Emerging Technologies and International Stability [1 ed.] 1032017619, 9781032017617

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Emerging Technologies and International Stability

Technology has always played a central role in international politics; it shapes the ways states fight during wartime and compete during peacetime. Today, rapid advancements have contributed to a widespread sense that the world is again on the precipice of a new technological era. Emerging technologies have inspired much speculative commentary, but academic scholarship can Improve the discussion with disciplined theory­ building and rigorous empirics.This book aims to contribute to the debate by exploring the role of technology - both military and non-military - In shaping international security. Specifically, the contributors to this edited volume alm to generate new theoretical insights into the relationship between technology and strategic stability, test them with sound empirical methods, and derive their implications for the coming technological age. This book Is novel in its approach. It covers a wide range of technologies, both old and new, rather than emphasizing a single technology. Furthermore, this volume looks at how new technologies might affect the broader dynamics of the international system rather than limiting the focus to a stability. The contributions to this volume walk readers through the likely effects of emer­ ging technologies at each phase of the conflict process. The chapters begin with competition in peacetime, move to deterrence and coercion, and then explore the dynamics of crises, the outbreak of conflict, and war escalation in an environment of emerging technologies. The chapters In this book, except for the Introduction and the Conclusion, were originally published in the Journal ofStrategic Studies.

Todd S. Sechser is the Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, USA, Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, and Director of the University of Virginia's Democratic Statecraft Lab. Dr. Sechser's research interests include coercive diplomacy, nuclear security, emerging technologies, and the psychological effects of political violence.

Neil Narang is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, USA, Research Director at the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), and Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is currently an advisor to the Director's Office of Los Alamos National Laboratory, a faculty affiliate at the Stanford University Center for International Security, and Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as Senior Advisor in the U.S. Department of Defense. Narang specializes in international relations, with a focus on issues of International security and conflict management. Caitlin Talmadge is Associate Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, USA, where her research and teaching focus on nuclear deterrence, military effectiveness, civil-military relations, and security issues in Asia and the Persian Gulf. She is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and previously worked as a consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense.

Emerging Technologies and International Stability

Edited by Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang and Caitlin Talmadge

Routledge Taylor & Franck Croup

LONDON AND NEW YORK

University of < A, / a Wisconsin-Maoison Libraries First published 2022 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon. Oxon 0X14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge Is an Imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

Introduaion, Chapters 1-7 0 2022 Taylor & Francis Conclusion © 2022 Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg Chapter 8 © 2019Tristan A. Volpe. Originally published as Open Access. Chapter 9 © 2019 Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe. Originally published as Open With the exception of Chapters 8 and 9, no part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised In any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. For details on the rights for Chapters 8 and 9, please see the chapters'Open Access footnotes. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without Intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing In Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-01761-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-01764-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1 -003-17991-7 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9781003179917

Typeset in Myriad Pro by Newgen Publishing UK Publisher's Note The publisher accepts responsibility for any inconsistencies that may have arisen during the conversion of this book from journal articles to book chapters, namely the inclusion of journal terminology.

Disclaimer Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grateful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions In future editions of this book.

Ic )bQ-'2-

OLTJContents

Citation Information A/ofes on Contributors

vii ix

PART I: INTRODUCTION Emerging technologies and international stability Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang and Caitlin Talmadge

3

PART II: COMPETITION AND COERCION IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1

2

3

The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: implications for computing, cyber, and the onset of war Jacquelyn Schneider

21

Cheap fights, credible threats: The future of armed drones and coercion AmyZegart

44

Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment RupalN. Mehta

85

PART 111: CRISIS, CONFLICT, AND WAR 4

5

Blood and robots: How remotely piloted vehicles and related technologies affect the politics of violence ErikCartzke

113

When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deterrence and stability Michael C. Horowitz

144

CONTENTS

6

Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today Caitlin Talmadge

PART IV: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND STABILITY 7

Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles Heather Williams

8

Dual-use distinguishability: How 3D-printing shapes the security dilemma for nuclear programs Tristan A. Volpe

9

How does the offense-defense balance scale? Ben Garfinke! and Allan Dafoe

J*ART V: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 10 Conclusion

Lawrence Rubin and Adam N.Stulberg

Index

291

Citation Information

The following chapters were originally published in various issues of Journal of Strategic Studies. When citing this material, please use the original citations and page numbering for each article, as follows:

Chapter 1 The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: Implications for computing, cyber, andtheonsetofwar Jacquelyn Schneider Journal ofStrategic Studies, volume 42, issue 6 (2019), pp. 841-863

Chapter 2 Cheap fights, credible threats: The future of armed drones and coercion AmyZegart Journal of Strategic Studies, volume 43, Issue 1 (2020), pp. 6-46

Chapter 3 Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment Rupal N. Mehta Journal ofStrategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1621173

Chapter4 Blood and robots: How remotely piloted vehicles and related technologies affect the politics of violence ErikGartzke Journal ofStrategic Studies, DOI; 10.1080/01402390.2019.1643329

Chapter 5 When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deterrence and stability Michael C. Horowitz Journal of Strategic Studies, volume 42, issue 6 (2019), pp. 764-788

viii

CITATION INFORMATION

Chapter 6 Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, implications for today Caitlin Tdlmadge Journal of Strategic Studies, volume 42, issue 6 (2019), pp. 864-887

Chapter 7 Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hyper­ sonicglidevehicles Heather Williams Journal ofStrategic Studies, volume 42, issue 6 (2019), pp. 789-813

Chapter 8 Dual-use distinguishability: How 3D-printing shapes the security dilemma for nuclear programs Tristan A. Volpe Journal of Strategic Studies, volume 42, issue 6 (2019), pp. 814-840

Chapter9 How does the offense-defense balance scale? Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe Journal of Strategic Studies, volume 42, issue 6 (2019), pp. 736-763

For any permission-related enquiries please visit: www.tandfonline.com/page/heip/permissions

,

Notes on Contributors

Allan Dafoe, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.

Ben Garfinkel, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.

Erik Gartzke, Department of Political Science and Center for Peace and Security, The University of California, San Diego, CA, USA. MichaeIC.Horowitz, Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.

Rupal N. Mehta, Department of Political Science, University of NebraskaLincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA.

