Labour Party shared power in the new government, but its leaders were denounced by the IRA as collaborators and traitors. As the new government struggled to function, the IRA and Protestant paramilitary groups continued to shoot and bomb each other and innocent bystanders. The death of the power-sharing agreement came as the result of a general strike by militant Protestant unions in May 1974, which shut down much of Northern Ireland. The RUC and the British army were unwilling to break the Protestant picket lines. The new government, internally divided, unable to deal with either terrorists or strikers, was paralyzed. It had no choice but to resign. After May 28, 1974, Britain again took direct control of Northern Ireland.

Continued Violence Between 1974 and 1993, there was little improvement in Northern Ireland. Britain continued to rule directly, and the Protestant unionists remained unwilling to share power with the Catholic minority. Both the IRA and Protestant paramilitaries continued their attacks. Television programs in Europe and the United States were filled with pictures of UDA paramilitaries marching through the streets wearing ski masks to hide their faces, while IRA members with dark glasses and berets marched as honor guards beside an endless series of funerals, and everywhere British army units patrolled in armored cars. By 1994, more than 3,000 people had died from the Troubles.

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During this period, the IRA expanded its area of operations to England itself. Bombing attacks were carried out against English cities. Among the most spectacular attacks were the 1984 attack on a Brighton hotel that just missed killing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the 1991 mortar attack on 10 Downing Street (residence of the British prime minister) during a cabinet meeting, and the 1993 bombing of the London financial district, which caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. No longer an informal militia devoted to protecting Catholic neighborhoods, the IRA was a well-organized network of professional terrorists who tried to make the British occupation of Northern Ireland as costly as possible. The IRA’s sources of weapons were varied, but they included smuggled shipments from IrishAmerican organizations sympathetic to the nationalist cause. Fundraisers in the United States described to Irish-Americans the brutality of British soldiers and Protestant paramilitaries, but were silent about IRA bombings of civilian targets. The IRA also received weapons from anti-Western sources, including Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. The Protestant paramilitary groups received their funding from the financially better-off Protestant community. Protestant paramilitary groups were only marginally less violent than the IRA. The UDA, the UVF, and other groups targeted IRA leaders and individual Catholic civilians and threw gasoline bombs into the homes of Protestants who were deemed insufficiently loyal. The hatred between Protestants and Catholics grew so bitter that some killings had a bizarre and twisted character. From 1972 to 1977, a gang of Protestant thugs known as the Shankhill Butchers carried out a series of brutal torture-murders against random Catholic victims. The killers used knives, axes, and cleavers to dismember their victims. Same-religion violence also occasionally erupted. The Protestant UVF carried on a shooting feud against the relatively more moderate UDA, while many IRA men died as the result of internal conflicts. The British army also contributed to the death toll. Particularly infamous were the SAS (Special Air Service) squads. These elite British army antiterrorist units were responsible for killing a number of IRA militants. Perhaps the most famous protest of this era involved no shooting. In 1981, Bobby Sands, an IRA prisoner, went on a hunger strike in an effort to force the British to treat IRA captives as prisoners of war rather than common criminals. Other nationalists

joined him, and ten, including Sands, died. Sands’s hunger strike attracted international attention when, before his death, he was elected to the British Parliament by Northern Ireland’s Catholics. His death caused further riots.

Movements Toward Peace In 1985, a small step toward peace was taken when Britain and Ireland signed an agreement in which the British gave the Irish government the right to consult on issues of concern to Catholics in Northern Ireland. In return, the Irish Republic conceded that there could be no change in government in the north without the consent of the majority of Northern Ireland’s population. Even this mild nod toward the south, granting the right to consult, brought forward more Protestant riots and demonstrations, but British Prime Minister Thatcher did not back down. This agreement set the precedent that the Irish government should be involved in future peace talks. Further cooperation occurred on the Catholic side in 1988, when SDLP leader John Hume agreed to open talks with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams (previously Hume had refused because of Adams’s close ties to the IRA). These talks, which continued off and on over the next five years, helped to bring together the Catholic nationalists’ two most prominent leaders. The end result was a 1993 joint statement by the two leaders asking for self-determination for the Irish people. The Hume-Adams statement was followed later in 1993 by a joint statement between John Major and Albert Reynolds, then prime ministers of Britain and the Republic of Ireland, that peace must come to Northern Ireland through the cooperation of both governments and all peoples in Ireland, north and south. These moderate statements eased Northern Ireland further in the direction of compromise. The British government even held occasional secret talks with the IRA itself, something that it had previously claimed it would never do so long as the IRA continued to carry out terrorist attacks. In August 1994, the IRA, believing that peace negotiations might be possible, announced a ceasefire. The announcement was a response to the generally improving political climate and to Gerry Adams’s improved status in Northern Ireland. With Adams being treated as a respected politician, and with Britain acknowledging that the Irish Republic should have a

Ireland: The Troubles Since 19 6 8

say in Northern Ireland’s future, the IRA decided that many of its goals might be within its grasp. The main Protestant paramilitary groups responded with their own cease-fire in October of the same year. Leaders in both the IRA and the Protestant paramilitary groups were tired of the many years of violence. They let it be known that even if all their goals were not achieved, they still might be willing to lay down their weapons.

Peace? With the IRA and the Protestants having declared a cease-fire, the way to peace was open, but it was slowed by further intransigence on the part of Unionists and the British. The British and the Unionists demanded that the IRA give up its arms before talks could begin. The IRA refused—and, in 1996, broke its ceasefire with further bombings. The unionists, led after 1995 by hard-liner David Trimble, worked to avoid moving any further toward unity with the south. Trimble had been one of the extremist Protestants who had helped to sink the 1973 power-sharing arrangement. Britain’s Prime Minister John Major was personally willing to compromise, but he was handicapped by his weak hold on the House of Commons. To stay in power, he needed Unionist Party votes in Parliament, and so the Unionists could blackmail him into stalling further peace talks. Finally, on May 1, 1997, the British Labour Party swept elections in Britain, and Tony Blair became prime minister. This altered the political situation. As a Labour prime minister with a landslide victory, Blair had no need of Unionist support in Parliament, so he was free to reopen negotiations. Talks began almost immediately. In August, after the IRA had agreed to another cease-fire, Britain agreed to allow Sinn Fein to join the talks. This caused Paisley and the DUP to walk out, but Trimble and the UUP remained at the table. From September 1997 until April 1998, the negotiations’ most significant participants—Britain, Ireland, the SDLP, Sinn Fein, and the UUP—worked to come up with a peace plan that would satisfy both Protestants and Catholics. The talks were mediated by a former U.S. senator from Maine, George Mitchell, and were strongly supported by President Bill Clinton, who made regular trans-Atlantic phone calls to all the participants. Many credited this American pressure with keeping the talks from falling apart.

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The final plan, called the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement, agreed to on April 10, 1998, created the following: a Northern Ireland assembly that would be elected via proportional representation; a northsouth ministerial council that would bring together leaders from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to discuss issues such as tourism or the environment; and the Council of the Isles, which would bring together representatives from Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Britain, Scotland, and Wales, to discuss issues of mutual interest. As part of the agreement, the Republic of Ireland agreed to remove from its constitution the language that laid claim to the northern counties. Trimble and Hume were awarded the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in creating the agreement. Some Protestant and Catholic leaders opposed the peace plan—including the extremely vocal Paisley, who called Unionist leader Trimble a traitor to the Protestant cause—but many, including the larger paramilitary groups, campaigned for a yes vote. The elections, held on May 22, 1998, resulted in a 71–29 percent victory for the peace agreement. According to exit polls, almost every Catholic voter supported the plan, while a bare majority of Protestant voters gave it their approval. The Belfast Agreement was understood by different constituencies in different ways. Nationalists saw it as a transition to a united Ireland, while unionists viewed it as a barrier to the same outcome. The creation of this agreement was influenced by both internal and external factors. Leaders of the Irish Republic believed that in time a democratic vote about the island’s future would swing in their favor as their birthrate continued to outstrip that of the mostly Protestant unionists. Other factors that led the IRA to the negotiating table included the collapse of Soviet Communism, which led to a reappraisal of leftist political ideology. Integration between Dublin and London was enhanced with the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union. There was also an increasing awareness of military stalemate and a growing conviction by most parties to the conflict that political means could achieve ends that violence could not. Violence was seen as less effective and, indeed, kept large numbers of voters from supporting the IRA. Despite these internal and external factors’ seemingly easing tensions between unionists and nationalists, the cease-fire did not hold. Splinter groups from

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the larger movements murdered their opponents. One such group that disagreed with the Belfast Agreement dubbed itself the “Real IRA” and by late 2000 claimed to have 100–200 members. At the end of December 1999, direct rule over Northern Ireland from London came to an end, with the new government agreed upon by the Belfast Agreement coming into power. Decommissioning of weapons was yet another topic that continued to generate conflict. For the IRA, turning in all weapons rang of defeat and of acknowledging that military tactics were no longer to be used as an option. This internal conflict was eventually resolved by allowing for the creation of weapons dumps that independent arms inspectors could visit and ensure that the weapons were not being used. By mid-2000, both the Belfast and London governments agreed to the full implementation of the Belfast Agreement as of June 2001. Several events occurred to increase Catholic willingness for compromise on the arms issue. In 2001, the IRA’s reputation suffered as three of its members were arrested in Colombia and links were uncovered between the IRA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a left-wing rebel group that often employed guerrilla tactics, including bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and murders. Association with such a group tarnished the IRA’s image, particularly in the United States, which had been a major source of funding. Secondly, the terrorist bombings of U.S. targets on September 11, 2001, brought home the horror of political violence and terrorist actions, leading to less support for both IRA and Unionist extremism. Both of these events served to accelerate the decommissioning process. Another sign of softening lines was the official apology issued in 2002 by the IRA to what they termed “noncombatants”—civilians who had been killed in IRA actions. Still, there were stumbles along the way to peace. The process broke down by the end of 2002, with Unionist support for the agreement down to 33 percent. Unionists left the government they shared with Sinn Fein, the Irish Nationalist party, after a suspected IRA break-in at the Castlereagh police station and continued IRA paramilitary activity. Then the results of police investigation into the IRA’s intelligence-gathering methods further reduced trust in that organization. With no operating government in Northern Ireland, the British once again took charge in October 2002, suspending the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. Prime Minister

Blair called for the IRA to step fully into the peace process and remove the threat of violence. This breakdown lasted little more than two years, as steps toward reconciliation again began in 2003 with the establishment of an independent monitoring commission to scrutinize paramilitaries on all sides of the conflict. By the end of that year, the IRA again expressed some willingness on decommissioning, with the idea that both Catholic and Protestant churchmen would serve as witnesses, and talks about power sharing resumed. Sinn Fein seemed increasingly aware that paramilitary actions of the IRA served only to increase hostility and lose it votes in elections. In July 2005, the IRA announced that it had instructed all units to dump arms, an announcement seen by experts as a major turning point in the conflict. This new policy on the part of the IRA was expected to allow the power-sharing local government to return to ruling Northern Ireland after its 2002 suspension. The announcement followed growing revulsion among IRA supporters at its involvement in organized crime, as well as bank robberies and barroom murders. As in the past with such announcements, there was fear that this move away from violence would alienate some members of the IRA and they would turn to militant splinter movements such as the Real IRA. In 2005 talks also began between Northern Ireland’s political parties and British administrators of the province. The goal was to resuscitate the province’s local government. There were also separate talks in London between Prime Minister Blair and the leaders of Northern Ireland’s main Catholic and Protestant political parties. But the hard-line Democratic Unionists, Ulster’s largest party, threatened to boycott the negotiations to protest the reduction in the number of British soldiers in the province and other British moves to disengage.

Analysis Those who viewed Northern Ireland’s Troubles as resulting from a conflict between the British and the Irish were mistaken. There were at least four major sides: Northern Irish Protestants, Northern Irish Catholics, the British government, and the government of the Republic of Ireland. For this reason, it took cooperation by all these parties to achieve peace. At first the Protestants and the British were allied because they both wished to maintain the status quo.

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Similarly, the Catholics and the Irish government were allied because they both supported change, meaning reform and unification. But as the death toll of the Troubles increased, the British and their Unionist allies soon began to split apart. The Unionists were loyal to Britain only if Britain did as they wanted. When the British tried to push them toward compromise, they viewed the British with almost as much hostility as they did the Catholic minority. What made change possible was, first, a growing awareness among many leaders that compromise by all sides would be necessary before peace could be achieved, and, second, the overwhelming victory of Blair’s Labour Party in 1997. With Blair leading a government that did not need Unionist support in Parliament, the Unionists could no longer stonewall the peace process. They were forced to compromise. Finally, U.S. President Bill Clinton decided to take a more active role in pushing forward negotiations. The United States, with its strong IrishAmerican community, had always been interested in Northern Ireland’s Troubles, but only by the early 1990s did it acquire a sufficiently nuanced understanding of Ireland’s problems to be able to help foster a compromise peace. The events of September 11, 2001, also served to discourage Northern Ireland’s population, already worn down by thirty years of violence. More and

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more Catholic nationalist supporters were withdrawing their support at the polls from parties associated with the IRA because of political and criminal violence. Hopeful as these developments were, it was still not clear that the Troubles, after more than thirty-five years, were really over. Carl Skutsch and Erika Quinn See also: Anticolonialism; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s.

Bibliography Bell, J. Bowyer. The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence, 1967–1992. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. Coogan, Tim. The IRA: A History. Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart, 1993. ———. The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966–1996 and the Search for Peace. Boulder, CO: Roberts Rinehart, 1996. English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Hennessey, Thomas. A History of Northern Ireland, 1920– 1996. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland. London: Longman, 1997. Lloyd, John. “Ireland’s Uncertain Peace.” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September-October 1998): 109–24. O’Brien, Brendan. The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein, 1985 to Today. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995. Smith, M.L.R. Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement. New York: Routledge, 1995.

ITALY: Anti-Mafia Campaign Since 1980 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Terrorism and International Incidents the independent mini-state called Vatican City within Rome. Politically, Italy is a republic divided into twenty largely autonomous regions and subdivided into ninety-five provinces. The head of state is the president, chosen by an electoral college made up of both houses of the national legislature and regional representatives. Executive power resides in a council of ministers whose president, the prime minister, is appointed by the head of state. The legislature, consisting of the senate and the chamber of deputies, is elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term. Italy is a highly industrialized country and exports of a wide range of goods, especially automobiles and other transport machinery, as well as clothes, textiles, and wines. Tourism is an important source of foreign exchange. The northern regions of the country are the centers of manufacturing and wealth, while the areas south of Rome and the island of Sicily are relatively poor and backward.

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Italy, with its familiar boot shape extending into the Mediterranean and its island possessions Sicily and Sardinia, occupies 116,320 square miles and is home to approximately 57 million people. The capital is Rome, with 2.8 million people. The Italian population represents a broad mix of ethnic types, a consequence of Italy’s long history as an imperial center in ancient times and as the scene of foreign invasions and occupations for many centuries since then. Although Italian is the official language, many regional dialects—such as Sicilian, which is hardly comprehensible to most Italians—remain in use. In the alpine regions, in the far north of Italy, German is spoken on the Austrian border, and French is spoken on the frontiers with France and Switzerland. About 90 percent of Italians profess Roman Catholicism. The pope, the worldwide leader of the Roman Catholic Church and archbishop of Rome, lives and works in

From the end of the Roman Empire in the fifth century until the nineteenth century, Italy was, in a famous phrase, merely a geographical expression. The cities and regions were controlled or governed by local authorities or often by foreign powers, including France and the Hapsburg Empire. The center of the peninsula remained under the control and governance of the pope. In 1870, Italy was unified. Beginning in the 1920s, the country was ruled by the fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, who fashioned an alliance with Nazi Germany and fought with Germany in World War II. The Italian forces were defeated in 1943, but fighting continued in Italy between German troops and Allied forces. After the defeat of Germany in 1945, Italy ended its monarchy and established a republic. For much of the post–World War II era, Italian politics was dominated by a long struggle between

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KEY DATES 1920s

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini conducts a military campaign to destroy the Mafia in Sicily.

1943

The United States seeks the advice of Mafia figures in the United States to help plan its invasion of Sicily during World War II.

1960s

The Sicilian Mafia takes the lead in the international illegal drug trade.

1980s

Italy intensifies its efforts to break Mafia power in Sicily.

1990s

High-profile arrests, trials, and convictions of Mafia leaders reduce the power of organized crime in Sicily and Italy.

the Communist Party of Italy (PCI), Western Europe’s largest and most popular Communist Party, and the conservative Christian Democratic Party (DC), which was initially financed by the United States in its effort to stop the spread of Communism in Europe. Alone or in coalition with other nonCommunist parties, the Christian Democrats controlled the government of Italy from 1946 to 1983. Italy enjoyed steady economic growth in the postwar era, allowing both individual initiative and supporting an extensive system of public welfare. However, a pervasive element of corruption grew into the political system, first to block the Communist Party, later to ensure the continued dominance of the Christian Democrats and their allies. But by 1992, corruption had reached such a level that public confidence was destroyed. A major political reorganization occurred. The old parties, including the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party, essentially disappeared. They were replaced by a constellation of new political groupings, including most prominently Forza Italia (Go Italy, or FI), a right-wing populist movement headed by the television multimillionaire Silvio Berlusconi, and the Liga Nord (Northern League, or LN), which called for secession of the industrialized northern provinces from the crime-ridden and relatively underdeveloped south. Berlusconi became prime minister in 1994 but was forced to step down the following year. As leader of the single most popular party (with 25 to 30 percent of the vote), he was the most influential political leader through the late 1990s. In 2001, as head of the Freedom House coalition, Berlusconi returned as

prime minister until his defeat in national elections in 2006.

Taking Aim at the Mafia A key factor in the 1992 political upheaval was the revelation of the extent to which politicians, most notably the leaders of the Christian Democrats and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), had been linked to organized crime, especially to the Sicilian Mafia. The Italian voting public was tolerant of a certain amount of corruption, but during the 1970s and 1980s, the illegal narcotics trade, under control of the Mafia, became widespread in Italy. Criminal violence associated with drug dealing spread from the Mafia center in western Sicily throughout much of the country. Crime became a major political issue. According to Italian government statistics, in 1974 only eight people in the country had died of a heroin overdose. In 1980 there were several hundred such deaths, and the number of addicts was estimated at 200,000. The center of the drug trade was the Mafia stronghold of Palermo, the capital of Sicily, a city of some 700,000. In 1980, Pio la Torre, the Communist Party senator from Palermo and a member of the national anti-Mafia commission, began pushing for legislation to make membership in the Mafia a crime and to allow seizing the assets of convicted mafiosi. The legislation was strongly opposed by the Christian Democrats, and la Torre was unable to get it passed. Still, Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini—the first non-Christian Democrat to lead Italy since 1946—sent General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa of the carabinieri

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(the Italian national police) to Palermo to head operations against the Mafia. On April 30, 1982, the day Dalla Chiesa arrived in Palermo, Senator Pio la Torre was murdered there. Four months later, another Mafia hit squad killed Dalla Chiesa and his wife. The Mafia had routinely terrorized or killed local politicians or law enforcement officers they considered uncooperative, but this was the first time they had struck against national figures. It was a declaration of war. During the 1980s more than 10,000 people were killed by Mafia violence in southern Italy, more than three times the number of those killed in Northern Ireland in the twenty-five years from 1965 to 1990.

The Mafia The Sicilian Mafia, known to its own members as la cosa nostra (our thing), grew out of the nineteenthcentury gangs of rural thugs employed by Sicilian landlords to keep the peasants on their estates obedient. For their services, the gangs received a share of the crop and immunity from legal action. Eventually, they gained control over the landlords themselves. As Mafia leaders became widely known, they were highly romanticized, especially when Sicily was resisting the fighters for Italian unification in the 1860s. The Mafia’s refusal to abide by the laws of the new nation was interpreted as patriotic resistance. After unification, the government began to break up the great estates. Fearing the loss of their livelihood, many peasants began a rural insurgency, becoming guerrilla fighters or mere bandits. The Italian authorities turned to the same source of control the landlords had used, the Mafia gangs, to help defeat the rebellious peasants. As before, the Mafia gangs’ reward was a share in political patronage and the understanding that the authorities would turn a blind eye to their criminal economic activities. Also as before, the corruption of government eventually put the Mafia in effective control and confirmed Sicily’s longstanding reputation for lawlessness. When Benito Mussolini came to power, he dispatched Cesare Mori, the “Iron Prefect,” to bring Sicily under control. Between 1925 and 1929, Mori conducted what amounted to a military campaign— besieging towns, taking hundreds of prisoners in mass arrests, destroying the houses of suspected mafiosi, and seizing their property. In many ways, the campaign was a success. Homicides in Palermo dropped from 278 in 1925 to 28 in 1929. Property owners and busi-

nessmen, freed from the need to pay protection money, were especially grateful. Many mafiosi emigrated to the greener fields of Prohibition-era America. During World War II, when U.S. military authorities in North Africa were planning the 1943 invasion of Sicily, they turned to U.S. Mafia émigrés first for assistance in planning the invasion and then for help during the occupation. The notorious Mafia don Vito Genovese, who had fled U.S. prosecution in 1937, served as interpreter to the U.S. military governor, Colonel Charles Poletti. Genovese recommended the appointment of numerous friends to official positions, from which they controlled the black market in food, cigarettes, and other supplies pilfered from U.S. army storehouses. After the war, the United States deported some forty top Mafia members, including Lucky Luciano and Frankie Coppolla, back to Sicily. There they imparted some of their more modern racketeering skills to their Sicilian cousins. The Mafia served other purposes as well. In early postwar elections, the United Left coalition of Communists and socialists won a plurality of Sicilian votes and held cabinet posts in the 1947 Italian government headed by Christian Democrat Alcide de Gasperi. The United States strongly disapproved and forced de Gasperi to remove the Socialists and Communists from the government as a condition of receiving U.S. aid. On May 1, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall cabled Rome to express his alarm at the strong Communist showing in the election, especially in Sicily, and to call for new anticommunist measures. Coincidentally, on that same day, the Mafia-controlled “bandit” Salvatore Giuliani attacked a Communist farmer organization celebrating the electoral victory and killed eleven people. Between 1945 and 1955, the Mafia, working for the Christian Democrats, assassinated forty-three Socialist or Communist political candidates. Italian historian Francesca Renda explains the effect of the Christian Democrats’ decision to use the Mafia as a cold war weapon against the PCI: “The Mafia was ennobled by being given the role of the military arm of a major political force. . . . Naturally, the Mafia then drew on the power of the government and became not only a political and social force, but an economic force.” The economic power of the Mafia during the early postwar era came from controlling the immense government contracts (largely financed in those years by the U.S. Marshall Plan) used for rebuilding the war-torn island. Between 1959 and

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1964, 2,500 of the 4,000 building permits issued in Palermo went to three Mafia front men. Palermo’s mayor at the time was Salvatore Lima, a chief aide to Christian Democratic leader Giulio Andreotti. Appointment to jobs in the expanded bureaucracy of Sicily, which gained regional autonomy in the late 1940s, was negotiated between the Christian Democrats and the Mafia. In 1955, a Christian Democrat judge on Italy’s equivalent of the Supreme Court publicly praised the Mafia for its cooperation with the forces of law and order. At the same time, romantic accounts of Mafia loyalty, secrecy (omertà), unconditional obedience, and willingness to die, and kill, as “men of honor” for the organization gave it an aura similar to that enjoyed by government intelligence agencies. In fact, it was rumored (accurately, as it turned out) that the Mafia had connections to those secret government operatives.

Forces of Change It appeared that this cozy relationship between government and the Mafia could have gone on forever. However, the Mafia was far from a tightly controlled or unified body. Scores of independent “families”— thirty in the province of Palermo alone—organized in villages, towns, and urban neighborhoods and competed for influence and greater shares in profits. The competition intensified after the wide-open, early postwar black market ended. In 1955, representatives of the U.S. Mafia (whose existence at this time was vehemently denied by J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) met in Palermo with their Sicilian counterparts to plan for a division of labor in the emerging international narcotics traffic. They agreed that the Sicilians would receive the raw opium or morphine base from suppliers in the Middle East (principally Turkey) and Southeast Asia (Thailand), refine it in Sicilian laboratories, and deliver it to the United States. There, a chain of pizza parlors under Mafia protection would distribute the drug. The huge profits would be split between the U.S. and Sicilian organizations. The arrangement enabled the U.S. Mafia to avoid endangering relations with American law enforcement over the issue of narcotics, an area where U.S. authorities were notoriously intolerant. Six weeks after the Palermo meeting, the U.S. Mafia families convened in Apalachin, New York, to ratify the agreement. The meeting was broken up by suspicious police, and for the first time

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U.S. law enforcement agencies began to accept the idea of a national organized crime syndicate with its roots in the Sicilian Mafia. At the Palermo meeting, the Sicilians also agreed to organize themselves on U.S. lines, establishing a coordinating commission to fight the Mafia.

Mafia Wars Begin Taking a leading role in the enormously lucrative drug traffic changed the Mafia in Italy and its relationship with the Italian government and the Christian Democratic Party. Previously, the Mafia had been paid in the form of construction contracts and government jobs for keeping down the Communist and Socialist parties and delivering the vote in Sicily for the Christian Democrats. Now the Mafia had a separate and much greater source of income. To protect its valuable operation, it began making larger payoffs to politicians and law enforcement offices. It was understood, however, that no politician dared acknowledge that drug trafficking was the source of the money. Mafia leaders became more like managers of big business. They realized that they no longer needed the widespread and unwieldy network of small-time operators in neighborhoods and communities. The first of the Palermo bosses to recognize this was Michele Cavataio. In the early 1960s he began playing off one family against another, orchestrating feuds that soon turned violent and resulted in a growing number of assassinations, removing or weakening those who stood in the way of his gaining complete control over organized crime in Sicily. However, in June 1963 a car bomb meant for the head of the Palermo coordinating commission, one Salvatore “Little Bird” Greco, killed seven police officers instead. The government sent more than 10,000 police reinforcements into Sicily, and the Italian parliament appointed its first anti-Mafia commission. Within a few months 1,903 Mafia members had been arrested, and many others, including “Little Bird” Greco, left the country. The flurry of official activity soon died down, and after trials in 1969, most of those arrested were acquitted. By this time the heads of the feuding Mafia families had figured out what was going on and assassinated Cavataio. In the reorganization of the commission that followed, the Mafia from the village of Corleone emerged as the dominant family. The Corleone family during the 1970s and 1980s was led first by Luciano Leggo

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and then by Salvatore “Toto” Riina. The latter, a feared killer with at least forty murders to his credit, became the most significant Mafia figure of the period. Throughout the 1970s, Riina lived as a fugitive, but he progressively eliminated leaders of other families who might challenge him. Operating almost anonymously, he forced potential rivals to submit to his authority and managed to throw suspicion for murders he commissioned onto other Mafia members, causing their arrest and prosecution. Having intimidated most of the Sicilian Mafia, Riina tried the same tactics against the politicians and the police. In 1977, he arranged the killing of the chief of the carabinieri in Sicily. In March 1979, Michele Reina, head of the Christian Democrats in Palermo, was murdered. Four months later, Boris Giuliano, a police officer who had evidence of the suitcases full of heroin and cash that went from Palermo to New York and back, was shot dead. In September, Cesare Terranova, a member of the national antiMafia commission who had just taken over the criminal investigative office in Palermo, was murdered. On January 6, 1980, Piersante Mattarella, a Christian Democrat and president of the Autonomous Region of Sicily, who had announced plans for changing the corrupt system of awarding public contracts, also was killed. Five months later, police captain Emanuele Basile, who had taken Giuliano’s place, was killed on the steps of a police station in front of his wife and children. Riina was sending a clear message to the government: Do not interfere.

Renewal of the Mafia War There were two reasons that Riina and his Corleone family were able to carry out their bloody campaign in the 1970s with impunity. One was that most of the convictions gained by the authorities following the 1963 death of the seven police officers in Palermo had been overturned on appeal, discouraging and demoralizing police and prosecutors. The second sprang from the Cold War roots of the DC-Mafia relationship. The 1970s was the era of détente. East-West relations were being normalized. Communism seemed less of a threat, and the Italian Communist Party registered growing support at the polls. It was clear that the Christian Democrats could no longer play the anticommunist card effectively. Just at this moment a group calling itself the Red Brigades began a terrorist campaign, taking credit for the explosion of

a bomb in the Bologna railway station that killed and injured many people. Oddly, Bologna was a center of Communist Party strength in Italy. In 1978, the terrorists kidnapped and murdered former prime minister Aldo Moro, a Christian Democrat who had been seeking to steer his party away from its rigid anticommunism. It later became known that the Red Brigades were thoroughly penetrated, and to some extent controlled, by hard-line, anti-left elements in the Italian intelligence and security services (including the chief and deputy chief of police in Palermo). They were members of a secret Masonic lodge in Milan called Propaganda Due (P2), with links to the Christian Democratic Party. It turned out that the train station bombing and other terrorist acts were actually carried out by security service agents. It seems clear that one purpose of these terrorist acts was to bring back the red scare of the 1950s and 1960s to the advantage of the Christian Democrats. Beyond that, there is evidence that P2 leaders may have been preparing the ground for a military coup d’état in Italy. P2 had links to other right-wing organizations. The head of the lodge, Licio Gelli, traveled frequently to Argentina during its so-called dirty war, to advise the military leaders of that country (many of them of Italian origin), who had themselves penetrated and controlled the terrorist groups there. Gelli directed them to carry out attacks that were then used to justify the continuance of military rule. Gelli and P2 also had tight links to the Mafia. One of P2’s members was the shady international banker Michele Sindona, a Sicilian and a close financial adviser to the Vatican, which was nearly bankrupt. He had taken over the Franklin National Bank, one of the largest in the United States at that time. In 1974, he made a $2.5 million gift to former and future Christian Democrat prime minister Armintore Fanfani. Giulio Andreotti, the dominant figure in Christian Democratic affairs, called Sindona the savior of the lira (the former Italian currency). Another major Italian banker and P2 member was Roberto Calvi, head of the Banco Ambrosiano, which failed in 1981. Calvi was found dead, hanging under a bridge in London. Both Sindona’s and Calvi’s banks laundered Mafia drug money for Riina, and both were major Christian Democrat contributors. Gelli also arranged a multimillion-dollar payoff from Calvi to Socialist prime minister Bettino Craxi. In April 1992, Gelli, along with thirty other defendants, was

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convicted and imprisoned for his role in the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano. In 1978, as Sindona’s banking empire foundered, U.S. prosecutors indicted him for fraud in his management of the Franklin Bank and placed him under bond arrest in New York. Sindona called on his friends in the Italian government for funds to bail him out. The request was blocked by Giorgio Ambrosoli, the Italian treasury investigator who was prosecuting Sindona for his Milan bank operations. In desperation, Sindona persuaded New York Mafia boss John Gambino to arrange a fake “terrorist” kidnapping. Gambino’s men succeeded and transported Sindona to Palermo, where he was hidden in the home of Mafia real estate magnate Rosario Spatola and visited frequently by Gambino. The supposed Communist terrorists sent messages from Sindona to the government in Rome saying that unless prosecution was dropped and his banks rescued, he would tell his “captors” all the details of the Mafia–narcotics–money-laundering connections with the Christian Democrats. In July 1979, Giorgio Ambrosoli, who had blocked Sindona’s request for government help against U.S. authorities, was assassinated. Shortly before he died, he tape-recorded a message from his assassin, William Arico, a Gambino hit man. Arico told Ambrosoli that he would die because he had incurred the wrath of the big boss and the little boss. Arico identified the little boss as Sindona, and the big boss as Christian Democratic leader Giulio Andreotti. Andreotti had been meeting frequently with Sindona’s lawyers in Rome. Until October, Italian and U.S. authorities were fooled by the claim that Sindona had been kidnapped and held by leftist terrorists. Then police captured a messenger delivering a ransom note to Sindona’s lawyer in Milan. The messenger was Vincenzo Spatola, nephew of Rosario Spatola, who was already under investigation as part of the Pizza Connection heroin case in both the United States and Italy, for which Sindona had been laundering money. Once the cover story for the kidnapping was blown, the Mafia dumped Sindona on a New York street corner with a bullet wound in his leg. In a final pathetic effort to keep up the terrorist kidnapping pretense, Sindona swore his Communist captors had inflicted the wound. Finally, on March 19, 1986, Sindona was convicted in a Palermo court of ordering the murder of Ambrosoli. The following day someone gave him a

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cup of strychnine-laced coffee in his jail cell, and he died immediately.

Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino Early in 1980, during this period of national preoccupation with the Red Brigades and banking scandals, Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, two middle-aged lawyers in the Italian equivalent of the Department of Justice and both native Sicilians, were assigned to work on the Spatola heroin case. Falcone, the senior of the two, had previously specialized in bankruptcy cases and knew the importance of following the money trail. Necessarily, this approach kept him in constant contact with U.S. narcotics investigators. Using a bank check found on the body of Giuseppe di Cristiani, a Mafia family boss murdered two years earlier, as the starting point, Falcone went through more than five years’ worth of bank records of known Mafiosi. He painstakingly established the existence of the Italian heroin industry and its links to the Mafia of Naples (camorra) and of Calabria (Ndrangheta). This discovery led him to the network of non-Mafia couriers who moved the drugs worldwide. These people, not bound by the Mafia code of omertà, talked. On August 26, 1980, working on tips from one of these couriers, Falcone arranged a police raid on the first heroin lab ever discovered in Sicily. Two leading Mafiosi were arrested. In addition, Falcone worked with U.S. authorities investigating the Gambino family in New York. He was able to establish that the Spatola construction business it Italy was really a front for the SicilianGambino drug operation. This discovery led to the previously discussed connection with Michele Sindona in Milan. By mid-1981, Falcone’s investigation produced 120 defendants. When the case was heard at the end of the year, he got seventy-four convictions. While this prosecutorial work went on, Toto Riina continued his campaign to take over the whole Mafia in Sicily. The murder rate kept rising, concluding with the “Christmas Massacre” of 1981 in the Palermo suburb of Bagheria. In broad daylight, Riina’s gunmen attacked a car with three rival Mafiosi, eventually killing them and a bystander. The assassins abandoned their own car, however, leaving fingerprints on the steering wheel that identified the driver. The

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A crowd assembles inside the specially built courtroom in Palermo, Italy, where 474 defendants went on trial in February 1986 on Mafia-related criminal charges; 360 were convicted. (AFP/Getty Images)

laboratory technician who made the identification refused a Mafia bribe to damage the evidence and was himself murdered. It was at this point that General Dalla Chiesa, the hero of the anti-terrorist campaign, was brought in and subsequently was himself murdered. Once again, national attention focused on the Mafia problem. Parliament established a central office for investigating the Mafia and passed, as a posthumous tribute to Pio La Torre, the Sicilian Communist member of parliament who was assassinated just before Dalla Chiesa, the law that he had long urged, making membership in the Mafia a crime (the Rognoni–La Torre Law). However, the Christian Democratic minister of justice, Clelio Darida, denied Falcone’s request for a computer to help him sort through the voluminous records. Darida believed that elimination of the Mafia was too ambitious a goal. The Mafia should be contained, he told the Palermo magistrates’ office, “within its natural limits.” Shortly after this meeting, a judge in Trapani was murdered, and one of the speakers at his funeral demanded of Darida

some guidelines on the natural limits of Mafia killing in a year. If anyone doubted that the Mafia still controlled important resources within the Italian government, further proof was given in March 1983 when Falcone’s fellow prosecutor, Paolo Borsellino, brought to trial the three assassins who had killed police captain Basile. The judge declared a mistrial, and the defendants were released. Meanwhile, Falcone continued pursuing the international drug connection. An arrested courier identified Ko Bak Kin of Singapore as handling the heroin now being refined in Bangkok. On May 23, 1983, Egyptian police searched a freighter in the Suez Canal and found 233 kilos of heroin being guarded by a Sicilian Mafioso. While Falcone flew to Bangkok to interview Ko, his superior, Rocco Chinnici, was killed by a Mafia car bomb. However, he left a diary in which he named everyone in the Palermo judiciary and police whom he suspected of being connected to the Mafia. He particularly noted one senior judge who had urged him to curb Falcone’s investigations because they were “ruining the Sicilian economy.”

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Chinnici’s successor, Antonino Caponetto, a native Sicilian who had been working in Florence, did not even bring his family to Palermo. He worked in a bulletproof office in the government building, and at night he occupied a guarded room in the barracks of the treasury police. Caponetto made an important policy decision, establishing a single office—a pool— to which he assigned all Mafia cases. The office was headed by Falcone. Borsellino was brought in, and a third attorney, Leonardo Guarnotta, was added. Just as important, there was a new minister of justice in Rome who, unlike Darida, did not believe in “natural limits.” Suddenly, Falcone had computers, electric typewriters, and bulletproof cars. Finally, at the end of 1983, Falcone got his biggest break. Tommaso Buscetta, known as the “boss of two worlds,” had fled Sicily in 1960 after a murder conviction and spent the next ten years in Brazil and the United States, allegedly running a major narcotics ring. In 1972, Brazilian authorities arrested him for heroin trafficking and extradited him to Italy to serve his murder sentence. Paroled in 1980, he again fled to Brazil where, in October 1983, he was again arrested on narcotics charges and again extradited to Italy. Falcone contacted him, and Buscetta, many of whose near relatives had been assassinated by Riina, decided to talk. He was the most senior Mafia member to break the code of silence in Italy. It was from him that the authorities became aware of Riina’s strategy for gaining full control of the Mafia. Buscetta also provided literally hundreds of names. The one thing he would not talk about, though, was political connections. He was convinced, he told Falcone, that nothing would be done about the politicians who benefited from their Mafia connections. On September 29, 1984, on the basis of evidence provided by Buscetta, Falcone’s office issued warrants for the arrest of 366 individuals. Two days later, Salvatore Contorno, former driver for murdered Mafia boss Stefano Bontate, in prison in Rome and fearing that on release Riina would get him, too, was encouraged by Buscetta’s example to come forward. After he testified, another 127 warrants were issued, among them one for the former Christian Democratic mayor of Palermo, Vito Ciancimino. Buscetta, convinced by Ciancimino’s indictment that Falcone would go after the political bigwigs, revealed that the Salvo cousins, Ignazio and Nino, the two richest men in Sicily and pillars of the Christian Democratic Party, were also “men of honor.” The

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Salvos were arrested on November 12. (The arrests coincided with the return to Italy of Michele Sindona and the revelation of his ties to former prime minister Andreotti, then serving as foreign minister. Paradoxically, the Communist Party abstained on the parliamentary vote of censure against their old enemy Andreotti. This saved his political career and gave the party some markers to call in at some future date.) As additional Mafia witnesses came forward, the organization struck back hard. Members of families that associated with witnesses Buscetta and Contorno were assassinated, including eight men massacred in a horse stable in Palermo in October. On November 23, Riina apparently arranged to have the Naples-Milan express train blown up. Sixteen people lost their lives and hundreds more were injured. Riina was said to have committed this “fake” terrorist attack to draw law enforcement resources away from Sicily.

Maxi-Trial Eventually 474 defendants faced charges in the “maxi-trial,” as it was dubbed. For the trial, the ministry of justice built a bunker-like court facility of reinforced concrete, about the size of an indoor sports arena with thirty steel cages around the back to house the defendants. The courtroom was designed to withstand a missile or bazooka attack and equipped with the most modern security devices. It seated more than a thousand spectators and an equal number of lawyers and witnesses. When the trial was ready to proceed in February 1986, 3,000 army troops were brought in to provide further protection. Mafia murders were continuing, however. During the spring and summer of 1985, several of Falcone’s police investigators were among the victims. Fearing for their safety, the authorities moved Falcone, Borsellino, and their families to a remote prison island in the Mediterranean until the trial could take place. The trial itself was a riveting drama, carried live on Italian television for nearly two years. On December 16, 1987, Judge Alfonso Giordano read the verdicts: 360 defendants were found guilty, with life sentences for 19 of the top bosses, including “Toto” Riina, still a fugitive who was tried in absentia. Buscetta and Contorno, as cooperating witnesses, got three and six years, respectively. Meanwhile, the Mafia itself had executed several of the indicted fugitives, and one of those acquitted, Antonio Ciulla, was shot down on his

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way home with the champagne and pastries he had bought to celebrate.

Last Campaign With the successful conclusion to the maxi-trial, Falcone and Borsellino’s superior as presiding investigative magistrate, Antonio Caponetto, decided to retire. It was widely believed that Falcone would succeed him, but the internal politics of the national magistracy placed Antonino Meli, a man with more seniority, in the office. Determined to show that he was in charge, Meli promptly dismantled the system of placing all Mafia cases in Falcone’s office and began to assign them at random. Borsellino had already been reassigned to the small city of Marsala. Falcone, despite his disappointment, continued to pursue the wounded, but far from helpless, Mafia. He was aided again by a new Mafia defector, Antonino Calderone, former underboss of Catania imprisoned in Nice, France, on drug charges. Calderone was a gold mine of information on the relationships between the Mafia and Sicilian politicians, particularly the Christian Democratic Party, including the Salvo cousins and Andreotti’s personal representative in Sicily, Salvatore Lima. Calderone’s information resulted in 160 more arrest warrants being issued on March 9, 1988. This was Falcone’s last hurrah. Meli, determined to run things his way, refused to permit a coordinated approach to Mafia cases. Prosecutors were not encouraged to share information and often did not. When Borsellino sent relevant evidence from Marsala, Meli sent it back, telling him that what was learned in Marsala was irrelevant in Palermo. Buscetta, seeing that Falcone had lost his authority, refused to cooperate further. Even worse, most of those convicted at the maxi-trial and its sequels were allowed out on bail pending appeal, and many had promptly disappeared. Worst of all, when the appeals reached the Italian supreme court, they were all mysteriously assigned to Justice Corrado Carnevale, who found a way to overturn the vast majority of the convictions, sometimes saying he simply did not believe the evidence. It was soon clear that the Mafia on both sides of the Atlantic was rejoicing at the turn of affairs. After all Falcone’s efforts and the publicity of the maxi-trial, it looked as though the Mafia was reviving. In September 1988, the Mafia killed two judges who had sentenced their members, and one after an-

other, Salvatore Contorno’s relatives were disposed of. Contorno himself, who was in the U.S. witnessprotection program, denounced Judge Carnevale and said that he would refuse further cooperation. Antonino Calderone now refused to testify in court. “I don’t feel protected,” he said. The chief judge of the Palermo court of appeals said simply that the war was lost: “The state has abandoned us.” Although blocked in Italy, Falcone was still able to work with the support of the U.S. team he had helped with the Pizza Connection cases. Together they found that just as the flow of heroin had gone from Sicily to New York, now cocaine was moving from Colombia through the Dominican Republic back to Sicily, from which point it was distributed to markets in northern Italy. On December 1, 1988, police in Brooklyn raided the Gambinos’ Cafe Giardano and arrested 55, while simultaneous raids by the police in Sicily netted 133. This was Falcone’s last victory over the Mafia while in Sicily. In the next two years, bureaucratic infighting paralyzed investigations in Sicily. At the same time, the government in Rome passed counterproductive laws. Organized criminal activity drastically increased throughout the country. In June 1989, a massive bomb was found at Falcone’s beach house, and he realized he had to leave Sicily. In February 1991, with Andreotti once again prime minister, Falcone accepted an offer from the new minister of justice, Claudio Martelli, to become his director of penal affairs. He saw the appointment as an opportunity to try to put into practice some of the reforms he felt were necessary if the problem of organized crime was to be addressed. His first success was to persuade Martelli to issue a decree ordering the immediate rearrest of the latest batch of maxi-trial convicts released by Carnevale. He was also able to block appointment of judges known to be soft on, and possibly controlled by, the Mafia. Finally, he got Martelli to endorse his plan to have organized crime task forces set up on the U.S. model in Italy’s twenty-six largest cities, with exclusive jurisdiction over Mafia cases. His plans for an Italian FBI got a favorable reception. In just a few months in Rome, he seemed to have turned the tide that had been running against law enforcement for the previous two years. The Martelli-Falcone program got an important boost in May 1991, when a particularly atrocious Mafia assassination took place in broad daylight in Taurianova in Calabria. Journalists’ stories revealed

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that the town and several other Christian Democratic strongholds in the region were nothing but Mafia fiefdoms. The murder in the Taurianova town square— where no one could be found who recalled seeing or hearing anything—was the fifth in three days and the thirty-second in only two years in a town with 17,000 people. It was a sensational story. Not long afterward, one of the government’s prosecutors in the maxi-trial appeal was murdered in Calabria, and in August, a Palermo businessman, Libero Grassi, who had been organizing a campaign against the payment of protection money, was murdered in front of his home. All these cases generated enormous publicity, especially the revelation that payment of protection in Italy amounted to an estimated unofficial $25 billion annual tax on business. Within weeks, the entire set of Falcone’s proposals became law, including a provision that defendants convicted of Mafia crimes could be held without bail for up to six years while their cases were being appealed. Nor did Falcone and Martelli act only through parliament. In Sicily, the chief judge of the appeals court, Pasquale Barreca, was allowing twenty-two convicted Mafia bosses who claimed illness to be treated in their homes or in private hospitals rather than in prison hospitals. Martelli issued a decree ordering the judge to send the bosses back to prison. When the judge refused, Martelli had him removed. The same tactic was used on the notorious Supreme Court “sentence killer,” Carnevale. Under pressure, Carnevale withdrew from the panel hearing the appeal of the maxi-trial. Without him the justices upheld the so-called Buscetta theory—that Mafia bosses could be held responsible for murders committed by their subordinates. Even while the maxi-trial prosecutors celebrated the Supreme Court’s decision, the Christian Democratic government of Giulio Andreotti collapsed over a bribery scandal. Both Christian Democrats and Socialists, and their leaders, Andreotti and Bettino Craxi, were implicated. New elections were held, but both the old parties suffered drastic declines in public support. More fuel was heaped on the fire of scandal when Salvatore Lima, Andreotti’s long-time representative in Sicily, was the victim of a Mafia assassination. Martelli, though, remained minister of justice and pushed the appointment of Falcone to the new post of national super-prosecutor for Mafia cases. In May 1992, the nomination had still not been approved, and Falcone went on a visit to Palermo to see his wife,

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who had not yet made the move to Rome. Somehow the Mafia had been made aware of his visit, and hundreds of pounds of plastic explosives had been placed in a culvert under the road over which his car traveled from the airport. The blast killed Falcone, his wife, and three of his bodyguards. Falcone’s assassination was perhaps the most dramatic event in Italian history since World War II. The country went into official and unofficial mourning. In Sicily, a general strike was called. Public anger was intense. As politicians and government officials arrived from Rome for the funeral in Palermo, the angry crowds threw coins at them, shouting insults—“Clowns, murderers, accomplices. Go back to your bribes.” At Falcone’s funeral, for the first time in history, crowds of ordinary Sicilians demonstrated openly against the Mafia. It was a revolution. Almost immediately, there was popular demand that Paolo Borsellino should take the post of super-prosecutor. Meanwhile, Borsellino, who had taken over Falcone’s old job in Palermo during the past two years, was pursuing new and important leads in Sicily. The most significant of these was the rise of a Mafia rival organization, the so-called stidda. This group, whose members sported a star-shaped tattoo, was making a concerted effort to take over from the old mafiosi, and it looked as though there would be a major gang war. At the same time in northern Italy, the investigation into the Milan bribery cases was unearthing daily the involvement of another prominent public figure. Carlo Bernini, the minister of transportation, was indicted in June 1991 for getting kickbacks from the contracts let by his department. On July 14, just after acting as joint host with the American ambassador at his going-away party, foreign minister Gianni De Michelis was indicted on charges of skimming money for the Christian Democrats from Italy’s humanitarian aid to a third-world program. At first, Craxi, also tainted with charges of corruption and accepting bribes, denied that he had done anything criminal. When faced with the evidence, he simply declared that such acts were so common they couldn’t be considered criminal. On Sunday, July 20, Borsellino, accompanied by six bodyguards, went to visit his mother in Palermo. As they approached her house, a car parked across the street blew up. The car bomb killed them all. After Falcone’s death, this was too much. The angry mob this time did not merely insult the public officials who came from Rome. Mourners broke through the

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cordon of 4,000 security troops and jostled president Oscar Luigi Scalfaro before he could be hustled to safety. There was an immense crisis of public confidence nationally, and the Italian stock market almost collapsed. Within Sicily itself a veritable cult of the martyrs Falcone and Borsellino sprang up. Scores of mafiosi now came forward to confess. Hundreds more were arrested in Italy and internationally as police action intensified. Importantly, some of the new witnesses identified Justice Carnevale as having been under Mafia influence. Tommaso Buscetta, reassured by these new signs of seriousness, began for the first time to reveal what he knew about ties between the Mafia and the politicians. At the same time, the national bribery investigation, Operation Clean Hands, was creating its own headlines. The Christian Democratic treasurer was indicted. At the end of September the entire government of Abruzzi was arrested on charges of misappropriating $350 million in European Community funds. The mayor and six city council members of Vercelli in northern Italy were taken publicly to jail through crowds of jeering citizens. The chief investigative judge in Milan, Antonio Di Pietro, had become a national hero, the new Falcone. He accused Craxi in forty separate instances of bribery amounting to about $30 million.

Downfall of Andreotti On January 15, 1993, police in Palermo arrested the legendary boss of bosses of the Sicilian Mafia, Salvatore “Toto” Riina. A fugitive from justice for twentythree years, Riina had been living in Palermo the whole time. With his capture, the floodgates of information opened even further, and ranking former mafiosi now began to provide lurid details of former prime minister Giulio Andreotti’s close ties with the organization. The most damaging specific charge was that in 1979 he had called on his Mafia friends to murder the Rome scandal sheet journalist Mino Pecorelli. A member of P2, Pecorelli had evidence that Andreotti had received about $2 million in checks from a shadowy financial firm connected with Michele Sindona and one of his associates, Gaetano Caltagirone, which had gone bankrupt after receiving more than $300 million in public loans. Pecorelli, who had already successfully blackmailed Andreotti and had killed an earlier story, was asking for more money in return for his silence. According to testi-

mony given by Buscetta, Andreotti asked Mafia friends, through the Salvo cousins, to eliminate the journalist, who was shot to death in March 1979. In October 1995, Andreotti went on trial facing a multitude of charges relating to his Mafia connections and corruption. He was found guilty of ordering the murder of Pecorelli, but the conviction was overturned on appeal, and he was acquitted of the charge in 2003. The former Socialist prime minister Bettino Craxi fared no better. In July 1994, Craxi and Claudio Martelli, the former minister of justice who had backed Falcone, were both convicted of bankruptcy fraud in the 1980s collapse of Banco Ambrosiano and were sentenced to eight years and six months of imprisonment. Craxi was tried in absentia, because he refused to return from Tunis. In October 1995 he was tried again in absentia and sentenced to four years on bribery charges. He died in Tunis in January 2000. Investigations and arrests continued. Former Christian Democrat prime minister Armando Forlani was only the most prominent of the former government officials charged. In October 1995, Di Pietro’s investigators arrested 20 high-ranking military officers on bribery charges, and another 2,500 were under investigation. Even Silvio Berlusconi, head of the new political forces that emerged, was implicated in past Mafia and bribery scandals. His major Sicilian ally, Francesco Musotto, was arrested in Palermo in November 1995 for helping ranking mafiosi elude arrest over the previous four years. Berlusconi’s attempts in 1993 to limit Di Pietro’s investigations and to stop pretrial detention were abandoned after public protests threatened to overthrow his government. As for Riina, in March 1995 he was sentenced to seven life terms for murders he had ordered during the 1980s. Clearly, Italy had reached the end of an era in its long relationship with the Mafia. Whether it was the end of the Mafia, though, is still in doubt.

Legacy of the Mafia Wars After the spectacular Mafia wars and the trials and prosecutions of the 1980s and 1990s, the Sicilian Mafia generally kept a low profile. Murders and overt criminality declined in Italy, with some noticeable exceptions. However, many observers believe this reaction indicated not the end of the Mafia but a reorganization and change of tactics. The Mafia seemed to be operating with a much looser “cell” structure and with fewer family contacts, making networks difficult

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to trace. There was also anecdotal evidence that the Mafia sought to subvert the political process rather than wage war with the system. Many Sicilians and research institutes attempted to estimate the current size and scope of Mafia activity. According to one Sicilian prosecutor, organized crime in Italy (including areas outside Sicily) earned at least $60 billion between 1995 and 2003. The Mafia earned about half its income from drug trafficking and the other half from extortion and graft in the public sector (notably construction). Rival criminal elements from Albania, Eastern Europe, Nigeria, and North Africa had also established presences, but the Mafia, an organization with a long history and deep ties to Sicilian society, was in no danger of extinction. Perhaps 5,000 Sicilians were actual Mafia members, hundreds of thousands had dealings with the Mafia, and nearly all Sicilian businesses still paid protection money. During the anti-Mafia campaign, the Mafia responded by directly challenging the state through assassination and violence. This response was unsuccessful in the long run, so the Mafia leaders may be trying to influence politicians by more subtle means of easing the tough anti-Mafia laws. While prime ministers Andreotti and Berlusconi generally were successful in fighting charges of corruption and Mafia connections, graft in Italy has remained a serious problem. Citing too much left-wing influence in the judiciary and activist judges, Berlusconi’s Forza

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Italian party has eased some anti-Mafia laws and suggested revoking others. Their motivations for legal reform were open to debate, but the net effect was to deprive the anti-Mafia judiciary of much of its power in combating organized crime. Forza Italia and Berlusconi allies won all of Sicily’s sixty-one parliamentary seats in the 2001 elections. In the 2006 elections, however, Berlusconi and his Forz Italia Party were turned out of power by Italian voters in a very narrow loss to Romano Prodi. Meanwhile, in Sicilian regional elections, the Forza Italia candidate Salvatore Cuffaro won as president (the title of the executive in Sicily). Still, the strongly anti-mafia independent candidate, Rita Borsellino, sister of murdered judge Paolo Borsellino, won nearly 42 percent of the vote. David MacMichael and Charles Allan See also: Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s.

Bibliography Jamieson, Alison. The Antimafia: Italy’s Fight Against Organized Crime. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Pasquino, Gianfranco, and Patrick McCarthy, eds. The End of Post-War Politics in Italy: The Landmark 1992 Election. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Renda, Francesca. Storia della Mafia. Palermo: Sigma, 1998. Stille, Alexander. Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995. Wiskemann, Elizabeth. Italy Since 1945. London: Macmillan, 1971.

MACEDONIA: Ethnic Conflict,1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Greece SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO BULGARIA Skopje

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The independent state of Macedonia was born out of the breakup of Yugoslavia, which included six republics, one of which was Macedonia. In 1980, Josip Broz Tito—Yugoslavia’s iron-fisted leader for thirtyfive years—died, and nationalism soon began to rise in Yugoslavia’s republics. Even though most Yugoslavians were ethnically similar, they had linguistic, cultural, and religious differences that often created suspicion and could be used by ambitious leaders to gain a local following. Finally, in 1991, three of the republics— Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—declared their independence. Macedonia was one of three republics remaining in Yugoslavia. The other two were Serbia, which had been the dominant republic and was home to the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade; and Montenegro, which was controlled by and generally sympathetic to the Serbs. The Macedonians were less than eager to set out on their own. They did not have the same history of resentments that had motivated the other republics to break away. To the contrary, Macedonia had often

found the strength of Yugoslavia to be a useful counter, discouraging aggression from neighbors in Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria, which had controlled parts of the republic in the past. Outside of Yugoslavia, Macedonia would be an isolated nation. The only other choice, however, was to remain in a Yugoslavia completely dominated by the Serbs. Macedonia’s 2 million people would be far outnumbered by Serbia and the regions under its control (Montenegro, and the “autonomous” regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina), with a combined population of 10 million. So Macedonia followed its fellow republics in declaring its independence from Yugoslavia. Macedonia held its first open elections in December 1990. Extremist nationalist parties did well, but the parliament chose Kiro Gligorov, leader of the moderate Social Democratic Alliance, to be Macedonia’s president. In September 1991, the Macedonian parliament declared the Macedonian Republic independent of Yugoslavia. Two months later, the parliament passed a constitution that confirmed Macedonia’s independence. In 1992, the Yugoslavian army, under international pressure, withdrew from the country, tacitly accepting the Macedonians’ decision to become independent. Macedonia was the only one of the Yugoslavian republics to secede without any shots being fired, until Montenegro did so in 2006. However, there remained rumors that Yugoslavia’s Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, still hoped to maintain some hold over Macedonia, and Serb nationalists openly called for renewed claims to the region.

U N Peacekeepers In 1992, the United Nations agreed to send peacekeepers to Macedonia in hopes of preventing the troubles elsewhere in the Balkans from spreading. The peacekeepers were known as the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), and their job was

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KEY DATES 1980

Long-time Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito dies.

1990

Macedonian nationalists display growing popularity in national elections.

1991

Macedonia declares itself independent from a disintegrating Yugoslavia.

1992

To prevent the spread of ethnic violence from other former Yugoslav republics, the UN dispatches peacekeepers to Macedonia; Greece and Macedonia have a diplomatic dispute over the name of Macedonia; Greece fears that Macedonia’s taking this name will arouse irredentist sympathies in Macedonian areas of Greece.

1997

Riots break out in the provincial Albanian-dominated city of Gostivar after police pull down the Albanian flag raised by the mayor.

1999

350,000 Kosovars, or Albanian residents of Serbia, flee Serbian oppression and war between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Serbia; Macedonia reluctantly supports NATO.

2001

The National Liberation Army (NLA), an ethnic Albanian rebel group, launches an uprising in ethnic Albanian sections of western Macedonia in February; a 3,000-strong NATO force is dispatched in July to maintain peace; the government and rebels sign the Ohrid Agreement in August, calling for a political resolution to the dispute.

to patrol the border areas between Macedonia, Albania, and Yugoslavia. The main concern was to prevent the ethnic conflicts between Serbians and Albanians in neighboring Kosovo province from spilling over into Macedonia, which also had a large Albanian minority. The first contingent was 700 soldiers from Scandinavian countries. In June 1993, the peacekeeping force was joined by a unit of 300 Americans. The government in Skopje, Macedonia’s capital, was uneasy about the intentions of Serbia’s Milosevic, so it supported the presence of the peacekeepers. Fears of further Yugoslavian aggression soon faded, but other ethnic and political problems surrounding Macedonia did not disappear, and some new ones arose. In its first years of independence, Macedonia had political difficulties with two of its non-Yugoslavian neighbors—Greece and Bulgaria—and with its own minority of ethnic Albanians.

Greece In early 1992, Macedonia fell into a serious diplomatic dispute with neighboring Greece over its name. The place-name “Macedonia” had once applied to a much larger region, including parts of northern Greece and western Bulgaria as well as the former Yugoslav republic. In fact, provinces in both northern Greece and western Bulgaria included the term “Macedonia.” Greeks in particular were outraged that the new republic sought the name for itself. For Greece, the historical Macedonia was very important to its sense of national identity. Alexander the Great, the leader who conquered much of the Near East in the fourth century b.c.e., was a Macedonian. Alexander’s conquests spread Greek culture throughout the ancient world. The Greeks did not want his heritage to be stolen by their northern

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neighbors. Historically, the Greeks had right on their side: Macedon had been named in ancient Greek times or earlier, and Alexander had grown up within the culture of classical Greece. The Slavic peoples who now lived in the new Republic of Macedon had arrived in the area about a thousand years later. They continued to call the region Macedonia and gradually developed their own national identity based upon the Macedonian label. More significant than fights over ancient history, some Macedonian nationalists had suggested the new republic should claim all of “Greater Macedonia,” including the lands in northern Greece and western Bulgaria. Macedonian leaders emphatically denied any design on land beyond the present borders and said that such ambitions were held by only a few extremists. Still angry, Greece refused to recognize the new Macedonia and threatened economic sanctions against any other nation that offered recognition. This reaction caused most nations to delay recognizing Macedonia. When Macedonia refused to change its name, Greece imposed a trade embargo on the republic, closing its borders to travel and trade. At a time when Macedonia’s relations with Serbia were also edgy, Greece’s embargo cut off its only other outlet to world markets. International sympathy was on Macedonia’s side in the naming conflict. Greece was accused of threatening to destabilize the region for the sake of ancient history. What did 10 million Greeks have to fear from a nation of 2 million poor Macedonians? As one Macedonian put it, “How would we take over northern Greece with 30,000 poorly trained territorials, lots of unemployment, and a rundown economy?” European states put pressure on Greece to compromise on Macedonia’s name and to end its embargo. When it became clear that other nations were not willing to support Greece in its arguments, tensions between Greece and Macedonia lessened. As other nations officially recognized Macedonia, the pressure on Greece increased. In April 1993, the United Nations accepted Macedonia as a member, but, in deference to Greece, under a compromise name: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In February 1994, Russia and the United States recognized Macedonia. Greece and Macedonia finally signed an agreement to normalize relations in September 1995.

Bulgaria The danger from Bulgaria was both deeper and less immediate. Traditionally, Bulgarians argued that Macedonians as such did not exist; they were simply Bulgarians who spoke a slightly different dialect of Bulgarian. It was true that the Macedonians’ language was more closely related to Bulgarian than to Serbo-Croatian, but all three belong to the South Slav language family. Bulgaria recognized Macedonia early, in January 1992. The Macedonians, while grateful, remained skeptical, speculating that Bulgaria was simply accepting an independent Macedonia to prepare for a campaign to take it over. After all, many Bulgarians still claimed that Macedonians were only Bulgarians with funny accents. Despite these suspicions, relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia remained generally friendly, and there were no signs of growing hostility.

Albanians The most serious problem facing Macedonia was its large minority of ethnic Albanians. About 22 percent of the country’s population are ethnic Albanians, concentrated in the western part of the country around the town of Gostivar near the border of Albania. Albanians living in Macedonia had a higher per capita income than those living across the border in Albania itself, and they were better treated than ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Even so, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia resented what they perceived as a subservient position. They wanted to be recognized as a separate ethnic nation within Macedonia and given autonomy to govern themselves in local matters. Macedonian Slavs feared that giving Albanians autonomy would encourage them to demand complete separation. Struggling Macedonia could not afford to lose more than 20 percent of its population. The Macedonian government tried to placate Albanian anger by power sharing. President Gligorov insisted that Albanians would always have a share in the government and brought their Party for Democratic Prosperity into his governing coalition. Some Albanians were appointed ministers in Gligorov’s government. Some Albanians refused to accept Gligorov’s overtures. They supported the more radical Democratic Party of Albania, which demanded that Albanians be

Macedonia: Ethnic Conflict, 19 9 0s

recognized as a nation. For the most part, however, relations between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians improved through the mid-1990s. All this began to change in 1997 when open warfare broke out in neighboring Kosovo between the Serbian government and the Kosovars, who were also ethnic Albanians. The Serbian minority in Kosovo had been menaced for some time by radical Kosovars, and many were returning to other parts of Serbia. However, Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic and other Serb nationalists were determined to keep Kosovo in the shrunken remainder of Yugoslavia (which was renamed Serbia and Montenegro in 2003). Milosevic commanded the Serbian-dominated police in Kosovo to protect Serb residents. Kosovars complained that the police were attacking them without cause, and soon the radical Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA, but UCK is the Albanian acronym) fought back, defending Kosovars and attacking Serbs. Then in 1999, at the urging of U.S. president Bill Clinton, NATO troops intervened in Kosovo to prevent another war of “ethnic cleansing” like the one in Bosnia in the early 1990s. The Macedonian government reluctantly supported NATO’s intervention, housing 350,000 Kosovar refugees and allowing NATO to use the country as a staging area. Ethnic Albanians cheered, but the Macedonian majority sympathized with Serbia, a sympathy that deepened when the result of NATO’s intervention was that Kosovo’s Serb population fled, leaving the province to the Albanians. NATO’s member nations did not anticipate the potential effects of their Kosovo intervention on Macedonia. When Albanians in Macedonia saw that Kosovo was heading for stability and independence under Albanian governance, they began demanding more autonomy at home. They formed the National Liberation Army (NLA), whose Albanian acronym was UCK, the same as the Kosovo Liberation Army’s. KLA veterans from across the border joined the movement. The situation was made worse by the flood of cheap weapons in the region, encouraged by political turmoil in Albania as well as in Kosovo. In February 2001, Albanian residents launched a rebellion in western Macedonia, catching the government and the poorly equipped and trained Macedonian army off guard. President Boris Trajkovski called up reserves and helped to form a “unity coalition” that included both of the moderate Albanian political parties. The fighting continued through the spring and sum-

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mer of 2001. Typically, Albanian rebels would occupy a village or ambush isolated government troops, and the army would reply with bombardment by helicopter gun ships, tanks, and heavy artillery. Because both sides were inexperienced and poorly trained, casualties were light. Approximately 60 government police and soldiers and 140 NLA guerrillas died in the conflict. Both Albanian and Macedonian civilians were caught in the crossfire, however, and nearly 100,000 fled their homes (half of them taking refuge in Kosovo). On July 5, 2001, international mediators arranged a cease-fire, and a NATO force of 3,000 (which included no U.S. troops) entered the country to disarm the rebels and prevent new outbreaks of fighting. On August 8, 2001, the Ohrid Agreement was signed as a framework to negotiate the settlement of the conflict. After 2001, both sides made significant progress in addressing questions of ethnic rights. The Macedonian constitution was revised, language rights were granted to Albanians, and parliamentary procedures were created to give Albanian parties oversight on issues affecting the Albanian population. Government power was “devolved” to the local level to a significant degree. The agreement created resentment among ethnic Macedonians, however, and remained politically unpopular. Most of the Albanian liberation force disarmed, but a few factions kept their weapons, and small clashes continued. More ominous were the continued economic problems throughout the country. National unemployment hovered near 25 percent. Hard times continued to breed discontent on both sides. Some Albanian groups continued to advocate autonomy and ultimate secession from the republic. At the same time, some Macedonian groups suggested that some of the Albanian-inhabited areas should be allowed to secede and that other Albanians should be “encouraged” to emigrate.

Analysis Newly independent Macedonia avoided violent confrontations with its suspicious neighbors—Greece and Bulgaria—in the 1990s. On the other hand, it could not avoid being drawn in to a dispute involving its own largest ethnic minority, the Albanians. The outbreak of fighting between Macedonians and Albanians in 2001 caused few casualties compared to the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but it left a legacy of bitterness and a feeling on both

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sides that the underlying problems were unresolved. Since the Albanians’ violent uprising worked to force key concessions, violence might remain tempting to Albanian leaders. Some Macedonians argued that they should be ready to strike the rebels hard and fast, before any international intervention. Despite Macedonia’s enviable record in promoting ethnic coexistence since independence, renewed conflict remained a strong possibility, especially if the country’s economic condition did not improve. Carl Skutsch and James Frusetta See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Albania: Civil Conflict, 1990s; Bosnia: Civil War, 1992–1995; Serbia: Kosovo Secessionist Movement, 1990s.

Bibliography Ackerman, Alice. Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000. Brown, Keith. The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nationhood. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. Lampe, John. Yugoslavia: Twice There Was a Country. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pettifer, James. The New Macedonian Question. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Phillips, John. Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004. Poulton, Hugh. Who Are the Macedonians? Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

POLAND: Imposition of Martial Law, 1981–1983 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coup country produces machinery and transport equipment (shipbuilding is traditionally important), metals, chemicals, and textiles. Currently, the outdated manufacturing sector is being modernized.

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The Republic of Poland, as Poland has been known since 1989, has an area of 120,728 square miles and a population of 38.6 million. It is bordered on the north by the Baltic Sea and the small Russian territory of Kaliningrad and on the northeast by Lithuania. Its eastern neighbor is Belarus, and its southeast neighbor is Ukraine. In the south it borders the Czech and Slovak republics. To the west is Germany. The capital city of Poland is Warsaw. Ethnically, the country is almost entirely Polish, with only a small German minority. Roman Catholicism is by far the majority religion. While Poland is a major industrial nation, over 20 percent of the population is engaged full time in agriculture, mostly as small peasant farmers. Nearly a quarter of the rest live in the countryside and farm part-time. Principal crops are potatoes, sugar beet, wheat, rye, and barley. Pigs are raised in quantity. Poland is an important producer and exporter of coal, copper, and sulfur. Manufacturing is varied. The

The Polish nation appears in the Middle Ages as a coherent grouping of Slavic people in the basins of the Oder and Vistula rivers. From time to time, these people occupied more extensive territories, but they suffered from inadequate political organization and the lack of defensible borders. Their last monarch, Augustus the Strong (1697–1733), was described as being “as ambitious as he was lacking in talent.” The end of his reign marked the first partition of Poland among its powerful neighbors—Prussia, Russia, and AustriaHungary. After another partition in 1795, the country disappeared, only to be recreated in 1815 as an independent duchy. In 1875, it was absorbed by czarist Russia. After World War I, it was established again, essentially as a buffer state against Communist Russia in 1921. It endured until 1939, when it was partitioned between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. In 1945, after the Soviet Union had driven out the Germans, the Soviets again established Poland, this time as a satellite nation and with altered borders. The Soviet Union absorbed Poland’s eastern territories, which contained largely Ukrainian and Belorussian people, and compensated Poland with former German territory to the Oder and Neisse rivers, the OderNeisse line. This boundary was recognized by West Germany only in 1970.

Postwar Poland The Poland established after World War II had lost fully 20 percent of its population—including nearly

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KEY DATES 1948

All opposition to Soviet-backed Polish Communists is effectively eliminated.

1956

Mass strikes and demonstrations by workers against the government are met by Polish troops, who kill more than 80 protesters; Soviet troops converge on the Polish capital to defend the Communist government; Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka convinces Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev not to attack the demonstrators.

1970

The government announces large price increases for food products, setting off mass protests by workers, including those at the huge shipbuilding works at Gdansk and Szczecin; police fire on the protesters.

1979

Pope John Paul II, a Pole, visits the deeply Catholic country in June and greets crowds estimated in the millions; workers gather in Gdansk and elsewhere in December to commemorate workers shot down in the 1970 protests.

1980

Workers organize the Solidarity labor union, headed by Gdansk electrician Lech Walesa.

1981

Facing rising protests by workers and criticism from parliament, Polish general Wojciech Jaruzelski takes power and declares martial law.

1983

With Solidarity repressed, the government ends martial law.

1985

Reformer Mikhail Gorbachev becomes premier of the Soviet Union.

1988

At mass demonstrations, workers demand the restoration of the Solidarity labor union and democratic reforms.

1989–1990 Elections lead to victories by Solidarity-backed candidates, including Walesa for president, ending more than four decades of Communist rule.

all of its 3 million Jews, who had made up 10 percent of the population in 1939. An astonishing 40 percent of its national wealth—factories, railways, houses, roads, and livestock—had been destroyed. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the United States and Great Britain had conceded that Poland was in the sphere of influence of their wartime partner, the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, had agreed that the Poles would be allowed to choose their own government, but in 1947 he imposed a coalition

“democratic bloc” formed by the (Communist) Polish Workers party (PWP) and the Polish Socialist party (PSP). In 1948 the two parties merged into the Polish United Workers party (Polish acronym, PZPR), a purely Communist party. The Peasant party (ZSL) and the Democratic party (SD) continued to exist but were tightly controlled in what was, for all practical purposes, a one-party state. The PZPR leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was a Communist, but also a tough nationalist who had

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remained in Poland as an underground fighter during the war. To a surprising degree, he was able to resist imposition of Soviet policies, particularly collectivization of agriculture, which, even until today, remains essentially the realm of small peasant producers. Gomulka’s independence created enmity with Stalin, however, and he was deposed as first secretary of the PZPR. The new secretary, Boleslaw Bierut, followed the Soviet line on forced industrialization and achieved some success in rebuilding and modernizing Poland’s shattered manufacturing base. Even Bierut did not dare to attempt agricultural collectivization, but his regime did cause widespread resentment against the PZPR by its use of terrorism and its obvious subservience to Moscow. After Stalin’s death in 1953, political control in Poland loosened up somewhat. However, the buildup of internal security forces, especially the intelligence service (UB), and the creation of a large and inefficient party bureaucracy meant continual intrusions into people’s private lives, alienating many former supporters. Bierut died in February 1956, shortly after Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s excesses in a famous secret speech. In Poland, Edward Ochab, a reformer, replaced Bierut, just in time to face the June uprising of the factory workers of Poznan, one of Poland’s major industrial cities.

Gomulka Era Forced industrialization under the Six Year Plan had required higher production targets and limits on wages. The workers were fed up. In June 1956, a strike by the 15,000 workers at the Cegielski engineering plant spilled into the streets, with as many as 100,000 demonstrators. The police and military moved in and more than eighty people, mostly demonstrators, died. Polish troops had fired on Polish people. The crisis was immense. Workers Councils were organized at factories around the country. To many in the PZPR, the answer was to bring back Gomulka, the one Communist who had a genuine popular following. The Workers Councils and student organizations demanded his return. The Soviets, though, were preoccupied with unrest in Hungary and East Germany, reflecting that its satellite nations, a buffer against the hostile West, were crumbling. Khrushchev cared less for the ideological orthodoxy of East European governments than for assurance that they would not defect to the West.

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On October 19, Khrushchev flew to Warsaw to confront Gomulka. The Soviet divisions stationed in Poland began to converge on the capital. In return, the PZPR, meeting with Gomulka present, ordered the Polish army and the popular militias to take up defensive positions. Gomulka convinced Khrushchev that any Russian military occupation would mean war and that Gomulka, while he was a reformer, was also a Communist and had no intention of turning to the West. Khrushchev flew home, the Soviet divisions returned to base, and Gomulka was restored as first secretary, where he ruled until 1970. Gomulka fell from power in 1970 for basically the same reasons that had toppled his predecessors. Party bureaucrats and internal security police intruded into citizens’ intellectual and personal lives. Poland’s large university student population was roiled by student activism in the rest of the world during the 1960s. In January 1968, the government closed down the production of a classic nineteenthcentury Polish play about resisting Russia. The student riots that followed showed how much of his popularity Gomulka had lost. In addition, the massive program of government investment in industrial modernization (supported largely by foreign loans) had become enormously expensive, and Poland’s overstaffed factories simply were no longer economically competitive. At the same time, the cost of consumer goods was kept artificially low to appease consumers. Something had to give. Just before Christmas 1970, the government announced price increases. Worker protests and strikes broke out, particularly in Gdansk and Szczecin (Stettin). This time it was Gomulka—by now an old man who in the midst of all this ferment was disabled by a stroke—who ordered the police to fire on the demonstrators. As in 1956, the PZPR, unwilling to take the steps necessary to suppress the workers, backed down. It replaced Gomulka with Edward Gierek, who went to Szczecin and negotiated directly with the workers to defuse the situation.

Gierek and the Rise of Solidarity Gierek’s approach to government was basically the same as Gomulka’s: increase the pace of modernization and hope to turn angry workers into satisfied consumers. He failed miserably. Ten years later, Poland’s foreign hard currency debt was over $23 billion, and,

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despite enormous subsidies to the farmers, the gap between food supply and food demand was so great that 40 percent of the state budget was being spent on retail food subsidies. Actually, the first five years of Poland’s “Great Leap Forward” had gone well, with Poland having one of the highest economic growth rates in the world. Improvements in the standard of living were obvious. For the first time, the average Pole was able to buy a locally produced car. The 1973 war in the Middle East and the consequent huge rise in oil costs soon affected the price of everything Poland was buying from the West. Desperate to keep up exports to pay for the country’s imports and to pay interest on its skyrocketing foreign debt, the authorities sold more and more food abroad, leading to shortages and higher prices at home, beginning again the cycle that had brought down first Bierut and then Gomulka. On June 24, 1976, the government announced price increases of 100 percent for sugar, 69 percent for meat, and 33 percent for butter and cheese. The reaction was immediate. Mobs of workers shut down the country for a day, destroying transport facilities and looting shops. In the city of Radom, a mob stormed PZPR headquarters and took all the food from the cafeteria, while shouting “Red Bourgeoisie.” The next day the protests continued. The government backed down and rescinded the price increases. At the same time, the police stepped up their arrests of rioters and suspected sympathizers, arousing more public anger and offsetting any good the restoration of prices might have done. The economic policy of modernization of production was quickly shifted to a policy of production to meet consumer demand, especially in food. Scarce foreign exchange was now spent on food imports. By the end of 1977, Poles were eating more meat than people in most Western countries, and it was estimated that about 70 percent of the retail price was subsidized by the state. Essentially, the Polish people were eating themselves out of house and home. Meanwhile, the government continued its selfdefeating policy of harassing individuals and censoring the press and electronic media, merely making itself look ridiculous while it grew more hated. Grassroots worker organizations were spreading without much hindrance, simply ignoring the official trade unions. The Catholic Church was becoming more and more confrontational, a trend that was made much more significant by the election of the Pole Karol

Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II. The pope’s visit to Poland in June 1979 drew the largest crowds in European history, a reminder to Gierek and the PZPR of where the real power in the country lay. A PZPR internal study group had already reported the need to end harassment and corruption within the party ranks. It advised further liberalization. However, the situation was beyond that, as the events of 1979 and 1980 would show. In December 1979, workers gathered at the Lenin Shipyard and other sites in Gdansk to commemorate comrades who had lost their lives there in the 1970 strike. Among the speakers was a former electrician named Lech Walesa. Many who took part in the commemoration were fired, sparking more demonstrations and work stoppages. On July 1, 1980, the government again decreed modest increases in the price of meat. By now, the workers knew what to do. They simply walked away from their machines and demanded compensating wage increases. Desperate to avoid confrontation and bloodshed, Gierek ordered managers to comply. In many cases, the workers’ response was simply to elevate their demands. On August 14, the workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk began a sit-down strike. Lech Walesa, who had been fired from his job at the yard four years before, climbed over the fence and took charge. By this time it was clear that the PZPR was no longer in charge of the country. It did not control the factories. It did not control the farms. It certainly did not control the Catholic Church. There was even some question as to whether it controlled the army. Behind all the questions was the big one: What, if anything, would the Soviet Union do? The Polish government sent its negotiator, senior party official Mieczyslaw Jagielski, to Gdansk, where the workers, with Walesa’s participation, had set up the Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS). The MKS presented twenty-one demands, the principal one being government recognition of the workers’ independent unions. The worker representatives took the opportunity, in full view of the Western press, which Gierek had allowed to cover the negotiations, to demand responses from Jagielski about faked political trials, police harassment, and censorship—in short, about all the sins and shortcomings of the regime. The talks dragged on for a week. The 6,000 workers continued to occupy the plant. On August 31, Jagielski and the MKS signed an agreement

Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 19 81–19 83

acknowledging the right to establish free trade unions. Meanwhile, similar strikes with similar demands were spreading across the country. On the same day, an almost identical agreement was signed in Szczecin between the government and an MKS representing 380 enterprises. Among the more interesting aspects of both agreements was that the relatively highly paid shipyard workers insisted that the lower-paid workers in other enterprises get greater pay increases to reduce the wide pay differential. The Gdansk MKS adopted the name Solidarity, and as other strikes were settled, the name spread. Solidarity soon became a national labor organization. It also became a political vehicle for Walesa.

Crisis of 19 8 0 Things went even further politically. At a September 5 meeting of the Polish parliament, or Sejm, members vied in ridiculing the government and party. One member declared that censorship had become so ridiculous that Poles no longer even believed bad news when they read it. At about the same time, Gierek broke down physically and went into the hospital. The moderate Stanislaw Kania was chosen first secretary. Even he, though, seemed to realize that his post and his party were becoming irrelevant to what happened in Poland. Solidarity, which had just opened a Warsaw office, was more and more calling the tune. In another sign of changing times, on Sunday, September 21, 1980, the state radio, overturning decades of official atheism, broadcast a Catholic mass. While the people celebrated their victories, however, grim economic facts had to be faced. According to the agreements with Solidarity, there was to be a 12 percent increase in the national wage fund, but only a 9 percent increase in prices for goods and services. This was a certain recipe for inflation at a time when domestic production was falling steeply and when the potato crop had failed. The foreign debt crisis was unresolved. The rest of the world, both East and West, recognizing the crisis, continued to advance both credits and emergency food deliveries. Western bankers and politicians, particularly in Germany and the United States, argued seriously that lending more money to bankrupt Poland was one way to prevent a Russian invasion. If the Soviets occupied the country, the bankers reasoned, the USSR would have to take responsibility for Poland’s foreign debt.

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So Poland limped along through 1980. Kania met privately with Walesa, who agreed that newly independent labor unions should act responsibly during the economic crisis, but it was soon clear that he was not in control either, as strikes continued through the fall. It was not until December 5 that a strike-free day could be reported.

Martial Law Strikes and labor actions resumed in 1981, and the economic situation worsened. However, there were increasing concerns, not only in Poland but even more so in the West, that the Soviet Union would eventually intervene militarily, if only to prevent the economic and social collapse of a state on its borders. U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planners openly discussed possibilities. It was widely believed in Western political and military circles that a Soviet intervention would spark a war of resistance that would inevitably require a military occupation. It would not be like Budapest in 1956, where troops had quickly squelched resistance. In fact, it was unclear what Soviet intentions were. Already militarily engaged in Afghanistan, the Kremlin’s aging leadership probably was not eager to assume another military burden. Inside Poland, there were some in the PZPR who would probably have called on the Soviets as a last resort, but party leaders viewed Soviet intervention as the greatest of evils. As for Solidarity, which by mid-1981 claimed over 10 million members, its leadership felt as if it were riding a tiger, realizing that continued strikes were bringing the country closer to an economic and social precipice and the possible catastrophe of Russian intervention. It was in this atmosphere that Joseph Pinkowski, chairman of the Council of Ministers (the president), resigned in February 1981. He was succeeded by the longtime minister of defense, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who continued in his defense post. In December Kania resigned as first secretary, and Jaruzelski took that post, too, heading both the government and the party. On December 13, Jaruzelski took the final step, declaring martial law. What motivated him is still unclear. Critics say it was a last desperate move to preserve Communist Party rule. However, party control of the military is an essential Leninist principle, and Jaruzelski’s move violated it. Whether Soviet intervention was an

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Polish strike leader and Solidarity head Lech Walesa addresses a crowd of workers after the government declared martial law in December 1981. The trade union was banned and Walesa detained, but the movement gained momentum. (Keystone/Getty Images)

imminent danger is also much debated. It does seem clear that Jaruzelski and many others, including some in the Solidarity leadership, were convinced that the country was on the brink of civil war, especially if the economy crashed and destroyed the raised expectations of the workers. Jaruzelski may also have feared that a civil war or a Soviet intervention would have destroyed the Polish army. There was only minimal resistance to martial law. Seven miners were killed battling anti-riot squads at the Wujek mine near Katowice. Mines and other strategic industries were militarized, their workers under military discipline. Thousands of Solidarity activists lost their jobs and Walesa was briefly detained, but corrupt party officials were also purged. Civil rights were suspended, and the country was governed by the Military Council of National Salvation. Generally speaking, Jaruzelski’s rule was mild. He had moved into a power vacuum. PZPR was totally discredited, and Solidarity had lost much of its initial support as people blamed it for the continual

public disorder. Consequently, the general received at least passive support from the majority. The period of maximum repression lasted about a year, with all trade unions abolished in 1982. In July 1983, martial law was lifted, and the Council was dissolved. In the summer of 1984, an amnesty released about 31,000 persons who had been arrested for various offenses. Elections for the Sejm were held in October 1985. Solidarity called for a boycott, but the government claimed nearly 80 percent participation, resulting in a government in which Jaruzelski became the elected president of the Council of Ministers. Jaruzelski’s attempts at reform and revival of the PZPR were by and large failures. The party was comatose. He had somewhat better luck in sponsoring autonomous consultative organizations. These included the Patriotic Movement for National Renewal (PRON), intended to provide ongoing criticism and suggestions to government, the National Trade Union Accord (OPZZ), which filled some of the gap left by the suppressed Solidarity, and the Social

Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 19 81–19 83

Economic Council. Censorship was relaxed, and even though prohibitory laws still existed, there was considerable tolerance of much underground intellectual activity, a welcome relief from the petty intrusions of the old PZPR. Nevertheless, Jaruzelski ran up against the same economic immovable obstacles, as had his predecessors over the previous forty years. A wave of strikes by a new generation of workers demanding the legal restoration of Solidarity began in May 1988. Rather than attempt direct repression, Jaruzelski called on the Catholic Church and Solidarity to act as intermediaries with the strikers. After the so-called Round Table negotiations of September 1988 and new elections in July of the following year, a coalition of Soli-

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darity, the Peasant party (ZSL), and the Social Democrats (SD) made Solidarity member Tadeusz Mazowiecki chairman of the Council of Ministers, ending forty-five years of Communist rule. David MacMichael See also: Coups; Czechoslovakia: Soviet Invasion, 1968; Germany: East German Uprising, 1953; Hungary: Soviet Invasion, 1956.

Bibliography Ascherson, Neil. The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution. New York: Viking Press, 1981. Europa Yearbook. London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1997. Millard, Frances. The Anatomy of the New Poland: Post Communist Politics in Its First Phase. Aldershot, UK: Elgar Press, 1994.

ROMANIA: Fall of Ceausescu,1989 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation 0

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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envisioned by Moscow planners. When Georghiu-Dej died in 1965, he was succeeded by RWP Central Committee member Nicolae Ceausescu, who continued his predecessor’s industrialization plans and independent foreign policy, while returning the name of the RWP to the RCP. Ceausescu became the only Socialist bloc leader to condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and he established close links and warm relations with many Western countries, including the United States.

200 Miles 200 Kilometers

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Targoviste Bucharest

YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA

Economic and Political Crises

BLACK SEA

Formerly a province of the Ottoman Empire, Romania became an independent kingdom in 1881. During World War II, its Fascist-led government allied itself with the Nazis. In 1944, the pro-German government was overthrown and the Soviet army entered the country. In March 1945, Moscow pressured King Michael to appoint a Communist-led government, which then won 89 percent of the votes in a November 1946 election that was widely seen as flawed. A year later, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) joined with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) to form the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP). In December 1947, the new ruling party forced Michael to abdicate and declared Romania a republic. By the end of the 1940s, a new constitution had been adopted and all the main industries and financial institutions in the country nationalized. All private land holdings were expropriated and consolidated into state-run and cooperative farms. In the early 1950s, purges of non-Communists and neutral Communists— that is, those who were not pro-Soviet—led to the undisputed dictatorship of RWP chairman Gheorghe Georghiu-Dej. But Georghiu-Dej soon proved a renegade within the Soviet bloc, insisting on an industrial base for Romania rather than the agricultural one

To bolster his hold over both the machinery of government and the party, Ceausescu resorted to frequent changes in personnel, so that no bureaucrat could establish an independent power base. He also turned to close associates and even family members to fill appointments to high office. In 1980, for example, he appointed his wife Elena to head the Council of Ministers, the main consultative body in the country. At the same time, like other Communist leaders of Eastern Europe, Ceausescu maintained the fiction of democracy. In regular elections, the RCP swept the polls with 90 percent or more of the vote and always reappointed Ceausescu as president. But Ceausescu’s capacity for tight political control was not matched by economic success. Sons and sons-in-law—regardless of experience, education, or talent—were given control of major industrial sectors. Nepotism was not the only problem. During the 1970s, Ceausescu had borrowed heavily in Western financial markets to maintain his breakneck industrialization and urban renovation schemes. With the collapse of fuel prices in the early 1980s—Romania was Eastern Europe’s largest oil producer—Ceausescu found himself hard-pressed to pay back the loans. Rather than reschedule payments, he forced the country to tighten its belt, even as he continued to build lavish and unnecessary government buildings in the capital. This meant exporting virtually all of the

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KEY DATES 1946

Communists win national elections in a poll that is widely denounced as fraudulent.

1965

Ruling Romanian Worker Party (RWP) central committee member Nicolae Ceausescu becomes leader of Romania.

1980

Ceausescu appoints his wife, Elena, to head the Council of Ministers, the country’s main consultative body.

1985

Reformer Mikhail Gorbachev becomes premier of the Soviet Union, vowing to open up the Communist system economically and politically.

1987–1988

In meetings between Ceausescu and Gorbachev in Romania and Russia, Gorbachev criticizes Ceausescu for maintaining a centrally directed economy and repressive political system.

1989

As Communist regimes fall peacefully across Eastern Europe, Ceausescu orders security forces to fire on Romanian antigovernment protesters, killing hundreds; in December, mass demonstrations force Ceausescu and his wife to flee the capital; they are captured by antigovernment forces in the provincial town of Targoviste; they are quickly tried and then executed by firing squad on Christmas Day.

1990

The National Salvation Front (NSF), a coalition of Communists and non-Communists, takes power upon the fall of Ceausescu and then wins national elections in May.

country’s oil reserves and cutting imports of all other goods to a minimum. Shortages of fuel and power led to strict energy rationing by 1987. This caused immediate suffering in the unusually cold winter of that year and had a ripple effect throughout the economy. Without sufficient fuel, the mechanized farms could not produce enough food. Hunger began to grow in the country, since Ceausescu refused to import enough foodstuffs to make up the gap. Moreover, factories were forced to cut back production or close down. As paychecks began to become increasingly delayed, grumbling turned into protest. By the summer of 1987, thousands of antigovernment leaflets were circulated underground. In November, thousands of demonstrators in the city of Brasov stormed the local RCP headquarters, protesting impossible working conditions and falling living standards. Similar protests broke out in the Hungarian-enclave

city of Timisoara in December. All were met with force by government security forces, and hundreds were arrested. Rather than grant the demands of protesters to alleviate food and energy shortages, Ceausescu announced an elaborate plan for “agro-industrial centers,” in which some 8,000 villages in the Transylvania area—mostly inhabited by the Hungarian minority in the country—would be razed and replaced by multistory housing complexes. The plan was met by sharp criticism both at home and abroad for its destruction of the traditional way of life. Ceausescu insisted, however, that it would improve living standards and ensure social equality. By 1988, Romania found itself increasingly isolated within both the international community and the Socialist bloc. With Mikhail Gorbachev in power in the Soviet Union, Romania found itself outside the

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current of reformist Socialist thinking. During visits by Gorbachev to Romania in 1987 and by Ceausescu to the Soviet Union in 1988, the Romanian leader was heavily criticized for his outdated commandstyle economics, his refusal to allow social freedom, and his unwillingness to curb human rights violations. In 1988, both West Germany and France recalled their ambassadors after Romania refused to sign international human rights documents.

Fall of Ceausescu By early 1989, there were signs of growing antiadministration unrest within the country. In March, several retired RCP officials sent an open letter to Ceausescu accusing him of disregarding the constitution that he himself had backed and of economic mismanagement. They were particularly critical of the rural urbanization programs. All of the signatories were subsequently arrested. In the fall of 1989, East European regimes from Poland to Bulgaria were entering their final days. Bowing to mass pop-

ular protest, most old-line Communist governments in the region had resigned, succeeded in some cases by former dissidents and in others by reformminded party members. Ceausescu, however, vowed to hang on. In December, security forces arrested a popular dissident clergyman in Timisoara, setting off waves of demonstrations. Later in the week, a more overtly anti-Ceausescu rally was attended by thousands, many of whom were inspired by events in the rest of Eastern Europe, including the fall of the Berlin Wall the month before. Security forces, under orders from the central government, opened fire, killing hundreds of demonstrators. As news of the massacre spread, protests erupted throughout the country, forcing the government to close its borders, as thousands of Romanians attempted to flee to neighboring countries. On December 21, Ceausescu attended a mass rally in the capital Bucharest, designed to show the extent of popular support for his regime. Instead, hostile chanting drowned out his speech, followed by mass antigovernment demonstrations throughout

Soldiers who joined the uprising against Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989 deface a portrait of the ousted Communist dictator. Ceausescu and his wife were executed by firing squad. (Michel Gangne/AFP/Getty Images)

Romania: Fall of Ceausescu, 19 8 9

the city. These quickly became running street battles between protesters and members of the Securitate, Ceausescu’s secret police. As fighting broke out around the country, the president declared a state of emergency and ordered his troops to quell the protests by force. When the army refused, Ceausescu and his wife were forced to flee the RCP headquarters by helicopter as demonstrators surrounded the building. When the helicopter set down in the town of Targoviste, the two were captured by antigovernment forces. After a summary trial, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu were executed by firing squad on Christmas Day. Fighting continued between Securitate forces and dissident protesters for some days, gradually dying down as the police found themselves outnumbered and began to surrender. Many of them—much hated by the populace—were also summarily executed.

Aftermath Even before the fighting let up, a 145-member National Salvation Front (NSF) was formed to run a provisional government. It included liberal Communists, intellectuals, and members of the armed forces. Ion Iliescu, a former central committee member of the RCP, was selected to be interim president. The new government soon banned the RCP and announced elections for 1990. Tribunals were also established to punish those officials—including members of Ceausescu’s family—responsible for the shooting of protesters during the uprising. Over the next four years, dozens were sentenced to prison sentences from several years to life. Despite the widespread joy at seeing the end of Ceausescu, many Romanians were not happy with the NSF, seeing it as too closely allied with the former regime. Unrest between pro- and anti-NSF supporters continued until the May 1990 elections, in which the NSF won an overwhelming—if controversial— victory in elections rife with accusations of fraud. As antigovernment protests continued, spreading to

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miners and other workers, the new government cracked down, leading to more unrest. In the 1992 elections, a breakaway faction of the NSF—eventually calling itself the Party of Socialist Democracy in Romania (PSDF)—won power, promising limited reforms. Its failure to deliver improvements in the economy and its plans to privatize the nation’s industrial and commercial organizations in ways that would benefit party elites led to further challenges in parliament and on the streets, including a general strike. In the 1996 elections, the PSDF lost power, and the new government established the National Council for Action Against Corruption and Organized Crime, intended to curb both of these social ills that were running rampant in postCommunist Romania. Meanwhile, ethnic unrest also plagued the country. In the mid-1990s, Germany began to expatriate Romanian Gypsies back to their country of origin, setting off attacks against the disliked minority. At the same time, Romania’s Hungarians—about 7 percent of the population—were pushing for minority rights and protections, setting off anti-Hungarian protests by ethnic Romanians. Ultimately, the protests resulted in concessions from the government, allowing for the use of Hungarian in school and for bilingual government administrators in areas where Hungarians made up more than 30 percent of the population. James Ciment See also: Coups; Poland: Imposition of Martial Law, 1981– 1983.

Bibliography Deletant, Dennis. Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Fischer, Mary Ellen. Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in Political Leadership. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989. Verdery, Katherine. National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

RUSSIA: Chechen Uprising Since 1994 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious ABKHAZIA CHECHNYA

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GEORGIA ARMENIA

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difficult. The Chechens, together with the people of neighboring Dagestan, fought the Russians for almost fifty years, repeatedly eluding or defeating the larger Russian armies, until they were forced to surrender in 1859. After the 1917 Communist Revolution, the Chechens again attempted to break away from Russia but were forced by the Communists to join the newly created Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Chechnya became a part of Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. During World War II, Joseph Stalin accused the Chechens of collaborating with the invading Germans. As punishment, he deported half a million Chechens to Kazakhstan in Central Asia. Only in 1956, after Stalin’s death, were the survivors allowed to return to Chechnya. Many had died during the forced migration and the difficult years in central Asia.

KAZAKHSTAN

AZERBAIJAN

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NORTH OSSETIA

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The Chechen people are a North Caucasian people who have probably lived in the Caucasus mountain region since before the Roman Empire. The peoples of the Caucasus endured many invasions by outsiders but survived and retained much of their distinctive culture. The Chechen language, like others in the Caucasus (Abkhaz, Georgian, e.g.), belongs to no other language family and is linguistically separate from the surrounding Turkic and Indo-European languages. During the Arab invasions of the seventh century, the Chechens converted to Islam, as did many of the other Caucasian peoples. Nevertheless, the Chechens remained a fiercely independent people.

Historical Background In the early nineteenth century, the Russian Empire sent its armies to conquer the Caucasus. The mountainous nature of the region, combined with the intractable temper of its inhabitants, made this conquest

The conflict that developed between Chechnya and the Russian Federation (the country that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union) after 1991 was the latest in a long string of Chechen-Russian battles. When the Soviet Union began to collapse, and outlying republics began to claim their independence, the Chechens again demanded their independence, too. Unlike full-fledged Socialist republics like neighboring Georgia, however, Chechen-Ingush was merely an autonomous republic in the old Soviet system. The new Russian republic considered Chechen-Ingush one of the federated states within Russia. The politicians in Moscow refused to consider Chechen independence. In Chechnya, however, a move toward independence continued. When a short-lived Communist-led coup in Moscow was put down on August 18, 1991, citizens of Chechnya revolted against their Communist leadership, demanding that they resign. In early September, armed Chechens, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, seized key buildings in Groznyy, the capital of

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Russia: Chechen Uprising Since 19 9 4

871

KEY DATES 1941–1945

Accused of collaborating with German invaders, thousands of Chechens are deported to Kazakhstan by Soviet leader Josef Stalin.

1956

After thousands of Chechens die in exile, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev allows the survivors to return to Chechnya.

1991

The Soviet Union collapses in the wake of a failed military coup in August; constituent Soviet republics become independent states; Chechen leader General Dzhokhar Dudayev declares Chechnya independent of Russia in November.

1992

Russian president Boris Yeltsin sends in troops but then withdraws them, as an uneasy peace continues between Russia and Chechnya through 1994.

1994

In June, Yeltsin organizes Chechen opposition to the Dudayev government and begins to arm it; in November, Yeltsin issues an ultimatum that all Chechen parties disarm or Russian troops will be sent in; one month later, over 40,000 Russian troops, backed by air support, attack Dudayev strongholds in the Chechen capital of Grozny.

1996

The Russian government in July declares the Chechen rebellion over, but Chechen rebels fight back, showing that they have not been defeated; fighting continues into 1997.

1997

Russians and Chechens sign a peace agreement in May but both sides refuse to concede their position on Chechen independence.

1999

Russia launches a new offensive to destroy the rebel Chechen government.

1999–2000 Chechen terrorists set off bombs throughout Russia, killing hundreds; in 2000, Vladimir Putin becomes president of Russia, vowing to crush the Chechen independence movement. 2003

The Russian government holds a referendum that leads to greater Chechen autonomy, but the Kremlin refuses to consider independence for Chechnya.

Chechen-Ingush. Dudayev announced his intention of declaring Chechen independence. Dudayev was a former general in the Soviet air force and a leader among the Chechen nationalists. He soon attracted the support of many Chechens who shared his desire for Chechen independence. In October he was elected president of Chechnya, and in November he declared Chechnya an independent nation. The old Chechen-Ingush republic was dissolved and

replaced by two separate states: Chechnya and Ingushetia. (The Ingush decided to remain within the Russian Federation.)

Russian Interests The Russian government refused to recognize Chechnya’s independence, believing that its secession from Russia could challenge the country’s stability. The

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Europe and Former Soviet Union

new Russian Federation was left with many of the military obligations of the Soviet Union but without any clearly defensible borders. Internal borders, like the one between Chechnya and the newly independent Georgia, had suddenly become international borders of the new republic. Chechnya, in the heart of the Caucasus, was a particularly problematic area. The main rail lines to the south ran through Grozny, Chechnya’s capital. Without Grozny, Russia would be almost completely cut off from its southernmost state, Dagestan. Chechnya’s independence might also encourage the people of Dagestan—many of whom were ethnic and linguistic cousins to the Chechens, and most of whom were Muslim—to break away from Russia as well. A secession movement might even encourage broader revolts among ethnic groups in the rest of the Caucasus. If such a domino-like reaction occurred, the Russians could find their southern border moved 300 miles closer to Moscow. The Chechens had already shown their willingness to export violence. They sent fighters to help other Muslim groups elsewhere in the Caucasus, including the Ingush in their guerrilla war against North Ossetia, the Muslim separatists in the Georgian region of Abkhazia who were seeking independence from Georgia, and the Azeris (citizens of Azerbaijan) in their skirmishes with Armenia. These actions contributed to the general instability of the region—the Ingush-Ossetian conflict alone had created 60,000 refugees—and was a drain on Russian resources. Finally, Chechnya was a valuable economic resource for Russia. Chechnya had large oil and gas reserves, and a ninety-five-mile oil pipeline ran through Chechnya, carrying additional oil from fields along the Caspian Sea. Losing Chechnya would mean losing Chechnya’s oil and perhaps access to the oil that was transshipped through its pipelines.

Civil War When Boris Yeltsin gained the Russian presidency, he denied the legitimacy of Chechnya’s declaration of independence, but he did little to directly interfere with the region. Some Russian troops entered Chechnya in 1992, but most of them were withdrawn later that year. In the meantime, Chechnya’s president Dudayev worked to make new alliances in the region, organiz-

ing a Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples, which Russia refused to recognize. He also sought diplomatic ties with nations overseas. No country was willing to recognize Chechnya as independent, however. Many considered the Chechen dispute to be an internal affair of Russia’s. No doubt they also had no desire to gain Russia’s hostility. So Chechnya floated in a no-man’s land during 1992 and 1993, neither under Russian control nor entirely independent. Chechnya’s fight for independence did have consequences, however. Without friendly relations with Russia, the economy declined steeply, bringing high unemployment and want. Those most affected began to oppose Dudayev’s policies, and the Russians encouraged dissent by supporting Chechen rivals to Dudayev. Numerous gun battles between Dudayev and his opponents took place in the streets of Groznyy, and Dudayev’s forces were always victorious. In June 1994, Russian president Yeltsin helped to orchestrate the creation of a Chechen Interim Council (IC), which also opposed Dudayev. Throughout 1994, the Russians provided arms to the IC, while it jockeyed for power with Dudayev. Dudayev occupied the capital of Groznyy, while the IC was based in Chechnya’s northern provinces (nearer the Russian border). In September 1994, open warfare broke out. The IC was equipped with tanks and helicopters, obtained from its Russian supporters and accompanied by some Russian troops. Despite these advantages, the IC lost once again to Dudayev’s forces. By late 1994, the Russians were increasingly frustrated with the situation in Chechnya. Their proxy opposition had been unable to budge Dudayev. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of ethnic Russians and other minorities in Chechnya were fleeing into Russia, creating social problems and an economic burden. On November 26, 1994, Yeltsin issued an ultimatum demanding that all sides in Chechnya lay down their arms or Russia would send its troops in. When Dudayev refused to back down, Yeltsin followed through on his promise.

First Russian War On December 11, 1994, Russian assault troops, carried by helicopter gunships, moved against Dudayev’s strongholds in Chechnya. They were supported by an overland attack carried out by mechanized and armored units. A total of 40,000 Russian ground troops crossed into Chechnya. The assault was also

Russia: Chechen Uprising Since 19 9 4

A Chechen nationalist waves the republic’s colors from the destroyed presidential palace in Grozny in September 1995. Thousands gathered in the bombed-out main square to celebrate the fourth anniversary of Chechnya’s declaration of independence from Russia. (Sergey Shakhijanian/AFP/Getty Images)

backed up by air and missile strikes against Chechen strongholds. Russian forces began their assault on Grozny on December 31. The battle for the capital city took more than five weeks and involved brutal house-tohouse fighting. The Russian troops lacked the high morale of the Chechen soldiers—many Russians deserted during the battle—but Russian commanders compensated by the liberal use of helicopter and missile attacks. Thousands of civilians were killed in the fighting. By the second week in February, the city of Grozny, what little was left of it, was largely under Russian control. Dudayev and his Chechen partisans refused to accept defeat. They retreated to the mountainous country south of Groznyy, leaving the city and surrounding plains to the Russians. The Russians continued their assaults by helicopter and ground troops but were unable to pin down the elusive Chechen guerrillas in the rough Caucasus Mountains. The Chechens used hit-and-run attacks to keep the Russians off guard, even staging raids against Russian army posts and villages outside Chechnya itself. The Russian commander summed up the fighting by saying that the ten-year Soviet war in Afghanistan was “a picnic compared to Chechnya.” By July 1996, the Russians declared that Chechnya had been conquered, except for a few guerrilla bands in the mountains. Russians had managed to kill Dudayev in a high-tech assassination in April— they had programmed a missile to follow the signal

873

from his satellite telephone. The Russians believed Chechnya’s guerrillas were all but defeated. They installed a puppet government in Grozny under Doku Zavgayev, a long-time opponent of Dudayev, and announced that they would begin withdrawing some of their troops. The Russian victory was short lived. On August 6, 1996, the Chechens, now commanded by Aslan Maskhadov, another former Soviet officer, responded to Russian claims of victory by slipping 2,000 soldiers into Groznyy and retaking most of the city in the course of a one-week battle. This Chechen resurgence proved to be the final straw for Russia, but this time it pursued a strategy of negotiation. In mid-August, Yeltsin dispatched General Aleksandr Lebed, a harsh critic of the Chechen war, to bring the warring sides together. Lebed negotiated a cease-fire with Maskhadov and other Chechen leaders that same month. Under the agreement, Russian troops were withdrawn from Chechnya in January 1997.

Roots of Chechen Resistance The first Chechen war amazed the Russians and the world. Chechnya, with a population of about 1 million, seemed to have defeated the Russian Federation, with 150 million people. The costs had been high— in addition to at least 3,000 Russian deaths, the Chechens lost 4,000 of their freedom fighters and at least 60,000 civilians. Chechnya’s ability to repel the Russian invasion rested in part on its strong traditions of clan loyalty and military prowess. Chechens had never been fully integrated into the old Soviet system, and they retained the traditional mountain peoples’ leanings toward sturdy independence, easy violence, and blood feuds. Furthermore, Chechens seemed to remain loyal to their own in the face of all outside threats, and in spite of great losses and suffering. There was also a negative side to the Chechen character. As the Soviet Union broke apart and the government plunged into an unfamiliar free-market economy, a new Russian-style mafia emerged as a power in many large cities. Chechens were leaders in some of the most deadly Moscow criminal gangs. Many of these same Chechens later fought in the streets of Grozny. An Italian mafia member commented on the reputation of Chechens for ruthlessness: “Where we would first threaten someone, the Russians would kill him. The Chechens would kill his whole family too.”

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Another element in the Chechen character was its roots in Islam. Islamic holy men had led the nineteenth-century wars against Russia, and Chechnya’s Islamic faith remained a cultural protest against both the Christianity of Old Russia and the atheism of the Soviet era.

Peace After Lebed and Maskhadov signed the cease-fire in August 1996, the Russians gradually withdrew their troops, and most fighting ceased. Maskhadov was elected president of Chechnya on January 27, 1997. He had been a fearless military leader, but he proved much more willing to conciliate the Russians than some of his more belligerent colleagues were. Maskhadov publicly stated that an independent Chechnya would still have to have close economic ties to Russia. President Yeltsin and Maskhadov signed a formal peace agreement on May 12, 1997. The agreement stated that neither side would ever shoot at the other, but there were still uncertainties lurking behind the words. The August 1996 cease-fire had stated that Chechnya’s status would be resolved before December 31, 2000, but, for reasons of expediency, both Chechnya’s status and its future were left unclear. Such an agreement probably helped both sides to mollify their hard-liners, who still had the potential to stir up trouble. Meanwhile, Maskhadov and the Chechens insisted that they were an independent nation—which they called the Republic of Ichkeria— while Moscow was equally insistent that Chechnya was still a part of the Russian Federation. The Chechen situation remained in limbo throughout the following year, but there were signs that the Chechen nationalists were losing patience. In April 1998 they appointed ambassadors to the United States and other countries, even though no nation had yet recognized Chechnya as an independent state. Earlier, in January, the Chechen government had taken an even more provocative step, naming Shamil Basayev as prime minister. Basayev was a powerful warlord and military leader whom the Russians considered a criminal because he led a 1995 cross-border raid on the Russian town of Budyonnovsk in which more than 100 people died. In Chechnya, this same action had made Basayev a popular war hero. Basayev would eventually be killed on July 10, 2006, in a “special operation” conducted by Russian security forces.

The Chechens showed no signs of agreeing to give up their hard-won freedom, and there were also signs of revitalization. The government took steps to bring about a Muslim spiritual and moral revival, including the establishment of Islamic courts and religious instruction in the schools. Even Prime Minister Basayev ordered a crackdown on kidnapping. He also initiated a land-reform plan designed to turn exfreedom fighters into law-abiding farmers.

Second Russian War After the peace, the Russians largely ignored Chechen claims of independence and directed criticism at the violent backgrounds of the Chechen leaders Maskhadov and Basayev. At the same time, they offered little or no assistance in reconstructing the war-torn country. The Russians also saw little to admire in the religious revival in Chechnya. They warned against Islamist extremism, which they saw as a significant threat to Russian national security. In August 1999, Vladimir Putin was named Russian prime minister under President Yeltsin. He became acting president on December 31 and was elected to a full term as president in March 2000. Putin brought a new hard line to Russian policies in Chechnya, leading rapidly to a second Chechen war. The same month that Putin became prime minister, Islamic extremists in the Russian state of Dagestan, which bordered Chechnya, declared jihad against Russia and revolted against the Russian government there. Chechen prime minister Basayev led Chechen troops into Dagestan to support the uprising. At the same time, a series of terrorist bombings broke out in Russia, killing hundreds. The Russians blamed these attacks on Chechen separatists. These violent incidents generated broad public support in Russia for a return to force in Chechnya. Putin cracked down quickly on the Dagestan uprising, sending Russian troops to drive off and pursue the attackers. At the same time, he began to plan a second invasion of Chechnya. He announced that he would be stationing Russian troops in Chechnya, which was, he said, Russian territory. The Chechen defense minister warned that Chechens would attack any Russian troops who entered Chechnya. Thousands of refugees fled the country, and Western powers expressed concern over the growing instability in the region. In late September, the Russians began to bombard Grozny and other targets in Chechnya. In the fol-

Russia: Chechen Uprising Since 19 9 4

lowing months, the town—still in ruins from the first Chechen war—was almost completely destroyed. Chechen troops, led by President Maskhadov, withdrew to the southern mountains. Maskhadov appealed to his Muslim neighbors for help against the Russian invaders. He assembled 10,000 Chechen troops and was reinforced by 10,000 more from neighboring countries. These guerrilla fighters were armed primarily with hand-held weapons. In contrast, the Russians followed the bombing campaign with a ground invasion by an estimated 30,000 troops, 24 strike aircraft, 30 attack helicopters, and 1,000 armored vehicles. Soon after the invasion began, Maskhadov proposed a potential peace plan calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces in return for a promise that Chechens would end the terrorist acts of gangs and extremists in the country. The Russians snubbed the proposal and continued the invasion. In response, Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev threatened to launch terrorist attacks on Russian soil. Russians had demolished Grozny and gained military control in northern Chechnya, but they could not destroy the thousands of militants in the southern mountains. The military situation ground to a stalemate. Meanwhile human rights activists began an international campaign to call attention to the Russians’ violations of Chechens’ rights, including torture and mass killings. In May 2000 Russians set up a new government in Groznyy and appointed Chechen Akhmat Kadyrov acting president. In 2003, a constitution was presented to Chechen voters. It offered considerable autonomy to the Chechens but clearly kept them in the Russian Federation. The constitution passed, but outside observers protested many irregularities— including the right of nearly 40,000 Russian soldiers to vote. In October 2003, Kadyrov was elected president with 80 percent of the vote. Government officials and Chechens who cooperated with the new administration became targets of Chechen nationalists. Kadyrov himself was assassinated by a huge bomb blast in Groznyy in May 2004. Outside Chechnya, Chechen terrorists brought their claims to Russian and international attention through a series of violent and brutal incidents. In October 2002, terrorists invaded a theater in Moscow during a performance and took more than 700 people hostage. During a counterattack by police and military units, more than 100 of the theatergoers were killed, along with many of the terrorists. On September 1,

875

2004, terrorists took over a school in Beslan in the Russian province of North Ossetia, just to the west of Chechnya. Russian troops were dispatched, and a tense showdown resulted. The terrorists wired the building with explosives and threatened to blow it up if their demands were not met. On September 2 and 3, explosions rocked the building, resulting in the death of about 330 people, including 186 schoolchildren. In March 2005, the former president of independent Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, was killed by Russian forces when they attacked a village outside Groznyy. Moscow believed the killing would be an important step to promoting stability and reducing terrorism, but Chechnya remained a war zone. Few Chechens believed that the death of a rebel leader would bring peace any closer. In 2005, military checkpoints still stood at most street corners in Grozny. The pro-Moscow administration worked in a fortress of reinforced concrete to protect against attacks by nationalist Chechens. Warlord and terrorist Shamil Basayev, implicated in the Moscow and Beslan hostage incidents, remained at large. Nevertheless, the pro-Russian government held parliamentary elections in November 2005. In August 2005, a Chechen government spokesman estimated that the two Chechen wars had cost 160,000 people dead or missing on all sides. The situation in Chechnya remained so unstable that no one could predict how many more might die before a stable and peaceful solution could be found. Carl Skutsch and Luke Perry See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Georgia: Civil War, 1990s.

