Empathy and its development

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Cambridge Studies in Social and Emotional Development General Editor: Martin L. Hoffman Advisory Board: Nicolas Blurton Jones, Robert N. Emde, Willard W. Hartup, Robert A. Hinde, Lois W. Hoffman, Carroll E. Izard, Jerome Kagan, Franz J. Monks, Paul Mussen, Ross D. Parke, and Michael Rutter

Empathy and its development

Edited by NANCY EISENBERG Arizona State University

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JANET STRAYER Simon Fraser Univesity

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CAMBRIDGE

UNIVERSITY

Cambridge New York New Rochelle

Melbourne

PRESS Sydney

! Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge C82 IRP 32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia

Contents

© Cambridge University Press 1987

First published 1987 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congre.ss Catalo1:in1:-in-Publication Data

Empathy and its development.

List of contributors Preface

(Cambridge studies in social and emotional development)

page vu ix

Includes index. I. Empathy.

2. Developmental psychology.

Introduction Critical issues in the study of empathy Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer

-Ji

I. Eisenberg, Nancy. 11. Strayer, Janet. III. Series. IDNLM: I. Empathy. WB 575.E55 E55J BF575.E55E453 1987 155.2'32 87-11622

3

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Part I Historical and theoretical perspectives , 1 History of the concept of empathy Lauren Wispe 3 Evolutionary bases of empathy Robert Plutchik 4 The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment Martin L. Hoffman 5 Empathy and psychotherapy James Marcia Commentary on Part I Ervin Staub

Empathy and its development. - (Cambridge studies in social and emotional development). I. Empathy I. Eisenberg, Nancy 152.4 BF575.E55

II. Strayer, Janet

ISBN O 521 32609 5

Part II Empathy across the life span Empathy and emotional understanding: the early development of empathy Ross A. Thompson 7 Empathy and related responses in children Mark A. Barnett 8 Adults' emotional reactions to the distress of others C. Daniel Batson, Jim Fultz, and Patricia A. Schoenrade Commentary on Part II Paul Mussen

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Part III Current issues and empirical findings Gender and age differences in empathy and sympathy Randy Lennon and Nancy Eisenberg Affective and cognitive perspectives on empathy Janet Strayer V

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17 38

47

81 103

119 146 163

185

195 218

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Contents

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11 Mental health, temperament, family, and friends: perspectives on children's empathy and social perspective

taking Brenda K. Bryant • 12 Parental empathy and child adjustment/maladjustment Norma Deitch Feshbach

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Empathy, sympathy, and altruism: empirical and conceptual links Nancy Eisenberg and Paul Miller Motor mimicry as primitive empathy Janet Beavin Bavelas, Alex Black, Charles R. Lemery, and Jennifer Mullett Commentary on Part Ill Bert S. Moore

Contributors

245 271 292

317 339 Mark A. Barnett Department of Psychology

Nancy Eisenberg Department of Psychology

351 356

Kansas State University

Arizona State University

Manhattan, KS 66506

Tempe, AZ 85287

361 374

C. Daniel Batson Department of Psychology University of Kansas Lawrence, KS 66045

Richard A. Fabes

Janet Beavin Bavelas

Norma Deitch Feshbach Graduate School of Education UCLA 405 Hilgrad Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90024

Part IV Methodological issues Picture-story indices of empathy Janet Strayer 16 Self-report ratings of empathic emotion C. Daniel Batson

15

17 Critique of comparable questionnaire methods in use to

assess empathy in children and adults Brenda K. Bryant 18 Somatic indices of empathy Robert F. Marcus 19 Physiological indices of empathy Nancy Eisenberg, Richard A. Fabes, Denise Bustamante, and Robin M. Mathy

380

Department of Psychology 20

Conclusions

University of Victoria

Empathy viewed in context Janet Strayer and Nancy Eisenberg

389

Canada

399

Alex Black Department of Psychology

Index

Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2

University of Victoria

Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2 Canada Brenda K. Bryant Department of Applied Behavioral Sciences University of California, Davis Davis, CA 956 I 6 Denise Bustamante

c/o Nancy Eisenberg Department of Psychology Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287 vii

l

Department of Home Economics Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287