Neil Narang, Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, USA. Lawrence Rubin, Sam Nunn School of Internationa! Affairs, Georgia Institute ofTechnoIogy, GA, USA.

Jacquelyn Schneider, Department of Strategic and Operational Research, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, USA.

Todd S. Sechser, Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA Adam N. Stulberg, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute ofTechnoIogy, GA, USA.

Caitlin Talmadge, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA. Tristan A. Volpe, Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA. Heather Williams, Defence Studies Department, King's College London, London, UK.

X

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Amy Zegart, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, CA, USA; Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studied, Stanford, CA, USA; Stanford University Hoover Institution, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.

Parti

Introduction

Emerging technologies and international stability Todd S. Sechser, Nell Narang and Caitlin Talmadge

Technology has always played a central role In international politics.The Inven­ tion of tanks, jet engines, ballistic missiles, submarines, aircraft carriers, nuclear weapons, and other technologies changed the way states competed in peace­ time, maneuvered during crises, and fought during wartime. These technolo­ gies revolutionized the nature of power, shaped the way conflicts were fought and prevented, and changed the complexion of diplomacy and competition among major and minor powers alikeJ Today, significant advancements In autonomous weapons, artificial intel­ ligence, remote sensing, cyber technology, hypersonic vehicles, additive manufacturing, stealth, precision guidance, and other areas have contributed to a widespread sense that the world is again on the precipice of a new technological era. In Washington and other world capitals, these new tech­ nologies have sparked intense Interest. U.S. Defense Department studies recently have examined the potential impact of ongoing developments in cyber warfare, electronic warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, and autono­ mous systems, among other technologies.^ Numerous think tank reports

’ Examples include Bernard Brodie and Fawn Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); T.N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: Bobbs-Merrlll, 1980); William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Michael E. O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 201 l);Thomas G. Mahnken, Technology and the American WayofWarSInce J945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution In Warfare,'Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (1996), pp. 37-54; Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Andrew F. Krepinevlch, 'Cavalry to Computer The Pattern ofMilitary Revolution,'TheWor/onaZ/nferesf, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30-42; David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation In the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Martin van Creveld, Technology and

War: From B.C. to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1991). 2 As examples see Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence (Washington, D.Cj Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2017); Defense Science Board Study on 21" Century Military Operations in a Complex Electromagnetic

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

have delved into the long-term Implications of these technologies as vYell?

It is increasingly uncontroversial that emerging technologies have the potential to be "game-changers* in military and strategic affairs. A recent Center for a New American Security (CNAS) report sums up this technological consensus: "The next decade is likely to be the most disruptive since the early 1980s, when military planners in the Soviet Union began to worry openly about a'military-technical revolution'emerging in the United States." * Many defense experts view these coming technological disruptions with deep concern. In particular, it is widely believed that the proliferation of new technologies poses a threat to the long-term foundations of U.S. mili­ tary dominance. During his term as Secretary of Defense, for instance, former U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel warned that "potential adversaries have been mod­ ernizing their militaries, developing and proliferating disruptive capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. This represents a clear and growing challenge to our military power. I see no evidence that this trend will changG."^ Weaker powers, according to this view, will be able to harness new technologies to make sudden and dramatic improvements to their capabilities, ultimately challenging U.S. military superiority. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work explained in a 2016 speech:"Almost all of the technology that is of importance in the future Is coming from the commercial sector, and all of the technology base is global. So that means any competitor and any adversary is going to have access to these types of technologies, and they can quickly mimic even the most powerful state."® The U.S. Defense Department's 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review likewise drew a worrisome conclusion about the ways in which emerging technolo­ gies might combine with other factors to threaten the U.S. military edge.

Environment (Washington, DC Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, July 2015); Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Strategies for Advanced Ballistic Missile and Cruise Missile Threats (Washington, DC Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,Technology, and Logistics, January 2017); and Report of die Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy (Washington, DC Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, June 2016). »See, for example, Robert Haffa and Anand Dalta, Hypersonic Weapons: Appraising the "Third Offset" (Washington, DC American Enterprise Institute, April 2017); Shawn Brimley, et aL, 'Game Changers; Disruptive Technology and U.S. Defense Strategy,' Disruptive Defense Papers (Washington,OCCenterforaNew American Security, September 2013);and PeterW. Singer, Wired for Wan The Robotics Revolution and Conflict In the Twenty-First Century (New York: Penguin, 2009). * Brimley et al., p. 7. ’ Chuck Hagel, 'Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subject: The Defense Innovation Initiative,'November 15,2014, available at www.scribd.comZdocument/ 246766701/ SecDef-Hagel-Innovation-Memo-2014-11-15-OSD013411-14. ‘Robert Work,'Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy,'delivered in Brussels, Belgium, April 28, 2016, available at www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/ 753482/remarks-by-deputy-secretary-work-on-third-off5et-strategy/.

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

5

"The security environment is rapidly shifting," the report argued. "Our aging combat systems are increasingly vulnerable against adversaries who are modernizing—many of whom have invested in leap-ahead technologies— making our ability to develop and employ leading-edge technologies, systems and concepts even more urgent.... All of these factors diminish our present military advantage and complicate our ability to meet ambitious strategic

objectives."^ Nongovernmental analyses reach similarly pessimistic conclusions. For example, the aforementioned CNAS report argues that "the rise of new powers and the accelerating diffusion of advanced technology throughout the inter­ national system will pose significant challenges to U.S. technological dom­ inance In military affairs."® in the same vein, Robert Martinage, former Acting Undersecretary of the Navy, warns that "dealing with emerging threats is increasingly difficult as traditional sources of U.S. military advantage are being undermined by the maturation and proliferation of disruptive technologies."® And a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report argues that "while previous technological advantages gained by the United States have endured for significant periods, the pace of technological innovation, and the pace at which new technology diffuses across the world, means that most new technological advances will provide DoD with only a temporary advantage, assumed to be no more than five years.... The effect of these changes has been the gradual erosion of significant military advantages that the United States has long enjoyed."’® Fears about the effects of emerging-technologies have driven significant changes in U.S. defense planning, particularly the Obama administration's so-called Third Offset Strategy, which aimed to harness advanced technolo­ gies to gain an edge over U.S. adversaries. As Work explained, "'Offset' means that we will never try to match our opponents or our competitors tank for tank, plane for plane, person for person.... So what we do Is we seek ways In which to offset our potential adversary's advantages. And this is exactly what we did do in the Cold War twice, because we were vastly outnumbered

