Embodiment and Professional Education: Body, Practice, Pedagogy (Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives, 8) 9811648263, 9789811648267

Citation preview

Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8

Stephen Loftus Elizabeth Anne Kinsella   Editors

Embodiment and Professional Education Body, Practice, Pedagogy

Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives Volume 8

Series Editors Ronald Barnett, Institute of Education, University College London, London, UK Søren S. E. Bengtsen, Danish School of Education (DPU), Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives is a new book series launched by Springer and is motivated by two considerations. Higher education has become a huge matter globally, both politically and socially, commanding massive resources, national and cross-national decisionmaking, and the hopes of many. In parallel, over the last four decades or so, there has been a growing interest in the academic literature in grappling with technical issues in and around higher education. In particular, work has developed drawing on philosophical perspectives and social theory. This is evident right across the world, especially in the journal literature and in research students’ doctoral theses. In effect, we have witnessed the formation of a new sub-discipline, a shorthand of which is ‘the philosophy of higher education’, and which includes perspectives drawn not only from philosophy and social theory but also feminism, ethics, geopolitics, learning theory, and organizational studies. Through this book series – the first of its kind – the editors want to encourage the further development of this literature. We are keen to promote lively volumes which are informed about changing practices and policy frameworks in higher education and which engage seriously and deeply with matters of public interest, and are written in an accessible style. Books will take a variety of forms, and will include both sole-authored and multi-­authored formats. Importantly, each volume will have a dialogical flavour, engaging explicitly in dialogue with contemporary debates and their contending positions and, where practicable, especially in volumes with many contributors, will themselves exemplify dialogue. The editors are keen that the series is open to many approaches. We wish to include work that focuses directly on the university as a social institution and on higher education as an educational process; on the idea of the university and on higher education as a sector with political and policy frameworks; on students and learning, and on academics and academic knowledge; and on curricula and pedagogy, and on research and knowledge processes. Volumes will examine policy and practical issues including, for example, internationalisation, higher education as a set of ‘public goods’, access and fairness, and the digital era and learning as well as more conceptual and theoretical issues such as academic freedom, ethics, wellbeing, and the philosophy of social organizations. The editors very much welcome informal inquiries at any time. Ronald Barnett, UCL Institute of Education  – [email protected]øren S.E. Bengtsen, Aarhus University – [email protected] More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/15094

Stephen Loftus  •  Elizabeth Anne Kinsella Editors

Embodiment and Professional Education Body, Practice, Pedagogy

Editors Stephen Loftus Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine Rochester, MI, USA

Elizabeth Anne Kinsella Institute of Health Sciences Education, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences McGill University Montreal, QC, Canada

ISSN 2366-2573     ISSN 2366-2581 (electronic) Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives ISBN 978-981-16-4826-7    ISBN 978-981-16-4827-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

There is a certain irony in writing a book on embodiment and professional education in the midst of a pandemic. The irony exists because the contributors to the book have been, in an important sense, disrupted from taken-for-granted embodied ways of being in the world; they have literally been ‘differently embodied’ for several months. Face-to-face teaching and other responsibilities have been replaced with work from home, together with a lot of videoconferencing and other technological interventions to get work done, both in professional education and professional practice. Work relationships have been modified, sometimes drastically. Teaching dynamics have changed. For example, those who facilitate small group discussions will know how much harder it is to encourage open discussion by videoconference versus sitting round a table together in the same room. The students who enrolled in new programs during the pandemic, and the teachers who started new jobs, will know how hard it can be to establish supportive relationships and communities when restricted to technologically-mediated modes of communication. There are concerns about the wellbeing of all participants in professional education under these circumstances. Our intersubjective and intercorporeal relations have changed shape, with profound implications. As we begin to emerge from the pandemic it is not clear what changes will be permanent, or what new hybrid models may be forthcoming. As many people find that working remotely has some advantages, it is likely that further educational transformations, with implications for embodiment, are at hand. It can be argued that we are moving into an age of the virtually connected, and forms of the ‘differently embodied’ professional, which makes this book even more timely. The lens of embodiment offers us an opportunity to explore the nuances and subtleties of the changes to professional practice and education brought about by the pandemic. The pandemic has highlighted a problem with higher education in general, and professional education in particular, and this problem has been named, ‘the absent body’ (Leder, 1990). The absent body is a problem because humans are embodied creatures yet this dimension has often been overlooked, and higher education is no exception (Dall’Alba, 2009). We are generally unaware of the degree to which embodiment shapes our experience of the world. As Charles Taylor (1995) reminds v

vi

Preface

us, we live in a world shaped by embodiment. Our way of experiencing the world is essentially that of an agent with the particular kinds of body that we have. We have a ‘creatural existence’ (O’Loughlin, 2006). The place of the body has been explored in the context of professional practice and this book builds on previous work (e.g. Green, 2015). However, a look at educational practices and the ways in which we conceptualise higher/professional education reveals that creatural/embodied existence has been ignored for a long time, arguably for centuries, at least in Western culture. This book seeks to address this issue by drawing attention to the ways in which an awareness of, and sensitivity to, the body can enlighten educational practices. The discourses around higher education frequently focus on cognitive forms of knowledge to the exclusion of attention to embodied life. Knowledge is spoken of as if it was abstracted, residing exclusively ‘in the head’ of the learner, with little consideration for the place of the body. In this book we explore discourses that ‘let in’ the body. These discourses come from a range of thinkers. Examples include work from fields such as phenomenology, neurophenomenology, embodied cognition, social theory, practice theory, socio-materialist theory, poststructuralist theory, and feminist theory, amongst others. The chapters take up the writing of philosophers/theorists such as Merleau-Ponty, Aristotle, Gadamer, Bakhtin, Goethe, Varela, Damasio, Foucault, Deleuze & Guattari, Barad, Butler, Haraway, Polanyi, Lakoff, Johnson, Taylor, Schön, Gendlin, Gadow, Leder, Grosz, Ahmed, Schatzki, Kemmis, Green, and others. We seek to show how attending to the body in higher education offers a number of affordances. In general, we argue that attention to embodiment can help us to reimagine the goals of education in ways that fit more coherently with human concerns. An embodied perspective has the potential to infuse an educational vision that is more consistent with the ways in which humans experience the world. More particularly, attention to embodiment can help us design educational interventions that fit more naturally with how humans are inclined to learn and thus make educational experiences more meaningful. An attention to the role of embodiment in professional practice can help us adapt education so that learners are encouraged to master professional practice itself and not just professional knowledge. Even when attention is paid to the body it is often still regarded as an object I have, and not as a subject I am. We seem to have neglected in the Western world the body as “the existential condition of the possibility for self and culture” (O’Loughlin, 2006 p. 7). Attending to embodiment might also serve as a means to implement calls to regard curriculum along the axes of doing, being and becoming, in addition to the usual axis of knowing (Barnett & Coate, 2005). Embodiment allows space for a broader array of curricular and learning dimensions to receive attention, without one unduly dominating the others. Embodied perspectives place great emphasis on experience. Because of the enormous emphasis placed on cognition and abstract theoretical knowledge in educational contexts, it remains difficult to gain acceptance of the need for appropriate experience. Embodied perspectives can help us recover the experiencing and experienced body for education. Much professional education requires people to develop what can be called bodily repertoires. More obvious examples include the practical

Preface

vii

procedures of professions such as dentistry – fillings, tooth extraction, or root canal treatments – and how they are learned. Less obvious examples include intercorporeality, such as how the bodies of health professionals, such as nurses, interact with the bodies of patients (DeLuca et  al., 2015). An important aspect of developing bodily repertoires involves interacting with, and acting through, various technologies, which have the potential to reconfigure our embodied beings. The relationships that professions have with technology are not simple. There are technologies that people learn to use in their professions as well as a growing number of educational technologies. The educational technology literature focuses on the affordances they offer, i.e. what people can do with them. What is often overlooked however is that the affordances available are determined by the body and its capabilities, as well as the technology and its capabilities. A sensitivity to the body can alert us to the possibilities and potential dangers of technology. There are disciplines that have a particular focus on the embodied reality of the practitioner, such as theatre and dance. We introduce insights from these disciplines to see what they might offer professional education in all disciplines. The bodily repertoires that professionals need to learn can begin the development of practice wisdom, or phronesis. Practice wisdom entails the sensitivity to work out what is in the best interests of a particular client/patient in their particular circumstances, especially if the problem is not a textbook example. It may require explicit cognitive judgment to work out what may be best in this particular case, but also embodied tacit knowledge may be used or shared in particular contexts (Kinsella, 2007). This practice-based wisdom appears to be developed through the embodied being of practitioners as they navigate particular contexts. In summary, there is a need to draw attention to the many ways in which greater sensitivity to the body can enliven and enlighten our educational practices, especially in professional education. Embodiment allows us to appreciate the extent to which the body appropriates a professional practice and the extent to which a professional practice appropriates the body of the learner. How is professional knowledge corporealised? Attention to embodied perspectives in higher education can go a long way to counterbalance and complement a preoccupation with cognitive, abstract or theoretical perspectives, to foster a broader understanding of what constitutes a competent professional. If we wish to move beyond the ‘absent body’ in the quest for a more comprehensive and nuanced approach to professional education, we need to recognise and attend to embodiment in higher education, and professional education contexts. RochesterStephen Loftus MI, USA MontrealElizabeth Anne Kinsella QC, Canada 

viii

Preface

References Barnett, R., & Coate, K. (2005). Engaging the curriculum in higher education. Open University Press. Dall’Alba, G. (Ed.) (2009). Exploring education through phenomenology: Diverse approaches. Wiley-Blackwell. DeLuca, S., Bethune-Davies, P., Elliott, J. (2015). The (de)fragmented body in nursing education. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (eds.) The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 209–225). Springer. Green, B. & Hopwood, N. (Eds.) (2015). The body in professional practice, learning and education. Springer. Kinsella, E.  A. (2007). Embodied reflection and the epistemology of reflective practice. The Journal of Philosophy of Education, 41(3), 395–409. Leder, D. (1990). The absent body. University of Chicago Press. O’Loughlin, M. (2006). Education and embodiment: Exploring creatural existence. Springer. Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical arguments. Harvard University Press.

Contents

1 Embodiment and Professional Education: Opening a Conversation��������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Stephen Loftus and Elizabeth Anne Kinsella Part I Embodiment and Professional Practice 2 Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body��������������������������������������������������������������������������������   13 Bill Green 3 To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional Action and Education��������������������������������������������   27 Eva Schwarz 4 Embodied Knowledge and Thinking in Professional Education ��������   43 Stephen Loftus Part II Embodiment and Professional Performance 5 The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy����������������������������������������������������������������������������   57 Tatiana Chemi 6 Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   71 Sandra DeLuca Part III Embodiment and Reflection 7 “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education������������������������������������������������������������������������   89 Elizabeth Anne Kinsella and Kirsten Sarah Smith

ix

x

Contents

8 Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education Programmes������������������������������������������������  105 Helen F. Harrison 9 Ethics and Embodiment in Health Professions Education������������������  121 Amy Michelle DeBaets Part IV Embodiment and Professional Knowledge 10 Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  135 Stephen Loftus 11 Neurophenomenology and Professional Education������������������������������  149 Bradley Roberts 12 Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives in Professional Education��������������������������  163 Eva Cupchik and Melissa Schnarr Part V Embodiment and Technology 13 (Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching and Learning in ‘Tele-co-presences’����������  183 Wendelin Küpers 14 Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts������������������������������������������������������������������������������  197 Barney Dalgarno Part VI Embodiment and Institutional Structures 15 “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education����������������������������������������������������������������������  213 Kathleen Mahon 16 It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism in the Implementation of Gender-­Based Violence Policies and Practices����������������������������������  229 Rita A. Gardiner and Jennifer Chisholm 17 Embodiment and Professional Education: Implications for Practice������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  243 Elizabeth Anne Kinsella and Stephen Loftus Postscript����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  253 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  255

About the Contributors

Tatiana Chemi,  PhD, is an Associate Professor in the Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University, Denmark, where she investigates artistic learning and creative processes. She is the author of The Art of Arts Integration, 2014, and co-­ author of Behind the Scenes of Artistic Creativity, 2015, among other publications. In 2013, Aalborg University Press named her Author of the Year. Her latest work focuses on examining cross-cultural artistic creativity, arts-integrated educational designs in schools and theatre laboratories. The latter work led her to author A Theatre Laboratory Approach to Pedagogy and Creativity: Odin Teatret and Group Learning published in 2018 by Palgrave. She is also a visiting professor at the University of Chester (Philip Barker Centre for Creative Learning). Jennifer  Chisholm  is Assistant Professor in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies at Lakehead University. Her work examines sexual and gender-­ based violence at post-secondary institutions, with a focus on embodied experience and policy implementation. She researches and publishes in a variety of areas including reproductive justice, motherhood studies, feminist pedagogy, gender-­ based violence and trauma informed practices. Jennifer is passionate about feminist research methodology in the social sciences and engages a variety of methods to explore how gender shapes our lived experiences. Eva Cupchik  (she/her), PhD, is an Assistant Professor in Gender, Sexuality, and Women’s Studies, Western University, London, Ontario. She is a queer identified settler scholar of Eastern European (Ashkenazi) Jewish descent. She defended a doctorate at Western University’s Theory Center in February 2020. Her dissertation explored how the narratives of health, well-being, embodiment and identity, through interviews with Indigenous students at Western University, develop concepts in critical phenomenology and transnational feminist research methods. Her research explores Indigenous critical theories and ways of knowing, relational ontologies, global development, gender/environmental injustices, mental health policies/laws, Indigenous-Settler reconciliation in Canada, (accessible) curriculum development, and feminist phenomenology. xi

xii

About the Contributors

Barney Dalgarno  is Executive Dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of Canberra. Professor Dalgarno’s research contributions have focused on educational and social impacts of digital technologies, learning affordances of virtual, mixed and augmented realities, and the future of universities and schools in the age of digital disruption. He has had international influence through over 100 publications, award winning online learning innovations and editorship of educational technology journals, books and conference proceedings. Amy  Michelle  DeBaets,  PhD, ThM, MDiv, MA, HEC-C, is the Director of Bioethics for the North region of Hackensack Meridian Health, and an Associate Professor in the Department of Medical Sciences at Hackensack Meridian School of Medicine. Dr DeBaets earned a PhD at Emory University in religion with a focus on ethics and society, as well as a graduate certificate in women’s, gender, and sexuality studies. She also holds MDiv and ThM degrees from Princeton Theological Seminary, an MA in bioethics from Trinity International University, and BA and BS degrees in sociology, anthropology, and theatre from Truman State University. She served as a faculty scholar in the University of Chicago Program on Medicine and Religion and has expertise in clinical ethics, research ethics, spirituality in medicine and ethical issues in emerging technologies. Sandra DeLuca  is Chair of the School of Nursing at Fanshawe College (London, Ontario, Canada). Adjunct Associate Professor, Arthur Labatt Family School of Nursing, and Adjunct Associate Professor, Graduate Studies, Faculties of Health Sciences and Education, Western University (also in London, Canada). Her research interests include: transdisciplinary knowledge development in health professional education and pedagogy; critical narrative, critical autobiographical/auto ethnographic narrative, and hermeneutic phenomenological research in health professional education and practice; college/university collaborations, curriculum development and programme development; and aesthetic representation (poetry, theatre, art, narrative response) as a location for knowledge development in health professional education, research and practice. Rita  A.  Gardiner  is an Assistant Professor in Critical Policy, Equity, and Leadership Studies, in the Faculty of Education at Western University. Her publications include Gender, Authenticity and Leadership: Thinking with Arendt, and articles in Business Ethics Quarterly, Leadership, Organization, and Gender, Work and Organization. Currently, she is working on a Social Science and Humanities funded project that examines the implementation of sexual violence policies in Ontario universities, as well as a monograph, with Dr Katy Fulfer, on feminist approaches to Hannah Arendt, home and belonging. Bill  Green  is Emeritus Professor of Education at Charles Sturt University, New South Wales, Australia. His research and writing interests range across various areas, including literacy studies and curriculum inquiry, English curriculum history, doctoral research education, rural (teacher) education and professional practice

About the Contributors

xiii

education. His publications include the co-edited book The Body in Professional Practice, Learning and Education: Body/Practice (Springer, 2015). His most recent publication is Curriculum Challenges and Opportunities in a Changing World: Transnational Perspectives in Curriculum Inquiry (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), co-­ edited with Phillip Roberts and Marie Brennan. Helen  F.  Harrison  is a nursing professor at Fanshawe College in the Western-­ Fanshawe Collaborative BScN Program, and recent PhD graduate in health professional education at Western University. Helen has practised as a Registered Nurse in many settings including acute inpatient medicine and population-based research on hereditary hemochromatosis. Her research interests include professional education, embodied knowing, hermeneutic phenomenology and student peer mentorship in higher education. Elizabeth  Anne  Kinsella  is a Professor in the Institute of Health Sciences Education, Faculty of Medicine & Health Sciences, McGill University. She is also an associate member in the School of Physical and Occupational Therapy. Her scholarship addresses philosophical perspectives on knowledge in health and social care, with an emphasis on epistemologies of practice, reflective/reflexive practices, phronesis, embodiment, ethics, praxis, mindfulness, arts and humanities. Wendelin  Küpers  is Professor of Leadership and Organisation Studies at Karlshochschule International University in Karlsruhe in Germany and at the ICN Business School in Nancy in France. In his phenomenological and interdisciplinary research, he examines the possibilities of integral organisational and leadership practices, organisational learning and change, corporeality, emotions and creativity, aesthetics in organisational lifeworlds, and the development of a ‘pheno practice’. Using the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, he works towards making a contribution to an understanding of embodied integral organisational and management practice. Stephen  Loftus  is an Associate Professor in medical education at Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine in Michigan. A dental professional with more than 20 years in medical education, he has worked at universities in the UK, Australia and the USA. His research on clinical reasoning has appeared in several journals and books, such as the popular book Clinical Reasoning in the Health Professions (now in its fourth edition). He has also advised doctoral research students from different health professions in topics such as clinical reasoning, higher education and clinician/patient relationships. Kathleen Mahon  is a Senior Lecturer (and Docent in Pedagogical Work) in the Department of Educational Research and Development, University of Borås, Sweden. Her research areas are higher education, pedagogy, teacher education, outdoor education, teacher professional learning and educational praxis. Her current projects relate to understanding praxis and conditions for academic practice as

xiv

About the Contributors

praxis in higher education settings. She is also a Senior Editor of the Journal of Praxis in Higher Education. Bradley  Roberts  is affiliated with Swinburne University of Technology (Melbourne) and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority. His research interests include maritime safety and leadership, professional practice development and embodied sensemaking in critical events. Melissa  Schnarr  (she/her) is a PhD candidate in Critical Policy, Equity and Leadership Studies, Faculty of Education, Western University. She is an Anishinaabe kwe from Deshkan Ziibii (London, Ontario). She is a writer, educator and community builder and is currently pursuing a PhD in Education at Western University. Her research explores how urban public schooling impacts Indigenous cultural identity and how Indigenous youth assert their cultural identity in spite of these impacts. She is the chair of the Indigenous Writer’s Circle at Western and is also a published author and poet. Eva Schwarz  is a philosopher working as a senior lecturer and researcher at the Center for Studies in Practical Knowledge at Södertörn University in Stockholm, Sweden. She is mainly working within the fields of phenomenology, subject theory and social ontology. Her current research is concerned with collective action and judgement and the relation between ethics and epistemology in welfare professions. Kirsten  Sarah  Smith  is an instructor and clinical educator in the School of Occupational Therapy, and a PhD candidate in health professional education, at Western University in Ontario, Canada. Kirsten has been an occupational therapist for more than 12 years, where she incorporates mind-body practices including mindfulness and yoga into her work with children and youth. Her research interests include professional education and practice, mindfulness in rehabilitation, and mindfulness in higher education.

Chapter 1

Embodiment and Professional Education: Opening a Conversation Stephen Loftus

and Elizabeth Anne Kinsella

Abstract  In this chapter, we discuss the reasons for engaging with a book on embodiment and introduce some of the major themes relevant to an embodied view of the world in general and professional education in particular. The argument is that the role and significance of the body in our lives has been misunderstood and is far more important than we have previously accepted. We have also long neglected the body in education, and this neglect can distort our views of what education is about and how it is to be conducted. There are implications from taking an embodied view of education, especially professional education. The various chapters of the book explore some of those implications. Our intention is to help educators become aware of the importance of the body and to encourage ongoing conversations that continue to explore the implications of taking the body seriously in professional practice and professional education. Keywords  Embodiment · Epistemology · Ontology Cognition and meaning are not in the head, but in the world. (Lemmen, 1997, p. 2) It is through my body that I understand other people. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 186)

Why a book on embodiment and professional education? The role and significance of the body has long been neglected in Western society in general and in higher education in particular. This has resulted in blind spots that can have a deleterious effect on both professional education and the practice that follows. We argue that ‘bringing the body back in’ can help us to identify and characterise these blind

S. Loftus (*) Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] E. A. Kinsella Institute of Health Sciences Education, McGill University, Quebec, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_1

1

2

S. Loftus and E. A. Kinsella

spots and begin to address them. The blind spots affect the humanity of both students and teachers. A failure to attend to these blind spots can contribute to a range of outcomes, from the disengagement that many students experience as they progress through professional education programmes, to the disillusionment that educators experience when their pedagogies are ineffective, to the poor implementation of institutional policies aimed at protecting students and preparing them for a professional career. The end goal of integrating insights from theories of embodiment is a professional education that is more closely aligned with the ways that humans inhabit their world and make sense of it. What is embodiment about and why might it be important? We can begin with the epigraphs to this chapter and what embodiment is reacting against. It has long been assumed in Western society that cognition resides exclusively in the mind of an individual. Following on from this assumption, that mind activity is all important, there is the dualist assumption that a human consists of two distinct entities, the mind and the body. The mind is assumed to inhabit and control the body. Following on from these assumptions, the implication is that education is an abstract enterprise that is all about improving the mind. The body is reduced to being a mere vessel for the mind. Rationality and propositional knowledge then become all important. The body merely provides sensations that are then turned into representations in the mind which the brain manipulates because it is assumed to be a biological computer. These are all questionable assumptions that can be traced all the way back to the dualism of Descartes (1637). The embodiment thesis accepts that while the mind is necessary for cognition, it is not enough. Embodiment begins with the belief that mind and body are not separate entities but one. We are not minds possessing bodies as objects. We are our bodies. We are body-subjects. The mind is a metaphor that helps us conceptualise and articulate some of the ways that humans (bodily) engage with the world. This is summarised by Lemmen (1997): Mind and matter are seen as abstractions from a single reality. A cognizer is not a mind with a body, or a body with a mind, but a unitary entity with both mental and bodily aspects, which are inextricably intertwined. (p. 13)

There is a trivial sense in which we can understand embodiment, and this is the simple necessity of needing a body in order to have sensations that provide the raw material for experience. However, the embodiment thesis goes deeper. The manner in which we perceive and experience the world is profoundly shaped by our embodied being-in-the-world. ‘The body is the existential condition of the possibility for self and culture’ (O’Loughlin, 2006, p. 7). My body not only permits, and restricts, the ways I can engage with the world but grounds me and shapes my agency within the world together with the nature of my experiences ‘in the sense that the way of experiencing or living the world is essentially that of an agent with this particular kind of body’ (Taylor, 1995, p. 62). From the embodied perspective, experience is a key idea.

1  Embodiment and Professional Education: Opening a Conversation

3

Cartesianism tends to dismiss experience as merely a representation of atomistic sensations that are duly processed by the brain and then displayed to the mind. This has often been likened to the prisoners in the cave, in Plato’s Republic, who can only see the wall of the cave. They must infer what is happening in the outside world from the shadows the outside world projects on to the cave wall. Merleau-Ponty (1962) calls this the sensation fallacy where perception is an internal screen in the mind showing images of an external reality. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty offers something else. Perception is the way the world presents itself and is emergent ‘between my organizing, sensing body and the things of the world. It is a synergy’ (Hass, 2008, p. 36 emphasis in original). This synergy occurs when my living body interacts with the things of the world around me. Meaning and cognition are, in this sense, out in the world because they are a complex interaction between the body-­ subject and the environment. This idea is not new and has been articulated before. Volosinov, a member of the Bakhtin circle, once claimed that ‘By its very existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be localized somewhere between the organism and the outside world, on the borderline separating these two spheres of reality’ (Volosinov, 1973/1929, p.  26). From this perspective, perception and the mind are not distinct entities, despite the many attempts to reify them. Supporting this idea, we have a related insight from John Dewey (1929) that we should speak of mental activity in terms of adverbs. We do things intentionally, intelligently, conscientiously, thoughtfully, wisely, and so on. All these adverbs describe aspects of our overall behaviour. These aspects are not cognitive data structures that are part of some software running on the hardware of the brain. The computer metaphor of the mind/brain may possibly be useful in some situations, but it is, and always will be, a metaphor, a tool for thought, not a description of a hard reality as it really is. Looking more closely at these adverbs can also help us gain insight into the embodied aspects of behaviour. We will take a brief look at the example of acting wisely. Wisdom is often seen, simplistically, as a more refined version of the routine propositional knowledge we can all learn from books. However, here is a quite different interpretation of what wisdom might be: But when wisdom has shown up in my life, it’s been less a body of knowledge and more a way of interacting, less the dropping of secret information, more a way of relating that helped me stumble to my own realizations. … Wisdom has an embodied moral element. (Brooks, 2021, p. 23, emphasis added)

From this perspective, wise people are those who can relate to others with deep (embodied) empathy. Brooks goes on to describe them as ‘story editors’. This label applies to the best (wisest) health professionals, for example. They can help the rest of us to articulate our own life stories and reconsider them in new ways, when we are challenged by serious illness or disability in ourselves or those close to us. They can do this because they have their own meaningful, embodied experience that allows them to relate to the meaningful embodied experience of others. In so doing, the wise can help others to re-interpret the life stories they are living out. There is a sense of intercorporeality (sometimes called intercorporeity) that can be part of a

4

S. Loftus and E. A. Kinsella

deep attunement and meaningful interaction with the other (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). There are connections here with the intersubjectivity and the dialogism of Bakhtin (1982) that offer further opportunities for exploring the ways that embodiment and dialogue can inform meaningful relationships. This sense of wisdom and intercorporeality is also one way of understanding Merleau-Ponty’s insight that mutual understanding ‘comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my intentions and gestures discernible in the conduct of other people’ (p. 185) and ‘It is through my body that I understand other people’ (Merleau-­ Ponty, 1962, p. 186). Our embodied-being-in-the-world reminds us that humans are ‘intrinsically connected to the world in complex and irreducible ways’ (Thybo Jensen and Moran, 2013, p. viii) because we are immersed in, perceive, and experience a world already full of significance, even though there may be ambiguity about what is perceived and ambiguity about what is significant. There are profound implications from adopting such a stance that challenge much of what we do in professional education and how we think about it. These challenges bring to light various dimensions that shape educational practices: the centrality of bodily experience and doing in learning; how perception and knowledge can be embodied; the significance of intercorporeality and how bodies are organised and relate to one another and environments in educational spaces; and embodied intersubjectivity as occurring through gesture as well as dialogue and the ambiguities that can come with all of this. Learning to deal with ambiguity is important. Merleau-Ponty (1962) reminds us that when we perceive a familiar object, like the exterior of a house, we can reasonably suppose that there will be features present that we cannot perceive at present, such as rooms within the house, and we can do this because of previous perceptions and previous experience. However, we can never be absolutely certain. We might be looking at a façade rather than a real house. Our perception is always incomplete and may be wrong. Because of this, the world can often be ambiguous and is, therefore, ineliminably indeterminate. The full plenitude of an object must always elude us. This is an insight that other scholars have reached, such as Gadamer (1989) when he discusses the hermeneutic circle in which we attempt to relate the parts we can perceive to the whole that we are trying to understand. In professional education, we need to prepare people to practise in such a world. In the realm of healthcare, for example, there will be patients who appear to have one problem but turn out to have another. We need to provide educational experiences that prepare our students for the inherent ambiguity and indeterminacy of the workplace and professional practice. This ambiguity and indeterminacy are always present because of our embodied being-in-the-world and they are inescapable. In this book, we are trying to start conversations that engage with some of the issues that follow from ‘bringing the body back in’ and taking ‘embodiment’ seriously as an organising principle in professional education and practice. Some of the authors adopt ideas, and techniques of presenting them, that may seem to challenge academic norms. One way of understanding this is through the idea of Carnival as discussed by Bakhtin (1984). The Bakhtinian idea of Carnival provides an opportunity for the normal rules, values, and conventions of society to be challenged and

1  Embodiment and Professional Education: Opening a Conversation

5

upended. Subversive viewpoints are given voice and the chance to show people different ways of acting and being in the world around them. With Bakhtin’s emphasis on heteroglossia, and dialogical relationships, the carnivalesque is a means of allowing normally unheard voices to speak and get our attention. The carnivalesque gives us permission to ask ourselves subversive questions and consider how our responses might challenge or change established norms. The notion of embodiment threatens to subvert the mind/body dualism that is still a deeply entrenched characteristic of modern Western society. It may be that we need the carnivalesque to help us confront this norm and see that humanity can be conceptualised differently. If so, then we may need to rethink our priorities in education in general and professional education and practice in particular.

The Chapters in This Book In the first section of the book, three chapters take up embodiment and practice in relation to the expressive body and the practice encounter, intercorporeality and collective action, and the complexities of embodiment and decision-making. In his chapter, Bill Green uses the lens of practice theory (Schatzki, 2001)  to examine questions of why the body matters in and for practice. His aim is to reassess the role and significance of corporeality for professional practice, learning, and education. He explores some profound questions. What are the relationships between practice and the body? How does the study of one inform the other? Why does any of this matter now in the world of professional education? Bill Green draws on Merleau-­ Ponty’s post-Cartesian theorisation of the ‘expressive body’ to consider the practice encounter as intercorporeal and as always already social. The implications for practice are that it is comprised not only of ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’ but also of ‘sensings’ with profound implications for intersubjectivity in the practice encounter. He uses the example of home visits in the professional practice of social work to draw out some of the theoretical and practical implications of elaborating the expressive body within practice theory and the implications for professional education, learning, and practice. Eva Schwarz looks at philosophical debates on collective action and judgement and the role of embodiment to argue that the bodily nature of professional interactions is constitutive of how decisions are made in professional practice. She draws attention to intercorporeality to explore settings in which students must learn to coordinate their bodily presence and actions with colleagues in teams, as well as with the bodies of the people they serve. She uses the professional education of teachers and police officers to provide examples where these issues are opened up. There are practical and logistical challenges in simply getting the job done that require subtle and nuanced bodily coordination, and there are also serious ethical issues to consider. Phenomenological and Aristotelian perspectives are brought together to inform a recognition of embodied interpersonal praxis and phronesis, with significant implications for professional education.

6

S. Loftus and E. A. Kinsella

Stephen Loftus examines embodied knowledge and its role in decision-making. He shows how embodied knowledge, and the intuition that emerges from it, can be either a help or a hindrance to education at all levels, including the professional. He explores some of the history of this issue, together with some of the ways we can overcome embodied knowledge when it is a hindrance. If we do not, then there is a real risk that we can graduate professionals who have major flaws in their knowledge. He finishes with a discussion of ways we can take advantage of our embodiment to improve professional education. Two chapters point to the link between embodiment and performance, drawing on examples from the embodied, poetic, relational pedagogy of the theatre laboratory and aesthetic representations and theatre of carnival in nursing education. The body is, of course, a prominent feature in the professional practice of acting. Students of theatre pay a great deal of attention to their bodies and how they use them. They learn how to, in a sense, inhabit the bodies of the characters they portray. We now have theatre laboratories where actors and directors can develop their expertise as well as explore and experiment with ways of developing and extending theatre performance. In the chapter by Tatiana Chemi, we are given insights into the work of one particular (and famous) theatre laboratory, that of the Odin Teatret. Theatre practice is portrayed as an embodied and relational apprenticeship that entangles performance and pedagogy together. We learn, for example, of the theatre laboratory as a place of participation in collective creative processes, where bodies, objects, places, and practice are entangled in complex ways. We also learn of the complex relationships or ‘embodied kinships’ between senior and junior members where individuals continually learn from each other and a deep sense of belonging can emerge. Embodiment is central to the work of the theatre laboratory as processes of creation, pedagogy, and performance are shared collectively in and through the body. From Sandra De Luca, we learn about embodied subjectivity as an aim in nursing education. She employs Bakhtin’s metaphor of carnival as a playful way to question taken-for-granted discourses of illness and healing. She explores the ways in which illness representations sometimes call upon ‘carnival’ as they are enacted and narrated, as aesthetic, poetic, mythical, and artistical representations. Her work proposes theatre workshops that use mythic and counter-mythic aesthetic approaches to engage nursing students in reflexivity about their own embodied subjectivity and the embodiment of those they care for. Her goal is that nursing education should aim to help its graduates become vigilant embodied healers. Three chapters invite conversations about embodiment and reflection through attention to mindfulness, embodied reflection, and ethical reflection. Elizabeth Anne Kinsella and Kirsten Sarah Smith explore embodiment and mindfulness in health and social care education. They note that theories of embodiment and practices of mindfulness share the aim of bringing ‘mind’ and ‘body’ together. They discuss the design of mindfulness education in higher education and students’ reflective phenomenological writing regarding mind-body awareness and mindfulness in everyday activities. Their work also reveals how arts-based approaches have the potential to elicit embodied forms of knowledge. Some reflections on the

1  Embodiment and Professional Education: Opening a Conversation

7

potential of mindfulness practices that can contribute to student well-being, as well as other benefits and challenges, are illustrated. They conclude with pedagogical insights to support students to embody the space of mindfulness education in the professional education classroom. Helen Harrison introduces us to the practice of body mapping and its use as a pedagogical approach to foster embodied reflection. Through her description of a process that she refers to as ‘auto/body mapping’, we learn that body mapping can be used to examine educators’ assumptions about teaching and learning and to make visible embodied forms of knowledge. Body mapping foregrounds bodily knowing and can help teachers and learners engage with their own embodied being-in-the-­ world. Through this process, there is the possibility to come to a deeper sense of self in relation to others and to appreciate how greater self-knowledge can shape one’s practices as teachers and learners in professional education. Amy DeBaets explores the ethical aspects of adopting an embodied perspective in the professional education of those in healthcare. She points out that the ethical impact involves the experiences, needs, and identities of learners and that these are wrapped up in the details of their embodied existence. When we value the bodies of learners, teachers, and patients and address their embodied needs, then learners are better positioned to thrive and learn as flourishing healthcare professionals. She draws our attention to embodied practices such as epistemic humility, respect for others as persons, tolerance for ambiguity, and a yearning for justice. The field of embodiment is in dialogue with other disciplines and invites us to rethink our conceptions of knowledge. Three chapters extend ways of thinking about knowledge in unique ways by turning to a Goethean science, integrating insights from neurophenomenology, and bringing Indigenous and feminist epistemologies into conversation with Eurocentric knowledge. Stephen Loftus looks at the science of Goethe, which is an embodied and phenomenological science. In Goethean science, there is an emphasis on the embodied experience of the practitioner. This is in opposition to our current understanding of science where the practitioner must pretend to be completely detached and objective. His argument is that those professions, such as healthcare, that see themselves as science-based can gain advantages from adopting insights from Goethe. These advantages include a more holistic approach to the relationships of the people involved in the clinical encounter where the humanity of the participants can play its full role. This promises more humane clinical care and more satisfied patients and practitioners. In the chapter by Bradley Roberts, we are presented with work that foregrounds the significance of embodiment in professional practice by drawing on the emerging field of neurophenomenology. He uses the lifeworld experience of master mariners, facing challenging situations at sea, to explore ways in which we might integrate findings from neurobiology with cognitive studies and the lived experience of these particular professionals. This is a difficult but important task. Too often, empirical work in psychology and neurobiology is seen as being in opposition to phenomenological work. The former work is seen as being purely scientific and objective, while the latter has been dismissed as merely subjective. Insights from neurophenomenology suggest that this conceptual divide is misplaced. The body offers an opportunity

8

S. Loftus and E. A. Kinsella

to bring these disparate discourses into dialogue. We also hear of embodied sensemaking, as deeply embodied practices where professionals are bodily engaged with their environments and relations. Metaphors such as ‘finding the line’ or ‘feeling for points of equilibrium’ emerge as an embodied sense in one’s work. Insights from neurophenomenology, and the embodied perspectives they attend to, are shown to have great potential for rethinking professional knowledge and consequently for professional education and practice. Eva Cupchik and Melissa Schnarr introduce a highly original performance style dialogue to consider how Indigenous and feminist perspectives can help us embrace diverse knowledge systems and overcome dualistic thinking. They propose ‘two-­ eyed seeing’ as a paradigm for teaching that accommodates both Indigenous and Eurocentric knowledge systems. Two-eyed seeing offers a means to express ideas and share concepts, offer mutual respect, and respect different epistemic views without homogenising content or privileging one vantage point. The chapter raises important questions such as how higher education curricula can embody the complexities of Indigenous perspectives. Recommendations are offered that prompt reflection on educational design. A central message is that Indigenous knowledges are embodied and articulated in unique and important ways that require equal recognition. While one might assume that chapters on embodiment and technology would focus on the challenges of disembodiment, instead two pieces contest the idea that technologically mediated education necessarily leads to disembodied educational practices. Wendelin Küpers examines how bodily presence affects interactions in educational encounters and how this bodily presence changes in significant ways from face-to-face meetings to the online environment. He draws on examples from management education to show the challenges to embodiment posed by education in a virtual space. Yet, he also contends that what he calls ‘embodied tele-presence’ is possible. Drawing on examples from business education, he demonstrates how the virtual space can allow teachers and learners to experiment with, and experience, new forms of embodiment. One of his conclusions is that, in the virtual educational environment, we need a new and wiser understanding of corporeality. Barney Dalgarno explains how the world of educational technology is waking up to the importance of embodiment. He uses the concept of affordances to open up a discussion of how we can use the insights from embodiment to help us understand the ways in which a learner’s prior lived experience influence their interactions with technology-enhanced learning. Dalgarno also discusses how we can use educational technology to support embodied learning in authentic practice-based learning contexts. Two chapters show how embodiment is shaped by structures in educational settings. Kathleen Mahon looks at the discourse of neoliberalism and how this is affecting higher education. She uses the theory of practice architectures to pose questions about the ways in which neoliberalism is constraining and transforming the bodies and practices of people in higher education. A major question she asks is: in what ways are bodies, through practices, becoming both ‘neoliberalised’ and ‘neoliberalising’? What is the significance of this trend? She discusses the

1  Embodiment and Professional Education: Opening a Conversation

9

importance of being informed and sensitive to these issues and of resisting the insidious influence of neoliberalism. Rita Gardner and Jennifer Chisholm look at embodiment in professional education from more of a systemic position, pointing out how policies shape the embodied agency of different people within institutions. They examine the institutional sexism that is apparent in the implementation of gender-based violence policies. They use insights from practical phenomenology and institutional ethnography to explore the embodied lived experience of those affected by gender-based violence and how institutional policies affect their further experience. They conclude that policies alone cannot eradicate gender-based violence in higher education institutions but that there needs to be systemic change at many levels. They advocate for a person-centred embodied approach to policy development and suggest that a feminist embodied lens enables us to think about policies from the perspectives of diverse groups.

Conclusion The concept of embodiment is superficially simple but has many complexities. The aim of this book is to help those interested in professional education to get a sense of some of those complexities and of their importance. The idea of embodiment offers scope for further exploration and scholarly work as well as the prospect of improving the education we provide to our future professionals. We have too long been held captive by the idea that education is all about the mind and nothing else but the mind. Barnett and Coate (2005) pointed out that a higher education needs a curriculum that has three axes, knowing, doing, and being/becoming. Theories of embodiment have profound implications for rethinking all three of these axes. The contributions open a conversation concerning the very nature of knowing, viewing it not only as cognitive-rational understanding but also as fundamentally embodied. Doing from this view does not necessarily stem from a prior intellectual operation – with the mind dictating to the body what to do – but also points to knowing as also occurring in the action itself, as fundamentally embodied. The third axis of being/becoming is something that many educators struggle with. This is because it is more about ontology and not epistemology. Educators are generally more comfortable talking about epistemology as they have the vocabulary for this, but not for talking about ontology. The notion of embodiment offers an opening into this third curriculum axis of being/becoming as well as a means to integrate it with the other two axes. There are other possibilities related to intercorporeality and intersubjectivity that emerge as important here. The social and relational dimensions of embodied practices are revealed and made visible, and, as pointed out by practice scholars, our embodiment is always already social. If we pursue the invitation to explore our embodied being-in-the-world, then we may find ourselves agreeing with Rorty who once said: ‘if the body had been easier to understand, nobody would have thought

10

S. Loftus and E. A. Kinsella

that we had a mind’ (1979, p. 239). If Rorty is only partly right, then the notion of embodiment promises to open up a new research agenda that can go in many different directions and provide a host of new insights into the world of professional and higher education for many years to come.

References Bakhtin, M. (1982). The dialogic imagination: Four essays. University of Texas Press. Bakhtin, M. (1984). Rabelais and his world (Vol. 341). Indiana University Press. Barnett, R., & Coate, K. (2005). Engaging the curriculum in higher education. Open University Press. Brooks, D. (2021). Wisdom Isn’t What You Think It is. New  York Times, Section A, 16 April 2021. P. 23. Descartes, R. (1637/2012). Discourse on the method. Start Publishing. Dewey, J. (1929). Experience and nature. Open Court Publishing Company. (Revised edition; originally published in 1925). Gadamer, H.-G. (1989). Truth and method. (J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall, Trans. 2nd revised ed.). New York: Continuum. Hass, L. (2008). Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Indiana University Press. Lemmen, R. (1997). Towards a Non-Cartesian Cognitive Science: In the light of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. D. Phil thesis. The University of Sussex. September 1997. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith, London: Routledge. O’Loughlin, M. (2006). Embodiment and education: Exploring creatural existence. Springer. Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press. Schatzki, T. R. (2001). Practice theory. In T. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina, & E. von Savigny (Eds.), The practice turn in contemporary theory (pp. 1–14). Routledge. Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical arguments. Harvard University Press. Thybo Jensen, R., & Moran, D. (Eds.). (2013). The phenomenology of embodied subjectivity. Springer. Volosinov, V. N. (1973/1929). Marxism and the philosophy of language (L. Matejka & I. R. Titunik, Trans.). Harvard University Press.

Part I

Embodiment and Professional Practice

Chapter 2

Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body Bill Green

Abstract  Why does the body matter in and for professional education? How does it matter? Why now? These and other questions can be explored through what has come to be called practice theory and philosophy, or the practice turn in contemporary theory. This chapter focuses on the question of corporeality within a reconceptualised view of practice, as itself a distinctive concept. We explore the relationship between practice and the body, philosophically and historically, and argue that professional education is best served at this time by bringing the body back in – that is, by re-assessing the role and significance of corporeality in and for professional practice, learning, and education. Keywords  Professional practice · Practice theory · Merleau-Ponty · Social work · Corporeality · Body knowledge Recent work in professional education has increasingly drawn on practice theory and philosophy as a resource for reconceptualisation and renewal (Green [Ed.], 2009; Hager et al., 2012; Kemmis et al., 2014). This perspective asserts the primacy of practice, as a distinctive concept. Professional practice needs to be explicitly thematised and interrogated, rather than simply taken for granted, or seen as simply analogous to the demands of reality, or ‘real-world’ engagements and work activities. Instead, practice is that work and constitutes it. Practice is the work we do in and on the world; it is what professional practitioners do, as professionals and as practitioners. It is what makes them what and who they are and marks them out as such, in their being-in-the-world. More recently, attention has been given to the role and significance of embodiment in this regard, of the body and its integral involvement in practice, and

B. Green (*) School of Education, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, NSW, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_2

13

14

B. Green

especially in professional practice (Green & Hopwood [Eds.], 2015a, b). Practice is always embodied – that is, it involves the body, or bodies, in a quite fundamental sense. In this chapter, I focus on the question of corporeality within a reconceptualised view of practice. Highlighting the relationship between practice and the body, philosophically and historically, I argue that professional education is best served at this time by bringing the body back in – that is, by re-assessing the role and significance of corporeality in and for professional practice, learning, and education. Here I continue a theme introduced previously, as ‘an ever-increasing emphasis on “mind” at the expense of “body”’ (Green & Hopwood, 2015a, b, p. 15), referencing particularly fields like teaching and nursing. This emphasis on ‘mind’ is especially clear in the history of teacher education, with a marked shift away from ‘apprenticeship’ and ‘training’ models towards an ever-growing focus on ‘theory’ (p. 15). There, the focus was clearly on educational theory and the education disciplines, but similar shifts might well be observed in other fields. My primary interest here remains in the relationship between professional practice and professional education. This is both where one leads into the other, as in the case of preparatory pre-service professional education, and where the two overlap, in and across the professional career. Increasingly, the emphasis in professional education has come to be on theoretical knowledge, or the interplay between theory and knowledge, at the expense of practice and the body. Professional education becomes increasingly cognitive, or cognitivist. This is despite a plethora of attempts to compensate for this, most recently in calls to take greater account of so-called practical knowledges (and being ‘work-ready’), although too often these calls remain rather superficial. In this attempt to bring the body back in, I am seeking to enrich the debate and draw out its complexity. I do so with explicit reference to practice theory and philosophy and highlight the need for clearer conceptual frames for professional education. In particular, I want to draw in social work, as a distinctive professional practice field. It seems to me that interesting links can be observed between social work, teaching, and also nursing, as fields increasingly drawn into the university and thereby increasingly professionalised, which means, among other things, becoming more and more abstract, and abstracted. Bringing the body back in, theoretically as well as practically, is arguably central to making fields such as these key sites of organic professionalism, committed to helping others and making a difference in the world.

Practice Theory and Philosophy: Bringing in the Body-Subject Practice is to be understood as the primary social thing – ‘the primary generic social thing’ (Schatzki, 2001, p. 1). This is the ‘primacy of practice’ thesis (Green, 2009): the view that practice constitutes the social world in a fundamental sense, as a key organising principle. Practice enables and energises social life. Understanding practice as concept, however, is a complex and somewhat contested matter, and there is now considerable ongoing work in this regard, including my own. One feature of such work to date is the issue of different ‘meta-traditions’ of practice theory and

2  Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body

15

philosophy, which I have named elsewhere as the neo-Aristotelian and the postCartesian strands. Since the first is more developed and certainly more widely known1, I shall focus on the latter. The ‘post-Cartesian’ perspective is more attuned to poststructuralist theory and philosophy, or ‘post-theory’ more generally, and more open therefore to notions of discourse and textuality, language, and the symbolic order. While both perspectives are concerned to challenge Cartesianism, what I am calling the post-Cartesian position is distinctive in the way it explicitly problematises the subject – the constitutive nature of social subjectivity. This is especially central to poststructuralist theory and philosophy, supplemented by feminism and psychoanalysis (Butler, 1997, 2015). In this account, subjectivity is (per)formed in and through discursive practice. By this, I mean, in effect, the combined operation of discourse and practice. This might also be seen as the, often intertwined, nature of the relationship between discourse and practice and their entanglement. How best is the subject to be understood, in such a view? Briefly, it consists of an organic ensemble, an organised set of knowledges and understandings, skills and capacities, and attitudes and dispositions. These are always dynamic, revisable, renewable, often contradictory, though still more or less cohesive and coherent, and realised in and through distinctive forms of identity and agency. They come together in and through discourse, from a poststructuralist perspective. This can be understood, from a practice-theoretical perspective, in terms of what Schatzki (2012, p. 14) describes as ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’; practice is conceived as ‘an open-ended, spatially-temporally dispersed nexus of doings and sayings’ (p.  15). These are moreover ‘bodily activities’ – ‘[t]hey pertain to, and arise from, the body … and are implicated in the interaction of bodies’ (Green & Hopwood, 2015a, b, p.  18). Importantly, Schatzki (1996, p. 41) adds to this formulation ‘sensations’ – ‘bodily sensations and feelings’, or ‘sensings’. Clearly what is at issue, then, is better understood as the body-subject. Just as practice is always ‘embodied and relational’ (Hager et al., 2012), so too is subjectivity. Professional practice produces the professional subject; or rather, it provides a productive, affordant space for professional becoming. Two points can be made here. Firstly, the way is thereby opened to consider the notion of the expressive body and to introduce Merleau-Ponty into this account – a matter I take up in greater depth below. Secondly, it is worth thinking more at this point about these avowedly foundational activities, specifically those of ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’. Articulated in this fashion, they might seem rather reductive. Is the body’s rich field of somatic and semiotic possibility to be rendered simply as voice and action? What or who is doing the ‘doing’? How? What is the relation between the two – between ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’? Moreover, both terms are relational, and fundamentally so. And what about what I have deliberately termed ‘sensings’ here? This seems to be underestimated in its significance. What is involved in this regard? An opportunity exists to link to recent accounts of affect (e.g. Massumi, 2002) and the sensory subject (Butler, 2015) – again, something I resume below.

 For example, in recent work on ‘practice architectures’ (e.g. Mahon, Francisco & Kemmis, 2016)

1

16

B. Green

 erleau-Ponty, Corporeality, and the Philosophy M of Expression Of particular interest here are the possibilities associated with drawing Merleau-­ Ponty’s ‘post-phenomenological’2 philosophy more explicitly and systematically into thinking about practice theory, corporeality, and professional education. Recent explorations of his philosophy of expression represent a new reading of his work or a re-reading of enormous productivity (Hass, 2008; Landes, 2013). This is not to overlook that his work on the body and on perception has always been relevant, if not always used.3 Yet my contention is that there is a connection to be forged between practice and Merleau-Ponty’s generative concept of expression. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty is clearly located within the post-Cartesian tradition (along with other notable figures such as Deleuze). What are the connections, then, between these notions of practice and expression, subjectivity, and the body? Hass (2008, p. 172) proposes that ‘expression’ is ‘Merleau-Ponty’s master term for a creative, productive cognitive power – a power that is rooted in the excess of embodied perceptual life’. This can be traced throughout Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, as Hass indicates, from the early opus Phenomenology of Perception to the posthumous The Visible and the Invisible. Expression is linked with his explorations of language while not being identified with language per se. A significant relationship exists between language and expression, albeit difficult to properly or fully understand. Something of this can be discerned in Merleau-Ponty’s view of language, as Hass (2008) describes it, as a matter of both ‘sedimentation’ and ‘origination’ – as ‘already acquired and sedimented’ (p. 176) and as ‘creative, contingent, expressive’ (p. 177). These two aspects work off each other, in ongoing practice. There is a productive tension between the established and the creative, between routine and novelty, stasis and flow, between drawing on available resources and enacting the new, between past and future. The role and significance of the body is emphasised in this regard, with the ‘living body’ conceived as ‘an active, sense-­ making, organizing power’ and as ‘actively attuned to the world around it’ (p. 81), as being in the world and of the world, and fully implicated, active. ‘Expression emerges as the central phenomenon of embodiment’ (Landes, 2013, p.  90). In a sense, embodiment is expressive. Corporeality expresses human being and, importantly, human being-with-others; sociality is thus fundamentally involved. Hence, to speak of the expressive body, the body as expression, is to enable a view of social practice and human existence. It is worth pursuing this matter a little further. For Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 186), ‘[i]t is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through my body 2  I increasingly identify Merleau-Ponty with the notion of ‘post-phenomenology’, which I understand to be a ‘postmodern’ intellectual formation arising out of the encounter between phenomenology and poststructuralism, as philosophical traditions. See, for instance, recent work on ‘post-intentionality’ (e.g. Vagle, 2015). 3  See however Harrison, Kinsella, and De Luca (2019) with specific regard to nursing.

2  Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body

17

that I perceive “things”’. The world is available to me through my body, in all its involvement and engagements. At the same time, others move in and out of my ambit, as ‘an incarnate subject’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.  185). We are bound together, in what is always a ‘carnal-material world’ (Hass, 2008, 184). We are attuned to one another. ‘As an embodied subject I am exposed to the other person, just as [s]he is to me, and I identify myself with the person speaking before me’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 18). This suggests a fundamental sociality – an interplay of bodies in social space. Corporeality thus implies intercorporeality. To be a body is to be in transaction with others, other bodies. Bodies are always-already social, that is, implicated in a social world. It remains here to attend to an important issue in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of expression. This is his understanding of what has been described in terms of ‘sedimentation’, or the ‘already acquired and sedimented’, whether that be a matter of language or of practice itself. Merleau-Ponty’s own focus is on the expressive, the new, that which opens up a world of possibility. But this is connected, intimately and organically, to that which already exists, or pre-exists. What is the status, then, of the pre-expressive? Landes (2013) provides insight into this when he writes of ‘[t]he life of an expressive body’, describing it as ‘a historical trajectory’, with ‘any given moment … but a phase in a long process of becoming’. In that context, ‘[t]he past sediments in numerous ways, into personal habits and into the things that “everyone knows”’ (p. 34). There is a connection to be made here to the notion of habitus, as a resource for practice (Marcoulatos, 2001). But more than simply being a resource, something more active and dynamic is available which can be understood, therefore, as providing for renewal and transformation, as pushing into the future. ‘The gesture of speech (or any human action, properly speaking) involves taking up a constituted structure in order to initiate a new expression in a new context that catches up with a felt sense that is in the process of emerging’ (Landes, 2013, p.  12; my added emphasis). A productive tension exists between ‘creative activity’ and ‘apparently repetitive everyday activity’ (p. 6). Bourdieu’s emphasis on ‘… the continuum between genuine creativity and repetitiveness, between virtuosity and ordinary ability’ (Landes, 2013, p. 6) becomes highly significant therefore as a crucial complement to Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the new, without discounting or undercutting it. Rather, the relationship between the ‘sedimented’ and the ‘expressive’ is a dialectic, a dynamic metastability, a dialogism. Finally, what are we to make of the notion of ‘sensings’, introduced above, in this particular context? How might ‘sensings’ be understood with reference to Merleau-­ Ponty’s philosophy of expression and specifically to our concern here with bodies and corporeality? It is intriguing to think of the body apart from what might be seen as its ordinary character, described elsewhere as a ‘realism’ (Green, 2015, p. 125).4 4  Reference is made to ‘think[ing] outside and beyond not simply what might be called the anthropomorphic body, but also the realist, representational body – the body of commonsense and of orthodoxy’ (Green, 2015, p. 133). Although the focus is on Deleuze, there are important links to be made between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, and specifically with regard to ‘expression’, as Hass, (2008) argues. This is not a matter taken up here.

18

B. Green

It may be, too, that it is easier to attend to the more obvious instrumental activities of ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’ and to see ‘sensings’ as somehow more nebulous or intangible; someone is ‘doing’ and ‘saying’ things, and this can be recorded in various ways. It is perhaps more difficult and more challenging to approach ‘sensings’ in this way. It is important therefore to return to the notion of the lived-living body, a body that ‘lives’. In that regard, it is pertinent to note, as Harrison et al. (2019) indicate, a different translation is now available of Merleau-Ponty’s key term ‘corps propre’, originally rendered in English as ‘lived body’ but now as ‘my own body’. My view is that it is productive to work off both of these translations and thereby bring them together as well as work them off each other. This notion becomes clear when the term is glossed as ‘“my body”, the body that is lived as my own’ (p. 2). This is a body engaged in the world, with others, attuned to other projects and perspectives. Moreover, it is always situated, and intentional, or oriented. In its interactions and transactions, it experiences more than it knows or aims for; there is always an excess. And this is the realm of the sensory, of sensations, ‘sensings’, of being alive to the world. Here it becomes useful to draw in Butler’s more recent work on subjectivity, where she engages with Merleau-Ponty among others to explore ideas of embodiment, desire and relationality, and above all else the notion of subject formation as never completed and ever in process.5 Subjectivity is embodied and passionate. As she writes: ‘I am less concerned with understanding the activities of the thinking “I” than with the sensuous conditions of being sensed and sensing, a transitive and ongoing paradoxical condition that continues even in the most self-sufficient postures of thought’ (Butler, 2015, p.  11; my added emphasis). Moreover: ‘Just as philosophy founders time and again on the question of the body, it tends to separate what is called thinking from what is called sensing, from desire, passion, sexuality, and relations of dependency’ (Butler, 2015, p.  15). Thus, it is that the body-subject precedes and has priority over the intellect, the ‘mind’. There are rich connections here with notions of incarnate subjectivity, so fundamental to MerleauPonty’s philosophy, with profound implications for professional practice and education. Work of this kind has already been initiated for fields such as nursing (e.g. Harrison et al., 2019). I turn now to social work, as a quite distinctive professional practice field.

 See Stoller (2010) for a useful account linking Butler and Merleau-Ponty.

5

2  Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body

19

Social Work: An Embodied Professional Practice What makes social work so distinctive, in my view6, is that it seems difficult to specify the nature of its practice – what it is that social workers do.7 Social work would appear to be defined in part by its mission, which itself is significantly shaped by its commitment to social justice and the interests and welfare of the least advantaged in society. As such, it is one of the ‘helping’ or ‘caring’ professions. Relevant here is ‘the bodywork involved in caring’, as a practice field, with ‘care’ described as ‘an embodied, performative and imaginative endeavo[u]r’ (Küpers, 2020). Practice in this account is understood as ‘first and foremost embodied’, with practitioners seen as ‘primarily bodily beings’ (p. 6). They remain so even outside and beyond the directly immediate interactions that their work requires, as ‘embodied caring’ (p. 6).8 This point is clearly pertinent to social work. While working with ‘clients’ face-to-face is undeniably important, there are nonetheless other dimensions to account for. This is indicated in the following, from the Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW): Social workers may undertake roles in casework, counselling, advocacy, community engagement and development and social action to address issues at both the personal and social level. Social workers also work in areas such as policy development, education and research particularly around issues of social justice, disadvantage and the marginalisation of people in their communities or in society.

That is, the work ranges from ‘casework’ through legal and other forms of advocacy and organisation through to policy development and professional education, along with various forms and levels of bureaucracy. Some of these activities might be regarded as more abstract in nature, which in this case means being more removed and less directly involved on the ground, and in the flesh. Each of them, though, has its own forms of practice, its own repertoire of practices, and each, in its own way, is embodied. My focus here is on the practice of social workers in the field, in engaging with their clients, particularly in the context of what are called ‘home visits’.

On ‘Home Visits’ ‘Home visits’ are arguably at the core of social work as a professional practice field. This focus on ‘casework’ is not to deny the value or importance of other aspects of social work, at different levels, and in different places and spaces. Rather, it is to 6  I want to acknowledge that I am approaching this from the perspective of someone whose sense of the field is second-hand, at best. I thank Caitlin Green, as a practising social worker, for her advice in this respect. 7  A point made clearly, and repeatedly, by social work scholar Harry Ferguson 8  Elsewhere this is referred to as ‘embodied care work’ (Küpers, 2017, p. 97).

20

B. Green

assert, as Ferguson (2009) does with specific regard to child protection, ‘[h]ome visiting is the most fundamental act or step that child protection workers have always taken’; this remains the case, even though it ‘is the least well understood aspect of its practices’ (p. 478). Elsewhere, he refers to home visits as ‘the main way social workers achieve co-presence’ (Ferguson, 2008, p. 569). Even though notions such as ‘co-presence’ are problematical, nonetheless, it allows a link to be made here to other pertinent notions such as ‘intersubjectivity’ and, even more pressingly, ‘intercorporeality’ and also ‘co-production’. What matters in this context is the importance of the concrete, of contact and connection: face-to-face and body-to-­ body – of transaction and exchange. This is the ‘shock’ of the encounter, the lived-­ through experience of the concrete engagement, in and through practice, of social worker and ‘client’. It is a meeting place, in more than just the one sense. It is often a coming together of social worlds, as much as it is of ‘individuals’, in their specificity, of very different circumstances and backgrounds. It is where relationality and reciprocity come together, in a crucial relationship, something that might well need to be constructed over time; and even if it is more of an ideal to work towards, nonetheless the practitioner must go into the situation with establishing relationship as a professional expectation. This is not to deny, either, what are likely to be very real asymmetries in terms of social power. Notwithstanding all this, the home visit remains crucial. Indeed, Ferguson (2008, p. 569) claims that: [t]he dominant perspective in commentary on the state of social work today suggests that practitioners are being deskilled by procedures, audit and technologies of care and spend more and more time at their desks and computers and less and less time with service users. (p. 568)

‘Without it [i.e. the home visit], social work could not exist’ (p. 569). This is, of course, an all too familiar story in many fields of endeavour today, although it is particularly apposite and acute in the human services. What is important here is how, properly understood, home visiting is a profoundly embodied professional practice. The body is deeply implicated, in every respect. It is intriguing then that acknowledgement of this is a relatively recent phenomenon.9 Part of this is due to the point raised earlier, that professional education has become increasingly abstract especially as it has moved into the university. ‘During the twentieth century, many Western knowledge disciplines  – including sociology […] anthropology […]  – underwent a process of disembodiment and exclusion of the senses (except sight and, to some extent, hearing)’ (Muzicant and Peled, 2018, p. 828). The realm of the body was excluded or overlooked. This is something now being increasingly thematised and challenged, for instance, in feminism and elsewhere: ‘To take seriously the idea that knowledge is embodied implies recognizing that knowing is a corporeal activity potentially mobilizing the five senses’ (de Sousa Santos, 2008, p.  15). Recent developments in professional 9   An early reference of note is Tangenberg and Kemp (2002); see also Cameron and McDermott (2007).

2  Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body

21

education research and scholarship (Montgomery, 2006; see also Green [Ed.], 2009; Green and Hopwood [Eds.], 2015a, b) are entirely congruent with such assertions. Research by Muzicant and Peled (2018) indicates that social workers experience home visits as ‘moving them from a disembodied professional state to an embodied one’ (p. 838). This picks up on the significance of mobility in and for social work (see Ferguson, 2008), the movement from office out to clients’ homes and other contexts, as private spaces, and back again.10 This movement in itself involves and implicates the body. Moreover: ‘… the form that late-modern social work takes must be understood in terms of the flow of mobile practices between public and private worlds, organizations and service users, the office and the home. At the heart of this is the sensual body of the practitioner on the move’ (Ferguson, 2008, p. 568). Within the home itself, the body plays a crucial role, or rather there is always an interplay of bodies. Who is speaking to whom, how, and why? When to sit and when to stand? Does one remain still, or does one move around? What else is happening? How to deal with ‘[t]he considerable bodily and sensory input received during home visits  – occasionally to an overwhelming degree’ (Muzicant and Peled, 2018, p. 832)? Or is that, rather, to be bracketed out? Such matters are to be seen as practical professional issues and even dilemmas  – negotiated in the moment of being there and reflected on afterwards or perhaps in professional preparation circumstances, where they are necessarily encountered as more abstract representations. There is moreover no ‘blueprint’ for the home visit, as Ferguson (2018, p.  68) observes: ‘Social workers have to make their own practice by improvising their ways into and through the home. This requires practitioners to act much more on the basis of knowledge, skill, intuition, ritual and courage than bureaucratic rules and to be craftspeople and improvisers’.11 However, there might well be ‘core practices’ (Grossman et al., 2009) that can be discerned and described, as resources and reference points for professional learning. All this can be understood both philosophically and socio-culturally.

Back to Merleau-Ponty? What then of Merleau-Ponty and in particular his philosophy of expression? How is this relevant, and even compelling, with respect to understanding social work as an embodied professional practice? For McCormick (2010), it is the notion of ‘the lived body’ that is most important. She conceptualises this as ‘an integration of the  Hence, as Ferguson (2008, p. 565) puts it, ‘The nature of social work and welfare practices today is inconceivable without the culture of the car and, more generally, these socio-technical developments which have transformed capacities to reach vulnerable people and provide services’. 11  This is not to deny or overlook that there are always protocols and procedures, and professional ‘standards’, that social workers must take into account. The point, rather, is that representing practice is necessarily limited and no exact rendering of the practice-to-come can be made available beforehand, i.e. before the event itself. 10

22

B. Green

flesh with consciousness’, noting Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that ‘each individual not only has a body, but it is [her] body’ (p. 70). Similarly, addressing what she calls ‘the resonant body’ in relation to social work practice, Walsh (2009) asserts that ‘[r]ather than the anatomy or the psychology of the body, the aspects of the body’s experience that are of primary concern here, have to do with our felt embodiment’ (p. 48), specifically as practitioners, in the field. She describes Merleau-Ponty as seeing ‘that what is outside of body, and what is inside, what is visible and invisible – these aspects of our encounter with reality are entirely intertwined and inseparable, by way of our corporeality’ (Walsh, 2009, pp. 49–50). It is our corporeality that connects inside and outside and ‘intertwines’ them – a powerful formulation that suggests that what is at issue here is not so much the literal body, necessarily, with its boundaries and limits, but a spilling over into the world, an exchange between body and world, a flow, a between-ness, the incarnation of connection. As well as working with our bodies as resource – what we do, what we say, what we feel, and what we are drawn to attend to – we are attuned to the world and to others, in our mutual interactions and projects. We aspire to being there, with others, fully, in all its lived possibility, its intensity. It is unlikely, of course, and unrealistic to think that such a heightened state of being can be maintained all the time, in the never-ending-ness of everyday life, in practice. Much of the time we depend on our well-honed professional habitus, our store of habits, our stock of sedimented ways of being-professional, to keep us on track and able to go on. But equally important is the manner in which this plays off the authentic expression of our vocation. What must be appreciated is ‘[t]he contingency of expression’ (Landes, 2013, p.  98), the fact that it cannot be fully prescribed, or controlled, let alone contrived. Rather, authentic expression is something that one must be open to and as much as possible ready for – which is to say, it is an attitude, as much as anything, a stance, a way of being in itself. Moreover, it is something which, while it might be cultivated, can never be compelled or assumed. There are implications here, and challenges, for professional education. This is a good example of the role and significance of ‘dispositions’ in considerations of subjectivity. At issue is the manner in which subject-professionals are invested with certain qualities, investments, attachments, commitments, and the like, as a crucial aspect of their formation. Subjectification is always more than acquiring certain knowledges and capacities (although these are certainly important and indeed necessary); it always involves ‘values’ of various kinds. This is where it becomes appropriate to ask what is it that makes one a professional, or a professional practitioner? What are the qualities associated with being a professional? Moreover, this is always a matter of what elsewhere I have called organic professionalism (Green, 2009), to be sharply distinguished from the more bureaucratic professionalism increasingly called for, in neoliberal policy contexts. Here I want to focus on the notion of compassion. What is at issue, for professional practitioners, in being compassionate?12

 I note here, again, Harrison et al.’s (2019) account of nursing as an embodied practice, in particular their explicit concern with ‘empathy and compassion’ (p. 10).

12

2  Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body

23

In a fascinating account, Whiting (2020) draws attention to the particular role and significance of compassion in and for social work. Noting that it is typically dealt with rather ambivalently in policy and regulation, he nonetheless insists that it is an important matter. As he writes: ‘The concept of compassion holds a prominent yet precarious position in social work’ (Whiting, 2020, p. 1). Key to it is what he discerns in the word’s etymology, i.e. the notion of ‘to suffer with’; hence, he points to the implication that ‘compassion is something done not alone but together with others’ (p. 2). He draws explicitly upon phenomenology as a ‘language’ to work with, a philosophical perspective, to illuminate what is involved in seeing compassion as central to social work. Merleau-Ponty is a key reference point in this regard, as is David Michael Levin.13 Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body is critical, or more particularly the body-subject. The body-subject is always relational, attuned to others, the Other: ‘… as Merleau-Ponty insists, embodied subjectivity is also intersubjectivity: living bodies are involved with other living bodies from the start, and the perceptual field is social through and through’ (Hass, 2008, pp. 98–99). In this instance, the social worker, as an embodied subject, is professionally invested in the other, the client: she/he or they are within the social worker’s ‘intentional arc’ (cf. Hass, 2008, p. 83), as not simply the focus of their attention but its raison d’etre. They are why she/he is here, now, in this situation, in its unfolding and all its event-fulness. Moreover, this should be understood, fundamentally, as a matter of intercorporeality: ‘“I am, first of all, intercorporeality” (Levin, 1988, p.  266)’ (cited Whiting, 2020, p.  5). Hence, social and political considerations are necessary and unavoidable. The emphasis is the collective and the communal over and above neo-Cartesian individuality. For Whiting (2020, p.  9), Levin’s assertion of the significance of inter corporeality complements and extends Merleau-Ponty’s own position. Notwithstanding that, it should be clear that what might be called a ‘post-­ phenomenological’ perspective such as outlined here has possibilities for (re)thinking social work as a deeply ethical embodied practice.