Jim Fultz Department of Psychology Northern Illinois University DeKalb, IL 60115-2892 Martin L. Hoffman Department of Psychology New York University 6 Washington Place New York, NY 10003 Charles R. Lemery Department of Psychology University of Victoria

Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2 Canada

viii

Contributors

Randy Lennon Department of Educational Psychology University of Northern Colorado Greeley, CO 80639 James Marcia

Department of Psychology Simon Fraser University

Burnaby, BC Y5A IS6 Canada Robert F. Marcus Institute of Child Study University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 Robin M. Mathy Department of Sociology Indiana University

Bloomington, IN 47405 Paul Miller Department of Psychology Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287 Bert S. Moore

Department of Psychology University of Texas, Dallas Richmond, TX 75083-0688 Jennifer Mullett Department of Psychology University of Victori_a

Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2 Canada

Paul Mussen Institute of Human Development University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720

Preface

Robert Plutchik Department of Psychiatry Albert Einstein College of Medicine 1300 Morris Park Avenue Bronx, NY 10461 Patricia A. Schoenrade Department of Psychology

Among the many self-evident problems in modem society are the lack of communication and understanding between individuals and groups and the frequent

University of Kansas

occurrence of inhumane and uncaring behavior. Many factors, both societal and psychological in nature, may contribute to these problems. There is a great need,

Lawrence, KS 66045 Ervin Staub Department of Psychology

particularly at this time in human history, for information about these factors and their precise role in the development and maintenance of affective bonds, understanding, and caring actions among people. One factor Jong considered to be a mediator or contributor to positive human interaction and altruistic behavior is empathy or its potential derivative, sympathy. There is now some empirical evidence to support such a view. Therefore, it

University of Massachusetts

Amherst, MA 01003 Janet Strayer Department of Psychology

is important that we fully understand the nature of empathy, its development, and its role in behavior. With such an understanding, we may be able to improve

Simon Fraser University

Burnaby, BC V5A IS6 Canada

the quality of human interrelationships.

To understand empathy, scientific investigation is needed. Although psychologists have been studying empathy (defined in this book as having an affective

Ross A. Thompson Department of Psychology Burnett Hall University of Nebraska Lincoln, NE 68588-0308

component) for several decades, most of the work reported in the literature has

been done in the past 15 years. Indeed, research on this topic has increased dramatically in recent years. However, there are few books in which the research and theory concerning empathy have been integrated, and most of these have

been written primarily from the perspective of clinical psychologists (who tend to define empathy somewhat differently from many developmental and social psychologists). Thus, a considerable body of information is available, but it is

Lauren Wispe Building 158 SC, Room 134 University of Oklahoma Norman, OK 73069

in need of evaluation and organization. For the aforementioned reasons, we felt that it was time for investigators in-

terested in the development of empathy and its relation to social behavior to organize and present the major findings and conceptualizations in the field, and to evaluate current methods for assessing empathy. This volume is an effort to

accomplish these goals. We hope that this book will not only inform its readers, but also lead to further and better research as well as stimulate interest in this

very important topic. Perhaps by doing so, it will, in a small way, help to meet ix

I.

x

Preface

the urgent need for a better understanding of factors affecting the quality of human relationships. This volume is the product of a group effort. We are indebted to the contributors for their thoughtful presentations and their help in completing the project. In addition, we are grateful to Sally Carney for her assistance in the preparation of the manuscript. Work on this volume was funded by grants from the National Institutes of Health (a biomedical grant administered through Arizona State University and a Career Development Award [1KO4HD00717]) and from the National Science Foundation (BNS-8509223) to Nancy Eisenberg, and by grants from the Child Development Foundation and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Strategic Area Grant 498-82-0027) to Janet Strayer. We are truly grateful for this support. The first editor also wishes to thank Jerry Harris for his continuing support and input throughout the duration of this project. The second editor wishes to express her appreciation to her interested colleagues and research assistants, and to express special thanks to J. M., who retained resilience and good humor at both the high and low altitudes along the flight of ideas.

