Emancipation and consciousness : dogmatic and dialectical perspectives in the early Marx 9780631141013, 0631141014

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Emancipation and Consciousness

In

Memoriam

Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979)

"Weitermachen"

Emancipation and Consciousness Dogmatic and Dialectical in the

Early

Perspectives

Marx

Erica Sherover-Marcuse

Basil Blackwell

©Erica Sherover-Marcuse 1986 First published

1986

Basil Blackwell

Ltd

108 Cowley Road, Oxford

0X4

1JF,

U.K.

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York,

NY

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All rights reserved.

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by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or that

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shall not,

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is

published and without a similar condition

including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication

Sherover-Marcuse, Erica Emancipation and consciousness

:

Data

dogmatic and

Marx. Marx, Karl, 1818-1883— Sociology Marxian school of sociology

dialectical perspectives in the early 1.

2. I.

Title

301'.092'4

HX39.5

ISBN 0-631-14101-4 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Sherover-Marcuse, Erica, 1944Emancipation and consciousness. Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral

—Johann Wolfgang Goethe University,

Frankfurt/Main) Includes index. 1. I.

Marx, Karl, 1818-1883.

2.

Philosophv, Marxist.

Tide.

B3305.M74S52 1986 ISBN 0-631-14101-4

335.4'11

85-18711

Typeset by Oxford Publishing Sendees, Oxford Printed in Great Britain by Page Bros (Norwich) Ltd

1

Contents

Acknowledgements Note on Translations and Abbreviations

Introduction: 1

Some

vii

ix

Framework and Goals of this Study

1

2

Methodological Considerations

2 Marx's

Two

Perspectives on Emancipatory Consciousness

3 Contemporary Perspectives on the Concept of "Two Marxisms"

4 The

Crisis in

5 Chapter

1

Marxism

1

2

The Roots of a Dogmatic

Perspective 17

Subjectivity

The Wood Theft Articles and The Estates and Those of No Political

the "Origins of Marxism"

18

Estate in Hegel's

20

Philosophy

4

The Poor as the Elemental Class of Human The Universalist Subjectivity of the Poor

5

Propertylessness and Universality

6 7

The Benefits of Non-Membership The Poor as Philosopher Kings

8

Marx's Transformation of Hegel's Concept of the Poor

34

9

36

10

The Jacobin Conception of the Virtuous Poor The Jacobin Emphasis on Education

1

Conclusion

43

3

2

15

Articles:

Towards Emancipatory

8

12

Summary

The Wood Theft

4

Society

24 27 29

in Civil Society

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight": The Emergence of a Towards Emancipatory Subjectivity

Dialectical Perspective

31

32

41

45

1

Feuerbach's Theory of Mystified Consciousness

47

2

Feuerbach's Solution: Idealist Voluntarism

54

9

vi

Contents 3

Marx's Reformulation of Feuerbach's Theory of Mystified

4

Mystified Consciousness as a Social

5

Marx's First Discussion of the

57

Consciousness

The Dogmatic

3

4

62 67

Perspective

6

Marx's Solution:

7

Conclusion

Dogmatic and

Phenomenon Reform of Consciousness:

The

71

Incipient Dialectical Perspective

73

Dialectical Perspectives

on the "Jewish Question" 74

1

The

2

Marx's Critique of Bauer's Position

3

Marx's Refraining of the "Jewish Question": Marx as

"Jewish Question" and Bruno Bauer's Solution

74 76

"Anti-Semite"?

81

4

Inverted Consciousness and Inverted Reality

85

5

Mystified Consciousness as A-Historical Consciousness

88

6

Emancipatory Subjectivity: The Dogmatic Perspective

92

7

Emancipatory Subjectivity: The Dialectical Perspective

95

8

Conclusion

97

Dogmatic and

Dialectical Perspectives in Marx's First

98

Discussion of the Proletariat 1

2 3

4 5

6

7

8

5

The Impossibility of a Political Revolution for Germany The Theoretical Possibility of a Radical German Revolution The Positive Possibility of a Radical German Revolution The Universal Character of the Proletariat: Analysis and Critique The Proletariat and Philosophy The Revolutionary Consciousness of the Proletariat: The Dogmatic Perspective The Dialectical Perspective in Religious Guise: The "Internal Priest" Conclusion and Summary

In Lieu of a Conclusion: 1

Towards

The Dogmatic Conception

A

Continuing Issue

in

An

a Dialectical

Marxism

98 100 102

104 1

07

113

117 1 1

122

of Emancipatory Subjectivity:

Marx's Thought

Attempt

123

2

Western Marxism:

Conception of Emancipatory Subjectivity

1

3

A

135

Practice of Subjectivity:

A

to

Recapture a Dialectical

Preliminary Outline

32

Notes

143

Index

204

Acknowledgements

for this book came from the intersection of my life with the and work of Herbert Marcuse. The context within which this study took shape has been the continuing conversation I have had with him. I began working on the manuscript when I was a graduate student in the Philosophy Department of the University of California, San Diego. I

The impetus

life

submitted

it

as a doctoral dissertation to the Philosophy Faculty at the

Johann Wolfgang Goethe University In the course of its evolution

many

friends;

I

I

outcome

impossible to mention

those to

For

list is

Frankfurt/Main

have discussed the ideas in

responsibility for the final

following

in

all

in

June 1983.

have shown the text (or portions of it) to is

it

with

many more. The

of course mine alone.

whom

I

owe

It

would be

a debt of gratitude; the

of necessity incomplete.

a variety of helpful criticisms

I

want

to thank: Bettina

Aptheker,

Carol Becker, Liora Beer, Sandy Boucher, Barbara Brick, Harry Brod,

Cohen, Robin Cohen, Helmut Dubiel, Iring Fetscher, Friedland, Beth Haas, Juergen Habermas, H. Stuart Hughes, Lumei Hui, Audree Jinnies, Terry Kupers, William Leiss, Aurora Levins -Morales, Suzanne Lipsky, Leo Lowenthal, Heinz Lubasz, John McFadden, Harold Marcuse, Peter Marcuse, Margit Mayer, Osha Neumann, Gail Pheterson, Annie Popkin, Moishe Postone, Carl Ratner, Carl Shames, Jeremy Shapiro, Thee Smith, Donna Warnock, Victor Zamudio. John Burke, a friend and colleague from graduate school days, and Joy Marcus, a comrade in many causes, read and commented on the N. O. Brown, Robert

S.

Lew

manuscript

at a crucial juncture.

For additional support and encouragement: Beatrice Agman, Gail Boehm, Lisa Blum, Sylvain Bromberger, Gayle Cribb, Josie Foulks, Marilyn Golden, Hilda Gutierrez-Baldoquin, Martha Herbert, Joke Hermsen, David Jernigan, Sharon Kaiser, Nancy Lemon, Pam McMickin, John and Lydia Martin, Odette Meyers, Barry Mike, Edna Myers, Rachel Neumann, Yeshi Neumann, Maria Papacostaki, Pam

viii

Acknowledgements

Roby, Inez Roelofs, Alexandra Saur, Alice Sherover, Jane Sprague Zones, Lida Van den Broek, Stacey Zones. David Weingarten read countless drafts of the Introduction and the Conclusion: his love and support in the hard months after Herbert's death made a crucial difference, and continue to do so. I owe a special debt to Gus Bagakis who read and edited several versions of this manuscript with great care and attention, who listened for long hours as I wrestled with a phrase or a paragraph, who initiated me into the trials and the glories of a word processor (and rescued me when my mastery of the technology failed), and who cooked, cleaned, shopped

and

in general did

much more

than his share.

Note on Translations and Abbreviations

and made some use of the standard English translations (where these were available) of Marx, Hegel, Bruno Bauer and Feuerbach, but the actual translations are my own. For ease in locating passages which I have cited I have used a system of dual references: to the German and to the English language editions. I have rendered passages in gender-neutral language. Sometimes I have pluralized pronouns; on other (rarer) occasions I have used "he or she," I

have

referred

to

or "his or hers." I have used the following abbreviations in the notes: MEGA for Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov (Frankfurt for Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Collected a/Main: 1927-32);

MECW

Works

(New York:

Engels,

WERKE

International Publishers,

(Berlin: Dietz Verlag,

1975);

MEW for

1956 onwards).

Marx-

Introduction:

Framework and Goals of This Study

The present study undertakes a critical re-examination of Marx's earliest conceptions of the relationship between social existence and consciousness. My aim is to bring a new perspective to bear on some of Marx's early writings

and thereby

to

illuminate the origins of a persistent

Marxist tradition regarding transformative conscioushope that the implications of my discussion will prove

difficulty in the

ness.

It

is

my

many

useful to people engaged in the

struggles for fundamental social

change. attempt to disengage and to interrogate Marx's early theory of "emancipatory consciousness." This early theory has a twofold significance for present day Marxist thought. On the one hand, it In the following pages

I

reveals that certain difficulties in in his earliest writings;

on

Marx's

the other,

unexplored) sources of strength. theoretical roots of the

It

it

social theory are already present

points to potential (as yet largely

contains, at least in part, both the

contemporary

"crisis in

Marxism" and the seeds

of a possible solution.

At the outset of this project we are faced with a paradox: Marx himself never speaks about "emancipatory consciousness." Indeed it is a commonplace of Marx scholarship that his various remarks about the class consciousness of the proletariat are never formulated into a systematic account. Nevertheless I contend that we can legitimately speak of "Marx's early theory of emancipatory consciousness," and that a re-exploration of this theory can provide some new insights for contemporary radical practice. What I have termed "emancipatory consciousness" can be understood 1

as the "counter-concept" of mystified or ideological consciousness. In

the

most general sense, therefore, emancipatory consciousness can be

defined as the forms of subjectivity that tend towards a rupture with the historical system of domination. More specifically, emancipatory subjectivity

would be those

attitudes, character traits, beliefs

that are both conducive to

and supportive of the

and dispositions

sort of radical social

2

Introduction

transformation that the young

emancipation."

Marx

characterizes as "universal

human

2

This study traces the development of Marx's theory of emancipatory consciousness from his first discussion of the problem of poverty in 1842 to his first analysis of the possibilities of a radical revolution toward the end of 1843. In the former, Marx passionately defends the traditional rights of the rural poor; in the latter, he proclaims the revolutionary mission of the proletariat. In situating the discussion of Marx's early theory of emancipatory consciousness within these textual boundaries I do not mean to suggest that other early texts, such as the 1844 Manuscripts or the German Ideology, would prove uninteresting on this issue. Nor am I intending to argue for another hard and fast "periodicization"

of Marx's thought.

My

intent

is

to

focus critical

which has generally been ignored by other studies, the pre-history of Marx's conception of transformative consciousness. This pre-history remains important. Its themes appear in different form in Marx's mature writings, as well as in the work of subsequent Marxist thinkers. Thus the present discussion of Marx's early writings seeks both to advance the contemporary understanding of the Marxist tradition as a whole and to contribute to the ongoing process of critical attention

on

a subject

reflection within this tradition itself.

However, the issue of emancipatory consciousness has a significance which extends beyond a concern with Marxist theory and practice. In the decades after Hiroshima and Nagasaki the development of a (collective) human consciousness that could inspire and guide a liberating social practice has

become

a vitally important matter.

3

Ultimately

it is

this issue

which has motivated the present reconsideration of Marx's early texts. It is my view that questions which are raised in embryonic form by Marx's theory of emancipatory consciousness present an increasingly urgent challenge to contemporary movements for fundamental social early

change.

1

To

Some Methodological Considerations disengage a theory from a surrounding body of thought is to engage of intellectual venture. The aim of such a venture is

in a particular kind

on a body of thought in such a way that new contours of thought structure emerge as a result of the process of critical examination. To disengage a theory is to interrogate a text or group of texts from a perspective which reveals that the body of work so interrogated contains answers to questions which hitherto could not be to focus attention this

3

Introduction

posed. As a result of the interrogation, previously unnoticed facets of an intellectual

apparent.

may

system

To

appear; sometimes points of tension

disengage a theory

through a more powerful

is

to

examine

may become

a thought structure

it were, a lens which illuminates what were previously taken to be either merely anomalous remarks or unimportant comments.

critical lens as

the theoretical significance of

The

practice of critical reflection involved in disengaging a theory

from a body of thought

Such

is

tantamount

to a conceptual reconstruction

making

of

what in the texts is only implicit, articulating the theoretical constructs which a thinker uses to analyze or explicate those issues which engage her or his reflective interests. To disengage a theory from a body of thought is to engage in the time-honored intellectual project of attempting to understand a thinker better than that thinker understood herself or

this thought.

himself.

a reconstruction consists of

explicit

4

This study understands itself as an instance of conceptual reconstruchermeneutical venture in the sense described above. It is for this reason that I speak of disengaging what I term the young Marx's theory of emancipatory consciousness. I am well aware that Marx may not have taken himself to be constructing such a theory, and I am aware as well of the risks involved in attempting to reconstruct such a theory without attributing positions to Marx which he does not hold. Nevertheless, the current project is not ungrounded; not is it without internal justification in Marx's own work. For although the young Marx does not explicitly address the issue of emancipatory consciousness, he does elaborate a theory of mystified consciousness. He is concerned to tion, as a

analyze both the causes and the nature of those inclinations, attitudes,

and beliefs that tend to strengthen and perpetuate the continuum of domination. Thus it is Marx's own

values, character traits, dispositions

theory

of mystified

consciousness

that

constitutes

the

theoretical

construct which legitimizes the present attempt to reconstruct his theory

of emancipator}- consciousness.

The

following discussion takes the form of a chronological analysis of

it focuses both on the concept of mystified consciousness and on the concept of emancipatory consciousness. As

four of Marx's early texts;

noted, it is only the former which is a matter of explicit concern for the young Marx. Because of this, the exegetical task with regard to it is considerably more straightforward than it is with regard to the issue of

emancipatory consciousness. Marx's theory of emancipatory consciousness has to be ferreted out and reconstructed from his remarks on other issues.

The

possibility-

of putting words in Marx's mouth

is

always present;

I

4

Introduction

have tried to minimize this danger by basing my discussion on the problematics of the texts themselves. In this way the project of disengaging and critically examining Marx's views on emancipatory

can itself be contextually grounded. My goal throughout has guard against imposing an external perspective on Marx's concerns, and to carry out an immanent critique of his thought. subjectivity

been

2

to

Marx's Two Perspectives on Emancipatory Consciousness

Marx's early thinking about emancipatory consciousness exhibits a one which regards emancipatory consciousness as contingent and problematic, and one which regards emancipatory consciousness as inevitable and unproblematic. I will argue that the first perspective takes a dialectical stance toward emancipator) subjectivity while the second treats emancipator)' subjectivity in a dogmatic fashion. In effect these two perspectives constitute two opposing models of emancipatory subjectivity. tension between two perspectives:

The Dialectical Perspective

The

dialectical

perspective views the development of emancipatory

consciousness as an ongoing project requiring an intentional practice

which focuses

explicitly

of this perspective

is

on the transformation of subjectivity. The heart

the recognition of the

phenomenon of internalized

oppression. 5 This recognition entails the understanding that an oppres-

and minds in the form of and attitudinal habits which are installed and "nourished" by the normal functioning of social intercourse itself. A

sive society recreates itself in its victims' hearts

behavior

patterns

towards emancipator)' subjectivity recognizes that of systematic mistreatment sediment themselves in the consciousness (and sub-consciousness) of the oppressed and that in the course of time these effects acquire both a "natural" appearance and a life of their own. As a result, oppression is recycled; mistreatment is passed along by the victims themselves. Having internalized the norms and values of the dominant group, members of an oppressed group often 6 mistreat each other in an unconscious imitation of their own suffering. A dialectical perspective understands that no oppressed group can remain immune to the institutionalized and socially empowered untruths which purport to "justify" its oppression. Describing this dynamic with dialectical perspective

the

effects

reference to the experience of colonization Albert

Memmi

speaks of the

Introduction

5

"echo" which the "mythical portrait" established by the colonizer "excites in the colonized":

Constantly confronted with this image of themselves, set forth and imposed on

and

institutions

all

human contact, how could the colonized help cannot leave them indifferent and remain a veneer blows with the wind. They end up recognizing it as one

in

every

reacting to their portrait?

which,

like

would

a

an

insult,

It

become a familiar description. The them and worries them even more because they admire and

detested nickname which has

accusation disturbs

"Are they not partially right?" they mutter. "Are we because we have so many idlers? Timid, because we let ourselves be oppressed?" Willfully created and spread by the colonizer, this mythical and degrading portrait ends up by being accepted and 7 lived with to a certain extent by the colonized. fear their powerful accuser.

not

A

all

a

little

guilty after all? Lazy,

dialectical perspective

towards emancipatory consciousness under-

stands that as a result of their

system, even people

who

are

life

experience under an oppressive social

engaged

in

movements

for radical social

have inevitably introjected or internalized various aspects of these conditions. It recognizes that an oppressive system also binds its victims to it, that there comes to be a certain "adherence," on the part of the oppressed themselves, to the prevailing order of unfreedom.

change

will

Accordingly, a dialectical perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity

assumes that in order to undo this adherence, individuals must engage in a deliberate and systematic attempt to transform their own consciousness in an emancipatory direction. In effect they must unlearn the habits of 9 thought and action that are the consequence of domination. This "unlearning" ought not to be regarded as a phenomenon which just "happens" in the course of other "more significant" transformative activity, but as a project in its own right, meriting both sustained and focused

effort.

effects of

"doing". therefore,

The

deliberate undoing, at the level

an oppressive social order

This as

subjectivity."

project

an

would be

intentional

is

more

practice,

of subjectivity, of the

actually a particular kind of

in

accurately

conceptualized,

effect

a

as

"practice

of

10

Finally, a dialectical perspective

towards emancipatory consciousness

views the goal of subjective transformation as a contingent process.

It

envisions the attempt to develop an emancipatory subjectivity as a project

whose outcome cannot be "guaranteed" by any other

either

by the laws of history or

factor.

To the extent that an analysis of Marx's early texts uncovers a conceptual framework which can incorporate the notion of internalized oppression, I will argue that these writings implicitly recognize the necessity of a practice of subjective transformation.

To

the extent that

6

Introduction

these texts imply that the development of emancipatory consciousness

is

be understood in this manner, i.e. as a contingent project involving a practice of subjective transformation undertaken by the emancipating agents themselves, Marx's perspective on emancipatory consciousness is to

dialectical.

The

use of the term "dialectical" to characterize a perspective which on the contingent nature of the process of subjective transformation may require some explanation, especially if one is accustomed to

insists

associating "the dialectic" with the inevitable forward

movement of

Reason or History. The justification for understanding the concept in this fashion can be found both in Hegel and in Marx. Hegel does indeed articulate a philosophy of history in which reason and progress always prevail, and there are passages in Marx which suggest that his conception of the transition to socialism is also wedded to this same notion of an inexorable progress.

11

But the core of both Hegel's and Marx's conception of dialectical is intrinsically opposed to the notion of an inexorable progress. For both Hegel and Marx the essence of dialectical thinking is its refusal to accept the givenness of experience and the immediacy of knowledge. This refusal makes dialectical thinking critical thinking par excellence. Both Hegel and Marx contrast the critical thrust of dialectical thinking with the dogmatism of unreflective consciousness which assumes that 12 things are as they are and that facts come ready-made. Dialectical thought seeks to expose the one-dimensional logic of domination; it seeks to comprehend the social processes which have become established facts. In so doing it attempts to uncover the social possibilities (not the thought

alleged certainties) of liberation.

Genuine

dialectical

thought must reject the notion of an inexorable

progress, for an inexorable progress

is

a guaranteed progress,

concept of a guaranteed progress treats the future

Inasmuch given,

it

as dialectical thought

will also

be

dialectical perspective

critical

is

critical

itself as

and the a given.

of the very concept of the

of the notion of the future as a given.

towards emancipatory subjectivity

A

will therefore

refuse to treat the project of subjective transformation as a given.

It will

refuse even the seductive promise of a given future.

The Dogmatic Perspective

The second model of emancipatory writings indicated,

is

constituted this

by very

consciousness in Marx's early

different

assumptions.

As already

perspective construes emancipator)- consciousness as

Introduction entirely unproblematic.

7

Marx's presentation of emancipatory conscious-

ness as unproblematic takes two forms. In the

first,

inasmuch presumed

emancipatory consciousness

is

regarded as unproblematic

segment of the population is to be immune to the consequences of domination. In this version, the members of this group are regarded as "already emancias the subjectivity of a particular

pated"

as far as their subjectivity or consciousness is concerned. Emancipatory subjectivity is viewed as a static property or as a set of qualities which inhere in people by virtue of their position in the social order. In effect emancipatory consciousness is regarded as a given which some social groups simply "possess." The emancipatory character of their subjectivity is posited as already attained and secure. The second version of the dogmatic perspective is most clearly illustrated by the early Marx's conception of the "reform of consciousness," the abolition of mystified consciousness. The dogmatism in Marx's discussion of this issue reveals itself in his assumption that

mystified consciousness will "collapse by itself," that

it

will "dissolve like

consequence of more substantial structural changes. In this version emancipatory consciousness is taken to be unproblematic inasmuch as its eventual appearance is assured. To the extent to which the emancipating agents can be said to undergo a process of subjective development, the outcome of this process is presumed to be certain. Emancipatory consciousness is treated as a phenomenon which can be expected to develop more or less automatically as a consequence of certain changes in a more fundamental set of conditions. Emancipatory consciousness is regarded as an epiphenomenon, a result of social change rather than a factor in bringing about such change. For both versions of the dogmatic perspective the issue of emancipatory consciousness is as good as settled. Both versions of this perspective regard emancipatory consciousness as a given. In one case emancipatory consciousness is regarded as a datum which already exists; in the other it is treated as a future given. Both versions consider emancipatory subjectivity without any reference to an intentional practice on the part of the emancipating agents. Indeed the dogmatic perspective excludes questions as to the possible need for a practice whose focus is the transformation of subjectivity. Such questions cannot even arise within its conceptual framework. While one variety of this perspective relies on guarantees provided by the givens of social existence, the other places its a thin haze" as a

benevolent laws of historical development. To the extent that Marx's early writings suggest that emancipatory consciousness is unproblematic in either of these two ways, his perspective on emancipatrust in the

tory consciousness

is

dogmatic.

8

Introduction

Contemporary Perspectives on the Concept of

3

"Two Marxisms" The Two Marxisms

Alvin Gouldner's

is

the most recent attempt to

consider the question of a tension in Marx's thought in a systematic fashion. Gouldner's thesis is that there is a tension in Marx's thought between a "Critical Marxism" and a "Scientific Marxism." Gouldner argues that each of these Marxisms can be viewed as a complete paradigm which is constituted by a contrasting set of assumptions and

presuppositions.

Marxism are divergent paradigms because Marx's concerned to discover laws independent of human will and which cannot be suspended by science itself, while his "critique" is concerned to exhibit the manner in which outcomes depend on human efforts. His science's standpoint, then, is deterministic and structural; his critique's and

Scientific

"science"

standpoint

Critical

especially

is

is

voluntaristic.

Gouldner claims out of their

own

13

that the

two paradigms continually generate each other Each paradigm thus requires the other.

deficiencies.

According to Gouldner the continual generation of the alternative paradigm is due to the fact that "neither Critical Marxism nor Scientific 14

Marxism justify the commitments they seek." Gouldner argues that the tension between the two Marxisms

exists at

the very center of Marx's thought in the form of a "nuclear tension

between voluntarism and determinism, between freedom and necessity." Each side of this polarity is "a true part of Marxism."

We

are not faced with only a seeming contradition that can be glibly resolved by

claiming that one side

is false,

Marxist, while the other

is

revisionist, opportunistic,

misguided, not really

the authentic, genuine, dyed-in-the-wool, true

revolutionary article.

Our Two-Marxisms

thesis

maintains

that

both

differentiations of a single originally undifferentiated

emerge in part out of an 15 Marxism.

the "two" original

effort to

are

in

Marxism;

fact

structural

that over time

reduce the real internal tensions of

be commended for attempting to develop "an auto16 critique of Marxism" and for refusing to avail himself of those facile explanations of possible difficulties in Marx's thought which attribute them to revisionist or misguided interpretations of his theory. But his discussion is permeated by a lack of critical reflection as to his own interpretive standpoint. This difficulty reveals itself from the start. Gouldner's attempt to analyze Marx's theory in terms of the antinomic

Gouldner

is

to

Introduction

9

tension between freedom and necessity treats the existence of this opposition as a given. For Gouldner "the nuclear tension between

voluntarism and determinism"

Western thought."

is

simply "part of the deep structure of

17

dogmatism in the Marxist tradition is Noting that even "conventional and normal science" has a "potential for dogmatism" which is inherent in the paradigm form, Gouldner poses the question: "why does this potentiality 18 blossom so fully in Marxism?" According to Gouldner the problem lies in the nature of Marx's "double-pronged project" of knowing and changing the world. It is at this point that Gouldner's failure to reflect on his own interpretive perspective causes difficulties. Gouldner simply assumes that it is Marx's "double-pronged project" itself which is the source of the dogmatic strains in his thought and in the subsequent Marxist tradition. Gouldner finds it problematic that Marxism is both "rational understanding and political practice: 'reports' about the world 19 but he offers no and a 'command' to do something to change it," argument for the Gouldner's only position. his argument for convincing attempt to Marx's problematic in inherently something view that there is need for "action's of "explanation" an is unite theory and practice assumptions unjustified itself makes which certainty," an explanation about the psychology of action. "Precisely because it is an effort to unite Gouldner's

of

analysis

particularly problematic.

theory and practice to change the world, there is great pressure to present 'theory' as a secured basis for action, rather than as problematic

need of further development. One cannot ask people to undertake great risks on behalf of uncertain theories." But by insisting on an inherent divergence between the aims of critical social theory and emancipatory practice Gouldner rejects out of hand the Marx's "Theses on in articulated perspective epistemological 21 attempt to "underany According to this perspective, Feuerbach." of acting in and on question stand" the social world which brackets the a spectacle to be becomes this world results in a false objectivity; history epistemology Marx's observed rather than a project to be undertaken. world and the comprehend regards the dichotomy between the effort to and

in

not as a self-evident given but as the expression of a particular conception of knowledge, a conception which itself

the project of changing

it

requires a socio-historical critique.

Gouldner's criticism of Marx's project is thus undertaken from a perspective which is external to Marx's own conceptual framework. Gouldner is at liberty to choose his own point of view but he has no right to assume that Marx's perspective is eo ipso problematic. Perhaps in spite of his intentions, Gouldner ends up with an interpretation of the tensions

10

Introduction

and difficulties permanent fate

Marx's thought which implies that dogmatism is a and that any practice guided by this theory will inevitably contain elements of the irrational. Gouldner's discussion of the tensions in Marxist theory contrasts sharply with attempts to grapple with this issue which attribute difficulties and contradictions in Marx's thought to the presence of "pre-Marxist" or "non-Marxist" elements in his thinking. One of the earliest examples of this approach is found in a 1924 review by Karl 11 Kautsky of Karl Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy. Kautsky draws a distinction between the "primitive Marxism" of the young Marx, who was infected with Hegelianism, and the scientific Marxism of the "genuine Marxist Marx" who elaborated the laws of dialectical materialism. Louis Althusser's argument for the existence of a "break" in Marx's work is essentially a modern day elaboration of Kautsky's position. For Althusser the offending "non-Marxist" element in Marx's work, in addition to the pernicious influence of Hegel, is Feuerbachian

humanism.

in

for Marxist theory

23

In contra-distinction to the external approach exemplified by Gouldner and the programmatic attempts to define and defend a "genuine Marxist Marx", Juergen Habermas and Albrecht Wellmer focus on the

question of a tension in Marx's thought from the perspective

immanent that

critique.