Conclusion Bringing the body back in, then, is increasingly evident in the social work field, and this is to be welcomed (Cameron and McDermott (2007). This ranges from a more practical, instrumental perspective, where the body is principally and explicitly foregrounded as resource, to more philosophical-empirical ways of thinking the body in social work, and in other professional practice fields. The former includes efforts and injunctions to make greater use of the body and its forms of ‘knowing’ in both fieldwork and professional education. Hence, as McCormick (2010), citing

 A significant phenomenological philosopher in his own right, Levin’s work is nonetheless clearly influenced by Merleau-Ponty, as Whiting (2020, p. 3) indicates.

13

24

B. Green

Cameron and McDermott (2007, p. 7), indicates, increasingly ‘social workers are taught about the use of the body in client interactions, with emphasis on communicating “empathy, interest, positive regard, genuineness and authenticity in our voice tones, facial expressions, eye contact and bodily positioning”’ (p. 69). This is certainly to be welcomed. But how well does it work, in practice, and moreover, is this sufficient? Continuing to operate within a Cartesian framing is certainly unlikely to make for productive change. What is needed, instead, is a new language, a quite different perspective. In this chapter, I have sought to outline what ‘post-phenomenology’, and Merleau-Ponty in particular, has to offer in this respect. This is an aspect of what has been described as a ‘post-conventional paradigm’ (Bell, 2012) for social work, a new philosophical base. But there are implications, I believe, for professional practice and education more generally. Bringing the philosophy of expression to bear in recalibrating practice theory and philosophy is consistent with recent engagements with practice as concept as well as problem. Küpers (2020) describes practice as ‘both an umbrella term and a facilitating boundary concept’ and suggests that, as such, it is ‘open enough for a multidimensional analysis and a creative exploration across disciplinary borders, allowing different traditions with their distinct perspectives to join the discussion’ (Küpers, 2020). Corporeality provides a powerful provocation to thought in this regard, as well as to professional praxis, re-affirmed now as lived-through, fully embodied practice.

References Bell, K. (2012). Towards a post-conventional philosophical base for social work. British Journal of Social Work, 42, 408–423. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcr073 Butler, J. (1997). The psychic life of power. Stanford University Press. Butler, J. (2015). Senses of the subject. Fordham University Press. http://www.jstor.com/stable/j. ctt130h9pt.4 Cameron, N., & McDermott, F. (2007). Social work and the body. Palgrave Macmillan. de Sousa Santos, B. (2008). The end of the cognitive empire: The coming of age of the epistemologies of the South. Duke University Press. Ferguson, H. (2008). Liquid social work: Welfare interventions as mobile practices. British Journal of Social Work, 38, 561–579. Ferguson, H. (2009). Performing Child Protection: Home Visiting, Movement and the Struggle to Reach the Abused Child. Child & Family Social Work, 14, 471–480. Ferguson, H. (2018). Making home visits: Creativity and the embodied practices of home visiting in social work and child protection. Qualitative Social Work, 17(1), 65–80. Green, B. (Ed.). (2009). Understanding and researching professional practice. Sense Publishers. Green, B. (2015). Thinking bodies: Practice theory, Deleuze, and professional education. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education: body/practice? (pp. 121–136). Springer. Green, B., & Hopwood, H. (Eds.). (2015a). The body in professional practice, learning and education: Body/practice? Springer. Green, B., & Hopwood, N. (2015b). The body in professional practice, learning and education: A question of corporeality. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education: body/practice? (pp. 15–33). Springer.

2  Practice Theory, Corporeality, and Professional Education: Rethinking the Body

25

Grossman, P., Compton, C., Igra, D., Ronfeldt, M., Shahan, E., & Williamson, P.  W. (2009). Teaching practice: A cross-professional perspective. Teachers College Record, 11(9), 2055–2100. Hager, P., Lee, A., & Reich, A. (2012). Practice, learning and change: Practice-theory perspectives on professional learning. Springer. Harrison, H. F., Kinsella, E. A., & DeLuca, S. (2019). Locating the lived body in client-nurse interactions: embodiment, intersubjectivity and intercorporeality. Nursing Philosophy, 20, e12241. https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.12241 Hass, L. (2008). Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Indiana University Press. Kemmis, S., Wilkinson, J., Edwards-Groves, C., Hardy, I., Grootenboer, P., & Bristol, L. S. M. (2014). Changing practices, changing education. Springer. Küpers, W. (2017). Critical performativity and embodied performing as materio-socio-cultural practices  – Phenomenological perspectives on performative bodies at work. Management, 20(1), 89–106. Küpers, W. (2020). Embodied ‘Inter-Practice’ in organizations  – The contribution of Merleau-­ Ponty to carnal organizational practices and studies. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 1–21, 0953–4814. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOCM-­05-­2019-­0124 Landes, D. A. (2013). Merleau-Ponty and the paradox of expression. Bloomsbury. Levin, D.  M. (1988). The opening of vision: Nihilism and the postmodern situation (1st ed.). Routledge. Mahon, K., Francisco, S., & Kemmis, S. (2016). Exploring education and professional practice: Through the lens of practice architectures. Springer. Marcoulatos, I. (2001). Merleau-Ponty and bourdieu on embodied significance. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 31(1), 1–27. Massumi, B. (2002). Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation. Duke University Press. McCormick, M. (2010). The lived body: The essential dimension in social work practice, qualitative. Social Work, 10(1), 68–85. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). The body as expression, and speech, in Phenomenology of perception, Trans. Colin Smith, London: Routledge, pp. 174–199. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). Science and the experience of expression, in The prose of the world, Translated by John O’Neill & Introduced by Claude Lefort, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, pp. 9–46. Montgomery, K. (2006). How doctors think: Clinical judgement and the practice of medicine. Oxford University Press. Muzicant, A., & Peled, E. (2018). Home visits in social work: From disembodiment to embodied presence. British Journal of Social Work, 48, 826–842. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcx033 Schatzki, T. R. (1996). Social practices: A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Cambridge University Press. Schatzki, T. R. (2001). Practice theory. In T. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina, & E. von Savigny (Eds.), The practice turn in contemporary theory (pp. 1–14). Routledge. Schatzki, T. R. (2012). A primer on practices. In J. Higgs et al. (Eds.), Practice-based education: Perspectives and strategies (pp. 13–26). Sense Publishers. Stoller, S. (2010). Expressivity and performativity: Merleau-Ponty and Butler. Continental Philosophical Review, 43, 97–110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-­010-­9133-­x Tangenberg, K.  M., & Kemp, S. (2002). Embodied practice: Claiming the body’s experience, agency, and knowledge for social work. Social Work, 47(1), 8–18. Vagle, M. D. (2015). Curriculum as post-intentional phenomenological text: working along the edges and margins of phenomenology using post-structuralist ideas. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 47(5), 594–612. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220272.2015.1051118 Walsh, A.  M. (2009). The resonant body: Preliminary considerations for social work practice. Critical Social Work, 2009, 10(1), 48–58. Whiting, R. (2020). Compassion through intercorporeality: The value of the phenomenological philosophy of David Michael Levin to social work education. Social Work Education, 40, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/02615479.2020.1771299

Chapter 3

To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional Action and Education Eva Schwarz

Abstract  This chapter considers professional practice as a potentially collaborative form of practical wisdom, phronesis. The question to be explored is to what extent “collective phronesis” transcends the individual with a focus on the professions of teaching and policing as examples. Professional identity can be seen as an embodiment that involves both the individual and the social. Practitioners “embody” their profession individually and collectively. How can this be understood? As individuals, professionals often make decisions that use the routines and informal rules provided by the profession, and sometimes groups of professionals may make decisions together. There can be conflicts between these settings that challenge the embodied being-in-the-world of practitioners and their capacity to relate to other subjects in an empathetic way. Examples of such challenges will be explored to critically analyse our understanding of phronesis for the individual and the collective. Keywords  Collectivity · Professional action · Phronesis · Empathy · Embodiment Looking at the professional life of a teacher, nurse or police officer, we can see that much of what each individual does is done together with others or is based on action and judgement that transcends one’s individual horizon. In many professions, physical, bodily cooperation is necessary for skilful performance: such as physicians involved in surgery, police officers restraining a violent suspect or musicians playing in an orchestra1. In this sense, professionals often act together as “one body”. In other contexts, it may be that an ongoing action is handed over to, or complemented by, other professionals. Examples of this are shift changes in healthcare or a team of  See, e.g. Simon Höffding’s insightful phenomenological analysis of the interplay of a famous Danish string quarter in A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption, 2019. 1

E. Schwarz (*) Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge, Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_3

27

28

E. Schwarz

teachers working together to best serve children with different needs. One way of understanding the collective dimension of these activities would be to recognise the individual professionals as being educated in shared methods and committed to common goals. For example, a team of teachers might base their work on common routines and jointly agreed learning outputs. Nevertheless, the collective dimension of professional actions consists not just in professionals acting skilfully together. Professional actions are also already embedded in a pre-constituted professional practice, based on traditions, habits and rules that are often formulated by others. The pre-constituted practice also includes certain ideals of a professional community. This collaborative dimension is not always explicit but is often implicitly expressed in the way professionals act together, how they move, talk or decide what to do  (Bourdieu, 1985). In a way, professionals embody their profession.2 This also involves their bodily way of relating to their praxis: how one moves, talks, a certain rhythm, timing or feeling for the needs of another (Pröckl, 2020). This can be difficult to explain to a newcomer to a profession. Often, common routines and habits only become noticeable when someone performs them poorly, for example, when a student teacher does not know how to tell a story to children in a way that engages them or a young police student who does not know what it means to look for a “suspicious” subject (Schwarz and Lappalainen, 2020). Yet, knowing how to act as a professional requires not only skilful collective interaction towards a predefined goal, or maintaining certain embodied habits and routines, but also judgement regarding the very specific situation in question (Kinsella and Pitman, 2012). Sometimes this judgement includes questioning the common habits and routines, the way “we are used to doing it”, or to question the very goal that has been set in advance. Judgement can prompt us to look at a situation in a different way For example, as a teacher, I have to ask myself how to relate to this specific student and her specific situation today. Judgement is often thought of as an individual activity; however, it can also be understood as a collective capacity, as a form of judging together. It also involves the ability to know when to judge and act as an individual and in coordination or in rhythm with others, in order to achieve the best outcomes. For people who are learning to become professionals, this implies a complex tension: On the one hand, they must learn how to become a competent member of the professional community. One goal of professional education is to enable professionals to act skilfully together. On the other hand, they must learn to judge situations independently, to modify their actions according to the uniqueness of each situation. This includes, as I want to argue in the following, a certain capacity for empathy both towards other (often more experienced) professional partners, to coordinate the activity, and towards those who receive the professional service: students, patients or clients. I take empathy as the capacity to see other people not only

2  Within sociology, this is often formulated by use of the term “professional habitus” (e.g. Bourdieu 1985).

3  To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional…

29

as recipients with certain capacities or needs but as embodied subjects who have their own perspectives on a situation that is distinct from my perspective. How can we address this tension within professional education? How can we educate students to make judgements both individually and collectively? In the next section, I begin with an overview of the current philosophical debate on collective action, judgement and the role of embodiment and present some criteria from the literature related to action. In a second section, two examples from professional education are introduced. The examples are sequences from essays, one written by a young police student and one by an experienced childminder who is on her way to become a preschool teacher at a university in Sweden.3 In their narratives, they describe a difficult situation “at work” where the relation between the individual and the collective is problematic.4 In a third section, two philosophical concepts are discussed that enable a better understanding of these examples in terms of collective action: empathy and intercorporeality. Both concepts have recently played a central role in the phenomenological debate on collectivity and contributed to shed light on the above-mentioned tension regarding collectivity. In a fourth section, the educational dimension of embodiment and collective action are explored from the framework of an Aristotelian perspective on professional judgement. Both perspectives, the phenomenological and the Aristotelian, inform an understanding of professional action as an embodied praxis. Finally, some practical implications for higher education are discussed.

 hilosophical Debate on Collectivity and the Role P of Embodiment and Empathy There is an ongoing debate about how to conceptualise collective action with many different approaches and concepts such as intersubjectivity, sociality, plurality, we-­ consciousness and shared agency (Schmid and Schweikard, 2009; Szanto and Moran, 2016). Each of these concepts touches upon different dimensions of collectivity and mirrors certain philosophical traditions and discourses. The debate circles around both ontological and epistemological questions. Is it justified to allow agency to social entities, such as states or commercial companies, and regard them as “group subjects” (List and Petit 2013)? How can we justify beliefs that are based on “collective consciousness”, and how can we describe the different dimensions of collective intentionality (Schmid and Schweikard, 2009)? When it comes to the 3  In Sweden, police education and preschool teacher education have very different academic histories. Whereas the teaching professions have been located in higher education for decades (at least in Sweden), police education is a newcomer to higher education. 4  These examples come from final undergraduate papers in a form developed at the Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge at Södertörn University, Sweden. This specific essay form is use in  Teacher Education and Police Education at Södertörn University as well as at the Police University College in Bodø, Norway.

30

E. Schwarz

philosophical debate on collective action and judgement, there is often a focus on intentional or goal-directed action. Collective action is often defined via shared goals (Pacherie, 2014) or plural subjects who act based on “joint commitment” (Gilbert, 2014). Different criteria have been introduced that can help distinguish the phenomenon of collective agency from other forms of action or subjectivity.5 One criterion is “collectivity”, the idea of belonging and having some “commitment” to the group. To be part of a collective is more than just random participation such as people sitting on a bus; rather, it requires people to intentionally form a social group (Mathiesen, 2005). Another criterion is “awareness” (Mathiesen, 2005). To speak of collective agency presupposes that the members of the collective are aware of their participation, as opposed to an organism or machines that can have no such awareness. There is a debate as to what extent the criteria of collectivity and awareness have to be complemented by a form of “plurality”: the idea that collective subjectivity and action have to include multiple conscious subjects with distinct perspectives who join together without being dissolved into a homogenous unity (Loidolt, 2016; Mathiesen, 2005). The different criteria show a certain ambivalence regarding the possibility of speaking of collective action and subjectivity. In order to act together, the explicit formation of a collective seems to be necessary. The ideas of awareness and goal-­ directed collectivity, however, are based on an assumption that much of our collective life is taking place solely on a cognitive level. Lately, there has been a growing focus on the role of embodiment, emotions and affect that underlie collective subjectivity (e.g. Krueger, 2015; Zahavi, 2015). Here the roles of shared emotions and empathy have played a very important part in the debate on collectivity (Fuchs, 2016; Fuchs, 2017). Empathy, as a capacity to recognise the emotional or mental states of others, has been pointed out as central for forming a “we”. Yet, empathising with another does not (necessarily) mean to feel the same as the other; empathy is an understanding of the perspective of the other as distinct from my own. Still, joint bodily experiences – intercorporeality – are taken to be a presupposition for empathy (e.g. Walsh, 2014). How can we understand the role of embodiment for collective action? Let us take a look at two concrete examples from professional education. In contrast to the debate within social ontology, which is mainly focused on goal-­ directed action6, I am interested in collective action in the form of a vulnerable

5  Kay Mathiesen (2005) presents three criteria or requirements for what he calls a “collective subject” that are helpful in grasping the complex phenomenon of collective consciousness. I have used these criteria and expanded the focus from the possibility of speaking of collective consciousness to collective action. 6  Given that the problem of collectivity confronts us with very complex philosophical questions, examples used in the social ontology debate are often simplistic. The examples include people going for a walk, people cooking dinner (Pacherie, 2014) or people gardening together (Szanto 2014). Sometimes we can find examples from science fiction (Mathiesen 2005). The use of thought experiments is not unusual, especially in analytic philosophy, but the question arises, whether or not it is possible, on the basis of simplified or invented examples, to capture the complexity of the phenomenon in question.

3  To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional…

31

practice that is not only goal directed but which gains its meaning in the embodied interaction with others in situations we cannot totally predict.

Professional Education: Two Examples The examples are from very different educational practices, police education and early childhood teacher education. These professions might appear to not share many similarities. Whereas policing is about maintaining public order and law enforcement (Polismyndigheten, 1984), professionals within early childhood education are focused on the development and care of young human beings (Skolverket 2018). The examples are excerpts from texts written by students, which serve as their final essay before becoming a qualified police officer or teacher. In their texts, they describe, and reflect upon, a difficult situation they have experienced “at work”. These stories were gathered as part of a research project on collective phronesis in the welfare professions in Sweden and Germany (Schwarz and Lappalainen, 2020). Names, places and so on are anonymised according to the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity and the research principles of the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet, 2017). Comparing the examples, one can see that even though they are dealing with entirely different situations, they nevertheless touch upon similar questions of authority, trust, integrity and vulnerability. The first text is a passage from an essay written by a young police student describing a difficult situation that arose during her 6-month internship. She and her supervisor, an experienced police officer, were summoned by the healthcare service to the apartment of a woman diagnosed with schizophrenia. The woman is naked and acts aggressively towards herself and others, and they are to assist in transporting her to a psychiatric facility against her will (Andersson, 2021). After a while, the young police student gets more and more uncomfortable with the situation: Finally, we come up with a solution. We wrap Kerstin in the quilt and together we cautiously roll her down on the floor where the mattress from the stretcher lies. To control her arms and legs so that she does not injure herself or anyone else, we fix her with foot cuffs and straps from the stretcher. It is not easy to tie up Kerstin. The whole discussion goes on over her head. Kerstin is now just staring straight into the air. Someone puts a pair of white panties on her, they have a hole and yellow stains. She looks ashamed. The bedroom is crowded and there are six people, which is too many, so a younger colleague and I end up doing nothing, just standing there. The situation feels undignified. The two ambulance men, my instructor and another colleague grab each corner of the stretcher and pull Kerstin down the stairs. We manage to get Kerstin into the ambulance and my instructor and I are ready on the spot and get in the car. (Andersson, 2021, p. 36, my translation)

The second example is a sequence from an essay written by a student teacher reflecting on a difficult situation at a preschool. In contrast to the police student, the author is not a novice but rather an experienced childminder who is studying to become a qualified preschool teacher. She describes how she and her colleague,

32

E. Schwarz

Anna, who have been working together for many years, jointly deal with a young boy who does not want to go outside by starting to tell made-up stories: Anna and I are sitting in the hall, helping the kids to get dressed. (…) Martin is mostly spinning around. He doesn’t want to go out. He has been working on a Lego project all day and really wants to continue with it. I have persuaded him to come along so we can go to the forest. He does not want to get dressed and drops the rain pants I give him on the floor. They are the ones he dislikes most. Before he can start arguing, I tell my colleague Anna: “Do you remember that boy whose parents wouldn’t allow him to wear rain pants?” Anna hooks up directly: “You mean Kalle?” “Yes, do you remember how wet he got every day outside?” “Yes, it was crazy, he got so cold too, his butt was all red!” Anna and I enjoy making up stories of this kind, it becomes like a game between us. As we talk about that poor Kalle who got so cold, Martin is listening intently, allowing me to dress him. Before he knows it, he is ready to go out. Before leaving, he asks: “What was that boy called again?” (Stålberg, 2016, p. 219, my translation)

Both examples pose many  complex ethical  questions concerning e.g. empathy, vulnerability or autonomy but also questions of skilful professional action and judgement. Before approaching those dimensions, let us first look at them from the perspective of embodiment and collectivity. The challenge in the first example consists in a (seemingly) basic physical operation: together the group of police officers roll the quite heavy woman on to the stretcher.7 This is the joint goal of this part of the operation. The police student has been instructed in university classes how to do this; she has learned how to physically handle violent people. Yet, this situation seems different. The student expresses doubt about the situation and her participation: “The situation feels undignified”; she writes and wonders if there is another way to reach the same solution (Andersson, 2021, p. 36). Leaving the woman in her bed would probably lead to negative consequences for this woman who requires psychiatric help. The second example has a somewhat similar structure; it is also about moving a person against his will. Here too, the physical dimension of the sphere of action is clear. It is about getting dressed, about moving outside and about the well-being of the boy.8 The student teacher is facing a dilemma: She cannot leave the boy on his own. Staying inside with the boy would mean leaving the other teacher alone with the rest of the group. Forcing him to go outside, carrying him, means physical coercion and emotional upset. In both examples, the becoming professionals meet a vulnerable person in need of help. But they are also confronted with their own vulnerability and insecurity: Is it right to act this way? Can I rely on our joint decision and strategy? The examples demonstrate these professions, policing and early childhood education, as bodily practices. Not only in the sense that, as a police officer, one must be strong, or as a 7  The Swedish police have, by law, to assist the ambulance staff only if a person is in need of psychiatric care. The law is explicit that patients must be treated considerately and as gently as possible (Riksdagen, 2017, 36). 8  Yet, as Maria Pröckl recently argued, to act professionally in early childhood education is much more than instrumental action (Pröckl, 2020). A skilled preschool teacher must be capable of “reading” a situation and possess an embodied knowledge of when to do what in relation to whom. Pröckl calls this capacity “empathic timing” (Pröckl, 2020, pp. 128–135).

3  To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional…

33

teacher one has to work with her hands to dress a child, but first and foremost as a characterisation of the existential sphere of policing and teaching. The future professionals are affected by persons who are showing signs of resistance and shame. Many police students I have met, after returning from their internships, express that they were not prepared for this dimension of their future work: to be confronted with the vulnerability of others, with expressions of violence and fear, and neglected bodies,9 but also with their own bodily reactions of disgust, anger and shame. Sometimes they struggle with their own inability to empathise with vulnerable persons. Sometimes they are deeply touched and upset that their more experienced colleagues no longer seem to show signs of empathy. From the outside, both examples show successful teamwork. Together, the practitioners manage to solve a difficult situation. With regard to the student teachers, one can see a shift from individual to collective action the moment they start telling the story. In fact, they are already an established “team”. As the student teacher writes, they have worked with each other for years as childminders, and they have organised the situation in the hallway in a familiar way: The “method” of telling stories is something they are trained in. They can rely on pre-established structures, experiences and routines between them. Together, they manage to get the little boy to dress and leave the hallway without using physical coercion. The first example is more problematic in relation to collectivity. The young police student is a newcomer. For her, this is a new situation. She has no previous experience with similar situations. In this situation, she appears as both agent and spectator. She is physically involved with the joint problem solving, writing in first-person plural, but changes perspective after a while. Empathising with the woman, she is – at least for a moment – no longer part of the group, even though none of the others may notice. She takes up the perspective of the woman for a second, imagining what it would mean, lying there naked in front of many strangers: “The way we talk about the woman shows that she is a problem that we should solve, rather than a human we should help. We don’t talk to her. We talk about her, over her head. It feels wrong” (Andersson, 2021, p.35, my translation). In the contemporary philosophical debate on the possibility of collective agency and judgement as described above, there is a focus on situations that require both plurality, in the form of distinct judgements jointly made, in the here and now, and the prior long-term commitment to collectivity as a member of a professional community. Yet, looking at our examples, one can see that professionals often have to deal with conflicts between these two dimensions. This is the case when collective actions are based on routines and group commitments that are mostly implicit and unconscious rather than joint judgements based on the perspectives of the members of the group, which can be verbalised and discussed. Looking at the examples, we can see a tension between these dimensions. 9  “I look around in the apartment. It is nothing extraordinary, a little messy and I think it should be renovated. In the bedroom, the only thing I see is a double bed. It’s worn out. On the part where the woman lies, the sheets are dirty and the mattress is broken. I guess it’s been a long time since Kerstin left the bed” (Andersson 2021, p 35, my translation).

34

E. Schwarz

When the young police student is empathising with the woman, the student is outside of the police collective and is, in a way, no longer part of the group of police officers jointly facing a problem. This outside perspective, as a not yet fully established member of the group, enables her to see the situation from a different angle. Yet, because she is not yet a fully established member, there is not much she can do to influence the process that is based on routines that fail to attend to the dignity of the naked woman. The group of experienced police officers do not appear to judge the situation or to ask themselves how to meet the woman in a way that recognises her dignity. The student questions the way the group handles the woman, like a “problem that has to be solved”. In the second example, the student teacher bases her actions on a joint routine. Telling a story together with her colleague, they create a “third space” directing the attention of the boy from the physical, here and now, to an imaginative shared space. Even here, the initial collective of the two preschool teachers has been transformed. The little boy has been caught up with the story. He is – seemingly – part of a joint space. The two teacher students have found a collective and embodied way to handle the situation. But one could still ask whether they really have taken the perspective of the boy into account. Have they really included him in the joint storytelling in an empathetic way or just distracted him?10

 Phenomenological Perspective: Empathy A and Intercorporeality From a phenomenological perspective, empathy is about me being experientially acquainted with the experience of someone else. This does not necessarily have to be understood in cognitive terms. Empathy is not the same as a simple awareness such as “She must be ashamed” or “He rather wants to play with his toys”; empathy can be seen as related to embodied experience. I not only see but bodily experience another person’s expression of shame or distrust. As in the police example, one can have an immediate embodied understanding of the woman being ashamed without having to make inferences from the person’s facial expression to possible inner states of mind (e.g. Zahavi, 2001). Fuchs (2016, 2017) distinguishes between a primary form of empathy that arises from a direct bodily attunement to another person and a more extended, cognitive, secondary empathy that requires one to put oneself, via imagination, in the place of the other. Secondary empathy depends on primary empathy, but does not replace the functions of primary empathy (Fuchs, 2017). Rather the two forms of empathy “remain the basis of our social interactions

 Stålberg asks herself in the text: “Probably I don’t really listen to him when he says that he does not want to go out and that he doesn’t want the pants. The choice to stay inside ‘does not exist’, so when I remember the situation in order to write down the story it is the pants I concentrate on” (Stålberg, 2016, p. 221).

10

3  To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional…

35

and relationships throughout life” (Fuchs, 2016, p 196). Primary empathy is based on a fundamental bodily attunement to each other. Merleau-Ponty (1962) famously describes the intersubjective dimension of human embodiment as a fundamental “inter-corporeality” we have as embodied beings with others. He uses the term “intercorporeality” to describe the way sociality is constituted by mutual embodied experience in which I experience other persons as embodied subjects and expressive persons and vice versa. Intercorporeality refers to a fundamental mutual bodily openness and connectedness towards other people. This does not mean that intercorporeality guarantees openness to other people. According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), intercorporeality is the condition for the possibility of openness and connectedness. Thus, the body is not just one dimension of our social life underpinning others but is, in an important way, an integral part of all of our social life. In order to be able to communicate at all, to establish a social community with others, we already have to be bodily connected to each other on a pre-social, pre-communicative level (Walsh, 2020)11. Given this shared bodily ground of intercorporeality, empathy still seems to presuppose a distinction between me and the other, a distinct someone with whom I can empathise. Meeting another person first and foremost means meeting an embodied person who has a certain “point of view” that is different from my own perspective and whose point of view cannot always be easily grasped. Empathy is not the same as sharing an emotion. In fact, I can empathise with someone who feels ashamed without feeling ashamed myself. Yet, there is something in my bodily constitution that still enables me to empathise with this other person. The capacity to empathise with another is dependent on my own feelings, experiential history and previous experiences. In our example, the young police student feels uncomfortable. This feeling is based on her (embodied) experience, possibly her own experiences of shame and vulnerability. Taking an empathetic perspective presupposes that I can see another person as an individual human, i.e. as someone who has a distinct perspective on the world. In the situation with the woman in her bed, naked and angry, but also vulnerable and powerless, the young police officer can follow the gaze of the woman. In order to empathise with the woman she does not have to imagine what it would mean to be lying there, but as an embodied vulnerable  human being herself, she can experience the vulnerability of a stranger. This capacity is not self-evident. In the example with the police student, we can see how her empathy with the woman conflicts with being part of the group of police officers and maybe even with her ability to fulfil the task of helping the woman to get access to medical care. Here, the above-mentioned tension with the collective becomes explicit: The young police student seems to be positioned between different possible collectives: the shared practices and expected emotions of a police officer, on the one hand, and her feelings of empathy as a fellow human

 Walsh uses the term intercorporeity although this seems to be synonymous with intercorporeality which is more widely used.

11

36

E. Schwarz

with the naked woman. In this moment, the police student is enabled to look at the situation from another perspective as she reflects on what is happening. In the second example, the student teacher describes how the cooperation with her colleague creates something new between them. She describes it in terms of “magic”, something that is related to who they are together and how they have worked together earlier (Stålberg, 2016, p. 221). In relation to the children, this is both a strategy and a way of showing how they themselves can identify with children and be “one of them”. As the student teacher writes: telling stories, joking around, “also means that the children learn to know that we understand what it is like to be a child” (Stålberg, 2016, p. 221). Yet, this is not the same as sharing a perspective as a member of a collective. The preschool teachers are not children and have their own – educational – perspective on the situation. In her text, the student shows that she can empathise with the boy; she understands that he prefers to stay inside, where it is warm and there are toys. Yet she also weighs the value of following the individual boy’s wishes against the value of the collective good that is realised in not leaving her colleague alone to supervise all of the other children.

Collective Action and Professional Judgement Both examples describe difficult situations one can respond to in different ways. The students’ responses depend on their capacity to judge the situation and understand what is happening but also their practical ability to know how to act in the best possible way, however this is defined. In book 6 of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle famously distinguishes between two different spheres of human activities, poiesis and praxis, that require two different forms of practical knowledge: techne and phronesis. Poiesis is the sphere of production or work and requires techne, which is often translated as craftsmanship or art. It is characterised by producing an entity in relation to a goal set up in advance. Whether it is a good entity, or not, is determined by the product’s definition, i.e. by a particular goal formulated in advance (Aristotle, 1975, 1140a). Poiesis is something that can be done alone, or in groups, working towards a goal. The members of the group are interchangeable as long as they possess techne, i.e. the capability to work towards the goal or product. Praxis, or action, on the other hand, is introduced by Aristotle as the sphere of interaction between humans. Praxis requires, according to Aristotle, phronesis or practical wisdom. Phronesis shows itself in the manner we perform with and towards others and not in an achieved goal or product. Often, the need for phronesis becomes obvious in unanticipated situations. One example of this is the student teacher who runs into a conflict with the little boy and has to decide how to proceed. The student’s confidence in her knowledge and the relationships she has established with the boy and her colleague allow her to exercise phronetic judgement to resolve the situation. Yet, from the perspective of phronesis, it is not the result that characterises the action as good, namely, that the boy agrees to go outside, but the very way it is performed, namely, in a

3  To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional…

37

playful and empathetic manner, appropriate to the setting. Empathy is an important part of the challenge. On the one hand, her empathy with the boy is part of her practical embodied knowledge and gives her insight into what is happening. Yet, she also has to judge how to act upon this insight. Phronesis is about not only doing the right thing but also doing it in the right way. Looking at the example with the police student, phronesis suggests there are other possible ways of achieving the goal, namely, moving the woman. As the student writes: (B)y talking to Kerstin we could still have given her the feeling that she could be involved in influencing her future. We could have created confidence by explaining to Kerstin what would happen, how we would carry on and where we would go. (Andersson, 2021, p.40, my translation)

In contrast to techne, phronesis is related to who the practitioner is, her previous experiences, her current understanding of the present situation and her relation to the other person involved, but also her capacity to feel certain things, to read the bodily expressions of another person as an expression of another’s point of view. Here we can see the connection between phronesis and empathy. Phronesis is always about our ethical relation to others. While techne is displayed in products or goals, phronetic knowledge is displayed in actions that include judgements about another person. Since phronesis is usually understood as a characteristic of an individual, it can be harder to see it in a collective sense when it takes place in joint interpersonal activity (e.g. Annas, 2011, Von Brandenstein, 1973). Nevertheless, we can see, from the examples provided, that sometimes it is the collective that has to act phronetically as a group to solve a practice issue in an ethical way that goes beyond merely achieving a technical solution. This form of joint action is not to be reduced to cooperation towards a predefined goal, as, for example, in division of labour in craftsmanship, or a mere execution of law, but includes the possibility of change of goals and methods during the very action. This raises the issue of professional identity. The ethical identity of the police force and the community of teachers is at stake, in addition to the ethical identity of the individuals.12 There is a tendency to minimise the professionalism of policing and teaching. These professions need, if they want to consider themselves in terms of a professional practice, ethical interpersonal praxis and phronesis in the Aristotelian sense. It is unfair to these professions to consider them only from the perspective of poiesis, as only focused on completing technical tasks.

 Police forces are widely seen as encouraging a perspective of conformity. There tends to be one distinctive way of seeing things. New members are often expected to accept this completely and without question in order to build “esprit de corps”. This is counter to the need to engage different perspectives on challenging situations. An unquestioning perspective in the police force also runs other risks, such as failing to stand up to totalitarianism (in Swedish “kåranda”; see, e.g. Bergmann, 2016; Karp & Stenmark, 2011).

12

38

E. Schwarz

The Tension of Collectivity and Professional Education What can professional education learn from the discussion above? I want to take up three points as a consequence of my analysis of the examples above that I argue are important for higher education. The first point concerns the tension or ambivalence that arises when it comes to the relation between professional action and phronesis. Looking at the Aristotelian distinction between poesis and praxis, we can see that professional practice runs the risk of being reduced to merely cooperative technical work (poiesis) towards a predefined goal, losing the interactive and ethically significant character of praxis. Members of a profession have to act phronetically in relation to the group or the profession as a whole. The concept of collective phronesis relates to the capacity of a group to act in relation to a concrete situation that requires the judgement of more than one subject and a sensitivity to the very manner in which members of a collective act towards other subjects. In order to be successful, they have to be able to change perspective when trying to interact with colleagues and those who are in need of their services. As newcomers, they tend to have an outsider’s perspective. There needs to be a space where they can step back from the ongoing joint process in order to question and reassess a situation from different viewpoints. Here a newcomer may be in a vulnerable position and feel unable to question more experienced colleagues, who base their actions on embodied routines and habits. This questioning can only occur once students become accepted members of a profession themselves. The dilemma is that accepted members of the professional community may lose the fresh perspective of the newcomer and fail to ask important questions such as “Who are we?”, “What do we do?” and “How do we do it?”. In a way, the experienced childminder, who is well on her way to become a preschool teacher, is in the opposite situation. Reflecting on her activity, she is confident in taking up different perspectives. In her reflection, she can see her own actions in terms that closely involve her colleagues. Professional education needs to offer spaces where students can both learn to act phronetically together with others and also reflect on the tensions and productive spaces between the individual and the collective in the practical activities they engage in as new members of the profession. The second aspect concerns the very way we address these tensions in professional education. I contend that we need, theoretically and practically, to look at distinctive cases that rigorously challenge the students to reflect on their actions and “who” they are and who they want to become in their future professional roles. We must become better at addressing the role of the individual in relation to the collective and question more closely what it means to find oneself working with other people in a profession as embodied subjects. The bodily nature of professional interaction is constitutive of the decisions and judgements that are made but is often ignored as these issues are usually considered at a more abstract level. If, however, our primary relation to others is not abstract, but fundamentally embodied, intercorporeal and performative, how can we develop new ways to conceptualise and teach this in professional education? I offer one possibility here.

3  To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional…

39

We can encourage students to share stories of their fieldwork experience and help them reflect on the details in ways that bring attention to the embodied nature of these experiences. The examples above are written by people who are beginners in their professions but who are, at the same time, people with relevant, previous, embodied life experiences. In my own practice as a teacher, I ask students to thoroughly describe situations in a way that brings awareness to the “embodied practice”. I put emphasis on the importance of carefully describing the nuances that can characterise a situation as an example of embodied praxis in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. as more than simply a technical task that has to be fulfilled (Schwarz and Lappalainen, 2020). This leads me to the third aspect, the role of theory. Professional education means not only training students to see what is needed at a particular moment or to be able to judge the actions of others in that context but also enabling students to relate to the profession as a collective whole and to the demands placed on the profession in the long term. Looking at our examples of possible collective actions that include embodiment and judgement, we can see that epistemological and conceptual questions are tightly interwoven with ethical and even political questions. Most theoretical positions presuppose “disembodiment” from practice. However, there are theoretical positions that offer richer multidimensional analyses of professional phenomena as they are constituted in experience. Phenomenological accounts on embodiment or empathy, for example, provide a discourse that enables students, researchers and practitioners to jointly relate to professional phenomena from a new angle and to articulate their different experiential and embodied perspectives in relation to the philosophical concepts. Within such a discourse, we can, for example, ask a range of questions such as: What is the difference between the sharing of an emotion and empathy in professional practice? What are the consequences for how we understand and perform professional activities? What is the experience of your body in relation to other bodies (intercorporeality) in practice? In summary, attention to the collective and embodied dimensions of judgement enriches professional education by drawing attention to the complex ways in which our embodiment affects concrete actions within the context of professional practice. Attention to intercorporeality draws out nuances in the interpersonal relations that are characteristic of many professional activities. And finally, attention to embodiment elucidates the importance of the deep ethically significant engagement that occurs in professional practice.

References Andersson, T. (2021). “Det känns fel. En vetenskaplig essä om ett polisiärt ingripande där en människa blev ett problem.” (It feels wrong. A scientific essay on a police operation where a human being is treated as a problem) In J. Lappalainen (ed), Aspiranten och erfarenheten. Polisens praktiska kunskap. (Aspirant and experience. The practical knowledge of policing) (Huddinge: Södertörn University Press. Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent virtue. Oxford University Press.

40

E. Schwarz

Aristotle. (1975). The Nicomachean ethics. Harvard University Press. Bergman, B. (2016). Poliser som utbildar poliser; Reflexivitet, meningsskapande och professionell utveckling. (Police officers educating police officer. Reflexivity, meaningfulness and professional development) Diss. Umeå: Umeå Universitet, Pedagogiska Institutionen. http://umu. diva-­portal.org/smash/get/diva2:970969/FULLTEXT04.pdf Bourdieu, P. (1985). The social space and the genesis of groups. Theory and Society, 14(6), 723–744. Retrieved December 22, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/657373 Fuchs, T. (2016). Intercorporeity and interaffectivity. Phenomenology and Mind, 11, 194–209. Fuchs, T. (2017). Levels of empathy  – Primary, extended and reiterated empathy. In V.  Lux & S. Weigel (Eds.), Empathy (pp. 27–48). Palgrave MacMillan. Gilbert, M. (2014). Joint commitment. Oxford University Press. Höffding, S. (2019). A phenomenology of musical absorption. Springer. Karp, S., & Stenmark, H. (2011). Learning to be a police officer. Tradition and change in the training and professional lives of police officers. Police Practice and Research, 12(1), 4–15. Kinsella, E., & Pitman, A. (2012). Phronesis as professional knowledge: practical wisdom in the professions. Brill/Sense Publishers. Krueger, J. (2015). The affective “we”: Self-regulation and shared emotions. In T.  Szanto & D. Moran (Eds.), Phenomenology of sociality: Discovering the we (pp. 263–277). Routledge. List, C., & Pettit, P. (2013). Group agency. The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents. Oxford University Press. Loidolt, S. (2016). Phenomenology of plurality. Discovering the We. In Szanto, T (Ed.), Phenomenology of Sociality : Discovering the We (1st Edn). New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Print. Routledge Research in Phenomenology. Mathiesen, K. (2005). Collective consciousness. In D. Woodruff Smith & A. Thomasson (Eds.), Phenomenology and philosophy of mind (pp. 235–252). Oxford University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). The phenomenology of perception. Routledge. Pacherie, E. (2014). How does it feel to act together? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13, 25–46. Polismyndigheten. (1984). Polislag (Police law). [https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-­lagar/ dokument/svensk-­forfattningssamling/polislag-­1984387_sfs-­1984-­387] Pröckl, M. (2020). Tyngd, sväng och empatisk timing (Weight, swing and empathic timing), Doctoral Thesis, Södertörn University: Huddinge. Riksdagen. (2017). Lag (1991:1128) om psykiatrisk tvångsvård (Law of psychiatric compulsive care); (https://lagen.nu/1991:1129#P5S1) Schmid, H. B., & Schweikard, D. P. (2009). Kollektive Intentionalität. Frankfurt am Main. Schwarz, E., & Lappalainen, J.  H. (2020). Collective phronesis? An investigation of collective judgement and professional action. In R. Giovagnoli & R. Lowe (Eds.), The logic of social practices. Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics (Vol. 52). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­37305-­4_2 Skolverket. (2018). Curriculum for the Preschool (Lpfö18) (https://www.skolverket.se/publikationsserier/styrdokument/2019/curriculum-­for-­the-­preschool-­lpfo-­18; 2020-06-01). Stålberg, L. (2016). Förskola i samhällets tjänst (Preschool and society). In L.  Alsterdal & M.  Pröckl (Eds.), Inifrån och utifrån. Förskollärarens praktiska kunskap (From within and without. Preschooleacher’s practical knowledge) (pp. 219–253). Huddinge (Södertörns Studies in Practical knowledge). Szanto, T. (2014). How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13, 99–120. Szanto, T., & Moran, D. (Eds.). (2016). Phenomenology of sociality: discovering the we. Routledge. Von Brandenstein, B. H. (1973). Handbuch der Philosophischen Grundbegriffe, Bd. 2. München. Vetenskapsrådet. (2017). Den Europeiska kodexen för forskningens integritet. https://www.vr.se/ download/18.7f26360d16642e3af99e94/1540219023679/SW_ALLEA_Den_europeiska_ kodexen_för_forskningens_integritet_digital_FINAL.pdf

3  To Act as One Body? Collective and Embodied Judgement Within Professional…

41

Walsh, P.  J. (2014).  Empathy, embodiment, and the unity of expression. Topoi, 33, 215–226. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-­013-­9201-­z Walsh, P.  W. (2020). Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty. Continental Philosophy Review, 53, 21–47. Zahavi, D. (2001). Beyond empathy, phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), 151–167. Zahavi, D. (2015). You, me and we: the sharing of emotional experiences. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22, 84–101.

Chapter 4

Embodied Knowledge and Thinking in Professional Education Stephen Loftus

Abstract  Embodiment affects how people learn in ways that can be generative or confounding. If we are aware of how this happens, then we should be in a better position to modify the education we provide so that it becomes more effective and better prepares people for the world and especially the world of professional practice. Insights from settings where embodied knowledge is important can help us understand many of the likely obstacles that can interfere with learning, as well as suggesting ways to improve the learning experience. In addition, integrating insights from embodied knowledge with theoretical approaches, such as threshold concepts, can help us think through what needs to happen in planning a curriculum and conducting pedagogical activity. In this chapter, I explore, in particular, how embodied knowledge affects thinking and its teaching and the implications for the specialist thinking needed in academic and professional practice. Keywords  Decision-making · Clinical reasoning · Intuition · Emotion · Ambiguity

ambiguity is of the essence of human existence, and everything we live or think has always several meanings (Merleau-Ponty)

When I was at high school, I remember a conversation with the older brother of an acquaintance. This young man told us of a car crash that he had recently been involved in. He had been the driver of one of the vehicles. He told us that there came a point when he realised the collision was not only imminent but unavoidable. To my astonishment, he said that he then pressed his foot firmly down on the accelerator. I asked him why he had done this. His explanation made it clear that he believed in a commonly held fallacy that when two bodies collide, the one with more velocity S. Loftus (*) Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_4

43

44

S. Loftus

will ‘pass’ more of its kinetic energy to the body that is moving more slowly or is stationary. His belief was that he was minimising the damage to his vehicle and his risk of injury. The implications, that he was increasing the damage to the other vehicle and the risk of injury to those inside it, do not seem to have been a consideration. At the time, I had just been studying Newton’s laws of motion in physics at high school. In my youth and naivety, I started to explain to him how wrong he was to have accelerated at a time when he should have braked as hard as possible, so as to minimise the kinetic energy that would be shared equally between the vehicles. He cut me short and explained that, as a schoolboy, I was simply repeating irrelevant and abstract classroom theory. He, on the other hand, was an adult, with a fulltime job, a driving licence, and a better understanding of how things worked in the real world. I learned a lesson that day, not about physics but human nature. There are implications here about embodiment, thinking, and education.

Intuition It was clear that in the collision there would have been no time to think through his theoretical understanding of the world before acting. His dangerously incorrect knowledge of how moving bodies interact was embodied. It was a part of who and what he was. He had acted on this knowledge immediately and intuitively. Kahnemann (2011) claimed that intuition is simply recognition. If so, then it is also clear that intuition and recognition can be in error, as recognised in the epigraph to this chapter where Merleau-Ponty (1962) reminds us of the inherent ambiguity of the world. In the examples below, I explore further the interactions of embodiment, thinking, and education and the implications for professional practice. Some of the examples used come from healthcare, as this reflects my own experience, although I believe that the implications apply to all professional education. The central message is that a sensitivity to the embodiment of much knowledge can help us improve how we teach people to think and make decisions, especially in professional settings. This, in turn, can help our students learn and understand what we want them to learn and steer them away from incorrect, and possibly dangerous, misconceptions. There is often a tendency to believe that teaching, learning, and thinking are purely cognitive activities with little relation to the body and the rest of the world. The consequence of this is that education is frequently seen as primarily theoretical. It is mostly conducted as an abstract activity, concerned with abstract ideas and, therefore, best restricted to the classroom. If knowledge needs to be applied to the real world, then this application is often seen as a secondary function that comes after the primary, and far more important, function of thoroughly absorbing the theory. This is reflected in many professional education programmes. For example, a number of health professions still follow the model laid down by Flexner (1910)

4  Embodied Knowledge and Thinking in Professional Education

45

over a century ago. These programmes begin with some years exclusively devoted to the theoretical study of the biomedical sciences and only then progress on to clinical application. However, this belief that knowledge and theory need to be disembodied, and separated from the real world, is an assumption. It is an assumption that can lead to the kind of incident, described above, where the danger was increased rather than decreased. It can be argued that our most fundamental knowledge is grounded in our embodied being-in-the-world and this embodiment can be either a help or a hindrance when it comes to learning new knowledge and making decisions based on that knowledge.

Embodiment as Help or Hindrance? Firstly, our embodiment can be a help when working out new knowledge. In the field of cognitive science, Hofstadter and Sander (2013) give the example of Albert Einstein who performed many thought experiments in order to come up with some of his greatest insights. Einstein would, for example, imagine what it might be like to travel on a beam of light or imagine how certain events would appear to different observers moving at high speed while the observers were moving in different directions. These were no mere flights of fancy, but serious thought experiments that were then backed up with sophisticated mathematics. The point is that the thought experiments began with an embodied observer positioned in time and space. Einstein’s genius required embodiment. Our embodiment, however, can also be a major hindrance to learning new knowledge. When scientists first tried to persuade the general population that the Earth was spherical and moved through space, there was a lot of resistance to these ideas. Our embodied experience suggests to us that the world is flat because that is how we usually perceive it. Our embodied experience also suggests to us that the world does not move because most people feel movement when they physically move themselves to another location. New information (or new experience) informs our sense-­ making by being compared to something similar that we are already familiar with. Hofstadter and Sander (2013) call this analogical thinking and argue that this is fundamental to how humans think. They also argue that analogical thinking is identical with the activity of categorisation that human beings constantly engage in when they think. They provide numerous examples. There is a lot of overlap in this analogical view with the position that language and thinking are, at their heart, metaphorical (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Loftus, 2011). From this perspective, everything we think, and speak, is related to something else more foundational, and the most foundational thing of all is our embodied experience of the world. In this view, it is only possible to make sense of new knowledge by relating it to something else we already know. However, education can make a difference, and there is fascinating research that provides useful insights into this connection between embodiment, learning, and knowledge. This research has lessons for those who want to improve professional education.

46

S. Loftus

Thinking, Literacy, and Education In 1931–1932, Alexander Luria (1976) led an expedition to isolated villages in Central Asia, to study cognition among peoples who were only just beginning to be exposed to the modern world. The expedition was inspired by the work of Vygotsky and his developing insights into the sociocultural aspects of cognition (Vygotsky, 1978)1. One of the most important findings was the extent to which literacy and education influenced cognition. People who were nonliterate were quite unable to engage in the deductive logical reasoning, characterised by the classical syllogisms described by Aristotle. When presented with the premises of a simple syllogism, these people were usually unable to complete the thinking required in the expected way. For example, they were given the following information: In the far north, in snowy areas, all bears are white. Novaya Zemlya2 is in the far north and there is always snow. What colour are the bears there? (Luria, 1976)

Most people, with a modicum of education, would recognise this as a classic deductive logic puzzle and that the answer (according to the rules of deductive logic) is that the bears in Novaya Zemlya must be white. This is not how the nonliterate people in the study saw these puzzles. For them, all parts of the syllogism were isolated phrases with no connection to each other. Some claimed that they had never been to Novaya Zemlya and therefore could not possibly know the answer. Some also said that they did not know the answer because they knew, from their own experience, that bears could be many different colours. Being unaware of the rules of the language game (to use Wittgenstein’s term) of deductive logic, they thought in very concrete and context-dependent terms and relied heavily on their own embodied experience and knowledge. However, Luria and his team also discovered that people, with even a little education, were quite able to understand the logic puzzles for what they were and give the correct answers. Others have found similar findings in different settings (e.g. Cole, 1996). It is important to point out that there is a danger here of assuming a Western intellectual imperialism which might claim a monopoly on understanding (Tindale, 2021). However, there is awareness, going back to John Locke, in the seventeenth century, warning against the dangers of such an assumption. As Locke said: there are many men [sic] that reason exceeding [sic] clear and rightly, who do not know how to make a syllogism. He that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism. (Locke, 1689)

1  Vygotsky himself was unable to join the expedition due to ill health from the tuberculosis that was to kill him in 1934. The findings of the expedition were suppressed by the communist authorities for ideological reasons until the 1970s in the Soviet Union. 2  Novaya Zemlya is an island in the Arctic Ocean and an extension of the Ural mountain range that separates Europe from Asia.

4  Embodied Knowledge and Thinking in Professional Education

47

My point here is not to explore the different cultural approaches to reasoning that are discussed in more depth elsewhere (including this volume). My goal here is to emphasise the embodied foundation of most reasoning, especially in professional settings, and look at how we might use embodiment to help newcomers become professional knowers and reasoners, according to the standards of a profession. The role of schooling is important but often misunderstood, as discussed below. Cole (1996) looked at the alleged challenges that Kpelle children in Liberia seemed to have with learning mathematics. Cole quickly discovered that the Kpelle children were just as good at mathematics as Western children. However, he also discovered that mathematical ability varied according to the setting in which the children used mathematical skills. The Kpelle children struggled with mathematics in the classroom just as much as Western children, but, working in the marketplace with their families, they demonstrated high levels of mathematical ability when working out the costs to charge customers. Cole realised that the children were quick to learn and master mathematics in a context where it had real-world relevance and importance. On the other hand, the mathematics studied in the classroom was seen as something context-free, abstract, remote, and, therefore, difficult. Capabilities to learn complex ideas are not only related to education but can also be related to embodied experience.

Embodied (Mis)understanding in School Education Schooling can help people make use of embodied knowledge to help them understand new ideas, but there are many opportunities for misunderstanding. For example, many people learn mathematical division first in terms of sharing (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013). Sharing is a familiar (concrete and embodied) experience for most people and can be easily related to simple division. The problems can start when more complex division is needed and the sharing analogy is inadequate. A better analogy than division as sharing could be the analogy of division as measuring. I would argue that difficulties, like these, require our pedagogy to help people move beyond the naive understandings they may have of issues and that these misunderstandings are often rooted, in turn, in their embodied experience. Such difficulties are also seen in higher education.

Embodied (Mis)understanding in Higher Education Mazur (1997) has described his experience with learning difficulties among students at Harvard University, widely seen as an elite institution for high-achieving students. For several years, Mazur says that he believed he was a good teacher of physics. He enjoyed teaching. His students enjoyed his courses. They passed their exams, and Mazur was regularly voted to be one of the best teachers in this

48

S. Loftus

prestigious institution. He relates how he eventually heard of disturbing research that revealed that many graduates of physics and engineering programmes did not really understand basic physics, despite comfortably passing their exams (e.g. Hallouin and Hestenes, 1985). Mazur was so concerned that he decided to repeat this research with his own graduates and was dismayed to find many of the same failings. The graduates were given simple scenarios, as word puzzles, and asked to explain what was happening in terms of the physics involved. For example, one scenario might be a large truck travelling down a highway that is involved in a head­on collision with a small car travelling in the opposite direction. The participants were asked to explain what would happen to the vehicles using Newton’s laws of motion. Mazur was shocked at how many participants (who had all successfully completed physics courses) were unable to do this. He relates how one participant said to him that the problem could be considered from two perspectives. One perspective was the way Mazur talked in the classroom about the forces involved, using the equations of Newton’s laws of motion. The other way was how these things happened in the ‘real world’. This Harvard graduate’s understanding of Newton’s laws of motion was as misguided as those of my friend’s brother. It was then, Mazur says, he understood that, for these participants, the classroom setting was seen as entirely separate from the real world. This is similar to the findings of Cole (1996) with the Liberian schoolchildren. The real world, where cars and trucks interact in collisions, was not seen as having any connection with the theoretical problems in the classroom. In the classroom, in an attempt to clarify Newton’s insights into force, mass, and momentum, collisions occur between idealised objects that are homogeneous, are frictionless, and move in straight lines at a constant velocity forever, once they have been given an impulse. What many students missed was that, in the real world, these forces, and the equations that describe them, are very much present. The problem is that in the real world there are many confounding variables that bring complexity and ambiguity. These confounders include friction in machine parts, friction between tyres and road surfaces, wind resistance, and the fact that big trucks that need to carry heavy loads must be more robustly built than small passenger cars. So, when a large truck collides with a small car, the truck may have less damage, but this is because the kinetic energy the truck absorbs is dispersed through a larger volume and into a stronger structure. The small car will have an equal share of the kinetic energy from the collision, but this will be focused into a smaller volume and a weaker structure. The educational issue is that the students saw the real-world collisions as entirely separate from the classroom problems they were given. The students would relate to the real-world collisions through their own embodied experience of the world, but the classroom problems were seen as abstract exercises. Many students learned how to ‘play the game’ presented by theoretical classroom problems. They learned which equations from Newton’s laws of motion were needed and how to use them. They managed to pass assessments without really understanding what they were supposed to learn. On top of this, it seems the students did not realise they had failed to understand, because they could pass the

4  Embodied Knowledge and Thinking in Professional Education

49

assessments. In addition, their teachers were also blissfully unaware of their students’ ignorance, again, because the students had passed the assessments. The implication is that our teaching and assessments need a great deal of careful thought if they are to help students really understand ideas that go against their embodied experience. Mazur (1997) was honest enough to admit that he had identified a major problem.

Embodiment in Education Mazur changed his teaching (1997). His ingenuity was in devising ways for students to teach each other and combine these with a method that enabled him to track how their understanding was developing. In his professional development lectures to other academics, Mazur provides some examples of how he does this. Mazur had very large classes. So, he used what is probably the first ever digital audience response system, the i-clicker™. This allowed him to ask questions of the whole class and get a response from everyone simultaneously. He also devised techniques that encouraged students to teach each other. Having experienced Mazur lectures, at conferences, I can confirm that the approach is engaging and generates some emotional involvement as participants were keen to ‘play’ this particular educational game and get the right answer. There are a number of lessons to be learned from this approach. The interactions with the audience response system and the other students were short, just 2 or 3 minutes. The points to be learned were clarified even to those who, like me, sometimes got the wrong answers. The learning environment was a safe place where it was acceptable to make errors. It could be argued that the emotional involvement in the interactions was an example of how to use our embodiment to aid learning. I shall say more about emotion below. There is a theoretical perspective that can be used to deepen our understanding of this approach to pedagogy, and this is threshold concepts (sometimes referred to as threshold theory). This approach has implications for an embodied approach to teaching and learning.

Threshold Concepts Threshold theory emphasises a focus on key ideas that must be learned and understood if a field of study is to be truly comprehensible to a student (Meyer and Land, 2006). In Mazur’s case, it could be argued that momentum is such a key idea. There are five characteristics of threshold concepts. They must be transformative, troublesome, integrative, bounded, and irreversible. I will focus on just some of these characteristics that are relevant to embodied learning. Once a student understands Newton’s concept of momentum, then the whole field of modern mechanics starts

50

S. Loftus

to open up to the student, and their worldview is transformed. The transformation is irreversible. Once we have this new understanding, then it is not possible to go back to the old misconception. However, learning a threshold concept is troublesome. It can go against our intuitive and embodied understanding of the world. Vehicle collisions are examples. This troublesomeness can be a problem, not only for students but also for teachers who often fail to remember their own troubles when they learned the same concept. In order to accommodate the troublesome learning of a threshold concept, there is a need for liminality.

Liminality The concept of liminality comes from anthropology and describes the uncomfortable state a person enters when they are in a transitional state. For example, in a rite of passage, when a child officially becomes an adult, the child enters a transitional state where they are neither child nor adult. Applied to education, the idea of liminality is useful to describe the transitional state that many students experience when trying to understand a strange new idea that contradicts their old embodied worldview. The liminal state can be uncomfortable and challenging. It may take time to work through. Some students may take longer than others. Some may have to try out this new understanding and test it in different ways before they make the change. Teachers need to be present and engage with the students to find out what trouble they may have and help them through the liminal state. Mazur’s use of the audience response system can be seen as an example. By asking students to apply some new knowledge, he could find out what the misconceptions were, alert the students to the fact that they had misunderstood, and then help them (with the aid of those students who did understand) to reach the correct meaning. As Mazur found, the danger of not helping students through a liminal state is that students may opt for a superficial understanding. This impoverished understanding mimics the correct understanding, and, with inadequate assessment, both student and teacher may be unaware that the teaching and learning have failed. An aspect of this approach to teaching and learning is the importance of emotion.

Emotion and Embodiment in Education I still remember the slight discomfort I felt, attending a Mazur lecture at a conference, when I realised I had misunderstood how to apply a simple concept in physics. However, I enjoyed the engagement with other attendees, and I looked forward with anticipation to discovering the correct answer. I was filled with curiosity to hear the explanation of the correct answer. These feelings, the discomfort, the enjoyment,

4  Embodied Knowledge and Thinking in Professional Education

51

and the curiosity, played a key role in motivating the learning in this safe setting. Feelings and emotions are always an aspect of our embodiment. It was Nussbaum (2003) who once said: Emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy parts, of this creature’s reasoning itself. (p. 3)

Emotion is an important element of learning knowledge, together with the application of that knowledge in reasoning, because it helps the learning (and decision-­ making) to become embodied. There is a growing realisation of the importance of paying conscious attention to how we use emotion in designing and implementing teaching and learning activities: A great deal of learning involves working with the unknown, failing at tasks, sloughing through inherently uninteresting problems, butting one’s head against text that seems incomprehensible, and so on. These experiences are not only unavoidable but probably also essential to learning … one of the most effective ways of engendering interest and motivation is to challenge students, to push them to the outer limits of their skills— and sometimes a bit beyond. (Cavanagh, 2016, p. 8)

Even when our students are pushed out of their comfort zone, a learning experience should occur in a safe space where it is acceptable to be out of one’s comfort zone and to make mistakes. This important insight is now informing modern professional education. Not too long ago, it was standard practice to humiliate medical students if they revealed ignorance. The result was that, for generations of students, medical school was far more stressful than it needed to be. This, fortunately, is changing with the switch to new curriculum models. For example, case-based learning (CBL)3 is a pedagogy that provides a safe setting where it is routine for students to acknowledge, and articulate, what they do not know. These knowledge gaps then become learning issues that motivate the students to find out what they need to learn to solve, and manage, the cases. The small group setting too can provide peer support and is a liminal space where misconceptions can be aired and corrected. In health professions education, the relevance of realistic cases that will eventually be experienced in the real world can be highly motivating. Students experience some emotion because they recognise that they are rehearsing for their future practice and, usually, want to show the rest of the group that they are a good team member. A CBL approach provides a curriculum that includes liminal spaces and utilises a pedagogy that helps students work through the troublesomeness of new knowledge with the support of a good facilitator and their fellow students. In addition to learning new knowledge, it is important in professional education that students learn how to make sound decisions based on that knowledge. It is now clear that emotion and decision-making are also linked.

 Problem-based learning (PBL) is the best-known example. For more on CBL, see Loftus (2021).

3

52

S. Loftus

Embodiment, Emotion, and Decisions It was Damasio (2000) who articulated the important relation between emotion and decision-making. His studies showed that people with certain forms of brain damage make compromised decisions because they cannot integrate emotions into the decision-making process, especially when prioritising options. Damasio’s conclusion was that most people could imagine/think through the different options and compare how they would feel after each decision. They would then select the option that would make them feel best. This happens quickly and usually unconsciously, i.e. intuitively. There are some educational settings where the emotional element can be particularly powerful. It is now routine practice for surgical teams to rehearse treating emergencies that may be rare, but require a rapid and coordinated team response if the patient is to survive. To do this, the teams can practise in high-tech simulators. It is a common observation that intense emotion is generated in these realistic settings, even though the teams know they are treating mannequins. In the all-important debriefs, the teams need to address the knowledge and skills involved and the effect their emotions can have on their decisions and overall performance. The urgency of many emergencies means that decision-making has to be rapid and this brings us back to intuition. As noted above, Kahnemann (2011) claimed that intuition was nothing more than recognition (or part of his rapid System 1 thinking). However, the lens of embodiment allows us to see a little deeper.

Intuition and Context Dreyfus and Dorrance Kelly (2011) describe situations where people had to react rapidly in order to deal with emergencies where there was little time for deliberation. Their claim is that our environment can ‘call out’ from us certain responses, but only if we are sensitive to the call and are already familiar with the affordances and meanings available in that context. The implication is that professional education must provide opportunities for students to practise in real and realistic settings. Professional practitioners, who develop the right (embodied) preparation, can then be in a position to rapidly discern what is going on in a professional setting. The training and education of professionals need to foster embodied knowledge so that they can see the world differently, the way professionals see it: The skilled surgeon, for example, sees something more than a broken and bloody leg; he [sic] sees a particular kind of break, one that requires this precise surgical technique to fix … This vision of skill is essentially practical and embodied. … his ingenuity is practical, embodied, and in the moment. (p. 207–209)

Such skills and embodied knowledge become part of an intuition that is also anticipatory and allows the practitioner to be justifiably confident of what to do next. This is because, as Dreyfus and Dorrance Kelly note, ‘The genuinely confident

4  Embodied Knowledge and Thinking in Professional Education

53

agent does not manufacture confidence, but receives it from the circumstances’ (2011, p 6). For this to happen, professional practitioners need education and experience that allow them to cultivate in themselves the skills and knowledge to deal with any ambiguity and discern the meanings of a situation that are already there in settings where these meanings are available to those trained to see them. One role of teachers is to guide students to develop this discernment. Professional students need practice-based education (Higgs et al. 2010) where these professional settings can become an integral part of a practitioner’s lifeworld. According to Schön (1983), being a professional is a way of being-in-the-world. For this to happen, there needs to be an integration between the abstract knowledge of the class and its practical application in the real world. Otherwise, there is the risk that the two become dissociated from each other. A balanced and integrated education helps students see the close association of abstract theory and its application. This is summarised in an insight shared by a medical student reflecting on applying theory learned in a PBL class in an emergency clinic: when you’re … in the Emergency department at night … you’re trying to work out ‘what’s going on here?’ … it’s not until you’re in that place of responsibility … that you really start getting it. (Loftus, 2006 p. 173)

There is some overlap here with the work of Bortoft (2012). In making the science of Goethe relevant for a modern world, Bortoft emphasises the importance of adopting an ‘upstream’ view of events, where the focus is on the appearing of what appears, even though the appearance may only be partial and ambiguous (see the chapter on Goethe in this volume). The upstream view implies a disposition to be sensitive to what else will appear and to anticipate what needs to be done as events unfold. Professional practitioners need to develop this sensitivity. It is an anticipatory sensitivity where theory and its application come together and it is embodied.

Conclusion The point of all this is to highlight the crucial role of embodied knowledge in learning and decision-making and the importance of context for integrating theory with practice. Embodied knowledge is fundamental but it tends to be ignored and it is a double-edged sword. It can help or it can hinder. The significance of embodied knowledge and its relation to thinking and decision-making are gradually receiving more attention. There is a complex relationship between the theoretic knowledge learned in class and how that knowledge needs to be combined with technical skills in real-world practice, so that our professional practitioners can navigate ambiguity, discern what they need to do now, anticipate what they need to do next, and be confident in doing so. With more attention to the provision of learning experiences, where teachers guide students through their liminal spaces, we can help them know and understand what their profession requires of them. Combining this with appropriate practical experiences can help students to become true professionals.

54

S. Loftus

References Bortoft, H. (2012). Taking appearance seriously: The dynamic way of seeing in Goethe and European thought. Floris Books. Cavanagh, S. (2016). The spark of learning: Energizing the college classroom with the science of emotion. West Virginia Univ. Press. Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Harvard University Press. Damasio, A. (2000). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. Harcourt Brace. Dreyfus, H., & Dorrance Kelly, S. (2011). All things shining: Reading the Western classics to find meaning in a secular age. Free Press London. Flexner, A. (1910). Medical education in the United States and Canada. Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Hallouin, I. A., & Hestenes, D. (1985). Common sense concepts about motion. American Journal of Physics, 53, 1043–1055. https://doi.org/10.1119/1.14031 Higgs, J., Fish, D., Goulter, I., Loftus, S., Reid, J., & Trede, F. (Eds.). (2010). Education for future practice. Sense. Hofstadter, D., & Sander, E. (2013). Surfaces and essences: Analogy as the fuel and fire of thinking. Basic Books. Kahnemann, D. (2011). Thinking fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live By. University of Chicago Press. Locke, J. (1689/1996). An essay concerning human understanding. Book IV, Ch. XVII, sec. 4. Loftus, S. (2006). Language in Clinical Reasoning. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Sydney, Australia. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1165 Loftus, S. (2011). Pain and its metaphors: A dialogical approach. The Journal of Medical Humanities, 32(3), 213–230. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10912-­011-­9139-­3 Loftus, S. (2021). Case-based learning. In K.  Huggett, K.  Quesnelle, & W.  Jeffries (Eds.), An introduction to medical teaching (3rd ed.). Springer (in press). Luria, A.  R. (1976). Cognitive development: Its cultural and social foundations. Harvard University Press. Mazur, E. (1997). Peer instruction: A user’s manual. Prentice Hall. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. Trans. Colin Smith, London: Routledge. Meyer, J.  H. F., & Land, R. (Eds.). (2006). Overcoming barriers to student understanding: Threshold concepts and troublesome knowledge. Routledge. Nussbaum, M.  C. (2003). Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions. Cambridge University Press. Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. Basic Books. Tindale, C. W. (2021). The anthropology of argument: Cultural foundations of rhetoric and reason. Routledge. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society. Harvard University Press.