Bibliography Fowkes, Ben, ed. Russia and Chechnya: The Permanent Crisis: Essays on Russo-Chechen Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. German, Tracey C. Russia’s Chechen War. New York: Routledge, 2003. Knezys, Stasys, and Romanas Sedlickas. The War in Chechnya. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999. Lieven, Anatol. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998. Meier, Andrew. Chechnya: To the Heart of the Conflict. New York: Norton, 2005. Seely, Robert. Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800–2000: A Deadly Embrace. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001. Smith, Sebastian. Allah’s Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001.

SERBIA: Kosovo Secessionist Movement,1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious

Historical Background

60 Miles

Albanian Bulgarian Hungarian

60 Kilometers

HUNGARY

RO

CROATIA

NIA

MA

Montenegrin Muslim Serb

VOJVODINA

Slovak No majority present

Belgrade

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SERBIA

MONTENEGRO Podgorica

ADRIATIC SEA

Mitrovica Pristina

Medvedja Bujanovac

KOSOVO Presevo

RIA

30 30

BUL GA

0 0

ALBANIA MACEDONIA

In 1989, ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia broke out in its autonomous region of Kosovo. In the early 1990s, the multi-ethnic country was convulsed by a series of secessions and ethnic wars. Through this period, Kosovo remained in turmoil, but it did not reach world headlines again until 1996. In the next few years, thousands died in Kosovo, death and destruction crossed the border into neighboring Serbia, and world powers intervened to impose their ideas of justice.

Kosovo’s problems were rooted in history and ethnicity. Present-day Kosovo was the site of the first great Serbian state in the Middle Ages, but Serbian dominance was soon challenged by the growing Ottoman Empire, with Turkish Muslims facing Serbian Christians. The decisive battle was fought at Kosovo Polje in 1389. The Serbian empire was broken, and by 1459 Serbian lands were incorporated into the Ottoman dominions. Serbia would not become a nation again until the nineteenth century, but its glorious history—and its defeat at Kosovo Polje—was preserved in memory. Over the years, the center of Serbian settlement shifted to the north, eventually centering around Belgrade. The province of Kosovo became a shrine for believers in Serbian nationalism and for those who cherished Serb culture and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Its landscape was dotted with Orthodox churches and monasteries. The city of Pec was the home of the Serbian Church’s first patriarchate. Even though most modern Serbians were not observant members, the Orthodox Church played a large part in defining their ethnic identity. By the seventeenth century, however, Kosovo was going through further changes. The presence of the Muslim Ottoman Turks in the region caused many Serbs to move north and west, seeking a better life away from Muslim control. Albanians, who had been converted to Islam, settled the land left behind by the Serbs. By the twentieth century, a majority of residents in Kosovo were Albanians, a majority that steadily increased after World War II. In 1953, Serbs made up 27 percent of the population; by 1987, they were only 10 percent.

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Serbia: Kosovo Secessionist Movement, 19 9 0s

877

KEY DATES 1980

Upon the death of longtime Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, Albanian Kosovars rise up to demand republic status for Kosovo; thousands are arrested, and republic status is not granted.

1987

Playing on anti-Albanian sentiment, Serb nationalist Slobodan Milosevic takes power as leader of Yugoslavia.

1989

As Yugoslavia begins to break apart into its constituent republics, Kosovars begin to secretly organize resistance to Serb rule.

1991

Kosovars hold a secret referendum for independence.

1997

The previously secret Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK, its Albanian acronym) announces its existence and steps up attacks on Serb police.

1998

Fighting intensifies as, first, the UCK seizes 40 percent of Kosovo territory, and then the Serbian army counterattacks.

1999

International efforts to end the fighting in Kosovo fail in March after Milosevic refuses to allow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops to enter Kosovo to oversee peace accords; NATO forces conduct an air campaign against Serbian targets in both Kosovo and Serbia from March 24 to June 10, driving the Serbian military out of Kosovo.

2004

Despite the fact that most Serb civilians have fled Kosovo, ethnic fighting between Albanian Kosovars and Serbian Kosovars breaks out.

It was this growing Albanian majority that pushed Kosovo into turmoil. Albanians felt that their numbers gave them the right to control Kosovo, but the Serbs were reluctant to give up what they saw as their ancestral homeland. This Serbian sense of history was intensified by the cultural and religious importance they saw in Kosovo. That the Albanians of Kosovo were Muslim simply added to the insult of their demand for independence. For the Serbs, Kosovo was the symbol of their ancient resistance to Muslim invaders, and just as they fought to keep the Turks out of Kosovo, they would now fight to keep the Albanians from claiming this Serbian birthright.

Conflict in the 19 8 0s While Josip Broz Tito and the Communist Party ruled Yugoslavia (1944–1980), Tito suppressed the nationalist desires of all the ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, including those in Kosovo. In 1974, he addressed

Albanian demands to the extent of creating a constitution that gave Kosovo the status of an autonomous province in greater Yugoslavia. Some of its government functions remained under the control of the Serbian Republic, but in most areas it was independent. By 1980, Albanians, now nearly 90 percent of the population, dominated the province’s government and culture. Most officials were ethnic Albanians, and the Albanian language was used in the schools. In 1981, the year after Tito’s death, Albanians in Kosovo rose in an attempt to gain the status of a full republic, but they were brutally crushed by the Yugoslav army. Thousands of Albanians were arrested, and Kosovo remained under some form of martial law for the rest of the decade. Encouraged by this shift in political power, the Serbian minority in Kosovo began to demand more influence in the province. They claimed that the reason their numbers in the province were declining was that they were being persecuted by the Albanians. Some Serbians

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Europe and Former Soviet Union

might have been pressured into emigrating, but many others did because economic conditions in Kosovo were much poorer than in the rest of Serbia. Also, the Albanians had a higher birthrate than the Serbians, which increased their share of the population. With the arrival of martial law, in fact, Albanians were more likely to be persecuted than Serbians. In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist politician, began to harp on the problem of Kosovo’s Serbs. He used widespread sympathy for the supposedly oppressed Serbs, together with the Serbian veneration of the province’s history, to gain political control of the Serbian Republic. Claiming that Albanians were raping and killing Serbs, which was untrue, Milosevic and his allies mustered enough support to orchestrate a takeover of Serbia’s government. Thus Kosovo was the starting place of the nationalistic frenzy that swept Yugoslavia. As leader of Serbia, Milosevic followed through on his promise to redress supposed Serbian grievances in Kosovo, orchestrating a Serb seizure of power. In March 1989, after arresting some Kosovo leaders, he forced the provincial assembly to cede national authority to the Serbian Republic. As a result, Albanians in Kosovo no longer had administrative control over a province where they made up the vast majority of the population.

Democratic League of Kosovo The Albanians of Kosovo refused to accept this defeat. Starting in 1989, they began to organize political resistance. A secret and illegal election was held in September 1991 and declared Kosovo a fully independent nation. Ibrahim Rugova, the head of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was elected its first president. Despite the refusal of Milosevic and Yugoslavia to accept the existence of an independent Kosovo, President Rugova did his best to act like the leader of a free state. He and his fellow Kosovars created a parallel Kosovar state, with its own government, schools, and tax collectors. Much of the money that supported Rugova came from Kosovars who had emigrated to other countries in Europe but still supported Kosovo by sending home cash (there were an estimated 500,000 Kosovar émigrés in Europe, compared to a population of 2 million in Kosovo itself ). Rugova, a highly respected figure in and out of Kosovo, advocated nonviolent resistance as the means of gaining independence, but not all Albanians were as willing to turn the other cheek.

Armed Struggle Between 1989 and 1996, as Yugoslav republics seceded from the country and ethnic war raged in Bosnia, there was relatively little violence in Kosovo. By the mid-1990s, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia had all become independent states, leaving a much-reduced Yugoslavia—only the republics of Montenegro and Serbia (including the “autonomous” provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina). In the summer of 1996, Kosovars stepped up their attacks on Serbian police and civilians, and rumors spread that a new resistance group had formed. In early 1997 the group announced its existence, calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA—the acronym in Albanian was UCK). Now the KLA became a major combatant in a war against Serbian domination. It attacked the Serbian police, mostly in night ambushes but sometimes fighting in the daytime, and assassinated Albanian Kosovars accused of cooperating with the Serbian government. Their weapons were mostly small arms, but they also had acquired some antitank guns and grenade launchers. The KLA was aided in its efforts to create an army by the chaos across the border in Albania. The Albanian government collapsed into armed civil war in 1997, creating a Wild West atmosphere that made it easy to ship arms and move troops across the border. Reports circulated that the native Albanians were being helped by mercenaries from Muslim countries elsewhere in the world. By early 1998, the Serbs had withdrawn from some of the more rural parts of Kosovo, and the KLA immediately claimed those regions as liberated territory. In March, Serbian police and paramilitary units began to attack villages where UCK was believed to be hiding, killing dozens, including many women and children. The Serbs continued to mount daytime raids, while at night bands of heavily armed Kosovars roamed the countryside looking for Serbs to fight. The size of the rebel bands was steadily increasing.

International Mediation, Intervention, and Escalation As the violence escalated, the conflict in Kosovo attracted world attention. U.S. President Bill Clinton seemed especially eager to take action to end the violence, perhaps motivated by a desire to avoid the mistakes the international community had made during

Serbia: Kosovo Secessionist Movement, 19 9 0s

U.S. peacekeeping forces search vehicles for weapons and explosives at a checkpoint near Vitina, Kosovo, in July 1999. Days before, the town market had been ravaged in a Serbian grenade attack. (Department of Defense/Getty Images News)

the war in Bosnia. In March 1998, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, which was supposed to remain in place until Milosevic made serious concessions on the issue of Kosovo’s autonomy. The embargo had some teeth because it was backed by Russia, Yugoslavia’s main supplier of weapons, as well as by the United States. However, it was unclear whether the United States, Russia, and the Europeans would be willing to go beyond the embargo if the Serbs escalated their repression in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the International Contact Group (ICG, consisting of Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations) pressed both sides into negotiations. Talks held in March 1999 in Rambouillet, France, were unsuccessful, since Milosevic balked at the ICG’s insistence that NATO troops be allowed to enter Kosovo to oversee peace accords. The U.S. negotiators believed that the Serbian government was bluffing and would back down after limited air strikes, as had been the case in the Bosnia air strikes in 1995. The Serbian government believed that the United States was not yet willing to conduct an air campaign, since it had proven extremely reluctant to do so. The threat of a bombing campaign became a reality on March 24, 1999. Operation Allied Force turned into a seventy-eight-day air campaign, lasting until June 10, 1999. With the Yugoslav National Army dispersed and difficult to find, NATO quickly turned to bombing government facilities and economic targets within Serbia proper. These air strikes were intended to minimize casualties, but they caused ap-

879

proximately 500 civilian deaths. In retaliation for the air strikes, Serbian security forces began a major campaign to drive ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. Several thousand were killed, and as many as a million Kosovars were displaced from their homes. Ironically, the NATO campaign triggered the kind of attacks on civilians that negotiators had sought to prevent, chiefly because the NATO forces were not prepared to commit large numbers of ground troops for fear of sustaining heavy casualties. The bombing helped to bolster Milosevic’s support among Serbs at home, but a buildup of NATO troops at the border of Kosovo in Albania forced him to back down rather than fight NATO troops in his own country. Kosovo Force (KFOR), made up of international troops, entered Kosovo. KLA guerrillas also reentered the province in force, sparking a widespread exodus of the Serbs and Roma (gypsies), who had been accused of persecuting ethnic Albanians. World leaders and KFOR were unprepared for this “countercleansing” and were accused of bringing on a result they had hoped to avoid. The crisis in Kosovo caused dislocations in other areas. The example of the KLA (and direct assistance from KLA veterans) encouraged the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) to seek autonomy for the Serbian region of Presevo until combined NATO-Serbian action disarmed them. More significant was the rise of the National Liberation Army (NLA) within Macedonia, where the Albanian minority fought for greater autonomy and power during 2001.

Legal Limbo Legally, Kosovo remained a part of former Yugoslavia, renamed Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, and it was administered by the multinational administration of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The lack of a resolution to the province’s status brought further tension. Many Kosovars were angry that UNMIK refused them significant authority and disgusted by evidence of corruption among the UN officials. Many refused to consider any solution short of full independence. The remaining Serb population in Kosovo (chiefly the enclave of Mitrovica) and the government in Belgrade continued to insist that Kosovo remain a part of Serbia. High unemployment and crime (some, reportedly, by ex-KLA factions) have raised additional frustrations about the future, as has the limited economic growth after the intervention.

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Participation by Kosovo residents in UN polls and initiatives gradually declined. The frustration of more radical groups was expressed in three explosions that rocked downtown Pristina on July 2, 2005, targeting UN and other international facilities. Until the status of Kosovo was ultimately determined, the depth of popular dissatisfaction would provide a breeding ground for future conflict. Carl Skutsch and James Frusetta See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Albania: Civil Conflict, 1990s; Bosnia: Civil War, 1992–1995; Macedonia: Ethnic Conflict, 1990s.

Bibliography Cohen, Lenard. Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002. Daalder, Ivo, and Michael O’Hara. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001. Judah, Tim. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Lampe, John. Yugoslavia: Twice There Was a Country. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Macolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History. New York: HarperPerennial, 1999. Mertus, Julie. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

SOVIET UNION: Conflict with Iran over Azerbaijan,1945–1946 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: Iran C

SOVIET UNION

AS SEA AN PI

SOVIET Oil field UNION Kurdish Mahabad Republic, 1945-1946

AZERBAIJAN

Baku

AZERIS

Azeri area

Tabriz

Mashhad

Mahabad Tehran

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

Kermanshah

Esfahan

IRAQ

PAKISTAN

Abadan

KUWAIT

0

Pe

0

250 250

500 Miles

500 Kilometers

rs Gu

n

BAHRAIN

ia

SAUDI ARABIA

lf

U.A.E.

OMAN

During World War II, American officials assumed that the Allied powers would cooperate with each other to maintain the peace once the war ended. The United Nations was established in 1945 as the instrument for constructing the postwar era. The Big Five—China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—had primary responsibility for maintaining the peace. They were the permanent members of the Security Council, each with the right of veto. The effectiveness of the United Nations required the cooperation of the Big Five, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. Before World War II ended, differences between the United States and the Soviet Union began to surface. Although the Cold War had not yet officially begun, the 1945 Iranian crisis was one of the events that made American and British officials aware that the

wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union was a thing of the past. The crisis was also a major challenge to the United Nations when it first met in January 1946. Historically, czarist Russia and Great Britain were rivals in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s survival often depended on its ability to balance one against the other. During the 1930s, Iran supported Germany’s rise to prominence, hoping that its friendship with Germany would help fend off aggressive activities by Britain and Russia. Iran’s situation changed dramatically when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. Great Britain and the Soviet Union, now allies against Germany, demanded that the Iranian government expel the many German agents stationed in Tehran, the capital of Iran. The request was denied. In August 1941, Great Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran to gain control of the oil fields there and keep them from Nazi Germany. As a result of the military interventions, Northern Iran, including Azerbaijan province, came under the control of the Soviet Union. Southern Iran came under the control of the British. When the United States entered the war, American military forces went to Iran. The American military contingent was composed primarily of engineers whose responsibility was to facilitate the flow of military supplies through Iran to the Soviet Union. Approximately five million tons of munitions and war material reached the Soviet Union through Iran. These munitions played an essential role in the Soviet war effort. In January 1942, largely at the urging of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union signed a tripartite treaty in which they agreed that all foreign military forces would withdraw from Iran within six months after the end of World War II. Article 4 of the treaty

881

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Europe and Former Soviet Union

KEY DATES 1941

To secure oil fields and prevent a Nazi takeover, British and Soviet forces occupy Iran.

1942

Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States sign a tripartite treaty calling for all foreign forces to leave Iran within six months of the end of World War II.

1945

In October, Britain and the Soviet Union agree to withdraw their troops by the following March 2; in November, the Soviet-backed Tudeh, or Iranian Communist, Party organizes antigovernment demonstrations to break out in Iranian-controlled parts of Azerbaijan; Soviet troops prevent Iranian security forces from entering the region and ending demonstrations; in December, the Soviets announce the formation of Iranian Azerbaijan, as well as the independent Kurdish republic of Mahabad in northwestern Iran.

1946 In January, Iran protests to the UN that the Soviet Union is interfering in its internal affairs; negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union begin in Moscow; on March 1, the Soviet Union announces it will keep its troops in Iran beyond the March 2 deadline; on April 4, Iran and the Soviet Union announce an agreement calling for Soviet withdrawal from Iran and establishment of a joint oil company between Iran and the Soviet Union; Iranian troops gain full control over Iranian Azerbaijan in December. 1947

To strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Iran signs a military aid agreement with the United States in June.

specified that the Allied troops were not in Iran as an occupation force. Great Britain and the Soviet Union pledged to respect Iran’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity. The treaty itself was based on the principles contained in the Atlantic Charter signed by Great Britain and the United States in August 1941, which the Soviet Union subscribed to about a month later, with some qualifications. The charter consisted of eight principles to guide foreign policy during and after the war. In signing the Atlantic Charter, the Allies had agreed they would seek no territorial gains nor would they make any territorial changes if opposed by the affected people. The charter principles reflected the idealism of President Roosevelt, and he assumed they would have universal validity. Even though Soviet Premier Josef Stalin signed the tripartite agreement,

however, he came to view its principles as inimical to Soviet national interests. The Soviet concept of democracy was not one shared by Anglo-American leaders. The charter principles and Soviet goals proved to be incompatible. At the end of Word War II, Stalin made many territorial changes affecting millions of people without ever seeking the consent of the other tripartite treaty signatories. In September 1943, Iran declared war against Germany. In November–December 1943, the Big Three leaders—President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Premier Stalin— met in Tehran and issued a declaration on the future of Iran. It reaffirmed the commitment of the three allies to Iran’s independence and territorial integrity. The declaration recognized the contribution Iran was making to the Allied effort to defeat Nazi Germany.

Soviet Union: Conflict with Iran over Azerbaijan, 19 45–19 4 6

The Allies promised to review Iran’s economic needs when the war ended. The three powers had multiple interests in Iran. Great Britain and the Soviet Union were interested in oil. They undoubtedly could have agreed to divide Iran into spheres of influence, but that would have violated the Atlantic Charter principles. Besides oil, the Soviet Union had a security interest in Iran. If Iran were dominated by a foreign power hostile to the Soviet Union, Soviet national security could be endangered. The United States opposed carving up Iran into spheres of influence, but American policy was not entirely altruistic. The United States wanted Iran to be free and independent to serve as a buffer between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, whose oil reserves were under the control of U.S interests. All three nations had a geopolitical interest in Iran because of its location on the Persian Gulf. As World War II was ending, Soviet policy toward Iran became more assertive. The Soviets hoped to use their military presence in Northern Iran, including Azerbaijan, as leverage to force Iran to meet Soviet demands. The Soviets hoped to win an oil concession in Northern Iran, but their other goals remained unclear. Some policymakers in London and Washington thought the Soviets wanted more than oil. A Soviet military presence in Iran could be used to support a coup d’état, and a Soviet-sponsored coup could lead to the breakup of Iran. The Soviet Union could then annex Northern Iran or parts of it. (Some garrisons of Soviet troops were only about twenty miles from Tehran.) There was also the possibility Iran could be absorbed into the Soviet bloc. At the 1945 Yalta conference, Iranian issues were discussed briefly and informally, and consequently, there was no mention of Iran in the public communiqué. Stalin was, however, aware that Great Britain and the United States expected the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Iran when the war ended. In 1945, President Truman received reports indicating that the Soviets were increasing their military presence in Northern Iran.

Soviet Threat In October 1945, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw all of their troops from Iran by March 2, 1946. In November 1945, major antigovernment demonstrations took place in Azerbai-

883

jan. The Tudeh party, a local Communist Party, organized the demonstrations with the backing of the Soviet Union. The Iranian government dispatched troops to quell the rebellion, but Soviet military forces prevented Iranian troops from entering the province. Local police were also prevented from interfering with the demonstrations. Leaders of the Tudeh party demanded greater autonomy for Azerbaijan, but they never clearly defined what they meant by autonomy. The Soviet line was that the leaders of the Tudeh party were simply trying to protect their democratic rights. In December 1945, the Soviets announced the establishment of the National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan. They also established a Kurdish Republic in Northwestern Iran. Azerbaijan province in Northern Iran bordered on the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union. The people on both sides of the border were ethnically alike and spoke the same language. (Ironically, when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan would become independent.) The Iranian crisis involved two issues. One was the presence of Soviet troops, and the other was Soviet support for greater autonomy for Azerbaijan. Articles in the government-controlled Soviet press supported the demands of the Tudeh party. Such statements always reflected government policies. The United States hoped to defuse the crisis by proposing that all foreign troops withdraw from Iran by January 1, 1946, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. They intended to abide by the 1942 treaty provisions on troop withdrawal and would not leave any sooner. The Soviets justified their refusal to allow Iran’s troops into Azerbaijan by claiming there was no rebellion, only demonstrations in support of democratic freedoms. Whatever disturbances did take place were allegedly the result of reactionaries supported by the government in Tehran. Allowing Iranian troops into Azerbaijan would, in the Soviet view, only exacerbate the situation. They threatened to send additional troops into Azerbaijan if necessary. Soviet policies clearly violated Iran’s sovereignty and the principles of the United Nations Charter. In 1921, the Soviet Union and Iran had signed a treaty that permitted the Soviet Union to send troops into Iran if a third party threatened Soviet borders or if disturbances occurred in Northern Iran. The Soviets could therefore manufacture a disturbance any

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Europe and Former Soviet Union

time they wished and then use the threat as a pretext to invoke the provisions of the 1921 treaty.

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers In December 1945, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States met in Moscow to try to resolve issues that had developed at their September meeting in London. By December, the Soviet presence in Northern Iran was a major problem. U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes was concerned that a range of issues, including Iran, was driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. The Soviets were supporting a Communist rebellion in Greece and threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity. A victory or defeat for either side in Iran, Greece, or Turkey could have a significant impact on the balance of power in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf. Byrnes hoped to settle all these issues by negotiations. The Iranian government wanted the issue of Soviet troops on the official agenda of the Moscow conference. Instead, Secretary of State Byrnes, without consulting President Truman, decided to discuss the issue informally. He feared that if the Iranian issue was on the agenda, Soviet-British differences could wreck the conference and the opportunity to seek diplomatic solutions to other outstanding problems. During the Moscow meeting, Byrnes and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin met with Stalin, who insisted that the Soviet Union had no territorial ambitions in Iran. While the conference was in session, the Soviet Union did, however, make territorial claims on Turkey. Bevin, more so than Byrnes, saw a Soviet pattern in Greece, Iran, and Turkey. Bevin was particularly incensed when Stalin claimed it was necessary to have Soviet troops in Northern Iran to protect the oil fields in Soviet Baku. Bevin thought the claim was absurd, that Iran could not possibly pose a threat to the Soviet Union or its oil fields in Baku. The communiqué issued at the end of the Moscow conference said nothing about Iran. Although Byrnes considered the Moscow meeting a success, President Truman had a different opinion. He was incensed because Iran was not mentioned in the final communiqué and because the conference did not produce any evidence that the Soviets would abide by their treaty commitments. Truman’s anger at Byrnes was in part due to the fact that Iran had

been an ally during World War II and the Soviet Union had received tons of U.S. military supplies through the Iran supply route. Truman thought a wartime ally should be treated more decently. He believed that a wartime ally should not be occupied once the war ended, and he further questioned Soviet goals. If Iran fell under Soviet control, then Iraq and Turkey also would be endangered. The Moscow meeting was a defining moment in the Cold War. Until the Iranian crisis, President Truman had followed President Franklin Roosevelt’s approach to the Soviet Union, believing that whatever differences existed between the Soviet Union and the United States could be resolved by compromise. After the Iranian crisis, Truman was forced to rethink Soviet-American relations. The Iranian dispute was one of the opening salvos of a Cold War between the great powers that would last nearly half a century. The diplomatic events of the 1930s had shaped President Truman’s values and beliefs in terms of foreign policy. He saw the 1930s as a period of appeasement in which the League of Nations and the nations of Western Europe had failed to constrain Italy, Japan, or Germany, resulting in the carnage of World War II. Truman did not want to repeat the mistakes of the 1930s, and this historical view helped prompt him to take a less accommodating approach to the Soviet Union.

United Nations On January 19, 1946, the government of Iran, in a letter to the UN acting secretary general, accused the Soviet Union of interfering in Iran’s internal affairs and preventing the Iranian government from exercising its sovereign rights, including the right to send troops into Azerbaijan. Iran wanted the Security Council to investigate the problem. Days later, Iran presented a memorandum to the UN Security Council laying out the facts in the controversy. The Soviet Union denied all allegations but emphasized the procedural aspect of the problem rather than its substance. The Soviets, of course, did not want the Iranian question put on the agenda of the Security Council. On January 30, the Security Council approved a resolution calling on the Soviet Union and Iran to negotiate a solution to their problem. The council asked the two governments to keep it informed regarding the negotiations. The issue confronting the Security Council was whether to put Iran’s complaint on the agenda. This

Soviet Union: Conflict with Iran over Azerbaijan, 19 45–19 4 6

was a procedural, not a substantive, issue. The Soviet Union claimed the United Nations lacked jurisdiction, Great Britain wanted the issue put on the agenda, and Secretary of State Byrnes thought the United Nations could take up the issue but was willing to keep it off the agenda to see whether Iran and the Soviet Union could negotiate an agreement. Byrnes decided that he personally would argue the American case before the Security Council if Iran and the Soviet Union failed to reach an agreement. This was a way of demonstrating America’s support for Iran.

Stalin Alarms the United States On February 9, 1946, Premier Stalin gave a speech that frightened American officials. He claimed that the capitalist nations were encircling the Soviet Union, and in order to cope with this apparent threat, he announced plans to rebuild Soviet military capabilities. The speech came at a time when the United States was rapidly demobilizing its own military forces. Several weeks after Stalin’s speech, George Kennan, the American chargé d’affaires in Moscow, sent a long telegram to his superiors in Washington, analyzing Soviet behavior and motivations, concluding that the Soviet Union would continue to expand its power and influence unless checked. Soon afterward, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered a famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, in which he warned that an “iron curtain” was descending across Europe, dividing East and West.

Diplomatic Efforts In February 1946, negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union commenced in Moscow. Stalin wanted Iran to recognize Azerbaijan as an autonomous province, and he wanted to establish a joint SovietIranian oil company. Iranian officials were handicapped in the negotiations. They did not have the military might to oppose the Soviets on their own, and they understood that neither the United States nor Great Britain was willing to use military force to check the Soviet Union. If Iran opposed the Soviet proposals, it would have to rely on the United Nations and the diplomatic support of Great Britain and the United States. The Iranian crisis presented the United Nations with an unanticipated problem. The world body was created in part to protect weaker nations against the

885

strong, but the architects of the charter did not expect the five permanent members of the Security Council (including the Soviet Union and the United States) to endanger the peace. An underlying assumption of the architects was that the Big Five would cooperate with each other to maintain the peace. The Iranian complaint, however, accused the Soviets, and if the UN ruled against their interests, the Soviet Union might decide to quit the United Nations. On March 1, 1946, while Iran’s Premier Ahmad Ghavan was in Moscow negotiating with Soviet officials, the Soviet Union announced to the world that it would keep its troops in Iran beyond the March 2 deadline. It appeared that the Soviet announcement was a way of applying pressure on Iran to win concessions. At the same time, it was a sign that Premier Stalin was not greatly concerned about violating treaties and agreements he had signed with Britain and the United States. He seemed to accept the idea that Soviet differences with its wartime allies were irreconcilable. The United States and Great Britain sent notes of protest, reminding the Soviets of their obligation under the United Nations Charter. London and Washington were attempting to influence Soviet policy by relying on diplomacy, world public opinion, and the United Nations. On March 12, the Department of State announced that there were reports of Soviet troop movements toward the Iranian border. Military might backed Soviet diplomacy. On March 18, 1946, the Iranian government lodged another complaint with the United Nations because the Soviets would not withdraw their troops. Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko again demanded that the issue stay off the agenda. He said the Soviets were negotiating a solution to the Iranian problem as requested by the Security Council in January. He claimed that the two sides had reached an “understanding” on the troop withdrawal issue. He used the word “understanding” rather than agreement. He said some troops had already left Iran, and he expected that all troops would be out in five or six weeks. The Iranian representative to the United Nations said there was no such agreement or understanding. This time, the United States, Great Britain, and Iran agreed that the issue should be on the agenda. On March 27, 1946, despite Soviet objections, the Security Council voted to place the Iranian question on the agenda. Since procedural issues are not subject to a veto, Gromyko angrily denounced the decision. The

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Soviet Union and Poland were the only nations to vote against the resolution. The 9–2 vote indicated there was not much support for the Soviet position. At this point, the Soviets asked for a postponement of debate until they had completed negotiations with Iran. They said that their willingness to negotiate was proof that they were committed to peaceful relations with Iran. In response, Secretary of State Byrnes said there was no evidence of an understanding and that his information had come directly from the Iranian government. Byrnes wanted the issue debated immediately and felt that after the initial debate, further discussions could then be postponed to allow the parties to reach an agreement. However, to place an issue on the agenda and then fail to debate it would prevent the United Nations from doing what the charter required it to do, and Iran would not have the opportunity to tell why it felt endangered. Byrnes did not think the United Nations would be much help in protecting smaller nations if their charges were kept off the agenda and not debated. Byrnes’s argument won the approval of the council. Gromyko then announced that he would boycott all council meetings dealing with the Iranian issue.

Resolving the Issue On April 4, 1946, the Soviet Union and Iran declared that an agreement was completed. All Soviet troops were to leave by May 6 and Iran would create a joint oil company with the Soviet Union. Tehran and Moscow agreed that Azerbaijan was an internal problem, the responsibility of the Iranian government. Although the Soviet Union denied it, critics saw a linkage between the troop withdrawal and the decision to establish a joint oil company. The Security Council, despite further objections from the Soviet Union, kept the issue on the agenda but agreed to defer any further discussions until May 6, 1946. The Iranian government reported that Soviet troops were withdrawing but was unable to verify how many had left and how many remained behind. The Soviet Union provided no information. The Security Council requested another report on May 20. The Tehran government complied but again said it could not verify that all Soviet troops had left. The crisis ended in December 1946. Iranian troops regained control of Northern Iran, including

Azerbaijan, meeting only light resistance, suggesting that the Soviet Union had manufactured the rebellion against the government. Some of the leaders of the rebellion had departed with the Soviet troops. To help strengthen the government in Tehran, the United States and Iran signed a military aid agreement in June 1947. The United States also agreed to help train the Iranian army. The agreement put the Soviet Union on notice that the United States was committed to the territorial integrity of Iran. On September 15, 1947, the Soviet government, in a note to Iran, demanded an end to the “delaying tactics” regarding the implementation of the oil agreement negotiated in April 1946. Implementation of the agreement required approval of the Iranian parliament. The issue was finally resolved in October 1947. The Iranian parliament voted 102–2 not to approve the agreement. Thus, the Soviets, who had violated treaties they had signed to keep troops in Azerbaijan, were now served with a dose of their own medicine. They had withdrawn their troops and received nothing in return. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes.

Bibliography Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Byrnes, James F. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962. Gaddis, John L. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Kuniholm, Bruce R. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980. Mastny, Vojtech. Russia’s Road to the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Messer, Robert L. The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1981. ———. Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics of Influence. New York: Praeger, 1982. Thomas, Lewis V. The United States and Turkey and Iran. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952.

SOVIET UNION: Conflict with Turkey, 1945–1953 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANT: Turkey 0

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was often dependent on balancing the interests of one against the other. In 1854, France, Great Britain, and Turkey went to war against Russia to prevent it from gaining control of the straits and dominating the Balkans. At the end of the war, the great powers pledged to respect Turkey’s territorial integrity. Russia defeated Turkey in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. The war enabled Russia to win control over Bulgaria, but only temporarily. The 1878 Congress of Berlin reversed Russia’s territorial acquisitions. In World War I, France and Great Britain promised the Russians control of the straits when the war ended. That promise was not kept because Russia withdrew from the war during its own revolution.

200 Miles 200 Kilometers

UNION

Odessa

ROMANIA CRIMEA Sevastopol

BLACK

BULGARIA GREECE

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Bosporus SEA OF MARMARA

AEGEAN

Dardanelles

Ankara

TURKEY

SEA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

SYRIA

IRAQ

World War I I

In June 1936, Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Romania, Turkey, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia signed the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. The convention determined the principles governing the passage of ships, both commercial and naval, through the Dardanelles Straits, connecting the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, in times of peace and war. Turkey was the custodian of the straits. The Dardanelles Straits is one of the most important waterways in the world. In 1936, it had huge commercial and military importance for the Black Sea powers—Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and the Soviet Union (including present-day Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia). Soviet territory bordered the Black Sea for approximately 1,100 miles. By 1946, the Soviet Union also dominated Bulgaria and Romania. If it could gain control of Turkey, the Soviet Union could become a major player in the Eastern Mediterranean. Historically, Russia and Great Britain were the great-power rivals in the region. Turkey’s survival

In 1944, when it became apparent that Germany would be defeated in World War II, the Soviet Union (successor to imperial Russia) again turned its attention to the straits. Turkish officials saw no difference between the demands made by czarist governments in the past and those made by the Soviet Union. In October 1939, soon after the beginning of World War II, Turkey entered an alliance with France and Great Britain in which it was recognized as a “non-belligerent ally.” The Soviets did not accept this formulation. Before they could question it formally, however, the Soviet Union itself was attacked by Germany and became an ally of France, Great Britain, and the United States. The primary goal of the Soviets and the other Allies was the defeat of Nazi Germany. In August 1941, Great Britain and the Soviet Union pledged to respect Turkey’s territorial integrity. In February 1945, as the defeat of Germany became certain, Turkey did declare war on Germany, thus becoming one of the Allies. This displeased the

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KEY DATES 1936

The Montreux Convention, signed by Turkey, the Soviet Union, Japan, and several European countries, establishes rules for shipping in the strategic Dardanelles Straits, connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

1945

At the Potsdam Conference in July, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States agree to revise the Montreux Convention.

1946

The Soviet Union insists that only countries on the Black Sea be allowed to revise the Montreux Convention and that Turkey and the Soviet Union be responsible for the defense of the Dardanelles.

1947

Fearing Soviet interference in Turkish internal affairs, U.S. President Harry Truman declares that the United States will support any country resisting Communist subversion or attack.

1951

Turkey joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, guaranteeing it protection by other European powers and the United States in the event of an outside attack.

1953

Longtime Soviet dictator Josef Stalin dies in March; in May, the Soviet Union officially renounces its territorial claims against Turkey and its right to a preferential role in the defense of the Dardanelles.

Soviets, who hoped to find a reason to accuse Turkey of being anti-Soviet. It could then claim that its desire to gain greater control of the straits and the region was a response to the hostility of others. Soon afterward, the Soviet Union renounced the SovietTurkish Treaty of Neutrality signed in 1925, claiming that it had become obsolete. This diplomatic renunciation was the beginning of a Soviet campaign to intimidate Turkey. At the 1945 Potsdam conference the Allied powers—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—agreed that the Montreux Convention on control of the Dardanelles Straits needed revision. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin urged that a completely new convention be negotiated, but neither U.S. President Harry Truman nor British Prime Minister Winston Churchill would agree. The leaders did agree, however, that all three countries should discuss with Turkey proposed changes in the regime for the straits. These discussions were to be exploratory only. Churchill told Stalin that Turkey was apprehensive about Soviet policies. The Soviets were making territorial demands on Turkey and had amassed a

large number of troops in Bulgaria. Churchill also expressed concern about the attacks on Turkey in the Soviet press. Churchill made it clear that he supported Turkey’s refusal to cede territory to the Soviet Union or to permit it to have military bases in the straits. Churchill said the victorious powers should guarantee any revision of the Montreux Convention. He rejected any Soviet claim to have exclusive responsibility. President Truman supported Churchill’s plans. The conference ended without the Soviet Union accepting the recommendations of Churchill and Truman. Turkish officials knew that before Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, German and Soviet diplomats had discussed Soviet territorial demands on Turkey. They had also discussed revising the Montreux Convention to permit the Soviet Union to have military bases in the straits. At the time, the Soviets distrusted the Turkish government because of its friendly orientation toward France and Great Britain. When German armies marched into the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet ambitions in the Balkans were put on hold.

Soviet Union: Conflict with Turkey, 19 45–1953

Soviet Pressure on Turkey In June 1945, Turkey expressed a willingness to renegotiate the 1925 treaty of neutrality. In the first meeting between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the Soviets demanded far-reaching concessions. They insisted that Turkey agree to three preconditions before detailed negotiations could begin. First, they demanded that Turkey cede the Kars and Ardans districts along its east coast to the Soviet Union. Second, they wanted military bases in the straits. Third, they insisted that the two nations agree between themselves on revisions to the Montreux Convention before negotiating with Great Britain and the United States. The last demand violated the understanding reached at Potsdam that preliminary discussions should be exploratory only. The Soviet Union wanted to present Great Britain and the United States with a fait accompli. Despite the military superiority of the Soviet Union, Turkey was determined to resist Soviet demands. The Soviet press repeatedly accused the Turkish government of being anti-Soviet. Left-wing political groups in Turkey, with or without Soviet encouragement, accused the Ankara government of being aligned too closely with Great Britain and its imperialistic policies. These attacks were countered by antiSoviet demonstrations in Ankara. The Soviets, as they had done in Iran and Greece, accused the Turkish government of being dominated by Fascists and imperialists. Turkey was accused of supporting Nazi Germany during World War II and switching allegiance to the Allied powers only toward the end of the war. Turkey’s alleged hostility toward the Soviet Union was used to justify its demands for the proposed changes in the straits regime. In November 1945, the United States presented Turkey with several proposals for revising the Montreux Convention. The straits would be open to merchant vessels at all times. The straits would be open to the warships of the Black Sea powers at all times. Non–Black Sea powers could send their warships through the straits only with the consent of the Black Sea powers unless the ships were acting under the authority of the United Nations. (The original conventions had recognized the authority of the League of Nations, the predecessor of the UN, which no longer existed.) Turkey accepted the American proposals as a basis for negotiations. Great Britain also supported the American proposals.

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In December 1945, Secretary of State James Byrnes traveled to Moscow to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister V.S. Molotov and Great Britain’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. While they were meeting, the Soviet Union publicized its claim to the Kars and Ardans districts along the east coast of Turkey. The territorial claim was a way of putting further pressure on the Ankara government regarding a new regime for the straits. Although Byrnes went to Moscow to reach a better understanding with the Soviet Union, the demands the Soviets made on Turkey suggested that improved relations were unlikely.

Efforts to Revise the Montreux Convention In March 1946, President Truman, increasingly apprehensive about Soviet expansionism, decided on a show of force. He ordered the battleship Missouri and a number of other naval vessels to travel to the Mediterranean, including a stop in Turkey. The Turkish government did all that it could to publicize the presence of the Missouri. Truman clearly had the Soviet Union in mind when, in a speech on April 6, he laid out, very plainly, American interests in the Near and Middle East. He promised to use American military might in support of the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. He warned that the nations of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened or coerced. In particular, he was referring to Greece, Iran, and Turkey. In August 1946, President Truman dispatched the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt to Greece. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin also reminded the world of Britain’s interest in Turkey. In an address before the House of Commons, he reminded the members that Great Britain was obligated by treaty to help defend Turkey if it was attacked. The Soviet Union was well aware of the Anglo-American support for Turkey. Although Great Britain and the United States were quite willing to modify the Montreux Convention, they were equally determined to protect the independence of Turkey. Article 29 of the Montreux Convention permitted revisions every five years, if necessary. The next revision was scheduled for November 1946. In August 1946, the Soviet Union put forth its proposals for revising the Montreux Convention. Copies of the note went to Great Britain and the United States. The Soviets accepted some of the principles put forward by the United States. Moscow, however, demanded two

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major changes unacceptable to Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States. The Soviets wanted a new regime for the straits, composed of Black Sea powers only. Turkey was the only Black Sea power not dominated by the Soviet Union. Great Britain and the United States were excluded. At Potsdam, both powers made it clear that they expected to be a part of a new regime. The Soviets also proposed that Turkey and the Soviet Union be jointly responsible for the defense of the straits. The proposed changes were justified by alleging that Turkey had permitted German and Italian warships to enter and exit the Black Sea during World War II. Later in August 1946, the United States responded to the Soviets and rejected their participation in the defense of the straits. American officials suggested that should the straits be endangered the problem should be taken to the United Nations. The United States also rejected the idea of a regime for the straits composed of Black Sea powers only. Great Britain supported the American position. Turkey, in a note to the Soviet Union on August 22, 1946, refuted the allegations in the Soviet note. Turkey pointed out that some provisions of the Montreux Convention were ambiguous and could be interpreted in contradictory ways. The distinction, for example, between merchant vessels and warships was not always clear. Turkey categorically rejected a joint defense of the straits and a regime composed exclusively of Black Sea powers. The exchange of notes continued, but the positions remained the same. Great Britain and the United States backed Turkey. The Soviets were aware of the American military buildup and Anglo-American unity. The Soviets tried to get Turkey to agree to bilateral negotiations based on the Soviet proposals, but the Ankara government refused. The United States accused the Soviet Union of violating the Potsdam agreement by seeking a bilateral agreement with Turkey. The Potsdam agreement called for preliminary discussions on the issue. The British were sensitive to Soviet efforts to expand their influence in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. Bevin pointed out that although British ships sailed to Odessa in the Soviet Union, as well as many areas of the world, Great Britain did not insist on having military bases there. He therefore did not think the Soviet Union was entitled to have military bases in Turkey just because Soviet ships sailed through the straits.

In October 1946, the United States informed the Soviet Union that the preliminary negotiations were completed and that the United States and Great Britain were willing to convene a conference to revise the Montreux Convention. The Soviets did not respond, and consequently the Montreux Convention was not revised in 1946.

The Truman Doctrine In February 1947, the United States learned that Great Britain could no longer continue to assume primary responsibility for assisting Greece and Turkey. Although the Turkish situation was not as serious as the one in Greece, the Ankara government needed aid. Much of its military equipment was obsolete, the military was not well organized, and training was inadequate. The financial cost of maintaining a large military meant that few resources were available for economic development. On March 12, 1947, President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to ask for aid to Greece and Turkey. Only the United States had the resources to help rescue both countries. He announced that in the future the United States would provide economic assistance to any nation in Europe that was threatened by a totalitarian movement. Greece and Turkey would be the first recipients of such aid. Turkey would receive $100 million in aid, and American advisers would assist the government to modernize its military forces and infrastructure. Turkey eventually also became eligible to receive aid under other programs, such as the Marshall Plan and the 1951 Mutual Assistance Act. The Turkish army could not match the much stronger Soviet military forces, but now the United States was a factor the Soviets could not ignore. In addition to the aid received by Turkey, the Truman Doctrine had a major psychological impact on the morale of the Turkish leaders who could now be more confident in resisting Soviet demands. Power and responsibility had shifted from Great Britain to the United States. The Marshall Plan came soon after the Truman Doctrine. Under this plan, huge amounts of economic assistance were offered to European countries to rebuild and repair the destruction caused by World War II. The program resulted in a dangerous escalation of tension between the United States and the Soviets. In June 1948, Premier Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the alliance of Communist nations in Eastern Europe

Soviet Union: Conflict with Turkey, 19 45–1953

because Marshall Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia, refused to follow Moscow’s lead in Communist policy and doctrine. The rivalry that developed between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia helped relieve pressure on Turkey. The Soviets turned their attention to the nations of Eastern Europe. Leaders in the satellite nations that were sympathetic to Yugoslavia were purged or executed. Soviet demands on Turkey were deferred. By 1949, the aid Turkey received enabled it to reduce the size of its military forces while at the same time improving their effectiveness. In May 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Bevin issued statements pledging their support to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. These statements of support were intended to make the Soviet Union aware that while the three were not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, the defense alliance between the United States and Western European nations), the United States and Great Britain would protect them. In 1951, Turkey joined NATO, acquiring an even larger degree of security. An attack on Turkey would trigger Article 5 of the NATO treaty, obliging other members to come to its aid. In May 1950, for the first time, genuinely free elections were held in Turkey. The opposition Democratic Party won an unexpected victory, capturing 52 percent of the vote and winning an overwhelming majority in the Assembly. The leadership of the Democratic Party promised no major foreign policy changes. The country would continue to foster close ties with the West, particularly with the United States. The election was also important as a demonstration of Turkey’s commitment to democratic government.

Death of Stalin The death of Stalin in March 1953 brought about a dramatic if temporary change in Soviet policy. Stalin left no heir apparent, and it would take some time before a new leader would emerge. The Soviets did

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not want to confront a crisis during the transition period. They ended the “hate America” campaign and launched a “peace offensive.” The Soviets had begun the “hate America” campaign during the Korean War. As part of that campaign, the Soviets had accused the United States of using biological weapons against the North Koreans and the Chinese. Ending the threats to Turkey and the “hate America” campaign were parts of the Soviet “peace offensive.” In May 1953, the Soviet Union officially renounced its territorial claims on Turkey and abandoned its policy of attempting to win a preferential role in the Dardanelles. Turkey emerged from the conflict victorious. It retained control over all its territory and remained the custodian of the straits. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; Greece: Civil War, 1944–1949.

Bibliography Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Bortoli, Georges. The Death of Stalin. New York: Praeger, 1975. Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962. Esmer, Ahmed Sukru. “The Straits: Crux of World Politics.” Foreign Affairs ( January 1947): 290–302. Ferec, Vali. Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971. Hammond, Thomas, ed. The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975. Howard, Harry N. “Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey During World War II.” Department of State Bulletin (July 18, 1948): 63–73. ———. “Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits.” Department of State Bulletin (January 26, 1947): 143–51. ———. “The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits.” Middle East Journal (January 1947). Kuniholm, Bruce. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

SOVIET UNION: Downing of Korean Airliner,1983 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation 0

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t path

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SEA OF JAPAN

MONGOLIA

NORTH KOREA Seoul

CHINA

SOUTH KOREA

PACIFIC OCEAN JAPAN

YELLOW SEA

On September 1, 1983, a South Korean airliner, Flight 007, was flying from New York to Seoul, South Korea. The airliner penetrated deep into Russian airspace, about 300 miles, and flew over sensitive military areas. The Soviets sent fighter planes to track it. The Soviets claimed they tried to communicate with the Korean pilot but were unsuccessful. A Soviet fighter pilot received permission to shoot down the airliner despite the fact that the airliner had been tracked for more than two hours, time enough to correctly identify it as a commercial plane. There are established procedures, put into place by the International Civil Air Organization (ICAO), for intercepting planes that have penetrated national boundaries. The Soviet pilot

failed to follow those procedures, and the Soviet attack resulted in the deaths of 240 passengers and 29 crew members. Among the dead were 61 Americans. For several days, Soviet officials said nothing publicly about the downed aircraft and then just said the plane had probably crashed. They did not know that the United States had a transcript of the conversation between the Soviet pilot and military officials on the ground. Finally, on September 6, the Soviets publicly acknowledged what everyone already knew. The Soviets announced that the shooting down of the airliner was “neither an accident nor an error.” They later gave a number of different explanations for their action, including the charge that the Korean plane was on a “preplanned” spy mission for the United States. They said they would continue to shoot down planes in similar circumstances. The Soviet military had in fact shot at another passenger plane in 1978, but it had managed to land safely with just two fatalities. The shooting down of the Korean aircraft and the Soviet response to international criticism was in part the result of the Soviet obsession with secrecy. Soviet leaders often displayed a siege mentality whether the issue was arms control or tourism.

International Reaction Many nations condemned the Soviet Union for shooting down the Korean aircraft. The American State Department demanded that the Soviets apologize for their action, provide a detailed account of what actually happened, and pay compensation to the families of the victims. Some members of the Reagan administration wanted to retaliate by suspending arms control negotiations dealing with strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons. Those who wanted to suspend the arms

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Soviet Union: Downing of Korean Airliner, 19 83

893

KEY DATES 1979

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan strains relations between Moscow and the United States.

1981

Vowing to roll back Communism, Republican Ronald Reagan, who would come to call the Soviet Union the “evil empire,” becomes president of the United States.

1983 Korean Airline Flight 007, flying from New York to Seoul via Anchorage, is shot down by Soviet missiles over the Soviet island of Sakhalin, killing all 249 passengers and 29 crew on September 1; in a television address to the American people on September 9, Reagan denounces the shoot-down of the airliner as a “crime against humanity”; the Soviet Union vetoes a UN Security Council resolution criticizing the Soviet Union for shooting down the airliner on September 12.

control talks favored the policy of “linkage”—that is, conditioning arms control agreements on the Soviets’ progress in human rights and noninterference in third-world conflicts. The concept had first been enunciated by former president Richard Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, opposed linkage. He did not want the shooting down of the Korean airliner to become an issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. He wanted the issue defined as one between the Soviet Union and the international community. On September 6, 1983, members of the United Nations Security Council heard an eleven-minute tape provided by the United States of the conversation between the Soviet pilot and his military superiors. The taped conversation suggested that the Soviets did little to communicate with the Korean pilot before shooting down the plane. A Canadian delegate to the United Nations accused the Soviet Union of “murder.” A delegate from Australia described the Soviet action as “barbaric.” On September 12, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution critical of the Soviet action.

Soviet-American Hostility The Korean airline incident occurred at a time when Soviet-American relations were bitter and hostile. President Ronald Reagan had rejected the policy of détente (relaxation of tensions) that had been followed

by presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. After his election in 1980, Reagan had concentrated on strengthening America’s military capabilities and had supported Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet troops that had invaded in defense of the Communist Afghan government. The United States supplied the rebels with military equipment, including Stinger missiles, which were effective in shooting down Soviet helicopters. In a speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in March 1983, Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” A few weeks later, Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative, a visionary plan for a new defense against nuclear missiles. In a speech to the nation on September 9, 1983, President Reagan criticized the Soviets for shooting down the airliner. He labeled the action a “crime against humanity.” He added that there was no legal or moral justification for what the Soviets had done. In response to the attack on Flight 007, the Reagan administration announced that it would continue to deny the Soviet airline Aeroflot landing privileges at U.S. airports. The president also notified the Soviets that the United States would “not renew the bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation as long as they threaten the security of civil aviation.” He asked the Congress to pass a joint resolution condemning the Soviet Union, and he urged them to pass his requests for military spending to deal more effectively with the Russian threat. In September, the Congress did pass a joint resolution

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condemning the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the International Civil Aviation Organization conducted an investigation and concluded that the Soviet Union had not complied with standard procedures for intercepting a plane that was off course. Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko were scheduled to meet in Madrid during a session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). President Reagan wanted the Korean incident to be the primary topic on the agenda. The meeting took place on September 8, 1983. Soviet negotiator Andrei Gromyko was defiant. He justified the Soviet action and showed no remorse. Gromyko claimed that the international condemnation of the Soviet Union was part of an anti-Soviet campaign led by the United States. He also charged that the anti-Soviet campaign was designed to derail the arms control talks between the

superpowers. He claimed again that the United States bore the primary responsibility for Soviet action against the Korean airliner. Gromyko said the “borders of the Soviet Union are sacred.” He made it clear that the Soviet Union would shoot down other planes if they penetrated Soviet airspace. Shultz described Gromyko’s speech as “astonishingly brutal.” Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations.

Bibliography Dallinn, Alexander. Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Hersh, Seymour. “The Target Is Destroyed”: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It. New York: Random House, 1986. Shultz, George. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993.

SPAIN: Basque Uprising Since 1959 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War; Ethnic and Religious BAY OF BISCAY

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The Basque country (Euzkadi in the Basque language) covers an area of about 7,950 square miles (20,600 square kilometers), about 85 percent of it in northeastern Spain and the remainder in southwestern France. The region is divided into four provinces. Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa lie between the Bay of Biscay to the north and the Cantabrian Mountains to the south. Navarra and Alava lie on the south slope of the Cantabrian Mountains, extending to the Ebro River. Of Spain’s approximately 35 million people, about 3 million live in the four provinces. Of these, about 2.1 million are Basques. Most of the nonBasque Spaniards in the region live in or near the industrial city of Bilbao in Vizcaya. Under the current constitution of Spain, the Basque region is one of seventeen autonomous communities making up the country. The two northern Basque provinces are heavily industrialized. In recent decades, however, the region’s industries have suffered the “rust belt syndrome,” and unemployment is high. The two interior provinces are more rural.

The Basques are an ancient people who have inhabited their region of southern Europe since Neolithic times. They have resisted integration into the societies of many invaders, including the Romans, Visigoths, French, and Spanish. They remained most unified by their language, called Euzkera, a mysterious tongue not clearly related to any other in Europe. Conquerors over many centuries sought to forbid the use of Euzkera, but all eventually failed. During the Middle Ages, the Basque provinces were part of the medieval Basque Kingdom of Navarre. Gradually, Navarre came under the control of the dominant power in the region, the Kingdom of Castile. When the present boundary between France and Spain was drawn in 1512, the Basque region was divided. The largest portion remained in Spain, but the small Basque corner of France often provided a safe haven for revolutionary Basques. Spain was far from being a centralized monarchy, and the rulers in Castile made little effort to impose the Spanish language or customs in Basque territories. In fact, Basque seafarers and merchants played a major role in the creation of the Spanish empire, capitalizing on their seafaring tradition and their strategic location on the coast. However, the prosperous merchants in the two northernmost provinces came to resent Madrid’s attempts to impose its rule and collect its high taxes. The inland Basque provinces were less resistant to Spanish influence and governance. In the early twentieth century, Basque nationalists (most from the northern provinces) formed the Basque National Party (PNV) to seek regional autonomy within Spain. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa provinces were strong supporters of the left-leaning Spanish Republic, which had granted autonomy to Basques in 1936.

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KEY DATES 1936–1939

1959

1967 1973 1975 1976–1980

1982

1998 1999 2004

2006

The Republican government in Spain fights a civil war against the fascist forces of General Francisco Franco; having been granted autonomy by the republican government in 1936, Basques generally back the government in the war; Franco’s forces execute thousands of Basque nationalists; thousands of others will be imprisoned during Franco’s rule. Various Basque nationalist groups unite to form Euzkadi ta Akatasuna (Basque for Basque Nation and Freedom; ETA, its Basque acronym). ETA launches a string of bank robberies, bombings of government buildings, and shoot-outs with police. ETA assassinates Franco’s hand-picked successor, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, in a Madrid car bombing. After a long illness, Franco dies on November 22. Despite the new government’s amnesties of Basque political prisoners and a referendum on autonomy, ETA continues its bombing campaign, now against the new republican government in Spain. The Socialist Party comes to power in Spain, vowing to grant even more autonomy to the Basque region; but independenceminded ETA continues its bombing campaign. Increasingly isolated from the democratic-minded Basque population, ETA announces a cease-fire. Citing the government’s failure to negotiate in good faith, ETA resumes its campaign of assassinations and bombings. The government denounces ETA as the perpetrators of the Madrid bombing that kills nearly 200 commuters at Madrid train stations; it is soon learned that Islamist terrorists were behind the bombing. ETA announces a “permanent” cease-fire.

The Republicans lost the war to the pro-Fascist forces of Generalissimo Francisco Franco in 1939, and once again Basque autonomy was revoked. In fact, Franco hoped to crush Basque nationalism and culture, and, among other actions, he banned use of the Basque language. Many of the PNV leaders went into exile in France, where they directed an antiFranco underground in Spain. During World War II, the Basque nationalists of the PNB worked with the Allies and against Franco, who supported the Nazi regime in Germany and the Fascists of Italy. The Allies implied that when the bat-

tle against Germany and Italy was won, the Franco regime in Spain would be removed and regional autonomy would be restored. When the war ended, the Basques learned that wartime alliances do not always provide future benefits. In the anticommunist environment after the war, the Allies sought an alliance with Franco, who was a Fascist but reliably anticommunist. Postwar France, too, was not eager to see a restored autonomous Basque region providing a model of independence for its own Basque population. The postwar Basque resistance grew from the increasingly repressive policies of Franco and from their

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sense of betrayal by the Allies. Their experience in carrying out secret missions for the underground resistance during the war trained them for this resistance. Franco had executed thousands of Basque nationalists during the Spanish Civil War. Those he did not execute he kept in special prisons. The survivors of these prisons formed a network with common experiences and a common grievance. In 1945, Basques who had worked with the Allies, both within Spain and as part of the anti-Nazi French underground, met in Bayonne, France, to organize the Basque Consultative Council, under the leadership of the president of the Basque government-in-exile, José Antonio Aguirre. From France, the council would direct the activities of the Basque Resistance Committee in Spain. Eager for U.S. and other Western support, the council expelled all its Communists and disbanded the experienced guerrilla fighters who had fought in France during World War II. From 1947 to 1951, the council’s strategy was to work with other anti-Franco groups, using massive labor strikes as the principal weapon. The first of these, the Bilbao general strike of 1947, shut down Vizcaya and spread to Guipuzcoa. It did not spread beyond the Basque areas, however, and Franco’s retaliation was harsh. Thousands lost their jobs, and hundreds were jailed. By 1951, economic conditions throughout Spain were so bad that spontaneous strikes spread throughout the country. Basque workers began to grumble that they were being asked to risk death or jail by striking while the prosperous Basque middle class and professionals stood aside. Reflecting their continuing sense of betrayal by the Allied powers, Basque leaders also protested the treaty signed between Spain and the United States, which allowed U.S. warships in Spanish ports. At about the same time, France evicted the Basque government-in-exile and turned its buildings over to the Spanish government. Without a home and with its clandestine organization in Spain damaged by Franco’s police, the Resistance Committee fell apart.

Rise of ETA Some of the youthful members of the shattered underground regrouped in prison and concluded that the old nationalist strategy of the PNV, trying to work with other Spanish democratic groups, had failed. Beginning in 1952, the former prisoners joined with a Basque student group called Ekin, proposing to con-

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centrate on creating an independent Basque republic with Euzkera as the sole language. In 1957, the Ekin group, headed by a former PNV youth group (EG) leader, José Luis Alvarez Enparanza (who used the nom de guerre “Txillardegi”), met in Paris with the PNV leadership. When it refused to submit to PNV orders, Ekin was expelled from the organization. In 1959, Ekin emerged as a new organization, Euzkadi ta Akatasuna (the Basque Nation and Freedom) or ETA. For the next ten years, ETA was more a debating society than a resistance movement. One faction, the culturalists, stressed restoration of Basque culture and language. Political or armed action could come later, they said. A second group, with Marxist tendencies, argued that only the working class could carry out the nationalist revolution. The main effort should be on organizing workers. They argued against armed action until objective conditions were right. A third faction, the so-called Third Worldists, looked to anticolonial wars in Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba. Since Euzkadi was a colony, they said, it had to wage a war of colonial liberation. Armed struggle would create the objective conditions for revolution; ETA must begin an urban guerrilla war. The Third Worldists prevailed. In 1964, ETA defined itself as “anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist.” The strategy was to attack the Spanish army, police, and civil guard; the attacks would provoke the government into harsh actions against the Basque population; the government’s actions would cause more Basques to join the struggle, provoking more harsh reactions, and so on, until the spiral climaxed in general revolution. After much debate, it was agreed that non-Basques who participated and agreed to learn the language would be considered Basques. This decision resolved the question about waging a classbased ethnic struggle in a region where almost half the working-class population was non-Basque. Beginning in 1967, ETA began to test its new program with a string of successful bank robberies, bombings of government buildings, and wild shootouts with police. On June 7, 1968, in a gun battle at a police roadblock, ETA fighters killed a policeman, the first government casualty. At another roadblock a few miles away, Txabi Etxebarrieta, the ETA guerrilla who had killed the police officer, was killed, the first ETA death. His companion was captured, tortured, and sentenced to fifty-eight years in prison by a military court.

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Etxebarrieta’s death made him a Basque hero. Masses were held in his honor in all the major towns, police stations were stoned, and police cars overturned. The ranks of ETA swelled with new recruits. It was time, according to the theory, to keep the spiral going with a major provocation. On August 2, an ETA gunman assassinated Meliton Manzanas, a notorious police torturer, at the door of his apartment. The gunman escaped, but, true to the theory, Franco reacted with extraordinary force between August 1968 and April 1969. Constitutional guarantees were suspended throughout the country. Thousands of arrests were made, and almost the entire ETA leadership was killed or captured. At this point, with the organization leaderless and demoralized, Franco overplayed his hand. In December 1969, sixteen ETA members were charged in the Manzanas killing; fifteen were brought to public trial in Burgos by a military court. This trial, referred to as the Burgos 16 Affair, occurred at the height of the 1960s revolta against government authority and the Vietnam War. In near-revolutionary fervor, the Burgos 16 became a cause célèbre in Spain and throughout Europe. There was chaos in the streets of Basque cities. Police and demonstrators clashed bloodily. The government declared selective continuation of martial law for Guipuzcoa. Throughout Western Europe, mobs stoned Spanish embassies and demanded that their governments break relations with Madrid. Some countries temporarily recalled their ambassadors. Inside the courtroom, the defendants loudly proclaimed their innocence, contending their confessions had been extracted through torture. Regardless, they were convicted on December 9. At this point, ETA somehow managed to pull off a coup that revived the organization. They kidnapped a West German consul, Eugen Biehl, and held him hostage, demanding that those convicted at Burgos be spared the death penalty. An informal deal was made, and Biehl was released unharmed. Nine of the prisoners were given long prison terms, and six prisoners were sentenced to death. But the sentences were never carried out, and over the following months, all fifteen were released.

End of the Franco Era Even though the Burgos 16 affair gave ETA international notoriety, the organization continued to be weak and faction ridden. It was left to one of Biehl’s

kidnappers, Eustaquio Mendizabal Benito (Txikia), to revive the group. As head of a faction called ETAV, he downplayed the previous leadership’s emphasis on class and its hope for a mass revolutionary movement. Instead, ETA-V emphasized ethnicity over class and action over organizing. Its first major action was the kidnapping on January 19,1972, of a Basque industrialist, Lorenzo Zabala Suinaga, who had just fired his striking workers. In a master stroke of public relations, ETA-V released Zabala unharmed four days later, after he met the kidnappers’ demands—rehiring the discharged workers and acquiescing to the wage demands they had made during the strike. ETA greatly increased its activity over the next two years. Bank robberies in 1972 gained over half a million dollars. More than forty attacks on Spanish government buildings or the businesses of known government supporters were conducted. It is noteworthy, though, that when a civil guard named Eloy Garcia was killed in August in a skirmish with ETA, it was only the fourth fatality recorded as a result of ETA activity in almost a decade. Txikia’s next major operation was kidnapping another industrialist, Felipe Huarte, on January 16, 1973. The occasion was a strike in response to Huarte’s refusal to meet his workers’ demands. This time, the terms for Huarte’s release were that he settle the strike on the workers’ terms and make a payment equivalent to $800,000. Huarte met the terms and was released after ten days. However, Txikia was identified, tracked down by the police, and killed in April 1973. Even before his death, though, plans had been made for the most spectacular of all actions ever undertaken by ETA. This was the assassination of the Spanish prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, widely regarded as the real power in the Franco government. It was an elaborate operation. An ETA commando unit named in honor of Txikia rented a basement apartment in Madrid on the route over which Carrero was driven to Mass every Sunday. The etarras, or members of ETA, working from the apartment, dug a tunnel under the street—telling their landlord that they were sculptors to explain the noise—and packed it with 100 pounds of plastic explosives stolen from a government arsenal months earlier. On December 20, 1973, as Carrero’s car drove down the street, another ETA commando unit, disguised as electricians working on a power line, detonated the charge, blowing the car over a fivestory building, killing Carrero, his driver, and his

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bodyguards. The “electricians” shouted that there had been a gas line explosion, and in the confusion all the ETA men got away. Once again, an apparent success badly divided ETA. While many wanted to continue the violent acts, another group urged that violence be suspended while a dialogue was begun with Carrero’s successor. They pointed out that Franco was ailing and likely to die soon. If ETA continued its violence, the military and the hated civil guard would have a perfect excuse to seize power on his demise. The activists carried the day. In the first half of 1974, two more civil guards were killed in ETA actions. Then, on September 13, a bomb exploded in the Café Rolando in the center of Madrid, killing at least nine people and wounding many more. This act of indiscriminate terrorism was uncharacteristic of ETA to this point, and the organization denied responsibility. Nevertheless, it raised the tension within Spain still higher.

After Franco After a long illness, Generalissimo Franco finally died on November 22, 1975. The transition to democracy in a constitutional monarchy appeared to go smoothly. In 1977 and 1979, national parliamentary elections were held, and in the latter year there were popular elections for provincial and municipal assemblies for the first time since the civil war. In 1978, King Juan

The militant Basque separatist organization ETA has relied for decades on car bombings and assassination to advance its cause. This January 1997 blast in downtown Madrid came moments after the killing of a Spanish military officer outside his home. (Dominique Faget/AFP/ Getty Images)

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Carlos promulgated the new constitution providing for autonomous regional governments. Basque voters approved an autonomy statute in October 1979 and, in March 1980, elected the first autonomous Basque government. Royal amnesties in 1976 and 1977 emptied the jails of political prisoners, most of them Basques. In the Basque region, many people considered ETA to be a band of patriotic heroes, now that most of its nationalist goals were being realized. ETA itself, however, was committed to continuing its underground struggle. In fact, in 1978, ETA killed more people than it had in all the previous years of its existence, and in 1979 and 1980, it contributed to making the Basque region the most violent area in all of Western Europe. This new outbreak of violence found some support in nearly all Basque political factions—right, center, and left. Now that they had gained so much, it seemed that further progress could be made— especially the removal from the region of the hated civil guard, which had fought Basque nationalists for so long. Even beyond that, many Basques saw the possibility of complete independence from Spain. Extreme action also gained credibility because of the economic crisis in the region. As old factories closed, unemployment reached almost 20 percent by 1981. The ETA leadership remained deeply committed to anti-capitalist social revolution. The group adopted the tactic of increasingly indiscriminate terrorist activities. In a statement explaining its policy in 1978, ETA declared that it was not merely an organization of “anti-Franco [Basque] patriots” but a Basque socialist revolutionary organization committed to achieving the political supremacy of the proletariat, without violence if possible or with violence if necessary. ETA still believed that the tide of history was running in its favor, pointing to the relatively strong showing Basque leftsocialist parties made in the elections. (ETA ignored the fact that the center-right group PNV won a slight majority.) The group also pointed to continuing massive strikes by workers protesting the region’s economic decline and high rate of unemployment. ETA leaders were also convinced that Spanish military leaders remained strongly opposed to the autonomy policy, particularly in the Basque region. Following the old revolutionary theory, they reasoned that if they could provoke the military into overthrowing the Spanish government to restore centralized rule, the Basque people would rise up and gain

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complete independence. To this end, ETA began a series of assassinations of senior military officials, killing ten generals and admirals between 1976 and 1986, as well as more than 300 other members of the military and police. However wrong it might have been about strategy, ETA was right about military hard-liners in Spain. Despising the civilian political leadership of Christian Democratic Prime Minister Adolfo Suàrez, military leaders believed that the new king, Juan Carlos, a graduate of the military academy, was sympathetic to them. In 1978, the plan for a military coup, Operation Galaxia, was uncovered before it began. The military were encouraged that the leaders of the coup received only light punishment. Their hopes rose further when one of their leaders, General Alfonso Armada Comyn, one of the king’s mentors, became deputy chief of the general staff. Armada seems to have shared the belief that Juan Carlos would likely support a military coup after it was carried out. Then the military would have a free hand in stamping out terrorism and reunifying the nation. On February 23, 1981, Colonel Antonio Tejero (one of the Operation Galaxia plotters) stormed into the parliament with a company of civil guards firing machine guns and took the whole membership hostage. They announced that “senior military authority” would soon arrive. Apparently Armada was to go to the royal palace, tell the king the coup was under way, and gain at least his tacit consent to the overthrow of the civilian government. The plotters had miscalculated the king’s response, however. He refused Armada’s request to come to the palace and began telephoning military headquarters throughout the country to tell them he absolutely disapproved of the coup attempt. Within twenty-four hours, the coup collapsed and Armada found himself under arrest. ETA seemed to have made the same miscalculation as the military. They did not expect that civil authority would prevail. Not only was the military discredited by the failed coup, so was conservative political leadership represented by prime minister Suàrez and his successor, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo. In 1982, the Socialist Workers Party of Spain (PSOE) won the elections and committed fully to the autonomy policy. ETA continued its assaults on the military, but after 1982, they seemed irrelevant. By the 1990s, Basque separatists had achieved an important cultural conquest: Basque-language istakolas (schools) had almost completely replaced the for-

mer Spanish-language public schools in the Basque provinces. Public radio and television were required to use Euzkera, despite the fact that only 25 percent of the population was fluent in the Basque tongue. Public ceremonies celebrated Basque, not Spanish, history. Increasingly the Spanish immigrant population was ignored. For many public- and privatesector jobs, being Basque became an advantage rather than a handicap. Meanwhile, ETA became increasingly unpopular among the people it purported to represent. In July 1997, ETA kidnapped a young Basque town councillor, Miguel Angel Blanco. ETA tried to exchange Blanco, a Popular Party member from Bilbao, for the transfer of 450 ETA prisoners from jails in other parts of Spain to jails in the Basque region. Blanco was an unpaid politician who played drums in a band and had plans to marry, and his very insignificance and ordinariness made his capture seem all the more outrageous. Nearly 500,000 people filled Basque streets to demand his freedom, but the following day, ETA executed him. In the Basque provinces, work stopped for an hour to coincide with Blanco’s funeral. The rest of Spain also observed his passing; people left their workplaces and homes to stand for ten minutes in silence in the streets. In October 1997, in the largest protest since Blanco’s funeral, hundreds of thousands of Basques demanded an end to separatist violence. They were specifically protesting against ETA guerrillas who killed a police officer in a foiled attack on Bilbao’s new Guggenheim Museum. Basque government leaders led the way behind a banner that said, “We need peace” in the Basque language. ETA announced a cease-fire in September 1998 to allow dialogue with the government. ETA spokesmen continued to insist upon self-determination for the Basques, while the Spanish government of Jose Maria Aznar was only willing to discuss leniency for hundreds of Basque prisoners and exiles. (Aznar had narrowly avoided becoming a victim of an ETA car bomb in 1995.) When no progress was made in the talks, ETA declared an end to the cease-fire in November. Starting in 1999, it began a series of assassinations and bombings. That year, a plan to explode a truck bomb at the Picasso Tower skyscraper in Madrid was uncovered by law enforcement authorities before it could be executed. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, ETA became identified with

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other terrorist groups, and its activities diminished. In 2003, the Basque regional governor, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, formally proposed a referendum to convert his troubled region into a “free associate” of Spain. The Basques would remain Spanish citizens but would be divided into two overlapping categories of citizens and nationals. This might keep non-Basques in the region from voting in some elections. The Basque regional government would gain further powers and the Basque court system would be largely separated from the Spanish one. Basque nationalists and separatists supported the plan, but it received a negative reception from the government in Madrid and even from moderates in Basque country. Opponents said the proposal was the political equivalent of the ETA terror campaigns. One former ETA member observed sadly that Basque nationalism of any kind, violent or nonviolent, was fast becoming a new demon. By early 2006, the vast support the ETA once enjoyed in the Basque region had become a thing of the past, a victim of the organization’s record of violence. In 2005, PNV President Josu Jon Imaz urged the ETA to renounce violence because negotiations with the Spanish government could not continue in the midst of threats. The ETA responded to the call for a cease-fire by planting roadside bombs. But in March

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2006, the organization made a dramatic announcement of a “permanent” cease-fire, vowing to move from violent action to political involvement. Spanish authorities welcomed the announcement but advised caution, as ETA had declared cease-fires before, only to violate them later. David MacMichael and Caryn E. Neumann See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s.

Bibliography Aguero, Felipe. Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Bray, Zoe. Living Boundaries: Frontiers and Identity in the Basque Country. New York: Peter Lang, 2004. Clark, Robert P. The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. ———. The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1979. Clark, Robert P., and Michael K. Haltzel. Spain in the 1980s: The Democratic Transition and a New International Role. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1988. Collins, Roger. The Basques. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990. Heiberg, Marrianne. The Making of the Basque Nation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Totoricaguena, Gloria P. Identity, Culture, and Politics in the Basque Diaspora. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2004.

TAJIKISTAN: Civil War,1990s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

UZBEKISTAN

Dushanbe

TAJIKS S EK ZB U

Kulob

AFGHANISTAN 0 0

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200 Miles 200 Kilometers

CHINA

TAJIKISTAN TAJIKS

Z HI G R KI

PAKISTAN TAJIKS

Ethnic group

Tajikistan began as an artificial state conceived by the founders of the Soviet Union. In many ways, the civil war that has torn the country apart since its independence can be traced to its artificial birth. The original occupants of modern Tajikistan were a mix of Persian, Turkic, and Mongol peoples who spoke a dialect of Persian and who had adopted Islam as their religion. The Russian Empire had conquered the region in the nineteenth century. After the Russian Revolution, the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics redrew the borders of its Central Asian territories in 1924, designating Tajikistan as an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan. Five years later, it created the freestanding Soviet Republic of Tajikistan. Like all other Soviet republics, Tajikistan was firmly under the control of the central authorities in Moscow. Before 1924, the residents of Tajikistan had not considered themselves a distinct people. They identified themselves as Muslims or as members of a particular tribe, but not as a national group. The Soviets changed this by forcing Tajiks to define themselves by the language they spoke. If a Central Asian spoke Persian, he was to be considered a Tajik, even if he

had never identified himself as such. This was the case even if he had a great deal in common with his Uzbek-speaking neighbors. Complicating matters, the new Soviet borders could not clearly separate linguistic or cultural groups. Nearly a million Persianspeaking Tajiks were left in Uzbekistan, while more than a million Uzbeks lived in Tajikistan. Finally, the mountainous terrain divided Tajikistan into four distinct and isolated regions, connected only by primitive roads and paths. Thus, Tajikistan began as a patchwork of settlements that the Soviets had decided to call a nation. The Soviets further complicated Tajikistan’s ethnic mix by encouraging or sometimes forcing ethnic Russians to settle there. By 1989, ethnic Russians made up almost 8 percent of Tajikistan’s population and more than 30 percent of the population in Dushanbe, the capital. Ethnic Russians held most of the better jobs in government and industry, creating resentment among Tajiks, especially those in the educated elite.

Independence In the late 1980s, as Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev declared a new era of glasnost (openness), Tajiks responded with protests against their treatment by the Soviet government. They demanded that their cultural and religious heritage be respected. In 1989, the Soviets responded by decreeing that Tajik (rather than Russian) would be the official language of the republic. Devotion to Islam was also increasing in Tajikistan. The Soviets had always attacked Islam as antithetical to their efforts to create a secular Communist society, but they had not succeeded in eliminating its importance to many Tajiks. With the freedom allowed by glasnost, Tajiks were building new mosques and opening religious schools. In 1990, dissatisfaction with Soviet rule led to violent antigovernment riots in the Tajik capital and other towns. The Soviet government responded with increased repression. By 1991, after the neighboring

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Tajikistan: Civil War, 19 9 0s

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KEY DATES 1985 Reformer Mikhail Gorbachev becomes the leader of the Soviet Union, pledging an era of political openness called glasnost; such calls lead to increased nationalism among the Tajik minority. 1991

In the wake of a failed military coup, the Soviet Union collapses into fifteen constituent republics, including Tajikistan.

1992 Antigovernment forces—including nationalists, democrats, and Islamists—demonstrate in March against the regime of President Rahmon Nabiev, a holdover from the old Communist regime; in August, a group of antigovernment demonstrators capture Nabiev; he is replaced by moderate Akbarsho Iskandarov as part of a settlement for Nabiev’s release; despite this move, civil war breaks out between Islamists in the south and anti-Islamist forces in the north, leaving up to 50,000 dead by the end of the year. 1993 Northern Tajik forces take the offensive with help of Russian troops. 1995 With the support of the Islamist government in Iran, Islamist Tajik forces led by Abdullo Nuri gain ground against Russian-backed northern Tajik forces. 1997 With neither side able to deliver a knockout blow against the other, Nuri and northern Tajik leader Imamali Rakhmonov sign a peace and power-sharing agreement.

republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan declared their independence from the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan declared its independence. This time, the central government did not react by repressing the action, as the Soviet Union itself was dissolving. The Tajik declaration of independence was passed by a deliberative body, the Supreme Soviet, which was still dominated by Russians. Their action was less an expression of nationalism than an attempt to maintain control in an unstable political environment. They created a new flag, a new national anthem, and a new constitution, but they made sure that the same people remained in control. The new Tajik leaders were eager to join the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose confederation of former Soviet republics, demonstrating their desire to maintain ties to the Russian heartland. In early 1992, the Communist leadership in Tajikistan continued to resist any real democratic reform. Opposition parties were allowed to operate only under repressive conditions, and press freedoms were

limited. As a further support for the government, Russian troops still stationed in Tajikistan were willing to intervene on the part of the Tajik leaders.

Civil War Begins In March 1992, antigovernment forces—a mixed collection of democrats, Tajik nationalists, and advocates of Islamic renewal—began open demonstrations in the capital of Dushanbe against the administration of President Rahmon Nabiev. They were countered the following month by pro-government groups (made up of ethnic Russians and Communist Tajiks), who opposed any further democratic reforms or movement away from the CIS. As the demonstrations continued, Nabiyev attempted to organize a national guard that could be used to defend his government and repress the opposition. Tajiks in the southern province of Khation responded by acquiring weapons and preparing to defend themselves. By May there was open fighting in the streets of Dushanbe.

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In the summer and fall of 1992, the fighting continued to escalate, as pro-government irregulars mounted attacks on rebel bases in southern Tajikistan. In August 1992, a group of antigovernment demonstrators captured President Nabiev at gunpoint and forced him to resign. He was replaced by a more moderate ally, Akbarsho Iskandarov, but Iskandarov’s calls for a negotiated compromise were ignored by extremists on both sides, and the fighting continued. Control of Dushanbe went back and forth until December, when forces under Imamali Rakhmonov, the new head of Tajikistan’s government, were able to regain control. Although ethnicity played a part in dividing the two sides, the main divisions concerned politics, power, and regionalism. The old Communist elite in Tajikistan, both Russian and Tajik, was simply unwilling to give up its political control of the region. Ethnic Russians feared that a Tajik nationalist victory would lead to their loss of a privileged status in Tajikistan society. As violence continued, however, many Russians decided to leave their adopted homes, most returning to Russia itself. In 1992 more than 100,000 Russians left Tajikistan. With the exodus of Russians, the war became primarily one of Tajiks versus Tajiks. Those of Leninabad, in the north, and from around the city of Kulob, in central Tajikistan, supported the Communist leadership and feared the creation of an Islamic state. Tajiks from the southern provinces favored new leadership. While Islam was important to Tajiks, especially those in the south and the east, the vast majority did not follow sects advocating extreme adherence to Islamic law (such as the Shi’a in Iran or the Taliban in Afghanistan). Even Tajiks who advocated the creation of an Islamic state—such as Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition—wanted only a government that would accord Islam a proper degree of respect. By the end of 1992, upwards of 50,000 Tajik had died in a struggle that was increasingly breaking down into clan feuds, with local battles often having little connection to the theoretical lines of opposition. It was a war of ambush and assassination rather than set-piece battles.

Helped by the Russian Motorized Rifle Division, the Communist old guard—still led by Imamali Rakhmonov—had been able to gain complete control of Dushanbe, and, in 1993, it took the offensive against the rebel opposition. Many southern Tajiks were forced to flee across the border to Afghanistan. There they received aid and supplies from their ethnic cousins, and some of them even joined the forces of Ahmad Massoud, the Tajik leader of one of the factions in Afghanistan’s civil war. The two wars became symbiotically connected: Tajiks in Afghanistan aided the war in Tajikistan, and Tajiks from Tajikistan fought for Ahmad Massoud faction in the Afghani war. By 1994, what little national identity Tajikistan ever had was disintegrating. Northern and central Tajiks had managed to defeat their southern and eastern enemies, but their success was largely the result of the aid they had received from the 25,000-man force dominated by Russians. Even the Tajikistan government’s army was led by a Russian general and was officered primarily by Russians. Both Russians and neighboring Uzbeks supported Rakhmonov’s government to help prevent the establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan. Such a state would be a threat to Russia’s substantial economic interests in the region, and also seemed likely to threaten the Uzbek minority in Tajikistan, which made up about 20 percent of the country’s population. Uzbeks may also have feared that enthusiasm for an Islamic state might spread to the substantial Tajik minority inside their own country.

Russian Intervention

A Tajik opposition radio commentator discusses the latest war news with a rebel fighter in 1994. Fighting between the Russian-supported Communist government and Iranian-supported Islamic rebels continued until a power-sharing agreement in June 1997. (EPA/AFP/Getty Images)

In 1993, the tide turned for the northern Tajiks when the Russian troops still stationed in Tajikistan intervened in favor of the northern and central regions.

Tajikistan: Civil War, 19 9 0s

A rigged presidential election late in 1994 rubberstamped Rakhmonov’s position as leader of the country, but the violence continued. The opposition, although forced out of much of Tajikistan, was able to use Afghanistan as a base from which to carry out raids against the government, while eastern Tajikistan, dominated by the rugged Pamir mountains, remained under rebel control.

Peace The war between the government and the opposition—increasingly identified with the Islamists and supported by the Islamic regime in Iran—continued through 1995 and 1996. The Islamist Tajiks, led by Said Abdullo Nuri, slowly gained ground, while President Rakhmonov found it difficult even to maintain control of his own troops, many of whom were more loyal to local warlords who were more interested in making profits from the regional drug trade than in fighting to defend the government. It was clear that the Tajik rebels would likely overrun the capital if the government lost the continued support of the intervention force, and Russian support for the war was beginning to fade. Distracted by a brutal war in Chechnya, the Russian government pressured Rakhmonov to make peace with Nuri and his Islamist followers. Even the Uzbek government, which had supported Rakhmonov, agreed that it was time to settle with the opposition. The Russian and Uzbek position was also complicated by the changing political situation in Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban, a religiously motivated army dedicated to making Afghanistan an Islamic state, made both Russia and Uzbekistan eager to build closer relations with the Taliban’s main opponents, the Tajiks of Afghanistan. (The Taliban’s extremism made Nuri and his Islamic followers seem moderate in comparison.) In order to remain friendly with the Tajiks in Afghanistan, it was necessary to make peace with their allies in Tajikistan. Likewise, Iran, which had been supporting Nuri, was encouraging him to make peace. Iran had long backed the Tajiks, both because of their Islamic tie and because of their shared cultural roots in a common Persian language. Now the rise of the Taliban in

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Afghanistan made peace in Tajikistan seem vital to Iran’s interests. In June 1997, Nuri and Rakhmonov signed a peace agreement that involved a power-sharing arrangement between the two factions. In September, Nuri, preceded by some of his troops, peacefully entered Dushanbe. Killings and violence still continued into the new year—neither leader had complete control over his respective allies—but for the most part the two sides seemed set on ending the fighting, which had killed 50,000 in six years of war. Despite the peace agreement, the Rakhmonov government continued its disputes with Islamist leaders. Some Islamists entered the government in the late 1990s, but most were soon driven out of office. After Rakhmonov was overwhelmingly reelected to the presidency in 1998, many Islamist leaders were accused of crimes, convicted, and sentenced to long prison terms. Meanwhile, the Tajik government maintained close ties to the Russian Federation, welcoming the reestablishment of a Russian space-monitoring center there and the permanent stationing of Russian troops. The situation in the region remained tense, however. After the United States declared war on Afghanistan in 2001, it gained permission from Tajikistan’s neighbor, Uzbekistan, to operate an air base there. The U.S. presence in Central Asia became a threat to Russia’s dominance in the region. David MacMichael See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Uzbekistan: Conflict with Islamists Since 1999.

Bibliography Curtis, Glenn E., ed. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Area Handbook Series). Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1997. Dawisha, Karen, and Bruce Parott, eds. Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Djalili, Mohammad Reza, Frederic Gare, and Shirin Akiner, eds. Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994.

TURKEY: Kurdish War Since 1984 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Iraq; Syria; United States Historical Background

RUSSIA

BULGARIA

BLACK SEA

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GEORGIA AZERBAIJAN

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Diyarbakir Eruh Shemdinli

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The Kurds are a distinct cultural group, with languages and a set of customs all their own. Their identity is heavily influenced by their mountainous home and by a history shaped by their 3,000-year struggle against the lowland regimes of the Middle East. Of the forty-nine identifiable ethnic groups in Turkey, the Kurds are the largest and best known. In modern times, the Kurds have demanded a homeland for their people, often referred to as Kurdistan. By many definitions, Kurdistan would take in parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, but its boundaries are far from clear. Kurdish identity is generally understood to refer to speakers of one of four interrelated languages— Kurmanji, Sorani, Zaza, and Gurani. With no census data on their mother tongues since 1965, however, it is not even possible to make a reliable estimate of the number of Kurds—suggestions range from as few as 3 million to as many as 20 million. At least 65 percent of Kurds are believed to live in the southeastern Anatolian peninsula—within the bounds of modern-day Turkey. Iran, Iraq, and Syria also have sizable Kurdish populations, and other Kurds have migrated to many cities in western Turkey and Europe. Some of these emigrants work in cities, while others provide seasonal or migrant labor.

Under the Ottoman Empire, from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century, the Kurds lived in semi-independent emirates. In remote regions, the Kurdish princes paid minimal obeisance to the sultan’s governors and representatives. In general, however, Istanbul and the Kurdish emirates had an uneasy relationship. The Kurds guarded their independence zealously but also agreed to patrol the frontiers of the empire against the encroaching Persians and later against the Russians. The mid- and late-nineteenth century saw two significant changes in the Ottoman Empire that affected all its subjects. First, the empire began to assert its administrative control over outlying areas. In the case of Turkish Kurdistan, the empire used this control to dissolve the emirates and assume direct governance, including the right to collect taxes and conscript men into military service. As the emirates were abolished, the Kurds came to rely again on their most basic unit of organization, the tribe. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire passed a series of economic reforms that effectively turned what had once been communal lands, controlled (but not owned) by local Kurdish chiefs, into privately held property. This land reform caused massive alienation for the Kurds, from both their tribal chiefs, who gained land ownership, and their lands. Chiefs now acted largely as landlords without observing traditional feudal obligations. The more urban and commercially minded Christian Armenians, many of whom lived in Kurdish areas, gained ownership of urban property and some farmlands; many became landlords to Kurds. In earlier centuries, the Kurds had largely ruled over the Armenians, and this reversal engendered great hostility toward them among the Kurds. In the 1890s, the Ottoman government, threatened by the encroaching Russian empire, established

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Turkey: Kurdish War Since 19 8 4

907

KEY DATES 1980 After decades of repression and several years of political turmoil, Kurdish nationalists form the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, its Kurdish acronym), led by intellectual Marxist Abdullah Ocalan; a military coup in Ankara leads to mass arrests of Kurdish activists. 1984

PKK launches its first armed attacks on Turkish military targets.

1985

Following the failure to spark a mass Kurdish uprising, the PKK embarks on a guerrilla campaign against Turkish government forces.

1986 The Turkish military launches a major offensive, dispatching 45,000 troops to Kurdish areas of the country; by the early 1990s, more than 300,000 Turkish troops will be fighting an estimated 10,000 Kurdish guerrillas. 1990 Massive street protests break out across Kurdistan on New Roz, the Kurdish new year, in March. 1991

Thousands of Iraqi Kurds flood into Turkish Kurdistan in the wake of the Gulf War.

1992

Britain and the United States establish a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds in the northern part of Iraq; Turkish military and Iraqi Kurds conduct joint military offensives against PKK bases in northern Iraq.

1998 Ocalan is captured by Turkish Special Forces in Kenya. 1999 During his trial, Ocalan calls on PKK forces to quit their rebellion; he is nevertheless sentenced to death; but Turkish leaders, eager to placate European powers and start talks on Turkish accession to the European Union, keep Ocalan in prison rather than executing him. 2000 The PKK leadership agrees to Ocalan’s call for a cease-fire. 2003 Frustrated with a failure to win concessions from the Turkish government, former PKK activists renounce their self-imposed cease-fire.

a new Kurdish military force known as the hamidiye— named after the sultan Abdulhamid II. Like the Cossacks of Russia, the hamidiye was established to guard the fringes of the empire. In return, the sultan turned a blind eye to the depredations of hamidiye against other subjects of the empire—including the Christian Armenians. The “Young Turks” then in control of the empire frowned on the behavior and values of the hamidiye, but these warriors had been indispensable to the Ottomans and continued in existence through World War I (1914–1918). During that war, the hamidiye participated in the expulsion and killing of Armenians, to such a degree that

Armenians describe the attack against them as a genocide.

Kurds Under the Turkish Republic At the end of World War I, the long-troubled Ottoman Empire finally collapsed. For millions, especially in Turkey, the demise was traumatic. Not only did the Turks see the 600-year-old empire divided up among several nations, some led by Europeans, they also found their homeland occupied by foreign forces, including their ancient rivals, the Greeks. Amid this

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catastrophe, General Mustafa Kemal, a senior military commander based in central Anatolia, began to gather the remnants of the old Ottoman army into a military force. Appealing to the Kurds and other minorities to help defend the ancient Islamic caliphate against infidel intruders, Kemal and his forces drove the European occupiers out of the country. For this feat, and as the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal took on the title Ataturk, or “Father of the Turks.” Most Kurdish leaders—including hamidiye officers—believed that their support for the cause of Islam and an independent Turkey would be rewarded with some kind of autonomy for Kurdistan. They were soon disappointed. By 1924, the Westernoriented Ataturk had embarked on a crusade to turn Turkey into a modern nation-state along European lines. To this end, he adopted the Latin alphabet and abolished the caliphate, which had served as a center for international Islam for centuries. Most upsetting to the Kurds, however, was Ataturk’s anti-Kurdish legislation. Determined to prevent a further carving up of the Turkish realm, Ataturk imposed the dominant western Anatolian culture throughout the new country. All Kurdish schools, organizations, publications, and religious fraternities were banned. The use of the Kurdish language was made a crime against the state, as was the very mention of anything with the words Kurd or Kurdish in it. Finally, Ataturk made sure that virtually all government administrators in Kurdish areas were Turks. This last act infuriated the Kurdish elites from the cities of western Turkey, who had recently left their urban lives to settle in the Kurdish homeland far to the east. In the mid-1920s, a number of them formed a secret society called Azadi, or Freedom, and recruited the popular Kurdish cleric, Sheik Said, as their leader. In the winter of 1925, they rose up, taking control of about a third of Turkish Kurdistan in a matter of weeks. Ataturk reacted quickly, sending 35,000 elite Turkish troops to crush the Kurdish uprising. Retribution for this first uprising and others that followed in the 1930s was brutal. Hundreds of villages were destroyed, thousands of civilians summarily executed, and whole districts depopulated. Martial law was imposed, and because of the leadership of Sheik Said, the government closed virtually all religious establishments in the region. Kemal Ataturk died in 1938. During World War II (1939–1945), Turkey remained neutral. It emerged after the war prepared to make further strides toward

a modern industrial economy. In Turkish Kurdistan, a network of roads had encouraged commercial farming and provided easy transportation for the Turkish military. Ultimately, the roads served to turn Kurdistan into a kind of internal colony of Turkey, enabling its resources and labor to be exploited by farm owners who lived elsewhere. At the same time, Kurds began their troubled involvement in Turkish politics. While Ataturk’s successor, Ismet Inonu (president 1938–1950), tried to establish a democracy in Turkey, he maintained a total ban on Kurdish political expression. That is to say, Kurds were considered full citizens of Turkey so long as they suppressed their Kurdishness. All political parties based on ethnic or religious affinity were banned. As Turkey seesawed between military and civilian rule from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Kurds generally participated in the nation’s politics through leftist parties, which were rather more sympathetic to Kurdish cultural aspirations. Through these years, the Kurds’ situation alternated between periods of civilian rule, when repression lifted somewhat, and periods of military rule, which brought harsh crackdowns on Kurdish activities. Little was done by civilian or military leaders to improve economic conditions in Kurdistan or to abolish the harsh laws suppressing Kurdish cultural or political expression. By the 1970s, thousands of Kurds were moving to the urban areas of western Turkey. Mostly poor peasants, they congregated in shanty towns, or gecekondu, where they lived among and intermarried with Turks. Among these emigrants were a small number of students, many of them the sons and daughters of the remaining elite of Kurdistan. As a new generation of Kurds began to assert itself in the 1970s, it parted ways with the traditional Kurdish leadership of the sheikh and the agha, or traditional chieftain. Many of these earlier leaders had amassed large fortunes by acting as go-betweens for the Kurdish masses and the Turkish government. The younger leaders, who had grown up in commercialized Kurdistan or in the more cosmopolitan cities, had new tools in their struggle against Turkish repression. In the mid-1970s, a group of Kurdish students began to coalesce around a fellow intellectual named Abdullah Ocalan. A self-declared Marxist, Ocalan denounced both the traditional Kurdish leadership and middle-class Kurdish parliamentarians for their ineffectiveness in bringing much-needed political, economic, and cultural reforms to Turkish Kurdistan.

Turkey: Kurdish War Since 19 8 4

Amid the political turmoil of the late 1970s—unrest that would prompt a military coup in 1980—Ocalan and his supporters established the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan or PKK). The party was something new in Kurdish politics. Unlike the clan-oriented Kurdish groups in Iraq and Iran, the PKK was led by nontraditional leaders with a nontraditional agenda. Not only did Ocalan demand an independent Kurdistan—in the age-old tradition of Kurdish rebels—he also insisted that it be a socialist state. His intention to wipe the slate clean of old-style politics and economic exploitation was an affront to both the Turkish government and the region’s established Kurdish leaders.

P K K Rebellion The 1980 military coup that overturned the Turkish government represented a watershed for the PKK. The slight political gains made by earlier efforts were undone in one stroke. More than 33,000 Kurdish activists were arrested, and 122 received death sentences. To boost support for the trials of nearly 500 others who were accused of assassinating 240 people (including 30 security personnel), the government announced for the first time that an underground Kurdish political movement existed. When the military gave up power to the civilian Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in 1983, things did not improve much for the Kurds. While Ozal lifted the martial law in effect throughout most of Turkey, he maintained it in the Kurdish areas. The military regime had left behind a new constitution and 628 pieces of new legislation passed between 1980 and 1983. These new laws contained, in many ways, a blueprint for a liberal democracy. At the same time, they provided for a larger role by senior military officials and restricted “rights” they described by catchall allusions to national security and the “indivisible integrity” (Article 14) of the state. In practice, these restrictions struck at the rights of Kurds and other minorities whom the state would view as outside the “invisible integrity” of the Turkish state. Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code, for instance, prohibited any association or dissemination that might weaken “national sentiments,” while Article 26 of the constitution and Law 2932 combined to ensure that Turkish remained the country’s only legal language. Speaking or writing in Kurdish or even using it as a name could be considered a breach

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of Article 3 of the constitution, which enshrined a “national culture.” Despite some legal revisions in 1991 and 1995, terrorism continued to be equated with a broad range of activities, including the undefined charge of separatist propaganda. Interpretation of this section of the statute was placed in the hands of the state security courts, made up of centrally appointed military and civilian judges. Left with few resources for legal discussion or debate, Ocalan and the PKK decided to embark on a strategy of armed resistance. Ocalan was convinced that no matter who appeared to rule Turkey, the military would always remain in charge and thus must be the target of resistance. After years of organizing a cadre of guerrillas, the PKK launched its first move against the Turkish military on August 15, 1984, with an attack on the towns of Eruh and Shemdinli that killed twenty-four soldiers and nine civilians. Little is known about the war in its first years, since the Turkish government refused to release its records and prevented outside journalists from investigating. What is known is that the PKK’s original strategy of a mass uprising among both Kurds and non-Kurds in the southeast failed in 1985, forcing the movement to transform itself into a guerrilla army prepared to expand its hold over Kurdish areas and resist Turkish military incursions for years to come. This tack was relatively easy to take in the late 1980s, the early years of the conflict. Operating out of bases deep in the Turkish mountains or across the border in northern Iraq—where the Baghdad government was too preoccupied by its war against Iran to interfere—the PKK used hit-and-run tactics against the Turkish army. The army was completely unprepared for guerrilla warfare, having organized and trained to resist an invasion by the Soviet Union. Gradually, with U.S. military guidance, the army began to transform itself into a counterinsurgency force. Helicopter gunships increased mobility and allowed for rapid response to PKK attacks. Moreover, the government quickly took the war into northern Iraq, attacking suspected PKK bases on the other side of the border. By the end of the 1980s, it was estimated that between 2,500 and 10,000 persons on both sides had been killed in the conflict. The government also began to employ strategies borrowed from the U.S. effort in Vietnam. It systematically drove the Kurdish civilian population from areas where the PKK operated, in order to deny the guerrillas logistical support and intelligence. According

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to Ankara’s own figures, 3,216 settlements were emptied and then destroyed, forcing the internal displacement of 362,915 people. Some observers suggest the true numbers were nearly 9,000 settlements and almost 3 million people displaced. Tens of thousands of Kurdish civilians were settled into barely disguised concentration camps in Kurdish towns or into the already overcrowded neighborhoods of western Turkish cities. Free-fire zones were then established along Turkey’s borders with Iraq and Syria to prevent passage of fighters and supplies. Syria actually aided the PKK in pressuring Turkey to release adequate water down the Euphrates River. In 1986, 45,000 Turkish security personnel were stationed in Kurdish areas; by the early 1990s, the force had grown to nearly 300,000. By contrast, the PKK had an estimated 10,000 guerrilla fighters. Meanwhile, the Turkish government instituted a policy of deploying peasant militias. In March 2000, these “village guards” amounted to more than 65,000 men, with an additional 335,000 to 400,000 family members salaried by the state. By forcibly recruiting villagers to defend their areas against the PKK, the

government was able to compel the PKK to attack local Kurds to obtain supplies and information. These attacks helped divide the Kurds, as villagers saw their family and friends killed by PKK guerrillas. The Turkish military and government said publicly that PKK guerrillas enjoyed little support among the peasantry, but it remained clear to outside observers that the continued success of the PKK could only be explained by the help they received from Kurdish peasants. Further diminishing the government’s eroding credibility were the massive street protests across Turkish Kurdistan in the winter and spring of 1990. On March 14, amid celebrations of New Roz—or the Kurdish new year, the biggest holiday in their calendar—5,000 protesters marched in several cities, a major turnout given the harsh sentences handed down to those who actively and explicitly fought for Kurdish interests in Turkey. The march was crushed by police, but this action sparked larger protests and more violence in other cities. The government crackdown was brutal. Prosecutors sought ten-year sentences for the protest organizers. The military—accusing the PKK of instigating the demonstrations—announced

Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the armed Kurdish resistance in Turkey and founder of the leftist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), ran a training camp on the Syrian-Lebanese border in the 1990s. (Scott Peterson/Getty Images News)

Turkey: Kurdish War Since 19 8 4

the establishment of more free-fire zones along the Iraqi frontier. The first Gulf War between Iraq and the Allied coalition in 1991 had a major impact on Turkey’s war with the PKK. First, in the midst of the war, Turkish President Ozal legalized the use of the Kurdish language for private purposes only. This was the first time in the history of the Turkish republic that the government had officially recognized the existence of a Kurdish people. For decades, the official designation for the Kurds was “mountain Turks who had forgotten their language.” Ozal’s decision, which antagonized hard-liners in the Turkish military, was based on his conviction that Turkey had to improve its stance on human rights if it was to gain eventual entry into the European Union. Since Ozal knew that the Gulf War was likely to focus attention on the Kurds, especially if the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein collapsed, he moved to head off possible international criticism of Turkey’s own record with the Kurds. The second major impact of the Gulf War happened soon after its end. When the Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein failed, tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees crossed the border into Turkish Kurdistan. The United States, which had suggested it would support an uprising, had not come through. Now, it was the Turkish government that sent the first shipments of food and other supplies to the refugees in northern Iraq. The action improved the international reputation of Turkey, and it also helped divide the Kurds. The Ankara government was already in conversations with the more conservative Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Massoud Barzani. Ankara hoped that the KDP would take up arms against the more radical PKK. The plan succeeded in 1992, when the Turkish military and KDP conducted highly successful joint operations against the PKK within the safe haven in Iraq. The Turkish forces did not always distinguish between the Iraqi groups and the PKK, killing supposed friend as well as foe. This produced acute tensions between the KDP and the other force in the safe haven—Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In May 1994, the two sides went to war with each other, undermining the campaign against the PKK. In the end, the PKK entered the brawl between Kurdish groups, attacking the KDP and fatally overstretching itself. The final blow to the PKK came in October 1998 when Syria, under enormous pressure from Turkey and

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the United States, expelled the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan. After failing to attain sanctuary in Russia, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Greece, he was eventually arrested by Turkish Special Forces, Mossad (the Israeli intelligence agency), and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He was returned to Turkey to face charges and almost certain death.

War Since the Arrest of Ocalan Once in custody, Ocalan adopted a conciliatory line toward his captors. In interviews and at his trial in 1999, he praised Ataturk’s legacy and spoke of the need for a nonviolent, democratic solution to the conflict. There was no talk of separatism, revolutionary socialism, or vengeance. Instead, Ocalan ordered his guerrillas to discontinue the struggle and leave Turkey—a decision supported by the PKK congress of January 2000. In addition, he arranged for a number of senior PKK activists to surrender as a gesture of reconciliation. In response and as part of a process of implicit bargaining, Turkey’s Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit declared that the state would change its policies toward the southeast if the Kurds would disarm. Equally significantly, even the Turkish military refused to call for Ocalan’s execution. Under the influence of a new right-wing government elected in April 1999, though, Ocalan was sentenced to death in June 1999. The Turkish Court of Appeal upheld the sentence in November of that year. However, when the European Union decided to accept Turkey’s candidacy for membership in December, the government gave Ocalan a stay of execution (nearly all EU member states condemn capital punishment). To remain on the road to membership, the government also began to develop a package of major constitutional reforms. Within the major legislative packages later passed through parliament lies the potential to reduce the marginalization of the Kurds in southeast Turkey. Reforms include the abolition of the death penalty, the lifting of the ban on broadcasting and teaching in the Kurdish language, an end to trials of civilians in military courts during peacetime, agreement to hear cases in which state torture is alleged, and the general expansion of civil freedoms of thought and expression. Still, much remained unchanged in the southeast. Emergency rule was formally ended, and Ocalan’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, but the issue of improved cultural rights for the

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Kurds living there continues to be problematic. Many of the cultural reforms called for by the EU were not properly implemented, and human rights protections remained thinner in practice than in theory. For example, Kurds attempting to return to their homes following the decline in violence were obstructed, intimidated, and occasionally murdered by irregular security forces. They were also obliged to relinquish their rights to compensation and frequently found their land mined or occupied by village guards. Outside the southeast, the military also continued to enjoy considerable influence, retaining a powerful voice within the executive branch of government. The armed forces remained at the forefront of economic planning and reconstruction in the southeast. The government worked to fulfill a plan approved in May 2000, but much of it was never made public. A key part of this program is the much vaunted South East Anatolian Development Project (Guney Dogu Anadolu Projesi, or GAP), which proposed to construct twenty-one dams and nineteen hydroelectric power stations and to irrigate more than 1.7 million acres across seven southeastern provinces. Estimated costs of over $30 billion (almost the nation’s entire annual budget) doubled per-capita public investment in these areas and offered the government great public relations opportunities. In the first five years, however, progress was painfully slow, especially in providing irrigation for small farmers. Some observers asserted that electricity would be supplied to major businesses in western Turkey long before local people would see trickledown benefits. Moreover, the plan apparently did not include land reforms to address the loss of land, homes, and the livelihoods of thousands when their lands were flooded for the project.

There were signs that Kurdish resistance was radicalizing once again as Kurdish hopes for improved conditions in their homeland went unrealized. In the Eighth Party Congress of the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in April 2002, Kurdish activists warned of the need to resist government efforts to disarm them. In 2005, in a sign that they were giving up on conventional activism, the members of the party changed their name back to PKK. With 4,000–5,000 guerrillas, it stepped up its attacks on security forces, with more than fifty fatalities reported for May 2005 and a series of bombings in tourist areas in the summer of 2006. James Ciment and Tim Jacoby See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Iraq: Kurdish Wars Since 1961; Iraq: Gulf War, 1990–1991.

Bibliography Barkey, H., and G. Fuller. Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998. Ciment, J. The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. New York: Facts on File, 1996. Ibrahim, F., and G. Gurbey, eds. The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Jacoby, T. Social Power and the Turkish State. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Kirisci, K., & G. Winrow. The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict. London: Frank Cass, 1997. McDowall, D. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000. Olson, R., ed. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996. Ozbudun, E. Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. Ozdag, U. The PKK and Low Intensity Conflict in Turkey. Ankara Paper no 5. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

UZBEKISTAN: Conflict with Islamists Since 1999 K A Z A K H S T A N ARAL SEA

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The origins of the military conflict between Islamists and the government of Uzbekistan lay in the fractured post-Soviet political climate of Namagan, regional capital of the area that included the fertile Ferghana Valley in the eastern part of the country. The conflict had its roots in the struggle between the political movement known as Adolat (Justice) and the Uzbek government. Adolat challenged the supremacy of the government and briefly took control of the local Communist Party headquarters in Namagan in December 1991, protesting the government’s refusal to build a mosque. Led by Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldashev, a wellknown local mullah in the underground Islamic movement, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev, a former Soviet paratrooper who served in Afghanistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) would rise from the ashes of Adolat to openly confront the Uzbek regime by calling for an Islamic revolution.

Roots of the Islamic Movement Initially an opponent of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the last president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, Islam Karimov, changed his mind following the failure of the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev

in Moscow on August 31, 1991, and declared Uzbekistan independent. The leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (former Communist Party of Uzbekistan) and later president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Karimov consolidated his control over domestic politics in Uzbekistan. He systemically either coopted or outlawed secular opposition parties— thereby eroding their base of support—leaving Islamic opposition only in the Ferghana Valley. Originally members of the Uzbekistan branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), Yuldashev and Khojaev became disillusioned with the IRP’s refusal to demand an Islamic state and broke away to form their own movement, Adolat. From its inception, Adolat lacked a political agenda, instead calling for the creation of an Islamicized society and the implementation of traditional Muslim law (Sharia) in Uzbekistan. As many as 12,000 young Muslims joined Adolat, which promoted an Islamic way of life. For a short period, Adolat enjoyed considerable grassroots support in and around Namangan for its efforts in fighting petty crime and corruption. In September 1991, Adolat activists stormed the local Communist Party office to protest the government’s refusal to build a mosque in an abandoned government building. Adolat came into direct conflict with the state when Karimov visited Namangan in an effort to mediate the simmering discontent at the declining living standards in the Ferghana Valley and was met by a crowd estimated to be as many as 40,000 people. Caught off guard, the president was forced into making concessions that included handing over the local Communist Party building to be used as a Muslim women’s hospital. Fearing the growing power of Adolat as a threat to the stability of Uzbekistan, President Karimov banned the organization in March 1992. Twenty-seven Adolat activists were arrested and given lengthy prison terms. The group’s leadership, including Yuldashev and Khojaev (who had changed his name to Namangani), fled to neighboring Tajikistan.

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KEY DATES 1991

In the wake of a failed military coup, the Soviet Union collapses; on August 31, the last president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, Islam Karimov, declares Uzbekistan independent; members of the Islamist political movement Adolat (Justice) briefly seize control of the Uzbek Communist Party headquarters in December.

1992

Karimov bans Adolat and arrests twenty-seven of its leaders; civil war breaks out in neighboring Tajikistan between government forces and Islamist guerrillas; Uzbek Islamists seek refuge in the country.

1997

The Tajik civil war ends, and Uzbek Islamists flee to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where they found the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

1999

The IMU declares jihad, or holy war, against the Uzbek government; on August 9, IMU guerrillas seize hostages in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, ransoming them for money, supplies, and safe passage to Tajikistan.

2000 In July, IMU guerrillas launch offensives in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 2001

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan destroys IMU bases in that country, effectively ending the movement’s struggle against the Uzbek government.