Introduction

1

Critical issues in the study of empathy

Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer

The role of empathy and related processes such as sympathy in social and moral development has been debated for centuries by philosophers as well as psychologists (e.g., Allport, 1937; Blum, 1980; Hume, 1777/1966; Titchener, 1924). Moreover, empathy has been an important concept in contemporary develop-

mental, social, personality, and clinical psychology (e.g., Batson & Coke, 1981; Dymond, 1949; Goldstein & Michaels, 1985; Hoffman, 1984). However, in part because of its wide-ranging application, the notion of empathy is, and always has been, a broad, somewhat slippery concept - one that has provoked considerable speculation, excitement, and confusion. Indeed, identifying the topic of this edited volume as empathy does not clarify for many readers exactly what will be discussed. Some people take the term empathy to refer to a cognitive process analogous to cognitive role taking or perspective taking (e.g., Deutsch & Madie, 1975); others take it to mean a primarily affective process (having some cognitive components) (e.g., Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1984); still others, primarily clinicians, view empathy as a process that serves a communicatory and/or information-gathering function in therapy (e.g., Goldstein & Michaels, 1985). The history of the term is an interesting topic in itself, which is discussed in chapter 2. The perspectives of the contributors to this volume, although diverse, are not nearly so varied as has been the use of the term both historically and in present-day psychology. For most of the contributors, empathizing involves the vicarious sharing of affect - this is the critical similarity that underlies our different perceptions of both the role of cognition in this affective process and the exact nature of the process itself. Consider the similarities in the following definitions of empathy: an affective response more appropriate to someone else's situation than to one's own (Hoffman, chapter 4) other-oriented feelings of concern, compassion, and tenderness experienced as a result of witnessing another person's suffering (Batson, Fultz, & Schocnrode,

chapter 8) 3

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Critical issues in the study of empathy

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refers to as the ''reverberation phase.'' However, the last phase in Reik's model is said to be particularly important for the clinician. It is defined as the "moving back from the merged inner relationship to a position of separate identity that permits a response to be made that reflects both understanding of the other as well as separateness from them" (Marcia, chapter 5). Thus, in addition to emphasizing affect, Reik's definition includes "detachment," which refers to a highly cognitive process and seems to involve some neutralization of emotion. A brief reading of the contributors' definitions of empathy, however, may be misleading. The similarities in their conceptualizations of empathy may well be greater than these brief quotations suggest. Even Wispe, who defines empathy in more cognitive terms than do many of the contributors, defines sympathy in somewhat the same way as they define empathy:

empathy denotes the vicarious experiencing of an emotion that is congruent with, but not necessarily identical to the emotion of another individual (Barnett, chapter 7) a definition of empathy that requires that an observer share the general emolional tone of another - whether or not there is direct emotional match - seems appropriate for most purposes. . It seems appropriate to regard both kinds of empathic responding reactions requiring minimal inference from an observer and those requiring much greater inferential role taking as anchor-points on a continuum of empathy (Thompson, chapter 6) empathy viewed multidimensionally may be initiated by one's attention to a person in a salient stimulus event (real or symbolic). . Subsequent phases of the empathic process may entail motor mimicry, classical conditioning, association, imaginal transposition of self and other, and similar processes as part of the reverberation that links the other person's experience to our own and permits affect sharing (Strayer, chapter 10) Social perspective taking entails cognitive understanding of the feelings and motives of others and, as such, is an instrumental skill. Empathy, on the other hand, entails emotional responsiveness to the feelings experienced by others and, as such, is an expressive experience (Bryant, chapter 11) Empathy has been defined as "the capacity for participating in, or a vicarious experiencing of another's feelings, volitions, or ideas and sometimes another's movements to the point of executing bodily movements resembling his'' (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971). This definition has several implications. First. it suggests that empathy is an internal state or experience similar to an emotion. Second, it implies that this emotional state can sometimes be recognized through imitative bodily movements (Plutchik, chapter'3) an affective state stemming from apprehension of another's emotional state or condition and which is congruent with it (Eisenberg & Miller, chapter 13)

Sympathy refers to the heightened awareness of the suffering of another person as something to be alleviated . . sympathy intensifies both the representation and the internal reaction to the other's predicament. (Wispe, 1986, p. 318)