’’ QuadTennlaiDefenseR&/iew20'l4Wd&’f\\t\g‘V3r\, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), p.63. • Shawn Brimley, Sen FitzGerald and Kelley Sayler, 'Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and U.S. Defense Strategy," Disruptive Defense Papers (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, September 2013), p. 7. ’ Robert Martinage, *A Strategy to Save U5. Military Superiority: Toward a Third Offset Strategy," RealClearDefense.com, November 17, 2014, available at www.realcleardefense.com/articles/ 2014/11/17/a_strategy_to_save_amerlcas_military_superiority_107551.html. For expan­ sion on these themes, see Robert Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting LongTerm Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability (Washington, DC Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014). ” Jesse Ellman et aU Assessing the Third Offset Strategy {Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2017), p. 1.

6

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in conventional forces."” More recently, the Trump administration's 2018 National Defense Strategy pointed to rapid technological change as one of the defining challenges of the future security environment.’^

Reframing the discussion Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their nega­ tive consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least three reasons to be circumspect. First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of inter­ national conflict. The consensus view today is that new technologies are on the horizon, and that the fundamentals of strategy and warfare stand on the brink of inevitable dramatic transformation. From a historical perspective, ' some technologies do indeed have lasting effects on strategic relationships. The atomic weapon is perhaps the most obvious example of a technology that fundamentally altered the dynamics of strategic stability. By posing a risk that international confrontations could escalate into clashes that threaten a nation's

very survival, nuclear weapons likely have helped some armed conflicts remain, limited, and prevented others altogether. Yet, historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incre­ mental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance des­ pite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.’’ Some technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allow them to reach their full potential; the invention of firearms, for example.

” Work, "Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Third Offset Strategy." ” Department of Defense. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/l/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf. ’* For example, see Brodie and Brodie. From Crossbow to H-Bomb, pp. 195-96;Trevor N. Dupuy The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), especially Chapter 23; and Matthew Meselson, "The Role of Chemical Defence in Chemical Warfare. Chemical Deterrence, and Chemical Disarmament," in R Deshinger. M. Meselson, and J.R Robinson, eds.. Antichemical Protection and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Harvard-Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation. Occasional Paper No. 2 (1993). pp. 11-15.

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

7

had little effect on military power until armies finally began to develop effective tactics for employing them in combat. Other innovations are rendered quickly obsolete by other technological developments. The use of barbed wire and machine guns in World War I, for example, had an immediate impact on the war, inhibiting ground offensives and contributing to the war's bloody stalemate. Yet before these and other defense-dominant Innovations could inaugurate an era of stable deterrence in Europe, they were quickly countered by yet another emergent technology: armored tanks designed to traverse battlefields laden with barbed wire, craters, and machine gun nests. And even when technologies do have lasting strategic consequences, these consequences may take decades to emerge, as the Invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nas­ cent technologies.’** Second, while contemporary analyses of emerging technologies are often narrowly focused on whether they will benefit or harm particular countries, the effects of new technologies may in fact be systemic. Indeed, throughout history, new technologies have shaped not only the fortunes of individual nations, but the dynamics of the international system itself. Technological innovations have reshaped the ways in which both large and small powers compete with, deter, coerce, and fight one another. The invention of nuclear weapons, for example, is sometimes credited for transforming international relations, improving deterrence, and reducing the likelihood of war among the great powers.’^ By contrast, the innovations of ballistic and cruise missiles may have contributed in some ways to instability, compressing crisis decision times and creating pressures to preempt by raising the possibility that one could become the victim of a rapid and disarming first strike.’® It therefore is important for any assessment of the effects of emerging technologies to look broadly, beyond their effects on America's position in the global military hierarchy. Third, even if today's emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes In the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilizing under some conditions, but stabilizing in others.They may fuel competition in some arenas, while at the same time also giving states new ways to cooperate, as the case of

’* See Stephen D. Biddle, "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," Security Studies vol. 8, no. 1 (1998), pp. 1 -74. ” For example, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (Adelphi Paper #171) (London: International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 1981). ’‘Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security (New York Praeger, 2008).

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

nuclear weapons illustratesFurthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geog­ raphy, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organizational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few?® Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple clas­ sification. Indeed, more than 75 years after nuclear weapons .em.erged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.” In short, although scholars and policy makers have devoted consider­ able attention to the narrower implications of emerging technologies for U.S. national security strategy, the more general systemic effects of these technologies have remained largely unexplored. While the United States undoubtedly faces daunting challenges in an era of artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, and other new technologies, other states will also encounter challenges and opportunities of their own. But we have not yet grasped how Individual national responses might aggregate to generate International outcomes. Adapting U.S. strategy for a new technological age requires that we first understand the systemic international effects of emer­ ging technologies.

Shifting from strategy to strategic stability This book considers the effects of emerging technologies - including non­

weapons technologies - on the overall stability of the international system.^® It alms to consider new technological developments in light of existing theor­ etical models of strategic stability. The following chapters focus on three main areas of stability:

’’Todd S. Sechser,"Sharing the Bomb: How Foreign Nuclear Deployments Shape Nonproliferation and Deterrence," Nonproliferation Review, vol. 23, nos. 3-4 (2016), pp. 443-58. ’’For example, Stephen 0. Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 19, no. 2(1996), pp. 171-212; Adam N. Stulberg, "Managing Military Transformations: Agency, Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution," Security Studies, vol. 14, no. 3 (2005), pp. 489-528. ’• For example, Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3’^ edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012); Neil Narang, Erik Gartzke, and Matthew Kroenig, eds. Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Posture: Causes and Consequences for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Routledge, 2015); Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017). “ Several of the essays in this book were originally published in a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies. See Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, and Caitlin Talmadge, "Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability in Peacetime, Crisis, and War," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 6 (2019), pp. 727-35; Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe. "How Does the Offense-Defense Balance Scale?" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 6 (2019): 736-63; Michael C. Horowitz. "When Speed Kills: Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence and Stability." Journal of StrategicStudie5.vo}.42. no.6 (2019): 764-88;Jacquelyn Schneider."TheCapability/Vulnerabillty Paradox and Military Revolutions: Implications for Computing, Cyber, and the Onset of War." JournalofStrategicStudies.vol.42. no. 6 (2019): 841-63; Caitlin Talmadge. "Emerging Technology