Part II

Embodiment and Professional Performance

Chapter 5

The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy Tatiana Chemi

Abstract  Theatre laboratories emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in Western theatre and provide a space and time where sustained hard work and reflections shape performing and theatrical tasks by means of an embodied pedagogy. In this chapter, I focus on the idea of genealogy applied to theatre laboratories by looking at the example of Odin Teatret and reframe genealogy as the felt relationship amongst ideas, bodies and practices, rather than a rigid succession of causes and effects. The methodology used combines theoretical discussions, archival desk study, participant observation and informal interviews with three members of the Odin Teatret ensemble (director Eugenio Barba and actors Tage Larsen and Julia Varley). My theoretical outline brings together Barba’s theatre anthropology, which is the study of technical and bodily principles that are common to performers from several cultures, and insights from key poststructuralist thinkers (Barad, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Haraway), with the purpose of looking at hybrid embodied practices that entangle performance and pedagogy together. This approach is useful not only for the understanding of theatre and ensembles but also because this rethinking can have direct consequences for the ways in which pedagogical and artistic practices are performed in education. Keywords  Theatre · Theatre laboratory · Performance · Pedagogy · Poetic communities

The first word of the theatrical vocabulary is the human body, the main source of sound and movement. (Augusto Boal, 2008, p. 102) Nothing is connected to everything; everything is connected to something. (Donna Haraway, 2016b, p. 31)

T. Chemi (*) Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_5

57

58

T. Chemi

Laboratory or Not Theatre laboratories emerged from the original work of Stanislavski (1936) and provide opportunities for actors and directors to explore and research aspects of theatrical performance. They are often seen as having two goals: the personal development of those involved and the exploration of ways of developing and extending theatre performance. Theatre laboratories provide a space and time “devoted to sustained hard work on and reflection regarding performing and theatrical tasks” (Chemi, 2018, p. 2). Embodiment is a key feature of theatre laboratories as participants use their bodies to explore performative possibilities in relation to their own personalities and creative projects. In July 2019, I was invited to hold a lecture on theatre laboratory’s approach to creativity and pedagogy, at a conference in Greece. My contribution was titled “The invention of theatre laboratory: apprenticeship to creativity” and relied on my earlier research on the topic (Chemi, 2018). Looking at the example of the Odin Teatret’s laboratory, I drafted a special phenomenology of this theatre practice as embodied and relational apprenticeship. The pupil and master jointly shape the pupil’s performance by co-presence in the same creative space, sharing joint space/ time for creation. In these settings, learning happens in and through the body, in a reciprocal commitment to a shared project. The senior actors who taught more junior actors used “work” and “learning” as synonyms and constituted a bodily and affective presence in the pupils’ lives. This strong relationality could then be extended in time and space over geographical distance and was experienced as a sense of belonging to a joint community. During the panel that followed my presentation, an interesting discussion took shape, where participants spoke of different approaches to creative genealogies. A creative genealogy exists when participants develop a sense of belonging to a shared tradition of creative artists. Participation in this community of practice can be achieved simultaneously (by means of tangible here-and-now collaborations) and/or in trajectories distributed in time and space, by means of distant dialogues with geographically remote partners or even with inspirational sources from other ages (Glăveanu, 2014). For my contribution, I proposed looking at the emergence of theatre laboratory as historically and emotionally interconnected with the early Stanislavski and Meyerhold Studios and their later development, especially Eugenio Barba’s Odin Teatret (Chemi, 2018). During the discussion, scholars debated applying the concept of genealogy to the emergence of theatre laboratory practices. We discussed, in particular, whether Odin Teatret – and Eugenio Barba – could and should ever be linked to other theatre laboratory practices. More generally, the conversation focused on whether theatre laboratories could be described by means of genealogy at all, given their variety in forms, purposes and contexts. This debate is also present in the literature, where Schino (2009) goes so far as to question the very existence of theatre laboratory as a clearly graspable phenomenon. Even though “etymologically, a laboratory means a workshop equipped with the appropriate

5  The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy

59

apparatus designed for carrying out research and experiments” (p.  149), Schino believes that theatre historians cannot formulate a comprehensive definition of a single method. Being present at the above-mentioned panel, and being part of it myself, I proposed neither to dispose of the genealogical possibility nor to consider all theatre laboratories as one. My suggestion was to rethink the very idea of genealogy applied to the complex development and establishment of theatre laboratories. In this way, genealogy could be seen as the felt relationship of, and amongst, ideas, bodies and practices, in other words as more than a mere succession of causes and effects. Genealogies embody practices of belonging to a given tradition, but also explore translations of traditions to new contexts and needs. As such, my opening question in this investigation was: how can genealogy be reframed as hybrid embodied practices in order to describe the ensemble’s creativity and pedagogy? The present chapter pursues these conceptual problems by means of a methodology that combines theoretical discussions, archival desk study, participant observation and informal interviews. My theoretical outline relies on Barba’s theatre anthropology (Barba, 1995; Barba and Savarese, 2003, 2019) for the understanding of Odin Teatret’s work on/with embodied cultural practices. Theatre anthropology is the study of underlying technical and acting principles across cultures. Insights from key poststructuralist thinkers (Barad, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Haraway) contribute to looking at hybrid embodied practices that entangle performance and pedagogy together. These insights can be useful not only for better understanding of theatre laboratories but also because there are implications for the ways in which pedagogical and artistic practices are performed in many branches of education.

First Encounters Narratives about scholars’ first encounters with Odin Teatret (Turner and Campbell, 2018) are often told in ways that are not only vivid and memorable but lead to professional and/or existential change. Such transformative narratives are related in Taviani (1975), where the author reflects on the ensemble’s early performances through the eyes of a “spectator in awe”, and in Savarese (in ASGARD, 1995, p. 4), where he recalls the 1974 ensemble tour in Rome through the eyes of a spectator, who was drawn to experience Min Fars Hus (My Father’s House) no less than 15 times in a row because of its stylistic novelty and emotional impact. Well-known is also Inger Landsted’s story as a spectator who went on to play a central role in the ensemble. She saw them perform and “suggested that the Holstebro municipality invite the ensemble to move to Denmark from Norway” whereby “her role shifted from observer to agent, in its etymological sense of person who acts (Lat. agere)” (Chemi, 2018, p. 113). There are numerous accounts of actors and actresses who felt compelled to join the ensemble as a consequence of a life-changing experience

60

T. Chemi

with the company (Carreri, 2007; Rasmussen, 2006; Varley, 2011). During the Odin Teatret’s educational events1, actors present themselves to the participants by means of these narratives, making the mythology of these first encounters with Odin Teatret well-known to their pupils. Barba himself, in his educational speeches, frequently refers to facts, events, experiences and persons that have influenced or touched him, sharing first encounters or ongoing conversations that have been significant (Chadwick and de Courtivron, 1993). First encounters, as transformative emotional experiences, can become the drive that motivates individuals to reach out to those whom they perceive as masters, and this can start long-term professional relationships. When this occurs, pedagogical and creative reciprocity often follow (Chemi, 2018). The implications of these pedagogical-creative interactions are several. First encounters capable of arousing interest to the point of changing lives are agentic in Barad’s terms (2007). With the concept of “agential realism”, Barad (2007, p. 44) describes ontologies that constantly engage each other reciprocally and “intra-­ actively”. Intra-actions are understood here as exchanges occurring within relationships, distinct from the inter-actions that occur between phenomena. Agentic influences not only arise in human relationships but involve the non-human (objects, nature) in complex entanglements. Retrospective narratives about first encounters with Odin Teatret suggest that these encounters might help individuals to develop in-depth relationships with the ensemble and/or their members that extend over some considerable time. The motivational drive for such exchanges seems to be recognition of a feeling of belonging. The emotional nature of the encounter anchors one’s personal identity in a theatrical family that can be conceptualised several different ways: as a community of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991), a field (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997), a tribe (Wyatt, 2018) and a network (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Regardless of the way in which one constructs the understanding of this belonging, the common trait that emerges from these (repeated) transformational experiences is the feeling of relational affinity. In the Odin Teatret’s professional practices, which are from the theatre laboratory approach, these relational affinities stretch beyond a superficial sympathy, or the enjoyment of an evening, or gratitude for public entertainment. For the Odin Teatret spectator, performances are not only about watching but also participation. Originating from the ancient Greek theaomai (Etymonline, 2016), theatre indicates the act of looking, while participation implies taking an active role. The former is the activity of repeated observation and pondering. The latter demands a sense of agency. Participation comes from Latin particeps (partaker, comrade, fellow soldier), and it is a combination of the noun pars (genitive partis) “a part, piece, a division” and the verb capere “to take” or “to grasp” (Etymonline, 2019). Odin Teatret’s practices do not separate these activities but fuse them: observation/spectatorship, participation/agency and research/performance. In the laboratory, theatre 1  Such as the Odin Week Festival, a 9-day-long training period for actors, which occurs at the home of the ensemble

5  The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy

61

becomes a material-discursive practice (Barad, 2007) where bodies, objects, places and practices are entangled in complex ways. Theatre laboratory practices do not occur exclusively within the limited frames of the ensemble’s work or work spaces, and therefore they do not only concern artistic purposes and exchanges. Rather they unfold as material-immaterial and meaningful-embodied participation in a collective creative process. Below are examples of two types of embodied participation: the spectator/ensemble intra-action and the actor/actor kinship.

The Spectators’ Dance: Spectator/Ensemble Intra-action In his landmark article Four Spectators, Barba (1990) describes different qualities of spectatorship: the experience of the child “who perceives the actions literally” (p. 99); the experience of the spectator who dances, the one “who thinks s/ he doesn’t understand but who, in spite of her/himself, dances” (p. 99); the experience of the director’s alter ego, who understands the performance as it is meant to be comprehended in the director’s intentions; and the experience of the fourth spectator, “who sees through the performance” (p. 99). Each spectator contributes to the performance with their uniqueness, not only by co-constructing its meaning but also by determining its transformative, or agentic, value. Barba insists on using the word spectators (from Latin spectare = to look) instead of audience and on emphasising a pedagogical element in the ensemble/spectator relationship: There are spectators for whom the theatre is essential precisely because it presents them not with solutions but with knots. The performance is the beginning of a longer experience. It is the scorpion’s bite which makes one dance. The dance does not stop when one leaves the theatre. The aesthetic value and the cultural originality of the performance are what make the sting sharp. But its precious poison comes from somewhere else. (Barba, 1990, p. 98)

Barba suggests the dramaturgical reason for the unity of spectatorship and agency: the Odin Teatret’s performances do not offer solutions but problems, knots to be worked on, dances to be danced and obsessions (the scorpion’s bite) to be healed. The felt sense of belonging to a “poetic tribe” demands the initiation of a process of embodied enquiry or re-search. Participation in this community does not soothe the individual’s thirst for knowledge, does not lull its participants with a warm feeling of security but rather challenges members to take up knowledge work. In order to undo the knots, individuals’ work consists in initiating a re-search project. In order to make sense of the different levels of signification and of the emotional reaction to the experience, they engage in constructing and deconstructing meaning performatively. This recursive doing and undoing occurs in distributed modalities initiated in/by/ through the actors’ bodies whereby the search makes the maker. This joint search develops a distributed creativity (Chemi, 2017; Glăveanu, 2014; Miettinen, 2006; Sawyer and DeZutter, 2009), which can be defined as the ongoing, near or far,

62

T. Chemi

conversation with significant others (including non-humans). This activity can, in turn, develop the identity of participants. Participants in a spatially and temporally circumscribed event (the performance) become fellow comrades in a shared life journey (the search). However, as the members of this community are as diverse as scholars, artists, masters, pupils, directors, teachers and cultural entrepreneurs, these knowledge projects take different material shapes. The individual journey might lead to a traditional research process of field observations, interviews, data analysis, report writing and scholarly dissemination; other times, the research journey chosen is an artistic one. In this case, individuals embark on the production of a performance that investigates different relationships or addresses different “cognitive dances” by dramaturgical means. In any of these agentic transformations, members of this learning community might end up experiencing a sense of changing identity: being or becoming a researcher or an artist (actor/director). Both approaches exist as material-discursive practices that mark the individuals’ (personal and professional) becomings as embodied. Belonging to this field has little to do with traditional communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Participants who share Odin Teatret’s cultural and pedagogical interests do not gather in several communities (plural) that share one practice (singular); rather, they might feel they are members of a cohesive community (singular) that shares diverse practices (plural). This implies both a multiplicity of memberships and a common, recognisable frame with which they identify. This community laboratory is characterised by common principles: a special kind of apprenticeship, creativity, pedagogical relationships, reflexivity and educational structures. My investigation (Chemi, 2018) emphasised the following common traits of theatre laboratories across historical and geographical contexts: a place, a group, common values, research and pedagogy. Here, I focus on the elements of group creativity and common values as embodied and relational pedagogy.

Unpacking the Pack Tangible frames (shared places, artefacts, artistic traditions, collaborative projects), intangible beliefs (affects, values, rules, mindset, ideologies) and real, historically situated individuals constitute the entangled matter within the social practice of theatre laboratory. Deleuze and Guattari (2016) substitute the idea of community with the concept of the “pack” (p. 38), which is a contrast with communities seen as masses, groups where individuals disappear in a unified, standardised unity. In the pack, individuals remain distinct even when participating with the group: “in a pack each member is alone even in the company of others (for example, wolves on the hunt); each takes care of himself at the same time participating in the band” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2016, p. 38). These metaphors can be useful to reframe the creative exchanges occurring in theatre laboratory ensembles as necessarily bodily, relational, affective and pedagogical. Taking the example of Odin Teatret, where the aim of the creative process

5  The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy

63

is, and remains, artistic, it is possible to detect a strong embodied pedagogical function in the relationship between the ensemble and their spectators and between actors within the group. Participation in this laboratory engages individuals in transformational experiences of self (identity), relational exchanges distributed in time and space (community) and broadening of embodied knowledge (knots). The preferred methodology in this creative environment is the ensemble, the team of artists collaborating over time on shared artistic projects. From the French word “ensemble” that means “together”, “at the same time” and “of the same kind” (Etymonline, 2020), the idea of a special kind of synchronous togetherness has been adopted in the theatre world to indicate the company of performing artists. Ensembles create by being present with bodies and minds in the same room, sharing embodied experiences and participating in affective knowledge. In shared creation, the emphasis lies more with the group rather than the single, isolated star performer, the pack as opposed to the lone wolf. However, each individual has his/her own unique ontology, body and role in the company. In this context, actors’ embodied relationships do not grow in the shape of a classificatory genealogical tree, from roots to branches, but rather as a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 2016), which grows underground, non-linearly, non-dualistically, with multiplicity and heterogeneity. Theatre laboratory structures allow embodied practices of creation that are at the same time invented/reinvented, materialised (in full-fledged performances or dramaturgical materials in-progress), re-searched, learned, taught and shared collectively in and through the body. The relational closeness of this assemblage is not limited to the here-and-now but expands to the before-and-after, by imagining past connection and envisioning collective futures. It is in this sense that theatre laboratory materialises practices that are genealogical in rhizomatic shapes, according to a pedagogy that is embodied and a relationality that is affective and ethical.

Actor/Actor Kinship in the Lab At Odin Teatret, adoption is the practice whereby established actors mentor junior pupils and take care of their material well-being. According to Odin Teatret’s actress, Julia Varley, the ensemble has established two kinds of adoption: 1) the actor adopting another actor within the ensemble and 2) the actor adopting pupils outside the ensemble. The former practice emerged during the 1970s, when group members felt the need to extend participation in the ensemble to younger actors. Tage Larsen recalls2 that, when he entered the company in 1971, adoption was a practice already established. However, the first official adoption seems to be Iben Nagel Rasmussen’s adoption of Toni Cots and Silvia Ricciardelli in 1975 (Ledger, 2012). According to Larsen, “[the ensemble] didn’t talk about it, just did it as

 Informal interview, 1 February 2020

2

64

T. Chemi

established practice. When I got there, they already had the practice and the word [for it]”3. When Julia Varley joined the group in 1976, Larsen had already adopted Francis Pardeilhan, and about 1 year after, she was also adopted. Larsen explains that the adoption practice “meant that you would take care of the ‘pupil’ in economic terms” alongside the pedagogical and artistic responsibility. Roberta Carreri was the last actress to be trained by Eugenio Barba himself (Christoffersen, 1993), and, according to Varley (2011): adoption was the solution devised by Eugenio to satisfy the desire of ‘elders’ to have new young people in the group. Eugenio felt no such need and demanded that anyone who did should assume the financial and didactic responsibility for those they invited to stay. (p. 15)

Asked about the origin of this practice and of the choice and use of the word “adoption”, Barba recalls4 that the word “adoption” emerged from irritation: “It was Iben who kept asking for new members to join the Odin Teatret, so I replied: ‘all right, and then you can adopt them!’”. It meant to have responsibility for their training (Barba would not train them) and maintenance (the ensemble would not pay any honorarium), and finally the actors’ work with their adopted pupils was not allowed to interfere with the ensemble’s work and its tight work schedule. By complying with these demands, the actors were then free to do what they wanted to help the young actors. Haraway (2016a) attributes a character of “family-making apparatus” (p. 187) to the practice of adoption. The kinship made in these circumstances is not a surrogate for “the real thing”, but rather a more equal, sustainable and respectful way of establishing responsible relationships. From Haraway’s perspective (2016b), this practice draws from the Arendtian aspiration “to go visiting” (p. 127) like-minded others through the establishment of “‘working together’ in this kind of daily interaction of labor, conversation, and attention” (p. 129). All this can generate a sense of “felt belonging”. Felt belonging, however, does not imply complete identification with individuals or traditions, but rather a looser “affinity” (Haraway, 2016a, p. 17), not one common language but “heteroglossia” (Haraway, 2016a, p. 68). Odin Teatret has embraced all sorts of differences (cultural, geographical, artistic, psychological, affective, gender) in its “ensemble” and made this embrace of difference a key characteristic. A similar multiplicity can be observed in the ways in which actors establish apprenticeship relationships with their own pupils (what Varley defines as the second kind of adoption). This current form of kinship is closer to apprenticeship than to adoption. Julia Varley points to a fundamental difference: adoption in the 1970s “meant that the actors were in residence”5. Now the pupils are in residence only for short periods of time and are considered the individual actor’s pupils, not as members of the ensemble. Varley tries not to encourage the figures of speech related to family, in order to avoid parent/child dynamics that can get in the way of creative  Unreferenced quotes refer to informal interviews as indicated in text.  Informal interview, 1 February 2020 5  Informal interview, 2 February 2020 3 4

5  The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy

65

processes. However, participants in apprenticeship relationships experience ­affective and what can be described as embodied kin-making. Pupils report the feeling of “being taken care of” (Chemi, 2018, p. 135), a profound sense of being at home in a community of relatives, even when their members are physically distant and learning consists in working alone. Haraway (2016b) talks about the – pedagogical and ethical – “response-ability” (p. 105) human beings have towards each other and the world (nature, animals, things). The current form of adoption/apprenticeship at Odin Teatret seems to conform to response-able interactions: pupils and masters take care of each other in cross-­ generational, multidisciplinary, multicultural, distributed relationships. These exchanges are embodied because they are situated in material contexts that bodies inhabit fully and with ethical tenets in place. As in theories of situated knowledges (Haraway, 1991), which oppose doctrines of disembodiment, the body is an agent (of knowledge, growth, learning) and not just a resource, a screen in the background or a slave to cognition. At the same time, the embodied pedagogy practised in these forms of apprenticeship requires “an ethical appreciation of what bodies (…) can do” together (Braidotti, 2013, pp. 71–72). Braidotti defines this reciprocal engagement as “affirmative ethics” (p. 129) and explains it as the combination of critique and creativity that is necessary to shape visions for alternative, more ethical futures. Far from being abstract utopian visions, affirmative engagements empower human, and non-human, bodies in concrete bonding processes. Embodied, and affirmative pedagogical, communities function “sym-poetically” (Haraway, 2016b, p. 102), in the sense that pupils and masters make together, make with each other and make each other. However, families can both embrace and suffocate, as Haraway warns: all earthlings are kin in the deepest sense (…). Kin is an assembling sort of word. All critters share a common “flesh,” laterally, semiotically, and genealogically. Ancestors turn out to be very interesting strangers; kin are unfamiliar (outside what we thought was family or genes), uncanny, haunting, active. (Haraway, 2016b, p. 103)

If families are uncanny strangers who haunt future generations, is kin-making creativity dangerous? What are the pedagogical consequences of apprenticeship models based on the establishment of assemblage genealogies and embodied kinship?

Embodiment of/for Learning Thinking in genealogical terms (Foucault, 1989) that are not a digging in the past through straight lines of lineage, but rather messy, muddy, rhizomatic and entangled, brings human learning back where it belongs: in the body. Thinking of genealogy as a practice of kin-making opens up pedagogy to more emotional routes of/ for learning and creating, which are not simply linear but more complex and distributed. From this perspective, embodiment of/for learning occurs in times and

66

T. Chemi

spaces “that are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through one another” (Barad, 2007, p.  383). Embodiment of/for learning occurs where individuals are and become, in relationship with others, the significant others here and now, but also the others that live in a different time (asynchronous relationships) and in distant places (distributed topography). Learners establish embodied kinship relationships with these crowds of humans, non-humans and imagined humans, and all that comes with them. These chosen families can embrace or stifle people. As Haraway (2016b) cautions, “kin is a wild category that all sorts of people do their best to domesticate”. However, kin is the necessary companion during processes of becoming; and it is embodied. Haraway (2016b) reminds us that the word companion comes from Latin “cum panis, with bread” (p. 11) and indicates what comes/goes with something else. Vergil (2020) describes the actual use of bread in antiquity: disks of bread were used as plates on top of which the “real” food was located. The “mensae” would absorb the juices of food and provide a flexible, but compact, platform for nourishment. The plate-role explains the omnipresence of bread in the Mediterranean cuisine: bread was the base of/for food; it came with nourishment and provided the structure for eating practices. The word “companionship” holds the image of this juicy comradeship between bread and the nourishment that comes with it (food). According to the constructionist definition of embodied pedagogy, “learning (…) joins body and mind in a physical and mental act of knowledge construction” (Nguyen and Larson, 2015, p. 332). Both learning and creative processes perform a relocation from old to new: what we did not know, now we know; what we did not imagine, now we have created. From not-knowing to knowing, from envisioning to creation, the changes brought by learning and creativity seem to challenge genealogical thinking. However, the idea that the old leaves room for the new and ceases to exist is too simplistic. In Barad’s (2007) terms, “neither past nor future is ever closed” (p. 383), as they interact with each other. In practice, this means that individuals keep on learning from, and having conversations with, the complex kinship they have chosen. Consequently, the challenge for educators becomes how to shape learning environments that allow for creativity to occur in critical, relational, embodied and distributed ways. A first step is to address the necessity for further studies on synchronous/asynchronous routes of co-creation and co-learning and how these are embodied. The distinctive creative exchanges and pedagogical strategies that an ensemble may practise constitute a privileged environment where theatrical genealogies can be reframed: My purpose is to make “kin” mean something other/more than entities tied by ancestry or genealogy. The gently defamiliarizing move might seem for a while to be just a mistake, but then (with luck) appear as correct all along. Kin-making is making persons, not necessarily as individuals or as humans. I was moved in college by Shakespeare’s punning between kin and kind—the kindest were not necessarily kin as family; making kin and making kind (as category, care, relatives without ties by birth, lateral relatives, lots of other echoes) stretch the imagination and can change the story. (Haraway, 2016b, pp. 102–103)

Haraway here reminds us that learning is not only about the mind/body unity or relationality between humans but also about the “interaction with the environment;

5  The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy

67

that is, the potency of affects generated by other minds and bodies” (Watkins, 2012, pp. 57–58). From this perspective, learning is both embodied and intersubjective, relying on the power of consciousness “to act not simply (as) a result of accumulated bodily affects but (as) a function of the intervention of other consciousnesses” (Watkins, 2012, pp. 57–58) and other non-human entities.

Conclusions This chapter has investigated alternative ways of looking at the genealogy of theatre laboratory, in order to explore the embodied pedagogy practised in this community of learners/creators, by looking at Odin Teatret’s example. Narratives of first encounters with this ensemble materialised the bodily reactions of spectators in whose memory these encounters are crystallised as transformational experiences. Affective reactions to aesthetic experiences are elements of the embodied pedagogy in the theatre laboratory, where taking part (participation) in shared learning happens in intra-actions between spectators/ensemble and actors/actors. This new way of looking at genealogical connections involves agentic transformations: individuals and/in communities take action on their felt sense of belonging. This can take the shape of ensemble creativity, through the embodied and affective participation of one group of performers committed to joint creative processes. More generally, the embodied pedagogy in Odin Teatret’s laboratory shapes poetic communities, which I define as communities that gather through/by means of shared poetic and embodied experiences. These communities are built on a set of performative principles through which embodied encounters occur through sustained practices which are uniquely performed by/through the arts. Similar to communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991), these poetic communities practice a mutual engagement in a joint enterprise. However, their professional and pedagogical repertoires take many different shapes, thus becoming a single community of multiple practices. The kin-making, the affirmative ethics and the co-creative (sym-­ poietic) are uniquely practised in theatre laboratory, to the extent of shaping a sense of belonging that is professional and personal at the same time. However, this embodied, poetic, relational community is not unique to theatre laboratory or to any one artistic practice. This suggests that the embodied pedagogy shaped in poetic communities can be translated to formal education. This would imply a number of consequences for the ways in which formal education is conceived, designed, applied and reflected upon. Bringing the embodied, affective and relational pedagogy practised in theatre laboratory to formal education would imply rethinking learning environments as poetic communities and securing spaces for bodies to encounter, for metaphors to be uttered and performed and for embodied practices to be experienced together.

68

T. Chemi

Acknowledgments  Thank you to the three members of the ensemble for sharing their insights: director Eugenio Barba and actors Tage Larsen and Julia Varley. The conversations were conducted at Odin Teatret, Holstebro, Denmark, in early February 2020.

References ASGARD. (1995). Teatro Antropologico e Antropologia Teatrale. Rassegna Internazionale di Teatro. Scilla: Teatro Proskenion. Retrieved at Odin Teatret Archives, ODINPUBLICATIONS-A-B3_1.2_302-382. Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. Duke University Press. Barba, E. (1995). The paper canoe. a guide to theatre anthropology. Routledge. Barba, E. (1990). Four spectators. The Drama Review, 34(1), 96–101. https://doi. org/10.2307/1146009 Barba, E., & Savarese, N. (2003). A dictionary of theatre anthropology: the secret art of the performer. Routledge. Barba, E., & Savarese, N. (2019). The five continents of theatre: facts and legends about the material culture of the actor. Brill/Sense. Boal, A. (2008). Theatre of the oppressed. Pluto Press. Braidotti, R. (2013). The posthuman. Polity. Carreri, R. (2007). Tracce: Training e Storia di un’Attrice dell’Odin Teatret. Il Principe Costante. Chadwick, W., & de Courtivron, I. (1993). Significant others: Creativity and intimate partnership. Thames and Hudson. Chemi, T. (2017). Distributed problem-solving: How artists’ participatory strategies can inspire creativity in higher education. In Handbook of research on creative problem-solving skill development in higher education (pp. 139–157). IGI Global. Chemi, T. (2018). A theatre laboratory approach to pedagogy and creativity: Odin teatret and group learning. Springer. Christoffersen, E. E. (1993). The actor’s way. Routledge. Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention. Harper Perennial. Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2016). A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. Bloomsbury. (I ed. 1988). Etymonline. (2016). Theatre. In Online etymology dictionary. Retrieved 14 July 2016 at www. etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=theatre Etymonline. (2019). Participation. In Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved 25 April 2019 at www.etymonline.com/search?q=participation. Etymonline. (2020). Ensemble. In Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved 16 March 2020 at www.etymonline.com/search?q=ensemble Foucault, M. (1989). The archaeology of knowledge. Routledge. Glăveanu, P. (2014). Distributed creativity: Thinking outside the box of the creative individual. Springer. Haraway, D.  J. (1991). Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature. Free Association Books. Haraway, D. J. (2016a). Manifestly Haraway (Vol. 37). University of Minnesota Press. Haraway, D.  J. (2016b). Staying with the trouble: Making kin in the Chthulucene. Duke University Press. Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1979). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton University Press.

5  The Genealogy of the Actor’s Laboratory: Making Kin as Embodied Pedagogy

69

Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge University Press. Ledger, A. (2012). Odin Teatret: Theatre in a new century. Palgrave MacMillan. Miettinen, R. (2006). The sources of novelty: A cultural and systemic view of distributed creativity. Creativity and Innovation Management, 2, 173–181. Nguyen, D. J., & Larson, J. B. (2015). Don’t forget about the body: Exploring the curricular possibilities of embodied pedagogy. Innovative Higher Education, 40(4), 331–344. Rasmussen, I. N. (2006). Il Cavallo Cieco: Dialoghi con Eugenio Barba e Altri Scritti. Bulzoni Editore. Sawyer, K. R., & DeZutter, S. (2009). Distributed creativity: How collective creations emerge from collaboration. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 3(2), 81–92. Schino, M. (2009). Alchemists of the stage: Theatre laboratories in Europe. Routledge Icarus Publishing Enterprise. Stanislavski, C. (1936/2011). An actor prepares. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Taviani, F. (1975). Il libro dell’Odin: il Teatro-laboratorio di Eugenio Barba. Feltrinelli. Turner, J., & Campbell, P. (2018). Radical care: Performative generosity and generativity in third theatre. Performance Research, 23(6), 58–64. Varley, J. (2011). Notes from an Odin actress: Stones of water. Routledge. Virgil. (2020). Aeneid. Book VII, 115. In Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press. Retrieved 26 March 2020 at www.loebclassics.com/view/virgil-­aeneid/1916/pb_LCL064.11.xml Watkins, M. (2012). Discipline and learn: Bodies, pedagogy and writing. Sense. Wyatt, J. (2018). Therapy, stand-up, and the gesture of writing: Towards creative-relational inquiry. Routledge.

Chapter 6

Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer Sandra DeLuca

Abstract  Drawing on theoretical work from Russian philosopher and social theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, I propose the Theatre of Carnival as an insightful approach to embodied engagement in the health and social care classroom. Drawing on my own experiences as a nurse and nurse educator, I discuss embodied ways in which students can construct and work with aesthetic representations. This work invokes vigilant subjectivity as a means for understanding of self, and the importance of relationship to finding meaning places for healing and for becoming an embodied healer. As part of this work, I describe mything and countermything workshops for nursing and other health professional students that reveal dialogism and embodied connectiveness, as the glue of healing relationships. Finally, I work with poetic response to the illness experiences of others as part of this approach to becoming embodied healers in health and social care. Keywords  Carnival · Embodied healer · Aesthetic knowing · Poetic response · Myth · Countermyth · Nursing

Unintentional Practices As noted in DeLuca, Bethune-Davies and Elliott (2015), Sacks, a British neurologist, reflects upon his own bodily experience with a surgeon and surgery as a “thing with a thing,” suggesting that this objectification becomes “the center of a person’s experience with health care” (p. 212). Sacks writes of his experience with a leg that would not move and a surgeon who considered himself a carpenter: “I regarded my leg as a thing, and he regarded me as a thing. Thus I was doubly thinged: a thing S. DeLuca (*) Fanshawe College, School of Nursing, Western University, Faculty of Health Sciences, London, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_6

71

72

S. DeLuca

with a thing” (Sacks, cited in Gadow, 1990, p. 37). I wonder, in the years following Sack’s words, has much changed? Nurse researchers have for years noted the objectification process in health care (see Benner, 1984, 1994; Benner & Wrubel, 1989; Benner et al., 1996; Bevis & Watson, 1989; Gadow, 1990; Leininger, 1978; Paterson & Zderad, 1976). In fact, even further back in time, Florence Nightingale, in her seminal work, Notes on Nursing (1859), alluded to this issue of dismissing the embodied connection to the ill patient. She referred to this, in what I suggest is with similar dismay, as “chattering hopes and advices” (p. 54). I really believe there is scarcely a greater worry which invalids [sic] have to endure than the incurable hopes of their friends. There is no one practice against which I can speak more strongly from personal experience … of its effects during sickness observed both upon others and upon myself. I would appeal most seriously to all friends, visitors, and attendants of the sick to leave off this practice of attempting to “cheer” the sick by making light of their danger and by exaggerating their probabilities of recovery. (p. 55)

Disembodied practices, as unintentional as intended, may be masked in a variety of ways. Recently, the increased use of the simulated patient – the high fidelity mannequin – the “cold body” – has in many instances replaced embodied face-to-face clinical practice for nursing students. In addition, certain treatment regimes may fracture the embodied self. Frank (2005), during treatment by chemotherapy for cancer, noted: “I was unmade as my mind sought to hold onto the promise that this treatment was curing me, while my whole body deteriorated: my intactness, my integrity as a body-self, disintegrated” (pp. 216–217). Grosz (1994) has long called for “some kind of understanding of embodied subjectivity, of psychical corporeality, [that] needs to be developed” (p. 22). For Grosz (1994), a feminist theoretical approach to concepts of the body offers potential to “avoid the impasse posed by dichotomous accounts of the person which divide the subject into the mutually exclusive categories of mind and body” (p. 21). In the following sections, I work with my own experiences as a nurse educator/ researcher to think through ways in which nurses and nursing students may call upon aesthetic ways of knowing and practising in order to enhance their development of a vigilant subjectivity that informs the work of the embodied healer.

 o Embody Is to Transgress … to Transgress Is to Embody: T The Body as Visual Narrative In medieval carnival, societal norms were inverted. The rich, powerful, beautiful and sacred were mocked and caricatured. The obscene and grotesque were celebrated. The powerless could pretend to be powerful. Bakhtin takes this idea to explore situations where norms are challenged and subverted. He uses carnival as a metaphor to describe the “unveil[ing of] the social processes that would come into play in the overthrow of established authority” (Bell & Gardiner, 1998, p. 177). I am interested in the ways in which illness representations, at times, seem to call upon

6  Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer

73

carnival in the ways in which they are enacted and narrated, and are represented aesthetically, poetically, mythically, artistically, etc. Gardiner (1992) explains: Carnival effectively broke down the formalities of hierarchy and the inherited differences between social classes, ages, and castes, replacing established traditions and canons with ‘free and familiar’ social interaction based on principles of mutual cooperation, solidarity and equality. (p. 52)

Illness representations, many times, are transgressive, raw and responsive to medical procedures and diagnoses that, at times, are felt to rob a person of their sense of self, imposing another way of knowing who one is. Carnival has a transformative potential derived from its “capacity to suspend ordinary life and relations of power” and allow for “new forms of interpersonal relations, redefinitions between high and low culture, and processes of profanation that reconnect people to their bodies and nature” (Bakhtin, 1984, in Bell & Gardiner, 1998, p. 159). There are many representations of illness that use the body to tell the story of one’s experience with illness and healing. Spence reflects on the challenges to identity posed by her experience of being reduced to her disease. Outside of the hospital I had a complex identity which took 48 years to form. I had a profession, a set of life skills, a network of relationships … Inside the hospital I was reduced to my disease, to a part of the body where it was apparently located. (Spence, 1995, p. 139)

As a form of resistance, Spence (1995) conjures a visual as well as textual experience by photographing her breasts throughout her cancer treatment. Spence (1995) played with transgressive imagery, displaying her breast, marked with an X, awaiting amputation (as she refers to it). She painted her body with war paint outwardly showing scars of her lumpectomy (her “cultural sniper” image). This visual narrative also tells a story of what is not seen … a mastectomy or hair loss from chemotherapy because she refused treatment. I propose that Spence’s work alludes to the work of Bakhtin’s notion of the “carnivalesque.” As opposed to the official feast, one might say that carnival celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchal rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions. Carnival was a true feast of time, the feast of becoming, change, and renewal. It was hostile to all that was immortalized and completed. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 199)

Bakhtin (1984) says that the awareness of victory over fear is an essential element in medieval laughter, where people “play with terror and laugh at it; the awesome becomes a ‘comic monster’” (p. 91). Perhaps Spence’s cultural sniper is the modern equivalent of the comic monster of medieval times. I suggest that the comic monster takes various forms in aesthetic representations of illness and healing. Disabled individuals whose disability/illness takes them and their bodies on a course outside of the popular cultural normative of person whom Wendell (1996) refers to as a “paradigm citizen” (p. 41) must learn that upon “coming into the public world with illness, pain, or devalued body [they will] encounter resistance to mixing the two worlds.” As a result, they often go underground. Or, as Nancy Mairs, a prize-winning poet who had multiple sclerosis, has done, some arise from the

74

S. DeLuca

underground and reclaim the language of the obscene or images of the grotesque to rage or to alter. Mairs (1986), in her essay, “On Being a Cripple,” states: First, the matter of semantics, I am a cripple. I choose this word to name me. I choose from among several possibilities, the most common of which are handicapped and disabled. … Even now, I’m not sure what my motives are, but I recognize that they are complex and not entirely flattering. People – crippled or not – wince at the word cripple, as they do not at handicapped or disabled. Perhaps I want them to wince. I want them to see me as a tough customer, one to whom the fates/gods/viruses have not been kind, but who can face the brutal truth of her existence squarely. As a cripple, I swagger. (Mairs, p.  18; quoted in Zola, 1993)

Perhaps Spence, Mairs and others who rage with their body as visual narrative invoke the obscene/grotesque as an agent of embodiment in a social and biomedical culture of divisiveness. Sartwell (1996) makes the claim that all obscenity is “related to the salient signs of embodiment” and that “embodiment is transgressive” (p. 158). Thus, to embody is to transgress, and likewise to transgress is to embody. The body as visual narrative takes back its agency  – the agency that illness, disability and culturally entrenched notions of the normative body and biomedical dualism pilfer. It seems that at least there is peace in reclamation. So who am I, as interpreter of these images and renderings? Interpretation is fluid and dialogic and may alter at any point and for any person involved. What one takes from, or understands about, the representation evolves from within the dialogue that one has with the image (textual or body). One must acknowledge that it is as much a construction of the interpreter’s self as it is a construction of the other, given over to a community space in trust. I suggest that there are understandings to be gained, as well, through an intrasubjective dialogue I can have with myself and with my interpretation of the illness/ healing representation of another. Or, this may happen through intersubjective dialogue between myself as practitioner and the person who is the seeker of care who has represented their experiences of illness/healing through body narratives, poetry, photography, text and other aesthetic means.

Poetry as Heuristic for Embodied Practice An ever-increasing number of nurse educators and researchers call for a more embodied practice in nursing (see Harrison et  al., 2019 for further discussion of embodied practices in nursing). Benner (1996, 2010) uses the term “ethical comportment” to refer to the “embodied, skilled know-how of relating to others in ways that are respectful, responsive, and supportive of their concerns” (1996, p.  233). She writes: Embodiment provides a common human circumstance that allows for understanding, compassion, and the protection of vulnerability that objective rational calculation cannot provide. (1996, p. 235)

6  Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer

75

Benner (2010) further explains that: For nurses, the capacities to see and to act require imaginative understanding and rapport with patients. In their formation, nurses encounter their own coping in the context of identifying others’ ways of handling difficult life experiences such as suffering, dying, and emotional responses of patients, including anger, helplessness, and fear. (p. 30)

Intentional acts must then encompass embodiment whereby the nurse/healer finds ways in which to take in and assimilate the experiences of others. Yet this work must start with oneself. I suggest that aesthetic representational work and dialogue serve as a heuristic for the embodied practice of a vigilant nurse healer who is truly sensitive to the experiences of those seeking care. Below I start with some reflections on myth and countermythic knowing.

Myths and Countermyths: A Way of Knowing If we keep on speaking the same language together, we’re going to reproduce the same history. (Irigaray, 1985, p. 205)

There are multitudes of sources of myths. There are accounts of many women in the late 1800s who were incarcerated in asylums for articulately and passionately speaking their minds in an historical time period when a woman’s place was to be compliant and silent (see Geller & Harris, 1994 , for first-hand accounts). Scribbled on the walls of women’s cells were poems and narrative representations of their own experiences of illness and/or healing. Their non-compliance was defined as insanity. Stay, jailor, stay, and hear my woe! She is not made who kneels to thee, For what I am now, too well I know, And what I was, and what should be. I’ll rave no more in proud despair, My language shall be mild, though sad; But yet I’ll truly swear, I am not mad, I am not mad.

(Excerpt from an 1892 Asylum journal, p. 1 as it appears in Geller & Harris, 1994). It appears that the embodied act of speaking out as a woman was at times misrepresented as the myth of the female malady – madness. Do these forms of misrepresentation continue to exist? Do we label those in our care who speak in embodied tones of voice, as complainers or difficult patients? Is the reason for such a label an avoidance or lack of understanding of ways in which to intervene and to care for patients’ embodied experience of illness? What I see in those narrative accounts on the jail cell wall are countermythic knowings  – the reconstruction of the mythic story of the female malady. Perhaps, these served as a place for some form of healing to occur. Having begun the process of listening to what aesthetic representations might offer to the healing process, in a past research study (DeLuca, 2000), I took myself as subject. As a researcher, I wondered about the possibilities of making

76

S. DeLuca

connections between myself as practitioner/educator and those who are seeking care. I contend that it is very much the responsibility of the healer to find meaning places for healing, and that these places must exist within what it means to be an embodied human being and a part of a community of like-minded souls working towards inspiriting health in self and other. I believe that if one looks carefully, there can be fertile locations in one’s embodied subjectivity where human-to-human connections of the heart may be found. As I looked, I took as my data my own process of engagement with poetic form or poetic representation, or even simply poetry. Aesthetic activity actually begins at the point where we return into ourselves, when we return to our own place outside the suffering person, and start to form and consummate the material we derived from projecting ourselves into the other and experiencing him [sic] and from within himself [sic]. (Bakhtin, 1995, p. 26)

While witnessing the suffering of others in their representational imagery and while listening to their testimony of pain, I return to my own subjectivity to look for meaning places where healing may take place.

 orgons, Tricksters and Me: Embodiment Work Towards G a Vigilant, Subjective Self I have spent much time with Medusa. She has become, for me, an alter ego, a way of seeing and a way of understanding both self and experiences with control, oppression and silence. It, at one time, seemed strange that I might find insight and understanding of self in the myths of the gorgon, or goddess, as Medusa is at times known. Medusa is one of three gorgon sisters, the only mortal one, “who had snakes for hair, and whose gaze, on meeting another, turned the beholder to stone” (Brown, 1993, p. 1120). There are many interpretations of the myth of Medusa, which, as Bulfinch (1947) maintains, claim that Medusa was once endowed with beauty. Although Medusa’s story appears simple in nature, “the Medusan archetype has become imbued with complexities which are very much contingent upon one’s perspective” (DeLuca, 1996, p. 92). This paradox of perception became recognisable to me as it related to the way in which nurse educators, for example, came to believe that rigour depended upon objective, non-emotional practice. As in the myth of Medusa, many nurses believed that passion was “ugly,” and yet if one examines the many, early and current, writings about science, many science theorists call for passionate, emotional and creative acts of science. Bronowski says: the language of science cannot be freed from ambiguity, any more than poetry can. In spite of its tidy look, the structure of science is no more exact, in any ultimate and final sense, than that of poetry. (cited in Watson, 1985, p. 1)

Much of our early understanding as nurse educators about rigour in science work was influenced by the beliefs, transformed into “truths,” of the biomedical community. These myths became the “facts” that guided nursing as well as medical practice.

6  Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer The point here is that passion, emotion and creativity are elements of embodiment. So how is the myth of Medusa, for me, a reminder that in working through what it means to practise and teach and learn embodied practice, one must reconnect with one’s vigilant self? Various heuristics such as poetic response may enable one to remember and work with an embodied practice, and to support our students to learn and work and create their own embodied practice. The following is an early attempt of mine to work with Medusa. Medusa’s White Paste and Ditto Ink Story She had neatly placed, tidy brown hair, She was seven, and she was good. But Medusa loved smells. The smell of wet cement in the rain. The smell of fall, the smell of old buildings. But Medusa especially loved the smell of the old school and white paste and ditto ink. Whenever the time came for Art class, Medusa could hardly wait to engage her nose in close proximity to the white paste that she was supposed to use to hold together her creation. Oh, and the paper with the directions, that was handed her for the lesson, that heavenly smell of ditto ink. One day Medusa was compelled to ask her teacher: “Why does white paste smell so good? What is in it?” “Flour and water – now do your work!” “But my mother’s flour doesn’t smell like this, and water doesn’t smell at all.” “That’s enough questions – be quiet, and get down to the REAL work!” And Medusa’s hair turned to knots and her eyes became green agates. Medusa was mad, some say she got

77

78

S. DeLuca down right ugly. Medusa was changed from that day forward. No longer would she ask questions about the REAL stuff of life. From now on she would, in a very clandestine manner, lower her head, avert her gaze from the Master-ess, focus on her paste and ditto paper, and smell… until her head was full of what mattered. Only then would she look up. (DeLuca, 2008, pp. 56–58)

What I did not recognise at the time was that many of the original interpretations of this myth, that Medusa was a monster to be feared, constituted a guiding myth that directed my passions, connectedness and creativity to the sidelines of professional, and sometimes personal, life. Many of the “shoulds” under which I lived – whether they were gender or professional role stereotypes – were fuelled by an unconscious and perhaps patriarchal interpretation of the Medusan myth. After composing a number of countermythic poems, I constructed a poem entitled The Cello and the Paintbrush. I include it here as a testament to the contribution of countermythic poetry to the understanding of the vigilant subjective self. What originally accompanied this poem was a sketch I did of a cello and a paintbrush beside it, with Medusan tangled hair/snakes threaded around and underneath (Fig. 6.1). The Cello and the PaintbrushThe muse’s playground Who is muse? Is she Medusan monster conjured to frighten you, to turn you to stone? Is she sitting in waiting to capture your life. To suck, to engulf, to change you into what you fear?

6  Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer Fig. 6.1  Cello and a paintbrush beside it, with Medusan tangled hair/ snakes

Or is she your fear? What is this fear? Who is this fear? She is not to be fed your control or she will sting. She is not to be wiped from your consciousness or she will lurk. Look at her. Those eyes are only yours, beckoning you to come Those snakelike tangles are only arms, waiting for embrace. Know her. She is your passion. She walks with brush and sound. She sings of you. She is muse. She is you. (DeLuca, Fall, 1996)

79

80

S. DeLuca

I understand countermythic poetry and poetic response work as a gift of self to self, an offering of insight, a reclamation of an understanding whose origin may as yet be unknown. Medusa wears clothes that do not outwardly resemble my own, and yet if I look carefully at my self-wardrobe, I can eye her garb, hidden behind the everyday clothes, pushed into a corner. It seems that in the process of making meaning, one becomes able to clarify and come to terms with mythic introjections that nourish the infestations and indoctrinations that have invaded one’s mindset.

Finding the Embodied Self Through Mything I see the possibilities for the nurse/healer in developing a more holistic, connected and embodied practice to work with mything/countermything self-work. Perhaps the healer must be required to enter their subjectivity and search for sites of self-­ healing, or to at least clarify what wounds/perspectives are one’s own, prior to even considering developing an ethical healing relationship with others. I suggest the risk of not doing this work is a muddied understanding of what embodiment actually means. The taking on and receiving of another, and the resultant altering of one’s self that occurs when one truly bears witness must be done with vigilance of the other as well as with care for the self. From my perspective, embodiment means finding the place within one’s self to understand and thus share in some way the healing journey. I see the healing experience as mutually undertaken, and mutually liberating rather than burdensome and dark. I understand the vigilant subjective act as an alert and attentive examination of self-representations; however, they may be constructed, as one thinks about self in a certain way – that is as a part of a community of others. What I see of my own humanity is reflected in others and gathers its reflection from others. I look at humanity as not mine, but ours. I look at healing as not mine, but ours. I receive your testimony as indicative of my responsibility to you. I engage in dialogue with you as my moral responsibility, not as a choice. I engage with you to search for meaning places for healing. Most often someone writing a poem believes in, depends on a delicate, vibrating range of difference, that an “I” can become a “we” without extinguishing others, that a partly common language exists to which strangers can bring their own heartbeat, memories, images. (Rich, 1994, p. 85)

I see these words as evocative of the potential of all self-representations of illness/ healing, including one’s own. It is not unusual for those experiencing illness to represent their experience in poetry and art. Why? I believe that poetry has the potential to bring us closer to understanding another’s experience with illness. If a healer responds to the poem of one struggling with illness, does the healer impose their own understanding of the illness or does their response work to open up an opportunity for dialogue? I see this opening of dialogic possibilities as one of the potentials of the poetic encounter within the therapeutic relationship.

6  Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer

81

Dialogic Imagination: Learning Embodiment Once one starts to love one’s body in the world and hence to love the world – that is, once one comes to love some particular situation in which one finds oneself … one can be drawn into a love of things in general. … If we simply allow ourselves as bodies to experience what we are, as bodies, experiencing, we will be taken fully into situation and joy in situation. (Sartwell, 1996, p. 166–167)

Where are the sites of carnival in nursing education? The carnivalesque has the capacity to offer a theatre for the enactment of one’s embodied self, or at least for the rehearsal of such an enactment. Is there such a space in the curricula of nursing education? A number of years ago, Chinn and Kramer (1999) wrote of a vision of a rehearsal studio in nursing education for the purposes of creating and recreating storylines, creating embodied synchronous movements and engaging the “connoisseur-­critic.” They noted that creating and recreating storylines can “provide aesthetic narrative skills that the nurse uses as a participant in the emerging real-life stories of those cared for” (p. 197). They highlight the parallels between various features associated with creating stories, such as the suggestion that change is central to a storyline; conflict, struggle and tension are ever present; the storyline compels movement towards an ending, although endings remain uncertain; as well as interactions between characters and their motives which provide key structuring devices in the story that unfolds in real life for the person experiencing the illness (Chinn & Kramer, 1999, p. 196). Whereas I see the relationship between Chinn and Kramer’s (1999) proposed rehearsal studio and my own, I suggest that my theatre has a different purpose or perhaps a divergent route. The theatre of carnival that I propose offers a space for playful aesthetic representation, imagination and resistance; as such it is decorated with myths, witches, mystics, fairy tales, gorgons and the grotesque (see Bakhtin, 1984, Rabelais and His World).

 heatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant T Embodied Healer Based upon a previous research study (see DeLuca, 2000) as well as the writings of Bakhtin, I suggest that a theatre of carnival is an open and inviting space for nursing students and students of other health disciplines to dialogue with their own subjectivity. I see these workshops as reminiscent of a performance poetry course where one works with the written and spoken word in a rather free flowing manner where one may discover the wisdom hidden under the words. This is not unlike so many children’s books where, within the fairy tale or the “Fairly Stupid Tale” (Scieszka & Smith, 1992), one discovers many layers of thought about life and those who live it.

82

S. DeLuca Once upon a time there was a mother duck and a father duck who had seven baby ducklings. Six of them were regular-looking ducklings. The seventh was a really ugly duckling. Everyone used to say, “What a nice-looking bunch of ducklings-all except that one. Boy, he’s really ugly.” The really ugly duckling heard these people, but he didn’t care. He knew that one day he would probably grow up to be a swan and be bigger and look better that anything in the pond. Well as it turned out, he was just a really ugly duckling. And he grew up to be just a really ugly duck. The End. (Scieszka & Smith, 1992, no page numbers, emphasis in original)

This may seem like a children’s tale turned a bit upside down, but that is precisely what a theatre of carnival provokes. Lensmire (1994) stresses that the carnivals and popular festivals of the Middle Ages and Renaissance could teach us “how to bust open and transform traditional and closed discourses” (p. 371). Carnival work obliterates the canons of discourse as it frees behaviour, gesture and discourse from its shackles. In this atmosphere, participants would construct and work with their own aesthetic representations, looking with vigilance for understandings of self and what relationship this work may have for an embodied healer. This would be a site for “dialogic heteroglossia” (Bakhtin, 1996) – where the multiplicity of self-voices may enter into dialogue and be joined by others who are in turn exploring their own understandings … a classroom for the vigilant subjective self. Maxine Greene (1995) speaks of aesthetic experience as those which “require conscious participation in a work, a going out of energy, an ability to notice what is there to be noticed in the play, the poem, the quartet” (p. 125). Greene goes on to say: To introduce students to the manner of such engagement is to strike a delicate balance between helping learners pay heed – to attend to shapes, patterns, sounds, rhythms, figures of speech, contours and lines – and helping liberate them to achieve particular works as meaningful. (p. 125)

Although Greene is speaking of education in general, what better way to sensitise nursing students to subtle signs of humanity and illness experience of, and a resulting embodied relationship with, their patients. Greene (1995) also makes the point that when we hold an image of what is objectively “the fact” (think diagnosis), “it has the effect of reifying what we experience, making our experience resistant to re-evaluation and change rather than open to imagination” (pp. 125–6). Participants in mything and countermything workshops would work through masks that we all inhabit in order to explore the authentic self. There are many myths that roost within us. To name them and to go about countering them in writing, poetry, art and song releases the participants to allow them to work with what it might mean to remove the masks that protect them. Aesthetic work affords one a safe space to do so, again the work of vigilance. A third workshop would take public aesthetic representations that seekers of care have been willing to offer and engage the participants into a kind of response work. An example of this is one that I have used in clinical teaching in a psychiatric unit. There resided a resident who had little speech, but posted his poems publicly all over the hallway walls. I refer to him as “Bill.” One of Bill’s poems was entitled “Nuts.” I include an excerpt here:

6  Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer

83

Nuts What is nuts? Am I nuts? If I’m nuts-are you nuts? Is everybody nuts? If you work, are you nuts? If you do work and go nuts, do you make sure everyone else is nuts too? If you didn’t work would you be nuts, or nuts in a different way? In which way would you rather be nuts?

Bill’s poem goes on for quite a length. I will include an excerpt of my response poem:

What I Hear You Say, Bill You say I’m crazy, but I wonder if you have ever thought about what that means? It’s a word – a word you use to distance me from you. But have you ever looked around you? There is craziness everywhere. If you don’t do what others demand of you, they call you crazy. Yet if you do what you’re supposed to do, and do it well, then you are “crazy” to others who don’t understand your perfection. Is this the same kind of “crazy” as me?

My response poem continues, but the question is, does this poem bring me closer to understanding Bill’s experience with mental illness or does this impose my own understanding of mental illness upon his words? Perhaps the dialogue needs to continue as I see this as an opening up of dialogic possibilities, albeit through poetry. At the time, the nursing students with whom I worked were offered a choice as to various assignment packages best suited to who they were and how they would learn best. A student who chose the aesthetic package wished to work with Bill. As a result of his wish not to speak other than say “good morning,” this student formed a relationship with Bill through poetic response. She met him where he was – in a world of silent words. They met every shift, and as a result, this nursing student explained that through poetic response, she learned as much about herself as she did about Bill. Hanh (1988) shares the following: When we want to understand something, we cannot just stand outside and observe it. We have to enter deeply into it and be one with it in order to really understand … To comprehend something means to pick it up and be one with it. There is no other way to understand something (p. 11).

84

S. DeLuca

An education that I envision for the healer parallels what I see as the work of the healer. It therefore makes sense that as the work of the healer is liberatory work, so too must the education of the healer be devoted to a similar philosophy.

Final Thoughts for Now A Theatre of Carnival invites the healer/student and healer/teacher to construct together what it means to heal as we find our own embodied meaning places for healing. In a Theatre of Carnival, one is urged to find one’s subjectivity. The carnivalesque becomes also a place to be in relation, to teach and to learn, to heal self and to be healer, to make strange and to find the familiar. As one looks for meaning, so too does one invoke meaning. Questions about meaning are reconstructed into questions of whose meaning. The work of aesthetic representation is the work of carnival as much as it is a heuristic for the acknowledgement and understanding of the experience of self and other. As an agent of embodied subjectivity, and as an educator of insight and of vigilance, the aesthetic representation is at once a creative form, an ethical position, a teacher, a wisdom, a curiosity and a belief. Like Medusa, the aesthetic form pokes and prods one to see differently with each glance. The aesthetic workplace is a place where embodied meaning lives, only to be set free.

References Bakhtin, M. (1984). Rabelais and his world (Vol. 341). Indiana University Press. Bakhtin, M. (1994). Rabelais and his world, 1965. In P.  Morris (Ed.), The Bakhtin reader (pp. 195–206). Edward Arnold Publishers. Bakhtin, M. (1995). Art and answerability: Early philosophical essays (M. Holquist & V. Liapunov, Eds.) (V. Liapunov, Trans.). University of Texas Press. Bakhtin, M. (1996). The dialogic imagination (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Trans.). University of Texas Press. Bell, M. M., & Gardiner, M. (Eds.). (1998). Bakhtin and the human sciences: No last words. Sage. Benner, P. (1984). From novice to expert: Excellence and power in clinical nursing practice. The American Journal of Nursing, 84(12), 1479. Benner, P. (Ed.). (1994). Interpretive phenomenology: Embodiment, caring, and ethics in health and illness. Sage. Benner, P. (1996). The primacy of caring and the role of experience, narrative, and community in clinical and ethical expertise. In P. Benner, C. Tanner, & C. Chesla (Eds.), Expertise in nursing practice: Caring, clinical judgment, and ethics (pp. 232–257). Springer. Benner, P. (2010). Educating nurses: A call for radical transformation. Jossey-Bass. Benner, P., Tanner, C., & Chesla, C. (1996). Expertise in nursing practice: Caring, clinical judgment, and ethics. Springer. Benner, P., & Wrubel, J. (1989). The primacy of caring: Stress and coping in health and illness. Addison-Wesley/Addison Wesley Longman.

6  Theatre of Carnival: A Classroom for the Vigilant Embodied Healer

85

Bevis, E. O., & Watson, J. (1989). Toward a caring curriculum: A new pedagogy for nursing. NLN Publications. Brown, L. (1993). New shorter Oxford English dictionary on historical principles. Clarendon. Bulfinch, T. (1947). Bulfinch's Mythology: The age of fable, the age of chivalry, the age of Charlemagne. Crowell. Chinn, P., & Kramer, M. (1999). Theory and nursing: Integrated knowledge development. Mosby. DeLuca, S. (1996). Uncovering the passion: The reclaiming of self in the teaching lives of nurse educators. Unpublished master’s thesis, The University of Western Ontario. DeLuca, S. (2000). Finding meaning places for healing: Toward a vigilant subjectivity in the practice of a nurse educator. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto. DeLuca, S. (2008). Medusa’s white paste and ditto ink story. In J. Nisker (Ed.), From the other side of the fence: Stories from health care professionals (pp. 56–58). Pottersfield Press. DeLuca, S., Bethune-Davies, P., & Elliott, J. (2015). The (De) fragmented body in nursing education. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 209–225). Springer. Frank, A. (2005). The self unmade: Embodied paranoia. In M.  Fraser & M.  Greco (Eds.), The body: A reader (pp. 216–218). Routledge. Gadow, S. (1990). The advocacy covenant: Care as clinical subjectivity. In J. Stevenson & T. Tripp-­ Reimer (Eds.), Knowledge about care and caring: State of the art and future developments (pp. 33–40). American Academy of Nursing. Gardiner, M. (1992). The dialogics of critique: M.M. Bakhtin and the theory of ideology. Routledge. Geller, J.  L., & Harris, M.  E. (1994). Women of the asylum: Voices from behind the walls, 1840–1945. Anchor Books/Doubleday. Greene, M. (1995). Releasing the imagination: Essays on education, the arts, and social change. Jossey-Bass. Grosz, E. (1994). Volatile bodies: Toward a corporeal feminism. Indiana University Press. Hanh, T.  N. (1988). The heart of understanding: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita Heart Sutra. Parallax Press. Harrison, H.  F., Kinsella, E.  A., & DeLuca, S. (2019). Locating the lived body in client–nurse interactions: Embodiment, intersubjectivity and intercorporeality. Nursing Philosophy, 20(2), e12241. Irigaray, L. (1985). This sex which is not one. Cornell University Press. Leininger, M. (1978). Political nursing: Essential for health service and educational systems of tomorrow. Nursing Administration Quarterly, 2(3), 1–16. Lensmire, T. (1994). Writing workshop as carnival: Reflections on an alternative learning environment. Harvard Educational Review, 64(4), 371–391. Mairs, N. (1986). On being a cripple. In Plaintext: Essays. (pp. 9-20). University of Arizona Press. Nightingale, F. (1859). Notes on nursing: What it is, and what it is not. Harrison. Paterson, J. G., & Zderad, L. T. (1976). Humanistic nursing. NLN Publications. Rich, A. (1994). What is found there: Notebooks on poetry and politics. W. W. Norton. Sartwell, C. (1996). Obscenity, anarchy, reality. State University of New York Press. Scieszka, J., & Smith, L. (1992). The stinky cheese man and other fairly stupid tales. Viking Juvenile. Spence, J. (1995). Cultural sniping: The art of transgression. Routledge. Watson, J. (1985). Nursing: Human science and human care. Appleton-Century Croft. Wendell, S. (1996). The rejected body: Feminist philosophical reflections on disability. Routledge. Zola, I. (1993). Self, identity and the naming question: Reflections on the language of disability. Social Science & Medicine, 36(2), 167–173.

Part III

Embodiment and Reflection

Chapter 7

“I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education Elizabeth Anne Kinsella

and Kirsten Sarah Smith

Abstract  The aim of this chapter is to open a dialogue about embodiment and mindfulness education. We begin with a discussion of mindfulness, and mindfulness education in higher education health and social care contexts, followed by a section in which we situate ourselves, and discuss the context of our experiences of teaching mindfulness in a health professions education classroom. We then consider theories of embodiment, and ways in which we employed them in the design of a hermeneutic phenomenological study of mindfulness education and practice. Examples of embodied accounts of mind–body awareness and mindfulness in everyday activities are highlighted drawing on students’ writing about their experiences. A body mapping protocol and a body map that explores the embodiment of mindfulness are presented. Finally, we reflect on a few of the benefits and challenges of mindfulness practice as identified by students and share emerging pedagogical insights to support students to embody the space of mindfulness education in the professional education classroom. Keywords  Pedagogy · Embodiment · Mindfulness · Reflection · Journaling · Body map · Well-being In recent years, mindfulness has become popular, with some suggesting that Western society is undergoing a “mindfulness revolution” (Boyce, 2011). Mindfulness is

E. A. Kinsella (*) Institute of Health Sciences Education, Faculty of Medicine & Health Sciences, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] K. S. Smith Health and Rehabilitation Sciences, Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University, London, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_7

89

90

E. A. Kinsella and K. S. Smith

being recognised as an important approach to education in health and social care professions (Kinsella et al., 2020), as an approach to therapeutic intervention with service users (Crowther et al., 2020; Kinsella et al., 2020; O’Driscoll et al., 2017), and as contributing to the health and well-being of health professionals (Shapiro et al., 2005). In the context of high rates of stress, anxiety, depression, burnout, and attrition amongst students, mindfulness has been highlighted as an approach with potential to help mitigate these challenges (Kinsella et al., 2020). Further, mindful higher education has been posited as a means of educating the whole person, of integrating the inner and the outer life, and of bringing the mind, body, heart, and spirit together (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010). Some contend that mindful approaches offer a means to renew human purpose and meaning, and that it is important to centre this purpose in higher education (Palmer & Zajonc, 2010).

What Is Mindfulness? One of the challenges in engaging mindfulness practices, and with the mindfulness literature, is discerning what “mindfulness” entails. Regardless of the approach adopted, it is important to acknowledge that the roots of mindfulness practices extend to ancient Eastern traditions dating back 3000–5000 years, and to recognise diverse perspectives on the meanings, origins, and applications of mindfulness (Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2013). In a recent consideration of perspectives on mindfulness, Khoury et al. (2017) discussed 3 dominant conceptualisations – Buddhist, Western, and Langerian – presenting some 18 definitions, and suggesting “mind-­ body awareness” lies at the heart of these distinct conceptions. In a recent scoping review of mindfulness in health and social care education, we found that a large percentage of the articles (over 60%) drew on the work of Jon Kabat-Zinn to operationalise or define the construct of mindfulness (Kinsella et al., 2020). Kabat-Zinn is a physician, who popularised a secular Western version of mindfulness, known as mindfulness-based stress reduction. He defines mindfulness as “The awareness that arises by paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally”, and proposes attitudinal qualities of mindfulness such as: non-judgement, acceptance, patience, beginner’s mind, trust, non-striving, letting go, gratitude, and generosity (Kabat-Zinn, 2013a). Kabat-Zinn (2013b) describes mindfulness as “a way of being and of seeing that has profound implications for understanding the nature of our mind and bodies” (p. 284). The cultivation of awareness is at the centre of many conceptions of mindfulness. Berila (2016) describes mindfulness as a process by which people become more self-aware by engaging in particular practices. Buddhist perspectives point to four foundations of awareness: mindfulness of body, mindfulness of feelings, mindfulness of mind, and mindfulness of phenomena (Goldstein, 2013; McCown et  al., 2011). Shapiro et  al.’s (2006, 2009) classic work points to three mechanisms of mindful awareness: intention, attention, and attitudes. Dreyfus describes mindfulness as “a way of being in which one is highly aware”, which he describes as

7  “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education

91

“focused on the reality of the present moment, accepting and acknowledging it without getting caught up in thoughts about the situation or emotional reactions”. He notes that “mindful awareness allows us to observe our mental states without overidentifying with them, creating an attitude of acceptance that can lead to greater curiosity and better self-understanding” (Dreyfus, cited in Barbezat & Bush, 2014, p. 95–96). Kabat-Zinn (2013a) suggests that mindful awareness and acceptance are implicated in healing which he defines as “coming to terms with things as they are” (p. 27). Interestingly, theories of embodiment share central aims of mindfulness in their quest to bring mind and body together, recognise the mind itself as embodied, and recognise the body as a means of pre-reflective perception (Johnson, 1999, 2007; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Thompson, 2007; Varela et  al., 2017). Further, there have been recent calls to bring more attention to embodiment in professional education and professional practice (Green & Hopwood, 2015; Kinsella, 2015; Loftus, 2015). Recently, Khoury and colleagues have underlined the link between the concept of mindfulness and theories of embodiment, pointing out that “present moment awareness generally refers to the full awareness of processes relating to the: a) body, b) feelings, c) mind, and d) phenomena” (2017, p. 1165). Their aim is to ground the concept of mindfulness in bodily experiences, with a call for recognition of what they refer to as “embodied mindfulness”.

Mindfulness in Health Professions Education In a recent scoping review into mindfulness in allied health and social care professional education, we found a number of potential affordances of mindfulness education identified in the literature (Kinsella et al., 2020). Quantitative studies depicted mindfulness education as potentially contributing to improved capacities for student mindfulness; decreases in stress, anxiety, and depression; improved academic skills; enhanced reports of quality of life and well-being; enhanced empathy; and improved physiological measures, resilience, and emotional regulation. Qualitative studies pointed to affordances of mindfulness education with respect to students’ perceived self-care, defined as what a person does to improve a sense of subjective well-being; increased attention and management of stress in the classroom; presence with patients and ability to cope with stress in professional practice placements; and the cultivation of mindfulness qualities such as attention, self-awareness, compassion, non-judgement, and acceptance. Mindfulness education protocols in health and social care are often operationalised through a combination of 3–4 practices such as guided meditation, mindful movement/yoga, body scan, mindful breathing, mindful walking, and mindful inquiry (Kinsella et al., 2020). Eight weeks is a frequent time frame for courses in mindfulness, with additional daily home practices recommended, as per the mindfulness-­based stress reduction curriculum developed by Kabat-Zinn (2013a).

92

E. A. Kinsella and K. S. Smith

 esign of Mindfulness Education in a Higher D Education Context We take a moment here to situate ourselves before briefly describing the context of our engagement with mindfulness education. The first author, Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, has been a practitioner of meditation and yoga for over 25 years. Elizabeth Anne is a professor of health sciences education at a Canadian university, with a scholarly focus on reflective practice, professional knowledge development, phronesis, critical reflexivity, and ethical praxis. One stream in her programme of research focuses on mindfulness in health professions education and practice. The second author, Kirsten Sarah Smith, has engaged in a personal mindfulness practice for over 12  years. Kirsten is a PhD candidate in health professions education, a paediatric occupational therapist who uses mindfulness and yoga in her professional  practice, and a part-time lecturer at a Canadian university. Her research focuses on mindfulness in the health professions, with a particular interest in its use by rehabilitation practitioners. In light of the potential affordances for students, and bearing in mind educational designs in the literature, the first author developed and taught a mindfulness course for occupational therapy students. The course entitled “Mindfulness and Professional Practice” was offered for 4 years at a Canadian university. In this elective course, students chose whether or not to participate, with approximately 10–14 students enrolled per year. The course involved 15 hours of classroom time (3 hours per session over 5 weeks). Kirsten was a guest lecturer in the course and taught an adapted online version to 72 students over 14 weeks in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The elective course includes theory and research on mindfulness, mindful inquiry through dialogue, and experiences with mindfulness practices, as recommended by experienced teachers (Kabat-Zinn, 2013a; Meleo-Meyer, 2021). Embodied mindfulness practices are facilitated such as guided meditation, mindful movement/yoga, breathing exercises, body scans, and mindful walking. Students engage in a daily mindfulness practice for whatever time they can manage, with twenty to thirty minutes in the morning and the evening recommended (Kabat-Zinn, 2013a). Based on our experience as long-time students and practitioners of mindfulness, we weave attention to a range of embodied mindfulness qualities into our teaching. Some examples include attention to awareness, acceptance, focused attention, intention, equanimity, non-reactivity, freedom in action, impermanence, trust, compassion, insight, self-regulation, courage, generosity, presence, and gratitude. These topics arise spontaneously through dialogic mindful inquiry related to students’ readings, experiences with the practices, and ongoing reflections. In addition, ethical tenets oriented towards the creation of a safe space are incorporated such as commitments to engage with mindfulness practices; respectful behaviours; confidentiality; cultivation of a safe atmosphere; refraining from “advice giving”, freedom to set personal boundaries; and invitation to take risks, explore, and share at one’s comfort level (Meleo-Meyer, 2021).

7  “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education

93

Students keep a reflective journal throughout the course and are asked to think about past experiences with mindfulness, responses to mindfulness exercises, and key points, quotes, or insights, arising through the materials and practices presented in the course. The final paper consists of reflective writing, drawing on the journal entries, and considers one’s perspectives on mindfulness and its place in various domains such as everyday life, professional practice, human occupation, and interaction with clients.