Habermas and Wellmer proceed from

Marx's original project

is

practical intent, a theory with

pation.

They argue

scientistic" aspects

Habermas

an interest

that this project

is

in universal

human emanci-

frustrated by the "positivistic-

of his thought.

we can no

Scientism claims that

itself;

that

is

the

longer understand science as one form of

must

24

knowledge with science." science has exclusive title to knowledge, hence that

possible knowledge, but rather

the

an

to develop a critical social theory with a

defines "scientism" as "science's belief in

conviction that

£)f

the premise

methods and value

identify

neutrality appropriate to the natural sciences are

forms of theoretical inquiry. Habermas contrasts this one-dimensional "scientistic self-understanding of the sciences" with the perspective of reflection which regards science itself as one form of knowledge. The perspective of reflection is thus inherently critical of the applicable to

attempt to

all

make

science the prototype of

all

knowledge.

from this perspective that Habermas approaches Marx. He argues that Marx's thought exhibits an analogous self-misunderstanding inasmuch as all forms of human practice are construed in terms of one form of practice: "instrumental action" (or labor). Habermas argues that the self-generation of humanity must be understood in terms of an interplay between "instrumental action" and "communicative action" (reflection and critique). For Habermas the problem is not Marx's actual It is

1

Introduction

research

practice

but

[Forschungspraxis]

misunderstanding) of

this practice.

2

1

understanding

his

Habermas maintains

(or

when

that

his own research practice, he conflates the dimension of "instrumental action" with the sphere of "communicative action" by "reducing" the latter to the former and assimilating the process of critical reflection to the process of material production. As a

Marx misunderstands

result, claims

Habermas, Marxism becomes

critical social theory.

The

a scientistic rather than a

26

of the confusion between scientism and

significance

reflection appears at the level of emancipatory social practice.

argues

that

a

social

scientistic

theory

"lends

substitution of technology for enlightened action"

technical

progress in the

27

critical

Habermas

countenance to the and tends to confuse

mastery of nature with progress in the

humane society. Wellmer follows Habermas in arguing

construction of a

dialectical

of the

process

that

self-production

Marx

interprets

human

of the

"the

species

28

As a result, claims from the viewpoint of labor". Wellmer, Marx's work contains an essential contradiction between a "shortened" [verkuertze] or "truncated" form of historical materialism and an "ideology-critical theoretical approach." The "shortening" unilaterally, that is

[Verkuerzung] of historical materialism consists in the attempt to trace

"the dialectics of morality back to the

Wellmer maintains

dialectics

Marx's truncated

that

of production."

historical

materialism

29 is

characterized by a "latent positivism" which tends to assimilate the

"hypothetic -practical status" of a theory with an interest in universal

human emancipation

to the (value-free) analytic-descriptive

Such an attempt

the empirical sciences.

according to Wellmer.

He

argues that

is

it is

truth of critical social theory in terms of a

empirical sciences.

"The

canons of

fundamentally misconceived, a mistake to conceptualize the

framework appropriate

truth of critical social theory

is

to the

a verite afaire [a

it can demonstrate its truthfulness hence the hypothetic-practical status

truth to be made]; in the last resort

only by successful

liberation:

peculiar to the theory."

30

The present analysis of the tension in Marx's early theory of emancipatory consciousness shares with both Habermas and Wellmer the project of undertaking an immanent critique of Marx's thought. Additionally, it shares the view that difficulties in Marxist theory are significant also at the level of practice.

distinguish

it

from

But both

focus and its method from other studies of

its

their discussions as well as

Marx's early thought. At this point it might be helpful to state very explicidy what I am not attempting to accomplish in this book. There are at least three types of investigations which are not being undertaken. (i) This study does not

1

2

Introduction

intend to be a systematic presentation of Marx's early thought.

31

(2) It

does not seek to provide a comprehensive account of the early Marx's relation to Hegel or to his contemporaries among the Young 33 Hegelians. (3) Finally, this study does not seek to be a work of intellectual history; it is both more and less modest than such a venture. It is more modest in that between 1842 and 1844;

its

historical scope

is

confined to the period

modest in that it seeks examination of a limited number of Marx's early texts contribution both to contemporary Marxist thought and it

is

less

to to to

use the

make

a

radical

practice.

4

The

As

early as

today

is

a crisis

Crisis in

Marxism

1927 the German Marxist Karl Korsch declared: "Marxism midst of an historical and theoretical crisis. It is not simply 3 within the Marxist movement, but a crisis of Marxism itself." * The in the

Marxism

notion that

in crisis has

is

become commonplace among

variety of twentieth-century social theorists

who

a

identify themselves as

Marxists. Thinkers as disparate from each other in their other concerns

and their readings of Marx's work as Georg Lukacs and Louis Althusser, Juergen Habermas and Stanley Aronowitz, have addressed themselves to 35 this issue. Although every thinker approaches the issue of a crisis in Marxism from their own perspective, the sense of the crisis tends to be articulated in terms of what Paul Sweezy describes as "the deviations between observed reality and the expectations generated by [Marxist] theory."

36

Goran Therborn sums up

the situation as follows:

Fundamental aspects of Marxist theory have been called into question both by its North America and Western Europe, and by the

historic defeats, so far, in

aftermath of

and

its

successes

political condition

-

Stalinism, the Sino-Soviet

split,

the present social

of that third of the world claiming to be governed by

Marxist theory. These and other contradictory and often unexpected develop-

ments of the union of Marxist theory and practice make 37 of a crisis of Marxism.

it

possible to speak also

Louis Althusser does not explicidy characterize this situation as a "crisis," but he addresses the issue of the gap between Marxist theory

and

social

development

in

analogous terms: "The revolution did not take

place in nineteenth century Britain, nor in early twentieth century

Germany;

it

did not take place in the advanced countries at

all,

but

3

Introduction

elsewhere,

Russia,

in

1

then later in China and Cuba, etc ... the

we know are either premature or miscarried." 8 Paul Sweezy comments bluntly that "None of [the] socialist societies 39 while for Georg Lukacs the thought they would," behave as Marx revolutions which

.

.

.

gap between Marxist theory and contemporary social reality looms so large that it seems almost appropriate to speak of "the death of Marxism." "One may say that Marxism, conceived as it should be conceived, as a general theory of society and history, no longer exists, 40

For Lukacs it is not so much an end some time ago." that the historical development challenges Marxist theory or calls it "into question," it is rather the case that "There are new phenomena about that

came

it

to

which we have nothing

to say."

4

In the main, the descriptions of the crisis in to bracket the question

Marxism

cited above tend

of the responsibility of Marxist theory

the gap between theory and practice.

These thinkers tend

to

itself for

view the

Marxism

as something caused primarily by extra-theoretical perhaps an exception here inasmuch as his claim that factors. Lukacs is "there are new phenomena" about which Marxist theory has "nothing to say" seems to acknowledge that there may be certain theoretical deficiencies in Marxist theory itself. But for Lukacs these deficiencies consist essentially of lacunae in Marx's work rather than in points of difficulty within the work itself. Thus Lukacs points to the incompleteness in Marx's studies: "For me it is clear that Marx never studied 42 This is a seriously the economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America." not do; it does comment about analytical work which Marx did not

crisis in

address the issue of there being difficulties in any of the analytical work which Marx did. And it is congruent with Lukacs's explanation of why

Marxist theory "has nothing to say" about "new phenomena." "Our analysis stood still, but capitalism continued to evolve. We stopped with Lenin. After him there has been no Marxism."

The is

implication here

is

clearly that the source of the crisis in

simply that, after Lenin, Marxist analysis

evolve.

work

is

The

itself

own And about the possibility that there for why subsequent Marxist analysis

issue of there being any theoretical difficulties in Marx's

internal theoretical grounds still,"

Lukacs maintains a discreet

silence.

description of the crisis but no explanation for

dynamics of Marxist theory

itself.

The

it

which Marxist theory has nothing attribute the crisis to the

problem

in

Lukacs thus has a terms of the internal

explanation which he gives

simply a reiteration of the claim that there are

To

Marxism

did not continue to

not considered by Lukacs.

may be "stood

43

is

new phenomena about

to say.

march of history

in other terms. Explanations of the crisis

is

simply to restate the

which seek

its

origin in

14

Introduction

the perversion of Marxist theory at the hands of later generations have an

unfortunate ad hoc character.

44

And

attempts to rescue Marxist theory by

Marxism as a description of the dynamics of capitalist society and Marxism as a guide to the construction of a humane socialist society succeed at their peril. They succeed in "saving" Marxism distinguishing between

only by cutting out

heart: the unity of critical social theory

its

emancipatory practice.

and

4

Marx's own emphasis on the unity of theory and practice demands that we approach the crisis in Marxism from another perspective, that we re-examine some of the internal difficulties and tensions in Marx's own thought. This perspective considers the role played by Marxist theory as social and political phenomena seem to constitute a challenge to the theory. I interpret Marx's emphasis on the unity of theory and practice to mean that such self-reflection is imposed on Marxism as an internal necessity. As a theory which seeks to comprehend the world in order to change it, Marxism must also subject its own concepts to continual re-examination

development of those

a factor in the

which

and

in turn constitute or

critique.

One

46

of the earliest advocates of this approach

critique

of the

theory

and practice

notwithstanding, Korsch insists that

is

Karl Korsch. His

Second International

of the

it is:

deceptive and even false to see the theoretical origins of the present crisis as resulting either

from a perversion or from an oversimplification of Marx's and

Engel's revolutionary theory at the hands of epigoni. juxtapose this degenerated, falsified

Engels themselves. In the Engel's theory as well.

Of

to the

It is

equally misleading to

"pure theory" of Marx and

final analysis, today's crisis is the crisis

of Marx's and

47

the recent commentators

Marxism from

Marxism

who approach

this perspective,

the issue of the crisis in

Albrecht Wellmer's position most nearly

my own point of view. Speaking of the need to engage in a re-examination of Marx's theorizing about the nature of the transition to socialism in the face of what he terms the "bureaucratic corresponds to critical

degeneration of socialist praxis," Wellmer says,

assumption that ...

if

"We must

not the nucleus then

correlative for the decline in practice

must be

at

least

start

a

from the

theoretical

available in the theorv

48 itself."

At this point I want to hazard a claim about the crisis in Marxism which can only begin to be addressed in this study: one of the central "theoretical correlatives" of the petrification of socialist practice

is

the

dogmatic conception of emancipatory consciousness which haunts the Marxist tradition itself. In other words, one of the internal factors in the

5

Introduction

origin of the crisis of

Marxism

lies in

1

a particular aspect of Marxist

theory.

To consider the crisis in Marxism from this perspective is not to proclaim that a given historical event or situation was the inevitable outcome of the inherent logic of Marx's thought, nor is it to engage in a purely negative undertaking.

On

the contrary, an exploration of Marx's

thought which seeks to uncover some of the theoretical roots of the contemporary crisis in Marxism may also unearth the seeds of a possible

same body of thought. The consequences of such an exploration may well require the rethinking of certain aspects of Marxist theory. This should not be understood however as a call to "abandon Marxism" but as an opportunity to re-articulate its 49 The present re -examination of Marx's early progressive function. theory of emancipatory consciousness is undertaken with this goal in solution to this crisis within this

mind.

5

Chapter

Summary

Chapter 1 examines Marx's first discussion of the problem of poverty and analyzes the assumptions which underlie his attribution of a universalist consciousness to the poor. This chapter argues that Marx's articles in the Rheinische Zeitung on The Wood Theft Debates contain the roots of a dogmatic view towards emancipatory subjectivity. As a background to Marx's own discussion I examine both Hegel's conception of estate-membership and his discussion of poverty in the Philosophy of Right. I also discuss the romanticized conception of poverty which is found in the writings of the Jacobin theorists Robespierre and Saint-Just. Chapter 2 analyzes Marx's first discussion of mystified consciousness in his Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" and juxtaposes it to Feuerbach's account of mystified consciousness in The Essence of Christianity. This chapter also examines Marx's first discussion of the reform of consciousness in his correspondence with Arnold Ruge in the fall of 1843. I argue that while Marx's own discussion of the reform of consciousness

is

dogmatic, his critique of Hegel's political philosophy

contains the seeds of a dialectical perspective.

Chapter 3 continues the examination of Marx's theory of mystified as this is articulated in the essay "On the Jewish Question." I argue that the dogmatic element in Marx's conception of the abolition of religious consciousness is contradicted by the dialectical implications of his own critique of Bruno Bauer's position. This chapter also reconsiders the issue of "Marx as an anti-Semite?" consciousness

1

6

Introduction

Chapter 4

is

Marx's "Introduction to The "Philosophy of Right." It examines Marx's first

a detailed discussion of

Critique of Hegel's discussion of the proletariat as "a class of civil society that civil

society." In this context

I

that the proletariat "possesses a universal character"

relationship

Marx

is

not a class of

discuss the implications of Marx's claim

and

I

examine the

sketches between philosophy and the proletariat. This

chapter argues that Marx's dogmatic conception of the proletariat exists in tension with the dialectical

conception of emancipatory subjectivity

suggested by the notion of a struggle against the "internal priest."

The concluding chapter contains an abbreviated discussion of the dogmatic conception of emancipatory subjectivity in several major works of the mature Marx. In this context it considers the emergence of "Western Marxism" as an attempt to recapture a dialectical conception of emancipatory subjectivity. It concludes with an attempt to articulate a preliminary criterion for a practice of subjectivity.

1

The Wood Theft Articles: The Roots of a Dogmatic Perspective Towards

Emancipatory Subjectivity

In the

fall

Marx wrote

of 1842

a series of articles for the Rheinische

which he sharply criticized the debates in law regarding thefts of wood. In proposed on Parliament a the Rhenish Marx concerned himself Debates, referred to as these articles, hereafter revealed himself to be a of poverty and for the first time with the problem of social justice, champion order and a trenchant critic of the established

Zeitung {'Rhenish Gazette'') in

a

compassionate advocate of the rights of the poor. In most discussions of Marx's early thought the Wood Theft

articles

have been accorded recognition primarily as stepping-stones in his

development. These articles are mentioned chiefly as indicators of Marx's turn towards economic and social issues. Most commentators tend to limit their remarks to a gloss on Marx's own statement: "In the year 1842-43 as Editor of the Rheinische Zeitung I experienced for the time the embarrassment of having to take part in discussions on so-called material interests. The proceedings of the Rhenish Parliament

first

on

thefts of

wood

.

.

.

provided the

first

occasion for occupying myself

with economic questions."

What most commentary on

Wood

Theft articles overlooks, however, is that Marx's first discussion of "economic questions" is structured by a perspective on poverty and the poor which remains central to his thought. In this chapter I will argue that Marx's articles on the Wood Theft Debates contain the roots of a dogmatic perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity. In particular I will argue that one of the

the key elements of his later conception of the proletariat as a class "not

of

civil

articles.

society"

is

already present in embryonic form in these early

1

The Wood Theft Articles

8

The Wood Theft

1

Articles

and the "Origins of Marxism"

In a recent article on Debates Heinz Lubasz argues against what he

describes as the "established thesis" concerning the origins of Marxism. According to Lubasz, the "established thesis" asserts that Marx's early thought is either "an application of Hegel's political philosophy to 3 [or] a speculative inversion of it." empirical reality .

The

.

.

established thesis as to the origins of

Marxism

is that

Marx's

initial

problematic was a philosophical one, and that only after he had cleared the philosophical decks did he concern himself, theoretically and empirically, with

economic matters, with the

role

of the proletariat,

and with revolution.

Philosophical speculation or reflection or critique are thus taken to have

furnished

As

Marx

with the foundation on which he was to build his theories.

against the established view

Marx

4

Lubasz maintains:

once empirically grounded and rooted in worked out his own concepts and methods by bringing empirical inquiry, theoretical analysis and value premises to bear on one another from the first; and that when he turned to Hegel or Feuerbach (or, for that matter, to Moses Hess) for ideas it was in quest of means with which to achieve a more sharply systematic formulation of 3 problems which arose for him out of his initial socio-political problematic. that

set out

from

a problematic at

the practical, socio-political issues of the day; that he

If Lubasz is only claiming that Marx's concern with the condition of the poor is not attributable to his doctoral discussion of early Greek 6 philosophy, there is nothing to dispute in his assertion. Indeed, in a draft of a new preface to the doctoral dissertation written at the time he joined the Rheinische Zeitung Marx explains why he has abandoned his earlier intention of incorporating the dissertation into a larger work on Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism. Marx writes that "political and 7 philosophical concerns of an entirely different sort" are now taking up

his time.

But

in the attempt to argue against the "established thesis"

overstates his case.

It is

Lubasz

not necessary to deny the significance of Marx's

philosophical grounding in order to claim that his interest in economic

and

social issues

we minimize

is

not derivative from philosophical premises.

Nor need

the important role played by Feuerbach's critique of

Marx's development in order to argue that Marx's studies of political economy can hardly be attributed to his reading of The Essence of Christianity. Lubasz seems to suppose that this is what he has to assert. "Had not Marx already, in the course of his work on the Rheinische religion in

9

The Wood Theft Zeitung, grappled with the

problem of the

social

and

political

Articles

1

dimensions

of property and propertylessness, poverty and penury, Feuerbach's

more have prompted him to study political 8 prompted Feuerbach himself to do so." The dichotomy Lubasz wants to establish between Marx's philosophical grounding and his concern with political and social issues is contradicted by Marx's own texts. To take only one example: the Appendix to his doctoral dissertation contains a discussion of the realization of philosophy: this same concern permeates Marx's first materialism would no

economy than

it

discussion of the role of the proletariat.

The dichotomy in terms origins of

Marxism

leads

9

of which Lubasz construes the question of the

him

to claim that the "incisive originality" of

Marx's approach consists in his "categorical rejection of any historical or 10 political a priori." Lubasz finds this "categorical rejection" exemplified particularly in Marx's discussion of the condition of the poor. Lubasz poses the issue of the originality of Marx's thinking in a manner that abstractly polarizes the alternatives. He seems to think that acknowledging the importance of Hegel's political theory for Marx's first discussion of poverty would mean denying Marx's "incisive originality." More importantly, Lubasz seems to suppose that the issue of the originality of Marx's analysis can or should be discussed without any consideration of the problematic elements of his thinking. It is at this point that I take issue with Lubasz. I agree with Lubasz that Marx's discussion of the poor in the Wood Theft articles is "literally the 11 starting-point of his analysis of the proletariat." It is precisely for this reason that it is important to subject these articles to a critical examination. The question of Marx's relation to Hegel is only one aspect of a critical consideration of these articles. An equally significant issue concerns the problematic features of Marx's own discussion. Inasmuch as the Wood Theft articles contain, as Lubasz notes, "the elements 12 for much of his later thinking" it is important to consider whether of poverty Marx's first discussion might also contain elements which are in the roots of difficulties his later thought. As a result of the way in which he has structured the issue of Marx's originality, Lubasz is unable to perceive the problematic elements in Marx's discussion of the poor. These elements consist both in the use which Marx makes of Hegel's political philosophy and in the assumptions about the character of the poor which he borrows from the Jacobin revolutionary tradition. The Wood Theft articles contain the seeds of a dogmatic perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity precisely because Marx reworks this intellectual inheritance in his own unique way. 7

.

.

.

The Wood Theft Articles

20

2

The Estates and Those of No

Estate in Hegel's Political

Philosophy

The

claim that Marx's analysis of the condition of the poor

rather than derivative in any

way from Hegel,

is

is

"original,"

contradicted prima facie

by the very terminology of the text. Indeed the most cursory examination of the Wood Theft articles reveals that Marx's description of the poor as 13 "those of no estate" [die Standeslosen] is a direct borrowing of Hegel's own characterization of the unincorporated poor. However, even as Marx takes over Hegel's terminology he transforms the meaning of this description by making it synonymous with his own definition of the poor as "the elemental class of

human

society."

13

In order to appreciate the

significance of Marx's transformation of the Hegelian characterization of

the poor

it is

necessary to elucidate the meaning which the concept of

estate-membership has in Hegel's

The

political philosophy.

estates have the function of seeing to

existence not only implicitly, but also

it

that universal concerns

explicitly, i.e.

of seeing to

it

come

that the

into

moment

of subjective formal freedom, the public consciousness as empirical universality 16 should come into existence as the opinions and thoughts of the many.

Hegel uses the term "estate" [Stand]

to

refer both

to

the

legally

recognized social group to which an individual belongs and to the function which these groupings have in relation to the state. According to

Hegel this dual usage is justified by the fact that these civil divisions have an explicidy political significance. The estates are the locus of the rational or communal moment [Gemeinwesen] in civil society. For Hegel this is equivalent to saying that the estates are islands of universality in an 7

otherwise atomistic, particularistic existence.

"The destiny [Bestimmung] of individuals is to lead a What Hegel means by this claim is that people need to organized, rational totality in order to beings.

To

participate in such a totality

universality,

and

it

is

fulfill is

for

universal

participate in an

their nature as

Hegel

17

life."

human

to participate in

only in virtue of such participation that the

member of the human community. Without such participation the existence of the individual is reduced to isolated

individual

is

a full or real

contingency; one's activity becomes mere "selfseeking."

Hegel views the

estates as providing their

18

members with

access to universality that can be had in the arena of

Accordingly the estates

civil

the only society.

an absolutely essential function for their members. "When we say that a human being must be something, we mean that he or she must belong to some determinate estate, since to be fulfill

1

The Wood Theft something means no estate

Each

to

be a substantive being.

A

and does not incorporates the element of

human

merely a private person

is

estate

being

2

Articles

who

belongs to

exist in real universality.''''

universality in a different

manner. The bureaucracy, the estate of civil servants, has universality "as the goal of [its] essential activity." As the officers of the state, which 20 the civil Hegel characterizes as the "actuality of concrete freedom," 21 servants are "the universal estate." The landed nobility has a "natural" or familial relation to universality. In common with the monarch, the members of this estate attain their position through the "natural event" [Naturbestimmung] of their birth. Like the monarch, the members of this 22 estate possess "a will which rests on itself alone," a will which is independent of the daily fluctuations of life. And, because the wealth of this estate is independent both from the wealth of the state and from "the 23 uncertainty of business," Hegel claims that this estate is particularly well suited for political position.

The

and

third estate, "the business estate," includes both proprietors

artisans.

This estate

"essentially oriented towards the particular."

is

24 It

has neither a natural relation to universality (as does the landed nobility)

nor does

have universality as the "goal of

it

bureaucracy.

through

its

The

business estate achieves

articulation into substructures

are roughly equivalent to guilds.

the Corporations that

is

It is

its

its

known

activity" as

does the

relation to universality as Corporations

which

particularly Hegel's conception of

important for an understanding of his attitude

towards the unincorporated poor.

The most complete

statement of Hegel's views regarding the benefits of

Corporation membership Right.

One such

benefit

is

found

more important however is the accords individuals what for Hegel public recognition of their status as

passage

is

worth quoting

in

paragraph 253 of the Philosophy of

the recognition of family property. Perhaps

is

in

its

that

fact

Corporation membership

human existence: members of an organized whole. The is

a sine qua non of

entirety.

In the Corporation not only does the family have

assurance, conditioned by capability, of

its

its

livelihood,

stable basis i.e. it

through the

has a stable capital

[Vermoegen] (no. 170), but both [capability and livelihood] are recognized. result,

the

membership

Corporation

member needs no

as evidence of his skill

evidence that he

is

somebody.

It is

external signs

beyond

his

and regular income and subsistence,

The

hat so in seinem Stande seine Ehre].

crucial factor here

is

the

a

own i.e.

as

whole concerned in

also recognized that he belongs to a

which is itself an organ of the entire society and that he is actively promoting the disinterested end of this whole. Thus he finds his honor estate [Es

As

in his

25

phenomenon of mutual

social recognition.

The Wood Theft Articles

22

which makes the Corporations organs of universality; herein lies the importance which Hegel attaches to membership in a Corporation as It is this

far as individuals are

"Individuals

first

The

members

as

community,

members of their

universality of the Corporations

universality since the

etc."

26

of universality inasmuch as their

Corporations are organs

members share common aims tions.

its

achieve their real and living definition in the universal

in the sphere of the Corporation, the

The

provides

of universality, the experience of community.

experience

with the

The Corporation

concerned.

is

individual Corpora-

and limited

a partial

aim of any given Corporation

is

common

only to a

certain group in society rather than being shared by the society as a

whole. But in spite of the fact that the Corporations themselves are limited forms of universality, membership in a Corporation enables individuals to experience a

Hegel

whole that

is

greater than themselves. For

only through participation in such partial communities that

it is

individuals can be

members of civil society. And it is only in this way that members of the political community,

individuals can be considered

members of the There and

is

state.

7

thus a reciprocal relationship between membership (political

and membership (social status) in a German term [Mitglied] to refer to the civil society and to the individual who is

legal status) in civil society

Corporation. Hegel uses the same individual a

who

member

is

a

member

of a Corporation.

particular skill a

of a

"A member of civil

member

whether one says that

estate

in virtue of his

only

members of Corporations who the same: for individuals

is

It makes no difference of a Corporation." members of civil society who are members individuals of the business estate) that it is only

it is

of Corporations or (for

society

28

who

are

members of civil

society.

The

point

is

are not members of the landed nobility or of the

of civil servants, only membership

in a Corporation confers

membership

in

This means that to be a non-member of a Corporation, i.e. to be "unincorporated," is to be a non-member of civil society itself. I will civil society.

return to the significance of this conclusion below.

Hegel insists on the distinction between the member of a Corporation 29 This distinction, the distinction and the day laborer [Tageloehner]. between Corporation members and those unfortunates who are unincorporated,

is

the

foundation

for

his

views

regarding

the

unincorporated poor. Hegel refers to this group as the Poebel. This term is often rendered in English by the word "rabble," a translation which accurately captures its dual meaning of being both poverty30

and malcontent, rebellious. Hegel's conception of the poor has nothing

stricken

in

common

with the

notions of "genteel" or "honorable" poverty. His discussion of the

The Wood Theft Articles unincorporated poor

is

free

from any traces of

nothing honorable, in Hegel's eyes, in being a

Honor applies

for

Hegel

only to

honor" [Standesehre].

is "civil

those

who

unincorporated poor are not It

idealization.

23

There

is

member of the Poebei Honor is a concept that

are members of civil members of civil society.

society

and the

bears repeating that the issue for Hegel is not poverty per se but the Members of a Corporation may suffer extreme

unincorporated poor.

Corporation assures them Corporation members still retain their Standesehre; thus they retain their dignity as persons even

material distress, but their that they are

when

membership

in the

"somebody." Poor as they

are,

they receive material assistance. Hegel

is

very explicit on this point.

"Within the Corporation the assistance which poverty receives loses

its

accidental character as well as the humiliation wrongfully associated with 31 it."

Thus it is not their extreme poverty which makes the unincorporated poor non-members of civil society; it is that since they do not belong to any authorized Corporation, they do not belong to any legally recognized social group in civil society. Hegel's reasoning on this point is as follows: an estate can be said to exist in civil society only if it is "legally constituted 32 It is clear that a social order which consists of and recognized." Corporations and estates cannot bestow legal recognition on an "estate" of unincorporated individuals. In terms of the standards of civil society such an "estate" is a non-estate. The consequences of this position are that the unincorporated

poor have no

They cannot be members of civil membership

legal existence in civil society.

society, for they lack the

in this social order: they are not

requirements of

members of any

recognized estate. In terms of the standards of unincorporated poverty is simply "illegal."

civil society,

legally

therefore,

Hegel's uncompromising honesty reveals itself in his realistic assessment of the situation of the unincorporated poor vis-a-vis civil society. Hegel recognizes that poverty is no accidental feature of civil society. After discussing several possibilities for finding a systematic solution to the problem of poverty, Hegel concludes: "It despite the excess of wealth

civil

society

is

becomes apparent

not rich enough,

i.e.

its

that

own

resources are insufficient to control excessive poverty and the creation of a rabble."