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

9

1. Deterrence, coercion, and the outbreak of war. Because military tech­ nology shapes how states fight and win wars, it is also inextricably linked to the causes and prevention of conflict. Technologies that allow states to impose high costs on their adversaries are believed to strengthen deter­ rence, whereas technologies that permit surprise and deny information to the enemy are believed to undermine it.^’ How will emerging technologies shape the overall likelihood of military conflict in the international system? Will emerging technologies contribute to general deterrence among global and regional powers, or are they likely to be destabilizing? Will new tech­ nologies enable new and different types of coercion? Which types of con­ flict may be more likely to occur in the new technological era, and which will become less likely?

2. War conduct, crisis escalation, and termination. A second set of issues deals with the effects of emerging technologies In wars once they have begun. One key question pertains to the escalation of conflicts. Some technologies, for example, might create Incentives for states to use nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts, thus pressuring both sides to escalate quickly. Others may have the opposite effect. Will new technolo­ gies make wars more interise and violent, encouraging escalation, or will they encourage restraint? Belatedly, some technologies might help bring about swifter conclusions to wars, while others might prolong conflicts. Technologies that allow states to quickly ascertain the relative balance of power might lead to shorter wars, while technologies that allow adver­ saries to avoid direct combat and conceal their capabilities might have the opposite effect.” 3. Arms races and arms control. International stability depends in part on the rate and transparency with which states (and non-state actors) acquire military capabilities, and the extent to which the spread of those weapons can be controlled or prevented. One set of questions addresses the arms race dynamics of new types of weapons. Will new technologies create

and Intra-war Escalation Risks: Evidence from the Cold War, Implications for Today." Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 6 (2019): 864-87; Tristan A. Volpe. "Dual-use Distinguishability: How 3D-prlntlng Shapes the Security Dilemma for Nuclear Programs." Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 6 (2019): 814-40; Heather Williams. "Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability: Scenarios for Hypersonic Glide Vehicles." Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 6 (2019): 789-813. Also see Erik Gartzke. "Blood and Robots: How Remotely Piloted Vehicles and Related Technologies Affect the Politics of Violence." Journal of Strategic Studies, (forthcoming); Amy Zegart.'Cheap Fights, CredibIeThreats:The Future of Armed Drones and Coercion." Journal ofStrategic Studies, vol. 43, no. 1 (2020): 6-46. ” For example, Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1999). ” James Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for International Organization, vol. 49, no. 3 (199S), pp. 379-444; Jonathan D. Caverley andTodd S. Sechser,'Military Technology and the Duration of Civil Conflict," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 3 (2017), pp. 704-20.

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

incentives for arms racing in peacetime? Or wiil they help queii pressures for states to cioseiy monitor and match the arms capabiiities of their rivais? in addition, some new weapons may be amenable to arms controi, while others may not. The technical requirements of nuclear weapons, for

example, have made them easier to control than ballistic missiles, which are easier to manufacture. Which new weapons technologies will be easier to contain, and which will not? New weapons technologies, however, are only part of the equation. A variety of non-weapons technologies could affect the dynamics of arms control and verification. For instance, new technologies could alter the balance between transparency and opacity. Some technolo­ gies, such as improvements in remote sensing, might make monitoring and verification easier, whereas additive manufacturing might make monitoring another state's capabilities more difficult. Which emerging technologies will make it easier to collect information about other states' arms stockpiles? Which will help states develop clandestine capabilities without being detected? Some technologies are likely to strengthen strategic stability, while others may weaken it. This book aims to distinguish between technologies that are likely to improve stability from those that are not. Moreover, the effects of

new technologies are likely to be conditional: the consequences of techno­ logical advancements depend on how they interact with other technologies, as well as the geographical, political, institutional, and human landscape.^^ A particular technological innovation might have stabilizing effects under one set of conditions, but destabilizing effects under other conditions. Identifying these conditions is one of the central goals of the chapters that follow.

Our approach Historically, projecting the effects of new developments in international relations has proven difficult, even for experts with access to the best informa­ tion. Extrapolating from current trends is risky since actors are likely to readjust their strategies to counter advantages from these technologies. One need only look at the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation for an illustration of the challenges associated with forecasting. In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, President John F. Kennedy predicted that by 1975 some

“ On the limits of technology alone in explaining important outcomes, see for example Keir Lieber, Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 71-104; and Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle. "Technology. Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare In the Developing World," Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (June 1996): 171-212.

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

11

20-25 countries might possess nuclear weapons?* A half-century after Kennedy's prediction^ however, only six additional countries have joined the nuclear club. Perhaps more telling still is that scholars continue to debate the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations.^ Likewise, at the begin­ ning of the nuclear age, many observers predicted that nuclear weapons would become the ultimate coercive tools, not anticipating that their non­ nuclear adversaries would develop strategies to blunt their influence.^® Despite the difficulty of prediction, however, the field of international relations offers an extensive toolbox for tackling the implications of emerging technologies, with well-developed literatures on deterrence and coercion, crisis bargaining,“ arms races?’ signaling,^’ and the escalation and termin­ ation of conflict.’’ These bodies of academic research, combined with insights from the policy community, can provide a starting point for rigorous and sys­ tematic analysis of the broader implications of emerging technologies for stra­ tegic stability. Mining these theories to provide a clearer picture of the road ahead is the purpose of this book. In what follows, we outline this approach in more detail and discuss how the contributions that follow execute it. Our approach to understanding the impact of emerging technologies begins by identifying theories about various elements of strategic stability. We then examine how one or more new and emerging technologies might influence those factors. Whether formally or informally, this approach entails