Embodied Research In reviewing students’ reflective writing, we were moved by the richness of their accounts of learning about and integrating mindfulness practices. As such, we retrospectively asked students for consent to study their reflective papers as part of a study into mindfulness education and practice in the caring professions. The research drew on theories of embodiment (Ellingson, 2006, 2017; Harrison et  al., 2019; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Park Lala & Kinsella, 2011a) and employed embodied perspectives within hermeneutic phenomenological methodology (Harrison & Kinsella, in press; Heidegger, 1996; Laverty, 2003; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Park Lala & Kinsella, 2011b; Thompson, 2007; Van Manen, 2016; Wright-St. Clair, 2015; Wright-St. Clair & Kinsella, 2021). We also invited these same individuals, one year post graduation, to participate in a guided body mapping interview session. The study was approved by our  University Research Ethics Board and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Embodied approaches to research focus on the body as a path to access the world, the body’s skilled intelligence in the world, and the body’s intercorporeality (Park Lala & Kinsella, 2011a). Merleau-Ponty (2012) writes of the body as a primary means of perception. Human beings are not spectators of the world, but rather they are involved, interwoven, and living in the world as embodied beings. He highlights how pre-reflective experience acquired through the lived body moving through the world constitutes a means of perception in and of itself (Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Harrison, Kinsella, & DeLuca, 2019). Price and Shildrick (1999) draw attention to how “knowledge is produced” through the body and through “embodied ways of being in the world” (p. 19). Further, Minh-ha (1999) contends that we “write – think and feel- through our bodies” rather than solely through our minds (p. 258). In thinking about methods, we reasoned that reflective writing and body mapping would be fruitful methods to elicit embodied accounts. A number of writers have discussed writing as a method with potential to engage embodied understandings in the context of education (Leigh, 2016). Arts-informed approaches such as body mapping have also been described as powerful tools for overcoming mind–body dualism and for enhancing embodied understandings of experience (Costanzo, 2020; De Jager et al., 2016; McCorquodale & Deluca, 2020). In the next three sections, we offer some exemplars of ways in which “embodied mindfulness” (Khoury et al., 2017) was revealed in the data from our study. The first

94

E. A. Kinsella and K. S. Smith

section offers some examples of how students wrote about mindfulness with respect to the body; the second section highlights some of the ways in which embodiment was linked to everyday occupations; and the third section presents an exemplar of types of knowledge about mindfulness that can be revealed through a body map. Pseudonyms are used in the following sections to protect participants’ confidentiality.

Embodied Experiences: Mindfulness and the Body For many students, the practices of mindfulness led to new insights into the relationship between the mind and the body. Layla wrote: Taking time to acknowledge my senses has helped me to invite this new narrative, where I am able to let go of seeing my body as something that needs to be overridden by the mind. My mind has been doing a lot of talking over the years, and I’m realizing that it needs to start learning how to listen, to give space for my body to share.

A number of students wrote about the ways in which mindfulness offered opportunities to perceive sensations or messages arising in the body. Hannah wrote of mindfulness as a way to move beyond the confusion and noise of the mind and as offering “small yet attainable steps toward clearing the haze; bringing me back to my body”. Navya described mindfulness as allowing her to stay attuned to her body, and as offering an alternative to what she noted as ever-present striving for achievement: “It allowed me to stay attuned with my own body and do what was right for me. In doing so, I was more connected to the moment as my focus was on myself and not on reaching a goal”. Other students noted that mindfulness enhanced awareness of their own physical needs by enhancing perception of bodily sensation. Constance wrote, “I am now more mindful of what my body needs – whether that be rest, fresh air, or deep mindful breaths”. Adeline echoed these sentiments: “I became more aware of my body sensations, pain and became more attuned to my body. I’m more mindful of my body and pay attention to feelings such as tension or pain, and I listen to my body more”. For Layla, this bodily awareness moved her towards listening to how her body was communicating to her and acknowledging a type of embodied goodness and wisdom. She wrote: “I am beginning to learn to trust in the wisdom and goodness of my body, and understand that it has been trying to communicate itself to me for a long time”. Students also wrote about mindfulness as allowing awareness of the body in activities where it is often taken for granted. For example, Navya wrote of mindful walking as a practice she had not had exposure to yet thoroughly enjoyed: “This time I was noticing the movements of my body and experienced how it felt to be conscious doing something that is usually done unconsciously”.

7  “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education

95

 mbodied Experiences: Mindful Approaches E to Everyday Occupations Embodiment was also revealed in interesting ways in student accounts of mindful approaches to everyday occupations. Everyday occupations are defined broadly here, in line with occupational science perspectives, as “all that people need, want, or are obliged to do” (Wilcock, 2006, p. 9). While we often think of mindfulness as particular practices (i.e. meditation, breathing, yoga, body scan), the focus on mindful occupations (Goodman et al., 2019) shows how mindfulness can also be integrated into everyday activities. Sarah summed up this embodied experience: Encompassing mindfulness into my daily occupations enabled me to experience these mundane occupations through a new lens. I focused on how my food tasted, the shape, the smell and the colour, the sensations of the water falling onto my body when showering and how my body felt when walking including my breath, the feeling of the natural elements such as the wind on my face, and the emotional experiences.

Layla talked about how she used to arrive at school stressed from ruminating about the day as she rode her bike to school. She started using her morning bike ride as an opportunity to practice mindfulness. She wrote of focusing her attention on sensation in the moment: how the bike was supporting her body, the muscle groups she was using, the colours around her, the smells in the air. Layla described how she noticed a change whereby she arrived at school refreshed and ready to learn. Hannah noted that everyday occupations, combined with attention to her bodily experience, served as a key stepping-stone in her mindfulness practice. As compared to sitting meditation, she wrote “I found my most productive moments of mindfulness while walking the meadow outside … moments of stepping lightly around snakes, watching the deer frolic while I had my morning tea, and watching the butterflies buffered by the wind, brought me more appreciation for the present moment than the many, many hours I spent struggling to focus on my breath”. Many mundane daily occupations were noted as offering an opportunity to reconnect with one’s body through mindfulness. Navya noted that recognising daily occupations as opportunities for mindfulness created more opportunities to practice mindfulness. She wrote that even brushing her teeth allowed her to pay attention to the present moment: “feeling the sensation of the brush touching my teeth, tongue, and gums, and noticing the way the brush would go over every contour of each tooth”. Mia wrote about how “mindful eating provided me with the opportunity to experience an occupation that I engage in everyday (usually without much thought) with a new appreciation and perspective”. She noted “how different it was to actually experience the taste, texture and appearance of some of my favourite foods” and reflected further on “how complex the process of eating was and all the biological, physiological and physical factors at play”.

96

E. A. Kinsella and K. S. Smith

Embodied Experience: Body Map and Mindfulness In this section, we explore the embodied account of a novice practitioner’s application of mindfulness through examination of a body map generated in our research. Body mapping is an approach that has been utilised as a research method, therapeutic intervention, and a tool for community engagement (De Jager et  al., 2016; Gastaldo et al., 2012; Orchard, 2017; Solomon, 2002). Body mapping is an arts-­ based method that uses “drawing, painting or other art-based techniques to visually represent aspects of people’s lives, their bodies and the world they live in” (Gastaldo et al., 2012, p. 5). The primary outcome is a visual representation of embodied experiences and a narrative, or testimonio (Gastaldo et al., 2012). Costanzo (2020) writes of body maps as an opportunity for “participants to create their own personal, felt view of their body” (p. 306). A number of scholars have highlighted the capability of body map methods to “elevate emotion and somatic experience” (McCorquodale & DeLuca, 2020, p. 2), and to elicit embodied knowledge (De Jager et al., 2016; Gastaldo et al., 2012; Harrison & Kinsella, in press). McCorquodale and DeLuca (2020) have used body mapping methods to study mindfulness in the lives of mothers working in health and social care professions; their research reveals the richness of this method for studying mindfulness. The body map (Fig. 7.1) was created by a graduate of the mindfulness course, one year following completion. It was generated through a virtual guided body Fig. 7.1 Camille’s Body Map

7  “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education

97

mapping process, focused on embodied experiences of mindfulness. Body maps are often life size; however for this study, they were scaled to legal sized cardstock in order to accommodate the body mapping process through online virtual facilitation. Prior to the body map session, legal size cardstock with an outline of a body drawn in the centre, as well as pencil crayons and markers, were mailed to Camille. She was invited to use her own arts supplies in the process as desired. A guide (adapted from Solomon, 2002) was used to facilitate the body map process virtually by videoconference. The prompts and steps of the body map process were similar to those described by Helen Harrison in her chapter in this book, but with a focus on participants’ experiences of mindfulness. Camille offered reflections and interpretations about the body map following the process that show embodied forms of knowledge. The visual images and colours of the body map speak in different ways from what may be possible with words alone. Although a full interpretation of Camille’s body map is beyond the space available here, the body map and related description show how body mapping methods allow expression of perceptions beyond what might be conveyed verbally (Harrison & Kinsella, in press). Such approaches have the potential to engage what Davey refers to as a “hermeneutics of the visual” (Davey, 1999), to employ the power of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and to offer a more visceral and embodied perspective of a phenomenon. In the section below, we use italics to highlight some of the images, symbols, and metaphors in Camille’s body map. When asked about insights from the mindfulness body mapping session, Camille stated: “it helped me process that there’s lots of layers, like light and dark layers, and that I’m continually growing as a person, as a clinician, and there are beautiful parts and ugly parts … Clinically you show a very particular part of yourself, but mindfulness practice brings out really a more honest and authentic side”. In working with the body outline provided on the cardstock, Camille adapted it, retracing it using the colour blue. She indicated that she wanted to take the image and “turn it into my own body; to just make it my own”. Camille reflected that initially she saw mindfulness as like a calm river; she was curious about it and placed it “on a pedestal”. She spoke of mindfulness as a blue river of calm running through her body, calming her mind, with pathways into her chest, nervous system, breathing, and continuing on to other parts of the body. She described the “blue lines” streaming out of her body as “about the way mindfulness helps me to be calm and bring that calm forward into my life and practice”. She indicated that she had come to see it as a way to find calm amidst the storm, which over time was “more like a tsunami”, stating “in much more chaotic times it can be the tool in the storm”. When asked to mark a power point and create a personal symbol, Camille described mindfulness as a “life-saver” drawing a red and white-striped life preserver around her head. In speaking about a personal tragedy and the role of mindfulness, she said: “For me personally, I feel like it has been a lifeline … It came at a very particular time and I believe it came for a very particular reason”. As someone who loves to create, she talked about integrating the arts with her mindfulness practices and noted “I do a lot with my hands – even through the process of grief”.

98

E. A. Kinsella and K. S. Smith

She painted her hands “as big balls of glitter”, describing them as “glittery balls of goodness”. Camille placed personal slogans like “I’m getting there” at the top of her leg, and “stop eating yourself alive” to denote movement away from self-criticism and self-judgement, through her mindfulness practice. She noted “sometimes the guilt of where I am ‘not’ can overpower my day to day of where I am right now, instead of just appreciating, I’m here right now and that’s good enough. Sometimes that guilt or negative framing causes me to not move forward in my mindfulness practice  – so that … slogan is something to remember, to keep me motivated, to remind me”. Camille drew marks on and under her legs, noting the “lessons mindfulness teaches me”: “I drew my imperfect legs, and just making peace with them as a person, as a woman, as a therapist, it’s not my favourite body part at all – but maybe part of mindfulness … is recognizing that they do a great job of getting me from point A to B. There’s nothing wrong with them… they have some scars, and I have my own judgements, but they do a very good job with what they do”. Further, she shared: “There are layers that have been burnt [under the skin] that are of healing – you know, there’s trauma there”. Mindfulness is revealed in Camille’s body map as contributing to authenticity, healing, self-acceptance, a sense of calm, present-moment awareness, self-­ compassion, less negative self-judgement, and the cultivation of well-being. These qualities are important in the “becoming” of a therapist and show potential affordances of mindfulness to support healing, promote well-being, and mitigate stress, which are essential for health care practitioners charged with supporting others towards health. From the body mapping description, a number of metaphors point to embodied forms of knowledge. Camille’s body map and reflections speak to the potential for mindfulness to reveal layers, reconcile contradictions in the self, and promote authenticity. The blue rivers flowing through the body speak of the potential calming effects of mindfulness as a way to weather the storms, and also as a way to bring that calming presence into the world. The red and white life-preservers circling the head and connected to red hands, red heart, and red lungs perhaps speak to the “life-­ saving” or “life-line” potential of mindfulness practices discussed by Camille. The image of a face on the belly might speak to awareness of embodied responses in the body and allowing those to speak. The words “stop eating yourself alive” positioned over the gut offer a visceral impression of the embodied experience of perfectionism and self-criticism, and how mindfulness might help one recognise patterns and explore new possibilities for ways of being. The words “I’m getting there” placed at the top of a leg filled with scars are suggestive of the embodied movement of walking forward with self-compassion. Although Camille did not talk about some dimensions that stand out on her body map, as researchers we were struck by aspects, that in retrospect we wish we had explored more deeply. For instance, the contrast between the linear, angular, buildings in the background and the colourful soft lines of the body in the foreground. What does this signal? Perhaps the potential of mindfulness to help practitioners

7  “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education

99

creatively or calmly navigate the more rigid systems, structures, and rules of the world?

 mbodying the Space of Mindfulness Education: Student E Experience and Pedagogical Insights Through our own experiences of embodying the space of mindfulness education, we’ve come to appreciate two sides of the coin of mindfulness revealed in the reflective comments of students. On the one hand, students frequently write about realisations and benefits of engaging in the practices. Many students note positive outcomes arising from mindfulness practices that are helpful for mitigating the stresses and challenges of being a student and future health care practitioner. These include dimensions such as feelings of well-being: “I have experienced a feeling of wholeness, wellness and peace in my mind, body and soul in the last six weeks” (Kathryn); a greater sense of presence: “Mindfulness has helped me develop a greater appreciation of myself in connection with the world around me in the now” (Leah); a feeling of “coming home” to oneself: “Mindfulness has been a gentle invitation and reminder for me to ‘come home’ to myself; to be aware of my surroundings, again and again; to experience life more fully and to tap into that within me which is already okay, beautiful, and whole” (Constance); a path to self-awareness: “I find this simple technique useful in helping me to cultivate my moment by moment experience and just be more aware of my body, my emotions and feeling” (Anya); and to greater calmness in approaching the demands of the world: “The outcome of many classes has been a quieter mind, feelings of calmness and peace, and a readiness to tackle the world in a systematic and ordered way” (Naomi). On the other hand, stories of students’ struggles are also regularly depicted. We have witnessed high achieving students, their quest to be “perfect” at mindfulness practices, and cycles of self-admonishment and despair when they struggle. Accounts of self-criticism and judgements are frequently illuminated in students’ journals or in debriefing sessions in the classroom. It is not uncommon for students to struggle. For instance, students often write about an overly busy mind: “My racing thoughts seemed uncontrollable, so each time I meditated I felt an internal battle to stop my thoughts and achieve an unachievable standard. Instead of bringing a sense of comfort, mindfulness became an uncomfortable, stressful and judgmental experience” (Kathryn); negative self-judgements: “I consistently compared my practice, my body, and my ability to other people around me. Even though the instructors would encourage the class to avoid judging and to embrace whatever our practices were … I couldn’t quiet the voice in my head that demeaned my efforts” (Kathryn); resistance to the practices: “resistance stemmed from an internal tension of wanting to do mindfulness ‘right’ by being regimented with the homework as well as implementing further changes to my daily habits … I grappled with a tendency to see mindfulness in an ‘all or nothing’ commitment” (Camille); challenges

100

E. A. Kinsella and K. S. Smith

balancing practices in light of other demands: “Many of my late-evening meditations were interrupted by the whimpers of a sick preschooler, and plans to practice mid-day were often thwarted by group project meetings or impending deadlines” (Aubrey); unresolved personal issues: “it revealed how difficult mindfulness can be when there are personal factors impeding practice” (Andrew); or physical limitations: “physical pain and fatigue made it difficult to focus on my breathing” (Andrew). These latter accounts stand in contrast to the compassion towards self, advocated by teachers of mindfulness. There is a paradoxical irony here, that a practice which intends to promote the embodiment of self-acceptance, compassion, non-­judgement, and well-being may also generate its opposite in the form of angst, anxiety, frustration, and self-criticism, in students who have high expectations for the promise of mindfulness practices. This latter aspect receives little attention in writings about mindfulness education. Through our experiences over the years, pedagogical insights have emerged. In the learning setting, these are woven throughout the course and arise organically within dialogue and debriefing sessions. We encourage students to be generous with themselves when, metaphorically speaking, they “fall off their mat”. We encourage students to recognise that obstacles are to be expected; mindfulness capabilities develop with experience; compassion to oneself is at the core of mindfulness practices; playfulness is welcome – experiment with different practices; at times life will get in the way – responding wisely is itself a practice; stay curious about whatever arises; and remember it takes time and experience to train the mind.

Conclusion As mindfulness practitioners, educators, and scholars, we have become fascinated with the intersections of theories of embodiment and practices of mindfulness, and their parallel aims to bring mind and body together. In coming back to the earlier question of “what is mindfulness”, we might think of mindfulness as cultivating embodied qualities of being, becoming, and belonging, in a culture focused on doing. And further, as helping us embody “doing” – our occupations – in qualitatively different ways, i.e., with awareness, presence, and attention. Metaphorically, mindfulness practices can feel – in the first author’s experience – “like drinking a refreshing glass of spring water in the midst of a scorching desert”. For practitioners experiencing challenges of professional practice, such as stress and burnout, perhaps mindfulness practices can offer a place of a respite? Part of the generative nature of the practices may well relate to opportunities to embody the space of silence, and to bring focused awareness to one’s body, feelings, and mind in a world that is ever busy. “Embodied mindfulness” brings to light the embodied nature of mindfulness and to bodily “doings” or “occupations” in everyday life. We propose that mindfulness holds promise in promoting the embodied health, healing, and well-being of students and practitioners in health and social care.

7  “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education

101

The health and well-being of practitioners are essential to prevent burnout and attrition, and to support practitioners in their capacities to work well and with compassion with vulnerable individuals. Further, mindfulness may assist practitioners to navigate complex and stressful workplace environments, in times of neoliberalism and managerial practice contexts. Camille’s body map offers an example of how, for her, mindfulness was a place to cultivate calm and bring that quality into the world, was linked to her creativity and positive contributions in the world, served as a “life-line” in times of chaos and crisis, and appeared to offer a space of healing and self-acceptance. We contend, and have attempted to show, how theories of embodiment can help make visible the lived experiences of mindfulness. This work opens a dialogue concerning the nature of mind–body awareness, or “embodied mindfulness”, and makes this phenomenon visible through consideration of students’ reflective writing, an arts-based body map, and pedagogical insights for embodying the space of mindfulness. As we draw this chapter to a close, we acknowledge that there are important conversations beyond the scope of what we have taken up here. Such conversations intersect with concerns about the neo-liberalisation of workplaces, and the consequent embodied distress of professional practitioners, as we have discussed elsewhere (Durocher et al., 2016; Pitman & Kinsella, 2019), and as eloquently examined by Kathleen Mahon in her chapter in this book. It is not enough for institutions to offer mindfulness sessions to practitioners without also addressing structural arrangements that shape their everyday lives and very beings. Our hope is that by engaging in mindfulness, individuals, institutions, and societies can transform in ways that support health, well-being, humane organisations, and caring communities. Acknowledgements  The authors would like to express appreciation to the participants of the study for their generosity in sharing insights. Special thanks to Helen Harrison for helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. Thank you to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for support of this research through an SSHRC Insight Grant.

References Barbezat, D., & Bush, M. (2014). Contemplative practices in higher education: Powerful methods to transform teaching and learning. Jossey-Bass. Berila, B. (2016). Integrating mindfulness into anti-oppressive pedagogy: Social justice in higher education. Routledge. Boyce, B. (Ed.). (2011). The mindfulness revolution. Shambala. Costanzo, C. (2020). Body maps reframing embodied experiences through ethnography and art. In A. Bleakley (Ed.), Routledge handbook of the medical humanities (pp. 300–308). Routledge. Crowther, L. L., Robertson, N., & Anderson, E. S. (2020). Mindfulness for undergraduate health and social care professional students: Findings from a qualitative scoping review using the 3P model. Medical Education in Review, 54, 796–810. Davey, N. (1999). The hermeneutics of seeing. In I. Heywood & B. Sandywell (Eds.), Interpreting visual culture: Explorations in the hermeneutics of the visual (pp. 3–29). Routledge.

102

E. A. Kinsella and K. S. Smith

De Jager, A., Tewson, A., Ludlow, B., & Boydell, K. (2016). Embodied ways of storying the self: A systematic review of body-mapping. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 17(2), Art, 22. Durocher, E., Kinsella, E.  A., McCorquodale, L., & Phelan, S. (2016). Ethical tensions related to systemic constraints: Occupational alienation in occupational therapy practice. OTJR: Occupation, Participation & Health, 36(4), 216–226. Ellingson, L. (2006). Embodied knowledge: Writing researchers’ bodies into qualitative research. Qualitative Health Research, 16, 298–310. Ellingson, L. (2017). Embodiment in qualitative research. Routledge. Gastaldo, D., Magalhães, L., Carrasco, C., & Davy, C. (2012). Body-Map Storytelling as Research: Methodological considerations for telling the stories of undocumented workers through body mapping. Retrieved from http://www.migrationhealth.ca/undocumented-­workers-­ontario/ body-­mapping Goldstein, J. (2013). Mindfulness: A practical guide to awakening. Sounds True. Goodman, V., Wardrope, B., Myers, S., Cohen, S., McCorquodale, L., & Kinsella, E. A. (2019). Mindfulness and human occupation: A scoping review. Scandinavian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 26(3), 157–170. Green, B., & Hopwood, B. (Eds.). (2015). The body in professional practice, learning and education. Springer. Harrison, H., & Kinsella, E. A. (in press). Embodied hermeneutic phenomenology: Bringing the lived body into health professions education research. In S. Crowther & G. Thomson (Eds.), Hermeneutic phenomenology as research method in health, social care and educational research. Routledge. Harrison, H., Kinsella, E.  A., & DeLuca, S. (2019). Locating the lived body in client-nurse interactions: Embodiment, intersubjectivity, and intercorporeality. Nursing Philosophy, 20(1–14), e12241. Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time. State University of New York Press. Johnson, M. (1999). Embodied reason. In G. Weiss & H. F. Haber (Eds.), Perspectives on embodiment: The intersections of nature and culture (pp. 81–102). Routledge Publishing. Johnson, M. (2007). The meaning of the body: Aesthetics of human understanding. The University of Chicago Press. Kabat-Zinn, J. (2005). Coming to our senses: Healing ourselves and the world through mindfulness. Hyperion. Kabat-Zinn, J. (2013a). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain and illness. Bantam Books. Kabat-Zinn, J. (2013b). Some reflections on the origins of MBSR, skillful means, and the trouble with maps. In M. Williams & J. Kabat-Zinn (Eds.), Mindfulness: Diverse perspectives on its meanings, origins and applications (pp. 281–306). Routledge. Khoury, B., Knauper, B., Pagnini, F., Trent, N., Chiesa, A., & Carriere, K. (2017). Embodied mindfulness. Mindfulness, 8, 1180–1171. Kinsella, E. A. (2015). Embodied knowledge: Toward a corporeal turn in professional practice, research and education. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 245–260). Springer. Kinsella, E. A., Smith, K. S., Bhanji, S., Shepley, R., Modor, A., & Bertrim, A. (2020). Mindfulness in allied health and social care professional education: A scoping review. Disability and Rehabilitation, 42(2), 283–295. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago Press. Laverty, S. (2003). Hermeneutic phenomenology and phenomenology: A comparison of historical and methodological considerations. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 2(3), 1–29. Leigh, J. (2016). An embodied perspective on judgements of written reflective practice for professional development in Higher Education. Reflective Practice, 17(1), 72–85. Loftus, S. (2015). Embodiment in the practice and education of health professionals. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 139–156). Springer.

7  “I Listen to My Body More”: Embodied Mindfulness in Professional Education

103

McCorquodale, L., & DeLuca, S. (2020). You want me to draw what? Body mapping in qualitative research as Canadian Socio-Political Commentary. Forum Qualitative Social Research, 21(2), 6. McCown, D., Reibel, D., & Micozzi, M. (2011). Teaching mindfulness: A practice guide for clinicians and educators. Springer. Meleo-Meyer, F. (2021). Tapestry of MBSR: The art of interweaving transformational elements. The Humanistic Psychologist, 49(1), 147–161. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge. (Original work published 1945). Minh-ha, T. (1999). Write your body and the body in theory. In J. Price & M. Shildrick (Eds.), Feminist theory and the body: A reader (pp. 258–266). Routledge. O’Driscoll, M., Byrne, S., McGillicuddy, S., Lambert, S., & Sahm, L. J. (2017). The effects of mindfulness-based interventions for health and social care undergraduate students – A systematic review of the literature. Psychology, Health & Medicine, 22(7), 851–865. Orchard, T. (2017). Remembering the body: Ethical issues in body mapping research. Springer. Palmer, P., & Zajonc, A. (2010). The heart of higher education: A call to renewal. Jossey-Bass. Park Lala, A., & Kinsella, E. A. (2011a). Embodiment in research practices: The body in qualitative research. In J. Higgs, A. Titchen, D. Horsfall, & D. Bridges (Eds.), Creative spaces for qualitative researching: Living research (pp. 77–86). Brill-Sense Publishing. Park Lala, A., & Kinsella, E. A. (2011b). Phenomenology and the study of human occupation. Journal of Occupational Science, 18(3), 195–209. Pitman, A., & Kinsella, E. A. (2019). A place for phronesis in professional practice: A reflection of turbulent times. In J. Higgs (Ed.), Practice wisdom: Values and interpretation (pp. 57–68). Brill-Sense Publishers. Price, J., & Shildrick, M. (Eds.). (1999). Feminist theory and the body: A reader. Routledge. Shapiro, S., & Carlson, L. (2009). The art and science of mindfulness. American Psychological Association. Shapiro, S., Carlson, L.  E., Astin, J.  A., & Freedman, B. (2006). Mechanisms of mindfulness. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62, 373–386. Shapiro, S. L., Astin, J. A., Bishop, S. R., & Cordova, M. (2005). Mindfulness-based stress reduction for health care professionals: Results from a randomized trial. International Journal of Stress Management, 12(2), 164–176. Solomon, J. (2002). “Living with X”: A body mapping journey in time of HIV and AIDS. Facilitator’s Guide (Psychosocial Wellbeing Series). REPSSI. Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology and the sciences of the mind. Harvard University Press. Van Manen, M. (2016). Phenomenology of practice. Routledge. Varela, F.  J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (2017). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press. Wilcock, A. (2006). An occupational perspective of health (2nd ed.). Slack. Williams, J. M. G., & Kabat-Zinn, J. (2013). Mindfulness: Diverse perspectives on its meaning, origins and multiple applications at the intersection of science and dharma. Contemporary Buddhism, 12(1), 1–18. Wright-St. Clair, V. (2015). Doing (interpretive) phenomenology. In M. Stanley & S. Nayar (Eds.), Qualitative research methodologies for occupational science and therapy. Routledge. Wright-St. Clair, V., & Kinsella, E. A. (2021). Phenomenology: Returning to the things themselves with wonder and curiosity. In S. D. Taff (Ed.), Philosophy in occupational therapy: Informing education, research, and practice. Slack.

Chapter 8

Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education Programmes Helen F. Harrison

Abstract  Reflective practice has become well established as an important dimension of professional education and practice over the last 30 years, with the major emphasis on enhancing cognitive, as opposed to bodily, knowledge. In this chapter, I discuss indications that body mapping, an innovative and emerging method, may be a suitable pedagogical approach to encourage not only cognitive reflection but also embodied reflection. Linking to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodiment, I describe a synopsis of the body mapping process. As a college nursing professor, I describe my own use of body maps as a means of reflection and discuss the powerful impact it has had on my own pedagogy. The body mapping method highlights strong connections between one’s own history and contextual situations as a learner and one’s current practices as an educator. Through the body mapping process, my own embodied knowledge was uncovered, and my ideas about curriculum evolved in new directions. I gained a stronger sense of my own positionality as a teacher, greater awareness of the importance of sharing power with students, and increased recognition of the need to attend to teachers’ and students’ bodies in the teaching-learning process. The potential affordances of body mapping as a means to inquire into teachers’ and students’ embodied knowledge in professional educational programmes are discussed. Keywords  Embodiment · Phenomenology · Embodied reflection · Body mapping · Professional education · Pedagogy · Nursing

I am not in front of my body, I am in my body, or rather I am my body. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 151) Burning eyes and aching jaw and furrowed brow and tired back, Pushing through to write this down, to fight this down, to rite this down H. F. Harrison (*) Elborn College, Western University, London, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_8

105

106

H. F. Harrison Decades’ worth of being forced to write like this—to Write it that way, phrase it this way, cite it that way. Growing tired of all this non-sense, sleepy yawn-sense, Much prefer to make my own sense, move then hone sense, coming-home sense

The above passage was taken directly from a paper on embodiment that I wrote as a graduate student. The professor who had assigned the paper conveyed an interest in allowing creativity in our writing, giving students freedom to explore alternate avenues of expression. I was intrigued and delighted with what sprang from my fingertips while writing that paper. Having taught nursing as a college professor for more than 12 years, I had returned to school to pursue a PhD. With an interest in embodied knowledge, I planned to investigate development of practical wisdom in professional education programmes. I had observed that the character of student learning seemed different when their bodies were in motion, and I noticed that students who joined the “nursing dance team” that I offered for several years seemed to have a certain ease in asking me questions related to nursing. My thoughts turned to the students in the programme in which I taught and faculty attempts to welcome creativity and to share power with them in learning activities. Despite our best efforts, we had students who seemed fatigued, discouraged, and frustrated with the intensity of the programme or who showed signs of distress such as fainting during skills labs. Although my colleagues and I strove for a supportive learning environment, our students were showing signs of distress in embodied ways. Additionally, not all students seemed comfortable developing practitioner-client relationships. To explore the ways that my own teaching style may have shaped some of the students’ embodied responses, I was motivated to reflect on myself as an embodied teacher. My aim was to use what I learned through self-reflection to inform my pedagogy and practice as a nursing professor. After reading about embodied reflection, studying Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of embodiment, and exploring body mapping as a research method (Solomon, 2002; Gastaldo, 2012; de Jager, 2016), I wondered if body mapping, sometimes referred to as “body-map storytelling” due to its narrative component, might be a way to access more embodied forms of knowledge. To explore this possibility, I engaged in a body mapping process; the results are described in this chapter. Undergoing the body mapping process provided personal first-hand experience with the affordances of this approach, which can be related to several aspects of cognitive and embodied reflection in a higher-­ education context. The questions framing this chapter are 1) “What might embodied reflection look/ sound/feel like in professional education?” and 2) “What affordances could body maps offer as a pedagogical tool for nurturing embodied reflection in professional education programmes?”. First, a short overview of Donald Schön’s (1983, 1987) and Elizabeth Anne Kinsella’s (2007, 2009, 2012) work on reflective practice, with a particular focus on embodied reflection, is discussed. Next, I provide a brief synopsis of body mapping as method and consider the ways in which it is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodiment. I discuss the findings of several researchers who suggest body mapping may be used as an effective approach to

8  Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education…

107

encourage embodied reflection in research participants. Following this, I describe my experience of developing two body maps in a process that I refer to as “auto/ body mapping”. I describe the process and affordances of creating two body maps based on my experiences as a learner and as an educator. I suggest some processes that may further foster embodied reflection during body mapping experiences, and I outline how my conceptions of pedagogy have been transformed as a result.

Embodied Reflective Practice Engaging in reflective practice has become well established in professional education practice over the last 30  years (Kinsella 2007, 2009, 2012). Schön (1983) advanced the idea that practitioners need to take time to reflect in and on practice to improve their capabilities. Argyris and Schön (1992) state that “all human beings— not only professional practitioners—need to become competent in taking action and simultaneously reflecting on this action to learn from it” (p. 4). Schön (1983) made a strong argument for not depending solely on the tenets of technical rationality to guide professional practice, and he encouraged inclusion of often tacit, embodied professional knowledge developed in what he calls the “messy, indeterminate zones of practice”. He invited us to “search … for an epistemology of practice in the artistic, intuitive processes which some practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflict” (1983, p. 49). Drawing on Michael Polanyi and Gilbert Ryle, he proposes that “intelligent action” reveals a type of knowing, which he names “knowing-in-action”. Schön defines reflection as “A dialogue of thinking and doing through which I become more skillful” (1987, p31). He suggests that making our tacit knowledge partially explicit by observing and reflecting on actions may be helpful in shaping our future actions (1987). Kinsella studied Schön’s work and built upon his ideas (Kinsella, 2007, 2009, 2012). She describes intentional reflection as involving “cognitive thought, individual meaning-making, connecting to ‘other’ through thought, examined action and summarized by ‘knowing that’” (2012, p. 36). This is the classic type of reflection with which most teaching and other professionals in North America are likely familiar. Although Kinsella (2012) admits that Schön does not explicitly discuss embodied reflection, she contends that this aspect of reflection is implicit in his work and attempts to make this link explicit. For Kinsella, embodied reflection involves action in a contextual world, “doing”, reflecting in- and on-action, embodied connection to “other” through action, and intelligent action and is summarised by “knowing how” (2012, p. 35, 41). Schön (1983) reminds us that “although we sometimes think before acting, it is also true that in much of the spontaneous behavior of … practice we reveal a kind of knowing which does not stem from a prior intellectual operation” (p. 51). Following the work of Schön, Argyris, and Kinsella, embodied reflection among students of the professions may involve noticing “intelligent actions of the body” while students engage with others encountered during professional work, perhaps during interactions with clients. After considering these

108

H. F. Harrison

ideas, I became motivated to investigate ways to recognise intelligent bodily action and to encourage embodied reflection in myself, my colleagues, and the students we have the privilege of guiding in our programmes.

Merleau-Ponty’s Reflection French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) work with developing phenomenology as a philosophy can help us to understand what the role of the body in reflection might be. He argues that “My body is the … very actuality of the phenomenon of expression … (it) is the common texture of all objects and is, at least with regard to the perceived world, the general instrument of my ‘understanding’” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 244). He theorises that knowledge which is “latent” in the body is brought to recognition through our embodied being-in-the-world through the “unity” of the body; he considers perception to be “intentional” instead of originating solely from a series of neurological impulses—perception results from the way our bodies are “open to the world” and to the situations in which we find ourselves (Harrison et al., 2019). As a philosopher, Merleau-Ponty writes about reflection in a phenomenological, “lived” manner, proposing “what is given is not a massive and opaque world, or a universe of … thought; it is a reflection which turns back over the density of the world in order to clarify it, but which, coming second, reflects back only its own light … we will miss that relationship—which we shall call here the openness upon the world—the moment that the reflective effort tries to capture it” (1968, pp. 35–36). Merleau-Ponty cautions that reflection cannot take us back to an original experience, as the process of reflection changes it. He thus calls for a “hyper-reflection” that “takes itself and the changes it introduces … into account”, thereby “not losing sight of the brute [original] perception … it must use words not according to their pre-established signification, but in order to state this pre-logical bond … it must make it say, finally, in its silence what it means to say” (1968, pp. 38–39). This idea of not using the common meanings of words to describe what has been reflected on seems to call for “other-than-common-language” ways of expressing meaning— perhaps through using established words in new ways (e.g. poetry), through creating new words or expressions, or through embodied methods such as the arts (e.g. music or painting). Following Merleau-Ponty’s thought, reflection by professionals may involve engagement in embodied arts-based creations—a departure from the formal prose-based reflections often elicited from students of the professions by their professors.

8  Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education…

109

Body Mapping Foregrounds Bodily Knowing The body can refer to the physical “object body” which is materially present in the world along with other objects, or it can refer to the “lived body” described by Merleau-Ponty in the quote in the introduction (2012). Educators of professionals are encouraged to be concerned with the body “as lived” to provide person-centred service; students of the professions need to learn self-knowledge as well as knowledge of their clients’ experiences to provide excellent care (Schwind et al., 2014) and service. Teachers practising in all levels of education and across disciplines have been challenged to attend to their students’ embodied selves to engage them in the learning process (Perry and Medina, 2011, Loftus, 2015; Nguyen and Larson, 2015). Accessing the “lived body” may be facilitated using body map storytelling (McCorquodale and DeLuca, 2020), in which a literal map of the lived body is produced. Body mapping, which has been used for therapeutic, research, advocacy, and education purposes, involves the creation of a life-sized map of the body filled with images and symbols: using drawing, painting or other art-based techniques to visually represent aspects of people’s lives, their bodies and the world they live in. Body mapping is a way of telling stories, much like totems that contain symbols with different meanings, but whose significance can only be understood in relation to the creator’s overall story and experience. (Gastaldo et al., 2012, p. 5)

Consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, body mapping provides a central expressive space for the body, encouraging participants to “engage in a conversation about experience and perceptions as lived in an embodied manner, rather than in a temporal or spatial way” (Gastaldo et al., 2012, p. 11). The history of body mapping in its current form, originating in South Africa, has been elaborated elsewhere (Solomon, 2002; McCorquodale and DeLuca, 2020). While the entire process of body mapping engages an embodied approach, two of the steps originally described by Solomon et al. (2002) may align particularly well with engagement in embodied reflection. In one of these steps, the person creating the body map is invited to create “marks under the skin”, which involves “visualization to find and identify [emotions] that may be stored beneath the skin” (p. 39). The other step asks the person to engage in “body scanning—marking the power point”, which involves “visualization to locate your place of personal power in the body” (p. 27). These activities focus on embodied knowing.

Body Mapping and Reflection Scholars using body mapping as a research method have noticed that it may enhance participant reflection. de Jager et al. (2016) undertook a systematic review of body mapping which they called “embodied ways of storying the self”. The articles of this review met the inclusion criteria of 1) life-sized body maps were created and 2)

110

H. F. Harrison

meaning-making occurred in collaboration with participants. The review identified various uses of body mapping in research, therapeutic, and educational contexts. To explore to what extent body mapping may have encouraged various types of reflection, I accessed several of the reviewed articles whose titles linked to my interest in embodied reflection. I also looked under the subsections (themes) of the systematic review that included the words “embodied experience”, “embodied awareness”, “reflections”, and “benefit of body mapping” and undertook my own search for evidence of embodied reflection in the articles. There were several studies cited that exemplified embodied reflection—two of these were especially salient (Griffin, 2014; Tarr and Thomas, 2011). Griffin (2014) investigated how student teachers felt their past experiences with music may impact their identity as teachers of music in their future elementary school programmes. She found body mapping, with harp music playing in the background, helped to “jog” participants’ memories of past and present experiences with music. Participants expressed that the process of body mapping allowed deeper thinking and more authenticity and led to remembering more instances of music experience and better ability to imagine themselves as future music teachers than if they had not used this method. Some of them suggested that drawing images helped them to portray ideas they were unable to describe with words only. Tarr and Thomas (2011) used computer-generated three-dimensional body maps to analyse how dancers distinguish between pain and injury and the consequences these have for their careers and for their bodies. They found some interesting phenomena as their participants used a computer programme to mark areas of pain and injury on computer-generated digital body maps. They state, “two dancers commented that they could feel the pain ‘while they were drawing it’, an example of strong identification with the image, which brought their attention to the area of the body they were marking” (p. 149). Polkinghorne (2004) suggests that “embodied reasoning” may involve remembering not only events themselves but whole sensory experiences of when they happened for the first time. There were cases when marking on their body map helped Tarr and Thomas’ participants to remember pain and injury that had not immediately come to their minds when initially verbally asked about present and past pain: among some participants, their body-maps became a tool not only for bringing past pains and injuries to conscious awareness but also for thinking about the relationships and patterns evidenced on the map. For these dancers, a kind of self-reflective awareness emerged which required consideration not only of the history of their bodies but also of their futures. (p. 149)

Auto/Body mapping Process and Experience To begin what I refer to as “auto/body mapping”, I followed the methods for body mapping outlined by Solomon (2002) and Gastaldo et al. (2012), and I developed some questions to ask myself (thus the label “auto/body mapping”) (see Table 8.1).

8  Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education…

111

Table 8.1  Guiding prompts for “learner” and “teacher” reflective auto/body maps 1

Trace your body in pencil in a position that says something about your experience as “learner” and “teacher” onto two large sheets of paper (with the help of a partner) 2 Highlight the body shapes in dry paint (Sharpie™ dry paint pens, water based) or markers, and add hand-/footprints in acrylic paint to demonstrate their presence in the world 3 Choose and draw symbols to represent where you are coming from and what your dreams are for the future as a “learner” and “teacher” 4 Painting in your support: Write the (nick)names or symbols of those who support you as a “learner” and “teacher” on the body maps 5 Body scanning—Marking the powerful points: Visualise the point(s) on your body that give you power as “learner” and “teacher”, then create personal symbols to represent them, and draw them on or near the powerful points 6 Creating a personal symbol: Draw a symbol on the power points on the maps that represent how you feel about yourself and how you think of yourself in the world as “learner” and “teacher” 7 Drawing a self-portrait: Draw a self-portrait on the face of your body tracings that represents how you are in the world as a “learner” and “teacher” 8 Creating a personal slogan: Create a personal slogan about your strengths as a “learner” and “teacher” 9 Marks on the skin: Draw on marks that you have on your skin (physical) and under the skin (physical or emotional) on the body maps to represent physical and emotional interaction with the world as a “learner” and “teacher” 10 Create a symbol to explain to others what being a “learner” and “teacher” means to you 11 Public message: Message to the general public about becoming a “learner” and “teacher” 12 Add more drawings, symbols, or colours to the rest of the body maps until you are satisfied that it (partially) represents you Adapted from Gastaldo et al. (2012) and Solomon (2002)

By adapting the questions posed by these body-map scholars, I was able to guide myself to create body maps of “self-as-teacher” and “self-as-learner”. Initially, I started with only a “teacher” body map; however, as the process unfolded, I realised that I needed to also inquire into myself as a learner in order to allow for a more relational approach. The interactions and connections between the two pieces provided deep learning for me, as I became aware of how the characteristics of the two maps continue to shape each other in the present moment. For each map, I traced my body in a position or pose that said something about my life in those roles onto large sheets of paper, with the help of my life partner. When deciding about which poses to draw, I strove to calm my active cognitive mind to allow my body to move into relevant poses. As a teacher, I felt confident and stood up tall with my hands stretched out to my sides, wrists exposed, in a welcoming yet vulnerable pose. As a learner, I felt the need to protect myself from potential critique—my gaze became directed downwards, and my arms crossed my chest to create a self-protective pose. Merleau-Ponty wrote about bodily gestures as synonymous with thought: “It was always observed that the gesture or speech transfigure the body … It was not seen that, in order to be able to express these, the body must ultimately become the thought or the intention that it signifies to us (italics added).

112

H. F. Harrison

It is the body that shows, that speaks” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 203). Purposefully attending to the way in which my body naturally assumed a pose while focusing on the roles of teacher and learner exemplifies embodied “thinking”. While, traditionally, body map outlines are created while the person is lying on a sheet of paper, I followed my gut instinct to stand against a wall while my partner made the lifesized outlines of the poses. I had a greater sense of agency while standing up than I would have had lying down. I highlighted the pencilled-in body shapes with dry paint markers and added hand- and footprints with acrylic paint to “demonstrate my presence in the world” (Solomon, 2002). I added marks on my skin which are physically present on my body such as freckles and tattoos. More difficult was drawing in the marks under my skin; these represent the emotional markings within my body. While I was highlighting my body shape and thinking about the marks that I would be adding underneath my skin for the learner body map, I suddenly noticed a nauseated feeling in my abdomen. This struck me as something that my body was trying to communicate to me—some tacit knowledge that was becoming revealed to my awareness. Creating this sensation internally may have represented an “intelligent action” on the part of my body (Schön, 1983). While I was focusing my conscious attention on drawing around the outline of my paper “learner body”, my actual body seemed to be problematising an aspect of my prior experience as a learner. I determined that to express this problem defined by my body, I needed to draw an image of my intestines tightening up in some way, and I settled on my intestines being drawn in knots on the learner body map (Fig. 8.1). In my opinion, creating this symbol exemplifies Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion not to express perception during hyper-reflection with the common signification of words (1968, pp. 38–39). While intentionally cognitively reflecting on this situation later, I realised the queasy feeling happened while I was engaged in painting on the body map with dry paint—an arts-based activity. Images of a long-past experience, as a child, during an art class entered my awareness. The art teacher had misinterpreted my yawn as representing boredom with the story he was telling about the death of his colleague. The yawn was more a symptom of the sleep deprivation I was experiencing at the time; however, I was not allowed a chance to explain. This situation caused me great distress, but I refused to allow my mother to confront the teacher at the time. After that incident, my marks in art class dropped to a failing grade, despite my sustained efforts to do well in the class. Reflecting on this, I determined the source of the visceral discomfort to be this unsatisfactory, unfair situation with the former art teacher. This experience in my formative years had the effect of dampening some of my creative urges and became a significant disappointment in my life. While painting on the body map, I believe I engaged in a phenomenological type of embodied reflection; Merleau-Ponty writes: Reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of consciousness as the foundation of the world; rather, it steps back in order to see transcendences spring forth and it loosens the intentional threads that connect us to the world in order to make them appear … it reveals the world as strange and paradoxical. (2012, p. lxxvii)

8  Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education…

113

Fig. 8.1 Knotted intestines in “self-as-­ learner” body map—detail

In “loosening the intentional threads” of cognition while engaging bodily in drawing on my body map, I experienced strange and paradoxical sensations within my body. Attending to those sensations led me to question the assumptions about my art ability that had become incorporated into my body-self, thus transforming my self-­perception. For Merleau-Ponty, “Reflection is only truly reflection if it does not carry itself outside of itself, if it knows itself as reflection-upon-an-unreflected, and consequently as a change in the structure of our existence” (2012, p. 63). The appearance (or “dys-appearance” per Leder, 1990) of the queasy feeling in my gut as I drew the outline of the learner gave me the idea to use Eugene Gendlin’s (1962, 1981) method of focusing while deciding what marks to make under my skin for the teacher body map. “Focusing” is a process for helping one’s mind listen to the wisdom of one’s body (see Gendlin 1981 for an elaboration). Briefly, the participant clears their mind and allows the “felt sense” of an issue from the body to make itself known. The participant then attempts to find a word or image that describes the felt sense and goes back and forth between the feeling and signifier until the most resonant word or image is found. This exercise was fruitful for me; my cheeks stretched into a smile, and I became aware of my heart beating as I thought of learning with nursing students. The marks under my skin then became flushed cheeks and a big heart in the centre of my chest (Fig. 8.2). The body mapping process outlined in Table 8.1 continued, as I completed the next few steps. I engaged in what Solomon (2002) calls a “body scan” to determine my points of strength as a learner and as a teacher. This process could be interpreted as directing attention interiorly, from head to toe, to notice sensations and initial interpretations, while thinking of where power is held within one’s body. I created

114

H. F. Harrison

Fig. 8.2  Flushed cheeks and red heart in “self-as-­ teacher” body map—detail

personal symbols to represent these strengths or, in Solomon’s (2002) terms, “power points” and drew them near those locations on the body maps, an activity that engaged both embodied and intentional cognitive reflection. For each body map, I drew a self-portrait, which involves reflection as one has an idea of the way one looks that may not be accurate (Solomon, 2002). I needed to be purposefully focused on what I saw in a photo or mirror of my face that represents how I am in the world as a learner and as a teacher. This was a time-consuming process, and the resulting drawings may represent a more youthful-looking self than what I saw in the self-photo. Perhaps the youthful appearance of the self-portrait pointed to the way I am, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “open to the world”, in contrast to the actual lines and colours that another person may have found in the photos. Again, I felt the influence of my bodily knowledge during the physical process of making my self-portrait. My hand was starting to ache from holding the pencil crayons so tightly. I then became aware of significant muscular tension in my neck and upper back—likely tension from long-standing decreased confidence in my ability to draw. Once my awareness was focused on this uncomfortable tension, I noticed a bodily sense that my muscles needed to “just relax” to facilitate drawing. Simultaneously, my muscles did start to relax, and my cognitive, filtering brain stepped out of the way and allowed my body-self to draw more freely, with less self-­ judgment and monitoring. The results exceeded my expectations of producing a self-portrait that somewhat resembled my actual face. During this reflecting-in-action, I was able to get a “feel” for creating a self-­ portrait using the materials at hand. Instead of precisely drawing each line, I “let it flow” and explored different hand motions with the pencils (e.g. circular). This is reminiscent of the reflection-in-action of the musicians and pitchers Schön wrote

8  Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education…

115

about who gain a “feel for music” or the ball (1983, p. 55). One of Griffin’s (2014) participants stated “I had to … let my guard down for my illustrations … I find visual art difficult and so I was a little self-conscious about what it might look like”; another stated “It’s all in me, it’s just buried. I have to find it again”; and a third said “I dug a little deeper and then I was able to get a little more of raw me in my response” (p.  11). Perhaps embodied reflection can be made explicit not only through observing behaviour but also through intentionally accessing embodied knowledge through preferentially attuning to the senses (both internal and external) and bodily actions while engaging in an activity. I suggest this could potentially result in a type of “intentional embodied reflection”. Following the process guided by Solomon (2002) and Gastaldo et al. (2012), in the next step, I created personal slogans about my strengths in each role. Along the side of each body map, I wrote in a message to the general public about ways to nurture becoming a learner and about my invitation as a teacher for us “to become learners–teachers all together”. Messages are representations of thought processes; distilling many thoughts into a single message felt like intentional cognitive reflection. Deciding on the most appropriate phrases did, however, involve a sort of “gut sense” (Barnacle, 2009). I continued to add visual and textual symbols and images to the body maps until I was satisfied that they were representations of myself as teacher and learner, partial though they may be.

Transformed Embodied Pedagogy I have found many benefits of engaging in auto/body mapping. This process allowed me to access experiences and embodied knowing that I was not immediately aware of in my day-to-day life. The body maps intertwined in unexpected ways—while I have concurrently held the role of “learner” and “teacher” at several times in my life, it wasn’t until I created and reflected on the two body maps side by side (Fig. 8.3) that I was able to appreciate the full range of my embodied responses in both roles. By foregrounding my experiences and embodied responses to “being a learner”, I became more aware of the self-protective posture I assume related to academic work, despite having past success in academic pursuits. By engaging in this process, my ideas about curriculum are evolving in new directions: I have a stronger sense of my own positionality as a teacher, a greater awareness of the importance of sharing power with students, and increased recognition of the need to attend to teachers’ and students’ bodies in the teaching-learning process. Viewing and experiencing the body map of myself as learner shaped my perceptions of myself as teacher. The difference in power between the two became more apparent—even though I am the same person, I do experience power differently in the two roles. As teacher, I have considerable power to shape learning activities, assessments, and marks. As a student—even as a mature student—I feel somewhat at the mercy of the professor regarding all three of these. In this process, I engaged with one of the maps as being a “sketch of self” and the other map being a “sketch

116

H. F. Harrison

Fig. 8.3  Author with “self-as-learner” and “self-as-teacher” body maps

of other”. In following Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion to “loosen intentional threads” by disengaging from one of the aspects of myself while identifying with a second aspect, I experienced a shift in perspective. When I perceived the “teacher” as “other”, my learner-self felt somewhat threatened by the open-arms approach towards me and the bright colours of the teacher, friendly though she appeared. When I perceived the “learner” as “other”, I felt compassion towards the learner with whom I was attempting to engage. Now, when I consider my role as an educator, I perceive heightened levels of empathy within myself towards my students. Before engaging in this process, I may have had erroneous preunderstandings about my “clients”—nursing students—whom I assumed would be confident regarding their success in a professional education programme since the admission requirements were so high. Afterwards, I see that, even assuming an intentionally inviting yet confident posture as an educator, I still may not be interacting with students in an optimal way. Attempting to show my own vulnerability with open arms may not be enough to assist my students to open up to the world of nursing education and practice. Regardless of past success with learning, my students may also perceive a need for self-protection, and I may need to be more mindful of my approach to help nurture confidence in my students. Discussing the processes and personal meanings in my body maps with my colleagues allowed me to engage in dialogue with people outside of myself. Fielding questions and hearing suggested insights from my peers brought a socially and historically situated element to the body maps. My intentions as a teacher have not changed; I continue to intentionally engage students in the learning process by sharing power. My approach to sharing power, however, has changed. I am making efforts to bridle my assumptions that nursing

8  Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education…

117

students enter the learning process from a position of confidence. I have made plans to invite students in all levels of the programme to provide more input into learning activities. In this time of the COVID-19 pandemic, my colleagues and I have invited a group of second-year student volunteers to join us as “online peer mentors” for the incoming first-year students. I will be meeting online biweekly with the peer mentors to ask for their perceptions of how the first-year students are doing with their transition to higher education in general and to the nursing programme specifically. This will include a focus on incoming students’ embodied responses to this major transition and ways in which online learning may be affecting them bodily. Along with this change in perspective and approach, I plan to incorporate body mapping into the nursing education curriculum as a pedagogical tool to encourage embodied reflection. I will invite nursing students to create body maps of themselves, both as health-care professional and in the role of client, drawing on previous experiences as a client or imagined experiences as a client. The aim is to nurture a deeper appreciation of the embodied experience of being a client with greater understanding of their needs and perspectives. Simultaneously, the students may gain a deeper embodied understanding of “knowing how” to engage with their clients in a mutually beneficial way. In our new world of online learning, it may be less realistic to produce life-sized body maps. Creating maps of a smaller size (8.5 × 11″ or 8.5 × 14″) as advocated by Solomon (2002) in a “workbook” approach may allow opportunities to engage in body mapping in an online environment, several times over the course of the professional education programme. Body mapping could become a reflective pedagogical tool for increasing embodied awareness. I suspect that becoming attuned to sensations of the body while “doing” this arts-based activity may deepen the understanding of practitioner-client interactions. I will also invite fellow professors to engage in this activity.

Conclusion Embodied reflection within professional education settings may involve reflection in- and on-action, intelligent action, considering aspects of self as “the other”, being open to embodied perspectives of clients, and intentional focus on bodily knowledge through the senses during professional interactions. Expression of embodied reflection includes modes that may be other than formal prose such as through poetry, drawings, and music composition. Body mapping can be used as a method to nurture embodied reflection by attending to sensations and embodied responses arising from focusing on embodied emotions and knowledge during an arts-based activity. This process can be used as a pedagogical tool to assist educators and students of the professions to be open to deeper appreciation of the embodied experience of being a client of their profession. I invite colleagues to consider auto/body mapping as a means of embodied reflection on their positionalities as teachers and learners and as a pedagogical approach that invites embodied reflection with students in professional education programmes.

118

H. F. Harrison

Acknowledgments  The author would like to thank Alan Gooding for his assistance with editing the figures and with providing feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript. Appreciation is also extended to Kirsten Smith for taking the photograph in Fig. 8.3.

References Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1992). Theories of action. In Theory in practice: Increasing professional effectiveness (pp. 3–19). Jossey-Bass. Barnacle, R. (2009). Gut Instinct: The body and learning. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 41, 22–33. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-­5812.2008.00473.x de Jager, A., Tewson, A., Ludlow, B., & Boydell, K. (2016). Embodied ways of storying the self: A systematic review of body mapping. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 17(2), 1–31. Gastaldo, D., Magalhaes, L., Carrasco, C., & Davy, C. (2012). Body-map storytelling as research: Methodological considerations for telling the stories of undocumented workers through body mapping. Retrieved from http://www.migrationhealth.ca/undocumented-­workers-­ontario/ body-­mapping. Creative Commons. Gendlin, E. T. (1962). Experiencing and the creation of meaning. Free Press. Gendlin, E. T. (1981). Focusing. Bantam Books. Griffin, S. M. (2014). Meeting musical experience in the eye: Resonant work by teacher candidates through body mapping. Visions of Research in Music Education, 24. Retrieved from http:// www.rider.edu/~vrme Harrison, H., Kinsella, E., & DeLuca, S. (2019). Locating the lived body in client–nurse interactions: Embodiment, intersubjectivity and intercorporeality. Nursing Philosophy, 20(2), e12241–n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.12241 Kinsella, E. A. (2007). Embodied reflection and the epistemology of reflective practice. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 41(3), 395–405. Kinsella, E.  A. (2009). Professional knowledge and the epistemology of reflective practice. Nursing Philosophy, 11(1), 3–14. Kinsella, E.  A. (2012). Practitioner reflection and judgement as phronesis: A continuum of reflection and considerations for phronetic judgement. In E. A. Kinsella & A. Pitman (Eds.), Phronesis as professional knowledge: Practical wisdom in the professions (pp. 35–52). Sense Publishing. Leder, D. (1990). The absent body. University of Chicago Press. Loftus, S. (2015). Embodiment in the practice and education of health professionals. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­319-­00140-­1_9 McCorquodale, L., & DeLuca, S. (2020). You want me to draw what? Body mapping in qualitative research as Canadian socio-political commentary. Forum, Qualitative Social Research, 21(2). https://doi.org/10.17169/fqs-­21.2.3242 Merleau-Ponty. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge. (Original work published 1945). Merleau-Ponty. (1968). The visible and the invisible. Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1964). Nguyen, D., & Larson, J. (2015). Don’t forget about the body: exploring the curricular possibilities of embodied pedagogy. Innovative Higher Education, 40(4), 331–344. Perry, M., & Medina, C. (2011). Embodiment and performance in pedagogy research: Investigating the possibility of the body in curriculum experience. Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 27(3), 62–75. Polkinghorne, D. (2004). Embodied reasoning. In D. Polkinghorne (Ed.), The case for a judgement-­ based practice of care (pp. 129–150). Suny Press. Schön, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. Basic Books.

8  Body Mapping to Facilitate Embodied Reflection in Professional Education…

119

Schön, D. (1987). Educating the reflective practitioner. Jossey-Bass. Schwind, J., Beanlands, H., Lapum, J., Romaniuk, D., Fredericks, S., LeGrow, K., Edwards, S., McCay, E., & Crosby, J. (2014). Fostering person-centred care among nursing students: creative pedagogical approaches to developing personal knowing. Journal of Nursing Education, 53(6), 343–347. Solomon, J. (2002). “Living with X”: A body mapping journey in time of HIV and AIDS. Facilitator’s Guide (Psychosocial Wellbeing Series). REPSSI. Tarr, J., & Thomas, H. (2011). Mapping embodiment: methodologies for representing pain and injury. Qualitative Research, 11(2), 141–157. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794110394067

Chapter 9

Ethics and Embodiment in Health Professions Education Amy Michelle DeBaets

Abstract  A wide variety of ethical issues and needs arise in embodied educational practices for new health professionals. This chapter will first consider some core understandings about health professions learners and their embodied needs, namely, the inherently embodied nature of human life and healthcare practice and the overlapping, yet sometimes distinctive, needs of learners in the health professions. Specific virtues are proposed as important for healthcare professionals learning to provide excellent, embodied care for their patients. These virtues are epistemic humility, respect for the integrity of the patient as a person, tolerance for ambiguity, and a yearning for justice. Finally, this work will consider key ethical issues in embodied health professions education such as respect for the bodily needs and limits of learners, addressing damaging aspects of hidden curricula that socialise learners into patterns of disrespect, and questions about the safety of patients when they are practised on by novice health professionals. Keywords  Ethics · Respect · Integrity · Humility · Virtue Healthcare, at its root, is the care of embodied persons by other embodied persons. I argue that it is time to recognise and represent embodiment in the form and content of education provided to future healthcare providers. This chapter will explore some ethical issues and practices that increase attention to embodiment in health professions education. For the purposes of this work, ethics is defined as the pursuit of the good. Ethics concerns character and actions in terms of right and wrong, but also better and worse, recognising that the pursuit of the good is simultaneously free and constrained by forces beyond our control. Ethics is a question not solely of individual action but also of collective action, both the actions of individual educators and learners and those of institutions and professions more broadly. At its root, ethics A. M. DeBaets (*) Hackensack Meridian School of Medicine, Hackensack, NJ, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_9

121

122

A. M. DeBaets

considers the flourishing of ethical subjects, as well as the moral objects1 of actions. Why should we think about ethics in relation to embodiment?

Foundational Assumptions: Embodied Learning and Learners Discussing ethical issues related to learning and learners’ embodiment invites an examination of assumptions. Three foundational assumptions guide the ethics questions addressed here: 1. Humans are inherently embodied creatures, not simply minds that absorb information. 2. Healthcare practice is an inherently embodied act, including both mental and physical healthcare. 3. Learners’ needs overlap to a significant extent, but there is a diversity of embodied needs and experiences to account for in the education of new healthcare professionals. First, the recognition that human beings are inherently embodied learners, rather than simply minds who happen to have bodies, is crucial to the development of curriculum, forms of education, allowances, and aspirations for teaching new healthcare professionals. I do not simply have a body; I am a body, in a meaningful way (DeBaets, 2012). The bodies of the learners are not tangential to the learning that is happening – the bodies of the learners interface with the bodies of the patients they are being educated to serve; their bodies meet in diagnosis, discussion, treatment, and other interventions, and it is important to recognise and incorporate those bodies into educational processes. The ethical impact is that the experiences, needs, and identities of learners are wrapped up in the details of their embodied existence. When we value the bodies of learners, teachers, and patients and address their embodied needs, then learners are better positioned to thrive and learn as flourishing healthcare professionals: ‘Embodiment matters,’ one may say, but it ought not be either romanticized or overdramatized. On the one hand, many aspects of human life encourage an optimistic understanding of the importance of embodiment. Life in the flesh can be a truly pleasurable experience. One cannot begin to understand the heights of human joy - the delights of wonderful food, beautiful art, passionate sex, etc. - apart from the existence of human beings as bodies. It is an ethical, as well as an aesthetic, good to encourage and support the flourishing of human beings as bodies. On the other hand, one’s human existence as a body is also one of inevitable suffering, and we ought not overlook this in a rush to explain the amazing importance of the body as our mode of being in the world. Simply put, it is not only because embodiment is wonderful that it is important; it is also because life as a body is painful and messy that it matters so much. I do not cherish my sufferings, nor do I believe that there must be

1  Moral objects are those persons and situations affected by the ethical choices of others. Moral objects are the counterpoint of moral subjects, who are those performing ethical acts (or unethical as the case may be).

9  Ethics and Embodiment in Health Professions Education

123

some hidden meaning in them, but they are a necessary, if messy, part of who I am. We exist as bodies, with both the joys and sufferings that go along with that, and there is not an escape into something other than embodiment that can provide us with the former but not the latter. (DeBaets, 2012, p. 138–139)

Second, what does it mean to say that healthcare practice is an inherently embodied act? It is not only that healthcare practitioners act on the bodies of their patients, though they do, of course. Rather, it is to say that healthcare is embodied in that the bodies of patients and healthcare professionals act upon each other, with each other, and for each other. There is intercorporeality. Healthcare practice is a mutually embodied practice of persons, calling for recognition of these bodies, and their intercorporeality, in our practical ethics and education. The majority of healthcare practices, including mental healthcare, are mediated through the body, so whether one subscribes to a dualist understanding of persons or a monistic understanding, the care of the whole person exists as the care of the body.2 We provide mental healthcare as part of care for the whole, embodied person, including medications that act upon mental status, as a recognition that the mental and physical are part of the same whole and have impacts upon each other. Third, learners’ embodied needs overlap to a significant extent, but also differ. Thinking about embodiment is important in designing education for health professionals that is accessible for all learners, including those with disabilities and learning differences. People have needs for flourishing that overlap (food, shelter, belonging, etc.) as well as those that are distinctive to the individual (some people have greater needs for creativity, while others need stability; some need greater sociality, while others need more solitude). Educational design that attends to overlapping and distinctive embodiments can better respond to individual and general needs to foster accessibility and success. Health professions education that attends to the unique embodiments of persons is an ethical matter, as it concerns both the good of learners and the good of those whom they will go on to serve. People with disabilities, for instance, are overrepresented among patients, yet underrepresented among healthcare providers, creating a mismatch between those serving and those whom they serve (DeLisa and Lindenthal, 2012). Responsiveness to the embodiment of people with disabilities requires creativity and attention to varied needs. Greater inclusion of people with disabilities among healthcare professionals more broadly is also an ethical matter. Starting with the technical standards for health professions education, educators can themselves creatively reimagine the education that they offer in order to become more welcoming of learners with unique embodiments, including disabilities and learning differences. It is difficult to teach new health professionals to respect and value the varied embodiments of their patients if teachers do not model that respect and valuation in their teaching practices and if educational practices themselves are not accessible or inclusive. Likewise, for other groups  – racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual 2  I am a non-reductive physicalist in my understanding of human persons, but I do not believe that orientation is necessary to understand the importance of embodiment, even in mental healthcare. For more on this, see Murphy (2006).