The lack of consistency in the usage of the terms empathy and sympathy has given rise to considerable confusion. In reality, there is no correct definition of empathy, just different definitions. Because this volume is about empathy, it seems appropriate to open the discussion with our own definition of empathy and to compare it with definitions of related concepts. We should also look at some of the general issues relevant to many of the chapters in this volume. Definitional issues

In all of the definitions just mentioned, the sharing of affect is a primary component. However, several contributors depart from the general view represented by these quotations. For example, Wispe, in chapter 2, does not really emphasize his own definition of empathy; he views empathy in more cognitive terms than do the other contributors:

Empathy In our view, empathy involves sharing the perceived emotion of another "feeling with" another. This vicarious affective reaction may occur as a response to overt perceptible cues indicative of another's affective state (e.g., a person's facial expressions), or as the consequence of inferring another's state on the~{ indirect cues (e.g., the nature of the other's situation). Thus, we defiryt empath~ as an emotional response that stems from another's emotional state ~ton and that is congruent with the other's emotional state or situation. This definition is quite similar to Hoffman's (1982) and implies that one can empathize with a broad range of affects. Several important issues concerning the conceptualization of empathy also need to be clarified here. One is the degree of self-other differentiation when empathizing. Some theorists assume that empathy involves an "as if" distinction - that there is at least a minimal differentiation between self and other when empathizing (e.g., Feshbach, 1978; Kohut, 1978; Rogers & Truax, 1967). 0th-

''Empathy'' refers to the attempt by one self-aware self to comprehend unjudgmentally the positive and negative experiences of another self. These emotions and reactions are often unclearly understood by the other person so one important aspect of the process is empathic accuracy inasmuch as the purpose of empathy is often (but not necessarily) to provide understanding for one or both parties. Empathy depends upon the use of imaginal and mimitic capabilities and it is most often an effortful process.

Marcia (chapter 5) defines empathy from the perspective of a clinician or, more precisely, from the perspective of various groups of clinicians. He adopts Reik's ( 1949) definition of the empathic process in psychotherapy, a model that provides a focus for discussion of its development in Strayer's chapter as well. In Reik's view, empathy has an affective component, particularly in what Reik

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ers (e.g., Hoffman, 1982) assume that such a differentiation does not necessarily take place in the early phases of empathy. Thus, there is some question whether it is empathy or merely a precursor to empathy when one experiences vicarious emotion and is not aware of where the affect originated. For example, an infant may experience contagious affect without recognizing the source of the affect. If infants truly do not differentiate between their own and others' affect, their vicarious experiencing should then be considered a potential precursor of empathy, not empathy itself. However, even young children may have some primitive understanding of the difference between their own and others' affective responding.

Sympathy

Another critical issue is how to distinguish between empathy, sympathy, and personal distress. Sympathy, like empathy, has been defined in a multitude of ways. Wispe's (1986) definition is perhaps representative of the ones most widely accepted today. For him, sympathy refers to the heightened awareness of the suffering of another person as something to be alleviated. There are two.aspects to this definition of sympathy. The first makes reference to the increased sensitivity to the emotions of the other person. Sympathy intensifies both the representation and the internal reaction to the other person's predicament. The second aspect involves the urge to take whatever mitigating actions are necessary; that is, in sympathy the suffering of the other person is experienced immediately as something to be alleviated. (p. 318)

Our definition of sympathy is, in general, consistent with that of Wispe. Sympathy is "feeling for" someone, and refers to feelings of sorrow, or feeling sorry, for another. That is to say, sympathy often involves feelings of concern, although the conscious cognitive realization that one is concerned about another's welfare is an outcome, rather than a part, of sympathizing. Often sympathy is the consequence of empathizing, although it may be possible for sympathy (as well as empathy) to result from processes such as cognitive perspective taking. Whether or not empathy always mediates sympathizing is an open question. Our and Wispe's definition of sympathy is in marked contrast to that of some clinicians. For example, in Katz's (1963) view, sympathy involves heightened attention to one's own feelings and the assumed similarity between one's own and another's feelings. Similarly, Goldstein and Michaels ( 1985) have stated that "the sympathizer, in contrast [to the empathizerj, is more preoccupied with his or her own feelings in response to the other and thus is less able to respond to, for, or with the other in a manner sensitive to the other person's actual ongoing emotional world and context" (p. 8). In attempting to differentiate between sympathy and empathy, Goldstein and Michaels suggest that the latter involves role