" President John F. Kennedy Speech at the U.S. Department of State in Washington D.C. on March 21, 1963, available at www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Alds/Ready-Reference/PressConferences/News-Conference-52.aspx. “For a thorough review of this debate, see Neil Narang, Erik Gartzke, and Matthew Kroenig, eds. Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Posture; Causes and Consequences for the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Routledge, 2015); Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller.'Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59 no. 1 (2015), pp. 74-92. “ For example, see Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (New York; Cambridge University Press, 2017). ’^Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). “ See Robert Powell, 'Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,' Annual Review of Political Science, vol. S (2002), pp. 1 -30. “ Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intrillgator.'Arms Races and Proliferation,' Handbook ofDefense Economics. vo\. 1 (1995), pp. 109-64; Charles L. Glaser, “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,' Annual Review ofPolitical Science, vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-76. * Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1970); James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, no. 1 (1997), pp. 68-90; Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 58, no. 4 (2014), pp. 919-35. ” Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

parameterizing specific aspects of new technologies and then interacting them with these underlying models to generate hypotheses about what

consequences can be expected. This approach will be familiar to most scholars of international relations, including those who study phenomena in the field of international security. In general, scholars of international security are typically interested in a range of phenomena produced through the interaction of individuals, groups, and states in the international system. For example, they are interested in the causes and consequences of; conflict and war, conduct within wars, military alliances, horizontal and vertical weapons proliferation, economic sanctions, and many other phenomena related to strategic stability. Political scientists have developed theoretical models of each of these phenomena?2 For example, there is a large literature arguing that war can be use­ fully understood as a situation of bargaining, modeled as two actors that have divergent preferences over some issue space. And If we understand fighting to be a costly way to settle disputes, it follows that all sides generally have an incentive to reach a negotiated settlement that each would prefer to paying the costs of fighting. If this is the case, then states should have incentives to find a mutually agreeable settlement that leave both sides better off. War

among rational actors, then, can only occur as a result of bargaining failure due to private information with incentives to misrepresent, credible commitment problems, or Issue indivisibility.^

” See the followhg for thorough reviews of the theoretical work on each of these topics. On war, see Jack Levy.'The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,' Annual Review ofPolitical Science, wl. 1, no. 1 (1998), pp. 139-65. On bargaining theories of conflict, see Robert Powell.'Bargaining Theory and International Conflict*Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 5, no. 1 (2002), pp, 1-30, Andrew H. Kydd.'Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution,'Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 13 (2010), pp. 101-21, Kristopher W. Ramsay. "Information, Uncertainty, and War: Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 20 (2017), pp. 505-27; Todd S. Sechser, A Bargaining Theory of Coercion," in Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., Coercion: The Power to Hurt In International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 55-76, On bargaining the­ ories of civil conflict, see Barbara F. Walter. "Bargaining Failures and Civil War," Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 12 (2009), pp. 243-61. On deterrence theories, see Paul K. Huth. "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates;"AnnualReviewofPolitical Science, vol. 2, no. 1 (1999), pp. 25-48, and James D. Fearon. 'Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1, no. 1 (1998), pp. 289-313 On Intra-war diplomacy and escalation, see Robert R Trager.'The Diplomacy of War and Peace." Annual Reviewof Politicalscience, vol. 19 (2016), pp. 205-28. On theories of alliances, see James D. Morrow.'Alliances: Why Write Them Cownr Annual Review ofPolitical Science, vol. 3. no.1 (2000), pp. 63-83. On theories of economic sanctions, see David A. Baldwin.'Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,"Annual Review ofPolitical Science, vol. 3, no. 1 (2000), pp. 167-82. On the­ ories of nuclear proliferation, see Scott D. Sagan. *The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation' Annual ReviewofPolitical Science, vol. 14 (2011). pp. 225-44. On arms races, see Charles L Glaser. "TheCauses and Consequences of Arms Races,' Annual Review of Political Science vol 3 no 1 (2000), pp. 251-76. ■ ' ■ ” Fearon,'Rationalist Explanations for War.'

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

13

Similarly, with respect to alliances, scholars have noted that formal written alliancesaregenerallytheexceptlon and notthe rule when states fighttogether. Indeed, Informal alignments can and do accomplish the same function as formal written alliances. The question then becomes, what causes states to ever write down these agreenrients? For many scholars, alliances can be use­ fully understood as costly signals of commitment to a collaborative outcome in this case, the joint production of military power.’* Understood this way, the theory implies that alliances are more likely to be observed when uncertainty about the capabilities or resolve of allies is highest. Like the bargaining model, this generates several useful observable implications. As a final example, scholars have proposed that arms races In general, and nuclear proliferation In particular, can be understood as a prisoner's dilemma, wherein the collectively optimal outcome would be for all parties to refrain from building them. But because each actor also has an individual incentive to unilaterally defect from this cooperative outcome, an inefficient equilibrium can be obtained in which parties expend resources to build nuclear weapons only to arrive at rough parity.” These are just a few of the many examples of theoretical models that might be applied to better understand emerging technologies. By treating war, alliance formation, nuclear weapons proliferation, and other phenomena as particular cases of more general situations of coordination, cooperation, and bargaining, scholars can leverage what we know about these general classes of problems to generate insights about the consequences of exogenous shocks such as new technologies. These theoretical models can yield novel insights about the effects of emerging technologies. The rationalist bargaining model of war, for instance, highlights three proximate causes of war. The theory suggests that any new technology that (1) Increases uncertainty, (2) reduces the credibility of commitments, or (3) contributes to the indivisibility of disputed issues would ** James D. Morrow.'Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 38, no. 2 (1994), pp. 270-97. Brett Ashley Leeds.'Alliance Reliability In Times of Wan Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties,' International Organization, vol. 57, no. 4 (2003), pp, 801 -27. Brett Ashley Leeds. 'Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 47, no. 3 (2003), pp, 427-39. Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun. 'Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?’ The Journal ofPolitics, vol. 69, no. 4 (2007), pp. 1118-32. “ Robert Jervis. 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Michael D. Intrillgator and Dagobert L. Brito. 'Nuclear Proliferation and the Probability of Nuclear War,' Public Choice, vol. 37, no. 2 (1981), pp. 247-60; Dagobert L Brito and Michael D. Intrillgator. 'Arms Races and Proliferation," Handbook of Defense Economics, vol. 1 (1995), pp. 109-64; Robert Powell. "Guns, Butter, and Anarchy,' American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 1 (1993), pp. 115-32; Robert Powell.'Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neoreallst-Neoliberal Debate,‘InternationalOrganization, vol. 48, no. 2 (1994), pp, 313-44; Robert Powell, In the Shadow ofPower: States andStrategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

therefore increase the likelihood of war. The model thus draws our attention to ways in which emerging technologies might contribute to these three spe­ cific processes. Or consider the above discussion of the prisoner's dilemma as a model for arms races. Analysis of this mode! suggests that the likelihood of future interactions, the ability to monitor compliance with agreements, and the benefits of cooperation (or costs of conflict) shape the dynamics of the dilemma. This framework suggests that new technologies could reshape the dynamics of proliferation and change the likelihood of arms races if they alter one or more of these factors.