33

There is another consequence to Hegel's position; the unincorporated poor represent a danger to the stability of the social order. Hegel's political philosophy shares the suspicious attitude towards the poor that is characteristic of liberal political theory beginning with Hobbes and Locke, but Hegel's perspective is the result of his conception of estate-membership. For Hegel, the unincorporated poor are dangerous

24

The Wood Theft Articles

precisely because they

do not participate

in the

norms and values of civil

Or as Hegel puts it, they have no "civil honor." "Unless one is a member of an authorized Corporation (and it is only by being authorized society.

that an association [ein Gemeinsames]

without

civil

honour."

is

a Corporation), an individual

is

34

To

be without civil honor is to be an outsider. Such people are The unincorporated poor threaten the social cohesion of civil society because they are social outlaws. Their very existence outside the framework of the social norms incorporated in the estates challenges the social consensus. For Hegel, all morality is social. The unincorporated poor are thus amoral in terms of the established morality of civil society. They cannot live according to the social norms which would be established by their estate "since this estate does not exist [da der Stand nicht existiert]" It is thus no wonder that in contemplating the spectacle dangerous.

of the ever increasing numbers of these non-members of

civil

society

Hegel remarks, "the important question as to how poverty is to be 36 abolished is one which most agitates and tortures modern society."

3

The Poor

as the Elemental Class of

Human

Society

Having outlined Hegel's views of the unincorporated poor I now turn to Marx's characterization of this group as "the elemental class of human society." By characterizing the poor in this manner Marx succeeds in completely transforming the meaning of the Hegelian terminology. To describe the poor as "the elemental class of human society" is to attribute to them a positive significance which was entirely absent from Hegel's characterization of them as the Poebel. More importandy, Marx's characterization of the poor as "the elemental class of human society" turns Hegel's description of them as non-members of civil society, a description which Marx accepts, into a critical concept. To characterize the poor as "the elemental class of human society" is to say that they are the most fundamental part of the universal human community. This means that the fact that the poor are non-members of a particular form of society, i.e. civil society, is eo ipso a critique of this society. A social order which denies membership to those who are in fact the most fundamental part of the human community declares itself by this action to be a social dis-order. For Hegel the unincorporated poor constitute a problem for civil society only

inasmuch

as they threaten

which

is

its stability;

for xMarx

it is

rather

which excludes the poor from membership the problem. Hegel discusses the poor from the perspective of

the existence of a social order

The Wood Theft Articles civil society;

Marx criticizes

civil

society

25

from the perspective of the poor.

fact that the existence of the poor has been "a mere custom 37 is thus itself a criticism of this society, a criticism of its civil society"

For Marx, the of

standards of universality, rationality and humanity. Marx's description of the existence of the poor as "a mere custom of civil

society" introduces a central polarity in his thinking at this point: the

between custom and law, between the contingent or and the rational or universal. The issue which is being debated by the Rhineland Assembly is whether the poor ought to have the legal right to gather wood which falls from trees growing on privately owned land. Marx's position is that the Assembly ought to bestow the universality of law upon the custom which the poor have of gathering wood. Such an action would transform "customary rights" into custom which has become law, i.e. into a "custom of the state" 38 Marx's discussion of the customary rights of the [Staatsgewohnheit]. poor is worth examining in some detail for it provides the backdrop for disjunction

particular

his views as to the subjectivity of the poor.

We

should note

at the outset that

Marx's defense of the custom of

not a defense of the customary aspects of this activity but a defense of the rational aspects of this custom. It is these which make the traditional activity of the poor a right. It is Marx's view that only the poor

wood

gathering

is

maintain, that a customary can be said to have customary rights. "We right by its very nature can only be a right of this lowest, propertyless and 39 Marx is no defender of custom for its own sake; he elemental mass." rejects the notion that the aristocracy has customary rights: "The so-called customs of the privileged classes are understood to mean 40 Marx's exposition of this point is unambiguous. customs contrary to law." .

.

.

The customary rights of the aristocracy conflict by their content with the form of universal law. They cannot be given the form of law because they are formations of lawlessness. Inasmuch as their content is contrary to the form of law universality and necessity - they thereby prove that they are customary wrongs and

cannot be asserted in opposition to the law ... 41 wrongful because it is their custom.

No

one's action ceases to be

argues that the right of the poor to gather fallen wood is a custom 42 a practice "which is not of local character, "of the entire poor class,"

Marx but

is

the customary right of the poor in

all

countries."

43 It

may seem

as if

always gathered fallen

Marx is simply claiming that poor people have wood, and thus that this custom has what Kant would call "comparative 44 But this is not the case. Marx is arguing that the universality." wood-gathering activity of the poor is fundamentally correct and rational, and that it ought to have the strict universality of legal recognition.

The Wood Theft Articles

26

What

is

most

significant in the context of the present discussion

Marx

justification

gives for his position.

gathering activity of the poor has what

customary

their

activity

I

Marx

finds that the

is

the

wood-

will call ontological significance;

expresses their essentially correct perception of

the real nature of things. In particular

which are the customs of the poor

Marx

claims that those practices

in all countries reveal that the

poor

43

have "a sure instinct" for the "indeterminate aspect of property." The custom of wood gathering illustrates the fact that "there exist objects of property which by their very nature can never acquire the character of predetermined private property." In effect

Marx

is

claiming

customary activity of the poor is itself informative about the nature of certain objects. We get ontological information, information about the real nature of things, when we reflect on the meaning of the customary activity of wood gathering. We learn that there are objects which can never rightfully become private property because this would be contrary to their nature. Objects which can never acquire the character that the

of private property are: objects,

belong

which by

of that class, all

their elemental nature

and

their accidental

other property, and which has the same position in

This

mode

of existence,

sphere of occupation rights, and therefore to the occupation right which, precisely because of this occupation right, is excluded from

to the

last

phrase

is

civil society as these objects

central to Marx's argument. In effect

Marx is

claiming

an ontological correspondence between the position of the and the position of the poor in civil society. The poor are the dead branches of civil society; therefore, in Marx's view, they have what can be called an ontological right, a right resulting from their very being, to gather the fallen wood, an object whose nature is identical to their own. On Marx's analysis the customary practice of that there

is

fallen

wood

wood

gathering

The

in nature

is

vindicated because

it

corresponds to the nature of

poor is thus customs themselves are right, in a cosmic sense. This notion of cosmic Tightness pervades Marx's discussion of the wood-gathering activities of the poor. "In these customs of the poor class, therefore, there is an instinctive sense of right whose roots are 47 The wood-gathering activities of the poor positive and legitimate." 48 reveal "a social instinct." By gathering fallen wood the poor simply demonstrate "a rightful urge" which circumstances have capriciously converted into a crime. "It will be found not only that this class feels an urge to satisfy a natural need, but equally that it feels a need to satisfy a things.

justification for the customary' practices of the

that these

rightful urge."

49

The Wood Theft

Articles

11

The rightfulness of the wood -gathering custom is twofold. On the one hand the activity of the poor is a means of pacifying nature by introducing harmony and order into an untamed universe. "By its act of gathering, the elemental class of

human

society appoints itself to introduce order 50

More power of nature." importandy, however, the wood -gathering custom has a social justification: it is a means of combatting the antithesis between wealth and poverty. These two justifications are linked through the fact that the relation between the living trees and the fallen (dead) branches is for Marx a representation of the relation between wealth and poverty in society. Nature itself thus portrays "the opposition between poverty and Human poverty senses this kinship and deduces its right to wealth property from this feeling of kinship." The wood-gathering activities of among

products

the

.

.

of the

elemental

.

the poor are thus the counterpart to the play of natural forces. Nature itself

provides the model for the poor;

causing the

wood

to

fall.

it

justifies

their activities

by

"In this play of elemental forces poverty senses a

humane than human power. The

beneficent power more

arbitrary action of privileged individuals

is

fortuitous

replaced by the fortuitous

operation of elemental forces, which take away from private property

no longer voluntarily foregoes." 51 The activity of wood gathering is thus anchored in the natural order of things. The correspondence between the activity of the poor and the activity of nature is what ultimately justifies the custom of wood gathering. In other words, the poor are right to model their own activity on the activity of nature and to follow the lead of the "fortuitous operation of elemental forces." If the poor cannot claim that God is on their side, they can certainly claim that nature is. According to Marx, the

what the

latter

"alms of nature" belong exclusively to them. "Just as

it is

not

fitting for

the rich to lay claim to the alms distributed in the street, so also in regard to these

4

The

alms of nature."

52

Universalist Subjectivity of the Poor

Thus

far I have focused the discussion on the ontological aspect of Marx's defense of the customary rights of the poor. But there is another aspect to Marx's discussion which touches direcdy on the issue of emancipatory consciousness. In the course of his analysis of the condition of the poor Marx makes several comments of a psychological nature, i.e. comments about the subjectivity or consciousness of the poor. These comments are relatively brief, but it is precisely their brevity and

the fact that

Marx

feels

no need

to

argue for the claims he makes that

The Wood Theft Articles

28 gives

them

major significance

a

in the text.

The form

in

which they

appear, their "matter of factness," reveals the nature of the assumptions

which guide and structure Marx's thinking about the

subjectivity of the

poor.

In Marx's view, the poor as the elemental class of

human

society are

the only group which has not been affected by the false conceptions and artificial

values of

only ones

civil society.

who have

Thus

the poor, die Standeslosen, are the

not been deceived as to certain fundamental truths.

The poor are not confused as to what is really valuable. Unlike the forest owners who obviously believe in giving preference to "the rights of young trees" over the rights of human beings, the poor know that human beings are more important than property. The poor do not have hearts of wood; they have human hearts and consequentiy they do not confuse the heart 3 and soul of the human being with the heart and soul of a piece of wood. One might say that the insight of the poor is morally superior to the insight of the Provincial Deputies sitting in the Assembly.

more accurate

to say that for

Marx

both a moral and an ontological sense.

The knowledge

as to

what

as

the insight of Plato's philosopher kings.

is

is

really

important

is

But

the insight of the poor

is

it

would be

superior in

that the

poor have

both a moral and an ontological insight,

The

reference to Plato's

might seem, for although there are fundamental differences between Marx's poor and Plato's philosophers (which I will discuss below), the two are alike in their ability to perceive fundamental truths of a moral-ontological sort. That the poor have this ability is evident from the fact that (unlike the Deputies in the Assembly) they do not confuse the human essence with something inhuman. The poor are not mystified; the poor (unlike the Deputies) do 54 not worship "an alien material being." The poor are not victims of the fetishism which enslaves the members of the Provincial Assembly. Although Marx does not use the term fetishism, he does use the term fetish. Thus he comments: "The savages [Wilden] of Cuba regarded gold as a. fetish of the Spaniards" and he claims that if these so-called "savages" had been sitting in the Rhineland Provincial Assembly they would doubtless have regarded wood as the 55 fetish of the Rhinelanders. It is clear from the text that Marx regards the insight of the Cuban natives and the insight of the poor as superior to the insight of the Spaniards and the Rhinelanders. Those who worship fetishes take these objects to be endowed with some sacred or holy aura. Thus the ability to see that gold or wood is a fetish is the ability to see through this mystification, the ability to see through mystified reality. The poor seem to possess this ability. The "abject materialism" which has mesmerized philosopher kings

is

not as far-fetched as

it

The Wood Theft Articles the consciousness of the Provincial Deputies apparently has the subjectivity of the poor.

The poor do

29

no hold over

not engage in the fetishistic

adoration of an "immoral, irrational, and soulless abstraction of a The poor understand that wood is only wood;

particular material object."

they do not endow it with a soul. Most importandy, the poor do not possess "a particular consciousness which is slavishly subordinated to 56 According to Marx it is the Deputies sitting in the this object." Provincial

Assembly who have a particular consciousness; the poor, on

the other hand, do not have a particular consciousness; the poor have a universal

human

consciousness.

At the time Marx writes the series of articles on the Wood Theft Debates he identifies the standpoint of the state with the standpoint of universality, reason and morality. Thus he speaks of "civic reason" 58 For Marx, it is [Staatsvernunft] and "civic morality" [Staatssittlichkeit]. the poor who are the ideal citizens of the state for they share its universalist perspective immediately, without any effort on their part. Arguing that the debates on the Wood Theft Laws reveal how far the 5 Rhineland Provincial Assembly has degraded "the idea of the state" Marx writes: "our estates have fulfilled their function as such, but far be In them the it from us to desire to justify them on that account. Rhinelander ought to have been victorious over the estate, the human 6 The being ought to have been victorious over the forest owner." implication is unmistakable that, had the poor had legislative power, their elemental human consciousness and their universalist perspective would '

have determined social policy in accordance with the standpoint of

and Staatssittlichkeit. Marx's attribution of a universalist consciousness to the poor depends upon two interrelated arguments. The first focuses on the fact that the poor own no private property. The second focuses on their status as non-members of civil society. Each line of argument amounts to a transvaluation of the values and the perspectives of civil society.

Staatsvernunft

5

Propertylessness and Universality

The poor own nothing but

themselves; their property consists of

life,

61

In contrast to the particular freedom, humanity and citizenship. material property of the forest owners, the "possessions" of the poor are nonmaterial "universal property" - the property of all human beings qua human beings. The identity which Marx posits between the poor as "proprietors of freedom" [Freiheitseigentuemer] and their material propertylessness

contrasts strikingly with Hegel's justification of private

30

The Wood Theft Articles

property.

Hegel follows Kant

ownership of property

is

ownership of property is an individual's free will, and thus that the

in arguing that the

essential for the expression of

essential to the realization of the individual as a

person. For Hegel any disqualification from holding property, or any

encumbrances on property are "examples of the alienation [Entaeusser62 Using the remarks made by the Deputies in the ung] of personality." Rhineland Provincial Assembly as evidence, Marx argues that it is precisely the possession of private property which distorts people's sense of justice and compassion and warps their perception of reality. Thus he juxtaposes

one-sided,

the

Naturinstinkt]

63

"lawless

natural

instinct"

[gesetzloser

of private or particular interest to the social impulse and

the instinctual sense of right possessed by those

who own

nothing but

themselves.

Marx's identification of universality with the lack of private material possessions harks back to Plato. But whereas for Plato's philosopher kings the lack of private material possessions

is

a necessary but not a

sufficient condition of their universalist perspective, for

Marx

the lack of

property seems to be the determining factor in shaping the consciousness

Marx seems

be claiming that it is because the poor only have "universal property," that they have only universal interests, and it is because they have only universal interests that they have the, kind of of the poor.

subjectivity

Marx

to

which they do. what we might

identifies

call

the objective/ontological sense of

and the subjective/psychological sense. Interest in an objective/ ontological sense is the interest which "belongs" to one in virtue of one's social being; it is a feature or quality of what one is. Interest in a subjective/psychological sense describes or refers to what one is concerned with (that in which one is interested), the values, ideals, goals, desires that one has or pursues. Interest in this sense is what one "wills." In terms of this latter sense of "interest," the distinction between the forest owners and the poor is that the forest owners are interested only in their property rights, while the poor are interested in life, humanity, freedom and citizenship. The objective/ontological sense of interest and the subjective/psychological sense of interest are related to each other; it is because the poor have only universal interests in the first sense that they are only interested in universals in the latter sense. Life, humanity, freedom and citizenship are all universals of human existence. To be interested only in these, as the poor are, on Marx's analysis, is to have a universalist interest

subjectivity or consciousness.

The Wood Theft Articles

The

6

Benefits of

Non-Membership

31

in Civil Society

Secondly, the universalist consciousness of the poor seems to be the result of their negative ontological status vis-a-vis civil society.

It is

here

Marx's transformation of Hegel's concept of the poor is most striking. Hegel's discussion of poverty and the unincorporated poor points out only the drawbacks in not belonging to any estate. For Hegel, the situation of the unincorporated poor is unfortunate in every respect. that

They

lack

the "advantages of society."

all

that they are estateless,

Marx

reads the situation

poor belong to no estate, the fact has compensating qualities; indeed it becomes a

For Marx, the

differendy.

64

fact that the

positive factor.

For Marx, the

poor are non-members of civil society means from experiencing what I will call the "disbenefits of

fact that the

that they are spared

more paradoxically) the "disadvantages in the As Marx describes them in Debates, "the disadvantages in

social privilege" or (even

advantages."

concern the harmful effects of private interest on moral character and consciousness. The people who are

the advantages"

people's

"disadvantaged" in this manner are only those

who

are

ostensibly

advantaged by private interest. In other words, according to Marx, it is only the members of civil society who experience the disadvantages of membership in a social order which is dominated by private interest. Private interest dominates interest

this interest into this

all

aspects of

life in civil society.

"Private

which a person comes into conflict with 65 person's whole sphere of life." Individuals under

makes the one sphere

in

the sway of private interest are unable to perceive anything but the

Marx says they are like the man with corns on his whose opinion of a passerby is determined solely by the fact that the latter has stepped on his foot. The disadvantages of membership in injuries to this interest. feet

civil

society chiefly concern the subjective dimensions of social

life.

They

are disadvantages in terms of individuals' personal relations with others

and

in

terms of their

or consciousness.

The

"inner

life," their subjectivity,

difference between Hegel and

not that Hegel is

own

mental structure

67

is full

Marx with

of uncritical admiration for

respect to civil

civil

society

society while

is

Marx

Hegel is very critical of civil society, even in the Philosophy of Hegel does not shy away from detailing the negative aspects of

"critical." 68

Right.

civil society.

Anyone who

is

familiar with Hegel's description of civil

society as "the battleground of the private interest of each individual

against all"

69

cannot maintain that Hegel idealizes

civil society.

With

regard to the subjectivity of the poor, however, the significant difference

The Wood Theft Articles

32

in Hegel's

and Marx's \iews about

civil

society

is

that while

focuses only on the disadvantages of non-membership in

Marx

Hegel

civil society,

also considers the disadvantages of membership in this distorted

social order.

70

From

this perspective

Marx

focuses on the "benefits" of

of non-membership in civil society. For Hegel, the idea that there could be any advantages to being a

being an outsider, the

non-member of civil

benefits

society does not

make any

sense, for the reason that

Hegel identifies civil society with participation in the modern human community generally. Given that this is Hegel's perspective, it is clear 71 why he does not see any "benefits" to non-membership in civil society. Marx does not share Hegel's identification of civil society and the human community. The fact that as a Jew Marx was a member of a group that had traditionally been excluded from membership in the dominant (Christian) community, may well have given him a somewhat cynical perspective as to the legitimacy of established standards of community, and may have enabled him to consider the issue of membership in the /2 It universal human community from a radically different point of view. is perhaps for this reason that he focuses on the "benefits" of being "outside" civil society, the benefits of non-membership. These are the benefits of being untouched by the narrow concerns of civil society. If private interest tends to dominate the whole sphere of a personVlife in civil society,

from

who are not members of civil society are free They are free to have thoughts and feelings other by the "petty, wooden, mean and selfish soul of

then those

this influence.

than those inspired

[private] interest [which] sees only

wounded."

one point, the point

in

which

it

is

inherently limited and one-sided. Inasmuch as

it

73

Private interest

is

which a person comes into conflict with this this person's whole sphere of life," it has no sense of interest into perspective. Private interest mistakes one sphere of reality for the whole. Private interest and all those who share its point of view (all members of

"makes the one sphere

civil society)

in

are unable to rise to the perspective of universality, the point

The poor, however, have no difficulty in attaining This perspective is theirs simply by virtue of their place

of view of the whole. this perspective.

outside the social order.

7

The Poor

as Philosopher Kings

This last point requires that we look again at the comparison of the poor with Plato's philosopher kings. There are two points of similarity: Marx's

The Wood Theft

Articles

33

poor and Plato's philosopher kings resemble each other both ontologically and socially. The ontological superiority of the poor (their status as the elemental class of human society) is analogous to the golden nature of the philosopher kings. Socially, neither the poor nor the philosopher kings

own

private property.

At

Marx

analogy breaks down. For although both Plato and ownership of property as a factor that destroys one's

this point the

treat the

universalist perspective, Plato's philosopher kings require a long process

of training and education in order to attain their insight into the Good. Although the philosopher kings do start out with a certain "ontological advantage" in the form of their golden nature, this nature can only become functional if it is intentionally developed in a certain way. The philosopher kings undergo a lifetime of planned education before they are able to perceive the Good. Marx's poor on the other hand do not seem to need any sort of training or education in order to perceive the fundamental truths which escape the Deputies in the Rhenish Parliament. In fact, Marx seems to be claiming that the poor do not have to do anything to attain their universalist consciousness. This is just something they already have by virtue of who they are (the elemental class of human society), and by virtue of what they do not possess (property). There seems to be an immediate connection for Marx between the social being of the poor and their consciousness or subjectivity. There is a parallel between their elemental status in human society and their ability to perceive fundamental moral-ontological truths. In effect the poor can thank their poverty for the fact that they have the superior insight and perspective which they allegedly do. There is no suggestion in Marx's discussion of the subjectivity of the poor that they might have to struggle against the baser motives of egoism or meanness in order to develop a social instinct. Their social instinct is just something they possess by virtue of their ontological status; it is a fact of their nature. Moreover, it seems to be a permanent feature of their being. There seems to be no danger that they will become enamored of fetishes, no danger that their "instinctive sense of right" would become corrupted by inhuman values. To put the point in slighdy different terms: Marx's poor do not need to have their consciousness transformed in any way. They seem to have the correct moral-ontological perceptions and values a priori simply by virtue of their poverty and their non-membership in civil society. They do not need to undergo any process of subjective development. Nor do they need to engage in a process of education to acquire the perspective of "reason and morality" - they simply have to be what they are.

The Wood Theft Articles

34

The poor seem to be the representatives of the human species as it would be if it were not corrupted by private interest. Lubasz remarks that 74 for Marx the poor are "quintessentially human." One might object that this notion introduces an extraneous moral element into Marx's discussion but in fact the moral element is introduced by Marx himself, and it is not extraneous. A summary of the effects which private interest has on human beings reveals that it makes them deceptive, sophistical, 75 hypocritical, cowardly and cruel. The qualities of the poor on the other hand are all traits which are diametrically opposed to these. The sense of justice which Marx attributes to them is, as Lubasz notes, "instinctively 76 social as well as instinctively humane."

8

Marx's Transformation of Hegel's Concept of the Poor

analysis of the Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood supports Lubasz's claim that Marx's discussion of the poor is "neither an

The above

application of Hegel's political philosophy to empirical reality nor yet a speculative inversion of it."

not

mean

that

we should

But

Lubasz

to agree with

follow

him

in the

in this respect

does

conclusion he draws with

regard to the general importance of Hegel's political thought for Marx's discussion of the poor. Summarizing the essentials of Marx's

first

discussion Lubasz writes: "It this

owed

is

.

.

.

worth pointing out how

to Hegel, except very indirecdy."

little

any of

77

This conclusion is unwarranted; it is based on a highly schematic and mechanical conception of the way in which one thinker might be indebted to a predecessor. Lubasz seems to be saying that the only way to support the claim that Marx's discussion of poverty owes something substantial to

Hegel would be

to

show

that

Marx's thinking

is

either "an

application of Hegel's political philosophy to empirical reality" or "a

speculative inversion" of this

same philosophy.

describing what one thinker "owes" to another,

we accept this way of we must assume that a

If

thinker takes over a ready-made set of ideas and then simply "applies"

them

either in their original or in their inverted

reality." If

we

form

to

"emprical

accept Lubasz's account of intellectual debt, the only way

to argue against him,

i.e.

to

argue that

Marx

does in fact

owe

a great deal

Hegel on the issue of poverty, would be to maintain that the relation between Marx and Hegel is of the following sort: Marx receives Hegel's political philosophy with a set of instructions which read: "turn upside down before using." Lubasz's description of the relation between Hegel's political philosophy and Marx's thinking about poverty lacks any reference to the notion of transformation, and it is precisely this notion to

The Wood Theft

which we need discussion

is

in

order to address the issue of

35

Articles

how Marx's

first

indebted to Hegel.

To be sure, Marx's treatment of poverty in the articles on the Wood Theft Debates differs markedly from Hegel's earlier discussion of this topic in the Philosophy of Right. But this difference, noteworthy as it is, does not yet settle the question as to the importance of Hegel's political philosophy for Marx's thinking in this area; it simply poses the question. And if we acknowledge that Hegel's importance for Marx can be revealed not only in identity but also in difference, then the fact that Marx transforms some of Hegel's concepts and descriptions is itself an indication of Hegel's significance. Indeed I will argue that Marx's treatment of poverty owes a substantial debt to Hegel, not in spite of, but precisely because of the transformations which Marx makes in Hegel's concepts. In the preceding sections

I

have pointed out the ways in which

Marx

transforms Hegel's concept of the poor by defining this group as the

elemental class of human society. I have also discussed the ways in which Marx reworks Hegel's description of the poor as non-members of civil society. In transforming these Hegelian concepts Marx is neither applying "Hegel's political philosophy to empirical reality," nor

is

applying a "speculative inversion" of Hegel's political philosophy.

transform a concept

Hegelian

concepts;

is

not to "apply"

he

is

using

it.

them

Marx to

is

he

To

thinking through the

analyze

a

phenomenon

(euphemistically called "the social question") which, as Lubasz notes,

only "penetrated educated consciousness" in the decades following 78

But Marx's thinking through Hegelian concepts is guided by a particular set of assumptions about the nature and character of the poor. It is these assumptions which account for the transformaHegel's death.

which Marx makes in the Hegelian concepts and it is these assumptions and their origin to which I now turn. These assumptions do not originate in the German political tradition.

tions

Lubasz correcdy notes that a comparison of Marx's views with those of Ruge, Hess, Feuerbach or the brothers Bauer reveals that Marx's treatment of poverty "differs strikingly from contemporary discussion of 79 it whether among liberals or philosophical radicals." But the striking difference between Marx and various Young Hegelians on this issue should not lead us to conclude that his own thinking about the poor emerges ex nihilo, or that it has no antecedents in the wider tradition of political and social thought.