Critical issues in the study of empathy

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taking, adeptness at reading nonverbal cues, sensitivity to the full range and depth of the other's affective state or situation, and communication of a feeling of caring, or at least sincere attempts to understand in a nonjudgmental or helping manner (see also Keefe, 1979; Macarov, 1978). Goldstein and Michaels's definitions of empathy and sympathy reflect a current perspective among c1inicians, which differs somewhat from that of nonc1inicians. Personal distress

When perceiving cues related to another's distress, some people may experience an aversive state such as anxiety or worry that is not congruent with the other's state and, what is more important, that leads to a self-oriented, egoistic reaction or concern. Batson (e.g., Batson & Coke, 1981) has labeled such a response "personal distress" and has suggested that the experiencing of personal distress leads one to attempt to alleviate one's own aversive state. Personal distress, therefore, is conceptually quite different from both empathy (which is, in essence, neither an egoistic nor other-oriented response) and sympathy (which involves a clear other-orientation). Nonetheless, owing to the conceptual and methodological limitations of existing research, personal distress undoubtedly is confused with sympathy and empathy in much of the literature (see Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrode, chapter 8, for an exception to this confusion). Many researchers disagree about the relation of personal distress to empathy. For Batson (Batson & Coke, 1981), the two types of affective reactions are conceptually unrelated, although owing to the relation of both to other relevant factors (e.g., general affective arousability), they are positively correlated. For Hoffman, however, feelings of" global distress" (Hoffman, 1982) or "empathic distress" (Hoffman, I 976), whereby young children confuse their own and others' feelings and act as if they themselves are experiencing another's distress, is an early stage in the development of empathy. Thus, Hoffman does not consider such personal distress to be distinct from empathy (Hoffman, 1982). Our view is somewhat more akin to that of Batson, although we do agree with Hoffman that "contagious" personal distress is an early precursor of the development of empathy. We believe that personal distress can occur either independently of empathy or as an outcome of an initial empathic experience. In the latter case, the individual's initial empathizing is experienced as an aversive reaction and, consequently, the individual focuses on his or her own affective state. However, it also is likely that empathizing leads one to focus on the other person rather than solely on the self. Indeed, in most cases involving persons older than infants, one would expect empathy to engender feelings, which, if sufficiently strong, would prompt the empathizer to attempt to locate whether their source is self- or other-derived. This process would not be expected to occur

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if the feelings aroused are weak or if the individual is distracted by competing events. Projection Although we are concentrating on definitional issues here, it is useful to differentiate between empathy and projection. Projection is defined as "the act of ascribing to someone or something else one's own attitudes, thoughts, etc.'' (Random House College Dictionary, 1980, p. 1058). Thus, projection differs from our definition of empathy in two ways: (I) it is a cognitive process that does not necessarily involve affect, and (2) the direction of the process is from self to other, rather than vice versa (see Feshbach, 1978). There is, therefore, a clear conceptual distinction between empathy and projection. Nonetheless, as Strayer points out in chapter 10, differentiating projection and empathy becomes an issue when researchers try to measure empathy.

The role of cognition in empathy Although the role of cognition in empathy is discussed in many chapters of this book, especially those by Hoffman (chapter 4) and by Straye, (chapter 10), we should at least touch on this topic here because it has direct bearing on the definition of empathy. A number of cognitive processes of varying sophistication can be viewed as contributing to empathy. The complexity of these cognitive processes probably varies, depending upon the age of the individual and other personality and situational factors. At the most basic level, the ability to differentiate between self and other and between one's own and another's affective responding is necessary for empathizing, at least according to our definition of the concept (see Hoffman, 1982, 1984 for a more detailed discussion of these processes). R~~all, however, that Hoffman (e.g.~J 982) \!Qesl]Qt_thinkdif~n,ntiation processes are necessary for _primi_tiveempathic responding and has sugg~d.im:examj)fe;tlj'!!_ e-m.Qli