Outline of the volume This book is divided into five parts. Part I includes this chapter, written by the coeditors, which serves as an introduction to the key questions and policy challenges addressed in the book. Part II (Chapters 1-3) examines how emerging technologies will reshape peacetime competition and coercive diplomacy among the great powers. In Chapter 1, "The capability/vulnerabllity paradox and military revo­ lutions: Implications for computing, cyber, and the onset of war," Jacquelyn Schneider argues that the information and computing revolution has allowed states to leverage digital capabilities to exert conventional mili­ tary dominance. However, these capabilities also create new vulnerabilities. What does history tell us about the relationship between military trans­ formations, vulnerability, and the onset of war? Schneider examines two military transformations - the lev^e en masse and the mechanization revolu­ tion - and derives several lessons that may help predict the impact of today's information revolution on international stability. Technological revolutions historically are more likely to lead to war, she finds, when they introduce new vulnerabilities that opponents can exploit. If emerging technologies Increase militaries'reliance on centralized networks and digital information, they will increase incentives for adversaries to target those resources with preemptive strikes. In Chapter 2,"Cheap fights, credible threats:The future of armed drones and coercion," Amy Zegart observes that drones are often considered poor coercion tools: they cannot operate In contested airspace and they constitute cheap, low-risk measures instead of more credible, costly signals. However, Zegart argues that technological advances will soon enable drones to function in hos­ tile environments. Moreover, drones offer three unique coercion advantages that theorists did not foresee: sustainability in long duration conflicts; cer­ tainty of precision punishment that can change the psychology of adversaries; and changes in the relative costs of war. A unique survey of 259forelgn military officers finds that costly signals are less credible than assumed and that drones demonstrate resolve in new ways.

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

15

In Chapter 3, "Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging tech­ nology environment," Rupal Mehta explores how emerging technologies impact strategic stability In the international system by focusing on how one aspect of strategic stability - extended deterrence commitments inherent to alliances - may be impacted by the development of new technologies and cap­ abilities. Mehta argues that while new technologies may enhance the ability of patrons to provide extended deterrence, allies may be less assured by these new capabilities. To test these hypotheses, Mehta explores emerging capabil­ ities in new domains such as drones and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) on international stability. Part III (Chapters 4-6) focuses on the consequences of new technologies for how wars will be fought - and how they will end - in the coming decades. In Chapter 4, "Blood and robots: How remotely piloted vehicles and related tech­ nologies affect the politics of violence," Erik Gartzke notes that new technolo­ gies make it possible to consider circumstances in which human beings are no longer directly involved in combat. How will the use of automated combat systems alter the practice and purposes of political violence? Will conflict become "costless" In human terms as machines replace people on the front lines? While considerable attention has been devoted to the role of technology in transforming warfare, little is known about how new modes of combat will affect established motives for using force. Gartzke explores these political dimensions of automated conflict. To the degree'that substituting machines for humans in combat lowers the costs for fighting, he argues, conflict should become more frequent, but less informative. In a reversal of standard techno­ logical trends, battlefield automation promises to disproportionately favor ground elements. Regrettably, technology may also encourage combatants and others to blur distinctions between civilian and military targets. In Chapter 5, "When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deter­ rence and stability," Michael Horowitz asks how the development and deploy­ ment of autonomous weapon systems (AW5) will shape the international security environment. He notes that this vital question Is difficult to answer because of the uncertainty associated with AWS, including their operational reliability and the details of their programming, along with the opacity of those features to outside observers. The chapter explores the Impact of uncer­ tainty surrounding AWS capabilities on the International security environment focusing on the Implications for their deployment, the consequences for cross­ domain deterrence, and the prospect of arms races. In Chapter 6, "Emerging technology and Intra-war escalation risks: Evidence from the Cold War, Implications for today,"CaitlinTalmadge considers whether wars might escalate Inadvertently In a world of new technologies. Will emer­ ging technologies create new pathways for unintentional escalation by cre­ ating first-mover advantages during crises? Talmadge takes a skeptical view,

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

arguing that technology historically has been more likely to create oppor­ tunities for intentional, not Inadvertent, escalation. Drawing from several cases during the Cold War, she shows that wartime escalation is more often a conscious strategic choice than an accidental consequence of technology. Although new technologies could generate some inadvertent escalation risks, the more likely outcome is that technology will enable escalatory actions that states intentionally choose for other strategic and political reasons. Part IV (Chapters 7-9) tackles the connections between emerging tech­ nologies and arms competition and explores the prospects for arms control in the coming era. In Chapter 7, "Asymmetric arms control and strategic sta­ bility: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles," Heather Williams asks whether arms control can Incorporate emerging technologies. Is there a future for multilateral strategic arms control? This chapter explores how concepts of both arms control and strategic stability should be updated In an era of rapid technological change. Building on Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin's seminal study of the relationship between strategic stability and arms con­ trol, this chapter offers an original framework - asymmetric arms control for incorporating new technologies, which Williams then uses to identify six scenarios for arms control of HGVs. She concludes that arms control can poten­ tially reduce the risks to strategic stability associated with emerging technolo­ gies by incorporating dynamism into arms control design. Ultimately, she argues, asymmetric arms control can best contribute to strategic stability by reflecting the cross-domain nature of International conflict. In Chapter 8, "Dual-use distinguishability: How 3D-printing shapes the security dilemma for nuclear program," Tristan Volpe observes that additive manufacturing Is being adopted by nuclear programs to improve production capabilities, yet Its impact on strategic stability remains unclear. Using the concept of the security dilemma as a framework for analysis, Volpe assesses incentives for arms racing as additive manufacturing becomes increasingly integrated into nuclear supply chains. Additive manufacturing can sow the ground for competition by making it easier to produce weapons and harder to distinguish civil from military motives. At the same time, he writes. It could also allow nuclear aspirants to reveal more information about their intentions. While additive manufacturing therefore may lower barriers to the spread of nuclear weapons, It may also enable states to more easily reveal nonmilitary motives, thereby dampening pressures to engage in arms racing. In Chapter 9, "How does the offense-defense balance scale?" Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe ask how the delicate balance between attacker and defender changes as investments in technology increase. To do so they offer a gen­ eral formalization of the offense-defense balance in terms of contest success functions. Simple models of ground invasions and cyberattacks that exploit software vulnerabilities suggest that, in both cases, growth in investments will