The Wood Theft Articles

36

The Jacobin Conception of the Virtuous Poor

9

One of the most important elements of Marx's first discussion of the poor comes from the Jacobin tradition of French revolutionary thought, from the writings of Robespierre and Saint-Just. Indeed a comparison of Marx's views about the nature and characteristics of the poor with those of Robespierre in particular is highly illuminating, for it reveals just how much of the Jacobin theorizing on this subject has found its way into 80 Marx's thinking. To be sure there is a difference in the social composition of the group which is referred to as "the poor." When Robespierre speaks about the poor, he has in mind urban artisans, small shopkeepers and peasants. Robespierre's poor are not propertyless; they are not "povertystricken." Marx's poor, on the other hand, are propertyless; they are destitute. What is at issue here, however, is the similarity in the conceptual framework in terms of which the respective "poor" are characterized. Both Marx and the Jacobins tend to have a romanticized conception of the "virtues of poverty." 1

The that

theoretical starting-point for the Jacobins

the

people

distinction will

is

always

between the

will

well

who can be

is

82

Rousseau's postulate

Rousseau makes

a

of an individual qua private person and the

of an individual qua citizen,

only the latter

intentioned.

i.e.

as a

member

of "the people."

said to be well intentioned

inasmuch

as

It is

being

well intentioned consists in "willing the general will," thinking about

and willing what is best for the whole. The general inasmuch as it abstracts from the particular interest of the individual as a private person and considers only the universal aspects of social life: "the general will, to be really such, must be general in its object as well as its essence ... it must both come from all and apply to all and ... it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed 83 to some particular and determinate object." To will the general will is society as a totality

will is well intentioned

in effect to

have a universalist consciousness.

should be evident from the preceding that Rousseau's concept of the people is essentially a normative notion that abstracts from all It

socio-economic content. For Rousseau "the people" means the citizens assembly. But not any group of flesh and blood legislators are "citizens." This term refers only to those who deliberate about public concerns from the standpoint of the general welfare. Working with this concept of "the people" Rousseau maintains that the general will can in

only be expressed by "the people" sitting as citizens in assembly. This

means

that if the individuals in the assembly hall are not functioning as

The Wood Theft Articles citizens

37

but are motivated instead by their particular interests, the 84

"mute" and the society is unfree. The Jacobins make two significant changes in this conception.

general will

is

for the Jacobins

the well-intentioned people, the citizens,

and

Firstly,

become

the

poor people of Paris. Robespierre and Saint-Just inherit a formalistic concept of the people which they transform into a quasi-empirical concept which refers to a specific economic-social group about whom they postulate certain moral traits. Secondly, as a result of their transformation of Rousseau's notion of the people, the Jacobins make a change regarding the concept of the general will. Robespierre and Saint-Just argue that when the general will is mute in the assembly, it can be expressed outside the assembly, by and 85 through the action of the poor people of Paris in the streets. The justification for this reasoning depends upon the subjective characteristics which both Robespierre and Saint-Just attribute to the poor people. The Jacobin theory of revolutionary action as the expression of the general will is a direct consequence of their attempt to find a specific social group whose members possess the universalist consciousness which is the essential feature of Rousseau's concept of the wellwell-intentioned poor people,

in particular the

intentioned people.

The Jacobin

poor people of Paris with is that only the poor people possess the characteristics which enable them to be well intentioned. The Jacobins argue that the poor are not corrupted by luxury; they are not seduced by artificial pleasures; and most importantly, they are not motivated by any private (non-universal, non-general) interests. Their only interests are the essential (hence universal) interests of humanity itself. This point comes out particularly clearly in Robespierre's argument against a property qualification for voting. The proponents of a restricted suffrage who view society essentially as a joint-stock company argue that the poor should not be allowed to vote because they have no interest in society. The Girondins claim that the poor are incapable of exercising the rights of citizenship because they have "nothing to lose." Robespierre denies this is so; he maintains that the description of the poor as having "nothing to lose" is a false description, a product of the absurd ideas of despotism and "delirious pride." To be sure, the people whom the Girondins describe as having "nothing to lose" exist "in the bosom of society without any means of life and subsistence," but according to Robespierre it is not true that they have nothing to lose. What the poor have to lose are in fact the most important possessions and rights of humanity. The fact that these justification for identifying the

the "well-intentioned" people of Rousseau's theory

The Wood Theft Articles

38

possessions are valued as naught

is

not a reflection on the poor but a

on those who suppose these possessions Robespierre's words are worth quoting at length: reflection

To

to

have no value.

be sure, the rough garments that cover me, the humble retreat where I earn modest wage with which I feed my wife,

the right to retire and live in peace, the

my

children;

all

may perhaps be

these,

I

point of view of humanity; glittering

The

admit, are not lands, not castles, not carriages;

called nothingby luxuryit is

and opulence: but

it is

all

this

something from the

a sacred property, as sacred without doubt as the

domains of wealth. 87

fact that "luxury

and opulence" do not value these fundamental

possessions simply indicates that "luxury and opulence" are incapable of seeing what

is

really essential for

human

beings.

Robespierre asserts that the wealthy are guilty of "a strange abuse of words"; they have distorted the notion of property itself. In claiming that the poor have nothing to lose, the rich have restricted the definition of

property to certain material objects which they alone possess, and then they have argued that only the owners of this kind of property' are worthy

of being citizens. Robespierre accuses them of deception and sophistry: 88 "they have called their particular interest the general interest." On the basis of this deceit the wealthy have perpetrated the

poor have poor do have an interest in society; their interest is in those things which are truly and elementally important to human beings: "The people only demands what is necessary; it wants only justice and tranquility The interest of the 8 people is the general interest, that of the rich is the particular interest."

no

interest in society.

But

.

The

lie

that the

in fact, says Robespierre, the

.

.

which the poor have an interest is not a society of which the basic (natural) desires of human beings could be realized. As Robespierre sees it, the poor are society in

particular privilege but a society in

interested in the following sorts of things:

My

liberty,

those

who

exercise the

first

my

life,

the right to obtain security or revenge for myself and for

are dear to me, the right to repel oppression, the right to freely

all the faculties of my mind and my heart; ones of those which nature has dispensed

The poor

all

to

these sweet possessions,

humanity.

are interested in those "sweet possessions"

90

which are the most

basic possessions of human beings. Existing as they do, "in the

bosom of

poor are only interested in the foundational or elemental aspects of being human. The Jacobins do more than champion the rights of the underprivileged; they glorify poverty and romanticize the poor. For the Jacobins, poverty becomes "honorable"; it becomes something of which one can be society," the

justifiably

proud. In arguing against a property qualification for voting

The Wood Theft Robespierre

declaims:

"Permit

me

to

Articles

39

be proud sometimes of an

honorable poverty."

For the Jacobin Their

universality.

human

theorists the will is

poor people are the embodiment of

purely general, their desires are "natural"

Robespierre maintains that "the people desire the 92 because the common good is their interest." But since,

desires.

common good

according to Robespierre, the desires of the poor are only for such universals as

life,

justice, tranquility,

mental and physical

This amounts to claiming that it is entirely natural for be well intentioned, since what they want is what anyone who not stupefied by luxury or corrupted by wealth would want. It should come as no surprise that Robespierre defends the poor from

poor are the poor is

and the right of exercising their good and the good of the

faculties, the universal

identical. to

the charge of corruption levelled at

them from the

them by those who would exclude

rights of citizenship. Robespierre argues that corruption

and abuses "are the work and the domain of the rich." Indeed, Robespierre goes further and asserts that the laborious life of the poor does not engender the traditional vices; these are much rather the result of luxury, softness and ambition. In one of his more extreme paeans of praise to the natural virtue of the poor Robespierre proclaims: There is nothing as just and as good as the people ... it is thankful for the weakest considerations that one accords it, for the smallest favor that one does for it; it is even grateful for the evil that one does not do to it. It is in the people that

one finds under the exteriors which we call rough, souls that are frank and common sense and a vigor for which one would long seek in the class that

true, a

scorns It

93 it.

would be hard

these

to overlook the romanticized

The

remarks.

people,

as

and idealized

strains in

Robespierre conceives them, are a

repository of natural virtue, goodness incarnate in a social class. "In itself to that which is Indeed it is this natural virtue which is to be the foundation of the Republic of Virtue whose trustees are the Jacobins. But unfortunately for the Jacobins, historical reality pierced through the romanticized populism. The Parisian sans culottes were not content with the sort of "honorable poverty" which the Jacobins idealized, and the exigencies of the revolution at war revealed only too clearly the gap between the idealized people of Jacobin theory and the empirical people

order to be good, the people needs only to prefer

not

94

itself."

of Paris.

95

The preceding

discussion reveals that there are a

in Robespierre's

number of

parallels

and Marx's thinking about the poor. Both Robespierre

and Marx appeal

to the universality of the law against the selfishness of

40

The Wood Theft Articles

private interest; both claim that the poor ought to have the full rights of citizenship; both describe private interest in identical terms as deceitful, selfish, cruel, etc.

More

importantly, both Robespierre and

Marx make Thus the

the poor into a touchstone of the state of society generally. situation of the

poor and the larger

society's attitudes

fact that the existence itself

of the poor

towards them yield

For Marx, the mere custom of civil society" is an immanent critique of its standards

information about the justness of the social order is

itself.

"a

an indictment of this society, Equally, for Robespierre,

of humanity.

the

social

attitude

which

characterizes the poor as having "nothing to lose" arid therefore as being

unworthy of citizenship condemns itself as both conceited and corrupt. That the rich think about the poor in this way reveals a deficiency in their own values. Those who scorn the poor for having "nothing to lose" simply betray their own lack of understanding as to what is really valuable

human life. The fact that the poor function as a touchstone for both Robespierre and Marx is related to another similarity in their thinking. Robespierre's in

and Marx's treatment of the poor exemplifies a dramatic "transvaluation of values" with respect to the worth and significance of the poor. This transvaluation of values has the following dimensions: (1) For both Robespierre and Marx the interest which the poor represent is the universal interest of humanity in general as against the particular interest of the privileged classes. (2) Both Robespierre and Marx describe the possessions of the poor as fundamental or elemental (primary) human possessions. (3) Both Robespierre and Marx attribute a universalist subjectivity to the poor in consequence of their objective universal interest; both Robespierre and Marx maintain that the poor in fact actually do desire only universal goods. (4) Finally, and most importantly, instead of seeing the poor as a marginal (if problematic) group in a particular social order, both Robespierre and Marx regard the poor as the most basic element in human society. Robespierre's characterization of the poor as existing in the "bosom of society" is paralleled by Marx's characterization of the poor as "the elemental class of human society." Indeed it is because the poor occupy this place in human society generally that their fate is a measure of the rationality and humanity of the particular society in which they live. But it is also more than this. The poor serve as the criterion for social criticism in general: in their fate one can read the

fate

of humanity at large.

The Wood Theft

10

41

Articles

The Jacobin Emphasis on Education between the Jacobins and Marx development of Marx's This aspect concerns the importance which the

In one respect, however, the differences

are particularly significant for a discussion of the

views on subjectivity.

Jacobins seem to attribute to a "practice of subjectivity".

Marx is not concerned with this issue. Indeed Marx should be interested in this issue given

there

is

no reason why

the problematic he

is

concerned with in Debates. At the time he writes the articles for the Rheinische Zeitung Marx is not engaged in analyzing the conditions for a possible social transformation. He is simply defending the customary rights of the poor vis-a-vis private interest. The fact that the poor are engaged in gathering fallen wood means that they already know what their customary rights are. They do not need any education or enlightenment on this point; they do not need their consciousness transformed in any way.

The Jacobins, however, are involved in the process of creating a new and they are very much concerned with the issue of transforming the human base of this society. Their concern is revealed in the society,

importance which they attach to the project of education.

The Jacobins regard education not merely as a technical project concerned with the development of certain skills but as a moral and political enterprise of the greatest importance. For the Jacobins, to educate is to "direct the passions of the human heart towards matters useful for public prosperity."

of citizens; virtue

which

The For

its

all

function

is

is

to

96

The

goal of education

is

essential to the continued existence of the Republic.

natural capacity for virtue

must be recovered

as well as developed.

their lofty idealism the Jacobins recognize the

heritage of despotism.

From

of the ancien regime

is

inculcated in

some

the Legislative

the construction

develop and recover the natural capacity for

hard

of the

facts

Robespierre's perspective, the worst aspect

the attitudes of scorn and contempt

The

citizens towards others.

Assembly are

full

of arrogance towards the people

natural result of the corrupt environment in which they lived:

leaving such a profound corruption,

how

has

it

fact that the deputies in is

the

"Upon

could they respect humanity,

cherish equality, believe in virtue?" Robespierre shows himself an astute

observer of the dynamics of oppression; those

who have been oppressed The oppressed

turn the mistreatment they have received on others.

become oppressors

in turn.

Consequendy

dynamic will take time; it will be necessary of attitudes and of habits of behavior.

the process of undoing this

to effect a transformation

both

The Wood Theft Articles

42

[W]e ought not to be surprised or even irritated. Our habits have not been able to change completely along with our ideas and our language. Did the education we received under despotism have a goal other than that of forming us for egoism and for a stupid vanity? What were our institutions and our customs other than a code of impertinence and baseness, in which contempt for people was submitted to a kind of tariff and calibrated according to rules as bizarre as they were

numerous? To scorn and to be scorned, to dominate and to grovel by turns, this was our lot. Should we be surprised if so many egoistic burghers still retain for the artisans something of the distain which the nobels lavished upon the burghers themselves? 97

This problem in its most urgent form affects the deputies who are to frame the laws of the Republic: "In order to form our political institutions we need the habits which they are supposed to give us some 98 This problem is not only limited to the deputies; in a general way day." it affects the entire population which has lived under the tyranny of the ancien regime. To put the point in other terms, Robespierre does not assume that the poor are exempt from the heritage of despotism. His comments as to the difficulties of creating a free society out of the ruins of despotism could apply to the poor as well: "We are building the temple of liberty with hands which are It is

true that

9

from the irons of servitude." Robespierre does not specifically mention the, task of still

soiled

transforming the character of the poor, but

we should remember

that the

Jacobin plan for education was to include all children from the ages of five to twelve. Education was to be undertaken by the state. Pupils were to be raised in common; they were to receive not only the same instruction, but also the

same food, clothing and general

care.

The

goal

of this education was not to produce identical automatons, but to inculcate a genuine respect for equality while fostering the development

of essential

human

traits, qualities

which

it is

important for everyone to

have.

We want

to give children the physical

and moral aptitudes which

for everyone to acquire in the course of their

position is

may

be.

necessary to

We

do not form them

endow them with

from every group.

life,

it is

important

whatever their particular

for this or that determinate destination;

qualities

whose

utility is

common

it

to individuals

100

The Jacobins may have idealized the poor as possessing an innate virtue but they never suppose that the poor were non-members of the social order of the ancien regime. For all the bon sens which the Jacobins attribute to the poor, they insist that the poor need to be enlightened in order to function as citizens. The Jacobin insistence on a national education plan which would include the children of the poor can be understood as

The Wood Theft Articles

stemming from poor are

poor vis-a-vis the ancien

their view of the

at the bottom of the social

regime.

43

The

order of despotism; they are not outside

it.

Conclusion

1 1

have argued that Marx's originality in the Wood Theft articles lies in which he combines diverse elements of the larger political tradition into his own synthesis. I have also claimed that this combination I

the ways in

responsible for some of the problematic aspects of his later thinking about the proletariat. In particular, Marx's transvaluation of values with respect to the benefits of non-membership in civil society along with his Jacobin-like assumption as to the natural virtue of the poor results in a is

highly problematic notion which

I

will call the

a priori emancipation of

revolutionary consciousness. According to this view, the agents of a possible social revolution already "possess" an emancipatory subjectivity

simply in virtue of their place "outside"

To

be sure,

this difficulty is

civil society.

not significant in the context of the

Wood

Theft articles. Marx's passionate defense of the customary rights of the poor is not yet an analysis of the possibilities of social transformation. His appeal is still to the state as the guardian and guarantor of universality in 101 Strictly speaking, therefore, we cannot say that the the social order. Wood Theft articles exhibit a dogmatic perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity because the concept of emancipatory subjectivity itself

presupposes a context in which the question of transformative action is on the agenda. What we can say, is that the Wood Theft articles contain a potential dogmatism with regard to the issue of emancipatory consciousness.

The

context changes, however, once

Marx

turns from a defense of the

customary rights of the poor to an analysis of the possibilities of a radical revolution in which the proletariat are to take the leading role. It is in the context of this problematic that the nature and consciousness of the proletariat become significant, and it is at this point that the roots of

Marx's conception of the proletariat reveal their importance. Marx's unique reworking of Hegel's description of the poor results in a conception of the ontological superiority of non-membership in civil society. This notion, together with the Jacobin view of the poor as innately virtuous and well intentioned, issues in a conception of the revolutionary subject whose emancipatory consciousness appears to be guaranteed by virtue of its place in the social order. However, the dogmatic conception of emancipatory subjectivity is only

44

The Wood Theft Articles

one pole of Marx's thinking. In the succeeding chapters I will attempt to show that Marx's early writings are characterized by a tension between dogmatic and dialectical perspectives towards emancipatory subjectivity.

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy of Right":

The Emergence

of a Dialectical

Towards Emancipatory

Perspective Subjectivity

argued that Marx's reworking of Hegel's concept of the poor as non-members of civil society in conjunction with his acceptance of the Jacobin notion of the virtues of poverty gives his thinking about the poor a dogmatic quality. This chapter will examine Marx's first systematic critique of Hegel's political philosophy in order to uncover the origin of a dialectical perspective in his conception of emancipatory subjectivity. Marx's critique takes the form of a detailed commentary on paragraphs

Chapter

1

261-313 of Hegel's Philosophy ofRight. It was written during the summer of 1843 and published posthumously in 1927. Marx is critical of some aspects of Hegel's political philosophy as early l

Arnold Ruge dated 5 March 1842 Marx mentions that he has written an article which is "a critique of Hegelian natural law insofar as it concerns the internal political system.'" Describing the aim of this essay Marx writes: "The central point is the struggle against the constitutional monarchy as a hybrid which from beginning to end contradicts and abolishes itself." Marx tells Ruge that he had originally intended to publish this essay in the Deutsche jfahrbuecher and that he would have sent Ruge a copy to read along with another essay, "Treatise on Christian Art," except that both essays are in as the spring of 1842. In a letter written to

2

need of a "cleaning up" and "in part of some corrections." Marx mentions both manuscripts again in a letter to Ruge written on 20 March

Marx is more explicit about the nature of the They concern "the tone" of both essays, which Marx says was

1842. In this letter revisions.

be included in a volume which Bruno Bauer. Marx writes: "the burdensome constraint of the Hegelian exposition should now be replaced with a freer and therefore more thorough exposition."

determined by the he was intending

fact that they

were

to

to publish joindy with

46

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight"

But as the Wood Theft articles show, in 1842 Marx still accepts the major premises of Hegel's political philosophy regarding the role and function of the state vis-a-vis civil society. Even though Marx rejects Hegel's account of the estates as having a universalizing function, he accepts the Hegelian ideal of the state as the realm of universality. In 1842 Marx is working within a conceptual framework in which there is a dichotomy between the following two spheres: on the one hand, matter, passivity, civil society, need and private interest, on the other, spirit, activity, the state, rationality and universal interest. Even at the end of 1842 Marx is primarily concerned with the question: how can the universality of the state be protected from the corrupting influence of private (egoistic) interest; thus in effect, how can the state be protected 4 from civil society? To be sure, Hegel's conception of the poor undergoes a radical transformation in the course of Marx's articles on the Wood Theft Debates, but this transformation does not yet constitute an explicit critique of the premises of Hegel's political thought on Marx's part. And although Marx's analysis of the Debates turns the Hegelian concepts themselves into vehicles of social critique, Hegel's political philosophy is still the framework for Marx's discussion; it is not itself an object of concern. Marx's attention is focused on the desperate situation of the rural poor on the one hand, and on the callous sophistry of the Rhineland Deputies on the other. Inasmuch then as Marx's discussion of the poor contains a critique of Hegel's political thought, this critique is implicit rather than explicit and it does not challenge the basic premise of Hegel's political philosophy: the notion of the state as a sphere of "reason and morality" opposed to

civil society.

In 1843 a decisive shift takes place in Marx's thinking, a shift

which

can be described from several vantage-points. In terms of Marx's earlier acceptance of the Hegelian identity between the state and universality, this shift can be described as the rejection of this notion and the rejection of the concomitant Hegelian view of the state as a sphere of reason and morality separate from

civil society.

From

another perspective, the

shift

Marx's thinking can be described as the appropriation and transformation of Feuerbach's theory of mystified consciousness. It is particularly this development in Marx's thinking which will be the focus of this

in

chapter.

5

The two new elements

in

Marx's thought come together

for the first

time in his Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight". The importance of this text for the development of Marx's thought has been noted by several scholars.

ways

in

6

The

significance of the Critique for the present study lies in the

which Marx uses Feuerbach's theory of mystified consciousness

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

47

Marx uses Feuerbach Hegel as he had earlier used Hegel to criticize the Rhineland Assembly. But here again Marx does not simply apply a methodology which he borrows ready-made from another thinker. Rather, in using a method of analysis derived from Feuerbach, Marx reformulates and to criticize Hegel's political philosophy. In effect to criticize

transforms Feuerbach's account of mystified consciousness in several

This reformulation contains the seeds of a dialectical understanding of emancipatory subjectivity. In the first part of this chapter I will outline Feuerbach's theory of crucial respects.

I will then examine Marx's transformation of Feuerbach's account in his Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight". In the last part of this chapter I will analyze Marx's first discussion of the

mystified consciousness.

reform of mystified consciousness

Ruge

1

in the spring

and

fall

in his

correspondence with Arnold

of 1843.

Feuerbach's Theory of Mystified Consciousness

Feuerbach has both

a structural analysis

of mystified thinking from the

point of view of logic and metaphysics, and a genetic account of the

causes of such thinking from the point of view of psychology and morality.

From

the perspective of logic and metaphysics, mystified

from the perspective of psychology, it is a compensation, and from the perspective of morality, mystified consciousness is a moral flaw or weakness. Feuerbach's most explicit account of mystified consciousness as a species of logical confusion is found in his "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy." 7 In this work Feuerbach defines mystified thinking as the transposition of the infinite and the finite, or, more exactly, as the attribution of infinity to things which are in reality only finite. "The infinite in religion or philosophy is and never was anything consciousness

is

rationalization or

a confusion;

an attempt

at

other than a finite or determinate of finite

or

determinate

determinate." is

8

[thing]

According

to

some

postulated

kind, but mystified, that as

being

not

finite,

Feuerbach the "quality" of being not

in fact a pseudo-quality; the alleged infinite

is

is,

a

not

finite

simply the non-finite.

Feuerbach claims that both speculative philosophy and religion have the same error. They have mistaken the logical process of negating

made

the quality of finitude for the non-logical "discovery" of another quality called "infinitude."

what

This

is

the error of

making "the determinations of

of the infinite 9 merely by negating the determinacy in which they are what they are." Feuerbach's remarks here are reminiscent of Hegel's critique of is

real or finite into determinations or predicates

48

The Critique ofHegel

's

"Philosophy ofRight

"

Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself. Hegel argues that the concept of the thing-in-itself part.

According

simply the result of a logical confusion on Kant's

is

to

Hegel, Kant mistakenly supposes that things-in-

themselves are things beyond thought, things which are entirely undetermined by thought. But, says Hegel, the notion of things-in-themselves as

something beyond thought is itself a product of a particular kind of thought. Hegel maintains that Kant arrives at the concept of things-inthemselves as entirely indeterminate by a process of abstracting from 10 determinate things. Thus the notion of an indeterminate thing is only the consequence of failing to understand what is involved in attempting to negate the notion of determinacy. Similarly, Feuerbach argues that in order to give "content" to the notion of infinity, one must abstract from all finite

determinations.

The

key to Feuerbach's discussion of mystified thinking as a logicalis found in his notion of abstraction: "To

metaphysical confusion

of nature outside nature, the essence of humankind, the essence of thought outside the act of 11 thinking." For Feuerbach, it is the predicates or qualities of an object which constitute the nature of that object, and it is determinacy' itself which makes a quality a quality. Consequently, according to Feuerbach, to deny the determinacy of a quality is to abstract from it the very element abstract

is

humankind

to posit the essence

outside

which makes it a quality. When the quality is viewed apart from the determinacy which characterizes it as a quality, it is inevitably viewed as a substance. Because speculative philosophy transposes qualities and characteristics into substances, Feuerbach claims: "Speculative philosophy has hypostatized [fixiert] this separation of the essential human qualities and has thereby deified purely abstract qualities as independent beings."

12

For Feuerbach, the solution method which he

interpretive

to this calls

critique of speculative philosophy."

undo the mystical

problem "the

The

is

found through

a

new

method of the reformative "reformative"

critic

seeks to

transposition by restructuring the originally mystified

meaning of the statement. "We need only always make the predicate into the subject thereby [converting] the subject into the object and the principle; thus when we invert statements, and thus laying bare the real

[umkehren]

speculative

shining truth."

13

philosophy,

we have

the

undisguised,

pure,

Since Feuerbach holds that speculative philosophy

is

only the rationalized form of theology, he claims that the reform of the

former

is

simultaneously the reform of the

But theology for

is

latter.

not the original expression of mystified consciousness

Feuerbach; theology itself is nothing but the systematized form of A thorough-going reform of mystified consciousness

religious feeling.

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" has

to

tackle

the

problem

at

source.

its

The

origin

49

of mystified

consciousness has to be exposed and undercut in religion. Feuerbach's "Preliminary Theses" thus depend on his argument in The Essence of Christianity where he sets forth his account of the origin of mystified

consciousness ontology.

from

the

of

perspectives

psychology

and

human

4

book Feuerbach sets as his task "to show that the antithesis 15 between the divine and the human is altogether illusory," thus that "the In this

true essence" of religion

is

The

anthropology.

qualifying adjective "true"

is the touchstone of Feuerbach's thesis. The concept of the "true essence" of religion seeks to distinguish the real nature of religion (the

real

meaning of religious claims) from the meaning

religious consciousness.

anthropology'

God

is

To

attributed to

to say that all the characteristics

are in reality only characteristics of the

system, religious consciousness actual

of religious

nature

human

species, although

lation of

human

is

As

a belief

thus inherently false consciousness;

is

consciousness

consciousness. Religious consciousness

essence of religion

is

which are predicated of

they are not recognized as such by religious consciousness. the

them by

say that the true essence of religion

is

forever

escapes

eternally self-ignorant.

this

"The

the immediate, involuntary, unconscious contemp-

nature as another."

16

For Feuerbach the real villain is theology, not religious feeling. In its Feuerbach maintains, religious consciousness is neither mystified nor harmful. The trouble with religion however is that it inevitably "becomes theology," as a result of "reflection." original form,

The

intuitive

contemplation [Anschauung] of

human

nature as another, as a

however in the original conception of religion an involuntary, childlike, ingenuous act of mind, i.e. one which distinguishes God from humankind just as immediately as it identifies them. But when religion advances in years, and, with years, in understanding, when, within religion reflection on religion is awakened, and the consciousness of the unity of the divine nature and human nature begins to dawn, in short when religion becomes theology, then the originally involuntary, harmless separation of God from humankind becomes an intentional, studied distinction which has no other purpose than to banish from consciousness the unity mat has already entered separately existing being,

there.

The

is

17

structure of mystified thinking

is

the

same

in speculative philosophy

But whereas the transposition of human qualities into independent subjects effected by speculative philosophy results in the various pseudo-entities of Thought, Being or the Idea, the transposition effected by religious consciousness creates the pseudo-entity God. According to this argument God is not a real subject. Claims about God as in religion.

50

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight

"

therefore are really indirect and disguised claims about

To

God

"loving

human

beings.

on Feuerbach's analysis, is really to say that divine." According to Feuerbach's hermeneutic, the true

say that is

is

loving,

meaning of this statement is a claim that human beings place the highest value on their ability to love. Religion is actually mystified anthropology inasmuch as it informs us only indirectly (by virtue of claims about the pseudo-entity God) what characteristics of human nature are considered valuable, worthy of respect and adoration. The mystification in religious consciousness lies in the fact that human beings do not recognize their own nature in the characteristics which they attribute to God. 18

Why is

it

that

human

are

human

beings

fall

prey to mystified consciousness?

Why

beings religious? According to Feuerbach the ground of

consciousness is ontological: the difference between the and the species. For Feuerbach this difference is equivalent to the difference between existence and essence. The human individual is limited and imperfect; the human species as a whole is infinite and mystified

individual

perfect.