Following the outbreak of the Tajik civil war (1992–1997), Yuldashev fled to Afghanistan, where he established contacts with fellow Islamists from across the Islamic and Arab world. In addition to networking and fundraising, Yuldeshev clandestinely established underground cells in the Ferghana Valley that would aid the IMU in its military forays into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, Namangani joined like-minded Islamists in neighboring Tajikistan and fought alongside the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party, schooling Tajik and Uzbek volunteers in small-unit tactics, marksmanship, and bomb making, establishing a reputation as a daring commander and charismatic military leader. The Tajik Civil War pitted Islamic forces and inhabitants of the Pamir region against a coalition of neocommunists from Khujand and Kulobi forces. Several thousand Islamists fled Uzbekistan to Tajikistan, where they learned to fight with the Islamic opposition. The Islamists lost the civil war and, with the Uzbek and Russian intervention, fled to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Following the end of the Tajik Civil War in 1997, Yuldashev and Namangani retreated to the rel-

ative safety of Afghanistan, where they formally announced the creation of the IMU in Host that summer. They also allied the IMU with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The IMU issued an official communiqué on August 25, 1999, declaring jihad (Muslim holy war) and calling for the overthrow of the government of Uzbekistan. Consisting of a fighting force of about 1,500 guerrillas, the IMU was multiethnic, consisting of Central Asians, Chechens, Uighurs, Arabs, and Pakistanis who sought to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and replace it with an Islamic caliphate. The IMU received funding from Islamic organizations as well as Uzbek expatriates in Afghanistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and had bases in the Tavildara Valley of Tajikistan as well as the northern Afghan cities of Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Taloqan.

I M U Militar y Operations With its relatively small fighting force, the IMU could not militarily confront the Uzbek army, but it could carry out low-intensity guerrilla warfare in the

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A government-appointed imam (Muslim cleric) leads the faithful in prayer at a mosque in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent in 2002. The nation’s secular, Soviet-style leadership cracked down on Islamic political activity and practice in an overwhelmingly Muslim society. (Scott Peterson/Getty Images News)

mountainous areas of Uzbekistan and neighboring Kyrgyzstan. Its combat operations were organized by small mobile groups that used hit-and-run tactics before fading over the mountains to Afghanistan. The IMU began its military operations against the Uzbek government on February 16, 1999, when it set off a series of car bombs in the capital of Tashkent that killed 16 people and injured 125 civilians. The purpose of the bombings was to kill President Karimov and destabilize the government by targeting the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Cabinet of Ministers building. On August 9, 1999, IMU guerrillas penetrated into Kyrgyzstan, where they kidnapped the mayor and three officials from a small village before ransoming them back in return for cash, supplies, and safe passage to Tajikistan. Four days later, small detachments of IMU guerrillas appeared in the Batken region as well as Vorukh and Sokh enclaves in southern Kyrgyzstan, where they briefly occupied three villages and kidnapped a major general of the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry, four Japanese geologists, and three American mountain climbers. The IMU eventually released all

of the hostages in exchange for ransom, but the Uzbek Air Force retaliated by bombing the IMU-held villages around Batken and Osh in Kyrgyzstan. Following their incursion into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999, the IMU was forced to temporarily vacate their bases in the Tavildara Valley in Tajikistan and leave for Afghanistan, where they established bases and supply depots in the Talibancontrolled cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz. In July 2000, IMU guerrillas launched a threepronged offensive into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from their bases in Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Taloqan, as well as from its bases in the Tavildara Valley. Using diversionary tactics, the IMU simultaneously attacked the enclaves of Batken province, Vorukh, and Sokh in Kyrgyzstan, while penetrating deep into Surkhandaryo province in Uzbekistan as well as the mountains overlooking Tashkent. It fought poorly trained Kyrgyz and Uzbek forces for two months before retreating across the mountains back into Afghanistan. As a consequence of the guerrilla operations, Yuldashev and Namangani were sentenced to death in absentia in November 2002.

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Joining the Global Jihad The seeds of the decline of the IMU lay in its relationship with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, with whom it allied itself militarily. In July 2001, the IMU again attacked Uzbek troops in Surkhandaryo province before retreating to Afghanistan, where they fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. But the events of September 11, 2001, changed everything. In the opening phase of Washington’s War on Terrorism, the United States bombed IMU positions around Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz, allegedly killing Juma Namangani, who had become commander of the 055 Brigade of the Taliban army. The IMU sustained significant losses during the fighting in northern Afghanistan and was quickly routed by the Northern Alliance. While some members of the IMU survived the bombardment and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, it remained unclear as of 2006 whether or not the IMU could reconstitute itself as a guerrilla movement capa-

ble of mounting a significant military campaign against the government of Uzbekistan. Keith A. Leitich and Fatimakhon Ahmedova See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Tajikistan: Civil War, 1990s.

Bibliography Ahmedova, Fatimakhon, and Keith A. Leitich. “Ethnic and Religious Conflict in the Ferghana Valley.” Journal of Central Asian Studies 6, no. 1 (Fall/Winter, 2001): 33–43. Fredholm, Michael. Uzbekistan and the Threat from Islamic Extremism. Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2003. Naumkin, Vitaly. Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Spring 2003. Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Ruzaliev, Odil. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Lines to Complete the Portrait.” Central Asia and the Caucasus 73, no. 3 (2004): 21–31.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Middle East and North Africa SEA IAN SP CA

BLACK SEA

AT L A N T I C OCEAN

TUNISIA MEDITERRANEAN SEA LEBANON PALESTINE ISRAEL

MOROCCO

SYRIA IRAQ

IRAN

JORDAN PE

KUWAIT BAHRAIN QATAR

RE

D

SE

SAUDI ARABIA

GU

N

EGYPT

IA

LIBYA

RS

ALGERIA

LF

U.A.E. OMAN

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Lake Chad

YEMEN

INDIAN Countries in the Middle East and North Africa that have experienced conflict on their own soil since World War II

OCEAN 0 0

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250 500 Kilometers

ALGERIA: War of National Liberation, 1954–1962 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonial PARTICIPANT: France de Gaulle to political life and the creation of the executive-dominated fifth republic.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

SPAIN

Algiers

ATLANTIC

Setif

Guelma

KABYLE AURES MTS.

OCEAN

TUNISIA

Historical Background

MOROCCO Oil fields

MA UR ITA NI A

ALGERIA

SAHARA

MALI

LIBYA

Natural gas fields

DESERT

NIGER 0 0

250 250

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500 Kilometers

The Algerian war of national liberation from France was among the most significant anticolonial wars of the twentieth century and represented the longest and most violent revolution in modern Arab history. More than 1 million Muslim Algerians and some 20,000 French soldiers died in the eight-year-long struggle. The ideas and tactics of the National Liberation Front (FLN, its French acronym) served as inspiration and a source of methods for revolutionaries throughout the developing world, as well as among black nationalists in the United States. At the same time, the war represented a watershed in post–World War II French history. With some 1 million French and other European settlers in Algeria, the French government and French society were ideologically torn apart, as leftists called for withdrawal and rightists demanded the continuation of Algérie Française. In France, the war brought down the fourth republic and led to the return of Charles

Algerian history has always been dominated by invaders. Between the first millennium b.c.e. and the early nineteenth century c.e., this region of the North African coast was conquered and occupied by the Phoenicians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Turks, and finally, the French. Of these various invaders, the two most important, in terms of the legacy they left in Algeria, were the Arabs and the French. The former brought their language and religion, and the latter imposed a political system and the rudiments of a modern economy. Between these two conquerors were the Turks. With the collapse of Moorish Spain in the late fifteenth century, western North Africa faced the threat of Christian invasion. To prevent this, local sheiks appealed to the Ottoman sultan in Constantinople to send forces to the region. This appeal led to three centuries of Turkish domination. As a distant and rather unimportant province of the vast Ottoman Empire, Algeria was divided into four districts, each nominally ruled by sub-governors appointed by the sultan. In fact, however, only the capital, Algiers, and its environs came under direct Ottoman rule. The rest of the country was controlled by local sheiks, who paid nominal tribute and loyalty to Constantinople. This division left a bitter and lasting hostility between the peasant farmers and herdsmen of the interior countryside and the merchants and court elite of the coast. France’s involvement in Algeria began in the early nineteenth century. In 1830, angry with

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KEY DATES 1830

The French begin their occupation of Algeria.

1954

The National Liberation Front (FLN, its French acronym) launches its armed rebellion against French rule in November.

1956

The French grant independence to neighboring Tunisia and Morocco but retain control over Algeria; unlike the other two nations, Algeria has a large population of European colonists, or colons.

1957–1958

FLN launches a terrorist bombing campaign in Algiers and other major coastal cities; the French Fourth Republic falls in May 1958, partially as a result of the unresolved war in Algeria; World War II hero Charles de Gaulle takes power as the first president of the Fifth Republic.

1961

Fearing a French pullout, the Secret Armed Organization of colons in Algeria launches a terrorist campaign, killing Muslims and destroying infrastructure.

1962

French government negotiates with the FLN for an end to the war; the two sides agree to a referendum on independence for all Algerians; the vote goes overwhelming for independence, and the FLN take power as roughly a million colons flee to France.

Algerian-based privateers preying on European shipping in the Mediterranean and eager to shore up his increasingly fragile rule at home, King Charles V dispatched 37,000 French troops to Algiers in the last year of his reign. While claiming to liberate Algeria from the increasingly despised Turks, the forces of France brutally attacked and pillaged the city, an action that would be repeated several times during the early years of France’s occupation. For the next 40 years, Paris moved hesitantly to consolidate its control over Algeria. On one hand, the French government claimed that its goal was for a “limited occupation” in and around Algiers, and indirect rule elsewhere. On the other hand, the French began settling ex-soldiers and other French pioneers on lands appropriated from Algerian landlords and farmers. Resistance to French rule began very soon after the initial invasion but was hampered by divisions between tribal groups within Algerian society. Gradually, under the leadership of an Arab Emir named Abd al-Qadir—often referred to as Algeria’s “greatest national hero”—a united anticolonial movement be-

gan to grow in the 1840s. With Paris’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, a massive rebellion spread through much of Algeria in 1871. It took the French over a year and a half to put it down. About 2,500 European settlers and uncounted thousands of Algerians were killed. Between 1871 and World War I, the French extended their rule to all of Algeria. This effort involved four distinct elements. First, huge swaths of land were expropriated from Algerians and given to European settlers and landlords. Second, the French government passed a series of “native laws,” establishing the primacy of European settlers. Third, there was a conscious effort to divide the minority Berbers from the majority Arabs, by encouraging the Berbers to assimilate to French ways and offering them superior social status. (Berber and Arab Algerians are identical racially and religiously. The difference is that the lowland Algerians assimilated with the Arabs who invaded from the seventh to tenth centuries, while the highland Berbers did not. The two groups speak two distinct languages.)

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Finally, the French rationalized their rule over Algeria through the propagation of the mission civilisatrice, or civilizing mission, by which Algerians would be taught French customs and norms for their own good. Ultimately, this policy resulted in the development of a small Algerian elite—called evolués, or “evolved ones”—who came to serve French interests and, paradoxically, would come to form the core of the twentieth-century anticolonial movement. Algerian nationalism in this period was nurtured in three spheres: in the mosques, in the expatriate Algerian community in France, and among the Frencheducated Algerian elite of the coastal cities. The first group, called the Islamic Reform movement, emphasized a return to the roots of Islam, as well as the embrace of Western civilization. Their slogan—“Islam is my religion; Arabic is my language; Algeria is my fatherland”—would be adopted during the revolutionary struggle of the 1950s. The second nationalist element—Algerians in France—coalesced around an organization called the North African Star and its leader Messali Hadj, who helped found the Algerian People’s Army and whose slogan was the more radical: “Neither assimilation nor separation, but emancipation.” World War II had a galvanizing effect on the Algerian nationalist movement. The occupation of France by the Nazi armies of Germany in 1940 and the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in 1942 (together with the Americans’ explicit call for the liberation of colonized people) radically changed the thinking of many Algerian intellectuals. The change was also expressed by ordinary Algerians in great antiFrench uprisings in the cities of Setif and Guelma in 1945. Both were brutally crushed by French forces. Together, these events led to the formation of the Committee of Unity and Action, the precursor to the National Liberation Front (FLN), which launched the war of liberation in November 1954. In short, Algerian nationalism passed through several distinct phases between 1900 and 1954: a crusade for equality based on assimilation (1900–World War I), a drive for equality based on cultural distinctiveness (1920s), a political push for autonomy within the French Empire (1930s), and a movement for negotiated separation (1945–1954).

National Liberation War While the French security forces in Algeria suspected in 1954 that some kind of guerrilla action was about

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to take place, they were taken by surprise when guerrillas of the FLN launched simultaneous assaults on French army garrisons and dynamited infrastructure projects throughout the country on November 1. At the same time, an announcement went out over Cairo radio, outlining the demands of the FLN and calling for the Algerian people to join the organization in its struggle against the French. The reaction of French security forces was predictably harsh. Thousands of suspected militants were rounded up in raids throughout the country. These raids also targeted members of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), Messali Hadj’s new political party. Indeed, the party was banned, its files confiscated, and its leaders arrested. For the colons (European or colonial settlers), however, this wasn’t enough. They demanded a total crackdown on all Algerian political and social organizations. The French sent forces into the countryside to round up FLN guerrillas, but they were able to disappear into the mountains of the Aures and Kabyle regions, the latter the heartland of the Berber people. Despite their ability to evade the French, the militants of the FLN were forced to endure a harsh winter with few supplies and few supporters. Meanwhile, the new French government under Pierre Mendes-France decided to try reform as well as repression to counter the Algerian resistance movement. Mendes-France appointed a new governorgeneral for Algeria. Jacques Soustelle began a campaign to persuade French nationals in Algeria to accept the idea of full French citizenship for all Algerians. (Under the 1919 Jonnert law, about 500,000, or 10 percent, of the educated Arab- and Berber-speaking Algerians had already received citizenship.) The colons resisted extending citizenship in this way, unwittingly helping FLN recruiting efforts. Many new FLN members were disgusted by the colons’ resistance to reform. As the FLN gained experience in guerrilla fighting and established a more structured organization in 1955 and 1956, its attacks on French forces and colon settlements grew more numerous, audacious, and successful. When direct attacks on French forces became more difficult, the guerrillas switched tactics, going after “softer” targets, including Algerian collaborators with the French regime. Similarly, numerous acts of sabotage were carried out against the property of the French government, colon-owned enterprises, and, most commonly, colon-operated farms.

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The army reacted to this new aggressiveness with a policy of pacification, first developed during the French war against the Vietminh in Indochina from 1946 to 1954. In what was known as the “spreading oil patch” approach, the French army established controlled zones, which served as launching points for incursions into the surrounding countryside in efforts to expand the zones under army domination. However, the policy of “limited repression”—that is, attacking guerrillas but leaving civilians alone— confused and frustrated French soldiers, who understood that the many apparently innocent civilians were actually supporting the guerrillas. Under pressure from the colons, Soustelle was forced to enact a new, harsher repressive policy of “collective responsibility.” If French troops were attacked, nearby village populations would be rounded up, its men jailed or forced to work on army or government projects. In response to this policy, FLN leaders issued a call in June 1956 for reprisals as an answer to collective punishment. “To colonialism’s policy of collective repression,” an FLN manifesto declared, “we must reply with collective reprisals against the Europeans, military and civil, who are all united behind the crimes committed upon our people. For them, no pity, no quarter!” Thus, reprisals and counter-reprisals escalated, with massacres occurring on both sides. Still, Algerians tended to suffer more often and more harshly than colons or French troops. In August, the Algerian people rose up in spontaneous rebellions across the country, attacking European civilians at random in urban centers. The response of the French army was immediate and brutal, with troops firing randomly into crowds of Algerian protesters. Meanwhile, developments were occurring outside the country that would have a major impact on the war. In 1956, France granted the neighboring colonies of Morocco and Tunisia their independence. Unlike Algeria, these two colonies were not legally part of France and had very small populations of French and European settlers. Thus, their independence was achieved peacefully. However, independence for Morocco and Tunisia meant that the FLN could now use bases just inside these countries, protected from direct French army attacks and colon reprisals. When this became clear to the French, they established defense perimeters along Algeria’s borders with Morocco and Tunisia, which included minefields, barbed wire, guard towers, and electronic sensors.

In response to the new border defenses and the increasing crackdown on guerrilla forces in the countryside, the FLN embarked on a terrorist bombing campaign in the coastal cities, including the capital Algiers, in late 1957 and early 1958. The bombs were often placed in French cafés and restaurants by European-looking Algerian women. The random violence soon shook the confidence of the colons, but it also infuriated them and increased the frustration of the army, whose officers believed they were not receiving necessary support from the government in Paris. Meanwhile, both the army and the colons were feeling increasingly isolated within the French political environment and in world opinion. While leaders of the Socialist bloc countries and newly independent states in the developing world had long called for France to give up Algeria, now Western voices, including that of Senator John F. Kennedy in the United States, were added. At the same time, suspicions were growing among the French colons and the army in Algeria that Paris might be willing to negotiate an end to the war with the FLN by freeing Algeria. Together, these pressures and fears led to a fateful army uprising in May 1958. The events of that spring began when the army, supported by right-wing forces in France, sent tanks into the streets of Paris attempting to overthrow the French government. Only the return of World War II hero Charles de Gaulle prevented the military from taking power. De Gaulle demanded and got an end to the weak executive structure of the fourth republic. The constitution of the new fifth republic would grant extraordinary power to the executive—who would be de Gaulle himself. In response, the Algerian Nationalists, under the leader of longtime political activist Ferhat Abbas, formed a free Algerian government in exile. De Gaulle was acceptable to the army and to right-wing forces because they believed he would take a hard line with the rebels in Algeria, a view that he encouraged by tough-sounding rhetoric during his early days in office. Secretly, however, de Gaulle had other intentions. Using the newly expanded powers of his office, he opened secret negotiations with the FLN leadership in the town of Evian in the French Alps. Calling for a “peace of the brave,” de Gaulle announced the results of the negotiating process in March 1962: Algerians of all backgrounds would vote in a referendum for independence or continued affiliation with

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French soldiers interrogate an Algerian rebel prisoner in September 1959. The rebellion, which culminated in Algerian independence in 1962, ended more than a century of French colonial rule in North Africa. (John Phillips/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

France, and the French would continue to share revenues from oil and natural gas reserves recently discovered in the Algerian Sahara Desert and would maintain the right to keep military bases throughout the country. The vote was never in doubt. The Algerians overwhelmingly chose independence. Despite the negotiations and referendum, the war was not quite over. Unrepentant and vengeful French army officers and colon leaders formed the Secret Armed Organization and conducted a massive campaign of terror and destruction during 1961 and 1962, destroying key parts of Algeria’s infrastructure, killing some 3,000 Muslim civilians, and thoroughly eradicating any goodwill that still existed between the colon community and the Muslim majority. In all, the war cost as many as 1 million Algerian lives, mostly civilians, though French estimates were only 200,000. Some 25,000 French soldiers and colons also lost their lives in the fighting. The cost of the war—about $10 billion 1960 dollars—bankrupted the French treasury. Ultimately, nearly all colons— about 1 million of them—would flee to France in the months leading up to independence.

The Algerian Side Throughout Algerian history, the people have been divided by clan and tribe. Neither the Arab concept of the Islamic community, the umma, nor the Turkish sultanate was able to overcome this force in Algerian political life. The French simply ignored it by imposing their own regime. In some sense, the FLN that emerged in the early 1950s and led the nation to independence in the 1960s represented a new clan forged out of that struggle. Educated in French institutions or rising through the ranks by their talents and commitment, the FLN leaders took a top-down approach to the liberation struggle, refusing to democratize the movement or open up their decision-making process to the rank and file. As the historian Alistair Horne, author of the definitive English-language book on the revolution, wrote, “the more one studies the Algerian revolution, the more one come[s] to realise how well the FLN leadership succeeded in spinning an impenetrable cocoon of secrecy around the incessant rifts and dissents at the top.” The most significant of these rifts existed between the bureaucratic leadership of the FLN’s National

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Liberation Army, whose headquarters were in Morocco and Tunisia, and the radical and independent guerrillas centered in Algeria. Ultimately, the army would establish its dominance over the guerrillas by taking control of the negotiations with de Gaulle’s government, then purging the radical guerrillas during the early years of independence. In 1965, only three years after independence, the secretive former commander of the FLN forces in Morocco, Houari Boumédienne, would push aside the radical Ahmed Ben Bella in an army coup. Yet another division within the FLN involved religion, though the full implications of this would not be fully felt until the fundamentalist struggle of the 1980s and 1990s. Since the 1930s, leading Algerian clerics had pushed for a resistance struggle against French rule, seeing the Europeans as infidel invaders. The FLN leadership adopted their call for an independent Muslim Algeria but never embraced their call for a truly Islamic state. Indeed, the religious elements within the FLN ultimately lost out to secular nationalists whose vision for the future revolved around an independent and socialist Algeria.

The French The French side in the war of national liberation consisted of three elements: the colon settlers, the political right wing in France, and the French army. The colons and their right-wing allies were the most adamant in maintaining Algeria as an integral part of France. Throughout the history of the French presence in Algeria, the colons consistently refused to support any concessions to the Muslim majority, a major cause of the growing frustration and violence of the latter in their evolution toward armed rebellion. The colon members of the French parliament maintained a solid front and successfully prevented any such concessions from being enacted without their approval. Because the governments of the fourth republic were so weak and divided, any determined bloc could prevent the passage of legislation that it did not approve of. In essence, then, long after the majority of French citizens had become opposed to the war, the government was paralyzed, held hostage to a minority of colon and right-wing legislators. The army was more divided than the colons. Many in the officer corps, especially those that came from colon backgrounds or subscribed to right-wing politics, were determined to maintain complete French

control of the colony. These same elements conducted the failed coup of 1958 that led to the downfall of the fourth republic and the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. Like other moderates in the military, de Gaulle had gradually come to the conclusion that a negotiated settlement was necessary. Indeed, many moderates were officers who had become disillusioned with French policy during their service in Algeria. They came to believe that inflexibility of the colons and the brutal tactics of the army could never bring a stable settlement. These moderates in the army, together with the mass movement in France calling for peace, were largely responsible for ending the war.

Issues and Tactics Ultimately, the war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was about self-determination or continuing colonial control, but there were other issues involved. In 1956 and 1957, French geologists discovered vast hydrocarbon reserves in the Algerian portion of the Sahara Desert. Ownership of these reserves and access to them became a key demand of the French government in its negotiations with the FLN. Self-determination remained the key issue in the war, though it implied different things to the different groups. Algerian society in the early 1950s was in desperate shape. A rapidly growing Muslim population—benefiting from the advances in medicine brought by the French—was being crowded onto smaller and less productive patches of farmland, with few resources to develop it in order to compete with colonial farmers. Living standards were low, and unemployment was high. Added to this was an insulting array of laws and customs that made Arabs second-class citizens in their own land. Meanwhile, the colons—confident in their control—refused to accept even the slightest accommodation to Algerian demands for a more equal share of economic wealth and political power. Algeria was technically an integral part of France itself, but in fact it was largely under the control of the colons in Algiers and the army. For the colons, the struggle to maintain French control over Algeria was like the later struggles of whites in South Africa to maintain white rule. Both colons and white South Africans had moved to a nonEuropean land where their white skin and European citizenship guaranteed a standard of living and a social station superior to what they could have achieved

Algeria: War of National Liberation, 195 4–19 62

in their home countries. Both groups had nearly everything to lose. The one significant difference was that the colons were still close enough to their country of origin to return to it—which is what virtually all of them did before independence. For the French army, the war in Algeria represented a means to preserve what little remained of their dignity after two disastrous losses: their rout by Nazi armies during the 1940 invasion of France and their ignominious defeat by the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina in 1954. Eventually, however, with the return of General de Gaulle, the army was able to salvage its sense of purpose even as it was withdrawn from Algeria. The tactics employed by the colons, the French army, and the FLN were typical of struggles for independence in settler societies. The FLN employed several different kinds of tactics. First, there were hitand-run guerrilla attacks against French army outposts and colon settlements. These attacks continued throughout the war. To achieve both the element of surprise and the capacity to avoid French army sweeps, FLN guerrillas came to rely on sympathetic elements among the Algerian civilian population. In response, the French army increasingly came to rely on preventive measures, including population relocation and collective punishment. In urban areas, the FLN used terrorist-style tactics, including the planting of bombs in cafes and other spots where European civilians congregated. This tactic was employed only after the French army increased its effectiveness against guerrilla actions in the countryside. A final component of the fighting involved the colon population. Their efforts to put down Algerian resistance also took several forms including mob attacks on Muslim civilians, usually in urban areas after the explosion of an FLN bomb. At the same time, secret paramilitary organizations— including the infamous Secret Armed Organization, established toward the war’s end—worked to assassinate FLN leaders and make terrorist attacks on Muslim civilians.

The End of the War and Its Legacy The failed coup of disaffected army officers in May 1958, more than any other factor, paved the way for the negotiations that ended the war. The coup thoroughly polarized French politics, eliminating the

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possibility of a compromise settlement in which Algeria would become an associated part of France. Also, through a series of events the coup planners could not foresee, their actions brought Charles de Gaulle to power, the one person whose stature as the savior of France during World War II allowed him the latitude to negotiate a lasting settlement. De Gaulle had become convinced as early as 1960 that a negotiated settlement was the only way out of the Algerian quagmire, especially after the mass Muslim rioting that year proved that the majority of the Muslim population would not support France. At the beginning of 1961, de Gaulle dispatched banker and future president Georges Pompidou to meet secretly with FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella, who had been imprisoned in a French jail since his capture in 1956, at Evian. To get negotiations going, de Gaulle authorized Pompidou to tell Ben Bella that France would release thousands of Algerian political prisoners and would drop a demand for a ceasefire prior to negotiations, which had been the main sticking point for the FLN. Over the next year or so, the two sides struggled to reach a compromise. Among the items under consideration were the status of the oil and gas fields of the Sahara. France wanted a special status for this region that would give it effective control. The FLN refused. Eventually, a compromise was reached in which French companies would be given priority in exploration and drilling. In addition, France demanded a military presence at bases in Algeria, which the FLN eventually conceded. (France gave up the idea of military bases soon after Algeria gained independence.) Finally, on March 19, 1962, a cease-fire was declared by both sides. The Secret Armed Organization of reactionary colons violated the pact, leading to retaliation by FLN and other Muslim forces, and ultimately to the mass exodus of the European population in the months leading up to independence in July 1962. Algeria’s war of national liberation established significant legacies in both Algeria and France. In France it had already helped bring a permanent change in government, the fifth republic, which proved to be more stable than its predecessor. The war also helped precipitate a new French policy toward colonial possessions and shape the country’s role in the superpower confrontation of the Cold War. Rather than attempting further rearguard efforts to preserve its

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colonial holdings, France adopted a more conciliatory policy toward its former colonies. For Algeria, the impact of the war was naturally even more profound. The gradual conversion of the FLN from a ragtag rebel movement to a highly bureaucratic organization, with its own army and government in exile, soon led to a new struggle. This one opposed the top-down FLN leadership emphasizing bureaucratic control and centralized planning to forces advocating radical, democratic socialism. The secretive nature of the FLN, itself a legacy of the war, ultimately resulted in corruption, incompetence, and nepotism at the top. After the drop in gas and oil prices in the 1980s, the FLN government could no longer buy the populace’s allegiance with well-funded social welfare programs and padded payrolls at state-owned enterprises. Despite its iron control of political activity, the FLN lost its legitimacy and was opposed by the only institution that remained independent, the network of free mosques established by radical clerics in the 1970s and 1980s. These mosques and clerics would form the core of the

fundamentalist challenge to FLN rule that exploded into civil conflict in the 1990s. James Ciment See also: Anticolonialism; People’s Wars; Algeria: The Fundamentalist Struggle Since 1992.

Bibliography Bennoune, Mahfoud. The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830–1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Development. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Entelis, John, and Philip Naylor, eds. State and Society in Algeria. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Fanon, Frantz. A Dying Colonialism. New York: Grove Press, 1965. Horne, Alastair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962. New York: Penguin, 1987. Ottaway, David, and Marina Ottaway. Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Ruedy, John. Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. Tlemcani, Rachid. State and Revolution in Algeria. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.

ALGERIA: The Fundamentalist Struggle Since 1992 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious Social and Economic Causes

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

SPAIN

Algiers

ATLANTIC

TUNISIA

“Triangle of Death”

OCEAN

MOROCCO

Oil fields

MA UR ITA NI A

ALGERIA

SAHARA

MALI

LIBYA

Natural gas fields

DESERT

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The civil war between fundamentalist Islamist forces and the government of Algeria that began in 1992 became one of the longest and bloodiest religious struggles in the Islamic world since World War II. While no hard figures on casualties were available, it was estimated that roughly 200,000 persons— mostly civilians—died in the conflict. The war began in 1992 just before elections that the radical Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, its French acronym) was poised to win by a landslide. The Algerian military, fearing the militants and hoping to preserve its own authority, canceled the elections and seized power. Immediately the military began a massive repression of Islamist leaders and supporters. As the war continued, leaders on both sides began to lose control of their forces. Acts of wanton violence, torture, and terrorism multiplied. Neither side—especially the military-dominated government— was willing to negotiate in good faith with the other.

Algeria gained independence from its colonial master, France, in 1962, after a brutal eight-year-long war of liberation. In a negotiated settlement, the National Liberation Front (FLN) took power. It inherited a colonial economic infrastructure, designed primarily to serve the needs of France, and witnessed the departure of a large community of European settlers, who represented virtually the entire technical and professional class of the country. The FLN struggled mightily to overcome these handicaps, aided by revenues generated from Algeria’s huge natural gas and oil fields in the Sahara Desert. The state spent much of this revenue on industrial development, with an emphasis on heavy industry. It also invested heavily in social welfare, health, and educational programs, raising Algeria to the top ranks of the developing world in these areas. Deeply influenced by the command economy model of the socialist world, the FLN also adhered to a radical foreign policy. It supported revolutionary movements throughout the world and offered refuge to political exiles from both the developing and developed worlds. Indeed, several members of the radical Black Panthers settled in Algeria after being indicted in the United States. At the same time, however, the FLN developed an oppressive political environment at home. Following a brief experiment with autogestion (self-development), in which worker and peasant councils helped make decisions, the FLN turned to more bureaucratic economic structures. These changes were directed by Algerian Liberation Army commander Houari Boumédienne, who assumed power after a military coup in 1965. Virtually all the worker, peasant, youth, and women’s councils were placed under state control. Rather than

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KEY DATES 1962

Following an eight-year war, the socialist-oriented National Liberation Front (FLN, its French acronym) drives France from Algeria and takes power.

1988

Massive rioting over unemployment, a lack of housing, rising food prices, and FLN corruption break out in major cities across Algeria.

1992

Fearing a victory by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the second round of the national elections in January, the army cancels the poll, forces President Chadli Benjedid to resign, and seizes power; fighting breaks out between government forces and Islamists.

1993

The Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the militant wing of the FIS, issues a warning to foreigners: leave the country or be targeted for attack.

1995

Elections are held, but the FIS is prohibited from running a candidate; army-backed candidate Liamine Zeroual is elected president.

1997–1998 The GIA launches bloody attacks on civilians, killing thousands; some FIS supporters suspect the government is behind the massacres, making it look like Islamists were responsible to turn public opinion against the latter. 1999

New national elections are held as the government negotiates the surrender of some rebel groups; in September, voters approve the Civil Harmony Act in a referendum, allowing amnesty for many rebel fighters who surrender their weapons.

2004

Sporadic shoot-outs continue between Islamist rebels and government forces, but major fighting is all but over.

serving as democratic forums, they became a means to propagate and enforce policies enacted by political and military leaders. Worker and peasant democracy was given up in favor of rapid, state-sponsored, and state-directed economic development. Increasingly, the French-speaking elite of Algiers lost touch with the wants and needs of the masses of Algerians. These growing contradictions between rulers and ruled were masked by the wealth of the regime, which was able to improve the standard of living of a large part of the population, especially after the huge jump in oil prices in the early 1970s. Yet that price hike also sowed the seeds of future problems. State-

owned enterprises—many of them unproductive and protected from international competition—expanded rapidly, hiring tens of thousands of new workers, many of whom were redundant. The mass of petrodollars flowing into the country also fueled increasing corruption among government leaders. The contradictions within boumédiennisme began to become apparent after Boumédienne died unexpectedly in 1978 and oil prices collapsed in the mid1980s. Under the regime of his successor, Chadli Benjedid, several major policy changes were undertaken. First, the government cut back on the provision of social services. More importantly, an effort

Algeria: The Fundamentalist Struggle Since 19 92

was made to increase the productivity of the huge state industrial enterprises. This effort involved breaking them up into smaller units and giving managers more authority to make decisions at the factory level. Finally, heavy tariffs on imported goods, instituted partly to make Algeria independent of outsiders and partly to protect the country’s fledgling industries, were lifted. The results of these policy shifts proved disastrous. Given more freedom to run their enterprises but shielded from the consequences of their actions, the new managerial elite rewarded themselves with the increased profits generated by firing thousands of workers rather than reinvesting the revenues to increase productivity. With many smaller firms, the ranks of the managerial elite—mostly FLN members and their children—grew in number. As their incomes grew rapidly in the 1980s, they spent the money on the luxury imports formerly denied them by the country’s high tariffs. The cities of Algeria saw a proliferation of fancy cars, restaurants, villas, and boutiques. The increasing discrepancy between the profligate lifestyles of the rich and well connected and the poverty of the average Algerian, who was now increasingly unemployed or underemployed, became apparent to all. Other problems confronting Algerian society grew out of the very gains achieved by the FLN. Having expanded the health care system, the government had effectively lowered the death rate to near developed-world levels and reduced infant mortality; but it still encouraged Algerians to raise their traditional large families. The population exploded, particularly in the cities, which saw a huge influx of rural Algerians. Because the FLN had largely neglected agricultural and rural development, these rural people hoped to find ways to earn a livelihood in the cities. Algeria, which had fed its own population and exported food in colonial times, now had to spend billions of dollars in hard currency to import more than half of its basic foodstuffs. With rapid population growth, Algeria also suffered severe housing shortages, traffic jams, and deteriorating environments. By the early 1990s, the average age of the population was steadily dropping. On average, the younger population was better educated—more than 75 percent of the population was under twenty-one, and a large percentage had high school diplomas. However, the Algerian economy could not provide most of them with jobs. Many were unemployed and unable to find housing. Frustration mounted, as fewer and

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fewer members of the younger generation remembered the Algerian revolution that had brought the FLN to power. In October 1988 these frustrations exploded in nationwide rioting over rising food prices, lack of housing, growing unemployment, and official corruption. The government panicked. After several days of violence, it sent troops in to quell the riots. The troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing between 200 and 1,500 persons. The event shocked both the government and the Algerian people. The former tried to calm popular passions by inaugurating a policy of democratization. The press was freed from censorship, political parties and independent organizations were legalized, and elections were scheduled. In the municipal elections of 1989 and the first round of national elections in December 1991, the FLN faced serious opposition for the first time, including the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) based on the support of the Berbers, non-Arab natives of Algeria, and dozens of small parties. More important was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an avowedly Islamic fundamentalist party. The ruling FLN was left in the dust. The FFS gained the votes of most Berbers (about 20 percent of the voters), and the FIS took the lion’s share of the rest. Suddenly the Islamist fundamentalists controlled the dominant party in Algeria. With the second round of the national vote scheduled for January 1992, the FIS was poised to win more than the two-thirds of the assembly seats, which would allow it to amend the national constitution without votes from other parties. At this point, the Algerian army moved in. It dissolved the government of Chadli Benjedid, forcing the president to resign on national television. It canceled the second round of voting, outlawed the FIS, and declared martial law. Claiming to protect Algeria’s experiment in democracy, military leaders rounded up thousands of FIS leaders and supporters. Liamine Zeroual, the defense minister and leader of the new ruling junta, asserted that an FIS victory would have meant “one man, one vote, one time.” The FIS and its followers were outraged. We played by the democratic rules, they said, and the army violated those rules.

Rise of Fundamentalism Despite the FIS’s impressive electoral showing, most foreign and domestic experts agreed that perhaps

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only about a quarter of the country’s electorate were actually Muslim fundamentalists. So why had the party garnered such a huge vote? Arab armies had brought Islam to Algeria in the eighth century. Under the Turks, who ruled the region from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century, the practice and organizational structure within Algerian Islam split in two. An educated clergy, serving the court and the commercial elite, developed in the coastal cities. In the mountainous Berber areas and the peasant farmlands of the interior, a more popular form of Islam known as mahgourism (similar to Sufism in the Arab east) developed, based on the worship of popular sheiks and situated around their burial sites. As in other Islamic lands, the arrival of conquering Europeans in the nineteenth century sparked a religious reaction. Under the charismatic sheik Abd al-Qadir, a rural revolt exploded across the country, and it took the French more than a year to defeat it. This kind of unorganized reaction soon died out. In its place arose a new kind of Islamic thinking, borrowed from the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and other out-of-country sources. The Brotherhood and other groups of the Islamic renaissance sought to learn from the Europeans, even as they adapted Western ideas to an Islamic setting. They laid the foundations for the ultimate ejection of Westerners from Islamic lands. In the 1950s, the FLN’s revolt against the French was largely secular, but its appeal to the masses was largely based on Islam. Following independence, the FLN did what the Turks and French had done before them: they established control over the Muslim clergy and the mosques through official appointments and funding. This move was part of the larger FLN plan to yoke all institutions in the country to the ongoing FLN-led revolution. They called it Islamic socialism or, alternatively, socialist Islam. This formulation deeply offended many conservative Muslims. They pointed out that the revolutionary ideology was based on individual, not patriarchal family-centered values—and they saw the revolution as anti-Islamic. In the 1990s, when these leaders were battling the FLN, they drew upon Islamic teaching that advocated rebellion against heretical rule. At the same time, they began to develop a network of free mosques, especially in the growing shantytowns and slums of the major cities—institutions free of official control. There they preached a return to fundamental

Islamic values and offered the only independent organization for Algerians frustrated with the economic decline and corruption gripping the country. Of those who voted for the FIS before the 1992 coup, some were true Muslim fundamentalists, but perhaps a larger group voted for the new party as a way of expressing an emphatic “no” against the aging, corrupt FLN.

The War On January 11, 1992, President Chadli Benjedid resigned on national television. Formation of the High Council of State (HCE) was announced the next day. While it included government and civic leaders, the military was the dominant player. After canceling the second round of elections, they recalled Mohammed Boudiaf, one of the chefs historique, or historical leaders, of the 1962 revolution from twenty-seven years of exile in France, to give the new government legitimacy. While the FFS and even the now-deposed FLN condemned the coup, the FIS urged its followers to remain calm, fearing a bloodbath like the one in 1988. Beneath the surface, however, militants within both the FIS and the military were maneuvering toward an escalation. The military moved first, beginning with a crackdown on free mosques and illegal demonstrations. Among many arrests were the FIS’s two best-known leaders—Ali Belhadj, the representative of the older Islamic believers, and Abbasi Madani, a spokesman for younger, more technocratic Islamists. The FIS militants reacted to this persecution with a disorganized assassination campaign aimed at security personnel. In June, the hard-liners in the military turned on their own, allegedly assassinating Boudiaf for making overtures to the FIS. (Boudiaf was killed by a military marksman who was suspected of having links to military leaders, but it was never proven.) The following month, Belhadj and Madani, who refused to appear in what they considered to be a kangaroo court, were convicted of breaking aspects of the emergency law and sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The imprisonment of these leaders, say many experts, intensified the war. These two men advocated using the electoral process for Islamizing Algerian politics and society. With them in jail, other, more militant FIS leaders took control. Meanwhile, the military continued its crackdown, arresting no fewer than 10,000 suspected FIS militants. Many of them were sent to horrific prison

Algeria: The Fundamentalist Struggle Since 19 92

camps in the Sahara, which ironically had been built and used by the French in their war against Algerian independence fighters. Most of those arrested in 1992 and 1993 were not guerrilla fighters or assassins. Like most religious-oriented political organizations in the Islamic world, the FIS was a hybrid, being both political party and social welfare organization. According to Amnesty International, the hard-liners in the military made little effort to differentiate between these two elements, holding many innocent people without trial and torturing hundreds of prisoners. Militants from the FIS, many of them having left the organization for the more radical and violent Armed Islamic Group (GIA), began an extensive campaign of assassinations, targeting governmentappointed religious officials, security forces, bureaucrats, anti-Islamic intellectuals, and journalists. In September 1993, attempting to isolate the regime from international supporters, especially France, the GIA issued a warning to all foreigners in the country to leave or risk being murdered. Both sides increased their verbal attacks as well. The FIS continued to deny the legitimacy of the government, denounced its repressive tactics, and claimed that it did not have the support of the Algerian people. For its part, the government insisted, with some foundation, that the majority of Algerians did not want a fundamentalist state and had voted for the FIS out of sheer frustration with the ruling FLN. The two sides also charged one another with serving foreign interests, a harsh indictment in a country that prided itself on its independence from foreign domination. The FIS asserted that the governing coalition was a tool of France. The government insisted that the FIS and the GIA were both supported by fundamentalist forces from Saudi Arabia and had the backing of the United States, which, it was said, was eager to support the pro-market fundamentalists as a way to earn points in the Arab world. These mutual recriminations made negotiations virtually impossible, especially since the government simply refused to accept the FIS as a negotiating partner, even though the Islamists had, by 1994, formed an opposition alliance with the major secular parties in Algeria. Extremists on both sides were beginning to spin out of control. The government set up an antiterrorist police force, known popularly as the “ninjas” because of their black outfits and balaclava hoods. Secular death squads, many of them with connections to the security forces, began to attack both Islamist

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supporters and guerrillas in retaliation. On the Islamist side, the more politically oriented FIS leadership found itself in prison or in exile, with little control over its militant members and virtually no authority over the GIA. As the government took measures to protect its own personnel, the GIA began going after softer targets. Women were particularly vulnerable. Like other fundamentalists, the GIA had strong and reactionary views on the role of women in Islamic society. A campaign—if such a purposeful-sounding word can be used for a virtually leaderless network of guerrilla cells—began to force women to wear the veil, using rape, beatings, and even assassination. The GIA acted on its warning against foreigners in July 1994 by murdering seven Italian seamen aboard their ship in the port of Djedjen, 200 miles east of Algiers. In December, GIA militants hijacked a French jet in Algiers, intending to fly it over Paris and then blow it up. They were gunned down by a French antiterrorism squad while the jet was parked on the tarmac at the Marseilles airport. Rather than negotiating, the government appointed Liamine Zeroual temporary president and announced new presidential elections in 1995—without the participation of the FIS. In November 1995, Zeroual was elected to a full term as president with 80 percent of the votes. Most major parties had boycotted the elections. Elections for the national assembly followed in late 1996, with a higher voter turnout, a fact that the government claimed showed its own legitimacy and the basic distaste most Algerians had for fundamentalist politics. At the same time, Algiers continued to insist that negotiations with “terrorists” remained out of the question. It also established such a strong security presence in the major urban areas that bombings and assassinations of government officials tapered off. The government began to claim it was winning the war. These assertions were not without an element of truth. The GIA, growing more isolated, was forced into taking more drastic actions. It planted a series of bombs in the Paris metro, to force France to drop its support for the Algerian government. France, fearing a wave of unwanted immigration from Algeria should the Islamists win, made no secret of supporting Algeria’s military government. The real escalation of the GIA’s war was occurring in the suburbs and towns south of Algiers, an area that the local press had come to call “the triangle

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of death.” In both 1997 and 1998, GIA launched a series of attacks designed to disrupt elections and the observation of the holy month of Ramadan. Its operatives massacred villagers, killing some 1,000 or more people in January 1998 alone. Attacking almost anyone who was not a member of the GIA, the group engaged in particularly sadistic assaults involving the murder of children, the maiming of adults, and the abduction of women for the purpose of sex slavery. These attacks shocked both world opinion and the Algerian public. Some conspiracy theorists speculated that the government might have tacitly allowed or even carried out the massacres with its own secret agents, with the aim of altering Algerian popular opinion toward the rebel movement. One effect of the GIA’s bloodthirsty campaign was to have the Islamic Liberation Army (AIS), the military arm of FIS, issue a cease-fire that took effect on October 1, 1997. FIS and AIS wished to dissociate themselves from the massacres and perhaps gain better treatment for their members from the government. Another effect of the GIA’s terror campaign was the arrival, in 1998, of two delegations from the European Union to investigate the situation in Algeria. The EU delegates subsequently issued a report blaming the GIA for the attacks. The GIA’s policy of murder had also caused dissension within the group. A splinter group calling itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) spun off from the GIA in September 1998. That same month, President Zeroual announced his resignation, and new elections were scheduled for the spring of 1999. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who enjoyed army support, was the victor, although all the other candidates boycotted the election on the grounds of fraud. Bouteflika’s government began negotiations with the AIS, and in June 1999 the group agreed to end its campaign. It formally disbanded in January 2000. Seeking to build on this success, President Bouteflika embarked on a series of amnesties for rebels guilty of minor crimes. The proposed Civil Harmony Act would formally extend amnesty to all fighters, provided they had not committed rape or murder. The act was approved in a referendum on September 16, 1999, and became law. Many former Islamist fighters took advantage of amnesty and laid down their arms. President Bouteflika reported that

the wars between 1992 and 1999 had been responsible for the deaths of at least 100,000 Algerians. The Islamist terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, immediately improved the American attitude toward the Algerian government. It contributed military aid for defense against terrorists in Algeria and froze the assets of the GIA and its offshoot, the GSPC. While the GIA withered away, the GSPC continued violent attacks, even striking in the desolate Sahara. In 2003, a GSPC commander abducted German tourists there, hoping to receive a ransom. However, the 9/11 attacks reduced support for terrorist acts and intensified the search for terrorist leaders. In June 2004, the GSPC’s radical new leader, Nabil Sahraoui, was reported killed. While violence continued in Algeria, the momentum for peace was growing. Algerians were tired of fighting. The amnesty had reduced the number of rebels, and the murderous behavior of the remaining groups had turned Algerian popular opinion against them. The radical groups were also riven by factionalism. The GSPC, the only remaining radical force, had repeatedly broken into three different cliques. President Bouteflika won reelection in 2004, in an election observed for the first time by neutral international organizations. Large-scale violence in Algeria appeared to be over, although smaller attacks continued, making it difficult to achieve a settled peace. James Ciment and Charles Allan See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Algeria: War of National Liberation, 1954–1962.

Bibliography Burgat, François, and William Dowell. The Islamic Movement in North Africa. Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas, 1993. Ciment, James. Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Lazreg, Marnia. The Eloquence of Silence. New York: Routledge, 1994. Roberts, Hugh. The Battlefield: Algeria, 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity. New York: Verso, 2003. Roy, Olivier. The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Ruedy, John. Islamism and Secularism in North Africa. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. Stone, Martin. The Agony of Algeria. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

EGYPT: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Coups SYRIA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA ISRAEL Alexandria

WEST BANK GAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Jerusalem

JORDAN

Suez Canal

Cairo

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In 1952, King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown by army officer Gamal Abdel Nasser, inaugurating a new era in Egyptian history and a new chapter in the history of the Arab world. Ruling from 1952 until his death in 1970, Nasser set out to accomplish three things: first, to establish himself and Egypt as the undisputed leader of the Arab world; second, to unite the disparate Arab countries—and other developing nations, if possible—into a neutral alliance, independent of the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance; and third, to destroy Israel as a Zionist state. Nasser’s coming to power was one of the seminal events in the post–World War II era, and by registering significant successes in his first two objectives, he became the most dynamic Arab leader of the twentieth century.

Historical Background The cause of Arab nationalism dates to the nineteenth century, when the power of the Ottoman

Empire was rapidly diminishing and giving way to the conquest of the Middle East by European imperialist nations, primarily France and Great Britain. In part because Napoleon had sought to conquer it early in the century, Egypt became the first Arab “nation” to develop a national identity. Because of its unique culture and geographical position, Egyptian nationalism would take a different course than that of the rest of the Arab world. After Napoleon’s defeat by the British in Egypt in 1805, Muhammad Ali, a Turkish officer from Macedonia (then a part of the Ottoman Empire), seized power in Cairo. He rallied the urban masses to his cause and forced Constantinople to recognize him as governor. Eventually, when the empire reasserted its control over Egypt in the middle of the century, Ali would win the right for his descendants to rule Egypt, with the enhanced title of khedive. Ali also modernized the Egyptian army and bureaucracy, imposing his own independent system of taxation and administration. He briefly conquered the Levant and Arabia but was soon ousted from these areas by the British and French, who feared a powerful and independent Egyptian state. Ali also tried to modernize the Egyptian economy, especially its agriculture, in order to keep the lion’s share of profit in Egypt rather than have it go to Europe. In this he failed, and Egypt became another source of raw materials for the industrial revolution in Europe. While Egypt became largely independent of the Ottomans in the 1850s and 1860s, its economy was coming under firmer control of European enterprises, especially after the expansion of cotton farming, first set up to provide cotton during and after the American Civil War when production there was halted or limited. Later, the completion of the Suez Canal by a French company in 1869 enlarged markets for Egyptian cotton and other products. Short of

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KEY DATES 1922

Britain unilaterally declares Egypt independent with King Fuad as sovereign; a year after his death in 1936, he is replaced by King Farouk.

1948–1949 Israel unilaterally declares itself independent and then fights off Egypt and other Arab countries in defending its sovereignty over much of Palestine, sending thousands of Palestinian refugees into neighboring Arab states, including Egyptian-administered Gaza. 1952

In response to Arab humiliation over the loss of Palestine and British troops’ firing on Egyptian police, Gamel Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers, a group of socialist, reform-minded military officers, lead a coup that overthrows King Farouk.

1956

Nasser outmaneuvers Britain, France, and Israel in the Sinai War; the Egyptian leader becomes a hero to the Arab masses.

1967

Nasser leads Arab countries in a disastrous war with Israel; Egypt loses possession of Sinai and Gaza to the Israelis.

1970

Nasser dies and is succeeded by his vice president, Anwar Sadat.

funds, the khedive was forced to sell Egypt’s shares in the canal to an Anglo-French consortium in the 1870s. Angry at the subjugation of the Egyptian government to European interests, a group of army officers under the leadership of Ahmad Urabi attempted to establish an independent parliament as a check on the khedive’s power. Britain—which relied on the Suez Canal for a sea route to India—understood that the new parliament might prove less malleable and invaded Egypt, claiming that the khedive’s government was being attacked by rebels. The Egyptian army and the administrative elite, torn between loyalties to the khedive and to the parliament, were unable to offer much resistance. Britain abstained from asserting absolute sway over the country, but it quietly exercised almost complete control. At the same time that imperial maneuvering was placing Egypt under British control, government reforms were hastening a dramatic change in land ownership. Under Ottoman rule, all lands had belonged to the state and were farmed by individual peasants or peasant villages at the pleasure of the Turkish sultan and his governors. In the mid-nineteenth century, reforms swept through both the Ottoman Empire and

Egypt. In order to make better use of the land and collect more tax revenues, the khedive began to offer fee simple land ownership, in the hopes that this would lead to more commercial agricultural production. The families of wealthy urban merchants and rural sheiks, with their better education and familiarity with administrative procedure, gained control of most of the land, turning the traditional peasantry either into exploited tenant farmers or into a rural proletariat. By 1920, fully 40 percent of Egyptian farmland was in the hands of large landholders. Above all else, the land issue would propel Nasser to power and secure his place there in mid-century. The Arab nationalism of the late nineteenth century emerged gradually. As elsewhere in the Middle East, Egyptian nationalism began as a demand, largely among the educated elite of the cities, for a more distinctive form of Arab literary expression and personal identity. This cultural hunger brought about a renaissance in Arab arts and literature, and only gradually turned to political expression. The Arab reawakening was still hampered by internal divisions, however. Some reformers tolerated British dominance, believing that stability would provide time for moral and cultural enlightenment. More radical elements,

Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970

however, insisted that the British should leave immediately and that a new national identity could be achieved only in an independent Egypt.

Egypt: 1922–1952 World War I proved a watershed for both Egyptian and Arab nationalism. While the British promised independence to those Arabs who joined them in the struggle with the Central Powers (including the Ottoman Empire), they kept a tight lid on nationalists in their Egyptian colony. The British and their French allies would eventually betray their Arab allies by assigning them to “mandates”—regions that remained under European authority—after the war. Britain did, however, grant Egypt independence of a sort. In 1922, Britain unilaterally declared Egyptian independence but sought to keep a tight control over the country to protect the Suez Canal and other vital interests. It imposed the pro-British King Fuad as sovereign. This left the most ardent nationalists in the parliamentary opposition, where they kept up a constant drumbeat of anti-English rhetoric. A pattern quickly developed that would last through the interwar period. When the parliament, largely under the control of the anti-British Wafd party, became too obstreperous, the king would dissolve it and create a new government that would soon prove as contentious as the last. But the Wafd party proved unable to unite on anything other than opposition to British rule. Dominated by wealthy landlords, it refused to consider the only issue that would gain the support of the masses, land reform. Still, by default, it remained overwhelmingly the most popular party in Egypt. Meanwhile, yet another force was emerging in the country. The Muslim Brotherhood—founded by an Egyptian schoolteacher and first dedicated to a revival of Islamic piety—soon turned to politics, pushing for a legal, administrative, and even economic order based on the precepts of the Koran and later Islamic teachings. Through its network of mosques, the Brotherhood developed a number of quasi-Fascist youth groups, trained militarily and willing to undertake terrorist actions against the government. Thus, when Fuad’s son Farouk, an intellectual lightweight and playboy, ascended to the throne in 1937, a year after his father’s death, the Egyptian political scene was in turmoil. While Egypt remained neutral during World War II at the request of the British, who feared a Nazi

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attack if the country publicly supported the Allies, the British and the pro-Egyptian royal family remained immensely unpopular, and domestic tranquility was achieved only through the presence of British troops. With the war’s end, the political scene became polarized further. The Wafd, unable to come to terms with the land issue, declined in power, leaving a vacuum filled by the more radical members of both the secular nationalist camp and the Muslim Brotherhood. Demonstrations rocked the capital throughout the late 1940s. The establishment of Israel and the defeat of Egypt and other Arab nations in the first Arab-Israeli war created deep disillusionment among the masses and in the military. Since the late 1930s, when the officers’ ranks were opened to men of lower-class or even peasant background, the Egyptian army had become increasingly reformist and radical in outlook. The experience of fighting the Israelis was galvanizing. While the Jewish forces were disciplined, well equipped, and highly motivated, the Egyptian force was poorly supplied and poorly coordinated, faults that many of the officers blamed on the corrupt and incompetent Farouk government. The immediate beneficiaries were the Muslim Brotherhood, who fought bravely against the Zionist forces. When they returned to Cairo, however, they were savagely repressed by the government, leading one of their members to assassinate the prime minister after he had imposed martial law. Shortly afterward, a member of the counterterrorist police gunned down the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, Sheik Hassan al-Banna. Terrorist attacks and police violence continued. Increasingly isolated, the Wafd employed desperate measures to stop the violence, going so far as to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, which reaffirmed British control of the canal and granted England the right to station troops in the country. The Wafd-led government even encouraged the formation of volunteer “liberation” squads to attack British military posts. In January 1952, British forces surrounded the police station in Ismailia, which they suspected was the headquarters for a local anti-British squad, and issued an ultimatum for surrender. When the police resisted, the troops opened fire, killing some fifty Egyptian officers. The Muslim Brotherhood organized massive demonstrations in Cairo that resulted in rioting and the torching of a number of buildings associated with British interests.

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Fearing that Britain might reoccupy Egypt or help the king to reassert his power, the Free Officers, a junta that dated back to the Egyptian occupation army of the Sudan in the 1930s, made their move. Led by army colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, they overthrew the king in July and established the first republic in Egyptian history.

Nasser Gamal Abdel Nasser was born in Alexandria on January 15, 1918, the son of a local postmaster, though Nasser—ever assiduous in asserting his peasant roots— insisted that he had been born in the upper Egyptian farming village of his ancestors. In his youth, Nasser moved into the home of his uncle’s family in Cairo— his uncle having just been released from a British prison. There he attended school, while also participating in the many street protests that rocked the capital during the interwar period. During one of the protests, he received a blow from a British soldier that would leave a permanent scar on his face. Upon graduation from secondary school in 1936, Nasser attended university, where he intended to earn a law degree. Never a good student and more interested in political and military issues, he took advantage of a recent law that opened up the Egyptian military academy to members of the lower classes and became an officer in the British-run army. Both as a student and a cadet, Nasser was an avid and passionate reader of Western, Arab, and Islamic biographies, particularly those of strong leaders from the past. Like many other nationalist-oriented students and cadets in Egypt during the interwar period, Nasser subscribed to no fixed ideology. He listened to both the Islamic exhortations of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Marxism of Egyptian academics but remained uncommitted. Yet Nasser held true to two beliefs: Egyptian patriotism and the need to provide a better life for the Egyptian peasantry through land reform. While serving in the Sudan in the late 1930s— which was jointly administered by Britain and Egypt at the time, and where Sudanese nationalists were fighting to assert their country’s independence— Nasser met several fellow officers. Together they formed a group called the Free Officers. The other members included Abdel Hakim Amer, future field marshal of the Egyptian army, future vice president Zakaria Mohieddine, and Nasser successor Anwar Sadat. All three would serve together in Palestine, but they

maintained that the real struggle was still to come and would take place in Egypt.

Nasser in Power In January 1952, British troops opened fire on an Egyptian police outpost, killing fifty officers. With this “Black Saturday” incident, the urban masses increased their demands for action. Nasser and the Free Officers began to plan their coup. Altogether, they recruited some ninety officers in military posts in the Cairo area. On July 23, 1952, they staged an almost bloodless coup. Some of the more radical members wanted to execute King Farouk and some of the more reactionary members of parliament, but Nasser vetoed the idea, sending Farouk and other leaders of the old regime into exile. Nasser’s role in the coup remained a secret, however. So well disguised was his leadership that few were aware of it. Instead, they saw the country taken over by the Revolutionary Command Council, consisting of

Army Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (right) led the July 1952 coup that ousted Egypt’s King Farouk and took control of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. He designated General Mohammed Naguib (left) as the nation’s nominal president. (AFP/Getty Images)

Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970

eleven officers and secretly led by Nasser, and a puppet regime headed by Major General Mohammed Naguib. The council abolished all the old Ottoman titles and dissolved all existing political parties. For the next two years, Nasser stayed in the shadows, letting Naguib administer the day-to-day affairs of the country. One initiative Nasser and his fellow Free Officers insisted on from the beginning was land reform. As noted above, much of Egypt’s overcrowded farmland had come under the control of wealthy urban and rural landholding families in the nineteenth century. By the time Nasser took power in 1952, less than half of 1 percent of all landholders owned more than a third of the available farmland, while over 70 percent owned less than one feddan each (a feddan is slightly larger than an acre). Under the 1952 reforms, a land ownership limit of 200 feddans was enacted. Land held by a landholder in excess of 200 feddans was confiscated and distributed in 2- to 5-feddan lots to peasants, enough to support a traditionally large Egyptian family and provide a small surplus for sale. In addition, the reforms enacted a strict series of rent controls on lands still owned by the larger landholders. The plan worked. Rural incomes rose, and output did not fall. Unlike Nasser’s political moves in later years, his initial agricultural reforms would serve as a model for agrarian reform in many parts of the Middle East and the developing world at large. Nasser eventually grew frustrated with Naguib, however. The latter, a conservative career officer recruited by the Free Officers because they knew his prestige would gain them support among the Egyptian elite, frequently disagreed with the more radical thinking of the younger officers. Nasser tried to pressure Naguib into accepting the political and economic reforms—still largely unarticulated and unfocused— that the Free Officers had pledged to enact. Naguib refused. In October 1954, Nasser ousted Naguib and placed him under house arrest. After a series of maneuvers designed to eliminate his political rivals, Nasser emerged as the real head of state. Despite his growing power, Nasser faced continuing unrest in the streets, largely led by the Muslim Brotherhood, which believed that its role in overthrowing the monarchy had earned it a power-sharing role in the new government. The Brotherhood also made it clear that it opposed the kind of secular state Nasser seemed to be imposing on Egypt. Several months after coming into the open, Nasser was the

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target of an attempted assassination. His courage amid the bullets won him the admiration of the masses, and the gunman admitted he had been under orders from the Brotherhood. Nasser used this revelation to crack down on the organization, arresting hundreds of its leaders and supporters. By doing so, he squashed Islamic politics for the rest of his reign. In January 1956, Nasser finally announced his political plans for the country. He issued a new constitution that called for an undefined Arab socialism and a one-party state. As a concession to both the Muslim opposition and the devout Egyptian masses, he added a clause that declared Islam the official state religion. Nasser then put the new constitution and himself to a referendum. The constitution was ratified, and Nasser was elected by more than 99 percent of the 5 million votes cast. Nasser used this mandate to begin playing a more assertive role in the world at large, a goal he had enunciated several years before in his book The Philosophy of the Revolution. In that volume, he spoke of Egypt as the hub of three concentric circles—Arab, African, and Islamic. But to achieve that, he knew he needed to free Egypt from the remaining shackles of British control. As early as August 1952, the Free Officers had announced they were willing to separate the two issues that had stymied a proposed new Anglo-Egyptian treaty—Sudan and the Suez Canal. Sudan was granted its independence. The British were disappointed that Sudanese voters chose a proEgyptian government in the first election, and Egypt was equally disappointed that the new government declined to accept union with Egypt. The Sudanese treaty opened the way for an agreement on the canal, which was reached in July 1954, though not until Nasser authorized further guerrilla attacks on British positions to put pressure on London’s negotiators. Britain agreed to pull its last troops out but retained the option of bringing them back in case of an attack on the canal. Still, AngloEgyptian relations continued to deteriorate. At the first meeting of non-aligned countries in Bandung, Indonesia, Nasser spoke out harshly against residual colonialism, a barely veiled attack on Britain. Meanwhile, the United States was moving into the Middle East, through its Baghdad Pact, an anti-Soviet alliance of Muslim countries in south and southwest Asia. With his own ambitions to lead a nonaligned Islamic bloc, Nasser found the pact anathema and spoke out sharply against it. Still, the administration

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of Dwight Eisenhower took a generally benevolent view of Nasser at first, trusting in his strongly anticommunist rhetoric and the initially harsh reaction of the Soviet Union to Nasser’s crackdown on the Egyptian Communist Party. Of course, Nasser’s real objection to Communism was not so much to its ideology as to its threat to Egyptian nationalism and Arab solidarity. Relations with the United States, however, were soon poisoned by the Aswan Dam affair. In 1955, the World Bank—largely under American control—had agreed to finance the building of a massive dam on the Nile, aimed at increasing Egyptian agricultural output, an old dream of Nasser’s. When the bank attempted to interfere in the Egyptian economy, however, Nasser balked. The United States and the bank pulled out of the deal, allowing the Soviets to step in. Amid all this, maneuverings over the canal and tensions with Israel continued. Finally, these tensions resulted in a military attack secretly planned by Britain, France, and Israel, to return the Suez Canal to European control and return the Sinai Peninsula to Israeli sovereignty. After the attack began, the United States responded with a harsh condemnation of its allies and a clear signal that it would not provide moral or military support. Britain and France were forced to retreat from the region in humiliation, ending whatever lingering pretense the two had for continued dominance in the Middle East. Nasser lost much of the Egyptian air force in the war and could hardly be said to have won much on the battlefield, but the masses of the Middle East chose to view the conflict as a great victory and saw Nasser as the savior of the Arab world.

Nasser’s Decline At the height of his powers in the late 1950s, Nasser next tried to establish a more formal Arab alliance, by enticing the Nuri Said regime in Syria to join an Egyptian-dominated United Arab Republic (UAR). He had hoped to include Iraq in the new Arab republic, but the new revolutionary regime of Abd alKarim Qasim refused his invitation. Then, in 1961, Ba’athist party leaders took over Syria in a coup and ended joint governance with Nasser. The UAR was dead. Another blow came in Yemen. Following a revolt by pro-Nasser army officers, Yemen descended into a

civil war between republican forces and those still loyal to the family of the Imam who had ruled Yemen for decades. Nasser sent troops to support the republican forces, while conservative Saudi Arabia and Britain backed the traditional side. The 50,000-man Egyptian force soon became bogged down in a lengthy and costly conflict, even as tensions with the antiNasserist regime in Syria escalated. In 1964, Syria began to assert its own claims to Arab leadership by sponsoring attacks on Israel and King Hussein’s government in Jordan, which they blamed for inadequately defending them from Israeli reprisals. Both Hussein and the leaders in Damascus went on radio in 1967, taunting Nasser for his timidity in standing up to Israel, a direct challenge to his claims of Arab leadership. Nasser responded by ordering the UN forces out of Sinai—they had been stationed there to keep the peace after the Sinai War of 1956—and closing the Straits of Tiran, Israel’s outlet to the Red Sea. The moves triggered a massive preemptive Israeli attack on all three countries— Egypt, Syria, and Jordan—and a tremendous Zionist victory, resulting in Israeli occupation of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and its administered territory in Gaza, as well as the Jordanian West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Syria’s Golan Heights. Nasser, in short, had been utterly defeated and immediately offered his resignation as president of Egypt. But massive street demonstrations in his support— both spontaneous and surreptitiously organized by the government—changed his mind. Yet Nasser was a chastened man. Although he lived for another three years, he no longer commanded the respect he once had, even in the Arab world. An immediate consequence of the war was his decision to pull his forces out of Yemen, still short of victory. Other ramifications of the war in Yemen were also becoming clear. By 1969, Nasser had lost control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which he had originally established and controlled, to Yasir Arafat and his Jordan-based Fatah party. A second blow that year came on the Suez Canal. Eager to show that he was not intimidated by Israel, he launched his country into the disastrous War of Attrition with Israel, resulting in the wholesale destruction of Egypt’s canal-side cities to Israeli artillery barrages and bombings. Ailing and near death in 1970, Nasser sought a new accommodation with his enemies both in Israel and in the Arab world. He gradually reached a truce

Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970

with Jerusalem, ending the War of Attrition. His final official act was to serve as an intermediary to end the “Black September” conflict between the PLO and the government of King Hussein in Jordan. He died shortly thereafter, on September 28, 1970.

Nasser’s Legacy Nasser left a bittersweet legacy for Egypt and the Arab world generally. On the one hand, no modern leader had ever galvanized the Arab masses to the extent that Nasser had done. He effectively destroyed the old political and economic structures of Egypt, rebuilding on their ruins a more egalitarian, though hardly perfect, social order. His attempts to eliminate Islamic extremism from Egyptian politics, while successful in his lifetime, proved impermanent, as the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 and more recent massacres in Egypt can attest. Abroad, Nasser achieved much and lost much. His charismatic resilience ended old-style European imperialism in the region for good, even as it invited a new form of meddling by the superpowers. And while the non-aligned movement—which he did so much to foster and guide—had lost its reason for

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being, in the post–Cold War world, the paradigm it evoked of a world in conflict between the have and have-not nations lives on. In the end, Nasser’s greatest defeat, that by Israel in June 1967, was a result of his own grandiose ambitions. Claiming leadership of the Arab world, he was forced into a war he did not want and knew he could not win. James Ciment See also: Coups; Egypt: Sinai War, 1956; Egypt: War of Attrition, 1967–1970; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967.

Bibliography Beattie, Kirk J. Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Dekmejian, R. Hrair. Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971. Farid, Abdel Majid. Nasser, the Final Years. Reading, PA: Ithaca Press, 1994. Hasou, Tawfig Y. The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt’s Nasser and the Arab League. Boston: KPI, 1985. Lacouture, Jean. Nasser, a Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. Stephens, Robert Henry. Nasser: A Political Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971. Woodward, Peter. Nasser. London: Longman, 1992.

EGYPT: Sinai War,1956 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: France; Israel; United Kingdom 0

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0

50

SYRIA

100 Miles

SEA OF GALILEE

100 Kilometers

MEDITERRANEAN SEA British and French attacks

Tel Aviv Jerusalem

GAZA STRIP

Jordan River

DEAD SEA

ISRAEL

Suez Canal

JORDAN

E G Y P T Israeli offensives

SINAI PENINSULA

RED SEA

In 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the dominant leader of Egypt. He was charismatic, a nationalist, and an enemy of colonialism. One of his major goals was to force the withdrawal of all British troops from Egypt, including the Suez Canal. In July 1954, Great Britain agreed, in part because of American pressure, to withdraw its troops from Egypt over a 20-month period. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was deeply concerned about containing Communism in the Middle East, and he was pleased by Nasser’s public statements in apparent opposition to Communism. In addition, Eisenhower believed that the United States could develop a good working relationship with Egypt because of America’s anticolo-

nial traditions. In the next few years, however, the American president would realize that he had miscalculated on both counts. Nasser soon adopted a number of policies that conflicted with American priorities. He began by criticizing the Baghdad Pact, a plan for a broad alliance of Asian and European nations to contain Communism. The early signatories to the pact included Iraq, Turkey, Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. The United States, which helped organize the alliance, supported it but did not join. Nasser charged that the Baghdad agreement provided an excuse for the Western powers (including Britain) to keep their military forces in the region. He condemned both the alliance and the Arab leaders who agreed to become members. In April 1955, Nasser attended the first meeting of nonaligned nations (mostly from Asia and Africa) in Bandung, Indonesia. At the conference, he urged the attendees to align neither with the United States nor with the Soviet Union, the two superpowers engaged in the Cold War. He believed that nonaligned nations could devise a “third way.” U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that nonalignment was nothing more than a policy of neutrality, and he believed that nations could not be truly neutral in the Cold War. For Dulles, the Cold War was a conflict between freedom and tyranny, democracy and totalitarianism, and that neutrality was immoral. He also believed that many nonaligned nations were more supportive of the Soviet Union than the United States. In September 1955, Egypt negotiated an arms deal with the Soviet bloc. This opened the door for the Soviet Union to become a major supplier of arms in the Middle East and a major player in the region. The nations receiving military equipment would also rely on Soviet sources to provide training and spare parts. The deal demonstrated that the U.S.-sponsored

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KEY DATES 1952

Socialist and nationalist military officer Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrows the monarchy and takes power in Egypt.

1955

The Nasser government alienates Washington with its talk of neutrality in the Cold War and an arms agreement it signs with the Soviet Union.

1956

In retaliation for Nasser’s recognition of Communist China, the United States withdraws its offer to finance the Aswan High Dam on the Nile; in response to the U.S. decision, Nasser places the Suez Canal under Egyptian control—formerly, it was run by a British-French company; between August and October, Egypt and the Soviet Union reject the idea of international control of the canal; on October 29, Israel invades the Egyptian Sinai; on November 5, British and French troops occupy the Suez Canal zone; after facing condemnation of the occupation by the United States and the Soviet Union, France and Britain agree to withdraw.

1956–1967 The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) oversees a ceasefire and monitors the border between Egypt and Israel until ordered out by Nasser, as tensions that will lead to the June 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors grow.

Baghdad Pact had been ineffective in containing Soviet influence in Asia. In October 1955, Syria and Egypt signed a military alliance. Israel, which feared Nasser because of his public anti-Israeli statements, believed the alliance might be the prelude to another war. Nevertheless, the United States continued to believe that it could win Nasser’s cooperation. In December 1955, the United States, Great Britain, and the World Bank agreed to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile, which would help Egypt irrigate a huge area, increase its agricultural output, and provide the Nile Delta with electric power. Relations between Egypt and the United States did not remain smooth, however. In May 1956, Nasser extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China, the Communist government that had taken power there in 1949. The United States still supported the Nationalist government of China, which had retreated to the island of Taiwan. U.S. leaders believed that denying recognition to the Peo-

ple’s Republic and denying it membership in the United Nations could help contain and isolate Chinese Communism. They were irritated that Nasser had undermined that policy.

Crisis Over Suez Two months after Nasser extended diplomatic recognition to China, the United States retaliated by withdrawing its offer to finance the building of the Aswan Dam. Great Britain and the World Bank followed the American lead. On July 27, Nasser responded to the American action by placing the Suez Canal, which had been operated by a joint British-French company, under Egyptian control. He wanted to use the tolls collected from ships using the canal to help build the Aswan Dam. Nasser’s action was unexpected. America’s withdrawal of financing had precipitated the crisis, but the immediate impact was on Great Britain and France. The 1956 Suez Crisis involved two issues. First, did Egypt have the right to nationalize the canal?

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A political cartoon in November 1956 depicts a half-submerged ship in the Suez Canal. Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the blocking of the canal in retaliation for British and French bombing in the Sinai War. (Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-70158)

And second, how would the nationalization affect navigation through the canal? For Great Britain and France, the nationalization of the canal was a challenge to their political authority and a threat to their

economic well-being, since both relied heavily on the canal for transporting goods to and from Asia, Australia, and the eastern coast of Africa. Britain’s Prime Minister Anthony Eden made it clear that he would

Egypt: Sinai War, 195 6

use military force to reverse Nasser’s policy and if possible remove him from power. Great Britain, France, and Israel each had their own reasons for opposing Nasser. Taking the events of the 1930s as his model, Prime Minister Eden was determined not to appease Nasser as the allies had appeased Adolf Hitler, which subsequently led to the carnage of World War II. Eden was also convinced that the Egyptians would be unable to operate the canal efficiently, making it dangerous to international trade and commerce. He also saw that the major trading nations of the world would no longer be able to set the tolls for the canal, giving Egypt great leverage. The French opposed Nasser because of his antiWestern sentiments, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and his support for Algerian independence. They accused him of supplying the anti-French groups in Algeria with weaponry to use against the French government there. Nasser had also supported the Algerian cause in international forums such as the United Nations. In 1957, France and Israel were closely allied. Israel’s military capabilities had been strengthened by modern French military equipment, including warplanes. French assistance to Israel had antagonized Nasser and made him more determined to aid the anticolonial movement in Algeria. Finally, the Israeli government opposed Nasser because Egypt refused to recognize the Jewish state, prohibited Israel from using the Suez Canal, supported an Arab economic boycott of Israel, and defended military raids that resulted in the killing and wounding of Israeli settlers.

Differences Among the Allies The American approach to the Suez crisis differed markedly from that of Great Britain and France. Viewing the crisis in the framework of America’s global responsibilities, President Dwight Eisenhower made it clear that the United States would not participate in any military action against Egypt and that it would not support the use of force by others. Neither Eisenhower nor Secretary of State Dulles wanted to align the United States with Great Britain and France against the Arabs. To do so could drive some Arab nations into the Soviet bloc. U.S. officials differentiated between Nasser’s policy and the best way to respond to that policy. The United States criticized Nasser’s

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seizure of the canal, but that did not imply that Great Britain could expect the United States to support or condone a violent solution to the problem. The two issues were distinct. Nationalizing the canal was one issue, and how to cope with the situation created by Nasser was another. In August 1956, two international conferences convened in London in an effort to reconcile Egypt’s demand for sole control of the Suez Canal and the desire of many canal users for some type of international control. Egypt rejected all demands for the creation of an international authority to operate the canal. Nasser believed that Egypt had a sovereign right to operate the Suez Canal much as the United States operated the Panama Canal. The two international meetings failed to produce an agreement acceptable to all the participants. One reason Prime Minister Eden wanted the canal under an international authority was his claim that the Egyptians were not able to operate it efficiently. He was soon proved wrong. In September, all foreign pilots who had been working for the Suez Canal Company quit their jobs and were replaced by ones from Egypt and the Soviet Union. The new pilots proved to be competent, and the canal operated much as it had in the past. On October 13, 1956, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution favoring international control of the Suez Canal. Soviet support for Egypt’s policies guaranteed that the Security Council would be unable to resolve the conflict. Neither Britain nor France wanted to take the issue to the General Assembly because Egypt had the support of many nonWestern nations. The two international meetings in London and the debate in the UN Security Council clearly revealed the absence of an international consensus.

War Begins In the fall of 1956, France, Great Britain, and Israel, without consulting the United States, agreed on a plan to invade Egypt. British and French leaders thought that President Eisenhower would be preoccupied with his reelection campaign and want to avoid getting involved in an international crisis until the campaign ended. The election was scheduled for the first week in November. The 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt contained a

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Israeli forces conduct cleanup and salvage operations in the Sinai Desert after sweeping across the peninsula virtually unopposed in late October 1956. (David Rubinger/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

provision permitting the return of British troops if a third party attacked Egypt. This provision was an essential element in the plan to retake the canal. The Sinai War began on October 29, 1956. Following the prearranged plan, Israel invaded Egypt. The British and French then issued an ultimatum, demanding a cease-fire and insisting that Israel and Egypt withdraw their troops ten miles from the Suez Canal. British and French troops would occupy the canal zone to guarantee its safety and to keep the opposing sides separated. Israel accepted the ultimatum. Egypt did not. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire, but on November 5, British and French troops landed in Egypt. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev proposed a joint Soviet-American intervention to enforce the United Nations cease-fire order. Eisenhower rejected the proposal, and Khrushchev threatened to send a Soviet volunteer force to Egypt to implement the cease-fire. Eisenhower warned the Soviets that such a move would result in a dangerous escalation of the conflict. Although the American president opposed the actions of Britain and France, the United States remained allied with them. The credibility of

Khrushchev’s threat was difficult to evaluate because the Soviet Union was suppressing a rebellion in Hungary and facing civil unrest in Poland at the same time. Even without Soviet threats, Eisenhower was determined to force Israel, Britain, and France to withdraw from Egypt. On November 7, Great Britain and France reluctantly agreed to uphold the UN cease-fire resolution and withdraw from the canal without achieving their objectives. Nasser remained in power and resumed control of the Suez Canal. Israel—which had the most to lose by withdrawing because its military forces had won significant gains including control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip—also agreed to withdraw its forces. Eisenhower insisted that all troops had to withdraw completely. To oversee the cease-fire, the General Assembly established a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). It was the first time the UN deployed a peacekeeping force. UNEF functioned from November 1956 until May 1967. The commander of the force was selected by the secretary general and approved by the General Assembly. Initially, UNEF numbered about 6,000 personnel.

Egypt: Sinai War, 195 6

Reasons for the Failure The invasion of Egypt failed for a number of reasons. Most important was the opposition of the United States. President Eisenhower would not permit U.S. allies to use force to achieve their foreign policy goals. Even as he condemned Israel, Great Britain, and France for the invasion of Egypt, he also condemned the Soviet Union for crushing the populist revolt in Hungary. Thus, he applied the same standard to the Western allies and the Soviets. It remains difficult to understand why Great Britain, France, and Israel thought they could use force in Egypt against the expressed opposition of the United States. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles had consistently refused to sanction the use of force. When British Prime Minister Eden urged all ships to pay their tolls to the Suez Canal Company, thereby denying the funds to Nasser, the United States refused and instructed ships under its flag to pay tolls to the Egyptian authorities. The mystery of the British, French, and Israeli action is deepened by the fact that in each of the three countries there was strong opposition to the invasion even before it began. British and French troops had landed in Egypt a week after the Israeli invasion began, and opposition parties could easily see that military action was planned. The British Labour Party and members of Eden’s own Conservative Party publicly warned against using military force against Egypt. After the ignominious withdrawal, Prime Minister Eden received much of the blame, and in January 1957 he resigned from office. In France, the invasion was also opposed by members of the French Assembly. Critics warned that even if Nasser were removed from power in Egypt, France would gain little in its battle to retain its empire in North Africa. Although the Israeli military action had been successful, that success endangered Israel’s relationship with the United States. The country relied heavily on generous amounts of U.S. foreign aid, which had helped the economy develop since Israel won its independence in 1948. Although the United States

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had not provided Israel with military equipment, it had encouraged other Allied nations to do so.

Consequences Although the United States played the most important role in ending the Sinai War, Arab nations gave it little credit. In fact, the Soviet Union gained greater support in the area because of its unconditional support for Nasser’s Egypt. Premier Khrushchev had been generous in supplying the Arab nations with Soviet military equipment and economic aid, and he soon agreed to replace the United States and Britain in supplying financing for the Aswan Dam. Nasser’s defiance of France, Great Britain, and Israel in the 1956 war enabled him to become the unchallenged leader of the Arab world. He emerged as a significant threat to those Arab nations closely allied with the West, particularly members of the Baghdad Pact. In 1958, he supported a coup in Iraq that overthrew the pro-Western government. Later that year, he signed a mutual defense treaty with the new Iraqi government. For the British and French, the withdrawal from Suez marked the end of their long dominance in the Middle East. It was clear that events in the future would be driven by newly independent regimes and by the United States and the Soviet Union. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Cold War Confrontations; Anticolonialism; Invasions and Border Disputes; Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967.

Bibliography Childers, Erskine. The Road to Suez: A Study in Western-Arab Relations. London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1962. Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. Neff, Donald. Warriors at Suez. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. Ovendale, Ritchie. The Arab-Israeli Wars. New York: Longman, 1992. Thomas, Hugh. Suez. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.

EGYPT: War of Attrition,1967–1970 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANT: Israel

Alexandria

WEST BANK GAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Jerusalem

JORDAN

Suez Canal

Cairo

now closed because of war damage and Israel’s presence on its eastern bank. This situation was particularly galling to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had risen to preeminence in the Arab world and had led the assault against Israel. Nasser, who had suffered a series of setbacks before the 1967 war, offered his resignation after the defeat but was dissuaded by mass demonstrations of support by the Egyptian people. While Nasser’s dominance of the region was over, his animosity toward Israel was not. Determined to salvage his own and Egypt’s dignity, Nasser began a series of attacks on Israel’s forces along the Suez Canal that sparked retaliation and counter-retaliation in an escalating low-intensity conflict that came to be called the “War of Attrition.”

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In the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors—popularly known as the Six-Day War—Israel emerged victorious, having captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Seemingly decisive, the war actually created a powerful backlash in Arab nations, leaving the Middle East in an even more unsettled state. The following summer, the Arab states met in Khartoum, Sudan, and issued their infamous “three no’s”: no to recognition of Israel, no to direct negotiations, and no to a permanent peace treaty. The reasons for their obstinacy were obvious. No self-respecting Arab leader could accept the outcome of that war. Israel, after its conquests, had acted quickly to formalize its control over Jerusalem by declaring the entire metropolitan region part of the Israeli state. Moreover, Israel’s occupation of the Sinai was not only a military setback but a disaster for the Egyptian economy. Egypt had lost the small but symbolically important oilfields of the southern Sinai and the substantial revenues from the Suez Canal,

The War Whether suggested by the Soviet Union—itself disappointed by the poor showing of its armaments in the 1967 war—or developed by Nasser himself, both agreed that Egypt should resume low-level hostilities immediately following the Six-Day War to let the world and Israel know that the current stalemate was unacceptable. If Egypt could maintain tension in the region and keep the canal closed, Nasser hoped that the international community would put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai without requiring corresponding concessions from Egypt. The first ambushes of Israeli forces on the canal occurred on July 1, 1967, less than a month after the end of the Six-Day War. The attack triggered an exchange of artillery fire that left several soldiers dead on both sides. The UN Security Council, still in emergency session over the Six-Day War, won Israeli and Egyptian agreement to set up a series of observation posts on both sides of the canal. The two combatants disagreed, however, over the precise cease-fire line—

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Egypt: War of Attrition, 19 67–1970

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KEY DATES 1967 In six days of fighting in June, Egypt loses control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza to the Israelis, who now occupy the east bank of the Suez Canal; Nasser launches ambushes against Israeli forces on the Suez Canal on July 1; the attacks trigger an exchange of artillery fire; in September, more artillery exchanges send 750,000 Egyptian refugees from the canal zone. 1968 On October 31, Israeli commandos penetrate deep into Egypt, blowing up bridges and a power station. 1969 After six months of quiet, Israel shoots down several Egyptian reconnaissance planes, triggering more artillery exchanges. 1970

With Israeli bombings causing much damage and Soviet-supplied jets and surface-to-air missiles shooting down Israeli planes, both sides agree to a cease-fire in August; Nasser dies on September 28 and is replaced by Anwar Sadat, who proves less hostile to Israel.

Egypt insisted it lay along the canal’s eastern bank, while Israel maintained that it ran down the middle of the waterway. Egypt carried out further naval and air attacks in mid-July, though both sides eventually ceased hostilities after some two dozen soldiers had been killed. Another engagement occurred in September, again over demarcation of the cease-fire line, when Egypt fired on Israeli ships navigating along the Israeli side of the canal. Jewish forces responded with a blistering artillery attack on the Egyptian canal cities of Kantara, Suez City, and Ismailia, forcing thousands of civilians to abandon their homes. These were the first of some 750,000 Egyptian refugees who would be driven from the war zone to the interior of Egypt. A month later, Egypt fired a missile at the Israeli destroyer Eilat, hitting the vessel and killing nearly one quarter of the 200-man crew. Again, Israel responded with a massive artillery assault, this time targeted on an Egyptian oil refinery in Suez City. Despite these losses, Nasser used the year following the 1967 war to rebuild his forces in a process he called “defensive rehabilitation.” With Soviet assistance, he rebuilt the Egyptian military—with the exception of the air force—back to its prewar size. In 1968, Nasser increased Egyptian troops on the western bank of the canal to 150,000 men, including several hundred Soviet advisers, and for the next month

and a half, Egypt unleashed a massive but intermittent artillery assault on Israeli forces. On October 31, 1968, Israeli commandos penetrated deep into Egypt, blowing up two bridges and a power station. Nasser responded by setting up a militia force to defend infrastructure projects against future attack. Once again, quiet returned to the canal. Israel used the lull to fortify its defenses along the canal and in the Sinai. Under a plan developed by Major-General Yeshavahu Gavish, head of the southern command and leader of Israel’s forces in the Sinai during the Six-Day War, Israel established a series of posts at key crossing points on the canal. Lightly defended, these were maintained as observation points during lulls in the fighting and staging points for a mobile defense. In addition, a system of pipelines was installed that could pump oil into the canal and be set afire if the Egyptians attempted to cross it en masse. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Israeli Chief of Staff General Chaim Bar-Lev, Israel decided to construct a more elaborate set of defenses along the canal, with fortifications designed to withstand the heaviest artillery assaults. Nasser immediately recognized that the construction of the so-called Bar-Lev line, the largest engineering project ever undertaken by Israel, represented a potentially permanent Jewish presence along the canal. To slow the progress of

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construction, Egyptian marksmen sniped at Israeli workers and soldiers. In March 1969, six months of silence along the canal came to an end. After several Egyptian reconnaissance planes were shot down, an artillery battle broke out that caused casualties on both sides, including Egyptian Chief of Staff General Abd alMuneim Riadh. At this point, Nasser announced that the “liberation phase” of the war had begun. Knowing how seriously the Israeli government and population took every soldier’s death, Nasser hoped to create growing dissent within Israel over the losses of men on a battlefield where the lines never changed and the Egyptians with their superior numbers and superior artillery had an advantage. In addition, Nasser hoped that the constant barrage would eventually soften Israeli defenses, allowing him an opportunity to invade where he sensed the Israelis were at their weakest. It did not work out that way. To prevent the slow attrition of men, Israel beefed up its system of defenses along the canal, with an eye to the provision of maximum protection from Egyptian artillery fire and prevention of any Egyptian crossing of the canal. Thus, the artillery battle grew in intensity through 1969, culminating in Egypt’s unsuccessful armored raid against Israeli positions at the southern end of the canal in September. At this point, Israel tried a new tactic. Rather than bring up more of their precious artillery to the Suez front, the Israeli Defense Forces decided to use their superiority in fighter jets as a kind of “flying artillery.” The failure of the Egyptians to stop the Israeli fighters with Soviet-supplied jets and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) led to a greater and more direct involvement by the Russians. By early 1970, the Soviets had supplied the Egyptians with the latest in Soviet SAM technology. In addition, they lent Egypt some of their most advanced fighter craft but insisted

the craft be flown by Soviet pilots. Israeli defense forces retaliated by launching massive bombing attacks on Egyptian bases deep within the country. Egypt then responded with more frequent and largescale hit-and-run attacks on Israeli posts in the Sinai, backed up by Soviet aircraft engaging Israeli jets in dogfights over the Sinai.

Cease-Fire By July 1970, both sides were stymied. The new Soviet air defenses were causing unacceptable losses of Israeli aircraft while Israeli bombing attacks on Egyptian bases were damaging the morale of the Egyptians. The mounting losses—combined perhaps with more personal reasons—soon led to a cease-fire, proposed by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers as part of a comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East. Nasser accepted, and Israel followed suit. The cease-fire went into effect on August 8, 1970. Nasser was mortally ill and may have wanted to make peace before he died. Others say he may have believed that his successor could make use of a lull to prepare for the next war, which is exactly what Anwar Sadat would do. As for Secretary of State Rogers’s comprehensive peace plan, it never got off the ground. James Ciment See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970; Egypt: Sinai War, 1956; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967; Israel: Yom Kippur War, 1973.

Bibliography Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence Through Lebanon. New York: Random House, 1982. Ovendale, Ritchie. The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars. London: Longman, 1992. Taylor, Alan. The Superpowers in the Middle East. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.

IRAN: Coup Against Mossadegh,1953 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coup TURKEY

U.S.S.R

CASPIAN SEA

Oil field

Tehran AFGHANISTAN

IRAQ

IRAN PAKISTAN

KUWAIT

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250

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500 Kilometers

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The coup against Mohammed Mossadegh, the prime minister of Iran from 1951 until 1953, represented a key moment in the geopolitical history of Southwest Asia. With the fall of the leftist Mossadegh government, the West was assured of a supportive Iran, rather than a neutral one, or worse, an Iran allied with the Soviet Union. At the same time, U.S. involvement in the coup marked a new foreign policy strategy in Washington in which potentially hostile governments would be overthrown through subversion directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rather than military force.

Historical Background The decade preceding Mossadegh’s rise to power had been a tumultuous one in Iran. In 1941, the British and the Soviets—allied in their struggle against Germany during World War II—deposed the pro-Nazi shah of Iran in favor of his pro-Western son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The two powers also occupied Iran for the duration of the war. In 1946, after the war, the Soviets moved to support the establishment of two independent republics among the ethnic minorities of northwest Iran: Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Confronted by the Americans

and British, however, the Soviets were forced to back down, allowing the shah’s military forces to crush the independent republics and reunite them with Iran. This enhanced the reputation of the shah—previously perceived as a puppet of the British—and Iran’s military forces. Iran’s military chief of staff was General Ali Razmara, who had led the country to victory over Azerbaijan. In June 1950, under the rules of the 1906 Constitution, the shah appointed Razmara prime minister. Though competent and moderate, Razmara was caught between irreconcilable political forces in Iran. Pro-shah conservatives wanted Razmara to shift power from the Majlis, or parliament, to the palace, while the radicals expected him to shift power in the opposite direction. Above all, all Iranian nationalists, whether conservative or radical, demanded that Razmara confront the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Established by the British before 1920, the AIOC had enjoyed extremely favorable financial terms in extracting and selling Iranian oil. It earned more reselling surplus oil outside the country than the Iranian treasury received in royalties. Popular pressure had been building since the end of World War II to renegotiate the terms of the treaty with the AIOC. In 1949, Iran and the AIOC had signed the Supplemental Oil Agreement, providing for a 50–50 split in earnings. Many, however, saw this agreement as too little too late. While Razmara supported the agreement, the Majlis did not. In February 1951, they flatly voted it down, establishing a commission—headed by Mohammed Mossadegh— to take further action. Everyone knew that the commission would recommend nationalization, a position that Razmara argued was untenable and would bring down the wrath of the Western powers on a virtually helpless Iran. Razmara’s opposition soon became academic. On March 7, he was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic, who was quickly hailed as a hero by the people of Iran.

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KEY DATES 1941

Soviet and British forces depose the pro-Nazi shah of Iran in favor of his pro-Allies son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

1946

The Soviets move to support establishment of two independent republics in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

1949

The Iranian government signs the Supplemental Oil Agreement with the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), splitting oil revenues 50–50 between the company and Iran.

1950

The shah appoints General Ali Razmara, who had crushed the independence movement in Azerbaijan, as prime minister.

1951

The Majlis, Iran’s parliament, votes down the 1949 oil agreement in February; in March, Razmara is assassinated by nationalists; popular pressure forces the shah to appoint Mohammed Mossadegh, the leftwing nationalist who called for the nationalization of AIOC holdings in Iran, as prime minister; the parliament votes to nationalize the AIOC.

1952

Mossadegh appoints a new war minister; when the shah refuses to ratify the appointment, Mossadegh resigns; the shah appoints a conservative as prime minister, but popular protest forces him to reappoint Mossadegh.

1953

Military officers, backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, fail in a February coup attempt against Mossadegh; with political turmoil intensifying, the CIA convinces the shah to flee the country on August 17; on August 19, the military takes control of government buildings; on August 21, the military arrests Mossadegh; the shah returns to the country on August 23.

1967

Under house arrest since 1953, Mossadegh dies of natural causes.

1979

The shah of Iran is overthrown in an Islamist revolution.

Mossadegh Takes Power While the shah would have preferred to appoint a moderate—perhaps even a military man—as Razmara’s replacement, pressure was building both in the Majlis and the country to appoint Mossadegh. As a strong advocate of nationalizing the AIOC and the leader of a loose parliamentary alliance known as the National Front, Mossadegh seemed unassailable. The shah bowed to popular pressure and appointed him prime minister. Despite his popularity, however, Mossadegh’s power was more apparent than real. He did not have

the support of the shah or the military. The conservative landlord class distrusted his rhetoric on land reform, and the Islamic clergy were suspicious of his liberal social views. Indeed, even as he took office, pressure was building among conservatives to undercut his power. For this reason, Mossadegh—who was not a Communist—enlisted the support of Iran’s powerful Communist Party, the Tudeh. He also appealed directly to the people, telling them they would be lifted out of poverty once the AIOC was nationalized, a promise that was bound to be unfulfilled since the inequities of Iranian society went far beyond the oil industry.

Iran: Coup Against Mossadegh, 1953

On the other hand, Mossadegh was no fool and knew he had to proceed cautiously with nationalization. Unfortunately for the new prime minister, the Majlis left him little maneuvering room, passing a bill nationalizing the AIOC—and paying just compensation—in the weeks following Razmara’s assassination. Britain’s reaction to the nationalization was fierce. The Labour Party, which had a more open attitude toward the developing world, had recently come to power, but Britain itself was still recovering from World War II and desperately needed the economic lift provided by cheap Iranian oil and the additional revenue it earned by reselling the surplus to other countries. The government appealed to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but the court ruled that as long as Iran paid just compensation, it had the right to nationalize AIOC. Britain moved to establish an international boycott on Iranian oil exports and to freeze Iranian assets in Britain. Both measures were extremely effective, plunging the Iranian economy into recession. This not only encouraged Mossadegh’s conservative opponents but also alienated the masses, who had expected nationalization to bring economic rewards that even they would enjoy. Realizing he had to neutralize the boycott, Mossadegh decided to appeal to the only international power that might be able to force the British to back down. Following an address to the UN Security Council in September 1951, Mossadegh met with U.S. President Harry Truman, hoping that the United States would live up to its anticolonialist rhetoric and support Iran. Truman, who feared that Mossadegh’s relations with Iran’s Communist Party could lead to increased Soviet influence, flatly refused Mossadegh’s plea for support in ending the British boycott. Mossadegh returned to Tehran empty-handed. Meanwhile, the political scene in the Iranian capital was reaching the boiling point, as nationalists cursed the United States and Britain, and leftists maneuvered to push through radical land reform. Sympathetic to the cause of reform, Mossadegh also realized that moves in this direction could set off a military coup. On July 16, 1952, he insisted on appointing a new minister of war, until then a prerogative of the shah. When the shah refused permission, Mossadegh resigned, and the shah appointed a conservative as president. Within a week, however, mass

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protests forced the shah to back down and reappoint Mossadegh. From this point on, Mossadegh assumed neartotal authority over the government, assuming the position of war minister (now called defense minister) and persuading the Majlis to grant him emergency powers. He used this new authority to push land reform and a more progressive taxation system—two measures guaranteed to offend conservatives. He also went after the shah, confiscating some of his estates and cutting off his official contacts with foreign diplomats. Still, despite his seemingly unassailable power, Mossadegh’s political position rested on the fragile base of the National Front, which began to come apart as more moderate elements and the clergy abandoned it. Increasingly alienated from the right-wing elements of the National Front, Mossadegh leaned more heavily on Tudeh support.

Washington Organizes a Coup While political maneuvering continued in Tehran, Britain was seeking support in Washington. In November, members of British intelligence approached

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi returns to Tehran after the CIA-led overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in August 1953. (James Whitmore/ Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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their American counterparts in the newly elected Eisenhower administration. The future secretary of state John Foster Dulles and his brother, future CIA head Allen Dulles, became interested in the idea, first proposed by the British, of ridding themselves of Mossadegh by covert means. Kermit Roosevelt, a young CIA operative stationed in Iran and a grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, was put in charge of a mission aimed at fomenting a coup against Mossadegh. By July 1953, Roosevelt had put a team together, which then sneaked over the Iraqi border and began operations. Meanwhile, intrigues were building in Tehran. A coup attempt in February 1953 had been thwarted, as the shah and Mossadegh continued to struggle over command of the military. By August, however, the tide was turning against Mossadegh, especially after Roosevelt’s CIA team went into action. In August, they convinced the shah to leave Tehran for one of his palaces on the Caspian Sea. From there the shah issued an order dismissing Mossadegh. When the order was ignored, the shah fled the country on August 17. Mossadegh seemed to be in full control. That control quickly broke down, however, as mobs—paid for with CIA funds—began to demonstrate throughout the capital. Mossadegh ordered the army into the streets to convince the U.S. ambassador and his superiors in Washington that Mossadegh was still in control of the situation. However, the army, mostly under the control of anti-Mossadegh officers, cleared the streets of Mossadegh’s own Tudeh supporters and left the CIA-hired mobs undisturbed. On August 19, the military made its move, seizing government buildings and even attacking Mossadegh’s own residence. Rescued from his house by supporters, Mossadegh surrendered two days later.

Aftermath and Legacy On August 23, 1953, the shah returned to Tehran from his brief exile in Switzerland. A massive purge of political opponents quickly ensued, with thousands exiled or executed. To prevent future dissent, the shah established one of the most brutal and extensive secret police forces in the world and gradually turned the Majlis into a rubber stamp with no real authority. By the 1960s, the shah had become practically an absolute monarch. With the flood of oil money in the 1970s, he spent lavishly on military equipment and pursued a policy of rapid social reform. The corruption of his regime and its proWestern ways angered many Iranians, who would turn to the opposition clergy in the late 1970s, leading to the shah’s overthrow and the establishment of the Islamic republic in 1979. Meanwhile, the easy success of the coup convinced the Eisenhower administration and future U.S. administrations that the CIA could be an effective tool in ridding the world of governments that Washington considered insufficiently pro-American. The model first tried in Iran in 1953 would be successfully imitated in Guatemala in 1954 but would prove an utter failure in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. James Ciment See also: Coups; Iran: Islamic Revolution, 1979.

Bibliography Diba, Farhad. Mohammed Mossadegh: A Political Biography. Dover, NH: Croom Helm, 1986. Elm, Mostafa. Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992. Katouzian, Homa. Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1992.

IRAN: Islamic Revolution,1979 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious TURKEY AZERIS KURDS

Tehran Qum

AFGHANISTAN

PERSIANS

IRAN

S AB AR

IRAQ

Abadan

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500 Kilometers

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n ia rs f Pe Gul

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the Soviet Union to reassess their relations with the Islamic world. As the shah’s strongest supporter, the United States was dealt a severe blow to its strategic position in the region, a shock made more painful by the seizure of its Tehran embassy and diplomatic staff. To counter the shift in the balance of forces in the region, the United States established closer relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey and moved closer to the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, whose own population included millions of Central Asian Muslims, feared the spread of Islamic radicalism in its own territory. It can be argued that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, less than a year later, was in part a response to the Iranian Revolution.

U.S.S.R

CASPIAN SEA

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AZERIS

Ethnic group

The 1979 revolution that overturned the imperial government of the shah of Iran and replaced it with an Islamist government led by the Ayatollah Khomeini was called by some at the time one of the great revolutions of modern times, ranking it with the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions in terms of world historical significance.* That assessment has been modified in light of subsequent events (or, perhaps better put, non-events), since the Iranian revolution did not bring about similar revolutions in other Islamic nations, as many expected. Still, the revolution represents one of the most important political events of the post–World War II era. It sent shock waves through the Middle East, as secularist and conservative leaders alike scrambled to avert its impact on their own societies. Regimes as disparate as those in Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia saw renewed radical Islamist forces emerge. In response, many Middle Eastern governments reemphasized Islam as part of the social contract. At the same time, the revolution had a profound effect on the balance of power in the strategic Persian Gulf region and forced both the United States and

Differences Within Islam Like Judaism and Christianity, Islam is a religion based on the revealed word of God. More akin to the former, Islamic teaching places heavier emphasis on right living in this world than on salvation in the next. Islam includes within its scriptural writings and interpretations a complex system of religioninspired laws and state theories, as well as a tradition for applying these laws and theories to earthly society that has little counterpart in the modern Christian tradition. Thus, devout Muslims do not separate religious and government affairs, as Christians have done in modern liberal democracies. Islamic scripture and teaching devote a great deal of effort to defining the appropriate role of government and its relationship with the people. Much of this effort concerns leadership. Islam emphasizes the moral qualities of leadership far more than it examines the issue of power. Islamic teaching says that if the leader follows the precepts of the faith and acts in ways that are morally consistent with them, then

*The term Islamist is used to designate Islamic politics. The more popular usage, fundamentalism, is, for a variety of reasons, a less accurate and more misleading term, since it was originally conceptualized for Christian politics and can only be applied to Islam circuitously.

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KEY DATES 1941

Soviet and British forces depose the pro-Nazi shah of Iran in favor of his pro-Allies son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

1953 Left-wing, nationalist prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh is overthrown in a military coup supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 1963 The shah launches the “white revolution,” aimed at rapid modernization of Iran’s society and economy. 1964 Anti-shah protests by Islamic leader Ruhollah Khomeini lead to the latter’s exile in Iraq. 1978 In January, students in the holy city of Qom protest articles critical of Khomeini; in August, a cinema fire kills nearly 400 persons in Abadan; many Iranians blame SAVAK, the shah’s secret police; hundreds of thousands of protesters take to the streets in Tehran in September; up to 2,000 are shot down by police in a single incident; in December, the shah appoints opposition leader Shahpour Bakhtiar as prime minister. 1979 Facing rising protests and a crippling oil industry strike, the shah abdicates the throne and flees the country on January 15; Khomeini returns to the country in late January; in February, Bakhtiar is forced to resign as Tehran descends into chaos; in November, militants seize the American embassy and dozens of hostages, who are held through early 1981.

questions of power and its use become secondary or even irrelevant. As in the Christian world, schisms have divided Muslims. The two great branches of Islam are Shiism and Sunnism. Sunnis believe that with the death of the fourth caliph, Ali ibn Ali Talib, in 661 c.e., the era of “right-thinking” leaders came to an end, and all later caliphs (and, by implication all secular leaders of the twentieth century) are neither prophets nor infallible interpreters of the faith. Shiism holds that after Ali’s death, the Shiites of Persia (modern-day Iran) restored right-thinking through Ali’s family, while the Sunnite Ummayid dynasty, dominated by Arabs, went astray. Persians and Arabs are ethnically and linguistically distinct. At first, Shiism was largely a political stance, but it gradually became enshrined as religious doctrine. Shiites continued to follow the leadership of Ali’s line through the ninth century, when the last Muhammed died, and they then developed a doctrine of the innate

infallibility of the present-day Imam, or politicoreligious leader and teacher. These doctrinal developments had three important consequences for Shiism. First, the Shiites emphasized a more volatile and dynamic form of Islam, compared to the pragmatic approach taken by the Sunnis. Where Sunnites emphasized the ijma, or consensus, of the faithful, Shiites believed that religious truth emanated from the teachings of living mujtahids, or divines, under the guidance of the living Imam. This, in turn, meant that Shiism developed a far more hierarchical and innately more political system of governance. Second, because the Shiites believed that the Sunnis were responsible for the repression of Ali’s family, they came to see themselves as both a persecuted minority within Islam and the guardians of true faith and true knowledge. Because of early defeats to the larger Sunnite group, they also developed more strongly than Sunnis the doctrine of taqiyah, or covert dissemination of the faith in hostile environments.

Iran: Islamic Revolution, 1979

The secret passing of the faith could occur not just in lands ruled by infidels but also to lands ruled by Sunnites. Finally, with its emphasis on the true, hidden revelations of Ali, Shiism leans toward the transcendental and esoteric rather than the practical and earthly. Because the hidden truth is known to the living leaders of Shiism, it can therefore be utilized to stir the faithful. Thus, displays of religious ecstasy and passion are far more common in Shiite lands than in Sunni ones. The differences between the Shiism and Sunnism traditions have an important impact on the view each takes of basic questions of justice, political participation, and social equality. Islam places enormous emphasis on these questions, emphasizing in its practices and teachings that all Muslims are honor-bound to fight for all three principles. Here again the two main sects diverge in interpreting these principles. Sunnism effectively divides religious guidance from political rule and emphasizes social harmony over justice. Shiism takes the opposite position. Shiites, with their belief in the infallibility of the living Imam, are more willing and likely to challenge the divine right of princes and kings to rule. Where Sunni doctrine places the burden of proof on those who would rebel against a sitting ruler, Shiism leans toward the view that rebelliousness is an inherent part of the faith, especially if that rebelliousness receives the imprimatur of the living Imam and mujtahids. This differing perspective applies to economic issues as well. Again, while all Muslims believe that excessive wealth leads to moral corruption, only Shiites tend to examine the acquisition of that wealth as a question of faith. In other words, Sunnis believe that as long as a man violates no principals of the faith in acquiring wealth—and then uses some of that wealth to help the poor and needy—he is living in concert with God’s will. Devout Shiites, however, believe that the mere presence of wealth can indicate a lack of faith. Thus, their faith impels them toward both a more critical view of wealth and a commitment to use the power of the government to see that it gets distributed more equally among the people.

Modern Iranian Histor y Iran’s history dates back to the dawn of recorded time. The civilization of Persia, in various manifestations, defeated the Assyrians, threatened the Greeks,

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assimilated the Hellenes, and held off the Romans in the millennium leading up to the beginning of the Christian age. In the early centuries of the current era, Persia achieved new heights in political power, economic wealth, and cultural expression under the Sasanids. So great was this legacy that when the region was conquered by Islamic armies in the seventh century c.e., Persian culture had as much impact on the conquerors as the religion of the conquerors had on the conquered. Tension between the PersianIslamic world and the Arab-Islamic world has persisted to this day. For centuries, most Muslims in Iran embraced Shiism but were governed by rulers from the Sunnite sect. They came to view themselves as a persecuted minority and lived in an uneasy state with their Sunni rulers. Only in the sixteenth century, with the rise of the Safavid dynasty, was Shiism declared the official religion of the land. The Safavids were a relatively tolerant dynasty, offering a place for the many minorities of the vast Persian realm, including Kurds, Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Afghans, and Lurs. The tensions of the empire were largely between the central core ethnic Persians and the outlying regions inhabited by nonPersians. This acceptance of a multinational state and the tension between core and periphery remained defining elements in Iranian history. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the Qajar dynasty came under increasing pressure from outside powers, notably the expanding Russian Empire to the north and the British to the south and west. The Russians, seeking a warm water port, and the British, hoping for a secure route from Europe to India through the Persian Gulf, made alliances with peoples on the periphery of the empire. Together, they conspired to reduce the power of the central government at the core. By 1900, the Russians and especially the British had won valuable economic concessions in the country. Indeed, Iran’s royal house found itself in deeper and deeper financial debt to British creditors. This outside interference and economic control sparked strong feelings against foreigners in Iran, even as the empire’s governing elite maneuvered to gain the approval of foreign powers. Growing opposition to the Qajar dynasty led to a series of nationalist revolts and the declaration of a constitutional monarchy in 1906. Then, shortly before the outbreak of World War I in 1914, British geologists discovered vast reserves of oil in the country. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), established to exploit those

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reserves, was largely a British creation and offered only token payments to Iran’s government for the right to extract and sell the oil. The operations of AIOC further exacerbated anti-Qajar and anti-British sentiment in the country. After World War I, the situation in Iran deteriorated. When the new Bolshevik government in Moscow tried to foment a Communist rebellion in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan in the north, leaders in Tehran dispatched an army under the leadership of Reza Pahlavi. After crushing the rebellion, Pahlavi returned to the capital, where he ousted the Qajar rulers and forced the parliament to declare him “shah,” an ancient title derived from the name Caesar and resurrected especially for the occasion to lend the new supreme leader an air of legitimacy. The attempt was never very successful. Reza Pahlavi was never popular with the masses, and he ruled Iran largely as a traditional rather than a constitutional monarch. His land reform policies, for example, alienated all sectors of society, by seizing the property of wealthy landholders and distributing it not to the impoverished peasants but to members of his own family and court. He did little to modernize the country economically and relied on the military to keep himself in power. In the 1930s, the Nazi government of Germany, in need of reliable supplies of oil, took advantage of the shah’s antipathy toward the Russians and the British, offering fairer rates than the AIOC and urging an alliance. Britain and the Soviet Union, fearing that a pro-Fascist regime in Iran would threaten both British oilfields and crucial supply routes to Russia, jointly occupied the country in August 1941, sending the shah off to a comfortable exile on the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius and placing his more pro-Western son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, on the throne.