124

A. M. DeBaets

minorities – the more that our health professionals reflect the diversities of different populations, the better a range of populations will be served (Greenwood et  al., 2020). A characteristic of embodiment is change.

 hanging and Challenging Embodiments C in Healthcare Practice It is important for ethical health professions education in the twenty-first century to be based around a recognition of some key factors related to embodiment in healthcare practice: 1) changes in the embodied healthcare needs of patients, 2) the changing nature of the embodied practice of healthcare as interprofessional and collaborative, and 3) the embodied challenges of overcoming the hierarchies and mistreatment that are part of the internal cultures of healthcare and health professions education. First, the most common embodied needs that patients bring to healthcare encounters are no longer acute injury and infectious disease. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the intertwined nature of infectious disease with the chronic diseases that constitute much of contemporary healthcare. Since the widespread acceptance of the germ theory of disease and the use of antisepsis, asepsis, and antibiotics, the frequency with which people die of infectious diseases has dropped in relation to other causes of illness (Warner, 1997). Instead of people routinely dying at relatively young ages due to infectious illness, acute injury, or childbirth, most people now live past childhood and young adulthood into old age. With the dramatic increase in the average lifespan, the relative importance of the diseases of age also increases (Omran, 2005). Diabetes, hypertension, arthritis, and asthma – these are now some of the major reasons why people seek healthcare on a regular basis, and these diseases require a different structure of the patient-provider relationship and different kinds of solutions to those of acute models of illness (Holman and Lorig, 2000). Ethical healthcare education demands a structure of healthcare that meets the embodied needs of patients, including a shift from primarily understanding medicine as something that is done to patients to something that is primarily done in partnership with patients. The effective management of chronic diseases requires that the healthcare professional develops an understanding of the embodied life of the patient, including their environment and cultural lifeworld. The effects of environments of racism, toxic housing and water supplies, food deserts, and more have crucial impacts on the health of the public that need to be accounted for in understanding both the origins of chronic illness and their solutions. Second, healthcare has changed dramatically in its nature and function in the past 100  years. In addition to the transition from healthcare practice primarily focused on management of acute illness and injury to primarily managing chronic illnesses of age, healthcare is no longer based on a model of a single provider (usually a physician) treating patients. Rather, the model of interprofessional teams

9  Ethics and Embodiment in Health Professions Education

125

providing healthcare is now much more important, both in how we educate professionals and in how those professionals go on to treat their patients. Healthcare practice has begun to move away from strictly hierarchical models to more collaborative models, but this shift needs to begin with the ways in which we educate new healthcare professionals (Wagner, 2000). When students learn entirely separately from each other, it limits opportunities to develop embodied understandings of how to creatively work together, to recognise and appreciate the strengths of each person on the team, and to continually learn with, and from, one another, including learning from patients. In Freirean terms, “Education either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system … or it becomes ‘the practice of freedom,’ the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world” (Shaull, 2000, p 34). Ethical teaching of new health professionals that attends to the cultivation of embodied understandings of one another can facilitate this creative transformation to better serve both the professionals we teach and the patients they serve. Third, the development of interprofessional collaboration and de-­hierarchicalisation of healthcare needs to be accompanied by a major shift in education practice away from a hidden curriculum of socialisation into brutality and break the cycle of hazing that so frequently characterises the training of new health professionals (Doja et al., 2016). Currently, many new trainees are mistreated by those above them in the hierarchy and then turn around to become “sub-oppressors” (Freire, 2000, p. 45). These situations shape the embodiment and relations of healthcare providers. From an ethical perspective, the choice to support new trainees – through transformative health professions education – to live out ethical values in their embodied relations with colleagues and patients is important. This begins by reimagining the teacherstudent relationship away from the “banking” model of education and moving instead toward humanising education, “through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other” (Freire, 2000, p.  72). Only when health professions educators challenge existing hierarchical models of education can we begin to expect students to challenge hierarchical models of health professions’ embodied relationships with each other and with patients. Only by a willingness to enter into genuine, creative, humanised partnerships with students can we empower students to enter into such partnerships with patients and each other.

 irtues and Embodied Practices in Health Professions V Ethics Education I now turn to a consideration of virtues and embodied practices that I propose as important for ethics education in the health professions. What makes a health professional “good” is not simply technical knowledge or clinical skill, but an entire set of practices of character lived out in daily interactions. That is to say, one can know everything about the technical aspects of healthcare; however, to become a truly

126

A. M. DeBaets

“good” practitioner requires ethical habits and formation. Health professions education is, in part, intended to contribute to the development of ethical practitioners, in addition to the cultivation of clinical skills. To help educate virtuous health professionals, I propose that educators attend to four embodied practices: epistemic humility, respect for the integrity of the patient as a person, tolerance for ambiguity, and a yearning for justice. I contend that one of the key virtues that health professionals require, yet sometimes do not possess, is epistemic humility. Epistemic humility is a virtue that needs to be modelled by teachers so that students can learn it as part of their professionalisation. Epistemic humility involves awareness of the limits of one’s knowledge, including what we do and do not know, and the impact on what we say and do; it is contrasted with clinical arrogance (Schwab, 2012; Dalmiya, 2016). Cultivating epistemic humility can cause a profound shift in health professionals’ practices and is an important virtue for educators to model. Every patient is more than the sum of their lab values, diagnoses, or healthcare needs. Each patient (and professional) brings embodied knowledge, expertise, lived experiences, and understandings of their pain and suffering. Each patient brings their lifeworld, including history, relationships, strengths, values, and fears. Each patient brings virtues and habits of character, as well as weaknesses and mistakes, to the clinical encounter. These go beyond whatever clinical knowledge the healthcare professional may bring. Acknowledging the embodiment of the patient, bringing epistemic humility to the encounter, and working together in genuine partnerships is an ethical matter. Genuine epistemic humility may also help healthcare providers when faced with ambiguity, uncertainty, mistakes, and overwhelming situations. When healthcare professionals accept their limitations, shortcomings, and the limits of their knowledge, it offers freedom to not have to be perfect, and to do their best in a given situation, without compromising their identity. As an example, the COVID-19 pandemic has recently forced healthcare professionals around the world to reassess what they know and don’t know while trying to take care of patients to the best of their ability under circumstances of deep uncertainty and limited resources. Emerging diseases, where new knowledge, treatments, and options form quickly, but may also be discarded as new information comes out, pose a challenge to clinicians in confronting the limits of their knowledge. Clinicians often feel an internal pressure to do “something”, rather than “nothing”, even when it is not known whether that “something” might end up doing more harm than good. In situations like these, having the courage to say “I don’t know” matters so much. Hand in hand with epistemic humility is fundamental respect for the integrity of the patient as a person. This embodied practice, which requires modelling and regular practice, goes beyond what is often referred to as “respect for autonomy”, which basically means that capacitated patients may decide to accept or reject proposed medical treatments. Respect for the integrity of patients as persons means first recognising them as the primary stakeholder in their care. This requires active, attentive listening to their concerns, values, narratives, and choices and treating them with dignity and care at every point in the process. Respect for patient integrity includes, but should go far beyond, simply avoiding harming the patient. It means

9  Ethics and Embodiment in Health Professions Education

127

engaging in a relationship that recognises the power imbalance between healthcare providers and patients and that actively works to mitigate those imbalances, through a meaningful deference to the patient as the person who can best understand her own experiences, needs, and values. Respect for the integrity of patients as persons means never writing off a patient, simply because they live on the margins of society, have severe mental illness, experience addiction, or are “other” to the healthcare provider. Respect for integrity means never demeaning or discounting the experiences of patients that cannot be fully explained by current science  – those with fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, hyperemesis gravidarum, chronic fatigue, and more (Hoffman and Tarzian, 2001). The embodied practices of respect for the integrity of the patient and epistemic humility together allow healthcare providers to truly serve the patients for whom they care. Students in the health professions typically begin their studies with great respect for their patients, though that respect is frequently lost through the socialisation into hierarchy that takes place during their training (Ubel et  al., 2003). Rectifying this problem requires health professions educators to take an active role, in both preclinical and clinical training, to shift cultural expectations in healthcare, and to model respect for patients and their families. Healthcare has traditionally been hierarchically oriented, and the shift toward greater democratisation, including greater respect for patients and members of other professions, will likely take a generation or more. This culture change starts with shifting the ways we educate healthcare professionals in a less hierarchical and more democratic and respectful way, modelling the practices that we expect of them. Transforming the embodied experience of health professions education to develop professionals who deeply respect their patients and each other requires listening to the concerns, needs, ideas, and experiences of those we are educating and inviting them to practise doing the same for each other and their patients. One of the most difficult things for new (and experienced) healthcare professionals to learn is a tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty, yet these are crucial virtues of effective and ethical clinicians (Geller, 2013). The bodies of patients rarely conform to the expectations in a textbook – they are messier, more complex, and more beautiful. Patients also frequently have multiple health conditions such that the “chief complaint” is often layered upon a complex combination of issues that come together to create a need for care. This is frequently ignored in the ways that students are assessed. Health professions students are trained early and, often, to do well on multiple-choice, single answer tests, which train them to think in simplistic ways, reducing the real complexities of care to simple conclusions. These modes of thought however are not always helpful for addressing the complexities of contemporary medicine, which require not a single, right answer, but a meaningful partnership in which a subtle combination of “right” answers are needed. Embodied practices of tolerance for ambiguity may assist practitioners to work effectively with patients experiencing the stresses of everyday life that may be exacerbated by racism, environmental pollution, poverty, or social isolation which means embracing clinical and ethical creativity and welcoming ambiguity, rather than looking for “one right answer” to complex clinical situations.

128

A. M. DeBaets

A final proposed virtue for embodied ethical practice is cultivation of a deep yearning for justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens in healthcare (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). Healthcare professionals work in very different environments, but they often see the complex challenges of society at close range – the effects of poverty and violence, as well as disparities in education, housing, nutrition, and care. Healthcare education often gives lip service to these issues: teaching about social determinants of health and how they impact outcomes, for instance, without giving new clinicians the tools with which to begin to address these challenges as members of powerful professions and engaged citizens in society. As educators, we owe it to students to do more than simply teach them what is wrong with the world; we need to foster capabilities and practices to change it. We can encourage students to be active for justice and to promote justice within our institutions and societies, as these embodied practices can shift discourses and practice toward a more caring, compassionate, and just healthcare system. In the USA today, for example, millions of people still lack meaningful access to healthcare, and millions more cannot afford the care they receive. Even for those who have access to health insurance, the quality of care, particularly for people of colour, frequently lags behind what white people receive, and the maternal mortality rate among black Americans is one of the highest of any group in a wealthy nation. It will be important for health professions education to find ways to move beyond fostering simple acceptance of these circumstances or doing one’s best within them, but also work to change them and create a better future for their patients. I contend that together, these virtues and embodied practices can help promote ethical healthcare and provide an environment in which both healthcare professionals and their patients can flourish. Creating a system of education that attends to embodied practices and is oriented toward an ethical vision demands creativity and a rethinking of longstanding practices; however, these are called for in order to break from harmful habits of thought and action.

The Primacy of Embodiment In considering key ethical questions related to embodiment in health professions education, I now turn from the discussion of important virtues and embodied practices to some key ethical questions addressing embodiment in health professions education. The focus is primarily on ethical questions involving the embodiment of the learners; however, most of the issues can be applied to the embodied experiences of educators, practitioners, and patients as well. An important ethical issue related to embodiment is to educate new healthcare professionals in ways that promote respect for the bodily limits and needs of the learners. This involves promoting respect for bodily needs in the context of needs for continuity in patient care; managing bodies over the course of lengthy procedures, such as complex surgeries; and recognising the 24/7 nature of inpatient and long-term care. Complaints that recent moves to place reasonable restrictions on

9  Ethics and Embodiment in Health Professions Education

129

“duty hours” both reduce the educational experiences of medical (and other healthcare) residents and induce a “shift work” mentality in place of an “all-­encompassing” mentality fail to appreciate the downsides of what can happen when the basic bodily needs and limits of learners are not recognised (Institute of Medicine, 2009). When healthcare providers are stressed and continually worked to the point of exhaustion, the rates of both burnout and medical error increase significantly, which puts both the learners and their patients at risk. Respecting the bodily needs and limits of learners includes additional considerations beyond those of basic needs for sleep, food, etc. It also entails providing sufficient flexibility and creativity in the curriculum design to be adaptable to the embodied needs of learners with disabilities and different learning styles. While health professions education cannot be completely redesigned for each student, there are opportunities to make education more welcoming and accessible to a wide variety of learners. Simple interventions like recording and captioning lecture content can significantly impact students’ abilities to master the material. Interactive learning and regular engagement with the material in several different ways (e.g. listening, writing, explaining, applying) may also help students with different learning styles to achieve competency and continue to move forward to improve patient care. Another key ethical point, related to learners’ embodiment, and raised briefly above, is the importance of addressing the damaging aspects of the hidden curriculum and related faculty behaviours that socialise new healthcare professionals into behaviours and attitudes of disrespect and discrimination. Too often, learners are expected to tolerate misbehaviour and mistreatment by their professors and preceptors and to say nothing, because they are dependent upon those professors and preceptors for grades, evaluations, and recommendations. Women may be shamed into thinking they must simply tolerate sexist behaviour and try to “move on” to the next phase of their education, while the behaviours persist. People of colour are frequently mistreated by patients and preceptors alike, but too often choose to suffer in silence, lest they be perceived as either angry or fragile. Queer and trans people are regularly subjected to negative things said about them and their families, yet are told to “let it go”. And minoritised faculty are often told the same, all of which can combine to create cultures of disrespect and damaging actions and attitudes. It is crucial that this problem be addressed at the level of institutions and professions – to create a culture in which it is genuinely safe and not career-ending, to name mistreatment and discrimination, and to move those out of positions of power who are unwilling to change. Another practical ethical issue, related to embodiment in health professions education, is that novice clinicians are required to become proficient by working with real patients. Effective supervision of such practice is important so that students have the opportunity to learn clinical skills, while patients are not placed at risk. Questions regarding how much supervision is necessary and what risks are appropriately borne by patients in teaching environments can be asked afresh as learners, their skills, and learning environments continue to evolve.

130

A. M. DeBaets

Embedded within each of these ethical issues is the deeper need to attend to the embodiment of learners, in order to develop ethical healthcare professionals who have the capabilities to treat patients with the respect and care they need and deserve. Keeping that ultimate goal in mind can help health professions educators design and deliver curricula that attend to embodiment, as a means to move learners toward that end.

Conclusion As health professions curricula are developed, assessed, and revamped, it is important to keep ethical considerations about the embodiment of learners, teachers, and patients at the forefront of those processes. Health professions educators can consistently assess their own practices to better understand what virtues (or vices) they may be fostering among their students and be aware of hidden curricula and other influences that may lead to a loss of respectful care among learners. For instance, modelling epistemic humility in clinical teaching and practice can help learners to acknowledge their own gaps in knowledge and normalise uncertainty. Likewise, respecting the capabilities and limits of the bodies of both educators and students can foster respect for the bodies of the patients who are being served. Teaching practices that highlight ambiguity can support learners as they grow to understand the ambiguity in their own clinical practices, and supporting teaching cultures that are just promotes justice in patient care and healthcare administration. Incorporating this intentionally into the structures and practices of teaching, and mindfully reflecting on those embodied needs, is key to supporting learners in their growth as professionals.

References Beauchamp, T., & Childress, J. (2013). Principles of biomedical ethics (7th ed.). Oxford University Press. Dalmiya, V. (2016). Caring to Know. Oxford University Press. DeBaets, A.M. (2012). The robot as person: Robotic futurism and a theology of human ethical responsibility among humanoid machines. PhD thesis. Atlanta: Emory University. https://etd. library.emory.edu/concern/etds/v118rf378?locale=en DeLisa, J. A., & Lindenthal, J. J. (2012). Reflections on diversity and inclusion in medical education. Academic Medicine, 87(11), 1461–1463. https://doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0b013e31826b048c Doja, A., Bould, M. D., Clarkin, C., Eady, K., Sutherland, S., & Writer, H. (2016). The hidden and informal curriculum across the continuum of training: A cross-sectional qualitative study. Medical Teacher, 38(4), 410–418. Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th Anniversary ed.). Bloomsbury. Geller, G. (2013). Tolerance for ambiguity: An ethics-based criterion for medical student selection. Academic Medicine, 88(5), 581–584. https://doi.org/10.1097/ACM.0b013e31828a4b8e

9  Ethics and Embodiment in Health Professions Education

131

Greenwood, B. N., Hardeman, R. R., Huang, L., & Sojourner, A. (2020). Patient-physician racial concordance and disparities in birthing mortality for newborns. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1913405117 Hoffman, D. E., & Tarzian, A. J. (2001). The girl who cried pain: A bias against women in the treatment of pain. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 29(1), 13–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1748-­720x.2001.tb00037.x Holman, H., & Lorig, K. (2000). Patients as partners in managing chronic disease. BMJ, 320(7234), 526–527. Institute of Medicine. (2009). Resident duty hours: Enhancing sleep, supervision, and safety. The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/12508 Murphy, N. (2006). Bodies and souls, or spirited bodies? Cambridge University Press. Omran, A. (2005). The epidemiologic transition: A theory of epidemiology in population change. Millbank Quarterly, 83(4), 731–757. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-­0009.2005.00398.x Shaull, R. (2000). Foreword. In P. Freire (Ed.), Pedagogy of the oppressed (pp. 29–34). Bloomsbury. Schwab, A. (2012). Epistemic humility and medical practice: Translating epistemic categories into ethical obligations. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 37(1), 28–48. Ubel, P. A., Jepson, C., & Silver-Isenstadt, A. (2003). Don’t ask, don’t tell: A change in medical student attitudes after obstetrics/gynecology clerkships toward seeking consent for pelvic examinations on an anesthetized patient. American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 188(2), 575–579. https://doi.org/10.1067/mob.2003.85 Wagner, E. (2000). The role of patient care teams in chronic disease management. BMJ, 320(7234), 569–572. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7234.569 Warner, J. H. (1997). The therapeutic perspective: Medical practice, knowledge, and identity in America, 1820–1885. Princeton University Press.

Part IV

Embodiment and Professional Knowledge

Chapter 10

Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice Stephen Loftus

Abstract  In this chapter, I provide an overview of Goethe’s science, with its emphasis on the bodily participation of the observer. I argue that Goethe’s insights can help us understand the role of the body in professional practice and education, using the example of healthcare. For too long, those professions that claim a scientific basis have adopted a reductionist and Cartesian approach to how they understand their practice and how they implement their education. This approach has brought problems such as the alienation felt by many practitioners and the people to whom they provide services. Adopting Goethean insights can help us to rethink the role of experience, the body and relationships in how we conceive professional practice and education. Keywords  Goethe · Phenomenology · Holism · Hermeneutics · Experience · Relationship An important first step in self-awareness in the clinical realm is the discipline of heightened consciousness of your thoughts, words, feelings, and actions. (Cassell, 2015 p. 279)

There is a problem in professional practice and education, especially in the health professions. A growing number of voices are complaining that the manner in which these professions are conceptualised, conducted and passed on to new generations is producing alienation (e.g. Boudreau et  al., 2018). There is alienation between patients and clinicians with a growing number of patients feeling that mainstream technical-rational healthcare treats them as mere objects. One result is that many people are seeking alternative (often highly questionable) therapies where they feel they are regarded as people and are cared for. Another sense of alienation is that felt S. Loftus (*) Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_10

135

136

S. Loftus

by many health professionals towards their own professional practices with an increase in moral distress, burnout and people leaving these professions (Durocher et al., 2016). In this chapter, I argue that a sensitivity to embodiment can help us better understand these issues and how we may deal with them. The underlying assumption here is that we live in a world profoundly shaped by embodiment, “in the sense that the way of experiencing or living the world is essentially that of an agent with this particular kind of body” (Taylor, 1995 p. 62). My body not only permits, and restricts, the ways I can engage with the world but shapes my agency within the world and shapes the nature of my experiences. From this starting point, I argue that insights from the science of Goethe, which is an embodied science, can shed light on what it is that health professionals do, in ways that may then be used to counteract some of the problems described above. These insights have implications for how we educate people for these professions. I summarise the relevant points of Goethean science and discuss how these insights can inform how we think about professional education and practice as being embodied.

Goethe’s Science Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) is not well known for his science, even though he regarded it as more important than his literary work. His scientific output was prolific and included geology, optics and biology, among other topics. He was, for example, the first to describe the intermaxillary bone in humans. He has, however, often been dismissed as a dilettante who would have been better off restricting himself to literature and poetry where his genius has long been recognised. In recent years, there has been a reappraisal of Goethe’s scientific work, and a small, but growing, number of scholars argue for the relevance of his work today (e.g. Bortoft, 1996; Seamon and Zajonc, 1998). A well-known example of Goethe’s scientific work, which has often been condemned, was his attempt to critique Newton’s work on optics, in particular the work on colours. Goethe himself is alleged to have admitted in later life that he was mistaken to do this. However, a contemporary re-reading of Goethe’s work on colours reveals that Goethe was in fact doing something different to Newton. Whereas Newton was trying to establish a theory of light, Goethe was trying to establish a theory of vision, i.e. how humans experience light. This is quite a different goal. Indeed, as part of this work, Goethe is credited with developing the first ever colour wheel. Colour wheels are used by artists today. Artists have little interest in the physical nature of light, but they are concerned with how we, as human beings, experience light and the visual world around us. How humans bodily experience the world and its phenomena is at the heart of Goethe’s science. Goethe’s science is a phenomenological science, although Goethe’s work predates phenomenology by almost a century. The extent to which Goethe influenced Husserl, the pioneer of phenomenology, is debatable (see, e.g. Robbins, 2006).

10  Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice

137

Goethe’s phenomenological science is in marked contrast to the technical-rational ideal of science still prevalent in the Western world. The technical-rational view assumes that scientists must be completely objective and detached from the phenomena they observe. It can be argued that this attitude of detachment has been carried over into the health professions which generally see themselves as applied sciences and this detachment is a major reason for the disillusionment described above. In contrast, Goethe emphasised the importance of the direct bodily engagement of the observer with the phenomena being studied and the importance of the relationship established between them. In healthcare, this translates to the relationship between a clinician who must observe, and engage with, a patient.

Goethe’s Method Goethe’s studies of plant morphology are the best-known example of how he implemented this scientific phenomenological approach (Goethe, 2009). Essentially, he engaged in careful, and intense, observation that attempted to see underlying patterns that gave unity to the observed variations in the phenomena. He claimed that through this approach, one could, eventually, with the right training and practice, develop a “delicate empiricism” and learn to discern the “ur-phenomenon”, the archetype, that underpinned the observed entities and gave them their wholeness and their identity. He was also insistent that the well-trained observer could be equivalent, in many ways, to the best scientific instrument in being able to perceive a phenomenon in its wholeness. The emphasis on the phenomenological engagement needed to reveal the ur-phenomenon has implications. One major implication of Goethe’s scientific approach is the need for the observer to be prepared to carefully observe the phenomenon and that this might take some training. Goethe’s observational method has been described as having three stages. They are “intuitive perception, perceptive imagination and the ability to synthesize” (Bywater, 2005, p 299).

Intuitive Perception Intuitive perception requires paying careful attention to what is there in front of the observer and learning to recognise how the phenomenon reveals itself to the bodily senses of the observer. Bortoft (1996) said Goethe’s approach is like carefully looking at a complex picture to see what is there, hidden in full view of the observer. Bortoft contrasts this with the technical-rational view, typical of modern science, where the observer looks behind the picture to see what underlying mechanism may be present. This latter approach assumes a mechanistic universe where everything can always be reduced to cause/effect mechanisms and is based on the foundational work of Descartes and Galileo. Another assumption, from Galileo, underlying the

138

S. Loftus

technical-rational approach, is the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are those, such as mass and position, that can be reliably quantified, whereas secondary qualities are those that are sensed by the body such as touch, sight, sound and smell. Technical-rational science tends to focus on the primary qualities, and this is seen in healthcare where great importance is placed on numerical test results, such as blood sugar levels, etc. Goethe accepted the need to quantify what could, and should, be quantified but also placed emphasis on the secondary qualities and felt this emphasis was missing from the emerging science of his time. How do phenomena reveal themselves to the senses? How are they bodily experienced? How does the observer relate to the phenomena? The argument is that if we pay more attention to this process of revelation to the senses, then we can learn to see important things that are not obvious to the untrained observer and may be ignored by the technical-rational approach.

Learning to Observe Bortoft, a contemporary commentator on Goethe’s work, demonstrated simple examples of this approach to perception in his lectures when he showed the audience how to see figures, hidden in plain sight, in various graphics (Bortoft, 2016). Once an audience member can see the figures, it is not possible to “unsee” them, and the figures are, from then on, easily recognised. The importance of helping people to see what is “there” can also be related to more abstract phenomena. I have an example from my own experience. As a graduate student, I sought a meeting with a scholar whose work I much admired. I was granted a meeting on condition that I gave a short presentation to the staff in her department about my research. I agreed to this, and eventually the meeting took place. After the presentation, there was a very useful discussion, and, at one point, I was advised to inform myself about rhetoric and to take another look at my data through this theoretical lens. At the time, I knew little about rhetoric beyond the fact that it was the ancient art and study of persuasion and often had a bad reputation, as people often spoke of “mere rhetoric” or “empty rhetoric”. In due course, I read some introductory texts to modern rhetoric and, when I returned to my data, was astonished to find that rhetoric leapt off the page. It had been there all along but I had been unable to see it. However, once I had been “rhetoricised”, I was unable not to see it. The insight here, from Goethe, can be summarised as that we can only perceive what we can first conceive (Brady, 1998). In other words, we need the idea before we can observe an instance of it before us and recognise what it is we are experiencing. Sometimes, as in my case, the perception then becomes straightforward and unproblematic. In many cases, though, such as in professional practice, the perception may be more complex, and careful, meticulous training in observation is needed.

10  Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice

139

In many professions, such as medicine, newcomers must learn to recognise important information that may not be obvious to most people. For example, there was the medical student who, sent to assess a patient, saw that the patient had “glaring cardiac signs” (Loftus, 2006, p. 199) as soon as she stepped into the patient’s room, signs that a layperson was likely to miss. This is not simply an issue of learning facts, although that is involved. Bortoft (2012 p.53) compares the “verbal-­ intellectual mode of apprehension” with the “sensuous-intuitive experience of phenomena”. The latter is characteristic of Goethe’s science and requires that the observer must bodily engage with the secondary qualities of the observed phenomenon. Medical practice and education tend to focus on the verbal-intellectual mode and downplay the sensuous-intuitive experience. Medical practice needs both. This training to observe with one’s whole being almost certainly occurs in medical education and practice but tends not to be recognised or given much importance when it is acknowledged.

Perceptive Imagination The second stage of Goethe’s method is called perceptive imagination. Goethe gave detailed descriptions of his use of perceptive imagination when studying plants (Goethe, 2009). He paid careful attention to the variations he saw in leaf forms within a plant. He claimed that he could discipline his imagination to postulate intermediate forms that were likely to be part of an overall pattern that would be characteristic of the plant and that these imagined forms would help to reveal the underlying pattern, the archetypal plant, the ur-phenomenon mentioned earlier. In medicine, the equivalent of Goethe’s ur-phenomenon is an entity that the textbooks call the typical patient. Most experienced clinicians will admit that they have never seen a typical patient because all patients are different. Real patients are all variations on a pattern, each with their own idiosyncrasies. Newcomers to a profession need to develop this ability of perceptive imagination so that they can be confident in recognising variations even if they have never seen a particular variant before. Developing this ability often needs careful guidance from more experienced practitioners who must help newcomers distinguish “the subjectively projected from the inter-subjectively perceivable” (Wahl, 2005, p. 69). Wittgenstein, influenced by Goethe, picked up this theme in his discussion of family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 1953). Individuals may share a number of features that identify them as belonging to a group, but no one individual has all the features, and it is not necessary for an individual to have all the features in order to be identified as a group member. This leads us to the final stage of Goethe’s method which has been called synthesis.

140

S. Loftus

Synthesis According to Goethe, the nascent science of his time was too preoccupied with analysis and tended to ignore synthesis. “A century has taken the wrong road if it applies itself exclusively to analysis while exhibiting an apparent fear of synthesis: the sciences come alive only when the two exist side by side like exhaling and inhaling” (Goethe in Miller, 1995, p 49). It can be argued that Goethe was prescient and that science since his time has continued to be preoccupied with analysis and breaking phenomena into smaller and smaller parts that can be manipulated and controlled. It has to be admitted that, in many ways, this analytic approach has been enormously successful and, in healthcare, has given us many of the medical advances we enjoy today. However, by paying less attention to synthesis, many problems have arisen. The resultant fragmentation, from more and more analysis, makes it harder and harder to see patients as complete human beings, leading to the alienation mentioned earlier. A Goethean approach to synthesis can help us have a deeper understanding of this issue. In synthesis, the observer must learn how to bring together what is perceived with possible (realistic) variations, in order to grasp the wholeness of what is being revealed. This can be very difficult because, in real-world settings, phenomena may reveal themselves only partially and over time. There is often ambiguity, and this is frequently seen in professional practice. The reality of healthcare is that clinicians are often confronted with difficult diagnoses when only some clinical features of a condition are present. In addition, each feature that is present may only be partially present. Even the objective measures from test results may not always help. It is a common experience for a clinician to find that test results are not yet available or, even worse, have been lost or are ambiguous or contradictory. However, decisions must still be made, based on an overall judgment of what are emerging as the issues to be dealt with. A problem with how we conventionally conceive phenomena is that we tend to think of them as they are when they are fully formed and fully apparent. The typical patient of the textbooks, with all the expected clinical features and all the test results (and who is rarely seen in real clinical practice), is an example. Bortoft (2012) calls this focus on the fully formed phenomenon “downstream thinking”. He contrasts this with what he calls “upstream thinking” where phenomena are still being revealed. He claims this upstream focus is one of the great strengths of the Goethean approach. There is an emphasis on the appearing of what appears and how it appears to the bodily senses of the observer. Heidegger too was aware of this when he said, “Let me give a little hint on how to listen. The point is not to listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow a movement of showing” (cited in Rowe, 1991 p, 300 emphasis in original). In healthcare, this translates as the difference between thinking of illness as a series of completed events and ongoing and dynamic processes that are unfolding as you observe a patient. According to Cassell (2015), reflecting on a long career in medical practice and education, novice doctors tend to think in terms of textbook

10  Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice

141

events, whereas experts think in terms of unfolding and dynamic real-world processes: events are easier to think about than processes … It requires a habit of mind to see everything changing all the time, but once that habit of mind is acquired, clinical medicine becomes easier too. (p. 290)

Cassell is articulating what is essentially a Goethean approach to patient assessment. Acquiring a habit of mind that is bodily attuned to processes still unfolding, and still changing, is what Bortoft means by upstream thinking. In the clinical encounter, sick patients often, gradually and dynamically, reveal themselves in ways that textbooks do not. This is the reality of clinical practice which is why, once Cassell’s habit of mind is acquired, the practice of clinical medicine can become easier. The upstream thinking, the openness to dynamic and unfolding processes, combined with the focus on synthesising the parts, means the observer will need a hermeneutic view of what is happening, where complex interpretation is required.

Hermeneutics Bortoft (1996, 2012) emphasises the hermeneutics of a Goethean approach to science and claims this is closely related to the phenomenological. Upstream thinking can be seen in terms of the hermeneutic circle in relating the parts that are experienced with the whole that is emerging and back again. Bortoft argues that because of our Western preoccupation with analysis of parts, we tend to have an impoverished view of what the whole might be. Too often, we think merely of totalities which are simply the sum of the parts. Bortoft often refers to totalities as counterfeit wholes. This is because in a Goethean approach, there is a richer understanding of what the whole might be and the whole is very much more than the sum of the parts. The whole includes the relationships between the parts, the relationships to the context and the many ways that the whole can have meaning. In a text, the collection of words is a mere totality, but the meanings of the whole text are not restricted to the totality of the words, although the words do put constraints on the ways in which we can interpret the whole. There is a strong connection here with the works of other more recent scholars, such as Gadamer who was probably influenced by Goethe, at least indirectly through the later work of Wittgenstein. Commentators on Gadamer’s work remark that, in this view, the whole includes what is revealed along with what has not been revealed (e.g. Davey, 2006). This is in keeping with the Goethean viewpoint on the emerging whole with the emphasis on the relationship between the phenomenon, the observer and the context. Gadamer (1989) tells us that in a genuine encounter with a phenomenon, we not only question the phenomenon but allow ourselves to be questioned and possibly changed by the encounter. This is very much Goethe’s view. Charles Taylor summarised the contrast between this more hermeneutic view with the technical-­rational

142

S. Loftus

when he said that it was the difference between learning facts and coming to an understanding with an interlocutor (2002). In the health professions, both approaches are needed. The clinician must gather objective facts about a patient. At the same time, this must be balanced with developing a relationship with the whole person who is present in the clinical encounter. The balance may be different depending on the clinician-patient relationship, but a balance must be sought.

Relationships The importance of the clinician-patient relationship is based on the experiences that occur within the clinical encounter where the participants bodily meet each other. Cassell laments that “contemporary medical practice and teaching have cast aside the fundamental importance in medicine of relationships: the doctor-patient relationship and the teacher-student relationship” (2015 p. 5). Cassell echoes Goethe’s emphasis on the importance of experience when he goes on to say “what clinicians come to know about sick persons – patients – is primarily experiential” (p. 3). From my own experience in dentistry, sometimes I had patients who wanted nothing more than a quick, technical fix for their toothache, and sometimes I had patients with chronic conditions who needed ongoing compassion far more than they needed a technical procedure (Loftus, 2015). Learning to discern the difference, and responding appropriately, is one of the ways in which a clinician is questioned and challenged by the patients one encounters. However, the technical-rational approach puts emphasis on the objective facts rather than the human relationship, and there are several reasons for this. One reason has been already mentioned, and this is the preoccupation with objective facts. Another reason related to this is the preoccupation with modern technology. Verghese (2008) discussed how modern technology can interfere with the relationships that clinicians must develop with patients. He related how he started as a senior clinician, at a new hospital, and found that the junior doctors expected to do a ward round sitting in a room where they had access to computers that would provide them with electronic records and all the test results for the patients. Verghese helped the juniors discover a new balance between the direct physical examination of patients and over-reliance on computerised test results. He describes the joy the juniors discovered through doing this and of what they were able to learn. Verghese was helping the juniors to reconnect with patients and develop their skills of experiencing the patient with their bodily senses. He was making use of secondary qualities. He was not discarding test results but balancing them with, what is, essentially, a more Goethean approach. There are echoes again here of Gadamer who warns us of the dangers of substituting an image for reality (2006). The imagery of technology can be seductive. The apparent certainties offered by the objective facts of technology can lead us away from the relationships we need to develop with patients. Another reason that the technical-rational approach can fail us is because modern health professionals now tend to learn only the discourse of the technical-rational,

10  Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice

143

Bortoft’s verbal-intellectual mode. There is a need for other, balancing discourses to be present in healthcare.

Balancing Discourses When Sackett et  al. (1996) recommended a more evidence-based approach to healthcare, they also made other recommendations that are in keeping with a more embodied Goethean approach. They said that a clinical decision should be made by synthesising the best available (scientific) evidence with the values of the patient and the experience and expertise of the practitioner. Since the advent of evidence-­ based practice, nearly all the attention (and research funding) has been directed towards the first part of their recommendation, towards the best available evidence. This is probably because the best available evidence falls within the scientific and technical-rational discourse of the biomedical disciplines. Because of their education and training, clinicians are comfortable with this way of talking about the world and this way of viewing healthcare. The values of patients (and their families) and the expertise and experience of clinicians do not fit easily within this type of discourse. This is why the medical humanities and social sciences need a more prominent role in medical practice and education. They do have the vocabularies to articulate values, experience and expertise. Again, it is not a question of replacing the technical-rational but of balancing it with these other discourses so that objective, measurable, scientific facts can be contextualised within the meaningful lifeworld of the patient and the repertoire of embodied experiential knowledge accrued by the practitioner over time. A small, but growing, number of contemporary scholars are now using discourses that integrate the technical-rational with the bodily engagement of the clinical encounter. There is the embodied relational understanding of Todres (2007) that is based on a synthesis of Gendlin’s (1997) logical order and responsive order. The logical order is the technical-rational, whereas the responsive order is based on the dialogical relationship between language and bodily experience. Likewise, Svenaeus (2000) talks of the bodily attunement needed in the clinical encounter and takes his inspiration from Gadamer and Heidegger. Svenaeus goes on to use both hermeneutics and phenomenology to articulate the clinical encounter.

Articulating Clinical Experience A few clinicians have attempted to articulate their experience of the clinical encounter in ways that try to express what happens to them in hermeneutic, phenomenological and bodily terms. Here, for example, is a clinician describing how a more experienced practitioner worked through a difficult diagnosis:

144

S. Loftus

What intrigued me even more was Dr. Meryl. As I watched her scan José and then examine his elbows, she wasn’t so much thinking as feeling, performing a quiet, unhurried search inside a huge experience, not linearly but globally, feeling around in her Self for that wholeness, that solution which is the right diagnosis and fits all the clues. (Sweet, 2017, p. 131)

Later, Sweet describes this experience in herself: It was subtle, but there was some global way I was registering her state of health and illness, not the individual changes but the whole change. Just as a musician registers the harmony of a piece of music, my body, my self, had somehow learned to tune itself to hers. And if I could do that with one patient, then I could do that – whatever it was I was doing – with others. (p. 154)

There are several points to note here. First, there is the acceptance that the whole being of the practitioner is involved in the experience of the clinical encounter in a Goethean sense. As Franses and Wride (2015) note: Thus, there is a shift from a static world that we are separate from and which we view from the “outside”, that we can fix, pin down and explain, to a dynamic world that is constantly in process, which has to be participated in to be revealed. (p. 344)

The practitioners here are bodily participating in the clinical encounter and relating to their patients in a part-whole way that engages their whole being. This kind of clinical encounter is not just an exercise in cognition, of how much can be remembered from a textbook. Cognition is certainly involved, but to stop there is to miss much of importance. There is a meticulous Goethean observation. There is a careful, Goethean use of the imagination in the attempt to be open to whatever unfolding and dynamic processes may be revealing themselves. There is a Goethean attempt to synthesise all that is occurring. There is emotional and bodily commitment as well. There is embodied attunement between the practitioner and patient. It is likely that the practitioner will be transformed by the experience. In this kind of professional activity, the ontological matters as much as the epistemological. There are implications here for how we think about preparing people for this kind of professional practice.

Educational Implications In these descriptions, of the clinical encounter, we can see real experts in action, being stretched to the limit of their expertise and the limits of their being. Note that Sweet (2017) finds it difficult to articulate just what was happening, the “whatever it was I was doing”. The competency-based approach that is currently popular in higher education is wholly inadequate to capture what Sweet is trying to describe. The descriptions above assume competency but go far beyond it. However, if we want our clinicians to have Sweet’s level of expertise, and I assume we all do, then we must ensure that we make stronger efforts not only to articulate this expertise but to consider how it can be passed on and taught to others for all our sakes. These

10  Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice

145

efforts to address professional education must also include the being of the students as well as their skills and knowledge. There are possibilities. Our students need a community of practice (Wenger, 1998) made up of mentors who can guide them, coach them, demonstrate to them and role model for them what is involved. They need the chance to see experts like “Dr Meryl” stretching themselves with difficult cases. They need to hear the “war stories” of these experts as they try to explain what they were doing and why they did it that way. They need to be immersed in the narratives of their profession (Loftus and Greenhalgh, 2010). The students also need to engage in practice for themselves and experience, bodily, at first hand, the challenges, the complexities and the uncertainties that come with real patients. In addition to the mentoring of people like Dr Meryl, they need to reflect deeply on their own embodied experience and what it offers to teach them. Simulations and other forms of training can be excellent learning opportunities, but there must come a time when students need prolonged, bodily immersion in the challenges of practice where they find out that the textbooks can be of limited use and that methods and protocols need thoughtful modification in the moment of their application.

A Practice Focus This ability, the disposition to work out, in practice, what is best for this particular patient, at this particular time, in this particular place, under these particular circumstances is often called practical wisdom or phronesis. Our students need opportunities to face challenges to their knowledge, their skills, their emotions and their being. Part of this includes cultivating a “discipline of heightened consciousness of … thoughts, words, feelings, and actions” (Cassell, 2015 p. 279). Good professional education is transformative of the whole person, mind and body, and is never finished. It needs ongoing experience and exposure to practice so that professionals can keep on developing their Goethean abilities to observe, imagine, synthesise and relate. These insights can lead us to a more sophisticated view of what professional practice is and its educational implications, best summarised by Davey: What makes a practice a practice rather than a method is precisely the fact that it is based upon acquired and accumulated experience. The acquisition of discernment, judgment, and insight is based not so much upon what comes to us in a given experience but upon what comes to us by involvement and participation in a whole number of experiences. … Experience of this order affords a wisdom. (2006, p. 245)

The importance of involvement and embodied participation in a practice is at the heart of a Goethean approach, and from this comes the personal transformation of a practitioner who can develop further discernment and judgment.

146

S. Loftus

Conclusion A growing number of voices are calling for a reappraisal of practice and education in the health professions with the realisation that the Cartesian technical-rational approach often fails us. An approach informed by the embodied and phenomenological science of Goethe offers a way forward. There is an emphasis on a more appreciative, qualitative, meaningful and bodily participatory engagement with sick patients. This is an approach based on “a science of qualities and conscious awareness of the relationships and interactions between the parts out of which the whole emerges and which are dependent on that whole” (Wahl, 2005 p 68). This can open the way to a professional education that is more phenomenally based and that can be more personally developmental rather than a quest to simply acquire knowledge and apply it. Such an education promises to give us practitioners who care more for their patients and care more for themselves. We shall give the final quote to Goethe with his emphasis on the dynamic reality of the whole: [Nature] is complete, but never finished. (Goethe)

We can paraphrase this in terms of professional education. Our educational programmes should aim to produce graduates who are complete, but who know that they are never finished.

References Bortoft, H. (1996). The wholeness of nature: Goethe’s way toward a science of conscious participation in nature. Lindisfarne Books. Bortoft, H. (2012). Taking appearance seriously: The dynamic way of seeing in Goethe and European thought. Floris Books. Bortoft, H. (2016). Goethean Science: Part 1. https://youtu.be/nsH6-­n7BUtw (accessed 5 May 2021). Boudreau, J. D., Cassell, E. J., & Fuks, A. (2018). Physicianship and the rebirth of medical education. Oxford University Press. Brady. (1998). The idea in nature: Rereading Goethe’s organics. In D. Seamon & A. Zajonc (Eds.), Goethe’s way of science: a phenomenology of nature (pp. 83–11). SUNY Press. Bywater, B. (2005). Goethe: A science which does not eat the other. Janus Head, 8(1), 291–310. Cassell, E.  J. (2015). The nature of clinical medicine: the return of the physician. Oxford University Press. Davey, N. (2006). Unquiet understanding: Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. SUNY Press. Durocher, E., Kinsella, E. A., McCorquodale, L., & Phelan, S. (2016). Ethical tensions related to systemic constraints: Occupational alienation in practice. OTJR: Occupation, Participation & Health, 36(4), 216–226. Franses, P., & Wride, M. (2015). Goethean Pedagogy: A case in innovative science education and implications for work based learning. Higher Education, Skills and Work-Based Learning, 5(4), 339–351. https://doi.org/10.1108/HESWBL-­06-­2015-­0037 Gadamer, H-G. (1989). Truth and Method. (J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall, Trans. 2nd revised ed.). New York: Continuum.

10  Goethe and Embodiment in Professional Education and Practice

147

Gadamer, H.-G. (2006). Artworks in word and image: ‘So True, So Full of Being!’ (Goethe) (1992). Theory, Culture and Society, 23(1), 57–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276406063229 Gendlin, E. T. (1997). Experiencing and the creation of meaning. Northwestern University Press. Goethe, J. W. (2009). The metamorphosis of plants. MIT Press. (Originally published 1790). Loftus, S. (2006). Language in clinical reasoning: learning and using the language of collective clinical decision making. PhD thesis, The University of Sydney, Australia. Online. Available: http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/1165 (accessed 17 November 2020) Loftus, S. (2015). Embodiment in the practice and education of health professionals. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 139–156). Springer. Loftus, S., & Greenhalgh, T. (2010). Towards a narrative mode of practice. In J. Higgs, D. Fish, I. Goulter, S. Loftus, J. Reid, & F. Trede (Eds.), Education for future practice (pp. 85–94). Sense. Miller, D. (ed.) (1995). Goethe: The collected works, Volume 13. Scientific studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Robbins, B.  D. (2006). The delicate empiricism of Goethe: Phenomenology as a rigorous science of nature. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, 6(sup1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.108 0/20797222.2006.11433928 Rowe, M.W. (July 1991). Goethe and Wittgenstein. Philosophy 66(257) pp. 283–303. Sackett, D. L., Richardson, S. W., Rosenberg, W., & Haynes, R. B. (Eds.). (1996). Evidence-based medicine: How to practice and teach EBM. Churchill Livingstone. Seamon, D., & Zajonc, A. (Eds.). (1998). Goethe’s way of science: A phenomenology of nature. SUNY Press. Svenaeus, F. (2000). The hermeneutics of medicine and the phenomenology of health. Kluwer. Sweet, V. (2017). Slow Medicine: the way to healing. Riverhead Books. Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical Arguments. Harvard University Press. Taylor, C. (2002). Gadamer on the human sciences. In R.  J. Dostal (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer (pp. 126–143). Cambridge University Press. Todres, L. (2007). Embodied enquiry: Phenomenological touchstones for research, psychotherapy and spirituality. Palgrave Macmillan. Verghese, A. (2008). Culture shock  – Patient as icon, icon as patient. New England Journal of Medicine, 359(26). https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp0807461 Wahl, D. (2005). “Zarte Empirie”: Goethean science as a way of knowing. Janus Head, 8(1), 58–76. Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of Practice: Learning, meaning and identity. Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations.. Wiley-Blackwell.

Chapter 11

Neurophenomenology and Professional Education Bradley Roberts

Abstract  The emerging field of neurophenomenology provides a source of fresh insights into professional practice from an embodied perspective. This chapter draws upon the lifeworld perspectives of master mariners at sea to illustrate the potential benefits of applying a neurophenomenological lens to better understand professional practice and its development. Neurophenomenology aims to integrate the fields of cognition, neurobiology and the phenomenological examination of human experience in order to advance and illuminate understandings of human consciousness. While it remains an emerging interdisciplinary field, it is supported by decades of empirical, neurobiological evidence. As such, it provides an evidence-­ informed approach to understanding embodied dimensions of practice. This chapter considers what neurophenomenology can bring to embodied perspectives, in professional education, and how neurophenomenology can enlighten educational practices that support professionals’ being, doing and becoming. The chapter draws on relevant examples from master mariners at sea, as well as other professional contexts, and demonstrates that neurophenomenology provides a fruitful and tantalising lens for developing insights into education and professional practice. Keywords  Neurophenomenology · Embodied cognition · Maritime · Leadership · Professional practice · Professional education The emerging field of neurophenomenology provides a source of fresh insights into professional practice from an embodied perspective. This chapter considers what neurophenomenology can bring to embodied perspectives in professional education and how it can enlighten educational practices that support professionals’ being, doing and becoming. The benefits of a neurophenomenological lens to professional education are twofold. First, neurophenomenology has the capacity to validate B. Roberts (*) Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, VIC, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_11

149

150

B. Roberts

embodied approaches through its integration of empirical research. Second, this evidence-informed approach yields rich insights into the neurobiological underpinnings of experience and practice. These insights can be used, in turn, to inform professional education.

Neurophenomenology: An Overview Varela’s (2010) conceptualisation of neurophenomenology viewed the human mind as an experience organ that is inseparable from sensorimotor systems in an “extramental” sense (Froese & Fuchs, 2012, p. 206; Laughlin & Throop, 2009). Claxton described neurophenomenology as: A view of the human body as a massive, seething, streaming collection of interconnected communication systems that bind the muscles, the stomach, the heart, the senses and the brain so tightly together that no part – especially the brain – can be seen as functionally separate from, or senior to, any other part. (2015, p. 4)

Neurophenomenology seeks to reconcile the fields of cognition, neurobiology and the phenomenological examination of human experience in order to advance and illuminate understandings of human consciousness (Varela, 2010). To achieve this, it integrates the positivist insights of neuroscience (experimental, “third-person” data) with the interpretivist insights of phenomenology (experiential, “firstperson” data) (Gordon, 2013, p. 21) to yield what has been described as “reciprocal productivity” and “meaning-creative dynamics” (Depraz & Desmidt, 2019). In other words, neurophenomenology enriches neuroscience and validates phenomenology in complementary ways. For example, while neuroscience can identify what segments of the human brain are activated when fear is experienced, phenomenological analysis can address the question of “What is it like to be afraid?” (Roberts, 2018). One of the key insights from Varela’s neurophenomenology is that lived experience is both embodied and enacted (Petitmengin, 2006). Depraz and Desmidt (2019) note that “cognition does not emerge from brain-function alone ... but also, from the interaction of the brain with the lived body and the life-context” (p. 499). This perspective challenges a reductionist conception of cognition as solely comprised of mental representations of people, objects and ideas that are subject to rational and behavioural processes (Roberts, 2019). Rather, from a neurophenomenological perspective, phenomena are experienced as also emerging through a living being’s interaction with the world and with others, in what Loftus (see chapter on Goethe this volume) describes as unfolding and dynamic real-world processes. Nonetheless, most professional education confines its pedagogy to techno-­rationalist means (Roberts & Higgs, 2019). Loftus (2015, p. 143), in describing this techno-­ rationalist pedagogy, applied Gendlin’s (1997) term “logical order”. Loftus goes on to contrast this logical order with Gendlin’s notion of a “responsive order”, or “the to and fro between the articulation of knowledge in language and bodily experience,

11  Neurophenomenology and Professional Education

151

with one validating the other”. It seems that the enactive nature of neurophenomenology aligns more with this responsive order, offering a to and fro between different understanding, neurological brain function and phenomenological embodiment. Thus, a neurophenomenologically grounded responsive order offers tantalising benefits to professional education from an embodied perspective. While neurophenomenology remains an emerging field, it is supported by decades of empirical, neurobiological evidence, which highlight the bodily linkages by which the interplay between mind, nervous system and neurochemical activity gives rise to an embodied self in biological terms. Without resorting to reductionist perspectives, several authors have endeavoured to explain in detail the dynamics of certain aspects of psychoneurobiological systems. Gordon (2013, p. 115) describes the link between the embodied, growth-oriented dimension of a person and the psycho- (psychological) neuro- (neurological) intracrinological (intracellular biosynthesis) dimensions. She argues that these neurobiological processes, through the formation of hormones, shape the way in which we perceive the world and ourselves in relation to it. Depraz and Desmidt (2019) describe the cardiovascular system as a “bodily-emotional heart system” that plays a key role in embodied cognition. Leclercq et al. (2016) researched the link between the human gut microbiome (microorganisms in the human digestive tract) and depression (traditionally viewed as a mental condition), further demonstrating embodied connections between biological states and states of mind. As such, neurophenomenology is rapidly amassing an extensive scientific basis for an embodied concept of perception and cognition, making it a valuable lens for considering professional education.

Master Mariners and Finding the Line My doctoral research focused on the embodied sensemaking of master mariners at sea. These are captains of medium-sized offshore ships that operate in remote locations, working in close proximity to oil and gas platforms. These master mariners and their crews conduct intensive, round-the-clock operations for periods of 5 weeks at a time, making their practice intensive, complex and challenging. Additionally, these professionals work in one of the most highly regulated industries – with comprehensive sets of regulations and standards aimed at ensuring safe operations at sea. This is a professional context of extreme isolation, with limited assistance available from shore-based resources and support. Furthermore, the mariners must maintain exceptional levels of operational reliability and safety while managing rapidly changing customer demands in the competitive oil and gas industry. These factors make the lifeworld of the master mariner volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) in the extreme (Roberts, 2019). I was keen to explore how these professionals made sense of these complex dynamics and to determine the degree that this sensemaking was an embodied phenomenon. I applied a phenomenologically attentive narrative interpretation to master mariners’ accounts of critical events they personally confronted – from vessels sinking

152

B. Roberts

to confrontations with hostile crewmembers. What emerged was a description of deeply embodied professional practices, where master mariners were bodily engaged through their environment (the ship) and through their embodied relations with others (the crew) to maintain equilibrium between vessel safety and commercial imperatives in a dynamic, high-stakes professional context. The master mariners’ phenomenological accounts and lifeworld perceptions of these critical events, and the possible solutions or actions, appeared to be deeply influenced by their immediate surroundings – particularly the region of space immediately surrounding our bodies, known as peri-personal space (Jackson, 2014). In terms of affect, or emotional aspects of their phenomenological narratives, these professionals appeared to be enacting their roles via their emotions, rather than merely experiencing emotions as by-products that “leaked” from them during these intense encounters (Barrett, 2017; Colombetti, 2017). There was evidence of embodiment in the ways master mariners enacted their roles – balancing the need for autocracy and autonomy with the need to be collaborative with stakeholders such as customers, head office managers and regulatory authorities (Roberts, 2019). Harmonising these paradoxical dimensions of their professional relationships involved reflection on their identities – not just as masters on their ships but as living beings within their precarious lifeworlds. Beyond the immediate crises, master mariners also sought to make sense of critical events in the longer term. This sensemaking was deeply affective and embodied and often continued years after the critical event itself. There appeared to be a bodily felt drive for such denouement that was closely tied to their identities as professionals (Chater & Lowenstein, 2016). Master mariners frequently described their efforts to achieve the best possible balance between complex competing factors in their environment as “intuitive”, as feeling-out for points of equilibrium or balance, and of grasping for patterns in order to make sense of their emerging professional context (Fuchs & Koch, 2014). Searching for patterns seemed to allow master mariners in this study to find “the line” and achieve “equilibrium”. They frequently described their process for finding the line in bodily terms, such as being on “firm footing” and “equilibrium”, as well as emotional terms such as being “happy”: As soon as there’s a change, such as [a] crane driver’s no longer available, I’ll move away just far enough to be able to come back and continue the job. So, I redraw the line; no crane driver, therefore the line’s moved, I’ll move away – I’m now back in an equilibrium that I’m happy with. You’re continually reassessing where you need to draw that line. (Roberts, 2019)

Embodied metaphors, such as finding the line, or feeling comfortable or happy, and feeling for points of equilibrium, are useful when the patterns can’t be expressed within rational decision-making tools such as decision trees and fault-finding processes (Prison et al., 2013). Accounts such as this, and there were many within the seafaring phenomenological narratives, spoke extensively of embodied, affective and enacted practices that frequently occurred in a preconscious space and time. These accounts parallel the responsive order (felt and enacted) rather than the logical order (rationally derived)

11  Neurophenomenology and Professional Education

153

(Gendlin, 1997; Loftus, 2015). Indeed, my research confirmed the primacy of the former in terms of the reality of professional practice, and the latter in terms of the focus of professional education, within the maritime domain. To improve professional education, particularly within an increasingly complex and ambiguous commercial context such as shipping, would involve integrating both responsive and logical orders. My research was further motivated by a question posed by Kinsella (2015, p. 250) concerning phronesis, or practical wisdom, “I am left wondering if part of the ‘invisible’ or ‘elusive’ dimension of phronesis is revealed through embodiment, and whether practical wisdom itself is an embodied phenomenon when enacted well”. My research was able to demonstrate that a neurophenomenological perspective was capable of illuminating those invisible and elusive dimensions of practice in ways that yielded insight and empirical validation (Roberts, 2019), particularly in the under-researched field of seafaring leadership. Throughout the master mariner accounts, the preconscious integration of thoughts, actions, feelings, sensations, language and interpersonal interactions appeared to be deeply rooted in the mind/body/environment dynamics described by neurophenomenology. I now move on to explore how neurophenomenological perspectives illuminate the field of embodied professional practice.

Neurophenomenological Dynamics A common thread running through neurophenomenology, from Varela (2010) to more contemporary scholars such as Colombetti (2017) and Gallese (2019), is the organismic view of human consciousness. Humans have unprecedented cognitive powers to perceive, make sense and articulate through language their ideas about their universe (Dennett, 2017). However, these unique human powers have their origin, and are scaffolded by, the neurobiology of an organism sensing and interacting with its lifeworld. Since the Cambrian explosion (Trestman, 2013), organisms have sought to access what they need to survive while avoiding what may harm them within environments that are inherently precarious (Colombetti, 2017, p. 447). According to Colombetti, these organisms (from microbes to water beetles to humans) are affective, based on her definition of affect as being “an absence of indifference”. Additionally, these organisms are not passively responding to their worlds in a stimulus/response manner – rather they are enactive! Barrett (2017) points to predictive coding as the means by which organisms (including humans) make sense of their world. In terms of predictive coding in humans, Barrett states that the brain creates a map of the human body as well as the lifeworld, or umwelt, in which the organism lives. Drawing on past experience, the brain constructs multiple scenarios, or simulations, of upcoming sensory events (both within the body and within their external environment) to determine the best action to deal with these “impending sensory events” (p.  7). Barrett states that these neural constructs are “embodied,

154

B. Roberts

whole brain representations” that are utilised by the individual-as-organism to predict future states while adapting to these states in ways that include sensations and responses from the entire brain/body entity, including those sensations that we popularly categorise as emotions (such as fear, anger and joy). She further states “For a given event, perception follows (and is dependent upon) action, not the other way around” (p.  7). Therefore, Barrett’s theory of constructed emotion, supported by extensive empirical research (p. 14), challenges the classical notion of emotions as a “stimulus-response” model. This theory posits the brain/body/environment system as creating an ongoing simulation of a sensible and affective lifeworld in which the individual-as-organism seeks to survive, thrive and maintain equilibrium. Such a dynamic is neurophenomenological in its very nature.

Incorporating Language Humans are unique among organisms in the extent that they utilise language to construct rich meaning: sharing complex concepts and creating nuanced cultures and civilisations (Dennett, 2017, p. 340). It is seductive to believe that humankind’s unique intellectual capacity for language exists above mere neurobiology. However, neurophenomenology has been able to provide an evidence-based explanation for language as an embodied, extended and affective dynamic that is scaffolded by the neurobiological dynamics described above. As proposed above by Barrett (2017, p. 6) and Colombetti (2017, p. 447), interactions between the body and the world (including others in the world) are mapped within the human brain. Lakoff (2012) cites a wealth of empirical evidence that demonstrates that this bodily mapping shares neural activity with the language used to express these interactions. For example, when a sales director in a meeting talks about “running with a business opportunity”, his/her words activate corresponding neural linkages associated with the physical act of running – both in the speaker and the listeners’ brains. Lakoff (2012) states that the common basis for language and embodiment is established in reinforcing cascades within shared populations of neurons. These neural cascades inscribe embodied action and language within a dynamic and interdependent neural system. Such bodily metaphors have a significant affective component in that they are expressed in feelings and sensations such as “happy” and “comfortable”. These positions of “equilibrium” and “comfort”, as used by master mariners to describe “finding the line”, can be seen in terms of neurophenomenological dynamics in which language and sensorimotor contents are enmeshed. The degree that language is bodily enmeshed with action and affect can be seen in the way humans make sense of their lifeworlds. Returning to the professional context of master mariners at sea, their practice appears preconsciously “felt for” rather than logically reasoned (Prison et al., 2013). It is expressed via language, in addition to other non-verbal means, in deeply embodied ways. These neurobiological dynamics enable master mariners to collaboratively make sense of their

11  Neurophenomenology and Professional Education

155

Fig. 11.1 Hourglass model of finding the line (with permission)

lifeworlds and to share this sensemaking with their crews and also with their, often globally dispersed, stakeholders such as customers and head office management. One master mariner described this embodied and extended dynamic of sensemaking, and meaning making, as being like an hourglass, with the master mariner grasping the “line” in terms of operational safety and commercial equilibrium and making meaning for both the crew, locally, and external stakeholders (Roberts & Higgs, 2019) (Fig. 11.1). In this way, master mariners “find the line” in embodied and enactive ways that appear consistent with the unfolding perceptions and sensemaking proposed by neurophenomenology. As such, it is both academically important and pedagogically productive to consider neurophenomenology as an input into the development of tacit (Polanyi, 1962), in addition to explicit, knowledge of professional practice and education.

A Neurophenomenological Basis for Empathy Having examined the neurobiological basis for professional practice, we now move on to explore one relevant example of neurophenomenological inquiry that is highly relevant to professional education  – empathy (Loftus, 2015). While essential for professional practice, empathy is largely considered as an intangible, hidden competency (Higgs, 2014). However, neurophenomenology provides a neurobiological description for empathy that offers promise for professional education. Vittorio Gallese (2019) has conceptualised empathy as a form of embodied simulation where we are “understanding what the other is doing and experiencing” (p. 113). In this way, the actions, emotions and sensations of ourselves and of others are represented in preconscious simulations of particular intersubjective experiences. As such, the mind is not merely embodied, but extended into the world

156

B. Roberts

through others in what Gallese describes as a “we-centric dimension” (p. 115). The notion of empathy being facilitated through embodied simulation poses significant implications for professional practice and education, as will be explained below. Gallese posits that this socially extended mind, rather than being founded on conscious guesses at what other people may be feeling, is facilitated through the function of mirror neurons. Neuroscientific research has identified mirror neurons in both humans and their simian cousins. This research has described the way that mirror neurons activate in response to a corresponding behaviour in another person (Gallese, 2014; Shapiro, 2009). Gallese points to numerous empirical studies that demonstrate the mapping of the perception of other’s motor behaviour, sensations and emotions onto the motor representations of the observer’s brain (2014, p. 3). This capacity to neurobiologically experience what another person is experiencing is facilitated through an empathic resonance in response to “emotional, personal, felt and sensed bodily experience embedded in words, gestures, facial expressions, ‘body language’” (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012). Therefore, the discovery of the existence, and function, of mirror neurons in the human brain gives strong biological support to the notion of intersubjectivity as a basis for professional practice and education. As an example from a professional practice context, the master mariners, within my PhD project, extended their perception through their ability to pick up on subtle cues from the behaviour of others. The master mariners were then able to extend their ability to behave professionally, immediately in real time, by interpreting, and responding to, the emotions and behaviour of the network of people around them. Neurophenomenology reminds us that the master mariner’s response to the others is simultaneously perceptive, emotional and neurobiological. For example, one master mariner who sensed an imminent confrontation with a crew member said “I knew he would come for me”, while another who observed an injured worker gained an immediate sense of the severity of the crew member’s injury just by looking at her. As Gallese (2014, p. 5) comments, the existence of an embodied, empathic resonance driven by mirror neurons “greatly reduces the mental gap supposedly separating us from others”. The existence of a neurobiologically facilitated empathic resonance offers tantalising possibilities for enhancing professional education. This is because empathic resonance highlights an “innate capacity of experiencing what the other is experiencing” (Gallese, 2014, p. 5). This can be utilised for the development of empathy as a professional competence (Higgs, 2014). For example, empathy can be brought into conscious awareness via reflection (Bleakley, 1999). This may be facilitated through realistic simulation of professional practice scenarios (Sellberg, 2018), via media such as virtual reality, computer-facilitated learning, physical analog or role-­ play. These simulations can then be debriefed in ways that highlight embodied dynamics such as empathy (Roberts, 2019). Additionally, Gallese’s research (2019) suggests that even reading visceral descriptions of another person’s experiences can stimulate the mirror neurons in the reader in ways that parallel actual engagement in these circumstances.

11  Neurophenomenology and Professional Education

157

From a neurophenomenological perspective, Gallese’s work means that professionals are not confined to consciousness within their minds in disembodied, solipsistic isolation. Instead, the discovery of mirror neurons has revealed an intersubjective reality in which meaning can be shared via embodied social cognition in a “we-centric space” (Gallese, 2018). Gallese’s conclusions have profound implications for professional education, in terms of developing capacity for empathic interactions with clients, patients, students or customers. However, for this to happen, it is critical that professional educators enable learners to reflect upon their embodied perceptions and understand how their neurobiology shapes their perceptions and experiences and interactions. To have professional educators who can explain and “unpack” such a phenomenon for their learners in these terms (Roberts, 2019), rather than limiting their pedagogy to the techno-rational “professional hegemony” that permeates much of current curriculum (Higgs, 2012; Townley, 2008), would radically reshape professional education and fast track the development of what would otherwise remain “immeasurable competencies” (Higgs, 2014). I have highlighted just one productive aspect of neurophenomenology  – the development of empathy through embodied simulation and empathic resonance that is a vital component of practice in many professional contexts. I now briefly relate an example where a failure of embodied sensemaking, on a neurophenomenological level, resulted in catastrophe.

Neurophenomenological Implications: The Capsizing of the Bourbon Dolphin Can failures of embodied sensemaking in professional practice, in neurophenomenological terms, have real-world consequences? My research demonstrates it can, often with catastrophic outcomes. An example can be seen in the case of the anchor handling vessel Bourbon Dolphin, which capsized while towing an oil platform in the North Sea in 2007. This tragedy claimed the lives of eight people, including the vessel’s master mariner and his son, who was onboard to experience what life at sea was like (Lyng et al., 2008; Sweeney, 2009). At the time of the tragedy, the ship was less than 12 months old, was defect-free and was captained by an experienced master mariner. However, evidence from survivors highlight that failures of embodied sensemaking in professional practice, as informed by neurophenomenology, played a key role in this tragedy. First, while the master mariner was highly experienced and technically knowledgeable, he was physically unfamiliar with the vessel and its operations, having never served on it. However, he failed to allocate any time before taking command to physically familiarise himself with the vessel and bodily acclimatise to how the vessel responded. As such, the master mariner was not able to detect several strong, tangible indications that the Bourbon Dolphin was struggling to perform its towing task. After all, the vessel was new and technically rated for the specific work being

158

B. Roberts

carried out. The master mariner did not stop the towing work, even after an initial, severe tilt of the vessel should have reasonably indicated there were critical stability issues associated with the work the vessel was performing on the day. Second, the tow-master on the oil platform, his customer, made a suggestion regarding the configuration of towing equipment on the Bourbon Dolphin. A surviving eye-witness testified in the ensuing government inquiry that the master mariner appeared visibly uncomfortable with this proposed towing configuration. Despite the visible signs of internal discomfort with the proposed change, the master mariner implemented it as if following an order (as opposed to a suggestion). Within moments of this action, the weight of the towing line shifted abruptly to the ship’s port side. This caused an irretrievable “tipping point” where seawater cascaded over the side and the vessel capsized, claiming the lives of eight people (Lyng et al., 2008). Viewed through a neurophenomenological lens, there were several professional practice opportunities that might have prevented this tragedy. First, ensuring time is allowed in the handover between new master mariners to gain a “feel” for the handling and dynamics of the ship would have attuned the master mariner’s interaction with the vessel. This tactile resonance would also have allowed the master mariner to respond to earlier signals from the ship that it was not performing as expected. Second, being attentive to an internal, “felt” resistance to a particular course of action, even when the cause for this resistance was not consciously apparent, could have prompted the master mariner to reflect on the bodily discomfort with that course of action. Such an embodied reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983; Bleakley, 1999) might well have yielded a different course of action than the master mariner took in changing the towing configuration (Roberts, 2019). Finally, a more empathic and intersubjective understanding of the professional relationship between the tow-master and the master mariner may well have prompted the master mariner to interpret the proposed change to the towing gear in more nuanced ways than he had access to on the day itself – interpreting the information as a suggestion rather than as a command or instruction may have averted tragedy. The tragic case of the Bourbon Dolphin stands in counterpoint to the earlier example of a master mariner who was able to “find the line” in a similarly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous professional context. The master mariner who was capable of “finding the line” and achieving “equilibrium” in embodied, felt terms appears to access an entirely different set of professional competencies that were not available to the master mariner of the Bourbon Dolphin. In these examples, such embodied competencies made the difference between life and death. I suggest these critical competencies originate in neurophenomenological dynamics as part of embodied professional practice. These neurophenomenological dynamics can also be observed across an expansive array of professional contexts.

11  Neurophenomenology and Professional Education

159

Professional Education Contexts My research showed the viability of applying a neurophenomenological perspective within the context of seafaring leadership. However, neurophenomenology appears to be a valuable lens for illuminating practice and improving professional education across many professional domains. Loftus (2015) described enacting embodied relational understanding  – empathy – towards a patient with an illness that was difficult to diagnose and treat. By listening to the patient in a deeply embodied manner, Loftus states this “enabled me to relate to [her] in a manner that allowed her to feel that she had not only been heard and understood, but she had been able to establish a healing relationship within a clinical encounter – possibly for the first time in a long time” (p. 140). This deep, therapeutic empathy parallels the intersubjective simulation and empathic resonance facilitated by mirror neurons, as proposed by Gallese. The third-person data cited by Gallese (2019) and first-person narrative account by Loftus (2015) provide us with a more detailed understanding of empathy that can be used to structure pedagogical approaches such as simulation and debriefing focused on embodied dynamics of clinical encounters. Another example from the health sector involves Ellingson’s (2015) exploration of the emotional aspect of care during patients’ dialysis treatments. Ellingson noted one healthcare professional who appeared to display excessive emotion in her role, which upset the dialysis patients. However, Ellingson noted that too little emotion would be perceived by the patients as cold, uncaring and detached. This example is consistent with the view of Barrett (2017) that emotions are constructed in bodily ways that can be explained and explored in neurophenomenological terms. As such, a neurophenomenological lens can be used to develop the emotional virtuosity essential to professional practice as an enacted and embodied phenomenon. One study from the biotechnology sector was recently completed by Dall’alba et al. (2018), who observed and interviewed 14 genetic scientists working to improve plant-based herbicide resistance using genetic modification. They noted these scientists bodily extended themselves via instruments such as tweezers and microscopes to make sense of the biological changes they were enacting on a genetic (and therefore invisible to the eye) level. While these scientists followed formalised protocols and procedures, they enacted these protocols through embodied artistry, finding their way towards success in ways that parallel Varela’s (2010) neurophenomenological concept of minds that are enmeshed and inseparable from bodies and their environments. An applied understanding of the neurophenomenology of laboratory practice would likely fast track the development of these embodied techniques in new scientists, which would contribute to the overall progress within the biological sciences.

160

B. Roberts

In the above professional contexts, the neurophenomenological lens can be used to enlighten professional practice in pragmatic ways. It offers opportunities for professional education to surpass its current focus on techno-rationalist theoretical content that leaves the development of these critical embodied competencies to the vagaries of trial and error during on-the-job learning.

Conclusion The neurophenomenological paradigm has made significant progress in shifting the understanding of human perception and cognition from the traditional mind/body divide (Froese, 2015) to a more holistic concept of the human mind as an experience organ that is inseparable from sensorimotor systems in an “extramental” sense (Froese & Fuchs, 2012; Laughlin & Throop, 2009). This progress has been achieved by integrating third-person neuroscientific data with first-person experiential accounts to provide a deep explanation and exploration of human existence. Not only does neurophenomenology provide an empirical basis for understanding professional practice in embodied terms, but it offers tantalising possibilities for radically transforming professional education. This chapter has applied a neurophenomenological lens to diverse examples from seafaring leadership, healthcare and biotechnology. By doing so, it has suggested how these embodied, and often preconscious, professional competencies may be made understandable and transferrable in pragmatic, pedagogical terms. Neurophenomenological research continues to validate the view of an integrated mind/body/other/environment system. As it emerges into a science of experience, it may well expand into a “neuro-physio-socio-phenomenology” (Froese, 2015) and a “biocultural” paradigm that scaffolds human interaction and culture in neurobiological terms (Gallese, 2019). Nevertheless, it is important to note neurophenomenology’s limitations. First, as stated at the start of this chapter, it remains an emergent field of research where methodologies continue to be debated and refined. Second, there appears to be a precarious trap of sliding into reductionist, brain-centric thinking (Froese, 2015) or descending into subjectivism if too closely focused on first-­ person sensemaking. This is perhaps because neurophenomenology runs counter to the ways in which humans are inclined to perceive the world and counter to the ways in which its scientific paradigms have formed (Roberts, 2019). This makes neurophenomenology an intellectually challenging lens to apply. Finally, neurophenomenology does not hold, nor claim to hold, exclusive explanatory power regarding professional practice. The varied chapters of this book point to theoretical perspectives that all contribute to an understanding of embodied professional practice. However, neurophenomenology may well offer a unique foundational theoretical lens, as it describes the preconscious, organismic sensemaking and enaction that underpins many of the theoretical approaches applied to embodied professional education.