Feuerbach's notion of the perfection of the human species seems to be two concepts, a compensatory notion of perfection and a notion of perfection as the plenitude of existence. According to the a hybrid of

former, the characteristics of one individual are compensated for by characteristics of other individuals: All human beings are sinners. Granted; but they are not all sinners in the same way; on the contrary, there exists a great and essential difference between them.

One

person

inclined to falsehood, another

is

is

not ... the third has a propensity

whether by favour of Nature or from the energy of her or his character exhibits none of these. Thus, in the moral as well as physical and intellectual elements human beings compensate for each other so that taken as a whole they are as they should be, to intoxication, the fourth to licentiousness, while the fifth

they present the perfect

The

individual

nature in

infinite: "this perfect

is

nothing

is

individuals."

in

19

notion of perfection as a plenitude of existence means that the

species itself

its

human.

less

this, that 20

being free from the limits of the

than the species which reveals the infinitude of

it is

realized in infinitelv

numerous and various

Neither of these notions of perfection has any connection with perfection any moral sense. Feuerbach's notion of perfection is an ontological

concept which seems to be morally neutral. Perfection is identical to non-limitedness. It is the non-limitedness of an attribute which makes the attribute itself "divine,"

Being. in

its

"Why

nature,

is

worthy of being predicated of a complete God? Because it is divine expresses no limitation, no defect. Why are

i.e.

a given predicate a predicate of

i.e.

because

it

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

themselves, they agree in

Using

this

however various

Because,

that they

this,

in

alike express perfection,

all

'

unlimitedness."

is

of God?

predicates

other predicates

51

notion of perfection Feuerbach argues that the idea of God

only the disguised, mystified idea of humanity:

The divine being

is

nothing

else

than the

human

being, or rather the

human

nature

from the limits of the individuals, made objective 22 contemplated and revered as another, as a different and distinct being.

purified,

freed

All divine attributes, species,

all

the attributes which

make God God,

i.e.

are attributes of the

[Gattungsbestimmungen], attributes which in the individual are limited but

the limits of which are abolished in the essence of the species, and even in existence, in so far as the species has

beings taken together.

But

if infinity is

appropriate existence only in

all

its

human

23

the sole criterion of divinity,

possess only

some

God who

not benevolent, not

is

its

attributes

and not others? just,

why does God seem

Why

is it

to

the case that "a 24

no God"? If the measure of its divinity we

not wise,

is

non-limitedness of an attribute were the sole might expect that God would also be characterized as absolutely evil, infinitely cruel and infinitely untruthful. In fact, Feuerbach's claim that a predicate is divine because it expresses no limitations applies only to those attributes which are variations of the three essential human faculties - reason, will and affection (or love) - which for him constitute human nature. 25 Feuerbach calls these faculties "perfections" [Vollkommenheiten], by which he means that they exist as ends in themselves. "We think for the sake of thinking, love for the sake of loving, will for the sake

of willing,

i.e.

in order to

willing existence.

own

sake.

be

That alone

But such

is

love,

free. is

True

existence

perfect, true, divine

such

is

reason, such

is

thinking, loving,

which is

exists for

the will."

its

26 It is

because these three faculties are perfections, and because human beings are implicidy aware of them as such, that they attribute characteristics

which embody these perfections to God. "You believe in love as a divine attribute because you yourself love; you believe that God is a wise, benevolent being because vou know nothing better in yourself than 2 benevolence and wisdom."

The

implicit recognition of these faculties as perfections

Feuerbach's account of mystified consciousness. will,

"It is

crucial to

is

impossible to love,

or think, without perceiving these activities to be perfections ...

It is

impossible, therefore, to be conscious of a perfection as an imperfection,

impossible to feel feeling limited, to think thought limited."

8

the case, the religious notion of the sinfulness of human nature

If this is

is

clearly

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight"

52

ness seems to

how is this mistake possible? Indeed religious consciousmake a dual mistake; it attributes limitations to the human

species and

worships an

a mistake, but

it

infinite (perfect)

God.

How are these mistakes

possible?

would seem

on principle, not only be conscious of a perfection as an imperfection," but because in addition to being conscious of the perfections of loving, thinking or willing each individual has a generalized awareness of perfection whch Feuerbach defines as the "consciousness of the infinite." This consciousness of the infinite is nothing else but "the consciousness which one has of one's own - not 29 finite and limited, but infinite nature." Consciousness of the infinite is thus equivalent to an awareness of the infinity of the human species; in other words, consciousness of the It

because

it

is

that these mistakes are impossible

"impossible

to

self-knowledge of humanity. The awareness of the infinity of the species is equivalent to consciousness itself. This follows from infinite is the

Feuerbach's definition of consciousness: Consciousness in the limited consciousness

strict is

or proper sense

is

consciousness of the

no consciousness; consciousness

is

infinite; a

essentially infinite in

its nature. The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness; or, in other words, in the consciousness of the infinite the conscious subject has for its object the infinity

of

its

own

nature.

30

"Consciousness in the

or proper sense

is present only in a being to 31 an object [of thought]." This means that for Feuerbach "consciousness in the strictest sense" is only

whom

its

species,

its

strict

essential nature

is

human beings, or that "consciousness in the strictest sense" is human consciousness. "Human beings cannot conceive of themselves as without 32 consciousness." The defining trait of human consciousness is an

present in only

ever-present awareness of the perfection of the species, an awareness

which Feuerbach characterizes at one point as "the self- awareness of the 33 perfection of the species." This is an awareness which the individual cannot help but have qua human being: "the individual cannot lose the 34 awareness of the species." Thus, on Feuerbach's account, to be human is

to

have consciousness. This consciousness

intentional, species consciousness,

is inherendy speciesawareness of the perfection of the

species. Ironically it is the very existence of species consciousness which is the ground of mystified consciousness. It is precisely because one has an implicit awareness of the perfection of the species that one is aware of

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

own

53

35

and defects as an individual. In fact, one is explicitly and unavoidably aware of these. They are the "objects" so to speak which stand out against the background of one's species awareness. And since the awareness of one's own limitations is painful, the individual seeks to assuage this pain by attributing these imperfections to the species as a whole. "A limitation which I know merely to be mine humiliates, shames and perturbs me. Hence to free myself from one's

this feeling

limits of

limitations

of shame ...

human

convert the limits of my individuality into the

I

nature in general."

imperfections to the species one

36

But having attributed one's own

is still left

with one's inherent awareness

of species perfection. At this point one concludes that this perfection

must be

a characteristic of a

than the

human

non-human

being, a being which

is

other

species.

Religious consciousness (and Christian religious consciousness in particular)

is

thus

the

result

of a mistaken indentification of the

individual with the species. Christian religious consciousness incorrectly 37

between the individual and the species. The mistake here is to forget that the identity between the individual and the species can only be established through the individual's relationship to other human beings as parts of the whole. Feuerbach claims that this

posits an immediate identity

mistake

of

the source of the problematic notion of the universal sinfulness

is

human

beings.

It is

because one forgets that the individual

is

only an

individual that one supposes that the single individual ought to be a

ought to be the species). It is because one incorrectly expects of the individual what can only be true of the species that one is disappointed with the species and proclaims that the species itself is

perfect being

(i.e.

sinful.

The

lamentation over sin

is

found only where one regards oneself

in one's

who does not need others for the realization of the species, the perfect human; where in place of the consciousness of the species, the exclusive self- consciousness of the individual has appeared; where one does not recognize oneself as a part of humanity, and does not differentiate oneself from the species, and therefore makes one's sins, one's limits, one's weaknesses into universal sins, into the sins, limits, and weaknesses of humanity individuality as a perfectly complete, absolute being

in general.

Thus

38

it is

the failure to recognize oneself as part of a whole which

is

responsible for the importance attributed to the failings of the individual.

But the mistaken perspective of Christianity the individual and the species

metaphysics.

According

to

is

as to the identity

between

not simply a morally neutral error in

Feuerbach the mistake which produces

Christian religious consciousness

is itself

a result of a particular kind of

54

The Critique ofHegel 's "Ph ilosophy ofRigh t

"

The incorrect identification of "an illusion which is intimately connected with the individual's love of ease, sloth, vanity and egoism." 39 The moral defect which gives rise to religious consciousness is thus the preference for self above others. If religious consciousness expresses "the exclusive self-consciousness of the individual," the cure consists of exchanging this exclusive self-consciousness for a superior "species moral

failure

on the part of the

the individual with the

individual.

species

is

consciousness."

The

substitution

of

species

consciousness

for

exclusive

self-

consciousness would enable one to realize that one's weaknesses are 40 "neutralized by the opposite qualities of other human beings."

Feuerbach claims species consciousness would render the

religious

notion of a superhuman savior and mediator unnecessary, for

it

would

allow individuals to recognize the "natural mediation" between themselves

2

and the species through the existence of other human beings.

Feuerbach's Solution: Idealist Voluntarism

Feuerbach seems

to

have two different accounts of the causes of One account attributes religious consciousness

religious consciousness.

of individual unhappiness (the unhappiness in being an individual); the second account views religious consciousness as the

to the rationalization

result of a

moral

failing

on the part of individuals. According

account, individuals attribute their

own

to the first

imperfections to the species as a

whole because the awareness of their own imperfections is painful to them. According to the second theory, religious consciousness is the result of the individual's preference for self against others.

In spite of the apparent differences in these explanations they share

two fundamental similarities: (1) In each case the ground of religion is the distinction between the individual and the species. This distinction is an unchangeable ontologicalfact. Religion as mystified consciousness is the result of the wrong attitude towards this fact. (2) In each case the "solution" to the problem of mystified consciousness consists of substituting another attitude towards the unchangeable fact. The solution to the problem of mystified consciousness is thus simply to abandon one's mystified beliefs. The difficulty with this solution is that the nature of mystified consciousness itself seems to prevent its implementation, for in each case the attitude which one is supposed to adopt to cure the problem is blocked by the very attitude which one already has. This can be demonstrated with regard to each explanation. According to the first account it is the painful awareness of one's

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

55

an individual which drives one to the idea of God. "The is painful and hence individuals free themselves from it by contemplation of the perfect Being. In this contemplation one According to this account possesses what one otherwise lacks." individuals will be able to free themselves from their experience of limitations as

sense of limitations

individuality as painful

when

they realize that every individual

is

a limited

and defects of individuality are simply an inevitable and inherent feature of this status. Having understood this piece of metaphysical wisdom, individuals will presumably cease to desire the impossible (to be other than an individual), i.e. to be, as an individual, a perfect being. Species consciousness would thus mitigate, if not entirely prevent, the painful consciousness of one's own limitations by giving one a perspective on one's ontological situation, by showing one what it means to be a part of a whole. Species consciousness would not erase the awareness of one's own limitations, nor would it erase the limitations themselves. Instead, the awareness of one's own limitations would be transformed into the comforting realization that one is by nature a member of a whole greater than oneself. Presumably as a result of this change in attitude towards the fact of individuality, individuality itself would no longer be a painful part of a perfect whole, thus that the limits

experience.

Since

on

Feuerbach's

analysis

it

is

the false

understanding

of

which makes being an individual painful, and since it is the painful aspect of individuality' which produces the mystified rationalization which is religion, if one changes one's attitude towards being an individual (if one understands this correctly), one will no longer need to blame the species for one's own (inevitable) limitations. "God springs out of the feeling of a lack; whatever one lacks, whether this be a determinate 4 and therefore consciousness or unconsciousness lack - that is God." Apparently if one has species consciousness, one will not experience individuality as painful, and therefore one will not need God. Here we should recall that Feuerbach's account of mystified consciousness depends upon his claim that human beings already have some sort of species consciousness in the first place. Indeed it is precisely against the background of an abiding consciousness of the perfection of the species that one experiences the limitations of one's own individuality. It seems then that the species consciousness which Feuerbach is individuality

advocating

the

as

antidote

to

that

troublesome

exclusive

self-

consciousness which produces religion must be qualitatively different

from the

latter.

The

qualitative difference

seems

to consist in the fact

that a genuine (or non-mystified) species consciousness

solution to the

problem of mystified consciousness

as

is explicit.

The

Feuerbach sees

it is

56

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight"

then the transformation of an implicit background awareness into an explicit recognition.

43

How is one to acquire this explicit species consciousness - given Feuerbach's analysis of the cause of religious consciousness? Granted, if one were to recognize the perfection of the human species, one would not be inclined to blame the species for one's own inevitable limitations as an individual. But the problem is precisely that the mystified individuals

do not recognize

this perfection

except implicitly,

i.e.

this

As a result, they feel badly and blame the species. It seems

recognition itself is the source of the difficulty.

about their

own

problem

limitations as individuals

consciousness

that mystified

is

self-perpetuating;

(feeling badly about one's

explicit species

own

the nature of the

limitations as a result of lacking

consciousness) prevents the recognition of the truth

which would cure the unhappiness. The same difficulty characterizes Feuerbach's account of religious consciousness as resulting from the individual's "love of ease, sloth, vanity, and egoism." Here again the nature of mystified thinking itself seems to preclude the recommended cure, which consists of rendering one's implicit awareness explicit and thereby substituting a correct belief for an incorrect and troublesome one. It is the individuals' "exclusive self-consciousness" which causes them to incorrecdy identify themselves immediately with the species and to forget (or ignore) the fact that all other

human

beings are necessary for the realization of the species.

one had explicit species consciousness, one would not make this mistake. But the fact is that individuals are plagued by their exclusive self-consciousness, and it is this very attitude which prevents the Clearly

if

realization that other

species consciousness

human is

beings are necessary. Once again explicit blocked by the individual's current conscious-

ness ("love of ease, sloth, vanity, and egoism"), and yet species consciousness which alone solution to the

problem seems

to

is

it

is

precisely

the cure for this egoism.

The

be precluded by the very nature of the

problem itself. As Feuerbach presents it, the problem of mystified consciousness appears insoluble. To be sure, there is an apparent solution: the making explicit of what is already implicit, but Feuerbach has no notion of a process or a practice through or by means of which this transformation might be expected to occur. Because Feuerbach lacks the conception of the transformation of consciousness as a process or a practice, this transformation

appears as the magical exchange of one belieffor another. Feuerbach's answer

how one "acquires" explicit species consciousness is recommend that one substitute this consciousness for the

to the question of

simply to

mystified attitude which one currendy has.

But as

I

have argued,

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" according to his

own account

of the nature and origin of mystified

consciousness, this substitution mystified consciousness

3

57

is

precluded by the phenomenon of

itself.

Marx's Reformulation of Feuerbach's Theory of Mystified Consciousness

The

extent to which Marx's Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" is indebted to Feuerbach's account of the logical structure of mystified

consciousness

is

evident from the very

first

Feuerbach's claim that for Hegel "Thought Being

[is]

the predicate"**

is

is

pages of the manuscript.

being- thought

is

the subject;

thematic for Marx's entire discussion.

45

Feuerbach's characterization of Hegel's philosophy as "theology made 46 finds its echo in Marx's description of Hegel's thought as

into logic"

"logical pantheistic mysticism,"

47

while Feuerbach's sarcastic

comment its own

about the "decision" of the absolute Idea "to document with

hands

its

descent from theological heaven"

48 is

repeated in Marx's

caustic dismissal of the "imaginary activity" of the Idea.

49

Feuerbach's

condemnation of Hegel's thought for deifying "purely abstract qualities as independent beings" is a fundamental element of Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy. It is this notion which Marx appropriates when he characterizes Hegel's philosophy as mystified. Commenting on Hegel's remark that "Subjectivity attains its truth only as a subject, 50 personality only as a person," Marx says: "This too is a mystification. Subjectivity

is

a determination of the subject, personality

nation of the person. Instead of considering subjects

them

is

Hegel makes the predicates independent and then

transformed in a mysterious way

The numerous

a determi-

as predicates of their lets

them be

l

into their subjects."

and echoes are striking, but the similarity in terminology can be misleading. It might lead one to conclude that Marx and Feuerbach mean the same thing when they characterize Hegel's thought as mystified, or, if they differ, that these differences are due to the different aspects of Hegel's system which they discuss. This conclusion assumes that Marx simply "applies" Feuerbach's method to another aspect of Hegel's thought in which "application" the method remains essentially unchanged. But this interpretation overlooks a fundamental distinction in Marx's and Feuerbach's characterization of Hegel's thought as mystified and it overlooks a fundamental distinction in their perspective on mystified consciousness. Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's philosophy is formal and structural; parallels

"

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight"

58

concerned both with the social implications and the social causes To be sure, Feuerbach is concerned primarily with Hegel's Logic and his metaphysics while Marx turns his attention to Hegel's Philosophy of Right, but when Feuerbach does discuss Hegel's political philosophy (albeit briefly), he objects to the manner in which

Marx

is

of mystified thinking.

Hegel expresses themselves.

his ideas, not to the political content of Hegel's claims

53

Marx's interest in the social implications and consequences of mystified consciousness

is

a motivating factor in his critique of Hegel's

For Marx, "the logical pantheistic mysticism" of not just bad metaphysics or disguised theology. Marx

political philosophy.

Hegel's system

is

argues that Hegel's mystified analysis of political existing irrationalities by giving

cance.

As Marx sees

it,

them

life

a "rational"

tends to camouflage

meaning or

signifi-

the "metaphysical mistake" of giving the Idea the

status of a subject has the quite unmetaphysical consequence of falsely

identifying the empirical as

and

it is,

own

is

and the

also proclaimed to

rational: "Empirical reality

be

rational,

reason, but because the empirical fact in

significance

When

which

the Idea

social life

become

other than

is

is

it

appears just

although not because of its its

empirical existence has a

itself.

given the status of a subject and the

phenomena of

exemplifications of a logical schema, the rationality of

existing features of social

life is

legislated a priori.

This inversion [Verkehrung] of the subjective into the objective and of the from the fact that Hegel wants to write the life history of abstract substance, of the Idea, and that he wants to allow the essence of humanity to act for itself as an imaginary individual instead of objective into the subjective (which results

consequence that human something else. [This inversion] necessarily has the result that an empirical existent is taken in an uncritical manner to be the real truth of the Idea. For it is not a matter of bringing an empirical existent to its truth, but of bringing the truth to an empirical existent, and thereby the immediately given [die Zanaechstliegende] is developed as a real moment of the acting in activity

Idea.

its

real

human

must appear

existence) necessarily has the

as the activity

and

result of

55

For Marx, mystified thinking

is

the uncritical acceptance of the given.

As

form and content: the incorrect form of Hegel's political thought reflects and expresses its uncritical identification of the existent with the rational. "Had Hegel started from real subjects as the basis of the state it would not have been such, mystified thinking

necessarv for him to

way."

let

is

a matter of both

the state

become

subjectified in a mystical

56

Marx

claims that Hegel's attempt to give the gloss of rationality to

irrational existence

is

contradictory in

its

very essence. This attempt

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" canons of thought

strains the

itself.

The fundamental

59

contradiction in

the intent of Hegel's philosophy expresses itself in the contradictory content of his

argument. Marx's Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" political thought is riddled with

proceeds by demonstrating that Hegel's contradictions:

Hegel

is

state as

not to be blamed because he has depicted the nature of the

it is,

but because he has depicted that which

That the rational is actual which everywhere opposite of what it is.

According

to

philosophy

is

proved precisely

is

actuality

is

asserts

it

Marx, the fundamental contradiction that

human

of irrational

in the contradiction

the opposite of what

modern

as the nature of the state.

is

and

asserts the

in Hegel's political

appears "as the activity and result of

activity

mind Feuerbach's description of Marx adopts Feuerbach's terminology, he transforms Feuerbach's analytical method into a tool of something

else."

This statement

calls to

mystified religious consciousness, but while

social critique.

Marx he

distinguishes

calls

between "vulgar" or "dogmatic"

criticism

and what

"true philosophical criticism." Criticism of the former sort

contents itself with pointing out the difficulties and contradictions within a given concept. In the case of religious notions vulgar criticism focuses

on the dogmas themselves. "True philosophical criticism" on the other hand is critico-genetic; it shows "the inner genesis" of a given dogma "in the

human

brain.

It

describes

its

act of birth."

of phenomena to which one can apply this that

true

philosophical

criticism

can

dogma such

58

Marx

critical

explain

extends the range

method. not

He

only

a

maintains "fact

of

Immaculate Conception, as Feuerbach has shown, it can also explain a "fact of experience" such as the social institution of monarchy. Marx argues that both of these facts 59 can be comprehended as results of "human illusions and conditions." True philosophical criticism does not return to the perspective of speculative philosophy. In comprehending the genesis of the phenomena of social life it does not derive them in Hegelian fashion from the logic of consciousness", a religious

as the

the Idea. True philosophical criticism grasps the contradictions in the phenomena and seeks to comprehend them "in their own significance." Marx explicitly distinguishes this kind of comprehension from Hegel's

notion of comprehension. "But this comprehension does not consist, as

Hegel supposes,

in recognizing again the determinations of the logical

concept, but in grasping the proper logic of the proper object." In Marx's hands Feuerbach's critico-genetic roots of mystified consciousness

conditions

of secular

life

- not

itself.

in

method uncovers

human

Marx's

60

the

ontology, but in the

perspective

on

mystified

60

The Critique ofHegel

's

"Philosophy ofRight"

consciousness comes through most clearly in his discussion of those passages in the Philosophy of Right where Hegel is concerned with the relation between civil society and the state. A good example of Marx's

emerging theory is found in his critique of Hegel's discussion of voting in paragraph 308 of the Philosophy of Right. In this section Hegel is discussing the question of whether the

members of

civil society should participate in political deliberations through representation (deputies) or through direct democracy (the participation of all members of civil society as individuals). Hegel opts for the first alternative and argues that the partisans of the second view are

According

to Hegel, the notion that

everyone has a right to share in deliberating

upon and deciding matters

guilty of "superficial thinking."

of general concern in

the product of an abstract conception of individuality

is

which individuals are regarded without reference

membership

to their

in a totality.

Marx

problem with abstract or Hegel's analysis which is mystified thinking, but he abstract, and that it is Hegel's understanding of the issue which is mystified. It may seem as if Hegel is discussing two genuine alternatives: the choice between participation by representation and participation by direct democracy. But in fact, says Marx, Hegel is discussing two variations of one perspective. The choice between participation by representation and participation by direct democracy is only a choice between a plurality and a totality of isolated, atomized individuals. Marx claims that the question with which Hegel is concerned is thus only a agrees with Hegel that there

is

a

argues that

it

is

question of quantity: deliberations.

Marx

how many

grants that

individuals should participate in political it is

more convenient

to limit the

number

of those participating in political debates, but he maintains that Hegel's discussion of the issue of participation in political

life

shows

mystified understanding of the relation of the state of

Marx

criticizes

Hegel

participation in political

be a

for discussing the question of the individual's life

only from the perspective of quantity.

Starting from Hegel's premise that the political sphere

community and

itself to

civil society.

universality,

Marx

is

the realm of

argues that to consider universality

is to consider it from a purely "external which ignores the issue of universality as a feature of people's lives. Again taking his cue from Hegel,

only in terms of quantity perspective," a perspective qualitative

Marx argues

that to consider universality in this fashion

is

to consider

it

"abstractly."

Marx

expresses the difference in these two ways of considering

universality as follows: In the first case universality as the

number

or quantity of individuals

who

is

considered simply

participate in a given

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

61

situation; universality is understood as "the sum total of individuality.'''' This perspective is "external" inasmuch as nothing about individuality is changed by varying the numbers of people involved. Debates in an assembly may be longer or shorter according to the number of

individuals

them but the character of the debates not thereby affected. "One individuality, many individuali-

participating in

themselves

is

One, many, all - none of these determinations 61 changes the essence of the subject, individuality." In the second case, universality is an "essential, spiritual, actual quality 62 of the individual." With this description Marx is attempting to pinpoint ties, all individualities.

ways

a qualitative difference in the

towards each other.

He seems

between individuals

as possessing

in

which people

to have in

act,

think and feel

mind Feuerbach's

distinction

an exclusive self-consciousness and

individuals as possessing an explicit species consciousness. In the

case

universality

unrelated

simply of the

consists

In

individuals.

so

society

a

total

first

number of otherwise

constituted

every

individual

functions without regard to a concept of a community. In the second case, individuals define themselves as

function as such. In the the second,

Marx

it is

first

case

it is

members of

a matter of the "individuals as all."

maintains

structured by the

that

first

Hegel's

Marx

community, and

63

of the voting issue

discussion

conception of universality, his

perspective notwithstanding.

a

a matter of "all as individuals"; in

own

is

critique of this

argues that Hegel uncritically accepts

the separation of individuals from universality because he treats the state as a sphere

which

is

separate from

civil society.

The

uncritical acceptance

of this separation forces Hegel to deal with the question of participation in political life in abstract terms, in terms of quantity.

Marx

grants that

Hegel's arguments against the partisans of democracy accurately point out the abstract quality of their thinking, but, says Marx, so long as Hegel views the issue of political participation in terms of participating in a civil society, his thinking will also be Marx, the question of how many individuals

realm of universality separate from abstract.

According

to

should participate in universality abstraction

of the political

state,

abstract political question."

With

this

remark Marx

is

inevitably "a question within the

or within the abstract political

state; it is

an

64

is

reaching for a characterization of mystified

thinking which goes beyond Feuerbach's essentially formalistic definition of mystified thought.

To

say that Hegel's question as to

society should "participate in universality"

abstraction of the political state"

is

is

how

civil

a question "within the

to say that this

is

a question

which

takes the existing abstraction of the political state for granted. In Marx's

view, to take the existence of a particular situation for granted

is

to

62

The Critique ofHegel 's "Philosophy ofRight"

assume

its

permanence, and thereby

to adopt

an uncritical (dogmatic)

stance towards the given. In the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" Marx defines mystified as thought which absolutizes a particular historical

consciousness configuration.

Assuming

the

permanence

of the

given,

mystified

seduced by the immediate and captured by the present. In Marx's hands Feuerbach's analytical method becomes not only a critique of the dogmatic underpinnings of Hegel's political philosophy, but also, by implication, a critique of the static understanding of mystified consciousness in Feuerbach's own theory. As such, Marx's transformation of Feuerbach's theory of mystified consciousness points the way towards a dialectical conception of emancipatory subjectivity. I consciousness

is

will return to this issue in section 6,

4

below.

Phenomenon

Mystified Consciousness as a Social

Marx moves beyond Feuerbach

not only through his conceptualization of

mystified consciousness as the dogmatic acceptance of the given, but also

through his attempt to account for mystified consciousness as a social phenomenon. Agreeing with Hegel that a particular view of society is abstract

To be

and atomistic, Marx

sure, this point of view

is

state as

Hegel himself develops

society

itself.

point of view

The is

says:

abstract, but it.

It is

it is

the "abstraction" of the political

also atomistic, but this

"point of view" cannot be concrete

"abstract".

The atomism

into

which

when

civil

is

the atomism of

the object of that

society plunges in

its

community [das Gemeinwesen], the communal essence [das kommunistische Wesen) within which the individual exists, is civil society separated from the state, or in odier words

political

act

necessarily

results

that the political state

is

And commenting on

from the

an abstraction from

fact

that

civil society.

the

6

Hegel's charge that the partisans of democracy are

guilty of thinking abstractly

about the concept of state membership

Marx

restates his point:

That the

definition [Bestimmung] "being a

definition,

is

member

of the state"

is

an "abstract" own line of

not however the fault of this thinking but of Hegel's

argument and of actual modern conditions which presuppose the separation of actual life from political life [Staatsleben] and make the political quality 66 [Staatsqualitaet] into an "abstract determination" of actual state membership.

What does Marx mean by political life"?