Shah Reza Pahlavi’s Reign The new shah could exercise little power during his first four years on the throne, as Iran had effectively become an Anglo-Soviet colony for the duration of the war. With food and other resources being shipped to the Russian front, the Iranian people found themselves in increasingly dire straits. Malnutrition increased in many rural areas and even in the poorer sections of Tehran. Moreover, both the British and Soviet authorities took a high-handed attitude toward

Iranian officials and repressed any signs of unrest among the people. While the shah remained loyal to the Allied cause, the masses grew increasingly attentive to German propaganda broadcasts, going so far as to openly express support for Hitler. They painted pro-Nazi graffiti on public walls and cheered dictator Adolph Hitler’s appearance in newsreels. Only the United States, among the Allies, seemed to win some popular support in Iran, especially after the 1943 Tehran conference, where the leaders of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States promised to promote Iranian unity, independence, and economic development after the war. Distrusting Britain and the Soviets, most Iranians believed these promises had come directly from U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. Even in the midst of World War II, however, tensions grew between the British and the Russians. In 1944, as the Germans began to retreat, Soviets began to insist on a sphere of influence in northern Iran after the war. In 1945, the Soviets went into action, establishing supposedly “independent” republics in the country’s Azerbaijani and Kurdish regions. Far from independent, both republics were totally dominated by the Soviet Union. Debilitated by war and preoccupied with problems in other parts of their far-flung empire, the British government notified the United States that if the Soviet influence was to be stopped in Iran, the United States would have to take action itself. The United States did just that. In one of the first confrontations of the Cold War, the Soviets blinked. Under strong American pressure, they agreed to withdraw from the contested northern regions and allowed the shah’s armies to march in and establish Iranian control. This incident cemented ties between the young shah and the U.S. government, but the era of good feeling did not last. When the shah asked for substantial economic aid from the United States in 1949—along the lines of the Marshal Plan in Western Europe—he was turned down. The Republican Congress—worried about excessive foreign aid spending—dismissed the Truman administration’s arguments that the reformist and anticommunist shah was exactly the kind of leader the United States should support. With decreasing U.S. aid, the shah turned to the only other substantial source of revenue available to his government—the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which had been prospering even while Iran

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languished. Between 1949 and 1951, the British offered small concessions but dragged their feet over granting major increases in Iran’s share of the profits. British actions only tended to aggravate public opinion, and soon a growing Communist Party was leading protests in Tehran. The Majlis, Iran’s parliament, was demanding extreme measures against the AIOC. In 1951, Prime Minister Muhammed Mossadegh, a liberal nationalist with ties to the Communist Tudeh Party, sponsored a successful bill that nationalized the AIOC. In the overheated atmosphere of the early Cold War, the nationalist Mossadegh, with his suspect Communist sympathies and strong Socialist rhetoric about nationalizing industries and bringing land reform, set off alarm bells in Washington. In Tehran, meanwhile, the battle lines were being drawn. The shah, fearing an assertive majlis, or parliament, under the dynamic leadership of Mossadegh, appealed to the United States to rescue his regime from what he described as an imminent Communist takeover. Supporting him were an array of forces that included the comprador class of major industrialists (most of them the junior partners of British and American multinationals), large rural landholders, government workers, and, most important, the military. Arrayed against this formidable coalition were students and intellectuals, worker and peasant organizations, Azerbaijani and Kurdish nationalists, and small landowners and shopkeepers, the latter referred to popularly as the bazaaris. Unrest and violence in the capital—usually taking the form of mass demonstrations and broken up by the police and army—forced the shah into temporary exile, where he attempted to rally the United States to his side. The Tudeh party, the largest political organization in Iran, remained divided between its loyalty to the Iranian masses and the Soviet Union. As was typical under Stalin, the Soviets urged restraint in third-world confrontations between popular forces and Western-supported governments. The Tudeh party failed to mobilize its members, making it possible for the shah to rally his own forces. In a 1953 coup orchestrated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Iranian military overthrew the Mossadegh government. Returning to Tehran in the wake of this coup, the shah dissolved the majlis and placed Mossadegh under house arrest, where he would remain until his death in 1968. He then banned Mossadegh’s National Front Party, as well as the National Federation of Trade Unions,

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which supported the deposed prime minister, and crushed the Tudeh by imprisoning, torturing, and executing much of its leadership, forcing the rest to go underground or into exile. In 1955, the underground military wing of the Tudeh was uncovered and destroyed, ending the Tudeh’s influence in Iranian politics until the Islamic Revolution of the late 1970s. The shah spent most of the 1950s consolidating his absolute control over virtually every sector of Iranian society, though for appearance’s sake he established a two-party political system, making sure that the heads of both parties were his personal friends. In 1955, he dismissed the popular army commander Fazlollah Zahedy and sent him into early retirement, letting the army leadership know that he himself was the supreme commander. Two years later, with the assistance of the CIA, he established the Organization of Information and Security of Iran, or SAVAK, his own personal spy network that would earn the lasting enmity of the Iranian people for its egregious abuses of human rights. Internationally, the shah firmly linked Iran to the West. Just one year after the coup, he signed an oil agreement with a consortium of British, French, Dutch, and American companies, on a 50–50 split, considered at the time to be quite generous for Iran. At the same time, he won the further allegiance of the United States by helping to organize the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact alliance (later called the Central Treaty Organization). In return, Washington bestowed no less than $1 billion in military and economic aid on the shah’s government between 1954 and 1962. The increasingly close ties between the shah’s regime and the Eisenhower administration led the United States to turn a blind eye to irregularities in the elections of 1954 and 1960, in which the shah’s candidates won overwhelming majorities by rigging the system in advance. The Kennedy administration, which took office in 1961, was a bit less forgiving, insisting that the shah do more to ease the gross inequities plaguing Iranian society. Indeed, by the early 1960s, unrest was once again growing in both urban and rural areas, despite the shah’s extraordinary efforts to suppress it. Galvanized by the impoverished conditions of the masses, opposition leaders focused their protests on the corruption, favoritism, and incompetence of the shah’s government. Specifically, small- and medium-scale businesses were finding it increasingly difficult to

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secure critical government contracts, being unable to compete against the massive bribery paid by wealthier merchants and industrialists. At the same time, small landholders and landless peasants were pushing for some kind of land reform. Confident in his power and sensitive to the wishes of the new administration in Washington, the shah pushed through the Land Reform Law of 1962, followed a year later by the inauguration of his grandiose “white revolution,” designed to modernize the Iranian economy and society along Western lines within a decade. With this program the shah hoped to create a lasting pro-government majority in Iran. Immensely popular at first, both land reform and the white revolution had a deep impact on Iranian society. Under the land reform law, large estates— including, significantly, the lands of the Shiite religious establishment—were broken up and distributed to the peasantry. As compensation, large landholders were given shares in the new industries being created by the white revolution. Cooperatives were also established among the peasantry to finance irrigation projects and purchase agricultural equipment, hybrid seeds, and fertilizer. Between 1962 and 1970, the percentage of owner-occupied farmland increased from 26 percent to 78 percent. At the same time, however, land reform proved limited. Just 2.5 million of Iran’s 12 million farm families benefited, mostly the wealthier peasants. In addition, through the familiar avenues of corruption and favoritism, huge portions of the confiscated lands ended up in the hands of wealthy urban families with close ties to the shah’s court. Millions of peasants, in fact, were pushed off the land, drifting to the cities where some found employment in the new factories emerging there while many joined the ranks of the unemployed in burgeoning shantytowns. The white revolution’s achievements proved even more troubling. While Iran’s industrial production skyrocketed, particularly after the massive early 1973 –1974 increase in oil prices, much of the industry was poorly managed and uncompetitive in world markets. Most of the shares in these new industrial enterprises also ended up in the hands of the favored few, who tended to use them as cash cows rather than investing to increase productivity. In short, though land reform and the white revolution offered a better life for a minority of peasants and workers, it failed to achieve its political ends: the creation of a pro-government, small farmer majority in the countryside and a well-paid

working class in the cities. Instead, it had created a bloated government bureaucracy, a class of wellheeled and well-connected entrepreneurs and landholders, disillusioned workers and poor peasants, and an aggrieved religious establishment. The economic reforms of the revolution had failed to ensure domestic tranquility. Even worse, the shah’s social reforms positively antagonized the people. The liberalization of laws concerning women and the family—particularly the new legal framework that enshrined individual rights over familial ones—went against the grain of socially conservative Iranians, particularly in the working and lower-middle-class urban sectors. Their grievances would be exploited by the Shiite clergy, which saw the shah’s reforms as a violation both of Islamic law and of their own prerogatives. For many in Iran, the most egregious failing of the shah was his own extravagance. Encouraged by the United States, the shah began to see himself as the dominant power in the Middle East. To fulfill that role, he spent lavishly on sophisticated and expensive U.S. military hardware, using the immense reserves of cash generated by Iran’s oilfields and even going into debt to create a military force far beyond what was practical or necessary for a semi-developed country. The shah viewed himself in grandly historical terms. He hoped to place Iran in the ranks of the first world within a generation, prepared to revive the glories of the ancient Persian Empire. He hosted an extravagant and costly celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of Iran and of his own dynasty (which had actually been established by his father only 50 years earlier). The shah’s huge expenditures for building a luxury tent city in the desert for thousands of foreign visitors to the celebration outraged many Iranians. Events were propelling Iran toward revolution, though neither the shah nor many in the international community saw it coming. All that was needed to complete the revolutionary trend was a charismatic leader to galvanize the masses. That leadership would be provided by the supreme cleric of Shiite Islam, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The Ayatollah Khomeini and Shiite Establishment Ruhollah Khomeini (born Ruhollah Musawi), the son and grandson of mullahs (Shiite religious leaders), was born in the town of Khomeyn on May 17, 1900 (though the date is not absolutely certain), several

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Members of the Iranian Army join with supporters of Shiite leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during the Islamic revolution of 1979. Khomeini took power in January and established a fundamentalist theocratic regime. (Keystone/Getty Images)

generations after his family had moved there from the Pakistani portion of Kashmir. His father was murdered, allegedly by agents of a local landholder, while Khomeini was an infant. The youngest of seven children, he was first raised by his mother and his aunt and then adopted into the family of one of his older brothers. Groomed for the clergy at an early age, Khomeini attended local religious primary schools before going off to the town of Arak to continue his education. In 1922, he moved to Qum, Shiism’s holiest city, adopting the name of his hometown as a surname and delving into Islamic philosophy, law, and ethics. Though never much of an original thinker, he published numerous works. He came to the attention of the Muslim masses of Qum through his popular preaching and his increasingly harsh criticism of the shah’s regime. His popularity and skills as an organizer

earned him the respect of fellow clerics as well. In the early 1950s, he was acclaimed an ayatollah, or major religious leader, and a decade later he was declared grand ayatollah, becoming one of a small circle of supreme Shiite leaders. With the land reform, the white revolution, and the social reforms of the early 1960s, Khomeini turned up the volume and vitriol of his rhetoric against the shah. An essentially conservative man most of his life, he spoke out against both land reform and women’s emancipation as violations of sharia, or Islamic law. He was also highly critical of the shah’s cozy ties with the United States and the infidel West, seeing these relations as an affront both to the faith and to Iranian nationalism. The attacks on the shah earned Khomeini the opprobrium of the regime, and he was forced into exile in November 1964, eventually settling in the holy

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Shiite city of An-Najaf, Iraq. From there, Khomeini kept up his barrage of criticisms against the shah, meeting with both secular and Islamist opposition figures who increasingly sought to overthrow the shah’s regime. At the same time, his sermons became widely available to the masses of Iranians through the underground distribution of cassette tapes. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, under pressure from the shah and worried about this rabble-rouser in the midst of his own volatile Shiite community, ordered Khomeini out of the country in October 1978. Khomeini went into temporary exile in Neauphle-le-Chateau, a suburb of Paris. When Iranian revolutionaries forced the shah out of power in January 1979, Khomeini returned to his country as both the hero of the revolution and as the supreme leader of the Iranian state and the Shiite faith.

end to their marginalization by the comprador class of wealthy industrialists and a rise in their status in an Islamic society. To the peasants and workers, the message offered a means of venting their frustrations about increasingly desperate economic circumstances and promised renewed hope for a better standard of living and more dignity. For students and intellectuals, it promised an end to the shah’s repressive police state and the possibility of a cultural rebirth. Of course, not all these groups were enamored with the idea of an Islamic state. Many students and workers were more likely to find the ideology of the Tudeh and other leftist parties more to their liking. In the heat of revolution, however, and through their mutual hatred of the shah’s regime, even the most unlikely of alliances was possible.

Course of the Revolution The Islamic Revolution Khomeini’s theological and political journey reflected that of the Iranian clergy generally. For much of his professional life, the Ayatollah had preached a traditional Islamic agenda alongside his denunciations of the shah: individual piety, the expansion of Islamic institutions, and criticism of social and economic reform. But in the early 1970s, the message began to change. His denunciations of the West continued, as did his defense of traditional Islam. Now, however, he began to express himself in more overtly political terms. He defended the interests of the bazaari class of small entrepreneurs, the traditional bulwark of the clergy’s support, and spoke out on behalf of the suffering urban and rural poor, winning a vast new and potentially revolutionary constituency. No longer defending the existing social order as ordained by God nor denouncing all economic reform as a violation of Islamic law, he now advocated measures designed to enhance the position of the poor by attacking the wealthy, the corrupt, and the favored few in the shah’s Iran. Most important, he began issuing calls for more than the overthrow of the shah’s regime. He insisted that Iran must become an Islamic state, ruled, as Shiite orthodoxy had it, by a religiously inspired and clerically led government. This, he said, would not only return morals and ethics to a corrupted Iran but would also ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and a national renaissance. The message appealed to a disparate cross section of the Iranian people. To the bazaaris, it promised an

The events of the revolution came fast and furious in the final year of the shah’s regime. Most historians argue that it began with the events of January 1978. Religious students in Qum demonstrated against an article written by the shah’s Ministry of Information, which denounced the Ayatollah. The police opened fire, killing and wounding dozens. Sympathy protests then broke out in the Kurdish city of Tabriz, long a center of Kurdish and Iranian opposition to the shah. This time, the police killed and wounded hundreds. At first, the shah blamed overly zealous local police officials, but few believed him. Through the spring and summer, massive demonstrations rocked Tehran and other major Iranian cities. The most terrible event occurred in Abadan, near the Persian Gulf, on August 20, when a movie house went up in flames, and nearly 400 persons died. The government suggested that Islamic radicals were responsible because they had already set fire to a number of theaters for showing “sinful” movies. The Islamists, however, had always set fire to movie houses that were closed and empty at the time. In the atmosphere of growing violence and mistrust, most Iranians blamed the disaster on the shah’s SAVAK agents. The shah had already promised new parliamentary elections in early August, but events were moving beyond his control. In September, hundreds of thousands of Tehran’s urban poor—rallied by simultaneous calls from the clergy and the secular left— poured into the streets in violation of the shah’s declaration of martial law. When they refused to

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follow orders to disperse, troops opened fire. The exact number killed on what came to be called “Black Friday” was hard to ascertain, but estimates ranged as high as 2,000. The events of August and September also caught the attention of the international community—including the administration of U.S. president Jimmy Carter—leading to calls for political reform and a dialogue between the Iranian government and the opposition. Waves of strikes followed in the autumn. Gradually, protesters came to believe that the shah’s regime could be and would be overthrown. This was also becoming the view of the United States embassy in Tehran and of the Iranian elite. Meetings began in the embassy to discuss ways to prop up the shah’s regime while calming the opposition with serious reforms, but they were futile. By November, protesters were echoing the Ayatollah’s demand for a civil war to overthrow the hated shah. With his support in virtually all sectors of Iranian society collapsing, the shah turned to his military as his last pillar of support. However, the army—if not the more elitist air force—was divided. Many officers and most enlisted men did not like having to shoot at compatriots and began refusing to do so. By late December, the shah was willing to compromise with the opposition on almost everything, from constitutional reforms to the disbanding of SAVAK. He appointed an opposition politician, Shahpour Bakhtiar, as prime minister, but this did little good. Both the clerical and the leftist leadership sensed that the shah’s days were numbered. They kept up their agitation in the streets and their demands that the shah leave Iran. Thus began the “big push” to achieve that end. A massive strike crippled the oil industry, cutting off all production, with the strike leaders insisting that the workers would return to their jobs when the shah stepped down. On January 15, 1979, the shah abdicated his throne and left the country. Two weeks later, the Ayatollah arrived to nearly universal acclamation as the new leader of the country.

Consolidation By mid-February, Bakhtiar had been forced out of power, and Tehran had descended into chaos, even as other parts of the country had yet to feel the full effect of the shah’s abdication. Fires burned out of control in much of the city, as undisciplined bands roved the streets in arms-laden jeeps. Much of the equipment

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had been expropriated from army stores. Meanwhile, the wholesale liquidation of the shah’s supporters, including numerous SAVAK agents, proceeded throughout the spring. Other more personal grudges were also being settled, and the city seemed headed for total anarchy. Indeed, from the very first days of the revolution, the United States had been condemned as the main international supporter of the hated dictator’s regime. On February 14, the U.S. Embassy came under its first assault by militant students, though the attack was denounced by Khomeini and a release of hostages was quickly effected. But Washington’s vocal criticism of the summary trials and executions occurring in Iran further fueled popular anger. On May 25, some 150,000 protesters marched on the U.S. Embassy, shouting, “Death to Carter” and “Death to the United States.” The Iranian people had overwhelmingly agreed in a national referendum to establish an Islamic Republic on April 1, but the revolution was increasingly revealing its internal divisions and contradictions. Thus, opposition to the United States and its continued presence in Tehran offered the regime convenient focus for dissent, while it struggled to control its own militants and the demands of its leftist and minoritynationalist allies. When Carter permitted the shah—who was stricken with cancer—to enter the United States for medical treatment at a New York hospital in October, Iranian militants were outraged, demanding that the United States extradite the shah to Iran to be tried there for crimes against the people. The offer of asylum was the spark that led to the seizure of the American embassy on November 4. The government of the Ayatollah was overwhelmed. A sporadic bombing campaign against religious leaders and officials of the new government by members of the left-wing guerrilla force, the mujahideen, had to be suppressed, as did a revolt in the Kurdish province in northwest Iran. In addition, the left-wing Tudeh party in Tehran was demanding a fair share of power for its contribution to the shah’s overthrow. By the beginning of 1980, the secular prime minister, Abolhassan BaniSadr, had been forced from office, and the clergy had taken firm control of the state. Meanwhile, the holders of the U.S. embassy had refused all efforts to negotiate the release of more than 100 U.S. diplomatic personnel. Most would be held for nearly fifteen months, until January 1981.

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The hostage crisis altered the course of politics in the United States, assuring that President Jimmy Carter would have no chance to gain reelection in 1980. In fact, to express their anger at Carter, the Iranian hostage takers delayed giving up the embassy and hostages until the day Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as president and Carter had officially left office. Relations between Iran and the United States remained broken for decades, as the Islamists continued to rule. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Iran: Coup Against Mossadegh, 1953; Iran: War with Iraq, 1980–1988.

Bibliography Abrahamian, Ervand. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Amjad, Mohammed. From Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989. Gerber, Haim. Islam, Guerrilla War, and Revolution: A Study in Comparative Social History. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1988. Hunter, Shireen. The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. Kapuscinski, Ryszard. Shah of Shahs. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. Kepel, Gilles. The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. Roy, Olivier. The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Rubin, Barry. Paved with Good Intentions: The American University Experience and Iran. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran. New York: Random House, 1985.

IRAN: War with Iraq,1980–1988 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Iraq TURKEY KURDISH AREA

Qasr-e Shirin

Baghdad

IRAQ Basra

0

250

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

500 Miles

Khorramshahr Abadan Fao oil tank farm

PAKISTAN

n ia rs f Pe Gul

SUDAN 250

Qum

Shatt al-Arab Waterway

KUWAIT

0

Tehran

Kirkuk Halabja

SYRIA

U.S.S.R

CASPIAN SEA

BAHRAIN QATAR

500 Kilometers

ARABIAN SEA

The Iran-Iraq War, launched by Saddam Hussein of Iraq against the newly founded Islamic government of Iran in 1980, was among the longest and bloodiest wars of modern times. Indeed, the war was perhaps the most destructive and deadly non-civil conflict of the post–World War II era, until the Congo war of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Between the 1980 Iraqi invasion and the UN-sponsored ceasefire in 1988, an estimated 1 million people—mainly soldiers from the two armies—were killed. Property damage, though difficult to assess, was estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars. Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf were heavily damaged, as were both Iraqi and Iranian cities targeted by air and missile attacks. Some students of the conflict also suggest that the inconclusive end to the war may have led Hussein to invade Kuwait, setting the stage for the Gulf War in which a U.S.-led coalition ousted Iraq from that oil-rich sheikdom in 1991.

Historical Background While the Iran-Iraq War was fought mainly about fairly recent conflicts between the two countries, the border between them roughly follows a boundary

that is thousands of years old, separating the civilizations of the Middle East and those of Central Asia. As far back as the second millennium b.c.e., the border was established between Babylon and Ur to the west and Persia to the east. In 1100 b.c.e., the aggressive Assyrian Empire—which occupied lands in presentday Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and southern Iran—invaded Persia but was ultimately destroyed. In the early centuries of the current era, the Iran-Iraq border marked the eastern limit of the Roman conquest, where it came up against the Parthians. The lands of Iraq and Iran were both overrun by the Arab invasions of the seventh century c.e., which brought in the new religion of Islam, which would add a religious element to the later conflicts in the region. In 680, the two rivals within the Islamic Caliphate—the Ummayad dynasty of Baghdad and the followers of Husain, the grandson of Muhammed—met in battle at Karbala, in presentday Iraq. The defeat and slaughter of Husain, his family, and his forces marked the beginning of the split in Islam between the Shia branch, centered in modern-day Iran, and the Sunni branch, encompassing much of the rest of the Islamic world. Originally, the differences between Shia and Sunni Islam coincided with differences of ethnicity. The Shia Persians were culturally and linguistically distinct from the Arabs, who continued to dominate the Sunni branch. While the original dispute between the Shiites and Sunnis may have been largely political, it was soon transformed into a religious controversy that has divided Islam for nearly fourteen centuries. Sunnis argued that the era of infallible caliphs, or politicoreligious leaders, came to an end with the death of the last heir of Muhammed in the ninth century. Shiites believed that the present-day imam, or spiritual leader, offered religious truths that could not be disputed. The Sunnis rejected the idea of a living religious authority, while the Shiites embraced it.

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KEY DATES 1968

A military coup led by Ba’athist Party followers seizes power in Iraq; over the next few years, coup leader Saddam Hussein consolidates his control over the government.

1975

The Algiers Accords end the shah of Iran’s support for rebel Kurds in Iraq; in exchange, Saddam Hussein surrenders control of the critical Shatt al-Arab waterway on the southern border between Iraq and Iran.

1979

Islamic revolutionaries overthrow the shah of Iran’s government and vow to spread Islamic revolutions throughout the Middle East.

1980

Iraq launches a mass attack on Iran on September 23.

1984

The so-called “tanker war” begins in earnest, as both sides attack oil tankers in the Persian Gulf.

1988 The UN negotiates a cease-fire between belligerents that ends hostilities in August. 1990

Iraq invades Kuwait in August.

Shia beliefs deeply influenced the Islamist revolution in Iran by which the Ayatollah Khomeini came to political and religious power in 1979 (ayatollah is the title for a spiritual leader). Modern Iran is the direct inheritor of the Persian Empire. The governments in Tehran—whether ruled by a shah or an ayatollah— have also inherited the tradition of imperial rule over a population that is largely non-Persian. Both the shah and the Islamists zealously guarded their right to rule over numerous minorities, and both followed ancient Persian tradition in offering latitude toward distinct ethnic groups. Although they ruthlessly quelled attempts at autonomy, they permitted cultural expression within the limits of an authoritarian state. Indeed, the two main minorities within Iran today—the Azeris of the north, who make up 25 percent of the population, and the Kurds of the west, who make up 10 percent—have long been permitted to speak their own language and express themselves culturally. The modern era in Iranian history began with Reza Shah Pahlavi, an army colonel who overthrew the last Qajar dynasty ruler in 1925. In 1941 during World War II, occupying British and Soviet forces forced him to abdicate because of his pro-Nazi sympathies. His son, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi,

who was more sympathetic to the Allied powers, was placed on the Peacock Throne and gradually consolidated his power in the 1950s. He then launched a massive campaign to modernize Iran politically, economically, and socially in the 1960s and 1970s. With the help of the United States, the shah also embarked on a vast expansion of Iran’s military, which both countries hoped would serve as a stabilizing element in the critical Persian Gulf area. The shah’s modernization effort, together with the corruption of his regime and his own excesses, brought on increasing opposition from many elements of Iranian society. Following a series of explosive demonstrations and paralyzing strikes in 1978, the shah fled into exile in January 1979 and was replaced by an Islamist government led by the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. The new administration spent its first years in power crushing a Kurdish rebellion, purging secularists and leftists from the new government, and antagonizing the United States, which it called the “great Satan” because of its support of the shah. Partisans of the regime took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held more than 100 diplomatic workers hostage, most for nearly 15 months.

Iran: War with Iraq, 19 8 0–19 8 8

Modern-Day Iraq The history of Iraq is quite different. It first became a separate entity at the end of World War I, representing three provinces of the old Ottoman Empire— the Kurdish-dominated province of Mosul in the north, the Shiite Arab province of Basra in the south, and the politically dominant Sunni Arab province of Baghdad in the center. Iraq began its existence as a British mandate. When the British granted nominal independence to Iraq in 1930, it largely handed over power to the Sunni political establishment in Baghdad under a British-imposed king from Arabia. In effect, the leaders of independent Iraq built a modern nation from a collection of provinces and peoples with little common history or tradition. From the beginning, the central government in Iraq faced rebellions, particularly by the Kurds in the north. Moreover, the central government itself was often torn apart by internal divisions between elements that wanted to build an independent Iraq and those who hoped to integrate the country into a panArab union. The Ba’ath, or Resurrection, Party, which came to power in 1968, was initially a supporter of pan-Arabism but soon turned away from that ideal and adopted a kind of Iraqi nationalism. During its first ten years in power, the Ba’ath government gradually introduced a totalitarian political order to the country. All agencies of government and all independent political and social organizations were incorporated into the party. Numerous security agencies enveloped the country in a network of informers who turned in any citizen displaying the slightest opposition to the Ba’ath leadership. As one Iraqi intellectual termed it, Iraq was the “republic of fear.” Perhaps the greatest challenge to Ba’ath rule, however, came from the country’s Kurds, who represented about 20 percent of the population. In rebellion against successive governments in Baghdad since 1961, the Kurds had come to rely on the shah’s government in Tehran for military assistance and political support. This was part of an age-old strategy in which the Kurds turned to the enemy of their enemy who, in turn, used the Kurds as a way to keep their own enemy off balance. However, the strategy backfired for the Iraqi Kurds in 1975, when Saddam Hussein reached an agreement with the shah. Under the Algiers Accord, named after the city in which it was reached, the shah agreed to stop supporting the Iraqi Kurds in exchange for territorial concessions, particularly access

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to the crucial Shatt al-Arab waterway, which offered direct access to the Persian Gulf from the western Iranian city of Khorramshahr.

Causes of War Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Iran was based on a series of complicated calculations that involved both internal and external factors. First and foremost was the Islamist revolution in Iran. While the Ayatollah Khomeini had been offered refuge in Iraq following his expulsion from Iran by the shah in the early 1960s, there was little love lost between the future leader of Iran and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Fearing Khomeini’s provocative presence among the volatile Shiite community in southern Iraq, Hussein ordered the religious leader out of the country in 1978. This decision followed years in which Khomeini had offered barely veiled criticisms of the government in Iraq, which he claimed was leading the country in ways that were antithetical to Islam since it subjected the Islamic establishment, like all other independent organizations in the country, to the will of the Ba’ath party. With Khomeini in power in Iran in 1979—and in command of the enormous military machine constructed by the shah—Hussein feared that once the Islamists had established effective control over Iran, they would represent both a military and political threat, since they clearly enjoyed strong ties with the Shiites in the southern third of Iraq. Adding to the volatile situation were the regional politics of the Middle East. While secularist and conservative regimes had ruled much of the region since the countries there had won their independence after World War II, a rising tide of Islamist militancy in the 1970s—culminating in the Iranian revolution of 1979—threatened the status quo. Dating back to the late nineteenth century, Islamist politics had always espoused a return to Islamic tradition and law in the regulation of social affairs. What had once been a moral crusade, however, was increasingly becoming a political militancy aimed at overthrowing what Islamists considered to be apostate secular regimes. In addition, the radical content of the Iranian revolution—with its call for Islam-based social and economic justice— frightened even religious regimes like the one in Saudi Arabia. Thus, leaders of other governments in the Arab world quietly let Hussein know that a military incursion into Iran to remove the Islamists or destabilize

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their government would be welcome. Indeed, as the history of the war reveals, the oil-rich sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf provided enormous economic support for Baghdad in its military struggle with Iran. One more ingredient in the explosive mixture of regional politics was the question of post–World War II leadership of the Arab world. Since the rise to power of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s, that mantle had rested on the leader of Egypt, the most populous country and the cultural heart of the Arab world. But when Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor, signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Egypt was ostracized by the other Arab countries, and a political vacuum arose. Hussein made no secret of his ambitions to lead the Arab world, and a decisive victory over Iran seemed to offer that possibility. Defeating Iran seemed likely. The Islamist government, just over a year and a half old, was still trying to consolidate its power at home while facing sanctions and hostility abroad. Even though Iran had greater military and demographic resources, Hussein believed that it lacked the political and military leadership to defend itself against an overwhelming, lightening-quick assault or to conduct a sustained conflict. Finally, there was an international component in Hussein’s calculations. Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union for many years, and now the United States, angry at the Islamist regime in Iran, was fearful that it might take hostile action in the Persian Gulf. Hussein rightly believed both the Soviets and the Americans would tacitly approve an attack on Iran. In 1980, President Carter had stated that any attempt to control the Persian Gulf by a force hostile to the United States and the West would be looked upon as “an assault on the vital interests of the United States.” Hussein may have taken that pronouncement as a green light from Washington to make his attack.

War Begins On September 23, 1980, the Iraqi military launched a two-pronged attack on Iran. A 10,000-man force from Basra invaded southern Iran, taking the town of Qasr-e Shirin, destroying much of the refinery complex at Abadan, and laying siege to the Iranian city of Khorramshahr. The ultimate goal was the large Iranian air base at Dezful on the main rail line and highway to Tehran. Farther north, several Iraqi divisions

drove directly east from Baghdad into the central provinces of Iran, hoping to put immediate pressure on the Iranian capital. Hoping to quickly bloody Iran’s nose, Iraq partially succeeded in the first few days, capturing several hundred square kilometers of Iranian territory. It then issued its conditions for a halt to the fighting. First, Iran had to hand back the territorial concessions made by Iraq in the Algiers Accord of 1975. Second, Iraq demanded that Tehran grant autonomy to the various minorities in Iran, including Azeris and Kurds. Third, Iraq demanded that Iran stop its inflammatory rhetoric against the regime in Baghdad and put a halt to its agitation among the Shiite Arabs around Basra. Both countries agreed to a UN cease-fire, but it was broken less than an hour later by the Iraqis. Despite its promising start, Iraq soon saw its hopes for a quick victory turn sour. While Hussein had guessed correctly that the Iranian military was disorganized and would be unable to mount an effective defense, he had underestimated both the popularity of the regime and the sheer patriotism of the masses of Iranian enlisted men who, against all odds, mounted a heroic defense just kilometers from the Iraq-Iran border. Indeed, the Iranian military even proved capable of going on the offensive. Just days after the first Iraqi attack, Iranian warships shelled and destroyed two of Iraq’s own oil terminals—as well as the Fao oil-tank farm—on the Persian Gulf. This was a heavy blow to the country’s oil industry, but Iraq’s northern fields continued pumping oil through pipelines to Syria, Turkey, and the West.

The Fighting Bogs Down The war settled into a near stalemate as the weeks passed. After a year, the two countries were still at war. It gradually became clear that the tide was turned in Iran’s favor. The Iranian army mounted major counteroffensives, hoping to drive the invading Iraqi forces out of the country. The first began four days after the first anniversary of Iraq’s initial invasion and succeeded in lifting the siege of the oil city of Abadan. Then came several more offensives in late 1982, aimed at the remaining Iraqi forces in southern Iran. In 1983 and 1984, several more offensives were launched on the central and northern fronts at the other end of the 700-mile battle line. During these years the war began to establish its routine, but horrifying, patterns. After realizing that

Iran: War with Iraq, 19 8 0–19 8 8

its offensive was bogging down in 1981, Iraq began to build massive defensive structures against anticipated Iranian assaults. Using its overwhelming superiority in artillery and armaments—largely paid for by its Arab allies and purchased from the United States and other Western countries—the Iraqi military established a virtually impregnable line just inside the border with Iran. Short of equipment and spare parts—largely due to international sanctions and bureaucratic snafus—the Iranians were reduced to assaulting Iraqi defenses with “human waves,” resulting in enormous casualties. The southern battlefields were the bloodiest. Iraq built heavily fortified positions in the marshes. It dug huge ditches that Iranian attackers would have to cross, then set up pumps to flood the ditches when Iranian troops were in them. The Iraqis also used their air superiority by employing fleets of helicopter gunships against Iranian positions on the far side of the marshes. It was here in the battle to recapture the Majnan oil field that Iraq allegedly first released mustard gas (which had been outlawed ever since its use in World War I) against Iranian troops. The Iraqi commander denied using the horrendous weapon. While the fighting may have been more intense in the south, the central sector of the battle line was potentially more important. In this hilly country lay the old highway from Baghdad to Tehran, offering each side a corridor for a quick and decisive offensive against the other’s capital. The terrain allowed Iraq to take advantage of its superiority in tanks until a 1984 Iranian offensive cut the roads. While Iran was able to capture some thirty-seven Iraqi towns and villages between 1984 and 1986, it was eventually driven back by a combined force of Iraqi and anti-Khomeini Iranian troops in early 1987. In the mountainous north, the situation was complicated by the presence of Kurdish forces, known as peshmerga, traditional Kurdish guerrillas whose name means “those who laugh at death.” With centuries of experience defending their mountainous homeland and deep hatred for Hussein, the Kurds were extremely effective in supporting Iranian offensives, harassing Iraqi positions, and sabotaging Iraqi oil installations in the region, including the large refinery at Kirkuk. The fighting in the north involved guerrilla tactics for much of the war, but that changed in early 1988, when Iran launched its first large offensive in that sector. Spearheaded by the peshmerga of the Patriotic

967

Iraqi soldiers pose near a bullet-riddled portrait of Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini in the strategic Faw peninsula in April 1988. A cease-fire came that August, after years of intense fighting but no clear outcome. (Mike Nelson/AFP/Getty Images)

Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—along with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two main Kurdish factions—the offensive captured a number of cities and towns. By February, with the Kurds leading the way south, the Iranian offensive was in a position to threaten Baghdad itself. Desperate to halt the drive, Hussein used weapons banned by international conventions since after World War I: nerve gas and mustard gas. Dropping chemical bombs on the hill-town of Halabja, Hussein’s forces killed an estimated 5,000 civilians. The peshmerga, fearing conventional attacks, had already abandoned the town.

Naval and Urban Warfare Attacks on oil tankers began as early as 1981 with an Iraqi air attack. The so-called “tanker war” began in

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earnest in 1984, when both sides tried to bankrupt the other by disrupting their oil trade. Some sixtytwo tankers were hit during that year, largely by Iraqi air and missile assaults. Iran responded with attacks of its own, though these were usually conducted by small gunships and were far fewer in number. The following year, the United States and other Western forces began to deploy their own warships in the Persian Gulf to protect their oil tankers. The number of attacks declined in 1985 and 1986, though this proved to be the lull before the storm. The year 1987 saw numerous attacks on tankers, as well as the Iraqi Exocet missile hit on the U.S. warship Stark in May, which killed thirty-seven U.S. servicemen. Because Iraq was tacitly allied to the United States, no retaliation was conducted. Instead, the United States launched a series of attacks on Iranian oil platforms, which it said were being used as launching pads for Iranian speedboat sabotage attacks on Western warships and tankers in the area. To hammer home its message that attacks on tankers that were neutral or were registered to Persian Gulf states was an indirect assault on U.S. interests, Washington began to offer its flag temporarily to these ships as protection. With tensions mounting in 1988, U.S. warships were on extreme alert, a status that led to the accidental shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner that crewmembers of the USS Vincennes believed was a fighter prepared to launch a missile at the ship. More than 100 passengers and crewmembers were killed. Many experts believe that the shoot-down inspired Islamist terrorists to blow up Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, a year later. While attacks on shipping were intended to disrupt oil supplies and make it more difficult for the enemy to pay for its military supplies, the missile attacks each launched on the other’s cities were largely aimed at civilian morale, intended to instill terror in the population and put pressure on the respective governments to sue for peace. The Iraqi attacks began on Iranian towns and cities near the front in 1983. Not so the fly-by of Iraqi jets over Tehran and the holy city of Qum in 1984, a clear demonstration that no city in Iran was safe. After Baghdad began bombing manufacturing plants inside Iran later that year, Iran began to retaliate with missiles fired on Baghdad. This forced the Iraqi civilian airline to disperse its fleet from the Baghdad airport, lest it invite attack. Though never very effective, sporadic missile

and air attacks on Iraqi and Iranian cities continued throughout the war.

Cease-Fire, Peace, and Legacy Almost from the beginning of the war, various third parties had tried to mediate an end to the conflict. Standing in the way were two factors. First, the Iraqi government was loath to end the war with Iranian troops occupying part of its territory, captured during 1987 and 1988. In Tehran, the Ayatollah had vowed that he would never accept peace with Iraq until Hussein had been driven from power. The first obstacle was largely removed by the Iraqi offensives of April and May 1988, which recaptured critical territory, including the oil complex at Fao. Meanwhile, concern over the attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf had forced the UN Security Council to overcome its differences and find a way to end the war. In July 1988, the five permanent members agreed to UN Resolution 598. Iraq was now eager to end the war. Tehran only came on board after Iranian military officials explained to Khomeini that a continuation of the war could jeopardize the revolution, by sapping it economically and militarily. After nearly a year of negotiations between the United Nations and the two belligerents, a cease-fire was finally signed, and hostilities officially ended in August 1988, just short of the war’s eighth anniversary. Under UN Resolution 598, both sides agreed to withdraw their forces from the territory of the other, accept the presence of UN observers to verify adherence to the resolution, repatriate the prisoners of war as soon as possible, and accept the UN secretarygeneral’s mediation in preparing a permanent peace treaty and his decision on responsibility for the war. Though the actual fighting had stopped, the hostility between the two sides lasted, delaying implementation of the accords until 1990. For all its destruction and bloodshed, the war was a stalemate, with neither side gaining territory or other advantage. The strategic balance in the Persian Gulf had hardly been altered. However, there were several lasting repercussions of the war. Iran’s revolutionary impulse to spread Islamic militancy to the rest of the Middle East was largely sapped. Indeed, the country’s leadership turned toward more prosaic domestic concerns, such as rebuilding its economy and establishing a more broad-based democracy, especially after the death of Khomeini in June 1989.

Iran: War with Iraq, 19 8 0–19 8 8

Iraq, however, proved more dangerous to Western interests following the war. Feeling that it had carried the brunt of stopping the Islamic revolution from spreading to the rest of the Middle East, it expected financial and other forms of compensation. The oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf, which had paid for Iraq’s huge expenses in the war, believed that they had saved the region from the threat of Islamic militancy. When Kuwait refused to make adjustments in the output and revenues from an oil field it shared with Iraq—revenues that Baghdad said it both deserved for its war efforts and needed for postwar reconstruction—Hussein sent his troops into the sheikdom in August 1990. This proved to be the beginning of the first Gulf War, between Iraq and UN forces led by the United States. James Ciment

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See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Invasion and Border Disputes; Iran: Coup Against Mossadegh, 1953; Iran: Islamic Revolution, 1979.

Bibliography Aziz, Tariq. The Iraq-Iran Conflict: Questions and Discussions. London: Third World Center, 1981. Bulloch, John. The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences. London: Methuen, 1989. Chubin, Shahram. Iran and Iraq at War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Creighton, John. Oil on Troubled Waters: Gulf Wars, 1980–91. London: Echoes, 1992. Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. New York: Routledge, 1991. Menashri, David. The Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989. Pelletiere, Stephen C. The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum. New York: Praeger, 1992.

IRAQ: Revolution and Coups,1958–1968 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups TURKEY s Riv e r gri Ti

SYRIA

SHIITES

Mosul

(United Arab Republic from 1958-1961)

Eu

IRAN

r at

es

Baghdad

r ve Ri

SUNNIS

JORDAN

KURDS

IRAQ ph

Ethnic group

SHIITES

SAUDI ARABIA 0 0

100 100

200

200

Basra 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

KUWAIT

Persian Gulf

Like most other Middle Eastern states, the country of Iraq was carved rather arbitrarily out of the remains of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Under a League of Nations mandate, the British, who had seized the region during the war, were given control of the three former Ottoman provinces that would become Iraq: Kurd-dominated Mosul in the north, Shiite Arab-dominated Basra in the south, and Sunnidominated Baghdad in the middle. Numerically, economically, and politically, the province of Baghdad had dominated what was to become Iraq for literally thousands of years, dating back to the time when the area was the heart of the Arab caliphate in medieval times. Under the terms of the mandate, the British were supposed to prepare Iraq for relatively quick independence, which they did, after a fashion of their own. Shortly after receiving the mandate, the British announced that they were establishing a monarchy for the new state, hand-picking the Emir Faisal of western Arabia for the job. The choice was extremely unpopular for several reasons: Faisal’s family was notorious for fleecing pilgrims to Mecca; the new king had never set foot in Iraq; and, most important, the majority of the country’s inhabitants wanted a repub-

lic. Mass uprisings in the Baghdad area in 1920 took months to quell and cost thousands of lives. In 1930, however, the British went ahead with their plans. The Anglo-Iraqi treaty of that year established a conservative, pro-British monarchy, which granted generous concessions to the former mandate power. Britain retained significant military use of the territory and was granted the rights to pump the vast and newly discovered oil reserves in the north of the country. (The southern oilfields, near Kuwait, were developed later.) The unpopular monarchy faced resistance on several fronts. Its Sunni Arab emphasis alienated both northern Kurds—who had been promised a state of their own by the British during the war—and the southern Shiites. The fears of these minorities were inflamed by the political struggle in Baghdad itself between Iraqi nationalist factions and pan-Arab ones. The minorities especially feared pan-Arab parties, concerned that the Kurds and Shiites alike could be swallowed up in a massive Sunni Arab state. A military coup in 1936, the first in the Arab world in modern times, set the stage for more than ten years of further political turmoil, even through a new British occupation during World War II (1939–1945). In 1948, a series of strikes and demonstrations brought down the government established in 1936. The 1950s were a decade of political instability, resulting from both internal and external causes. The pan-Arabist versus Iraqi nationalist split and the continuing anger over British dominance contributed to a record in which no fewer than twenty governments—all weak, all pro-Western, and all unpopular—came and went. Added to these internal squabbles were issues concerning the Middle East regionally and the Cold War internationally. The birth of Israel and the defeat of the Arab states, including Iraq, in the 1948–1949 Arab-Israeli War brought down at least one government. Baghdad’s 1955 decision to join the American-led anti-Soviet alliance of

970

Iraq: Revolution and Coups, 195 8–19 6 8

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KEY DATES 1930 The Anglo-Iraqi treaty ends the British Mandate in Iraq and sets up a conservative, pro-British monarchy in the country. 1952 Arab nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser takes power in Egypt, inspiring Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East. 1958 Left-wing, pan-Arabist military leader Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrows the monarchy, takes power, and establishes the Iraqi republic. 1963 Dissident military officers belonging to the Ba’athist Party and led by Defense Minister Abd as-Salam Arif overthrow and assassinate Qasim; in November, mainstream army officers overthrow the Ba’athist government. 1968 Ba’athist military officers, led by Saddam Hussein, overthrow the government in a second coup. 2003 Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist government is overthrown in a U.S. invasion.

southwest Asian states, known as the Baghdad Pact, brought down another. A key issue during the decade was the rise to power of the pan-Arabist, anti-British Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1952. Nasser’s successes had a galvanizing effect on the Iraqi people and its political leaders.

195 8 Revolution Like most Iraqi political leaders, the officer corps of the Iraqi army was largely opposed to the Britishinstalled monarchy but was divided into three factions: those who were pro-Western, those who favored socialist development, and those who leaned toward pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism. By 1957, a forty-three-year-old army officer named Abd al-Karim Qasim had become leader of several military left-wing, pan-Arabist factions, though Qasim himself was somewhat ambivalent on the question of Iraq’s place in the Arab world. Utilizing routine military maneuvers for cover, Qasim and thirteen other officers—known as the Free Officers, after Nasser’s group in Egypt—launched a successful coup that overthrew the monarchy in July 1958. Qasim declared himself prime minister, claiming that the revolution, as he called it, had not just

swept away the monarchy but would rid Iraqi society of its economic inequities, political repression, and socially backward ways. To bring the point home, Qasim ordered the execution of the king, the crown prince, and several other important personages from the monarchy. Though the coup was supported by an outpouring of popular support, the new government faced a series of delicate and potentially explosive domestic and foreign policy issues, including renegotiations for a fairer share of oil revenues, land reform, Kurdish nationalism, British military bases, Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact, and its response to the recent formation of the United Arab Republic of Syria and Egypt (UAR). Qasim proved largely ineffective in dealing with most of these during his five-year regime. He was unable to negotiate fairer payments to Iraq for oil extracted and shipped out of the country. He did, however, force Britain to pull its military forces out of the country. The country’s wealthy landholders were largely able to block a serious redistribution of land, and while Qasim did withdraw Iraq from the Baghdad Pact—which forced the alliance to change its name to the Central Asian Treaty Organization (CENTO)—he ended up inflaming the passions of both Kurdish and Iraqi nationalists.

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From the very beginning, Qasim alienated key constituents. His rejection of an invitation to become part of Nasser’s United Arab Republic produced pan-Arabist protests and earned the wrath of Nasser himself, who quickly became convinced that Qasim had to go. To put down the protests and also counteract a pan-Arabist coup attempt, Qasim turned to both the Kurds and the Communists, now the largest single political group in the country. In turn, both introduced new demands. First, the Communists insisted they be given a significant share of power, a demand that Qasim resisted. When they too rose up against his regime in 1960, he suspended all political activity and used Kurdish nationalists to quell Communist protests in the country’s north. Despite his use of Kurdish forces, Qasim’s relationship with this proud and combative ethnic group was strained. The provisional constitution declared that “Arabs and Kurds are considered partners in this homeland,” but Qasim refused to consider a serious devolution of power or autonomy to Kurdish regions. The Kurds, who constituted 20 percent of Iraq’s population and were a majority in the mountainous north of the country, rose up against Qasim in 1961 under their traditional ethnic leadership. Kurdish battles against the central government in Iraq would continue until 1975 and would again flare up in the 1980s and 1990s. The year 1961 also saw new tensions between Iraq and Britain. To draw the public’s attention away from domestic troubles, Qasim loudly protested Britain’s decision to grant independence to Kuwait, insisting that it was a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, since the new oil-rich country had been a part of Iraq under the Ottomans. Meanwhile, his ongoing negotiations with the British-controlled Iraq Petroleum Company for increased Iraqi royalties broke down when the British decided that Qasim’s demands were unacceptable.

Fall of Qasim and Rise of the Ba’ath By early 1963, Qasim had effectively alienated almost every element in the coalition that he built in the first days of his revolution, including large elements of the army, who were frustrated by the inconclusive war against the Kurds and wanted a more pan-Arabist emphasis to Iraqi foreign policy. In February, former defense minister and general Abd as-

Forces loyal to the pan-Arab Ba’ath Party patrol the streets of Baghdad after the successful coup against Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim on February 8, 1963. (AFP/Getty Images)

Salam Arif led dissident elements of the military in a successful coup, killing Qasim. While Arif was the leader of the coup, he served only as a figurehead for a clandestine political organization known as the Ba’ath, or Resurrection, party. Ba’ath was a self-proclaimed pan-Arab Socialist party. Highly secretive and brutal in their tactics, Ba’ath leaders began purging the government and other institutions of political opponents, murdering thousands in the process. Having moved too far ahead of its power base, the party was overthrown by the army in November, after less than a year in power. During the next five years Iraq was led by a series of ineffective civilian- and military-led governments. Finally, the Ba’ath party accomplished a second coup in 1968. This time it would rule for nearly 35 years. Headed by a military officer named Saddam Hussein, the new Ba’ath government moved more deliberately to consolidate its power. It purged its opponents gradually, even as it established a totalitarian state in which all governmental and private organizations

Iraq: Revolution and Coups, 195 8–19 6 8

were placed under party control. All other parties were eventually outlawed, the Communists were decimated, and the Kurds were slowly pushed back into the mountains. The Kurdish nationalist movement was destroyed when Hussein and the shah of Iran made a deal in 1975 in which Iran agreed to cut off all military aid to the Kurds in exchange for a key territorial concession by Iraq. James Ciment See also: Coups; Iraq: Kurdish Wars Since 1961.

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Bibliography CARDRI (Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq). Saddam’s Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? London: Zed Books, 1986. Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London: KPI, 1987. Fernea, Robert, and William Roger Louis, eds. The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991. al-Khalil, Samir (pseud.). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

IRAQ: Kurdish Wars Since 1961 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: Iran; Turkey; United States TURKEY

KDP KURDS

KURDS ris Tig

Mosul

Ri v e r

SYRIA

Eu

r at

Historical Background IRAN

Baghdad

Basra Shatt al-Arab

SAUDI ARABIA 100 100

es

PUK KURDS

r ve Ri

JORDAN

0

Halabja

IRAQ ph

0

Sulimaniyeh Kirkuk

struggles, international politics, and the Kurds’ own internal divisions continually thwarted their efforts to achieve self-determination and cultural autonomy.

CASPIAN SEA

200

200

Waterway

300 Miles

KUWAIT

300 Kilometers

Oil field KDP Kurdish Democratic Party (Barzani) PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Talabani)

Persian Gulf BAHRAIN

QATAR

The Kurds are among the world’s oldest living cultures. A distinctive people with a distinctive language type, the Kurds have inhabited the arc of mountains in the northern Middle East for thousands of years, zealously protecting their independence from lowland regimes through guerrilla warfare and banditry. And while the mountains have often protected them—an old Kurdish adage goes, “Level the mountains, and in a day the Kurds would be no more”— they have also been the Kurds’ curse, especially in modern times. Divided by topography into hostile clan networks, the Kurds were unable to come to grips with the rising tide of nationalism in the Middle East until it was too late. The Kurdish homeland stretched across several national borders into parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan, and Armenia; in each of these states, the Kurds were a minority. The modern Kurds never succeeded in achieving a state of their own. Competing nationalisms, regional power

The first recorded mention of the Kurds appears in the 4,000-year-old Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh, perhaps the oldest work of literature in the world. The story is emblematic of the relationship between the Kurds and the lowland regimes of Mesopotamia, then and since. In the epic, Gilgamesh, the hero from the city of Ur, first defeats and then recruits Enkidu, the half-beast, half-man of the mountains. This mythical creature is believed to represent the Kurdish people. In reality, the Kurdish culture formed over several thousands of years, as Indo-Aryan invaders from the north intermingled with the native inhabitants of the region. The most significant of these invasions was that of the Medes in the seventh century b.c.e. Both the invading Medes and the native Kurds were transformed by the long history of migration and intermingling. For example, the invaders’ Zoroastrian faith was modified by the local “cult of the angels” into a distinct form of ancestor worship, which even survived the coming of Islam in the first millennium c.e. Indeed, the rise of Islamic power in the Middle Ages represents a golden age in Kurdish history. Most Kurds converted to Islam, and many rose to high ranks in the Islamic caliphate of Baghdad, particularly in the military. It was a Kurdish general, SalahudDin—known to the West as Saladin—who finally drove the Christian crusaders out of the Holy Land in the late twelfth century. Moreover, as trans-Eurasian trade flourished, so did the Kurdish economy. The rise to power of the Ottomans in the fifteenth century had a devastating effect on Kurdistan. First, trading patterns were shifting away from the region as European traders found sea routes to the

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KEY DATES 1961

Fighting breaks out between the Kurdish federation of Mustafa Barzani and the revolutionary Iraqi government of Abd al-Karim Qasim.

1970

The Ba’athist government of Saddam Hussein, which came to power in the coup of 1968, offers a sweeping set of reforms, granting Kurds more autonomy; a cease-fire is signed between the Kurds and the Iraqi government.

1974

Fighting between the Kurds, supported by Iran, and the Iraqi government resumes.

1975

Iran and Iraq sign an accord ending each other’s support to Kurdish rebels in the other country; Iraqi Kurds are soundly defeated by government forces.

1980

Iraq invades Iran, leading to an eight-year war between the two countries; many Iraqi Kurds side with Iran.

1987

Responding to a major offensive by Kurdish rebels, the Iraqi government uses chemical weapons on the Kurdish city of Halaba, killing 6,000 persons.

1988–1989

In the wake of a 1988 cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, Baghdad launches a major offensive against Kurdish areas, destroying hundreds of Kurdish villages and sending tens of thousands of Kurds to concentration camps.

1991

After invading Kuwait in 1990, Iraq is defeated by an international coalition; President George H.W. Bush calls on the Kurds to rise up against the Iraqi government, but fails to support them militarily; hundreds of thousands of Kurds flee to Iran and Turkey; the United States and Great Britain establish a protective zone for Kurds in the northern part of Iraq.

1994–1998

Two main Kurdish factions, those led by the Barzani clan and those led by the clan of Jalal Talabani, fight a civil war.

2003

The United States invades and occupies Iraq.

2005–2006

The Kurds win a major place in the new Iraqi parliament, as junior partners of a ruling coalition headed by Arab Shiites.

East. Suddenly the Kurds found themselves on the periphery of international commerce. Second, during the 1500s and 1600s, the Ottomans and the Persians (modern-day Iranians)—whose imperial boundaries ran through the middle of Kurdistan—pursued almost constant war against each other, devastating the Kurdish people and their economy.

In the Ottoman realms, of which Iraq was then a part, a dualistic administration gradually took shape. In the lowlands, the sultan ruled directly through his governors. In remote mountain areas, power was divided between representatives of the Ottoman government and self-determined Kurdish tribal leaders. The Kurdish leaders maintained autonomy in ex-

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change for tribute money and fighting men. Kurdish fighters, famous for their skills, were especially valued by the sultan. The nineteenth century saw dramatic changes. The Ottoman Empire was in a long period of decline, losing influence to increasingly powerful European nations. The sultanate of Constantinople instituted a series of reforms. First, to increase its control, it dissolved the semi-independent emirates, especially among the Kurds, destroying traditional Kurdish institutions. Second, the new land codes claimed the Kurds’ communal grazing lands and their farms, which fell to the control of urban merchants and wealthy rural landlords (many of whom were also Kurdish tribal chiefs). The old feudal relationship between tribesmen and chief was destroyed in the process, particularly in the more accessible foothills like the traditional Kurdish regions of Iraq. By the time the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1920, the Kurds in Iraq had largely been reduced to tribalism and banditry in the mountains, and political and economic subjugation to the sultan in the foothills. The British further promoted these trends during their Mandate in the 1920s. At the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919 and other postwar conferences, the Kurds pleaded for a state of their own, but their own leaders were divided and the Kurds found themselves minorities in various new states, including Iraq. Contemptuous of the Kurds and fearful that they would prove hard to control, the British turned to the Arabs as the future rulers of an independent Iraq, including the rich oilfields of Kurdish-dominated Mosul province in the north. In 1930, London handed over power to a pro-British monarch, albeit with stipulations in the new country’s constitution guaranteeing Kurdish cultural and political rights.

Iraq as Kingdom and Republic The government of the new kingdom of Iraq largely ignored and abused the Kurds. Virtually all the administrators in the Kurdish north were Arabs appointed by Baghdad with little or no consultation with Kurdish leaders. Moreover, the government actively suppressed the teaching of the Kurdish language in schools. So blatant were these violations that the Kurds went to the League of Nations, which ordered King Faisal to comply with earlier guarantees of Kurdish rights. But Faisal was reluctant to obey

the order. He complained that Kurdish complaints were really the first steps in a campaign for autonomy or independence—an argument often heard from Iraqi leaders in later years. The Great Depression of the 1930s caused Iraq’s oil revenues to diminish, and Kurds working in the oil fields around Mosul began to suffer. Moreover, the weakening ability of the government to guarantee peace meant that internal Kurdish feuding increased, bringing political instability to the region. World War II only worsened these problems. Food shortages contributed to an uprising led by Mustafa Barzani, head of a confederation of clans in the northwest of Kurdish Iraq. The uprising was quickly put down by Iraqi and British forces. Barzani fled to neighboring Iran, where he helped found the only independent Kurdish state in modern history, the Mahabad Republic, which lasted for only one year. It collapsed in 1946 when its major-power patron, the Soviet Union, withdrew support. Barzani and 500 of his peshmerga—traditional Kurdish fighters (the name means “those who laugh at death”)—fought their way across hundreds of miles of hostile territory to refuge in the Soviet Union. Barzani and his followers remained in the USSR for twelve years, until new opportunities presented themselves in Iraq. The new opportunity for the Kurds came in 1958. Since the end of World War II, Iraq had been staggering from one political crisis to another. The king, a foreigner disliked for his slavish obedience to British interests, was overthrown by General Abd alKarim Qasim, who led a coalition of leftists and nationalists. Attempting to wipe the slate clean, Qasim reached out to the various minorities of Iraq, including the Kurds. He invited Barzani to return and announced a new republic that would guarantee the “welfare, freedom, and equality of the Kurdish and Arab peoples.” In fact, Qasim’s government proved not much different than prior regimes. First, it chose to ignore Kurdish demands as long as the Kurds were not threatening rebellion, and it failed to incorporate Kurdish leaders into the central government. Second, it used Kurdish fighters to repress other opponents of the regime, including pan-Arabists and Communist elements. The Kurds were happy to go along since they shared in Qasim’s dislike for pan-Arabists. Iraq’s incorporation into a supra-Arab state, they understood, would further diminish their strength.

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The Kurds wanted something in return for their efforts, however. Barzani, now the undisputed leader of much of Kurdish Iraq, began to demand more autonomy. Qasim responded in the time-honored fashion by stirring up conflicts between one Kurdish tribe and another. He began arming and supporting members of the Zibari confederation, Barzani’s main rival. Barzani allied himself with the traditional aghas, tribal chiefs and landlords angry with Qasim’s agrarian reforms, defeated the Zibaris, then turned against Baghdad. Aided and armed by Iraq’s rival, Iran, Barzani was now in a position to fight for Kurdish autonomy or independence militarily. The war would last fourteen years.

First Kurdish War, 19 61–1975 For two years, the Barzani confederation and the Qasim government fought a bitter guerrilla war, with neither able to deliver the knockout blow. The peshmerga—though outgunned by the Iraqi army— were skilled in mountain warfare and had the support of the vast majority of the Kurdish civilian population. Indeed, Qasim’s inability to deal with the Kurdish problem was one of the main reasons for his downfall. In February 1963, a group of officers belonging to the Ba’athist party—a strongly nationalist and socialist group, with increasingly totalitarian instincts—took power, executing Qasim and unleashing a “reign of terror” against real and putative opponents. At first, the Kurds welcomed the Ba’ath. This baffling alliance is explained by the fact that the Kurds—having helped to dispatch the Communists, their only real allies—had nowhere else to turn for help against the old government of Qasim. Their support for the new Ba’ath government soon proved disastrous. Within months, Baghdad began removing Kurds from their homes around the crucial oilrefining center at Kirkuk and replacing them with Arab families. Baghdad then launched a new offensive in the north. At this moment, having alienated virtually every sector of Iraqi society, the Ba’ath leaders were overthrown in a military coup just nine months after taking power. Meanwhile, a new power struggle was emerging in the Kurdish north. The Kurds who opposed Barzani’s dominance rallied around Jalal Talibani, a leader of the powerful Talibani clan in the eastern part of Mosul province. The two clans had been

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united in opposing the Ba’ath, but when the Ba’ath fell, they formed rival parties and began to fight each other. The Barzani clan took the lead in the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the Talibani clan sponsored the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In Baghdad, the new regime of Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz tried to exploit the hostility between the Kurdish confederations, throwing his aid to the Talabani group in its battle against Barzani, who maintained his hold on northern Mosul. Faced with growing popular protest against the war, the government was forced to negotiate to end the strife. In 1965, Baghdad and the Kurds worked out the most extensive series of reforms since independence. Under the agreement, the Kurds were recognized as a “nation,” assured cultural autonomy and use of their own language, and promised that most administrators in the region would be of Kurdish origin. Unfortunately, the al-Bazzaz government was in no position to enforce these policies. Weakened by internal bickering, the government was overthrown in a second Ba’ath coup in July 1968. Despite the return of their old enemies, the Kurds remained confident. The Ba’ath tended to rely on support from the Soviet Union, and this would almost certainly persuade the shah of Iran and his sponsors in the United States to increase military aid to the Kurds in Iraq. The growing power of both Barzani and Talabani convinced the new regime in Baghdad that a new set of negotiations was required. Unlike the former government, the Ba’ath sided with Barzani against the weaker Talabanis. Reviving the old al-Bazzaz agreement, the Ba’ath government announced a sweeping set of reforms on March 11, 1970. The Kurds responded with a cease-fire. The costs of the war to date had been terrible. Some 60,000 combatants and civilians on both sides had been killed or wounded. And at least 700 villages and some 40,000 homes had been destroyed, leaving 300,000 Kurds displaced. But the cease-fire was not to last. The Ba’ath government used the lull to consolidate its rule in the lowland provinces, demolishing the rival Communist Party, the largest in Iraq at the time. Meanwhile, continued negotiations with the Kurds bogged down over whether the region of Kirkuk should be included in the Kurdish autonomous zone and how oil revenues from the region should be divided. Tensions between Baghdad and the Barzani clan returned, especially after an assassination attempt against Barzani, likely

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ordered by the Ba’ath regime. In the spring of 1974, fighting between the two sides resumed. Faced with discontent in the army and grumbling among the populace, the government forces had to retreat. Saddam Hussein, who had gained full charge of the Ba’ath party and the government, tried a new tack. Knowing that the Kurds could not continue the war without the steady infusion of arms from Iran, Hussein secretly met with the shah in Algiers in March 1975. There, the two leaders worked out an agreement. The shah (and by implication his ally, the United States) would end all support for the Kurds. In exchange, Iraq would make territorial concessions, including the crucial Shatt al-Arab waterway on the Persian Gulf, which connected an Iranian city to the gulf. Cut off from their supplies and caught between Hussein’s forces and the army of the now-hostile shah, the Kurds were soundly defeated. While Talabani worked out a compromise with Baghdad, Barzani was forced to flee to Iran along with some 35,000 peshmerga and 150,000 Kurdish civilians. In addition, some 20,000 more persons had died or been wounded in that year’s fighting. It was a disaster for the Kurds, who had lost their latest gamble to pit Middle Eastern and international governments against one another.

Iran-Iraq War and Anfal Campaign The rise to power of a militant Islamic regime in Iran in 1979 dramatically changed the political and military equation in the region. Hussein feared the influence of Shiite Iran on the large Shiite population in Iraq. In addition, he was eager to reverse the concessions he had made in the Algiers Accord. In September 1980, Hussein launched a massive invasion of Iran. For the Kurds, renewed warfare offered new opportunities. The Kurdish leaders were receiving military support from the new regime in Teheran, and they used Baghdad’s preoccupation with the Iranian war to assert their autonomy and establish “liberated” zones in the north. To counter this threat, Hussein once again played off Kurd against Kurd. Appealing to Talabani’s fear of Barzani’s dominance and possible attacks by Iran, Hussein was able to set the the Kurds to fighting among themselves. By the mid-1980s, Talabani was turning against the government in Baghdad, hoping to consolidate control in his portion of Iraqi Kurdistan. He also

gained promises from the government in Iran that it would support his demands for autonomy. In the fall of 1986, Talabani launched a destructive raid on the Kirkuk refinery complex, an act of aggression against Hussein and Iraq. In May 1987, the two main Kurdish parties took the lead in forming the Kurdish National Front, an alliance that openly supported Iran and demanded Kurdish autonomy (or even independence) from Iraq. In 1987, the Iranians and Kurds launched their last great offensive of the war, with a drive on Baghdad itself. Iraqi forces held the line, employing chemical weapons to do so. In April 1988, Iraqi planes doused the Kurdish city of Halabja with nerve gas and mustard gas. Since most of the Iranian troops and peshmerga had already left the city, most of the 6,000 deaths were civilians. Iran’s failed offensive turned the war once again in Iraq’s favor. With casualties approaching 1 million, Iran’s leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was forced to negotiate with Hussein, something he had vowed never to do. On August 20, 1988, he accepted UN Resolution 598, calling for a cease-fire and eventually a return by both sides to the borders established before the war. The cease-fire left the Iraqi Kurds even more exposed than ever before. To prevent any further uprising, Hussein used his huge military machine to destroy the Kurdish military and much of Iraqi Kurdistan. The anfal, or “spoils of war,” campaign saw the killing of tens of thousands of Kurdish civilians and the flight to Iran and Turkey of hundreds of thousands more. Villages across Kurdistan were razed, wells capped, fields laced with salt. Tens of thousands of Kurds who had remained were forced to move into concentration camps on the outskirts of urban areas throughout Iraq. Having effectively destroyed the Kurdish military infrastructure and cowed the Kurdish population, Hussein granted an amnesty the following year. Most of the Kurdish refugees returned from Iran and Turkey, and many of the internally dispossessed began to filter back to the north. But if Baghdad believed it had put down Kurdish rebelliousness for good, it was sadly mistaken. As in the past, Kurdish leaders were ready at the first opportunity to take up arms in the cause of self-determination. That opportunity would present itself with Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the Gulf War that followed.

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Post–Gulf War Uprising Both Talabani and Barzani recognized the potential opportunity inherent in Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Within days, Talabani was meeting with Iranian officials and representatives of the Iraqi opposition. At the same time, representatives of both Kurdish factions visited Washington, offering to support a U.S. effort to oust Hussein from Kuwait. Their efforts failed, but Kurdish leaders continued to ingratiate themselves with the allied coalition that was forming under U.S. leadership in the fall of 1990. While the United States was dismissing the Kurds either as irrelevant or detrimental to the war effort, Turkey was seeking a closer alliance. Ankara, of course, had its own Kurdish problems, specifically a left-wing, nationalist uprising led by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK, its acronym in Kurdish) since 1984. Turkish leader Turgut Ozal knew that there was no love lost between the left-wing PKK and the tradition-bound Iraqi Kurd tribal confederations. He hoped to encourage a revived Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq and to gain the support of Iraqi Kurds in his own fight against the PKK in Turkey. Even as the Gulf War was getting under way, Ozal was making his move. To head off potential Western criticism of Ankara’s treatment of its own Kurdish population, Ozal legalized the use of the Kurdish language for private purposes for the first time since the 1920s. At the same time, however, he signed harsh new antiterrorism laws aimed at Kurdish rebels and increased the Turkish military presence in the Kurdish southeast into the hundreds of thousands. By March 1991, as Hussein’s forces were being driven out of Kuwait, Ozal and the Kurds had reached an agreement: Barzani and Talabani would prevent the PKK from using Iraqi territory as staging areas, and Turkey would “guarantee” the security of northern Iraq against Hussein’s forces. Washington was aware of the ongoing TurkishKurdish negotiations, and hesitantly supported them, as long as Turkey did not use the agreement to occupy northern Iraq. While Turkey had become an important ally of the United States, U.S. leaders did not want to encourage thorny border disputes between Turkey and Iraq. Still, the United States saw the potential of a Kurdish enclave even before the Gulf War was over. Having responsibilities for protecting the Kurds against Hussein could offer an

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acceptable excuse for maintaining the U.S. military presence in the region. Once again, the Kurds of Iraq were feeling confident. Both Talabani and Barzani had boasted of their military prowess and assured the West that they could drive Iraqi forces out of the north if given half a chance. When U.S. president George H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to rise up against the Hussein regime, the Kurdish leaders saw their chance. By the end of March 1991, they had virtually driven the disintegrating Iraqi army from the north and captured some 30,000 jash, Kurdish soldiers supporting Baghdad. In April, however, the tide turned against them. While the allies sat on their hands, Hussein used a relatively untouched division of his elite Revolutionary Guards to reestablish Baghdad’s control in the north. As a result of the brutal campaign, over a million Kurdish refugees fled to Iran and Turkey, where they suffered on the border mountaintops in the early spring cold. This mass exodus was seen in the West as a tragedy for Kurds who had been betrayed by Western leaders’ promises of support. In fact, things were more complicated than that. Many experts believe that the massive exodus may have been planned by Kurdish leaders in cooperation with the Turkish government. They point to several anomalies to prove their case. First, eyewitness accounts speak of organized efforts by peshmerga leaders to roust Kurdish civilians from their homes. This effort was aided, of course, by Kurdish fears of another anfal, or chemical campaign. But surely, say students of the conflict, the Kurdish leaders knew that Hussein would never dare use chemical weapons with a massive alliance poised against him. Second, the Kurdish peshmerga had not been scared to fight Hussein’s army when it was at its most awesome following the Iran-Iraq war. Why would they flee now when Hussein’s army had been decimated by its defeat in the Gulf War? Whatever the cause of the flight, the scale was massive. With hundreds of thousands of refugees freezing in the cold, the West was forced to act. Following the provision of humanitarian aid, Britain, the United States, Turkey, and other allies guaranteed a safe Kurdish enclave above the 36th parallel in May. This was exactly what the Turkish and Kurdish leaders had proposed in March. Indeed, virtually all the Kurds had returned to the Iraqi north by June, under the protection of U.S. and other allied troops. The

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choice of the 36th parallel was telling. Kirkuk and most of its oilfields remained south of the line, outside the Kurdish area. This division was pointedly aimed at Turkey, which the United States feared might have designs on the region and the oil. Ultimately, Operation Poised Hammer, as it was called, included 500 UN peacekeepers, designed to serve as a trigger in case of an Iraqi offensive. The UN force was backed up by squadrons of U.S. and allied jet fighters based in Turkey. Almost immediately, the Kurds returned to their infighting. In July 1991, Talabani launched an attack on the city of Sulimaniyeh, below the 36th parallel but once the headquarters of Barzani’s PUK. The attack was defeated, but observers speculated that Hussein might have had a hand in its planning. Once again, Baghdad was pitting one Kurd against another.

and Talabani in the years when the fighting broke out, the situation remained tense. In 1997, Talabani launched a massive invasion of Barzani-held territory, supported by Saddam Hussein. The invasion was turned back, but not before Hussein’s troops had marched into the safe haven, prompting the U.S. government to airlift out thousands of Kurds who had served in pro-U.S. functions. In 1998, the Barzani and Talabani factions signed a peace agreement in Washington, bringing their four-year-old conflict to an end. While the fighting ceased, the Kurdish region in northern Iraq remained divided between the KDP and PUK. Then, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, tensions flared between the largely secular PUK and the Islamic fundamentalist group Ansar al-Islam, which maintained training camps in the PUK-controlled section of Kurdish northern Iraq.

Aftermath of the Gulf War Iraqi War of 2003 and After In early 1992, the Kurds held elections. Unsanctioned by the allies—for fear it might lead to an independence move—and unobserved by the outside, the elections resulted in a virtual dead heat between Talabani and Barzani forces. When the new parliament convened, each side had fifty representatives, with another five divided among smaller parties. Meanwhile, a presidential runoff between Barzani and Talabani was canceled, and a “high committee” of the two was given executive power. The coalition was doomed from the beginning. First, it came under pressure from Turkey, which demanded more help in its own efforts against the PKK. Indeed, the first of many Turkish incursions into northern Iraq in late 1992 helped to destabilize the region. More troubling was the matter of revenues. Situated on the Turkish border, the KDP was in a better position to profit from the lucrative smuggling trade with Iraq. With its increased earnings, which it failed to turn over to the pan-Kurdish government in Arbil, it was able to hire more peshmerga and buy more arms, which it used to strong-arm the Talabani coalition. By 1994, the two sides were preparing for war against each other. In May, the necessary spark ignited over a small land dispute, and the Barzani and Talabani factions—much to the chagrin of Turkey and the United States—fell into fierce fighting with one another. Though the United States tried to broker cease-fires and peace agreements between Barzani

But the real impact of 9/11 was yet to be felt in Kurdish Iraq. As it became clear by 2002 that the administration of President George W. Bush was planning on invading Iraq, the two Kurdish factions opened negotiations with each other and with other Iraqi opposition groups. The talks, which began in June of that year, were aimed at coordinating the Kurdish response to the attack. In October, PUK and KDP parliamentarians met in Arbil for the first time in six years in what was dubbed a “transitional session,” until formal legislative elections could be held. In March 2005, Barzani and Talabani formed a “joint higher leadership” council to coordinate Kurdish participation in the war and to administer northern Iraq after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. But while the Kurds made offers to the Americans to help topple Saddam Hussein, their maneuvering to prevent Turkish troops from entering northern Iraq contributed to a setback to U.S. invasion plans, as the Turkish parliament voted to prohibit American troops from using Turkish territory to open a second front in the looming Iraqi War. Many in Turkey worried that Kurdish opposition to Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq could result in casualties and stir unrest in the Kurdish sections of Turkey. In the first few weeks following the U.S. invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, fighting came to northern Iraq, first as the United States launched cruise missile attacks on Ansar al-Islam bases and

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then as U.S. paratroopers landed near Arbil. By early April, as U.S. forces advanced into Baghdad, Kurdish peshmerga and U.S. forces seized the northern Iraqi city of Mosul and the oil-rich Kirkuk district. The easy defeat of Saddam Hussein’s army by May 1, 2003, was followed by months and years of growing insurgency in the country. Northern Iraq, particularly in those areas where Sunni Arabs—the favored minority under Saddam Hussein—and Kurds lived side by side, was the scene of numerous attacks by insurgents on U.S. forces, suicide bombings, and clashes between insurgents and Kurdish peshmerga. Meanwhile, some Kurdish groups took advantage of the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s army to oust Sunni Arabs from Kurdish areas. Many of the Sunnis had been relocated there to dilute Kurdish demographic strength in certain regions of northern Iraq, especially around the oil fields and refineries of Kirkuk. At the same time, the PUK, KDP, and smaller Kurdish parties formed an alliance to participate in elections for a new Iraqi government. In the January 2005 elections for an interim parliament, the Kurds won 77 seats, forming the second largest group, after the Shiites. Most Sunnis boycotted the elections. The new parliament then selected Talabani to serve as interim president of Iraq in April, a landmark achievement in a country traditionally dominated by Arabs, even if the post was largely a ceremonial one. Two months later, the first session of the Kurdish parliaments selected Barzani to serve as president of the autonomous region. Finally, in elections for a permanent parliament in Baghdad in January 2006, Kurds once again formed the second largest bloc, with 53 seats out of a total of 275. With a new permanent government in place in Iraq, old questions about autonomy and independence seemed likely to arise. It was no secret, said regional experts, that Iraqi Kurds secretly longed for an independent state, especially one that would include the disputed oil regions around Kirkuk. During the twelve-year period from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to the Iraqi War of 2003, the Kurds, despite infighting, built a prosperous and relatively well-

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administered region in their autonomous zone, under the protection of U.S. and British warplanes. With a new government in place in Baghdad, the Kurds were making it clear that their participation depended on the central government’s granting a large degree of autonomy to northern Iraq. For its part, the United States made it clear that it did not want to see a formal partition of Iraq. As of 2006, Kurdish parliamentarians had made no attempt to put that on their agenda, at least publicly. However, if chaos continued to reign in the Sunni region of Iraq or if the Shiite majority within Iraq tried to centralize power, as the Sunnis under Saddam Hussein did, irredentist sympathies were likely to arise in Kurdish Iraq once again. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Turkey: Kurdish War Since 1984; Iran: War with Iraq, 1980–1988; Iraq: Gulf War, 1990–1991; Iraq: U.S. Invasion, 2003– .

Bibliography Bruinessen, Martin van. Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan. London: Zed Books, 1992. Bulloch, John, and Harvey Morris. No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Chaliand, Gerard, ed. A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993. Ciment, James. The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. New York: Facts on File, 1996. Gunter, Michael. The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. McDowall, David. The Kurds: A Nation Divided. London: Minority Rights Publication, 1992. Middle East Watch. Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. Natali, Denise. The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005. O’Leaery, Brendan, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, eds. The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2005. Schmidt, Dana Adams. Journey Among Brave Men. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964.

IRAQ: Gulf War,1990–1991 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: United Nations Coalition world. In the United States, the war’s impact was not quite so clear. While President George H.W. Bush asserted that the decisive victory over Iraq had ended the so-called Vietnam syndrome in American foreign policy—which had caused American public opinion to resist U.S. military intervention overseas—massive antiwar demonstrations during the Gulf War sent a different message.

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Historical Background

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BAHRAIN QATAR

The Gulf War represented a major turning point in the history of the post–World War II era. By organizing a multinational coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait—following its August 1990 invasion—the United States demonstrated its unchallenged superpower status in the first major war of the post–Cold War era. While the Soviet Union and China stood by, after effectively giving their blessing to the U.S.-led mission, the allied forces, under UN aegis, overwhelmed Iraqi forces in a matter of weeks, not only driving them from Kuwait but virtually destroying Baghdad’s capacity to make war. The war also represented a major turning point in the history of Middle Eastern relations. By arraying most of the Arab countries against Iraq—and persuading Israel to stand aside—the United States asserted itself as the dominant outside power in the region. Moreover, the war left Iraq militarily, politically, and economically crippled, essentially ending its decades-old effort to assume leadership of the Arab

The ultimate causes of the Gulf War go back nearly 300 years. Since the 1500s, the Ottoman Empire had ruled Mesopotamia—modern Iraq—and much of the western littoral of the Persian Gulf. Following imperial tradition, the sultan in Constantinople had ruled these domains by a variety of direct and indirect means. In the more settled and accessible plains of Mesopotamia, Ottoman control was tighter, largely in the hands of governors appointed by the sultan. In the poorer and less accessible regions, including the Persian Gulf littoral, the sultan governed indirectly through local sheiks who paid tribute to the empire. Since the 1750s, the territory that is now Kuwait was ruled by the al-Sabah dynasty. Still, Kuwait was considered part of the province of Basra, one of three that would eventually come to form Iraq. With the opening of an East India Company base in 1776, British authority began to compete with Ottoman power in the al-Sabah-ruled territory. By the late nineteenth century, the Persian Gulf had become a battleground for conflicting imperial ambitions, with Britain, Russia, Ottoman Turkey, and Germany competing for power there. Fearful of German plans to extend the Berlin-Baghdad railway to Kuwait—and build a coaling station for its fleet there—the British fomented divisions within the alSabah family. It supported the effort of Mubarak alSabah to seize power from his half-brother, the ruling

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KEY DATES 1968

Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist Party take power in Iraq in a coup.

1979

Islamists take power in Iran after a year-long revolution.

1980–1988

After Iraq invades Iran, the two countries fight a costly war against each other.

1990

In June, Saddam Hussein sends a warning to the emir of Kuwait to stop exceeding his Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota, thereby bringing down the price of oil; on July 25, Hussein meets with American ambassador April Glaspie, who tells the Iraqi leader his conflict with Kuwait is “not associated with America”; on August 2, six divisions of the Iraqi army invade Kuwait, meeting little resistance.

1991

On January 16, the United States, head of a multinational coalition of more than 500,000 troops, launches Operation Desert Storm to oust Iraq from Kuwait with an air assault; on February 24, the coalition launches a ground invasion; on February 28, a temporary cease-fire goes into effect as Iraqis have fled Kuwait; calling for Shiites and Kurds in Iraq to rise up against the Hussein regime, U.S. President George H.W. Bush provides little support, and the rebellions are crushed by Iraqi forces; United States and Britain establish a no-fly protection zone over the northern Kurdish part of country.

2003

The United States invades Iraq, overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime.

sheik, Muhammed I al-Sabah, who was pro-German and pro-Ottoman. In 1896, Mubarak assassinated Muhammed, becoming ruler of the sheikdom. Mubarak immediately signed a secret treaty with Britain, granting it exclusive control over the country’s foreign policy in exchange for an annual stipend of 1,500 pounds. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the British became the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Under a League of Nations mandate, Iraq was handed over to the British, which then imposed an Arabian emir, Faisal I, as king of Iraq in 1921. Nine years later the Anglo-Iraqi treaty granted the country nominal independence. Under the treaty, Britain maintained military bases in the country and had exclusive control over the country’s northern oil reserves. (The huge oil deposits of the Persian Gulf

area would not be exploited until the late 1930s.) Despite persistent claims that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq—made by every government that ruled the country, whether monarchical or republican, left or right, and based on Ottoman precedent—the British continued to maintain Kuwait as a protectorate of its own. While Iraq officially accepted its disputed borders with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia upon its admission to the League of Nations in 1932, the country’s leadership continued to agitate to incorporate Kuwait into Iraq. In 1938, King Faisal requested a lease of Kuwaiti territory to build a deep-water port, with a railway connecting it to the Basra-Baghdad line. When he was opposed by Britain and its ally Iran, Faisal sent troops to the border. The incident ended suddenly when the king died in a car accident soon

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afterward, leaving the throne to his four-year-old son, Faisal II. Without an effective monarch, Iraq’s political establishment became more nationalist and antiBritish until the outbreak of World War II. At that point, British forces occupied the country (to forestall any attack by the Axis powers) and imposed the proWestern Nuri al-Said as prime minister. Al-Said and the equally pro-British regent Abdul Ilah helped Britain organize the pro-Western Baghdad Pact alliance of Middle Eastern countries in the mid-1950s, but nationalist sentiments were growing in Iraq, especially among its corps of military officers. In 1958, Abd al-Karim Qasim, a strongly nationalist military officer with socialist inclinations, overthrew the government and took power. He pulled Iraq out of the Baghdad Pact and began to demand that Kuwait be incorporated into Iraq. By this time, Kuwait was the leading oil exporter in the Gulf, and the British responded to Iraqi demands by granting Kuwait full independence and sovereignty on June 19, 1961. Within two weeks, Qasim had dispatched a large force to the Kuwaiti border, but he was dissuaded from invading after the British dispatched a 6,000-man armored detachment to the newly independent country. That summer, the Arab League—under the leadership of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who disliked Qasim’s nationalist politics—voted to defend Kuwait against any Iraqi aggression, permitting British troops to leave. Only Qasim’s overthrow and murder by forces of the Iraqi Ba’ath (Resurrection) party in February 1963 ended the immediate Iraqi threat to Kuwait. Later that year, an Iraqi-Kuwaiti friendship pact was signed, and Kuwait was officially recognized by the United Nations. Still, issues concerning the exact demarcation of the border between the two countries persisted. In November 1963, the Ba’ath party was ousted from power. For the next five years, Iraq was torn by political divisions and ruled by a series of ineffective governments. In 1968, the Ba’ath—led by an army officer named Saddam Hussein—reclaimed power and spent much of the 1970s fighting a Kurdish rebellion in the north and consolidating its power in Baghdad. This latter effort included the establishment of a totalitarian political order in which all government agencies and independent organizations were placed under control of the party. A vast security apparatus was also created that effectively eliminated all opposition to the party.

Still, the government faced one opposition force that could not be defeated by police methods alone. In the north of the country, the ethnically distinct and fiercely independent Kurdish population had been engaged in an armed revolt against Baghdad since the early 1960s. With military aid coming from the shah in Iran, the Kurds were able to keep the Iraqi army off balance in Iraq’s Kurdish territories. For that reason, Hussein negotiated the Algiers Accord in a secret meeting with the shah in 1975. Under the accord, the shah agreed to cut off aid to the Kurds—much of which came indirectly from the United States—in exchange for territorial concessions, specifically Iranian control of the strategic Shatt al-Arab waterway on the Persian Gulf. Many in Iraq considered the loss of the waterway a bitter setback for the country. Meanwhile, during the 1960s, the al-Sabahs in Kuwait had written a constitution that established a parliament and independent judiciary. This was largely for show since only about 10 percent of the male population was qualified to vote, which effectively permitted the al-Sabahs to control the entire government. After the assembly began to agitate for more power in the mid-1970s, Emir Sabah III alSabah simply dissolved it.

Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War While Hussein was establishing his supreme authority over Iraq in the 1970s, the shah was losing power in Iran. Both, of course, had utilized the tremendous revenues generated by the surge in oil prices following the 1973–1974 anti-Western, anti-Israeli boycott of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait were all members. These so-called Petrodollars allowed Hussein both to buy off his opposition and to pay for an effective security system. In Iran, by contrast, the shah’s ambitious and grandiose efforts at economic and social modernization had been causing enormous dislocations and unrest. By the late 1970s, the opposition had coalesced around Iran’s supreme spiritual leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of Iran’s Shia Muslims. Mass demonstrations drove the shah into exile in January 1979, and in February, the Ayatollah returned to direct the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamist revolution in Iran sent shock waves throughout the Middle East. Conservative monarchies

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of the Gulf states, including Kuwait, were especially fearful of Iran’s military power—built up by the shah through generous U.S. aid in the 1970s and now under the control of a hostile regime. The new regime in Iran supported Islamic religious and political militancy in countries that it considered to be tools of the Western powers. The regime in Baghdad had its own concerns. With more than half of its Arab population members of the Shiite faith, it worried that their allegiance would be to the Ayatollah rather than Iraq. Indeed, Iraq had forced Khomeini out of the country in 1978 (he had lived in exile there since the early 1960s) when he began stirring up unrest among Iraqi Shiites. In addition, Hussein was eager to reverse the territorial concessions he had made to Iran in the Algiers Accord, and he rightly believed that an attack on Islamist Iran would be welcomed by major world and Middle Eastern powers. In September 1980, after gaining the secret approval of the leaders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Hussein launched a massive military attack on Iran. Hussein believed a massive invasion force would quickly defeat Iran’s military, which was reeling from the revolution and cut off from supplies of parts and ammunition from the United States and other great powers. The Iraqi forces soon learned, however, that Iran’s resistance was fierce and effective. The conflict bogged down into a bloody and costly war of attrition. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia kept their promises to provide economic and military aid to Iraq. Kuwait provided billions of dollars in interest-free loans and sent between 500 and 1,000 trucks of supplies into Iraq every day during the early years of the war. Other oil-rich Gulf states provided both economic and moral support to the cause. Western countries, including the United States, lined up behind Iraq, fearing that Iranian-inspired militancy could cause lasting disruptions in the Persian Gulf region. They supplied Hussein’s government with loans and modern armaments, including jets, tanks, and missiles, as well as the means to manufacture chemical weapons. Despite this aid, Iraq could not defeat the Iranians decisively, and the war finally came to an end eight years later with a return to the status quo. The human and financial costs of the war had been enormous: some 1 million dead on both sides, heavy destruction of the border regions of both countries (including the extensive oil facilities at the head of the Persian Gulf ), and overwhelming

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debts made ever worse by the collapse in oil prices during the 1980s. Still, Baghdad emerged from the war with a massive military machine, including 950,000 regular troops and 620,000 elite Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC), representing about 60 percent of the country’s male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Moreover, it was still well equipped with artillery, armor, missiles, and fighter aircraft supplied by the Western powers during the war. The Iraqi military could now turn its full force on the remains of the Kurdish rebellion in the north, which was faltering with the end of Iranian support. As tens of thousands of Kurds fled to Turkey, Hussein used his vast array of weapons—including poison gases—to destroy the Kurdish guerrilla forces, known as peshmerga, and also to drive huge segments of the Kurdish population into concentration camps, after destroying their farms and villages in a campaign he labeled anfal, or “spoils of war.”

Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait Although the Iran-Iraq War had ended in a stalemate, Hussein’s propaganda machine convinced the Iraqi people that they had won “the longest conventional war of the twentieth century.” Bolstered at home, Hussein then went on a diplomatic offensive in the Arab world, hosting a conference in Baghdad in February 1989 that led to the formation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC). The following month Hussein signed an agreement with the Saudis formalizing their border and offered to sign a similar agreement with Kuwait—with the extra condition that Iraq be allowed to construct maritime facilities on Bubiyan Island, which was claimed by both countries. Fearful of upsetting Iran, with which they had just reestablished relations, the Kuwaiti government refused to sign an agreement with Iraq, though they did promise to buy water from Baghdad. Even as he was eliminating possible rivals at home—including those allegedly involved in the mysterious death of his popular defense minister— Hussein was securing Saudi help in the rebuilding of war-damaged oil facilities at Basra. He also won the ACC’s backing of his demands that Iraq have full control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway on the border with Iran, one of the initial causes of the Iran-Iraq War and one left unresolved at the war’s end. When the Ayatollah Khomeini died in June 1989, many in

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the region believed that relations between Iran and Iraq might improve. Yet during 1989 Hussein continued to build up his arsenal, which now included new rocket technology from China. At the fourth semiannual ACC summit in February 1990, Hussein asserted his claims to leadership of the Arab states by denouncing the United States and asserting that in the absence of a strong Soviet Union, the Arab world would have to unite to defend its interests against the West. He also increased his attacks on Israel, which was now caught up in brutal repression of the popular Palestinian uprising, the intifada. Tensions between the two countries had been high since Israel had thwarted Hussein’s first alleged attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by bombing a French-built Iraqi nuclear power plant in 1981. Though a foe of Islamic Iran, Israel was deeply concerned about Iraq’s enhanced power and prestige following the Iran-Iraq War. Still, Hussein faced a severe economic crisis. His military machine and reconstruction of Iraq’s wardamaged infrastructure were both expensive. And with the depressed state of oil prices, his revenues were not adequate for the task. In particular, Hussein was distressed over Kuwait’s decision to exceed its OPEC quota and sell its oil well below the agreed-upon floor price of $18 a barrel. Hussein sent a personal note to the emir of Kuwait in June 1990, warning him to cut production and proposing a new oil floor price of $25 a barrel. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—which were dependent on the military support of the United States and other Western nations—knew that the higher price would hurt Western economies and damage diplomatic relations. In July, Iraqi intelligence intercepted a phone message between the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that appeared to confirm Hussein’s fears that the two were plotting against Iraq. The supposed plot seemed especially outrageous to Hussein because he believed his long and costly war against Iran had saved both countries from the threat of Iranian-inspired Islamic militancy. Hussein also believed that Kuwait was stealing oil from Iraq. In a July 15 speech, Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz claimed that Kuwait was illegally pumping too much oil from the Rumeila field that lay on both sides of the disputed Iraq-Kuwait border. Kuwait denied the charge and turned it around, charging Iraq with the same violations. Hussein was becoming increasingly convinced that the Arab countries—fearful of Iraq’s immense

military—were conspiring with the West to hem him in, a suspicion fueled by U.S. comments that it would strongly defend the interests of its friends in the region—Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In late July, as Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak flew to the Gulf to mediate between Baghdad and Kuwait, Hussein dispatched 30,000 troops to the border. On July 25, the Iraqi leader met with American ambassador April Glaspie. At that meeting Hussein made his case against Kuwait and for higher oil prices, insisting that Iraq was America’s real friend in the region. If Iraq had not stopped Iran, he insisted, the United States would have had to use nuclear weapons to defend the region. Glaspie sympathized with Hussein’s complaints about depressed oil prices, Kuwaiti overpumping, and Iraq’s right to a readjusted border arrangement. In transcripts of the meeting released by the Iraqi government and never denied by the United States, Glaspie was heard to say that the United States had “no opinion on the ArabArab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. . . . The issue is not associated with America.” Many opponents of the Gulf War—both in the West and the Arab world—insist that Glaspie’s comments suggested that United States would not intervene if Iraq attacked Kuwait. At 2:00 a.m., August 2, 1990, six divisions of the Iraqi army—including two armored brigades— invaded Kuwait. The 20,000-man Kuwaiti army quickly proved itself no match for the 100,000-man Iraqi force. By 11 a.m., the Iraqi forces had captured the capital of Kuwait City, some seventy-five miles from the border.

Operation Desert Shield The Iraqi invasion caught the world off guard, even though Hussein had given many warnings and satellite photos showed a huge troop buildup. Within the first week, both the UN Security Council and the Arab League had condemned the invasion. Security Council Resolution 660 called for immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. President Bush imposed a U.S. economic embargo against Iraq, then launched a diplomatic offensive to have the embargo accepted by the rest of the world. Meanwhile, top Bush administration officials were becoming convinced that an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia was imminent. Bush showed the Saudi ambassador in Washington photos of the Iraqi troop

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buildup on Kuwait’s southern border with Saudi Arabia, and many Saudis were alarmed. King Fahd hesitated, however, to go to war against a neighbor. Then an accidental incursion by Iraqi forces into Saudi territory helped bolster hawks in the Saudi government and helped persuade the king to allow Western forces to use Saudi territory. The United States made several secret agreements with King Fahd, including a promise to pull its troops out once the threat from Iraq had lifted. Still, the idea of an Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia remained controversial. After meeting with Saddam Hussein in mid-August, Jordan’s King Hussein assured the world that Iraq had no such intention. Moreover, Hussein was fully aware that President Bush had reasserted the Carter doctrine—President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 declaration that any hostile moves in the Persian Gulf would be seen as an attack on vital U.S. interests. Thus, he knew that an attack on Saudi Arabia would result in war with America, something he did not want. Adding to the crisis were events in Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. One issue involved the foreigners living in

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the city after the Iraqi invasion. Hussein had set an August 24 deadline for foreign embassies in the Kuwaiti capital to pull out. However, both the United States and Britain refused, thus increasing the sense that the confrontation was now primarily between Washington and Baghdad. In addition, reports from Kuwait indicated both wide-scale and organized looting of Kuwaiti public and private property, as well as human rights violations against the citizens and foreigners in the country, mainly Arabs and other Muslims who had been working in Kuwait for many years. In Washington, Bush, as part of the campaign he called Desert Shield, was trying to line up support for an allied force to protect Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, with the possibility that such a force would be used to eject Iraq from Kuwait. While the West—with the possible exception of France— was solidly behind him, the Soviet Union was ambivalent. In spite of its long history of friendly relations with Iraq, Moscow was going through a major crisis at home and announced in late August that it would agree to whatever measures were necessary to force Baghdad to leave Kuwait. Premier Mikhail

U.S. troops in Iraq donned special clothing to protect them from possible chemical and biological gas attack in Operation Desert Storm. The ground war in February 1991 lasted just 100 hours. (U.S. Navy)

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Gorbachev affirmed this position in his meeting with Bush in Helsinki in early September. Meanwhile, most of the Arab leaders—excepting King Hussein of Jordan—also supported the allied coalition against Iraq—even though most ordinary people in the Arab world did not want a confrontation with Iraq. Israel, for its part, had mixed feelings about the crisis. While it feared Iraqi power, it was consoled by the divisions within the Arab world that the Kuwaiti invasion had engendered. Iran—which had just fought a bloody eight-year war with Iraq— condemned the invasion but refused to join the UN coalition forming against Baghdad. Public opinion in the United States was mixed as well. Though bolstered by press accounts that increasingly insisted war with Iraq was inevitable, President Bush was having a difficult time selling the idea to the American people. As late as November, opinion polls showed most Americans were against the idea of an armed conflict with Iraq, and those polls were reflected in Congress’s extreme ambivalence to the idea, which was deepened by independent assessments that such a war might result in as many as 30,000 U.S. casualties. Despite this ambivalence, the U.S. and coalition buildup in the Gulf continued. As early as the second week in August, some 40,000 U.S. troops had been dispatched to the Dhahran airport in Saudi Arabia, and some fifty Western warships were in or near the Gulf. By January 1991, the number of U.S. and coalition troops in the Gulf would climb to above 500,000. Still, before he could launch hostilities against Iraq, Bush needed congressional approval. Both houses debated a White House–sponsored bill calling for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait by January 15 or face a coalition attack for three days. On January 12, they voted in favor of the bill, but by a very slim margin. The House vote was 250–183, and the Senate vote was 52–47.

Operation Desert Storm At 11:30 p.m. on January 16, Operation Desert Storm began with coordinated air strikes by radar-evading Stealth bombers against targets in Kuwait and Iraq, including Baghdad. Carpet-bombing and cruise missile attacks followed during the first week of the air war, with Hussein firing Scud missiles at Israel and at U.S. positions in Saudi Arabia, attacks that would largely prove ineffective. The attacks on Israel were

designed to draw the Jewish state into the war, in the hopes that this would force Arab countries to pull out of the coalition. The strategy failed. By offering Israel Patriot missile defenses and assuring it that Hussein would be crippled by the war, Bush had effectively persuaded the Israelis not to counterattack, the first time that country had ever agreed not to retaliate against a hostile action by an Arab state. Equally important in Israel’s decision was that Hussein had not used chemical warheads on the missiles. Still, despite some 12,000 sorties by coalition aircraft, damage to Iraqi military forces was minimal, as the allied commander Norman Schwarzkopf had predicted before the air war began. Coalition forces increased the number of sorties to 3,000 a day during the war’s second week, but this too failed to break Hussein’s forces or his will. In an interview with CNN’s Peter Arnett on January 28, Hussein asserted that any chance of negotiations ending the conflict would have to come from Bush. Having attacked most of the military targets by the end of January, allied air attacks began to focus on civilian infrastructure targets in early February. When one of the so-called smart bombs destroyed a bomb shelter, killing hundreds of Iraqi civilians, Hussein displayed photos of the massacre to the world. Bush responded with charges that the Iraqi leader was purposefully using civilians as a human shield around legitimate military targets. As it became clear that the air campaign would not force Iraq out of Kuwait, and with the Iraqi military softened up by the relentless bombing, the allies launched the ground war on February 24, 1991. Within forty-eight hours, Iraqi’s vaunted military force—which Bush had labeled the “fourth largest in the world”—was collapsing. On February 26, Kuwaiti resistance forces announced that allied forces had driven the Iraqis out of the capital, a report confirmed the next day by allied commanders. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces retreating northward out of Kuwait were pounded by allied air attacks for over forty hours. The rout was so complete that Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz flew to New York to work out a cease-fire, accepting most of the UN resolutions, including the one calling for Iraq to surrender its claims to Kuwait. At the same time, Schwarzkopf and Chief of Staff Colin Powell notified Bush that “all military objectives” had been achieved. On February 28, after just four days of ground assaults, a temporary cease-fire went into effect.

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Aftermath and Legacy Though the war between the coalition forces and Iraq was over, several tragic and bloody chapters remained. Responding to Bush’s calls for the Iraqi people to rise up against Hussein, both the Kurds in the north and the Shiite Arabs in the south began to attack Iraqi military positions in their regions of the country. At first successful, the two uprisings were quickly crushed by the remaining Iraqi Republican Guard forces. Using helicopters as gunships and troop carriers, the Iraqi military decimated the Shiite rebellion in the marshes around Basra in the southern part of the country. In the north, Iraqi ground and air forces were able to drive Kurdish forces out of the country, leading to a mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish civilians into refuge across the Turkish and Iranian borders. At first, allied leaders took no responsibility for the Kurdish flight. However, when television broadcast pictures of the enormous suffering faced by the Kurdish refugees in the bitter-cold mountains inside the Turkish border, Bush and other allied leaders were forced to respond first with humanitarian aid and then with a decision to provide protection for returning Kurds within a “no-fly” (no military aircraft zone), safe haven in northern Iraq. Despite the seeming decisiveness of the war, the situation in the region remained tense for years afterward. Hussein was not driven from power, but under strong U.S. pressure the United Nations imposed severe economic sanctions against Iraq. Some human rights groups insisted that the sanctions resulted in the premature deaths of some hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, many of them children. The United States justified its position by insisting that Hussein continued to harbor ambitions in the region and continued to hide nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction. Hussein continued to insist that such hidden stockpiles did not exist. At the same time, he embarked on a long cat-and-mouse conflict with UN arms

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inspectors, refusing to allow them to inspect several key facilities. The attack of Islamist terrorists on the United States on September 11, 2001, once again changed the situation of Iraq. After U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, President George W. Bush, son of the president during the first Gulf War, insisted that Iraq remained a threat to world peace. After a long and divisive campaign, he gained the approval of the U.S. Congress to invade Iraq as part of his “War on Terror.” This second Gulf War, or Iraq War, resulted in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his eventual capture. In the meantime, U.S. military and diplomatic forces struggled to create a popularly elected and effective government in the war-torn country. James Ciment See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Iran: War with Iraq, 1980–1988; Iraq: Kurdish Wars Since 1961; Iraq: U.S. Invasion, 2003– .

Bibliography Bresheeth, Haim, and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds. The Gulf War and the New World Order. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991. Creighton, John. Oil on Troubled Waters: Gulf Wars, 1980–91. London: Echoes, 1992. Freedman, Lawrence. The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Graubard, Stephen Richards. Mr. Bush’s War: Adventures in the Politics of Illusion. New York: Hill and Wang, 1992. Greffenius, Steven. The Logic of Conflict: Making War and Peace in the Middle East. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993. Haykal, Muhammad Hasanayn. Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War. London: HarperCollins, 1992. Hiro, Dilip. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. London: HarperCollins, 1992. Matthews, Ken. The Gulf Conflict and International Relations. New York: Routledge, 1993. U.S. News & World Report. Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Times Books, 1992. Yant, Martin. Desert Mirage: The True Story of the Gulf War. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991.

IRAQ: U.S. Invasion,2003– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes; Antiterrorist PARTICIPANTS: United States; Britain; “Coalition of the Willing” CASPIAN SEA

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After a decade of hostility following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, an American-led coalition invaded Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein and implement a model of popular government in the Middle East. Operation Iraqi Freedom was relatively short, officially lasting from March 20, 2003, to May 1, 2003. Few were surprised that the American-led coalition was victorious. Less clear, however, was how and why Iraqi/American relations deteriorated so rapidly, whether the American justification for war was legitimate, and whether Iraq and coalition forces could overcome significant nation-building obstacles.

Interwar Period (19 91–2003) On April 3, 1991, the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) established terms for a formal ceasefire to the Persian Gulf War between Iraq and an American-led coalition of Kuwaiti allies. Resolution 687 required the supervised elimination of Iraq’s

weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. This oversight was called “weapons inspections.” Upon Iraqi agreement to these terms, a UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created by the Security Council to implement and enforce the cease-fire resolution. The goal of weapons inspections was to maintain some level of Iraqi sovereignty but inhibit development of advanced weapons technologies. The inspection process was highly contentious. Iraq consistently lied about or hid its true capacities and intentions. One example is Iraq’s biological weapons program. Iraq first claimed to have no biological weapons program, then claimed to have conducted biological research for defensive purposes, then admitted to creating biological weapons. Many Security Council resolutions were implemented to promote full Iraqi cooperation with weapon inspections and condemn their failures to uphold the cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile, American and Iraqi militaries engaged in a low-grade, undeclared war over the enforcement of two no-fly zones also established after the first Gulf War. No-fly zones prevented Iraqi planes or helicopters from entering the area and covered 60 percent of the country. American planes patrolling the no-fly zones were regularly attacked by anti-aircraft fire. The serious concern of American leaders in the interwar period was the possibility that a pilot would be shot down. In 1998, Ba’ath Party leadership decided to suspend cooperation with the weapons inspectors until UNSCOM was reorganized and the oil embargo against Iraq was lifted. Iraq’s position emphasized social deprivation resulting from American-led embargoes. The UN had created the Oil for Food program in 1995, which allowed Iraq to put profits from oil exports toward welfare concerns. Years later, it was revealed that corrupt leadership at the top of the Oil

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KEY DATES 2001

The United States is attacked by terrorists on September 11; United States invades and occupies Afghanistan, sanctuary to the al-Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

2002 The administration of President George W. Bush begins making an argument to the American people that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction and has links to al-Qaeda. 2003 Despite widespread protests in the United States and around the world, the United States declares the UN weapons inspections to be ineffective and launches an invasion of Iraq on March 20; on May 1, Bush declares an end to major combat in Iraq; insurgents destroy the UN headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, killing twenty persons, including envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello; U.S. forces capture former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in December. 2004 The United States turns over sovereignty in Iraq to an interim council in June; the killing of four foreign contractors leads to a major U.S. offensive against the insurgent stronghold of Falluja in November. 2005 In January, elections are held for a transition government, which writes up a draft constitution by August; the constitution is approved in October by Iraqi voters, who then go to the polls in December to choose a permanent government; despite progress in setting up a new government, fighting continues between U.S., coalition, and Iraqi forces on the one hand and insurgents on the other. 2006 Insurgents blow up the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of Shiite Islam’s holiest sites on February 22, setting off internecine fighting between Sunnis and Shiites and threatening to plunge Iraq into civil war.

for Food program funneled millions of dollars to themselves and Saddam’s leadership cadres. President Clinton’s covert military policy toward Iraq was regime change. The president and Congress authorized up to $97 million for Iraqi opposition groups who sought to remove Saddam Hussein from power and promote democratic governance. However, Iraqi business ties with UN Security Council members, including France and Russia, inhibited American ability to put together a coalition willing to take decisive action toward Iraq. In October 1998, Iraq ended all interaction with UNSCOM. This move triggered several days of American and British air strikes, termed Operation Desert Fox. UNSCOM inspectors were withdrawn prior to the operation and did not return.

The following year, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created to replace UNSCOM. Led by Executive Chairman Hans Blix of Sweden, UNMOVIC was weaker than its predecessor until tensions between the United States and Iraq escalated after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The Bush administration, inaugurated in 2001, had begun formulating military options for responding to real and potential Iraqi aggression prior to September 11, so much so that there was internal debate over who should be the first target in the “War on Terrorism,” Iraq or Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Bush administration decided on Afghanistan. Two months later, the invasion of that country was well under way, and the administration shifted its military focus to Iraq.

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In November 2002, UN Resolution 1441 greatly enhanced the powers of weapons inspectors and gave Iraq one final opportunity to attain disarmament or face “serious consequences.” In the 2003 State of the Union address in January, Bush described Saddam Hussein as a “brutal dictator with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth,” who should “not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States.” The president wanted there to be no misunderstanding: if Saddam did not fully disarm, America would lead a coalition to disarm him. According to the president, this was necessary to protect American national security and promote world peace. The United States was not satisfied with Iraqi compliance, but ultimately failed to produce a UN Resolution supporting the use of force. Secretary of State Collin Powell presented America’s case before the UN. Ironically, Powell was the least pro-war member of the administration and often clashed with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Powell assured the UN that Iraq posed an immediate threat and used photographs of alleged mobile biological weapons laboratories. America believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that could be used against the United States or given to terrorists. It was later discovered that these claims and the photos were based on faulty intelligence. No weapons of mass destruction or solid evidence that Iraq was close to producing these weapons was found once America occupied Iraq and could conduct a complete and unobstructed investigation. At the same time, President Bush provided other reasons the invasion of Iraq was the centerpiece of his foreign policy agenda in the Middle East. First, the invasion would eliminate an oppressive dictator who impoverished and terrorized his own people. Second, the invasion would demonstrate the new administration’s proactive approach to military conflict. If the United States believed that a hostile regime possessed weapons of mass destruction, it would not wait, in the president’s words, “for the final proof . . . in the form of a mushroom cloud.” Third, the invasion would allow sanctions to be lifted, generating revenue and enabling the Iraqi economy to be rebuilt. Fourth, the invasion would reduce the need for troops in Saudi Arabia, which was a very sensitive issue in the region. Indeed, Osama bin Laden, the Saudi-born architect of the September 11 attacks, had cited the presence of “infidel” troops in

the land of the Prophet Muhammad—that is, Saudi Arabia—as a factor in his decision to attack the United States. Fifth, the invasion would allow the United States to foster democracy in Iraq, which, in turn, would provide a model for other Arab countries. And democracies, the Bush administration argued, were far less likely to jeopardize regional stability and world peace. Critics of the Bush administration pointed to other, unspoken motives. Some argued that the administration, with its many ties to the oil and oil infrastructure industries, was interested in securing U.S. control over Iraq’s petroleum reserves, estimated to be the second most abundant in the world after Saudi Arabia. Some even said that Bush himself was obsessed with finishing the work his father had left undone—that is, removing the dictator George H.W. Bush had driven from Kuwait in 1991 but had left in power in Iraq. For its part, the Bush administration dismissed such arguments as beyond the pale of reasonable discussion. Meanwhile, protests of all kinds greeted the Bush administration’s preparations for war. There were the official antiwar positions of governments around the world, including UN Security Council members Russia, China, and France, as well as long-time NATO allies like Germany and Canada. There were also massive public demonstrations in the United States and around the world. Indeed, America’s only major power supporter of the invasion was Britain, and, even there, Prime Minister Tony Blair faced huge public protests and polls showing a majority of the British people against the attack. As for U.S. public opinion, it was roughly divided 50–50 on the eve of attack.

Invasion Despite such protests, President Bush issued a public ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on March 17, 2003: Hussein and his family were to leave Iraq within forty-eight hours or face an American-led invasion. American demands failed to be met, and Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003. The American-led coalition first launched a “decapitation attack” on Baghdad. The goal was to kill Saddam Hussein and high-ranking Iraqi leaders by means of targeted air attacks based on intelligence reports on where selected members of the regime might be hiding. Saddam appeared on Iraqi television hours later

Iraq: U.S. Invasion, 2003–

to denounce the attack in full military uniform and pledged to confront and defeat the invaders. In New York, Iraqi ambassador to the UN Mohammed Aldouri described the attack as a violation of international law. As predicted by most military experts, the invading forces met little resistance, as tens of thousands of Iraqi troops chose to surrender rather than fight against the vastly superior technology of the roughly 130,000-strong allied ground forces (100,000 Americans, 26,000 British, and several thousand troops from more than a dozen other countries; Iraq’s forces were estimated by the International Institute for Strategic Studies at a poorly equipped 375,000). Indeed, the greatest obstacle experienced by the so-called “coalition of the willing” came from the weather, when a dust-laden desert windstorm slowed the invasion for a few days. Fears that Saddam Hussein’s forces would unleash an environmental catastrophe by setting fire to Iraq’s oil fields, as they had done with Kuwait’s in the first Gulf War, proved unfounded. On April 9, U.S. forces occupied Baghdad, and Saddam Hussein’s regime was pronounced officially out of power by U.S. spokespersons. Within days, however, massive looting broke out in the capital and other major cities, as ordinary Iraqis, future insurgents, and organized criminal gangs looted armories, Saddam Hussein’s many palaces, and government facilities. What captured world media attention,

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however, was the pillaging of antiquities and rare art and archaeological objects from Baghdad museums. While U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would dismiss the looting as the inevitable price of war and freedom, critics of the war would later blame poor U.S. occupation planning and a lack of troops. Indeed, Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and other war architects had argued strenuously during the war preparations that smaller numbers of troops, properly armed and with good intelligence, could do the work of a much larger force. In a televised appearance aboard the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln, Bush officially declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, beneath a banner that read, “Mission Accomplished.” Meanwhile, the Bush administration acknowledged that many new challenges lay ahead, such as ensuring security, providing basic services, and creating a new Iraqi government. Paul Bremer, a longtime U.S. diplomat, was appointed the top civil administrator of Iraq, with the job of managing Iraq’s transition to democracy. Bremer quickly abolished Iraqi ministries and institutions under the Saddam regime, including the military. By laying off tens of thousands of soldiers and thousands of officers, critics later argued, Bremer created anger and frustration among large cohorts of militarily trained and armed Iraqis, many of whom would form the basis for the insurgency that soon confronted occupying troops of the coalition. In the meantime, however, the UN lifted its more than decade-long economic sanctions against Iraq and expressed support for the American-led nation building efforts. Some eighty nations pledged $13 billion toward the reconstruction efforts, in addition to the $20 billion promised by the United States. This made a sizable dent in the $56 billion the UN and World Bank estimated would be necessary for the next four years of Iraqi reconstruction.