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

17

favor offense when investment levels are sufficiently low and favor defense when they are sufficiently high. Such scaling effects, they argue, can help us understand the security implications of applications of artificial intelligence that have the effect of amplifying existing capabilities. Part V offers a conclusion by Lawrence Rubin and Adam Stulberg in Chapter 10. The chapter summarizes the volume's main insights and identi­ fies several important questions for future exploration. The chapter coalesces around a central theme: the strategic effects of emerging technologies cannot be understood outside of their political and security context. They also explore the policy Implications of the findings in the book.

Conclusion The primary purpose of this book is to correct a deficiency in the academic lit­ erature on the likely effects of emerging technologies on international security. There is now a near-consensus in Washington and other national capitals that the global political landscape will be dominated by the competition between the United States, China, and Russia for decades to come. As this competition is taking shape, revolutionary new technologies such as HGVs, artificial intel­ ligence, and autonomous weapons are beginning to come online. This book examines how these technologies are likely to interact with emerging great­ power rivalries. Will new technologies increase the likelihood of conflict, or make deterrence easier? How will these technologies change the complexion of coercive diplomacy, alliances, and crises? Can arms control offer a solution to the most dangerous new technologies? The chapters in this book aim to answer these and other pressing questions. Emerging technologies have inspired much speculative commentary, but academic scholarship can improve the discussion with disciplined theory­ building and rigorous empirics. This book aims to contribute to the debate by exploring the role of technology - both military and nonmilitary - in shaping International security. Specifically, the contributors to this edited volume aim to generate new theoretical insights into the relationship between technology and strategic stability, test them with sound empirical methods, and derive their implications for the coming technological age. While forecasting Is necessarily an uncertain business, forecasting informed by theory and history can make a significant contribution to grasping the stra­ tegic dynamics of tomorrow's technologies. Understanding the lessons of pre­ vious technological revolutions can help scholars and policy makers prepare for the next one. In particular, the studies in this volume make a convincing case that the effects of emerging technologies often are not straightforward. New technologies may strengthen strategic stability in some ways, while undermining it in others.

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

One clear lesson arising from this book is that the conclusions herein are only the beginning of a long conversation. As the contours of new technologies become increasingly clear over time, the questions explored in the chapters that follow will need to be continually revisited and reassessed in light of new developments. Moreover, this book raises at least as many questions about strategic stability as it answers. We hope that these studies will inspire further research to help illuminate the nature of the coming technological age.

Part II

Competition and Coercion in the Technological Age

The capability/vulnerability paradox and military revolutions: Implications for computing, cyber, and the onset of war Jacquelyn Schneider

ABSTRACT

The Information Revolution, or the rise in computing power, allowed states to leverage digital capabilities to exert conventional military dominance. But does it also create vulnerabilities that lead to war? In this piece, I examine the relationship between military revolutions and conflict initiation and identify a capability/ vulnerability paradox that suggests the degree of capability dependence creat^

by a military revolution combined with the ability of adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities creates potential pockets of dangerous instability. These indicators suggest that greater centralisation and data dependencies could move the Information Revolution towards incentives for instability.

Introduction In 1991, the U.S. military shocked and awed the world with the dramatic unveil­ ing of a new military revolution. The Information Revolution’ allowed states to

leverage digital capabilities to exert conventional military dominance. Computing power drove the development of precision-guided munitions, longrange targeting, near real time intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and revolutionary ability to command and control. The digital technologies of the information revolution became the backbone upon which network centric warfare emerged in the 1990s as the dominant precept for modern military employment. And the dominance of weapons, tactics, and strategies enabled and dependent on computing power remains the central characteristic of the acquisition strategies and force postures of most modern militaries. For example, in December of 2015, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work

’See, Inter alia, Owens and Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War, Cohen, 'A Revolution in Warfare', 37-54; Cohen, 'Change and Transformation in Military Affairs', 395-407; Dahl, 'Network Centric Warfare and Operational Arf, 17-34; Cebrowski and Garstka, 'Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin And Future', 28—35; and Mazarr, The revolution in military affairs: A framework for defense planning.

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

announced a new acquisition strategy. The Third Offset,' Work explained, would focus on emerging technologies that could exploit these digital capabilities -

acquisition would focus on artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, big data, and human-machine teaming.^ The U.S. was doubling down on the capabilities created by computing power in the information revolution.^ However, at the same time that states invested in the capabilities created by the information revolution, they also created new vulnerabilities from the very digital architectures that enabled the revolutionary military capabilities created by computing power. From mission planning software to undersea cables, digital links between satellites, and data networks that distribute both blue and red near real time information, the information revolution creates new vulnerabilities to information-enabled states. Paradoxically, as states continue to develop computer-reliant weapons, so also do they invest in offensive cyber operations to capitalise on the vulnerabilities of otherwise conventionally dominant digitised militaries. Could these capabilities and vulnerabilities of the information revolution destabilise conventional balances of power? This brings the discussion to a larger question beyond the information revolution and with implications for emerging technologies: when do mili­ tary revolutions lead to war? In examining historical cases of military revolu­ tion, I identify a capability/vulnerability paradox. This paradox suggests that when a state's military capabilities are highly dependent on a resource that can be exploited or controlled by an adversary, both sides have incentives for first strike. Perhaps most importantly, I find that incentives for first strike are not tied to capabilities but instead the novel vulnerabilities generated by a military revolution. In particular, when that vulnerability is dependent on