Actual

the phrase: "the separation of actual

life is

the

life

of individuals in

characterized by the competitive struggle against

civil all

society

from which is

life

other individuals.

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

63

Political life (as both Hegel and Marx conceive it) is supposed to be the realm of universality and rational community. The separation of actual life life

from

political life,

experience in

civil

from

"state-life,"

society

is

means therefore

elements of universality and rational community. "civil society is

We

that people's

unaffected by (hence separated from) the

Or

as

Marx

also puts

it:

the unreality of political existence.'

how Marx's use of the term "abstraction" from Feuerbach's. For Feuerbach, abstraction refers only to a particular kind of faulty or erroneous mental activity; for Feuerbach, abstraction is a mental process which is fundamentally misguided. As Feuerbach uses the term, abstraction is simply a mistake made by an individual thinker; thought which is abstract, for Feuerbach, is thought which has gone astray in a particular respect. For Marx, on the other hand, abstraction characterizes not only should note here again

differs

people's thinking but their

of the

state',

is

lives as well.

"The

definition 'being a

their 'abstract definition', a definition

member

which

is

not

Marx's concept of abstraction clearly owes more to Hegel than to Feuerbach inasmuch as for Hegel, too, abstraction is a characteristic of being as well as of thought. For Marx as for Hegel, any form of existence in which the individual is separated from the elements of universality and rationality is abstract existence. But Marx departs from Hegel in one crucial respect. Whereas for Hegel abstract being mirrors or reflects abstract thought, for Marx it is abstract social existence which gives rise to abstract (and hence) mystified thought. Indeed, as the above quotations show, Marx treats realized in their real life."

Hegel's

own

analysis of civil society as a case in point.

According to Marx the fact that people's everyday existence in civil society lacks the elements of universality and rationality means that they

come

to

know

these qualities only in a distorted "religious" form; they

experience these qualities as their daily

life.

For Marx,

it is

ideals

and values which are

inoperative in

the experience of the absence of universality in

the experience of universality- as- a-lack that gives rise to the life, conception of the political state "as an existent separated from civil society." Employing terminology which he has borrowed from Feuer-

actual

bach,

Marx

argues that demands for participation in the political state

which accept

its

separation

from

civil

society

are

demands which

originate "in the theological notion of the poltiical state."

69

The similarity of terminology pinpoints the ways in which Marx has transformed Feuerbach's notion of mystified consciousness. For Feuerbach, the ground of mystification is an unchangeable ontological fact: the inevitable

The

and eternal difference between the individual and the species. permanent feature of human existence

fact that this difference is a

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight"

64

means, for Feuerbach, that there is a more or less permanent possibility that consciousness will be mystified. From a Feuerbachian perspective, there is a natural tendency for consciousness to be mystified in much the same way as from a Kantian perspective there is a natural tendency for 70 For Feuerbach reason to overreach itself in transcendent metaphysics. mystified

consciousness

is

mistake in logic or metaphysics:

a

the

incorrect attribution of the characteristics of the part to the whole.

Although Feuerbach explains this error in both psychological and moral terms he does not attribute it to any particular historical form of social life. Thus for Feuerbach the existence of mystified consciousness does not suggest that something might be amiss in the social relationships

between individuals. The fact that human beings make the "mistakes" which result in mystified consciousness is socially uninformative from a Feuerbachian perspective. Marx's theory of mystified consciousness is grounded in the view which he shares with Hegel: "the destiny [Bestimmung] of individuals is to 71 Marx's formulation of this insight is embedded in lead a universal life." his discussion of the history and significance of the political sphere.

The political life,

constitution

the heaven of

actuality.

The

its

political

was

until

now

the religious sphere, the religion of popular

universality in opposition to the earthly existence of

sphere was the sole sphere of the state within the

its

state,

the sole sphere in which the content, like the form, was species-content [Gattungsinhalt], the true universal.

72

Marx is saying: the "species-content" What does this claim mean? To say that universality is the "species-content" of human life is to say that it is the defining characteristic of the human species. For Marx, to say that the "species-content" of human life is true universality is to say that people need to live as members of a community in order to be fulfilled as human beings. Although the term "species-content" has Feuerbachian overtones, Marx's theory of mystified consciousness owes much more to It is

of

easy to miss the import of what

human

life is

the true universal.

Hegel's insistence that universality has to be realized in the form of institutions.

For Marx

as for Hegel, universality that

is

only thought

is

a

false or abstract universality.

But although Marx and Hegel agree difference between

them

in this respect there

is

a

major

as regards their evaluation of the ability of

contemporary social life to fulfill this requirement. Hegel argues that the which is lacking in civil society itself is provided by the existence of the state, and by the fact that every citizen has a chance of joining the bureaucracy, the universal estate. For Marx this is not good enough. The possibility that every citizen could become a member of the

universality

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" universal class universality;

it

65

means for him that Hegel has a false conception of social means that Hegel's "universal class" is not really a

universal class but only another particular class. Moreover, this very "possibility" proves that universality

not actualized in the social order

is

itself:

The

fact that

each person has the possibility of acquiring the right

sphere only proves that their own sphere In a true state,

it is

is

not the realization of this

to another right.

not a question of the possibility of every citizen devoting

themselves to the universal as a particular estate, but of the capability of the universal estate to really be universal,

Marx

to

i.e.

be the estate of every

argues that the identity which Hegel has constructed between

society

and the

state is a false identity.

According

every citizen has the chance of becoming a estate

citizen.

no more establishes an

identity

between

to

Marx, the

member

73

civil

fact that

of the universal

their particular existence

and universality than the fact that a soldier has a chance of deserting his troops and joining a hostile army establishes an "identity" between the two armies.

own

Most class is

is

significandy,

Marx

rejects Hegel's contention that the universal

really accessible to all

because the only requirement for joining

it

successful performance on impartial examinations. For Marx, the fact

that examinations are required in order to join the bureaucracy only

proves once more that the bureaucracy

not a universal class, for the

is

kind of knowledge which one would have as a universal class

is

member

precisely the kind of knowledge

of a genuinely

which could not be

tested by a civil service examination.

Marx

claims that the only kind of knowledge which can be tested by

is a skill of some kind, a mental ability or a physical craft like shoemaking. But genuine "state-knowledge" [Staatswissen] is rather the set of attitudes and dispositions which one needs in order to be "a good citizen of the state, a social human being." This sort of "knowledge" is

examination

not really "knowledge" at

all.

It is

certain kind of consciousness.

more

In fact

accurately characterized as a it

is

the kind of universalist

which Feuerbach defines as non-mystified species awareness. According to Marx this consciousness is absolutely "necessary" to the human individual as a member of a community. "The necessary state-knowledge is a condition without which one lives outside 74 the state in the state, cut off from oneself, without air." In a rational society no one would mistake bureaucratic skills for Staatswissen. In such a society every individual would in fact have Staatswissen, which is to say that in such a society every individual would have species awareness. This consciousness would be the result of the consciousness

66

77k? Critique

ofHegel 's "Philosophy ofRight"

fact that the "true universal species content"

people's experience in daily

would be actualized

in

life.

When

people lack this species content in their daily experience, they seek (unintentionally and unconsciously) to compensate for this lack by "inventing" the fiction of the state as a community. For Marx, the mystification in the worship of the state lies precisely in the fact that

people do not recognize that the notion of a realm of universality beyond and opposed to civil society is the proof that universality is missing from their experience in civil society. In this sense the universality attributed to

the

community

political

simply

is

the

"affirmation

of their

own

73

Here

estrangement [Entfremdung]" from again the differences between Marx's and Feuerbach's conceptions of universality in their daily

life.

mystified consciousness are illuminating.

For Feuerbach theology

mystified compensation, not for social

is

miseries but for the miseries of false belief, miseries which result from the incorrect attitude towards one's ontological situation. For Feuerbach the problem

is

that the mystified individual suffers

from an

"the belief in the nothingness and worthlessness of this belief itself

is

incorrect belief:

But

life."

this

the consequence of the incorrect identification of the

individual with the species. This incorrect identification

is

either a

mistake in metaphysics or a moral defect.

To

be sure, mystified consciousness

the expression of a real need,

is

the need to be free from the "limits and defects" of one's individuality.

But, as noted above, Feuerbach maintains that this need would be fulfilled if the errant individuals would only recognize the truth which is

and has always been and imperfect individual, the is both infinite and perfect. Mystified consciousness is an attempt to compensate for the lack of universality in one's life, but on Feuerbach's analysis, this universality lies ready to hand so to speak, if one will but recognize it. Species consciousness would give one the desired experience of universality and the ontologically accurate sense of identity with one's species. According to Feuerbach, species consciousness is there for the taking - if one will but believe. staring

them

in the face, a truth

namely, that although one species to which one belongs true:

Marx

which is

is

already true

a finite

agrees that the "theological notion of the political state"

is

the

expression of the need to be free from the "limits and defects" of individuality, but for Marx these limits and defects are the result of the

rampant "individualism" in the daily experience of human beings in civil 77 society. These limits and defects do not follow from the ontological nature of the individual as a part of the whole. For Marx, mystified consciousness

is

not the "fault" of individuals

ontological situation, or

who

who

misinterpret their

(through moral short-sightedness)

fail

to

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" recognize their

own

universality in the existence of the species.

67

For Marx

an indication that something fundamental

mystified consciousness

is

lacking in people's daily

life

is

in civil society.

Marx's First Discussion of The Reform of Consciousness:

5

The Dogmatic Perspective contradistinction

In

Feuerbach's,

to

Marx's

analysis

of mystified

consciousness implies that, in order for mystified consciousness to be abolished, something has to be changed in people's real-life situation.

Inasmuch as mystified consciousness is simply the affirmation of the estrangement of daily life in civil society, it is this situation itself which has to be transformed. The need for universality in the individual's real-life experience has to be fulfilled. Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy yields the conclusion that the abolition of mystified consciousness requires that the species-content of human life must be institutionalized in the social relations of civil society. The abolition of mystified consciousness requires the abolition of the abstract political state,

the abolition of the separation between individuals and their

communal

How

essence.

be accomplished? For the most part Marx does not concern himself with this issue in the Critique but at one point he suggests that the creation of universality in daily life could be accomplished through the extension and universalization of the suffrage. His reasoning is as follows: the accomplishment of universal suffrage would mean that civil society had in effect transcended itself. is

this to

In unrestricted suffrage, both active and passive, for the first time to

an abstraction of

itself,

society actually raises itself

civil

to political existence as

true

its

universal and essential existence. But the full achievement of this abstraction at the civil

same time the transcendence \Aujhebung] of this

society actually establishes

thereby established as inessential.

its civil

And with

as

its political existence

existence,

its

distinction

the one separated, the other,

abstraction.

its

of this state even as

This solution seems discussion

and the separate as

Marx himself

changes

the

demand

critique

but

this

has

it

political existence,

the

Marx

demand

Thus

for the

takes in his

of direct democracy.

would abolish the

political state,

is

is

as

for the dissolution of civil society™

to contradict the position

of Hegel's

unrestricted suffrage

it is

its

opposite, collapses.

within the abstract political state the reform of voting dissolution

true existence,

its

from

Inasmuch

To

be

own sure,

distinction between civil society would only be a formal triumph,

has pointed out. In the absence of other fundamental of social life, universal suffrage would only

in the structure

The Critique ofHegel

68

accomplish what

Marx

"Philosophy ofRight"

's

"empirical universality" but not "true

calls

universality."

on human beings would in their change well a as attitudes as people's in change necessitate a require a would goal this of realization effect the behavior. In the transformation such a Without subjectivity. transformation of legislators would face each other with the habits developed in civil society still intact. They would face each other as atomic, egoistic individuals. Marx's comment leads one to assume that the necessary transformation in subjectivity would only require a change in certain institutional arrangements, in this case the reform of the suffrage. But the quantitative change in the number of those who are eligible to vote could not produce the qualitative change which Marx himself is seeking: a situation in which universality is an "essential, spiritual, actual, quality of the individual." Indeed (as recent studies on racism in the United States have shown) the implementation of political and legal changes is not enough to bring about a fundamental transformation of Marx's own analysis of the

effects of civil society

implies that the realization of the goal of "true universality"

attitudes.

79

In order for this to occur, the transformation of conscious-

ness would have to

become

a focus of social effort.

The

elimination of

oppressive social structures would have to go hand in hand with the project of "unlearning" the habits and patterns of consciousness which these structures inculcate and which in turn serve to perpetuate them. Because Marx does not address this dimension of social change, the

transformation of mystified consciousness appears as a straightforward and unproblematic development. It seems as if mystified consciousness will

It

simply "collapse by

may be

80 itself."

helpful to situate Marx's silence

on the

specifics involved in the

abolition of mystified consciousness in the Critique in the context of his

discussion of this issue in his correspondence with Arnold

spring and explicit is

fall

of 1843.

comment

81

The "reform

in these letters.

struggling to articulate his

the real

is

in the

a topic of

This correspondence reveals that Marx position vis-a-vis Hegel's dictum that

on the one hand, and Ruge's notion

the rational

Ruge is

own

philosophy should provide a "celestial politics

of consciousness"

on the other. Marx wants

map"

that Hegel's

for the course of

German

to reject the conservative implications

of Hegel's claim that the rational has already been realized without falling into the position that the world should obey the dictates of philosophical reason. It

is

82

only the conservative implications of Hegel's dictum that

wants to

reject.

The

Marx

Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" proceeds

Vie Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

69

from the perspective that the realization of reason

is indeed the task of Hegel's political system in terms of this central presupposition. According to Marx Hegel's mistake was to confuse the

history.

83

Marx

criticizes

present form of reason with

Marx

its

complete realization.

places himself on the side of a reason which has not yet been

adequately embodied in the world. nature

of reason

"realizable"

is

He

takes his task to be one of calling

"demands of reason." These demands

attention to the

itself;

the

evidence

the

for

are justified by the

claim that they are

the transcending content of the existent forms of reason.

meaning of Marx's statement: "it is precisely the political state, in all its modern forms, which, even where it is not yet consciously imbued with socialist demands, contains the demands of reason." The concept of the complete realization of an immanent reason thus provides Marx with both a standpoint and a standard of criticism. "Reason has always This

is

the

existed, only not always in rational form. Therefore the critic can start from any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and develop the true reality out of the forms inherent in existing reality as their 84 ought-to-be [Sollen] and final goal." Given this concept of the realization of reason in history the task of the " 5 critic is to engage in ruthless criticism of everything existing."* The old world must be "exposed to the light of day and the new world must be 86 shaped along positive lines." The criteria according to which the critic

proceeds are not arbitrary; they are given by rationality itself, not the 87 rationality of some "dogmatic standard," but the rationality that is

and wishes" -

already embodied in the world's "struggles

incomplete and not

fully self-conscious

Marx has nothing but contempt how it should struggle:

for the attempt to dictate to the

Hitherto philosophers have had the solution to desks, and the stupid exoteric world only

roasted pigeons of absolute science might

We is

do not confront the world

the truth, kneel

down

here!

albeit in

an

form.

had

all

to

fly into

world

the riddles lying on their

open

its

mouth

so that the

88 it.

in a doctrinaire fashion with a

new principle: here

We develop new principles for the world out of the

own principles. We do not tell the world: Cease your struggles; they we will give you the true slogan of the struggle. We merely show 89 world why it is really fighting. world's

are

foolish;

the

According to this conception of criticism the "reform of consciousness" to be accomplished "by analyzing the mystical consciousness that is 90 unintelligible to itself." For Feuerbach, too, mystified consciousness is consciousness which does not understand itself, but Marx's conception of the "opacity" of mystified consciousness owes much more to Hegel

is

.

70

The Critique ofHegeVs "Philosophy ofRight"

than to Feuerbach. For Marx, consciousness which is

is

unclear about

itself

consciousness which does not understand the "demands of reason,"

demands which

are clearly evident in the level of

development which

reason has already attained.

The reform

of consciousness consists merely in

aware of

consciousness; that one awakens the world out of

itself,

its

that

It will

one

explains to

it its

become evident then

something of which reality. It will

it

When Marx

it

it is

.

its

dream about

.

become conscious

to

that

it is

in

dream of

order to possess

it

in

not a matter of drawing a big dividing line

between the past and the

the past. Finally,

work, but that

actions

one makes the world

that the world has long possessed the

needs only

become evident

[Gedankenstrich]

own

this: that

future, but of realizing the thoughts of

become evident that humanity is not beginning 91 completing its old work consciously. will

a

new

adopts Hegel's teleological notion of the realization of

reason he transfers the conceptualization of this realization from the present to the future. Hegel's dictum that the real

becomes

affairs that

necessity

is

has already transpired. But

which inheres

in the

Marx

own

itself.

92

The outcome

is

it

state

"What

of

element of is

this that

thought. As he says by

reassurance in the opening lines of his letter to Ruge, to pass."

of a

retains the

Hegelian conception, and

accounts for the dogmatism in his

comes

the rational thus

a project envisioned rather than a description

is

way of

necessary

assured by the very nature of reason

Accordingly, the reform of consciousness appears as the inevitable

development of rationality, unimpeded by any significant obstacles. Thus asserts: "consciousness is something [the world] has to acquire 93 even if it does not want to." Why should "the world" not want to become conscious of its struggles? There is the merest suggestion here of a tension between what must happen and what might occur, but necessity prevails. Whatever obstacles there may be to the reform of consciousness disappear before the power

Marx

of a transcending destiny. occurs

behind

the

backs

The

abolition of mystified consciousness

of individuals,

without

their

intentional

participation in the process. If Feuerbach's conception of the transform-

ation of consciousness focuses only

on the

individual's "will to believe,"

Marx's conception seems to turn the whole process over realization of a

teleological

reason.

to the inevitable

In neither case however

is

the

transformation of consciousness envisioned as a process involving any sort of subjective practice.

At

this point

we

are in a better position to speculate as to the

meaning

of Marx's silence about the transformation of consciousness in the Critique

and

to offer

a notion of the

an explanation for it. Because Marx is operating with realization of reason in history, the abolition of

immanent

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

71

mystified consciousness can be envisioned as a straightforward unprob-

lematic development. Marx's reworking of Hegel's philosophy of history is

not radical enough to avoid a dogmatic perspective towards the

question of the transformation of consciousness.

6

Marx's Solution: The Incipient Dialectical Perspective

At the beginning of this chapter

I

claimed that Marx's Critique of Hegel's

"Philosophy of Right" contains the seeds of a dialectical perspective

towards emancipatory consciousness.

more

closely.

The

subjectivity are

It is

time to examine this claim

seeds of a dialectical understanding of emancipatory

found

in

Marx's emerging theory of mystified conscious-

ness and in his critique of the dogmatic aspects of Hegel's political philosophy. In section 3

Hegel

for

relationship

I

pointed out the extent to which

bestowing the

between

civil

mantle

society

and the

existent [to be] taken in an uncritical

Idea."

Marx

Marx

of rationality state, for

manner

takes issue with

upon

the

existing

allowing "an empirical

as the real truth of the

argues that the camouflaging of existing irrationalities by

proclaiming them to be manifestations of the Idea sanctifies the present as necessity

and absolutizes the given. Marx describes Hegel's

thought as mystified precisely because of Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy of Right"

Marx

this

characteristic.

political

In the

begins to articulate a theory

of mystified consciousness as consciousness which assumes the permanence of the given. But Marx's critique of Hegel's justification of the given, a critique which is effected through Marx's reformulation of Feuerbachian concepts, also yields a critique of the dogmatic understanding of mystified consciousness which is embedded in Feuerbach's theory. It is useful to juxtapose once more the differences between Feuerbach's and Marx's conceptions of mystified consciousness. For

Feuerbach, mystified consciousness is ultimately a natural phenomenon; source lies in an unchanging ontological fact about human beings: the permanent distinction between the individual and the species. For Marx, its

mystified consciousness

is

the result of a particular historical configu-

of a social order of competitive individualism. The implication of Feuerbach's conception of mystified consciousness is that ration: the existence

such consciousness is an a-historical given. Insofar as a "solution" for mystified consciousness exists, it is a solution which must be rediscovered and "reapplied" by every individual in every generation, for every

The Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight"

72

generation of

human

beings will be faced with the same (ontological)

situation.

Marx's reworking of Feuerbach's theory historicizes a static ontologperspective and thus historicizes the fact of mystified consciousness. In so doing Marx opens the way to considering the abolition of mystified consciousness from a dialectical perspective, as the result of an

ical

intentional practice.

For the most part

The

this aspect

of Marx's discussion remains implicit.

incipient dialectical perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity

must be deduced from the implications of his criticism of Hegel's But there is one passage in the Critique where Marx himself seems to argue for a dialectical perspective towards emancipatory

political thought.

consciousness. This passage occurs in the middle of Marx's criticism of

Hegel's discussion of the relationship between the legislature and the constitution. In the course of criticizing Hegel's treatment of this issue

Marx comments

generally on Hegel's

and tensions between

civil

society

manner of resolving the

and the

difficulties

state.

Hegel always wants to present the state as the realization of free spirit, but in fact he resolves all difficult conflicts through a natural necessity which is the opposite of freedom. Thus the transition of particular interest into universal interest is not a conscious law of the state, but is mediated by chance, and accomplished against consciousness. And Hegel wants everywhere in the state the realization of free will!

In

this

passage

94

Marx

is

claiming that Hegel's conception of the

freedom is inconsistent. Marx is arguing that freedom cannot be accomplished by "natural necessity" or through a process which is "contrary to consciousness." Freedom cannot be achieved "by accident." Liberation must be the result of a free practice, a practice which at least in some sense is consciously chosen by the human beings realization of

involved.

As noted

earlier, the

charge that Hegel's political theory

a fundamental part of

Marx's

is

inconsistent

This particular inconsistency, however, possesses a significance that transcends the framework of Marx's criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Indeed the discovery of the inconsistency in Hegel's philosophy of freedom constitutes an implicit challenge to the dogmatism in Marx's own discussion. Marx's critique of Hegel's conception of the realization of freedom can be applied with equal rigor to his own discussion of the reform of consciousness. Marx's criticism implies that the abolition of mystified consciousness ought not to be conceived as the straightforward, unproblematic working out of the logic of history. The implications of is

critique.

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

73

Marx's critique suggest that the development of emancipatory consciousness ought not to be conceptualized as a process that occurs behind the backs of individuals. Marx's criticism of the dogmatism in Hegel's discussion implies that the reform of consciousness ought to be conceived in an entirely different manner. The transformation of consciousness ought to be understood as a project undertaken by individuals themselves, as an intentional practice in which people are consciously engaged rather than as a destiny to which they cannot help but succumb. The implications of Marx's critique of Hegel's perspective on the process of emancipation argue for the necessity of a dialectical understanding of the transformation of consciousness.

7

Conclusion

The

tenor of Marx's

of Hegel's political dogmatic discussion of the subjectivity of the poor which characterizes his earlier articles on the Wood Theft Debates. If we were to apply Marx's critique of Hegel to his own earlier discussion of the consciousness of the poor, we would have to philosophy

contrasts

systematic

first

sharply

with

critique

the

say that this account portrays their universalist consciousness as a consequence of "natural necessity." The new perspective challenges the dogmatic notion of a universalist consciousness which is the natural result of social ontology. This perspective also challenges the dogmatic conception of the reform of consciousness which is articulated in the letters to Ruge and it contradicts the dogmatic conception of the abolition of mystified consciousness which characterizes Marx's own

discussion of the significance of universal suffrage in the Critique.

But

to

claim that Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy

contains implications which contradict the dogmatic elements in his

thinking

is

not to claim that this

dogmatic elements. Indeed

I

will

new

own

perspective supplants those

argue that

this perspective

does not

replace the dogmatic view of subjectivity which characterizes the early

Wood

Theft Debates. Thus the emergence of a dialectical perspective towards emancipatory consciousness announces a tension in Marx's thought. The next two chapters will examine the contours of this articles

tension.

on the

Dogmatic and Dialectic Perspectives on the "Jewish Question"

1

Marx's essay "On the Jewish Question" is a crucial text for any study of the development of his thought. It is his first work in which revolutionary social change becomes a topic of discourse, and it is the first time Marx publicly and decisively criticizes the political philosophy of one of his Young Hegelian contemporaries. "On the Jewish Question" is a particularly significant text for the project of reconstructing Marx's early theory of emancipatory subjectivity. In this essay Marx specifically addresses the question of the abolition of mystified consciousness; his discussion occurs in the context of his emerging concern with the issue

of universal It is

human

liberation.

ironic that the very text in

universal

human

which Marx

first

addresses the issue of

liberation appears to lend substance to the charge that

he was an "outspoken anti-Semite."" Dagobert D. Runes's translation of "On the Jewish Question" under the title A World Without Jews is the

most provocative formulation of this accusation. Runes apparently felt that his retitling of Marx's essay expresses the real meaning of Marx's 3

text.

of this chapter I intend to show that such an based either on the deliberate distortion of Marx's arguments or, at best, on a drastic misreading of his essay as a whole. Nevertheless the fact that Marx poses the issue ofJewish emancipation in language which repeats the pejorative portrayals of Jews and Judaism found in traditional anti-Semitism may be genuinely confusing, and In

the

course

interpretation

is

certainly merits discussion.

I

will

address this issue in the context of

Marx's general re framing of the issue ofJewish emancipation

in section 3

of this chapter.

1

The "Jewish Question" and Bruno Bauer's

Marx wrote

his essay

"On

Solution

the Jewish Question" as a highly critical review

of Bruno Bauer's discussion of this same "question."

4

At the time, the

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question "

75

"Jewish question" was the question as to the civic status of the Jews, i.e. whether Jews should be granted rights of citizenship in the modern secular state. This nineteenth-century debate about the civic status of the Jews was simply the secular form of the traditional Christian uneasiness about the existence of the Jews. The secular version of the "Jewish question" had been debated since the middle of the eighteenth century; the debate had become particularly intense just before the Austrian Emperor Joseph II issued an Edict of Tolerance in 1782 which granted the Jews the right to consider themselves permanent residents and naturalized subjects of the Hapsburg empire. 5 In 1790-1 the Jews became citizens of France; shortly thereafter Napoleon imposed the civic emancipation of the Jews on the territories conquered by the armies of the French revolution. With Napoleon's defeat the "Jewish question" was once more up for discussion inasmuch as the German reaction against the French conquerors also included a reaction against the civic emancipation of the Jews. The Congress of Vienna discussed the issue and reached an obscurely worded compromise solution. But there were no mechanisms to compel adherence to the agreements and several German municipalities, among them Frankfurt, Bremen, Luebeck and Hamburg, simply withdrew the rights granted to the Jews.

6

Bauer argues that even if the state were willing to grant full civic rights Jews themselves would be unable to exercise these rights to the extent that they insisted on being Jews. According to Bauer the Jews are unfit for emancipation because of the limited nature of their religion and their religious consciousness. to the Jews, the

Judaism has not made the complete human, the developed self-consciousness, i.e. the spirit which no longer sees in itself a limitation which constrains it into the content of religion; instead it has made restricted consciousness, which is still doing battle with its limitations and especially with its sensual, natural limitations into the content of religion.

Bauer finds

it

7

problematic that the Jews "are and remain Jews in spite of

the fact that they are citizens living in universal

human

relationships."