Occupation and Insurgency

A U.S. Marine deploys in a downtown Baghdad square in early April 2003, days after ground forces arrived in the Iraqi capital. Hours later, the statue of President Saddam Hussein was toppled. (Ahmad al-Rubaye/AFP/ Getty Images)

As it soon became clear, however, reconstruction depended upon security, and security was not guaranteed by U.S. and allied occupation. Even as military forces fanned out around the country, they were met with armed resistance, usually in the form of hitand-run attacks or sabotage by means of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), usually manufactured from ammunition looted from military armories. Most of the resistance was in the Sunni areas of Iraq, includ-

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ing Baghdad and the so-called Sunni triangle formed by Baghdad to the southeast, Ramadi to the southwest, and Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit to the north. Under Saddam Hussein’s regime, Sunni Muslims had largely controlled the government, and many experts on Iraq believe that, fearing oppression by the majority Shiite Muslims in a post–Saddam Hussein Iraq, they made up the vast majority of those who joined the armed resistance to American occupation. In the first weeks and months following the fall of Baghdad, American military and political leaders argued that it was “dead-enders,” or at-large leaders of the former Ba’ath Party regime of Saddam Hussein, who formed the core of the resistance, and so U.S. anti-insurgency efforts were targeted on this leadership. America focused on killing key leaders of the insurgency, so much so that the Bush administration created a deck of playing cards that ranked America’s most wanted Iraqis. This argument was reinforced by periodic announcements from a hiding Saddam Hussein to the Iraqi people. In July, however, American troops killed Uday and Qusay Hussein— Saddam Hussein’s sons and major former regime leaders—and then captured Saddam Hussein himself in December. The former leader was found hiding in a small cellar on a farm near his hometown of Tikrit, and he surrendered without a fight. American officials then proclaimed that Saddam Hussein would be put on trial in Iraq, though many around the world argued that the newly formed International Court of Justice was a more appropriate venue for such a trial. But the capture of Saddam Hussein did not lead to an end of the insurgency. Indeed, it had grown sizably between the formal end of hostilities on May 1 and the end of 2003, bolstered by former Iraqi military personnel, Sunni nationalists angry at the U.S. occupation, and foreign jihadists who had been able to enter Iraq over the country’s loosely policed borders. These latter individuals were believed to be responsible for the growing number of suicide bomber attacks against U.S. military personnel, Iraqi police recruits, and foreigners, such as the bombing of the UN’s headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, which left twenty persons, including envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello, dead. The attack led the UN to evacuate virtually all of its personnel from the country. By the end of 2003, the United States was engaged in major counterinsurgency operations in Baghdad,

the Sunni triangle, and the north of Iraq, particularly around Mosul, where Arabs and Kurds lived in proximity to each other. The Kurds, a distinctive nonArab ethnic group who had suffered persecution and attacks under Saddam Hussein’s regime, largely supported the U.S.-led invasion and had contributed tens of thousands of their guerrillas to the fight. As for the majority Shiites, while they opposed the U.S. occupation, they put up less resistance, hoping that as democracy came into being in Iraq, their majority status would give them control over a new government. The years 2004 and 2005 saw the insurgency continue to grow, as suicide bombings took a major toll on Iraqi civilians, particularly Shiites, and military and police personnel, while IEDs and other types of attacks killed American soldiers at a rate of about two to three daily. On March 2, 2004, for example, suicide bombers in Karbala and Baghdad killed 117 Shia worshippers who were commemorating the Ashura holy date rites. But even Shiites proved restive. In August, coalition forces attacked the Shiite holy city of Najaf where anti–U.S. occupation Shia leader Moqtada Sadr had fortified himself. Ultimately, a truce was negotiated by the supreme Iraqi Shia leader, the Ayatollah Ali Sistani, whereby Sadr pledged to disarm his militia and participate in upcoming Iraqi elections. Then, in November, following the killing of four foreign contractors in November, U.S. forces launched a massive attack on the Sunni city of Falluja, killing hundreds of insurgents and civilians. By the end of 2004, the United States had suffered some 1,334 dead and roughly 10,000 seriously wounded; a year later, the figure was 2,180 dead and over 16,000 wounded. The fact that the number of U.S. killed was almost identical in 2004 and 2005— 848 and 846—indicated that the insurgency had not eased up during the latter year. Meanwhile, the number of Iraqi dead was declared to be about 30,000 by the end of 2005, according to Bush, though others said it was much higher. According to a study conducted by researchers from Johns Hopkins and Columbia universities in the United States and al-Mustansiriya University in Baghdad, and published in the British medical journal Lancet in October 2004, Iraqi deaths were already at about 100,000. U.S. government officials dismissed the study, saying that it was unreliable since it extrapolated the number of dead from interview-derived sample cases, rather than counting the actual number of dead.

Iraq: U.S. Invasion, 2003–

As the insurgency persisted, both the Bush administration and outside experts tried to come up with explanations for it. As far as the administration was concerned, the reason was simple: the insurgents feared a democratic Iraq. Domestic Sunni insurgents understood it would lead to a Shiite-dominated regime that would put an end to Sunni dominance in the country. The foreign jihadists—allegedly led by Jordianian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—worried that democracy in Iraq would prove contagious in the Middle East, upsetting the jihadists’ goal to impose fundamentalist Islamist regimes throughout the region. Other experts disagreed with the Bush administration. They argued that the insurgency was fueled by nationalism. Whatever their political, ethnic, or religious persuasion, the insurgents were primarily motivated by the anger and humiliation they felt at the occupation of their country by a foreign power that they felt was really there to take its oil. This argument about motivation was bolstered by the sporadic communications from some of the insurgents themselves. Moreover, 2004 revelations—including photographic evidence—of torture and other forms of abuse being perpetrated on Iraqi prisoners by U.S. military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad only fueled more Iraqi anger—not to mention outrage in the United States and around the world—over the U.S. occupation. Yet observers offered other explanations for the insurgency. Some cited Iraqi frustration at the lack of progress the coalition had made in rebuilding the nation’s economy—a failure that produced poverty, poor living conditions, and unemployment. Still others said that many of the insurgents were motivated by revenge for the killings of friends and relatives by U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies. In the final analysis, most experts agree that ascertaining the motives of the highly secretive and decentralized insurgency is difficult.

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stabilized and Iraqi security forces could effectively fight the insurgency on their own. To this end, they pointed to a string of accomplishments. In July, U.S. officials appointed an Iraqi interim council to begin preparing for a transfer of sovereignty back to Iraqis. In October, the UN recognized the American-supported Iraqi provisional government. In March 2004, the interim government agreed upon a temporary constitution, which was then approved by U.S. occupation officials. Three months later, on June 28, administrator Paul Bremer officially handed sovereignty over to the interim Iraqi government. In January 2005, elections were held for a transition government, which would write up a draft constitution for the country. Completed in August, the draft constitution was then put to a national referendum and approved by 78 percent of voters in October. Finally, in December, Iraqis went to the polls for the third time in a year to choose a permanent government. While a higher turnout of Sunni voters in

New Iraqi Government Still, despite the continuing insurgency, mounting casualties, and growing calls for a troop pullout in the United States—most notably, in late 2005, from hawkish and conservative congressman John Murtha (D-PA)—the Bush administration pledged itself through the 2004 U.S. elections and as late as 2006 to keeping large numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq until the Iraqi government was established and

The golden-domed Askariya Mosque, a holy Shiite shrine in the Sunni-dominated town of Samarra, was destroyed in a February 2006 bombing. Nearly three years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq seemed on the brink of sectarian civil war. (Getty Images)

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this election was heralded by the Bush administration as a sign that insurgents were isolated even from their own religious community, the results of that election proved controversial as religious Shiite parties, allied with Kurdish parties, came to control more than twothirds of the seats in the new national assembly, allowing them to choose a president and government without any input from Sunni parties. The fact that Sunnis could be largely excluded from the government did not bode well for an end to the insurgency, say many experts. Nor did the fact that much of the $20 billion originally earmarked by the United States for Iraqi reconstruction had been spent, yet many gaps remained in the country’s basic infrastructure. Baghdad had only sporadic running water and electricity, and sewage continued to be dumped untreated into the nearby Tigris River. In fact, said many observers, Iraq was caught in a vicious circle. The insurgency slowed reconstruction and ate up development money—since much of it went to security rather than reconstruction—while the lack of progress in redevelopment may have been fueling the insurgency.

Leaving Iraq As of early 2006, the Bush administration was beginning to talk of limited troop withdrawals, even as it pledged itself to maintain a military presence in the country until Iraqis took over the security task themselves. “As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down,” Bush said repeatedly. But even here, disagreements persist. One of the criticisms directed at the Bush administration has been its inability to train enough Iraqi security forces fast enough. While administration officials have countered this charge by putting out various statistics—Bush himself claimed in a November 2005 speech that more than 120 army and police battalions were “working by themselves”— critics say that very few are truly capable of operating independently of U.S. forces. Indeed, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, the former commander of

Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq, that is, the man responsible for training Iraqi security forces, indicated in October 2005 that just one Iraqi army battalion was fully independent, or assessed as needing no U.S. assistance at all. Meanwhile some opponents of the war, including Murtha, said the whole training question is irrelevant. They argued that Iraq was inevitably headed for civil war between its still unreconciled Sunni and Shiite inhabitants, with the non-Arab Kurds itching to set up an independent Kurdistan in the north. By maintaining U.S. troops in the country, America was merely postponing the conflict and may even have been fueling it by creating yet another source of anger for insurgents. It was time, these war critics said, for the United States to pull out and let the Iraqis work things out for themselves, even if it meant civil war. The Bush administration argued that a pullout would be the height of irresponsibility. By leaving prematurely, America could doom the Iraqi government, leading to the victory of the insurgents and the rise of an Islamist regime that would prove a destabilizing force in the Middle East and a source of terrorism in the world. Luke Perry and James Ciment See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; International Arms Trade; United States: War on Terrorism, 1990s– ; Iraq: Revolution and Coups, 1958–1968; Iraq: Kurdish Wars Since 1961; Iraq: Gulf War, 1990–1991.

Bibliography Bremer, Paul. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006. Fawn, Rick, and Raymond Hinnebusch. The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. Hiro, Dilip. Secrets and Lies: Operation “Iraqi Freedom” and After. New York: NationBooks, 2004. Keegan, John. The Iraq War. New York: Vintage, 2005. Packer, George. The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005. Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

ISRAEL: War of Independence,1948–1949 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonialism; Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Egypt; Iraq; Lebanon; Syria; Jordan

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The war that broke out between Arabs and Jews in Palestine in 1948 was a watershed event in the modern history of the Middle East for several reasons. First, it led to the establishment of the State of Israel. Second, it created a vast reservoir of Palestinian refugees, who continued the struggle against Israel for the next sixty years. Finally, the war poisoned relations between the newly founded Jewish state and its Arab neighbors for at least the next sixty years, sparking no fewer than five more wars between them.

Though both Arabs and Israelis put forward age-old claims to the land of Palestine, the roots of the Israeli War of Independence—or the first war of Zionist aggression, as Arabs refer to it—lay in the competing nationalisms of the late nineteenth century. Until World War I (1914–1918), most of Eastern Europe— where many Jews lived—and much of the Arab Middle East were governed by three decaying empires: the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Ottoman. Against this old order, a variety of peoples had raised up the cry of nationalism. Among these—and representing what is certainly the oddest nationalism of the lot—were the Zionists. Zionism (based on the Hebrew word “Zion,” or Jerusalem) had ancient precedent in Jewish custom and thought. Indeed, Jewish religious identity was very much wrapped up in the idea of a return to the land of the ancient Hebrew kingdom established by David. Still, since the Romans destroyed Jerusalem in the first century c.e., this return was seen in largely spiritual rather than physical terms. This began to change in the late nineteenth century. In the Russian Empire, anti-Semitic prejudice was turning violent, as reactionary czars unleashed paramilitary forces in brutal attacks, or pogroms, on Jewish communities. Hundreds of thousands of Jews fled. Although most went to the Americas, over 40,000, sponsored by the wealthy Rothschild family in Western Europe, fled to Palestine in the 1890s and 1900s. While East European Jews were the first to return physically to Palestine, a West European Jew provided the ideological foundations of Zionism. As a young man, Theodor Herzl, a Viennese journalist, believed that a new tolerance toward the Jews was becoming entrenched in the civilized states of Western Europe. Then he reported on the Dreyfus case in France, in which a Jewish officer was convicted of

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KEY DATES 1917

Britain seizes Palestine from the Ottoman Empire; in an exchange of letters between London high commissioner for Egypt Sir Henry McMahon and King Hussein of Arabia, Britain promises independence for former Arab possessions of the Ottoman Turks; British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour promises a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine in a letter to Zionist financier Arthur Balfour.

1937–1939

Responding to Arab violence, British authorities in the Mandate issue various reports calling for the division of Palestine between Arabs and Jews, as well as a halt to Jewish immigration and land purchases.

1941–1945

The Holocaust in Europe leaves 6 million Jews murdered; survivors push more strongly for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

1946

Jewish guerrillas form a united front against British occupiers, blowing up Jerusalem’s King David Hotel, killing 80 British military personnel and civilians of various nationalities; Britain offers its last plan for Palestine, calling for a single, federated state under UN trusteeship for at least five years.

1947

Britain announces it is turning Palestine over to the UN in May 1948.

1948

In late April, Jewish forces attack the Arab village of Deir Yasin, killing 200 persons; as the conflict between Arabs and Jews increases, Zionists unilaterally announce the formation of the State of Israel on May 14, the day before the UN is to take power; Arab armies from neighboring countries invade Palestine.

1949

Fighting between Arabs and Jews dies down early in the year, as Jewish forces occupy roughly 70 percent of historic Palestine; five Arab states sign a cease-fire with Israel.

espionage (unjustly, it was later proved). The antiSemitic outbursts prompted by the case convinced Herzl that he had been overly optimistic. In 1897, Herzl published his seminal essay: “The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question.” Like most Europeans of that age, Herzl hardly considered non-European peoples. Concerning the presence of Arabs in Palestine, Herzl blithely hoped that they would just come to accept the leadership of a more civilized people from Europe. Indeed, the question of Palestinian nationalism would haunt the Zionists. All parties recognized the

Zionist slogan of a “land without a people for a people without a land” as a slogan rather than a statement of reality. Even so, another less obvious misconception developed among the early Jewish leaders. They came to believe that the people of Palestine were part of the larger Arab world, not a distinct nation. To bolster their point, they noted that Palestinian Arabs shared a religion, language, and culture with their Arab neighbors. They also noted, legalistically, that Palestine had been divided into two distinct administrative districts in the Ottoman Empire. This argument ignored the fact that most Europeans

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and Arabs considered Palestine a distinct region, with a history and customs of its own. In fact, the people of Palestine were developing their own nationalism in the nineteenth century. In the 1830s, they had risen up in a territory-wide revolt against their Ottoman rulers when the empire was fighting a major rebellion in Egypt. After defeating the rebel forces in Palestine, the Ottomans imposed a new and more tightly controlled economic and political order. The key to this effort was land. By formalizing private claims to land, the Ottomans created a two-tiered social order of commercially oriented landholders—based in cities like Nablus and Jaffa—and tenant farmers. The tenant farmers continued to work the land, but they had lost their ageold right to it. Eventually, absentee landlords would sell many of their holdings to Jewish buyers who then threw the farmers off the land they considered to be rightfully theirs.

The British in Palestine In 1917, during World War I, British and Arab forces marched into Jerusalem and occupied Palestine as part of an offensive to drive the Ottomans—allied with the Germans and Austro-Hungarians—from the Middle East. There had been little love lost between the Middle Eastern Arabs and ruling Turks, especially in regions such as Palestine where the weight of Ottoman rule was heaviest. To line up the Arabs on its side, Britain had offered the incentive of independent Arab states. These offers appeared in a series of letters between Sir Henry McMahon, London’s high commissioner for Egypt, and King Hussein of Arabia, whom the British had identified as spokesman for the Arab world. The McMahon-Hussein correspondence, however, was little more than a ruse. While the British were promising postwar independence to the Arabs, they were secretly conspiring with their French and Russian allies to divide the heart of the Middle East among themselves, with the Russians getting territorial concessions on their southern flank; the French receiving Syria and Lebanon; and the British controlling Iraq, Trans-Jordan (now Jordan), and Palestine. These regions would become “mandates,” an internationally established status somewhere between a formal colony and an independent state (later ratified by the League of Nations). Before the plan could be put into effect, however, events elsewhere conspired

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to expose the double-dealing of the British. In 1918, the newly empowered Bolshevik regime in Russia exposed the Sykes-Picot Treaty—named after the British and French negotiators—that divided up the Middle East among the victorious imperial parties. The revelation enraged Arabs who believed they had been offered true independence. In Palestine, there was a further irritant. In 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour had written to Lord Rothschild, a chief financial contributor to and leader of the burgeoning Zionist movement. Balfour offered British support for “a national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. Although he conditioned this promise by saying that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,” the Arabs in Palestine were outraged, especially at the fact that they were identified simply as “existing non-Jewish communities.” Their irritation was about more than wounded pride. They represented, after all, more than 90 percent of the 750,000 persons living in Palestine. Indeed, the British offer seems positively selfdestructive at first glance, since Arabs predominated not only in Palestine but in most of the Middle East, including Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, where vast newly discovered deposits of oil—increasingly critical to modern economic development and warfare— were situated. The British foreign service had their reasons for backing the Jews, however. First, they hoped that a future Jewish territory might offer a pro-British base from which to protect the oil fields and the nearby Suez Canal. Second, they believed—as did many other European leaders—that Jews were especially influential in the U.S. government and that they might hasten America’s entry into the World War. Finally, many British Christians liked the idea of doing their Christian duty by helping the Jews return to Zion as the Bible prophesied in the Christian book of Revelations. As far as the local Palestinians were concerned, British duplicity was only part of the problem. The more significant problem was increased Zionist immigration and Jewish purchases of Arab land, which was resulting in the expulsion of Arab tenants. This problem set off the first round of widespread antiJewish rioting by Arabs in 1921. The British responded by offering immediate concessions to the Arabs, including a revised interpretation of the Balfour declaration in which they emphasized that a

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“national home” for the Jews in Palestine did not mean creation of a Jewish state. This pattern of Jewish expansion, Arab reaction, and British consternation would be repeated many times during the 30-year mandate period. At the end of the 1920s, Jews in Palestine were trying to establish expanded prayer rights at the Western Wall of the Second Temple, Judaism’s holiest site, then located in a densely populated Palestinian neighborhood of Jerusalem. Once again, the Arabs rioted. This time, hundreds of Jews were killed. In Hebron, the faith’s second holiest city, the entire Jewish community was killed or driven out. Again, the British responded with a report that underlined the seemingly mutually exclusive demands of the two parties to the conflict. With the rise of Nazi Germany in the early 1930s, the pace of Jewish emigration to Palestine increased dramatically, leading to further clashes between land-hungry Jews and Arabs fearful of being pushed off their lands. At the same time, the British were imposing new taxes on the Arab peasantry, while rewarding cooperative members of elite Arab families with positions of power. This favoritism to certain wealthy Palestinian families raised age-old class hostilities among the Arabs. By the mid-1930s, the situation in Palestine was explosive, and the spark that set things off was a series of retaliatory murders of Arabs by Jews. Across Palestine, the Arab population rose up in anger. With the Jews heavily defended by their own forces, however—including the Haganah, a military body woven out of the various settler militias— Arab anger turned on the British. For three years, Arab guerrillas and rioters fought British soldiers and police. Some 5,000 Arabs were killed, and much of the leadership was imprisoned or driven into exile. The British responded to the riots with two investigative reports, both with policy options for the future. The Peel Commission Report, issued in 1937, called for a divided Palestine, a proposal rejected outright by the Arab population. The second report— the so-called White Paper of 1939—recognized the grievances of the Arab population and sympathized with them. It offered several recommendations: majoritarian—meaning Palestinian-dominated— independence within ten years, limitations on Jewish immigration, and tight restrictions on Jewish land purchases. As expected, Zionists rejected the White

Paper. More surprisingly, the Palestinian leadership also refused to accept it. After three years of British repression, anything from London was likely to be rejected. By the time the White Paper came out, things had grown desperate for Jews in Europe, a fact reflected in the terrorist actions by members of the Jewish community in Palestine. In 1937, a group of Zionist extremists broke from the Haganah to form the Irgun Zvei Leumi (Hebrew for National Military Organization), launching a bombing campaign aimed largely at Arab civilian targets. These attacks were partly to retaliate for violence against Jews but were also intended to instill terror in the Arab population and force them to accept Jewish control or move elsewhere. The British contributed to the bad feeling by permitting Jewish organizations to arm themselves but denying the same right to Arabs. Zionist leaders also got around British laws aimed at curbing the spread of guns in Palestine. Jewish groups learned to manufacture their own or to smuggle them in from Europe. On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland, and World War II began. Britain was among the first to declare war. Hoping to reduce their security needs in Palestine and to free up men and resources for the war in Europe, the British pleaded with the Arabs and the Jews to end hostilities for the duration of the larger war. Largely disarmed and demobilized, the Palestinians had little option but to obey, though their religious leader, the Mufti of Jerusalem, called unsuccessfully for a pro-Nazi uprising. The Jewish community also largely agreed to a cease-fire for the duration, with one important exception. Led by Avraham Stern, a radical faction of the Irgun broke away to form the LEHI (Fighters for Freedom of Israel). Known more popularly as the “Stern Gang,” the group continued to attack British and Arab targets during the war. Stern and the members of LEHI were disciples of Vladimir Jabotinsky, founder of a right-wing, religiously inspired Zionist group. (Mainstream Jewish leaders at the time, including David Ben Gurion and Golda Meir, were secular Socialists.) Jabotinsky’s faction believed in a so-called Revisionist Zionism. It maintained that Israel must become a thoroughly Judaized state within a larger, greater Israel, in which the Palestinian population had either been expelled or relegated to second-class citizenship.

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The British Pull Out As World War II came to an end, the Zionists were horrified by the scale of the slaughter of Jews in Germany and its environs. They moved quickly to take advantage of these revelations. First, they organized a major effort to bring Jewish refugees from Europe to Palestine. This antagonized Palestinian Arabs, who forced the British into the embarrassing situation of refusing entry to Holocaust survivors. At the same time, the Haganah stepped up its recruitment and re-armament campaign, including raids on British armories. Finally, the Haganah began openly attacking British targets, such as military posts and rail lines, while the newly reunited Irgun-Stern intensified its clandestine terror campaign against Arab civilians. By 1946, Haganah leaders were reaching out to the Irgun-Stern. The results of this rapprochement were mutually fruitful. The radical Irgun-Stern received weapons and logistical support while the more respectable, mainstream Haganah had a means to conduct terrorist action while keeping its hands clean. The most telling result of this new cooperation was the July 1946 bombing of Jerusalem’s King David Hotel, headquarters of the British military command in Palestine, which caused the deaths of over eighty people, including British military personnel and civilians of several nationalities. The bombing became a key justification for the British government to wash its hands of Palestine a year later. In the meantime, however, the bombing led to a reenactment of emergency wartime regulations, including administrative detention, banishment, and collective punishment. Also in 1946, the British government put together one last commission to advise it on Palestine. The Anglo-American commission recommended a single, federated state in Palestine, under a UN trusteeship for at least five years. The plan was rejected outright by the Zionist leaders, who insisted on a separate Jewish state. Frustrated by the obstinacy of both Zionists and Arabs, undone by their own duplicity, and depleted by World War II and the various anticolonial movements and rebellions emerging throughout their vast empire, the British issued a statement in May 1947 saying that they were turning over Palestine to the United Nations within a year. “All we [can] say,” declared the British representative at the United Nations, “is that we

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should not have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which is not accepted by both parties [Jews and Arabs] and which we cannot reconcile with our conscience.” The decision angered Palestinian leaders, who felt the British had caved in to Zionist demands. In fact, the British were more concerned with their own interests than with those of the Jews. Aware of the decline of their own influence in the Middle East, British leaders hoped to enlist the Americans in the cause of ensuring continued Western control of the Middle East in the postwar era. They were hopeful that President Harry Truman and his chief advisers would remain sympathetic to the Zionist cause. The broader concern among Arab leaders in the Middle East was that British withdrawal might mean the sacrifice of Palestinian Arabs to atone for European feelings of guilt over the massacre of millions of Jews in the Holocaust. While Arabs sympathized with the plight of post-Holocaust Jews, they did not believe that Palestinians should “pay for Germany’s crimes.” They feared that turning the issue over to the United Nations would surely play into the hands of the pro-Zionist Americans. The United Nations immediately set up a commission to look into ways of resolving the growing conflict in the region: the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which included ten member states. The committee eventually issued two reports. One advocated a two-state solution, with Jerusalem governed as an “international” city. The other called for a federated, single-state solution. The two-state solution was anathema to the Arabs, while the federated state solution seemed hardly an improvement. Under both reports, the Jews were offered over 56 percent of the Palestinian mandate territory, even though they represented only 30 percent of the population and owned just 10 percent of the land. Moreover, while only several thousand Jews would find themselves under Palestinian sovereignty, nearly half a million Arabs would be located in the Jewish state. In other words, huge tracts of Arab-owned and Arab-populated land would be turned over to the Jews. Still, the UN General Assembly went ahead and voted on the two-state plan. Under heavy pressure from the United States, the body voted 33 to 13 in favor, with 10 nations abstaining. The British then announced they would withdraw in favor of the United Nations on May 14, 1948.

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Members of the Haganah, the Jewish defense force in Palestine, stand guard against Arab attack in Jaffa after the declaration of Israeli independence in May 1948. The Haganah was the foundation of the Israeli national army. (AFP/Getty Images)

The War The traditional and widely accepted view of the first Arab-Israeli war—or the Israeli War of Independence, as it is commonly referred to in the West—is that a small and vulnerable population of Jews defended themselves heroically against an overwhelming invasion force of Arabs from five surrounding states: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. In fact, the history is more complicated than that. First, the war began long before May 15—the day after the British pulled out, when Zionist leaders proclaimed independence and the Arab armies invaded. Since the end of World War II, there had been constant fighting between Zionists and Palestinians, with the far better-organized and -armed Zionists often initiating attacks and usually winning military engagements. The culmination of the pre-independence fighting took place at the village of Deir Yassin. In late April, forces of the Irgun-Stern attacked the largely civilian population of Deir Yassin, killing some 200 persons. The village was situated on the

critical highway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and soon Irgun-Stern commandos were parading the survivors through the streets of Jerusalem, warning Palestinian onlookers that the same fate would befall them if they failed to leave what would soon become the Jewish state. The leaders of the Haganah immediately denounced what they called the massacre at Deir Yassin, saying it was the work of Zionist extremists. Indeed, within a month, Zionist leader Ben Gurion had outlawed private armies in an attempt to consolidate all Jewish forces under the aegis of the Haganah. Not long afterward, Haganah attacked and destroyed an Irgun-Stern force that was trying to land foreign recruits and arms on a Tel Aviv beach. In the decades after the war, much evidence has come to light that Haganah and Irgun-Stern were actually allies. According to papers from Israeli government archives, the Haganah leadership had formulated what they called “plan D” as early as March 1948. Under this plan, Arabs were to be forcibly expelled from the coastal area of Palestine—designated as the heart

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of the new Jewish state under the UN plan—in preparation for Haganah attempts to take possession of territory designated as Arab under the UN plan. Evidence also shows that Haganah and Irgun-Stern had signed a formal cooperation pact just two days before the Deir Yassin massacre. Haganah resorted to many of the same tactics as Irgun-Stern in fighting Palestinians, including the use of so-called barrel bombs that were sent crashing into Arab houses and businesses. Finally, Haganah threats to Jerusalem Arabs, urging them to flee, were broadcast from Haganah sound trucks. While subsequent Palestinian historians and others skeptical of the official story of Deir Yassin argue that the Zionist forces aimed to drive Arabs out of the new state, the truth may have been somewhat more immediate and tactical. In early May, Jewish forces launched Operation Maccabee to capture the entire length of the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem highway. Thus, the destruction of Deir Yassin and the warning to other Arabs was also a means to eliminate or neutralize a potential internal threat of guerrilla action by Palestinians caught behind Jewish lines. A second element in the traditional telling of the war is that the Zionist forces were outnumbered and outgunned. In fact, the opposite is true. Having had more than a ten-year head start in armament procurement and creation, they easily outgunned Palestinian forces and even outnumbered the combatants of all five invading armies by fully half, or 50,000 troops to some 33,000. In addition, the Zionists’ 30,000 machine guns, 54 million rounds of ammunition, 800 armored vehicles, and 25 warplanes offered far greater firepower than anything the Arabs had. Finally, the Jews were better organized. With the collapse of the Irgun-Stern, they fought under a single command, whereas the Arab armies were divided into five mutually antagonistic forces, each distrustful of the intentions of the other. In some respects, however, the traditional Zionist story of the “miraculous” victory against “overwhelming” Arab forces has merit. The Zionists were indeed more motivated, because they were fighting for their homeland, whereas their enemies—with the exception of the Palestinian soldiers—were fighting for the more abstract notion of Arab brotherhood. (Indeed, Arab leaders continued to believe long after the war that with enough pressure, the Jews would leave Palestine or accept Arab sovereignty, as Europeans elsewhere in the Middle East had done. They failed to recognize that the Jews felt they had nowhere else to go.)

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The Zionist forces also had better leadership. In contrast to the hierarchically run Arab armies—often a legacy of European imperial training—Jewish commanders gave field officers and even enlisted men a great deal of leeway in interpreting orders and making decisions on their own, a critical ingredient in a multifront, rapidly changing battlefield. Moreover, the constant drilling and overall better education of the Haganah troops paid off in the higher standards of discipline they displayed. Only the Arab Legion of Jordan was their match, as demonstrated by the fact that this force dealt the Zionists their only major loss of the war—holding the Old City of Jerusalem against all Zionist attacks. Finally, the Jewish forces—largely defending or attacking from a narrow base—enjoyed shorter internal supply and defense lines, a critical ingredient in any war. Given these advantages, it is not surprising that the Zionists won an overwhelming victory in a relatively short time. By early in 1949, the fighting had all but ceased. Within six more months, all five Arab states had signed cease-fires—though not formal peace treaties—with the new Jewish state. For their wartime efforts, the Zionists had not merely won a state of their own, but one that was substantially larger than that offered to them by the United Nations—80 percent, as opposed to 56 percent, of the old Palestine mandate—and one free of 80 percent of its Arabs. In the end, some 6,000 Jews and several times that number of Arabs were killed in the conflict.

Aftermath The Arab-Israeli war of 1948–1949 planted the seeds for much of the subsequent tension in the Middle East, as well as for the six Arab-Israeli wars that ensued between 1956 (the Sinai War) and 2006 (the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon). There were two main reasons for this. First was the creation of Israel itself. The Arab Middle East, which had only recently overthrown the yoke of European imperialism, saw the Zionist state as a European-style interloper, and they found the presence of a Zionist state in the heart of the Arab world politically and ideologically intolerable. Moreover, as Israel proved itself willing to ally itself with Western powers—first, France and Britain, then, the United States—in order to further its own ends, its existence seemed to threaten the very basis of Arab independence and power.

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At the heart of Middle Eastern tension, however, was a moral crisis that would come to be exploited by all sides for political and strategic ends. The crisis concerned the Palestinian refugees. In early 1948, there were approximately 750,000 Palestinians in the territory that would become Israel, but by early 1949, only 150,000—largely the most uneducated and impoverished—remained. The question that haunted the region was: Did they flee or were they expelled? Zionist leaders said the former, pointing to broadcasts by Arab countries and orders from Arab military leaders that the Palestinians leave. Zionists claimed that Arab leaders had invented Jewish atrocities and exaggerated Jewish efforts to defend themselves in order to gain the support of the Palestinians and to create international sympathy for their cause. For the Arabs, however, it seemed clear that the Jews had intentionally sought to rid their new state of as many Palestinians as possible, even before the war began. To address the Israeli argument that Zionist forces feared Palestinians collaborating with invading Arab armies, they point out that those armies never invaded what the United Nations had determined to be Jewish territory in the first place. How, they asked, could they be a threat if they had no access to weapons and no way to support the so-called Arab invaders? In either case, the ongoing presence of the Palestinian refugees would not only be a source of

tension in Arab-Israeli relations for decades to come, but it would also serve as a source of discord in the states—Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria—in which they found themselves exiled. James Ciment See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967; Israel: Yom Kippur War, 1973.

Bibliography Ciment, James. Palestine/Israel: The Long Conflict. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Findley, Paul. Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the United States–Israeli Relationship. New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1993. Gerner, Deborah. One Land, Two Peoples: The Conquest over Palestine. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence Through Lebanon. New York: Random House, 1982. Kimmerling, Baruch, and Joel Migdal. Palestinians: The Making of a People. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Ovendale, Ritchie. The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1992. Quigley, John. Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990. Taylor, Alan. The Superpowers and the Middle East. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.

ISRAEL: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes; Terrorism and International Incidents PARTICIPANT: Israel and fulfillment of Zionism, Arab nationalism, British imperialism, superpower confrontation, and the politics of oil. At its essence, stripped of foreign entanglements and geopolitical considerations, the conflict is, of course, about two peoples with an intense— almost fanatical—attachment to the same strip of land on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean.

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The conflict between the state of Israel and the Palestinian people—arguably the longest ongoing conflict of the post–World War II era—is neither the product of age-old hatreds nor is it preordained by scripture, though scripture is often invoked by Israelis, particularly religiously observant ones. Instead, it is the direct result of events of the last hundred years or so: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the articulation

The seeds of the struggle lay in Europe, not the Middle East. Zionism, the Jewish variant of the nationalist fervor that swept the declining empires of the Austro-Hungarians, the Russians, and the Ottomans in the late nineteenth century, was an idea articulated in the relatively enlightened and tolerant western half of the continent and nurtured in the repressive east. Viennese journalist Theodor Herzl described his dream of a Jewish state, modeled on the middle-class Jewish communities of Western Europe, but the dream was ultimately fulfilled by impoverished shtetl, or ghetto, Jews of Eastern Europe, with their socialist aspirations. Herzl began with the painful realization of anti-Semitism in the Dreyfus case, in which a Jewish officer in the French army was framed as a German spy. Yet the first large contingent of Jews who arrived in the Holy Land came from the increasingly repressive Russian empire during its dying decades. Herzl and the Eastern European Jews who acted on his theories shared one fatal idea, best expressed in the old Zionist adage: “A land without people for a people without a land.” Early Zionists paid lip service to Arabs who lived in Palestine, but made little effort to understand or work with them. Indeed, Jewish socialist pioneers—intent on building their own society with their own hands and without labor exploitation—explicitly excluded the Arabs by insisting that land never be sold to them and that they

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KEY DATES 1948–1949 Following Israel’s unilateral declaration of independence from Great Britain, the country is attacked by armies from neighboring Arab countries; the Israeli victory sends hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into exile. 1964 Egyptian leader Gamel Abdel Nasser establishes the Palestine Liberation Organization. 1967 The Israelis achieve victory over neighboring Arab states, seizing East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, as well as hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and Palestinian refugees from the 1948–1949 war. 1969 Palestinian nationalist Yasir Arafat seizes control of the PLO. 1970 In fighting with Jordanian forces, the PLO is driven out of that country and into Lebanon. 1982 Israel launches an invasion of Lebanon, driving out the PLO and sending it to exile in Tunisia. 1987 Palestinian civilians launch a major uprising, known as the “intifada,” against the Israeli occupation of the territories seized in the 1967 war. 1993 The PLO and Israel sign a peace agreement that sets up a plan that will lead to an independent Palestinian state. 2000 Continuing frustration over the failure of the 1993 accords to lead to a Palestinian state sets off a second Palestinian intifada. 2005 Israel unilaterally vacates the Gaza Strip. 2006 The radical Islamist party Hamas wins elections to become the governing party of Palestine.

never be hired as workers (though the latter principle was frequently ignored). Still, Palestinian Arabs had lived in the region for thousands of years—the very name “Palestine” is derived from “Philistine,” the name of the ancient foes of the Hebrews. Nevertheless, some Zionists maintained that Palestinians are Arabs—no more and no less—and therefore already have a whole region for themselves. However flimsy or substantial their arguments for a historical Palestinian people, modern Palestinians forged strong national ties in their long twentieth-century struggle with the British and the Jews. As any student of twentieth-century geopolitics knows, fervent nationalism can be created quickly in the forge of occupation and liberation struggle.

Interwar Period The Middle East underwent wrenching change in World War I. To help defeat their mutual Ottoman enemies, the British and the Arabs joined forces to liberate Palestine and much of the Middle East from Ottoman rule. While Britain promised Arabs independence for their efforts, it secretly worked with France to ensure continued imperial control of the oil-rich region. Thus, after World War I, the heart of the Middle East was divided up into League of Nations–sanctioned mandates controlled by the British (Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan) and the French (Lebanon and Syria). The mandates came with the explicit intention of preparing these states for independence. Since the word “indepen-

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dence” was not carefully defined, however, European masters had leeway to maintain control or very strong influence for decades to come. At the same time, elements in the British foreign service sympathetic to Zionism were making promises of independence to the early Jewish pioneers in Palestine. Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour’s declaration—actually, a letter to Zionist philanthropist and financier Lord Rothschild—read: “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People.” Britain’s mutually exclusive promises to Arabs and Jews in Palestine would come back to haunt it and would help plunge the region into thirty years of retributive violence. Still, concerns over ultimate sovereignty were relatively abstract ones, especially compared to events on the ground. The Zionists claimed that they were acquiring and building their new homeland “an acre and a goat at a time.” What this meant was something more controversial. Using funds provided by wealthy Jewish philanthropists, the Zionists purchased farm and pasture land, usually from absentee Arab landlords, then forced Arab farmers and herders—most of whom had worked the land for generations but had never acquired a deed to it—to leave their crops and flocks and migrate to towns or cities. This began a pattern of rising Arab resentment bursting forth in mob violence against Jews. The first such riot occurred in Jaffa in 1921, but a much more deadly explosion was sparked in Jerusalem in 1929, after Jewish attempts to expand worshipping rights at the Western Wall. In a period of days, more than 130 Jews were slain and the ancient Jewish community driven from nearby Hebron, the second holiest city in Judaism. The British also became victims of the strife. Following the retributive murder of two Arabs by Jews in 1936, the Arab population rose up in rebellion, first against the Jews, then against the British, resulting in the largest uprising of the mandate period. It took the British some three years to quell the violence, leading to a near-total disarmament of the Arab population. Jews, largely left out of the conflict, were able to keep their weapons. In seeking a solution to this dilemma partially of their own making, the British commissioned a host of official reports, each with a set of recommendations for solving the crisis. The 1939 White Paper, for instance, suggested majoritarian national independence within

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ten years and strict limitations on future immigration of Jews and on land purchases by Jews. The report was rejected not only by Zionist leaders but also by many Palestinian nationalists, who believed the report did not limit Jewish actions enough and wanted to see their gains rolled back. Events outside of Palestine were making the report irrelevant. The rise of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s was producing a flood of Jewish emigration to Palestine, and later in 1939, the German invasion of Poland began World War II, which would engulf even embattled Palestine. At British urging, the Arab population (largely disarmed) and the Jews (whose Haganah and Irgun forces were well armed) pledged to a cease-fire for the duration of the war. Radical and religiously inspired Arabs continued to call for a renewed struggle, and the terrorist Irgun faction, known as the Stern Gang, continued attacks on Arabs and British forces during the war.

Israeli Independence and Palestinian Disaster At the end of World War II, violence in Palestine increased once again. The radical Zionist group IrgunStern embarked on a bombing campaign against both Arab and British targets, culminating in the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946, which served as the British army’s headquarters. More than eighty people were killed, including British officials and soldiers and Jewish and Arab civilians. To quell the violence, the British imposed emergency law, which included administrative detention, banishment, and collective punishment. Despite such measures, the British found themselves unable to handle the situation, overextended as they were by rebellions across their crumbling empire. In May 1947, they announced that they were pulling out of Palestine within a year and turning the Palestinian Mandate over to the United Nations. The United Nations proposed dividing the territory into two states, with Jerusalem to be an internationally administered city. The Arabs rejected the plan because it gave the Jews—who represented less than 30 percent of the population and owned just 6 percent of the land—control of nearly 60 percent of Palestine. The British withdrew as announced in May 1948, but the UN never had a chance to take over the region. On May 14, 1948, the Zionists announced the formation of the independent country of Israel.

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The War for Israeli Independence is usually said to have started on May 15, when the armies of five neighboring Arab countries—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—invaded. It was in fact an extension of the low-level conflict between Palestinians and Zionists that had been going on since the end of World War II. Far better armed and organized, the Jewish forces usually had the advantage. Even though Arab forces invaded Israel, much of the fighting involved Israeli attacks on Palestinian Arabs. The most egregious case occurred in Deir Yasin—a strategic village on the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem highway—where Irgun-Stern forces massacred 200 Palestinian civilians and then paraded the victims and prisoners in the streets of Jerusalem, proclaiming that the fate of Deir Yasin awaited all Palestinians who did not leave the Jewish state immediately. The result was the expulsion or flight— Palestinians insist on the former, Israelis say the latter—of 800,000 Arabs, about 80 percent of the Arab population, including most of its skilled, educated, and urban members. About half went to Jordan (including the West Bank), and the rest went to Egyptian-administered Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and other countries in the Middle East and the West.

Rise of the P LO The years between the 1948 and 1967 wars were a period of relative quiet in the struggle between the Israelis and Palestinians, though low-level fighting continued. Palestinian guerrillas, known as fedayeen, launched raids on Israel from the beginning. Many of these raids were conducted by displaced Palestinian villagers attempting to steal back or destroy lost property. Israel retaliated in force, carrying out over a hundred counter-raids into Jordan in 1950 alone. Still, there was little in the way of coordinated Palestinian attacks on Israel before 1967. The general attitude of Palestinian leaders in the diaspora was that liberation of their homeland would come about through conventional attacks led by the neighboring Arab states. To help focus the struggle and encourage Palestinian participation in this effort, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser established the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, with Ahmed Shukeiry as its chairman. A Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was also created, with divisions inte-

grated into the various Arab national military structures. The future leader of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, was not involved in Nasser’s early planning, but he was already active in the Palestinian cause. A young Palestinian engineer working in Kuwait, Arafat had organized a liberation organization known as Fatah, meaning “victory” in Arabic, in 1959. He believed that Palestinians must lead their own struggle by engaging in direct action against what he called the “Zionist entity.” The first attack of Fatah on Israel was a sabotage raid on Israel’s new Galilee-Negev water project in January 1965. The project was a symbol of Israel’s permanence. The raid failed, indicating that Palestinian guerrilla action was having little impact on the developing Israeli state. “Resistance? What resistance?” Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan asked in early 1967. “The resistance is like an egg in my hand. I can smash it anytime.” While the 1967 Six-Day War is covered in another entry in this encyclopedia, it is important to note here two major effects it had on the Palestinian people and their struggle. First, the war sent 400,000 more Palestinian refugees into Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. And second, it finally ended the Palestinian hope that their liberation would result from the victories of neighboring Arab armies over Israel. Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank forced Fatah to try a new strategy. Inspired by the Algerian war of national liberation against France, Fatah began setting up a network of underground guerrilla cells in the occupied territories. These territories were much smaller and more crowded than Algeria, however, and the people too cowed by Israeli might for the guerrilla cells to work. Arafat and other Fatah leaders were forced to sneak out of the territories and into Jordan within a few months. Now operating out of refugee camps near the new Jordanian-Israeli border—with the grudging permission of King Hussein—Fatah launched raids on the occupied territories, drawing the predictable Israeli retaliation. The moment of truth came in March 1968, when a massive Israeli tank and air attack on the camp at Karameh was turned back by Jordanian military units and Fatah fighters. After the debacle of the 1967 war, Karameh was a muchneeded psychological boost for both the Palestinians and the Arab world. One result was that Arafat and Fatah took over the PLO in 1969.

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Terrorism While the use of terrorism by the PLO and other Palestinian liberation groups seems both murderous and self-defeating at first glance, there was some method to the madness. First, terrorism was designed to make it impossible for Israelis to live comfortably and securely in their country, despite their overwhelming victory of 1967. Second, terrorist acts, particularly those outside Israel, made it difficult for the world at large to ignore the fact that Palestinians were being denied their homeland. Third, for a group with few military resources fighting a country with the most powerful army in the Middle East and a staunch ally in the United States, terrorism was cheap and effective. Finally, it could be argued that Fatah and the PLO were only imitating the Israelis of earlier years, who adopted similar terrorist tactics. The terrorist actions began with hijackings, the first by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—an organization under the PLO umbrella— against an El Al jetliner in July 1968. Israel responded by beefing up its airline security and launching devastating retaliatory raids. After an attack on an Israeli jet in Athens in December 1968—which Israel blamed on Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon—a commando team blew up thirteen Middle East Airlines jets at Beirut airport. Then in September 1970, PFLP guerrillas hijacked three international airliners, forcing them to land at Dawson’s Field, near Amman, Jordan. The guerrillas removed the passengers from the planes, then blew the planes up. The Dawson’s Field incident represented the final straw for King Hussein of Jordan. Palestinians in Jordan had been challenging his authority and using the country as a safe haven from which to launch attacks. Now they had used a major Jordanian airport as a site to demonstrate their lawlessness. Hussein launched his army against the PLO and related Palestinian organizations based in Jordan. After several days of fierce fighting, the groups were forced to abandon Jordan and make their way to Lebanon and Syria. Out of the Jordanian debacle grew Black September, a loose group of Fatah guerrillas frustrated by the stalemate with Israel. Two years after Dawson’s Field, on September 5, 1972, Black September invaded the rooms of Israeli athletes and coaches during the Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, killing two and taking nine

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hostage. As a condition for releasing the hostages, they demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel. When Jerusalem refused to negotiate, West German security forces attacked the guerrillas, hoping to free the hostages. In the resulting gun battle, all nine hostages and two of the terrorists were killed. Black September later gained the support of Libyan president Muammar Qaddafi and launched several unsuccessful attacks on Israel and other targets in Europe. In April 1974, the Palestinian struggle returned to Israeli soil with a vengeance, when a breakaway PFLP group—the PFLP General Command (PFLP-GC)— launched a raid on the northern Israeli border town of Kiryat Shmona. Bursting into a four-story apartment building, three guerrillas used machine guns and hand grenades to kill some eighteen Israeli civilians and wound sixteen more. A month later, yet another PFLP splinter group—the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)—seized ninety Israeli schoolchildren in the Galilee town of Maalot. After refusing to meet the terrorists’ demands that they release twenty-six Palestinian prisoners, Israeli security forces raided the school. The resulting firefight resulted in the death of twenty-one students and the wounding of another sixty-five. Yet another hijacking in 1976 turned distinctly against the guerrillas. On June 27, a group of leftwing European terrorists and PFLP guerrillas took over an Air France jet bound from Paris to Tel Aviv with some 246 passengers, mostly Jews. After a forced landing in Libya, the hijackers took the plane to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where they were given protection by the quixotic and murderous dictator Idi Amin. In one of the most daring counterterrorist raids in history, Israeli commandos flew some 3,000 miles to liberate the hostages. While most of the terrorists and several dozen Ugandan soldiers were killed, only one Israeli soldier and one hostage were killed in the rescue.

Israeli Attacks on the P LO In 1977, partly as a result of these attacks, the hardline Likud party won the Israeli elections and took power, vowing to make Israeli security the linchpin of its administration. A key to this goal was Lebanon, where an ongoing civil war had left a power vacuum that the PLO used to develop its military infrastructure and launch attacks on Israeli targets. In

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1978, 20,000 Israeli troops invaded twenty miles into Lebanon, pounding PLO positions and creating a ten-mile strip of territory north of the border guarded by an Israeli-supported, anti-PLO Christian militia. While the Christian militia fought the PLO and Israel assassinated those it believed responsible for acts of terrorism—including alleged Munich mastermind Ali Hassan Salameh—the PLO continued to launch terrifying but relatively ineffective rocket attacks on settlements in the north of Israel. After years of artillery fire in response, the Israeli army launched an even more massive invasion in June 1982, Operation Peace for Galilee, triggered, the Israelis said, by the attempted assassination of Israel’s ambassador to Great Britain. The announced purpose of the raid was to clear the PLO out of south Lebanon, but its true aim was to crush the PLO and drive it out of Lebanon altogether. This became clear less than two weeks later when Israeli forces arrived in the southern suburbs of Beirut. After a brutal artillery and air attack on the Muslim enclave in West Beirut, the Israeli army engaged in street fighting with the PLO, leading ultimately to the withdrawal of the PLO under the protection of a U.S.-led multinational force. Offered asylum in the Tunisian capital, Tunis, the PLO was forced to give up its infrastructure in Lebanon and move to a locale over 1,500 miles from Palestine, a significant setback that would have enormous repercussions on the movement in years to come. It took the PLO several years to rebuild itself in Tunis before it could once again launch attacks on Israel. During the spring and summer of 1985, an elite PLO force initiated several sea-launched raids against Israel, though all were thwarted by the Israeli navy and one led to the kidnapping of a deputy commander of the force. In retaliation, the group assassinated three Israelis aboard a yacht in Cyprus. The PLO claimed they were agents of Mossad—Israel’s spy agency—but Jerusalem insisted they were merely civilians. Regardless, in October, Israel launched its most audacious attack on the PLO since the invasion of Lebanon three years earlier. With the intention of killing Arafat himself, Israeli jets bombed PLO headquarters in Tunis, killing fifty-six Palestinians and fifteen Tunisians. Arafat escaped unharmed. In response, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)—an organization of young guerrillas allied to the PLO and led by Abu Abbas—booked passage on the cruise ship Achille Lauro that same month. They

planned to wait until the ship docked at the Israeli port of Ashdod, when Israeli passengers would come aboard, but were detected by the ship’s crew before landing and forced to take action. After seizing the ship off the coast of Egypt and demanding that Israel release Palestinian prisoners, the PLF murdered an elderly Jewish-American passenger named Leon Klinghoffer. Eventually, the Achille Lauro crisis was defused when the Tunisian government offered asylum to Abbas and the PLF in exchange for the release of the ship and its passengers. Abbas and the other conspirators were captured before reaching Tunisia when U.S. jets forced the plane that was carrying them to land at a base in Sicily. Four were tried, convicted, and given long sentences, but Italian authorities, fearful of provoking Palestinian terrorist attacks on their soil, released Abbas. The hijacking of the ship and the murder of Klinghoffer antagonized U.S. officials and the U.S. public and may have contributed to Arafat’s decision to renounce terrorism the following month at a PLO conference in Cairo, though he insisted the Palestinian people had a right to resist Israeli occupation.

Impact of the Intifada A new chapter in the struggle between Palestinians and Israelis began in 1986 and 1987. While Arafat was renouncing terrorism and hinting at recognizing Israel, both the Palestinian people of Gaza and the West Bank and the Islamist militants among them were preparing to launch two very different challenges to Israeli occupation. In October 1986, two members of Islamic Jihad—a militant group with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt—threw grenades at a group of Israeli army recruits in Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad and Hamas—a much larger group—were much less willing to compromise over the existence of Israel than the PLO. Claiming that Palestine was holy land—Jerusalem being the third holiest city in Islam—Islamic Jihad and Hamas insisted that the Zionist state must be destroyed, even if the Jews themselves might remain in Palestine. Meanwhile, in December 1987, the Palestinian masses launched their own struggle against Israeli occupation. Following the traffic death of several Palestinians in Gaza—which, in the superheated political atmosphere of that crowded, oppressed, and impoverished territory, was interpreted as murder—Palestinians launched a

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spontaneous, unarmed uprising against the Israeli occupation army. Arafat called the movement an intifada (literally, Arabic for “shaking off”), a somewhat patronizing designation by the PLO leader, who did not take the action seriously at first. But the intifada soon proved him wrong, continuing unabated for four years. While the intifada is the subject of another encyclopedia entry, one of its key impacts on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict needs to be noted here. Until 1987, the PLO and the Palestinian movement generally were led by exiles, largely those Palestinians who had once lived in Israel itself. Not surprisingly, they focused their efforts on destroying the Zionist state. But the intifada changed the balance of power within the Palestinian liberation movement, shifting it to the occupied territories themselves, where the people, all too familiar with Israeli intransigence and power, sought a more workable two-state solution. As Arafat began to recognize this, he shifted his strategy. In 1988, he renounced the clause in the PLO covenant calling for the destruction of Israel. This move opened up the possibility of direct talks with the U.S. government, which had made such a renunciation a prerequisite for official contact. It also opened the way for discussions with Israel itself. In 1993, when a new Israeli Labor government expressed willingness to open secret negotiations with the PLO at Oslo, Arafat sent some of his top assistants. The resulting accord promised a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from some of the occupied territory and hinted at a possible Palestinian state in exchange for PLO cooperation in preventing terrorist attacks by Islamist groups.

Islamist and Jewish Fundamentalist Violence The signing of the Oslo Accords angered radicals on both sides of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for somewhat similar reasons. For Islamists, the accords were seen as a sellout to the fundamentally illegitimate state of Israel. Not only were nonbelievers left in control of the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and elsewhere, but the new Palestinian Authority was actually being set up to serve Israeli security needs first and Palestinian economic and social needs a distant second. Thus, the Islamist groups, such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas, took up the mantle of armed strug-

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gle against the Zionist state that had largely been dropped by the secular PLO. (Even many radical nonPLO groups had given up the armed struggle by the early 1990s at the urging of their main patron, Syria.) Beginning around 1990, Islamic Jihad stepped up its attacks against Jewish occupation forces. At the end of 1992, the new Labor prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, ordered 400 Hamas members deported to Lebanon. But when the Lebanese government would not allow them to enter, they remained on the barren borderland between the two countries. This was a public relations fiasco for Israel, and Rabin allowed all of the deportees to return to the territories within a year. Still, Islamic Jihad’s near-total emphasis on armed struggle—and its relatively small numbers—left it vulnerable to the Israeli security forces, which had greatly reduced the movement’s effectiveness by the mid-1990s. In its place would rise a much more broadly based and, from Israeli and PLO viewpoints, more threatening Islamist organization, Hamas. But before turning to Hamas, a discussion of Jewish fundamentalist violence against Palestinians is necessary. One of the great ironies of the establishment of Israel in 1948 was that the holiest lands for the Jews—that is, the center of the ancient Hebrew kingdoms, known as Judea and Samaria—lay in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank, while the heart of modern Israel was built on the coastal territory that had been peripheral in ancient times. As early as Passover of 1968, Jewish fundamentalists had begun to redress this anomaly by settling in the West Bank, specifically in Hebron, site of the Tomb of the Patriarchs—burial site of Abraham, patriarch of the Hebrew people (and also of Arabs and Muslims). Still, the Labor government, in power until 1977, discouraged religious settlements. Under Likud, however, Jewish fundamentalists were encouraged to establish settlements in the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, in Gaza. The Israeli government developed the infrastructure of roads and utilities to support them. Some of the Jewish settlers had religious motives, but the vast majority remained secular in orientation, drawn to the territory by cheaper housing costs. To defend themselves, and to intimidate Palestinians and force them to give up their land, the Jewish fundamentalists organized Gush Emunim, or Bloc of the Faithful. While the Likud government used force and questionable law to

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evict Palestinians from their ancestral lands, members of the Gush Emunim’s militia—often no more than teams of armed settlers—assassinated Palestinian mayors, destroyed Palestinian property, and killed Palestinian students, sometimes in retaliation for individual Palestinian attacks on Jewish settlers. The signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 increased the intensity of Jewish fundamentalist violence. In February 1994, an American-born fundamentalist Jew named Baruch Goldstein attacked Muslim worshipers at the Ibrahimi Mosque (known to the Jews as the Tomb of the Patriarchs) in Hebron, killing 29 people and injuring 200 more before being beaten to death by survivors. The Labor government of Yitzhak Rabin responded with a crackdown against Jewish fundamentalists, but the measures proved inadequate, and one fundamentalist assassinated Rabin himself in November 1995. Meanwhile, during the early 1990s, Hamas was growing in influence. An offshoot of the Egyptianbased Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was founded by the charismatic sheik Ahmed Yassin in the Egyptianadministered Gaza Strip before the 1967 war. Like other Islamist groups, Hamas was more than a political organization. It ran schools, health clinics, cultural centers, athletic programs, and other social service institutions for a Palestinian population underserved by the Israeli occupation government. In this way, it established broad and deep roots in the Palestinian community. At the same time, Hamas was at first encouraged by the Israeli government, which believed it represented a less politically oriented alternative to the PLO. But during the intifada, Hamas increasingly included political education and activism in its programs. It recruited hundreds, if not thousands, more to the cause in Israeli jails. In response to the Goldstein massacre in Hebron in 1994, Hamas set off bombs on two Israeli buses, killing fourteen persons. In October, they kidnapped an Israeli soldier, demanding the release of Yassin and several other Hamas prisoners. A failed rescue attempt by Israeli commandos resulted in the death of three Hamas kidnappers, the hostage, and an Israeli officer. Israel demanded that Arafat crack down on Hamas, but efforts by the Palestinian Authority to do so led to bitter fighting between PLO and Islamists in November, followed by an uneasy truce. Throughout 1995, Islamic Jihad and Hamas engaged in an intense clandestine struggle with Israeli security forces, even as the peace process contin-

ued and Israeli troops began to withdraw from most Palestinian urban centers in preparation for the 1996 Palestinian elections on January 20. Arafat and his alFatah party won the election overwhelmingly. (Both Hamas and Islamic Jihad largely boycotted the elections.) Two weeks before the poll, however, Israel’s Shin Bet, its domestic security force, assassinated Yahya Ayyash, Hamas’s top bomb maker. In response to the killing and as a way to derail a peace process that they believed was grossly skewed against the Palestinians, Hamas launched a series of devastating bomb attacks in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and elsewhere in February and March 1996, killing more than seventy Israelis and wounding hundreds more. The bombings undermined the Israeli public’s commitment to the peace process as it was proceeding. And without its popular leader, Rabin, Labor was narrowly defeated in the May 1996 general elections. The new prime minister, Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu, promised a tougher Israeli approach to negotiations with his campaign slogan “peace with security” and his open declaration that he might renegotiate existing provisions of the various accords signed by the Labor government and the PLO.

Netanyahu Era The new prime minister began his term in office with a set of calculated challenges and affronts to Yasir Arafat, whom Netanyahu claimed was doing far too little to ensure Israeli security. His obstinacy provoked warnings from Arafat and Arab leaders that the new Israeli government must stick to the existing accords. Still, it was a more symbolic gesture by Netanyahu that caused the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to explode in violence once again. In September 1996, the prime minister ordered the opening of a tunnel beneath the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Seeing the move as a threat to their holy sites, Palestinians rioted across the West Bank and Gaza. And when Israeli troops began shooting at protesters, they were met with return fire from Palestinian Authority police. After several days of fighting, eleven Israeli soldiers, along with thirty-nine Palestinian police and civilians, lay dead. The violence prompted the United States and the international community to put pressure on both parties to reopen the stalled negotiations. In January 1997, an accord was worked out whereby Hebron—the last major Palestinian city occupied by Israeli forces— would be divided between Israeli and Palestinian

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sectors. The settlement angered many Palestinians, who felt that it was unfair to give 20 percent of the city to some 500 Jewish fundamentalist settlers and only 80 percent to the city’s 100,000 Muslims.

Barak and Sharon Eras Netanyahu’s hard-line position vis-à-vis the Palestinians alienated many Israeli voters, who elected Labor Party candidate Ehud Barak in 1999. In his campaign, Barak promised to make peace with Israel’s neighbors, including Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians, without jeopardizing Israel’s security concerns. In May 2000, Barak unilaterally withdrew Israeli troops from the buffer zone in southern Lebanon that they had occupied since Israel’s 1982 invasion of that country. Negotiations with the Palestinians proved trickier to accomplish. Under the aegis of U.S. president Bill Clinton, Barak and Arafat met at Camp David in July 2000, with the goal of bypassing the incremental Oslo approach and reaching a final settlement on issues dividing the Israelis and Palestinians. Ultimately, Barak made an offer whereby roughly 95 percent of the West Bank and Gaza would be turned into a Palestinian state. While the Israelis, Clinton, and much of the media hailed the plan as generous, Arafat rejected it, largely because it would have broken up the West Bank into nearly noncontiguous parts, making an independent state unviable. With the talks at a stalemate, and recriminations flying back and forth between Israelis and Palestinians over the failure of the Camp David negotiations, events turned violent after Ariel Sharon, a hawkish former Israeli general—whom many Palestinians blamed for massacres of their people during the 1982 Lebanon invasion—made a provocative visit, with armed guards, to the grounds of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (known as the Temple Mount to Jews), a sacred and disputed spot for both Muslims and Jews. Violent protests—known as the Al Aqsa Intifada— then erupted across the occupied territories. The failure of Camp David and the start of a new intifada doomed Barak’s career as prime minister. In February 2001, Barak and his Labor Party were overwhelmingly defeated by Sharon and the Likud Party. In July 2001, the Israeli cabinet voted to give the IDF a broader mandate to target Palestinian terrorists, especially Hamas, which deployed suicide bombers in Israel through 2001 and early 2002. Despite Arafat’s denunciation of such attacks, Sharon’s

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government launched a massive offensive into the West Bank in March and April 2002, with Israeli forces razing large parts of Jenin and Ramallah and occupying many of the urban areas of the West Bank formerly controlled by the Palestinian Authority. The United States, preoccupied by the September 11 terrorist attacks and the war in Afghanistan, largely failed to protest the Israeli offensive even though it violated the Oslo Accords. Sharon also announced that he would not meet or negotiate with Arafat, now virtually under house arrest, with his headquarters in Ramallah surrounded by Israeli forces. In an effort to reopen negotiations with Israel, Arafat appointed moderate Mahmoud Abbas to serve as the Palestinian Authority prime minister. Meanwhile, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the UN—the so-called “quartet”—had developed a plan for peace called the “road map,” a twophase plan calling for an end to violence and the establishment of a Palestinian state existing in peace side-by-side with Israel. The “road map” was premised on the idea of renewed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. But Sharon had other ideas. Like many other Israelis, Sharon had come to the conclusion that, with their higher birth rate, Palestinians would soon outnumber Jews in an Israel that continued to occupy the West Bank and Gaza. Sharon’s solution was for Israel to go it alone, following a unilateral path to separation without negotiations. Part of his plan included a massive security fence (opponents called it a “wall”) that would divide the West Bank from Israel proper. Construction of the barrier began in 2002, but the fact that it deviated from Israel’s 1967 borders to encompass large Jewish settlement blocs within the West Bank angered Palestinians and their supporters. Israelis largely applauded the barrier as it cut Palestinian attacks within Israel proper by 90 percent. Sharon also continued to avoid meeting with Arafat. On November 11, 2004, the long-time leader of the PLO died of natural causes and was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas. Arafat’s death did little to change Sharon’s plans, and weeks later he announced a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Despite threats by fundamentalist Jewish settlers to violently resist removal, the evacuation went ahead relatively peacefully in the summer of 2005. Sharon also talked of evacuating much of the West Bank, though holding onto territories within the security barrier. Meeting resistance from many hard-line Likud members, led

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by Netanyahu, Sharon resigned from the party, announced the formation of a new party called Kadima— Hebrew for “Forward”—and called for new elections in March 2006. Most observers of Israeli politics believed that the election would serve as a referendum on Sharon’s unilateral approach to disengagement from much of the Occupied Territories. But fate intervened. With Kadima leading in the polls, Sharon suffered a massive stroke in early January 2006 that left him in a coma. Even if he lived, most experts agreed, the brain damage he suffered would make him unable to continue in office. Sharon’s departure from the political scene put his plans for a unilateral Israeli disengagement from much of the West Bank into question, as did the overwhelming victory of the military Islamist group Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in late January. As Hamas refused to accept Israel’s right to exist and refused to denounce violence, it soon found itself isolated from the international community of nations and international aid. In addition, Israel refused to hand over tax receipts as per previous agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. With funds running short, Hamas found itself unable to regularly pay the large civil service sector in the territories, sparking confrontations between members of Hamas and Fatah that threatened to plunge Gaza and the West Bank into civil war by mid-2006. Meanwhile, conflict with Israel heated up in the spring and summer of 2006. In early June, Hamas’s armed wing called off its sixteen-month truce with Israel after a family of seven Palestinians died from an explosion on a Gaza beach. Israel claimed the explosion resulted from buried ordinance, but Hamas authorities said the deaths were due to Israeli shelling, a conclusion backed up by international investigators. Later in June, renegade Islamist factions launched a raid into southern Israel, killing two soldiers and capturing a third. When the group refused to return the soldier, the government of Ehud Olmert (Olmert had replaced Sharon upon the latter’s incapacitation in January) ordered a massive assault on Gaza, which continued through the summer. In addition, Israeli forces kidnapped a number of elected Hamas officials.

Palestinians claimed the assault—which killed dozens of civilians as well as militia members and destroyed key infrastructure—was out of proportion to the initial kidnapping of the soldier. But Israel was also determined to put an end to the firing of primitive rockets from northern Gaza into southern Israel. The Gaza fighting, however, was overshadowed by the much larger struggle between Israel and Hezbollah, which engulfed Lebanon during this same period. James Ciment See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967; Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 2006; Jordan: Civil War, 1970; Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990; Palestine: First Intifada, 1987–1992; Palestine: Second Intifada, 2000– .

Bibliography Aruri, Naseer. The Obstruction of Peace: The U.S., Israel and the Palestinians. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995. Beinin, Joel, and Rebecca L. Stein, eds. The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993–2005. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Freidman, Robert. Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlements. New York: Random House, 1992. Gerner, Deborah. One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over Palestine. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Grossman, David. The Yellow Wind. New York: Delta, 1988. Kershner, Isabel. Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Kimmerling, Baruch, and Joel Migdal. Palestinians: The Making of a People. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Makovsky, David. Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Quigley, John. Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990. Said, Edward. The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination: 1969–1994. New York: Random House, 1994. Shipler, David. Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land. New York: Times Books, 1986. Wallach, Janet, and John Wallach. Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.

ISRAEL: Six-Day War,1967 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: Egypt; Jordan; Syria

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In October 1956, France, Great Britain, and Israel invaded Egypt with the aim of regaining control of the Suez Canal. That crucial international waterway between the Mediterranean and Red Sea had been nationalized by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser months earlier. Facing limited resistance, British and French troops soon occupied the canal. Israel’s forces occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was outraged at the joint attack on Egypt, which had been planned without consulting the United States. With the support of a United Nations resolution, Eisenhower insisted the three nations withdraw their troops from Egypt. The British and French withdrew their forces in December 1956; Israel in March 1957. Although Egypt suffered a major military defeat, President Gamal Abdel Nasser could claim that Egypt had been fighting three well-trained and well-equipped modern armies. Two countries, Great Britain and France, were members of NATO. Despite his defeat, Nasser emerged from the Suez War more popular than ever. At the same time, however, the war did not resolve any of the fundamental problems between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and other radical Arab states continued to oppose the very existence of Israel, and Israel therefore invested millions in defense because its borders were not secure. There were also millions of Arab refugees who had fled from Israel during the 1948 war, which had resulted in Israel’s independence. Solving any of these problems was complicated because the Arab nations were often in disagreement with each other. The primary division was between the radical governments led by Nasser and the more moderate states of Jordan, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. On January 5, 1957, in response to unrest in the Middle East, President Eisenhower proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine, committing the United States to provide economic and military aid to governments in the region threatened by Communism or by nations aligned with the Soviet bloc. President Eisenhower clearly had Egypt in mind when he talked about nations aligned with the Soviet bloc. The Eisenhower Doctrine complemented the Truman Doctrine, which President Harry Truman had proclaimed in 1947, extending U.S. economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey.

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KEY DATES 1948–1949 Israel becomes an independent state and then fights off Arab armies to defend itself. 1956

In coordination with France and Britain, Israel attacks Egypt in an attempt to seize the Sinai Peninsula.

1966

As tensions rise between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Israeli pilots shoot down two Egyptian planes in November.

1967

In April, Israeli pilots shoot down six Syrian fighter planes; Egypt demands withdrawal of UN troops stationed in Egypt since the end of the 1956 Sinai War in May; Egypt then closes the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping; on June 5, Israel launches a preemptive attack on Arab air force planes; between June 5 and June 10, Israeli forces defeat the combined armies of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, seizing Gaza, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, the latter including the Western Wall of the Second Temple, the holiest site in Judaism; Israel now controls territories with millions of Palestinians.

1968

The UN Security Council approves Resolution 242 calling for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.

1978

Egypt signs the Camp David Accords with Israel, calling for Israel to return control of the Sinai to Egypt in exchange for normalization of relations between the two countries.

U.S. diplomats during the late 1950s were increasingly concerned about political developments in the Middle East. Nationalists who admired Egypt’s president Nasser were causing unrest in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In July 1958, Iraqi nationalists overthrew the pro-Western government in Baghdad led by King Faisal II. The king and many of his family and followers were executed. Soon afterward Iraq and Egypt signed a military pact. The day after the coup in Iraq, President Eisenhower, in his first use of the Eisenhower Doctrine, dispatched 5,000 marines to Lebanon, where the government accused Nasser of supporting radical groups seeking to bring about a coup. Great Britain dispatched military units to protect the monarchies in Jordan and Libya.

Road to War For a few years, Arab-Israeli relations remained at a stalemate, and the situation remained tense. Then,

toward the end of 1966, tensions began rising again. In November, Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defense treaty and put their military forces on alert. That same month, in response to Arab military raids, the Israeli government vowed to seal its borders. The Arabs were increasing the number of raids into Israel from Syria and Jordan. Demonstrations took place in Jordan in opposition to King Hussein’s allegedly moderate policies. On November 29, Israeli pilots shot down two Egyptian fighter planes. In April 1967, Israeli pilots shot down six Syrian fighter planes. In May, events began to snowball. The military commanders of Syria and Egypt met to coordinate military strategy and tactics in preparation for another war, should one occur. Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed in Egypt since the end of the 1956 Suez War. UNEF served as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces. After the withdrawal of UNEF Egypt threatened to close the Strait of Tiran, blocking Israel’s only shipping route to the Red Sea and

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the Indian Ocean, a violation of the 1956 agreement that had ended the Suez War. On May 30, 1967, Egypt and Jordan, despite their many differences, signed a military agreement that placed the Jordanian army under Egyptian command. Meanwhile, Israel was also threatened along its northeastern frontier. Throughout 1966 and 1967, Syria was increasing its raids against Israeli settlements near the border and bombing the settlements from the high ground of the Golan Heights. Israel interpreted all these events as the buildup to another war and became increasingly concerned about the nation’s security. All of its Arab neighbors were mobilizing their forces along Israel’s borders.

The Six-Day War Rather than wait to be attacked, Israel decided to launch a preemptive strike, since maintaining a high pitch of readiness and trying to guess the direction of the first attack was expensive and psychologically debilitating. On June 5, 1967, Israeli forces mounted a coordinated attack. The first target was enemy airfields. Whatever airpower the Arab nations had was destroyed before the planes got off the ground. Without air cover, Arab ground troops and tanks were vulnerable to Israeli air attacks. The war lasted only six days, and the Arab nations—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria—suffered humiliating defeats. From Egypt, Israel won control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, the same territory it had captured in the 1956 war but later agreed to withdraw from. Once again, Israeli forces were at the banks of the Suez Canal. From Jordan, Israel won control of the West Bank and the Arab portion of Jerusalem. From Syria, Israel won control of the Golan Heights. During the brief war the United States insisted that it was neutral. The Arabs, however, viewed the United States as an ally of Israel, since most of Israel’s powerful military hardware had come from U.S. manufacturers. In fact, Nasser described Israel as an American military base and even accused United States forces of participating in the Israeli air attacks (although there was no evidence to support this accusation). On June 9, 1967, in response to the Israeli victory, President Nasser offered to resign, but the Egyptian National Assembly insisted he remain in power. His prestige, however, was tarnished, and he never regained the authority he had enjoyed in the Arab world before the Six-Day War.

Awestruck Israeli paratroopers gaze at the Wailing Wall, a Jewish holy site, after capturing the Old City of Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War. (David Rubinger/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

When the Six-Day War began, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent word to King Hussein of Jordan that Israel would not attack Jordan if it refrained from entering the conflict. Soon after the Israeli attacks began, Nasser told King Hussein that the Israeli Air Force was being destroyed on the ground, when in reality the Arab air forces were being destroyed. Encouraged by Nasser’s false information, Hussein ordered Jordan to launch an artillery attack against Israel. This gave Israel an excuse to invade the West Bank, which was under Jordanian protection. The heaviest fighting occurred in East Jerusalem, and Israel prevailed. On June 7, Israel and Jordan accepted the United Nations proposal for a cease-fire. Along the Syrian border, the Israeli effort to win control of Syria’s Golan Heights was costly. Prime Minister Eshkol and Israeli Defense Minister Moshe

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Dayan were determined to win control of the high ground in order to protect the Israeli settlements that had so often been the targets of Syrian artillery attacks. On June 10, Israeli military forces gained control of the Golan Heights. In the 1956 Sinai War, President Eisenhower had forced Israel to withdraw its forces from all occupied territory in Egypt. After the Six-Day War, Israel announced, however, that it would not withdraw from occupied territories until there was satisfactory progress in reaching an overall settlement with the Arabs. This time, the U.S. president, Lyndon Johnson, supported the Israeli decision.

Consequences The war brought about a fundamental change in the politics of the Middle East and created a new power configuration. The Arabs could no longer realistically expect to destroy Israel. In 1967, Israel was militarily, politically, and economically stronger than it had been since winning independence in 1948. During the SixDay War, it had tripled the territory it held in 1948. Even though the Arabs suffered their third military defeat at the hands of Israel in less than twenty years, they were no more willing to negotiate an overall agreement with the Jewish state. Israel, on the other hand, refused to consider withdrawing from lands occupied during the war. In the coming years it would learn the costs and difficulties of governing the large population of Arabs living in those areas. Arabs living in the occupied lands were often treated as second-class citizens, and this added to their resentment and their willingness to rely on terror tactics. These resentments would play an important role in the two intifadas, the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories that began in 1987 and 2000. The Six-Day War also produced hundreds of thousands of new Arab refugees, who fled the areas won by Israel. They joined the multitude who remained refugees of the 1948 war. The refugee camps became breeding grounds for developing individuals committed to violence and terror. Another consequence of the war was a stronger anti-American sentiment among the Arab nations. The Arabs were particularly bitter because the Johnson administration supplied Israel with sophisticated military weapons that helped it win the war. In addition, Johnson supported Israel’s refusal to withdraw its troops from territories gained during the Six-Day

War. Johnson believed that the new boundaries more closely reflected the new political and military realities in the region. To demonstrate their anger, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, and Yemen all severed diplomatic relations with the United States. The Arabs, rather than examine their own policies as a cause of the conflict, found it easier to blame America for the war and the Arab defeat. During the brief war, President Johnson had been concerned about an outbreak of war in the Middle East. He responded by calling Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin to suggest that the superpowers work to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict. Johnson was also looking for reassurance that the Soviet Union would not enter the fighting on the Arab side. The war ended before either superpower could become involved. The Arabs accepted cease-fire agreements before the Soviets could decide how best to respond. In the short term, the war brought a significant increase in Soviet influence in the Arab world. The Soviets championed the Arab cause and accused the United States of cooperating with Israel in the conduct of the war. The Soviets supplied Arab nations with new weapons and supported the Arab cause in the United Nations. They also supported the Arabs’ refusal to negotiate with Israel. On June 10, the day before the Six-Day War ended, the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel as a gesture of unity with the Arab nations. In the long run, however, the war reduced Soviet influence. Its failure to turn the tide of the war and its cutting of diplomatic ties with Israel reduced the Soviet Union’s ability to influence further actions in the region. Soviet policies could not advance the Arab cause in a positive way nor was there much evidence the Soviets wanted to do so. When Anwar Sadat came to power in Egypt in September 1970 and was seeking a fundamental change in Arab-Israeli relations, he recognized that only the United States could help.

Search for a Resolution In an effort to reduce tensions in the Middle East, President Johnson met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey, in June 1968. Although Johnson said the meeting produced positive results, little was resolved. The superpowers could not narrow their differences, and neither could the Arabs and Israel. There was simply no basis for a compromise agreement.

Israel: Six-Day War, 19 67

In November 1968, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 242, which was intended as an outline to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resolution called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands; an end to the state of war between Israel and the Arabs; respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all nations in the region; the establishment of secure boundaries; freedom of navigation through international waterways; and a settlement of the refugee problem. The resolution was sufficiently vague to appeal to both the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, all parties could agree on the need for secure boundaries, but they were unlikely to agree on where those boundaries should be. The Israeli government believed that its newly conquered territories were essential to its self-defense. The Arab nations, on the other hand, believed that Israeli withdrawal from the conquered territories was essential to peace. The Palestine

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Liberation Organization (PLO), which represented Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, rejected Resolution 242 because it said nothing about creating a Palestinian state. In 1973, Israel and the Arab states again went to war. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Israel: War of Independence, 1948–1949; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Egypt: Sinai War, 1956; Egypt: War of Attrition, 1967–1970; Israel: Yom Kippur War, 1973.

Bibliography Beling, Willard. The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1973. Johnson, Lyndon. The Vantage Point. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971. Tillman, Seth. The United States and the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982.

ISRAEL: Yom Kippur War,1973 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: Egypt; Syria

Israeli occupied territories, 19 1973 CYPRUS UN Control Zone after the war

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Y

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Jerusalem Hebron

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SINAI

Eilat

Aqaba

G ul Gu

lf of

z Sue

Aqab

a

f of Sharm el Sheikh

RED SEA

Between the end of the Six-Day War in June 1967 and the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, relations between Israel and the Arabs remained hostile and tense. Fighting erupted at various times between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Various proposals were put forward to end the impasse, but none was acceptable to all the parties. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) continued its policy of launching

military raids into Israel. Israel retaliated by attacking PLO bases in Jordan and Syria. In 1970, Soviet pilots began flying combat missions to help protect Egypt. This created a potentially dangerous situation. If Soviet pilots were killed while flying missions, the Soviet Union might take an even more active role in the fighting. In September 1970, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser died. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who changed the dynamics of Middle East politics in a fundamental way. He was more concerned about promoting Egypt’s national interests than about promoting the interests of all Arab countries in the region. He also saw that fundamental changes in the Arab-Israeli relationship would depend on the cooperation of the United States. On May 27, 1971, Sadat signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, Egypt’s main superpower ally. He then announced that the Suez Canal, which had been closed since the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967, would remain closed until Israel withdrew its troops from Arab territory. Sadat relied on the Soviets as the major supplier of arms to Egypt, but he was often frustrated by their apparent caution. After the Six-Day War, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLO) became a more important factor in Middle East politics. The PLO relied on terrorism and armed forays into Israel from bases in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Israel responded to these raids by attacking PLO bases. This contributed to the actionreaction cycle of violence. Relations between Israel and the PLO were particularly bitter because the PLO covenant called for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Israeli government refused to recognize the PLO and vowed never to negotiate with it because of its covenant. Although Arab governments often expressed support for the PLO, they also made certain, when they

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Israel: Yom Kippur War, 1973

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KEY DATES 1948–1949 Israel becomes an independent state and then fights off Arab armies to defend itself. 1967

In the Six-Day War, Israel seizes Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, as well as the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan.

1967–1970 In the War of Attrition, Egypt and Israel exchange air and artillery attacks; long-time Egyptian leader Gamel Abdel Nasser dies in the latter year and is replaced by his vice president, Anwar Sadat. 1973

On October 6, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria attack Israel; Egyptian forces cross the Suez Canal into Sinai; on October 9, Israel launches a counterattack against Egyptian and Syrian forces; on October 15, the United States agrees to resupply Israel with weaponry lost in war; on October 21, Israel launches a major counteroffensive against the Suez Canal, trapping the Egyptian Third Army Corps; on October 22 and 25, the UN Security Council issues resolutions calling for a cease-fire; on November 11, belligerents sign a cease-fire; Arab countries reduce their oil output to punish the United States and other proIsraeli Western countries.

1978

Egypt signs the Camp David Accords with Israel, calling for Israel to return control of the Sinai to Egypt in exchange for normalization of relations between the two countries.

were able to do so, that PLO activity was carefully controlled and monitored. Arab governments did not want to fight a war with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians.

Détente In the United States, the election of Richard Nixon as president in 1968 brought about a fundamental change in the Soviet-American relationship. Nixon initiated a policy of détente, an effort to ease Cold War tensions between the two superpowers. The essence of this policy was to engage the Soviet Union on as many fronts as possible while recognizing the basic incompatibility of communism and democracy. To achieve his goals, Nixon developed a policy of “linkage,” connecting American cooperation with the Soviet Union in one area to the Soviets’ actions in

another area. Good behavior would be rewarded with cooperation, and unacceptable behavior would be punished. The problem was to determine what constituted proper behavior. The Cold War was often fought as a zero-sum game. Whatever constituted a victory for one side was interpreted as a loss to the other. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was willing to sacrifice its political values to promote superpower cooperation. At a summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972, Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed a Basic Principles agreement that was to serve as a guide for Soviet and American policies. The two sides agreed on twelve principles, one of which obligated the superpowers to immediately exchange information to help avert an international crisis. In many ways, averting international crises that could escalate into armed confrontation was the primary goal of détente.

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President Sadat was apprehensive about the policy of détente. He worried that the Soviet Union might urge the Arab nations to accept Israel’s conquest of new territories acquired during the Six-Day War in 1967, which included the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Sadat was determined to win back the territories lost to Israel. He would do whatever was necessary, including launching another war. In July 1972, just two months after the NixonBrezhnev Moscow summit, Sadat expelled all the Soviet advisers in Egypt, about 15,000. He wanted to demonstrate his dissatisfaction with the type and amount of military assistance the Soviet Union was providing Egypt. The expulsion surprised Soviet leaders and baffled Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser. Despite the expulsion, the Soviets continued to supply Egypt with military assistance. They hoped the aid would enable them to continue to influence events in the Middle East. The United States continued to provide Israel with military equipment.

War Breaks Out Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on October 6, 1973, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. This was the fourth Arab-Israeli war since 1948. Despite all the evidence that Egypt was preparing for war, the attack surprised American and Israeli officials, and Israel paid a heavy price for not anticipating the conflict. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and scored impressive military victories. Syrian forces engaged the Israeli army on the Golan Heights. Israel suffered massive losses and came perilously close to running out of ammunition. The Soviet Union was airlifting supplies to the Arabs, and there was the threat of a decisive change in the region’s balance of power, a change that would endanger Israel and America’s national interests. On October 9, Israel launched counterattacks against Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi forces stationed in Syria. The fighting was intense, and casualties on both sides were high. The Israeli military succeeded in destroying an Iraqi tank battalion in Syria. On October 11, Israeli forces broke though the Syrian defense and stopped about twenty miles outside Damascus, the capital of Syria. Jordan agreed to send troops to assist the Syrians. On October 14, Israel and Egypt fought a massive tank battle in the Sinai, resulting in a major Is-

raeli victory. On October 15, the United States decided to resupply Israel with needed military equipment. These events began to turn the tide of battle in Israel’s favor. On October 16, President Sadat proposed a cease-fire and an Israeli withdrawal from territories taken in the Six-Day War. The proposal came a few days too late, since no Israeli government would stop the fighting and yield territory while it was winning on the battlefield. Henry Kissinger, now U.S. secretary of state, made an emergency trip to Moscow to confer with Brezhnev, who realized that Israel was about to score another victory. They agreed to introduce a resolution to the United Nations Security Council calling for a cease-fire. Even as the UN was debating the resolution, Israeli forces surrounded the Egyptians’ elite Third Army and advanced to within 40 miles of Cairo, Egypt’s capital. The Security Council approved the resolution on October 22, but the fighting continued. To help stem the Israeli advances, President Sadat called for a joint Soviet-American force to implement the cease-fire agreement approved by the Security Council. President Nixon rejected the Egyptian request. Brezhnev then threatened to send Soviet military units to aid Egypt and other Arab combatants. In response, the United States issued a worldwide military alert. The Soviets decided not to intervene. On October 25, the United Nations Security Council again called for a cease-fire along the Suez Canal. The Security Council approved a resolution to create a United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) to replace the UNEF force created after the 1956 Suez War and dissolved in 1967. UNEF II was composed of approximately 7,000 personnel from countries that were not permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The purpose of UNEF II was to monitor an Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire agreement and the separation of their forces. In retaliation for Israel’s continued fighting, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), made up largely of Arab nations in the Middle East, reduced the flow of oil to Western nations, including the United States. This caused a significant increase in prices for gasoline and other petroleum products. Nations in Western Europe, which were most dependent on Middle Eastern oil, became more sympathetic to the Arab cause. Decreased oil output continued even after the Yom Kippur War ended. On November 11, 1973, Egypt and Israel finally agreed to a cease-fire but still had to negotiate the

Israel: Yom Kippur War, 1973

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Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (eye patch) and General Ariel Sharon (head bandage)—legendary figures in Israeli military history—meet on the west bank of the Suez Canal during a stunning counteroffensive that hastened the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. (Ministry of Defense via Getty Images)

details of the agreement. Although the Yom Kippur War was over, there was still no peace.

Consequences The 1973 Yom Kippur War brought about fundamental changes in the dynamics of Middle East politics. In a military sense, Egypt again lost a war, but its forces had fought bravely and efficiently during the early stages of the conflict. Although no territory changed hands in the short term, the war did succeed in putting the Arab-Israeli conflict back on the international agenda. Perhaps most important, it succeeded in bringing the United States into the peace process. Israel looked to the United States for economic and military assistance to cope with the Arab threat and to counteract any possibility that the Soviet Union might intervene militarily in the region. The United States and Israel disagreed on many issues, but the two nations shared a bond based on politics, shared values, and anticommunism. The Six-Day War had proved that the Arab nations could not destroy Israel, and the Yom Kippur War showed that Soviet in-

fluence in the region was declining. The Soviets could provide military supplies to Arab nations and influence their actions, but it could not influence Israeli policymaking. Only the United States could influence Israel to make concessions for a lasting peace. The role of the PLO also changed as a result of the war. Its primary role was to try to win recognition for Palestinian rights and possibly a Palestinian homeland. For some Arab nations, including Egypt, the primary goal of the war had been to win back lost territories. These issues sometimes overlapped and sometimes clashed. The Palestinians were a problem for Israel, but they were also a problem in those Arab nations where they were clustered. After the Yom Kippur War, factions of the PLO relied increasingly on the use of terror, and, consequently, nations such as the United States refused to have official dealings with them.

Quest for Peace After the cease-fire ended fighting in the Yom Kippur War, U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger began a round of negotiations with its participants that became known as “shuttle diplomacy.” He shuttled into various

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capitals around the world seeking to reduce tensions in the Middle East and to promote Arab-Israeli cooperation. He decided on a step-by-step approach rather than convening all the parties to negotiate an overall agreement. He believed a general agreement was impossible at the time, given the deep animosities in the region. In January 1974, Kissinger succeeded in negotiating a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal, and UNEF II was responsible for monitoring that agreement. The disengagement of forces from the West Bank of the Suez Canal was completed in February 1974. Withdrawal from the East Bank was completed in March. In March 1974, the Arabs ended the oil boycott that had caused so much difficulty for the United States and its European allies, even though the Soviet Union had encouraged the Arab nations to continue it. In May 1974, Kissinger negotiated a disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. They agreed to disengage their forces on the Golan Heights and to permit the United Nations to monitor the disengagement and the cease-fire agreement. To do this, the UN secretary general established the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) that functioned along the Golan Heights. UNDOF consisted of approximately 1,250 personnel selected from countries that were not permanent members of the Security Council. In September 1975, Egypt and Israel signed an agreement on troop withdrawals in the Sinai Peninsula. The United States agreed to have its technicians monitor the agreement. One result of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy was the reduced role of the Soviet Union in the Middle

East. As Egyptian-American relations improved, the Soviet Union paid greater attention to Syria and Iraq, aligning itself with the more radical Arab regimes. The role of the Soviet Union in the Yom Kippur War brought into question the effectiveness of the U.S. policy of détente. The Soviet government knew the Arabs intended to go to war but did not inform the United States. This was a violation of the 1972 Basic Principles agreement, which required the Soviets to inform the United States of any developing conflict in the region. Premier Brezhnev had been in Washington to meet with President Nixon in June 1973, but he revealed nothing about the Arab war plans. The American role in ending the Yom Kippur War laid the groundwork for the Camp David agreements negotiated during President Jimmy Carter’s term in office. In March 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Egypt: Sinai War, 1956; Egypt: War of Attrition, 1967–1970; Israel: War of Independence, 1948–1949; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967; Middle East Negotiations.

Bibliography Dayan, Moshe. Story of My Life. New York: Morrows, 1976. Heikal, Mohamed. The Road to Ramadam. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1975. Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. ———. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982. Quandt, William. Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

ISRAEL: Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,1981 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Iraq TURKEY SYRIA

Euphrates River

er ri s R i v Tig

CYPRUS

LEBANON

Baghdad

ISRAEL EGYPT

IRAN

IRAQ JORDAN 0 0

250 250

SAUDI ARABIA 500 Miles

Osirak Nuclear Reactor

KUWAIT

500 Kilometers

On June 7, 1981, Israeli warplanes destroyed a nuclear reactor being built in Iraq by France and Italy. The Israeli government justified the attack by claiming that Iraq planned to build nuclear weapons that could be used against Israel. The reactor had been scheduled to become operational a few months later. Israel did not want to bomb the reactor when it became operational because the radioactive fallout would have killed many civilians. The raid took place on a Sunday when most of the foreign technicians at the site were not working, and only one foreign worker was killed. Iraq had enough highly enriched fuel to build about ten atomic bombs. American experts believed that Iraq would be able to build several atomic bombs by the mid-1980s. The United States therefore tried but failed to convince France and Italy to cease helping Iraq acquire the capability for building atomic weapons. The Israeli raid was in part a response to a statement by Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein that Israel would be the target of an atomic attack, not other Arab nations. Israel agreed with the American experts that the reactor and the fuel supplied could be used to build atomic weapons, even though French

experts continued to deny the claim. Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin did not think a policy of deterrence would prevent Iraq from using atomic weapons once they were built because deterrence theory is based on rational decision-making, and Begin did not think Saddam Hussein was a rational decisionmaker. Iraq and Israel were still technically at war because Iraq had refused to sign an armistice after the 1948 conflict. The fact that the two countries were technically still at war strengthened the Israeli argument that it was acting in self-defense. Iraqi leaders had often declared their opposition to the existence of a Zionist state in Palestine. On numerous occasions, they expressed a desire to acquire nuclear capability and had encouraged other Arab nations to do the same. Begin was critical of the Western nations’ supplying Arab nations with material and assistance to build nuclear reactors. He hoped that the raid on Iraq would make Western leaders more sensitive to the potential dangers of providing technology and fuel that could be used for building atomic weapons. In 1981, most experts assumed that Israel either had atomic weapons in stockpile or could quickly assemble them in case of an emergency. Begin apparently believed that it was legitimate for Israel to have atomic weapons, but not the Arab nations. Iraq was a signatory to the 1968 non-proliferation treaty, while Israel was not. However, Israeli officials did not think the treaty would prevent Iraq from building an atomic stockpile and pointed out that Iraq had plenty of oil and therefore did not need atomic energy.

Arab Reaction The Arab nations and many others, particularly the Afro-Asian nations, condemned Israel for the raid.

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KEY DATES 1957 With French help, Israel begins construction of the Dimona breeder nuclear power plant, beginning its secretive effort to build nuclear weapons. 1967 Israel defeats Iraqi forces, along with those of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, in the Six-Day War. 1968 Military officers led by Saddam Hussein seize power in Iraq in a coup; Iraq signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1980 Iraq attacks Iran, leading to an eight-year war between the two countries. 1981

On June 7, Israeli warplanes destroy the nuclear power plant being built in Iraq with help from France and Italy; Israeli officials believe the plant is part of Iraqi efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

The reaction of the Arabs was not unexpected. Saudi Arabia and Jordan were particularly critical because Israeli planes had flown over their territory going to and from Iraq. Iraq called for a Pan-Arab meeting to discuss the raid and a possible Arab response. Iraq also demanded a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. The criticism of Israel in the international community made it likely that the Security Council would take some action. President Saddam Hussein had only limited options in responding to the Israeli attack. If he ordered a military retaliation against Israel, the result could have been another Arab-Israeli war. Iraq was already at war with Iran, and it appeared the war would last a long time. Hussein could not risk diverting his troops without the possibility of giving Iran a significant military advantage. The Arab League members met in Baghdad in June 1981. They wanted the United Nations to impose sanctions on Israel, but they knew such a resolution would be vetoed by the United States. The Arab leaders were critical of the United States and wanted to discourage it from providing Israel with military equipment. The relatively mild response of the Arab League reflected disagreement among the Arab nations. Egypt, the most powerful Arab nation in the Middle East, had been expelled from the Arab League in 1979 because President Anwar Sadat had signed the Camp

David agreements, making peace with Israel. Without Egypt, the Arab League was much less influential. The Arab nations were also divided regarding the Iran-Iraq war. One of the unwritten rules of the Arab League was that support should be given to any Arab nation involved in a conflict with a non-Arab nation. Syria violated that rule and supported Iran, a non-Arab nation, in the Iran-Iraq war. Arab leaders could always join together in condemning Israel, but they could rarely agree on much else. They accused Israel of committing an act of terrorism and aggression, but no reprisals were planned.

Soviet and American Response The Soviet Union condemned the Israeli attack as “barbaric” and accused the United States of cooperating with Israel in carrying out the raid. The Soviets wanted to identify with the outrage of the Arab nations, but made no offer to provide Iraq with any additional military aid. Neither Iraq nor the Soviet Union referred to their friendship treaty signed in 1972. The Reagan administration accused Israel of violating the Arms Export Control Act. Under this act, nations that bought military weapons from the United States could use them only for defense. In response to the raid on Iraq, President Ronald Reagan ordered a delay in the delivery of four F-16 aircraft ordered by

Israel: Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 19 81

In June 1981, Israeli F-16 fighter planes carried out a preemptive strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in central Iraq. Intelligence sources indicated that the reactor would be used to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. International reaction to the attack was mixed. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Israel, a mild response expressing displeasure but not administering severe punishment—he might have suspended all military aid. The United States’ action was intended to reassure moderate Arab nations. President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig were trying to develop a more balanced relationship with Israel and the Arabs. Reagan did not want to damage America’s credibility in seeking to mediate Arab-Israeli differences. Before the Israeli raid occurred, President Reagan

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had dispatched Philip Habib as his special envoy to the Middle East to see if he could find a formula to end the fighting in Lebanon, then in a civil war. Habib’s first scheduled stop was Israel. As a result of the raid, he remained in Paris to await the outcome of the crisis. American officials were not sure countries such as Saudi Arabia and Syria would be willing to meet with Habib. The UN Security Council debate began on June 12, 1981. The Israeli government maintained that it had acted in self-defense and the raid was therefore not in violation of international law. The Israeli ambassador to the United Nations pointed out that, ever since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, “Iraq has been conspiring to destroy it.” Despite the efforts of the Israeli ambassador to justify his nation’s action, the Security Council unanimously voted to condemn Israel. Before the vote was taken, American and Iraqi officials at the United Nations cooperated in drafting a resolution. The United States was trying to improve relations with Iraq in part because of Iran’s hostility toward the United States following the 1979 Iranian revolution. The resolution contained no punitive provisions. On the same day this resolution was approved, a former inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency, in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, said Iraq planned to build atomic bombs and could do so without being detected. Iraq’s alleged desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction remained a problem long after 1981. Kenneth L. Hill See also: International Arms Trade; Iran: War with Iraq, 1980– 1988; Iraq: Revolution and Coups, 1958–1968.

Bibliography Feldman, Shai. Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980’s. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Hersh, Seymour. The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Answer and American Foreign Policy. New York: Random House, 1991.

ISRAEL: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah,2006 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: Israel; Lebanon; Palestinian Authority 0 0

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Amsheet Mount Halat Sannine Jamaliya Jbeil Jounieh Baalbek Hadath Shlaura Zahle Beirut Maarabun Airport Ouzai Falqa Bekaa Valley Jieh Rmeileh Choueifat Mdeirei bridge Kharayeb Nabatiye Ghaziyeh Meri ’Uyun Sidon Kfarshuba Damascus Srifa Taibe Al Khiam Ghanduriye Kafr Kila Bazuriyeh Tyre Beit Hillel Adesiye Naqura Rachef Qana Kfar Giladi Zarit SYRIA Kiryat Shmona Arab al Aram she Manara Milya Bint Jbail, Marun al Ras Tarchiya Aila al Shaab, Aitaroun Nahariya Maalob Dir-al-Assad Amirim, Halzor Haglilit Acre Safed Haifa Mughar Carmiel SEA OF Nazareth

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ISRAEL Beit Lahiya

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JORDAN Hezbollah attacks Israeli attacks

Five years after pulling back from the security zone it had occupied in southern Lebanon for eighteen years, and a year after removing its settlers from Gaza and turning governance over to the Palestinian Authority, Israel launched major air offensives and limited ground incursions into both Lebanon and Gaza during the summer of 2006. The immediate causes of the attacks were the seizures of several Israeli soldiers by Islamist militants in Gaza and by Hezbollah guerrillas

Amman

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Israeli attacks

in Lebanon. (Hezbollah is both a political party, representing Shiites, and a militia force.) A longer-term factor in the Israeli decision to attack was the periodic rocket attacks launched from both Gaza and southern Lebanon against civilian targets in Israel. While Israel defended its actions, maintaining that all nations have a right to protect their territory against attacks from neighbors, many outside observers argued that Jerusalem’s assaults on the civilian infrastructure of Gaza and particularly Lebanon were a disproportionately violent response to the initial acts of kidnapping and the limited destruction and fatalities caused by the rocket attacks. As of late September 2006, five weeks of fighting in Gaza had left more than 200 Palestinians dead, most of them, according to the Associated Press, Islamic militants. Israel had also lost 4 soldiers in the fighting. In Lebanon, nearly five weeks of fighting had produced an even greater toll, with more than 1,500 Lebanese dead and several thousand wounded, most of them civilians. In addition, up to 1 million persons had been displaced. Mean-

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Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 200 6

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KEY DATES May 2000

Israeli troops pull out of southern Lebanon after an eighteen-year occupation; UN troops establish a “blue line” between Hezbollah in Lebanon and Israel.

September– October 2003

Israeli warplanes hit targets in southern Lebanon after Hezbollah fires missiles at Israeli military aircraft.

February 2005

Popular former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri is assassinated; Syrian agents are suspected, and Syria is forced to end its three-decade occupation of Lebanon under pressure from Lebanese and international protests in April.

August 2005

Last Jewish settlers are removed from Gaza by the Israeli government.

June 2006

Following the abduction of an Israeli soldier, Israel launches a major air attack and a limited ground offensive into Gaza to win the soldier’s release and end Islamic militant rocket attacks on Israeli territory.

July 2006

In the wake of Hezbollah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and its persistent rocket attacks on northern Israel, the Jewish state launches a massive air attack on Hezbollah and the Lebanese infrastructure; Israel also launches a ground invasion of southern Lebanon; more than 400 Lebanese, mostly civilians, are killed; roughly 1 million persons are displaced by the fighting.

while, Israel had lost about three dozen soldiers in its offensive, and some 2,200 Hezbollah rocket attacks had killed about 20 Israeli civilians. Property damage in Gaza and especially Lebanon was extensive, while destruction of Israeli infrastructure from rocket attacks was far more limited.

Background Israel’s conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah, like those with the Palestinians in general and with neighboring Arab and Muslim nations—all of which were integrally associated with the events in Gaza and Lebanon—are both long-standing and complex.

Gaza Although the source of the conflict in Gaza goes back to before the founding of Israel in 1948, the deter-

mining event was the 1967 war, in which Israel defeated a coalition of Arab nations and seized control of the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and other territories with large Palestinian populations. Gazans chafed under Israeli rule, especially after Israel established Jewish settlements that came to occupy roughly 30 percent of the territory. ( Jewish settlers numbered several thousand, in the midst of more than 1 million Palestinians.) Gaza became a major arena of strife in both the First and Second Intifadas, or Palestinian uprisings, the first in the late 1980s and the second in the early 2000s. Concerned that the occupation of Gaza was draining the Israeli economy and military—as well as a demographic threat in which Palestinians, with their higher birth rates, would soon come to outnumber the Jews in Israel—former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon made the politically contentious decision to remove the settlers from Gaza and pull out

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the Israeli troops in the summer of 2005. Sharon planned to do the same in part of the West Bank, but a massive stroke left him in a permanent coma in late 2005. Within a few short weeks, in January 2006, Hamas won a surprise, and overwhelming, victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections. Amorphous and hard to define, Hamas is at once a political party, an organization providing social services, and a militant group that has attacked the Israeli military and carried out acts of terrorism against Israeli civilians, both in the Occupied Territories and in Israel proper. While opinion polls indicated that Palestinian voters chose Hamas as an alternative to the corruption and ineffectiveness of the dominant, secular Fatah Party of the late Yasir Arafat, Hamas maintained its militant opposition to Israel, refusing to recognize the Jewish state’s right to exist. And although Hamas leadership had initiated several ceasefires over the years, it also maintained its right to attack Israelis when the need arose. For its part, the Israeli government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert— who replaced Sharon—refused to meet with Hamas officials and sought to eliminate its leadership in targeted attacks (sometimes with collateral civilian casualties).

Lebanon The conflict between Israel and Lebanon was, if anything, even more complicated. Lebanon, Israel’s tiny neighbor to the north, is a nation of bewildering religious complexity. A former French colony, it is divided among Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and Druze, followers of a dissenting Muslim sect. When France pulled out of Lebanon in 1946, it turned the government over to a coalition of parties that represented the various religions but gave prominence to Christians. Over the succeeding decades, however, the largely impoverished Shiite Muslims emerged as the largest minority, at roughly 40 percent. They and other Muslims resented Christian rule, and in 1975 the country was plunged into civil war. Meanwhile, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was fighting against Israeli control of Palestine, had relocated to Lebanon—after its ouster from Jordan in 1970—and operated, according to many observers, as a “state within a state.” The PLO, too, became a force in the civil war, and its periodic guerrilla and terrorist attacks against Israeli targets

invited that nation’s retaliation against Lebanon. In 1982, Israel launched a major ground invasion of Lebanon, forcing the PLO into exile in Tunisia. To prevent cross-border incursions and rocket attacks, Israel occupied a ten- to twenty-mile-wide strip in southern Lebanon, adjacent to Israel’s northern border. The territory was largely Shiite; Hezbollah, which had been fighting in the civil war, now expanded its operations there to include attacks on the Israeli occupying force. Even after the end of Lebanon’s civil war in 1990, sporadic fighting continued in southern Lebanon between the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Hezbollah. IDF attacks sometimes killed civilians as well as militants; Hezbollah launched rocket attacks against northern Israel. As in the case of Gaza, albeit five years earlier, Israeli policymakers were coming to the conclusion that the occupation of southern Lebanon was placing too great a financial and military strain on their own country, as well as inviting international opprobrium. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Israeli forces pulled out of southern Lebanon in 2000. Hezbollah declared victory and continued to launch occasional rockets against Israel, inviting retaliation. The two sides also engaged in sporadic fighting over a disputed border area in the nearby Golan Heights called Shebaa Farms.

Outside Involvement In addition to Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Hezbollah, three other major players were indirectly involved in the conflict. The first was Syria, which had occupied much of Lebanon during that country’s civil war and afterward. Following the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri—an anti-Syrian occupation politician, whose death many blamed on Damascus—Syria was forced to pull out of Lebanon by international and domestic pressure. The Syrian regime remained an ally of Hezbollah, however, and continued providing it with weapons and other support. Similarly, Iran— a non-Arab country with a majority Shiite population and a militantly anti-Israeli government—was a major supporter of Hezbollah politically, diplomatically, and materially. Finally, the United States remained Israel’s chief diplomatic supporter and a major supplier of military and other forms of aid to the Jewish state. While every U.S administration since Harry Truman’s in the

Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 200 6

late 1940s has supported Israel, that of President George W. Bush was particularly close to Jerusalem, while at the same time less involved than its predecessors in trying to impose a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. According to some critics, the Bush administration was unable to contend with the new outbreak in the Middle East because it was bogged down with its occupation of Iraq, itself descending into civil war.

Fighting in 200 6 While tension remained high throughout early 2006, especially after Hamas’s victory in the January elections, the region was relatively peaceful. In June, however, the conflict in both Gaza and Lebanon exploded with such suddenness that many observers surmised one side or both had been preparing for a confrontation for some time.

Gaza In power or out, Hamas had been an IDF target for many years. The Palestinian territories in the West Bank and particularly Gaza—where Hamas is largely based—descended into chaos during the spring of 2006, cut off by Israel from international aid and tax revenues (collected by Israel but paid to the Palestinian Authority under previous agreements), as well as internecine fighting between Fatah and Hamas. Israeli forces, meanwhile, continued their assaults on the Hamas leadership and local infrastructure. The most controversial incident was an explosion on a Gaza beach on June 9 that killed eight Palestinian civilians, including three children. The Palestinian government accused Israel of firing the shell; Israel said the explosion was caused by buried ordnance. The two sides had already been engaging in long-range retaliatory attacks—Israel by air and artillery, Hamas with rockets. Further exacerbating the tension in Gaza was a call the next day by Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas for a Palestinian referendum on a two-state solution—which Hamas vigorously opposed. Many observers believed that, should such a referendum be held, Hamas’s hard-line refusal to recognize Israel would be voted down. On June 24, a spokesman for Abbas announced that he had reached an understanding with Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh to call off the rocket attacks, but militants in the armed wing of Hamas

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and another group, Islamic Jihad, denied any such cease-fire agreement. The following day, Islamist Palestinian guerrillas attacked an Israeli army post through a tunnel from Gaza, killing two soldiers and abducting a third. Israel gave the militants, whom it said were controlled by Hamas, two days to return the soldier. The abductors demanded the release of hundreds of Palestinians jailed by Israel in return, a demand that Prime Minister Olmert refused to consider. With the two sides at loggerheads, Israel then launched air attacks on Gaza that destroyed several bridges and the territory’s power plant. The Palestinian Authority denounced the attacks as wanton destruction that caused needless civilian death and infrastructure damage. Israel said it was trying to prevent the abductors from moving the soldier freely around the territory. In addition, IDF ground troops and tanks moved into Gaza and seized eight members of the Palestinian cabinet. Olmert said they would be released and IDF forces withdrawn once the Israeli soldier was released. Israel’s assault on Gaza, which included artillery shelling, air attacks, and ground offensives into areas used by rocket-firing militia, intensified in July. Government and residential buildings believed to be used by Hamas militants and leaders were attacked, largely from the air. Meanwhile, militants in northern Gaza continued to fire rockets randomly into Israel, though they caused little damage and no deaths.

Lebanon The fighting in Gaza was soon eclipsed by events in Lebanon. On July 12, Hezbollah launched a twopronged attack against Israel, firing Katyusha rockets at the northern Israeli town of Shlomi and IDF outposts at Shebaa Farms. The same day, Hezbollah guerrillas staged a cross-border attack on two Israeli Humvees, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two more. When Israel sent in ground forces to rescue the abducted soldiers, five more of its troops were killed. The following day, the IDF imposed an air and naval blockade on Lebanon to prevent further shipments of arms to Hezbollah. Israeli planes also bombed two runways at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport, and its gunboats knocked out an electric power plant in the southern suburbs of Beirut, another Shiite area controlled by Hezbollah. The fighting escalated over the next several days, as Hezbollah fired dozens of Katyusha rockets into Is-

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Middle East and North Africa

Hezbollah militants fire a missile from southern Lebanon into Israel. War broke out in July 2006 when Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid. Israel responded with a large-scale military assault in Lebanon. (Hassan Ammar/AFP/Getty Images)

rael, some reaching as far as Haifa, the country’s main port. One of the rockets killed eight workers at a train station, and an Iranian-built cruise missile hit an Israeli gunboat off Lebanon’s coast, killing four seamen. Meanwhile, Israel launched massive air attacks on hundreds of targets in both the Beirut area and southern Lebanon. Communications, energy, and transportation facilities, as well as numerous apartment and government buildings, were hit. The Beirut airport was struck repeatedly, as exploding fuel tanks rocked the area. Hezbollah’s nine-story headquarters building in the southern suburbs of Beirut was destroyed. Israel also began dropping flyers across Shiite territories, warning residents to flee. Using every available vehicle, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians took flight to northern locations or east across the border to Syria. On several occasions, Israeli warplanes fired at the fleeing vehicles, killing dozens of civilians. The Israeli government, while lamenting civilian casualties, claimed that some of the vehicles contained militants and blamed Hezbollah for storing weapons and operating in densely populated areas.

The fighting created two humanitarian crises. One involved the hundreds of thousands of displaced Lebanese, many of them with little food or water and almost no shelter. Israel promised safe passage for international organizations bringing in humanitarian aid, but the destruction of roads and bridges hampered relief efforts. At the same time, tens of thousands of foreigners, including some 25,000 Americans, found themselves temporarily trapped by the fighting, until Washington and other capitals were able to bring in ships to rescue their citizens and transport them to the nearby island of Cyprus. As the fighting continued through the end of July, both sides insisted that the attacks would not stop until their demands were met. Hezbollah insisted that it would not release the two kidnapped soldiers until Israel returned hundreds of militants it was holding. Israel, meanwhile, demanded the unconditional release of its soldiers and implementation of UN Resolution 1559, calling for the disarming of Hezbollah and the cessation of its rocket attacks on Israel.

Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 200 6

As for the outside powers, the Arab world, while condemning Israeli “aggression,” refused to become involved by shipping arms or attempting to defy the Israeli blockade of Lebanon. As for the United States, the Bush administration placed the fighting squarely on Hezbollah’s shoulders and refused to condemn Israel. As for the larger international community, initial sympathy for Israel’s response to the rocket attacks on its territory and the abduction of its soldiers inside its own borders gave way to widespread condemnation as the massive scale of its attacks on Lebanon played on the world’s television screens. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, while calling for negotiations among all parties and a halt to the fighting, said he “condemn[ed] without reservation” the Israeli attacks. Israel agreed to a UN-brokered cease-fire, also known as Security Council Resolution 1701, on August 13. Hezbollah agreed to the terms of the resolution the day before and the Lebanese government also signed on. The cease-fire went into effect on August 14. Under the terms of the agreement, Hezbollah was to be disarmed and armed militia were not allowed to operate below the Litani River, about thirty-five miles north of the Israeli border. In exchange, Israel would withdraw all of its troops from Lebanon and would lift its air and sea blockade of the country. To monitor the disarming of Hezbollah and to keep peace between the two forces, a new and muchaugmented UN force of approximately 15,000 blue helmets would patrol southern Lebanon and the border with Syria. In addition, an international flotilla would attempt to block the shipment of arms by sea into Lebanon.