a resource that can be controlled or exploited by an adversary, military revolutions incentivise conflict. Finally, I use the paradox as a lens to understand the impact of digital technologies, cyber, and war. I find that that advances in information technology create states that are militarily extremely capable and yet extre­ mely vulnerable because of increasing dependencies on information. The nature of the information vulnerability, which is virtual and distributed, mitigates some of the incentives for first strike that I find in military revolu­ tions with more fungible resources vulnerabilities. However, increases in highly centralised networks and the proliferation of digital vulnerabilities within civilian infrastructure, combined with a continued belief in offense dominance, could increase incentives for first strike over time. Below, I introduce the information revolution and review the literature on military revolutions and the onset of war. I then present the theory of the

j6ob Work, The Third U.S. offset strategy and Its Implications for partners and allies', 28 Jan. 2015. Schneider, 'Digitally-enabled warfare: The capability-vulnerability paradox', Center for a New American Security, 29 Aug. 2016.

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capability/vulnerability paradox and illustrate the paradox through two military revolution case studies: levee en masse and the mechanisation revolution. Finally, I apply the historical analogy and theoretical paradox to the information revolution to draw conclusions about the role the information revolution, computing, and cyber will have on international conflict dynamics.

What is the information revolution? Dramatic improvements in processing ability, computing, and interconnec­ tivity have ushered.in the information age, with significant implications for conflict and the cqnduct of war at every level? Almost every modern weapon contains digital processing capabilities - whether it is an updated computer processing unit on a radar, the digital technology that allows modern jammers to adapt to their electromagnetic environment, or the software that targeteers and combat planners use to allocate weapons and plan campaigns. Combat Information, previously disseminated via ana­ log and hampered by size and logistical limitations, is now sent via packets of binary code by satellite, fibre-optic cable and radio transmissions. That digital information is stored and processed through data centres filled with servers, routers, processing software, software applications, and accessed by conventional warfighters. Information has so fully integrated itself into the way modern states fight war that it cannot be separated from tactics, operations, or strategy. Unlike the Infantry or artillery revolution, the information revolution didn't just create information warriors, it informationised all conventional warriors. These are Infantry soldiers, munitions experts, forward air control­ lers, pilots, and war-fighting staffs that are dependent on digital technolo­ gies and Information to conduct conventional operations. They are the front-line combatants, armed with M-16s, radios, and combat IPads. It is virtually impossible to separate modern warfare from digital capabilities. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Lynn asserted in 2010, 'Information tech­ nology enables almost everything the military does ... [it] has evolved from an administrative tool for enhancing office productivity into a national strategic asset in Its own rlght.'^ Closely linked to the emergence of digitally-enabled weaponry and operations is the now pervasive dominance of network-centric warfare. Network-centric warfare emerged in the early 90s and proponents envi­ sioned a revolution in military affairs that would utilise information ^Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence In the Information Age', 81-94; Nye, and Owens, 'America's Information edge', 20-36; Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age; Owen, Disruptive Power, Metz, Armed conffict In the 2Jst century: the Information revolution and post-modern warfare; and Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. ^Lynn, 'Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyber Strateg/, 98.

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TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

technology to execute quick and dominating military operations while removing personnel from the danger of close combat. Digital technolo­ gies could create near real time dissemination of intelligence, establish the means for constant blue force tracking, and enable quick decisions throughout the force via emails and chat. Advocates of network warfare argued that the digital revolution would fundamentally alter the balance of military victory towards states that were able to achieve information dominance.® Accordingly, the network centric warfare that developed from these precepts is highly precise, integrated, and dynamic. It is extraordinarily capable. The capabilities created by the Information revolution mean that no longer do more weapons create effects additively, but instead create expo­ nential increases in effectiveness. Information revolution-enabled states can target over long-ranges, project power over the horizon, and conduct pre­ cision attacks via rapid computer-enabled fusion of a multitude of sensors. Some of these sensors include traditional radars that collect via analog techniques. However, with the information revolution has also come the proliferation of digitised sensor fusion centres, digital passive signal collec­ tors, and computer network exploitation. Sensor fusion - made possible by advances in computing - allows states to negate the inherent limitations of one sensor to generate targeting solutions, early warning, and situational awareness from sensors that would not individually be able to track, target, or guide to locations. And as the information revolution progresses and technologies evolve, 'big data,' quantum computing, artificial intelligence,

autonomy, the proliferation of virtual networks and cloud computing, and micro-processing create enormous detection, targeting, and control oppor­ tunities for states able to leverage information resources.^

Information technology as a military revolution These new revolutionary capabilities have led many scholars to predict that the information revolution will Incentivise conflict. However, the information revolution is not the first military revolution, and not all of them have led to conflict (see Table 1). What is a military revolution? According to Krepinevich, military revolutions® are what occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts

“Cebrowski and Garstka, 'Network-Centric Warfare: Its origin and Future'; and Cares, Distributed Networked Operations: The Foundations of Netvrorit Centric Warhire. ’Dafoe and Garfinkei, 'How Does the Offense-Defense Balance Scaler. ®The term revolution in military affairs (or RMA) was in vogue in the 90s and early 2000s, especially within the U.S. defense sector. In this analysis 1 am using the more general term military revolution because it Is less connected with the particular RMA defense policies of that time period.

TECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

25

Table 1. List of military revolutions^^.

Military Revolutions Fourteenth century rise of archers and pikemen increased role of infantry and Intensity of conflict Fourteenth century; rise of cannons and move from siege warfare to Artillery Revolution open battle Revolution of Salt and Shot Fifteenth century: rise of the sail and cannons on ships, drove the subsequent rise of offensive dominance on the sea Sixteenth century: rise of fortifications and resurgence of defensive Portress Revolution dominance Sixteenth century; rise of musket fire and linear tactics on the Gunpowder Revolution battlefield Eighteenth-nineteenth century rise of nationalist conscription armies, Levee en Masse Increased offensive advantage and intensity of conflict (in concert with societal revolution) Nineteenth century rise of railroads and telegraphs, led to In