11  Neurophenomenology and Professional Education

161

Neurophenomenology describes the underlying neural mechanisms that facilitate and shape how we bodily perceive and engage with others and our environment in “we-centric” professional spaces (Gallese, 2019). It offers the opportunity to draw these preconscious, hidden dynamics into conscious reflection. Neurophenomenology is also surprisingly complementary with other theoretical lenses, such as those outlined in the chapters of this section. The challenge – for the researcher, educator and practitioner – is to take these theoretical lenses and apply them to professional education in pragmatic terms.

References Barrett, L. F. (2017). The theory of constructed emotion: An active inference account of interoception and categorization. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 12(1), 1–23. Bleakley, A. (1999). From reflective practice to holistic reflexivity. Studies in Higher Education, 24(3), 315–330. Chater, N., & Lowenstein, G. (2016). The under-appreciated drive for sense-making. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 126, 137–154. Claxton, G. (2015). Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than It Thinks. Yale University Press. Colombetti, G. (2017). Enactive affectivity, extended. An International Review of Philosophy, 36(3), 445–455. Cunliffe, A., & Coupland, C. (2012). From hero to villain to hero: Making experience sensible through embodied narrative sensemaking. Human Relations, 65(1), 63–88. Dall’alba, G., Sandberg, J., & Sidhu, R. K. (2018). Embodying skilful performance: Co-constituting body and world in biotechnology. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 50(3), 270–286. Dennett, D. C. (2017). From bacteria to Bach and back: The evolution of minds. Penguin. Depraz, N., & Desmidt, T. (2019). Cardiophenomenology: A refinement of neurophenomenology (report). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 18(3), 493–507. Ellingson, L. (2015). Embodied practices in dialysis care: On (para)professional work. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 173–189). Springer. Froese, T. (2015). Beyond neurophenomenology: A review of Colombetti’s The Feeling Body. New Ideas in Psychology, 39, 73–77. Froese, T., & Fuchs, T. (2012). The extended body: A case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 11(2), 205–235. Fuchs, T., & Koch, S. C. (2014). Embodied affectivity: On moving and being moved. Frontiers in Psychology, 5(508). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00508 Gallese, V. (2014). Bodily selves in relation: Embodied simulation as second-person perspective on intersubjectivity. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 369(1644), 20130177. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0177 Gallese, V. (2018). Embodied simulation and its role in cognition, Reti, saperi, linguaggi. Italian Journal of Cognitive Sciences, 7(13), 31–46. Gallese, V. (2019). Embodied simulation. Its bearing on aesthetic experience and the dialogue between neuroscience and the humanities. Gestalt Theory, 41(2), 113–128. Gendlin, E. T. (1997). Experiencing and the creation of meaning: A philosophical and psychological approach to the subjective. Northwestern University Press. Gordon, S. (2013). Neurophenomenology and its applications to psychology. Springer.

162

B. Roberts

Higgs, J. (2012). Realising practical wisdom from the pursuit of wise practice. In A. Pitman & E. A. Kinsella (Eds.), Phronesis as professional knowledge: Practical wisdom in the professions (pp. 73–85). Sense Publishers. Higgs, J. (2014). Assessing the immeasurables of practice. Asia-Pacific Journal of Cooperative Education, 15(3), 253–267. Jackson, G. B. (2014). Skillful action in peripersonal space. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(2), 313–334. Kinsella, E. A. (2015). Embodied knowledge: Toward a corporeal turn in professional practice, research and education. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 245–260). Springer. Lakoff, G. (2012). Explaining embodied cognition results. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(4), 773–785. Laughlin, C.  D., & Throop, C.  J. (2009). Husserlian meditations and anthropological reflections: Toward a cultural Neurophenomenology of experience and reality. Anthropology of Consciousness, 20(2), 130–170. Leclercq, S., Forsythe, P., & Bienenstock, J. (2016). Posttraumatic stress disorder: Does the gut microbiome hold the key? The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 61(4), 204–213. Loftus, S. (2015). Embodiment in the practice and education of health professionals. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education (pp. 139–156). Springer. Lyng, I., Andreassen, D., Fiksdal, G., Loken, G., Skolvy, Y., & Petternsen, T. (2008). The loss of the “Bourbon Dolphin” on 12 April 2007. Government Administration Services Information Management. Petitmengin, C. (2006). L’énaction comme expérience vécue. Intellectica, 43(1), 85–92. Polanyi, M. (1962). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy. University of Chicago Press. Prison, J., Dahlman, J., & Lundh, M. (2013). Ship sense – Striving for harmony in ship manoeuvring. WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 12(1), 115–127. Roberts, B. (2018). Recasting Odysseus: Embodied sensemaking among seafaring leaders. Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 10(1), 19–34. Roberts, B. (2019). The sea within: Embodied sensemaking among seafaring leaders, PhD thesis, Faculty of Business and Law, Swinburne University of Technology. Roberts, B., & Higgs, J. (2019). Master mariners and practice wisdom. In J.  Higgs (Ed.), Practice wisdom: Value and interpretations (pp.  185–200). Sense-Brill Publishers. DOI: 9789004410497_016. Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. Basic books. Sellberg, C. (2018). From briefing, through scenario, to debriefing: The maritime instructor’s work during simulator-based training. Cognition, Technology & Work, 20(1), 49–62. Shapiro, L. (2009). Making sense of mirror neurons. An International Journal for Epistemology Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 167(3), 439–456. Sweeney, C. (2009). Company fined after tug disaster killed eight, The Times, Jan 6, 2009, p. 19. Townley, B. (2008). Reason’s neglect: Rationality and organizing. Oxford University Press. Trestman, M. (2013). The Cambrian explosion and the origins of embodied cognition. Biological Theory, 8(1), 80–92. Varela, F. (2010). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, AVANT.  Pismo Awangardy Filozoficzno-Naukowej [Avant. Journal of the Philosophical and Scientific Avant-Garde], 1, 31–73.

Chapter 12

Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives in Professional Education Eva Cupchik and Melissa Schnarr

Abstract  Indigenous and feminist perspectives prioritise relationships and lived experiences while remaining cognisant of power dynamics (privilege/oppression) and their real-world implications. Yet, within an embodied learning context, how do newcomers to these perspectives engage Indigenous and feminist ways of knowing in a respectful and meaningful way? Two-Eyed Seeing, a methodological model that balances diverse perspectives, offers one such option. In this chapter, we explore concepts that are fundamental to Indigenous knowledge systems and feminist approaches through a dialogue that does not privilege one over the other but seeks to synthesise our understanding of embodied learning across cultures. Through engagements with “butterfly metaphors” as method, hermeneutics and storytelling, and culturally responsive curricula, we contend that professional educators can foster a richer embodied pedagogy. This chapter aspires to cultivate a collective dynamism “of coming to know”, as we explore notions of feminist and Indigenous embodiment in professional education. Recognising that learning  – an embodied process – is rooted in dynamic perceptions that are in constant dialogue, we perform our own learning journeys as a means to embody critical reflexivity in theory and practice. We leave readers with practical suggestions for embarking on their own embodied learning journeys across cultural perspectives in professional education. Keywords  Feminist epistemologies · Butterfly dynamism · Lived experiences · Indigenous ontologies · Land-based embodied learning

E. Cupchik (*) Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies, Western University, London, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] M. Schnarr Faculty of Education, Western University, London, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_12

163

164

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

Indigenous and feminist perspectives prioritise relationships and lived experiences while remaining cognisant of power dynamics (privilege/oppression) and their implications. Given the modern moment we find ourselves in – a global pandemic that has exposed gross inequalities alongside systemic racisms – these qualities of Indigenous and feminist approaches are ever  more salient. There are practical issues, as well as an ethical imperative, to entreat pedagogical perspectives that inherently value the voices of those who are marginalised. Within an embodied learning context, we consider how Indigenous and feminist ways of knowing productively engage in a respectful and meaningful way. Two-­ Eyed Seeing, an epistemic model that balances diverse perspectives, offers one such approach. In this chapter, we explore concepts that are fundamental to Indigenous knowledge systems and feminist approaches through a dialogue that does not privilege one over the other. We seek to synthesise our understanding of embodied learning through the lenses of Indigenous and feminist perspectives. We propose that employing a Two-Eyed Seeing model (via Indigenous and feminist perspectives) can foster a richer embodied pedagogy by engaging relationships with land, storytelling, and responsive curricula that nurture critical reflexivity. Through our dialogue, we cultivate a performative, non-hierarchical exchange of theory, storytelling, and experience. Performative writing is expressive and embodied; it aims to demonstrate meaning through action. Performative writing aims to build relationships between readers and writers, through intuitive and creative expressions, as well as storytelling in text. We work to make visible our subjectivities as scholars-in-relation (to one another, to the reader, to our lands, and to communities), as we manifest our processes of coming to know. This is a facsimile of embodied knowledge production that we engender in actions and that sustains our relationships as colleagues; it is the best we can do given the written medium. Through words, actions, thoughts, and ideologies, we seek to challenge discursive limits. This chapter is a thought experiment that institutes critical reflexivity as a means to foster richer and more inclusive embodied pedagogies across cultures.

Self-Location Eva: I am a queer-identified Settler1 learner, researcher, tutor, and teacher of Eastern European (Ashkenazi) Jewish descent. As an outsider to Indigenous communities, ‘I come to know’ Indigenous theories from long standing community engagements at Trent University, the University of Toronto, and Western University. I believe that researching and working to reclaim land, pedagogy, and Indigenous Knowledge, is an implicit component of cross-cultural dialogues. I believe that writing reflects

1  Settlers are groups of individuals who “settled” in Canada as newcomers, on Indigenous territories. New Settlers to Canada include immigrant populations. Settler colonialism references the forced settlement of Indigenous lands by state institutions.

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

165

embodied relations to land, place, cultural resurgence2, and reconciliation as omnipresent elements of visiting on Indigenous territories. My academic training engages Indigenous knowledge systems, transnational feminist3, and Eurocentric phenomenology. Melissa: Boozhoo. She:kon. I greet you in the languages of my people: the Anishinaabe and Haudeonsaunee [Mohawk]. I am a writer and scholar living in Deshkan Ziibi (London, Ontario, Canada). My mother’s family [Potawattomi/ Ojibwe] is from Bkejwanong Territory (Walpole Island First Nation) and my father’s family [Mohawk] is from Six Nations of the Grand River Territory. My mother was an activist and scholar. As a child, she was taken from her family, culture and lands by the Canadian government through an insidious policy that has come to be known as the Sixties’ Scoop4. I continue her journey of reclamation by reforging connections to family, community, land, and language, and awakening blood memory5 through willful and transgressive acts of research, resurgence and creative work (art, poetry). I aim to embody mino-bimaadiziwin, living the good life, in all that I do.

Grounding Land Through Indigenous Worldviews This body we call the World sings Pow Wow songs eats fry bread drives dance to moccasins, fans, hands and feet (Melissa, excerpt from Natural Bodies, 2011)

Melissa: Where do you think we should begin? Eva: Given the cross-cultural nature of dialoguing across Indigenous and feminist perspectives, I think it beneficial to interrogate the parameters underpinning much of our earlier conversations. Melissa: Ah, you want to talk about land. 2  Resurgence was originated by Alfred (Wildcat et al., 2014) and is an inward view of self and nation that “refocuses our work from trying to transform the colonial outside into a flourishment of the Indigenous inside” (Simpson, 2011, p. 17). 3  Transnational feminist ways of knowing critically engage the affective experiences of women and trans persons in specific local or global places and spaces. Women and trans persons can share dialogical experiences about oppression, bodily orientation, health, and resistance that contribute to a location-based depth of meaning. Further, by thinking laterally about applying knowledge, transnational feminism surpasses restrictions imposed by Western gender segregating categories or binary logic, as non-hierarchal and open-ended. Transnational feminist practices ease social justice activism for researchers to work alongside, though not speak for, self-identified oppressed communities. 4  “The Sixties Scoop is the catch-all name for a series of policies enacted by provincial [Canadian] child welfare authorities starting in the mid-1950s, which saw thousands of Indigenous children taken from their homes and families, placed in foster homes, and eventually adopted out to white families from across Canada and the United States” (Dart, n.d.). See also Alston-O’Connor (2010). 5  Blood memory is our ancestral connection to knowledges and past experiences.

166

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

Eva: Exactly. I believe working through our understanding of land will allow us to set the stage for this dialogic expedition. As we are striving to de-center Eurocentric notions, I’d like to first ask: What does land mean to you? Melissa: That’s a good question! ‘Land’ is more than just materiality and is a complex concept. To me, land is Indigenous epistemology. Our ways of knowing (and our ways of being) come from the land and are manifest in the land. However, when we are speaking across cultures as we are now, I think it’s important to point out that from an Indigenous standpoint, ‘land’ is not just the physical features or space. Land is not just the soil, the water, the grass and the trees – it is those aspects, integrally so – but, it is also so much more … the best way I can think to translate the enormity and transcendent nature of it is “metaphysical”, but even that word falls short because land is simultaneously all aspects of creation – physical AND mental AND social/emotional AND spiritual. It is multidimensional, realms of understanding superimposed and synchronously interacting within the same knowledge space, and it is infinitely scalable from a single blade of grass or drop of water to this all-encompassing, all-land idea we use when we speak of ‘land.’ Eva: What do you mean by ‘multi-dimensional realms of understanding’, in terms of land-based knowledge? Melissa: Well, there is the physical – what we see, hear, smell, touch etc., but also the spiritual – land holds spirit, energy, life. There is the social/emotional – land is both the vehicle and the keeper of our stories and collective memories, our histories – and the mental – land is our teacher. It is all of these things at once. This is fundamental to an Indigenous understanding of the world. Land is the lens through which we understand the world and the means by which we come to understand anything at all. Eva: This reminds me of Merleau-Ponty’s levels of perception6. Do you think that, from an Indigenous perspective, land-based understanding foregrounds perception? Does it anticipate it? Melissa: Yes, absolutely. We are part of the land before we are part of anything else. Even as we grow inside our mothers, through them, we are connected to the land – physically, emotionally, mentally and spiritually and we inherit the histories, the blood memory of the land, once we are born. When Absolon and Willett (2005) speak of “re-membering”, in the work of Indigenous reclamation, to me, part of what they are talking about is returning to the knowledge (and living that knowledge) that we are all ‘members’ of the land. We belong to it. We are all members of a body we call the land. The land, as well as being transcendental, is embodied within our perceptions, and is an embodied form unto itself. We begin with a conversation about land purposefully, as an understanding of Indigenous and Settler relations with land permeates any meaningful engagement with Indigenous ways of being and knowing. Recognition that embodying land is part of an Indigenous lens is fundamental to a pedagogy that is inclusive of 6  Feminist and critical phenomenologist Helen Fielding (2005) explains Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual levels as “dimensions or worlds we move into or corporeally take up” (p. 279). Merleau-Ponty situates “the body as the first level” of perception, which allows individuals to experience a space.

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

167

Indigenous Peoples. Relationships to land, therefore, must be approached carefully and respectfully as these relationships underpin what it is to “come to know” from an Indigenous perspective. Embodied sensations, such as hearing, touching, and tasting, build sentient relationships that remain intertwined on shared Indigenous-Settler territories. As Ojibwa language teacher and translator Roger Roulette explains, the elements “the land carries” or embodies render it animate (personal communication, December 12, 2018). Therefore, humans embody land at the first level of perception, its aesthetic dimensions, sentience, and beings. Land is not simply “seen” for Indigenous Peoples. There is an embodied connection to land that needs to be considered when designing an Indigenous-Settler nation-to-nation curriculum that relates to Indigenous apprehension of well-being. In Indigenous cultures, land has a material embodiment and historical consciousness. As Richard Hill (2016) discusses, cultural experiences are “not the product of a biological essence, but a product of complex circumstances” that emerge from “customary heritage” (p. 3), material conditions, and social interactions. Tonawanda Seneca researcher Mishuana Goeman (2008) asserts how “Indigenous conceptions of land are literally and figuratively the placeholder that moves through time and situates Indigenous knowledges” (p. 24). Expressed through Indigenous languages, land is an embodiment that emerges from lived knowledge. Land is not only a metaphor but is part of a pre-reflexive experience with ancestral connectivity. Individuals engage with the ontological fragmentations of land; for Indigenous Peoples, reclaiming epistemologies of land means engaging its physical, spiritual, and linguistic importance. From an Indigenous perspective, in theory and practice, it is not possible to develop essentialist or simplistic understandings of land. Land exceeds a Gestalt logic, as it expresses social, mental, spiritual, and intergenerational embodied knowledge, beyond the sum of its parts. An Indigenous understanding of “land” is always connected to the local and visceral presence of the land under one’s feet; as such, it is embodied.

Two-Eyed Seeing: Embodying Diverse Perspectives the search for Primeval Adams Mitochondrial Eves is the question we answer walking backwards yet the drum beat heartbeat that drives the quest(ion) is found on a turtle’s back (Melissa, excerpt from Second-hand Moccasins, 2021)

168

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

Melissa: I know Two-Eyed Seeing is a practice that you have employed in your work, Eva. For you, what is a Two-Eyed Seeing framework? Eva: Two-Eyed Seeing is a method for working across Indigenous and Eurocentric frameworks. It is a creative means to express ideas and share concepts, without privileging Indigenous or Eurocentric vantage points. I aim to practise Two-Eyed Seeing across transnational feminist, phenomenological, and Indigenous perspectives. I engage transnational perspectives because they can extend knowledge about intersectional experiences across places, times, and spaces. Melissa: Why do you think a Two-Eyed Seeing framework is useful within the context of professional education? Eva: Two-Eyed Seeing is a balanced paradigm for teaching that accommodates Indigenous and Eurocentric knowledge systems. Western knowledge is not all positivist or predicated on hypotheses that presuppose truths. Two-Eyed Seeing offers Eurocentric and Indigenous genealogical perspectives mutual respect, without homogenising their content. Melissa: So, if a Two-Eyed Seeing framework doesn’t constrain us to ‘blending’ or reconciling divergent concepts, what happens when disagreements across knowledge systems occur? Eva: Disagreements within a Two-Eyed Seeing practice can serve to bolster and enrich knowledge. Melissa: You’re saying that divergences potentially create the opportunity for ‘better’ learning? Eva: Yes, exactly. Knowledge is not confined to a spatial-temporal network, category, scholarly discipline, ideology, or place. Without privileging the sense of ‘sight,’ Two-Eyed Seeing interrogates perceptions, meanings, expressions, data, and concepts across cultures. It is not dominated by rhetoric, authoritative voice, or privileged subject positions. There is a dialogic interplay across Eurocentric and Indigenous knowledge systems, unconfined by disciplinary limitations and ‘formal’ professional training. Western science and Indigenous paradigms explore convergent learning ecologies from their different perspectives. Melissa: I see … so how do you think practitioners can maintain balance across Eurocentric and Indigenous knowledge systems? Eva: Well, I don’t think it is possible to achieve perfect balance across Indigenous and Eurocentric learning paradigms. Scholars and practitioners have responsibilities: to self-educate and share teachings with colleagues, students, patients, and their social/kin-like networks. Concepts are situated: they have sociocultural histories, adhering to genealogies of place, abstract spaces, and landscapes. Lived experiences grant concepts an embodied resonance. Land as a living agent is not purely conceptual in substance; it is an intrinsic embodiment that speaks through Indigenous knowledge systems and fosters cultural memory (see blood memory). Melissa: We can only know what we have been exposed to … Eva: But with the interplay between Indigenous and Eurocentric perspectives, we do not privilege either knowledge system. Two-Eyed Seeing bridges method and process, without deferring to Eurocentric paradigms that constrain and understand lived experiences in dominant terms.

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

169

Debbie Martin (2012) developed a Two-Eyed Seeing paradigm, in collaboration with Mi’kmaq Elders Albert and Murdena Marshall from Eskasoni First Nation (near Cape Breton) and Cheryl Bartlett from Cape Breton University. Two-Eyed Seeing supports the idea “that there are diverse understandings of the world” (p. 24) that can be apprehended through complementary narrative and scientific discourses. Martin (2012) shares how “Two-Eyed Seeing” accepts “the partiality” of perspectives to understand “multiple epistemologies”, without deferring to Eurocentric systems of understanding. One eye is “never subsumed or dominated by the other”, and each one “represents a way to see the world that is always partial” (p. 24). Métis scholars Lavallée and Lévesque (2013) echo how engaging “Two-Eyed Seeing requires an attentiveness to bi-cultural ways of knowing” (p. 206), for instance, to consider health, education, or legal topics through hybridisation of Eurocentric and Indigenous perspectives. Two-Eyed Seeing is a metaphor for “seeing with” that balances divergent perspectives (Al-Saji, 2010). In dealing with interpretations of empirical data, Two-­ Eyed Seeing does not impose an objective hierarchy (Al-Saji, 2010). Two-Eyed Seeing does not equate Indigenous and Eurocentric theories but works to achieve common ground, developing a nuanced embodied understanding of physical (land) and theoretical place. Two-Eyed Seeing is a method, which integrates lived consciousness, creation, and the dynamics of being whole. It is a hermeneutic (interpretative) process that emerges in dialogues and ongoing relations with colleagues, family, and friends. Through Two-Eyed Seeing, we engage in open-ended dialogues that do not privilege any particular worldview. Like Indigenous knowledge systems, transnational feminism is critically reflexive, interrogating the impacts of globalisation within imbalanced political economies of gender. Transnational feminist practices can embody Two-Eyed Seeing paradigms, to engender institutional roles, confer dynamics of lived phenomena, foreground gender injustices, and cultivate inter-cultural knowledge translation. Eva’s work explores the intersections of feminist phenomenology and Anishinaabek theories of being in cultural worlds, through a transnational feminist lens. Feminist phenomenology, extending from Merleau-Ponty (2012), “is philosophy for which the world is always” present and grounded “prior to reflection” (p. xx). To perceive across worlds does not restrict knowledge to concrete terms but offers an intersectional engagement for translation. Feminist phenomenology uncovers how to embody identities across cultural positions. Ways of being in the world can open to divergent Eurocentric and Indigenous worldviews if each side takes care to create conditions for cultural safety7. From an Indigenous standpoint, dissenting opinions enhance thinking to foster collaborative ideas, projects, and outcomes from divergent subjectivities. Collective knowledge production, from multiple perspectives, can move in agreement, across balanced 7  Acoose et al. (2009 ) teach “cultural safety” as “the design and delivery of government and institutional policy” (p. 11). This practice “entails not just the agreement and understanding that cultural differences matter in social and health policy delivery, but also the need to make a real difference in methods of delivery and the ultimate effectiveness of the policies” (p. 11).

170

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

dynamics of dissensus and resistance. Embracing the partiality of perspectives, a mix of voices from varied lived experiences is encouraged; consensus means more when it is achieved across divergent perspectives. The learning journey to achieve that consensus enriches the knowledge produced, refining ideas, designs, and practices that speak to the needs of the collective. In this way, collaborative curricula design is encouraged, wherein Indigenous and Settler stakeholders can build consensus towards inclusive pedagogy and learning outcomes.

Embodied Learning The body is our general medium for having a world. —Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 147

Eva: How do we embody learning? What does the concept, embodied learning mean to you as an educationalist working within the context of Indigenous education? Melissa: I think before I answer that we must back up a bit and consider how dominant, Western frameworks view learning and knowledge in general. In dominant conceptions, ‘knowledge’ is principally the arena of the mind. However, from an Indigenous standpoint, knowledge is something that exists across all aspects of our being: the body, the emotions, the spirit as well as the mind. To me then, embodied learning is an expression of holistic learning. When we learn, we learn via these corporeal, emotional, spiritual and mental dimensions. Eva: By ‘aspects,’ do you mean senses? Melissa: Senses are part of it – part of the physical apprehension, but there is also the emotional/social and spiritual. You can call embodied learning ‘learning by doing’; however, ‘learning by doing’ doesn’t necessarily mean a physical act (although it can) but we must recognise that there is also learning in feeling and in connecting with spirit. For instance, in terms of decolonising practice, we can talk about the ‘unsettling’ that learners experience as they grapple with concepts of power, privilege and different ways of knowing and being, what Quetzala Carson (2017) calls an ‘ethic of uncomfortability.’ There is deep learning in being able to confront, accept and open yourself to experiencing the discomfort that this work brings, especially for Settlers. And that is something that you cannot learn from reading or even hearing about it – you must experience it yourself. Eva: I agree. Unsettling, through acts of decolonisation, occurs for both Indigenous and Settler allies. Embodied learning is an organic process of being attuned with others, in pedagogy and practice. Attunement to earth cycles, water, and synchronicity with land are factors that condition ontological wellbeing. Presence in mind, body, and spirit is a focal point for responsible learning across cultures. It is imperative to learn Indigenous and Eurocentric knowledge architectures, before offering critiques. I argue that not all Western knowledge systems are dominant paradigms, just as Indigenous epistemologies vary in content, form,

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

171

meaning, and intent. Embodied learning resists literature that essentialises creativity and reduces language to political speech acts, evident in state reconciliation initiatives with Indigenous groups. Learning is a measure of ‘doing,’ while being grounded in holistic relations with animate and inanimate beings. Does that resonate from an Indigenous standpoint, for you? Is embodied learning a mantra for deep listening, attuned social, and curricular practices? Melissa: I think ‘embodied learning’ recontextualises the learning and teaching process – learning is situated as an ecology rather than presupposed linear form. We automatically move away from the ‘banking model of education’ to a living, breathing place where learners and knowledge exist in mutual and symbiotic relation. Embodied learning is a mantra for being-in-relation with one’s self as much as the environment, whether that is a classroom full of peers (and a teacher) or alone sitting outside in the grass. Being a learner-in-relation. Eva: Do you think embodied learning conflicts with conceptualising knowledge as the arena of the mind, as we see in many dominant frameworks? Melissa: I think it’s problematic in its supremacy as the ‘de facto’ learning arena ... We revere theorisation. We theorise about life and phenomena, but some things, I would argue can’t ever fully be theorised – they just must be experienced. Eva: Like embodied learning? Melissa: Absolutely. Higher and professional education in its dominant, Eurocentric forms prioritises abstraction over lived, embodied experience – we are forced to pull apart the theory from the ‘doing’. It’s like trying to understand a butterfly’s flight by pinning it in a box. We run the risk of over-thinking and over-­ abstracting – we lose the essence of that which we are trying to understand. Embodied learning is tactile and performative, stretching across multiple realms of ontological experience for Western and Indigenous groups. Forming a kinship with feminist methods, Darnell (2015) affirms that “relational ontologies” can foster a meeting place between ways of being across cultures (p. 9). Challenging the rigidity of mind/body dualisms, embodied learning returns breath to decolonial teaching strategies (Brunette-Debassige, 2018). Centring decolonisation8 is a critical tenet of embodied learning. The late Dr. Roxanna Ng (2018) argued that decolonial experiences involve four key elements: “resistance, questioning, reclamation, and transformation (from negative to positive and from margin to centre)” (p. 50). Imagining Indigenous-Settler relationships, as unconfined to bodily limits, grounds the knower (educator) in historical thought processes and non-linear time-spaces (Ng, 2018). A body-spirit consciousness in teaching practices integrates anti-­ oppressive discourses and challenges hierarchical relations between students and teachers (Ng, 2018). Cultural safety is fostered by questioning power relations and embedded hierarchies (Fast et al., 2017). Culturally safe practices in education can

8  Peach et al. (2020) explain, “Decolonization is a theoretical and practical concept used to critically examine and transform historically entrenched and continued processes of colonization” (p. 118).

172

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

foster body sovereignty9, by entrusting the experiences of Indigenous self-­ determination in classroom spaces (Simpson, 2017). Embodied learning involves praxis. In Eurocentric philosophy, theory and practice are often cast as binary opposites. Narrowing the gap between theory and doing, feminist phenomenology invites a transnational perspective that reflects gendered implications for local and global life experiences. As Richa Nagar and Amanda Lock Swarr (2010) explain, “Praxis is understood as the process of mediation through which theory and practice are interwoven” (p.  6). For Williams (1983), arguing from a Marxist perspective, “Theory is always in active relation to practice”, which entails a “systematic explanation of things done” and “observed” (p.  317). Williams explains, “Praxis is practice informed by theory” (p.  318). However, in keeping with feminist epistemologies, praxis is “a whole mode of activity” that an individual embodies through reciprocal actions, thoughts, and words. Praxis therefore surpasses the “opposition between theory and practice”.

Embodiment and Professional Education Butterfly Metaphors as Embodiments We propose the dynamism of the butterfly as a metaphor for embodied learning in professional education  – a conjuring of lived experience, fluttering in opposition against the constraints of traditional theory-practice dialectics. We come to this metaphor through an interpretation of Anishinaabek knowledge. To hold a butterfly is to deprive it of its flight  – in the moment and thereafter. Likewise, we cannot marvel at its colourful aerial dance once placed in suspension. We contend that the experiences that propel embodied learning are evanescent, compelling engagement in the moment and reflection in the aftermath. This focus on embodied experience – on experiencing the experience – brings our two canoes of feminist and Indigenous thought within arms’ reach. In butterfly metaphors, there is a synergy of like-hearted mindfulness that precludes dominant binaries. In this spirit, Simpson (2011) notes that “Indigenous cultures understand and generate meaning through engagement, presence and process” (p.  93). Knowledge production comes out of experience, informed by self-awareness and self-in-relation. Butterfly dynamism allows us to embrace the “doing” of embodied learning in education while keeping experiences intact. 9  For Anishinaabe Kwe scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017), there can be no hierarchy between the land’s relationships to “bodies”, irrespective of “urban, reserves, and rural” locations. Simpson echoes how Indigenous persons need to harbour a “body sovereignty” (p. 110), which endorses political independence and resists institutional policies that instil fear-based cultures of bodily shame. She expresses how land is a form of pedagogy with its own “context and process” (p. 151). “Coming to know” the land’s intelligence informs a person’s “whole body” and every day “practices in the context of freedom” (p. 151).

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

173

We contend that butterfly metaphors can induce critical reflexivity on embodied learning and “give wing” to the lived experiences of self-identified marginalised communities. Within the kind of decolonising praxis we espouse, these embodied flights live in partnership with anti-colonial, social justice, and anti-oppressive ideological positions. Decolonisation is unequivocally about land and the rematriation of land back to Indigenous Peoples (Tuck & Yang, 2012). One cannot engender a decolonising approach without embodying this fact, yet for this to take place, a “reckoning” must occur within Settler learners and educators alike (Wildcat et al., 2014). We live, work, and learn on Native land. Avoiding discomfort – “uncomfortability”  – within a decolonising context only serves to perpetuate Settler-­ centeredness, which can result in passive practices that do not engage the issues at hand in a lived and visceral manner. Prepared land acknowledgements10, for instance, do not provoke awareness inasmuch as they assuage perceived reconciliatory obligations, nor do they require interrogation or reflexivity on the part of the learners or educators involved. Instead, educators can ask students to compose their own land acknowledgements, mediating confrontations of privilege, intergenerational trauma, and the colonial legacy. We call for an active reflexive awareness – an awareness that invites further reflection through the unique embodiments of land. Indigenous knowledge systems are inherently embodied. They resonate with active learning practices, seasonal cyclic movement, and non-linear relationships with time, space, animate beings, and land. In teaching with a perspective that recognises an Indigenous worldview, the sacred nature of land cannot be understated; hence, the butterfly, our teacher in this metaphor – who is always connected to the land, as a being of the land. Within an Indigenous pedagogy, Smith notes that “land is our first teacher” (2019, p. 1), while Restoule adds “we are all related” (2017, p. 12); land is foremost within these relations. Relationships do not spring up from textbooks. They require air, water, sunlight, and earth. Taking learners out onto the land becomes a literal first step in building a meaningful relationship with it. Personal experiences transform the unimaginable into the relatable and knowable. Engaging learners in lessons, activities, and discussions outside the confines of the classroom challenges the Eurocentric education delivery model and connects learners to the specific land on which they live, work, and learn. These connections encourage reflection: What does it mean to know the land? What might it mean to be denied this relationship? What does it mean to perceive through one’s embodied relationship with the land? Relationships with land provoke substantive reckonings via embodied experiences that root Indigenous knowledge systems and relationality to the ground under a learner’s feet.

 Following the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada’s Calls to Action (2015), land acknowledgements have become common practice across Canada. A land acknowledgement purposefully recognises the ancestral territory on which an institution resides (or an event takes place); in practice, land acknowledgements have become perfunctory speech acts.

10

174

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

 mbodied Hermeneutics and Storytelling E in Professional Education Performing feminist ways of being entails critical thinking from practical experiences. Indigenous Knowledges are inherently performative. From both perspectives, elucidations remain attached to an embodied knower and doer. Higher education in the professions speaks to a praxis of bringing theory into thoughtful actions that impact individuals and collectives (Gadamer, 1996). Hermeneutic11 practice can be an embodied form of interpretation, emergent from stories and lived knowledge. Stories within Indigenous cultures do not dwell solely in cognition. Educating via story(telling) can teach learners to interpret beyond plot, setting, and character. Story, a core pedagogical tool of Indigenous education, can promote critical thinking “as it provides the learner with the autonomy and independence to make their own meaning” (Restoule & Chaw-win-is, 2017, p. 15). Learners must fill in gaps and decide upon their own interpretation of a story’s significance. Through story, lived experience becomes the medium by which knowledge (meaning) is transformed. Métis researcher and scholar Danielle Alcock (2019), from Rama First Nation, explains how “storytelling and narrative approaches are a way to alter the interaction … to include emotional knowledge and spiritual knowledge” (p.  19). It is important that people express their narratives about suffering, resilience, and survival (Frank, 2001). Bruner (1986) explains how “key elements in narrative are story, discourse, and telling” (p.  145). Story carries abstract meanings in acts of telling. However, stories are embodiments of process, not reductive ideologies, nor formal language in policy/instruction manuals. Active listening, “witnessing”, and testimonio12 build relationships between audience and teller (Srigley & Varley, 2018; Hunt, 2018; Caxaj, 2015). The act of telling constitutes a process of self-­ determination, wherein storytellers are empowered to be the authors of their own lived experiences through the narratives they choose to tell (Epston et al., 1992). The practice of “telling” is central to critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1991) intersectional feminist discourse that integrates the life experiences of women of colour with political anti-racist incentives. Transnational feminist engagements can bridge the global intersections of cultural differences and Settler

 Philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) explains, “The hermeneutical experience also has its logical consequence: that of uninterrupted listening” (p.  422), prevalent in critical life episode dialogue. The hermeneutic circle is an interpretive nexus of actions, experiences, and identities that form an individual’s senses of sel(ves). Dialogue fosters layers of hermeneutic interpretation, commensurable acts, dialogue, attuned reflexivity, and thinking patterns. Hermeneutic interpretation is not a reduction of aesthetic process but can facilitate blood memory in layers of reflexive process or understanding. 12  A testimonio is a storytelling approach used in Latin America as “a means to bear witness to injustices through spoken or written word […] testimonios embody a subaltern space that claims authority through virtue of marginality and lived experience” (Caxaj, 2015, p. 3). 11

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

175

responsibilities, by recognising, embracing, and engaging the embodied power of contemporary and traditional storytelling.

Embodying Curricula in Professional Education It is critical that education practitioners across professions engage in critical reflexivity to relate diverse experiences across local and global (transnational) nation-to-­ nation domains. Global locations are not raw material for “area studies” literature that deliver weekly themes, such as “decolonisation” or “Indigenous research”. Transnational experiences are not collapsible within umbrella studies programmes, such as “Cultural Studies”, “Ethnic”, or “American Studies”. It is necessary to separate the ideological discourses of “racism”, “heterosexism”, and “patriarchy” from nation and place-based learning. The content of classroom storywork informs the interpretation of histories of transnational struggle. Syllabi can deal with global oppressive economic policies, locally developed class materials, and genealogies of resistance from transnational Indigenous community narratives. Reflecting on the dynamics of land-based Indigenous pedagogies, Cherokee scholar/artist Adrienne Keene discusses establishing meaningful relationships between students, communities, land, and classroom expectations, as Indigenous populations “move from history books to being living sources of place-based knowledge” (Tuck & Recollet, 2016, p. 57). Western-based educators can disrupt “stereotypes, focusing on local land and peoples”, by fostering collaborative respect and diverse artistic voices across multi-cultural institutions. Welcoming Indigenous knowledge keepers as collaborators on curricula design can transform oppressive teaching structures and raise consciousness to encompass Indigenous Knowledges and lived experiences. Drawing on knowledge from working as an educator at a reserve elementary school in Ontario, a Settler/allied researcher and writer describes how culturally safe and humble perspectives inform an important approach for a multi-faceted pedagogy (personal communication, August 15, 2020). She calls on education practitioners to understand the limitations of their Western knowledge and voice, foreground collaboration and non-competition in classrooms, and survey historical developments from Eurocentric and Indigenous teaching materials. To accomplish this effectively, educators must become “culturally responsive” (Williams, 2012; Bishop et  al., 2009), which means they “have an understanding of how students construct their knowledge, have an awareness about their students’ lives, are socio-­ culturally conscious, hold affirming views about diversity, use congruent instructional strategies, and advocate for the rights of their students” (MacIntosh et  al., 2014, p.  239). Resisting cultural appropriation, from mimicking Indigenous cultures in classroom activities, such as costumes, and historical role-play (e.g. Louis Riel’s trial), demonstrates Settler responsibility for respecting the host nation where an institution resides (Tuck & Recollet, 2016). Settler Canadian and international educators need to reflect upon and enact curriculum design, student engagement,

176

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

and project evaluations within the genealogical roots and contemporary needs of local Indigenous communities. We call on educators to consider embodied perspectives within the breadth of their curricula through a sensitivity to embodied perspectives in teaching. In what ways does the curriculum embody the complexities of Indigenous community members’ perspectives? Each statute or lesson plan impacts Indigenous communities differently – it is not possible to standardise classroom experiences while learning from place-based knowledge systems. Educators must first be critically reflexive about the content they intend to deliver, rather than defaulting to a checklist mindset. Bringing this chapter full circle, educators can improve pedagogy in their professions, not with guilt-ridden reform, but through sincere efforts to bring embodied perspectives into curriculum design. We offer this chapter as a starting point for embodied professional education and propose eight take-aways to inspire education and practice from “two eyes”: • Learn about the Indigenous communities on whose traditional land you reside; respect and learn about Indigenous perspectives and epistemological views that embody land in unique ways; build meaningful relations with the land. • Educate professionals about “Two-Eyed Seeing” and its promise as a way to respect and bring together diverse epistemological views. • Embrace the metaphor of butterfly dynamism; approach learning opportunities through a praxis lens “as experiences to be experienced” rather than as fodder for theory. • Incorporate reflections into curriculum design and intended learner outcomes to cultivate pedagogies that appreciate and facilitate embodied learning experiences. • Honour story and storytelling as a way to foster embodied learning in teaching and learning spaces. • Recognise stories as a way to nurture critical reflexivity, and to examine assumptions and positionalities, while also giving voice to embodied lived experience. • Enhance your own understanding of Indigenous history and education (for Canada, see White & Peters, 2009; RCAP, 1996; TRC, 2015). • Design curricular programmes with Elders and knowledge holders and teachers from urban and rural Indigenous communities; receive ongoing feedback. By re-centring embodied learning in professional education through a balanced approach between Indigenous and Eurocentric theoretical foundations, we offer educators an invitation to engage critically reflexive pedagogies and to transform approaches. We call for the development of curricula for the next generation of professional practitioners in a range of fields that emphasises agency through collaborative meaning-making strategies with Indigenous Peoples. We propose that educators attend to both the design and delivery of curricula, to yield balanced Two-­ Eyed Seeing outcomes that encourage critical reflexivity and decolonising praxis in professional education. Indigenous and feminist ways of being and knowing can work in collaboration, to challenge the status quo and offer meaningful ways forward through embodied knowing. Indigenous Knowledge and feminist critical thought can chart a path towards a more inclusive embodied learning praxis.

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

177

References Absolon, K., & Willett, C. (2005). Putting ourselves forward: Location in aboriginal research. In L. Brown & S. Strega (Eds.), Research as resistance (pp. 97–126). Canadian Scholars’ Press. Acoose, S., Blunderfield, D., Dell, C. A., & Desjarlais, V. (2009). Beginning with Our Voices: How the Experiential Stories of First Nations Women Contribute to a National Research Project. Journal of Aboriginal Health, 4(2), 35–43. Alcock, D. E. (2019). I honoured him until the end: Storytelling of indigenous female caregivers and care providers focused on Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias (ADOD) (6521). Doctoral dissertation, Western University. Electronic thesis and dissertation repository. Al-Saji, A. (2010). Bodies and sensings: On the uses of Husserlian phenomenology for feminist theory. Continental Philosophy Review, 43, 13–37. Alston-O’Connor, E. (2010). The sixties scoop: Implications for social workers and social work education. Critical Social Work, 11(1), 53–61. Bishop, R., Berryman, M., Cavanaugh, T., & Teddy, L. (2009). Te Kotahitanga: Addressing educational disparities facing Maori students in New Zealand. Teaching and Teacher Education, 25(5), 734–742. Bruner, E. M. (1986). Experience and its expressions. In E. M. Bruner & V. W. Turner (Eds.), The anthropology of experience (pp. 3–33). University of Illinois Press. Brunette-Debassige, C. (2018). From subjugation to embodied self-in-relation: An indigenous pedagogy for decolonization. In S. Batacharya & Y.-L. R. Wong (Eds.), Sharing breath: Embodied learning and decolonization (pp. 199–229). Athabasca University Press. Canada. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. (1996). People to people, nation to nation: Highlights from the report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples. Ministry of Supply and Services Canada. Carson, Q. (2017). Pedagogy of the decolonizing [Video]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=IN17Os8JAr8 Caxaj, C.  S. (2015). Indigenous storytelling and participatory action research: Allies toward decolonization? Reflections from the peoples’ International health tribunal. Global Qualitative Nursing Research, 2, 1–12. Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review, 43, 1241–1299. Darnell, R. (2015). Applied anthropology: Disciplinary oxymoron? Anthropologica, 57(1), 1–11. Dart, C. (n.d). The sixties scoop explained. CBC Docs. https://www.cbc.ca/cbcdocspov/features/ the-­sixties-­scoop-­explained Epston, D., White, M., & Murray, K. (1992). A proposal for re-authoring therapy: Rose’s re-­ visioning of her life. In S. McNamee & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), Therapy as social construction (pp. 96–115). Sage. Fast, E., Marie-Eve, D.-G., Bertrand, N., Bertrand, S., & Allouche, Z. (2017). Incorporating diverse understandings of indigenous identity: Toward a broader definition of cultural safety for urban indigenous youth. AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples, 13(3), 152–160. Fielding, H. (2005). The body of art: The singular plural of the feminine. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 36(3), 277–292. Frank, A. W. (2001). Can We Research Suffering? Qualitative Health Research, 11(3), 353–362. Gadamer, H.  G. (1996). The enigma of health (J.  Gaiger & N.  Walker, Trans.). Stanford University Press. Goeman, M. (2008). From place to territories and back again: Centering storied land in the discussion of indigenous nation-building. International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies, 1(1), 23–34. Hesse-Biber, S.  N., & Yaiser, M.  L. (2004). Feminist perspectives on social research. Oxford University Press.

178

E. Cupchik and M. Schnarr

Hill, R. M. (2016). Art by indigenous artists, or art about indigenous issues? Canadianart. https:// canadianart.ca/features/art-­by-­indigenous-­artists-­or-­art-­about-­indigenous-­issues/ Hunt. (2018). Researching within relations of violence: Witnessing as methodology. In D. McGregor, J. Restoule, & R. Johnston (Eds.), Indigenous research: Theories, practices and relationships (pp. 282–295). Canadian Scholars Press. Kovach, M. (2005). Emerging from the margins: Indigenous methodologies. In S.  Strega & L. Brown (Eds.), Research as resistance: Critical, indigenous and anti-oppressive approaches (pp. 19–36). Canadian Scholars Press. Kovach, M. (2009). Indigenous methodologies: Characteristics, conversations, and contexts. University of Toronto Press. Lavallée, L., & Lévesque, L. (2013). Two-eyed seeing: Physical activity, sport, and recreation promotion in indigenous communities. In J. Forsyth & A. R. Giles (Eds.), Aboriginal peoples and sport in Canada: Historical foundations and contemporary issues (pp. 206–229). University of British Columbia Press. MacIntosh, K., Christina, M., Craft, C., Golby, R., & Steinwand-Deschambeault, T. (2014). Implementing school-wide positive behavioural interventions and supports to better meet the needs of Indigenous students. Canadian Journal of School Psychology, 29(3), 236–257. Martin, D.  H. (2012). Two-eyed seeing: A framework for understanding indigenous and non-­ indigenous approaches to indigenous health research. Canadian Journal of Nursing Research, 44(2), 20–42. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). The phenomenology of perception (D. A. Landes, Trans.). Routledge (Original work published 1945). Nagar, R., & Swarr, A.  L. (2010). Introduction. In A.  L. Swarr & R.  Nagar (Eds.), Critical Transnational Feminist Praxis (pp. 1–23). State University of New York Press. Ng, R. (2018). Decolonizing teaching and learning through embodied learning: Toward an integrated approach. In S.  Batacharya and Y.-L.R.  Wong (Eds.), Sharing Breath: Embodied Learning and Decolonization (pp. 33–55). Athabasca University Press. Peach, L., Richmond, C. A. M., & Brunette-Debassige, C. (2020). “You can’t just take a piece of land from the university and build a garden on it”: Exploring indigenizing space and place in a settler Canadian university context. Geoforum, 114, 117–127. Restoule, J. -P., & Chaw-win-is (2017). Old ways are the new way forward: How indigenous pedagogy can benefit everyone. Canadian Commission for UNESCO’s IdeaLab. http://lss. yukonschools.ca/uploads/4/5/5/0/45508033/20171026_old_ways_are_the_new_way_forward_how_indigenous_pedagogy_can_benefit_everyone_final.pdf Schnarr, M. (2011). Natural bodies. Yellow Medicine Review, Fall, 90–92. Schnarr, M. (2021). Second-hand Moccasins [Manuscript submitted for publication]. Simpson, L. B. (2011). Dancing on our turtle’s back. ARP Books. Simpson, L. B. (2017). As we have always done: Indigenous freedom through radical resistance. University of Minnesota Press. Smith, L.  T., & Tuck, E. (2019). Introduction. In L.  T. Smith, E.  Tuck, & K.  W. Yang (Eds.), Indigenous and decolonizing studies in education: Mapping the long view (pp.  1–23). Routledge. Srigley, K., & Varley, A. (2018). Learning to unlearn: Building relationships on Anishinaabeg territory. In D. McGregor, J. Restoule, & R. Johnston (Eds.), Indigenous research: Theories, practices and relationships (pp. 46–64). Canadian Scholars Press. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. (2015). Truth and reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to action. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. Tuck, E., & Recollet, K. (2016). Engaging indigeneity and avoiding appropriation: An interview with Adrienne Keene [interview]. English Journal, 106(1), 55–57. Tuck, E., & Yang, K. W. (2012). Decolonization is not a metaphor. Decolonization, Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 1–40.

12  Embodied Learning and Two-Eyed Seeing: Indigenous and Feminist Perspectives…

179

White, J. P., & Peters, J. (2009). A short history of aboriginal education in Canada. In J. P. White, J.  Peters, D.  Beavon, & N.  Spence (Eds.), Aboriginal education: Current crises and future alternatives (pp. 13–31). Thompson Educational Publishing. Wildcat, M., McDonald, M., Irlbacher-Fox, S., & Coulthard, G. (2014). Learning from the land: Indigenous land based pedagogy and decolonization. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 3(3), I–XV. Williams, R. (1983). Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. Oxford University Press. Williams, S. (2012). Factors influencing academic achievement for salt river students (3505568) [Doctoral dissertation, Arizona State University]. Proquest Dissertations Publishing.

Part V

Embodiment and Technology

Chapter 13

(Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching and Learning in ‘Tele-co-presences’ Wendelin Küpers

Abstract  This chapter reviews forms and effects of increased digitalised learning from an embodied phenomenological perspective. In particular, the moves from and between embodied co-presence to virtual tele-presence and its implications are reflected on  critically and illustrated by using empirical vignettes. Furthermore, some possibilities for re-embodying and the need for re-purposing teaching and learning activities are outlined. Finally, some perspectives on the future of an integral embodied and transformative pedagogy are offered. Keywords  Body · (Re-)embodiment · (Co-)presence · Learning · Digital We are living in a time where questions about the role of embodiment and embodied qualities and dimensions of teaching and learning in professional education are becoming increasingly urgent (Küpers, 2008, 2020). This urgency is concerned, in particular, with how to relate the body to learning that takes place in the co-presence of situated participants and that can now be supplemented by blended or digital learning formats. At the time of writing, a pandemic is intensifying the use of such educational technologies, and many of the changes occurring are likely to be long-­ lasting. Accordingly, this is an appropriate time to rethink the role of the body and embodiment in our educational practices and their relationship to a digital context. A significant amount of research has examined both the strengths and weaknesses of online teaching (Ananga & Biney, 2018; Arbaugh et al., 2013; Redpath, 2012; Whitaker et al., 2016). However, there is a need to build on this research and

W. Küpers (*) Leadership and Organization Studies, Karlshochschule International University, Karlsruhe, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_13

183

184

W. Küpers

consider the challenges involved in terms of a ‘re-embodiment’ as we shift from co-present, directly embodied forms of learning to more digital learning practices. This chapter first briefly reviews the research into online and virtual learning, with a focus on embodied learning. This is followed by some observations concerning the move from embodied co-presence to supposed disembodied tele-presence. In particular, reasons for and ways of re-embodying teaching and learning are discussed. Vignettes are used to illustrate conceptual and empirical points, and some implications and perspectives on the future of an integral embodied pedagogy are discussed.

Online Teaching, Learning, and Pedagogy Contextualising Online Learning Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, a vast and growing body of scholarship has examined the usefulness of incorporating information technologies into management education in universities and business schools (Leidner & Jarvenpaa, 1993; Webster & Hackley, 1997). Over the years, this educational technology has evolved, enabling both asynchronous and synchronous forms of teaching and learning (see Whitaker et al., 2016, for an account of the history of online teaching and learning). It was assumed that new technological innovations would improve the delivery of online teaching (Gilbert, 1996). New technologies have brought to the fore interesting new possibilities in the form of asynchronous learning (Coppola et al., 2002; Jaffee, 1997), more interactivity (Dede, 1990; Glover et al., 2005; Laszlo & Castro, 1995), and the possibility of creating multi-platform teaching resources, for instance, blending face-to-face teaching with online tools (Daspit & D’Souza, 2012). However, there are also new challenges, including the disconnection between teacher and learner (Kozar, 2016). This last point in particular relates to the phenomenologically inspired literature on learning and embodiment.

Embodiment and Learning: A Phenomenological Perspective The relations between the processes and practices of learning and embodiment have been explored in miscellaneous contexts, for instance, the professional activities of train dispatchers (Willems, 2018), academics (Valtonen et al., 2017), and managers (Pittaway & Cope, 2007), as well as pedagogic activities in universities and business schools (Tomkins & Ulus, 2016). Highlighting the role of the body (or bodies) in learning processes (Gärtner, 2013; Küpers, 2008; Rigg, 2018; Yakhlef, 2010), this literature has drawn our attention to the unspoken, tacit, or hidden dimensions of learning that become apparent in embodied interactions. In line with this literature,

13  (Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching…

185

the cores of learning and teaching activities have been argued to primarily reside in the ‘schemata of the body’ (Wacquant, 2005, p. 466). While it has been argued that technologies might enable different forms of embodiment (Jewitt, 2006; Price et al., 2009), there is also a strong sense that something gets lost in the process of moving from physical co-presence to digital tele-­ presence. The distanced, unstable relationship between body and subjectivity that occurs in online communication involves modes of identity formation and pedagogical relations that are very different from those experienced in face-to-face classroom interactions. In digital learning, the body is ‘rearticulated’ by our increasingly intimate relationship with ‘the machine’ (Bayne, 2004). This view can reassert a mechanistic Cartesian mind/body split in education. This Cartesianism can be seen in computer-mediated communication and technologised learning, inscribed in the quantification of ‘dataism’ or objectification of ‘datafication’ (van Dijck, 2014) and ‘learnification’ of surrogate education and its inequalities (Biesta, 2020). Such approaches limit the intensity and depth of interpersonal and pedagogical contact. This limitation is also evident in what some scholars refer to as ‘machine behaviourism’ (Knox et al., 2020), whereby a combination, of radical behaviourist theories and machine learning systems, works against notions of student autonomy, agency, and participation. Machine behaviourism intervenes in educational conduct and by nudging learners, through digital choice architectures, shapes their behaviour towards predefined aims. The post-digital relationships (Reader et al., 2020) in digital(ised) universities (Peters & Jandrić, 2018) are part of a complex nexus between technologies, and the embodied and disembodied processes of digital learners, that generate specific challenges.

 oving from Embodied Co-presence to Technologically M Mediated Tele-presence The first challenge in technological approaches to higher education is related to the shift from co-presence to tele-presence that parallels the move from face-to-face to online teaching. With this shift, the question arises as to what ‘gets lost’ and how this may be addressed. As compared to embodied interactions in person, exchanges through tele-presences in technology-mediated cyberspaces appear as distant, non-­ localised, or displaced, which implies a reduction or loss of the richness of embodied co-presence. Similar to other forms of distributed interactions – such as dispersed or remote work, e-work, tele-work, and tele-commuting in virtual space  – tele-presence in learning enables the presence of the other, but at the same time constrains the type and depth of interaction. Phenomenological research has investigated the specific qualities and processes of embodied learning and implicit knowing (Evans et al., 2009; Gieser, 2008; Küpers, 2005, 2008) and informs the reflections below on the transition from embodied co-presence to supposedly disembodied tele-presence.

186

W. Küpers

This presence is only supposedly ‘disembodied’, as all aspects of digital engagement are grounded in material and embodied entanglements with devices and other artefacts and the human/nonhuman aspects of practices in the day-to-day (Gourlay, 2021) and as a performance. A lecture or a seminar bears striking similarities with theatrical performances. It involves a performer (the lecturer), an audience (our students), a setting (lecture theatre or seminar room), a program (contents), specific accessories and pieces of equipment (computer, microphone, etc.), a shared atmosphere, some rules (start and end times, quietness, etc.), a scripted performance, and so on. A theatrical performative perspective has been used to argue against the recording of lectures (O’Callaghan et al., 2017); a recording cannot fully capture the embodied nature of a lecture, and watching a recorded lecture fails to provide the same experience as physical presence. As such, there is a need to reflect on what it means to teach using digital technologies in cyberspace and to re-embody digital universities and other organisations (Styhre, 2004). Another illustration of these inherent tensions is reflected in the role that non-­ verbal cues play in the learning process. In the digital learning environment, the inability to perceive the other as a co-present body, in place and time, constrains the relationship between teacher and students and between students themselves. This distortion of ‘social presence’ (Hiltz, 1986) leads to missed opportunities to sense and read bodily and facial expressions. In a ‘disembodied’ relation, those involved can miss key signals and are susceptible to interruptions, distractions, and distortions in communication. Teaching and learning in tele-space imply a radical reduction of multisensory experience in contrast to what can be conveyed through traditional face-to-face and embodied learning activities. In particular, students lose the opportunities to directly, and bodily, experience much of what they might need to learn socially and through experimentation (Rigg, 2018). An example is the importance of learning the skills of onsite interactions between students in seminar discussions, group presentations, or informal communication in-between classes (Boud et al., 2014; Havnes, 2008). Shifting from co-presence to tele-presence directly affects the ‘provision’ and qualities of this social learning. While there might be ways in which interactions between lecturers and students can be digitally ‘re-created’, this turns out to be much more complex for interpersonal relations between students. One of the reasons might be that students are accustomed to using digital technologies with their friends for other purposes than those related to study. In light of this, the mobilisation of digital technologies for peer learning might both challenge existing forms of socialisation and require new forms. In addition, face-to-face encounters open students to other people and perspectives, in the sense of discovering and engaging with individuals whom they otherwise would not have met. The absence of such encounters is potentially detrimental to learning, as participation in a community can have a powerful impact on learning (Wenger, 1999).

13  (Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching…

187

Phenomenologically, relationships and communication in digitalised tele-­ presence affect the role of body and place, because tele-presence is a divided presence. When teachers or students are connected virtually, there is a sense in which they are in two places at once, thus creating a certain dissonance between a fictitious presence and felt absence. The temporally immediate transcendence of space through the use of digital communication technologies creates a bi-localised space of interaction, which causes specific changes in social praxis. The digitalised connections constitute a de-grounding of place and a disconnection from the lived bodily environment. Further, not sharing a physical environment also means that the perceived available space will have qualitatively different meanings for those involved. This realm of perceived tele-present spaces involves a modified ‘we-­ relationship’ through which meanings and intentions are intersubjectively synthesised. Yet, this intersubjectivity occurs in physically separate places. The intersubjective achievements of projects grounded within the immediacy of a tele-present ‘place’ create an embodiment ‘in there’ in the perceived space. This ‘in there’ means that the activities of teachers and students also take place in a specific temporal simultaneity, i.e. a virtual community of time, and this creates a third realm of co-existence. In such a simultaneity, we are able to engage in instantaneous synchronised contact with distant others; we are what Zhao (2004) refers to as ‘consociate contemporaries’ within what could be called electronic proximity. This corresponds to a being there/here presence that is to ‘share a community of time without sharing a community of physical space’ (Zhao, 2015, p. 114). In such apart-together co-presence, ‘individuals are physically remote from one another, hence “tele”; but in the sense that they are able to reach one another in real or near-real time through electronic mediation, the individuals are temporally together with one another, hence “co-presence”’ (Zhao, 2015, p. 115), thus forming a tele-co-presence. It is the increasingly important ‘perceived proximity’ (Wilson et al., 2008) of this tele-co-present mode that also explains the paradox of ‘far-but-close’ in virtual work, that is, the state of ‘being far’ physically while co-existing with ‘feeling close’. This paradox of far-but-close is typically experienced in communication via conference calls, video-conferencing, blogging, intranets, and other media. Importantly, this far-but-close paradox has the potential to jeopardise and displace the experience of relations through digital forms of teaching and learning. This displacement concerns, for example, the cultivation of mutual trust or sharing of implicit knowledge (Cramton, 2001). Further detrimental effects are losses of sensory and expressive communication and reductions in intimacy, opportunities to bond with others, and emotional involvement (Mann et al., 2000). Therefore, the questions arise: What new forms of ‘translocal’ selves, and their relations and practices, can there be in the context of the paradox of far-but-close? What are the implications of physical distancing in combination with the nearness mediated by digitalised ways of learning and teaching? The following vignette shares some experiences and reflections.

188

W. Küpers

 mpirical Vignette: Reflections on Digital or Online Teaching E and Learning The following vignette describes phenomenological observations and critical reflections of an adapted digital format re-design of teaching and learning in a specific course. Many of the aforementioned problems, of moving from embodied co-­ presence and situated face-to-face teaching and learning towards indirect, technologically mediated tele-presence, such as reduced multi-sensuality, non-verbal cues, were experienced as educational challenges. The module ‘Strategy as Practice’ was originally designed as an in-person, experiential, experimental, and creative learning opportunity, in a remote retreat in the Black Forest. The course was designed to systematically integrate bodily and non-cognitive dimensions of learning. Experience-based approaches were used to cultivate critical reflection and comprehensive learning. One of the main challenges of offering a digital format course, in the pandemic, was to ensure students would attend and be engaged. An ever-present danger was that students would disengage into ‘polite detachment’ because of the nature of the digital format; this could potentially undermine the very impetus of the learning objectives of the course. Tensions and conflicts between active and passive attention, the individual and the collective, and issues of concentration were exhibited by course participants in different ways. Some students expressed irritation, related to knowing and remembering each other from co-presence in prior classes, but now encountering one another online in new ways. Some took on new roles and became ‘influencers’ or facilitators or adopted leadership roles (e.g. in small break out groups), while others who were previously active disappeared with the camera off and remained silent, making it difficult to gauge their engagement. For instructors, learning new tools was supported via formal online training and informal exchanges among teaching staff. There were also opportunities to learn from students who were competent digital format and media experts, resulting in new teacher/student dynamics. All of this informed a co-inquiry into possibilities, which is itself part of learning and meta-learning.

Losses and Disadvantages of Digital Teaching and Learning There were a number of significant losses and drawbacks with the move to digital teaching and learning. Although there was more flexibility regarding the management and organisation of time, there was less time available. Digital technologies and formats for teaching and learning shape time and temporality in different ways; extra time is needed to enter, attune, clarify, and respond to the environment and material, to move in and out of group work, and to wind down, offer feedback, and

13  (Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching…

189

respond to final questions. Communications and exchanges were somehow less rich and restricted to visuals and voice with a loss of bodily mediated cues and gestures or expressions. In terms of contextual knowledge, there was a loss of subtlety and a corresponding need for adaptation and simplification of materials. Although there were certain gains with respect to explicit information sources, there were losses of implicit and tacit forms of learning. Overall, what could be noticed were simplifications of complex content and lower levels of theoretical sophistication in the discussions. On the one hand, as a teacher, I felt less control, serving more as a moderator, facilitator, or coach, and on the other, I felt the need to provide more structure and rules while organising a field for engagement or play (e.g. a cyberspace for playful and creative activities). There were further challenges concerning, for example, the preparation and implementation of presentations (live or recorded video, not being able to be seen by everyone, discussion in small groups versus overall discussion and feedback, etc.). Finally, many questions and problems emerged with regard to assessment and assignments that required additional explanations, extra online sessions, and additional individual and group briefings.

Gains and Advantages of Digital Teaching and Learning Some gains and benefits of digital approaches emerged from experimentation with new forms of teaching and learning/pedagogy such as different communication opportunities and didactic practices, for example, getting to know ‘micro-based’ mind mapping, and other virtual brainstorming techniques. Interactive possibilities, like polling, online quizzes, electronic whiteboards, digital pin walls, and ‘murmur groups’, allowed for the use of collective intelligence. Technologically mediated learning provided flexibility in terms of time and place, particularly for examinations. This learning allowed for reflection and individual learning paths (e.g. students could listen to recordings again and spend more time reflecting on the experience than they would in a situation of physical co-presence). The digital teaching also afforded use of different learning tools and games. For example, we employed the digital board game, ‘Pandemic’. Playing together in small groups afforded strategic learning about cooperative practices (e.g. the role of teamwork, use of resources, timing, means and ends, enabling and constraining rules, joint decision-making, judgement, dealing with ethical dilemmas, etc.). Students learned to deal with evolving chain reactions, where outbreaks spread rapidly and unpredictably across a web of interconnected cities. They engaged in reflection on the status and relationships between a cast of characters, each with their own special abilities. All players and teams gain varied experiences as the campaign progresses, picking up new skills, developing relationships with team-mates, and becoming steadily more capable in the face of an ever-increasing threat level.

190

W. Küpers

Reflections on Digital Teaching and Learning Overall, I and the students – as expressed in their direct feedback and indirect anonymised evaluations – experienced the course encounters as reduced social forms, as impoverished with regard to resonance and embodied transformative efficacy. There were fewer opportunities for collaboration, informal meeting, spontaneous connection, or playful improvisation. Trust and community building took more time, and feedback was deferred and not as authentic. Technologically mediated communications did not allow the usual mutual reciprocity, empathy, and hermeneutic learning in the spirit of spontaneous playfulness. These deficits contributed to distorted or reduced understanding among students linked not only to cognitive contents but also to pre-reflective and imaginative dimensions. These reflections and empirical observations invite a consideration of the role of the body and possibilities to re-embody learning and teaching practices wisely within a digital format.

Re-embodying Teaching and Learning Activities A major challenge was the need to re-embody teaching and learning activities within a virtual format. Being in tele-presence does not necessarily mean that all forms of embodiment and bodily encounters are lost. While in tele-presence, a sense of embodiment is predicated upon the sensorial body, which has a malleability of its experiential boundaries and thus can affect and extend bodily corporeality into the ‘real-virtual’. The body mediates tele-presence and experiences in cyberspace, because embodied beings bring everyday understandings and social experiences into virtual encounters. Yet, when dwelling in tele-presences, part of the sensorial qualities of the body remains in the physical world, while another part is projected into the virtual. Thus, and as indicated before, cyberspace is not and will never be completely ‘disembodied’. Rather, the virtual space is a medium through which different and new forms of embodiment can be experienced. Moreover, what may be observed is a kind of transfiguration of body boundaries, to such an extent that the ‘virtual’ becomes an aspect of an ‘augmented’ embodiment. What is needed, therefore, in the virtual environments of teaching and learning is a new and wiser understanding of corporeality. Bodily dimensions are insufficiently considered in conventional forms of teaching. Many of the mainstream approaches provide institutionalised and homogenous education that is increasingly standardised with national qualification frameworks that emphasise student learning outcomes, with quantifiable measures (Bologna Working Group, 2005) and metrics, including measures of quality (Pettersen, 2015). These limited systems need to be challenged so that alternative education concepts and practices can emerge and be recognised. Re-embodied modes can promote a multidimensional, qualitative, and transformative approach to learning. Importantly, this move to embodied modes of education in virtual environments requires support by academics, students, and all stakeholders who need to see themselves as part of a learning community. If

13  (Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching…

191

embodied digital teaching is a capability and competency to be mastered, so is (re-) embodied learning in relation to digital spheres. One way of conceptualising this is through phenomenology. Advanced forms of phenomenology, in particular Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy (1995, 2012), provide an important contribution to our thinking around re-­ embodiment and extended interpretations of the body. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology attends to ignored, undervalued, marginalised, or mistreated bodily dimensions of teaching and learning and how such embodiments are intertwined within the lifeworld. A phenomenological understanding of embodied organising (Küpers, 2015) and learning can help to reintegrate important dimensions and their ambiguities. In particular, it can reveal, and revalue, what heretofore has been unfelt, unseen, untouched, untasted, and un-smelled and hence unknowable, unthinkable, or unrealisable while reworking and reintegrating embodied practices of learning related to digital modes. These embodied practices integrate more holistic, emotion-­ integrating, non-cognitive, aesthetic, bodily, situated, and dynamic dimensions. These modalities would go beyond ‘cognicentrism’, without falling into anti-­ intellectualism, and entail developing reflexive, ethical, responsible approaches that make for wiser practices of teaching and learning. The challenge lies in making room for somatic, emotional, intuitive, non-­ discursive, and artful dimensions of learning, without lessening intellectual principles of analytical rigour and reason-based critique. This orientation allows a link to praxis in all its materio-socio-cultural dimensions, as it emerges in situated sayings and doings as well as other forms of expression. All of these dimensions are part of inter-relating in a new way of being in the world, a world extended into real and virtual spheres. Learning and teaching may be viewed as moving beyond fixed or linear transmissions, to a cluster of elements that are shifting, as in a decentred, lattice configuration; this has far-reaching implications. Such an understanding shows the significance of various forms of relational practices that are part of an ‘inter-­ world’ and ‘inter-be(com)ing’ orientation (Küpers, 2017a). Such learning requires educational arrangements that allow experimentation and mutual, co-evolving modalities and transformative processes, along with integration of aesthetic and ethical qualities and forms of wisdom learning and ‘wising-up’, especially in management education (Küpers, 2017b, Küpers & Pauleen 2015, Küpers & Gunnlaugson 2017). The following second vignette shares some ideas about re-embodiment in digital education practice.

 mpirical Vignette: Reflections on Re-embodying Digital E Teaching and Learning Accepting the problematic status of the body, and embodiment, early in the course, an attempt was made to towards re-embodiment in our teaching and learning experiences with students. In particular, specific ‘inter(in)ventions’ were used to bring forward bodily dimensions and embodied qualities. Recognising the need for

192

W. Küpers

sensory exercises and group work to engage students, we tried to sensitise students towards somatic awareness and social embodiment at individual and collective levels. An orientation session was designed that invited students to become more aware of their bodies. Mindfulness exercises like the ‘body scan’ and ‘conscious breathing’ were introduced to help students become more aware and attuned to their bodies. We asked students to imagine the inner lifeworld and embodied experiences of the others in the class, as a means to engage empathy and be mindful together. We prepared slides with reduced content and sound together with newly designed small group activities, to be enacted in virtual break-out rooms. What we called ‘slide bites’ were condensed forms of images and contents related to guiding questions, inviting responses. These were presented slowly to allow students to actively digest the contents while providing time to process and express themselves through self-study and small group discussion. Additionally, we curated podcasts – called ‘sound bites’ – that students could listen to on their own. We invited students to listen to the recorded content and music while walking. Offering breaks, music, and guidance for self-reflection, these sound bites provided a multi-sensorial forum for learning while walking. Later the content was discussed with selected peers by phone and then online with the entire group. In the group work, we asked students to work on strategising and policy-making in connection to the eventual easing of lockdown and social distancing related to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. While students were integrating complex knowledge related to given areas relevant for strategy, we asked them to be aware of how they were affected by the crisis and its restrictions. Students prepared a group presentation on their embodied experiences of the pandemic and were also asked to reflect on the presentation itself as an embodied performance. Re-embodiment was also reflected in an adapted design that moved between an asynchronous phase and a synchronous phase. Further efforts to re-embody aspects of the course involved processes of collaborative reflection and dialogue about how online teaching and learning affected us bodily – as individuals and as a learning community. Together, we tried to make sense of how we were affected in an embodied way. Overall, we tried to design and organise resources that scaffolded the bodily, affective, and interactive dynamics of the learning setting (Ward, 2018).