Possible Causes Theories abounded as to why the twin conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon escalated so quickly and so furiously. Some blamed Israel. The Israeli government has negotiated with militants over abducted soldiers before, said some, and it could have done so this time as well. Instead, the theory went, Israel’s reaction was a result of several factors. First, both Prime Minister Olmert and his coalition partner, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, represented the first Israeli government not to have veteran military men in at least one of these positions. As Olmert prepared Israel for a possible pullout from parts of the West Bank, a plan on which he had campaigned in early 2006, he would

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have to show strength in fighting Israel’s enemies. In addition, said Israeli watchers, Jerusalem knew that the United States—the only major power that really matters in the Israeli government’s policymaking calculus—was too preoccupied with its own conflict in Iraq to try to prevent it from damaging or destroying Hamas and Hezbollah. Some observers went so far as to suggest that Israel—perhaps backed by the United States—was trying to goad Syria and especially Iran, Hezbollah’s main foreign backers, to become involved. That, in turn, would allow Israel or the United States to launch air attacks on Iranian defense facilities, including its alleged nuclear weapons plants. Both Jerusalem and Washington were on record as saying that Iran’s nuclear power program was the biggest threat to peace in the Middle East in the mid-2000s. Other observers blamed the outbreak of fighting on various parties in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. As for the conflict in Gaza, these experts argued, it was initiated by Hamas to prevent the referendum Abbas wanted to call regarding the recognition of Israel. Even though Abbas did not announce his plan until a day after the initial kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, Hamas leaders knew it was coming—and, according to experts, expected to lose the referendum. The situation in Lebanon was equally murky, though most of those who blamed Hezbollah for escalating the conflict pointed to the organization’s close ties to Iran and Syria. Damascus, they said, may have called on Hezbollah to fire the rockets and capture the soldiers, knowing full well that Israel would respond with a major attack on Lebanon. That would leave the country vulnerable and force its government to ask for Syrian help, including a renewed military and security presence. Damascus had long felt that Lebanon, a major center of finance and business in the Arab world, was part of Syria’s sphere of influence and critical to its economy. Teheran, meanwhile, may have also wanted to trigger a massive Israeli reaction, which, it felt, would only weaken the Jewish state, distract the United States, and allow greater influence for Iran in both Lebanon and Iraq, the two countries with the largest percentage of Shiites in the Arab world. Perhaps the only certainty about the conflict was the suffering of civilians. As in the case of Israel’s other recent conflicts, the proportion of Arab to Israeli civilian casualties was on the order of 5 or 10 to 1. The ratio in property damage was closer to 100 or 1,000 to 1. This consequence was especially tragic in

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Lebanon, which had spent much of the 1990s and early 2000s rebuilding from the devastation of civil war—only to see cosmopolitan Beirut, as well as other towns and cities, once again in ruins. But Israeli civilians suffered as well, to be sure. Several dozen were killed by the random firing of rockets, and thousands were forced to seek safety in bomb shelters. Tens of thousands of Israelis were called into the military reserves and headed for the twin war fronts. Once again in the summer of 2006, the world’s longest-running conflict had burst into flames. Once again, no solutions were in sight. James Ciment

See also: Israel: Six-Day War, 1967; Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990; Palestine: First Intifada, 1987–1992; Palestine: Second Intifada, 2000– .

Bibliography Harris, William W. The New Face of Lebanon: History’s Revenge. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2005. Levitt, Matthew. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. The Palestine Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

JORDAN: Civil War,1970 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Terrorism and International Incidents PARTICIPANTS: Palestinian Liberation Organization; Syria LEBANON MEDITERRANEAN SEA WEST BANK

Jerusalem

IRAQ

Irbid Salt

ISRAEL EGYPT

SYRIA

Jerash Zarqa Amman Madaba Karak

JORDAN

SAUDI ARABIA

Ma’an 0 0

50 50

100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Palestinian refugee camps

Having won its freedom from Britain in 1946, Jordan quickly became enveloped in the turmoil connected to the rise of the Jewish state in Israel, just across its western border. In 1948, Jordan joined other Arab states to defend Palestinians from Jewish attacks and prevent the formation of a Zionist state in Palestine. Though Arab forces were defeated, Jordan was given control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, regions of Palestine where hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs continued to live. In 1967, Jordan reluctantly joined an alliance planning to attack Israel. This led to a catastrophic defeat in the Six-Day War. Israel captured and occupied both the West Bank and all of Jerusalem, and much of their remaining Palestinian population fled to Jordan. By the end of 1967, Palestinians made up about half of the Jordanian population. This huge refugee population was a destabilizing force in Jordanian politics and a special threat to Jordan’s leader King Hussein. Palestinians wanted to use Jordan as a platform for a guerrilla war against Israel. This invited attacks from the powerful Israeli defense forces. When the

king proved increasingly reluctant to allow Palestinian actions originating in Jordan, Palestinian activists began demanding his ouster. Meanwhile, in Egypt, President Gamal Abdel Nasser helped to organize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a force that would help in the struggle to destroy the Zionist state in Israel. Yasir Arafat, the future leader of the PLO, had already organized an independent Palestinian liberation organization known as Fatah (Arabic for “victory”). Disappointed at the Arab loss in the 1967 war and increasingly convinced that Palestinians needed to take the lead in their own struggle, Arafat took control of the PLO in 1969. He then began launching attacks on Israel from Jordanian territory. Jordan, which had suffered major losses in the war, wanted to avoid conflict with Israel until it had rebuilt its defenses. However, the PLO attacks brought Israeli counterattacks, and Jordan was becoming a battleground in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By 1970, the PLO had become an unofficial state within a state in Jordan and was challenging King Hussein’s authority. Syria and Iraq, the two most radical governments in the Arab world, supported the PLO and opposed Jordan. Hussein was a moderate who was willing to seek a political solution to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria, Iraq, and the PLO refused even to recognize Israel’s right to exist. The United States was concerned about the situation in Jordan. Tensions were high in the Middle East because of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Egypt. In March 1969, Egypt began a war of attrition against Israel that threatened to escalate. The Soviet Union was supplying Egypt with missile batteries, directly violating the 1967 cease-fire agreement. Soviet pilots even flew combat missions in defense of Egypt.

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KEY DATES 1946

Jordan gains its independence from Britain.

1948–49

During and immediately after the Israeli war of independence, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees flee to Jordan and other Arab countries.

1964

Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser organizes the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

1967

In the Six-Day War, Israel seizes the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, along with Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, as well as the Golan Heights from Syria; Palestinian nationalist Yasir Arafat and his al-Fatah Party take control of the PLO.

1967–1970 The PLO establishes itself as an alternative power in Jordan and launches attacks on Israel, drawing Israeli retaliation against Jordan. 1970

Jordanian leader King Hussein escapes an assassination attempt by Palestinian commandos on September 1; fighting breaks out between Palestinian guerrilla forces and the Jordanian military; on September 5, Jordanian forces withdraw from positions around PLO headquarters in an effort to ease the crisis; terrorists with the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijack four Western commercial jets on September 6 and 9 and fly them to Jordan; fighting intensifies between the Jordanian military and Palestinians around the capital of Amman from September 10 to 17; Syrian tanks cross the Jordanian border to help support PLO forces; by September 24, the Jordanian military gains the upper hand in the struggle with the PLO and Syria; a cease-fire is signed between Jordan and the PLO on September 25; the agreement calls for the PLO to withdraw from Jordanian cities; the PLO begins its evacuation of Jordan and relocation in Lebanon.

1982

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon forces the PLO to move headquarters from Lebanon to Tunisia.

1994

In the wake of the Oslo Accords signed by Israel and the PLO, the latter moves its headquarters back to occupied Palestine.

The Nixon administration also feared the possible overthrow of King Hussein and the establishment of a radical government in Jordan. Israel would almost certainly attack another radical government on its borders, and any war between Jordan and Israel would quickly escalate.

War Begins A number of events occurred in 1970 that convinced King Hussein he had to gain some control over PLO activities. On September 1, 1970, Hussein himself escaped an assassination attempt by fedayeen (Palestinian

Jordan: Civil War, 1970

commandos), which led to fighting between the fedayeen and the Jordanian army. Iraq issued an ultimatum demanding that the Jordanian government cease its attacks on the commandos. Iraq, which had more than 10,000 troops in Jordan, threatened to take “appropriate action” if the attacks did not cease. On September 5, in response to pressure by the PLO and Iraq, King Hussein ordered his troops to withdraw from their positions around Amman, the Jordanian capital, because PLO headquarters were also located there. Hussein hoped that by withdrawing his troops from around the capital, fighting between the PLO and the Jordanian army would cease. The king took a risk in ordering this withdrawal, however. Some commando units operated independently, and it was known that certain radical units wanted to overthrow him. To deal with the crisis in Jordan, the Arab League convened a meeting of its members. The League reactivated a four-nation committee composed of representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. The committee’s aim was to halt the fighting between the PLO and the Jordanian army. The PLO was confronted with a genuine dilemma. It needed the support of Arab countries whose interests did not always coincide with its goals. If, for example, Egypt and Jordan could reconcile their differences with Israel, they could sign a peace accord or at least engage in a long truce. The PLO would then be isolated, because there would be little incentive for those governments to keep supporting the PLO objectives. To avoid this scenario, the PLO was opposed to any Arab government reaching a separate agreement with Israel until a Palestinian state came into being. On September 6, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a constituent part of the PLO, hijacked three commercial aircraft, including two American passenger planes. Two of the three planes were diverted to Jordan without the consent of King Hussein. On September 9, the PFLP hijacked a British aircraft with 117 passengers and took it to Jordan. The PFLP now had three planes in Jordan and several hundred passengers held as hostages. The fedayeen wanted to use threats to the passengers to free Palestinians held in foreign countries. Those on the hijacked planes carrying Israeli passports were to be held until Israel freed PLO prisoners. The PLO was operating on Jordanian territory as though it was the legitimate government, refusing to confer with King Hussein.

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King Hussein of Jordan took up arms—and declared martial law—during the battle in Amman against the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1970. (Central Press/Getty Images)

The Fighting Intensifies On September 10, fighting in and around Amman intensified. On September 17, as heavy fighting continued, King Hussein proclaimed martial law and reorganized his government, preparing for an all-out attack on the fedayeen. He gave the military complete authority. In response, Yasir Arafat called for a general strike and promised to continue fighting until Hussein was overthrown. The Jordanian army launched a campaign to retake control of the capital and other cities controlled by the fedayeen. Again, Iraq and Syria threatened to intervene in support of the PLO. In response to these threats, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon expressed his support for King Hussein and suggested that, if necessary, the United States might intervene militarily to prevent the overthrow of the Jordanian government. The Soviet Union issued a statement calling upon all powers to refrain from intervening in Jordan. On September 20, the war took an ominous turn when Syrian tanks crossed the border into Jordan in

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Middle East and North Africa

support of the PLO. Syria’s initiative increased the level of violence and threatened to widen the war. The United States issued a statement calling on Syria to withdraw its forces. American officials again raised the possibility that U.S. troops might intervene to protect the Jordanian government. Libya called for a joint Libyan-Algerian military intervention to assist the PLO. Libya threatened to intervene unilaterally, if necessary. The Arab League convened an emergency meeting in Cairo to try to end the fighting. Divisions among the leaders of the PLO complicated the search for a solution. Some wanted to end the conflict, while others vowed to continue the fight until King Hussein was overthrown. After six days of fighting, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 people had been killed. There were a number of cease-fire agreements, but none were effective. One side or the other always resumed the fighting. During the first few days of the fighting, King Hussein was not sure his forces could defeat the fedayeen. He informed American officials that air strikes might be needed to halt the Syrian advance. American officials then contacted the Israeli government and suggested that the Israeli air force carry out the air strikes. After conducting reconnaissance flights, Israeli leaders did not think that air strikes alone would be sufficient. Ground forces might have to be used. This raised the interesting possibility that Israeli forces would be entering Jordan to fight one Arab nation (Syria) on behalf of another (Jordan). King Hussein’s troops, however, began winning more of the battles, so that no Israeli or U.S. intervention was necessary. The partial mobilization of Israeli forces may have been enough to convince Syria not to escalate the fighting. As the tide of battle turned in favor of Jordan, Syria began withdrawing its tanks. By this time, it was clear that the PLO could not win the civil war in Jordan without outside assistance.

End of the Civil War By September 24, a Jordanian victory seemed assured. King Hussein again reorganized his government and put civilians back in control. On September 25, a cease-fire was signed. By the terms of the agreement, the PLO was to withdraw from all cities and towns in Jordan and to reassemble along the Israeli border. The

agreement was a victory for King Hussein. On September 27, the Arab leaders signed a 14-point agreement they hoped would resolve the Jordanian–PLO crisis and restore order. American officials were pleased with the outcome of the conflict because King Hussein emerged victorious. The United States promised to supply Jordan with weapons to replace the equipment lost in the war. The civil war in Jordan clearly demonstrated the deep divisions in the Arab world in terms of dealing with the PLO. Some Arab nations gave unconditional support to the PLO while others offered verbal support but not much else. There were also many divisions within the PLO. Its leaders often disagreed with each other. Some looked to Syria for support, and others looked to Egypt. The civil war also demonstrated the danger of allowing the PLO to operate within a host state. The example of the Jordanian civil war indicated that the interests of the PLO and the government in Amman were not always similar. With his military victory, King Hussein’s regime was able to force the PLO to move its headquarters into Lebanon and Syria. Lebanon soon began to experience the same problems that had confronted Jordan. Unlike Jordan, however, Lebanon was not unified enough to effectively restrain the PLO. The weakness of the Lebanese government and the activities of the PLO became a major source of instability in the region and eventually led to a civil war. The fedayeen eventually released all the hostages from the airplane hijackings. Great Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, and Israel released nineteen Arabs being held for a variety of offenses. The taking of hostages became an important weapon used by the PLO to win international attention. Kenneth L. Hill See also: Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Lebanon: Civil War, 1975– 1990.

Bibliography Kaufman, B.I. The Arab Middle East and the United States. New York: Twayne, 1995. Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Lenczowski, George. American Presidents and the Middle East. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990.

LEBANON: Civil Conflict,1958 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANTS: Syria; United States

MEDITERRANEAN

SUNNI

Tripoli

SEA

CHRISTIAN

LEBANON

MT. LEBANON PROVINCE (OTTOMAN EMPIRE PERIOD) Beirut

SHOUF MTNS.

SHIA

DRUZE CHRISTIAN DRUZE

SUNNI

SHIA SUNNI

SUNNI

Sidon

SYRIA Tyre

SHIA

ISRAEL

0 0

25 25

50 Miles 50 Kilometers

The roots of Lebanon’s civil conflict of 1958 lie in the country’s history and geography. Since the Muslim conquest of the seventh century, the region has been home to diverse religious groups. These include Sunni Muslims, the dominant sect in the Arab world; Shiite Muslims, the largest Muslim minority, centered in Iran; Maronite Christians, affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church; Greek Orthodox Christians; Jews; and Druze, practitioners of a secretive faith that combines elements of several major Western religions and whose followers were often persecuted both by Muslims and Christians.

Historical Background Lebanon was temporarily conquered by the Christian crusaders in the eleventh century, but it was otherwise ruled by the Arab caliphate of Islam until the sixteenth century. From then until 1920, it was a part of the Ottoman Empire, whose center was in modern-

day Turkey. During Ottoman rule, the present-day geographic distribution of the various sects was established. Sunnis and Christians settled along the coast and in the port cities of Tripoli, Sidon, and Beirut. The Druze inhabited the Shouf mountains, south of Beirut, and the Shiites established themselves in the southern part of the country, near the border with Palestine. The Maronite population also spread southward into the Shouf mountain region, setting off a centuries-long dispute with the Druze. In fact, that conflict came to engulf all the different religions and sects in the country. In the late eighteenth century, the Sunni emir Yusuf Shehabi, who ruled the province in the name of the Ottoman sultan, converted to Maronite Christianity. Later, in 1840, his son took up arms with the rebellious governor of Egypt against the empire itself and was deposed by the sultan. This defeat left the territory in the center of modern-day Lebanon divided. Maronites ruled in the north, where the Druze were serfs; to the south, the Druze remained lords over the Maronites.

French Intervention Following a Druze rebellion in the north in the 1850s, the Maronites of the south prepared their own uprising, but some 11,000 of them were massacred by their Druze overlords before they could carry it out. To save the remaining Maronites, the French intervened, forcing the Ottoman sultan to establish a new Christian emirate throughout the region, excepting the main port cities. The Ottomans then created a council, based on proportional representation, to advise the governor. Since the Maronites vastly outnumbered the Druze, the losers in the civil conflict of the 1850s ended up as the victors, engendering lasting animosity among the Druze. The situation remained in this precarious state until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end

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Middle East and North Africa

KEY DATES 1919

In the wake of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the French assume the League of Nations Mandate over Lebanon.

1926

The French draw up a constitution for a future independent Lebanon with Maronite Christians in control.

1936

A Maronite Christian becomes president of Lebanon.

1940

With France occupied by Nazi Germany, Britain assumes control over Lebanon; using the 1932 census, which gives Maronites a six-to-five ratio over Muslims and Druze, the Maronites gain control of the parliament.

1946

Lebanon wins its independence.

1957

Pro-western Maronite leader Camille Chamoun accepts a U.S. offer of economic and military aid to overcome Communist activities in Lebanon; with the help of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Chamoun manipulates the parliamentary elections, limiting Muslim and Druze influence in that body.

1958

After the assassination of an antigovernment editor, riots break out as the opposition National Socialist Front calls for Chamoun to resign; as conflict breaks out across Lebanon, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower sends 10,000 troops into Lebanon to back Chamoun, angering Muslim and Druze leaders.

of World War I. In 1920, the territory that would make up modern-day Lebanon and Syria was handed to the French as a mandate under the League of Nations. The French incorporated other parts of presentday Lebanon into the old Ottoman province of Mount Lebanon, including the Sunni Muslim farming areas in the north and the Shiite region to the south. While the French claimed the move was designed to make the territory economically viable, they were really aiming to create a larger, pro-French presence in the Arab Middle East. The result of their enlargement of Lebanon was to create a significant Christian-ruled government in a state that had a large Muslim minority. To make matters worse, the whole of Lebanon was claimed by neighboring Syria. In 1926, the French drew up a constitution calling for republican rule, but with the Maronite population in effective control. This plan engendered hostility not just among the Muslims and the Druze, but also from the Greek Orthodox. Their patriarchate

was in Damascus in Syria, and its members considered themselves part of the Arab world. In the 1932 presidential elections, violence broke out, and the French decided to suspend the constitution for four years. When elections were finally held in 1936, a Maronite was elected president.

Independent Lebanon In 1940, Nazi Germany occupied France in the early part of World War II. During the fighting, British forces from neighboring Palestine occupied Lebanon and took effective control. Using a 1932 census that gave a slight numerical edge to the Maronites, the British offered to establish a parliament with a ratio of six Maronites for every five Muslims and Druze. Both parties accepted the offer in the National Pact, a kind of supplement to the 1926 constitution. Each side had been required to make concessions. The Christians agreed that the country would be officially Arab in

Lebanon: Civil Conflict, 195 8

orientation and language, while the Muslims gave up their demand that the territory be incorporated into Greater Syria. The major state offices were distributed among the groups: the president would be Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, the speaker of parliament a Shiite, and his deputy a Greek Orthodox. As a part of the broader ration, the Druze were offered five of the seventy-seven seats in parliament. The arrangement brought peace in the short run, but when Lebanon received its independence in 1946, the parliament proved unwieldy and divided, unable to govern the country effectively. Adding to the problem were the economic and demographic changes the country was experiencing in the immediate postwar era. With dynamic Beirut at its heart, Lebanon was becoming a center of trade and finance. With their closer ties to the West, Maronites prospered to a greater extent than Muslims. Over time, the higher birthrate among Muslims effectively turned Lebanese Christians into a minority. A divided parliament proved incapable of altering the state to reflect the changes in economics or in population balance. It also failed to provide social services for the increasingly impoverished Muslim population. Tensions mounted during the late 1940s and early 1950s as a wave of Arab nationalism spread through the Middle East. The Israeli War of Independence of 1948–1949 had excited a powerful new sense of identity among Muslims. Gamal Abdel Nasser, a new kind of Arab nationalist, rose to power in Egypt in 1952. Finally, in 1956, Nasser announced that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal, taking control of it from an Anglo-French consortium that had owned and managed it. The British, French, and Israelis favored military means to curb Nasser’s power and return the canal to European control, but failed when U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower opposed military action. The incident raised Nasser’s reputation throughout the region and cast the Europeans as the enemy. Eisenhower did not like Nasser, but he refused to support the former colonial powers in the Middle East and risk alienating the Arab states. During the Suez crisis, Lebanese president Camille Chamoun supported the Europeans. The West-leaning government seemed an anachronism, surrounded by more militant Arab states. In 1957, Chamoun accepted President Eisenhower’s economic and military aid, which was offered to any Middle Eastern country wishing to protect itself against Communist

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subversion. Lebanon was one of only two Arab states to accept the aid, the other being Iraq. Egypt’s Nasser railed against the U.S. aid, judging correctly that one of its aims was to diminish his own influence in the region. He also condemned the governments of Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, which accepted Western military might to secure their positions. The three governments faced growing Arab animosity for their choices.

Civil Conflict of 195 8 The Iraqi government was overthrown in a revolution in July 1958, but the British stepped in to preserve the crown for King Hussein. In Lebanon, Chamoun had managed to stay in power by manipulating the parliamentary elections of 1957. With the secret financial help of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, he succeeded so well that even major Muslim and Druze leaders lost their seats in parliament. Then, in February 1958, Egypt and Syria joined to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), in agreement on their Arab nationalist principals and promising a renewal of Arab pride and power and a more equitable social movement called “Arab socialism.” Throughout the Middle East, Nasser’s ideas proved to be exceedingly popular. Leaders who opposed Nasser were faced with increased opposition at home. Chamoun became even more of an outsider in the region. In the spring of 1958, a liberal Christian newspaper editor known for his harsh attacks on Chamoun was assassinated, and antigovernment rioting broke out in Tripoli, leaving thirty-five dead. Even Chamoun’s own party, the National Socialist Front (known by its French acronym, SNF), turned against him, calling a three-day national strike. Urging Chamoun to resign, the party warned that civil conflict was about to break out. On May 12, the pro-Western followers of Chamoun confronted the nationalist-leftist forces of Jamal Jumblatt in the streets of Beirut. While leaders of the 8,000-man Lebanese army remained neutral—for fear that ethnic divisions within the ranks would tear the army apart—a 2,000-man force under Jumblatt marched on Chamoun’s forces. The fighting grew so intense that summer that Lebanese army commander Fuad Chehab, a Maronite, decided to intervene. He refused to order the military to assault Jumblatt’s forces, but he began to search for a political solution. Chamoun asked the United States for support but was refused. In seeking a peaceful solution to the

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situation, Chehab began meeting with American diplomats, who broke the news to Chamoun that he could not run for a reelection—he would have little chance of winning—and must pursue a peaceful settlement through the United Nations. Chamoun followed this strong advice, and the situation in Lebanon improved. With the overthrow of al-Said in Iraq in July 1958, Chamoun lost his only ally in the region. When al-Said himself was killed, Chamoun feared that he would face the same fate. Again he sought help from the United States. This time Eisenhower agreed to send approximately 14,000 U.S. Marines and airborne ground troops, backed up by the American Sixth Fleet. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed concern that dispatching American troops unilaterally would heighten anti-American sentiment in the region. But they also believed they would lose credibility and standing in the Middle East if they turned their back on Chamoun. The arrival of American soldiers and Chamoun’s actions enraged Jumblatt, whose forces now controlled about one-third of the country, and led him to intensify the civil conflict. Across the region, Arab leaders, including Nasser, spoke out against the United States and Chamoun, and the state of affairs in Lebanon worsened. The situation was finally resolved on July 1, 1958, when both sides—under threat of facing more U.S. troops—agreed to accept Chehab as a compromise presidential candidate. Chamoun left the presidency on September 23, 1958, and Chehab’s first cabinet consisted mainly of eight anti-Chamounists. Chamoun’s supporters protested the move and threatened to strike, which would create more civil discord. Chehab, eager to avoid continued tension, appointed new advisers to placate the Chamounists.

Chehabism and Rebuilding President Chehab embarked on a program to build up and restore Lebanon. His reforms improved infrastructure, promoted tourism and industry, and generally focused on bringing Lebanon out of political and social strife and restoring harmony. He stressed the value of government centralization and economic planning and employed many technocrats and intellectuals, rejecting the traditional use of political appointees. Among his greatest successes was providing

basic public utilities to undeveloped parts of the country. The president made an effort to reach out to the Muslim majority in Lebanon, ensuring that the government hired more Shiite and Sunni Muslims. This was only a gesture, however, since many Muslims remained in the lower levels of Lebanese society and had no realistic access to the government jobs mainly held by Christians. In foreign affairs, Chehab quickly disassociated himself from the United States. He declared through his prime minister that Lebanon no longer advocated the Eisenhower Doctrine. American soldiers left Lebanon in late October 1958. Chehab’s government publicly supported the Arab agenda of Egypt and Syria, and only after 1961 did support for panArabism begin to wane. Syria dissociated itself from Egypt, withdrawing from the United Arab Republic. Nasser remained the dominant political figure in the region but had lost much of his appeal. Chehab survived an attempted coup by members of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), who advocated a larger union with Syria, on December 31, 1961. He remained in power until 1964. In the next few years, Lebanon remained relatively peaceful but uneasy, still awkwardly divided by ethnic and religious divisions and often at the mercy of volatile Middle Eastern politics. The next wave of violence would arrive scarcely ten years after Chehab left office. James Ciment and Brandon Kirk Williams See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990.

Bibliography Attie, Caroline. Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Cobban, Helena. The Making of Modern Lebanon. London: Hutchinson, 1985. Harris, William. Faces of Lebanon, Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions. Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner, 1997. Khala, Samir. Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Petran, Tabitha. The Struggle over Lebanon. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987. Winslow, Charles. Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society. New York: Routledge, 1996. Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

LEBANON: Civil War,1975–1990 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Invasions and Border Disputes PARTICIPANTS: Israel; Syria Historical Background

Palestinian refugee camp SUNNI

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The Lebanese Civil War, from 1975 to 1990, was the longest civil conflict in modern Middle Eastern history. Pitting various Christian, Muslim, and Druze sects against each other, it tore the country apart, resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, and demolished the capital, Beirut, once one of the most cosmopolitan and wealthiest cities in the Middle East. Internal factors set off the fighting, but the war soon drew in neighboring Syria and Israel, both of which tried to work their own political and military will in Lebanon and forward their own regional aims. Before the war was finally ended in 1990, Lebanon had witnessed most of the forms of fighting common to post–World War II conflicts. These included urban street fighting, rural commando raids, armored assaults, aerial bombing, and massive armored invasions.

For at least a millennium, Lebanon has been at the crossroads of the Middle East, its population a complicated mélange of religious sects, including Maronite Christians (affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church) and Greek Orthodox; Sunni and Shiite Muslims; Jews; and Druze, a sect whose secretive religion combines elements of all major Western faiths. Lebanon itself was ruled by the Muslim Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. Then the region around Mount Lebanon in the center of the country was turned over to the French as a League of Nations Mandate; under the rules of the league, France agreed to prepare the country for independence. The French, wanting to make sure that an independent Lebanon would be both economically viable and pro-Western, expanded the country’s boundaries and drew up a constitution that ensured Christian control. At the same time, they thwarted Muslim hopes that Lebanon would eventually be incorporated into Greater Syria, another former Ottoman territory held by the French as a League of Nations Mandate. Upon achieving independence in 1946, Lebanon established a constitutional order, based on the socalled National Pact, in which the country’s political establishment would be jointly controlled by the various religious sects with a formula that assured Christian sects of a majority. This structure was based on a 1932 census that gave a slight demographic edge to the economically and politically dominant Maronite community. Over the next thirty years, however, historical trends worked to undermine the basis of this political settlement. First, the more Western-oriented Maronite population began to have smaller families, while Muslims continued to have large families. Soon Maronites were outnumbered by Muslims, though

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KEY DATES 1946

Lebanon wins independence from France, with power shared among various religious groups but with Christians in ultimate control.

1958

Fighting breaks out briefly between Druze and Muslims on one side and Maronite Christians on the other; the arrival of U.S. troops and the selection of compromise president General Fuad Chehab brings an end to the fighting.

1975

Various incidents lead to fighting between Muslims and Christians; the central government quickly loses authority as factions arm themselves within their own enclaves in Beirut and around the country.

1976

Syrian forces move into country, backing Maronite Christians against Muslims and Palestine Liberation Organization forces.

1978

Israel launches its first invasion of Lebanon, forcing Palestinian forces away from the Lebanese-Israeli border.

1982

Israel invades Lebanon and drives all the way to Beirut, driving the PLO from the country, and occupying a section along the Israel border through 2000.

1983

U.S. forces are driven from the country after suicide bombers blow up the Marine headquarters at Beirut airport, killing 241 Marines.

1989

The Tripartite Arab Committee on Lebanon is established to draw up a plan to end fighting in the country.

1990

Various parties to the conflict sign the Taif Accords, ending most of the fighting in the country.

2005 Following widespread protests in the wake of the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, Syria withdraws its forces from Lebanon.

the shift in population was never translated into a revision of the religious groups’ political representation in the government. A second factor was the rise of Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East following the rise of power of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in the early 1950s. Nasser played on Arab frustrations at Western domination of the region, including the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in the late 1940s and the imposition of unpopular, pro-Western regimes in many Arab countries. The promise of Arab nationalist groups appealed strongly to the politically and economically marginalized Muslim and Druze populations of Lebanon.

In 1958, civil conflict broke out between the Druze and Muslims on one side and the Maronites on the other, with the Lebanese army and government caught in the middle. Lebanese President Camille Chamoun asked U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower for assistance in suppressing the uprising. The United States sent 14,000 troops to keep order, while the government settled on a compromise candidate for president, General Fuad Chehab. The fighting ended, but the underlying problems remained. Yet another factor was economic modernization. Under the Chehab administration, a modern system of paved roads introduced a new commercialization of agriculture in Lebanon and improved connections

Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–19 9 0

between Beirut and other cities. These developments produced a migration of poor Muslim peasants to Beirut and other major cities. The new urban proletariat, even more disenfranchised than their rural compatriots, soon grew frustrated by the dominance of the wealthier Maronite community. Developments in neighboring countries also played an important role in the rising discontent in Lebanon. During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel won a significant victory over Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian forces and gained control of lands previously controlled by the Arab states—the Golan Heights on the Syrian border, the West Bank (formerly under the protection of Jordan), and the Gaza Strip (formerly governed by Egypt). The defeat stunned Arab nationalists and led to a lull in the undeclared war between the Arab states and Israel. The breaking point for Lebanese society came in 1970. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then an avowedly terrorist organization operating against Israel, was forced to leave Jordan and moved its headquarters to Lebanon. Some Palestinians had lived in Lebanon since the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948; the Lebanese government had allowed them to settle even though many were linked to the PLO and other terrorist groups. Occasionally, these groups attacked cities along Israel’s northern border, and Israel inevitably responded by sending commando raids into Lebanon. One notable assault had come on December 28, 1968, when Israeli forces blew up thirteen jets at Beirut’s airport. Israeli retaliation raids often struck Lebanese civilians, heightening the division in Lebanon between those who supported the Palestinian terrorists and those who opposed them. The radical rhetoric and actions of the PLO had a galvanizing effect on the impoverished Lebanese Muslims. Most Christian Maronites, on the other hand, opposed Palestinian attacks on Israel, especially those launched from bases in Lebanon. Once again in 1973, the conflict between the Arab states and Israel broke out in full-fledged war. Syria and Egypt attacked lands occupied by Israel in the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. In the opening days of the conflict, both attackers scored victories over the Israeli defenders, sending pulses of newfound confidence through the Arab world. As before, the passions of war helped destabilize the tense political situation in Lebanon, as its Arab population again demanded more economic and political power.

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After the war, as tensions rose in Lebanon, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited the country briefly during his “shuttle diplomacy” to bring a settlement between Arab states and Israel. Kissinger conferred with Maronite leaders, hoping that they could help establish a government that favored the United States and would moderate the pressures of the radical Muslims in Lebanon, easing the pressure on Israel.

Civil War Several incidents contributed to the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s. One came in the port of Sidon in February 1975. The government granted a fishing monopoly to a company headed by influential Maronite leader Camille Chamoun. Outraged, local Muslims called for peaceful demonstrations, which later grew into violent protests. The popular Muslim mayor of Sidon, Marouf Saad, was killed during the demonstrations, and local Muslims rioted, forcing the government to send in the army. Most Muslims saw the army as a tool of Maronite power, which caused tensions to mount. A second and louder shot came in the Christian suburb of East Beirut in April. While Pierre Gemayel, the patriarch of a powerful Maronite family, was attending the consecration of a new church in Ain Rummane, unknown assailants fired on him, killing two of his bodyguards and two other people; Gemayel himself was not injured. Rumors quickly spread that Palestinians were to blame for the attack. When a busload of armed Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims accidentally passed the scene later in the day, militiamen from the Phalange Party—the most reactionary of Maronite political groups—opened fire, killing twenty-seven in reprisal for the attacks earlier in the day. This came to be known as the Massacre of Ain Rummane. The incident set off fighting between Muslim and Christian groups throughout the country. Maronites feared that the balance of political power was shifting against them and toward Lebanon’s Muslims. Radicalized Muslim groups added to that fear by increasing their demands for more political power and for cultural domination.

The Players By 1976, the pattern of alliances that would divide up the country had begun to develop. First, there was

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Once known as the “Paris of the Middle East” for its vibrant atmosphere and cosmopolitan lifestyle, Beirut, Lebanon, was devastated by fifteen years of civil war and foreign attack. (Dirck Halstead/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

the Lebanese Front (LF), a confederation of Christian parties that emphasized the country’s Western Christian roots over its Arab ones. The most important constituent party in the Front was the Phalange. Founded by Pierre Gemayel in the 1930s, it had been broadly modeled on the Nazi youth movement of that era. In the 1950s, it allied itself with more mainstream Maronite parties, increasing its presence in the parliament and backing Christian president Camille Chamoun in the 1958 civil conflict. The other major Christian party in the Front was called the National Liberal Party (NLP). Established by Chamoun after the fighting in 1958, it emphasized free-market economics and Christian political domination, attracting non-Maronite Christians to its ranks. Both the NLP and the Phalange formed militia forces, and together the two parties could field some 6,000 combatants, a force one-third the size of the entire Lebanese army. These parties and militias were supplemented by a host of smaller Christian parties and militias. By the time the civil war broke out, these various militias were openly allying themselves with Christian officers of the Lebanese army. On the other side of the religious-political divide was the Lebanese National Movement (LMN), con-

sisting of a dozen Muslim-dominated parties and led by Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt was of Druze origin, but he enjoyed excellent relations with the country’s Muslim population because of his strong pan-Arabist politics. The LMN included both left-wing and proSyrian parties. The main left-wing groups were the Progressive Socialist Party and the Communist Party of Lebanon. The main pro-Syrian groups were the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party—the Ba’aths, a strongly nationalist and socialist party, had come to power in Syria in the late 1960s—and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which represented a disparate population of pro-Syrian, anti-Maronite Christian groups. Rounding out the picture were two other groups. First was the Palestine Liberation Organization, representing tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees and guerrillas. Many of the refugees had been living in Lebanon since they fled or were forced out of Israeli territory in the late 1940s. The guerrillas had arrived more recently, in 1970, when King Hussein of Jordan had forced the PLO to leave his country after it began to clash with the Jordanian army. Finally, there were the Lebanese Resistance Detachments—known by the Arabic acronym Amal, meaning “hope”—who represented Shiite Muslims who lived in southern

Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–19 9 0

Lebanon and in impoverished Muslim neighborhoods around Beirut.

Early War Years: 1975–1978 The massacre of Ain Rummane in 1975 set Beirut ablaze. Palestinian and Lebanese Muslims attacked Maronite businesses while Maronites turned guns and rockets on Palestinian camps. The Palestinians tried to stay out of the fighting at first, merely firing back if attacked. There were no organized battle lines, just hastily erected barricades in various parts of the city. After the Muslim political parties issued a call to the Arab world to isolate the Maronite Phalange party, the Phalange dropped out of the governing coalition together with their NLP allies. As extreme groups on both sides deserted the government, it lost its power to govern. Fighting spread from Beirut southward. Jumblatt, the leader of the Muslim coalition, demanded an end to the division of government offices by faith, a reorganization of the army bringing in more Muslim and Druze members, and a reduction of the powers of the executive branch. All of these demands were, of course, aimed at reducing Maronite power. The Maronites strongly opposed all of these reforms. Muslims in the north also took up arms. Jumblatt appealed for help to Syrian president Hafez alAssad, who sent 600 troops of the Damascus-based Palestine Liberation Army (PLA, a Palestinian group not connected to the PLO) to restore law and order in the port city of Tripoli. For its part, the central government, led by the Maronite Suleiman Franjieh, failed to halt fighting that flared in Beirut throughout the autumn, sparked largely by conservative Maronite militias. These conservative militias had the support of American and Israeli intelligence officers and were able to purchase arms on the international market. Gradually they moved from their strongholds in the eastern part of the city to Beirut’s western neighborhoods. By January, the militias had wiped out both Palestinian refugee camps and Muslim neighborhoods, killing some 1,500 guerrillas and civilians. By January 1976, the central government had virtually collapsed and the divided Lebanese army was essentially powerless. In February, the PLO-LMN side took the offensive, pushing the Maronites out of West Beirut and threatening to invade the Christian suburbs to the east. The Maronites, in an age-old tradition, were des-

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perately searching for a strong foreign backer. Failing to gain public support from France or the United States, they turned instead to Syria, promising Syrian president Assad that they would support his conservative Muslim candidate for president. Assad did not have the power to command the PLO and its allies, however. Meanwhile, the United States, fearing establishment of a radical Muslim government in Lebanon, communicated secretly with Syria, which was also hoping for a more conservative regime. The two countries established “Red Lines” to ensure Israeli security. In addition, Syria agreed not to send its troops farther south than Sidon, not to use its air force in Lebanon, and not to use surface-to-air missiles. The “Red Line” agreement guaranteed that Israel would not be forced to protect itself from Syria. Thus, with the tacit approval of the United States and Israel, Assad sent his regular army into Lebanon on June 1 to preserve order. With Syrian forces supporting them, a resurgent Maronite militia went on the offensive, overrunning several Palestinian camps and prompting a desperate plea to Moscow from the PLO-LMN forces, asking the Soviet Union to rein in Assad, who had been a Soviet ally in the region. The Soviets were unwilling to risk alienating Assad. At this point, the Arab League agreed to step in. Under mediation by the government of Libya, a truce was worked out among all the factions in Lebanon, and a cease-fire was declared. But the cease-fire failed to hold. In August, Maronite forces overran more Palestinian camps, killing some 3,000 civilians in the process. In September 1976, Elias Sarkij, a Muslim backed by Syria and agreed to by the Maronites, became president of Lebanon. The following month, some 13,000 more Syrian troops, backed by heavy armor, poured into Lebanon. Their mission was ostensibly to back up the Sarkij regime, but in fact they had come to drive the remaining PLO-LMN forces out of East Beirut. Their offensive succeeded, and Syria and the Maronites became more willing to accept Arab League mediation. With the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF)— consisting of 25,000 Syrian troops, augmented by 5,000 more from five other Arab states—in place by mid-November, a cease-fire held. In nineteen months of fighting, some 10,000 Lebanese, mostly Muslim civilians, had died. Beirut and other cities were heavily damaged, and Lebanese society had been turned into a collection of bitterly hostile factions.

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As the Arab force deployed, the Lebanese government tried slowly to rebuild itself and its fractured military. The southern part of the country was descending into factionalism and violence. The collapse of the Lebanese army in 1976 had led to the formation of two military factions, one Christian and one Muslim, in the Shiite-dominated south. When the Christian militia tried to expand its operations there in early 1977, PLO commandos retaliated. The resulting fighting sent 300,000 refugees fleeing northward and raised the concern of Syrian President Assad and other conservative forces that the PLO might provoke Israel into attacking in the south. Events in both Beirut and Israel overwhelmed the Syrian president’s efforts to maintain peace. First, the hawkish Likud party, under Menachem Begin, took power in Israel after the May 1977 elections. Meanwhile, with the PLO-LMN effectively defeated, the conservative Maronite Christians were looking for a more reliable ally than Assad. They turned to Israel. That same fall, in a momentous change in Middle Eastern politics, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Prime Minister Begin in Jerusalem. This marked the beginning of peace talks between Israel and Egypt under the prodding of U.S. president Jimmy Carter. Within a year, Egypt would formally recognize Israel, and the two countries would sign the Camp David Accords, the first framework for a new peace in the Middle East. Sadat’s first visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 coincided with the first Israeli air attacks against Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon. Syria’s President Assad was so repelled by Sadat’s efforts to make peace with Israel and by Israel’s air attacks that he decided to change sides in Lebanon, seeking to form an alliance with his erstwhile enemy, the PLO. By early 1978, it became increasingly clear that a showdown was in the offing between Assad’s Arab Deterrent Force and the militias of his former Maronite allies. Assad ordered a preemptive strike against Christian forces in the Beqaa Valley east of Beirut and forced them to sign a cease-fire in February. Assad believed that this concession signaled that the Maronite parties had agreed to Syrian domination in all of Lebanon. He helped formed an alliance of Shiite and Palestinian forces in the south, which then attacked the Christian enclaves between them. These moves alarmed Israel, which was determined to find some way to eliminate the threat of 5,000 pro-Syrian Palestinian and PLO guerrillas on its northern border.

Israeli Invasions: 1978 and 19 82 When a group of Palestinians slipped over the border into Israel and attacked a bus, killing 35 passengers, Israel invaded southern Lebanon on March 14, 1978. It sent some 25,000 Israel Defense Force (IDF) troops, backed by fighter aircraft. As Palestinian forces fled northward, the Israelis decided to go beyond their initial plan and annex a buffer zone along the border. Assad provided little assistance to the fleeing Palestinians, fearing that Israel was trying to draw his forces into a confrontation. Within the week, Israel had occupied about 10 percent of Lebanon’s territory. It began building roads in southern Lebanon and offered protection to the Christian population and forces there. The United Nations condemned Israel’s invasion and called for immediate withdrawal. When the Arab League appealed for international intervention, the UN dispatched the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to oversee Israel’s withdrawal. Meanwhile, farther north, the Maronites, no longer in awe of Assad’s Arab forces, attacked along the green line established between Christian East Beirut and Muslim West Beirut. President Ilyas Sarkis, eager to demonstrate that he was independent of Damascus, demanded that Assad drop his support for the Palestinians in the south. Assad refused and demanded in turn that Sarkis send in the Lebanese army to take up positions in the south as soon as the Israelis had departed. Under UN supervision, Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon, but it soon became clear that it was still exercising military power there. The Christian militia forces of Saad Haddad, heavily armed by the Israelis, refused to allow the Arab Deterrent Force or the Lebanese army to cross the Litani River, some twenty miles north of the Israeli border, to join UN forces in the area. Saad Haddad’s militia, subsequently known as the South Lebanese Army (SLA), became the major military force in the region even though about 60 percent of the residents were Shiite Muslims. The Maronites in East Beirut approved of the new situation in the south. In May, their leaders traveled secretly to Israel, where they signed an arms deal and confirmed the dispatch of some 1,500 Israeli military advisers to the Christian mini-state they were building in the territory in East Beirut. The Maronites themselves were torn by complex factional disputes between their ruling clans, but they were

Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–19 9 0

becoming increasingly aggressive in their attacks on Assad’s ADF. In August the ADF retaliated, driving Christian forces back into their East Beirut enclave, killing 800 people and rendering 200,000 homeless. Backed by political support from Arab countries, Syria was again demonstrating its hegemony over Lebanon north of the Litani River. In the south, the Israeli-supported SLA continued to dominate. The Syrian force was equal to the combined strength of the Maronite militias and the Lebanese army, so the Maronites continued to strengthen their relationship with Israel. Their greatest problem remained their own internal disputes, mainly between the Phalange and NLP militias. At one point, the Lebanese army had to move into East Beirut to end fighting between the militias. Even after this movement, bloody clashes continued, weakening the Maronite cause. Israel was concerned by the infighting. In early 1980, it decided to back the Phalange, hoping to consolidate Maronite power in one group and make it a more effective anti-PLO force. By the end of 1980, the Phalange, led by Pierre Gemayel’s son Bashir, had won nearly total control of the Christian mini-state and was ready to confront the Syrians. In April 1981, the now united Lebanese Front attacked and seized Muslim positions around the strategic town of Zahle in the southern Beqaa Valley. The attackers had assurances from Israel that any attacks by the Syrian ADF on Maronite forces would be met by Israeli jet fighter response. As the fighting between the LMN-PLO forces and the Maronites intensified, the Arab League stepped in again to mediate the disputes and end the fighting. They persuaded the Maronites to leave Zahle and gained Syria’s agreement to lift its siege of the town. In southern Lebanon, meanwhile, the situation was also intensifying. Israeli jets attacked Palestinian positions as far north as Sidon, forty miles from the Israeli border. In November 1979, clashes with Syrian jets eventually forced the Israeli planes to curtail their activities, but not before they had killed some 1,000 people, displaced 260,000, and caused an estimated $400 million in property damage. The chaos caused by these air attacks set up further violence in the region, this time between Amal Shiite forces and Palestinians, who were fighting to become the preeminent Muslim force in the south. In July 1981, the newly reelected Likud government decided to launch new air raids against PLO positions in Lebanon,

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prompting fierce PLO rocket attacks against northern Israel. After several weeks of fighting, the United States helped to mediate a cease-fire. Meanwhile, there were signs in Beirut that the government of Lebanon and the Phalange were seeking some sort of accommodation with each other. In August 1981, Bashir Gemayel traveled to Washington to sound out the United States on its readiness to resolve the conflict in Lebanon. Meanwhile, at the Arab summit in Morocco, Lebanese president Sarkis received a promise from PLO leader Yasir Arafat that he would stop using bases in southern Lebanon to launch attacks on Israel, helping to end the threat of Israeli air raids and the deaths of Lebanese civilians. Still, these conciliatory moves proved to be harbingers of more fighting rather than of peace. In February 1982, the hawkish Israeli defense minister, Ariel Sharon, visited East Beirut, promising renewed shipments of Israeli arms and ammunition to Maronite forces. The Muslim Lebanese National Movement used this new threat as a reason to consolidate its control—with the help of PLO forces—over West Beirut, just as the Maronites had done in East Beirut. This development concerned Israel greatly, since it promised a safe haven for PLO fighters in central Lebanon, beyond the reach of its forces. Building on Sharon’s connections with the Maronite community, the Likud government began making plans for another invasion of Lebanon. An assassination attempt on Israel’s ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, by Arab extremists provided the necessary provocation in June 1982. Begin and Sharon publicly announced that the invasion, named Operation Peace for Galilee, would be confined to destroying PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon, but the Israelis’ secret plan was to send forces all the way to Beirut in the hope of destroying the PLO in Lebanon entirely, putting a Maronite government into power, and forcing a showdown with the Syrians. At first the invasion went smoothly. Israeli forces moved up the coast to the southern suburbs of Beirut in a week, easily overcoming Syrian air attacks on its planes. Israeli forces then unleashed a massive artillery assault on West Beirut and demanded that the entire PLO organization leave Lebanon. Then the plan began to unravel. Maronite leader Gemayel refused to use his forces to attack the PLO on the ground in East Beirut, and Israel was forced to move its troops into the city. Israeli forces took the green line in early July but soon faced fierce PLO resistance.

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In late July, Israel renewed its massive artillery assault on West Beirut. The international community considered the situation in Lebanon a threat to world peace. In midAugust, the United States, France, and Italy announced plans to dispatch a multinational force to ensure a cease-fire and the safe evacuation of PLO forces. President Ronald Reagan dispatched 800 marines, and the multinational force achieved its goals by early September. Arafat and his PLO guerrillas left Lebanon to established new headquarters in faraway Tunisia. After the PLO left, Reagan withdrew U.S. troops. Though frustrated in its efforts to wipe out the PLO, Israel was satisfied with the group’s departure from Lebanon, especially since its main ally in the country, Bashir Gemayel, was about to become president. But this prospect never came to pass. On September 14, a massive bomb went off at Phalange headquarters, killing Gemayel and twenty-six others. Suspecting the PLO, enraged Phalange forces entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps—ostensibly under Israeli control—and massacred more than 2,000 civilians. The incident led to international condemnations of Israel and the Phalange and set off huge protests in Israel sponsored by a new anti-militarist organization called Peace Now. Reagan was shocked by the slaughter and ordered U.S. forces to return to the multinational force on September 20. The murder of Gemayel left the presidency in the hands of his younger brother, Amin Gemayel, who leaned more toward Syria than toward Israel. This was a major setback for the Israeli government and its plans to control Lebanon through Bashir Gemayel.

Renewed Syrian Hegemony After the PLO and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in the fall of 1982, the Lebanese army was deployed throughout the country. However, it faced a confident Syrian force that had recently received new Soviet-supplied weapons and no longer had to deal with Israeli troops north of the Litani River. Israel and the United States responded by persuading President Amin Gemayel to agree that the United States had the responsibility of preventing the use of Lebanon by any forces hostile to Israel. This agreement was denounced at an Arab League summit in July 1983. The league also helped to form the National Salvation Front, which included all Lebanese

Muslim factions that opposed the agreement. Faced with rising opposition, Gemayel decided not to sign the accord with the United States, but his decision did little to improve his position. The hostility toward Gemayel was exacerbated when he sent the Lebanese army into West Beirut and the Shiite suburbs to the south. Meanwhile, the Druze of the Shouf Mountains, tired of their maltreatment by the Maronites, had risen in revolt. When Gemayel sent in the Lebanese army to reassert control, Druze leaders—seeing the army as a tool of the Christians—launched an artillery assault on Beirut. U.S. president Ronald Reagan interpreted the shelling as an attack on both the Lebanese army and the multinational force that supported it. In September, Reagan ordered the U.S. Sixth Fleet to begin heavy naval bombardment and air attacks on Druze positions. In retaliation, the Amal forces—allied with the Druze—crashed a truck bomb into the U.S. barracks at Beirut International Airport on October 23, 1983, killing 241 marines. This attack caused more U.S. military casualties in one day than any event since the Vietnam War. American intelligence blamed the terrorist group Islamic Jihad. In response to the attack, Reagan ordered the U.S. Navy to launch air strikes against Islamic Jihad outposts in the Beqaa Valley at the beginning of December. Early in 1984, however, the U.S. Marines quietly left Lebanon. All through the autumn of 1983, the AmalDruze forces fought the Phalange and the Lebanese army. Attacks on the army drove it to near-complete dissolution by February 1984. Indeed, the rise of Shiite power under Amal represented a decisive shift in the balance of forces in Lebanon. Allied with Syria, the Shiites were able to thwart the signing of yet another peace agreement with Israel and had compelled the multinational force, including U.S. Marines, to leave Lebanon. These developments strengthened Syria’s hand in the country, as Assad consolidated his hold on Lebanon. Yet another development in the factionalized world of Lebanese politics emerged in 1984 and 1985 with the rise of militant Shiite Muslim elements allied with Iran. The United States had withdrawn its troops from Lebanon in February 1984, after which Shiite militants kidnapped CIA station chief William Buckley and other Americans. The Reagan administration sought a secret accommodation with Iran, offering it weapons (for use in its war against Iraq) in exchange for the release of the hostages. When the

Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–19 9 0

secret deal was revealed as part of the larger IranContra scandal, many Americans were outraged, and Reagan was forced to confess his error publicly. In Lebanon, still further conflicts were taking place. In 1987, Amal and Druze forces, erstwhile allies, began fighting one another after the Shiite Islamic group Hezbollah attacked the more moderate Amal forces. The pro-Iranian Hezbollah had earlier formed an alliance with the Druze against the pro-Syrian Amal. With its Amal allies under siege, Syria went into action, invading West Beirut in a massive assault and engaging remnants of the Lebanese army and its Christian allies in extremely heavy fighting that continued on and off into the summer of 1989.

Cease-fire and Peace In May 1989, the Tripartite Arab Committee on Lebanon was established at an emergency Arab summit and came up with a plan to finally end the fighting. The United States and many prominent Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, supported the plan. But when the cease-fire agreement did not require Syrian forces to leave the country, Christian army commander Michel Aoun rejected it. In September, the committee proposed a new plan of “national reconciliation” that was accepted by Syria and the various Lebanese Muslim groups and established a cease-fire that went into effect on September 23. Isolated internationally, Aoun was forced to go along. At a session of the Lebanese parliament held in Taif, Saudi Arabia, leaders of the various factions hammered out a plan calling for an equal distribution of seats between Christians and Muslims. Although the Taif accord brought Lebanon’s destructive civil conflict to an end, Syria retained power over Lebanon’s government, and Syrian troops remained in Lebanon. Fighting continued in the Christian camp between Maronite forces and Aoun’s Lebanese army; the Maronites felt that Aoun had betrayed them. Even so, the various factions in parliament officially ratified the Taif accord in August 1990. In March 1991, the Lebanese government drew up a plan for disbanding all militias and deployment of a new Lebanese army—carefully balanced among the various factions in country—throughout Lebanon. Syria remained adamant, refusing to evacuate its forces from Lebanon until Israel withdrew its troops from the Golan Heights in Syria.

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Lebanon began the long process of rebuilding. Many forward-thinking professionals, such as billionaire Rafik Hariri, who became prime minister in 1992, assumed leadership roles and steered Lebanon on a course of reconstruction. Although the nation moved dramatically in the direction of sustained peace and succeeded in rebuilding its economy and establishing a parliamentary democracy, problems remained. First and foremost, the country was still occupied by two outside forces—the Syrians in the Beqaa Valley in the east and Israel in the south. The Israelis refused to give up a security barrier against terrorist attacks along its northern border, and its troops remained locked in a bitter guerrilla struggle with Hezbollah forces. Finally in 1998, addressing growing public disaffection with the Lebanon occupation, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu broached the idea of withdrawing from Lebanon. His successor, Prime Minister Ehud Barak, acted on the proposal. In May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon. Still, Israeli troops continued to skirmish with Hezbollah in the north of Israel, and Israel’s relations with Lebanon remained tense. The Lebanese marked Israel’s withdrawal as a national holiday. The Israelis left military equipment that Hezbollah and Lebanon’s security forces seized and subsequently paraded as signs of a Lebanese victory over the fleeing Israelis. Syria removed its troops gradually but still retained significant control of Lebanese politics. Many Lebanese officials, including Emile Lahoud, who became president in 1998, were backed by Syria. Others, including Hariri, who served from 1992 to 1998, then returned to office in 2000, opposed Syrian control of Lebanon. Lebanese and international calls for Syrian withdrawal increased as Lebanon rebuilt its economy and infrastructure. In 2004, the UN Security Council voted for the removal of all troops and the end of outside influence on Lebanese politics. Nevertheless, Syria’s troops remained. In early 2005, Lebanon finally became free of Syrian occupation, but the withdrawal resulted from tragedy: on February 15, former prime minister Hariri was assassinated by a car bomb. Many Lebanese and members of the international community blamed Syria because Hariri had opposed Syrian influence and favored Lebanese political liberty. Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s president, denied any involvement. Thousands of Lebanese demonstrated against Syria, and interna-

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tional calls for the end of Syrian occupation grew. Many anti-Syrian candidates were elected after Hariri’s death, and the United Nations and Lebanese government demanded that Syria remove its forces. Assad acceded to the demands, and the last Syrian troops left by April. In October 2005, a United Nations investigation into Hariri’s assassination alleged considerable Syrian involvement. Assad and members of the Syrian government denied playing any role. Lebanon had taken another step away from outside occupation and toward the liberty to chart its own course. Even then, however, the shadow of Syria still hovered, and the uncertainties of religious and ethnic conflict at home and in the region clouded its future. James Ciment and Brandon Kirk Williams See also: Invasions and Border Disputes; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 2006; Jordan: Civil War, 1970; Lebanon: Civil Conflict, 1958.

Bibliography Abraham, A.J. Lebanon: A State of Siege, 1975–1984. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press, 1984.

Cobban, Helena. The Making of Modern Lebanon. London: Hutchinson, 1985. el Khazen, Farid. The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. Fisk, Robert. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. London: Deutsch, 1990. Khalaf, Samir. Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Little, Douglas. American Orientalism, the United States and the Middle East Since 1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Petran, Tabitha. The Struggle over Lebanon. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987. Picard, Elizabeth. Lebanon: A Shattered Country, Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon. New York: Holmes and Meier, 2002. Rabil, Robert G. Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, & Lebanon. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Rabinovich, Itamar. The War for Lebanon: 1970–1983. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. Scruton, Roger. A Land Held Hostage: Lebanon and the West. London: Claridge Press, 1987. Winslow, Charles. Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society. New York: Routledge, 1996.

LIBYA: Qaddafi Coup,1969 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Coups MEDITERRANEAN SEA

TUNISIA

Benghazi Gulf of Sidra

LIBYA

NIGER Oil field Pipeline

Tobruk

EGYPT

ALGERIA

Tripoli

CHAD 0 0

100

200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

SUDAN

For much of Libya’s history the country was controlled by foreigners: Romans, Ottoman Turks, and, most recently, Italians. Libyan independence came only as a result of World War II. British troops conquered the province from the Italians and administered it as a United Nations trusteeship until 1951, when the UN declared that Libya would be granted its independence. On December 24, 1951, Libya became an independent state, with a constitutional monarchy led by King Muhammad Idris. King Idris had been a hero to the Arab nomads. He had fought against Italy during its attempt to subjugate Libya (1911–1943), first internally and later from exile in Egypt. He was also the traditional leader of the Sanusiyah, an Islamic mystical brotherhood, which had been strong in the province of Cyrenaica (in eastern Libya). King Idris’s government was extremely conservative and authoritarian. The constitution allowed for a bicameral legislature, but Idris had the power to appoint many of its members and could dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) at will. Idris relied upon the support of the Arab tribes, the tradi-

tional chiefs, and the Muslim establishment to maintain himself in power. The greatest resistance to Idris came from within the ranks of the younger Western-educated generation that was a part of Libya’s growing middle class. This younger generation was strongest in Tripolitania (western Libya). In 1952, this region rallied to the banner of the National Congress Party, which won elections in the coastal cities but lost in the Arab countryside and so were defeated. Riots by angry Congress Party supporters followed. King Idris outlawed the party and exiled its leader. Without any significant opposition party, Libya remained politically backward. Politics focused on local quarrels and struggles for influence within the king’s very large family. Too much of Libya’s internal stability rested on the king’s shoulders, and Idris, born in 1890, was not up to the task. Internationally, Libya remained friendly to Western powers. Both the United States and Britain paid a few million dollars a year for the right to have military bases on Libyan soil. Libya also maintained a good relationship with Italy and France, and the latter built military facilities in the Libyan desert. Income from the Western powers was critical to the king’s ability to maintain control over his state.

Economic and Political Unrest Libya’s financial situation changed radically with the discovery of oil there in 1959. The government’s oil revenues went from U.S. $3 million to U.S. $1 billion between 1961 and 1968. By the 1980s, more than two-thirds of Libya’s gross national product would come from oil production. Libya went from being one of the poorest countries in the world to being one of the richest. In the 1960s, growing wealth raised expectations of change among educated Libyans. Many were also frustrated with the king’s pro-Western policies. In an era when Arab countries were rallying together

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Middle East and North Africa

KEY DATES 1951

The UN trusteeship comes to an end as Libya becomes an independent country.

1952

Riots break out as the reformist National Congress Party loses elections to supporters of conservative King Idris; Idris outlaws the Congress Party.

1967

Arab armies lose to Israel in the Six-Day War, stirring up unrest in Libya; Idris responds to the unrest by appointing young reformist politician Abd al-Hami Bakkush as prime minister.

1968

Libyan oil and gas revenues top $1 billion annually.

1969

Idris replaces Prime Minister Bakkush with the more conservative Wannis Qaddafi; in June, Idris and his court leave for an extended rest stay in Greece; young military officers led by Captain Muammar Qaddafi take control of the government in an August-September coup.

against Israel and its Western allies, Libya seemed out of step, still playing host to American and British military bases. Bowing to public pressure, the Libyan government agreed that the United States and Britain would be asked to leave their bases when their leases ran out (in 1971 and 1973, respectively). This did not satisfy the more radical elements in Libya, however, and anti-Western sentiment continued to grow. There was also concern among many Libyans regarding the royal succession since the king had no children, and his nephew and heir, Hassan al-Rida, inspired little loyalty—he was known as “the man without a shadow,” a person of little consequence. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war agitated Libyans further. Students and workers rioted in Tripoli and Benghazi, the U.S. embassy was attacked, and Jews living in Libya were assaulted. (Most of the Jews soon emigrated, many to Israel.) The country was paralyzed by the disorder, and some government ministers fled. Idris responded by appointing a new government headed by Abd-al-Hamid Bakkush. Bakkush put some of the rioters on trial and began some modernization programs, particularly in the military, as a means of satisfying some of their demands. For unknown reasons, perhaps because he was perceived as too progressive and young (he was thirty-five), Bakkush was

replaced in 1969 by Wannis Qaddafi, a more conservative politician.

Coup d’Etat In June 1969 the king and his court went to Greece for what was described as a rest cure. It is possible that the king realized he could no longer control the country and was seeking a safe haven. In any case, he never returned. In August he moved to Turkey, and at the end of the month officers in Libya orchestrated a coup that ended the monarchy. (Idris retired in exile to Egypt, where he died in 1983.) The overthrow of King Idris should not have been unexpected. The Kingdom of Libya was an artificial creation born out of conflicts between the Turks, Italians, and British. Before the 1969 coup Libya had only a limited sense of itself as a nation, and most Libyans felt more loyal to their tribes or even to their villages. The king’s own constituency was the province of Cyrenaica, and the more populous province of Tripolitania had never been completely happy under his government. The coup was organized by a small group of junior officers in the Libyan army. Their leader was a twenty-seven-year-old captain named Muammar Qaddafi. As a young man Qaddafi had been attracted to the Arab nationalist ideas of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel

Libya: Qaddafi Coup, 19 6 9

Colonel Muammar Qaddafi headed a group of revolutionary army officers that overthrew Libya’s King Idris on the night of August 31, 1969. He proclaimed the nation the “Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” (AFP/ Getty Images)

Nasser. While still in secondary school he had discussed with his friends the possibility of overthrowing the monarchy, which they all saw as corrupt. He was also a faithful Muslim, and these two parts of his personal belief system, Islam and Arab nationalism, would form the foundation of his political ideology. In 1964, Qaddafi and some of his fellow conspirators joined the army. They planned from the beginning to infiltrate it from within, and they immediately formed a Free Unionist Officers clique to coordinate their activities. Once in the army, they recruited other young officers who were similarly frustrated by the traditional nature of Libya’s government. In 1969, Qaddafi and twelve of his fellow officers felt they were ready to act. On the evening of August 31, 1969, the conspirators and the troops they commanded—which included some of the newly created motorized units— seized control of the radio stations, key military bases, and the airports in Libya’s major cities. Some members of the royal family were arrested, along with a number of government officials. There was al-

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most no fighting, with only a few shots being fired at the airport, a few police stations, and a military base at Garnada. By the morning of September 1, the officers were in charge of the country. Then Qaddafi and his fellow officers formed themselves into the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), with Qaddafi as their chairman. They announced that the monarchy was over and that the Kingdom of Libya had become the Libyan Arab Republic. There was no organized resistance to the seizure of the government. At 7:30 a.m., Qaddafi announced to Libya, “In response to your own will, fulfilling your most heartfelt wishes . . . your armed forces have undertaken the overthrow of the reactionary and corrupt regime.” The most heartfelt feeling of the majority of Arabs in Libya was surprise; they cooperated because there was no center of resistance, but they were more apathetic than enthusiastic. Qaddafi and his allies represented the small educated elite in Libya, but most Libyans did not share their dreams of Arab nationalism or an Islamic revival. With the king out of the country, however, there was no national symbol around which resistance to the RCC could be rallied. Moreover, many Libyans agreed with at least some of its complaints. They hadn’t liked the pro-Western stance of their government, and they suspected (correctly) that many of the king’s ministers were lining their own pockets with oil wealth.

Aftermath Once it was clearly in control, the RCC appointed a mostly civilian government but kept it under close supervision. During its first month in power the RCC kept its membership anonymous, out of a fear of possible assassination attempts. Qaddafi revealed himself to the public in October, but his colleagues did not give up their anonymity until the following year. Over the next ten years Qaddafi would solidify his control over Libya. Military men loyal to Qaddafi replaced civilians in the government. His RCC colleagues remained important partners into the late 1970s but were gradually superseded as Qaddafi built a cult of personality around himself. In 1976 he declared that Libya’s name had again changed, this time to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ( jamahiriya translates roughly as “state of the masses”). He declared a new cultural revolution built around

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the three-volume Green Book he had written, which supposedly provided the solution for Libya’s—and the world’s—problems. The volumes were titled “The Solution of the Problem of Democracy,” “The Solution of the Economic Problem,” and “The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory.” In practice, Qaddafi’s internal policies were a mix of socialism, Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism, but guided by Qaddafi’s own unique vision. There were numerous coup d’état attempts against his government, some led by former members of the RCC, but none were successful. Every few years would see another spate of arrests and executions targeting those who opposed Qaddafi. In foreign policy, Qaddafi’s takeover led to a sharp anti-Western shift in Libyan policy. His government nationalized the oil wells that had been owned by Western corporations, Western technicians and workers were expelled, and the country began a policy of providing support to anti-Western groups around the world. Qaddafi’s main targets were usually the United States or Britain—President Ronald Reagan announced in 1981 that he had been the target of a roving Libyan hit squad. Qaddafi, however, also took aim at his neighbors, including Chad, Sudan, and Egypt. At the same time Libya was accused

of planning terrorist bombings. The United Nations approved sanctions against Libya for planting a bomb in Pan American Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, killing all aboard. In 2003, Qaddafi’s government accepted blame for that terrorist incident and deposited $2.7 billion for the benefit of the survivors. Later that year, Libya announced plans to discontinue its programs for developing weapons of mass destruction. In short, the Libyan coup replaced an archaic and inefficient monarchy with an erratic near-totalitarian dictatorship under the control of an eccentric philosopher. By 2006, however, Qaddafi had become the longest-serving head of state in the world, having outlasted many of his detractors around the world. Carl Skutsch See also: Coups; Libya: U.S. Air Attacks, 1986.

Bibliography First, Ruth. Libya: The Elusive Revolution. New York: Penguin, 1974. Simons, G.L. Libya: The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Wright, John. Libya, A Modern History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

LIBYA: U.S. Air Attacks,1986 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Terrorism and International Incidents U.S. Sixth Fleet

TUNISIA

Gulf of Sidra

LIBYA

EGYPT

ALGERIA

Tripoli

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

NIGER 0 0

100

200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

CHAD

SUDAN

In 1969, a young Libyan army officer, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, overthrew the pro-Western king of Libya. Qaddafi immediately began to antagonize Western interests with his nationalist rhetoric and ideologically based program that combined Arabism and socialism. He quickly nationalized the holdings of various foreign corporations, including those involved in the critical gas and oil industry. Libya was and is the second largest producer of hydrocarbon resources in North Africa, after neighboring Algeria. Throughout the 1970s, Qaddafi was suspected of supporting Middle East terrorist organizations involved in a variety of actions against European, Israeli, and even American targets overseas. The early 1980s brought skirmishes with the United States over access to the Gulf of Sidra, which Libya claimed as territorial waters and the United States regarded as international waters. In August 1981, two Libyan fighter planes engaged two U.S. Navy jets over the gulf, and the U.S. planes shot down their attackers. In March 1982, with relations deteriorating even further, the Ronald Reagan administration declared a ban on Libyan oil imports.

The incident that finally provoked planned U.S. military action against Libya came on April 5, 1986. At 1:50 a.m., a massive bomb went off at La Belle Club, a discotheque in West Berlin often frequented by off-duty U.S. military personnel. There were 500 people in the club at the time the bomb exploded. Two people were killed: a Turkish woman and an American soldier. In addition, some 150 were wounded, including between 50 and 60 Americans. The attack came just three days after a bomb exploded aboard a Trans World Airlines flight from Rome to Athens, in which four Americans had been killed. While authorities in both the United States and West Germany were hesitant to connect the two incidents, West German security forces suggested the possibility that the Libyan People’s Bureau in East Berlin—the Libyan name for its embassy—might have been involved in planning and carrying out the discotheque attack. The Libyans were widely suspected because of their alleged involvement in a series of hijackings and other terrorist incidents since mid-1985 and because of increasing tensions over the Gulf of Sidra. As early as 1973, Qaddafi had declared a “line of death” in the Gulf—the crossing of which would invite attack— outside the international standard of twelve miles (22 km) from shore. In early 1986, to assert international navigational rights, the Reagan administration sent three aircraft carriers and support ships from the Sixth Fleet into the Gulf. On March 24, Libyan forces fired several missiles at the ships. U.S. forces retaliated by destroying a missile radar installation and sinking several Libyan patrol boats. Tensions rose further as a result of the terrorist attacks in early April, though Libya continued to deny involvement. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia said that the Libyan government had approached him to act as a mediator to smooth relations with the United States but that the United States refused to respond to his overtures. Following this rejection, Qaddafi vowed to maintain a hard line against the Americans,

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Middle East and North Africa

KEY DATES 1969

Radical young military officers, led by Captain Muammar Qaddafi, overthrow the eighteen-year-old monarchy in a largely bloodless coup.

1981

Disputes over the right of U.S. warships to patrol the Gulf of Sidra off Libya lead to dogfights between U.S. and Libyan fighter aircraft; the United States sends aircraft carriers to the Gulf that are fired upon by Libyan missiles; the United States retaliates by destroying Libyan radar stations and patrol boats.

1982

Amid ongoing diplomatic tensions over Qaddafi’s territorial claims in the Gulf of Sidra and his alleged support of international terrorism, the United States declares an embargo on the Libyan oil industry.

1986

On April 5, a large bomb explodes in a West Berlin discotheque popular with U.S. military personnel, killing an American soldier and a Turkish woman and wounding more than 150 other people; President Ronald Reagan claims Qaddafi’s government is involved; on April 14, U.S. fighter planes in Britain and aboard aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Sidra launch aerial attacks against military and government targets around the capital of Tripoli, including a Qaddafi residence; Qaddafi claims the United States killed his adopted daughter in the attack.

meeting with a number of known terrorists from Palestinian and other Middle Eastern organizations. Contributing to the increasingly hostile situation between Libya and the United States was the war in neighboring Chad. For three months, that country had been involved in a civil war between pro-Western— specifically, pro-French—and pro-Libyan contingents. Western experts insisted that thousands of Libyans were involved in the conflict, with the long-term aim of carving off a strategic strip of land along the Libyan border. While Qaddafi denied the charge of seeking territorial gain, he did admit the presence of Libyan troops in the country, saying that Libyans and Chadians had a long history of military cooperation and that many Libyans lived in Chad and vice versa.

Air Attacks By April 13, it was said that the Reagan administration had decided on an “appropriate” response to what it termed Libyan “provocations” in both Chad and Europe, but officials refused to explain what that

response would be. Meanwhile, both Vice President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz went on trips abroad to explain to allies in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East the reasons for a U.S. response. A day later, in the early morning of April 14, the United States launched a series of air strikes against what it called “terrorist centers” and military bases in Libya. Nearly three dozen jets set off from American bases in Great Britain and from the aircraft carriers America and Coral Sea in the Mediterranean. The five targets of the attack were all in the region of the Libyan capital of Tripoli and included the naval academy, air bases, and a barracks said to be Qaddafi’s personal headquarters. Libya claimed it had shot down three American jets in the attack, but the Americans denied this, insisting that only one plane remained missing. Libyan authorities claimed that fifteen people had been killed in the raids and another sixty wounded. Among the dead was Qaddafi’s own adopted fifteenmonth-old daughter, fueling speculation that the raids

Libya: U.S. Air Attacks, 19 8 6

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An F-14 Tomcat fighter stands poised on the deck of the aircraft carrier Saratoga in the days before U.S. air strikes against Libyan military installations in April 1986. The mission was dubbed Operation El Dorado Canyon. (U.S. Navy/ Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

had actually been an assassination attempt against the Libyan leader, a charge vehemently denied by U.S. officials. Several other members of Qaddafi’s family, living in tents inside the barracks grounds, were reported to have been wounded, though these claims could not be confirmed. Meanwhile, Western reporters in the Libyan capital said that several large bombs had fallen on civilian areas near the military installations, damaging houses in a six-block area and destroying some six apartment buildings and homes. The bombs also damaged the French Embassy, though no one was seriously injured there. Qaddafi disappeared from public view after the attack—though he did appear a day later on Libyan television to condemn Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for murdering children. President Reagan announced in a televised address that the attack was in response to what had been proved to be a “direct” Libyan role in the bombing of the West Berlin discotheque two weeks earlier. Although Congress expressed general support for the at-

tack, our allies in Europe were outraged, particularly the French. Indeed, France had denied U.S. planes the right to pass over its territory in carrying out the Libyan attacks from bases in England. Instead, the jets were flown around France and had to be refueled in the air.

Aftermath The diplomatic fallout from the attack was severe in Europe, with many leaders there blaming the United States for acting rashly on unproved allegations of Libyan involvement in the West Berlin bombing. Many Europeans feared that the U.S. attack would prompt more terrorist attacks in their own countries. Indeed, polls across Europe—including Britain, whose government applauded the attack—showed that the vast majority of people condemned the U.S. air raids. Meanwhile, retaliation against Americans and British in the Middle East intensified. Just days after

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the attack, the bodies of an American and two British hostages in Lebanon were found in the street with notes attached, saying that their deaths were in response to the bombing of Tripoli. Across the Middle East, Arab governments condemned the attack, even those conservative governments that had been hostile to Qaddafi in the past. In the long run, however, the bombing of Tripoli did seem to have long-term results favoring U.S. interests. Qaddafi toned down his anti-American rhetoric and, according to U.S. officials, began to restrain the terrorist forces he was supposedly sponsoring. At the same time, however, he maintained tight control

over his country, despite an economic downturn caused by falling oil prices. James Ciment See also: Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Libya: Qaddafi Coup, 1969.

Bibliography European Nuclear Disarmament Campaign. Mad Dogs: The U.S. Raids on Libya. Dover, NH: Pluto Press, 1986. Haley, Edward P. Qaddafi and the United States Since 1969. New York: Praeger, 1984. Simons, G.L. Libya: The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

PALESTINE: First Intifada,1987–1992 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious PARTICIPANT: Israel 0 0

25 25

inside the territories, who were more willing to accept a compromise two-state solution with Israel, from the Palestinians in exile, who continued to insist on the destruction of the Israeli state or even the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine as a precondition for peace. Finally, the intifada forced Jordan, Egypt, and the United States to abandon the solution they had long considered the only viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—a West Bank (and perhaps Gaza) allied to Jordan in a federated state.

50 Miles 50 Kilometers

GOLAN HEIGHTS

SYRIA

Haifa

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

SEA OF GALILEE Jenin Nablus

Jordan

WEST River BANK

Tel Aviv

Ramallah

Jerusalem Gaza

GAZA STRIP

Hebron

Historical Background

DEAD SEA

ISRAEL JORDAN

EGYPT

The mass Palestinian uprising that began in December 1987 and continued into the early 1990s radically altered the political climate in Israel, the Palestinian territories, and the Middle East generally. Known as the intifada (“shaking off ”), the uprising forced the Israeli government and the public to accept an unpleasant truth—that the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank was neither benign nor accepted by the Palestinian people. The uprising also upset the status quo in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), shifting the balance of power to those

On December 8, 1987, an Israeli truck driving on a busy road in the Gaza Strip plowed head on into a car carrying Palestinian laborers, killing several of the occupants. Traffic accidents were not unusual in the overcrowded streets of Gaza, but this one proved different. In the hours that followed the accident, an ugly rumor spread through the towns and camps of Gaza that the Israeli truck driver had been related to an Israeli who had been stabbed to death by a Palestinian in Gaza’s main market a few days earlier. The clear suggestion was that the grisly accident was no accident at all, but a cold-blooded act of revenge. Within days, a wave of demonstrations gripped Gaza and soon spread to the West Bank, especially after a leading Arab newspaper there printed the rumor as an actual news story. Mass demonstrations were nothing new in the Occupied Territories, of course, but this was something new. It was more widespread and intense than anything the authorities had seen before. Israeli Defense Force (IDF) troops began to abandon isolated outposts. Why had a common if fatal traffic accident caused such an outburst? To answer that question, both long- and short-term causes need to be explored. Since Israel’s extraordinary victory over neighboring Arab states in the Six-Day War of June 1967,

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KEY DATES 1967

Israel defeats neighboring Arab states in the Six-Day War, taking possession of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights and control over a large Palestinian population.

1987

An Israeli truck driving in Gaza hits a car, killing several Palestinians, on December 8; pent-up anger at the Israeli population boils over in widespread demonstrations.

1987–1993

Sporadic rioting and fighting between the Palestinian population and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) lead to thousands of deaths, largely of Palestinians.

1993

The Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization reach an agreement calling for gradual establishment of a Palestinian state.

2000

After the failure of the peace process to end the fighting and bring about creation of a Palestinian state, a second intifada begins over a provocative visit of former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to the revered al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

both the West Bank and Gaza had become occupied territories. (The West Bank includes East Jerusalem, which was officially incorporated into the State of Israel in December 1967.) For Israelis, the victory was cause for joy and pride. The holiest site in Judaism— the Western Wall of the Second Temple—was now in Jewish hands, as was the heartland of the ancient Hebrew kingdom of David—Judea and Samaria (that is, the West Bank). For Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, however, 1967 was a moment of terrible disappointment. The 20-year hope of Palestinian refugees that a great Arab-Israeli war would bring them liberation and a return to their homeland—was crushed. An early effort by Yasir Arafat’s Fatah fighters to spark a guerrilla war inside the territories quickly collapsed, defeated by Israeli counter-insurgency forces and by Palestinian apathy, a by-product of their shock at being occupied by the Zionist state. At first, the Israelis considered returning the Occupied Territories to Jordan and Egypt as part of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement, but the Israeli government soon realized that the Occupied Territories might offer a chance for new Jewish settlements. Planners believed that Israelis could occupy the territories benignly while leaving the Palestinians

to run their own affairs. Indeed, early settlements under the Labor government were limited largely to a string of posts along the Jordan River and caused little conflict. Still, other factors were undermining this handsoff approach to occupation. First, there was the question of resources. The West Bank is situated above the largest aquifer in this arid part of the world. Israel immediately moved to tap this underground water source and to deny Palestinians the right to exploit the water further for themselves. Israel forbad Palestinians to dig any new wells or deepen existing wells. As Israeli cities and farms drew off water from the aquifer in large amounts, its level went down, drying up Palestinian wells and rendering more farmland unusable. A second factor concerned settlements. While the Labor government did little to encourage widespread settlement in the Occupied Territories outside of the Jordan Valley, it also did not take action against religious settlers who moved on their own to establish a Jewish presence in places such as Hebron. In addition, of course, Israel had annexed East Jerusalem—a city as significant religiously, culturally, and politically to Palestinians as it was to Jews—declaring it would forever remain the undivided capital of the Jewish state.

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Finally, there was the matter of labor. Virtually every sector of the Israeli economy—agriculture, industry, construction, and services—came to rely heavily on cheap, unorganized Palestinian labor. At the same time, Israeli manufacturers found the Palestinians a profitable captive market for their goods, which were often not competitive in international markets. Though each side came to be dependent on the other economically, the Israelis benefited most. Palestinians claimed that their increasing economic dependency was created through conscious acts of the Israeli government, which passed laws making it virtually impossible for Palestinians to expand their businesses or farms. Israelis countered that the growing entanglement of the two economies was simply an outcome of market forces, as the more dynamic Israeli economy drew Palestinian laborers and customers into its orbit. In either case, the entanglement had important non-economic repercussions. First, it introduced many Palestinians from the territories to the more open political and social climate of Israel, undermining the traditional authority of the Palestinian family and village. Second, it caused the younger generation of Palestinians to view their elders and leaders as servants of the Israeli occupiers. Finally, it introduced Palestinians to the indignities and frustrations of dealing with the Israeli Civil Administration (CA), the governmental agency established to run the territories. Virtually everything Palestinians might want to do—go to a university, drive a car, build a house— required them to go through the bureaucratic maze of the CA. Of course, this was true for Israelis, too, since their country remained one of the most bureaucratic in the non-Communist world. Israelis, however, knew the language, understood the rules, and often had family or political connections. Finally, because it was their own government, they could express their frustration politically. Palestinians could not. Moreover, although Israeli bureaucrats were often uncooperative with their Israeli clients, they were positively hostile and obstructive to Palestinians. The good news was that everyone was seeing some economic progress, even though Palestinians and Israelis had different explanations. The Israelis claimed credit for the better times, while the Palestinians said part of the growth could be traced to money sent home to the Occupied Territories by thousands of Palestinian exiles who had been driven out by the Israeli conquest.

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Occupation Under Likud The problems of the occupation were soon put into the spotlight by political changes in Israel. In 1977, the conservative Likud coalition took power, ending nearly 30 years of continuous Labor party government. Prime Minister Menachem Begin and his chief adviser, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, had a very different vision of Israel and its relationship to the territories. They saw the territories—and particularly the West Bank, which they referred to consistently as Judea and Samaria—as an integral part of Israel. Almost immediately, they made it a priority to establish both secular and religious settlements in the territories. Over the next 15 years, they would establish dozens of settlements with over 140,000 settlers throughout the West Bank and Gaza (not to mention some 180,000 settlers in annexed East Jerusalem). Accelerated settlement-building deepened Palestinian frustration and anger in several ways. First, most of the new developments were built on Palestinian lands expropriated by legal and extra-legal means. Second, the settlements required an elaborate defensive infrastructure for protection. Before the new settlements were established, Palestinians had become inured to the indignities they experienced in Israel and at the “green line”—the border between Israel proper and the territories. They knew that once they crossed the green line, they could escape most Israeli bureaucratic and military oversight and intrusiveness. Now, to protect the new settlements, the Israeli bureaucracy and military were everywhere. To make matters worse, many of the new settlers proved to be contemptuous of and violent toward Palestinians, even their close neighbors. Perhaps, much of this could have been tolerated if the economic good times had continued. However, by the mid-1980s, a combination of factors had conspired to undermine the economy for Israelis and Palestinians alike. First, a general economic downturn in the region—following the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s—brought a steep drop in cash received from Palestinians working in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Second, the building of settlements had stretched the Israeli economy to the limit, creating hyperinflation and high unemployment, factors that hit the Palestinian working class the hardest. Economic hardship now made political disenfranchisement and daily humiliation intolerable.

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For its part, the PLO—now with headquarters in faraway Tunis, after having been expelled from Lebanon in 1982—seemed increasingly out of touch with the daily experience of Palestinians in the territories. Its well-paid leaders appeared complacent, and its emphasis on sumud, or forbearance on the part of the Palestinians in the territories, was no longer a viable strategy. The PLO’s disconnectedness, however, was not just a matter of distance and datedness; it was inherent in the politics of the organization. Dominated by refugees who had been driven out of Israel in 1948 or in 1967, the PLO emphasized an allor-nothing policy—that is, the destruction of the Zionist state and its replacement by a secular, Arabdominated state. By the 1980s, the Palestinians of the territories found this position untenable and utopian. They simply wanted to get Israeli authority off their backs.

Protests Begin The intense desire to be free of Israeli domination could be seen in the Palestinians’ rising disregard for their own safety in the face of Israeli authority and power. The Israeli Civil Administration noted that the number of riots and demonstrations had tripled from 1986 to 1987 and were often dominated by youths seemingly unaffiliated with any official Palestinian organization. Moreover, the Israeli Defense Force noted a worrisome shift in the attitude of demonstrators, who jeered at armed troops and dared them to fire. Hopelessness had produced fearlessness, a sense among many Palestinians that they had nothing to lose. Thus, when the demonstrations began in early December 1987, there seemed to be no stopping them. Virtually everyone in positions of authority outside the territories—the Israelis, the PLO, and the international community—was caught by surprise. The Israeli government assumed the rioting would quickly die down, as it always had in the past. So did Yasir Arafat and the rest of the PLO leadership. Indeed, Arafat’s name for the demonstrations—intifada or “shaking off ”—suggested his dismissive attitude. Outsiders dismissed the significance of the early protests because of who was doing the protesting. They were the poorest and most alienated members of the Palestinian community, including migrant laborers who lived in the refugee camps and slums of

Gaza and the West Bank but traveled to Israel to find work. What started as a burst of anger and frustration soon turned into a more organized protest, however, with a more coherent strategy and more clearly enunciated demands. This transformation was effected by a new, disciplined underground leadership within the territories. Calling themselves the Unified National Leadership (UNL), they issued leaflets calling for specific demonstrations and later strikes by businesses and workers. They were soon joined by leaders of the political groups Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Soon this leadership also gained the cooperation of the PLO. Each honored the calls for protests and strikes by the other. At the same time, the UNL and the Islamists agreed that their leadership extended to the territories only. Neither questioned the overall authority of the PLO, and neither would usurp Arafat’s exclusive right to negotiate with the Israelis over larger issues, if that opportunity should ever arise.

Israeli Response The Israelis, however, were hardly willing to talk. Indeed, it took the government some time to recognize the severity of the intifada and even longer to find ways to deal with it. Its first efforts involved openly shooting down unarmed protesters. (The UNL and other intifada leaders had made it clear early on that they would employ no weapons outside of rocks and the occasional Molotov cocktail.) This produced embarrassing images—viewed around the world via television—of heavily armed Israeli troops gunning down young boys and even girls on the streets. Rubber bullets were then issued, but these proved nearly as lethal as regular bullets because the fearless protesters were so near the troops. When clubs were issued, images emerged of troops beating up children. It was a no-win situation for Israel’s carefully cultivated image in the United States and the West, but it was one they were bringing on themselves. At first, the Likud government issued a notolerance policy. If a Palestinian flag was raised, troops tore it down. If a store honored a strike, soldiers forced it to open. Victory gardens—aimed at undercutting dependence on Israeli-supplied food—were torn up. Gradually, the Israelis moved to more subtle tactics. Mass arrests and detentions were conducted more clandestinely, and collective punishment was

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Demonstrators in the West Bank town of Nablus wave the Palestinian flag, carrying the image of PLO leader Yasir Arafat, during a street clash with Israeli police in January 1988—early days of the intifada against Israeli occupation. (Sven Nackstrand/AFP/Getty Images)

circumscribed in its application. Most importantly, the government managed to infiltrate and arrest the UNL leadership. Imprisonment, however, sometimes encouraged new radicalism, as young protesters learned in jail from veteran leaders. Still, despite the determination of the Palestinians, Israeli power proved too overwhelming to be confronted directly.

Impact The intifada did not bring a revolution, but it did have a direct effect on Israel’s policies of occupation, many experts believe. Even though much of the Israeli public paid little attention to the ongoing protest after the first few months, the intifada was taking its toll on Israeli society. First, it was sapping army morale. The Defense Forces had been created to deal with clear-cut threats to the security of Israel—terrorist attacks and the threat of invasion by Arab armies. Now it was expected to do the worst kind of policing, maintaining order in a population

that despised it. Second, the Likud leadership seemed to be incapable of dealing with the twin economic crises wrought by the intifada. As relations with Palestinian workers worsened and security concerns forced the closing of borders between Israel and the occupied territories, Israeli businesses no longer had a ready cheap labor supply or a market for their goods. At the same time, the widely publicized crisis prompted foreign investors to curtail new investment in Israeli enterprises. Thus, in 1992, the Israeli electorate turned to the Labor party for leadership. Labor’s candidate for prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, had served as defense minister in the previous Likud cabinet and had established the “break their bones” policy toward intifada protesters several years earlier. In fact, Labor had selected him because his reputation for toughness would be valuable in working to resolve the crisis that had caused the intifada. Once in office, Rabin began secret negotiations with the PLO. In September 1993, he announced an agreement with

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the PLO to begin a move toward Palestinian autonomy and possible statehood. Realistic hopes would be short-lived. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Israel: War of Independence, 1948–1949; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967; Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990; Middle East Negotiations.

Bibliography Ciment, James. Palestine/Israel: The Long Struggle. New York: Facts on File, 1997. Freedman, Robert, ed. The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World and the Superpowers. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991.

Friedman, Robert. Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlements. New York: Random House, 1992. Gerner, Deborah. One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict over Palestine. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. Grossman, David. The Yellow Wind. New York: Delta, 1988. Kimmerling, Baruch, and Joel Migdal. Palestinians: The Making of a People. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Lockman, Zachary, and Joel Beinin, eds. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation. New York: MERIP, 1989. Said, Edward. The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination: 1969–1994. New York: Random House, 1994. Schiff, Ze’ev, and Yehudi Ya’ari. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel’s Third Front. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

PALESTINE: Second Intifada,2000– TYPE OF CONFLICT: Invasions and Border Disputes; Religious and Ethnic; Terrorism PARTICIPANTS: Israel

Palestinian populated areas Israeli settlements AN S EA

Jenin

ME

WEST BANK

GAZA STRIP

JORDAN

DIT

ERR

ANE

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

ISRAEL

Ramallah

ISRAEL

Jerusalem Bethlehem Hebron

EGYPT

RED SEA

SINAI

Green Line Existing or approved barrier

On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, then the leader of Israel’s main opposition party, Likud, visited Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, or Haram al-Sharif, a site holy to both Jews and Muslims. One side holds the Western, or Wailing, Wall of the Second Jewish Temple, destroyed by the Romans in the first century c.e. It is the holiest site in Judaism. On top of the mount is the Al-Aqsa Mosque, where the Prophet Muhammed is said to have ascended to heaven. Aside from Mecca

and Medina, the Al-Aqsa Mosque is Islam’s holiest place. Sharon’s visit to the grounds of the mosque, in the company of bodyguards and party officials, was highly provocative to Palestinians and other Muslims. It set off a wave of violence that gripped both Israel and the Occupied Territories for several years— indeed, through the mid-2000s. This period of violence is often referred to as the Al-Aqsa, or Second, Intifada. (Intifada is an Arabic word that means “shaking off,” as in shaking off Israeli occupation.) The First Intifada began in the late 1980s and largely subsided in the early 1990s, particularly after Palestinian and Israeli negotiators signed the Oslo Accords in

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KEY DATES 1993

Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization sign the Oslo Accords, calling for a two-state solution to the conflict between them.

1995

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, signer of the accords, is assassinated by a fundamentalist Jew opposed to giving up Jewish land.

2000

In July, at Camp David, Yasir Arafat refuses to sign on to an agreement by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, granting Palestinians 95 percent of the Occupied Territories; on September 28, opposition Likud leader Ariel Sharon visits the grounds of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, sparking a second intifada.

2002

In retaliation for Islamist suicide bombings, Israeli forces launch a major offensive against territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority.

2004

Arafat dies in November; he is replaced as leader of the Palestinian Authority by Mahmoud Abbas.

2005

In August, Israel removes its settlements from Gaza; in November, Sharon announces formation of a new political party, Kadima.

2006 On January 4, Sharon suffers a major stroke, putting him in a coma and ending his political career; on January 25, the militant Islamist party Hamas wins a majority in the Palestinian parliament.

1993, calling for a gradual end to the occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state.

Background To understand how a visit by an Israeli politician, no matter how provocative, led to years of violence— which had claimed more than 3,800 Palestinian and nearly 1,000 Israeli lives by the beginning of 2006— requires an examination of the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the years since the Oslo Accords. The result of months of secret negotiations, the accords were signed with hope and fanfare on the White House lawn in September 1993 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat. The agreement called for a withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, to be replaced by a Palestinian governing entity known as the Palestinian Authority (PA). The accords also called for a five-year negotiating period

in which the pace of further Israeli withdrawals would be worked out and more contentious issues— including the right of return for Palestinian refugees, the future of Jerusalem, and the fate of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories—would be addressed. While moderates in both camps hailed the Oslo Accords as a significant step forward, hard-liners on both the Israeli and Palestinian side were opposed to the compromises inherent in them. While the PLO committed itself publicly to a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Israel, many religious Palestinians— especially members of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas parties—were opposed to any agreement that allowed Israel to continue occupying any Islamic lands, including territories inside Israel’s pre-1967 border. Meanwhile, fundamentalist Jews—many of them in the 150,000-strong settler community—believed that Gaza and the West Bank (particularly the latter) were part of what they called Eretz Yisroael, the Land of Israel promised to Jews by God. In other words, ex-

Palestine: Second Intifada, 2000–

tremists on both sides were opposed to the two-state solution implicit in the Oslo Accords. Even as the Oslo Accords were being negotiated and implemented in the first half of the 1990s, Islamic Jihad and Hamas were engaged in bitter fighting with the Israeli forces as they prepared to disengage from parts of Palestine in anticipation of PA elections in 1996. In that voting, Arafat and his Fatah wing of the PLO scored an overwhelming victory, in part because Islamic Jihad and Hamas largely boycotted the polling. By 1996, the two latter organizations had launched a devastating terrorist bombing campaign inside Israel, killing more than seventy persons in February and March alone. Meanwhile, the IDF was carrying out targeted killings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad officials, while Jewish fundamentalists in the settler community were attacking Palestinians. In 1994, a religious fundamentalist named Baruch Goldstein killed fourteen Muslim worshippers at a mosque in Hebron. The following year, Prime Minister Rabin himself was assassinated by a fundamentalist Israeli Jew who claimed that the murder was revenge for Rabin’s signing of the accords and surrendering “Jewish territory.” The violence on both sides led to great uncertainty in the Jewish electorate and the victory of hard-liner Benjamin Netanyahu in the 1996 national elections. Under his regime, and with violence continuing on both sides, implementation of the Oslo Accords essentially ground to a halt. Continuing terrorist activity by Palestinians angered Israelis, and the continuing expansion of Jewish settlements on the West Bank frustrated Palestinians. Three years of violence finally proved too much for Israelis, who in 1999 voted to install Labor Party candidate Ehud Barak as prime minister. A former hard-liner and general like Rabin, Barak also promised a negotiated settlement to the Palestinian conflict. Importantly, he was assisted in that mission by U.S. president Bill Clinton. In July 2000, Barak and Arafat were invited to the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland for a marathon negotiating session. There, Barak went further than any previous Israeli leader in making concessions to the Palestinians, including granting them control of 95 percent of the Occupied Territories. To many Palestinian officials, however, the offer was not as generous as it appeared; the 5 percent over which Israeli would retain control divided the territories into largely noncontiguous parts, allowing the IDF to maintain overriding authority. Moreover, Israel retained all but total control

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over Jerusalem, including the eastern half, which Palestinians insisted must be the capital of a future Palestinian state. Arafat ultimately rejected the deal, but he was not alone. Many Israeli hard-liners were also unhappy with the plan, seeing it as giving up too much territory and security.

Suicide Bombings and I D F Attacks One of the Israeli opponents was Ariel Sharon, a mythic figure to his countrymen (having led the IDF to many outsized victories against Arab foes over the years) but a villain to Palestinians (who blamed him for the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian refugees at the Sabra and Shatila camps in Lebanon in 1982). Sharon’s visit to the grounds of the Al-Aqsa mosque in September 2000 has been viewed by many outside observers as at once a deliberate provocation, a way to assert Israeli control over East Jerusalem, and a way to undermine any chance for a new round of Camp David talks. In the immediate aftermath of his visit, Palestinian protestors, many of them children and youth, clashed with heavily armed IDF troops. On September 30, IDF soldiers shot and killed a twelve-yearold Palestinian boy. Caught on camera, the shooting was televised around the world and was a major public relations disaster for the Barak government. But it was the continuing violence sparked by Sharon’s visit—along with Arafat’s rejection of a Camp David agreement—that led to Barak’s downfall in the February 2001 election and the victory of Sharon and his hard-line Likud party. The new government immediately implemented a tougher, military approach to the Palestinians, launching air attacks against targets in Gaza for the first time. Unlike the First Intifada, which was largely confined to clashes between Palestinian protesters and the IDF in the Occupied Territories, the Second Intifada was far more violent and far more deadly, particularly for Israelis, who had largely escaped heavy casualties in the first one. In 2001 and early 2002, Palestinian terrorists—especially those connected with Islamist terrorist organizations—launched a new wave of suicide bombings in Israel. On June 1, 2001, an attack by Islamic Jihad on a Tel Aviv disco left twenty-one dead; in August, fifteen were killed by a Hamas bomber at a Jerusalem restaurant; in December, a Palestinian suicide bomber destroyed a Haifa

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The so-called “second intifada,” the uprising against Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories since 2000, brought an escalation in weaponry and violent tactics. Here, masked Palestinian militants display explosives to be used in suicide bombings. (Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP/Getty Images)

bus, killing fifteen; and on March 27, 2002, a Hamas bomber blew himself up at a Passover celebration in a Netanya hotel, killing twenty-eight. Sharon’s government retaliated in a massive way in early April, effectively tearing up the Oslo Accords and launching a major IDF offensive in territories previously under PA control. In Bethlehem, Palestinian fighters were trapped by the IDF in the Church of the Nativity, among the holiest sites for Christians. Fearing bad publicity if they launched an attack on the church but not wanting to give up the wanted militants, the IDF laid siege to the church and the militants inside until May 10. Meanwhile, in Ramallah, the IDF severely damaged and then laid siege to Palestinian Authority headquarters, trapping Arafat and other PA leaders inside. Arafat remained largely inside the compound until shortly before his death from natural causes in a Paris hospital in November 2004. But the worst of the fighting occurred at the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank, where, according to the Sharon government, numerous Islamist terrorists

were stationed in preparation for attacks on Israel. In brutal house-to-house fighting and a series of aerial bombings, much of the camp was destroyed, leaving thousands homeless. Palestinians claimed that the IDF was responsible, but Israeli officials claimed that Islamists had booby-trapped many of the buildings. Equally contentious were allegations of massacres of hundreds of Palestinians by the IDF. Ultimately, a UN commission concluded that just fifty-two Palestinians, including twenty-two civilians, died in the Jenin offensive; twenty-three IDF soldiers were also killed. By early May, the offensive into the PA territories was largely over, as IDF tanks and personnel withdrew from heavily populated areas but maintained cordons around them. Clashes continued between troops and protesters, often leading to shootings of the latter. Meanwhile, suicide bombings by Islamist terrorists also continued, including one by Hamas at a social club in the town of Rishon Letzion that killed sixteen. The Sharon government, while not directly blaming Arafat and the PA, argued that the PLO

Palestine: Second Intifada, 2000–

head was secretly encouraging the Islamists to continue their attacks as a way of forcing Israel to make concessions in the advent of further negotiations. For his part, Arafat condemned the bombings but said that, as long as the occupation continued, so would the struggle. Even as Sharon was launching his offensive against Palestinian militants and insisting that he would not negotiate with Arafat as long as the violence continued, he was moving toward a new strategy in resolving the decades-long conflict. Like other hard-line policymakers in Israel, Sharon was beginning to believe that continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza—and the continuing violence it was likely to spawn—was not tenable. For one thing, the higher birth rate among Palestinians would soon create a situation in which Jews were a minority in their own state. Sharon was coming to the same solution that more liberal Israelis had advocated a decade before: two states side-by-side in the territory that had once been Palestine (that is, Israel proper and the Occupied Territories). But Sharon differed from liberals like Shimon Peres, the perennial Labor Party leader and negotiator of the Oslo Accords, in that he wanted to impose a two-state solution unilaterally, on Israeli terms, without negotiations. To that end, in June 2002, the Sharon government began building a security barrier on the West Bank, a 440-mile long “fence” (which Palestinians referred to as a “wall”) that would physically separate Palestinians from Israelis and prevent terrorist infiltration of Israeli territory. While such a barrier had long been discussed in Israeli government circles, it had never been seriously considered before because of settler opposition; the Israelis on the West Bank feared that their homes would fall on the Palestinian side. Sharon answered that opposition by proposing a barrier that would take in the largest blocs of settlement.

Unilateral Israeli Moves Meanwhile, Sharon also kept up attacks on Palestinian militants through selective assassination. While often effective in killing leading Islamist terrorist organizers, leaders, and bomb makers, the attacks also led to the deaths of civilians caught in the crossfire. In July 2002, eighteen Palestinians in a Gaza apartment building were killed when an Israeli jet dropped a bomb intended for Hamas military com-

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mander Salah Shehada. For their part, Palestinians continued their suicide attacks on Israeli civilians, including a double bombing in Tel Aviv that killed twenty-three persons in January 2003 and two Jerusalem bus bombings in June and August that killed thirty-six people. Hamas and Islamic Jihad declared that the bombings were in retaliation for the Israeli assassination of their leaders. As the assassinations and bombings continued, so did construction of the security barrier, despite a July 2004 ruling by the UN’s International Court of Justice that any barrier infringing on Palestinian territory was illegal under international law and that construction must halt. Four months earlier, however, Sharon announced his boldest unilateral move yet: full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, a territory with far fewer settlers (about 5,000 compared to more than 200,000 in the West Bank) and far less biblical significance for Israelis. To win over Israeli legislators and public opinion—and show that he was as tough on Palestinian violence as ever—Sharon then launched a new offensive against Islamist militants in Gaza, assassinating Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the group’s spiritual leader, in an air strike in March 2004 and its secular leader, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, in a missile strike in May. In October, Sharon won a parliamentary vote on the Gaza withdrawal. Major political changes were also occurring on the Palestinian side. On November 11, Yasir Arafat— leader of the Palestinian cause since the late 1960s— died in a Paris hospital and was replaced in January 2005 elections by long-time aide Mahmoud Abbas, widely seen as a moderate. Abbas immediately moved to distance himself from Palestinian militants and prove to Israelis that he was a worthy negotiating partner. Upon his inauguration on January 15, he called for a cease-fire between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces. A week later, he sent hundreds of PA police to the Gaza-Israeli border to prevent militants from firing rockets at Israeli targets. On January 24, he persuaded Islamic Jihad and Hamas leaders to suspend attacks on Israel. And on February 8, Abbas and Sharon, meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, signed a truce calling for a phased return of West Bank territory to the PA, leading to hopes that the peace process might move forward again. But as so often happened in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, hopes for peace were scuttled by extremists. In February, a suicide bombing by Islamic Jihad killed five persons in Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, Palestinians com-

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plained that Israeli settlers in the West Bank continued to expand their settlements. Nevertheless, the Sharon government moved ahead with its plan for disengagement from Gaza, as well as a few tiny Jewish outposts in the far reaches of the West Bank, away from the main settlement blocs. While many Israelis and international observers expected widespread violence between Gaza settlers and IDF troops, most of the settlers left peacefully. The few who had to be forced out by troops did not resort to serious violence. By August 24, 2005, the evacuation of the Gaza settlements was complete. Sharon was now prepared to move forward with a similar plan for the West Bank. Although he indicated that Israel would retain the main settlement blocs, all of Jerusalem, and a security corridor along the Jordan River, disengagement from the West Bank promised to be far more contentious given the larger numbers of settlers involved and the deeper importance of the regions to religiously observant Jews. To skirt opposition in his conservative Likud Party, Sharon in November 2005 formed a new political organization called Kadima (“Forward”), which he intended to lead in 2006 national elections, widely seen as a referendum on the West Bank disengagement plan. Two major events, however, cast the plan in doubt. First was Sharon’s sudden disappearance from the Israeli political scene, as a massive stroke in January 2006 left him in a coma. And while his successor as Kadima leader, Ehud Olmert, vowed to contest the elections scheduled for March and carry on Sharon’s legacy, he, too, faced a major new hurdle, this time coming from the Palestinian side. In a stunning upset, the political wing of Hamas won an overwhelming victory in January 25 elections, gaining a majority of seats in the Palestinian parliament. Olmert and much of the Israeli political establishment reacted with outrage, insisting that they would never negotiate with a terrorist organization that refused to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist. The Israeli government immediately moved to cut off financial resources to the PA

government, a move backed by Israel’s major ally, the United States. The tough Israeli response, according to some observers, may have entailed a measure of posturing on the part of Olmert, who had to appear tough in the face of the Hamas victory to maintain his own political standing. Moreover, the underlying premise of the Sharon-Olmert plan was that a unilateral Israeli disengagement, facilitated by the West Bank security barrier—which reduced terrorist attacks in Israel proper by some 90 percent between 2002 and 2005 and was scheduled to be completed by the end of 2006—no longer required a partner in peace. By that reasoning, the Second Intifada would come to an end on Israeli terms, whether the Palestinians wanted to keep on fighting or not. The chance that one side could unilaterally disengage from a conflict the other side felt compelled to fight—in the face of a unilaterally applied settlement—was something only the future could tell. And, indeed, fighting broke out again after Islamist militants in Gaza kidnapped an Israeli soldier in June 2006. That, and the barrage of homemade rockets from Gaza into southern Israel, triggered an IDF offensive into Gaza in the summer of 2006, which left over 200 Palestinian militants and civilians dead. James Ciment See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Terrorism: Global History Since the 1940s; Israel: War of Independence, 1948– 1949; Israel: Palestinian Struggle Since 1948; Israel: Six-Day War, 1967; Israel: Conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah, 2006; Lebanon: Civil War, 1975–1990; Middle East Negotiations.

Bibliography Cordesman, Anthony H. The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005 Karsh, Efraim. Arafat’s War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest. New York: Grove, 2003. Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians. New York: Verso, 2003. Wasserstein, Bernard. Israelis and the Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.

YEMEN: Civil War,1960s–1980s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonial; Coup; Cold War Confrontation PARTICIPANTS: Egypt; Saudi Arabia ARABIA

RED SEA

Harad Sanaa

FORMER NORTH YEMEN

OMAN FORMER SOUTH YEMEN

YEMEN

Aden

Administrative line

y

Fixed boundary Najran

fined u n de

Bo un da r

SAUDI

0 0

50 50

100 Miles

100 Kilometers

GULF OF ADEN

The Republic of Yemen was formed in 1990 by the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), or North Yemen, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), or South Yemen. The YAR, then known simply as Yemen, had gained independence from Turkish rule at the end of World War I. The PDRY, as the Crown Colony of Aden, had been a British possession from 1830 until 1967, when it was given independence. The country occupies approximately 200,000 square miles in the southeast corner of the Arabian peninsula. This includes the island of Socotra, about 600 miles east of the mainland in the Arabian Sea. North Yemen fronts on the Red Sea, and the south is on the Arabian Sea (Gulf of Aden). Yemen has a population of about 20 million, of whom about 80 percent live in the north. The population, which is largely organized on a tribal basis, especially in the north, is almost entirely Arab and Muslim, both Sunni and Shiite. The capital is Sanaa in the north, while the main port, Aden, is in the south. Yemen is among the world’s poorest countries. Per capita income is estimated at $800 per year. The economy is basically agricultural, with relatively wellwatered and fertile central highland valleys producing primarily sorghum and potatoes, but also wheat, dates, grapes, barley, and khat, a mild narcotic. Coffee

is the main export crop. There are also commercially exploitable quantities of sulfur, iron, lead, and zinc. In the 1980s significant oil discoveries were made in both the north and the south. By the late 1980s production of 200,000 barrels a day was bringing in an estimated $600 million in foreign exchange annually. However, the economy was still dependent to a significant degree on cash sent to Yemen by nationals working in other parts of the world (mainly in the Middle East). Just prior to the first Gulf War in 1991, there were an estimated 1.25 million Yemenis working abroad, but that number was later greatly reduced when Saudi Arabia expelled several hundred thousand Yemeni workers because of Yemen’s support for Iraq during the first Gulf War.

Historical Background The locale of the Kingdom of Saba (the biblical Sheba), Yemen prospered in ancient times from the production of frankincense and myrrh, extracted from scrub plants that grow wild on the coast. That trade ended in the early Middle Ages, and after the rise of Islam, Yemen became a neglected province, usually ruled from Egypt, a situation that continued under the Ottoman Empire. While there was a Turkish governor and administration, actual local rule was exercised by Yemeni imams, combined secular and religious rulers, chosen from the leaders of the most powerful tribes. At the time of independence in 1919, the imam was Yahya Ibn-Muhammed al Din, a Shiite who pursued a policy of anti-modern isolation in order to create a theologically pure Muslim state. Telephones, radio, and newspapers were forbidden. Use of electricity and motor vehicles was discouraged. There was practically no secular education. In the Crown colony (South Yemen) under the British, of course, official attitudes toward modernization were quite the opposite, leading to

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Middle East and North Africa

KEY DATES 1962

The Yemeni Officers Movement (YOM) blocks the accession of Sheik Muhammed al-Badr, son of the recently deceased leader Ahmad al-Din, and proclaims the formation of the Yemeni Arab Republic; Muhammed flees to the northern tribal regions of the country; fighting breaks out between the royalists and republicans; Egypt sends 15,000 troops to defend the republican side.

1964–1965

Major republican and royalist offensives lead to widespread destruction and loss of life.

1967

In the wake of the loss to Israel in the Six-Day War, Egypt withdraws its troops from Yemen; Britain withdraws from Aden, allowing formation of an independent South Yemen, or People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), an ally of the Soviet Union; the lengthy royalist siege of the republican capital of Sana, North Yemen, comes to an end.

1970

Peace talks lead to an agreement whereby royalists and republican forces share the task of administering North Yemen.

1974

A military coup overthrows the North Yemen government.

1986

With the Soviet Union withdrawing its support from the government of PDRY, fighting breaks out between moderate and radical elements in the country, with the moderates emerging triumphant.

1990

North Yemen and South Yemen sign a treaty of unification, leading to national elections in 1993 and the adoption of a new constitution for a unified Yemen in 1996.

development of a radically different political culture whose influence spread to the north. In 1948, modernizing factions in Yemen, some of whose leaders worked from exile in Aden, assassinated Yahya and hoped to set up some form of constitutional rule. However, tribal leaders rallied around Yahya’s son, Ahmad, and managed to restore the old order for another fourteen years. Ahmad saw the Crown colony as both an ideological and territorial threat, as Britain maintained claims to large areas in Yemen in addition to sheltering the imam’s political enemies. To counter the threat he assisted tribal rebels in Aden, and there were continual armed clashes along the border. Since Britain was able to block sale of Western arms, Yemen received weapons and military training missions from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and economic (road-

building) help from China. In 1958, Yemen joined the United Arab Republic (UAR), the short-lived political union of Egypt and Syria, as an affiliated state until 1961. The UAR and its principal sponsor, Egypt, continued to support Yemen both against the British and against Saudi Arabia, which laid claim to lands on Yemen’s northeast frontier. In the end, the forces of nationalism and modernization were too much for Ahmad. When he died, in September 1962, army officers, mostly trained in Egypt and Iraq and organized as the Yemeni Officers Movement (YOM), blocked the accession of his son, Muhammad al Badr (even though Muhammed had the reputation of a modernizer) and proclaimed the Yemeni Arab Republic. Muhammad, however, fled to the northern tribal regions and rallied the conservative

Yemen: Civil War, 19 6 0s–19 8 0s

sheikhs, beginning an eight-year civil war that eventually involved not only regional powers Egypt and Saudi Arabia but also the United States and the United Nations.