Bauer the fact that the Jews insist on remaining Jews means that "their Jewish and restricted nature always triumphs in the end over 8 their human and political obligations." Bauer accuses the Jews of hypocritically demanding the impossible, of demanding the right to participate on an equal footing in the realm of public life while retaining their separate and particular nature as Jews. Arguing that the Jewish religion itself prevents the Jews from "fulfilling 9 their duties to the state and their fellow citizens," Bauer claims that they According

to

76

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

"

be willing to give up being Jews if they are to make a bona fide case for their being granted equal political rights. Only on this condition, says Bauer, are the Jews entitled to demand the rights of citizenship. Otherwise, their demand for political emancipation can only be 10 Bauer's position on the understood as a "demand to remain unfree."

must

first

issue of Jewish emancipation

is

reducible to the following claim: the

emancipation of the Jews requires that the Jews emancipate themselves from their Jewishness. We should note the asymmetry of Bauer's position vis-a-vis Jews and

political

Bauer objects to the existence of Christianity as an official he finds it acceptable (although perhaps regrettable) for 11 It is a individuals to practice Christianity in their homes and churches. different matter with the practice of Judaism, however. Here the issue is not the disestablishment of Judaism as a state religion, but the very existence of Judaism itself as a set of religious practices. Bauer terms these practices "exclusive" and argues that it is the practice of the Jewish religion itself which is responsible for the fact that Jews are excluded from civic life. Thus, according to Bauer, it is the Jews themselves who Christians.

state religion;

are the cause of the "Jewish question."

Bauer's approach to the "Jewish question" echoes the hostile response which characterizes Christian anti-Semitism.

to the existence of the Jews

According

to the latter,

all

the Jews have to do in order to avoid being

is to convert, i.e. to cease being Jews. To be Bauer does not require the Jews to become Christians, but he does require them to cease being Jews. Both varieties of anti-Semitism employ the time-honored strategy of "blaming the victim." Because the syndrome of "blaming the victim" is a feature of all forms of oppression, Marx's critique of one manifestation of this syndrome in Bauer's

persecuted as "unbelievers" sure,

1

discussion of the "Jewish question" retains

2

its

liberatory function today.

Marx's Critique of Bauer's Position

Marx's critique of Bauer's position is not intended merely as a criticism of the views of one individual. Marx treats Bauer's discussion of the "Jewish question" as an example of mystified political thinking. Thus his critique of Bauer seeks to address both the particular deficiencies in 13 Bauer's understanding of the issue of Jewish emancipation and the larger issue of the origin

Marx

and abolition of mystified consciousness.

argues that Bauer has considered the question of Jewish

emancipation only from the perspective of "Who should emancipate; should be emancipated?" But he has failed to consider what Marx claims is the crucial critical question: "What kind of emancipation is at

who

Perspectives on the "Jewish Qiiestion "

stake?

What

77

conditions follow from the very nature of the emancipation

demanded?"

14

According to Marx, the issue of Jewish emancipabe considered within the broader context of an analysis of several varieties of emancipation, and it is this which he attempts to do in that

is

tion has to

his

own

essay.

By way of answering the question which he claims Bauer should have asked, Marx distinguishes between two levels or stages of emancipation which he terms respectively "political emancipation" and "human 15 emancipation" or "universal human emancipation." And he distinguishes (correspondingly) between two types of revolution, according to the kind of emancipation each can achieve. Political emancipation is brought about by a political revolution. Universal human emancipation requires a revolution which would entirely transform the nature of life in 16 contemporary civil society. The distinction between political emancipation and universal human emancipation marks a turning-point in Marx's thinking. As Marx uses the term "political" in "On the Jewish Question" it often signifies an 17 inadequate or incomplete stage of emancipation. Inasmuch as Marx defines human liberation in terms of rationality and universality, the new identification of the political with an inadequate stage of emancipation means that political emancipation is tantamount to an inadequate or

incomplete embodiment of universality. In effect

emancipation

this

means

that political 18

an incomplete stage of the realization of reason. The consciousness which champions political emancipation as the highest form of emancipation is thus, on Marx's analysis, a consciousness which mistakes partial emancipation for complete or full emancipation, is

or equivalently, a consciousness which mistakes partial universality for full universality.

The

mistaking of partial universality for

full universality

amounts to a false understanding of universality. For Marx this mistake is no accidental one; the misunderstanding as to the nature of universality is inherent in the nature of mystified consciousness; it is a consequence of the structure of mystified thought, a structure which Marx character19 izes by the term "dualism."

As Marx uses the term, dualism covers a multitude of sins; the concept has a variety of instantiations depending upon the issue being discussed. a dualism of form and content, a dualism of rationality and dualism of morality and interest or need. Having said this much evident that further comment is necessary, for certainly the two

There

is

reality, a it

is

terms in any of the above sets of terms do refer to different things. It is therefore apparent that there is a certain kind of disjunction between these paired items which Marx designates as "dualism." We can characterize this disjunction in a preliminary fashion as follows: not only

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

78 does

it

to recognize the paired

fail

"

elements as belonging to a

totality

which is determined by the interpenetration or mediation of each element of the paired set of terms, it also (inevitably) posits an 20 antagonistic relation between each element of the pair. If we examine the above series of disjunctions from the perspective of the German idealist tradition, we note that the first term of a given pair represents or refers to the element of universality while the second term represents or refers to the element of particularity. Specifying Marx's notion of dualism more exactly, we can say that dualistic consciousness is a form of consciousness which does not grasp phenomena as being structured by the interpenetration or mediation of the elements of universality and particularity. As a result, dualistic consciousness conceives of the universal and the particular in any given phenomenon as antagonistically opposed to each other. For Marx, however, dualism is a social category as well as an

As a social category dualism refers to a situation an antagonistic disjunction between the alleged universality of the political realm and the atomistic quality of daily life in the arena of civil society. It is this real disjunction in the life experience of epistemological concept.

in

which there

7

is

which Marx declares

individuals

to

be the origin of mystified conscious-

ness.

"On

In

the Jewish Question"

consciousness position by

is

Marx

inevitably religious in

way of Feuerbach. Marx

takes the position that mystified its

orientation.

He

arrives at this

extrapolates from Feuerbach's

account of Christianity; he extends the meaning of the Feuerbachian concept of mystification to include any attribution of the concepts of

community

or universality to a realm other than everyday existence.

Marx

become the objects Marx, the species-

argues that in this attribution these concepts inevitably

of mystified worship and adoration. Thus, for worshipping quality of Christianity is simply a particular instance of the more general phenomenon of dualism which characterizes mystified consciousness. From this perspective, any mode of consciousness can be termed "religious" in virtue of its form (dualism) despite the fact that the content of the beliefs and doctrines involved may be secular." It is this conception of religious consciousness which underlies Marx's critique of Bauer's discussion of the "Jewish question." Bauer's "solution" to the "Jewish question" depends upon his view 1

that

human

state,

and

religion

is

on human

liberation

for

Bauer

is

a secular state.

liberation

achieved by gaining citizenship in the secular

a state in

Marx

which there

is

no privileged or

state

takes issue both with Bauer's perspective

and with Bauer's conception of the secular. Marx

argues that the abolition of an

official state religion is actually

only the

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question "

79

state from the domination of a particular religion. Or, he puts it, the abolition of an official state religion is only "the political manner of liberating oneself from religion." 22 This is not equivalent to the emancipation of human beings from religious or mystified consciousness. Marx points out that even Bauer is forced to recognize that the abolition of a state religion merely displaces religion from the public communal sphere to the private sphere of individual conscience.

emancipation of the as

But Marx's claim that

emancipation

is a limited form of Jews should not be emancipated politically. Marx maintains that Bauer's arguments against granting the Jews full political rights are specious. The issue for Marx is not whether 24 the Jews should be emancipated politically; the issue is that no one

political

liberation does not imply that the

(including the Jews) should confuse political emancipation with complete

human liberation. Under political emancipation a secular form, in the participation in the

religion itself continues to exist, albeit in

form of the value attributed

modern

state.

Marx

to citizenship

and

to

claims that the so-called "secular

its core - and not only because the majority of pursue traditional religion as a purely private matter. Marx argues that the secular state merely replaces the traditional religious concepts of heaven and the community of souls with the secular religious concepts of citizenship and the political community. Thus, from Marx's perspective, the citizens of the so-called "secular state" are thoroughly religious - even if they were all to be atheists in terms of traditional

state"

is

religious at

citizens are free to

religion.

The members of the

political state are religious by virtue of the dualism between and species life, between the life of civil society and political life. They are religious inasmuch as they relate to their political life [Staatsleben] 25 which is beyond their real individuality as though it were their true life.

individual

life

The dualism which permeates

the lives of the citizens of the

modern

secular state relegates the formal elements of rationality and universality to the political realm, the

realm where they have no effect on the actual life. As a result, claims Marx, the human

content of the individual's being: leads a double

life,

a heavenly

consciousness, but in

reality,

in

and an earthly life:

life

regards oneself as a communal being, and private individual, treats other

human

life,

life

community where one where one is active as a means, is oneself reduced to a

in civil society

beings as

means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers.

To

not only in thought, in

in the political

26

say that the citizens of the political state are religious

is

equivalent,

80

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

"

from Marx's perspective, to saying that their consciousness is mystified. Thus, inasmuch as Bauer's solution to the "Jewish question" adopts the standpoint of the citizens of the political state, his solution "religious"

or

mystified.

According

formulate a secular critique of religion

framework -

Marx

to

Marx,

fails to

in spite of his stated intentions.

transcend

is

own

its

equally

attempt

Bauer's

to

religious

27

Bauer's analysis and solution to the "Jewish two respects: (1) Bauer has defined "religion" only in terms of its traditional content and has neglected to consider the issue of its form. Thus he has failed to understand that the essence of religion is "the dualism between individual life and species life." (2) He has (consequendy) failed to understand the way in which this very dualism is expressed in the relation between the political state and civil society. claims

question"

The

that

fails in

political state is as spiritual [spiritualistisch] in relation to civil society as

heaven is in relation to earth. overcomes it in the same way profane world, that

and allows

The

itself to

political

It

in

stands in the same opposition to

which

religion

is, inasmuch as it necessarily recognizes 28 be dominated by it.

state

civil society;

it

overcomes the limitation of the it,

re-establishes

it,

does not represent a solution to the problem of

mystified consciousness; the political state

is

mystified consciousness in another form.

Marx

proposed solution (participation in perpetuating this consciousness

-

political

simply the expression of argues that Bauer's

life)

succeeds only in

precisely because this

"solution"

problem untouched. The source of the problem is the nature of the individual's life in civil society. In civil society "the sole bond which holds [people] together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their 29 property and their egoistic selves." The elements of community, rationality and universality are relegated to the political realm, a realm which is explicitly not that of "real life" in civil society. But it is precisely these elements which Marx takes to be the essential requirements of human life; they are the defining traits of the human being. Because leaves the source of the

these essential requirements are lacking in

civil society,

the individual

experiences a disjunction (dualism) between the realm of everyday existence and the realm of moral-political truth.

of being

human

The

are continuously "de-realized" in

become "unreal" and

"abstract."

essential features civil

society; they

Consequendy they become

the object

of mystified worship in the form of a secular religion, in the form of the value attributed to participation in political life.

The

real individuals

terms of their

of civil society become "an untrue appearance" in

human

essence or truth. Translated out of Marx's

Perspectives on the 'Jewish Question

"

81

Hegelian terminology this statement amounts to a claim that the human essence is not expressed or realized in the network of

individual's

social relations in civil society.

essential nature of the

In the state, on the other hand, the

human being

is recognized; the state is the realm of reason, universality and community. But because these elements have no effect on the workings of civil society, the universality of the political

community

is

member

reversed: the real

Marx's

The citizen of the state is nothing but of an illusory sovereignty." Hegel's dictum is

entirely "imaginary."

an "imaginary-

is

the irrational and the rational

analysis, mystified consciousness

The members

social fact.

individual lives

and

filled

of

is

with an unreal universality."

that the consciousness of these individuals

On

is

30 It is

their real

no wonder

mystified; the situation

mystifying and confusing!

itself is

3

the unreal.

"robbed of

society are

civil

is

simply the expression of this

Marx's Reframing of the "Jewish Question": Marx as 31 "Anti-Semite"?

The consequence of Marx's

analysis of the social origins of mystified

consciousness for the issue of Jewish emancipation

As

is

a reframing of the

no longer regarded as the cause of their own oppression. They are no longer blamed for being Jewish, for refusing to "emancipate themselves" from their Jewishness. In the course of Marx's analysis the source of the "Jewish question" is revealed to be something other than the Jews themselves. The problem is not the existence of Judaism as a particular set of religious doctrines or question.

a result of this reframing, the Jews are

religious practices, but the antagonistic nature of social relations in

secular

life.

citizens,

The

religious "separation"

which Bauer seeks

religious practices,

is

n32

between the Jews and their fellow by having the Jews give up their

thus merely the

probem: "the separation of [Gemeinwesen].

to address

human

religious

expression

of a secular

beings from their communal essence

Indeed, says Marx,

"We no

longer regard religion as

the cause, but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness."

According to Marx, the proof that the "Jewish question" is entirely its origin, the proof that the real problem is the nature of life in civil society, is provided by the existence of the state itself. The very fact secular in

that the state

must

assert

its

universality in opposition to the sphere of

problem

lies in the nature of civil society, i.e. devoid of the elements of universality, community and rationality. The universality of the state is thus only a compensatory universality; it is only a reaction to the non-universality of civil

civil

society reveals that the

in the fact that civil society

society.

The

is

universality of the state

is

not a genuine universality;

it is

not

82

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

universality in

and

for itself, but

the characteristics of

Thus

if

is

"

determined through and through by abstract negation.

civil society, as their

on Bauer's demand

the Jews were to act

"exclusive" religion in order to

become

4

that they give

they would merely exchange the religious form of religion for form.

One might suppose

that

up

their

full-fledged citizens of the state,

Marx would

its

secular

favor such an exchange and

that he would advocate it as a stage in the struggle for full emancipation, but he explicitly rejects this strategy. Not only does Marx not seek the abolition of Judaism as a particular religious practice, he maintains that it

would be unfair and unjustified to ask the Jews (or any other religious group) to "give up" their religion so long as the social source of religious consciousness continues to

exist.

While Bauer asks the Jews: do you have the

demand political of

emancipation}

have

emancipation

political

we

right

the

right

to

transcendence [iufliebung] of Judaism and from

transcendence \Aujhebung] of religion?

On

Marx's

to

demand from human beings

the Jews

the

in general the

5

analysis, the standpoint of political emancipation, Bauer's

standpoint,

is

standpoint.

As such

itself a

religious viewpoints, it

from your standpoint

ask the opposite question: does the standpoint

instead of

it

religious standpoint, albeit a disguised religious

not entitled to

is

i.e. it is

some other

not entitled to religious

recommend recommend

belief system.

standpoint of political emancipation has no secular solution to the "Jewish question."

itself

over other

that people adopt

In particular,

the

right to pass itself off as a

The

standpoint of political

doubly deceived; it misperceives both itself and the "Jewish question." Bauer's demand that the Jews give up being Jewish in order to enjoy the rights of citizenship thus perpetrates a dual deception; Bauer takes himself to be proposing a secular solution to a religious question, whereas, in fact, says Marx, Bauer is proposing a religious emancipation

is

solution to a secular question.

The citizen

contradiction which Bauer perceives between the is

actually the disjunction

between the

real

member

Jew and

the

human being as a as a member of the

of civil society and the artificial individual This is the disjunction between the real antagonisms of economic life and the mystified harmony of political life, the disjunction between the real egoism of civil society and the pseudo-community of the state. In state.

its

secular

(i.e.

non-mystified) form, the issue of the social relations

between human beings

indeed "the universal question of the age."

In

order therefore to provide a real solution to the "Jewish question"

it is

necessary to restate

it

is

as the secular question

which

then be seen that the issue of Jewish emancipation

is

it

really

is.

It

will

part of the larger

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question "

question of universal

when everyone also liberated.

argue that the

is

human

free;

83

The Jews will be free only be liberated unless the Jews are

emancipation.

and no one

will

Marx's re framing of the "Jewish question" enables him full,

human

liberation of the

restructuring of the social order.

Jews requires the

to

radical

37

In this connection I want to address the issue of how to understand Marx's statements about transcending Judaism. These statements occur in the section of the essay in which Marx criticizes Bauer's article "The Capacity of Present Day Jews and Christians to Become Free." Marx objects that Bauer has considered the Jews' "capacity" for emancipation only in terms of the religious aspects of Judaism. Contrasting his perspective to Bauer's Marx says: "The question concerning the Jews' capacity for emancipation becomes for us the question: what particular social element must be overcome in order to transcend [aufheben]

Judaism?"

38

Startling as this

may

be,

a whole.

we must It

manner of posing

the issue of Jewish emancipation

place this remark in the context of Marx's discussion as

Marx is arguing for the necessity human beings can only be active

then becomes apparent that

of abolishing a social order in which

productively "under the domination of egoistic need," a social order in

which "people can only produce objects in practice if they put their products and their activity under the domination of an alien being and bestow the significance of an alien entity - money - on them." It is this social order which Marx characterizes as "practical, real Judaism." The identification of the Jews with money is hardly original with Marx. Indeed for the particular identification of "practical, real Judaism" with egoism Marx is indebted most directly to Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer. In effect Marx's use of Judaism as a metaphor for a social order dominated by the power of money testifies to the long-standing existence of anti-Semitism in German society as an unexceptional (and hence unquestioned) feature of the social landscape.

Leon

Poliakov,

the

Russian Jewish historian of anti-Semitism, points out that by the end of the fifteenth century in Germany "the word jfude had come to signify both 'Jew' and 'usurer', [while] the word Judenpiess [was] used as a

synonym for Wucher [usury]." By the time Marx came to write his essay on the "Jewish question" this usage was well established and "normalized," in spite of the fact that

it

did not correspond to social reality.

With the development of industrial capitalism anti-Semitism acquired a

new

content; in the course of the nineteenth century the rhetoric of

anti-Semitism underwent a change.

The

earlier vilification of the Jews as

84

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

"

"moneylenders" was replaced by the mislabeling of the power of money as 43 "Jewish power." Marx's essay exhibits this mislabeling at several points. The fact that Marx himself was Jewish gave him no special immunity from the prevalent forms of false consciousness in this regard, nor could it

have.

On

the contrary the internalization of the content of one's

own

an inevitable result of this oppression. As noted earlier, the "acceptance" of socially sanctioned misinformation about 44 In this respect one's own group is one aspect of this internalization. Karl Marx is not unique, nor should we expect him to be. To find the phenomenon of internalized oppression surprising is to assume that members of groups who are targeted by particular forms of oppression are (or should be) immune to the socially enforced myths which purport to justify the mistreatment they receive. This assumption itself is one of the major components of a dogmatic view of emancipatory consciousoppression

is

itself

ness.

We

can thus speak of Marx's internalized anti-Semitism, but not of his we lay the charge of

anti-Semitism. Conceptual rigor requires that

anti-Semitism where not

on

Karl

Marx.

it

belongs - on Bruno Bauer (and on Feuerbach),

The

internalized anti-Semitism,

distinction between anti-Semitism and and by extension the distinction between any

form of oppression and its internalization, is more than a technical nicety. As I have argued in the Introduction, the recognition of the phenomenon of internalized oppression

emancipatory subjectivity. It

the

is

the heart of a dialectical perspective towards

45

should be clear from the preceding discussion that when Marx poses question "what social element must be overcome in order to

transcend [aujheben] Judaism," his intent

economic

activities

and functions. This

is is

to call attention to particular

apparent in remarks such as

the following: "Civil society continuously produces the Jew out of its 46

own

To

be sure "the Jew" thus produced is the mythological Jew, the Jew as moneylender and huckster. But the fact that Marx's own entrails."

discussion exhibits

some

classical characteristics of internalized anti-

Semitism should not obscure the point he is intending to make. 47 "Emancipation from huckstering and from money" is what Marx is seeking, and even his misdescription of this goal as "emancipation from practical, real Judaism" should not lead us to suppose that he wants to suppress either the Jews or the Jewish religion. 48 As noted earlier, Marx is not advocating the abolition of Judaism as a particular religious practice just as he is not advocating the abolition of the various forms of Christian religious practice. The issue for Marx is not the practice of any particular religion, but the social genesis of religious or mystified consciousness.

Perspectives on the 'Jewish Question "

We

no longer consider

secular narrowness.

religion as the source, but only as the manifestation of

We

therefore explain the religious constraints of free

citizens by their secular constraints. their religious

that they will

secular limits.

One might

85

We

do not

assert that they

must transcend

narrowness in order to transcend their secular limits. We maintain transcend their religious narrowness once they transcend their 49

disagree with Marx's conception of religion.

One might

take

issue with his view that "the existence of religion [reveals] the existence

of a lack"

50

in people's daily lives.

One might argue

the liberation elements in religious traditions.

that

But

Marx

has missed

this is a separate

A serious criticism of Marx's position on religion must start from an accurate reading of Marx's text. And, as I have argued, the position matter.

that the

Jews are

to

blame

for the "Jewish question" along with the

corollary position that the solution to this "question" requires that the

Jews cease

4

be Jews, belongs to Bruno Bauer, not to Karl Marx.

to

Inverted Consciousness and Inverted Reality

Marx's reframing of the "Jewish question" reveals that Bauer's proposed solution is not only anti-Semitic but conceptually inadequate to the task at hand.

One

point requires further clarification: Bauer's perspective, the

perspective of political emancipation,

with respect to the goal of universal

inasmuch

is

limited, inadequate of mystified

human

liberation;

it is

not mystified

an accurate expression or reflection of the real-life as situation of individuals in civil society. This point comes out particularly clearly in Marx's critique of the theory and practice of the French revolution, which for him is the epitome of a merely political revolution. Marx argues that the partisans of a political revolution suffer from a it

is

form of mystified consciousness; they invert the relation between ends and means: "in the consciousness of the political emancipators the relationship [between ends and means] is turned upside-down and the end appears as the means, while the means appears 52 as the end." This inversion is illustrated in the political revolution's conception of the purpose of political association. Marx notes that both the 1791 and the 1793 versions of the particular

Declaration of the Rights of association or individual's

government

"natural

is

rights."

Man

assert that the

goal of political

the protection and preservation of the

According

to

Marx,

this

perspective

degrades the concept of political community to a mere means instead of acknowledging it as the goal of human association. In this inversion:

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

86

"

the citizen is proclaimed to be the servant of the egoistic individual, the sphere in which the individual acts as a member of the community is degraded below the sphere in which he or she acts as a partial being, and finally the individual as bourgeois rather than the individual as citizen is considered to be the essential and true

human

being.

53

Marx's argument here depends upon his claim that the so-called "natural rights" or "rights of man" are in fact not "natural." They are not really the rights of human beings per se; they are only the rights "of the

human being as a member of civil society, i.e. the rights of the egoistic human being, the human being who is separated from other human beings and from the community." Marx expresses the same idea when he says that the "right of liberty" is not based on the "connection" of human beings but on their "separation."

which

is

being "as an isolated is

He

argues that the concept of liberty

enunciated in the French Constitution of 1793 views the

monad withdrawn

into

4 itself.""'

The

human Marx

point for

that the concept of liberty enshrined by political emancipation regards

the present form of social interaction as natural.

human

the connections between

Accordingly liberty

is

beings

are

is

presumes

it

that

antagonistic.

defined only negatively, as freedom from

rather than positively, as freedom for or freedom

Why

Thus

naturally

interference,

to.

the consciousness of the political revolutionaries a prey to the

"inversion" of

means and ends? Marx's answer

cause of the confusion

is

to

be found in

is

once again that the

social reality'.

And

as with the

dualistic structure of mystified consciousness, the social cause of the

deformation of consciousness which results in the conflation of means and ends is a particular deformation of universality' in the social reality' of civil society.

Marx's account takes the form of an analysis of the accomplishments of the political revolution vis-a-vis feudal society contained a limited

regime

was

"political,

society'.

He

form of universality', or

as

argues that feudal

he

savs, the ancicn

although political in a feudal sense."'

What Marx

means by this claim is that in feudalism the relation of the individual to the community as a whole was determined through the relation of individuals to their particular civil or social groups. These groups were limited or partial communities; they were constituted "as discrete societies within the society." In feudalism the business of the state (the larger society)

was not considered

to

be the province of individuals

the province of a special group

(a

particular

related to other social groups through

its

at large

community) which

but

itself

determinate function. All other

individuals related to the state through the mediation of their particular status in civil society; they related as landlords, as guild serfs. In this

way feudal

institutions:

members

or as

Perspectives on the 'Jewish Question "

87

excluded individuals from the state as a whole and transformed the particular relationship between their Corporation and the state into their own general relation to the life

determinate

The

of the community, just as they transformed individuals'

civil activity

mode

feudal

of the

with

[Vermischung]

and situation

civil

into their universal activity

political

life.'

K

consisted

According

revolution undid this entanglement;

it

to

in

its

and

situation.

57

"intermixture

Marx,

the

political

destroyed the structures of partial

which characterized feudal civil society. When Marx says "was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics," he means that the political revolution liberated civil society from the feudal form of the political. For Marx this universality

that the political revolution

is

equivalent to saying that political emancipation emancipates

"from even the semblance

society

important to realize here that

Hegelian sense.

A

Schein

is

[Schein] of a universal content."

Marx

is

civil

5

It is

using the term Schein in

its

not simply an illusion [Taeuschung] of

consciousness, but an objective manifestation (albeit incomplete) of the

and the universal. between an illusion and a semblance or an appearance is of fundamental importance. An illusion is a subjective phenomenon, a mistake made by consciousness so to speak. An appearance is an objective rational

The

distinction

manifestation of rationality, of the universal, albeit in limited form.

appearance

not eo

is

about an appearance incomplete

ipso illusory if

it

forgets that the appearance

manifestation

of

discussion, the consciousness is

the final or

full

but consciousness can have

rationality.

In

which supposes

means and ends

in

is

only a partial or

context

of Marx's

that political emancipation

form of human emancipation has

nature (the limits) of political emancipation. inversion of

the

An

illusions

illusions

Thus Marx

about the

describes the

the consciousness of the political

emancipators as an "optical illusion." Partial universality political

yoke was

is

at the

better than none: "The throwing off of the same time the throwing off of the bonds which

fettered the egoistic spirit of civil society."

from

its

partial

established

civil

61

or feudal political content,

In liberating civil society

the political revolution

society with "non-political," isolated, egoistic individuals

as the prime sphere of activity. The "political" content of life was banished to a sphere which was not that of everyday life. It is therefore not surpising that the political realm appears as the means rather than the end in the consciousness of political revolutionaries. Their conscious-

ness merely expresses the non-significance of political

life in

modern

civil

society.

When Marx inverts

describes political consciousness as one that conflates or is saying that what this perspective mistakes

means and ends, he

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

88

"

community) should both be and be acknowledged Those who champion political emancipation as do not have a false consciousness with liberation human of form final the case in modern civil society; they have the actually is what respect to have not understood that in order They mistake. of sort different made a individual must "become a the being, human a as fulfilled to be as the

means

(political

as the goal of human

species-being."

The

62

partisans of political emancipation

nature of they

life.

fail

human

existence which

Marx

fail

to see that the political sphere, the

community, has already

is

an essential need

made

for

something about the

to see

takes to be self-evidently true;

human

sphere of universality and

beings. This

is

Marx The fact Marx an

a claim

in his Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right

" t3

French revolution do not see this, is for consciousness. But inasmuch as the inverted

that the theorists of the

of their consciousness of the political revolutionaries accurately expresses the

indictment

actual relationship

between

consciousness reveals that priorities.

Thus

political life

modern

civil

and

civil society, their

inverted

society has an inverted order of

the mystified consciousness which

theory and practice of a political revolution

is itself

is

embodied

in the

an indictment of civil

society.