Conclusion As has been argued in this chapter, the necessity to develop more digitalised, technology-­mediated forms of pedagogy provides possibilities to re-assess the relevance of ‘what’ is taught and further to rethink and re-imagine the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of what we teach. Concerning the ‘how’, the challenge will be to further develop and enact being on- and offline in ways that connect embodied-analogical and digital forms, thus leading to more inclusive ways of learning and teaching. What is needed are open-ended forms of co-learning that recognise an integral

13  (Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching…

193

pluralism (Molz, 2009) and give space for processing complexities and ambiguities of experiences, decisions, and practices. This includes means of reaching consensus, resolving conflicts, and creative problem-solving. Questions remain about how the body is enacted in pedagogy, how genuine is individual and collective learning in the virtual sphere, and how communal is a virtual community? There is also a need to be critically aware of the manner in which power relations, such as silencing effects, and identities are shaped and managed (Bell & King, 2010). Verbeek (2020) talks of the political hermeneutics of technology in addressing this issue because power relations can be technologically mediated. Pressures to adopt technologised modes of education force all involved to move between co- and tele-presence. In responding to this situation, we might be in need of a form of ‘engaged release’. This release (Yu, 2018) encourages openness and enacting responsive and responsible relationships to others and technologies. There is a danger that technology might enframe education in a way that closes people down. We need an education that genuinely opens learning with approaches that are sensually enticing, engaging, enjoyable, and embodied. Overall, such an orientation resonates with the view of universities as places where inspiring education can encourage students to support ideals such as global sustainability (Shrivastava, 2020) and contribute to transformative education (Walsh et al., 2020). Such sustainability-oriented transformative education requires an integral pedagogy that is capable of dealing with the challenges of moving between the face-to-face and online environments. We need a more integral pedagogy that re-­ embodies the senses and re-purposes sense-making if we are to provide an education for a wiser and more sustainable future. Considering the tremendous challenges for learning and teaching that are increasingly enframed by digitalisation, further exploration and critique are called for. Opportunities to re-embody re-designed and re-purposed forms of teaching and learning will profoundly affect the development of what education will mean in the twenty-first century. Working, conceptually and empirically, on digitalised forms and ways of re-embodiment invites a more integral pedagogy. We need such a holistic approach to education that integrates embodiment and sense-making if we are to have a more sustainable and wiser future.

References Ananga, P., & Biney, I. K. (2018). Comparing face-to-face and online teaching and learning in higher education. MIER Journal of Educational Studies, Trends and Practices, 7(2), 165–179. Arbaugh, J., DeArmond, S., & Rau, B. (2013). New uses for existing tools? A call to study on-­ line management instruction and instructors. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 12(4), 635–655. Bayne, S. (2004). The embodiment of the online learner. In R. Atkinson, C. McBeath, D. Jonas-­ Dwyer & R.  Phillips (Eds.), Beyond the comfort zone: Proceedings of the 21st ASCILITE conference, pp. 105–115.

194

W. Küpers

Bell, E., & King, D. (2010). The elephant in the room: Critical management studies conferences as a site of body pedagogics. Management Learning, 41(4), 429–442. Biesta, G. (2020). Perfect education, but not for everyone: On society’s need for inequality and the rise of surrogate education. Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 66(1), 8–14. Bologna Working Group. (2005). A framework for the qualifications of the European Higher Education Area. Bologna working group report on qualifications frameworks, Copenhagen, Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation. Boud, D., Cohen, R., & Sampson, J. (2014). Peer learning in higher education: Learning from and with each other. Routledge. Coppola, N., Hiltz, S., & Rotter, N. (2002). Becoming a virtual professor: Pedagogical roles and asynchronous learning networks. Journal of Management Information Systems, 18(4), 169–189. Cramton, C. (2001). The mutual knowledge problem and its consequences for dispersed collaboration. Organization Science, 12(3), 346–371. Daspit, J., & D’Souza, D. (2012). Using the community of inquiry framework to introduce wiki environments in blended-learning pedagogies. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 11(4), 666–683. Dede, C. (1990). The evolution of distance learning: Technology-mediated interactive learning. Journal of Research on Computing in Education, 22(3), 247–264. Evans, J., Davies, B., & Rich, E. (2009). The body made flesh: Embodied learning and the corporeal device. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 30(4), 391–406. Gärtner, C. (2013). Cognition, knowing and learning in the flesh: Six views on embodied knowing in organization studies. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 29(4), 338–352. Gieser, T. (2008). Embodiment, emotion and empathy: A phenomenological approach to apprenticeship learning. Anthropological Theory, 8(3), 299–318. Gilbert, S. (1996). Making the most of a slow revolution. Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning, 28(2), 10–23. Glover, D., Miller, D., Averis, D., & Door, V. (2005). The interactive whiteboard: A literature survey. Technology, Pedagogy and Education, 14(2), 155–170. Gourlay, L. (2021). There is no ‘virtual learning’: The materiality of digital education. Journal of New Approaches in Educational Research, 10(1), 57–66. Havnes, A. (2008). Peer-mediated learning beyond the curriculum. Studies in Higher Education, 33(2), 193–204. Hiltz, S. (1986). The “virtual classroom”: Using computer-mediated communication for university teaching. Journal of Communication, 36(2), 95–104. Jaffee, D. (1997). Asynchronous learning: Technology and pedagogical strategy in a distance learning course. Teaching Sociology, 25(4), 262–277. Jewitt, C. (2006). Technology, literacy and learning: A multimodal approach. Psychology Press. Knox, J., Williamson, B., & Bayne, S. (2020). Machine behaviourism: Future visions of ‘learnification’ and ‘datafication’ across humans and digital technologies. Learning, Media and Technology, 45(1), 31–45. Kozar, O. (2016). Perceptions of webcam use by experienced online teachers and learners: A seeming disconnect between research and practice. Computer Assisted Language Learning, 29(4), 779–789. Küpers, W. (2005). Embodied implicit and narrative knowing in organizations. Journal of Knowledge Management, 9(6), 113–133. Küpers, W. (2008). Embodied ‘inter-learning’– An integral phenomenology of learning in and by organizations. The Learning Organisation: An International Journal, 15(5), 388–408. Küpers, W. (2015). Phenomenology of the embodied organization. Palgrave Macmillan. Küpers, W. (2017a). The embodied inter-be (com)ing of spirituality. In S. Nandram & P. Bindlish (Eds.), Managing VUCA through integrative self-management (pp. 229–247). Springer.

13  (Re-)embodied Digital Education Practices: Empirical Vignettes About Teaching…

195

Küpers, W. (2017b). Embodied Aesth-ethics for developing practical wisdom in management education/learning. In W.  Küpers & O.  Gunnlaugson (Eds.), Wisdom learning: Perspectives on wising-up management & business education (pp. 272–311). Routledge. Küpers, W. (2020). Cultivating sustainable organizational bodies by embodied and playful learning as an ‘inter-practice’. In K. Minisri & K. Schulz (Eds.), Pathways to connect creativity and sustainable development (pp. 119–142). Presses Universitaires de Nancy. Küpers, W., & Gunnlaugson, O. (2017). Wisdom learning: Perspectives on wising-up business and management education. Routledge. Küpers, W., & Pauleen, D. (2015). Learning wisdom: Embodied and artful approaches to management education. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 31, 493–500. Laszlo, A., & Castro, K. (1995). Technology and values: Interactive learning environments for future generations. Educational Technology, 35(2), 7–13. Leidner, D., & Jarvenpaa, S. (1993). The information age confronts education: Case studies on electronic classrooms. Information Systems Research, 4(1), 24–54. Mann, S., Varey, R., & Button, W. (2000). An exploration of the emotional impact of tele-working via computer-mediated communication. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 15(7), 668–690. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1995). The visible and the invisible. Northwestern University Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge. Molz, M. (2009). Toward integral higher education study programs in the European higher education area: A programmatic and strategic view. Integral Review: A Transdisciplinary & Transcultural Journal for New Thought, Research, & Praxis, 5(2), 152–226. O’Callaghan, F., Neumann, D., Jones, L., & Creed, P. (2017). The use of lecture recordings in higher education: A review of institutional, student, and lecturer issues. Education and Information Technologies, 22(1), 399–415. Peters, M. A. & Jandrić, P. (2018). The digital university: A dialogue and manifesto. Peter Lang. Pettersen, I. (2015). From metrics to knowledge? Quality assessment in higher education. Financial Accountability & Management, 31(1), 23–40. Pittaway, L., & Cope, J. (2007). Simulating entrepreneurial learning: Integrating experiential and collaborative approaches to learning. Management Learning, 38(2), 211–233. Price, S., Roussos, G., Falcão, T., & Sheridan, J. (2009). Technology and embodiment: Relationships and implications for knowledge, creativity and communication. Beyond Current Horizons, 29, 1–22. Reader, J., Jandrić, P., & Peters, M. (2020). Enchantment  - disenchantment-re-enchantment: Postdigital relationships between science, philosophy, and religion. Postdigital Science Education. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42438-­020-­00133-­4. Redpath, L. (2012). Confronting the bias against on-line learning in management education. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 11, 125–140. Rigg, C. (2018). Somatic learning: Bringing the body into critical reflection. Management Learning, 49(2), 150–167. Shrivastava, P. (2020). Global sustainability in the Anthropocene: The role of universities. In G. Magill & J. Benedict (Eds.), The global sustainability challenge (pp. 29–41). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Styhre, A. (2004). The (re)embodied organization. Human Resource Development International, 7(1), 101–116. Tomkins, L., & Ulus, E. (2016). ‘Oh, was that “experiential learning”?!’ Spaces, synergies and surprises with Kolb’s learning cycle. Management Learning, 47(2), 158–178. Valtonen, A., Meriläinen, S., Laine, P., & Salmela-Leppänen, T. (2017). The knowing body as a floating body. Management Learning, 48(5), 520–534. van Dijck, J. (2014). Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big data between scientific paradigm and ideology. Surveillance and Society, 12(2), 197–208. Verbeek, P. (2020). Politicizing Postphenomenology. In G. Miller & A. Shew (Eds.), Reimagining philosophy and technology, reinventing Ihde (pp. 141–155). Springer.

196

W. Küpers

Wacquant, L. (2005). Carnal connections: On embodiment, apprenticeship, and membership. Qualitative Sociology, 28(4), 445–474. Walsh, Z., Böhme, J., & Wamsler, C. (2020). Towards a relational paradigm in sustainability research, practice, and education. Ambio, 50(1), 74–84. Ward, D. (2018). What’s lacking in online learning? Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty and bodily affective understanding. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 52(3), 428–450. Webster, J., & Hackley, P. (1997). Teaching effectiveness in technology-mediated distance learning. Academy of Management Journal, 40(6), 1282–1309. Wenger, E. (1999). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge University Press. Whitaker, J., New, J., & Ireland, R. (2016). MOOCs and the online delivery of business education What’s new? What’s not? What now? Academy of Management Learning & Education, 15(2), 345–365. Willems, T. (2018). Seeing and sensing the railways: A phenomenological view on practice-based learning. Management Learning, 49(1), 23–39. Wilson, J., Boyer O’Leary, M., Metiu, A., & Jett, Q. (2008). Perceived proximity in virtual work: Explaining the paradox of far-but-close. Organization Studies, 29(7), 979–1002. Yakhlef, A. (2010). The corporeality of practice-based learning. Organization Studies, 31(4), 409–430. Yu, J. (2018). The Taoist pedagogy of pathmarks: Critical reflections upon Heidegger, Lao Tzu, and Dewey. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­01605-­0 Zhao, S. (2004). Consociated contemporaries as an emergent realm of the lifeworld: Extending Schutz’s phenomenological analysis to cyberspace. Human Studies, 27(1), 91–105. Zhao, S. (2015). Constitution of mutual knowledge in telecopresence: Updating Schutz’s phenomenological theory of the lifeworld. Journal of Creative Communications, 10(2), 105–127.

Chapter 14

Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts Barney Dalgarno

Abstract  If asked to describe a quintessential embodied learning experience, most would not describe an experience enabled by technology-based tools and environments. On the contrary, technology-enabled learning (TEL) experiences would be described by many as examples of disembodied learning. This chapter argues, on the other hand, that contemporary TEL tools can have valuable affordances for the support of learners in embodied learning environments. In making this argument, the chapter begins by outlining the important aspects of learning which are ignored by a disembodied stance, including the way in which environmental interaction impacts on cognition and perception; the role of implicit, unconscious or tacit learning; and the role of alignment or misalignment between the learning and application context. Next, a refocused explanation of the notion of affordances is provided which helps to understand the ways in which a learner’s unique prior experience, knowledge and body schema impact on the bodily learning affordances provided for them by the learning environment. Finally, the chapter unpacks the potential affordances of TEL tools to support embodied learning in authentic practice-based learning contexts. The argument is made that augmented reality technologies that capitalise on the ubiquitous availability of mobile devices have transformational potential. Keywords  Affordances · Augmented reality · Practice-based learning · Technology-enabled · Authentic learning · Tacit knowledge On the surface, the most likely angle for a chapter on technology-enhanced learning (TEL) in a book on embodied learning might be commentary about the limitations of the relatively disembodied learning experiences within TEL when compared to

B. Dalgarno (*) Faculty of Education, University of Canberra, ACT, Canberra, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_14

197

198

B. Dalgarno

practice-based learning in an authentic context. One might argue, for example, that TEL neither provides the opportunity for embodied action nor provides experiences for implicit learning that draw on patterns of information acquired through the bodily senses. However, I argue that certain applications of TEL tools and in particular augmented reality technologies have potential affordances to support embodied learning. I begin the chapter with an overview of the arguments for consideration of learner embodiment in understanding learning experiences, leading to an identification of key aspects of embodied learning. The concept of affordance is then introduced as an important idea in thinking about ways in which technologies can be used to enhance student learning experiences in embodied practice-based learning contexts, as these are particularly relevant for professional education. Affordance has been a prominent idea in the field of educational technology. However, arguably, the concept of affordance has often been misconstrued and misapplied in a techno-centric and reductionist manner that has impoverished our understanding of how the concept can be used to guide the design of technology-enhanced learning (TEL) environments. I contend that we need to return to an understanding of affordance as a relation between an object (or technology) and a human agent who has particular physical characteristics, prior experience and capabilities. We need to also understand that technologies can provide pedagogical affordances for certain actions for particular learners and those actions can result in learning. The technology itself does not directly cause learning. Bringing these ideas together, I flesh out the notion of embodied learning, combining it with a refocused explanation of the notion of affordances, to discuss the potential affordances of contemporary TEL tools to support embodied learning in authentic practice-based contexts. In particular, I argue that augmented reality learning environments provide opportunities to undertake real-world practice, augmented with supporting information and guidance, which scaffold the learning experience. With the ubiquitous availability of smartphones, almost all kinds of professional practice are now undertaken with a mobile device at hand. This leads to enormous potential to draw on smartphone platforms to provide learning support within practice-based learning for professional education and most specifically work integrated learning where students are active in real-world worksites, such as clinical placements. Additionally, the increasing availability of bodily interfaces for mobile information, such as smart watches and “head-up” displays on spectacles (such as the re-released Google Glass™), will make it easier to access this practice support without interrupting bodily activities.

Embodied Learning It is self-evident that, in practice-based education, we need to consider both the cognitive and behavioural aspects of practices to be learned. Perhaps less self-­ evident is the way in which embodiment during the learning process is, I would

14  Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts

199

suggest, important to all learning whether the intended outcomes are cognitive, behavioural or affective. In making this suggestion, I take embodiment to be a holistic view of human beings that encompasses our emotions, our physical activity, our physical interaction with the environment and with others around us and the implicit and explicit processing of environmental information coming in through our senses. There is an enormous multitude of research studies, theories and publications that assume learning is a disembodied process. Of particular concern is the trend for educational policy makers to prioritise quantitative evidence from controlled experiments focusing on conscious engagement with cognitive learning tasks in artificial laboratory settings and to dismiss evidence obtained from rich accounts of embodied experience in authentic contexts. A reductionist view of the learning process (as a disembodied process) is evident, for example, in debates about the teaching of reading (see, e.g. the ideas expressed in Buckingham et al., 2013, and the alternative perspective in Ewing, 2018) and in theories such as Cognitive Load Theory. These views have been used as the basis for critiques of authentic approaches such as Discovery, Inquiry and Problem-Based Learning (see, e.g. Kirschner et al., 2006). Fugate et al. (2019) argue that “cognitive psychology has undergone a paradigm shift in the ways we understand how knowledge is acquired and represented within the brain”, moving from theories which treat “the body as a ‘passive’ observer to the brain” to theories which “suggest that information is grounded in both perception and action, and that cognition is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body” (p. 274). They argue, however, that despite this paradigm shift, the implications for student learning are yet to be fully explored. Stolz (2015), building on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, highlights the notion that “learning involves the exploration of the world from where one is and a clear understanding of how things relate to each other and to ourselves in the world” (p. 478). He suggests that in an embodied account of learning “the whole person is treated as a whole being, permitting the person to experience him or herself as a holistic and synthesised acting, feeling, thinking being-in-the-world, rather than as separate physical and mental qualities that bear no relation to each other” and “it is impossible to separate the unity of the mind and the body from its relationship with the world through perception or experience” (p. 478). Kontra (2012) notes that theories of learning that highlight the importance of experience and action are not new, referring to John Dewey and Jean Piaget as early pioneers of these ideas. However, she argues that embodied cognition can provide a structure to investigate the mechanisms through which action impacts on thinking and reasoning and that “theories of embodiment can shed light on the role of action experience in early learning contexts” and “hold promise for using action to scaffold learning in more formal educational settings later in development” (p. 731). In the following paragraphs, then, I outline some of the specific ways in which embodiment impacts upon learning and therefore some of the key arguments for the importance of considering embodiment in understanding the learning process. Winn (2003) provides an account of learning as an interaction between a person and their environment during which our “physical bodies serve to externalize the activities of our physical brains in order to connect cognitive activity to the

200

B. Dalgarno

environment” (p. 7). He goes on to note that along with our physical embodiment and our embeddedness within the environment, we need to understand the ways in which learning is a process of adaptation to the environment. This is consistent with ideas from ecological psychology that suggest that cognition occurs through a process of constant interaction with our environment (Shapiro, 2019; Heft, 2001) or in other words occurs within a larger dynamic organism-environment system (Kiverstein & Miller, 2015). At a simple level, it is clear that our decisions and actions determine the input to our senses (e.g. moving our head changes what we see), while at a more complex level, a significant aspect of our understanding of our environment is learned from perceiving the way the environment responds or changes as a result of our interaction with it. Clearly our experience of the world as an active embodied participant is completely different to what our experience would be like if we were a disembodied brain sensing the environment without any interaction with it. Shapiro (2019) goes further, in noting that an organism’s body can limit or constrain the concepts that an organism can obtain, and therefore each person’s learning experiences are to an extent moderated by the characteristics of their own bodies and physical capabilities. Loftus (Chaps. 4 and 10, this volume) concurs, reminding us that our bodies both permit and restrict the ways we can engage the world and that our bodies shape our agency and the nature of our experiences. Another important aspect of an embodied account of learning is the idea that implicit learning leading to the development of tacit knowledge complements our conscious explicit learning processes (Reber, 1989; Seger, 1994; Sternberg & Horvath, 1999; Collins, 2010). In other words, while our conscious mind is attending to, and laboriously processing, a very small number of discrete elements of information, our unconscious mind is taking in absolutely massive quantities of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, vestibular and proprioceptive information and laying down patterns which are subsequently integrated into our memory systems and drawn upon implicitly in our future decision-making and practice (Kahneman, 2011). The context in which the learner is situated has been frequently found to be a key contributing factor in the learning that occurs. This can include the social and cultural aspects of the classroom environment (Brown et al., 1989) or the characteristics of the practice community in a professional context (Wenger, 1998; Barab & Duffy, 2000). Experiments carried out by psychologists have also found that similarities between the environment in which the learning occurs and the context in which concepts are recalled or applied can aid recall and application (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). To summarise the ideas above, I propose that key aspects of an embodied account of the learning process include consideration of the role of our physical activity and our interaction with the environment during learning; consideration of the role of sensory information coming into our unconscious mind in addition to what is in focus within our conscious attention; and appreciation of the role of the context in which learning takes place in what is learned and in the learner’s ability to apply their knowledge.

14  Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts

201

Affordances The concept of affordances has been used extensively in recent decades to help understand or explain the capabilities of, potential benefits of, or important considerations in the design of technology-enabled tools for learning and doing. The idea originated with Gibson (1977, 1979) who, from an ecological psychology standpoint, was interested in the ways in which the relationship between the characteristics of an object and the characteristics of an animal (or human) could afford action by the animal, including interaction between the object and the animal. This potential action or interaction was labelled by Gibson as an affordance. I argue below, however, that many recent uses of the term have misused Gibson’s notion of affordance and instead referred only to the affordances of an object (or technology) without reference to the characteristics of the animal (or capabilities of the user). Gibson (1979) defines the term affordance as follows: The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment. (p. 127)

Gibson (1977) notes that “the affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its substances and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal” (p. 67), going on to say that “the affordances of the environment are what it offers animals, what it provides or furnishes, for good or ill” (p.68). Put another way, the affordances are the opportunities for action provided to an actor by the environment or an object within it. Gibson (1977, p. 68) illustrates this idea, as follows: “if an object that rests on the ground having a surface that is itself sufficiently rigid, level and flat, and extended, and if this surface is raised approximately at the height of the knees of the human biped then it affords sitting-on”. Gibson’s example also implies that an affordance, being a relationship between an object and an animal (or human), might exist for one animal but not another. For example, a very small chair might afford sitting-on for a 5-year-old child but not a large adult. This notion that an affordance is not an objective property independent of the characteristics of the potential actor is further clarified by Gibson (1977) when he states that an affordance is not “what we would call an objective property of a thing if by that we mean that a physical object has no reference to any animal” (p. 68). The idea that an affordance is relative to the characteristics of the observer or potential actor is important but has often been ignored by authors who have used the term as a lens for analysing the interaction potential of human-computer interfaces. Jones (2016) provides a critique of the way in which the concept of affordances is used by Donald Norman whose extensive use of the term was pivotal in bringing it to the attention of user interface designers. Jones (2016, p. 29) notes that: Norman develops an essentialist approach in which affordances are fundamental properties, whereas Gibson makes no such distinction because he views affordance as being relational

202

B. Dalgarno

between things and their potential users. The affordances of the same stone can be as a vantage point to a small mammal, a heat source to a reptile and a hiding place to an insect. Norman removes this relational aspect and makes affordance a fixed property.

This tendency to treat affordances as absolute properties of a technology has also been prevalent in research analysing the learning potential of particular technologies. For example, Conole and Dyke (2004) presented a taxonomy of affordances of information and communications technologies, and Bower (2008) carried out an affordance analysis to match learning tasks to learning technologies. Similarly, in one of my own articles (Dalgarno & Lee, 2010), we provided an articulation of “the” learning affordances of 3D virtual environments. In these examples, affordances are treated as objective characteristics of the technologies rather than as a relation between the technologies and the users, with the activities afforded determined as much by the technology as the characteristics of the user or learner. These deterministic accounts of affordance are problematic because there is a range of individual factors potentially impacting the degree to which a potential educational technology affordance is an actual affordance for a particular learner. These factors include cultural differences between learners, differing levels of assumed knowledge, different prior experiences and personal technology capabilities and, in an embodied learning context, different body characteristics. A particularly contentious point in relation to the use of the concept of affordances to guide the design of user interfaces and TEL environments is the role of perception or lack of perception of the affordance. Norman (1988, 1999) argued that, in considering how an object would be used, we need to also consider any affordances perceived by a potential actor in addition to the actual affordances. He noted that “... the term affordance refers to the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used...” (p. 9). Subsequently, in his later writing (see, e.g. Norman, 1999), he argued that, from the designer’s perspective, only the perceived affordances matter because affordances that are not perceived are unlikely to lead to user actions. Gibson (1977) makes clear, however, that an affordance can exist even if not perceived, when he notes that “although an affordance consists of physical properties taken with reference to a certain animal it does not depend on that animal...an affordance is not what is called a subjective quality of a thing... “(p. 69)1. Gaver (1991) concurs with Gibson and highlights the importance in a human-computer interaction context of distinguishing between perceived and hidden affordances, introducing also the concept of false affordances, which are perceived but not actual. He comments that

1  In some of my earlier writing (see, e.g. Steffens et al., 2015), I interpreted this statement to be encouragement of a focus solely on what is possible using the object (or technology) irrespective of the characteristics or prior experience of the user or learner. Guided by in-depth discussions with Nina Dohn and with Chris Jones, I acknowledge that this was a misinterpretation and that Gibson’s comment should be interpreted to highlight that an affordance will exist for a potential actor irrespective of its subjective perception or lack of perception of the affordance (see also Dohn, 2009; Jones, 2016).

14  Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts

203

“when affordances are perceptible, they offer a direct link between perception and action; hidden and false affordances lead to mistakes” (p. 79). Dohn (2009) argues affordances are not goal-dependent or, in other words, that affordances can exist for a learner even if they don’t currently have a desire to carry out the afforded action. She explains this, along with the notions of false and hidden affordances, as follows: A chair affords sitting for me regardless of whether I now want to sit or stand, and the computer mouse affords clicking for me regardless of the fact that for the moment it is hidden under the wealth of paper on my desk. The mouse would even afford clicking for me had it been designed to look like something else (e.g., a banana) so that I could not right away see that it was a computer mouse. On the other hand, it most definitely would not afford eating just because I perceived it as a banana. (p. 154)

In the context of learning experiences, the situation becomes somewhat more complex because we are interested in not only the behaviours that might be afforded by a particular technology but also the learning that might occur as a result of this behaviour (and the associated cognition). This leads to the notion of pedagogical affordances. In understanding the possible pedagogical affordances of a TEL tool or environment, we need to consider the ways in which the capabilities and prior experiences of the learner impact upon the behaviours afforded for a particular learner by a particular tool or environment, as well as the ways in which the learner’s prior learning, learning motivations and affective state, for example, impact on whether a particular behaviour will result in the desired (or other) learning. This characterisation of pedagogical affordances is consistent with the notion of educational affordances proposed by Kirschner (2002) (also reproduced in Kirschner et al. 2004): Educational affordances are those characteristics of an artifact (e.g., how a chosen educational paradigm is implemented) that determine if and how a particular learning behavior could possibly be enacted within a given context (e.g., project team, distributed learning community). Educational affordances can be defined … as the relationships between the properties of an educational intervention and the characteristics of the learner. (p. 19)

Considering the notion of afforded learning tasks in an embodied learning context, we need to understand the challenges faced by novice learners in authentic practice-­ based environments. Considering these challenges through the lens of affordances, we might say that the learner’s cultural background, prior knowledge and experience and bodily capabilities will impact on whether certain learning activities are afforded for a particular learner and whether the affordance is perceived. In relation to bodily capabilities, Dohn (2009) argues, drawing on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, that these capabilities go beyond the learner’s physical characteristics but include learned behavioural capabilities. Following Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Gallagher (1986), Dohn (2009) argues that the learner’s “body schema” is a key determinant of whether an action is afforded by the environment for that learner. She describes body schema as “the way one has and knows one’s body in action, through the demands and possibilities of the situation and the task one is undertaking in it” (p. 159). In the next sections, I discuss the ways in which technologies and tools can help to scaffold the learner’s practice so that learning activities which may not be afforded

204

B. Dalgarno

without assistance are afforded for the learner through technology support and augmentation.

Technology and Embodied Learning In discussing embodied learning above, I highlighted the importance of holistic learning experiences in rich authentic contexts versus inauthentic, decontextualised learning experiences. Many readers’ first thoughts when considering technology-­ enhanced learning (TEL) experiences would be that such environments are classic examples of the latter. On the surface, one might argue, for example, that TEL neither provides the opportunity for embodied interaction with the environment nor situates learning in authentic contexts allowing implicit learning through patterns of information acquired through the bodily senses. This may certainly be true for the situation where a learner sits still at a computer while exploring a TEL environment; however, a number of educational researchers have described alternative TEL scenarios which accommodate a much greater degree of embodiment. Winn (2003) argues for the use of artificial or virtual environments that allow the learner to explore conceptual ideas through their embodied interaction with virtual objects. Lindgren and Johnson-Glenberg (2013) promote the use of mixed reality (MR) learning environments to provide a “controlled context where learners can interact physically with content and systems from which foundational concepts can be explored and articulated” (p. 447). Following Milgram and Kishino (1994), they describe MR as the “space between entirely virtual environments and entirely real-­ world environments” (p. 447), including two broad classes of technology-enabled experiences, augmented virtuality on the one hand, in which real-world elements are integrated into a virtual environment, and augmented reality on the other, which augments the real world with virtual elements or computer-generated information. While early definitions of the term “augmented reality” referred to the scenario where a head-mounted display provided a view of the world overlayed with a virtual environment, the term is now used more broadly to include the use of mobile devices to provide context-sensitive information during real-world practice scenarios (Wu et  al., 2013). One scenario which has received increasing attention is the use of mobile devices such as smartphones to provide location-dependent information and digital learning resources to help the learner in engaging with a real-world environment. Examples include the use of smartphones in museums and outdoor exhibitions to provide information pertinent to the exhibit currently being viewed and smartphone-based educational games which combine real-world and virtual experiences (see, e.g. Squire & Klopfer, 2007) somewhat similar to the highly popular game Pokemon Go™. In the next section, I use an affordance lens to further explore ways in which technologies can support embodied learning and argue that augmented reality technologies, in particular, have enormous potential in the support of learners in authentic practice-based learning environments.

14  Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts

205

Affordances, Embodiment and Learning Technologies The two most critical points from the earlier discussion about embodied learning were as follows: First was the idea that a learner’s perception and thus their cognition are shaped by their actions and their interactions with objects and people within the environment. Second was the idea that learning involves unconscious pattern formation based on information from all of our senses during our interaction with the environment, as well as conscious processing of information within our sphere of attention. A consequence of this characterisation of embodied learning is that a learner’s action choices within a learning environment are critical to the learning that occurs. Applying an affordance lens to this, we can say that the actions afforded by the environment are of critical importance in designing embodied learning experiences. Further, adopting a view of affordances as being a relationship between an embodied person and the elements of the environment, we need to pay particular attention to the ways in which the same learning environment might afford different actions for different learners. An affordance view presents us with three different reasons why a particular learner may not carry out the learning activities which, as a learning designer or educator, we may have intended in designing or selecting the learning environment. The first is that the learner may not be able to carry out a particular action because they don’t yet have the required knowledge, experience or bodily capabilities. The second is that, although they have the required capabilities, and consequently the affordance does exist for this learner, the affordance may be hidden and consequently not be perceived by the learner. Finally, because of this learner’s unique prior experiences, there may be elements within the environment presenting false affordances and misleading the learner to undertake alternative learning activities to those intended by the design. In considering the role of technology in embodied learning in authentic contexts, I would argue that a key focus should be on helping the learner to take up the learning activities which are likely to result in the intended learning outcomes. From an affordance perspective, this involves helping them to identify affordances within the environment, helping them to avoid false affordances and providing them with the support or scaffolding needed to undertake activities which they don’t yet have the capabilities to undertake unassisted. This third point is particularly important because it is well accepted that supporting learners through their zone of proximal development, that is, the zone just beyond a learner’s current capabilities, where activities are able to be undertaken only with appropriate support, is a highly effective teaching strategy (Vygotsky, 1978). The metaphor of a “scaffold” is a well-­ accepted one for thinking about the kinds of support that will help a learner to progress through this zone. The scaffold can be gradually removed as the learner progresses to the next stage (Wood et al., 1976). The ubiquitous availability of mobile devices in adult learning, and increasingly school learning contexts, makes them an ideal platform for technologies to support

206

B. Dalgarno

the embodied aspects of learning. Although such devices can, when misused, provide a distraction for learners from the learning activities at hand, I argue that, when used appropriately, they can be an ideal means to provide the context-dependent support that learners require. Such devices, which include laptops, tablets and smartphones, typically have the capabilities to determine the learner’s location and potentially their status within a sequence of intended activities and consequently have enormous potential to provide context-specific support. As mentioned above, the term, augmented reality, is now used for the scenario where a person’s interaction with their environment is supplemented or augmented with context-relevant information. The argument I am making here, then, is that augmented reality technologies should be a key focus of future research in supporting learners during embodied learning activities in authentic practice-based contexts. One of the key challenges in the use of mobile devices as a support tool during embodied learning activities, however, is that attending to the screen tends to interrupt the learner from the activity which can often hinder the learner rather than help them to efficiently carry out the learning task. The advent of alternative interface devices that can be attended to more seamlessly during embodied learning activities is important in addressing this challenge. One example is the smart watch, which is connected wirelessly to the mobile phone and which can display key guiding information much more seamlessly during learning activities. Of even greater potential is the use of devices like the recently re-released Google Glass™, which consist of a set of glasses with a small embedded computer, display screen, camera and earphone (see https://www.google.com/glass/start/). Potentially, a device like this could be used to provide subtle visual or spoken guidance during learning activities without the need for the learner to take their attention away from the task at hand. The other key feature of these devices is the way that the camera provides a digital video stream matching the learner’s current view, which, through intelligent processing, could help to ensure that the information and guidance provided are appropriate to the activity at hand.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that learning is an embodied process and that there are critical aspects of student learning experiences which tend to be ignored when treating learning as a disembodied process. Such aspects include the way in which our interaction with the environment impacts upon our perception and cognition, the implicit learning that occurs through unconscious processing of information through all of our senses and the way in which alignment or misalignment between the context in which the learning is situated and the context in which it is applied can support or hinder recall and application of knowledge. I have introduced the notion of affordances and explained how an understanding of embodied learners’ experiences from an affordance perspective can help in designing learning environments and providing learning supports that guide learners to undertake the learning activities

14  Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts

207

likely to lead to intended learning outcomes. Finally, from this affordance view of embodied learning, I have explored ways in which technologies can be used to support learners in embodied practice-based learning in authentic contexts. I have argued that augmented reality technologies have particular promise in providing support or scaffolding to learners to help them in embodied learning contexts. In particular, I have explained the way that such technologies could help learners to identify afforded actions aligned to their learning goals, to avoid false affordances which might mislead them towards unproductive actions and to undertake learning activities which they might be unable to undertake without additional support or scaffolding. I believe that such technologies have the potential to make a major (perhaps even transformational) contribution to professional and practice-­ based learning in the future. By guiding learners in the ways in which they move around and interact with the environment and the objects and people within it, such tools will shape both the information about the environment that learners consciously attend to and the perceptual information available to their unconscious pattern formation systems. However, I acknowledge that there is still a long way to go in developing smartphone applications which will provide the kinds of support learners need in practice-­ based contexts. It is also important to acknowledge that there are potential downsides to the use of smartphones in these contexts due to the tendency for learners to be distracted by information and communication unrelated to their current learning. It is likely that the emergence of technologies and interfaces that more seamlessly support us in our day-to-day activities, of which Google Glass is potentially an example, will provide possible platforms for these future practice-based learning support technologies. The development of technologies that provide seamless augmentation of practice-­ based experiences needs to be undertaken with careful user-centred design work that appreciates the different kinds of support that different learners need to allow them to realise embodied affordances in authentic practice-based learning contexts. I have argued here that the Gibsonian notion of affordances and the Merleau-Pontian notion of body schema can help us in understanding the student learning experience and in making sure that our learning supports are not one size fits all but adaptive to the specific needs of the learner.

References Barab, S.  A., & Duffy, T. (2000). From practice fields to communities of practice. Theoretical Foundations of Learning Environments, 1(1), 25–55. Bower, M. (2008). Affordance analysis  – Matching learning tasks with learning technologies. Educational Media International, 45(1), 3–15. Brown, J.  S., Collins, A., & Duguid, P. (1989). Situated cognition and the culture of learning. Educational Researcher, 8(1), 32–42. Buckingham, J., Wheldall, K., & Beaman-Wheldall, R. (2013). Why Jaydon can’t read: The triumph of ideology over evidence in teaching reading. Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas, 29(3), 21.

208

B. Dalgarno

Collins, H. (2010). Tacit and explicit knowledge. University of Chicago Press. Conole, G., & Dyke, M. (2004). What are the affordances of information and communication technologies? ALT-J, 12(2), 113–124. Dalgarno, B., & Lee, M. J. W. (2010). What are the learning affordances of 3D virtual environments? British Journal of Educational Technology, 41(1), 10–32. Dohn, N.  B. (2009). Affordances revisited: Articulating a Merleau-Pontian view. International Journal of Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning, 4(2), 151–170. Ewing, R. (2018). Exploding some of the myths about learning to read: A review of research on the role of phonics. NSW Teachers Federation. Retrieved from https://www.alea.edu.au/ documents/item/1869 Fugate, J. M., Macrine, S. L., & Cipriano, C. (2019). The role of embodied cognition for transforming learning. International Journal of School & Educational Psychology, 7(4), 274–288. Gallagher, S. (1986). Body image and body schema. A conceptual clarification. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 7(4), 541–554. Gaver, W. (1991). Technology affordances. In CHI’91 conference proceedings (New Orleans, Louisiana, April–May 1991), ACM, pp. 79–84. Gibson, J. J. (1977). The theory of affordances. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology (pp. 67–82). Gibson, J. (1979). The ecological approach to human perception. Houghton Mifflin. Godden, D.  R., & Baddeley, A.  D. (1975). Context-dependent memory in two natural environments: On land and underwater. British Journal of Psychology, 66(3), 325–331. Heft, H. (2001). Ecological psychology in context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the legacy of William James’s radical empiricism. Psychology Press. Jones, C. (2016). Networked learning: An educational paradigm for the age of digital networks. Springer. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan. Kirschner, P. A. (2002). Can we support CSCL? Educational, social and technological affordances. Inaugural Address: spoken upon the public acceptance of the professorship in Educational Technology, in particular Computer Supported Collaborative Learning at the Open Universiteit Nederland on Friday, October 25, 2002. Retrieved from https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/ handle/1874/25602/kirschner_02_threeworldcscl.pdf?sequence=1 Kirschner, P., Strijbos, J. W., Kreijns, K., & Beers, P. J. (2004). Designing electronic collaborative learning environments. Educational Technology Research and Development, 52(3), 47. Kirschner, P. A., Sweller, J., & Clark, R. E. (2006). Why minimal guidance during instruction does not work: An analysis of the failure of constructivist, discovery, problem-based, experiential, and inquiry-based teaching. Educational Psychologist, 41(2), 75–86. Kiverstein, J., & Miller, M. (2015). The embodied brain: Towards a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9, 237. Kontra, C., Goldin-Meadow, S., & Beilock, S. L. (2012). Embodied learning across the life span. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(4), 731–739. Lindgren, R., & Johnson-Glenberg, M. (2013). Emboldened by embodiment: Six precepts for research on embodied learning and mixed reality. Educational Researcher, 42(8), 445–452. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge and Kegan. Milgram, P., & Kishino, F. (1994). A taxonomy of mixed reality visual displays. IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems, 77(12), 1321–1329. Norman, D. (1988). The psychology of everyday things. Basic Books. Norman, D. (1999). Affordance, conventions and design. Interactions, 6(3), 38–43. Reber, A. S. (1989). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118(3), 219. Seger, C. A. (1994). Implicit learning. Psychological Bulletin, 115(2), 163. Shapiro, L. (2019). Embodied cognition. Routledge. Squire, K., & Klopfer, E. (2007). Augmented reality simulations on handheld computers. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 16(3), 371–413.

14  Technological Affordances for Embodied Learning in Authentic Contexts

209

Steffens, K., Bannan, B., Dalgarno, B., Bartolomé, A. R., Esteve-González, V., & Cela-Ranilla, J. M. (2015). Recent developments in technology- enhanced learning: A critical assessment. RUSC Universities and Knowledge Society Journal, 12(2), 1–14. Sternberg, R.  J., & Horvath, J.  A. (Eds.). (1999). Tacit knowledge in professional practice: Researcher and practitioner perspectives. Psychology Press. Stolz, S. A. (2015). Embodied learning. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 47(5), 474–487. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind and society: The development of higher mental processes. Harvard University Press. Winn, W. (2003). Learning in artificial environments: Embodiment, embeddedness and dynamic adaptation. Technology, Instruction, Cognition and Learning, 1(1), 87–114. Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning as a social system. Systems Thinker, 9(5), 2–3. Wood, D., Bruner, J. S., & Ross, G. (1976). The role of tutoring in problem solving. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17(2), 89–100. Wu, H. K., Lee, S. W. Y., Chang, H. Y., & Liang, J. C. (2013). Current status, opportunities and challenges of augmented reality in education. Computers & Education, 62, 41–49.

Part VI

Embodiment and Institutional Structures

Chapter 15

“Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education Kathleen Mahon

Abstract  The aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between professional education, embodiment, and neoliberalism, focussing primarily on the practices of professional educators. The chapter draws on the theory of practice architectures to pose questions about how practices, and the bodies that make those practices possible, are being enabled, constrained, and transformed by neoliberalising forces that have pervaded many aspects of contemporary societies, including sites of professional education and the everyday lives of professional educators. Are bodies, through practices, becoming both “neoliberalised” and “neoliberalising”? What does/could this look like/feel like? What might this mean for the future of professional education? The chapter highlights the sense in which, in this neoliberal age, professional educators’ bodies are increasingly experiencing, performing, and perpetuating neoliberal ideals, and why promoting a sensitivity to this, and resistance, is so important. For illustrative purposes, the chapter draws on some lived experiences of professional educators gleaned from literature and the author’s own research and history as a teacher educator. Keywords  Professional education · Embodiment · Neoliberalised bodies · Practice architectures · Neoliberalism Some years before becoming a teacher educator, I took leave from my school teaching position to expand my professional horizons with further study. The course of choice was a Masters in outdoor education, which meant spending many hours outside built environments. About 7 or 8 months into my course, I visited the school from which I had taken leave to see colleagues whom I had not seen since the previous year. As I moved through our large communal staff room greeting colleagues, I was struck by the strangeness of their bodies. All appeared to stoop, both when K. Mahon (*) Department of Educational Work, University of Borås, Borås, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_15

213

214

K. Mahon

walking and standing still, as if the ceiling were closing in on them. I did not say anything to my colleagues for fear of sounding weird, but I was both puzzled and disturbed by what I observed. What would make people stoop like that? What were they being weighed down by? Did anyone else feel or see the stooping bodies I observed? I begin with reflection on this experience and my puzzlement to highlight two points that I will elaborate in this chapter. The first starts from the premise that, in our professional practice, we encounter and interact with the world with our bodies (an obvious statement surely), and our bodies cannot but be impacted by those interactions and that world (see Green & Hopwood, 2015). I do not know which particular conditions or set of conditions were implicated in the story above. However, that so many of my colleagues’ bodies appeared to share a certain posture suggests that they were products of their interaction in that environment. On this basis, I make the point that profound changes to material and social conditions for professions and professional education, such as those associated with the neoliberalisation of society, may be felt and manifested, via our practices, in our bodily doings and in our physicality over time. The second point is that this impact can easily go unnoticed if the changes happen slowly and cumulatively, as has been the case, it would seem, with the neoliberalisation of so many aspects of our professional lives and work. There are both positive and negative consequences of these complex body–environment relationships for human wellbeing, for practices, and for professional education, that arguably warrant closer attention. My aim in this chapter is to elaborate on these two points to consider the implications of the neoliberalisation of society for professional education. The discussion amounts to a theorisation (of sorts) of the relationship between embodiment, professional education, and neoliberalism, taking as its point of departure the notion that we live our (professional) lives in practices (after Kemmis, 2020), and that practices are always embodied. This theorisation draws on the theory of practice architectures (Kemmis et al., 2014), and my own university research and experiences in Australia and Sweden, to explore whether and how the enablement and constraint of practices in professional education by neoliberal conditions have transformed our bodies – effectively creating “neoliberalised” bodies  – without us really noticing and/or acknowledging the transformation. I also ask how bodies can agentically shape conditions, interactions, and thus professional realities, in ways that perpetuate or resist neoliberalising forces. I focus particularly on the practices and (human) bodies of professional educators, since this has been central to my research. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of neoliberalism and neoliberalisation and what it means to be/become neoliberalised. Next, the chapter outlines some broad ways in which professional education appears to have been neoliberalised. This is followed by an introduction to the theory of practice architectures (Kemmis et al., 2014) and some examples of how professional education practices have been shaped by practice architectures in particular settings. In the final sections of the chapter, bodies are explicitly brought into focus with a consideration, first, of the neoliberalisation of professional educator bodies in practice, second, of how bodies can be neoliberalising, and third, of how bodies can also resist neoliberalisation. The chapter concludes with possible implications for professional education.

15  “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education

215

Neoliberalism, Neoliberalisation, and Neoliberalised? Neoliberalism is commonly defined as a “market-centred policy logic” (Connell, 2013, p. 1) or as a set of assumptions and practices which foreground market-based values and market-based ideals in social relations (Ball, 2012; Brown, 2003). It encompasses, according to Harvey (2007),1 the proposition that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (p.  2). Neoliberalism is generally associated with, amongst other things, increased competition (Davies & Bansel, 2007); privatisation (Peters, 1999); the commodification of services (Connell, 2013); nation states assuming a role in creating or preserving appropriate market conditions (Harvey, 2007); and individualism (Peters, 1999). Few would deny that this logic now pervades numerous aspects of society in many parts of the world. Indeed, Peck and Tickell (2002) noted nearly twenty years ago that “it has become a commonsense of the times” (p. 381). Despite a general shared understanding of what neoliberalism entails, it is a problematic concept. According to Apple (2017), it has “contradictory tendencies within it” (p.  148). Also, as Shore and Wright (2016) have pointed out, it has been taken up as a “portmanteau for explaining everything that is wrong with contemporary capitalist societies”, rendering it less useful as an analytical concept (p.  47). Neoliberalism is often represented or understood as a kind of all powerful, static, and external (“disembodied out-there”) phenomenon (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.  381–382; see also Furlong, 2013) and, as such, is discussed in ways that deny local variations and ignore how human actors are implicated in its flourishing. Also, there are contemporary phenomena that have become so entangled with neoliberalism  – such as managerialism and New Public Management,2 neoconservatism, globalism, digitalisation – that it is difficult to attribute societal factors to neoliberalism without also considering other such phenomena (see Apple, 2017). For these reasons, it is perhaps more useful, for a discussion on embodiment in relation to experienced or lived practices, to focus on neoliberalisation (Peck & Tickell, 2002) rather than neoliberalism. Neoliberalisation reflects a “multi-faceted and continually changing set of processes associated with neoliberal reform agendas, which assume different forms in different countries” and settings (Shore & Wright, 2016, p. 47), and which are “enacted and contested by real people in real time” (Hardy et al., 2020, p. 67). I use the term specifically here to refer to processes through which a neoliberal rationality affects/transforms, and is produced, reproduced, and normalised in, a given social context via arrangements and (embodied) practices specific to that context. I return to this idea later in the chapter. I also use the term neoliberalised to mean “significantly affected or transformed by an experienced process of neoliberalisation”. The term is not intended to suggest an end state.  See Harvey (2007) or Plehwe (2009) for historical accounts of neoliberalism.  Indeed, Olssen, and Peters (2005) described New Public management as a form of “neoliberal governmentality” (p. 324). 1 2

216

K. Mahon

The Neoliberalisation of Professional Education Universities, and therefore, university-based professional education, have not been immune to the process of neoliberalisation. On the contrary, stories abound of the ways in which a market logic has penetrated universities (Shore & Wright, 2016) relative to the social and educational and non-economic knowledge needs of individuals and society (see, e.g., Ball, 2012; Olssen & Peters, 2005). There are many well-documented organisational and programmatic changes to professional education3 and conditions for professional education associated with this market orientation. I mention only a few examples here that are relevant to the discussion below: • cost-cutting or efficiency-finding measures (e.g., in the form of budget restrictions, organisational mergers, casualisation,4 increased class sizes); • increased number of academic terms but reduced teacher–student contact time within any given course; • the rise of a performative culture and high pressure environments for staff; • the commodification of knowledge (linked, e.g., to a focus on educational outcomes, the modularisation of courses, and constructions of teaching as an instrumental, technical, or economic exercise); • significant increase in the use of online learning modes;5 • shifts from collegial to corporate and managerialist models of management (linked, e.g., to the over-administration of the work of professional educators, an audit culture, and/or culture of surveillance). Many of these overlapping and interrelated changes have contributed not only to an increase in work intensification and a lack of job security amongst professional educators, but also to a diminished lack of space for discussing and critically analysing current conditions (see Levinsson et al., 2020; Moffat et al., 2018). This is particularly alarming if we consider the insidious and pervasive nature of the changes taking place, and that they are so “poorly understood” (Moffat et al., 2018, p. 12). Scrutiny of conditions under such circumstances seems to be more urgent, not less so.

3  The neoliberalisation of society has also had major impacts on the professions and workplaces served by professional education. This is relevant to the discussion in this chapter, but is not its focus. For a poignant discussion, for example, of the capacity of social workers as caring professionals to be caring persons in the neoliberal context, see Moffat et al. (2018). For a discussion of market- or global competition-related changes to the teaching profession, see Furlong (2013), or to the nursing profession, see Foth and Holmes (2017). 4  Casualisation in higher education has been felt on a dramatic scale in Australia. As much as 70% of the academic labour force was believed to be on casual contracts before the pandemic. I began my own career as a teacher educator on such a contract. 5  This is not solely attributable to the neoliberalisation of society and educational institutions of course. However, the digitalisation of education has been linked to preoccupations with efficiencies (e.g., Moffat et al., 2018, p. 2).

15  “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education

217

To understand how human bodies within real sites of professional education are implicated in and affected by these broad trends, it is fruitful to consider how embodied professional education practices have been effectively neoliberalised in such sites over time. Practice theories are particularly relevant in this respect, as they can help us to see how practices are constituted, channelled, enabled, and constrained (Nicolini, 2012; Kemmis, 2020), whilst recognising “the critical role of the body and material things in social affairs” (Kemmis, 2020, p. 34). With this in mind, in the next section, I introduce a contemporary practice theory that is especially useful for examining the constitution and shaping and reshaping of practices (and thus bodies): the theory of practice architectures (Kemmis et al., 2014).

 rofessional Practices as Social, Embodied, Situated, Enabled, P and Constrained According to Stephen Kemmis (2020), “we live our lives in practices” (p. 31). It is in practices that we participate in life on the planet and interact with the world as “sentient beings” (capable of thought and speech6), “biological beings” (capable of action and sensation), and “social beings” (capable of belonging, solidarity and power) (p. 53; see also p. 32). Kemmis and colleagues (Kemmis et al., 2014) have developed the theory of practice architectures7 as an account of such relationships. According to the theory, a social practice (like the professional practice of teaching or nursing) is a “socially established cooperative human activity” comprised of sayings (utterances), doings (modes of action), and relatings (ways of relating to other human beings and the material world) that hang together (cohere) in a distinct project (aims of the practice) (Kemmis et al., 2014, p. 31). These aspects of practice are bodily performances that occur in three overlapping kinds of intersubjective space: semantic space in the medium of language, physical space-time in the medium of activity, and social space in the medium of power. Practices thus conceived are therefore always “situated” and “embodied” (see also Green, 2009). The theory also holds that practices are shaped by, and shape, the social sites (Schatzki, 2002) in which they are located – for example, a lecture, a videoconference, a medical simulation, an internship programme  – by virtue of shaping and being shaped by cultural–discursive, material–economic, and social–political

 Or other activities to replace speech, for those whose speech is impaired.  A contemporary practice theory drawing on Schatzki’s (2002) site ontology.

6 7

218

K. Mahon

arrangements (practice architectures) with which they are enmeshed in those sites8 (Kemmis et  al., 2014). Such arrangements, or practice architectures, enable and constrain practices in ways that, over time, intersubjectively transform and sustain (or not) the practices with which they are enmeshed. They also affect the subjective formation of those engaged in practices (i.e., practitioners or actors) through their practices (Kemmis, 2020). Conversely, practices can also produce, transform, and sustain (or not) practice architectures. To take cultural–discursive arrangements as an illustration, languages (and discourses, like neoliberal discourses) are “sustained by our use of … [them] for everyday communication purposes as well as for many specialist purposes” (Kemmis, 2020, p. 410), such as those involved in our professional work. Practices can also shape and produce consequences for other practices (e.g., the practices of professional educators can produce assessment conditions which affect how and the extent to which students can formally demonstrate their learning). In this way, people engaged in practices are agentic actors, not just acted upon by the practice architectures or conditions of those practices. Again, taking language as an example, “we can orient our interlocutors to things in the world by using language to point, prompt and push one another to see things in the same or similar ways” (Kemmis, 2020, p.  43). These complex dialectical relationships between practices and practice architectures within sites of practice are a significant part of the story regarding how practices and human bodies (of practitioners) can become both neoliberalised and neoliberalising.

 eoliberalised (Professional Educator) Practices – Examples N from Teacher Education Of particular interest in this chapter is how professional educator practices, and thus the embodiment of practitioners, have changed with the neoliberalisation of society. To illustrate, I consider the example of teacher education, drawing on research conducted in Australia (Mahon, 2014) and post-inquiry reflections (e.g., Mahon & Galloway, 2017), supplemented with reflections on my recent lived experiences in Sweden. The research aim was to explore conditions for, and the nature of, critical pedagogical praxis in higher education. The inquiry involved seven academics

8  To explain, cultural–discursive arrangements are resources (e.g., languages, profession-specific discourses, regulatory discourses) used in and about a practice that make possible particular sayings, constraining and enabling what it is relevant and appropriate to say (and think) (Kemmis et al., 2014). Material–economic arrangements are resources (e.g., classrooms, funding arrangements, technology, workload calculators) that make possible or shape the doings of a practice, constraining and enabling what it is relevant and appropriate to do (Kemmis et al., 2014). Social– political arrangements are resources (e.g., collegial solidarities, student–teacher relationships, line-management structures) that shape how people relate in a practice to other people, to things, and to the natural world (Kemmis et al., 2014).

15  “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education

219

(including myself) from a particular Australian university, most of whom were teacher educators. The teacher educators’ accounts, and my observations and experiences, of their practices and the practice architectures in that environment highlight the kinds of neoliberalised sayings, doings, and relatings, characterising practices within teacher education in that place, at that time. The research revealed that neoliberal and managerialist discourses had, as in other Australian teacher education departments/schools, found their way into everyday teacher educator conversations about/in their professional practice. For example, talk of budget restraints, boosting student enrolments, or “finding efficiencies” was commonplace and had been historically part of the practice traditions of the university since its establishment in 1998 as part of a significant national neoliberal reform. Managerialist and neoliberalised sayings particularly filtered through teacher educator conversations during a departmental merger which occurred in the first year of the project. Justifications for the merger were couched in terms such as “resource deployment” and “rationalisation”. Six years later and in a different national context, I find myself engaged in almost the same kinds of conversations about finances, with the idea of a departmental merger being floated in cost-saving/ financial viability terms on the one hand, and outcomes for staff terms on the other. Somewhere in the middle are some overshadowed sayings about the educational implications of such a merger for students. All of the participating teacher educators in the research experienced a greater intensity of doings in the period leading up to and during the research project. This was attributed to practice architectures ranging from increased class sizes, to the introduction of three teaching sessions per year, to multi-campus teaching arrangements, to casualisation leading to fewer full-time staff to take key responsibilities, and to an increase in bureaucratic procedures surrounding the teacher educators’ work. What the doings sometimes entailed echoes constructions of teaching as a technical exercise (see above). One participant described her doings using such expressions as filling-in-the-dots and bells and whistles teaching, and box ticking. “Filling-in-the dots” referred to “constructing the curriculum in such a way that anybody can teach it” (Mahon, 2014, p. 197), which was increasingly demanded of teacher educators due to the high number of casual staff, and thus high teacher turnover. “Bells and whistles teaching” was a reference to “decorat[ing] … teaching” (p. 197) with the use of the latest technology. This was based on the cynical view, shared by more than one research participant, that a measure of good teaching practice was “the amount of things that you use” (Mahon, 2014, p. 197; cf. Levinsson et  al., 2020). This view was reinforced by, amongst other things, an internally emailed document outlining “standards” to which educators ought to aspire. The participant concerned explained how such a document can inadvertently induce box ticking: “…when you confront me with this, four pages of standards, I all of a sudden get really preoccupied with box-ticking” (p. 197). By “box ticking”, the participant meant complying (also a significant “relating”) with whatever standards were imposed or legitimised through the various artefacts she encountered in her daily work. This is not to say that the research participant’s practice was only characterised in this way, but that she saw artefacts related to standards and expectations of

220

K. Mahon

teacher educator performance as significantly shaping what she was doing as an educator (and obviously how she talked about what she was doing). At the time of the research, when not working on my doctoral project or directly engaged in teaching, my daily doings as a teacher educator were dominated by writing and reading emails, completing administrative tasks such as quality assurance checks, and learning about the latest technological tools that we were obliged to use as part of our work (cf. Levinsson et al., 2020). I certainly did not spend as much time as I would have liked (or that I thought was ideal for good pedagogical work) preparing for classes, writing feedback on student assessment, or interacting with students and colleagues. In many ways, I was spending a significant amount of time literally ticking boxes (or box ticking). And that was the case despite only teaching one subject/unit because I was completing the doctorate full time. My time as a teacher educator now, in Sweden, seems to be similarly occupied with such tasks, although, whereas in the context of Australian teacher education, I might have been involved in internal quality assurance tasks on a regular basis, in my current setting I am working with colleagues to prepare for audits9 of educational programmes by both internal and external parties. The practice architectures shaping teacher educator practices are slightly different, but having similar effects. In terms of relatings, the research highlighted how we teacher educators were working in a way that was unintentionally distancing us from the actual task of teaching in teacher education (cf. Levinsson et al., 2020). Some of the participants also experienced our work, in some respects, as being distant from the students. Opportunities to relate to students and get to know them in a meaningful way were being inadvertently eroded by increased class sizes, and diminished contact time (see above). Also, some of the participant teacher educators felt that they were working increasingly in isolation. This was partly due to online teaching arrangements, which meant that staff no longer needed to be on campus. It was also partly due to being too busy juggling various tasks to engage meaningfully in collegial activity, a growing culture of competition that was perhaps drip-fed by the destabilising effects of the merger (see Mahon & Galloway, 2017), and casualisation of staff, which meant a diminishing “critical mass” (Mahon, 2014, p. 200) of full time teacher educators. I have not experienced or witnessed such a sense of isolation (until the coronavirus pandemic) and competition in my current context, but that is not to say that it is not relevant amongst Swedish teacher educators. Before making a shift to focus more explicitly on the body in practice, it is worth noting aspects of practice that teacher educator participants indicated were increasingly missing from their professional practice. The most obvious were thinking deeply about their work, questioning and interrogating new initiatives, especially with their colleagues, and talking with others in productive ways about their professional concerns. The participants had to make a conscious effort to find space and time to gather with peers for such purposes, which they did, even if that meant meeting outside work hours and off campus. Colleagues in my current context must similarly commit to carving out space and time for this kind of dialogue.

 These audits are regulated at a national level by the Swedish Higher Education Authority (UKÄ).

9

15  “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education

221

Zooming In on Bodies in Practice Despite human bodies being implicated in the kinds of practices described above, there is a risk of missing important aspects of the neoliberalisation of professional education and professional educator practices if we take bodies for granted. Also, one of the effects of the neoliberalisation of society more generally is arguably the increasing construction of practices and education as disembodied (Pickup, 2010). I therefore make a deliberate political and critical move in this section to focus on bodies in practice, even though doing so creates some tensions in terms of bodies being objectified or appearing separate from practices.

Neoliberalised Bodies in Practice Practices are inseparable from the bodies that enact or inhabit them. So, just as practices in professional education are subjected to and transformed by neoliberalisation processes, so too are the bodies that make practices possible. This is evident in (a) what our (professional educator) bodies are feeling and experiencing, (b) doing/performing, and (c) being and becoming in practice in today’s neoliberal conditions. (a) What are our bodies feeling and experiencing? Reports now abound of the physical and emotional effects of the neoliberalisation of universities and professional education on the human body (some might call them “injuries” – see Gill, 2009). My own research highlighted bodies in practice experiencing worry, performance anxiety, stress, and even emotional pain (the latter was mentioned in relation to the departmental merger). Similar bodily effects have been reported in relation to neoliberal change in social work education in Canada. Moffat et al. (2018) discussed increased worry and anxiety about the changes that are happening to education (e.g., shifting purpose, changes to structure and modes of university education, job losses, and job insecurity) and the changing role of academics and professionals and academic and/or professional identities (e.g., worry about “becoming part of the machine”, p. 14). Highlighting anxiety in teacher education in a Swedish university, Levinsson et al. (2020) describe experiences of anxiety and worry linked to an audit culture about what is at stake if people do not fall into line with the demands of managers. Other bodily experiences that I have endured myself, or that Swedish and international colleagues have spoken of anecdotally, include exhaustion, overload, sleeplessness, aching backs, tired or damaged eyes, guilt, frustration, disenchantment (see Gill, 2009), alienation, and emptiness (Levinsson et  al., 2020). Stress-­ related illness also seems to be more common than ever. Perhaps, such bodily effects feel a bit like “the ceiling closing in” on us?

222

K. Mahon

Of course professional educator bodies are still experiencing and feeling other things as well in these neoliberal times, many of which are positive for education and for the wellbeing of those involved (for instance, the joy of seeing students have an “aha!” moment in a seminar, or feeling creative energy and fun derived from developing a new course with colleagues, or experiencing a sense of “flow” whilst teaching, or feeling the genuine care and concern people have for each other in the workplace). But things do appear to be out of balance, linked largely to what we spend so much of our time doing/performing, or being expected to do. (b) What are our bodies doing/performing? The neoliberalisation of professional education and professional educator practices has meant that particular bodily performances, and the increased rate or extent of doing/performing them, have become normalised and naturalised. Many of these performances relate only cursorily to teaching and learning. Sitting for hours at a computer; reading and writing email after email; filling in forms; ticking boxes; worrying; thinking about job security; reading about and following new regulations and standards; interacting with other bodies and the world through a computer screen, and in virtual spaces; working through lunch breaks; counting (e.g., student enrolments, publications) and accounting (writing reports about our doings); and navigating new online systems are just some of the default (and intensified) bodily doings that now characterise the everyday lives of professional educators (day and night, and increasingly seven days a week) in these neoliberal times. Many of these bodily performances, through pressures exerted by various practice architectures, have become fast-paced and automatic, with less “deep” bodily engagement available for conversations and relationships (including with students of professional education courses). Many would relate to meetings nowadays where bodies are physically present, but emotionally and socially absent, oftentimes attending to pressing administrative tasks (emails perhaps) that might otherwise not “get done”. In these pandemic times, in contexts where meetings have shifted online, even the physical “presence” of bodies (albeit mediated by technology and in dispersed physical settings) is questionable, as cameras and microphones can be turned off, and bodies can be literally missing from the meetings, with fellow attendees being none the wiser unless those bodies are called upon to contribute. Perhaps, those missing bodies are taking a much needed rest? It is not surprising in this context that images of “professional educator” (human) bodies metaphorically bending to rules, standards, and mounting expectations, whilst simultaneously and literally moving “mindlessly” from one task or class to the next, are surfacing more and more in research literature and in daily conversations. The depiction by Levinsson et al. (2020) from a teacher educator perspective comes to mind: “This is blind compliance, and we are bending to great control”; “[this] results in a ‘paint by numbers’ feel to our existence as teachers”; “we mechanically follow a given formula for ‘good education’, and every step we take to prepare for teaching is predictable” (p.  12). There are stories to balance these images fortunately, as I mention below, but they are nevertheless worrying and need to be better understood.

15  “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education

223

(c) What are our bodies being and becoming? Such changes to our bodily performances raise questions about what our (professional educator) bodies are being and becoming as part of the neoliberalising processes. Are they being and becoming more docile and compliant? Are our form-filling, box-ticking, rule-following, back-ending, email-answering bodies becoming more robot-like and less expressive, autonomous, creative, and critical? And if so, is this rendering our bodies less human? Perhaps many spend too much time worrying for that really to be the case, but there is certainly a sense in which bodily expressions of autonomy, creativity, and criticality in practice are being constrained, and also perhaps an extent to which bodies are suffering in silence.10 Furthermore, current neoliberal conditions can mean that professional educators’ bodies are “always on” (to borrow from Gill, 2009 p. 237, citing Gregg, 2009). In a student-as-consumer climate and a performative culture, answering emails everywhere (including from bed, or a holiday cabin) and around the clock, for example, is not unusual. So, in some respects, professional educators’ bodies are being and becoming alert 24/7 to matters or things to which to they might need to “urgently” respond, such as a student query about an assignment. However, in other respects, and rather disturbingly, those same bodies are, it could be argued, being and becoming de-sensitised, to the point where they are no longer as alert as they might be to the kinds of changes (and the effects of changes) going on around them in the professional education context. Our bodies are, generally speaking, sensitive to changes in the physical environment (e.g., through change from night to day, changes to seasons, or a sudden unfamiliar presence in a dark room; see Kemmis, 2020). Our bodies are also sensitive to social changes; we can often feel, for example, when we, or others close to us, are threatened in some way by other people. But it seems that, in some contexts in this neoliberal age, bodily sayings, doings, and ways of relating, and the neoliberalised/neoliberalising practice architectures that shape them (like mergers, budget-driven reforms, audits, quality control measures, heavy workloads, casual contracts, performance management strategies, evaluation reports, etc.) have become such a normalised and taken for granted aspect of a professional educator’s everyday work that threats to, and implications for, human bodies (including our own) are barely being recognised, let alone questioned. People have become so busy and overwhelmed, at least in the contexts with which I am familiar, that they hardly notice what their own bodies are experiencing, doing, and contributing to, and for some who do notice, it seems, they barely recognise their own bodies anymore. I have experienced this myself. I have, and am becoming to my dismay, an increasingly inside, sitting, computer screen-­ enslaved, spreading body with constant tension “knots” in my shoulders and neck. So far, I have been signalling how bodies have been and are being impacted by neoliberalising processes, and perhaps, themselves morphing over time with the  I am borrowing from Gill (2009) here. Gill was describing the higher education context more broadly, but I think the comments apply to professional education specifically as well – certainly in the contexts in which I have been a teacher educator.

10

224

K. Mahon

changes to conditions and practices characterising professional education noted above. (And, it must be acknowledged that not all of these changes can be attributed to neoliberalisation alone. People experienced exhaustion, anxiety, and various forms of oppression before neoliberalism came along.) However, this is only part of the story of the relationship between embodiment, neoliberalism, and professional education, and how bodies are being neoliberalised. Another significant part of the story relates to the “productive capabilities of bodies” (Pickup, 2010, p.  11). As stated earlier, people in practices are agentic actors, not just acted upon by the various arrangements comprising the practice architectures or conditions of those practices. As agentic beings, bodies are capable of both reproducing and challenging neoliberalisation processes through practices. How bodies can reproduce neoliberalisation processes is discussed next.