Revolution and Civil War The leader of the coup was Colonel Abdullah as-Sallal, who had been in and out of the imam’s prisons for ideologically suspect thinking and, ironically, had been restored to duty through the influence of Muhammad al Badr. Colonel as-Sallal proclaimed himself head of the Revolutionary Council and premier. Abdul Rahman Baidani, sponsored by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, became vice premier. Most of the council and cabinet posts went to members of the YOM and to returning exiles of the Free Yemen movement. There was to be one political party, the National Union, headed by Baidani. The new republic would follow the Egyptian model. The new government faced daunting challenges. Most Western nations withheld recognition, seeing the new Yemen as a manifestation of radical Arab nationalism, a threat to U.S. and European control of Middle East oil, and a new state susceptible to Soviet influence. The internal challenge came from Muhammad al Badr. Financed by Saudi Arabia and King Hussein of Jordan, al Badr raised an army of conservative “Royalists” with a government-in-exile headquartered in the Saudi Arabian Red Sea port of Jeddah and a military command just across the northern border at the Saudi Arabian town of Najran. In the meantime, as-Sallal got strong backing from Egypt. By the end of 1962 there were about 15,000 Egyptian (UAR) troops in Yemen, both training the YAR army and taking the major role in combat operations. Despite early Royalist successes, reducing the Republican forces to control of only the major towns, UAR airpower and artillery made the difference. Saudi Arabia tried to interpose its air force, but many of its pilots defected to the UAR with their U.S.-made aircraft. This forced the Saudis to ground their air force. Likewise, Jordanian pilots, including the chief of staff of the Jordanian air force, defected to the UAR. Muhammad al Badr was able to make effective propaganda, presenting himself as the rightful ruler of Yemen defending his country against a usurper backed by foreign troops. Jordan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact, pledging to go to war

1075

against Yemen if their territory was attacked. There were also a number of clashes with British-led forces along the frontier with Aden. The British were secretly providing monetary and other support to the Royalists, largely as a means of attacking their enemy, Nasser. Egypt, of course, was backing anti-British independence groups in Aden. Internationally, the situation was further confused because both Royalists and Republicans claimed Yemen’s seat in the United Nations. In December 1962, the republic in Sanaa was recognized by the United Nations and the Arab League. The Kennedy administration in the United States, not wanting to be seen in the Arab world as supporting only monarchies, as in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Morocco, and desiring to offset the goodwill China and the Soviet Union were earning through their extensive economic and technical assistance, also recognized the republic and sent an Agency for International Development (AID) mission. However, Washington also continued to provide covert military aid to the Royalists through Saudi Arabia.

Stalemate In 1963, as a result of a U.S. initiative, a UN effort was made to bring about a cease-fire and a settlement. This came to naught, largely because Egypt essentially wanted to have Yemen as a satellite regime through which it could put pressure both on the Saudis and on the British. Throughout the next two years there was an effective stalemate in the fighting. The Republicans continued to hold the major towns and to control the main roads by means of Egyptian tanks and armored vehicles. The Royalists dominated the countryside. There were few pitched battles. Republican troops (the vast majority of which were Egyptian) suffered heavy losses in ambushes. The Royalists were bloodied whenever they attempted to take a town. By July of 1965, it was estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 Yemenis had been killed in the fighting as well as 5,000 to 8,000 Egyptians. Early in 1964, a major Republican offensive looked as if it might bring about an end to the struggle. Most of the Royalist areas were penetrated, and severe casualties were inflicted. Muhammad al Badr was forced to flee from his headquarters, and a round of peace talks began. A cease-fire was proclaimed in November but lasted barely a month. The main problem was

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dissension in the ranks of the Republicans, exacerbated by the fact that Nasser did not disguise his intention to exercise effective control over any postwar Yemeni government. This caused wholesale resignations of nationalists in the Republican government and defections in the military, giving hope to the Royalists that they might yet prevail. They simply withdrew into their Saudi territorial sanctuaries and, with the help of European and British mercenaries, got ready to resume the offensive. The year 1965 was difficult for the Republicans. The new Royalist offensive began in January and made steady progress for six months, with many towns captured. Seriously alarmed at his inability to bring an end to the fighting on terms satisfactory to him, Egyptian president Nasser met in August with the new Saudi king, Faisal, at Jeddah to arrange yet another cease-fire. This time Nasser began a withdrawal of UAR forces, and the two leaders agreed to sponsor a conference in November of all Yemeni factions at Harad, a Yemeni town just south of the Arabian border, near the Red Sea, to form a provisional government and prepare for a plebiscite on the country’s future. However, neither the Republicans nor the Royalists were present at the Jeddah meeting. Both sides did meet on November 23, 1965, but recessed a month later without even being able to agree on an agenda. However, Saudi Arabia and Egypt both seemed serious about their commitment to end their intervention in the conflict. Egypt, in particular, was preparing for renewed war with Israel and was eager to get out of the Yemen quagmire. It began withdrawing its troops at the rate of 10,000 a month. The situation then changed dramatically from Cairo’s point of view. In February 1966, Great Britain announced its plans to withdraw from Aden in the next year and grant independence to the Crown colony. Nasser saw this as the creation of a power vacuum in southern Arabia, one he hoped to fill. By the end of the year, UAR forces were again built up to peak levels, and Egyptian planes resumed bombing of the Royalist sanctuaries in Saudi territory. Colonel as-Sallal, who had been forced to resign as head of the republic earlier because of his total obedience to Nasser’s orders, took the office once again, causing additional defections by nationalist Republicans. Once again, the people of Yemen were held hostage to conflicting Egyptian and Saudi Arabian policies. Tunisia and Jordan, allying themselves with Saudi Arabia, withdrew their recognition of the Yemeni

Arab Republic, and the United States closed its AID mission. In June 1967, the situation in Yemen changed once again as a result of outside events. The Six-Day War with Israel ended in catastrophe for Egypt. By October the last UAR troops were withdrawn from Yemen, and as-Sallal was deposed for the last time, going into exile in Iraq.

End of Civil War With Egypt no longer a factor and as-Sallal removed from the scene, a nationalist Republican government was formed on November 5, 1967, a triumvirate composed of Abdul Rahman Iryani, Ahmed Numan, and Mohammed Othman, all pledged to peace talks with the Royalists and the Saudis. Even imam Muhammed al Badr, still the nominal head of the Royalists, issued a statement calling for negotiations. However, the Royalist field commander, Prince Mohammed Hussein, believed the triumvirate sought peace out of weakness and disregarded al Badr’s offer. On December 1, Hussein’s forces, some 5,000 regular troops with 300 European mercenaries and as many as 50,000 tribesmen, closed in on Sanaa, the capital, which was defended by only about 3,500 Republican soldiers. Fortunately, December was the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, so the Royalists were unable to mount their attack on the unprepared city right away. The Republican commander, Hassan al Amri, used the respite to negotiate the delivery of new supplies, including aircraft, from the Soviet Union and to organize and train a citizen militia of some 10,000 members, the Popular Resistance Front (PRF). Additionally, some 600 National Liberation Front (NLF) fighters arrived from newly independent South Yemen, while more troops were trained and supplies received at the port of Hodeida. The siege of Sanaa lasted for seventy days. Most of the Royalists’ tribal supporters headed for home once they found that serious fighting, instead of looting a helpless civilian population, was involved. Once again, the lack of airpower stymied the Royalists, and when the Saudis were convinced that there would be no easy victory, they cut off their financial aid. By February 8, the siege was over, and the Royalists were in full retreat. In October, the Royalist commander, Qassem Ben Monasser, defected to the Republic, and shortly thereafter all the remaining towns in Royalist hands fell to al-Amri’s forces.

Yemen: Civil War, 19 6 0s–19 8 0s

Aftermath The first order of business for the Republican government, now that the counterrevolutionary military threat was ended, was to mend fences with Saudi Arabia. It deliberately cut back on its ties with the Soviet bloc and sought aid from Western Europe. For its part, the Saudi government arranged negotiations between the republic and the remnants of the Royalists at Jeddah in 1970. At the meeting, Muhammed al Badr formally resigned as imam and went into exile in Great Britain. Once this issue was resolved, the delegates proceeded to the Compromise of 1970. This established a unified central government, with Royalist officials continuing to have administrative powers under the Sanaa government in areas they then controlled. The executive body, the Republican Council, was expanded to give a post to one Royalist member. Three cabinet portfolios were given to Royalists, and the quasi-legislature—the Consultative Council— had eight seats for the Royalists. To make this arrangement satisfactory to the Royalists, the essentially conservative Republican leaders had to crush the more radical Republican elements, many of them drawn from the ranks of the PRF, which had saved the Republican cause during the siege of Sanaa and was now organized as the Revolutionary Democratic Party. This was the case also with the NLF, which had strong ties to what had now emerged in the former Aden, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. These radical reformers would regroup and gain control of the People’s Democratic Republic.

Path to Unification The government formed by the 1970 compromise had as its chief feature a plural executive body, the Republican Council, reflecting not only the division of power between Royalists and Republicans, but also a determination to be done with one-man rule as exemplified by traditional imams. The chairman of the council, Abd al Rahman al Iryani, however, was seen as too much of a compromiser to confront the post–civil war tasks. In 1974, he was overthrown in a military coup headed by Colonel Ibrahim al Hamdi that did away with the political structure of the republic, including the constitution and the single political party, the National Yemeni

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Union. Al-Hamdi had built up a political base under the republic through his control of the ministry that funded local cooperatives. While a dictator, he was a superb politician and a nationalist reformer. Among his objectives was elimination of the power of the tribal leaders, who benefited from local corruption. His program necessarily caused him to rely on the radical reform elements of the old Revolutionary Democratic Party and probably was the cause of his assassination in 1977 and replacement by a more right-wing military leader, Ahmad al Ghashmi. Al Ghashmi appeased the conservative northern tribal leaders and the Saudis by forcing al Hamdi’s main supporters out of office and into exile, but his attempts to extend Sanaa’s rule and modernizing policies into the tribal areas also resulted in his assassination in 1979. He, in turn, was replaced by a relatively junior colonel, Ali Abdullah Salih. Salih, while managing to deal with the tribalists, succeeded in bringing many younger, foreigntrained technicians and administrators into the government, reforming the currency, and establishing the Central Planning Organization. Politically, he moved forward, organizing the first national elections in Yemen’s history in 1988. Finally and most importantly, despite the opposition of Saudi Arabia, he carried through the process of unification with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Unification was not an easy process, but it was made possible by the decline of the PDRY’s major outside support, the Soviet Union, which resulted in 1986 in a fierce and bloody factional struggle in the south in which the moderate socialist elements triumphed, but only after several thousand lives were lost. Another factor was the discovery of major oil and gas fields on the border between north and south and the decision that it made more sense to share the bounty rather than to fight over it. As the result of a treaty of unification signed in May 1990, a thirty-month process of establishing a unified government began. The legislatures of the two countries chose Salih as president and Ali Salem al Beidh, the secretary-general of the PDRY’s governing party, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), as first vice president. A constitution for the unified state was approved in a May 1991 plebiscite, although Islamic groups boycotted the voting because it established a secular state. Finally, in May 1993, a new

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legislature was chosen in universal franchise elections in which even women were able to vote. Unfortunately, six months later the YSP, unhappy about the number of legislative seats it controlled, revolted, but Salih’s forces captured Aden after a twomonth civil war. A new constitution, responding to some of the YSP’s complaints, was adopted on September 28, 1996, and a second successful national election was held in April 1997. David MacMichael

See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; Egypt: Nasser Coup and Its Legacy, 1952–1970.

Bibliography O’Ballance, Edgar. The War in the Yemen. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971. Peterson, J.E. Yemen: The Search for a Modern State. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Wenner, Manfred W. The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

OCEANIA

Oceania Countries in Oceania that have experienced conflict on their own soil since World War II

PA C I F I C

PAPUA NEW GUINEA I

N

D

O

N

E

S

I

A

AUSTR A LIA 0 0

500 500

1000 Miles

1000 Kilometers

SOLOMON ISLANDS

CORAL SEA

INDIAN OCEAN

OCEAN

FIJI

NEW CALEDONIA

FIJI: Ethnic Conflict and Coups Since 1987 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Ethnic and Religious; Coups nese. English is the official language, but Fijians speak a dialect called Bauan, while the majority of Indians speak Hindi. One island in the archipelago, Rotuma, is populated by Polynesians. In terms of religion, Fijians are mainly Christians, and the Indians are predominantly Hindu with a Muslim minority. The economy is based on sugar and tourism. Other principal crops are coconuts, cassava, and rice. Fiji also has mines for gold and other minerals and possesses valuable stands of tropical hardwood trees.

ROTUMA

PA C I F I C OCEAN

SOUTH PA C I F I C OCEAN Labasa

VANUA LEVU

Savusavu Lautoka

VITI LEVU

Levuka

Historical Background

TAVEUNI

F I J I

Suva

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The Republic of Fiji is an archipelago of some 300 islands in the southwestern Pacific Ocean about 1,200 miles south of the equator. Its total land area is 7,095 square miles, of which 87 percent is on the two main islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. The capital city, Suva, with about 160,000 inhabitants, is on Viti Levu. Fiji’s total population is approximately 893,000. The ethnic makeup of Fijians includes the native Melanesian people (currently 51 percent of the population) and Indians (approximately 44 percent). The remainder are chiefly of European or mixed background, including Pacific Islanders and overseas Chi-

The Fiji Islands have been inhabited for at least 3,000 years. They were first sighted by Europeans in the mid-seventeenth century and by the early nineteenth century were attracting European traders seeking the islands’ sandalwood and bêche-de-mer (sea cucumbers prized by the Chinese). Later, Christian missionaries followed the merchants. There was no overall government on the islands. Tribal chiefs were constantly at war. In 1874, one of the two principal chiefs, Cakobau, ceded the islands to Great Britain, which made Fiji a colony. Interested in developing sugar plantations and realizing the Fijians refused to do plantation labor, the British began to import thousands of Indians each year to work in the fields as indentured labor. This process ended only in 1916. At the same time, to protect the native population, the British instituted a parallel system of government, allowing the Fijians to govern their own communities, while the British made law for the colony as a whole. To ensure that outsiders did not cheat the Fijians out of their land, the Land Law of 1909 registered all existing land holdings and prohibited their sale. A Native Land Trust Board administered the law. Under colonial rule, the Fijian and Indian communities, essentially isolated from each other, grew

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Oceania

KEY DATES 1970

Fiji wins its independence from Britain.

1970–1987

The Alliance Party, dominated by native Melanesians, but including a minority of Hindus descended from Indian laborers brought into the colony by the British, rules the country.

1987

Elections lead to victory of a new alliance dominated by Hindus, causing unrest in the Melanesian community; on May 14, Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka overthrows the government in a pro-Melanesia military coup; after several months of negotiations with politicians, the military turns the government back over to civilians on December 5.

1987–1990s

Persecution by Melanesians leads thousands of Hindus to flee the country; the government comes under international pressure to put a stop to attacks on the Hindu community.

to approximately equal size. After 1946, the Indian population grew to be a majority. In 1970, the colony became independent within the British Commonwealth, under a constitution that made the British sovereign, represented by an appointed governorgeneral who was the head of state. The legislature consisted of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The House of Representatives was elected by popular vote, but, reflecting British determination to protect the Fijians, the electoral system was communally based. Seats were divided among the ethnic groups— twenty-two seats for Fijian representatives and twenty-two for the Indians, with the remaining eight seats reserved for “general electors” (other races). The Senate, appointed by the executive, was similarly balanced. Of its twenty-two members, eight were appointed on the advice from the Great Council of [Fijian] Chiefs, seven on the advice of the prime minister, six on the advice of the leader of the opposition, and one on the advice of the Council of the island of Rotuma, to represent the interests of its Polynesian residents. As a further protection for Fijian interests, any law affecting existing indigenous rights had to be passed by a three-quarters majority in each house.

Fijian Rule The first elections under the 1970 constitution were held in April 1972. They were won by the Alliance

Party (AP), a coalition of Fijian political organizations that also included some Indian organizations and “general electors” (representatives of non-Fijians and nonIndians). The AP, under its leader, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, held power until 1987. In that year, a new government was formed by a coalition of the Fiji Labor Party (FLP), an anticommunist, class-based party; the National Federation Party (NFP), the traditional Hindu political vehicle; and a smaller group, the Western United Federation. The coalition leader, Dr. Timoci Bavadra, was a Melanesian, but his support came mainly from the Indian community. Of the twentyeight seats held by the coalition, indigenous Fijians held only seven. A majority of Bavadra’s cabinet was Indian. The victory of this coalition represented not so much a triumph of Hindus over Fijians as the rise of an urban, working-class population restive under the traditional, conservative, and essentially rural rule of the AP, itself heavily influenced by the Council of Chiefs. Another important issue for the coalition was security of tenure for renters, particularly Hindus who rented indigenous land for sugar cultivation. However, the militant Fijian Taukei organization saw the election result as a threat to essential values, which should not be tolerated. It carried out a series of attacks on Hindu businesses and places of worship, and communal tensions rose. Barely a month after the election, on May 14, 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, head of

Fiji: Ethnic Conflict and Coups Since 19 87

the small, almost entirely Melanesian, Fijian army, and a Taukei supporter, led a military coup. Prominent among his supporters was the Reverend Manasa Lasaro, general secretary of the Methodist Church in Fiji, who exhorted his followers to attack the Hindu heathens. Rabuka dissolved the Bavadra government and imprisoned the cabinet members. The governor-general, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, declared a state of emergency in which he would rule the country for six months with the assistance of an advisory council. Its members were to include Rabuka (who had promoted himself to brigadier), former prime minister Mara, and recently deposed prime minister Bavadra among its eighteen members. Bavadra, declaring the emergency government unconstitutional, refused to serve. However, he did meet privately with Mara and Ganilau on September 23, and the three agreed to a compromise, the Deuba Accord, which would have given equal representation in the parliament to the AP and the FLP/NFP coalition. Even as native Fijians continued to attack IndoFijians, Brigadier Rabuka staged a second coup. He declared that the Deuba Accord defeated the purpose of his first coup. He dismissed Ganilau as head of state, removing Fiji from the British Commonwealth as a result, revoked the 1970 constitution, and declared himself interim president of a new Fiji Republic. He then appointed a twenty-two-member council of ministers and pledged a return to elective government within a year. On December 5, 1987, civilian government was reinstated. The flexible Ganilau agreed to assume the presidency, and Mara, the founding father of independent Fiji, became prime minister. He selected a twenty-one-member cabinet that included Rabuka and three other officers, but no members of Bavadra’s Indian-supported coalition. The government was appointed for two years, and in 1989, it renewed its emergency mandate for three more years, ruling by decree in both periods until 1992. Among the emergency government’s decrees were an Official Secrets Act and the Internal Security Decree of 1988, which gave the government wide powers of arrest and detention. Decrees passed in 1991 allowed the government to suppress strikes. The government’s chief accomplishment, though, was the drafting of a frankly racist new constitution, which was approved by the Council of Chiefs on June

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25, 1990. It guaranteed Fijians a permanent majority in parliament. One major objective was certainly achieved. Indians, who had been a growing majority of the population, began to leave Fiji in significant numbers. Between May 1987 and December 1989, more than 20,000 left. Through the mid-1990s, an average of 5,000 more left each year. As Fiji’s relations with India cooled, its government expelled the Indian ambassador in 1989 after he complained about a series of arson attacks on Indian temples and a mosque. In May 1990, the Indian embassy was ordered closed after India announced a ban on trade with Fiji. Perhaps the most potent argument between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians was economic. Although the original Fijians had an ancestral claim to Fiji, the Indians, who arrived as indentured workers, had managed to achieve greater economic success. They were the experts at growing sugar, Fiji’s main export crop, and they had prospered at business in the cities. Native Fijians feared that, left unchecked, the Indians might take unchallenged economic control of “their” island. There was also trouble with the ethnically distinct island of Rotuma. In 1988, Rotuma declared itself independent, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Rabuka’s self-proclaimed republic. It appealed to the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand for assistance in vain. Fijian troops quelled the revolt on Rotuma, and the king of Rotuma, Gagaj Sa Lagmatfaro, fled for his life to New Zealand.

A supporter of coup leader George Speight stands guard outside Fiji’s Parliament compound in June 2000, as the prime minister and his cabinet were held hostage inside. (Ross Land/Getty Images News)

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New Fiji Republic In June 1990, the Council of Chiefs announced the formation of a new political party, Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), a purely ethnic party to advance the interests of indigenous Fijians. In July 1991, Rabuka resigned from the army to reenter the cabinet of the interim government, hoping to gain civilian credentials so that he could lead the SVT into the elections in 1992. The Reverend Manasa Lasaro joined the cabinet at the same time. Rabuka and the SVT won thirty of the thirtyseven seats reserved for Fijians in the 1992 elections, and Rabuka became the legitimate prime minister of Fiji. Soon afterward, he proposed to Indian leaders that they join him in a “government of national unity.” They refused, not wishing to be party to the anti-Indian policies that Rabuka was already endorsing. Notable among these were support for the Taukei Canegrowers Association in its campaign to deny Indians the renewal of their leases on sugar lands so that Fijians could exercise control over the sugar industry. Another was his participation in the SVT review of the 1990 constitution, which described Fijian Indians as arrogant, disloyal, and unscrupulous.

Coup and Restoration of Democracy Amendments to the 1990 constitution, in response to reviews by prominent experts in governance, made it more equitable. It addressed Fiji’s ethnic divisions by adopting electoral techniques for inter-ethnic alliance building. In free and peaceful elections in 1999, Rabuka and his SVT party lost to a government led by an Indo-Fijian, Mahendra Chaudhry. Within a year, however, history repeated itself when a Fiji nationalist staged a coup to return power to indigenous Fijians. This time the coup leader was George Speight, a young man whose father had taken part in Rabuka’s coup in 1987. Speight’s coup was even more brutal

than the earlier one. He took Chaudhry and his cabinet hostage and held them in the Fijian state house. The last captives were not released for eight weeks. Speight’s actions gained broad support in the traditional Fiji community, but it caused serious trouble as well. Britain suspended Fiji from the Commonwealth, and aid from powerful nations was also suspended. Worst of all, the violence of the coup and the high tensions it created seriously damaged the tourist business on which Fiji depended for hard currency. By July 2000, a broad range of Fijians had second thoughts about George Speight. He and 369 of his supporters were arrested. In 2002, Speight was convicted of treason and sentenced to death, but the sentence was commuted to life in prison. Meanwhile, parliamentary elections held in August 2001 restored a democratically elected government. The new prime minister, however, was Fijian hard-liner Laisenia Qarase, who refused to offer any cabinet posts to the Indian-supported opposition as required by the constitution. Only when ordered to do so by the Fiji Supreme Court did he agree—and then he pointedly refused to offer a post to former prime minister Mahenda Chaudhry. Chaudhry’s party retaliated by refusing to accept the offered cabinet posts. They preferred to serve as an opposition party, they said. As the parliamentary disputes indicated, Fiji remained a deeply divided nation in which further outbreaks of violence based on ethnic, social, and economic grievances were likely to recur. David MacMichael and Luke Nichter See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Bastian, Sunil, and Robin Luckham, eds. Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003. Heijmans, Annelies, et al., eds. Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Lal, Victor. Fiji: Coups in Paradise: Race, Politics, and Military Intervention. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1998. ———. Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.

INDONESIA: Irian Jaya Separatist Conflict Since 1964 TYPE OF CONFLICT: Independence Movement; Ethnic and Religious BRUNEI MALAYSIA

S

PA C I F I C OCEAN

U M A

BORNEO

T R A

I

SULAWESI

N

Jakarta

D

JAVA

MISOOL

E

Manokwari BIAK Biak Sorong YAPEN Ransiki Serui Fak Fak

E S I I N D O N KAI

NEW GUINEA

WEST PAPUA (IRIAN JAYA)

Babo

SERAM

BANDA SEA

N

WEST

A PAPUA PAPUA

I

S

EAST TIMOR

INDIAN OCEAN

WAIGEO

O

Jayapura Nabire Kaimana Wamena Enarotali Tembagapura A Timika Agats Tanah Merah ARU Mappi

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

DOLAK ARAFURA SEA

A U S T R A L I A

Merauke

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Among the longest-running self-determination struggles in the world—and one of the most overlooked— the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) for an independent Irian Jaya, or Western Papua, has been ongoing since the 1960s. New Guinea, in the South Pacific, is the secondlargest island in the world. Irian Jaya occupies the western half of the island and is the easternmost province of the island nation of Indonesia. The eastern half of New Guinea is occupied by the republic of Papua New Guinea (PNG), which became independent of Indonesia in 1975. The province of Irian Jaya has an area of about 163,000 square miles (about the size of California) and a population of about 2.2 million. It is moun-

tainous and rich in resources—including oil, timber, and nonferrous metals. Its people differ both ethnically and culturally from those in the rest of Indonesia. Most of the province’s inhabitants are Melanesian or Papuan, belonging to a number of different tribes. Some follow animist faiths, and others are Christian. Most of those who live in the rest of Indonesia are ethnically Malays and are followers of Islam. The Dutch, who had established a colonial empire in South Asia during the seventeenth century, maintained their rule over New Guinea long after World War II and after Indonesia became an independent nation in 1949. On December 1, 1961, Papua nationalists raised the so-called “morning star” flag of West Papua for the first time and called for an independent country by 1970. Less than three weeks later, Indonesian forces landed on the island. Although they were held in check by the Papuan people, Indonesia maintained its claim on the island. In 1962, it won over both the United States and Australia to its cause. In 1962, the UN assumed administrative control briefly, but turned the province over to Indonesia the following year. In 1964, nationalists formed the OPM, with its military wing, the Liberation Army of Free Papua (TPN, its Bahasa acronym). Sporadic fighting began shortly thereafter between guerrillas of the TPN and Indonesia security forces. Five years later, the Indonesian government held a referendum in Irian Jaya— the so-called “act of free choice”—and a majority voted for incorporation into Indonesia as the country’s twenty-seventh province. Ever afterward, independence activists maintained that the election had been rigged and that Papuan voters had been intimidated by threats of violence.

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KEY DATES 1949

After years of struggle, Indonesia wins its independence from the Netherlands, though the province of Irian Jaya remains a part of the Netherlands.

1961

Papua nationalists in Irian Jaya raise the “morning star” flag in the province, calling for the independence of West Papua, also known as Irian Jaya, by 1970.

1962

The UN assumes administrative control of Irian Jaya.

1963

UN turns over sovereignty of Irian Jaya to Indonesia.

1964

Papuan nationalists form the Liberation Army of Free Papua (TPN, its Bahasa acronym), and fighting begins with Indonesian forces.

1998

The authoritarian centralizing government of Indonesian president Suharto falls in the face of widespread national protests, leading Papuan nationalists to hope that they might be able to negotiate their independence with the new government.

2000

Two main separatist groups in Irian Jaya hold a congress and vote to declare the province an independent country of West Papua.

Aside from their thwarted nationalist ambitions, Papuans had three major grievances against Indonesia. First was the wholesale, government-sponsored migration of people from overcrowded Java to sparsely settled Irian Jaya, altering its demographic makeup, and the favoritism the government showed in granting them land, jobs, and contracts. Second was economic exploitation. In 1967, two years before the “act of free choice” was voted on, the Indonesian government signed a thirty-year lease with a U.S.based corporation, Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., giving it exclusive mining rights in the province. The province receives virtually none of the revenues from the mining operations. Papuan activists also claim that the mining operations were conducted with little regard to the environment, leaving poisoned water and destroyed rainforest. Third was the brutal repression Indonesia has visited on the island in the seemingly endless war between guerrillas fighting for independence and Indonesian security forces backed by a paramilitary group known as the Barisan Merah Putih. The fighting grew particularly intense in the late 1990s. By the early

2000s, according to Amnesty International, more than 100,000 civilians and guerrillas had been killed in Irian Jaya. Papuans claimed the figure was closer to 200,000. With the fall of Indonesian dictator Suharto in 1998, Papuan hopes for independence were raised. In 2000, leaders from OPM and Satgas Papua, another independence group, held a congress in which West Papua was declared independent. The Indonesian government of Aburrahman Wahid refused to recognize the declaration and launched a military crackdown against separatists. At the same time, Wahid also offered “special autonomy” to the province, but the offer was withdrawn by others in the Indonesian government. In 2001, Irian Jaya was divided into two provinces: Papua and Irian Jaya Barat. That same year, Wahid fell from power and was replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri. There was little progress in implementing the autonomy agreement, and sporadic fighting continued between separatist guerrillas and Indonesian security forces. Patit Paban Mishra and James Ciment

Indonesia: Irian Jaya Separatist Conflict Since 19 6 4

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Police in Jakarta beat a pro-independence demonstrator from Irian Jaya in December 2000. The province was granted limited autonomy the following year, but the separatist movement continued. (Anung/AFP/Getty Images)

See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts; East Timor: Independence Struggle, 1974–2002; Indonesia: Wars of Independence, 1945–1949; Indonesia: Communist and Suharto Coups, 1965–1966; Indonesia: Aceh Separatist Conflict Since 1976.

Bibliography Elmslie, Jim. Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development Versus West Papuan Nationalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003.

Indonesia Commission. Peace and Progress in Papua. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003. Moore, Clive. New Guinea: Crossing Boundaries and History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003. Rutherford, Danilyn. Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an Indonesian Frontier. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. Saltford, John. United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of a Betrayal. New York: Routledge, 2003.

NEW CALEDONIA (FRANCE): Independence Struggle Since the 1970s TYPE OF CONFLICT: Anticolonial PARTICIPANT: France about 75,000. Ethnic division is the most significant political fact in New Caledonia. The Kanaks feel discriminated against in their homeland; other groups fear reverse discrimination should Kanaks take complete control. Unemployment is high, at around 19 percent, and is much higher among Kanaks—also an important political factor. However, New Caledonia has a high per-capita income. Its gross domestic product per capita in 2003 was about US$15,000, principally because New Caledonia possesses the world’s largest deposits of high-grade nickel. Dispute over control of these deposits had been an important element in relations between France and the Kanak population.

PACIFIC PA C I F I C

OCEAN

OCEAN

BELEP ISLANDS

OUVEA

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N

NEW CALEDONIA

N

N Nickel mine 0 0

100 100

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N N

LOYALTY ISLANDS

N

N EUROPEAN N N Nouméa

Historical Background ISLE OF PINES

New Caledonia, consisting of one large, long, and narrow island and a number of smaller ones, is a territory of the French Republic in the South Pacific about 930 miles east of Queensland, Australia. The islands have a total area of about 7,400 square miles, of which the main island of New Caledonia has about 85 percent of the land. The nearby Loyalty Islands archipelago is the only other substantial island group in New Caledonia. The population is approximately 216,000, about 43 percent of whom are indigenous Melanesians (Kanaks) and 37 percent European (Caldoche, in local parlance). The remaining 20 percent include Wallisians, Polynesians, Indonesians, Chinese, Vietnamese, and others. The capital, Nouméa, has a population of

France annexed New Caledonia as part of Tahiti in 1853 and established it as a separate colony in 1884. In 1946, as part of the post–World War II organization of the French Union, it became a territory of the French Republic. For many years, France encouraged European immigration and allowed settlers to purchase indigenous tribal land. This immigration was a source of frequent native rebellions then, and often violent political dispute today. Between 1956 and 1976, a thirty-member territorial assembly elected by universal adult suffrage was the official government, although France, through a governor, remained in effective control. In 1976, the governing statute was amended to give New Caledonians somewhat more control, with a council of government chosen by the assembly. The post of governor was replaced by that of a French high commissioner to the territory. Pro-independence parties gained a majority in the new government, and in March 1979, during

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New Caledonia (France): Independence Struggle Since the 1970s

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KEY DATES 1853

France annexes New Caledonia as part of its colony based in Tahiti.

1946

France incorporates New Caledonia as a territory of the French Republic.

1976

France gives New Caledonians increased power over their own affairs.

1979

In elections, pro-independence forces gain a majority in the territorial government; the French-appointed territorial governor dissolves the local assembly when it fails to reach an accord with France.

1981

As tensions in the territory rise, the French government offers several concessions to the native Kanak people, including more positions in government, a broader share of mining revenues, and an institute to promote Kanak culture.

1983

Both pro- and anti-independence groups protest the French decision to conduct a referendum on the territory’s future in three years; the Socialist Kanak Liberation Front (FLNKS, its French acronym) boycotts territorial elections, leading to Kanak rioting.

1987

In a referendum, European settlers vote against independence; 90 percent of Kanaks boycott the referendum; the conflict continues between FLNKS guerrillas and French gendarmes.

1998

In the Nouméa Accord, France agrees to gradual devolution of powers to local New Caledonians.

2004

The more moderate Future Together Party wins the election over the more strongly pro-French Rally for Caledonia in France party.

negotiations for a new ten-year accord between France and the islands, the high commissioner dissolved the assembly when they could not reach agreement. The local assembly had rejected a proposed agreement because it did not specifically set a time for independence. In new elections held in July, two pro-French parties won twenty-two of the thirty-six seats in the new expanded assembly. Political tension increased after September 1981, when the secretary-general of one of the leading proindependence parties was assassinated. In response, the French government announced a new plan that included putting more Kanaks in positions of authority, broader sharing of mining revenues, and an institute to promote Kanak culture. In November 1983, it proposed a five-year trial autonomy period, after which there would be a referendum on New Caledonia’s fu-

ture. This idea was opposed by both pro- and anti-independence groups. Kanaks put together an umbrella pro-independence grouping, the Socialist Kanak Liberation Front (FLNKS, its French acronym), which on December 1 proclaimed a “national government” with Jean-Marie Tjibaou at its head. FLNKS refused to participate in territorial elections, which were won by the Rally for Caledonia in the Republic (RPCR), the pro-French party supported by most non-Kanaks, headed by Jacques LaFleur. Riots by angry Kanaks followed, and in the next month a number of Kanaks were killed by security forces. In January, the new French high commissioner, Edgard Pisani, called for independence in association with France by January 1, 1986, if a majority gave its approval in a referendum scheduled for July. FLNKS rejected this proposal as well,

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saying only that Kanaks should be allowed to determine their future. More violence followed, and after police killed one of the FLNKS leaders, French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius hastily proposed another alternative. The referendum was suspended until an unspecified date not later than December 1987. In the meantime, New Caledonia would be governed by four separate regional councils, essentially reflecting ethnic territorial areas. FLNKS was agreeable, but now the RPCR-controlled territorial assembly rejected the proposal. Ultimately, the plan was imposed by action of the French national assembly. FLNKS, although it was originally agreeable, boycotted both the French national assembly elections in March 1986 and the independence referendum of September 1987. With fewer than 10 percent of Kanaks voting, the proposal for independence was defeated by 48,611 to 842. Unable to gain its objective by electoral means, FLNKS announced that it was abandoning peaceful means in its fight. FLNKS leader Tjibaou and one of his deputies were indicted for inciting violence. In April 1988, FLNKS supporters killed four police officers on the island of Ouvea and held twenty-seven more captive in a cave. An assault by the authorities on the cave left twenty-two Kanaks and two more police officers dead.

Matignon Accord In Paris, the new French prime minister Michel Rocard met with LaFleur and Tjibaou, the leaders of the two main parties, at his residence, the Hotel Matignon. They agreed to a proposition (the Matignon Accord) whereby France would exercise direct rule for one year. The territory would be divided into three provinces, North (largely Kanak), South (mostly European and non-Kanak), and the Loyalty Islands (Kanak), and a plebiscite on independence would be held in ten years’ time, in 1998. In the meantime, France would provide a program of economic development in Kanak areas (to deal with unemployment and to shift some wealth from the opulent south to the other regions) and would train Kanaks in public administration. On November 6, 1988, the French electorate overwhelmingly approved the accord, and in New Caledonia it was approved by 57 percent of those voting. Of eligible voters, 37 percent abstained—most of the Kanaks. An amnesty released all those detained in the Ouvea cave affair.

In May 1989, extremists from the Kanak United Liberation Front (FULK) assassinated FLNKS leader Tjibaou and his chief deputy, charging that by signing the Matignon Accord they had given away too much to the Europeans. Tjibaou was succeeded by Rock Wamytan. Soon afterward, territorial elections produced the expected provincial results, with the RPCR continuing to control the territorial assembly. In July 1989, French direct rule ended, but the basic situation of deadlock over independence remained. In April 1991, one of the FLNKS parties, the Kanak Socialist Liberation (KLS), withdrew from the accord, charging that its cultural preservation programs were actually undermining Kanak culture. Early the following year, major violence broke out again when unemployed Kanak youth rioted in Nouméa, burning down a major commercial center and looting stores. The immigration of skilled European labor again became the center of political debate.

Nickel Debate The political standoff on the independence issue continued. A despairing Jacques LaFleur proposed in 1994 that the vote on independence scheduled for 1998 be postponed for thirty years, but he could get no support. Unofficially, though, both sides agreed that a referendum or plebiscite would not resolve the issue. The winning margin would be too narrow to constitute a mandate, and the losing side would be too large to ignore. New talks in Paris, this time with Prime Minister Alain Juppé and the FLNKS and RCPR representatives, Rock Wamytan and LaFleur, sought to find some consensus to be put to the voters, rather than a simple “yes” or “no” on independence. A period of fifteen to twenty years for implementation was considered. These talks broke down when LaFleur leaked details to the press, leading to his exclusion and to bilateral negotiations between France and FLNKS. These talks, too, broke down, this time over a vexing economic issue. As part of the shift of economic resources from south to north under the Matignon Accord, the northern (Kanak) province had bought the South Pacific Mining Company (SPMC) and developed it into a significant participant in New Caledonia nickel mining. The French government had promised that if the Kanaks could find a suitable

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Militant pro-independence groups in New Caledonia protest the visit of France’s President Jacques Chirac in July 2003. The Melanesian island dependency was in political transition, with a referendum on full independence not scheduled for more than a decade. (Patrick Kovarik/AFP/Getty Images)

partner to construct a nickel smelting operation on New Caledonia, it would ensure access to the necessary ore. SPMC had established a joint venture with Canada’s giant nickel smelter Falconbridge to build the smelting plant, but the ore promised by France seemed not to be available. The ore belonged to Société le Nickel, a subsidiary of a French government–owned group, but the company’s management was independent and declined to sell the ore to SPMC. FLNKS broke off the political talks with the French government, convinced that there was a French plot to deny Kanaks a share in the riches being realized from New Caledonian nickel, their patrimony. The French government finally did get management to make good on its promise, but the relationship between the negotiators had been damaged. In April 1998, after several rounds of broken negotiations, the three parties to the Matignon Accords—the government of France, FLNKS, and RCPR—agreed to schedule a November referendum

that, if passed, would give New Caledonia broad powers of self-government, with final independence to be decided within fifteen to twenty years. Known as the Nouméa Accord, it passed on November 8, 1998, with a 70 percent positive vote.

Nouméa Accord As a result of the powers extended by France in the Nouméa Accord of 1998, significant governmental powers began to be exercised by New Caledonians, including taxation, trade, labor law, and multiparty government. France also granted additional concessions as a result of the Kanak separatist movement’s demands for independence. New Caledonia would enjoy increasing autonomy, leading up to a vote on full independence sometime between 2014 and 2019. Both leaders in France and party leaders in New Caledonia devoted huge effort and negotiating skills to achieving a new type of relationship between a governing nation and its small and isolated

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possession. Radical calls for independence were heard less frequently and forcefully. In 2004, a new political party, Avenire Ensemble (the Future Together), a reform group drawn mainly from the old RCPR, gained control of the government. Friends of New Caledonia hoped that this new party signaled a new commitment to ethnic and cultural peace. David MacMichael and Luke Nichter See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Connell, John. New Caledonia or Kanaky? The Political History of the French Colony. Canberra, Australia: National Centre for Development Studies, 1987. Connell, John, Michael Spencer, and Alan Ward, eds. New Caledonia: Essays in Nationalism and Dependency. Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1988. Economic Intelligence Unit. New Caledonia, 1997–1998. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998. Nicol, David. The Fundamentals of New Caledonia. Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2002.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA: Bougainville Independence Struggle Since 1988 TYPE OF CONFLICT: People’s War INDONESIA

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200 Miles

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BUKA ISLAND

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Port Moresby

Buka Passage Wakunai Arawa Torokina

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND Buin

SOLOMON ISLANDS

CORAL SEA

AUSTRALIA

PA C I F I C OCEAN

Bougainville is one of the 600 islands that, along with the eastern half of the island of New Guinea, make up the independent nation of Papua New Guinea. A member of the British Commonwealth, Papua New Guinea lies east of Indonesia and north of Australia, covering 179,000 square miles. Its population is estimated at 5.5 million. Approximately 742 different tribal languages are spoken in the country, but the language in general use is pidgin English (Tok Pisin). English and Hiri Motu are also widely spoken. Christianity is the dominant religion. Other than New Guinea and Bougainville, the main islands making up the country are New Britain, New Ireland, Manus, and Buka. The capital, on New Guinea, is Port Moresby, with a population of about 200,000. The national government is a unicameral parliamentary system, with a governor-general, as the representative of the British crown, elected by the parliament. As might be expected in a country where social organization remains essentially tribal, and where a small population is scattered over a vast territory with poor communications, the political system

is fragmented, characterized by a multitude of small tribally and regionally based parties. The central government is relatively weak, with each of the nineteen provinces responsible for education, primary industry, business development, and public works. However, the provincial governors are members of parliament, chosen by the prime minister, and, because of persistent corruption in the provincial governments, Port Moresby increasingly intervenes in their affairs. The country has abundant natural resources. Good agricultural land is plentiful, and forests cover 90 percent of the surface. There are significant gold and copper deposits as well as important oil and natural gas fields. About 80 percent of the population are small farmers growing a variety of root crops, principally yams, for subsistence. Cash crops—coffee, cocoa, copra, rubber, and oil palm—have been integrated into the subsistence system. In the late 1990s, Papua New Guinea, in common with the rest of the region, was hurt badly by the El Niño shift in weather patterns, suffering widespread drought, with starvation reported in many areas.

Historical Background Papua New Guinea was created in 1949 by a merger of the Territory of Papua, ruled by Australia from 1906, with the Territory of New Guinea, a former German colony captured by Australia in 1914 during World War I. Australia administered New Guinea under a League of Nations mandate and, after World War II, as a United Nations trusteeship. In 1949, Australia unified the two territories as Papua and New Guinea and began moving it toward independence. A legislative council under an Australian governor was established in 1951. In 1964, the council

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KEY DATES 1975

Papua New Guinea (PNG) gains its independence from Australia.

1988

Following landowner efforts to win compensation for damages caused by an Australian mining company operating in PNG, landowner Francis Ona organizes the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), which carries out acts of sabotage against the mine.

1989

As fighting escalates between PNG forces and BRA rebels, the mine closes, and the government declares a state of emergency.

1990

The government negotiates a cease-fire with BRA, but government violations lead to renewed fighting.

1992

The government launches a major new offensive against BRA rebels.

1995

Government efforts to negotiate with non-BRA representatives on Bougainville outrages leaders of the rebel group, who step up their attacks on government forces and those Bougainville officials who are negotiating with the government.

1997

Following a cease-fire agreement between the PNG government and BRA, New Zealand peacekeepers deploy to the island.

1998

A permanent cease-fire is signed by the PNG government and BRA, as an Australian-led monitoring group replaces the New Zealanders.

2001

A final agreement between the two sides is reached, calling for increased autonomy for Bougainville.

2005 Joseph Kaburi, a secessionist leader, becomes president of the Autonomous Bougainville Government.

was replaced by a House of Assembly with an elected indigenous majority. Papua New Guinea (the “and” was dropped in 1971) achieved internal selfgovernment in December 1973 and independence on September 16, 1975. The House of Assembly was renamed the National Parliament. The drive for independence was led by the more economically advanced islands, particularly Bougainville, the site of major copper mining. Another stimulus was fear of Indonesia, which forcibly annexed the western half of New Guinea—today’s Irian Jaya—in 1962.

The Bougainville Question Despite Papua New Guinea’s huge expanse and ethnic diversity, the unlikely country functioned well politically. Elections were held regularly, and there

was no trend toward authoritarian or military rule or domination by a single ethnic group. Ideology played little part in politics. But unrest stirred in April 1988 when landowners on Bougainville demanded compensation for environmental damages from the Australian-owned Bougainville Copper Limited. The company refused to pay, and in late 1988, a Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) led by Francis Ona, a landowner and former mine worker, appeared and began to carry out acts of sabotage against the mine. The owners then closed down the mine and refused the government’s request to resume operations, citing fear of further attack. Because the mine was extremely important to the national economy, Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu sent Papua New Guinea troops to the island in December, and production began again. After further

Papua New Guinea: Bougainville Independence Struggle Since 19 8 8

BRA violence, a curfew was imposed. In an attempt to pacify the landowners, the mining company increased its royalty payments significantly. However, the BRA stepped up its attacks and now demanded Bougainville’s secession from Papua New Guinea. The Bougainville rebels received at least tacit support from the government of the neighboring Solomon Islands, to which it was geographically much closer than to Port Moresby (residents of Bougainville and the Solomons were also ethnically similar). In May 1989, the mine closed again. The government declared a state of emergency and sent 2,000 more security forces, with orders to take Francis Ona, leader of the BRA, dead or alive. The government’s campaign was a bloody failure, and by the end of the year, Bougainville Copper suspended operations, and Australia sent in its own forces to evacuate the 300 Australian citizens working at the mine. In March 1990, Prime Minister Namaliu, faced by a rising death toll among security forces and civilians, an economic crisis aggravated by the closing of the mine, and a political crisis due to failure to resolve the situation, negotiated a cease-fire with the BRA and agreed to withdraw the security forces and release detainees. By the middle of the month, the BRA controlled Bougainville. The security forces were unhappy with the agreement, and Police Commissioner Paul Tohian led an abortive coup against Namaliu. However, Namaliu appeased the hard-liners in his government by announcing an economic blockade of Bougainville. In response, Ona declared the independent Republic of Bougainville, with himself as interim president. Port Moresby, of course, refused to recognize the declaration. In July, however, government and BRA representatives met aboard the New Zealand cruiser Endeavour to discuss a settlement. The BRA agreed to negotiate the future status of the island, and the government agreed to end the blockade and not to use its security forces against the rebels. However, the first supply ships to arrive in Bougainville concealed 100 troops to be landed on the neighboring small island of Buka. The BRA declared this a violation of the Endeavour Accord, and the government withdrew both supplies and troops, only to send more of its armed forces to Buka in September, allegedly at the request of the islanders. The BRA forces on Buka put up a fierce resistance, and there were heavy casualties on both sides.

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Negotiations were renewed in January 1991 in Honiara, capital of the Solomon Islands, and the two sides agreed that the government would not station its forces on Bougainville if the BRA would disband and turn over all its weapons and prisoners to a multinational peacekeeping force. However, again no agreement was reached on the political question of secession or more autonomy for Bougainville. The accord ended up a dead letter, and a number of Namaliu’s ministers resigned in disgust or were fired. By this time, Australia estimated that 200 people had died in the fighting since 1988, and a further 3,000 had died because of the blockade. Again the armed forces prevailed over Namaliu’s efforts to find a diplomatic solution, and attacks resumed in April against BRA forces. However, the commander of the forces on Bougainville was dismissed after revelations that his troops had committed atrocities against civilians. Nevertheless, more troops were sent to Bougainville and Buka. The BRA responded by seizing a government supply ship and holding its crew prisoner. After this event, the situation deteriorated swiftly. After June 1992 elections, Namaliu was forced to resign as prime minister. His successor, Paias Wingti, launched a major offensive against Bougainville in October, announcing capture of the capital, Arawa. The BRA counterattacked, and much of Arawa was destroyed in the fighting. Again casualties were heavy, and human rights groups reported atrocities on both sides. In April 1993, the island tribal chiefs joined with BRA on a committee to negotiate with the government. Between June and September 1994, a series of meetings in Honiara between the new Papua New Guinea prime minister, Sir Julius Chan, successor to Paias Wingti, and the BRA military commander, Sam Kauona, led to yet another ceasefire, to be enforced by a peacekeeping force from Fiji, Vanuatu, and Tonga, under the supervision of Australia and New Zealand. In addition, the blockade imposed on and off since the beginning of the conflict would again be lifted. However, in October, Prime Minister Chan sidestepped the BRA by negotiating the Charter of Mirigini with a group of non-BRA Bougainville representatives to establish a transitional government for the island. Outraged BRA leaders denounced the attempt to cut them out and resumed fighting. Nevertheless, Chan pushed ahead, and in April 1995 attended ceremonies on Buka in which Theodore

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Members of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and government-recruited “resistance fighters” all arrive in Arawa, Papua New Guinea, for the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement on April 30, 1998. (Torsten Blackwood/AFP/ Getty Images)

Miriong, a former adviser to Francis Ona, was named leader of the transitional government. The BRA, although invited to participate and offered amnesty, continued to demand secession and full independence, and stepped up its attacks, burning Miriong’s house in the process and killing several members of the Papua New Guinea forces. The leadership in Port Moresby was divided between those who recommended withdrawal from Bougainville and the hawks who demanded stronger action. The latter were encouraged by Miriong, who feared the consequences of a withdrawal. Minister of Foreign Affairs Michael Somare urged withdrawal, but he was overruled by the military, and a new offensive was launched in June 1996. By August, more than 67,000 civilian refugees were being housed in government camps under appalling conditions. Acting on his own, the local commander arrested Miriong. Brought back to Bougainville, he was murdered by government troops and local forces recruited as “resistance fighters.” Increasingly, the government military was taking matters into its own hands. By this time, both sides were committing

atrocities, and Amnesty International had a team on the island reporting it all. On the government side, military morale appeared to be breaking down, with many soldiers refusing to serve in Bougainville because the war seemed to have no end.

Mercenar y Scandal The Papua New Guinea military would not obey orders and could not defeat the BRA, but it would not accept a negotiated end to the struggle. Prime Minister Chan tried to resolve the dilemma in early 1997 by engaging a group of foreign mercenaries through the notorious Sandline International, a subsidiary of London-based Executive Outcomes, which for years had been providing security assistance to questionable regimes in Africa and elsewhere. The mercenaries, mostly white South Africans, had been hired for $30 million to defeat the rebels and provided with six helicopter gunships purchased from Russia. When Chan’s action was revealed in February, the country was embroiled in simultaneous foreign

Papua New Guinea: Bougainville Independence Struggle Since 19 8 8

and domestic crises. The British high commissioner denounced the action, and Australia threatened to cut off all financial assistance. Neighboring countries expressed concern and outrage. The defense force commander, General Jerry Singirok, announced on national television and radio that he had arrested the mercenaries and demanded that Chan resign. Chan, instead, fired Singirok, but the armed forces rejected the order. Students rioted in Port Moresby in favor of Singirok, and thousands of demonstrators looted shops. When parliament refused to remove Chan, 15,000 demonstrators marched on the parliament building, and Chan resigned. Meanwhile, negotiations to end the conflict began in July 1997, with a truce signed in October between the government and the rebels. By year’s end, the New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring Group had begun to deploy on the island. In April 1998, a permanent cease-fire was signed, and the Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group replaced the New Zealand team. A final agreement was not reached, however, until 2001. In August, the parties to the conflict signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which called for

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rebels to turn in their weapons under UN auspices and the holding of elections for the creation of an autonomous government for Bougainville. As for the final independence status of the island, the agreement called for a referendum, but not for at least a decade. In December 2004, a new constitution for an autonomous Bougainville was accepted by the Papua New Guinea government, and elections—deemed fair by international observers—were held in late May and early June 2005. Joseph Kabui, a secessionist leader, was sworn in as president of the Autonomous Bougainville Government on June 15. David MacMichael See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Callaghan, Mary-Louise. Enemies Within: Papua New Guinea, Australia, and the Sandline Crisis: The Inside Story. New York: Doubleday, 1999. Dorney, Sean. Papua New Guinea: People, Politics and History Since 1975. Sydney, Australia: Random House, 1990. Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). Report, Papua New Guinea, 1997–1998. London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1998.

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The Solomon Islands are about 1,000 miles northeast of Australia in the South Pacific. While most of the islands comprise the nation of the Solomon Islands, a few in the group are part of Papua New Guinea. The Solomon Islands are home to about 500,000 people, and the land area of the country (10,985 square miles) is roughly equivalent to Maryland. From 1893 to independence in 1978, the British ruled the island as a protectorate. After independence, the islands adopted a parliamentary democracy with a prime minister as head of the government. The country is usually referred to as Solomon Islands. While the vast majority of Solomon Islanders are ethnic Melanesians (a minority are Polynesian), there are many divisions among the populace, usually stemming from island of origin. One division in particular became problematic by the late 1990s. The island of Guadalcanal (also home to the nation’s capital, Honiara) attracted settlers from other areas of Solomon Islands, many of them from the large and populous island of Malaita. The native

Guadalcanal populace regarded the settlers as disrespectful and increasingly dominant in Guadalcanal’s business affairs, land ownership, and culture. By 1998, some native residents of Guadalcanal had organized themselves into the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), which later became known as the Istabu Freedom Movement (IFM). This organization engaged in the harassment and molestation of non-native settlers, most notably the Malaitan ethnic group. Order began to break down in earnest throughout 1999. Negotiations between Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu and the Guadalcanal local government failed to heal the situation. Seizure of Malaitan lands, rape, murder, overt rebellion, and the consequent refugee problem forced the national government to declare a state of emergency in Guadalcanal. The IFM stated that it would be willing to cease hostilities if the government granted an amnesty, but this condition was rejected. Marking the beginning of regional involvement in the conflict, a former Fijian prime minister served as the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Commonwealth) special envoy to aid negotiations in summer 1999. These negotiations resulted in regional police and UN personnel being sent to Guadalcanal and a Solomon Islands government payment to persons affected by the conflict. The IFN gave up its demand for amnesty and agreed to surrender its weapons, but the resultant peace was characterized by fragility and extension of the disarmament deadline. During this period, the Malaitans became increasingly militant, and a Malaitan armed group—the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF)—appeared by early 2000. Reacting to the unfortunate willingness of the Solomon Islands government to use cash to settle disputes, this group demanded $40 million from Solomon Islands government in compensation for Malaitan suffering. MEF members, acting in concert with ethnic Malaitans on the police force, seized Honiara on June

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KEY DATES 1978

Solomon Islands win their independence from Great Britain.

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Separatists on the island of Guadalcanal organize the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army, later called the Istabu Freedom Movement (IFM).

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Conflict breaks out between government forces and rebels; a British Commonwealth representative arrives in the Solomon Islands to negotiate a settlement.

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Rebels in Malaita form the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) and demand compensation from the government for the suffering the people of Malaita have experienced from government attacks; MEF rebels, along with Malaitans in the police force, seize the capital and put the prime minister under house arrest.

2001–2003 Fighting continues between MEF and IFM rebels and government forces. 2003

The prime minister requests regional armed intervention by Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific states to put down rebel movements; eleven nations send peacekeepers, who capture some rebel leaders.

5, 2000. Prime Minister Ulufa’alu was placed under house arrest, then released after agreeing to undergo a “no confidence” vote. However, he resigned before the vote occurred. Although opposition leader Manasseh Sogavare was elected the new prime minister, disorder worsened, and conflict between the IFM and MEF continued, killing an unknown number of people. Australia and New Zealand sent warships to Solomon Islands to facilitate diplomatic negotiations in 2000. With the help of these two countries, the semi-successful Townsville Agreement was signed in October 2000. However, neither country wished further involvement, refusing Ulufa’alu’s request for troops before his removal in 2000 and also Sogavare’s request for the same in 2001. Peace, the restoration of the economy and infrastructure, and the disarmament of the MEF and IFM proceeded tenuously. Sporadic episodes of violence continued. Some disaffected individuals formed new guerrilla groups and rejected the cease-fire. Most no-

table among these were the Marau Eagle Force and the Guadalcanal Liberation Force (GLF). By spring 2001, the situation appeared headed out of control once more, sparked by incidents of violence throughout the region and assassination attempts on high officials. Nevertheless, scheduled elections were held in late 2001, resulting in the election of Sir Allan Kemakeza as prime minister. But by summer 2002, Solomon Islands was headed for anarchy. Water and electricity were unreliable, the government was having difficulty meeting its payroll, and the GLF leader, Harold Keke, had become a murderous bandit who roamed the countryside. In June 2003, Prime Minister Kemakeza requested regional armed intervention from Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific states. Wishing to save Solomon Islands from becoming a failed state (and therefore a liability to the region), eleven nations eventually sent personnel to the area. GLF leader Keke was arrested and removed from Solomon Is-

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Malaitan rebels turn in their weapons to international security forces in the Solomon Islands in August 2003. The militia group complied with a government gun amnesty after the surrender and arrest of warlord Harold Keke. (Australian Defense Forces/AFP/Getty Images)

lands. Currently, Australia and other countries are engaged in a program to rebuild Solomon Islands’ economy, infrastructure, and civic society. Elections were scheduled for 2006. Charles Allan See also: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts.

Bibliography Fraenkel, Jon. The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands. Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University Press, 2004. Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara. “Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon Islands.” Contemporary Pacific 17, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 283–309.

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AFRICAN UNION (FORMERLY ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY) The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded on May 25, 1963. Its charter stated that its aims were to protect the interests of all African states, to eradicate colonialism, to improve economic conditions, and to promote unity and solidarity among African states. The OAU was created in a climate in which some African statesmen dreamed of creating a truly united Africa; the OAU was, for these men, a compromise or a stepping-stone, depending on their degree of optimism. As it turned out, the OAU accomplished substantially less than had been originally hoped—Africa’s many internal divisions made any real unity impossible—but it still served the useful purpose of giving African nations a forum in which to debate their shared problems. The OAU had its intellectual roots in the PanAfrican movement of the early twentieth century. This movement, originating in America and the West Indies, was led by the descendants of slaves, who wished to reforge a link with Africa as part of an effort to raise the self-esteem and pride of blacks who lived in the Americas. The first Pan-African Congress was organized by Sylvester Williams, a Trinidad lawyer, and was held in 1900. After Williams’s death, W.E.B. Du Bois, an American, took over leadership of the Pan-African movement and organized four Pan-African congresses between 1919 and 1927. Du Bois and the Pan-Africans argued that all people of African descent should work together to achieve freedom, both in the New World and in colonial Africa. Delegates to the congresses came from both the Americas and African colonies. Du Bois’s work was echoed in the “back-toAfrica” movement (1914–1925) of Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican journalist. Garvey wanted American and West Indian blacks to return to Africa to create a great nation, free from white control. By the time a fifth Pan-African Congress was organized, in 1945 in Manchester, England, the driving force behind Pan-Africanism had moved from the Americas to Africa. Du Bois presided over the con-

gress, but the initiative behind its creation came from African leaders, including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. This congress, more radical than its predecessors, demanded immediate freedom for Africa and argued that unity of African peoples was the only way to achieve freedom from the colonial powers. Alongside these Pan-African movements, other African leaders were working together to form regional alliances. These generally were linked along linguistic lines, with the colonies controlled by Great Britain forming groups separate from those controlled by France. These linguistic barriers would continue past independence, making it more difficult for the newly independent states of Africa to cooperate. In the 1950s and 1960s, Pan-Africanism’s strongest proponent was Kwame Nkrumah, one of the delegates to the 1945 Pan-African Congress. Nkrumah led Ghana to independence in 1957 and immediately began to push for integration with other African states. In 1958, Nkrumah and Sekou Touré, leader of Guinea, announced a merger of their two nations into the Ghana-Guinea Union. Nkrumah and Touré then called for a “Union of Independent States of Africa.” In December 1960, Mali joined with Ghana and Guinea to create the Union of African States, which was designed to be the nucleus of a United States of Africa. The leaders of the three countries invited others to join them. Although some African leaders, including William Tubman of Liberia, expressed interest, most were reluctant to join any such union. In fact, the union itself never became more than a symbolic one, quickly forgotten. The three nations continued to be ruled independently, and soon even the pretense of unity was dropped. It became clear that many leaders, while interested in the idea of cooperation, were reluctant to give up their hard-won national sovereignty. This was a particular concern because the leaders of Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah and Touré, both were developing into

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The fifty-three-member African Union, which held its first summit in Durban, South Africa, in 2002, is the successor of the Organization of African Unity. (Alexander Joe/AFP/ Getty Images)

autocratic leaders who allowed little opposition to their policies within their own countries. Instead, other leaders offered an alternative to Nkrumah’s vision of a tight federation of African states, suggesting that Africa might be better off gathered under the umbrella of a loose association.

Formation of the OAU The various regional organizations that had been forming in post-independence Africa—the AllAfrican People’s Conference (AAPC), the Pan-African Movement of East and Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), and the Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne (OCAM)—held a series of congresses and conferences between 1959 and 1962, all of which attempted to find some common ground for cooperation among African states. These gatherings were still either regional (East, West, or South African) or linguistic (English or French African) in focus. Two of these conferences, the Brazzaville Conference of December 1960 and the Casablanca Conference of January 1961, demonstrated some of the fault lines preventing African unity. The Brazzaville group, representing twelve former French colonies, advo-

cated cooperation based on “culture and community of interests”—meaning language—and was generally moderate in its criticism of colonialism. The Casablanca group, which included Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, and Libya, took a more radical position, committing itself to giving economic support to anticolonial movements in Africa. In 1961, Liberia and Ethiopia, neither of which had attended the Brazzaville or Casablanca meetings, organized a conference at Monrovia that invited members from both groups. This Monrovia group met again in 1962 at Lagos, Nigeria. The twenty states meeting at Lagos agreed to create an Organization of Inter-African and Malagasy States. The Casablanca group, however, boycotted both conferences. Finally, in May 1963, Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie organized a meeting at Addis Ababa that included all the independent African states, with the exception of Morocco. (One of the issues that had divided the Brazzaville and Casablanca groups—Algeria’s war of independence against France—became moot when France agreed to give up control of Algeria in late 1962. This resolution made it possible for the two groups to meet.) At the Addis Ababa Conference, those leaders, particularly Ghana’s Nkrumah, who wanted a federal union of African states, were outvoted by their colleagues who preferred the idea of a looser union. It was a victory of the moderate Brazzaville and Monrovia groups over the more radical Casablanca group. So, instead of creating an Organization of African States, the thirty leaders at Addis Ababa signed a charter (May 25, 1963) that brought into existence the Organization of African Unity. In honor of Haile Selassie’s efforts, the permanent headquarters of the OAU was located at Addis Ababa.

Aims of the OAU The OAU’s aims were large and vague. Its charter called for the promotion of African solidarity, cooperation in improving living standards, defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the elimination of colonialism. The emphasis in the OAU charter was the protection of national sovereignty. Unlike Nkrumah’s Casablanca group, the leaders of the OAU did not want the organization to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of their countries. Article 3 of the charter emphasized that member states should

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adhere to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other member states and that disputes should be settled peacefully, through negotiations. The OAU was to be a coordinating body, not an enforcement body. Nkrumah’s vision of a Pan-African Union would not be realized. Although the OAU, as a matter of policy, deliberately refused to intervene in the affairs of its members, it did leave open to itself two areas of international activity. First, the OAU, as part of its charter, was committed to mediating disputes between African member states—and there would be many of these. Second, the OAU dedicated itself to ending colonialism in Africa.

agree to allow a black government to take control of that country in 1980. South Africa was the longest colonial holdout. It was not until the late 1980s that F.W. de Klerk, also under international pressure, began to dismantle the apartheid system. The degree to which the OAU can take credit for the defeat of the colonialist regimes is debatable— only a part of its already small budget was devoted toward supporting black freedom fighters—but certainly its constant pressure on international organizations, especially the United Nations, added to the pressure that eventually caused Portugal to withdraw and whites in Rhodesia and South Africa to surrender power.

Anticolonialism and Anti-Apartheid Activities

Dispute Mediation

By the mid-1960s, three major colonial or white minority-ruled regimes were left in Africa: the Portuguese with their colonies in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau; the ex-British colony of Rhodesia; and the Republic of South Africa. To deal with these colonial remnants, the OAU called for sanctions by its members as well as by the international community. These calls had minimal effect at first. The world, while it might condemn the racist practices of the colonial holdouts, was unwilling to suffer economically to punish them. Even some African states ignored the OAU’s call: Zambia and Botswana had little choice but to trade with the white regimes that neighbored them. These efforts by the OAU failed because of the weakness of its membership. Divided they could do little. Some member nations of the OAU did offer refuge for freedom fighters from Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Rhodesia, but this was something they might have done even without an OAU. A more subtle victory of the OAU was to keep the issue of colonialism alive in United Nations debates. In order not to appear to be supporting racist regimes, the United Nations passed resolutions that called for self-determination for the peoples of Africa. This raised the consciousness of the Western world regarding the situation in Africa and thereby increased the pressure upon the white regimes. This pressure was partially responsible for the 1975 withdrawal of Portugal from its African possessions. Similarly, United Nations sanctions, recommended by the OAU, helped to force Rhodesia to

In the mediation of intra-African disputes, as in decolonialization, the OAU had a limited but real effect. Although its decentralized character tended to limit its willingness to interfere in African conflicts, the OAU acted on a number of occasions to end conflicts that seemed to be escalating out of control. As befit its conservative agenda, it almost always intervened on the side of the established government and ignored demands of recognition by rebel or secessionist forces—the major exception being its recognition of the Polisario rebels in the Western Sahara. The early successes of OAU negotiators include helping to achieve a cease-fire in the AlgerianMoroccan border dispute of 1963–1965, easing the withdrawal of British troops from Tanzania in 1964, and offering mediation in the Somalian-Ethiopian and Somalian-Kenyan border disputes, which were settled in 1967. Less successful were the OAU’s efforts to bring the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) to an end. The membership of the OAU was divided on the Nigerian struggle: The majority supported the territorial integrity of Nigeria (which was in line with the OAU charter), while a minority, including Tanzania and Gambia, supported the secessionist government in Biafra. Only the 1970 surrender of Biafra resolved this OAU disagreement. The OAU helped mediate an end to the first Sudanese civil war, which ended in 1972, but it was unable to stop a renewal of that war, which began again in 1983. The OAU’s limited success in resolving intraAfrican disputes was the result of limited means—

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the member nations of the OAU provided it with a relatively small operating budget—and its reluctance to commit troops to any conflict. The OAU did authorize member states to send peacekeeping forces to Chad in 1979 and 1981, but the peacekeepers—with virtually no financial support from the OAU—were unable to stop the fighting and were quickly with-

drawn. The Chad conflict continued despite OAU calls for a cease-fire. More successful was the 1990 intervention in Liberia after the collapse of Samuel Doe’s government. Although this intervention was carried out by troops under the command of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it had the blessing of

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the OAU. Liberia continued to be troubled by internal strife, but the ECOWAS force did provide a degree of stability that had been lacking. In 1996, the OAU began discussions regarding the possibility of creating an OAU-sponsored rapid reaction force that would be capable of intervening in African conflicts—the immediate catalyst for the talks was the ongoing ethnic violence in Burundi. It remained unclear whether the OAU would follow any steps that would break with its tradition of mediation rather than intervention. The OAU failed to accomplish great things because, as defined by its charter, it lacked sufficient unity for effective action. An OAU created along the lines that Nkrumah envisioned might have been more effective, but it was almost certain that it would never have been able to function—the nations of Africa had too many barriers dividing them, including ethnicity and language. Nevertheless, the OAU provided a forum for debate, moderated some of Africa’s uglier conflicts, and contributed to the end of colonialism in Africa.

Founding of the African Union In September 1999, members of the OAU met in Sirte, Libya, to discuss the possibility of establishing the African Union (AU). This conception of the AU is credited to Libyan president Muammar Qaddafi, who envisioned the AU as an African version of the European Union (EU). In its final years, the OAU had received increased criticism from a number of sources, most of whom viewed it as ineffective and little more than a “dictator’s club,” largely because it refused to address such issues as the democratic rights of citizens in member states. Emerging from this meeting was the Sirte Declaration, which called for the disbanding of the OAU and its replacement with the AU, the goal of which was “accelerating the process of integration in the continent to enable it to play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded as they are by certain negative aspects of globalization.” After the Sirte session, three other summits were held, which laid down the final framework for the AU. The Lomé Summit of 2000 established the Constitutive Act of the African Union, giving the AU its constitution and mandate, which was essentially based on the mandate of the OAU. It was followed by the Lusaka

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Summit of 2001, which “drew the road map for the implementation of the AU” the following year. The first AU summit was held in July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, where the OAU was officially disbanded. South African president Thabo Mbeki, who sat as the OAU’s last chairman, continued as the first chairman of the AU. After Mbeki’s term ended in 2003, the AU chairmanship was held by Mozambique’s Joaquin Chissano, Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, and Congo-Brazzaville’s Denis Sassou-Ngueso. Like the OAU, the AU is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and it is centered on the vision that “the AU is Africa’s premier institution and principal organization for the promotion of accelerated socioeconomic integration of the continent, which will lead to greater unity and solidarity between African countries and peoples.” To achieve this vision, the objectives of the AU include the defense of member states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, the encouragement of international cooperation and sustainable development, the promotion of peace and democracy, and expanding the effort to combat disease, such as HIV/AIDS, which afflicted Africa more deeply than any other region in the world.

African Union Activities Many critics of the old OAU claimed the AU was an improvement, particularly concerning peacekeeping and human rights. The OAU refused to intervene in civil wars and the internal human rights problems in member states—except when the state itself collapsed, as was the case with Liberia in the early 1990s. By contrast, the new organization was more outspoken and activist on both counts. Sudan provides the best example of this. In 2004, the AU responded to the ongoing strife in that nation’s Darfur region, even though the strife there was largely an internal matter, by dispatching 300 soldiers to protect the AU’s observers. This was the first time either the OAU or AU had taken such an interventionist measure in a country with a functioning government. Then, in 2006, the organization rejected Sudan’s bid for the chairmanship, citing the Sudanese government’s brutal human rights record in Darfur (though critics said the choice of Congo-Brazzaville’s SassouNgueso was not much better considering the civil strife and human rights abuses in that country’s recent history).

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In the meantime, the organization was bolstering its peacekeeping abilities. At a donor’s conference in 2005, enough money was raised to increase AU peacekeeping troop levels from 7,000 to as many as 12,000. Nevertheless, the African Union’s highest-profile peacekeeping mission, in the Darfur region of Sudan, was largely viewed as a failure. Dispatched to enforce a weak cease-fire agreement, the 7,000 AU peacekeepers were unable to prevent the Sudanese government and its militia allies from attacking civilians. By 2006, an estimated 200,000 persons in the Darfur region had been killed in the government and militia offensive against a rebel movement in the region. Although funded by the EU and the United States, AU commanders said they had not been given the resources (most especially air support), or the mandate (the right to go on the offensive against militias), to do the job effectively.

As for the OAU’s record of turning a blind eye to the undemocratic politics of member states, the AU had already shown itself less willing to abide coups. It was able to persuade Togo to hold elections after a coup in 2005, and, following another coup that year in Mauritania, the organization suspended that country from all organization activities until it held democratic elections. The military junta ruling Mauritania then agreed to do so by 2007. Carl Skutsch, Daniel F. Cuthbertson, and James Ciment

Bibliography African Union Web site: www.africa-union.org. Amate, C.O.C. Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986. Harris, Gordon. Organization of African Unity. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994. Murithi, Timothy. The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005.

ANZUS PACT The ANZUS pact was a Cold War alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States— hence the acronym “ANZUS”—dedicated to preserving peace and security in the Pacific Ocean region. The treaty, officially called the Pacific Security Treaty, was signed on September 1, 1951, in San Francisco, and took effect in April 1952. Pact business was transacted at annual meetings of the pact council, made up of the foreign ministers of the three involved countries; decisions by the pact council had to be unanimous. The pact also made provision for military representatives to meet separately and arranged for military maneuvers among the three members.

Reasons for AN Z U S The ANZUS pact was to be the foundation of security in the Asian-Pacific region. The threats to regional security that the pact was designed to counter were not specified, but there were two clear security motives behind its creation. First, the United States intended the pact to reassure a nervous Australia, which was concerned about the recent decision to allow Japanese rearmament. Japan had been disarmed at the end of World War II, but Cold War pressures had convinced Japanese and American leaders that Japan would have to recreate some kind of armed forces for its own protection. Japan’s new military was designed to be nonthreatening; its ground, air, and naval branches were called the Self-Defense Forces, and were forbidden to send combat troops abroad. Nevertheless, Australia and New Zealand, with memories of World War II still vivid, were distrustful. The ANZUS pact served to allay their fears by assuring them that the United States would guarantee their security. Second, the pact was a direct response to the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Cold War began in Europe, it had soon spread to Asia. In 1949, China’s long civil war had ended in the victory of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party. In 1950,

Communist North Korea invaded South Korea, an ally of the United States. Soon U.S. and other forces arrived to help defend the South, setting off a bitter war that lasted until 1953. The defeat of pro-Western forces in China and the conflict in Korea had created concern in the United States regarding the dangers of Communism in the Asia–Pacific region. ANZUS was created to fit in with the U.S. policy known as “containment.” Containment was designed to keep the Soviet Union and other Communist nations from spreading their influence. By creating regional alliances such as ANZUS—as well as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)— the United States hoped to hem in any further attempts at Soviet expansion.

Functioning When the ANZUS pact was signed, it was clear that the United States was the senior partner in the alliance. In 1952, Australia and New Zealand had a combined population of about 11 million, compared to the U.S. population of 150 million. With relatively tiny armed forces, the main contribution of Australia and New Zealand was their navy and air bases. The two smaller ANZUS countries became ports of call for the U.S. Navy, making it logistically easier for the United States to exert its influence on the Asian heartland. Australia also allowed the United States to base satellite tracking stations on its territory. The ANZUS pact made it clear that the United States had become the superpower to which the rest of the West turned. This caused ruffled feelings in Great Britain, which, before World War II, had been the primary protector of Australia and New Zealand. Britain objected to the fact that the pact had been negotiated without any British consultation, but American secretary of state John Foster Dulles argued that the inclusion of Britain would have been seen by Asian countries as harking back to the colonial era. Australia and New Zealand remained part of the British Commonwealth,

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but ANZUS demonstrated that the United States was now their most important ally. Even before the ANZUS pact took effect, the military alliance among the three signatories was being consummated by Australia and New Zealand who had committed small contingents of troops to the Korean War under United Nations auspices. Still, this commitment was seen as a confirmation that Australia’s and New Zealand’s strategic alliance was with the United States. The ANZUS pact was made somewhat obsolete by the 1955 creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—which included the ANZUS signatories and added Great Britain, France, Pakistan, and the Philippines—but relations between the ANZUS allies remained good. During the Vietnam War, Australia and New Zealand again sent soldiers to fight alongside their American ally.

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When SEATO dissolved in 1977, the ANZUS pact took on greater importance. Although vital regional issues were fewer, the annual pact meetings provided a forum for the three powers to discuss issues of mutual interest, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam. ANZUS began to break apart in 1984 with the victory in New Zealand of David Lange and his Labour party. Lange, fulfilling a campaign promise that had been inspired by the antinuclear movement, banned nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warships from entering New Zealand’s harbors. Since many American vessels were either nuclear-powered or carried nuclear weapons, this made it difficult for U.S. warships to participate in joint ANZUS exercises. The United States responded in August 1986 by suspending its treaty obligations to New Zealand. The

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treaty was not officially dissolved, and Australia continued to abide by its provisions, but as a threepower pact, it was effectively at an end.

AN Z U S Today After the effective withdrawal of New Zealand from the ANZUS pact, the formal military alliance had, for most practical purposes, ended. The United States and Australia continued to maintain close military links under the pact, but their relationship had been transformed into a two-power alliance. The collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and the decline of Communism as an international threat also made the ANZUS pact much less relevant. Australia and New Zealand, on good terms with most of their

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Asian neighbors, did not have the same need of a superpower protector. There were some attempts to revive the pact in the late 1980s and 1990s, but without success. It seemed likely that the pact would become part of Cold War history, though Australia invoked the treaty to express its support for the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Carl Skutsch

Bibliography Baker, Richard W., ed. The ANZUS States and Their Region: Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. Donnini, Frank. ANZUS in Revision: Changing Defense Features of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1991.

ARAB LEAGUE The Arab League (officially the League of Arab States) was founded in Cairo on March 22, 1945. The founding states were Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (Jordan), and Yemen. The Arab League’s current member states are more than twenty Arab nations in the Middle East and North Africa, including Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Kuwait, and Palestine (represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO). Each member state receives one vote in the Arab League Council, which coordinates all league activity. Its headquarters are in Cairo.

Historical Background Arab states had been subjugated for centuries by the Turkish Ottoman Empire. When the empire came to an end after World War I, Ottoman regions became “protectorates” under European colonial powers. Britain occupied Iraq, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, while France took Lebanon and Syria. Arab leaders chafed under this enforced tutelage. Arab intellectuals and leaders began discussing the possibility of a unified Arab state, free from European occupation. Prominent among the leaders pushing for Arab unity was Nuri al-Said, an Iraqi Arab who had fought with the British in World War I. With British help, al-Said became prime minister of Iraq. He began to work toward unifying Arab states as they became independent. In 1942, al-Said put forward a plan calling for a single nation combining the territories of Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. This greater Syrian state would be linked with Iraq in an Arab League, which would be open to other Arab nations as they gained their independence. Al-Said hoped that this confederation of Arab states would eventually become a single, united Arab nation. Al-Said’s idea was supported by Mustafa alNahhas Pasha, the prime minister of Egypt (also under British domination), who called for an Arab conference at Alexandria in September 1944. It was attended by delegates from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan (present-day Jordan), and Lebanon, and by observers from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco, Libya, and Palestine. Al-Said hoped the delegates would

agree to a centralized organization, but they were unwilling to surrender the sovereignty they hoped to achieve to a pan-Arab state. Instead, they created a loose confederation whose goal was to coordinate, not control, the Arab states’ activities. The focus of the 1944 discussions was on economic rather than political cooperation. The Pact of the League of Arab States was signed by its founding members in March 1945.

Activities of the League Consistent with the aims of its founders, the Arab League has been most successful in the realm of economics. An Economic Council, having as its members the ministers of economic affairs for the member states, was founded in 1953 and was given the responsibility of helping to coordinate Arab economic activity. In 1957, the league established the Council of Arab Economic Unity, whose mandate was to foster economic integration among Arab states. The council was responsible for creating the Arab Common Market, mirroring the efforts of the European Common Market. Similarly, the Arab Monetary Fund, established in 1976, was designed to be the Arab equivalent of the International Monetary Fund, providing loans for those members who were in need of assistance in developing their economies. In 1973, the League founded the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, which was dedicated to assisting African states with debt repayment and capital investment. From its early years, the Arab League was also deeply involved in politics, primarily in opposition to the state of Israel, which was established in 1948. All league members were opposed to the creation of the Jewish state. In April 1950, the league drafted a Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, which went into effect in August 1952. The treaty led to the creation of the Joint Defense Council, run by foreign and defense ministers, and the Permanent Military Commission, containing the military leaders of the member states. Under the Joint Defense Treaty, the Arab League led an economic boycott of Israel.

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The Arab League also created the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1948, the Council of Arab Unity had formed the All-Palestine Government to represent the needs of the Palestinian refugees who had fled the newly forming state of Israel, but this body had failed to attract widespread support among Palestinians. In 1964, therefore, the league authorized the creation of a more autonomous organization, the PLO, headed by Ahmad al-Shuqayri, a Palestinian activist. The League hoped to be able to maintain control over the growing forces of Palestinian nationalism. However, in 1969, Palestinians, dissatisfied with the League’s guidance, transferred the leadership of the PLO to Yasir Arafat, the head of the aggressive activist group al-Fatah. Arafat and the Palestinians remained independent of the Arab League as they followed their own course toward a Palestinian state.

For the most part, the Arab League did little more than play a coordinating role for the Arab world’s opposition to Israel. The many wars fought between Israelis and Arabs have been supported by Arab League members but have not been controlled by the league itself. In 1974, the League did declare its support for the PLO as the “sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” a move that undercut Jordan’s King Hussein, who had previously claimed a role as the spokesman for Palestinian affairs. In 1979, the league expressed its strong opposition to the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel by expelling Egypt and subjecting that country to the same economic boycott as Israel. The league headquarters was moved from Cairo to Tunis. (Egypt was later readmitted to the league.) The Arab League also attempted to direct military responses in conflicts between Arab nations. In

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1961, it sent a multinational force of Saudi, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Sudanese troops to guard Kuwait’s borders against threats from Iraq. In 1976, it created an Arab Deterrent Force in an unsuccessful attempt to end the fighting in Lebanon. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq divided the members of the league. Most Arab states (although not always their populations) supported the U.S.-led coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait. At an August 1990 League meeting, twelve of the twenty attending nations condemned the Iraqi invasion, demanded a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and voted to support the creation of an Arab army to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression. Some league members, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, joined in the counterinvasion of occupied Kuwait. Other members voted against the resolution or abstained. Jordan, which had close economic ties to Iran, attempted to maintain a neutral stance during the war. Other members, including Libya, Sudan, and the PLO, were sympathetic to Iraq, believing it to be engaged in a war against Western imperialism. During this period of division, the league moved its main office back to Cairo and elected an Egyptian, Ahmad Esmat Abd, as its secretary-general. Despite opposition from the league, the United Nations Security Council imposed heavy economic sanctions on Iraq, banning the import of goods that could be used for weapons development. Over the next decade, the Arab League pressured the United Nations Security Council to lift or at least relax the embargo, citing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children due to starvation or insufficient medical supplies as an example of the suffering the sanctions produced. The league also condemned the use of military force by the United States and Britain to enforce UN restrictions. The league maintained unwavering support for Palestinian statehood, even in the face of the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. In 1994, the Arab League and other Islamic organizations, such as the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), sought to maintain the Islamic trade boycott of Israel, but several of its members were unwilling to follow through. At the same time, the league expressed willingness to “normalize” relations with Israel if that country would withdraw its forces to the pre1967 (Six-Day War) borders and recognize an independent Palestinian state.

After an Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002, the league restated its support of Palestine. In the Beirut Declaration it saluted “the brave intifada of the Palestinian people” and expressed support for “the legitimate courageous resistance against the Israeli occupation forces.” The league also affirmed its solidarity with Lebanon and Syria, which, it said, continued to face Israeli aggression. Conflict between Israel and its neighbors continued, but there was some movement toward the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Islamist Terrorism and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq After attacks by Islamist terrorists against the United States on September 11, 2001, the league faced two new issues: the threat of Islamist terrorist groups and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The league was quick to condemn the September 11 attacks—as it has done with most forms of Islamist terrorism. However, opposition to terrorism remained a contentious subject. Many Arabs considered Palestine’s use of terror part of its legitimate struggle for self-determination. Most members of the league strongly opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, condemning it as an assault on the sovereignty of an Arab state. Several member states broke ranks with the league, however. Kuwait and Qatar, for example, supported the U.S. campaign and offered use of their territories as a launching point for possible military action. After the ouster of Saddam Hussein as leader of Iraq in early 2003, the league welcomed the establishment of democratic institutions in Iraq, supporting the post-Saddam transition, but expressing concern over the makeup of Iraq’s new democratic government. It supported the rights of Iraq’s Arab majority and questioned concessions to Kurds and other minorities in Iraq.

Economic Initiatives The Arab League continued to represent the economic interests of its members in regional disputes. In one notable case in the 1990s, it used its influence in a dispute between non-Arab Turkey and the Arab states of Syria and Iraq over rights to water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Turkey, which controls the upper reaches of the rivers, severely cut back on the amount of water flowing into Iraq and Syria. The

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Twenty-two heads of state, including President Zine el-Abidine ben Ali (center) of host country Tunisia, attended the Sixteenth Arab League Summit in May 2004. Middle East violence was a focus of attention. (Rabih Moghrabi/ AFP/Getty Images)

league protested this disproportionate use of water by Turkey and championed the cause of “Arab water security.” Finally, the league continued to work toward the integration of Arab economies. After years of preparation, the Arab free trade zone was established on January 1, 2005, incorporating seventeen league members. The new zone was intended to increase trade among Arab states and to increase investment in the region by Arabs and others.

Significance The Arab League failed to achieve unity in the Arab world but often succeeded in serving as a focus for Arab cooperation on issues of shared interest. Its economic accomplishments are accompanied by success in encouraging and promoting Arab culture

(such as the Arab League Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the Academy of Arab Music). Despite continuing deep conflicts in the region, the league also continues to focus on the interests of its member nations, most notably in its support of creating an independent state of Palestine. Carl Skutsch and Daniel Cuthbertson

Bibliography Hassouna, Hussein A. The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1975. Khalil, Muhammad. The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record. Beirut: Khayats, 1962. League of Arab States. www.arableagueonline.org. MacDonald, Robert W. The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (BAGHDAD PACT) Originally known as the Baghdad Pact—after the city in which it was signed in 1955—the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was an organization designed to promote mutual security and economic cooperation among its member states. These originally included Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Great Britain. Promoted by the United States, which joined the organization as an ancillary member in 1956, the Baghdad Pact was one in a series of regional security alliances stretching from the North Atlantic to the South Pacific, designed to counter armed outside aggression or internal subversion fostered by Communist Moscow and Beijing. The pact was renewable every five years. Under the original treaty, the organization was governed by a council, which met once a year, and a secretariat that met on a more regular basis. The secretariat included four divisions: political and administration, economic, public relations, and security.

While the military staff planned joint exercises and military coordination, the economic committee focused on projects in agriculture, scientific research and education, mining, health, and communications and public works. For the most part, the development projects concerned transport and communications, including the development of highways, railroads, and microwave transmission that had both military and civilian uses. In fact, the Baghdad Pact was little more than a paper organization. Following the 1958 nationalist revolution of Abd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq, which overthrew the pro-Western monarchy established by the British in 1930, Iraq pulled out of the organization, forcing the organization to change its name to CENTO and to move its offices from Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey. During most of the 1960s and 1970s, the group focused on the above-mentioned economic projects,

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the largest of which was a railroad linking Turkey and Iran. The absence of unrest in the region—with the exception of Pakistan’s wars with India—meant the organization had few security issues to deal with. Indeed, U.S. policymakers, who saw the real threat to the security of CENTO members coming from Moscow, viewed Pakistan’s struggle with India as a diversion. By the mid-1970s, with the collapse of Vietnam and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the general retreat of U.S. power from the Asian mainland, CENTO was even less a factor in the military power relationships of southwestern Asia than it had

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been in the 1950s and 1960s. After Islamic revolutionaries took over Iran and pulled that country out of the organization in 1979, CENTO was dissolved within a year. James Ciment

Bibliography Bethke, Gerald. Should the United States Continue to Support CENTO? An Individual Research Report. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1973. Kechichian, Joseph. Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Institute, 1994.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT— THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE The non-aligned movement, begun at the Bandung Conference of 1955, was the deliberate attempt by a group of countries to move away from allying themselves with either the United States and its allies, or the Soviet Union and other Communist states. The Cold War was at its height; the Soviet Union and the United States were insisting that the world’s nations must choose sides; and the non-aligned movement chose an alternative route. In a world divided between the rich Western “first world” and the Communist “second world,” Bandung created the possibility of a “third world” that would have its own interests, not connected to East-West conflicts. Although its actual achievements are difficult to pin down, it helped to define an era and gave a number of countries a means by which they could attempt to avoid joining either Communist or Western camps, while expressing an alternative ideology of thirdworld cooperation.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser—but Bandung did not have any clearly articulated ideology. In fact, Bandung included countries who were openly allied to the West (Turkey and South Vietnam), as well as Communist allies of the Soviet Union (China and North Vietnam). These varied participants at Bandung were only able to adopt a few vague proclamations, which included a statement condemning “colonialism in all of its manifestations” as well as a ten-point collection of principles that called for “the promotion of world peace and cooperation.” Nevertheless, the roots of the non-aligned movement first took firm hold at Bandung. For the first time, nations of the South—the underindustrialized world—had met together without consulting the rich nations of the North. Bandung was their declaration of independence.

The Non-Aligned Movement Bandung Conference Representatives from twenty-nine nations met at Bandung, Indonesia, for an Asian–African conference April 18–24, 1955. The delegates came from all the independent nations of Asia and Africa—except South Africa, North and South Korea, and Israel. Organized by five newly independent nations— Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, and Pakistan—and hosted by Indonesia’s Sukarno, Bandung was supposed to be an assertion of national pride in the face of dying colonialism. The sponsors wished to create a forum in which the national voices of countries outside Europe and America would be heard, and in which some kind of joint policies might be arrived at. Among their prime concerns was the continued existence of colonialism, as exemplified by the still-existing French Empire. The leaders at Bandung included men who would go on to lead the non-aligned movement— Indonesia’s President Sukarno, India’s Prime Minister

The idea of non-alignment was suggested by Bandung, but it was not clearly articulated as an ideology until the first Non-Aligned Conference, held in Belgrade in 1961. This conference was the result of an increasingly cooperative relationship between three leaders: Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt, and Nehru of India. All three believed that their countries had a shared interest in withstanding the threat of domination by both the capitalist West and the Communist East. A key year in forming the non-aligned consciousness was probably 1956. The Suez Canal Crisis, in which British, French, and Israeli troops invaded Egypt, demonstrated to Nasser and others that colonialism was still alive in the West. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s simultaneous brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolt made it clear that the East could be equally threatening. The three founders of non-alignment—Tito, Nasser, and Nehru—had all survived confrontations

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Representatives of twenty-nine Asian and African nations attended an April 1955 conference in Bandung, Indonesia, that paved the way for the Non-Aligned Movement. (Howard Sochurek/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

with the rich powers of the world. Tito had stood up to Stalin and saved Yugoslavia from becoming another East European puppet of the Soviet Union. Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal, facing down British and French attempts to retake it. And Nehru had successfully led the fight against British control of India. This commonality of experiences and interests led the Yugoslav, Egyptian, and Indian leaders to work more closely together during the late 1950s. The idea of a meeting of non-aligned states crystallized during 1960. That year, sixteen African nations had achieved independence, bringing United Nations membership up to 100, of which more than two-thirds were from either Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Many of these nations felt isolated by the East-West conflicts and wished instead to focus on

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problems that they considered more immediately relevant to their situation, such as economic development and ethnic strife. They wanted a forum to discuss issues that were outside the Soviet-American struggle for influence. Many of them also considered the Cold War a danger to the entire globe. In 1960, Cold War tensions heated up, with the downing of an American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union, and the collapse of a planned summit between the Soviet Union and the United States. Since both superpowers had atomic weapons, any confrontation had the potential of destroying the world. The time seemed to be ripe for creating a third force in international politics, one that would help to defuse East-West animosities. In 1961, Tito, Nasser, and Nehru organized a September summit at Belgrade. Twenty-five nations attended the first NonAligned Conference at Belgrade. The conference’s agenda was directed toward relieving Cold War tensions. The participants called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to suspend their “war preparations” and to initiate communications in order to avoid future conflict. The conference also criticized colonialism, called for an end to nuclear testing, and asked all nations to work toward general disarmament. Non-aligned conferences were held at regular intervals thereafter, such as in Cairo in 1964, Lusaka in 1970, Algiers in 1973, Colombo in 1976, and Havana in 1979, but they found it difficult to achieve more than general calls for an end to Cold War polarization. There were too many differences in policy among the many non-aligned nations. The Arab states were often focused on the issue of Israel, while Africa was usually reluctant to condemn the West and thereby risk losing the aid payments upon which their countries depended. Cuba, which hardly qualified as non-aligned, tried to push the movement in an anti-American direction but was opposed by Yugoslavia and others. The result was no result. The non-aligned movement lacked sufficient unity and coherence to have a substantial effect on international politics. The departure of the non-aligned old guard also lessened the impact of the movement. With the death of Nehru in 1964 and Nasser in 1970, the nonaligned movement lost two of its greatest leaders. Tito survived until 1980, but was eclipsed by younger

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leaders, like Fidel Castro, who continued to push the non-aligned movement in anti-Western directions. While Castro had some rhetorical successes, he and the other new-generation leaders lacked the moral stature and vision of their predecessors. The nonaligned movement gradually lost its focus and sense of purpose. Nevertheless, non-alignment was not a complete failure. If nothing specific was achieved, the nonaligned movement was still able to articulate a vague but real alternative to the Cold War ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union. It argued for a world in which nations could cooperate and coexist without being drawn into ideological wars. If many non-aligned nations failed to live up to this goal, it did not diminish their success in charting a new course from that being put forward by the rich northern states. The non-aligned movement survived the end of the Cold War; a twelfth conference was held in New Delhi in 1997. More than 100 nations attended.

American Attitudes America and its allies tended to see the non-aligned movement as a pro-Soviet political movement. In the American view, to be neutral in the struggle against the Soviet Union was to be supporting Soviet expansionism. That Fidel Castro, Cuba’s Communist dictator, was a leader in the non-aligned movement also helped to convince American leaders of the movement’s leftist leanings. Furthermore, the nations of the non-aligned movement attacked Western imperialism more often than they criticized Communist abuses. Although this was because most non-aligned nations had once been colonies of one or another Western power, and remained suspicious of the intentions their former conquerors might still harbor, the United States, whose historical memory was quite short, often discounted the legitimacy of their fears. The U.S. view of the non-aligned movement had some basis in fact. Many of its leaders were Communists (Castro and Tito) or Communist sympathizers (Nasser, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, and Nehru). But being a Communist was not the same as being an ally of the Soviet Union; America’s failure to realize this subtle difference would handicap its foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Not all nations

that criticized Western imperialism were dupes of the Soviets.

Communist Responses The Communist states, particularly China, were, at first, somewhat better at appealing to the nonaligned movement. China had sent Zhou Enlai to the Bandung conference and, by waving the banner of its own anticolonialist history, managed to convince some of the participants that China could be a useful friend to the third world. China and the Soviet Union were aided in their overtures to the nonaligned world by the leftist tradition in which many of the non-aligned had spent their political adolescence. For leaders such as Nkrumah, who had strong socialist leanings, the Communist world could be appealing. Openness toward the Communist bloc was damaged by the 1962 border war between India and China, as well as by the Soviet Union’s initial refusal to halt nuclear testing, as called for by the first NonAligned Conference. It soon became clear to all but the most devoted admirers of the Soviet Union—as Cuba’s Castro was obliged to be—that the Soviet Union was only interested in the non-aligned movement if it would help in advancing its own superpower agenda. Although Castro managed to achieve some success in leading the non-aligned movement in an antiWestern direction, particularly after the 1979 meeting in Havana, the general trend of the non-aligned states was to move away from a harsh anti-Western position. The fall of the Soviet Union only accelerated this tendency.

Analysis The non-aligned movement’s goals were many: to protest against the polarization of the world, to lessen the tensions that the Cold War had created, and to improve the economic status of the lessdeveloped world. Its failure was due as much to the difficulty of the problems that it hoped to address as it was to the inherent conflicts and crosscurrents within the movement. And as the Cold War faded, the non-aligned movement became increasingly irrelevant. In the 1960s and 1970s the Soviet Union and the United States had felt obliged to seek the

Non-Aligned Movement—The Bandung Conference

support of the countries of the non-aligned bloc, but with the Cold War gone, the industrialized world no longer had to be concerned about thirdworld issues. Still, the non-aligned movement had helped to create the image of the third world, in the minds of the other two worlds, as well as in its own. With the United Nations as its forum, the non-aligned movement became an alternate voice to that of the two competing alliance systems. The non-aligned movement was also the parent of a host of other Asian, African, and Latin American regional and international organizations; OPEC,

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the OAU, and the G15 all owe their birth, in part, to the same currents that created the non-aligned movement. Carl Skutsch

Bibliography David, Steven. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. Jackson, Richard L. The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers. New York: Praeger, 1983. Willetts, Peter. The Non-Aligned Movement. East Brunswick, NJ: Nichols, 1978.

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established by treaty in 1975 and ratified the following year. The original signatory countries were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (which left the organization in 2002), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Cape Verde joined the organization in 1977. ECOWAS was originally intended as an economic organization, designed to coordinate tariff, agriculture, labor, and monetary policies of the various member states. However, it came to play an important peacekeeping role in West Africa in the 1990s, particularly through its involvement in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1981, the member states signed protocols—reaffirmed in 1991—calling for nonaggression toward other member states, as well as for the provision of mutual defense assistance. A revised treaty, signed in 1993, committed the members to work toward regional peace, stability, and security.

Peacekeeping in Liberia The first trial of the ECOWAS security protocols came in Liberia. In August 1990, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—consisting of 4,000 troops from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—were sent into Liberia to enforce a cease-fire between the warring factions there, as well as to bring about public order and establish an interim government in preparation for elections. The Liberian conflict had begun in December 1989, when Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded the country from the Ivory Coast in an effort to topple the dictatorship of Samuel Doe. The intervention was only partially successful. An interim government was established, under President Amos Sawyer, but it had virtually no authority

outside the capital of Monrovia and its immediate environs. ECOMOG forces were supposed to occupy Liberian harbors and airports and establish a buffer zone along the Sierra Leone border before elections scheduled for May 1992. Because of resistance by Taylor’s NPFL, however, ECOMOG was unable to accomplish its mission. Indeed, the ECOMOG mission had strong political overtones from the beginning. Since its inception, the West African peacekeeping force was viewed as, and indeed has been, a largely Nigerian effort. Its command structure and most of its troops came from Nigeria, a country that by sheer population and economic might had dominated West Africa since at least the 1970s. Moreover, ECOMOG politics were fractured by divisions between Nigeria and the other member states, particularly the larger Francophone ones, including Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Because Taylor was heavily sponsored by former president of the Ivory Coast Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Nigeria’s rulers were highly suspicious of him and, during the first several years of the ECOMOG mission, did everything they could to prevent his coming to power. When Doe surrendered to ECOMOG in August 1990, the Nigerian commander made sure he was not turned over to Taylor. Instead, ECOMOG handed him over to Prince Johnson, a former Taylor lieutenant who had parted ways with the NPFL leader. Johnson ultimately tortured Doe to death. More importantly, ECOMOG thwarted two of Taylor’s offensives to capture the capital in 1990 and 1992. Then in October of 1992 ECOMOG went on an offensive against Taylor, after the NPFL had failed to demobilize and prepare for elections as required under the ECOWAS-sponsored Yamoussoukro accord of 1991, to which Taylor was a signatory. However, the offensive, which included heavy bombardment of the Taylor-held country around Liberia’s second city of Buchanan, failed. Part of the animosity between ECOMOG and Taylor concerned access to Liberia’s wealth of rubber,

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timber, iron ore, gold, and diamonds. Indeed, a map of the fighting between ECOMOG and Taylor matched the locations of Liberia’s major extractive industries or the ports from which the resources could be shipped. All parties to the conflict were interested in controlling these areas. This included not just ECOMOG—some of whose officers were engaging in smuggling activities—but Taylor’s rivals as well, including two factions representing the Krahn ethnic group that had ruled under the Doe dictatorship: the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). In April 1993, ECOMOG announced that ULIMO had been disarmed and demobilized. But all was not as it seemed in the confusion of the civil war.

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angered the other factions and sank both the 1993 agreement and a 1995 agreement signed in Ghana. Throughout 1995 and 1996, intensive multilateral fighting continued between and among the NPFL, ECOMOG, ULIMO, the LPC, a breakaway ULIMO faction, and the remaining elements of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Clashes between the ULIMO breakaway faction—known as ULIMO-J because of its leader, Roosevelt Johnson—and ECOMOG in the west of the country in December 1995 and January 1996 left 16 peacekeepers dead and saw the capture of 130 more, all of whom were Nigerians. The fighting between ULIMO-J and ECOMOG was rumored to be the effect of an agreement reached between Taylor and Nigerian strongman Sani Abacha during a secret visit by Taylor to the Nigerian capital of Abuja in mid-1995. By this time, ECOMOG forces had been augmented to some 12,000, versus an estimated 60,000 rebel fighters in the various factions. While the rebels—and especially the NPFL—controlled most of the interior of the country, ECOMOG was largely confined to the capital and the various ports.

Peacemaking in Liberia In April 1996, in an attempt to end the war, Taylor attacked Monrovia itself. In extensive fighting between the NPFL and remnants of the AFL, the city was heavily damaged, and tens of thousands of people—already internally displaced—fled to nearby countries. The April fighting shocked both ECOMOG and the international community into renewing their efforts to uphold the Abuja accords, signed in early 1995. In addition, a new ECOMOG commander, Victor Malu, was sent in to remake the force. Malu, considered one of the finest officers in the Nigerian army, took command in July. Malu immediately began making plans to station ECOMOG throughout the country, in preparation for a general disarmament process that would end on February 1, 1997. Whether from war weariness or ECOMOG’s new assertiveness, the faction leaders complied, and by early February most of them had demobilized, though rumors persisted that caches of weapons remained hidden in more remote areas of the country. Adding to the stories of hidden weapons were revised counts of combatants. The figure of 60,000 was revised downward to 35,000 as a result of demobilization and of ending double-counting of fighters who fought for more than one faction.

Multinational forces take part in closing ceremonies of a joint military exercise spearheaded by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to strengthen security and peacekeeping capabilities for the region. (Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP/Getty Images)

Under the Abuja accords, all factions were required to formally disband and form themselves into political parties by the end of February. In addition, all potential candidates for political office in the elections scheduled for May 1997—including most of the faction leaders—were required to resign from their positions in the interim government. All persons and parties complied, though for logistical reasons the elections were postponed until July. In those elections, for which an augmented ECOMOG force of 16,000 supplied the logistics and security, Taylor was the overwhelming victor. Because of his past history of hostility toward ECOMOG, it was expected that the new president would immediately move to have ECOMOG leave the country. But Taylor did not move precipitately, and the last ECOMOG troops did not leave Liberia until late in 1998.

Sierra Leone While members of the Sierra Leone army were serving with ECOMOG forces in Liberia, political conflict and rebel fighting continued in their home country. In 1992, fighting broke out between Taylor’s NPFL forces—which were being aided by and were aiding rebel forces in Sierra Leone—and the Sierra Leonean army after the NPFL invaded the country. Taylor claimed he was merely pursuing elements of ULIMO that were using the country as a base for attacks on his faction. In January 1992, ECOWAS-led discussions in Monrovia led to a cease-fire between

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the NPFL and the Sierra Leone government, though this was often violated by NPFL-ULIMO fighting in the border area. In May 1995, as fighting continued between government forces and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel forces, Sierra Leone president Valentine Strasser—who came to power in a military coup— requested that ECOWAS mediate. Strasser, however, was forced out of office by yet another military coup in January 1996, and elections were held the following month. With 36 percent of the vote, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his United National People’s Party were elected to power. The new president’s efforts to oust recalcitrant members of the military from power led to a coup by Major Johnny Paul Koroma in May 1997. Condemned by ECOWAS and much of the international community, Koroma’s government was isolated, facing international economic sanctions and an invading ECOMOG force, headed by the Nigerians. In June, the fighting began when Nigerian gunships shelled the capital of Freetown. Throughout the summer and fall, heavy fighting occurred around the capital, and numerous Nigerian-ECOMOG soldiers were killed or captured. In February 1998, however, ECOMOG defeated the Sierra Leone coup leaders and forced them into exile, leading to the reinstatement of President Kabbah. In January 1999, the RUF attacked ECOMOG positions in Freetown. Weeks of fierce fighting left over 5,000 dead, but resulted in the rebels being driven from the city. In November, UN peacekeepers began deploying to the country to enforce a cease-fire negotiated in July, allowing ECOMOG to leave.

Other Interventions and the Future In 1998, ECOWAS intervened in the civil war in member-state Guinea-Bissau when the army rose up to depose President Joao Bernardo Vieira. The organi-

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zation arranged several cease-fires in 1998 and 1999, finally deploying peacekeepers in the country in February 1999 to help swear in a government of national unity. ECOMOG troops remained in the country through the mid-2000s to maintain the peace. In 2001, more than 1,600 ECOMOG troops, mostly from Nigeria and Mali, were stationed on the border of member state Guinea, to prevent guerrilla infiltration from the civil conflicts in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone. Over the years, ECOWAS and its security arm, ECOMOG, had their share of problems. Some said that Nigeria enjoys too much influence over the organization and that ECOWAS and ECOMOG often serve that country’s interests to the detriment of other member states. There were also charges of corruption, as ECOMOG soldiers allegedly engaged in looting and profiteering in both the Liberian and Sierra Leone conflicts. In addition, ECOMOG has often sided with one faction or another, as was the case with its opposition to Charles Taylor’s NPFL in the Liberian Civil War. Nevertheless, ECOMOG represented the first serious and successful effort in Africa at fostering regional security through the deployment of a multination peacekeeping force. As the African Union, formerly the Organization of African Unity, began developing a multi-nation peacekeeping arm of its own in the early 2000s, it looked to ECOMOG to be a model of what to do and what not to do. James Ciment

Bibliography Adebajo, Adekeye. Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. ECOWAS Web site: www.ecowas.int. Keen, David. Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Kpundeh, Sahr John. Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995.

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY (EDC), 1952–1954 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in April 1949. The alliance members then had to determine the role West Germany would play in defending Europe. British and American officials realized that defending Europe without a West German contribution would be enormously difficult. By 1952, West Germany, because of its location, size, and potential power, was a major player in European politics. If a war broke out in Europe, Germany would undoubtedly be involved. That is where Soviet and Western troops directly confronted each other. The French recognized the necessity for a West German military contribution, but they also feared a re-armed Germany. The memories of World Wars I and II remained vivid. The French were particularly determined to keep West Germany out of NATO. As a NATO member, Germany could build its own army and a general staff. There was a need to re-arm Germany, but France wanted to limit and control the process by placing limits on personnel and armaments. West Germany’s chancellor Konrad Adenauer reluctantly agreed to re-arm West Germany, but he insisted that it be treated as an equal. Equality was a political necessity to help guarantee parliamentary approval for re-arming. There was much opposition to re-arming. The Social Democrats, the major opposition party in the German parliament, adamantly opposed re-arming. They believed that a re-armed West Germany would end any possibility that the Soviet Union would agree to German unification. Adenauer could insist that West Germany be treated as an equal because the United States and Great Britain recognized that they needed West Germany to help deter a Soviet military attack.

Origins In July 1950, French Premier René Pleven proposed what came to be known as the European Defense Community (EDC). His proposal called for establish-

ing a European army, including West German military units, controlled by supranational institutions. Under the terms of the EDC treaty, the EDC would have a European commander, would be subordinate to NATO, and would remain in force for fifty years. The EDC members included France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The purpose of the EDC, from a French point of view, was to prevent the establishment of a German army under the control of a German government. Representatives of the six participating nations signed the EDC treaty on May 27, 1952. Although the treaty was signed, many nations, including the six signatories, had reservations. Britain’s prime minister, Winston Churchill, thought the treaty unworkable. He envisioned a commanding officer unable to communicate with his troops because they all spoke a different language. There was also the question of sovereignty. The smaller countries— Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—would have most if not all of their military forces under a supranational authority. Governments would have no control over their troops assigned to the European army. Although France proposed the EDC, the French had more reservations about the treaty than anyone else did. Many members of the French National Assembly were determined to prevent the creation of a European army. The treaty was opposed by the Communists, the Gaullists, and members of the Socialist Party. Although there were many reasons for the opposition, the most important reason was that France did not want to see Germany re-armed, whatever the safeguards. It continued to think of Germany, not the Soviet Union, as its primary foe. Exacerbating French fears was the fact that a large number of its troops were in Indochina and the North African colonies. In 1952, there was no indication that the Indochina War would soon end. As a result of these troop deployments, it was conceivable that

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government preferred membership in NATO as an alternative to the EDC. Chancellor Adenauer wanted Germany to regain its sovereignty and independence. This was his primary goal. To accomplish this, West Germany had to contribute to the defense of Europe. Adenauer had the support of Great Britain and the United States. Both governments recognized the need to end the occupation, but they also wanted measures in place to make certain Germany would not again threaten

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Europe. They wanted Germany integrated into European institutions as the best means for preventing a future German threat. The Soviet Union opposed any scheme that included the re-arming of West Germany. The one trump card held by the Soviets was the desire of the German people for unification. In March 1952, in identical notes to France, Great Britain, and the United States, the Soviet Union called for a fourpower meeting to discuss German unification and national elections. The Soviets proposed the withdrawal of all troops from Germany, which would be prohibited from joining any military alliance directed at any nation that had waged war against Nazi Germany during World War II. The purpose of the Soviet proposal was to derail the EDC negotiations. Great Britain and the United States recognized the Soviet proposal for what it was, a delaying tactic. The French, however, wanted to try again to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union. During the debate on the EDC from 1952 to 1954, the Soviet Union put forth a number of proposals regarding German unification. The United States and Great Britain rejected them all. France, because of its fear of a rearmed Germany, was more willing to explore the Soviet proposals. The EDC countries signed the treaty in May 1952. The expectation was that it would be ratified within a reasonable period of time, but the ratification process took longer than anyone expected. The Netherlands ratified the treaty in January 1954, Belgium and West Germany in March, and Luxembourg in April. Italy was expected to ratify the treaty shortly thereafter. In April 1954, Great Britain signed an agreement with each EDC member pledging to keep its military forces in Europe indefinitely. President Eisenhower made a similar pledge regarding American forces. The British and American pledges were intended to win support in the French National Assembly for ratification of the EDC treaty. The pledges were also designed to reassure the French, who worried about the possibility that West Germany, once it re-armed, would withdraw from the EDC and again threaten Europe.

France Rejects the E D C On August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly killed the EDC treaty. A number of factors caused the defeat. Undoubtedly, the most important was the fear of a re-armed Germany. Nothing that British or American officials said or did could eliminate that fear. French political leaders knew that re-arming West Germany was inevitable. Their approach to the issue was based on emotion, not reason. Other factors contributed to the defeat of the EDC treaty. The Soviet Union launched a “peace campaign” after the death of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in March 1953. The Soviets abandoned their territorial claims on Turkey made by Stalin in 1945. The Korean War ended four months after the death of Stalin. The first Indochina War ended in July 1954. To the French, the Soviet Union looked a lot less threatening in 1954 than it had in the past. If the Western powers and the Soviet Union could agree on German unification, the re-arming of Germany could be postponed. The French wanted “peace at any price.” The rejection of the EDC by the French National Assembly negated the “contractual agreements” restoring sovereignty to West Germany. The EDC and the “contractual agreements” were part of a single package. New agreements were needed to restore sovereignty to West Germany and to enable it to contribute to the defense of Europe. Great Britain and the United States did not want to waste any more time. They were determined to re-arm West Germany with or without the cooperation of the French. In October 1954, the United States and the representatives of eight allied nations agreed that West Germany should join NATO. The occupation of West Germany ended the following year. It was now a fully sovereign nation. Kenneth L. Hill

Bibliography La Querrelle de la CED. France Defeats EDC. New York: Praeger, 1957. McGeehan, Robert. The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense After World War II. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent international judicial body established in 2002 to hear cases involving individuals charged with war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. The court is located in The Hague, Netherlands, but is authorized to hold proceedings anywhere in the world. The ICC describes itself as a “court of last resort,” to be appealed to only in cases where national courts are unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute the above-mentioned crimes. Cases may be brought to the ICC by a signatory state, a nonsignatory state that has chosen to accept ICC jurisdiction, a special three-judge panel (only in cases initiated by an ICC prosecutor), or the UN Security Council. (The ICC should not be confused with the International Court of Justice, also located in The Hague, which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and is charged with settling disputes between UN member states.) Only those countries that have ratified the various international agreements that established the court, most notably the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (usually referred to as the ICC Statute), are subject to the court’s jurisdiction. As of early 2006, approximately 100 countries had signed on to the treaty; the United States was not among them. President Bill Clinton signed the ICC Statute in 2001, but the measure was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. Thereafter, both the administration of President George W. Bush and much of the Republican-led Congress were opposed to ratification. As the world’s only superpower, they argued, the United States would be subject to frivolous and politically motivated prosecutions should it join the court. Most controversially, the Bush administration declared that it would not submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification until U.S. military personnel are explicitly exempted from prosecution. The origins of the ICC date back, at least indirectly, to the end of World War II, when the Allied victors (France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) concurred that the abuses committed by the Nazi regime in Germany—aggressive war,

war crimes, and crimes against humanity—were too heinous to go unpunished. The International Military Tribunal was established at Nuremberg, Germany, in August 1945, and some 200 leading Nazi officials were put on trial. Most historians agree that the rights of the accused were honored and that the trial was conducted with scrupulous attention to proper judicial procedure. According to Allied governments, the trials were conducted for several purposes: to express humanity’s outrage at the crimes committed by the Nazis; to punish the individuals guilty of such crimes; to prevent future violations of international law; and to provide a precedent for the establishment of international judicial procedures to try crimes against humanity. This last goal took many years to fulfill, as Cold War politics and the rivalry between East and West prevented the establishment of a judicial body and set of legal principles acceptable to both sides. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s came a renewed impetus for a permanent international crimes tribunal, further spurred by global outrage at the atrocities being committed in the former Yugoslavia and later Rwanda. The goals of the court were to make perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity “accountable” to world opinion; to establish the facts behind the crimes; to bring justice to the victims of such crimes, and to strengthen the rule of law by establishing international standards for the prosecution and punishment of such crimes. In 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 827, calling for the establishment of an ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). That court, based in The Hague, was given jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions committed in the states of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. By March 2006, the ICTY had indicted 161 persons and found 43 of them guilty. While generally regarded as fair and scrupulous, the ICTY did come under criticism for the slowness of its proceedings, for bias (Serbs complained the

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court brought more charges against them than other participants in the various wars of the former Yugoslavia), and for giving a forum to human rights violators. In particular, former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic—who died in prison in March 2006, before a verdict could be rendered in his case—used the court as a forum for attacking “enemies” such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in 1999 sent troops to stop ethnic violence in the province of Kosovo. In the wake of the Hutu genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994, another ad hoc tribunal was established in Arusha, Tanzania, to try those principally responsible for the mass killings. As in the case of the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) employed international judges and prosecutors and adhered to international judicial procedures as first established at Nuremberg. Hampered by poor infrastructure, a lack of defense lawyers, and the sheer number of potential defendants, however, the trial proceeded slowly. As of early 2006, the ICTR had tried nineteen cases, leading to the conviction of twenty-five persons. Among them were Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, executives at the national radio station, whose broadcasts urged Hutu to massacre Tutsi. Both received life sentences. With these trials ongoing, many in the international community came to believe that a permanent court to try war crimes and crimes against humanity was needed. Thus, in 1998, the UN General Assembly created the United Nations Diplomatic Confer-

ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome. Participating nations wrote up the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in July of that year, establishing the ICC. Aside from war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the statute also proposed to give the ICC jurisdiction over wars of aggression. However, that would not occur until a definition of “wars of aggression” could be agreed upon and appended to the treaty; as of early 2006, the definition remained a matter of discussion. The ICC Statute also stated that the court would come into being within sixty days of the treaty’s ratification by sixty countries. That ratification threshold came on April 11, 2002. As of March 2006, three cases were pending before the court, all at the stage of being investigated by the chief prosecutor’s office. These included cases against leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, a former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and perpetrators of the genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. James Ciment

Bibliography Calvo-Goller, Karin N. The Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court: ICTY and ICTR Precedents. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006. Leonard, Eric K. The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory and the International Criminal Court. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005.

MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS The history of Middle East negotiations is long and convoluted. Experts list more than eighty attempts at peacemaking in the region since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While a few of the peace initiatives and negotiations led to lasting treaties or to temporary armistices and cease-fires, many failed completely. This fitful history of regional diplomacy since the end of World War II has involved three basic kinds of negotiations: (1) talks between Israel and the Arab world; (2) talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians; and (3) talks among the Arab parties (also addressing issues not pertaining to Israel). With the exception of the multilateral talks that began in 1991—known as the Madrid round, after the Spanish capital, where they were first held—all the negotiations were conducted on a bilateral level. At least one set of talks—the Camp David Accords in 1978—was mediated by the United States, while the Madrid negotiations involved both the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. The rest were conducted largely without outside mediation. Aside from the many substantive issues dividing the various parties in the Middle East, the history of negotiations in the region was plagued by two general obstacles. The first was the problem of recognition. Perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, here it was difficult to get the parties even to recognize one another. Until the Camp David meetings in 1978, no Arab country was willing to officially recognize the legitimate existence of the State of Israel. And not before the Oslo Accords in 1993 was any Israeli government willing to accept the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, long after it became the accepted voice and representative of the majority. Indeed, until 1993 it was against Israeli law for any government official even to meet with PLO representatives. Even more obstructive were Israeli attitudes about Palestinians. For many years, most Israeli officials, in both the Labor and Likud parties (roughly, the moderate left and right on the country’s political spectrum), did not even recognize the existence of a distinctive Palestinian people. Instead, they described

Palestinians as a subset of the Arab world whose rightful home was neighboring Jordan. This view allowed Israeli governments to avoid the uncomfortable issues of Palestinian nationalism and statehood. The second general obstacle to Middle East negotiations concerned forums and context. Until Camp David, every Arab government made Israeli recognition of the PLO a prerequisite for direct Arab-Israeli talks. These governments also insisted that there would be no talks until Israel lived up to various UN resolutions—passed after the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars—requiring the Jewish state to settle the issue of Palestinian refugees and, in the case of the latter two, to withdraw from the lands occupied in 1967. Israel consistently tried to separate these matters, hoping to achieve peace with its neighbors without conceding recognition of the PLO or discussing the possibility of a Palestinian state. The Arab states always favored an international forum for talks, preferably under UN auspices and (during the Cold War) including the Soviet Union, which generally supported their aims and opposed Israel. Israel, which viewed the United Nations as a hostile body, opposed an international forum for negotiations and held out for bilateral talks with Arab states. The United States, Israel’s superpower patron, usually supported Israel on this issue for reasons of its own. Washington did not want to raise the stature of the Soviets in such international talks, fearing that it would lead to increased Soviet influence in a region deemed crucial to U.S. national security. This Israeli demand eased with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, when the United States accepted Soviet/Russian participation in the Madrid talks. While many of the wars between the Arab states and Israel have been followed by meetings to discuss cease-fires and other immediate issues pertaining to the specific conflicts, there were four key sets of negotiations in the region since World War II: the talks leading to the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978; the multilateral Madrid negotiations from 1991 to 1993; the Oslo Accords and subsequent negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis on their implementation that began in 1993;

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and the negotiations that achieved the IsraeliJordanian peace treaty of 1994.

Modern Histor y Through Camp David After World War I, the former Ottoman Empire lands in the Middle East were divided into League of Nations mandates, administered by the French and British. France was given control of Syria (which then included Lebanon), and Britain was put in charge of Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. By 1946, all of these states except Palestine had been granted formal independence. Palestine presented special problems, owing to the presence of a growing population of Jews who had been migrating to the region since the late nineteenth century in the hope of creating a Jewish state. Beginning in 1917, Britain promised the Jews a homeland in the region, while at the same time reassuring the Arabs in Palestine that their rights would be protected. The mutual exclusiveness of these promises produced a series of multi-sided conflicts between the Jews, the Arabs, and the British, as well as a series of British position papers that tried to glide over the problem. In 1947, exhausted by World War II and facing independence movements throughout its far-flung empire, Britain admitted that it had failed to find a workable solution for Palestine. It informed the United Nations that it would turn over administration of the region to the UN on May 15, 1948. A special UN commission produced a report calling for the division of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem administered as an international city. This solution pleased the Jewish settlers (known as Zionists) but angered the Arabs, who complained that the UN solution would give 55 percent of Palestine’s territory to a group representing just over 10 percent of the population. Representatives of Palestine and Arab governments in the Middle East rejected the compromise. The rejections became moot on May 14, 1948, however, when the Jews declared the independent State of Israel, claiming the zone recommended by the UN commission. Already they were arming themselves, preparing for war with the angry Palestinians. On May 15, the Arab states of Egypt, Transjordan (now Jordan), Syria, and Iraq retaliated by invading former mandated Palestine. After a year of fierce

fighting, the Israelis retained their independence and control over more than 70 percent of Palestine. During the fighting, several hundred thousand Palestinians fled Palestine (according to Israelis) or were driven out of the country (according to Palestinians). The enormous refugee population created a problem that has stymied Arab-Israeli relations to the present day. During the summer of 1949, armistices—though not formal peace treaties—were signed between all the belligerent states. Israel’s official borders were left to be determined. A state of belligerency between the Arab states and Israel continued to exist through the 1970s, even as the line between them continued to harden. In 1956, Israel cooperated with Britain and France in an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt to take back control of the Suez Canal, alienating Egypt and its influential leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1967, the Israelis mounted a whirlwind attack against its neighbors, capturing territory in Jordan, Egypt, and Syria in the Six Days’ War. This victory triggered yet another wave of Palestinian refugees, and a UN resolution calling for Israel to pull out of the new Occupied Territories. The war also confirmed Israel’s incorporation of East Jerusalem, previously considered by Palestinians to be their capital. More ominously, it prompted the infamous three “no’s” of the Khartoum Summit of 1967, in which the Arab League promised no peace with Israel, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel as a legitimate state. Earlier, in 1964, Nasser had organized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). At first, the organization and its military wing were meant to be subordinate to Egypt. But in 1968, militants from an extreme Palestinian faction called al-Fatah defeated the Israeli army at the Battle of Karameh. The victory was cheered by Arabs as a recovery from the stinging defeats of 1967; it also propelled al-Fatah and its leader, Yassir Arafat, to center stage of the Middle East conflict. No more was it said that the Palestinians themselves should wait upon Arab armies. In 1969, Arafat and al-Fatah took control of the PLO. Meanwhile, inter-Arab relations were undergoing a change, too. Since 1948, Jordan’s King Hussein had maintained that he spoke for the Palestinian people, since half his country’s population consisted of Palestinians. But at the Arab summit of 1974, the governments of the region officially recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. This change also brought major changes in Israeli

Middle East Negotiations

politics. The dominant Labor Party had long advocated a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation that would include the Palestinian territory on the West Bank of the Jordan. When Jordan gave up speaking for Palestinians, this position lost its relevance. In 1977, the hard-line Likud coalition won the Israeli elections and began building a new Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories, seemingly as a preparation for incorporating them into the Jewish state for good. The victory of hard-liners in Israel was answered by a surprising move by Egypt. Its leader, Anwar Sadat, who had succeeded to power after Nasser’s death, was more pro-Western and less aggressive. In addition, he had presided over some Arab successes against Israel, fighting the Israelis to a standstill in the Sinai Peninsula in 1973. At the same time, Sadat’s oil-rich Arab allies had demonstrated the power of their resources over the West with their oil boycott of 1973–1974. From his new, stronger position, Sadat made one of the boldest moves in modern Middle East history. He traveled to Jerusalem in late 1977 and spoke to the Israeli Knesset (parliament). The stage had been set for the first significant negotiations between Israel and an Arab state: the Camp David talks.

Camp David I Sadat’s speech to the Knesset—expressing sympathy for Jewish security fears and invoking the memory of the Holocaust—touched the Israeli people, though it was intended as much for Washington as for Jerusalem. Having expelled thousands of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972, Sadat was eager to establish warmer relations with the United States, knowing that it was better situated than the Soviet Union to offer the kinds of technical and economic assistance the Egyptian government needed to improve the quality of life of its people. The speech had its intended effect. U.S. president Jimmy Carter—with his longtime interest in the Middle East and a penchant for mediation—invited Sadat and the newly elected Likud prime minister Menachem Begin to the presidential retreat at Camp David for a marathon summit. After thirteen days of intensive talks in September 1978, the three leaders—who would collectively win a Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts—announced that they had reached not one but two sets of accords.

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The first Camp David Accord concerned the Palestinians, calling for a transitional period of five years in which the Occupied Territories would gradually be given autonomous status and the right to elect their own government. Ultimately, this would lead to a set of final status talks in the early 1980s, with Jordanians and Egyptians—together with Palestinians from the territories—negotiating on behalf of Palestinians generally. Most observers expected the talks to lead to a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. The second Camp David Accord was more straightforward. It called for the signing of a peace treaty, within three months, in which Egypt would recognize Israel and guarantee its security in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. As far as Sadat was concerned, the two accords were a package, but subsequent events proved otherwise. The Arab states all condemned Sadat for recognizing Israel and cut off relations with Egypt. Shortly after the talks, Israel invaded southern Lebanon, ostensibly to clear out PLO enclaves that had been using the region for attacks on northern Israel. Many Arabs—including many Egyptians—contended that Israel had used the Camp David Accords only to secure its western flank before attacking its northern neighbor. Sadat, they said, had been played for a fool. Moreover, the Likud government continued to accelerate the pace of Jewish settlement building in the Occupied Territories. Beleaguered and ostracized, Sadat, too, began to wonder whether Begin had negotiated in good faith, since the outcome of Camp David served Israeli needs so precisely. Israel had achieved an immediate bilateral peace with its most formidable Arab neighbor in exchange for vague promises of Palestinian autonomy in the future. Moreover, Sadat was disappointed at America’s inaction. While the United States was delivering a massive aid package to Cairo as promised, it was doing little to pressure the Israelis to live up to the agreements mediated by its own president. In 1981, Sadat paid the ultimate price for his unpopular dealings with Israel, when he was gunned down by Islamist militants in his own army who objected to the agreement. For their part, Israeli hard-liners—especially those on the far right of the Likud coalition—had their own suspicions. They said that Israel had given up the vast Sinai territory, with its oilfields, Israeli investments, and strategic position, for an Egyptian promise to abstain from hostilities. The hard-liners

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suggested that the Arabs were merely trying a new tactic in their decades-long quest to destroy the Jewish state.

Madrid During the 1980s, both the U.S. administration of Ronald Reagan and the more conservative Arab leaders proposed a series of plans to solve the Palestinian crisis and, they hoped, the overall Middle East situation. Both the so-called Reagan Plan of 1982 and the plan proposed by U.S. secretary of state George Shultz were based on the Jordanian option—the proposed Jordanian-Palestinian Federation on the West Bank. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia added another element to the mixture when he offered to use his influence to pressure Arab states to recognize Israel once the latter had agreed to the formula laid out in the Reagan Plan. But the Likud government was in no mood to negotiate, rejecting all three plans and continuing its policy of settlement building in the Occupied Territories. After the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, both Begin and his Likud successor, Yitzhak Shamir, hewed to a hard line, refusing any concessions to the Palestinians. The despair of the Palestinians in the territories was becoming more palpable with each passing year. Subject to economic exploitation, political oppression, and daily humiliations, they had little to hope for. The PLO, ejected from its bases in Lebanon by the Israelis and Syrians, was forced to move its headquarters 1,500 miles away to Tunisia. There, officials well supported by donations from the oil-rich Arab states and far removed from Palestine itself grew more and more complacent. During the Arab summit in Jordan in November 1987, Jordan’s King Hussein snubbed Arafat and the PLO, and for the first time the Palestinian issue was not the first item on the agenda. It placed second, after the Iran-Iraq War. Seemingly abandoned by their distant leaders, the Palestinians took matters into their own hands. Just a month after the Jordan summit, a spontaneous popular uprising broke out across the territories. Known as the intifada (Arabic for “shaking off,” as in “shaking off Israeli rule”), the protests changed every equation in the region, though it took some time for their full effect to be felt. In 1988, King Hussein renounced his claims on the West Bank and suspended his administration there, thus killing the so-called

Jordanian option. (Under the post-1967 agreement, Israel had permitted Jordan to continue administering basic social services in the West Bank.) The real impact of the intifada was felt in the PLO offices in Tunis. There, Arafat found the balance of power within the PLO forever changed. Until then, Palestinians in refugee camps and those living outside the country had dominated the organization, continuing to insist on the destruction of the Zionist state. Now the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were in command. Having seen Israeli power close up and wanting relief from Jewish oppression, they were willing to compromise with a two-state solution. This permitted Arafat to abrogate the parts of the Palestinian covenant calling for the destruction of Israel, a prerequisite for talks with the United States. (A year later, these talks ended abruptly when Arafat refused to condemn a Palestinian attack on a Tel Aviv beach.) In 1990, the Middle East’s attention shifted temporarily when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied neighboring Kuwait. The resulting Persian Gulf War, in which a multilateral force led by the United States drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait, changed the situation for Israel and Palestine once again. The United States, victorious over Iraq and no longer threatened by the collapsing Soviet Union, pushed for multilateral talks. The increased pressure on Israel was partly a reward to Arab nations for supporting the coalition against Saddam Hussein. (Israel, on the other hand, was rewarded for not fighting in the war, which would have risked losing Arab support.) The new talks were held in Spain and became known as the Madrid negotiations. They included Israel, the main Arab states, the United States, and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. The Palestinians themselves were represented only indirectly as part of the Jordanian delegation. The Madrid process included a two-track approach: a negotiation of the Palestinian problem, and talks to resolve the unsettled state of Jordanian and Syrian relations with Israel. Ultimately, the talks failed. Israel was unwilling to budge on Palestine issues, which prompted the Arab states to refuse to negotiate the second track. Still, Madrid came to have an important effect on subsequent relations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and indirectly on relations between Jordan and Israel as well. First, Yassir Arafat—excluded from the summit—feared that other Palestinian representatives might sign a separate deal with Israel, undercutting

Middle East Negotiations

his position and perhaps jeopardizing the possibility of a Palestinian state. Second, the failure of the Madrid talks was one factor in leading Israeli voters to oust the Likud government and replace it with a Labor majority in the 1992 elections. The new Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and Arafat both had strong reasons to seek a new and secret forum to settle their differences.

Oslo Almost immediately after the 1992 elections, Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres began looking for ways to meet with the PLO. When the Norwegian prime minister offered his country as a venue, both the Palestinians and the Israelis accepted. Meeting in and around Oslo, the secret talks got off to a tentative start, especially on the part of the Israelis, who refused to send representatives from the foreign ministry until pressed to do so by PLO representatives. Eventually, Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin joined the team. The first order of business was establishing the scope of the discussions and how binding the agreement should be. The PLO wanted a comprehensive agreement with an ironclad linkage between an interim accord and the final status talks. Israel refused to concede either. Indeed, the Israeli position dominated the talks, forcing the PLO to accept little more than a set of rules for further negotiations. In return, it received official Israeli recognition as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Ultimately, both sides agreed that the final status talks would take place three years after the signing of the Oslo agreement, leaving the PLO and the Palestinians in limbo between subjection and sovereignty. Still, the Declaration of Principles, as the Oslo Accords were officially known, and the internationally televised handshake between Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn after signing the accords in September 1993 inaugurated a new era in IsraeliPalestinian relations. There was widespread celebration in both Israel and the Occupied Territories, though this could not disguise the fact that important groups on both sides were utterly opposed both to the agreement and to the very idea of Israeli-PLO talks. Right-wing Israelis feared that Rabin was selling out legitimate security concerns by placing them in the hands of a Palestinian authority headed by someone they considered an unrepentant terrorist.

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Worse, he was admitting that Israel might not have a legitimate right to govern all the territories— territories that, the religious among them believed, God had given them in perpetuity. Extreme Palestinians agreed with the Israeli right wing, but from the opposite perspective. For the Islamists of Hamas, any agreement that accepted the existence of a Jewish state on holy Muslim lands was anathema. Similarly, secular left-wing opponents of Arafat considered the presence of a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab Middle East unacceptable. Thus, the Oslo Accords, thin and lacking substance, seemed to offer little beyond Israeli recognition of the PLO. Nevertheless, supporters and opponents of the agreement knew that the peace process, once started, could gain its own momentum and might lead to a final settlement.

Post–Oslo Accords Both the PLO National Council and the Israeli Knesset endorsed the accords, thin as they were. Beyond Israeli recognition of the PLO, they offered only protocols and schedules for future talks, an agreement that the new Palestinian Authority would include Gaza and Jericho, and a deadline for the final status negotiations. Now came the hard parts: working out the details of Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian security arrangements, and substantive issues concerning Jewish settlements, water supplies, Jerusalem, and the ultimate status of a Palestinian entity. While negotiators for the PLO and the Israeli government sat down at the Egyptian resort town of Taba, a militant religious Jew fired upon Muslim worshippers in Hebron, killing twenty-nine before being beaten to death by survivors. The terrorist Hamas organization retaliated with a series of suicide bus bombings that left more than a dozen Israeli soldiers and civilians dead. Despite the violence, both sides pledged to continue the talks, though the Israelis began hedging on the deadlines for future negotiations. On May 4, negotiators, now meeting in Cairo, announced that they had reached an agreement. In contrast to the dozen or so pages of the Oslo Accords, the Cairo document—outlining the specifics of the so-called Gaza-Jericho first plan—was hundreds of pages long, with dozens of annexes and hundreds of reservations, qualifications, and exceptions. Arafat’s opponents complained bitterly that the agreement

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offered little indeed: limited Palestinian Authority jurisdiction over Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho. Israel would continue to occupy almost all the West Bank, though its troops could not enter these Palestinian-administered areas. Palestinian society was torn apart by the agreement. While Arafat’s supporters celebrated—cheering the arrival of the first Palestinian forces in Jericho and Gaza—Hamas militants protested. As the demonstrations escalated in the fall of 1994, Arafat’s police opened fire, killing thirteen protesters and wounding dozens more. It was the worst violence in the Occupied Territories since the signing of the Oslo Accords, and, more ominously, it represented the first great clash between Palestinians themselves. Though the two sides reached an agreement, Hamas launched yet another bombing campaign against Israel, prompting border closures and demands that Arafat crack down on the militants. These demands placed the PLO leader in an awkward position. To keep Israel negotiating, he had to deal harshly with his own radicals. Doing so, however, jeopardized his legitimacy among the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, the Rabin government was having problems of its own, as the Hamas bombing campaign began to have a corrosive effect on Israeli public opinion, decreasing support for the Labor government and the Oslo process. Yet Rabin and the PLO had staked their political futures and reputations on the agreement, and thus were committed to further talks. After a series of deadlines had passed, the two sides signed a second set of implementing accords in September 1995. Under these, Israel agreed to pull out of some 450 Palestinian villages and towns before the January 1996 Palestinian elections. While this withdrawal placed more than 70 percent of the people in the territories (minus the Jewish settlers) under Palestinian authority, it left the bulk of the rural areas in Israeli hands. In effect, said Palestinian critics of the plan, it was turning their lands into a Middle Eastern version of South African homelands, isolated and crowded enclaves for the majority, surrounded by Israeli forces and settlers. Moreover, the agreement ignored the two most contentious cities in the territories, Hebron and Jerusalem. In the former, a small group of ultra-Orthodox Jewish settlers maintained a provocative presence in an overwhelmingly Muslim city. As for Jerusalem, both sides claimed it as their capital—or, in the Palestinians’ case, their future capital—though Israel insisted on keeping all of it.

Settlement of this issue, both sides agreed, would have to await final status talks. On November 4, 1995, the volatile situation in Israel and Palestine was once again inflamed, this time by the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a right-wing Jewish university student. At first, the event moved the peace process forward when his successor, Shimon Peres, invoked Rabin’s memory as a martyr for peace. Public opinion polls showed an upswing in support, a trend mirrored on the Palestinian side by the overwhelming victory of Arafat and his Fatah Party in the January 1996 elections. Still, the Palestinian issue was nothing if not unpredictable. Determined to destroy what was considered to be a sellout of Palestinian aspirations, Hamas launched a series of devastating suicide bombings in Israeli cities in the spring of 1996. This move, along with a disastrous Israeli offensive against Islamic militants in Lebanon, undermined support for Peres’s candidacy in May 1996 general elections. Those elections ended in the victory of the conservative Likud party, now led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who made no secret of his reservations about the peace process during the campaign. Though warned by the PLO, Arab leaders, and the United States not to renege on agreements signed by his predecessor, Netanyahu refused to meet with his Palestinian counterpart and initiated provocative moves, including the opening of a tunnel beneath holy Muslim sites on the Temple Mount. A symbolically charged issue, the tunnel opening sparked a series of Palestinian demonstrations that culminated in exchanges of gunfire between Palestinian and Israeli security forces. With the peace process seeming to unravel, U.S. president Bill Clinton sent special envoy Dennis Ross to arrange a settlement over the outstanding issue of Hebron. Months of negotiating resulted in a January 1997 agreement dividing the city into Israeliand Palestinian-controlled zones, though many Hebronites criticized the fact that 450 Jewish settlers were treated the same as some 100,000 Muslim residents of the city. Contentious and unpopular, the Hebron agreement proved to be the last major one between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government. Netanyahu’s insistence on expanding existing Jewish settlements and building entirely new ones in Arab East Jerusalem ensured that there would be no further progress in negotiations.

Middle East Negotiations

Syrian Track In 1999 a new Labor Party government in Israel under Ehud Barak embarked on a major diplomatic initiative aimed at a final peace settlement with the Arabs. It started with Syria—the last major neighboring Arab country still formally at war with Israel. The Syrian initiative offered the Israelis a chance to settle two outstanding foreign policy issues: Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights in Syria and its occupation of a strip of land in southern Lebanon. Syria was a major player in Lebanese politics and had had a large military presence in the country since the early years of the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s. For Barak, dialogue with Syria could help fulfill his campaign promise to end the politically unpopular Lebanese occupation. The agenda for the talks was practical. Syria wanted the 450 square miles of the Golan Heights, which had been occupied by Israel in June of 1967 and annexed in December of 1981. Israel hoped to normalize relations with Syria and receive security guarantees. Barak and Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Shara met on December 15–16 in Washington, D.C., and on January 3–10, 2000, in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Despite progress on the issues of Israeli withdrawal, normalization of relations, and security arrangements, including deployment of early-warning stations on the Israeli-Syrian border, the talks proved unsuccessful. Syria insisted that Israel withdraw to the line of June 1967, which would give Syria continued access to the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, while Israel insisted on keeping control of the whole shoreline, including a narrow strip of land in the northeast. For Israel, this was a crucial issue of security, since some 40 percent of Israel’s water came from the lake. At the same time, Syria was unwilling to compromise on full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, including the narrow strip along the Sea of Galilee. The issue was complicated for both sides by domestic concerns. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was old and ailing, and the return of every meter of territory was a matter of personal honor and dignity, representing a permanent legacy of his regime. For his part, Barak was managing a fragile coalition in the Israeli parliament and under continuous pressure not to compromise the nation’s security. In addition, there were about 17,000 Israeli settlers on the Golan Heights who would strongly oppose efforts to remove

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them. Finally, there were more than a million recent immigrants in Israel, many of them from Russia, who saw no reason to give up any land already incorporated into the state. In the end, these obstacles proved too much for the two presidents, and the two sides were unable to find a solution. Even intervention by U.S. president Bill Clinton during the Barak-al-Shara talks and his later meeting with Assad in Geneva could not break the deadlock. The Israeli-Syrian talks were postponed indefinitely. For Israel, the failure to reach a deal with its bitter adversary had immediate consequences—in Lebanon. Barak had wanted an agreement with Syria before withdrawing from southern Lebanon, to ensure Israeli security from attacks originating in the area. He knew that no Lebanese government at the time could make peace with Israel without Syria’s approval. In the absence of a peace agreement with Syria, Barak acted unilaterally, even though Lebanon warned that it could not guarantee security for northern Israel. On May 24, 2000, Israel completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Soon afterward, the militant organization Hezbollah took over the former Israeli security zone and proclaimed a major victory. In following years, there were minor border skirmishes between Israeli and Hezbollah forces, exploding into full-scale war in 2006.

Camp David I I After the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian part of the peace process, the Clinton administration concentrated its efforts on finding a settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. The situation on the ground was complicated enough. The Barak government had turned over control of additional territories in the West Bank to the Palestinians, freed some Palestinian prisoners, and opened a “safe passage” corridor between the Gaza Strip and West Bank. By 2000, 12 percent of the West Bank was under full Palestinian control, 27 percent under joint Israeli-Palestinian control, and 61 percent under Israeli control. In the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians controlled some 80 percent of territory, while the Israelis controlled the rest. In Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Stockholm in April–May 2000, some progress was made in finding compromises on territorial and security matters, but they also revealed significant distance between the sides on the so-called “final status issues”: borders,

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Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the problem of the Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem. Israel was prepared to recognize a Palestinian state on some 65–80 percent of the West Bank if the Palestinians agreed to cede their claim to East Jerusalem, give up their demand for Palestinian refugees’ right to return to Israel proper, and accept the incorporation into Israel of the 10 percent of West Bank territory where about 80 percent of the 170,000 Israeli settlers lived. Israel’s other demand, on security grounds, was that it be allowed to maintain a military presence on the eastern border of the West Bank, along the Jordan River. The Palestinians, in turn, insisted that Israel fulfill UN resolutions by withdrawing from all occupied Palestinian territory and accepting the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to pre-1967 Israel. The Palestinians also continued to claim East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. Arafat and the PLO announced that if the talks failed, Palestinians would declare their sovereignty unilaterally on September 13, 2000. With two sides publicly committed to such widely disparate positions, an extraordinary effort was needed to bring the parties to a deal. The Israelis followed the 1978 Camp David model, proposing to concentrate on the “framework” of a settlement rather than on its details: the outlines of the Palestinian state, the borders, and the settlements. Backing the Israeli approach, President Clinton invited Israeli prime minister Barak and Palestinian leader Arafat to a summit meeting at Camp David. From July 11 to July 24, 2000, the three leaders confronted the toughest problems the Arabs and Israelis had ever negotiated. At the same time, the talks revealed that the Israelis and the Palestinians were still far apart on all the most sensitive issues at the core of the conflict: territory and borders, Jerusalem, and refugees. On the territorial issue, the Israelis offered the Palestinians 87 percent of the West Bank, with Israel annexing those parts of the West Bank where most Jewish settlers lived, compensating Palestine with other, uninhabited lands in Israel. Some 10 percent of the territory along the Jordan River would remain in Israeli hands under a longterm leasing agreement as a security buffer zone. Also, Israel would have supervision over Palestine’s airspace and seacoast. The Palestinians, in turn, demanded at least 97 percent of the territory, stressing that even a 100 percent return to the 1967 line would

mean a Palestinian state on only 22 percent of historic Palestine as it had been recognized by the UN after World War II. The Palestinians did show some readiness for concessions: permitting Israel to annex some Jewish settlements, accepting Israeli warning stations in the West Bank, and acceding to the right of Israeli armed forces to enter the new state during wartime or in case of emergency. At the same time, the Palestinians were reluctant to agree on a permanent Israeli military presence in their territory in the Jordan River valley, preferring an international peacekeeping force there. Perhaps the most decisive objection, according to Arafat, was that the areas offered to the Palestinians did not make up a viable and contiguous Palestinian state. Instead, it appeared to be a patchwork of areas divided by Israeli roadblocks and security zones—essentially, a territorial reorganization of Israel’s occupation regime. On the question of Jerusalem, Barak insisted that the city remain united under Israeli sovereignty, but offered to turn over some Arab neighborhoods and Muslim holy places to Palestinian control; in exchange, Israel would annex Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish quarter of the Old City and the Western Wall, but insisted on Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Control over the Temple Mount, a site holy both to Jews and Muslims (Al-Aqsa mosque was built on the ruins of the Jewish Temple) was a focal point of the discussion. Even an unusual idea of splitting the Temple Mount between the upper area (Al-Aqsa mosque) under Palestinian control and the lower area (the Western Wall) under Israeli control could not resolve the dispute. On the issue of refugees, the Israelis bent slightly on their longtime denial of Palestinian refugees’ right of return to Israel. They agreed to allow a limited group of refugees to return within the framework of family reunification and to consider a program to compensate the rest of the refugees’ lost property through an international fund. The Palestinians continued to insist on the right of return for all 2.3 million refugees even though, after fifty years, many were the children and grandchildren of the original refugees and had never lived in Israel proper. Barak’s offers went further than those of any previous Israeli government, but for Palestinians they still fell short of what Israel was obligated to do under UN resolutions. The Palestinians were not ready for a compromise on a final settlement. The summit

Middle East Negotiations

also revealed that the two sides used fundamentally different approaches to the Oslo process and its aftermath. The Israelis saw Oslo as the start of a step-bystep settlement of the longstanding conflict with the Palestinians, in which compromises would be required of both sides. The Palestinians believed that they had made their main and final compromise at Oslo, where they agreed to the partition of Palestine. Now, in their view, it was Israel’s turn to make concessions. Thus the ambiguity of the Oslo Accords contributed to the Camp David II stalemate. Domestically, neither side was ready for a final settlement. In Israel, strong religious sentiments and security concerns prevented the growth of a broad, nationwide consensus for a compromise with the Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, there was strong sentiment, frequently supported by official propaganda, that any agreement reached with Israel was only a temporary truce, never the final end of the conflict.

From the Clinton Plan to the “Road Map” Meanwhile, frustration and anger continued to build in the Occupied Territories. In September 2000, radical groups began the Second Intifada, another wave of terrorist bombings targeted at Israelis. Even so, negotiations continued. During the summer and fall, there were more than fifty U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian meetings, including another summit at Sharm-el Sheik, Egypt, on October 17. These efforts resulted in Clinton’s proposals of December 23, 2000, on basic “parameters” of the final settlement. The Clinton Plan offered the whole Gaza Strip and 94–96 percent of the West Bank as the Palestinian “homeland,” with compensation for the remaining 4–6 percent, which would be annexed by Israel. Israeli forces would control borders with Jordan for three to six years and then be replaced by an international monitoring force. As for East Jerusalem, according to the Clinton proposal, Israel would govern the Jewish neighborhoods, and the Palestinians would rule the Arab ones, including the Temple Mount. In return, the Palestinians would accept the Jewish “connection” with the Temple Mount and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall, and the holy sites beneath it. The city would be the capital of both countries. On the refugee problem, the plan envisaged their return mainly to the new Palestinian state, while some would be allowed to return to Israel.

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During their talks in Taba, Egypt, from January 21 to January 27, 2001, the two sides agreed to the Clinton Plan as the basis for future negotiations on a final settlement. The Israelis modified their position on borders, separating security issues from the territorial problems and the future of the settlements. In return, the Palestinians agreed to Israeli sovereignty over fourteen major Jewish settlements in and around Greater Jerusalem. Both sides compromised on the problem of refugees: Israel agreed to recognize the right of Palestinians to return but would offer financial incentives to entice most of them to settle in a new Palestinian state. During the Taba talks, however, President Clinton, who had been a driving force in achieving compromise, left office in favor of Republican president George W. Bush. Without Clinton’s further attention and with continued violence in the Palestinian territories and acts of terrorism against Israeli settlements and Israel proper, the peace process was severely undermined. The majority of Israelis became convinced that terrorists were in charge on the Palestinian side and that there was no serious partner to negotiate with. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon, the leader of the conservative Likud Party and a hard-liner on security issues, was elected as the new Israeli prime minister. The Israeli position on negotiations returned to its traditional bases: undivided Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and military control over the Jordan Valley and other areas for security reasons. Security, measures to stop violence in the Palestinian areas, and the desire for an interim agreement with the Palestinians rather than a final settlement of the conflict, dominated the agenda of the new Israeli cabinet. These priorities defined the Israeli approach to a number of mediation attempts to put an end to the hostilities and resume negotiations. On April 13, 2001, Sharon declared that Israel could accept a disarmed Palestinian state on only 42 percent of West Bank territory (compared to earlier discussions of 94 percent or more). That same month, an international commission led by former U.S. senator George Mitchell declared that an end to Palestinian violence and a freeze on the construction of new Israeli settlements were prerequisites for resuming the negotiation process. The attacks of radical Islamists on the United States on September 11, 2001, changed the complexion of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute yet again. In seeking international support for its war against terror, the Bush administration focused again on a peace

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settlement in the Middle East. In early October 2001, President Bush declared for the first time that the United States would accept the creation of a Palestinian state. Seeking to avoid an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which by spring 2002 had almost developed to full-blown war, the Arab states also initiated diplomatic efforts. On February 17, 2002, Saudi crown prince Abdullah called for full Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and the return of refugees in exchange for full normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states. The Arab League summit in Beirut on March 27–28, 2002, unanimously endorsed the Saudi peace initiative. Only Egypt and Jordan, the two Arab states that formally recognized Israel, refused to attend the summit, declaring their solidarity with Arafat, who had been isolated and besieged by Israeli forces at his headquarters in the West Bank city of Ramallah. While this was the first time the Arab states as a whole had officially linked the Israeli withdrawal with a full normalization of relations—a long-held Israeli demand—the Arab position on refugees and Jerusalem was still far from acceptable to the Israelis. The Israeli government insisted on the complete termination of terrorist violence as a precondition for any talks with the Palestinians. The stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian relations activated unofficial contacts between two sides. In December 2002 in Geneva, Switzerland, former highranking Israeli and Palestinian politicians, including those who had participated in the Oslo process, launched a peace initiative that featured a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and shared sovereignty in Jerusalem, waived Palestinian refugees’ right to return in exchange for compensation, and proposed Israel’s withdrawal to the lines of 1967 with the exception of the settlements around Jerusalem. The escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, accompanied by the apparent inability and unwillingness of Arafat to end the violence on the Palestinian side, emphasized the need for mediation efforts between Israel and the Palestinians and for structural reforms within the Palestinian Authority, which continued to be plagued by corruption and inefficiency. On April 30, 2003, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations (the Quartet) presented a “road map” to Palestinian statehood within three years. The plan called for three consecutive

phases. The first would include a cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians, a buildup of Palestinian democratic institutions, a freeze on the building of new Jewish settlements, and Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian areas occupied since hostilities started. In the second phase, Palestinians would hold elections and create a representative government, the international community would convene a conference on Palestine, and a Palestinian state with provisional borders would be created. Finally, a second international conference would reach a comprehensive agreement on refugees, Jerusalem, and final borders between Israel and Palestine. Both the Palestinians and the Israelis agreed to the plan in principle, although it soon became clear that there were disagreements over the sequence and significance of the steps in the road map. There were some advances in following the plan—elections in the Palestinian Authority and an Israeli agreement to withdraw troops from the Palestinian areas—but there was no significant progress in the implementation of other steps.

Disengagement and Beyond The continuing hostilities within the Palestinian territories and acts of terror there and in Israel proper were making it evident to many Israelis that perpetual military control over Palestinian-populated areas was counterproductive to Israel’s well-being. There was also the demographic issue. The significantly higher birth rate among Palestinians and falling Jewish inmigration would soon give Palestinians a majority in an Israel that included the Occupied Territories. As early as 1988, during the Palestinians’ First Intifada, some in Israel suggested that Israel unilaterally withdraw from the Occupied Territories on its own conditions. In this way it could escape withdrawal to 1967 lines and maintain control of areas important to Israel’s defense. Ehud Barak had also toyed with this idea after the failure of Camp David II. In the grim realities of 2002, Ariel Sharon continued to support the road map, but eventually he abandoned it as unrealistic and turned to unilateral moves to ensure Israeli security through a disengagement with the Palestinians. His government decided to erect a “defensive barrier,” a wall or fence separating its territory from Palestinian areas. As finally laid out and approved by the Israeli government in February 2003, the barrier would become a long-term border

Middle East Negotiations

between Israel and the Palestinian territories. It annexed some 7 percent of the West Bank to Israel, without any compensation to the Palestinians. On December 19, 2003, Israel declared that unless the Palestinian Authority started disarming and disbanding militants, Israel had no choice but to go ahead with the disengagement, withdraw to a defensible line, and wait for a more responsible Palestinian negotiating partner to emerge. In October 2004, the Knesset approved a disengagement plan under which Israel would dismantle all seventeen Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, then withdraw from the area. In addition, it would evacuate four more Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The settlers were removed from the Gaza Strip on August 15–24, 2005, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops was completed on September 1. The withdrawal was of historical significance and had far-reaching consequences. Sharon insisted that Israel would never abandon the large West Bank settlements adjoining its territory, but the Gaza pullout represented a watershed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, it was a clear acknowledgment that Israel could not remain in the Palestinian territories indefinitely. Israelis set a historical precedent by uprooting settlers in a part of what many religious Jews considered Eretz Yisroael, the promised land of the Bible. The disengagement also had a significant effect on Israeli politics. By executing the so-called disengagement plan, Sharon paid a political and personal price. From the beginning of the settlement movement, the prime minister had been its biggest political supporter. Yet in contrast to many of the settlers themselves, he considered the settlements in strategic rather than biblical terms. Once useful for security, they now seemed to overstretch Israeli resources, provoke Palestinian attacks, damage Israel’s reputation abroad, and complicate Israel’s relations with allies. Thus, Sharon began to reconsider the value of holding on to all of them. Facing the growing opposition within his own Likud Party, he had radically altered the traditional left–right dichotomy of Israeli politics in dealing with the issue of occupation: he chose strategic redeployment and separation rather than retreat or keeping control indefinitely. On November 21, 2005, Prime Minister Sharon quit Likud and formed a new centrist party called Kadima, uniting those who believed in territorial separation with the Palestinians on Israeli terms. In January 2006, how-

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ever, Sharon himself was struck down by a major stroke, which incapacitated him physically and removed him permanently from the political scene. He was succeeded by his deputy, Ehud Olmert, who continued Sharon’s policies. As for the Palestinians, the disengagement plan did not meet all their territorial demands, but it did offer the precedent of the Israeli dismantling of some settlements on Palestinian land. Yassir Arafat, long the undisputed leader of the PLO, had died after a brief illness in November 2004. His successor, Mahmoud Abbas, faced great domestic constraints in dealing with Israel, including the fractured structure of Palestinian politics, escalating extremist sentiment, widespread corruption, and a disillusioned populace. In January 2006, in fact, the militant group Hamas, which has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks on Israel since 2000, elected an absolute majority in the Palestinian parliament. The Hamas victory seemed to sound the death knell for the PLO and presented both Israel and the international community with difficult new issues. At first, Israel not only refused to negotiate with a Hamas government but took the drastic measure of refusing to turn over customs receipts as long as Hamas remained in power and refused to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist. Once again, the situation in the Middle East entered a new phase, and prospects for peace were obscured by yet another new set of circumstances. James Ciment and Peter Jacob Rainow

Bibliography Aruri, Naseer. The Obstruction of Peace: The US, Israel and the Palestinians. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995. Ashravi, Hannah. This Side of Peace: A Personal Account. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. Beilin, Joel, and Rebecca L. Stein, eds. The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993–2005. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. Lesch, Ann Mosely, and Mark Tessler. Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Makovsky, David. Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accords. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Quandt, William. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993.

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Rabinovich, Itamar. Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948–2003. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Ross, Dennis. The Missing Peace: Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004.

Said, Edward. Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process. New York: Random House, 1996. Savir, Uri. The Process: 1100 Days that Changed the Middle East. New York: Random House, 1998.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 by twelve nations of Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. The treaty was a mutual military and defense pact, calling for the common defense of all members against outside attack. It was designed primarily to create a U.S. security umbrella over Western Europe, which appeared to be threatened by Soviet expansionism in the early years of the Cold War. Twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. Other nations joined NATO during the Cold War: Greece and Turkey (1952) and West Germany (1955). Spain joined the organization in 1982, but did not fully participate in NATO military functions until 1996. France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, but remained a member. It resumed participation in some NATO military activities and organizations in 1996. NATO’s governing body is the North Atlantic Council, consisting of permanent representatives (or heads of state or foreign ministers) of each member state. Meetings of the council are held at least twice a year. The secretary-general of NATO serves as the council’s chair. Decisions are made by common consent rather than majority vote.

Founding In 1945, at the end of World War II, much of Western Europe lay in ruins—its economy shattered by the war, its citizens discouraged, and its political institutions weak. The Soviet Union, though also heavily damaged by the war, appeared to be in a dominant position, with its vast military machine already occupying much of Eastern Europe. Between 1946 and 1948, Moscow imposed pro-Soviet Communist regimes in each country it occupied, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. (Yugo-

slavia, never occupied by the Soviets, would soon leave the Soviet bloc, but it remained Communist.) The only country in Eastern Europe to escape Soviet control was Greece. Britain and the United States provided aid to an anti-Communist government there in a civil war against Communist forces. The United States gave notice that it would provide support to any government fighting Communist partisans. This statement, known as the Truman Doctrine, was one of the first diplomatic salvos in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S. government headed by President Truman sought other opportunities to provide leadership and aid to U.S. allies in Europe. In its view, no other Western country was capable of providing such leadership and halting the tide of Communist expansion. In 1948, the United States launched a second great initiative to assist its European allies. Known as the Marshall Plan, it extended billions of dollars in aid to countries of Western Europe to rebuild war-torn cities and repair damaged economies. U.S. leaders hoped that the Marshall Plan would undermine the appeal of Communism to voters in the West, many of whom were unemployed and in need. The plan was an overwhelming success for the United States and the cause of anticommunism. It revitalized economies and stabilized the democratic noncommunist political order across Western Europe. At the same time, a number of Western European governments were also concerned about the revitalization of their military forces, fearing both the Soviet threat and the possibility that Germany might one day re-arm. In March 1948, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) signed a collective defense treaty known as the Brussels Treaty. The member nations knew, however, that they were in no position to defend themselves against the powerful Soviet military without the assistance of the United States.

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Only weeks after signing the Brussels Treaty, the European signatories were negotiating with the United States and Canada to draw them into the alliance. A year later, in 1949, twelve nations, including the Benelux countries, signed the North Atlantic Treaty and established NATO. For the United States, joining NATO was a historic step. It was the first time the United States had formed a permanent alliance since its 1778 treaty with France during the Revolutionary War. At the core of the treaty was Article 5, which stated that “an armed attack against one or more of [the member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Other key stipulations of the treaty called for a centralized military command (Article 9) and military assistance from the United States to other members (Article 3, resulting in an eventual total of $25 billion over twenty years in direct military aid).

Early Stresses Perhaps the most important issue in the early years of the alliance was forming a policy on West Germany. Germany had been partitioned after the Allied victory in World War II. By 1949, the sectors originally controlled by the United States, Britain, and France were organizing to become an independent state with its capital in Bonn. With the help of the Marshall Plan, West Germans were rebuilding their economy and preparing to become a fully independent state. For most Western European countries, however, the memory of Nazi occupation was still very fresh, and the idea of allowing West Germany to re-arm was frightening. Yet, at the same time, it was recognized that the West German government was a key to the alliance’s success. West Germany had a large population, a growing economy, and a geographic position between other Western nations and the Sovietcontrolled states of Eastern Europe. These factors made it critical that West Germany become a mem-

ber of NATO. Also, if West Germany was not admitted, it might seek closer ties with East Germany and the Soviet Union. Thus, the members of NATO sought a “safe” way to integrate West Germany into the Western military alliance. One safeguard was that NATO forces (including any future German units) would be commanded by a single NATO military chief. (The first NATO commander was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a World War II hero who soon after his NATO assignment was elected president of the United States.) Finally, in 1955, West Germany gained sovereignty as a nation and joined the NATO alliance. Thus NATO helped to integrate West Germany into the Western bloc of nations. At the same time, NATO helped to foster growing animosity between the Western and Eastern blocs. Soon after West Germany joined NATO, the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact, an alliance similar to NATO, among its Eastern European neighbors. Opponents of Communism in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, hoped that NATO might provide support for their efforts to restore open government. They were soon disappointed. In 1956, Hungarians (covertly aided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) attempted to overthrow the Communist regime, but they were quickly defeated with the help of Soviet forces. NATO members cheered the Hungarian uprising, but the alliance took no action to provide assistance. Twelve years later, in 1968, political leaders in Czechoslovakia attempted to liberalize its government. Once again, NATO members cheered, but no military action was taken when the rebellion was put down. In the meantime, NATO faced some difficulties within its own ranks. France—one of the original members—complained that the NATO alliance was dominated by the United States. The headquarters of the alliance was in Paris, but many in France resented the presence of so many “foreign” military officials. In addition, French President Charles de Gaulle feared for France’s sovereignty as a nation, worrying that NATO might draw France “automatically” into wars that it preferred not to become involved in. With these considerations in mind, France withdrew from the centralized command structure of NATO in July 1966, though it remained a member of the alliance. NATO headquarters was moved from Paris to Brussels, Belgium.

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Officials of the original twelve signatory nations attend the official signing ceremony creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C. (AFP/Getty Images)

Nuclear Defense From the very beginning, NATO faced a critical defense problem. Its combined armies and navies were no match for the overwhelming manpower and weaponry of the Soviet bloc, even after the United States stationed more 300,000 U.S. soldiers in Western Europe. This weakness made it necessary to rely on the alliance’s nuclear defenses as well. During the 1950s, the United States offered its nuclear umbrella to protect Europe in case of attack. Still, many Western Europeans did not believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend against a Soviet invasion of Europe and risk a nuclear attack on its own territory. These fears led Britain and France to develop nuclear retaliatory forces of their own. To alleviate European fears, the United States began to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons at Western European bases in 1957. Placement of these weapons ultimately played a role in one of the most dangerous

moments of the Cold War. After the United States positioned nuclear missiles in Turkey (a NATO member) near Soviet borders, the Soviets resolved in 1962 to put nuclear missiles in Cuba, fewer than 100 miles from the coast of Florida. U.S. reconnaissance detected the missiles, and U.S. President John F. Kennedy demanded their withdrawal. After three tense days, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed, but only after working out a secret agreement requiring the removal of U.S. nuclear missiles from Turkey. With the easing of tensions between Western and Eastern Europe in the 1970s, attitudes toward NATO defense among West Europeans began to change. Now many Europeans began to fear that Europe could become a proxy battleground in a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, when the United States sought to strengthen European defenses in the 1980s by installing a new generation of medium-range missiles,

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the plan was met with widespread protest, particularly in West Germany and Britain. Still, the deployments went ahead.

Collapse of the Soviet Union Through the 1960s, the Soviet Union seemed capable of matching the military might of NATO in Europe while achieving substantial economic growth at home. By the 1970s, however, this balancing act was becoming increasingly difficult for the Soviets to maintain. Their cumbersome centralized economy began to come undone in trying to meet NATO military advances while fulfilling the growing consumer demand at home. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev chose weapons development over improving the economy at home, and the

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economy deteriorated. In 1985, the ruling politburo, recognizing the impending crisis, selected Mikhail Gorbachev, a young reformer, to be premier. Gorbachev recognized that the Soviet economy was incapable of both continuing its arms race with the West and increasing the supply of modern consumer goods. He immediately moved to ease tensions with the West and began “demilitarizing” the Soviet economy. His reforms proved to be the undoing of his own administration and led to the dissolution of the Soviet bloc of nations and the Soviet Union itself. By the end of 1989, the Communist governments in every Eastern European nation had either been overthrown or forced to share power with non-Communist parties. At the same time, residents of the far-flung states that made up the Soviet Union began demanding their independence, and the Soviet Union itself began

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to break up. In August 1991, Gorbachev was ousted from power, and soon afterward the Soviet Union came to an end. NATO, initially erected to counter the Soviet military threat, now lacked an enemy and, its critics said, a reason for being.

Peacekeeping and Expansion In the 1990s, NATO was faced with questions that went to the heart of the organization’s existence in the post–Cold War world. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, what did mutual self-defense mean? Did it include preventing or stopping a war in a nonmember state? How could this be perceived as a selfdefense issue? These questions were raised by a series of wars in the former Yugoslavia. That nation, formed after World War I, united a collection of disparate republics deeply divided by ethnic and religious differences. The dominant republic was Serbia. In the early 1990s, nationalists in the Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Bosnia sought to withdraw from the country and gain independence. After a short but bloody war, Croatia succeeded in gaining its freedom. The battle in Bosnia, however, threatened to spread throughout the region. Under U.S. prodding, NATO’s leadership eventually concluded that its charter did include intervention in this difficult situation. First, the Bosnian war threatened to inundate European countries with hundreds of thousands of refugees. More importantly, the war threatened to draw in NATO members such as Turkey and Greece, perhaps on opposite sides of the conflict. And, finally, it was feared that the Russian Federation—heir to the Soviet Union— might throw its support to the Serbs and greatly increase the bloodshed. In July 1992, NATO announced support for UN peacekeeping activities in Bosnia and Croatia. In April 1993, NATO warplanes began to patrol the skies over Bosnia to enforce restrictions on aerial activity in support of Serbian militias on the ground. Later, NATO conducted air attacks, largely against Serb positions. In 1995, the United States took a more central role in resolving the Bosnian conflict, largely because NATO members in Europe could not agree on a course of action. By November, NATO and the various parties to the Bosnian conflict signed the Dayton Peace Accords, named after the Ohio city where they were drawn up. Among other things, the Dayton

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accords called for the establishment of a NATO-led peacekeeping ground force in Bosnia. Ultimately, thirty-one NATO and non-NATO countries supplied peacekeepers, and some Russian participation was included in the decision-making. War broke out again in the region in 1998 in the Serbian republic of Kosovo. This time it pitted government-supported Serbian troops against native Kosovars. NATO was determined to act more quickly than it had in Bosnia. Ethnic-cleansing campaigns conducted by the Serbs and guerrilla warfare conducted by the Kosovo Liberation Army had already created 350,000 refugees in 1998 and threatened many more deaths. After much debate and discussion among NATO nations and consultations with Russia, NATO undertook a bombing campaign against Serb military targets, including some in the Serb capital, Belgrade. Civilians were hit and killed in some attacks, causing an international outcry. For eleven weeks NATO pilots bombed with the intention of forcing Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic to the negotiating table. Milosevic finally agreed to a cease-fire, and NATO troops occupied Kosovo. A force of 50,000 helped thousands of refugees return to their homes in Kosovo, although they could not prevent vengeance killings of Serbs and Kosovars. New NATO members—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—participated in the campaign even though they had formally joined NATO only two weeks earlier. NATO also assisted the United Nations in coordinating humanitarian relief for refugees in the Balkans. NATO continued to grow and change. In the years after its Balkan actions, it welcomed many new members from Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. After Russia expressed concern about NATO expansion into its former sphere of influence, NATO and Russia developed closer, more formal ties, establishing the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. The council brings the two parties together as partners to pursue joint actions, particularly antiterrorist operations. In 2003, NATO held two important summits that broadened its relationships and capabilities. The “Berlin Plus” arrangement made it simpler for member states to gain access to NATO equipment and assets. Military planners hoped this plan would resolve questions about the capabilities of the security institutions of the alliance’s European members. The

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“transformation summit” agreed to greatly simplify the alliance’s bureaucracy. In addition, the summit created a portable analytical laboratory to address possible cases of chemical or biological warfare.

September 11 and Beyond The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, ushered in a new age for NATO. For the first time the alliance invoked Article 5, its mutual defense clause, declaring that the attacks were against all member countries. The ensuing “war on terror” led to the invasion of Afghanistan to remove the repressive Taliban regime, which was believed to have harbored and assisted members of alQaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the attacks. NATO troops took up peacekeeping duties in Afghanistan in 2003. The alliance’s first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area included election monitoring, reconstruction assistance, and training of security personnel in Afghanistan. In 2006, NATO troops assumed the leadership of anti-Taliban operations from the United States in the conflicted southern regions of Afghanistan. When the United States led an invasion of Iraq in 2003, the results for the NATO alliance were dire. Three member states—Britain, Italy, and Spain— originally supported the invasion, but other major NATO powers spoke out strongly against the war and have continued to criticize the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. The disagreements were especially wide between the United States and France. The French believed that America sought to turn NATO into an instrument of its own foreign policy, while

U.S. spokesmen suggested that French criticism was harming the alliance. NATO’s credibility was damaged by these vituperative exchanges, although its onthe-ground involvement in the war on terror helped to repair some of the harm. NATO remained in a period of redefinition, seeking ways to address new threats in the post–Cold War era. It continued to support military operations against terrorism and work with the UN in humanitarian actions, including efforts to end the fighting in the Darfur region of Sudan and bring aid to the region. In pursuing these activities, the alliance continued to broaden its range. James Ciment and Erika Quinn

Bibliography Cornish, Paul. “NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation.” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 63–74. Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000. Drew, S. Nelson. The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment. New York: Praeger, 1991. Gottfried, Kurt, and Paul Bracken, eds. Reforging European Security: From Confrontation to Cooperation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Kelleher, Catherine McArdle. The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995. Shea, Jami. NATO 2000: A Political Agenda for a Political Alliance. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1990. Sherwood, Elizabeth D. Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. Sjursen, Helene. “On the Identity of NATO.” International Affairs 80, no. 4 (2004): 687–703.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) The Organization of American States (OAS), whose membership includes every nation-state in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba (which was ousted following its Communist revolution in 1962), was founded in 1948. Largely a consultative body, with little power to initiate military action, the OAS meets annually in capitals of various member countries. Each state has one representative. The chair rotates yearly among members. The organization includes several permanent committees and commissions, the most important of which deal with economic development and human rights. There is also a court of human rights within the organization. The OAS, though officially organized in 1948 as part of a larger U.S. and Western initiative to develop a strong anticommunist diplomatic system at the beginning of the Cold War, had its roots in the late nineteenth century. In 1889–1890, representatives of virtually all of the independent states of the Western Hemisphere met in Washington to form the International Union of American Republics, largely to promote regional trade. Following several name changes and international conferences, the organization was officially founded at the Ninth Conference of the Pan-American Union (the last pre-OAS organization) in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948.

Anticommunism and Peacekeeping In 1954, at the initiative of the United States, the member states signed the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against the Intervention of International Communism, a move largely made in response to the rise of leftist president, Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala. Later that year, Arbenz was overthrown in a U.S.-sponsored coup. In 1962, the strong anticommunist tenor of the organization was evinced in its decision to oust Cuba after it was found to be

allowing Soviet nuclear missiles to be stationed on its soil. The OAS voted to back U.S. efforts to remove the weapons. The crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in which a leftist coup led to anarchy and a U.S. invasion, led to the formation of the OAS’s Inter-American Peace Force. The first effort at OAS peacekeeping came in 1969 when two member states, Honduras and El Salvador, engaged in a border conflict. Initially sent in to investigate human rights violations, an OAS task force eventually arranged a cease-fire and an exchange of prisoners. The rising level of tension throughout the region led to the decision, made at the annual meeting in Buenos Aires in 1970, to shift decisionmaking power from an executive council to the more representative General Assembly. High on the latter’s agenda was the growing level of anarchy in many South American republics, including extortion and kidnapping by terrorist groups. At the same time, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the OAS moved to establish protocols and institutions, including the founding of the Inter-American Development Bank to promote economic development. In the early 1980s, the organization was called upon to resolve two international and two internal conflicts in Latin America: the border war between Ecuador and Peru, the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, the leftist insurgency in El Salvador, and the rightist, U.S.-supported insurgency in Nicaragua. The organization’s failure to play a significant role in any of these conflicts—with the possible exception of the Peru-Ecuador war—led to efforts to try to revitalize the OAS. At the 1985 meeting, the group voted to establish a strengthened executive branch. It also voted to allow member states to mediate conflicts even if all the participants to a conflict had not agreed to set the matter before the OAS. Independent and local efforts to end the fighting in Central America—which led to the signing of

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the Esquipulas II agreement in 1987 (signed by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua)—came to involve the OAS as well. Under Esquipulas, the secretary-general of the OAS was invited to become a member of the international

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commission set up to implement the agreement. Two years later, the OAS sent a team to resolve the crisis in Panama, in which the government refused to abide by election results, but it was unable to reach a solution.

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The headquarters of the 35-member Organization of American States (OAS) is located on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. (Karen Bleier/AFP/Getty Images)

Democratization and the End of the Cold War By the late 1980s, the OAS was becoming more deeply involved in the democratic movement that was sweeping Latin America. Between 1990 and 1993, OAS observer teams were sent to monitor elections in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Paraguay, and Suriname. (Eventually, the requirement of representative democracy for membership was enacted as the Protocol of Washington in 1992.) With the exception of Haiti, all of these countries effectively transferred power from nonelected to elected officials. The situation in Haiti, in which the military ousted the legally elected government of JeanBertrand Aristide, led to an OAS decision to place a full embargo on that island nation. Together with the United Nations, the OAS orchestrated a conference on Governor’s Island in New York in 1993, which led to a peace agreement in which the army would step

aside and allow Aristide to resume his position as president of the republic. The UN-OAS contingent sent to Haiti to implement the Governor’s Island accord was forced to leave Haiti, however, because of civil unrest and the intransigence of the Haitian military leaders. In May 1994, most of the OAS members—with the exception of Anguilla and Argentina—voiced their opposition to the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Haiti in order to return Aristide to the presidency. The return of Aristide in October 1994 seemed to end the crisis, but the OAS continued to express doubts about the democratization of the island and continued abuses by military and paramilitary forces in Haiti. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991, many member states of the OAS were no longer willing to support the U.S. hard line against Communist Cuba. In 1995, the organization’s permanent human rights committee voted to condemn the U.S. embargo on food and

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medicine to Cuba as a violation of international human rights and OAS principles. In 1996, the OAS also decided to consider whether the Helms-Burton Act—U.S. legislation that punished foreign individuals and companies doing business in Cuba—was a violation of OAS rules and principles. At the same time, the spread of democracy in Latin America and the growth of regional trade led to more open cooperation between the United States and Latin American nations, which for a long time resented and feared the U.S. habit of interfering in their internal affairs. At the OAS-sponsored Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in 1994, the mem-

bers voted to set up structures to combat regional terrorism and push for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. Political opposition to the FTAA in the United States and many other countries prevented its implementation as of late 2006. James Ciment

Bibliography Sheinin, David. The Organization of American States. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995. Vaky, Viron P. The Future of the Organization of American States: Essays. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was founded in 1969 by Muslim states that included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In 2005, more than fifty-five countries were members, among them Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Chad, Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Its headquarters are in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Historical Background For centuries the Ottoman Turkish caliphate served as a religious center for the Islamic world. When the caliphate ended in 1918, it left behind a gap in the Islamic world. In the years that followed, many Islamic states were under the control of European colonial powers, only gaining independence after the end of World War II in 1945. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 gave a new impetus to a movement for Islamic unity. Many Muslims were hostile to the new state, which they believed had usurped the rights of the Muslim Arabs of Palestine. In addition, the success of Jewish nationalism helped to spark a renewed sense of Muslim identity. In the following years, ongoing hostilities continued to focus the attention of Muslims and others on the role of Islamic nations in the Middle Eastern dispute. In 1967, during the Six Days’ War, Israeli forces captured the old city of Jerusalem from Palestinians, further arousing Muslim antagonism, because Muslims consider Jerusalem to be the third holiest place on earth, after Mecca and Medina. These developments paved the way for the event that triggered the creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In August 1969 an Australian man set a fire at the al-Aqsa Mosque, located on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The mosque is believed to be the site from which the Prophet Muhammad ascended into heaven. News of the act shook the Islamic world. Many Muslims believed that the Israeli authorities were behind the attack— or at least guilty of creating the climate in which

such a radical act was possible. Extremist Jewish groups had been openly advocating removal of Muslims from the Temple Mount. In response to the al-Aqsa fire, Amin al-Husaini, the former mufti (Muslim religious leader) of Jerusalem, issued a call to all Muslim heads of state for an immediate Muslim summit. Blaming the Israelis for the fire, al-Husaini warned that “this Jewish crime is a striking example of the malicious Jew’s intention to commit similar crimes in other countries.” Without echoing the mufti’s anti-Semitism, other Muslim leaders supported the idea of holding an Islamic summit. Impressed by the outrage in the Muslim world, even nationalist leaders like Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser supported the idea of a summit.

Founding The first Islamic summit was held in September 1969 in Morocco. Attended by representatives— most of whom were heads of state—from twenty-four countries, the summit issued a resolution stating that “Muslim governments would consult with a view to promoting among themselves close cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural, and spiritual fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam.” The following year, a conference of foreign ministers met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to build an institutional foundation for the new Organization of the Islamic Conference. In 1972, the council of foreign ministers agreed upon a charter for the new organization. According to the charter, the first aim of the OIC was “to promote Islamic solidarity among member states.” The third aim was “to endeavor to eliminate racial segregation, discrimination, and to eradicate colonialism in all its forms.” This plank would be used in criticizing Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories. The fifth aim of the charter made the focus on Palestine explicit: “to coordinate all efforts for the safeguarding of the Holy Places and

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support of the struggle of the people of Palestine, and help to regain their rights and liberate their land.” The first official conference of the OIC was held in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1974. Beginning with the second conference, in Saudi Arabia in 1981, the conferences have taken place at three- or four-year intervals.

Activities of the O I C The OIC has a number of subsidiary organizations. Among the most active are the Islamic Development Bank, the Islamic Solidarity Fund, and the Islamic News Agency. The Development Bank is dedicated to providing loans to Muslim member countries in accordance with Islamic law. The Islamic Solidarity Fund has helped to establish Islamic universities in Niger, Uganda, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. The IDB also provides funds to Islamic communities in nonmember countries. In the arena of international politics, the OIC has served mainly as a coordinating body for Muslim nations in areas of mutual interest. Its one consistent international policy has been the promotion of Palestinian independence and the return of Jerusalem to Arab Muslim control. For example, at the 1981 con-

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ference the OIC called for a jihad for the liberation of Jerusalem and the occupied territories. This jihad took the practical form of an economic boycott against Israel. In 1979, when Egypt signed the Camp David Accords recognizing the state of Israel, the OIC expelled Egypt from the organization. (Egypt was reinstated in 1984.) The OIC took a more moderate position after 1991, ending its call for jihad and supporting peace negotiations with Israel. Beyond the issue of Palestinian rights, the OIC acted on issues of importance to the Islamic community and sought to coordinate policy among Muslim nations. Its leaders attempted to strike a middle ground between extremes of Islamic religious and political philosophies. The OIC expressed widespread Muslim outrage in 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, although its call for Soviet withdrawal was not effective. In 1987, it tried unsuccessfully to resolve the long war between Iraq and Iran, both Muslim nations. In March 1989, the OIC denounced the Muslim author Salman Rushdie for his novel The Satanic Verses (1988), in which a Muhammad-like character is depicted as a figure of fun. The IOC condemned Rushdie for blasphemy against Islam. (The Ayatollah Khomeini, religious

Organization of the Islamic Conference (O I C)

and political leader of Iran, was harsher, issuing a fatwa calling for Muslims to “execute” Rushdie and putting a $6 million bounty on his head.) In 1990, the OIC also condemned the invasion of Kuwait by the armies of Iraq—even though some of its members disagreed. In 1992, the European Muslims of Bosnia became combatants and victims in a brutal civil war in former Yugoslavia. At first the OIC was reluctant to get involved, but it soon became very active in supporting the cause of the Bosnians against attacks of the predominantly Serb (and Christian) government. In 1992 and 1993, the OIC asked that the United Nations lift the arms embargo placed on Bosnia and intervene militarily to prevent further attacks by Serbian militias against Bosnian Muslim villages. Many members of the OIC suggested that the United Nations’ reluctance to intervene in Bosnia was based on anti-Muslim prejudice. The Iranian representative said, “The behavior of the United Nations and the Security Council shows that they themselves want the Muslims to be

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driven out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that they approve of the crimes committed by the Serbs through their silence.” In 1995, the OIC declared the weapons embargo illegal and encouraged its members to smuggle arms to support the Bosnian Muslims. In the OIC’s December 1997 meeting, held in Tehran, Iran, member states discussed the possibility of creating a Muslim common market and a Muslim news agency and satellite network. It also discussed improving the position of women in the Muslim world. The meeting saw a limited reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which represent two extremes of the observant Islamic world. One of their main points of contention was support for the United States. Saudi Arabia was an American ally, while Iran condemned it as the “great Satan.” Finally, the OIC condemned terrorism in the name of Islam, a pointed attack on the actions of Muslim extremists in Algeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. Terrorism was again a central issue at the October 2000 OIC conference held in Doha, Qatar. The Second

Leaders of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) pose for a group portrait at their December 2005 summit in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. They opened the meeting with a call for moderation, tolerance, and rejection of violence. (Hassan Ammar/AFP/Getty Images)

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Palestinian Intifada had recently begun. Palestinians in Jerusalem rioted, and Palestinian radical groups began attacking Israeli civilians. The Israelis retaliated by attacking Palestinian radical leaders and their families. These events forced OIC member states to seek a clear definition of terrorism. Member states overwhelmingly condemned the actions of Israeli forces against the Palestinian people but declared that Palestinian actions were part of a struggle for self-determination against an oppressor. The OIC faced another challenge in the Islamist terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. OIC Secretary General Abdul Wahid Belkaziz spoke on behalf of OIC members when he denounced the attacks and expressed the organization’s condolences to the United States and its people. Later, at the 2003 OIC conference, member nations called on “all states to confront the threat of terrorism in all its forms.” The October 2003 conference was overshadowed by the American-led invasion of Iraq, which had begun in March of that year. Immediately following the initial invasion on March 20, 2003, the OIC released a statement that “demanded an immediate end to all hostilities against Iraq and the return to search for a peaceful resolution within the framework of the UN Security Council.” This call was echoed in statements from many Muslim and nonMuslim states. Throughout the course of the war, the OIC was vocal in urging a peaceful resolution, citing the invasion as “outside the bounds of international

legitimacy.” After Iraq regained sovereignty in 2005, the OIC endorsed—and frequently stressed its support for—a new Iraqi government. The OIC also called the attention of the world to the plight of Islamic states during times of disaster, and it helped to organize relief efforts. It established funds for countries affected by warfare (Sudan), tsunami (Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, in 2004), and earthquake (Pakistan in 2005). Furthermore, the OIC expressed the concerns of the Islamic community for other trouble spots in the world. It was especially concerned with Africa, where Islam was spreading rapidly. While many of the OIC’s declarations and initiatives—such as those on correcting human rights abuses in Islamic countries—go unheeded by some of its members, the organization has succeeded in providing a sense of unity in an otherwise divided Muslim world. Carl Skutsch and Daniel F. Cuthbertson

Bibliography Ahsan, Abdullah. The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction to an Islamic Political Institution. Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988. Baba, Noor Ahmad. Organisation of the Islamic Conference: Theory and Practice of Pan-Islamic Cooperation. New York: Sterling Publications, 1994. The Organization of the Islamic Conference. www.oic-oci .org.

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO) During World War II, American policymakers assumed that the Big Five—China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States— would cooperate with each other to maintain the peace once the war ended. What happened after the war was quite different. France and Great Britain were no longer world powers. Both countries struggled for years to recover from the devastating effects of World War II. Civil war resumed in China and ended with a Communist victory in 1949. The United States and the Soviet Union clashed over many issues, including peace treaties for the nations defeated in World War II, the civil war in Greece, and territorial demands by the Soviet Union on Turkey and Iran. America’s primary concern after 1945 was rebuilding and protecting the nations of Western Europe. The Marshall Plan in June 1947 and the creation of NATO in April 1949 were the primary instruments for achieving those goals. From 1945 to 1950, American policymakers were primarily focused on Europe, but that changed when North Korean troops invaded South Korea in June 1950. President Harry S. Truman decided that American forces, under the authority of the United Nations, should defend South Korea. Suddenly, the United States became the dominant power seeking to contain Communism in Asia. The outbreak of the Korean War convinced President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson that one way to contain Communism was to create a series of interlocking military alliances. In August 1951, the United States and the Philippines signed a defense treaty. In September, the United States signed a defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand. That same month the United States signed a defense treaty with Japan. When the Korean War began, France was engaged in the hopeless task of trying to defeat the Communist forces in Indochina under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, a dedicated Communist but also a

nationalist seeking to end French colonial rule. The United States provided France with substantial military and economic aid, but the Communists kept winning. In July 1954, France agreed to partition Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel. The Communists won control of North Vietnam, and South Vietnam became independent. The end of the first Indochina war brought about a sharp decline in French influence in Southeast Asia. The United States moved in to fill the vacuum of power.

Establishing S EATO President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to continue the alliance-building policy of President Truman. Eisenhower believed that negotiating a defense treaty with other interested nations would be an effective means to contain Communism in Southeast Asia. On September 8, 1954, about six weeks after France signed an agreement ending the first Indochina war, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles flew to Manila to sign a treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Members of the treaty included Australia, France, Great Britain, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, New Zealand, and the United States. There was a protocol to the treaty extending its coverage to Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. Later, in 1964, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson used this protocol to justify America’s intervention in the Indochina conflict. There were only two Southeast Asian nations in SEATO, Thailand and the Philippines. The Thai government had some legitimate concerns regarding the threat of Communism. Communists were active in northeastern Thailand, and there was the possibility that neighboring North Vietnam would support Communist activity there. Thai leaders were also concerned about Communist activity in Laos. The Communists in Laos, known as the Pathet Lao, were under the control of North Vietnam.

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U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, at whose urging the alliance was created, addresses the founding conference of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) on September 8, 1954, in Manila, the Philippines. (Howard Sochurek/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

The Philippines joined SEATO in large part because of historical factors. The Philippines had already signed a bilateral defense treaty with the United States that permitted the United States to use military bases in the Philippines. At the time the SEATO treaty was signed, the Philippines confronted no external threat. Pakistan joined SEATO primarily because of that country’s hostile relations with India. As a member of SEATO, Pakistan could expect to receive American military assistance, which would strengthen Pakistan’s military capability vis-à-vis India. Including Pakistan in SEATO antagonized the Indian government, and this became an irritant in Indian-American relations for many years. When negotiations were taking place to organize SEATO, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru urged his Congress Party to organize demonstrations against the treaty. He labeled American efforts to organize the treaty an “unfriendly act.” France and Great Britain were unlikely to play an active role in the treaty because both countries were dismantling their colonial empires. France had just lost a war in Indochina. It was, therefore, unlikely that

the French government would recommit its troops to fight in Indochina on behalf of American objectives. After France withdrew from Indochina in 1954, it had to cope with challenges to its power much nearer to home, in North Africa. The British government was sensitive to the fact that India, a member of the British Commonwealth, opposed the treaty. India was one of the leaders of the non-aligned bloc of nations, most of whom opposed military alliances. These nations believed that military alliances were a cause of war and therefore should be avoided. They also believed that Western military alliances were a form of neocolonialism. The British recognized that their resources were insufficient to enable them to play a dominant role in Asia. The decision to join SEATO was simply a reflection of Great Britain’s desire to cooperate with the United States. In 1954, when it became evident that France was going to be defeated in Vietnam, President Eisenhower urged Britain to intervene in Vietnam with the United States to save France. Prime Minister Winston Churchill refused. Great Britain was not likely to become involved in a major conflict

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (S EATO)

in Asia, especially for a cause that did not directly affect Britain’s national interests. Australia and New Zealand joined SEATO in part because the United States extended its protective umbrella to both those countries through the 1951 ANZUS treaty. After World War II, Australia and New Zealand could no longer rely on Great Britain’s military might.

Structure of S EATO SEATO was unlike NATO. The latter had a unified command with troops under its control. SEATO had no unified command, nor were troops available for its use. The members of NATO shared common historical experiences and recognized a common threat. The SEATO members had little in common and did not agree on a common threat. Australia and New Zealand, for example, were primarily concerned that Japan would re-arm and again become a menace. Pakistan was not being threatened by Communist governments in China or North Vietnam. No nation was threatening the Philippines. For Eisenhower and Dulles, the SEATO treaty was largely symbolic. They hoped it would raise the morale of Asian members worried about the ultimate goals of China or North Vietnam. The treaty did not commit the United States to maintain any military

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forces on the Asian mainland, nor did it guarantee an American response to an act of aggression. If aggression did occur, the treaty members were only obligated to consult each other. Theoretically, SEATO was designed as a guarantee underpinning the 1954 Geneva accords that ended the first Indochina war. In that sense, it was similar to the defense treaty the United States signed with South Korea. The purpose of that treaty was to deter North Korea from launching another attack across the thirty-eighth parallel. SEATO was a warning to North Vietnam not to cross the seventeenth parallel. American officials were to learn that the differences between Korea and Vietnam were more important than the similarities. The American treaty with Korea was bilateral. If North Korean forces again attacked South Korea, the United States would not have to consult with other countries to determine how to respond. SEATO was a multilateral treaty. The treaty members would have difficulty reaching a consensus because of clashing national interests. Just before President Eisenhower left office in 1961, there was mounting evidence that the Communists were seeking to win control of Laos. The president was willing to increase aid to the Indochina states but was unwilling to commit American forces to fight there. There were a number of ways to interpret the SEATO treaty. At a news conference in February 1954,

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President Eisenhower, in response to a question, said he could not imagine the United States getting involved in the French struggle in Vietnam. Although he made that statement before SEATO was organized, from 1954 on he gave no indication that the United States would intervene in Vietnam even after the renewal of the war in 1956.

The Vietnam War President Johnson frequently cited the SEATO treaty to justify America’s intervention in Vietnam. There was, however, nothing in the treaty that required the United States to militarily intervene the way it did. If SEATO had not existed, President Johnson would have found some other way to justify his policy of intervention. In 1974, President Richard M. Nixon

withdrew American military forces from Vietnam. A year later, the Communists won control over all of Indochina. SEATO was ineffective if not counterproductive. In 1977, SEATO was dissolved. It had been ineffective in containing Communism in Indochina in part because it was viewed as an instrument of Western colonial control. Ho Chi Minh and his followers were symbols of Vietnamese nationalism. Kenneth L. Hill

Bibliography Barnett, Doak. Communist China and Asia. New York: Harpers, 1960. Modelski, George. “Indochina and SEATO.” Australian Outlook (March 1959): 27–54. ———, ed. SEATO: Six Studies. Sydney: Halstead Press, 1964.

UNITED NATIONS Before the twentieth century, international cooperation was forged exclusively on an alliance-by-alliance basis. Countries made agreements designed to advance their national interests and abided by them as long as those interests continued to be served. The history of Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas was largely the result of alliances being made and unmade as circumstances changed. By the nineteenth century, however, statesmen and diplomats began to suggest that something more was needed. With the advent of railroads, dieselpowered ships, and the telegraph and telephone, the world was becoming a smaller, more interconnected place. At the same time, the development of a new, more lethal generation of weapons—the repeating rifle, the machine gun, and the artillery shell—made prospective conflicts between nations certain to be deadlier than any in the past. To avoid future wars, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia proposed two peace conferences, both of which took place at The Hague in the Netherlands. Tsar Nicholas hoped that the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 would help to prevent future wars, or at least avoid some of their more gruesome consequences. Although little was settled at the meetings—the nations involved did not wish to give up their sovereign rights to wage war as they pleased—they did result in the creation of an international court of arbitration, the Hague Tribunal, which was a precursor of the United Nations. The Hague Tribunal succeeded in arbitrating a number of international disagreements but could do nothing to prevent World War I. That cataclysmic event, in which at least 15 million died, convinced many participants that a stronger international organization was needed. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson championed the idea of a congress of nations that would work to prevent future wars. The result of the tribunal’s efforts was the League of Nations, established at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The League of Nations was the direct ancestor of the United Nations. It had a council that included the major European powers and an assembly that was to include all independent nations in the world. From

the outset, however, the League was handicapped by two major flaws. First, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty that created the League, which meant that the world’s greatest economic power would not be a part of this first international organization. And second, the League had no clearly delineated method of punishing aggressors. These two shortcomings left the body essentially helpless in the face of aggression. It would prove unable to stop Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, or Germany’s rearmament and absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939, respectively. Most importantly, the League could do nothing to stop World War II. With the onset of the war in 1939, the League became largely irrelevant and dissolved itself in 1946.

Creation of the United Nations Just as the League of Nations grew out of World War I, so the United Nations was an offshoot of World War II. This second world war was even bloodier than the first—at least 50 million died—and the need for an organization that could prevent future wars seemed vital. Discussions concerning the creation of the United Nations began well before World War II was over. On August 13, 1941, in the midst of the fighting, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain and President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States signed the Atlantic Charter, a nonbinding declaration calling for a world free of violent conflict and suggesting that to prevent future wars some kind of international organization should be formed. The Atlantic Charter was seconded by the January 1, 1942, Declaration of the United Nations. This was primarily a wartime agreement between the countries fighting the Axis powers, but it also echoed the Atlantic Charter’s call for an international organization. October 1943 saw the signing of the Moscow Declaration on General Security, which explicitly called for the creation of an international organization to promote peace. The Moscow Declaration was signed by the Big Four: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and China.

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The first planning conference for the United Nations was carried out by the Big Four at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Washington, D.C., in August and September 1944. The conference was a success, with all four parties agreeing to the framework upon which an international organization would be built—including the creation of a Security Council, General Assembly, and International Court. Further discussions took place among the Big Three—the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain— at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. At those meetings, the powers agreed to sponsor a United Nations Conference to be held on April 25, 1945, in San Francisco. Fifty nations met in San Francisco to draft the UN Charter. The document they signed on June 26, 1945, included all the elements that had been worked out by the major powers during 1943 and 1944, as well as modifications by the other participating nations. The central purpose of the new organization, according to the Charter, was “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . [and] to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights.” After the San Francisco meeting, the delegates returned to their countries to obtain ratification by their respective legislatures or rulers. A majority of the signatories had ratified the Charter by October 24, 1945, which became the date of the founding of the United Nations. By December 27, 1945, all participating nations had ratified the Charter; there were a total of fifty-one signatories, including Poland, which had not participated in the original San Francisco meeting but was considered one of the founding nations. The first meeting of the UN General Assembly took place on January 10, 1946. The UN Charter created six central organs: the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, International Court of Justice, Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council. In the decades since, the United Nations has created a number of specialized agencies, including the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), a variety of conflict-specific peacekeeping organizations (such as the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), and associated but autonomous organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The budget of the United Nations is funded by its member nations on a sliding

scale based on criteria that include national and per capita income.

Secretariat The Secretariat is the administrative hub of the United Nations, made up of all the officials and bureaucrats who manage the United Nations. At the head of the Secretariat is the secretary-general of the United Nations, who is elected for a five-year term of office. The secretary-general sets the administrative agendas of the UN agencies and serves as the symbolic head of the entire United Nations. The power of the secretary-general is highly circumscribed. He or she manages the UN’s administration bureaucracy, but all significant policy decisions are made by the Security Council and General Assembly. Nevertheless, the secretary-general’s symbolic role and prestige provide unique influence in world affairs, and an energetic secretary-general can use the limited powers of the office to great effect. The first secretary-general, chosen in 1946, was Trygve Lie of Norway. The most recent, elected in 1997 and reelected in 2001, is Kofi Annan, the first secretarygeneral from sub-Saharan Africa.

Security Council The Security Council is the center of real power in the United Nations. Of its fifteen members, five— Great Britain, China, France, the Russian Federation, and the United States—are designated permanent members; these five were the strongest countries in the alliance that successfully defeated the Axis powers during World War II, and they insisted on a preponderance of power in the new world organization. (Until 1971, China’s seat was held by the Nationalist government of Taiwan; then it was transferred to the mainland People’s Republic of China.) The ten nonpermanent Security Council members are elected to two-year terms by the General Assembly. While giving five countries special privileges over the other nations of the world is not in keeping with democratic norms, it realistically recognizes the fact that without the cooperation of these powers, the United Nations would be as ineffective as its League predecessor. In day-to-day business, the Security Council requires the votes of nine of its fifteen members to pass a resolution. On substantive issues—those that involve

United Nations

a major UN policy decision—the Security Council majority must include all five permanent members. In other words, any permanent member has the power to veto any substantive decision by the Security Council. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. If it believes that peace has been threatened by a nation or nations, it can initiate an investigation, issue sanctions, or even organize military action (although this has been rare). The Cold War hampered the role of the Security Council, and therefore the United Nations in general, as both the United States and Soviet Union exercised their veto powers to overturn any decision that went against themselves or their allies. During the Cold War, therefore, it proved difficult to find any common ground upon which all five permanent members could agree. The decline of Communism in the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s made unanimous Security Council decisions more feasible, which, in turn, strengthened the influence and reputation of the United Nations. The 1990 sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait, followed by the UN-sanctioned insertion of troops to expel them, marked the beginning of a new era of effectiveness for the international body.

General Assembly The General Assembly is the most democratic part of the United Nations. Each member state (191 as of 2006) sends a group of representatives to the General Assembly, with each delegation getting one vote, no matter the size of the country it represents. In theory, this gives the United States the same weight in General Assembly debates as, for example, Luxembourg. The General Assembly, unlike the Security Council, lacks substantive power. It can debate, make recommendations, and censure countries, but its resolutions are nonbinding. Member states are obliged to follow Security Council decrees; they are not required to obey General Assembly resolutions. Unlike the League of Nations, which required unanimity for all decisions, the UN General Assembly requires only a simple majority to pass its resolutions. Nevertheless, the General Assembly’s decisions have political, diplomatic, and moral weight. It provides an arena in which member nations can debate actions by other member nations, including the great powers, and condemn them if they see fit. Its resolutions may be ignored by their targets, but they have

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the potential of shifting world opinion. For example, the General Assembly’s consistent condemnation of South Africa’s apartheid system had no binding effect on that country’s white government, but it may have helped encourage individuals in member nations to boycott South Africa’s economy and thereby accelerate the end of the system. The General Assembly can also pass conventions or treaties. These have no legal validity until ratified by a sufficient number of states, but the mere existence of such documents can often lead enough nations to adopt them so as to give them legal meaning. Finally, the General Assembly, together with the Security Council, is responsible for admitting new nations to the United Nations and for electing certain UN officials, including the secretary-general.

International Court of Justice Popularly known as the World Court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), founded in 1946 and located in The Hague, Netherlands, acts as the judicial branch of the United Nations. The court has two main roles: settling legal disputes between nations on the basis of international law, and giving advisory opinions on international law to authorized international agencies. The court has fifteen justices, elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, who serve nine-year terms and may be reelected. Only UN member states may bring cases to the ICJ, and only member states may appear before the court. The ICJ can adjudicate a dispute only if both states agree to have their case heard or if a treaty between the states includes a jurisdictional clause declaring that disputes are to be adjudicated by the ICJ. The decisions of the court are final, and there is no appeal. If a state should fail to comply with the decision, the other party may take the case to the Security Council for action. Since 1946, the International Court of Justice has handed down nearly 100 judgments on everything from border disputes to extradition cases to maritime issues. Among the more contentious issues were South Africa’s illegal occupation of Southwest Africa from the 1960s through 1990, the U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbors during the contra war of the 1980s, the U.S. destruction of Iranian offshore oil platforms during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and charges of genocide brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Yugoslavia in the Bosnian war of the early 1990s.

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The ICJ is distinct from the International Criminal Court (ICC), an independent international body chartered in 1998 (and formally established upon treaty ratification by sixty countries in 2002) as a “court of last resort” to adjudicate war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

Preventing Aggression Although the United Nations operates in many areas, its primary purpose was and is to maintain peace in the world. Prevention and settlement of disputes is the topic of chapters 6 and 7 of the United Nations Charter. In its attempts to prevent war and internal turmoil, the United Nations has operated most often under the provisions of chapter 6, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” The text states that any parties to a dispute “likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-

In one of the tensest international incidents to come before the UN Security Council—the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962—U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson (bottom) discusses matters with an aide. UN SecretaryGeneral U Thant (top) and Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin (to his left) were other key figures. (Gary Renaud/ Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)

tional peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” The emphasis is on voluntary cooperation. The General Assembly or Security Council may recommend solutions to a dispute, but chapter 6 does not give them the power to enforce the solutions. Chapter 6, however, does allow the Security Council to investigate any dispute in an attempt to determine which country or countries might be at fault, as well as how the dispute might be resolved. If the only way to resolve a conflict were to rely on the voluntary methods outlined in chapter 6 of the Charter, the United Nations would be hardly more effective than its predecessor, the League of Nations. The United Nations, however, made a break from League precedent by adding provisions for peace enforcement. Chapter 7, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” gives the Security Council the right to determine whether a threat to peace is occurring and what measures might be taken to forestall it. Article 41 provides for the possibility of economic and communications embargoes. If those measures do not work, Article 42 allows the Security Council to use “operations by air, sea, or land forces” to suppress a threat to world peace—in other words, the use of military force. Because the United Nations has no army of its own, the Charter states (Article 43) that all members “undertake to make available to the Security Council . . . armed forces, assistance, and facilities . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” The forces are made available on a purely voluntary basis; no nation is obliged to contribute troops. In theory, therefore, the United Nations has the power to take a wide range of actions in defense of world peace. Assuming that nine out of fifteen Security Council members agree, the UN can even use military force to punish aggressors. In practice, the conflicting interests of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War made it likely that one or another would veto any contentious Security Council resolutions. What one viewed as aggression, the other might regard as a defense of vital interests.

Korean War The one time during the Cold War when the United Nations acted vigorously under Article 43 was in the

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early 1950s over the dispute in Korea—a very unusual set of circumstances. When North Korean troops came across the border into South Korea on the night of June 24, 1950, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations was absent from the Security Council; the Soviets were boycotting the UN to protest its refusal to replace the Nationalist Chinese delegation with a Communist delegation from mainland China. Without fear of a Soviet veto, the Security Council was able to pass a June 25 resolution calling upon member nations to support South Korea in its attempt to defend itself against North Korea. On July 7, with American troops rushing to assist South Korea, the Security Council created a unified command structure to coordinate the defense of that country. The United States was given the responsibility of leading the UN forces. Again, as the Soviets were still boycotting the Security Council, the resolution passed. The UN forces, operating under the auspices of Article 43, were led by American general Douglas MacArthur. The United Nations label was deceptive, however. The bulk of the troops were American; the commanders were American; and when peace talks were organized, it was Americans who negotiated on behalf of the Allies. Excluding South Korea, which contributed a large number of troops to its own defense, only Britain and Turkey committed as much as an infantry brigade; the rest of the allies sent battalion-size units or smaller. The Soviets returned to the Security Council in October 1950, but their vetoes were ignored. The United States convinced the General Assembly to pass a Uniting for Peace resolution in November 1950, which stated that when the Security Council is deadlocked by one permanent member’s veto, the General Assembly has the right to take the initiative in recommending military action. While the Uniting for Peace resolution was of questionable legality, it enabled the United States to claim that it was continuing to act under United Nations authority. The Korean War dragged on for three years, until a July 1953 armistice ended the fighting and left the borders approximately where they had started. In that sense, the United Nations had been a success; it had prevented an aggressor, North Korea, from profiting from its aggression. But it was only able to do so because of the unusual absence of the Soviet delegate.

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Peacekeeping While the United Nations was otherwise unable to muster support for active military intervention, it found another role as an observer and peacekeeper. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold initiated the use of peacekeepers during the 1956 Suez Crisis—a brief war pitting Israel, Great Britain, and France against Egypt. Although vetoes by the French and British representatives prevented Security Council action, the General Assembly voted for a resolution calling for a cease-fire and asked Hammarskjold to supervise the creation of an international force to watch over the withdrawal of the three attackers from Egyptian territory. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) sent 6,000 troops from ten countries to the war zone. Largely because of American pressure on its three allies, the operation was a success. UNEF supervised the withdrawal and stayed posted along the border between Israel and Egypt until 1967, when it was asked to leave by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. UNEF established the ground rules for peacekeeping operations. “Blue Helmets”—as the peacekeepers were called because of their distinctive headgear—were sent to regions where all parties were willing to accept their presence as a means of reducing tension, either by observing a border in an attempt to prevent incursions or, on a larger scale, by acting as a buffer between two countries or forces. Peacekeepers are usually armed, but they may only fight in self-defense and have no mandate to interfere in any armed conflict. The invention of peacekeepers by Hammarskjold was a response to paralysis in the Security Council. Despite Hammarskjold’s clever rule-bending, however, the ability of the peacekeepers to operate remained limited. Only the Security Council has the right to order aggressive action against a country; if any participant in the peacekeeping process wishes the peacekeepers to leave, they must oblige. Peacekeepers had already served on a smaller scale before 1956. A United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was stationed in and around Israel after 1948 to monitor the border between Israel and neighboring Arab states. Another border watch was kept in the area of Kashmir contested by Pakistan and India; these observers, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), began their watch in

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1949. Neither border-watching group succeeded in preventing the violence—wars continued to break out in both areas—but their presence may have impeded it for at least a time. Since the UNEF operation, UN peacekeeping forces have been active all over the world, usually only as observers but sometimes as buffer armies. One of the most important instances of the latter occurred in Cyprus, where in 1964 United Nations troops were called in to separate the warring communities of ethnic Turks and Greeks. Blue Helmets have remained there ever since—2,500 soldiers maintaining a line between the Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus.

The Congo The most extensive use of United Nations peacekeepers until the post–Cold War era was in the Congo (called Zaire from 1966 to 1997). In June 1960, the Congo achieved its independence from Belgium and immediately began to dissolve into a chaotic civil war. After Belgian civilians were attacked during the fighting, Belgium sent troops into the country to protect its citizens and interests. The Belgians also supported the independence bid of the mineral-rich province of Katanga. On July 12, in response to what seemed a threat to Congo’s sovereignty, the nation’s new prime minister called for UN assistance. The Security Council, prodded by Hammarskjold, agreed to send troops to keep the peace. The United Nations sent an army of 20,000 men from twenty-nine countries to the Congo. Its first job, to supervise the withdrawal of the Belgians from the country, was completed in September 1960. The peacekeepers lost direction at that point, as the Security Council argued over what its mission should be. The Soviet Union wanted the UN force to support the government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and to suppress the rebels in Katanga; the United States was suspicious of Lumumba’s left-wing politics and preferred a more neutral stance. After Lumumba was murdered in January 1961, the UN force was ordered by the General Assembly to suppress the revolt in Katanga. In September, fighting broke out between Blue Helmets and Katangese rebels. While attempting to negotiate a cease-fire, Hammarskjold, on his way to meet with Katanga’s leader, Moise Tshombe, died in a plane crash. U Thant, Hammarskjold’s replacement as secretary-general, was more aggressive in his leader-

ship of the UN army in the Congo. United Nations forces fought the Katangese rebels in December 1961 and again in December 1962, forcibly disarming their soldiers and seizing control of Katangese towns. In January 1963, Tshombe conceded defeat, and Katanga was brought back under the Congo government’s control. The last UN troops left in June 1964 (although fighting in the Congo continued until 1965).

Post–Cold War United Nations With the end of the Cold War, the UN finally was able to act in the manner that its founders had envisioned. In 1990, it had the first opportunity to demonstrate that it could be an effective force in defeating aggression in the post–Cold War world.

Desert Storm When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the UN Security Council reacted immediately by passing, 14–0, a resolution condemning the invasion and demanding a return to negotiations by both parties. When Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein refused to comply, the Security Council passed a 13–0 resolution calling for economic sanctions against that nation. UN nations, led by the United States, also began to send troops to Saudi Arabia to defend that country and to prepare for a possible counterattack against Iraq. The Security Council worked to avoid a war, even sending Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to Baghdad to negotiate with Hussein. On November 29, 1990, with no results from either negotiations or sanctions, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, which set a January 15, 1991, deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. If Hussein did not meet the deadline, the resolution authorized the use of “all necessary means” to force an end to the occupation. The resolution passed by a 12–2 vote; Yemen and Cuba opted against it, and China abstained. On January 17, 1991, the allied armies in Saudi Arabia opened an attack on Iraq, which defeated Hussein’s army in a matter of weeks, forcing its withdrawal from Kuwait. Although on the surface the Iraqi conflict seemed to represent the fulfillment of the UN’s goal of providing collective security, the pace of negotiations and military action was pushed along by the United States

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and its allies. From the beginning of the crisis, President George H.W. Bush made it clear that the United States would not allow Iraq to occupy Kuwait. His attempt to gain UN support was guided by a belief that it would be useful, not necessary. And in Security Council debates, it was the United States, seconded by Britain and France, that pushed for increasingly bellicose resolutions. China and Russia were less enthusiastic, and Cuba was actively hostile. Moreover, during the actual campaign, it was American troops that dominated the battlefield and American generals who issued the commands. Twenty-eight nations contributed troops to the war, but only Britain and France contributed more than a division. In many respects, therefore, the Iraqi conflict was a U.S. operation conducted under the cloak of a Security Council resolution. Subsequent negotiations with Iraq were affected by this dynamic. The United States continually pressed for harsher treatment of Iraq, while many other members of the United Nations argued for a more temperate approach.

Cambodia The United Nations undertook several other major military commitments during the 1990s, including ones in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Somalia. All had a mixed success. Cambodia had suffered from more than twenty years of civil war and invasion, including a 1979 invasion that ousted the Khmer Rouge regime. In 1991, the Cambodian government was still being supported by Vietnam, while antigovernment guerrillas (including both non-Communists and Khmer Rouge) received support from the United States, China, and Thailand. In an October 1991 peace conference, the United Nations agreed to create an administrative structure, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), that would supervise Cambodia’s transition to peace and democracy. The operation, which cost $2 billion, was at least a partial failure. More than 20,000 UN representatives, soldiers, police, and civilians were sent into Cambodia and successfully supervised elections in 1993, but they could not force the parties to abide by the results. Fighting between factions loyal to Prince Norodom Ranariddh and to Prime Minister Hun Sen continued into 1998. Despite its limited success, the UN intervention in Cambodia had given China an excuse to stop its support of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, with the

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result that by 1998 the Khmer Rouge had disappeared as an effective force. In general, the level of violence in Cambodia has remained far lower than before the UN mission.

Somalia The United Nations intervention in Somalia began as a humanitarian effort but developed into a military action. When the Siad Barre regime fell in 1991, the entire country descended into a confused civil war between rival factions. The constant fighting, combined with one of the worst droughts in modern Somalian history, left the country without sufficient food for its people. Attempts by relief agencies to bring food to Somalia were short-circuited by local warlords who confiscated the food and supplies for the use of their own factions. At first, the United Nations ignored the problem in Somalia. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accused the five permanent members of being racist, suggesting that they were more concerned with white Bosnia than black Somalia. The Security Council responded in April 1992 by sending 500 peacekeepers to Mogadishu. These were too few to face down the warlords, however, and the starvation in Somalia continued. It was the television images of starving Somali children beamed into American homes that convinced President George H.W. Bush to support a Security Council resolution authorizing a military intervention into the country. In December 1992, an American-led UN expeditionary force moved into Somalia to create a climate where food could be properly distributed. The 38,000-man multinational force, 25,000 of whom were American, overawed the warlords and was able to provide a safe environment for relief efforts. When the UN force attempted to impose greater order on the country, however, the Somali factions reacted with defiance and then open skirmishing. A firefight in June 1993 resulted in the deaths of twenty-five Pakistanis, and the UN Security Council, again pushed by the United States, passed a resolution calling for the arrest of those responsible. But the death of U.S. soldiers in the fighting that ensued soured the American people on the Somalia rescue mission. They had sent troops to Somalia to save starving children and did not understand why their troops were being shot at. President Bill Clinton

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ordered all American forces withdrawn by March 1994. Without the Americans, the mission floundered, and in November 1994 the Security Council agreed to its termination. On March 3, 1995, the last UN troops left the country. The Somalia operation was perceived as a failure by many, particularly in the United States. Although it had probably saved tens of thousands of lives, it had failed to eliminate the power of the warlords or to restore stability in Somalia. The sight of dead Americans made the United States less inclined to send its troops abroad in future peacekeeping efforts.

Yugoslavia The United Nations proved extremely slow in dealing with the growing catastrophe in Yugoslavia. The fighting began in June 1991, but the Security Council did not issue an arms embargo against the entire former Yugoslavia until September. Indeed, even this did little to slow the fighting between Serbs, Croatians, and Bosnian Muslims. In March 1992, UN troops were sent into Croatia to supervise a cease-fire between Croatians and Serbs, but this did nothing to halt the growing violence in Bosnia. A May 1992 economic embargo against Serbia was designed to accomplish that goal but was ignored by the Bosnian Serbs, who continued carrying out an ethnic cleansing campaign against Bosnian Muslims and Croats. In June 1992, the warring factions did agree to allow UN peacekeepers to be stationed in Sarajevo in order to facilitate the movement of food into Bosnia, which was near starvation. Eventually the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) reached a strength of 30,000 men, but because it was serving in a Blue Helmet peacekeeping role, it could do little more than protect a few enclaves. Thousands of Bosnians, mostly Muslims, continued to be killed every month. The inactivity of the UN was based on a combination of politics and apathy. Politically, the Russians felt bound to Serbia by ties of ethnicity and religion, and therefore dragged their feet in Security Council meetings. All the major powers, for that matter, wanted to avoid getting bogged down in military operations in Yugoslavia. The United States and nations of Western Europe pressured the combatants to make peace but were unwilling to force them to do so. This attitude slowly changed as television images of the slaughter and suffering were broadcast around the

world; international public opinion began to demand that something be done. In July 1995, the Serb destruction of a UN “protected” enclave at Srebrenica finally led to a change of policy by the international community. The United Nations, prompted by the leading NATO powers, agreed to authorize NATO air strikes against Serb positions. This move, combined with Muslim-Croat counteroffensives, forced the Bosnian Serbs to sign the November 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. To support the peace, the UN authorized 60,000 combat troops to be sent into Bosnia. Most of them, however, were NATO regulars, with the largest contingents coming from the United States, Britain, and France. The United Nations had served a useful purpose in providing humanitarian aid to the starving Bosnian Muslims, but, until the United States pressed for air strikes and military intervention, it lacked the will or the ability to stop the fighting in Bosnia.

Blue Helmets into the TwentyFirst Centur y UN peacekeeping statistics are impressive. Since 1948, it has mounted 59 peacekeeping and observation operations, with 16 ongoing (between Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon; in Kashmir; Cyprus, Syria—Golan Heights, Lebanon, Western Sahara, Abkhazia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Congo; between Ethiopia and Eritrea; in East Timor, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Burundi) and five special political and peace-building operations (Guatemala, Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Sudan-Darfur). In all, about 130 nations have contributed military and police personnel to UN peace operations, with up to 1 million soldiers and officers having served under the UN flag. As for ongoing operations (estimates for 2006), 108 countries were contributing a total of about 65,000 troops, more than 2,000 military observers, about 7,500 policemen, and more than 14,000 civil staff members. The top contributors of troops are Bangladesh (10,255), Pakistan (9,638), and India (9,061), followed by Jordan, Nepal, Ethiopia, Ghana, Uruguay, Nigeria, and South Africa. A total of about 2,000 UN soldiers from 100 countries have been killed in peacekeeping missions to date. The cost of the UN peacekeeping efforts was about $2.8 billion in 2004–2005. To be sure, UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone have been highly successful. Nevertheless, the

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new realities of conflict in the world have challenged two basic principles upon which UN peacekeeping has always rested: the deployment of forces adequate to the task, and the conclusion of a peace or truce as a prerequisite for the mission. As for the first principle, the lion’s share of troops deployed in “hot spots” around the world have come from Third World countries. In addition to their presumed neutrality, which makes them suitable for peacekeeping, the Third World countries are attracted by international prestige, financial benefits, and training opportunities for their troops. On the other hand, in the contemporary strategic environment, when the wars within countries have become more common phenomena then interstate conflicts, the peacekeepers are increasingly dispatched to failing and disintegrated states where there is no effective cease-fire agreement or truce. Thus, poorly armed and trained soldiers from small countries frequently find themselves in the midst of chaos, outnumbered and outgunned by local militias. In some cases (such as the Congo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor), French, British, and Australian troops, respectively, came to save peacekeeping missions from failure. Consequently, Western militaries dissatisfied with the inefficiency of the UN bureaucracy are reluctant to participate in peacekeeping by sending troops—the total European Union share in UN peacekeeping troops is about 6 percent, the U.S. share is less than 1 percent—preferring to act outside UN auspices (e.g., Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan since 2001, and Iraq since 2003). One other problem the UN needs to address when it comes to peacekeeping is the growing evidence of corruption and abuse of law within UN peacekeeping contingents, particularly in Africa. The UN has adopted measures to make the peacekeeping more efficient. Under the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), set up in 1994, designated resources and personnel can be called in for UN peacekeeping missions. The new realities of world conflicts have called for a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping. With intrastate conflicts putting national infrastructures increasingly at risk, UN peacekeeping efforts need to address a wide array of new, nonmilitary tasks: from reform of local security forces to reconstruction of civic and governmental systems. In other words, UN missions require a growing emphasis on post-conflict reconstruction. The recent UN missions in Bosnia and Kosovo underscore this trend. In August 2000, a special panel

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on UN peace operations led by Algerian diplomat Lakhda Brahimi issued a report that stressed the need to reform UN peacekeeping mechanisms, reorienting its human, financial, and organizational resources to early warning of impending crises, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction.

Arms Control In addition to the tasks of peacekeeping and military intervention, the United Nations, under the authority of Article 11 of the UN Charter, has worked to reduce the danger of violence in the world by recommending arms control limitations. These efforts have had only moderate success. During the Cold War, neither superpower, nor any of its allies, wished to disarm because of their fear of each other; the legacy of the Cold War arms race is a world filled with thousands of nuclear weapons. One modest success of the United Nations was the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which enjoined all signatories to promise to neither give nor accept nuclear technology (although it did not take away weapons from those nations that already possessed them). The treaty was signed by most nations, though two nuclear powers, France and China, did not sign until the early 1990s. A number of non-nuclear powers also refused to sign the treaty, including Israel and South Africa (the latter joined in 1991). And India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests demonstrated that while nuclear proliferation may have been slowed by the General Assembly’s treaty, it has not been stopped entirely. The UN General Assembly has also written treaties prohibiting the use of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—meaning biological and chemical weapons—but has had difficulty in getting many nations, including the United States and Russia, to sign them. With WMD proliferation as one of the most urgent security challenges in the post-Cold War world, an intergovernmental organization—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under the mandate of the United Nations—is primarily responsible for monitoring investigations and inspections of suspected cases of nuclear proliferation. At the end of the twentieth century, the IAEA was closely monitoring alleged WMD research and development in Iraq and Libya and had reported to the UN Security Council to take sanctions against these countries.

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Since 2003, Iran’s nuclear program has been on top of the IAEA agenda. While Teheran insisted that its nuclear program had only peaceful purposes, Western governments expressed concern that Iranian nuclear activities could be aimed at building nuclear weapons. In no small part, these suspicions were reinforced by growing reluctance on the part of Iran to cooperate with IAEA inspections in 2004 to 2006. Yet there was no agreement among major powers, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear program. While the United States was in favor of strong condemnation, UN sanctions, and even military actions in a worst-case scenario, the “Big Three” of the European Union—Great Britain, France, and Germany—initially advocated engagement and bargaining with Iran to persuade it to give up its supposed nuclear weapons ambitions, leaving pressure as a last resort option. As for Russia (a key contributor to Iran’s nuclear research) and China, they were even more inclined to continue dialogue with Iran in order to ensure a peaceful nuclear program. Iran’s insistence on its right to develop nuclear technology under almost no international control, its introduction of a new ballistic missile capable of striking anywhere in the Middle East and parts of Europe, and the threatening rhetoric of Iranian propaganda against Israel and the United States all aggravated the situation. By 2006, with Teheran adopting a more and more aggressive stance on the issue and with revelations that Iran’s efforts in the nuclear field were far more advanced than earlier believed, the Europeans moved closer to the U.S. position, supporting strong UN pressure on Iran, including economic and diplomatic sanctions if it did not comply with IAEA inspections.

Iraq War After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq continuously and persistently violated its obligations under UN resolutions and cease-fire agreements, frequently refusing entry to the country for UN weapons inspectors. In 1999–2002, the Security Council had passed sixteen resolutions on Iraq, dealing mainly with post–Gulf War issues (sanctions against Iraq, relations between Iraq and Kuwait, etc.). The growing resistance of Saddam Hussein’s regime toward demands of the international community had led to UN Security Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, which threatened “seri-

ous consequences” if Iraq failed to comply with its disarmament obligations. While UN inspectors returned to Iraq in 2002 after a long break, the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain all remained suspicious of Hussein’s supposed WMD programs and sought Security Council approval for military action against Iraq. This request resulted in an unprecedented split in the Security Council. While the United States, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria (the latter two as nonpermanent members) were in favor of military action, France, China, and Russia, supported by Germany, called for continuing weapons inspections. Angola, Cameroon, Chile, and Guinea supported further inspections, while not taking a stand on possible military action. Mexico supported continued inspection but did not rule out UN-sanctioned military action. Pakistan was in favor of inspections, while Syria supported Iraq, calling for a lifting of UN sanctions. With the Security Council failing to endorse a military operation, the United States and Britain—disappointed with UN divisions over the Iraqi question (including alleged corruption in the “oil for food” humanitarian program)—declared their right to disarm Iraq by force and, ignoring the UN, went to war in March 2003. In the aftermath of the debates, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was not in conformity with the UN Charter and stressed that there should have been one more UN resolution leaving it up to the Security Council to approve or determine the consequences. Nevertheless, the need for Iraq’s reconstruction stimulated a more active UN role in the country, and a special mission led by Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello was dispatched to Baghdad. In August 2003, de Mello and fourteen other UN officials were killed in a massive bombing of UN headquarters in the Iraqi capital by insurgents. By late 2006, the insurgency in Iraq had made the future of the country, as well as the future UN role, uncertain.

Countering International Terrorism On September 12, 2001, the day after the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368, which condemned the acts of terror, expressed the readiness of the international community to combat terrorism, and requested all states to deny terrorists

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access to bases and financing. In previous years, the Security Council had dealt with the problem of international terrorism by imposing sanctions on regimes that helped organized terrorist acts or harbored terrorists (examples include sanctions against Libya in 1992–1999 and agains