Bodies in Practice as Neoliberalising Agents It is not by chance that a neoliberal rationality has become entrenched in professional education. Ideologies, like neoliberalism, are “secured” through practices (see Kemmis, 2020, p. 68, drawing on Larrain 1979 and Foucault). People’s bodies agentically, through practices, produce and reproduce particular neoliberalised sayings, doings, and relatings in the sites in which they practice, such that they come to be “hegemonic” in those sites  – they come to be understood as “ways of doing things around here” (Kemmis, 2020, p. 68). As such, professional educator bodies can be both neoliberalised and neoliberalising. Inadvertently or not, it is bodies, through/in professional practices, that do the work of the neoliberalisation (or not) of those professional practices. Where professional educators are aware of their (potential) contribution to neoliberalisation processes, this can exacerbate the worry noted above. This was shown by Moffat et al. (2018): a respondent in their study worried about how she herself could “become responsible for enacting neoliberal governance and setting its standards” (p. 14). A similar experience was captured in Levinsson et al. (2020) in a teacher educator’s narrative about making himself into a “puppet in audit society’s service”. He had involuntarily come to support what was described as “audit mania” rather than question it, to the point where, the authors argue, he was unrecognisable to himself, reinforcing what I said earlier.

 odies as Sites of Resistance to the Neoliberalisation B of Professional Education However, just as bodies reproduce neoliberal ideals and ideas in professional education, they can and do also resist them, offering some hope for the transformation of current neoliberal conditions. As Casey (2000) noted, the “body is regarded paradoxically as both the site of discourse and operations of power, and of resistance to

15  “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education

225

power” (p. 54). Despite professional educators in some settings being overwhelmed, exhausted, and isolated, there are ways in which people have mustered such resistance. In my own research, at least one of the participants commented on the ways in which managerialist practices of the institution actually provoked resistance: “many of the practice architectures that make me more passionate about these ideas are the ones that try to silence me” (Participant interview). In that particular setting, the professional educators concerned made a commitment to making space and time to engage critically with colleagues in dialogue about practices and conditions in order to think through some of the challenges for profession education identified in this chapter. Some also talked about ignoring certain pressures, immersing themselves in sustaining activities, and saying “no” to taking on extra responsibilities. This was easier for some to do than others, however. In my current context, I work closely with a group of educators, some of whom are teacher educators, who accept the need to look after ourselves, our bodies. It is common for people in this group to say “Are you looking after yourself?” “Are you OK?” Sayings about how we are taking care of ourselves and staying healthy are also common. It is professionally acceptable to avoid emails on weekends, take breaks, exercise, have walking meetings, and look out for signs that we might be going down unhealthy paths. The acceptability of such things seemed to be quite rare in the Australian teacher education contexts I experienced. Such preoccupations with wellbeing seem to offer a healthy, if subtle, resistance to the more performative discourses and initiatives characterising aspects of our cultural–discursive and material–economic conditions.

Implications for University-Based Professional Education What does all this mean for professional education? There are two main questions emerging from the above discussion regarding implications for professional education. The first is this: “If the effects described above have emerged in relation to the practices of professional educators in a university context where a culture of critique has a long tradition, how might the neoliberalisation of society be affecting other professional practices and workplaces?” If other professional practices and workplaces are similarly affected, then perhaps professional education needs to play a role in preparing future professionals to understand, interrogate, deal with, and resist the neoliberalisation of their professions? The second question is “What will happen if the bodily effects of neoliberalisation of professional education and the reproduction of neoliberalising practices continue to go unchecked (and largely unnoticed)?” There are significant sustainability issues regarding how well professional educators can maintain the current pace and intensity of work, still find meaning in their practice, do good pedagogical work, and not end up with spent and unwell bodies. There are serious challenges too regarding the kind of professional education that is currently being offered. If/where professional education is reduced to a technical exercise, or even an economic

226

K. Mahon

exercise, the opportunities for helping aspiring professionals develop deep understandings and capacities that might help them contribute meaningfully to and transform their future professions in productive ways are potentially diminished. In response to these two questions, I suggest that professional education has a significant role to play in raising awareness of some of the issues raised in the chapter. This requires, first, awareness raising amongst professional educators about what they are experiencing, perpetuating, and challenging in their daily practices (i.e., through the professional education of the professional educators themselves). What neoliberalism11 is, and what changes are occurring in/to professional education and the professions through the neoliberalisation of practices and conditions and bodies, seem important questions to ask and debate. Perhaps we also need to ask ourselves such questions as: • How and to what extent are we participants in the neoliberal project? • What are we reproducing and resisting with our bodies? • How are we promoting, or not, a sensitisation to neoliberalisation of professional education and professional practice and its implications for human bodies in professional practice? Second, professional education has a critical role to play in encouraging students of professional education programmes to ask similar questions about their own practices and professions. This could involve, for example, promoting awareness of feelings and sensitivity to one’s own body and bodily doings in practice. It could also involve considering with students what it means to be/have/become neoliberalised bodies or to be a disembodied, desensitised practitioner/professional, or what might it mean to only focus on economic interests in practice, leaving aside the moral/ political. Both of these scenarios – raising awareness amongst professional educators and amongst students within professional education programmes – suggest an inquiry-­ based and critical approach to pedagogy and professional learning, or at the very least, the creation of spaces for productive dialogue. Such spaces are important for promoting understanding, collective imagining of how things can be otherwise, and the agentic generation, or belief in the possibility, of counter-hegemonic sayings, doings, and relatings. In other words, such spaces can foster resistance to the neoliberalisation of professional practices.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have used the theory of practice architectures and real experiences of professional educators to highlight some of the concerning ways in which professional educator practices, and thus bodies, in professional education have been and are being neoliberalised. This is occurring, I have argued, by virtue of the

 Reference to Levinsson et al., 2020 who cite Sleeter (2008) in saying that teacher educators need to be aware of what neoliberalism is, and its impact.

11

15  “Neoliberalised” (Human) Bodies and Implications for Professional Education

227

relationship between bodies and practices and practice architectures. Bodies are highly implicated in the neoliberalisation of society and its institutions not only because of how bodies in practice are subjected to neoliberalised practice architectures, sometimes with harmful effects, but also how they reproduce or resist neoliberalisation processes, whether that is visible to us or not. The notion of “neoliberalised bodies” is perhaps extreme, since, as suggested, not everything negative can be blamed on neoliberalism, and not everything that professional educators do/experience in/with their bodies in practice is negative, quite the contrary. However, the notion is worth thinking about because the costs for professional education and professional educators of not attending to what is happening to and being done by/with our bodies could be significant, and there may be lost opportunities for resisting some of the more concerning changes if we fail to understand what our bodies are part of. To conclude, I wish to return to the opening narrative of a former workplace and colleagues with what appeared to be stooping bodies, which, by the way, may have had nothing to do with neoliberalism. I never went back to that workplace, but I have since seen some workmates who left the school not long after the occasion I recalled. They no longer have the stooping posture I observed. This tells me that the effect of the place on those particular bodies was not permanent. Maybe there is some hope to be drawn from this story. Without dismissing the very real (and perhaps permanent) harm that some professional educators have experienced in high pressure environments, I offer a final question: If practices and bodies can be neoliberalised, can that neoliberalisation be undone with changed cultural–discursive, material–economic, and social–political arrangements? If there is to be any chance of this, then awareness raising regarding conditions and their effects on practices and thus bodies is crucial, as is holding on to/creating spaces for thinking with others about these very matters.

References Apple, M.  W. (2017). What is present and absent in critical analyses of neoliberalism in education. Peabody Journal of Education, 92(1), 148–153. https://doi.org/10.108 0/0161956X.2016.1265344 Ball, S. J. (2012). Performativity, commodification and commitment: An I-spy guide to the neoliberal university. British Journal of Educational Studies, 60(1), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.108 0/00071005.2011.650940 Brown, W. (2003). Neo-liberalism and the end of liberal democracy. Theory and Event, 7(1), 1–19. Casey, C. (2000). Sociology sensing the body: Revitalizing a dissociative discourse. In J. Hassard, R. Holliday, & H. Wilmott (Eds.), Body and organization (pp. 52–70). Sage. Connell, R. (2013). The neoliberal cascade and education: An essay on the market agenda and its consequences. Critical Studies in Education, 54(2), 99–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/1750848 7.2013.776990 Davies, B., & Bansel, P. (2007). Neoliberalism and education. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 20(3), 247–259.

228

K. Mahon

Foth, T., & Holmes, D. (2017). Neoliberalism and the government of nursing through competency-­ based education. Nursing Inquiry, 24(2). https://doi.org/10.1111/nin.12154 Furlong, J. (2013). Globalisation, neoliberalism, and the reform of teacher education in England. The Educational Forum, 77(1), 28–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131725.2013.739017 Gill, R. (2009). Breaking the silence: The hidden injuries of neo-liberal academia. In R. Flood & R. Gill (Eds.), Secrecy and silence in the research process: Feminist reflections (pp. 228–244). Routledge. Green, B. (2009). Introduction: Understanding and researching professional practice. In B. Green (Ed.), Understanding and researching professional practice (pp. 1–18). Sense. Green, B., & Hopwood, N. (2015). The body in professional practice, learning and education: A question of corporeality. In B. Green & N. Hopwood (Eds.), The body in professional practice, learning and education: Body/practice (pp. 15–33). Springer. Hardy, I., Petrie, K., Norlund, A., Henning Loeb, I., & Langat, K. (2020). Critiquing and cultivating the conditions for educational praxis and praxis development. In K. Mahon, C. Edwards-­ Groves, S. Francisco, M. Kaukko, S. Kemmis, & K. Petrie (Eds.), Pedagogy, education, and praxis in critical times (pp. 65–84). Springer. Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. Kemmis, S. (2020). A practice sensibility. Springer. Kemmis, S., Wilkinson, J., Edwards-Groves, C., Hardy, I., Grootenboer, P., & Bristol, L. (2014). Changing practices, changing education. Springer. Levinsson, M., Norlund, A., & Beach, D. (2020). Teacher educators in neoliberal times: A phenomenological self-study. Phenomenology & Practice, 14(1), 7–23. Mahon, K. (2014). Critical pedagogical praxis in higher education. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga, Australia. Mahon, K., & Galloway, L. (2017). Provoking praxis amidst a faculty restructure: A practice architecture perspective. In K. Mahon, S. Francisco, & S. Kemmis (Eds.), Exploring education and professional practice – Through the lens of practice architectures (pp. 183–199). Springer. Moffat, K., Todd, S., Barnoff, L., Pyke, J., Panitch, M., Parada, H., McLleod, S., & Hunter, N. (2018). Worry about professional education: Emotions and affect in the context of neoliberal change in postsecondary education. Emotion, Space and Society, 26, 9–15. Nicolini, D. (2012). Practice theory, work, & organisation: An introduction. Oxford University Press. Olssen, M., & Peters, M. (2005). Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge economy: From the free market to knowledge capitalism. Journal of Education Policy, 20(3), 313–345. Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalising space. Antipode, 34(3), 380–404. https://doi. org/10.1111/1467-­8330.00247 Peters, M.  A. (1999). Neoliberalism. In M.  Peters, P.  Ghiraldelli, B.  Zarnić, & A.  Gibbons (Eds.), The encyclopaedia of philosophy of education. Retrieved from http://eepat.net/doku. php?id=neoliberalism Pickup, A. (2010). Embodied phronesis: Conceptualizing materially engaged practical wisdom in teaching, teacher education, and research [sic]. Journal of Thought, Spring/Summer, 4–22. Plehwe, D. (2009). Introduction. In P. Mirowski & D. Plehwe (Eds.), The road from Mont Pelerin: The making of the neoliberal thought collective. Harvard University Press. Schatzki, T. (2002). The site of the social: A philosophical account of the constitution of social life and change. The Pennsylvania State University Press. Shore, C., & Wright, S. (2016). Neoliberalisation and the “Death of the Public University”. ANUAC, 5(1), 46–50. https://doi.org/10.7340/anuac2239-­625X-­2451

Chapter 16

It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism in the Implementation of Gender-­Based Violence Policies and Practices Rita A. Gardiner and Jennifer Chisholm

Abstract  In this chapter, we examine some institutional effects of the implementation of policies designed to eradicate gender-based violence on campus at two Canadian universities. In doing so, we adopt Sara Ahmed’s practical phenomenological approach to highlight problems with the embodied lived experience of those involved with said policy implementation. In addition, we share some initial findings from a qualitative study that examines the implementation of gender-based violence policies through interviews with practitioners and institutional leaders. Preliminary results of this study suggest that, if we wish to eradicate gender-based violence on university campuses, we need to focus on dismantling sexism and other forms of institutional oppression. This dismantling entails seeing gender-based violence as a structural as well as an individual, embodied practice. It is argued that policies alone cannot eradicate gender-based violence in institutions. Rather, there needs to be systemic change at the macro, meso, and micro levels of the institution. Finally, we offer suggestions for how we might educate future professionals to deal with the systemic issues underpinning gender-based violence in institutional settings. Keywords  Ahmed · Embodiment · Gender-based violence · Institutional sexism · Practitioners · Practical phenomenology · Universities

R. A. Gardiner (*) Faculty of Education, Western University, London, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] J. Chisholm Women’s Studies, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_16

229

230

R. A. Gardiner and J. Chisholm

In what ways do policies aimed at trying to eradicate gender-based violence lead to institutional change on university campuses? In this chapter, we explore this question by examining the implementation of gender-based violence policies at two Canadian universities in the province of Ontario. In addition, we share some initial findings from a qualitative study that examines the implementation of gender-based violence policies through interviews with practitioners and institutional leaders at two university campuses. Preliminary results of our study suggest that, if we wish to eradicate gender-based violence in institutional settings, such as university campuses, we need to focus on dismantling sexism and other forms of institutional oppression. This dismantling entails seeing gender-based violence not only as an embodied, relational practice, but also as structural and part of the institution. Recognising structural inequities serves to illustrate how policies alone cannot eradicate gender-based violence on campus. Instead, there needs to be systemic change at the macro, meso, and micro levels of the institution. In tracing some institutional effects of the implementation of gender-based violence policies, we adopt what Sara Ahmed (2014a, 2017) describes as a practical phenomenological approach. Her approach illustrates the embodied and affective nature of practitioners’ work in the implementation of said policies. In trying to effect institutional change, Ahmed (2017) highlights how practitioners find themselves coming up against institutional barriers that may seem invisible to others. This apparent invisibility makes it more difficult to trace the institutional effects of those attempting to effect institutional transformation. In attending to practitioners’ embodied and affective responses, however, we may be better able to understand the complex and, at times, contradictory processes of attempts to implement gender-­ based violence policies in diverse spaces. Thus, our research not only considers the embodied effects of these policies on employees tasked with their implementation, but also considers the difficulties practitioners experience in trying to bring about institutional change. This chapter unfolds as follows. First, we provide an overview of Ahmed’s work (2006, 2007, 2014a, b, 2017) situating her writing within a feminist phenomenological context. Next, we examine our research context. Here, we argue that although some policies make reference to the intersections of identity, in the main, these policies have a “one-size fits all” approach. This singular approach to policy implementation can be detrimental to dealing with the diverse and complex dimensions of gender-based violence. Following this discussion, we explore three themes emerging from the interview data at each campus: institutional silence, lack of institutional clarity regarding disclosure, and the gap between policy and practice. Finally, we draw together the disparate strands of this discussion to see what we have learned about the embodied effects of gender-based violence policy implementation, and conclude by discussing some future implications for practitioners.

16  It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism…

231

Sara Ahmed’s Work in Context In this section, we offer an overview of Ahmed’s work and its relevance for our study. A feminist theorist, she writes on diverse topics related to racism, sexism, and queer theory. Unlike many scholars engaging with thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, Ahmed does not focus on one major phenomenological thinker. Rather, she infuses her writing with different insights from diverse writers in the phenomenological tradition. In particular, Ahmed focuses on the embodied effects of sexism, racism, and heteronormativity within institutional structures (Gardiner, 2018). Ahmed employs what she (2014a) terms “practical phenomenology” to examine the effects of policy implementation in higher education contexts. This practical approach to phenomenology takes up Husserl’s idea that phenomenological inquiry is a reorientation of a previous way of thinking. For Husserl, this meant developing a theoretical attitude to a particular issue under investigation. Rather than privileging the theoretical attitude, Ahmed argues that we need to pay close attention to the practical experiences of those involved with policy implementation. By examining how employees, engaged in policy implementation, face institutional barriers, for example, we observe the ways in which it may be difficult to effect institutional change. The practical knowledge gleaned from workers involved in change efforts can help researchers not only understand why change efforts meet with difficulties, but also better understand institutional norms that many people take for granted. Thus, for Ahmed, practitioners’ practical knowledge of policy implementation can illuminate institutional norms that other employees fail to recognise. Throughout its history, Ahmed (2006) contends an institution takes on the “shape of norms that are repeated over time and with force” (p. 91). Over time, these normative ways of thinking become imprinted on institutional policy and practices, and have an effect upon those individuals who work within an institution. The end result is that normative ways of thinking and acting may hamper attempts to effect institutional change. As an instance, in many organisations, such as higher education spaces, “heterosexuality functions as a background” (p. 87). The background norms of an institution affect an individual’s experience of their spatial environments. Institutional norms also influence our relationships with one another, since workplace environments are replete with past gestures, assumptions, and intentions. Indeed, Ahmed contends that “gender norms regulate bodies and spaces” (p. 176), and this regulation has an effect on institutional practices. Through Ahmed’s investigation (2019) into how sexual harassment complaints are handled on university campuses in the UK, as well as her examination of the institutional barriers affecting the introduction of diversity strategies (2007, 2012), she illustrates some of the difficulties practitioners encounter in their work. It is as if the practitioner finds themselves bumping up against an “institutional wall” (Ahmed, 2012, p. 10). Although this institutional wall works to block change, this barrier may be invisible to those not involved in this work. Nevertheless, the institutional effects are tangible to those concerned with policy implementation, since they act as a barrier to organisational change. Ahmed (2017) describes how these walls

232

R. A. Gardiner and J. Chisholm

are, in effect, “hardenings of histories into barriers in the present” (p.  135). For practitioners, these barriers act as a way for an institution, and specific actors within it, to resist organisational change. In this section, we have provided some background to Ahmed’s work. Adopting her approach in our research may help us understand how policies meet institutional barriers, but also assists us to comprehend the effects that these institutional barriers may have on those tasked with the implementation of, in this case, gender-based violence policies. Next, we offer more detail about the context for our study.

Research Context Gender-based violence is an international problem, affecting individuals and communities around the world (Kendall, 2020). Although this is a pervasive global issue, scholars have noted that gender-based violence is pervasive on university campuses (Senn et al., 2014), the focus of our study. Specifically, our study focuses on higher education institutions in Ontario. A 2018 study indicates that, of more than 160,000 students of diverse genders surveyed, 63.2% reported experiencing at least one instance of gender-based violence while studying at an Ontario post-­ secondary institution (COU, 2018). These findings echo earlier studies which suggest that one-third of women enrolled at Canadian universities experience gender-based violence during their first year of study (DeKeseredy et  al., 1993; Senn et al., 2014). In addition to the individual trauma experienced by survivors, gender-based violence on campus has institutional impacts, affecting the academic success of students, and the culture of the workplace for faculty and staff (Quinlan, 2017). Recommendations resulting from the above-mentioned studies highlight the role of administrators, staff, faculty, and students, in efforts to prevent gender-based violence, and the need for structural change at the institutional level (Cahill, 2017; Quinlan, 2017). The on-going problem of gender-based violence in Canadian universities has caused greater demand for institutional accountability and action, especially from students (Garcia & Vemuri, 2017). And, in 2016, the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities (OMTCU) adopted a Gender-Based Violence and Harassment Action Plan (SVHAP) that requires all publicly funded post-secondary institutions to enact policies to address sexual and gender-based violence experienced by students. Although faculty and staff may also experience sexual and gender-­based violence on campus, students are deemed an especially vulnerable group to whom the institution is responsible. According to the OMTCU (2016), gender-based violence encompasses “any sexual act or act targeting a person’s sexuality, gender identity or gender expression, whether the act is physical or psychological in nature.” Included in the SVHAP document is a requirement that institutions “appropriately accommodate the needs of students affected by gender-based violence” (OMTCU, 2016). Such accommodations include academic supports, counselling, advocacy and awareness campaigns, as well as gender-based violence

16  It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism…

233

prevention and educational training. Although there has been an increase of formal supports on university campuses, it appears few sexual assault survivors actually use these supports (Holland & Cortina, 2017). Moreover, while some institutions report that informal processes offer a confidential way of dealing with complaints, Ahmed (2017) contends that the major reason that complaints about gender-based violence are not made public is to protect the organisation. So, while institutions often argue that handling cases in an informal manner is in the best interest of survivors, this emphasis on secrecy is potentially harmful both to survivors and others whose future safety may be at risk if the institution masks the extent of the problem (Whitley & Page, 2015). In addition, addressing how gender-based violence is framed in university policies is important because the way that it is defined influences how acts of gender-­ based violence are perceived. In most higher education institutions, gender-based violence is described as pertaining to an individual aggressor, rather than an expression of institutionalised sexism (Dougherty & Godstein Hode, 2016). What this individualised definition implies is that gender-based violence has no relationship to the institution, and can be dealt with by sanctioning or removing the offender. (What this suggests is that, if organisations get rid of the bad actor, then the problem is dealt with; we suggest however that this is but one part of a larger issue.) Furthermore, this definition often prioritises whiteness, heteronormativity, and masculinity. Defining gender-based violence in this manner fails to identify other aspects of identity as important and, therefore, does not provide an inclusive approach to understanding and responding to gender-based violence (Lockwood Harris, 2018). This definition also fails to account for how gender-based violence is influenced by implicit and explicit institutionalised sexism. To better understand the extent to which gender-based violence policies encourage institutional change on university campuses, we examined relevant policies, and their implementation, at two Ontario universities. Our study had three main phases. First, we conducted a policy analysis in which we examined the institution’s gender-­ based violence policies in detail, connecting them with other institutional and government documents, as well as examining similar policies at other universities. Next, we engaged in an institutional mapping exercise, whereby we explored how the policies are implemented (Gardiner et al., in press). We follow Smith’s (1987) assertion that individual experiences of, and within, institutions are coordinated through discourses and texts. In our study, institutional gender-based violence policies were interpreted as texts which coordinate social relations. Turner (2006) suggests that mapping, as a method of inquiry, has an “analytic goal to situate the text back into the action in which it is produced, circulated and read, and where it has consequences in time and space” (p. 140). So, in our process of mapping, our goal was to understand how gender-based violence policies coordinate social relations within the university, between students, staff, faculty, and the institution. In the final phase of this research project, we interviewed key actors in both universities involved in the implementation of these policies. And, in what follows, we share some preliminary findings from our research study.

234

R. A. Gardiner and J. Chisholm

Tracing the Silencing Effects of Institutional Sexism In this section, we explore some themes that arose from our interviews with those employees tasked with the implementation of gender-based violence policies, as well as with some institutional leaders at each institution who had some involvement with the policy. The two institutions involved in this study were chosen, in part, due to the differences between them, both in geography and student body. These interviews were conducted at each campus by one of the authors of this paper. The interviews were then transcribed by either the interviewer or another member of a four-person research team, two of whom were graduate students. Following this, the authors of this chapter separately read through the transcripts and identified initial themes. Once this was done, the researchers shared their insights and further developed themes. As the study as a whole integrates institutional ethnography (Smith, 1987) with Ahmed’s practical phenomenology, the approach taken was one that blended these two methodologies, and was also in line with feminist epistemologies that consider embodied, intersubjective perspectives. Although ethnography and phenomenology may seem disparate methodologically, Dorothy Smith, the founder of institutional ethnography, was heavily influenced by the work of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Campbell, 2003), giving a common intellectual heritage. As such, these two approaches complement each other. Our document analysis, alluded to earlier, illustrates that each institution had stand-alone policies and procedures for dealing with gender-based violence that were markedly different from one another, despite resulting from the same provincial legislation. Thus, it was important to view and understand each policy, and the practitioners tasked with implementing them, within their particular institutional context. However, alongside these differences emerged important themes, and points of connection, that go beyond the individual institution, highlighting the impact of broad systemic and institutional sexism. In the extracts that follow, we concentrate on three interconnected themes: institutional silence, the lack of institutional clarity regarding issues like disclosure, and the gap between policy and practice. Additionally, because of the sensitive nature of this study, and in the interest of ensuring anonymity, we are not including a table that gives information about each participant, or any other identifiers. Our research shows that the silencing of those who have experienced gender-­ based violence on university campuses occurs in different ways. For example, silencing can occur through university procedures that may become bureaucratic and overly cumbersome. One practitioner discussed how the university process was “starting to mirror the length of the criminal code process.” This lengthy process results in some students feeling “in a kind of limbo state.” This limbo state means that the student is unable to move beyond the trauma of the event, as a result of the slow institutional response. But it also places the practitioner in a difficult position, since as the embodiment of the organisation, she has to provide counselling to the student, while remaining silent about her own misgivings about the effects of these long-drawn out processes on those most vulnerable. Thus, institutional silencing

16  It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism…

235

has an embodied effect not only on those who come forward with a complaint, but also on those practitioners who seek to help students with this problem. In many ways, these practitioners are caught “betwixt and between” as they try and help students on the one hand, but have to be mindful of institutional practices, on the other. This problem is not one that only affects workers in higher education, it may also affect any practitioner who is tasked with dealing with the problem of gender-­ based violence in an institutional setting. Institutional silencing also occurs as a consequence of policy limitations. For example, one practitioner explained that a survivor’s desire to remain anonymous, while understandable and valid as a response to gender-based violence, could prevent a complaint from moving forward. This participant described procedural and legal limitations on the kinds of sanctions and disciplinary procedures that can be imposed as a result of anonymous complaints. In this case, procedural fairness was a pillar of the institution’s gender-based violence policy, which means that a respondent has a right to hear, and respond to, a complaint against them. Thus, if a survivor wishes to remain anonymous for any reason, including fear, their complaint is relegated to a file drawer, and effectively silenced. These limitations produce embodied effects for both the survivor, who may feel disbelieved or unsupported, as well as embodied effects for the practitioner who may feel ineffectual, or constrained by the policy. Similarly, other participants described this kind of silencing as especially difficult for practitioners, because it can mean that they become aware of offenders on campus whom they are unable to remove or discipline. Another problem that practitioners discussed was the problem of disclosure. By the time that some students consult with a practitioner, they may have already talked to several people. In doing so, they relive the trauma. The problem, institutionally, is one of a lack of clarity as to what an employee has to do when someone discloses to them. On campus, a research participant explained “there isn’t the same idea that if someone discloses to you, you have to do something with that information.” This participant went on to state that students often say “I told someone and they didn’t give me the resources.” Not only was there a problem in gaining the right resources, but it seems there was also a problem with follow up. This lack of a coherent response suggests that some employees are unsure of their role and responsibility when it comes to gender-based violence. But the result is that it also can leave the student feeling isolated and alone. Other participants discussed how there was a lack of institutional clarity with regard to what to do when a student discloses to you. Sometimes, students do not want their disclosure to be known, and ask for their story to remain silent. Yet the effects of keeping silent can have major adverse impacts on some students’ academic careers. Research participants talked about the unfairness that could ensue because of a lack of institutional clarity on disclosure. For example, one student may fail an examination, because they did not realise that they could get accommodation, whereas another student may have been well-counselled and, as a result, know their rights. In an attempt to redress this concern, one institution has included provisions in their gender-based violence policy to provide support and accommodations for students regardless of the formality of their complaint. However,

236

R. A. Gardiner and J. Chisholm

receiving support and accommodation still requires disclosure, and this means having the knowledge of where, and to whom, to disclose. Further, one practitioner described the difficulty in educating faculty about the academic accommodation provisions in their institution’s gender-based violence policy. Specifically, accommodation requests approved by the practitioner were to be honoured without additional inquiry or request for information from the professor. Therefore, a lack of institutional clarity around disclosure can lead to other institutional problems. Furthermore, when it came to issues of non-disclosure, several practitioners discussed how few racialised or Indigenous students reported an offence at their institution. This is not to suggest that instances of gender-based violence do not happen to these individuals. Rather, it appears that some racialised students are unwilling to make a formal or informal report. Several participants stated that this lack of reporting may be because most counsellors are white. For some racialised students, practitioners suggested an institutional culture of whiteness may negatively influence their desire to report an incident of gender-based violence. The issue of a lack of disclosure was something that some participants exhibited passionate feelings about. One participant argued that learning institutions had a responsibility to teach students that it was important to disclose instances of gender-­ based violence. This was not only for their individual well-being, but that many of those who commit offences may be serial offenders. When those who have been harmed do not come forward, then this allows the offender to continue to harm others. This issue surfaced in many interviews. Yet, we argue that this issue is far from simple, and that practitioners have to be cautious that they do not push people into making a criminal report, if that is not what they want to do (Cahill, 2017). Those who worked closest with victim/survivors seemed to us the most sensitive about how to handle each individual case.

The Gap Between Policy and Practice At both sites, individuals reported challenges to successful policy implementation due to their institutional structure. One particular challenge that surfaced across several participants’ accounts was that of silos within the institution. The siloing of departmental responsibilities led to, what one participant described as, “students falling through the cracks.” Similarly, another participant talked about the disjointedness in policy implementation, stating “it’s important to think about the interaction between the policy, and the people doing the work and the institution. It’s very disjointed.” What became apparent, therefore, was despite best efforts to avoid inconsistency in applications of the policy, sometimes inconsistencies occurred. What this meant, in effect, is that in the institutions where the alleged attacks took place there were different responses. Not only that but, in some cases, there was a lack of sharing of information such that an occurrence may not get reported in the

16  It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism…

237

same way that an alleged attack gets reported elsewhere. These reporting challenges are ones that institutions need to consider. Other issues were raised by research participants that may be considered as “outliers,” but nonetheless are relevant to not only individual, but also institutional responses to the issue of gender-based violence on campus. For instance, one research participant noted the distinction between university and criminal processes, and highlighted a disconnection between the types of evidentiary support required for an institutional complaint, versus the burden of proof required for criminal proceedings. The participant explained that the institution need not prove an assault took place; in order to act, they must only show probability. Despite the fact that institutions do not have the authority to place criminal charges or impose prison sentences, demands on survivors to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an assault took place, remain. This demand for irrefutable evidence echoes broad societal beliefs about gender-based violence, its victims, and perpetrators. But not all participants regarded policy implementation of gender-based violence as important. In one interview, a participant argued that, although he was told that the university was a violent space, he strongly disagreed. In his words, “I don’t see it.” Because this individual had never witnessed gender-based violence occurring on campus, from his perspective, it was erroneous to refer to the university as a place of violence. For this individual, there were too many anecdotes about gender-based violence, and not enough hard evidence. This participant’s view is included, even though it represents something of an outlier in our study, because it represents a view that is not uncommon in Canadian society. From a phenomenological perspective, this narrative also illustrates how a person’s orientation toward a particular issue influences what comes into view. That is, how we perceive institutional violence will depend, in part, upon our individual, embodied experience of the world. The problem here is that our individual experiences and way of being-in-the-world may preclude us from understanding the experiences of others. Who we are influences what appears to us. This is why Ahmed’s idea that phenomenology is as much a practical concern as a theoretical orientation is important. Viewing these interviews through a practical phenomenological lens, therefore, helps us to be open to re-orientation, encouraging the interviewers to understand how the way people view the world affects the ability to effect institutional change in both positive and negative ways.

Discussion and Conclusion In this chapter, we have considered the implementation of gender-based violence policies at two universities in Ontario, Canada. Our research suggests that, in dealing with gender-based violence, an organisation, and its employees, need to be willing to have candid conversations about barriers that may restrict the successful implementation of a policy. One barrier that emerged from our interviews is that of implicit or explicit sexist institutional practices. It is because masculine ways of

238

R. A. Gardiner and J. Chisholm

being and doing permeate many institutions, that some individuals fail to perceive, or even comprehend what others regard as instances of gender-based violence on campus. To mitigate organisational sexism requires leaders to have the courage to tackle this problem openly. For this to take place, those in positions of institutional power must be willing to listen to uncomfortable truths. This may call for leaders in positions of power to be open to listening to diverse emotive voices. Rather than seeing an emotional response as an irrational response, it is necessary to understand that some organisational truths can only be expressed in an embodied and emotive way. We call for leaders in higher education to employ what Jill Blackmore (2013) describes as “a politics of discomfort,” that is, to be willing to allow institutional actors to speak up. What became apparent to us is that institutional sexism has a sticky quality in institutions, not least because some individuals refuse to listen to perspectives that differ from their own. In the past, despite good intentions, many institutional policies have failed in their objective to decrease the problem of gender-based violence on university campuses. One problem that arises from this research is that, at times, these policies were understood either on a superficial level, or ignored by most people, while the institution continues to follow “business as usual.” Although there are strong advocates, on each university campus, who were part of this research, with each trying to change institutional culture, there was, according to our research participants and our own observation, a lack of connection to the issue of gender-based violence by most employees and students. As such, these policies act as “non performatives,” (Ahmed, 2010) meaning that what policies state will happen, and what occurs are different. Furthermore, although many higher education institutions profess a desire to address the issue of campus violence, some victims/survivors of gender-based violence argue that they have been further harmed by the processes institutions put in place to deal with this problem (Ahmed, 2019). Such processes are often highly confidential, since they are designed to ensure that the names of those involved are kept secret. But this organisational confidentiality has another purpose, which is to restrict any possible reputational damage to the institution. And, at times, this focus on preventing damage to the institutional reputation may inadvertently damage those who are most vulnerable. Put simply, institutional silence with regard to gender-­based violence on campus perpetuates sexism in the university (Whitley & Page, 2015), as was clear from our participants’ responses. Returning to Ahmed (2014b), she argues that we need to think through how “denials or justifications of sexism work as a social system” (p.  9). In her view, institutional sexism represents “a set of attitudes that are institutionalized, a pattern that is established through use, such that it can be reproduced” (p. 10). Hence, the institutional reproduction of sexism, alongside racism and other isms, permeates many higher education establishments. Because the diverse forms of gender-based violence are a component of an institution’s culture, these issues cannot be excised without broad structural change across the institution. Finally, there is a need to think differently about who is responsible for gender-­ based violence on campus. From our discussions with those whose work was to assist victims/survivors we heard that their work often goes unnoticed. Up until

16  It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism…

239

recently, many of those working in the front lines had short-term contracts. In fact, for one institution in our study, these front-line staff positions were created as a response to the SVHAP mandate, and are thus still in their institutional infancy. Through our interviews, we also learned that, because of emotional burnout, there was a frequent turnover of staff. These staffing issues could easily be addressed by higher educational institutions, some of whom have begun the task of changing these practices, by creating full-time permanent staff positions, and seeking guidance from faculty who specialise in gender-based violence. However, it is still the case that many universities employ young women to do this work, many of whom have little seniority in the institution. As a result, their voices are only partially heard which, in turn, influences the ability to develop policies that emerge from embodied experience and are person-centred. Further, this lack of voice that practitioners mentioned is a serious issue, since their work is vital to the success of the implementation of these policies. Thus, we urge higher education institutions to rethink their hiring practices with regard to practitioners working on the front lines of gender-based violence in university settings. Otherwise, there is a lack of effective organisational support for those most at risk, which ultimately risks any attempt to change organisational culture.

Implications for the Future In considering future implications, our research suggests that taking an embodied, relational approach to understanding policies may help us better understand how there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to addressing gender-based violence on university campuses. What this means, in effect, is that it is not sufficient for organisations to simply develop a policy; policy development must also address the needs of diverse individuals who work and study in the organisation. Rather we need to pay attention to the diversity of individual experience, as well as the systemic and cultural roots of gender-based violence. For this to happen, what is required is not only a comprehensive policy, but also a clear implementation plan that considers the embodied viewpoints of different stakeholder groups. In other words, we need to attend to the different effects such policies have on those to whom it applies, as well as on those who are tasked with implementation. There needs to be room for those most affected by the policy to have a say, and for faculty who do research in the area of gender-based violence to be included in discussions. Otherwise, we end up with policies that focus on consent. But consent, or lack thereof, is merely a starting point. There needs to be broader conversations so as to develop a deeper understanding of the ways in which gender-based violence is not only a violation of a person’s autonomy, it also undermines “a person’s ability to determine their own bodily experiences” (Cahill, 2017, p.  278). These conversations are ones that all institutions could benefit from since, by discussing these issues openly, we may be able to engage in meaningful ethical discourse about human dignity, and how all embodied agents are worthy of respect.

240

R. A. Gardiner and J. Chisholm

The ability to eradicate organisational sexism requires a new attitude not just from the institution, but also from all those individuals who work and study in it. An attitudinal change requires acknowledging, as Susan Brison (2020) contends, that gender-based violence is rooted in patriarchy, not only within organisations but also within society more generally. Therefore, our research suggests that, if we wish to eradicate gender-based violence, we need to dismantle sexism and other forms of oppression. This requires seeing gender-based violence not only as an individual problem, but also as a cultural practice that needs to be eradicated. This eradication cannot be done in any meaningful way by policies alone. Policies can help an institution navigate this issue, but what is needed much more is the political and institutional will to effect wide-scale change. In conclusion, we advocate for a person-centred embodied approach to policy development and implementation that may help in understanding the different needs of the diverse members of the campus community. Thinking about policy making through a feminist embodied lens enables us to think about how policies may be interpreted differently by diverse groups. This attention to different interpretations is of critical importance to ensuring that the policies that we develop are ones that have value to the various stakeholders who are affected by them. Finally, rather than developing policies at an abstract level, using the thinking tools that Ahmed provides can offer guidance into how practitioners in diverse institutions can develop and successfully implement policies that speak to the diversity of lived, embodied, experience. Acknowledgements  We thank Kasey Egan and Hayley Finn for the assistance they provided us on this part of the project. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

References Ahmed, S. (2006). Queer phenomenology: Orientations, objects, others. Duke University Press. Ahmed, S. (2007). ‘You end up doing the document rather than doing the doing’: Diversity race equality and the politics of documentation. Ethics and Racial Studies, 30(4), 590–609. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01419870701356015 Ahmed, S. (2010). The promise of happiness. Duke University Press. Ahmed, S. (2012). On being included: Racism and diversity in institutional life. Duke University Press. Ahmed, S. (2014a). Practical Phenomenology. Retrieved July 17, 2020 from https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/06/04/practical-­phenomenology/ Ahmed, S. (2014b). Sexism: A problem with a name. New Formations, 86, 5–13. Ahmed, S. (2017). Living a feminist life. Duke University Press. Ahmed, S. (2019). Damage limitation. Retrieved October 15, 2019 from https://feministkilljoys. com/2019/02/15/damage-­limitation/ Blackmore, J. (2013). A feminist critical perspective on educational leadership. International Journal of Leadership in Education, 16(2), 139–154. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360312 4.2012.754057

16  It’s Not Just One Bad Actor: Tracing the Embodied Effects of Institutional Sexism…

241

Brison, S. (2020). What’s consent got to do with it? North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP) conference, held online, July 16, 2020. Cahill, A. J. (2017). Why theory matters: Using philosophical resources to develop university practices and policies regarding sexual violence. In E. Quinlan, A. Quinlan, C. Fogel, & G. Taylor (Eds.), Sexual violence at Canadian universities: Activism, institutional responses, and strategies for change (pp. 275–291). Wilfred Laurier University Press. Campbell, M. (2003). Dorothy Smith and knowing the world we live in. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 30(1), 3–22. Council of Ontario Universities. (2018). Student voices on sexual violence survey results. Retrieved August 2020, from https://ontariosuniversities.ca/wp-­content/uploads/2020/02/ COU-­Overview-­of-­Survey-­FindingsFinal.pdf DeKeseredy, W.  S., Schwartz, M.  D., & Tait, K. (1993). Sexual assault and stranger aggression on Canadian university campuses. Sex Roles, 28(5), 263–277. https://doi.org/10.1007/ BF00289885 Dougherty, D. S., & Goldstein Hode, M. (2016). Binary logics and the discursive interpretation of organizational policy: Making meaning of sexual harassment policy. Human Relations, 69(8), 1729–1755. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726715624956 Garcia, C.  K., & Vemuri, A. (2017). Theorizing “rape culture”: How law, policy, and education support and can help end sexual violence. Education and Law Journal, 27(1), 1–17. X, XII.  Retrieved from http://ezproxy.lakeheadu.ca/login?url=https://www-­proquest-­com. ezproxy.lakeheadu.ca/scholarly-­journals/theorizing-­rape-­culture-­how-­law-­policy-­education/ docview/1983614241/se-­2?accountid=11956 Gardiner, R. (2018). Hannah and her sisters. Leadership, 14(3), 291–306. https://doi. org/10.1177/1742715017729940 Gardiner, R., Chisholm, J., & Finn, H. (in press). Translating gender policies into practice: Mapping ruling relations through institutional ethnography. In V. Stead, C. Elliott, & S. Mavin (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in gender and management. Edward Elgar. Holland, K. J., & Cortina, L. M. (2017). The evolving landscape of Title IX: Predicting mandatory reporters’ responses to sexual assault disclosures. Law and Human Behavior, 41(5), 429–439. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000253 Kendall, T. (2020). A synthesis of evidence on the collection and use of administrative data on violence against women: Background paper for the development of global guidance. UN Women. Lockwood Harris, K. (2018). Yes means yes and no means no, but both these mantras need to go: Communication myths in consent education and anti-rape activism. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 46(2), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/00909882.2018.1435900 Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities. (2016). The Sexual Violence and Harassment Action Plan Act (Supporting Survivors and Challenging Sexual Violence and Harassment). Retrieved August 2020, from http://www.tcu.gov.on.ca/pepg/audiences/pcc/factsheet12.html Quinlan, E. (2017). Institutional betrayal and sexual violence in the corporate university. In E. Quinlan, A. Quinlan, C. Fogel, & G. Taylor (Eds.), Sexual violence at Canadian universities: Activism, institutional responses, and strategies for change (pp. 61–78). Wilfred Laurier University Press. Senn, C.  Y., Eliasziw, M., Barata, P.  C., Thurston, W.  E., Newby-Clark, I.  R., Radtke, H.  L., Hobden, K. L., & Study Team, S. A. R. E. (2014). Sexual violence in the lives of first-year university women in Canada: No improvements in the 21st century. BC Women’s Health, 14(135), 135. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12905-­014-­0135-­4 Smith, D.  E. (1987). The everyday world as problematic: a feminist sociology. Northeastern University Press. Turner, S. M. (2006). Mapping institutions as work and texts. In D. Smith (Ed.), Institutional ethnography as practice (pp. 139–162). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Whitley, L., & Page, T. (2015). Sexism at the centre: Locating the problem of sexual violence. New Formations, 86, 34–53.

Chapter 17

Embodiment and Professional Education: Implications for Practice Elizabeth Anne Kinsella

and Stephen Loftus

Abstract  In this chapter, we review some of the themes that have emerged from the rest of the book. We also take a look at trends that suggest themselves for further work and development in the field of embodiment and professional and higher education. Key ideas that emerge are action, practice, story/narrative, arts, performance, intersubjectivity, emotion/affect, healing, technology, intersectionality, and institutional structures. Taking the lens of embodiment to these themes can reveal insights that offer the chance to deepen our understanding of what professional education (and professional practice) is all about. Embodiment also offers us a means to engage with the ontological aspects of professional education, and practice, and integrate these with the epistemological. The goal is to provide our students with a more integrated education that prepares them for the realities of professional practice by addressing their humanity in its fullness. Keywords  Embodiment · Epistemology · Ontology · Professional practice · Professional education What might it mean to take embodiment seriously as an organising framework for professional education? The answers are far from straightforward, and they reach further than we initially imagined. The ‘embodied turn’ or the ‘corporeal turn’ offers a fundamental paradigm shift from our traditional ways of thinking about knowledge, with profound implications for professional practice and professional education.

E. A. Kinsella Institute of Health Sciences Education, McGill University, Montreal, Canada e-mail: [email protected] S. Loftus (*) Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4_17

243

244

E. A. Kinsella and S. Loftus

As we reflect back on the contributions of this book, we are struck by the implications opened up concerning ‘epistemology’ and ‘ontology’. Questions of ‘what it means to know’ and ‘what it means to be’ change shape when we deeply consider embodiment. In professional education, one view of epistemology has long tended to dominate: propositional (textbook) knowledge, Aristotle’s episteme. It is now becoming clearer that much professional knowledge is also tacit (Polanyi, 1967) or embodied. Newcomers to a profession must still learn this tacit embodied knowledge, but it is often part of a hidden curriculum. Tacit knowledge is much harder to articulate and describe and tends to be ignored because of this. Accepting the importance of embodiment gives us permission to explore this tacit knowledge and to try to articulate it. If we do, there is the promise of being able to provide a more realistic professional education that better reflects real-world practice. This tacit knowledge is not the same as the technical skills of performing certain procedures, Aristotle’s techne, that must be explicitly taught, such as surgery techniques. However, tacit knowledge will also play a role here, although again it may not often be acknowledged. An example is the ability to quickly judge from contextual cues what is happening, and is likely to happen, in an overall situation. A specific example comes from critical care nursing. Benner et al. (2011) talk about the ways in which experienced nurses develop a sense of ‘salience’, an ability to judge what really matters and make holistic assessments in complex work environments. A sense of salience becomes a part of someone. It is ontological. Professional education has been mostly preoccupied with epistemology and has to a significant extent ignored ontology. It is becoming clear that we need to pay much more attention to ontology in education and that embodiment can help us to do this. For example, many professions can become preoccupied with teaching students the minutiae of the things they do. There needs to be more awareness of how the minutiae relate to the bigger picture of professional practices. The bigger picture includes the intercorporeal and intersubjective relations of practitioners with others. This includes relationships that professional practitioners, as human beings, have with their clients and patients. There are also the relationships that practitioners have with colleagues, with the profession at large, and with themselves as people. There are also the relationships between practitioners and their working environments, as well as their relationships to the wider world. It is a common observation that many professionals, such as doctors, are not always good at looking after their own health and well-being and may not recognise when they themselves need help. A sensitivity to their own embodiment, and the ways this works out in practice, may help more professionals recognise when they are in need of help. On the other hand, a sensitivity to embodiment can help people be aware of what it is that helps them feel they are truly at home in their work and how they are bodily attuned to the other people around them and their work environment. This sensitivity to embodiment may also help professionals and organisations to consider the ways material or structural conditions shape embodiment for better or for worse. In his book The Absent Body, Drew Leder (1990) talks about how we come to recognise our own embodiment most acutely, when the status quo is disrupted, when our habits are challenged, and when our bodies are distressed. Leder says we

17  Embodiment and Professional Education: Implications for Practice

245

take the body for granted, that it is largely invisible and absent from our awareness until we experience disruption. This disruption can occur in all manner of ways: through illness, disability, imprisonment, technological change, managerialism, migration, disorientation, crisis, discrimination, or a pandemic. By reflecting on particular instances of bodily disruption, such as that experienced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, we can gain a sense of how our bodily being-in-the-world, our bodily routines, habits, and interactions with others, are often taken for granted. Reflection on these corporeal disruptions offers an opportunity to ‘see’ the role and significance of the body and bring the usually ‘absent’ body into view. As is often discussed, theories of embodiment frequently begin with a critique of the famous dictum of René Descartes ‘I think therefore I am’, which has underpinned Western understandings and our common conceptions over time. Critics posit that his philosophical work has perpetuated a profound split (perhaps unintentionally) between mind and body in our systems of thought. Ryle (1949) referred to this split as a ‘category mistake’ in which the mind is seen as separate from the body and as preceding or directing the body. Ryle employed the metaphor of the ghost in the machine to underline his argument, with the ghost likened to the mind and the machine representing a passive body that responds to its driver. Ryle and many others have expressed concern with the dualism this bifurcation creates, pointing out that the mind is not separate from the body, but rather the mind is revealed in the doings of people. For Ryle (1949), ‘The statement “the mind is its own place”, as theorists might construe it, is not true, for the mind is not even a metaphorical “place”. On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, the judge’s bench … the studio and the football field are among its places’ (p. 51). From this perspective, mind and body are intertwined through our embodied activity in the world (Johnson, 2007). As such, knowledge is cultivated and revealed not only through our minds but also through our practices, our actions, and our occupations in the world and through doing. Johnson contends that the idea that the mind acts like a driver of the vehicle of the body is ‘the illusion of the disembodied mind’ (2007, p. 2). He claims that this illusion is so deeply embedded in our psyches, and conceptual systems, that it can seem to be an inescapable fact. The influential cognitive scientist and philosopher Merleau-Ponty (2012) aimed to correct this dualist view and to emphasise the inseparability of mind and body and the inseparability of thinking and perceiving. For Merleau-Ponty, perception itself occurs through the lived body. To be is to have a body that constantly perceives the world through sight, touch, smell, taste, movement, and sensual experience. For example, when we go for a walk, our body engages in a dialogue with the world in which it finds itself: the legs move the body forward, the eyes offer visual information, and our kinaesthetic sense orients us in space. This kind of dialogue with the environment requires the constant taking in of information and the constant recalculation of route, speed, and effort. For Merleau-Ponty, this direct experience of the world and our body in it is pre-reflective. Merleau-Ponty views human beings not as spectators of the world, but rather as involved, interwoven, and living in the world as embodied beings (Leder, 1990). As such, knowledge is constantly being accrued through our senses and experiences as we move through the world. Merleau-Ponty’s

246

E. A. Kinsella and S. Loftus

work draws attention to how our embodiment is constituted through lived body, lived time, lived space, and lived relations, with profound implications for thinking about how knowledge is embodied (Harrison et al., 2019). As we look across the chapters, we are presented with various ways to think about and work with embodiment. The significance of the lived body, as a means of perception and knowledge generation, becomes central, and the ways in which discourses, institutions, policies, and structures shape embodied experience also enter the conversation. So, what are the implications of all of this for professional education? In the following, we reflect on some of the considerations that arise and on what it might mean pedagogically to ‘bring the body back in’ and take embodiment seriously in professional education.

Action The idea of embodied action in professional practice is underlined in a number of chapters. Actions reveal tacit and embodied knowledge which can extend beyond the idea of a prior intellectual operation as informing action. Attention to embodiment helps illuminate tacit dimensions of professional actions in ways that can bring them into view and that recognise what Boyer (2005) refers to as the ‘corporeality’ of expertise, what Schön (1987) refers to as knowing-in-action, and what Ryle (1949) discusses as ‘know-how’. For professional education, the importance of experiential learning that involves ‘doing’ is underlined. Recognition of embodied action as fundamental to professional expertise affirms the emphasis in many professions of experiential learning. Embodied action perspectives call for learning through ‘doing’ and highlight the importance of supportive contexts for trial and error, such as simulation labs, role-playing, and active engagement through technology.

Practice The embodied nature of practice is a topic that arises in a number of the chapters. For Green, embodied perspectives point to ‘the primacy of practice’. Practice which is at the core in all professions is fundamentally embodied. Emphasis in professional education has been on theory at the expense of practice or the body, and that practice needs to be explicitly interrogated, rather than simply seen as ‘real-world’ engagements and work activities. Schwarz helps us see how practices are embodied not just by individuals but within the collective. Intercorporeality, the bodily nature of interaction between professionals in practice, shapes how decisions and judgements are made. For professional education, the primacy of practice points to the significance of practice-based learning opportunities on more levels than we may have imagined. Learning through apprenticeship, theatre laboratories, practicum or fieldwork placements, community service, and co-operatives all offer opportunities

17  Embodiment and Professional Education: Implications for Practice

247

for embodied learning. Further, opportunities for interprofessional learning in practice-based contexts in which students become aware of and experience intercorporeality, and collective judgement and action, become important.

Story The power of story to ‘show’ dimensions of embodiment is compelling. The majority of chapters in this book incorporated stories or vignettes to bring the intangible aspects of embodiment to life. Stories compel attention and advance embodied understandings. Stories can help engage imagination in new directions. An important take away for teaching and learning in professional education may well be the power of story to ‘make visible’ embodied forms of knowledge. The use of vignettes, case studies, narratives, and stories from practitioners, service users, instructors, students, media, fiction, theatre, movies, and blogs can all be artfully employed in professional education pedagogy.

Arts Another thread woven across the book is the connection between the arts and embodiment. We are reminded of what Heywood and Sandywell (1999) refer to as the hermeneutics of the visual as we are shown how image, metaphor, and art can reveal messages beyond words and speak to us in embodied ways. For professional education, various forms of aesthetic engagement can offer pathways to embodied learning. Bringing the arts and humanities into professional education through arts-­ based images, metaphor, poetry, body maps, photography, and other means, and engaging students in reflection on arts as well as processes of creation, may all advance pedagogy that takes embodiment into account.

Performance Many of the chapters in this collection show how, from an embodied perspective, identity is performed. It is performed through ritual, tradition, discourse, practice, arts, writing, theatre, carnival, technology, gesture, and bodily interactions. Embodied identity is performed in ways that shape the ‘becoming’ of a professional, on an ontological level. The performative aspects of embodied being in the world are revealed through the work of theatre laboratories, theatre of the carnival in nursing education, various art-making performances, and performance of doings, sayings, and sensings in practice. They are also evidenced through the performance of teaching and learning, for instance, as revealed when embodied performance

248

E. A. Kinsella and S. Loftus

changes shape between face-to-face and technologically mediated teaching and learning spaces. Recognising the performative nature of embodied identity has implications for professional education. Creative modes of pedagogy that bring in playful and performative dimensions such as theatre, carnival, artistic performances, musical performances, poetic performances, role-play, and simulation may be productive in fostering embodied approaches to teaching and learning. Recognising teaching and learning activity itself as an intercorporeal performance can encourage educators to employ more creative means in their teaching repertoire and to consider the ways in which bodies are situated and interact through the learning activities provided.

Intersubjectivity Intersubjectivity is a theme that permeates a number of the chapters and is featured in the work of Merleau-Ponty. Intersubjectivity recognises the social world ‘as the permanent field or dimension of existence’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 379). Our subjectivities are not islands, but are constantly shaped, and reshaped, in interaction with others through our embodied being-in-the world. Intersubjectivity may involve shared communication through non-verbal gesture, intercorporeality, or dialogue: ‘In the experience of dialogue, a common ground is constituted between me and another; my thoughts and his form a single fabric’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 379). Intersubjectivity can be seen in various ways across the chapters with related ideas such as co-presence, collective practice, expressive subject, gestural communication, collaborative sense-making, dialogue, ethics of relations, and the sociality of practice, as linked to this notion. Educators in professional education contexts can make efforts to attend to intersubjectivity in the design of teaching and learning activities. This can be done by recognising its importance and providing opportunities for collaborative dialogue, relationship building, and shared decision-making in the classroom and in fieldwork learning. The significance of group work and interprofessional work that involves meaningful collaboration and exchange is underlined by recognition of intersubjectivity. Fieldwork and practicum workplace education provide opportunities for future practitioners to engage intersubjectively with colleagues and with service users. The use of power within intersubjective professional relationships, and the shaping of identity within such relationships, is a topic worthy of consideration in professional education.

Emotion/Affect Emotion is a topic that has not traditionally been a central focus in most professional education programmes, as the focus often tends toward propositional or technical forms of knowing. A number of the practice stories in this collection are

17  Embodiment and Professional Education: Implications for Practice

249

visceral and reveal embodied emotive responses in the practitioner. A focus on embodiment draws attention to the emotive and affective domains of being. Educators can recognise the link between emotion and embodiment in professional education and consider these dimensions in teaching and learning contexts. In times of high rates of burnout and attrition from many professions, how might we help practitioners to recognise embodied emotions and the signals they may be offering in practice? What might it mean, for instance, to feel butterflies in one’s stomach, a sinking feeling in the chest, or a pounding in the head in the midst of practice? How might practitioners learn to recognise, work with, and use emotions productively in their practices? What harm may be done by the suppression of embodied emotion in the name of supposed professionalism? At the individual, relational, and systemic level, what are the possibilities for creating educational programmes, structures, and institutions that support the emotional well-being of future professionals?

Healing A number of the chapters point to ways in which attending to embodiment can foster healing. The use of aesthetic representations in the education of professionals entrusted with the healing of others provides one example. The healing that can occur through mind-body awareness and embodied mindfulness practices offers another. At a more structural level, healing can be promoted at a broader level by recognising, and taking steps to mitigate, structural racism, colonial legacies, environmental degradation, gender-based violence, and a vast array of oppressive structural arrangements that shape embodiment. While healing may not be a dimension of professional education that we generally think of, the well-being of future professional practitioners is without question in the interests of society at large. For higher education, we might think of pedagogical practices that promote the well-being of individuals, such as bringing arts and humanities into teaching and learning, making time for exploration of the deeper dimensions of the self through reflection, fostering collegial dialogue and relational approaches to teaching and learning, offering movement or mindfulness exercises within our classrooms, and recognising professionals as adult learners. In terms of healing at a broader structural level, classrooms can serve as locations for critical questioning and critical reflexivity and for keeping alive the conversations about ethics, diversity, equity, and social inclusion – and the ways these dimensions shape human embodiment.

Technology There are many questions to be contemplated at the intersection of embodiment and technology. How does technology, like a mobile phone or tablet, for instance, shape embodiment in relation to our individual and collective identities, within our

250

E. A. Kinsella and S. Loftus

relationships and intersubjectivities, and within professional practices and professional education? More and more technologies are utilised as extensions of our bodies. With technologies being implanted into bodies, used as augmentative communication, and as robotics  – they have the potential to shift our very identities. Technologies are also used within the professions, for instance, in healthcare professions through telehealth; electronic healthcare records; information seeking; scheduling and calendar management; visual and textual notekeeping; knowledge exchange through social media; and virtual communities of practice. The rise of new media technologies, such as virtual games and avatars, and computer-mediated interactions create new enactments of our embodied selves and become fused with our habits and routines and in some instances – such as in the use of data gloves and helmets – with the very contours and surfaces of our bodies (Kosut, 2011). All of these dimensions raise important issues related to how technology intersects with embodiment and professional practice with implications for professional education. Further, technologically mediated education itself shapes the embodiment of teachers and learners. Technology can be used in ways that create disconnection and a sense of disembodiment, or it can be used with pedagogical principles that take embodiment, intercorporeality and intersubjectivity, and the affordances of technologically enhanced learning into account. Professional educators can foster critical reflection with students on how technology shapes embodiment in professional life. Educators can optimise the virtual learning space, recognising it as offering a location for a different kind of embodiment, and optimise the affordances of technology-enhanced learning and its transformational potential.

Intersectionality Attention to embodiment has a long and diverse history that should be acknowledged. There is a longstanding conversation in Eastern cultures and spiritual traditions on overcoming mind-body dualism through various contemplative practices that have now become popular in the West. There are indigenous scholars who discuss indigenous embodiment through oral tradition, breath, storytelling, arts, dance, ritual, and relationship with others, with nature, and with the land, as well as how people are embodied through colonial legacies. There are conversations emerging around intersectionality and embodiment. There are intersections of race, gender, sex, sexuality, class, ability, nationality, citizenship, religion, disability, age, and body type and conversations about how these shape embodiments in particular ways. There are discussions in the feminist literature that take up embodiment related to gender, sexuality, patriarchy, control of the body, and the problematics of everyday life. There are conversations in critical disability studies calling for recognition of difference and for a culture that makes space for the embodiments of disabled people. There are crucial conversations taking place on race, racism, and embodiment  – with important conversations about how bodies are positioned in society and how structural forms exercise power over particular bodies. Professional

17  Embodiment and Professional Education: Implications for Practice

251

education classrooms can offer spaces for critical reflexivity and exploration of the ways in which any number of these intersections shape embodiment, as well as possibilities for transformative change. The conversations open up crucial considerations related to ethics, equity, diversity, inclusion, culture, decolonisation, sustainability, and justice.

Structures The body enters the social world through facilitating and playing mediating roles between human agency and social structure (Shilling, 2003). For Foucault, the body is the field upon which the play of powers and knowledges is worked out (e.g. Foucault, 1994). ‘The body is acted upon, inscribed, peered into; information is extracted from it, and disciplinary regimes are imposed on it, yet its materiality also entails a resilience and thus also (potential) modes of resistance’ (Grosz, 1994, p.  146). Recognition of how structures constitute embodiment in various forms, such as through structural racism, colonial legacies, environmental degradation, gender-based violence, patriarchal structures, and an array of oppressive arrangements, is an important conversation for the future of the professions and the health and well-being of society at large. The insidious nature of managerialism and neoliberal policies and how they shape the bodies, practices, and well-being of professional practitioners are important dimensions for further exploration. If we are to move toward transformative change, critical scholarship that explores and makes visible these domains is urgently required. The field of professional education requires ongoing critical examination of these larger structural issues and how they shape embodiment. Education that develops critical reflexivity, dialogue, and praxis may help lay the ground for the preparation of future professionals who are capable of transforming the status quo.

Conclusion In this chapter, we’ve drawn together some key ideas from across the book to consider how taking embodiment seriously might shape professional education. There are of course many more ideas within the chapters themselves which we do not have the space to unpack here. For those interested in bringing embodied perspectives into higher education, it may be useful to consider how embodiment is engaged, mediated, and/or constituted in relation to action, practice, story, arts, performance, intersubjectivity, emotion, healing, technology, intersectionality, and structure. Attention to these domains may be fruitful for the enactment of pedagogy that attends to embodiment in higher education. As we look back across the chapters, we recognise that this is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of important questions and concerns that a consideration of

252

E. A. Kinsella and S. Loftus

embodiment opens up. This project extends earlier work focused on the body in professional practice, learning, and education (Green and Hopwood, 2015) by extending conversations and focusing particularly on professional and higher education. Theories of embodiment, and the practices that reveal them, constitute a paradigm shift of profound significance. The stories and theorising in this book open up an important line of inquiry and dialogue that we hope will contribute to new ways of thinking about professional education in the future.

References Benner, P., Hooper Kyriakidis, P., & Stannard, D. (2011). Clinical wisdom and interventions in acute and critical care: A thinking in action approach (2nd ed.). Springer. Boyer, D. (2005). The corporeality of expertise. Ethnos, 70(2), 243–266. Foucault, M. (1994). The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception. Vintage Books. Green, B., & Hopwood, N. (Eds.). (2015). The body in professional practice, learning and education: Body/practice. Springer. Grosz, E. (1994). Volatile bodies. Indiana University Press. Harrison, H., Kinsella, E. A., & DeLuca, S. (2019). Locating the lived body in client-nurse interactions: Embodiment, intersubjectivity, and intercorporeality. Nursing Philosophy, 20(2), e12241-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.12241 Heywood, I., & Sandywell, B. (Eds.). (1999). Interpreting visual culture: Explorations in the hermeneutics of the visual. Routledge. Johnson, M. (2007). The meaning of the body: Aesthetics of human understanding. The University of Chicago Press. Kosut, M. (2011). Virtual body modification: Embodiment, identity, and nonconforming avatars. In M. Casper & P. Currah (Eds.), Corpus: An interdisciplinary reader on bodies and knowledge (pp. 155–170). Palgrave MacMillan. Leder, D. (1990). The absent body. University of Chicago Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge. (Original work published 1945). Polanyi, M. (1967). The tacit dimension. Routledge. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Hutchinson. Schön, D. (1987). Educating the reflective practitioner. Jossey-Bass. Shilling, C. (2003). The body and social theory. Sage.

Postscript Stephen Loftus

and Elizabeth Anne Kinsella

If there is one overarching theme that sums up the contributions in this book it is the importance of the body in our relationships in professional education. In order to better understand these relationships we need deeper insights into the role the of body in setting up, navigating and maintaining relationships. It is worth re-­emphasising the idea that we have a ‘creatural existence’ or, in phenomenological terms, an embodied-being-in-the-world and this is the foundation of all learning. Ignoring this foundation is a risky business and such ignorance can alienate the embodied human beings who participate in professional education, teachers and students alike. It is a common observation that the university, where most professional education now occurs, is believed to be a special place where there can be a meeting of minds. Such a viewpoint tempts us to overlook the body and see it as a mere vessel for the mind and we then insert an artificial separation into human beings that we call mind and body dualism. This separation is so deep-seated that it has come to seem a self-evident truth to many in the Western world. We can then be easily seduced into forgetting that our embodiment plays a much-neglected role in higher and professional education. The body does not simply play a minor role in somehow supporting the mind. Mind and body are one. It is time to ‘bring the body back in’ to our conception of what it means to be a thinking human being, especially a human being who is on the way to becoming a professional practitioner and who must form relationships with real (embodied) people in the real world. Schön (1983) reminds us that professional practice takes place in the ‘swampy lowlands’ of the real world and not the ivory towers of academe. S. Loftus (*) Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected] E. A. Kinsella Institute of Health Sciences Education, McGill University, Quebec, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4

253

254

Postscript

We have bodies that are immersed in those swampy lowlands, and bodies that are productive of, language, culture and social relationships of all kinds. Talk of the mind can be a convenient shorthand for referring to the more sophisticated ways in which our bodies engage in complex relationships and make sense of the world around us. In this book we hope to have opened up ways to start conversations about how embodiment  – including our intersubjective and intercorporeal relations  – affects all this and how we can utilise such insights within professional education and practice. The pandemic, in which this book was written, has served to emphasise the importance of exploring our embodiment, with nearly all of the writers experiencing disruption to taken-for-granted forms of embodiment in their work. So many of us had to reconsider, and reframe, the embodied aspects of the relationships we have in professional education. At the time of writing, the implications and consequences are still being worked out. There are so many different kinds of relationship that are influenced by embodiment. Student/teacher relationships are just the start. There are relationships with technology, relationships with people from radically different positionalities and cultures, relationships between individuals and the institutions within which they teach and/or learn, relationships with workplaces, and relationships with larger societal structures. To sum up, the relationships we have with education that prepares real people for real world professional practice are many and complex. Explorations of the ways in which the body plays a role in such education offers us the chance to engage with the complexities in promising ways. We will close with a quote, used in the opening chapter of this book, “if the body had been easier to understand, nobody would have thought that we had a mind” (Rorty 1979, p. 239).

References  Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press. Schön, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner. Basic Books.

Index

A Absent body, 244 Action, 246 Affordances, 198, 201 Ahmed, S., 230 Ambiguity, 127 Analogical thinking, 45 Arts, 247 Augmented reality learning, 198 Awareness, 30, 90 B Bakhtin, M., 72 Body map, 97 Body mapping, 106, 109 Body-subjects, 2 Butterfly metaphors, 172 C Carnival, 4 Cartesianism, 3 Collective action, 29 Collectivity, 30 Community of practice, 145 Competency-based approach, 144 Creative genealogy, 58 Critical reflexivity, 164

D Dewey, J., 3 Digital tele-presence, 185 Disability, 73 E Embodied attunement, 144 Embodied learning, 170 Embodied science, 136 Embodiment, 243 Emotion, 51, 248 Empathy, 28, 34, 155 Epistemic humility, 126 Ethics, 121 Experience, 145 F Feminist ways of knowing, 164 G Gender-based violence, 230, 232 Goethe, J.W., 136 Goethe's science, 136, 139 H Healing, 249 Hermeneutics, 141

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Loftus, E. A. Kinsella (eds.), Embodiment and Professional Education, Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4827-4

255

Index

256 I Indigenous epistemology, 166 Indigenous ways of knowing, 164 Institutional silencing, 235 Intercorporeality, 30, 35 Intersectionality, 250 Intersubjectivity, 20, 187, 248 Intuition, 44 Intuitive perception, 137 K Kinship, 66 L Land, 166 Liminality, 50 M Machine behaviourism, 185 Managerialism, 219 Master mariners, 151 Mazur, E., 47 Medical humanities, 143 Merleau-Ponty, M., 3, 21 Mindfulness, 90 Mirror neurons, 157 Myths, 75

Physical co-presence, 185 Poetry, 76 Policy analysis, 234 Post-Cartesian, 15 Practice, 246 Practice architectures, 214 Practice theory, 13 Praxis, 36 R Reflective practice, 107 Reflective writing, 93 Relationship, 142 Respect for patient integrity, 126 Rorty, R., 10 S Social structure, 251 Social work, 14 Story, 247 Synthesis, 140 T Technology, 249 Technology enhanced learning (TEL), 197 Theatre anthropology, 59 Threshold theory, 49 Transnational feminism, 169 Two-Eyed Seeing, 168

N Neoliberalisation, 214 Neoliberalism, 214 Neurophenomenology, 149 Newton, 136

V Volosinov, V.N., 3 Vygotsky, L.S., 46

O Ontology, 244

W Wisdom, 3

P Perceptive imagination, 139 Performance, 247 Performative writing, 164 Phenomenology, 39, 108 Phronesis, 36, 145

Y Yearning for justice, 128 Z Zone of proximal development, 205