5

Mystified Consciousness as A-Historical Consciousness

In chapter 2

I

commented on

mystified consciousness

ways tion.

is

the extent to which Marx's discussion of

indebted to Feuerbach.

I

also pointed out the

which Marx reworks and transforms the Feuerbachian concepFeuerbach's influence is clearly visible in some aspects of Marx's in

treatment of mystified consciousness in

"On

the Jewish Question."

The

between individual Feuerbachian schema, even

definition of the essence of religion as "the dualism

and species life" relies heavily on a though Marx has broadened the notion of religion to include secular thought as well. But Marx's discussion in "On the Jewish Question" moves beyond Feuerbach's in one crucial respect. Marx locates the disjunction between individual life and species life in a specific historical form of social life. Thus his acccount of mystified consciousness becomes 64 at once both historical and critical. "On the Jewish Question" explicitly articulates a conception of mystified consciousness as a-historical consciousness. It is this consciousness which animates and informs the practice of political emancipation. A-historical consciousness has no understanding of the present as being the outcome of a historical process of development; it life

Perspectives on the "Jewish Qiiestion

"

89

regards the present as a given, fixed in the eternal nature of things. In this sense mystified consciousness absolutizes and "naturalizes" the present, and in so doing

The

it

conflates history and nature.

conflation of history and nature

is

revealed in the attitude which

emancipation takes towards civil society. Political emancipation regards the structures of civil society as givens, as facts of nature which

political

require no further justification or explanation. "[Political emancipation] relates to civil society, the

as the basis of justification,

its

world of needs, labor, private

existence, as a presupposition

and therefore

emancipation regards

civil

as

its

natural basis."

society;

it

bS

Because

society itself as a fact of nature,

essentially accepting attitude towards the society. Political

interest, civil

emancipation

tends to recognize

inhuman

political

takes an

it

characteristics of civil

inherently conservative vis-a-vis

is

civil

law

not requiring any further

society as the natural

civil

form of human

association.

To

be sure,

political

emancipation embraces the radical idea of the God in the form of the

"sovereignty' of man" as against the sovereignty of

divine right of kings. But, says Marx, the "man" whom political emancipation proclaims as sovereign is actually humankind "in its

uncultivated and unsocial form, just as

it is,

alienated from

human

its

fortuitous existence, lost

and

oppressed by inhuman relations and elements - in a 66 being who is not yet an actual species being."

human Humankind "just is

in

itself,

word, the

which

humankind

corrupted by the entire organization of our society,

as

it

is" is

humankind

just as

it is

characterized by the "war of each against

beings "just as they are" in

civil

in a social order

all."

Consequently

society have an essentially

society "the only

human beings. As we have seen, in civil bond which holds them together is natural necessity,

need and private

interest, the preservation of their property

antagonistic relationship to other

and

their

egoistic selves." is no moral failing on the part of the individual. As the arena of "war of each against all," civil society itself is "the sphere of egoism." For Marx, the "war of each against all" and "egoism" are equivalent descriptions of the same state of affairs. Civil society is not characterized by armed conflict between individuals; it is a network of social relations which expresses only the antagonism and the separation between human beings. Because the a-historical perspective of political emancipation fails to see this network of social relations as the outcome of a process of development, it takes the characteristics of the human being in civil

Egoism

the

be permanent traits which define the essential nature of the human. Consequently, political emancipation mistakes the real, historical society to

"

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

90

individual of

human

society for a fictitious, "naturar

civil

being. This

not a contingent one. Because political emancipation is characterized by an a-historical consciousness, it has no option but to

mistake

is

and nature. From the mystified perspective of an

history

conflate

a-historical consciousness, the antagonistic egoistic individual of

society must appear as a fact of nature. civil society, the non-political

the natural

human

being."

human

"The human being as

a

civil

member

of

being, inevitably appears however as

68

This conflation of history and nature expresses itself in the fallacy of misplaced concreteness and in the corresponding fallacy of false abstraction. A-historical consciousness:

human being as homme as

[takes] the

a

in the proper sense, in

of

from

civil

society ... to be the

citoyen,

because

this is the

human being human being

her or his sensuous, individual, immediate existence, whereas the

human being

is

only the abstract,

allegorical,

moral person.

the egoistic

human

the abstract citizen.

In

member

distinct

this

The

being; the

human

being, the

political

human being

as

human being is only recognized in the shape true human being is only recognized in the shape real

an of of

69

confusion,

dual

artificial

socially

produced character structure and traits. Because the a-historical

behavior are taken to be inherent natural

perspective of mystified consciousness does not consider the Historical

process whereby the "uncultivated and unsocial" individual of society has

come

into existence,

it

fails to

see that "the egoistic

civil

human

being is the passive result of the dissolved society, a result that is simply found in existence.'''' Mystified consciousness sees only the present; it understands only the immediate which it identifies with the natural. The egoistic individual of civil society becomes for this consciousness "an object of immediate certainty, therefore a natural object."'

This characterization of mystified consciousness

calls to

mind Hegel's

Sense most immediate form of knowledge, the form of

critique of sense certainty in the first chapter of the Phenomenology.

certainty

is

the

knowledge which does not

entail any intervention (or mediation) by consciousness in the process of knowing. Sense certainty prides itself on

the fact that exists,

it

makes no assumptions and

but in fact

it

that

it

simply perceives what

assumes that objects are simply there (given) without

the intervention of any activity' on the part of the knowing subject and without any kind of process on the part of the object in order to become

what

it is.

In the

schema of the Phenomenology, sense

certainty

is

the

first

form of

a deceived or mystified consciousness. In the course of the first chapter

the point of view characteristic of sense certainty

is

subjected to an

Perspectives on the 'Jewish Question "

91

and shown to be self-contradictory. Far from being the and most extensive form of knowledge, sense certainty is shown 71 to yield only "the most abstract and poorest truth." Hegel argues that the content of sense certainty, the knowledge of a "this" or of "an individual thing," is the least informative sort of knowledge since 72 everything can be described as a "this." Hegel also characterizes the point of view of sense certainty as "natural internal critique richest

consciousness."

73

"Natural consciousness" is a-historical consciousness par excellence; it continually forgets its own history. In particular "natural consciousness" forgets the experience or process which reveals the perspective of sense certainty to be internally contradictory, and as a result

it

must continually begin the process

Marx's claim that equivalent to certainty"

all

over again.

human being human as an

to regard the

considering the

as a "natural object"

"object

is

of immediate

depends on the Hegelian opposition between natural con-

sciousness (sense certainty) and historical consciousness (reflection).

Thus,

human being

to see the

as a "natural object,"

is

to take the

assume that the features of human existence are immediately given and have no history. This perspective, as Hegel notes, focuses only on the fact that "the thing is, and it is, merely because it is. It is; this is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure being, or this simple immediacy a-historical perspective of sense certainty

constitutes

to

its truth.

"Natural consciousness"

is

not however the "natural way" for people

to think. Natural consciousness

thought;

and

it is

not an inherent feature of

is

human

neither the result of the natural (biological) structure of the

human brain, nor is it the consequence of the transcendental structures of the human mind. "Natural consciousness" is rather the historical result of certain social structures of domination.

The

consciousness which conflates history and nature

is

satisfied with

the limited achievements of the political revolution. This means, in

Marx's view, that

this

between the

"artificial"

"natural" egoistic

inevitability

and

accepts the permanence of the

split

consciousness

naturalness of the divided

self.

It

accepts

moral citizen of the

member

of

civil

the

political

society.

The

community and the

consciousness which

whole series of dualisms; it between need and morality, particularity and universality, individuality and community, natural necessity and rational freedom. Because mystified consciousness conflates history and

conflates history is

and nature

is

satisfied with a

satisfied with the disjunction

nature, because

it

regards the "uncultivated, unsocial" individual of civil human being, it contents itself with a revolution

society as the natural

which "dissolves

civil life

into

its

component

parts without revolutionizing

92

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

these

parts

themselves

"

and subjecting them

to

criticism."

76

The

conflation of history and nature results in a falsely happy consciousness, a

consciousness whose vision of the possibilities of limited to

6

human

liberation

is

what has already been achieved.

Emancipatory Subjectivity: The Dogmatic Perspective

At first glartce "On the Jewish Question" seems to be a somewhat "awkward" text for a discussion of Marx's theory of emancipatory subjectivity. One might be perplexed as to how to interpret it in the light of the claim that there is a tension in Marx's early thought with respect to this issue. Nevertheless, closer attention to this essay reveals two conflicting perspectives. Marx's discussion of the "Jewish question" contains both a dogmatic and a dialectical conception of emancipatory consciousness.

The dogmatic element subjectivity

human

is first

in

Marx's thinking about emancipatory

indicated by the nature of his discussion of complete

emancipation.

More

precisely

it is

revealed by what

Marx does

not say with respect to this project.

As noted, in "On the Jewish Question" Marx defines full human emancipation as the translation of the demands of reason into' reality. Full human emancipation would consist of the realization of the human community on the distinction revolution and a revolution which would aim

species-being, not in the abstract dimension of the political

but in the texture of daily

life.

Marx

also insists

between a limited political for complete human liberation. Who are to be the agents of such a transformation; what characteristics must they possess and how are they to acquire these characteristics?

When we

ask these questions,

face to face with a perplexing aspect of Marx's essay: there

absence of any discussion of (or even reference emancipation.

The

goal,

human

to)

emancipation,

is

we come a notable

the agents of

stands

human

alone

as

a

transcendent task.

one may be inclined to object that I am imposing a is alien to Marx's text. This caution is well taken, but the issue of the emancipating agents arises from Marx's own discussion. Marx himself acknowledges the legitimacy of the questions: "Who should emancipate? Who should be emancipated?" Marx's objection to Bauer's discussion of Jewish emancipation is not that Bauer considers these questions but that he addresses these questions only from a religious perspective and that he fails to consider the broader methodological question as to the nature of emancipation itself. Because At

this point

perspective which

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question "

93

Marx's critique acknowledges that questions as to the agents of emancipation are integral to a theory of human liberation, it seems

own theory take account of this issue. how can Marx be accused of having a dogmatic

legitimate to ask that his

But, one might say,

conception of emancipatory subjectivity on the basis of what he does not say? Even if the absence of any discussion of the revolutionary subject is suspicious, this absence by itself does not justify the claim that

Question"

"On

the

dogmatic

approach to emancipatory subjectivity. True enough. But this absence takes on a much more conclusive character when it is coupled with the several remarks that Marx does make in the course of criticizing Bauer's essay "The Capacity of Present Day Jews and Christians to Become Free." I have already indicated the significance of Marx's "secularist"

Jewish

of the

reinterpretation

however

is

that

emancipation, the

exhibits

in

Marx

transformation

the

a

"Jewish question."

course

What

important here

is

of reframing the

issue

of Jewish

betrays a certain dogmatic optimism with regard to

of mystified

consciousness

asserted that the secular basis of Judaism

is

in

general.

Having

practical need, bargaining,

self-interest, and money Marx says: "An organization of society which would abolish the preconditions for huckstering, and therefore the possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible. [This] religious consciousness would dissolve like a thin haze in the real, vital air of society." The dogmatic element in Marx's thinking here is the

assumption that the abolition of mystified consciousness is simply a matter of doing away with the secular conditions or "preconditions" which produce this consciousness. The dogmatism reveals itself in Marx's assumption that once the antecedent conditions are removed,

would just "dissolve." metaphor contains the dogmatism. There is no suggestion here that mystified consciousness might have a dynamic of its own and that some sort of a subjective practice might be needed in order not to dissolve it, but to transform it. The naturalistic metaphor of a "thin haze" dissolving implies that there is an inevitability about the whole

mystified consciousnes

The

naturalistic

only a matter of

process, that the abolition of mystified consciousness

is

removing the

and then watching

it

social causes of mystified consciousness

disintegrate.

This description of the disappearance of mystified

consciousness implies that nothing need be done at the level of individual subjectivity. The abolition of mystified consciousness appears to be

guaranteed by some inner logic of its has reached a point "at which

it

own development, by must

necessarily

the fact that

dissolve."

naturalistic conception of the abolition of mystified consciousness

reiterated again at the close of the essay:

"As soon

it

The is

as society succeeds in

94

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question

abolishing

essence

empirical

the

preconditions,

the

Jew

will

"

of Judaism,

have become

huckstering

impossible

and

because

its

[this]

consciousness will no longer have an object."

assumption that mystified consciousness will added significance to a remark which seems to dismiss out of hand the notion that oppressed groups must undertake the project of subjective transformation. As noted, Marx rejects Bauer's claim that the Jews must "emancipate themselves from Judaism" before they can legitimately demand the rights of citizenship. In the process of

Marx's

naturalistic

dissolve of itself lends an

rejecting

Bauer's solution to the

Bauer's position as follows: 80

"Jewish question,"

Marx

restates

emancipate ourselves before we Interestingly enough this sentence is not

"We must

can emancipate others." followed by any critical commentary. It is as if Marx supposes that the claim is self-evidently nonsense. But is it? To be sure, there is a reading of this statement which places the burden of emancipation on the victims of oppression in a manner that blames them for the mistreatment they receive.

And,

as

I

have shown, Bauer approaches the "Jewish question"

precisely in this way.

But the notion that oppressed groups must indeed "emancipate themselves" from the particular forms of mystified consciousness which imprison them need not be understood in this fashion. This notion actually invites quite a different interpretation. In this alternative reading

the notion that oppressed groups must "emancipate themselves" could be construed as the recognition of the phenomenon of internalized oppression. This in turn would imply that the abolition of mystified consciousness ought to be understood as a project which members of these groups must undertake for themselves, a project which itself presupposes that, as Paolo Freire puts it, the oppressed must "discover 81 To the extent that Marx's themselves to be 'hosts' of the oppressor." and implies instead that the such perspective a critique of Bauer rejects

transformation of mystified consciousness

consciousness will "dissolve" by

itself, it

is

automatic, that mystified

espouses a dogmatic conception

of emancipator}' subjectivity.

"On

marks the beginning of Marx's critical reflections on the possibility of human emancipation. As noted earlier, Marx maintains that Bauer's approach to the "Jewish question" is one-sided because Bauer fails to address the critical question: "What kind of emancipation is at stake and what conditions follow from the very nature of the emancipation that is demanded?" Marx considers that he has addressed this issue by distinguishing between political emancipation and complete human emancipation and by unveiling the secular cause of the Jewish Question"

the "Jewish question," citizens

i.e.

by explaining "the religious constraints of free

bv their secular constraints."

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question "

But Marx's consciousness

95

naturalistic conception of the dissolution of mystified is

also liable to the charge of "one-sidedness."

I

would

describe Marx's one-sidedness as a productivist one-sidedness.

Marx

considers the question of the abolition of mystified consciousness only

from one perspective, the perspective of its production or generation by the life, a perspective which Bauer indeed fails to consider. But Marx does not consider the question of the abolition of mystified consciousness from the perspective of its staying power. Marx's description of the dissolution of mystified consciousness implies that if there is no present reason for people to think or feel in ways which are rooted in their past experiences of domination, they will easily abandon these ways. This notion underestimates the extent to which the past retains its hold on the present, the extent to which the structures of domination recreate themselves in the affective dimension of consciousness. Marx's naturalistic conception of the disappearance of mystified consciousness makes no allowance for the ingression of domination into the depth dimension of human subjectivity and its resultant sedimentation into habitual patterns of thinking and feeling which eventually take on a life of their own. conditions of secular

Marx

considers the abolition of mystified consciousness only in terms

of removing

its

external causes.

He

fails to

consider the possibility that the

may

require an intentional practice

abolition of mystified consciousnes

which focuses individuals.

82

directly

on

its

In this respect

continuing existence in the subjectivity of

"On

the Jewish Question"

is

unable to

address the problem of the tenacity of mystified consciousness.

The

dogmatic element in Marx's conception of emancipatory subjectivity reveals itself as a one-sided focus on the question of the secular causes of mvstified consciousness.

7

Emancipatory Subjectivity: The Dialectical Perspective

However, there is another approach to emancipatory subjectivity in Marx's discussion of the "Jewish question." This approach is implied by the critique of political emancipation which he develops. As noted earlier, Marx argues that political emancipation makes the mistake of absolutizing a particular deformation of human nature. Political emancipation emancipates humankind "just as it is" in civil society. Political revolution may change the faces of those in power but it does not change their hearts and minds. Political revolution does not revolutionize "the elements"

of the current social order.

More

significantly,

political

revolution does not even suppose that these "elements" need to be

transformed in any way. Consequently

political revolution operates

with

96 a

Perspectives on the 'Jewish Question

"

concept of human nature as a given, and

it

accepts the consequences of

oppressive society as "natural." In this respect political revolution

an be said

to

have a "dogmatic" conception of

human

nature and

can

human

subjectivity. In accepting the given as the natural, political revolution limits its

concept of human emancipation to the already existent;

Marx rejects

it

as insufficient precisely for this reason.

Marx's own critique of

emancipation thus contains the

political

which is to achieve full human emancipation must refuse any dogmatism, any fetishism of the given. Such a revolution must reject the notion that the agents of this revolution could have a "given" consciousness which is somehow insulated from the

implicit

demand

that the revolution

corrupting influence of

The

civil society.

revolution that

is

to

transform

"the elements themselves" cannot assume that the subjectivity of the revolutionary agents is" in civil society.

mistake about

is

simply given as the "other" of humankind "as

To make

human

assumption would be

this

to

make

the

it

same

nature that the political revolution makes, albeit in

mirror-image form. Marx's critique of political emancipation would thus rule out the romanticized view of the subjectivity of the "outsiders" which characterizes his own early writings on the poor. The critique of political

emancipation implies the rejection of a ready-made subject of

revolution with a ready-made emancipatory consciousness. It is this critique which suggests the necessity of an alternative approach to emancipatory subjectivity, in spite of the fact that the issue of the revolutionary subject is not addressed in this essay. The dialectical perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity appears in "On the Jewish

an anticipatory form, as a critique "before the fact," as it takes shape as a negation: Marx's critique of the standpoint of political emancipation is an analysis of how emancipatory subjectivity should not be construed. It should not be Question"

were.

The

in

dialectical perspective

construed as a given.

But the conception of emancipatory consciousness

as a given

theoretical cousin of the notion that mystified consciousness

dissolve of

its

Thus Marx's

own accord once anticipatory

its

is

the

would

social-economic causes are removed. of the dogmatic conception of

critique

emancipatory consciousness is also a critique of the dogmatism in his own conception of the dissolution of mystified consciousness. This critique suggests that the revolution

which aspires

to achieve full

human

emancipation must recognize that one of the "elements" which is to be revolutionized and "submitted to criticism" is the subjectivity of the revolutionary agents themselves.

Perspectives on the "Jewish Question "

8

97

Conclusion

Marx's critique of the dogmatic conception of emancipatory subjectivity in the theory and practice of political emancipation constitutes the articulation of a dialectical perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity.

The

articulation of this perspective

is indirect.

The

dialectical perspective

on the implications of emancipation. But the fact that the

reveals itself only as a result of critical reflection

Marx's criticisms of

political

dialectical perspective reveals itself in this

nature in the

text.

The

manner argues

dialectical perspective

is

for

its

integral

not added to the

text;

Marx's own discussion. As in the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy ofRight," it is Marx's criticism of the dogmatic nature of his opponent's position which contains a critique of the dogmatic elements in his own thought. And as in this earlier work, the two perspectives coexist in an uneasy tension with each other. The above discussion is subject to one qualification: precisely because "On the Jewish Question" contains no discussion of the revolutionary subject, conclusions as to Marx's thinking on this issue must necessarily have a somewhat speculative quality. Indeed the project of extracting "Marx's early theory of emancipatory consciousnes" from the texts discussed thus far requires the caveat that the conclusions drawn be considered provisional. The "theory of subjectivity" which I have reconstructed from these early writings is most appropriately regarded as a question which we put to them, a question which must await a more definitive answer from a text in which Marx does discuss the revolutionary subject. It is such a text to which I now turn. instead,

it is

immanent

in

Dogmatic and

Dialectical Perspectives

Marx's First Discussion of the

in

Proletariat

The

revolutionary subject

makes

its first

appearance

in

Marx's writings

an essay he wrote towards the end of 1 843 which was to serve as the introduction to a revised version of his Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of in

Right".

1

In this essay, henceforth referred to as the "Introduction,"

Marx

connects the character and the existence of the proletariat with the possibility of universal human emancipation. The "Introduction" is an inquiry into "the positive possibility of explicitiy

German stake,

emancipation."

however. For

2

not only

It is

Marx Germany

constituted into a particular world."

emancipation of the

German

Inasmuch as Marx now outcome of a radical

is

is 3

German emancipation

that

is at

"the deficiency of the political present

Accordingly he argues that "the

the emancipation of the

identifies universal

human

being."

human emancipation with

revolution, the inquiry proceeds by

the

way of

a

demonstration of the necessity and "the positive possibility" of a radical German revolution. Marx's argument has three distinct strands: (1) the demonstration of the impossibility of a merely political or partial revolution

for

Germany,

(2) the

demonstration of the

conceptual possibility of a radical

German

demonstration that a radical revolution

1

A

is

really

theoretical

or

and (3) the possible for Germany.

revolution,

The Impossibility of a Political Revolution for Germany political revolution

occurs

when

a class of civil society emancipates

from the domination of other classes and succeeds in acquiring domination over the social totality. A political revolution is thus defined by Marx as the continuation of domination in one form or another. In a political revolution one class of civil society raises itself to the general level of civil society and acquires for itself what was already available to some other privileged class. The class making a political revolution itself

Marx's

First Discussion

99

of the Proletariat

emancipates the rest of society to a certain partial extent "but only under the condition that the whole of society class, i.e., that will."

it

possesses

is

in the

money and education

same

situation as this

or can acquire

them

at

5

Marx

delineates two general conditions for a political revolution. (1) In

order for one class of

civil

society to acquire domination over the social

itself (both to itself and to the rest of emancipator of society as a whole. This is not a matter of one class deliberately "deceiving" the rest of the population. The rights and claims of the emancipating class must really be "the rights and demands of the society itself. only in the name of the general rights of totality,

it

has to be able to present

society) as the

.

.

society can a particular class lay claim to general domination." (2) This in

turn presupposes that another social group represents "the notorious crime

of the whole society." This group must be "the incorporation of the general limitation so that emancipation from this sphere appears as

self-emancipation."

universal

6

Thus

the

making the

class

revolution does in fact benefit other disadvantaged classes by

But these benefits are not as great or as widespread do not constitute complete emancipation.

Marx

political

its

action.

as they appear; they

finds that both of these interrelated conditions are lacking in

Germany. Most importantly, however, the "subjective conditions" revolutionary action are not to be found in any sphere of

German

for civil

society: no group in German civil society has the consciousness which would predispose it to undertake revolutionary action. As Marx describes it, such consciousness involves both a comprehension of one's objective situation and a sense of self. Marx argues that no group in German civil society possesses the necessary "breadth of soul" which would allow it to

no group

own interests with in German civil

boldness"

which would permit

identify

its

those of the society as a whole. In addition, society has the necessary "revolutionary it

to

conceive

of challenging

the

established order.

combination of two factors: own oppresion, and (2) a (1) sense of pride or self-worth which deems this oppression illegitimate. At a minimum, revolutionary boldness is thus a consciousness of the contradiction between what is and what ought to be. The awareness of this "Revolutionary boldness"

an awareness of what

is

essentially a

exists, a

sense of one's

contradiction expresses itself in the claim: "/ everything.'"

But the members of German contradiction; their consciousness

acceptance of what civil

am

nothing and I should be

1

society

is

exists.

civil is

society are not aware of this

characterized by a one-dimensional

Instead of revolutionary boldness,

permeated by "a general passive ill-humor,

a

German

narrowness

1

Marx

00

First Discussion of the Proletariat

's

which recognizes

itself as

much

as

it

misjudges

8

In

itself."

German

civil

becomes aware of itself not through its own oppression appearance of another class which is beneath it in the and which it itself oppresses. Marx comments that a

society each class

but through the social structure

"modest egoism" suffocates the potentially rebellious

members of German experiences

its

civil

defeat before

"Every sphere

society. it

celebrates

subjectivity of

of

civil

victory, develops

its

all

society its

own

overcomes the limitations facing it, asserts its narrow-minded essence before it has been able to assert its generosity." A political revolution is thus impossible in Germany; in fact given the total absence of the necessary preconditions, a political revolution is utterly "utopian." As for a radical revolution, at first glance it seems to be even more impossible than a moderate political revolution. A radical revolution demands a feat which seems to defy even the most daring social imagination. It would require Germany to leap over obstacles and limitations which, from its perspective, appear as (and in fact are) emancipatory goals inasmuch as they are constituted at the level of liberation of those nations which have already reached the stage of civil society. To propose that Germany undertake a radical revolution is to ask Germany to treat its as yet unattained goals as obstacles and limits. "How should [Germany] somersault not only over its own limitations but limitations

before

simultaneously

it

over

the

of the

limitations

modern

nations,

over

limitations which in reality it must feel and strive for as bringing 10 emancipation from its actual limitations?" If Germany is incapable of a moderate political revolution how could one even suppose that it is

capable of a radical revolution?

The Theoretical Possibility of a Radical German

2

Revolution

The for

best defense is often a good offense: Marx's strategy is to argue that, Germany, the only revolution which is not Utopian is a radical

revolution.

Thus he

maintains: "In

Germany

universal emancipation

were

only

to

aspire

to

reach

the

level

is

11

Even if Germany of modern development

the conditio sine qua non of any partial emancipation."

characteristic of civil society (which other nations have already attained), it

would take

a radical revolution to

a radical revolution does not

aim

do

it.

The paradox

is,

of course, that

for the level of civil society; a radical

revolution aims to surpass these limits.

Given

that a radical

German

revolution

is

necessary, the task

is

to

Marx's

show how

101

of the Proletariat

The first difficulty facing Marx is that although a may be required in order to achieve German

possible.

it is

revolution

radical

First Discussion

emancipation, "a radical revolution can only be a revolution of radical needs, the preconditions and breeding grounds of which appear to be 1

" The issue here is the discrepancy between appearance and Marx's first task is to demonstrate that the "preconditions and breeding grounds" of the need for a radical revolution do indeed exist in German society', in spite of the formidable appearances to the contrary.

lacking." reality.

By way of addressing this question Marx turns to German history. He Germany has a revolutionary tradition which could serve as

argues that

the breeding ground of a contemporary radical revolution. This tradition exists

in

domain of

the

revolutionary past

is

according

theory;

theoretical;

it is

ary counterpart of the Reformation

to

is

Germany

"Germany's

Marx, L

The contemporGerman religious

the Reformation."

theory:

and philosophy. Marx argues that German theory is radical. "To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But the root for human

criticism

beings

is

German

human being

the

from the decisive

The

itself.

theory and therefore of positive

The its

clear proof of the radicalism of

practical energy,

transcendence of religion."

"decisive positive

is

transcendence of religion"

discovery that the essence of Christianity

is

that

it

proceeds

14 is

Feuerbach's

the adoration of

human

species characteristics in a disguised and mystified form. Feuerbach's analysis of the Christian religion has revealed that "the

being for

highest

human

beings.'"

human

being

Consequently, says Marx,

is

the

German

religious criticism itself contains "the categorical imperative, to overthrow all conditions in

which the human being

despicable being."

But

in spite

clear that political

is

of the radical nature of

German

a debased, enslaved, forsaken,

15

reality

German

theory,

it is

abundantly

has not even reached "the intermediate stages of

emancipation" long since achieved by other modern nations.

There seems to be an overwhelming and irreconcilable discrepancy between "the demands of German thought" and the backward answers of German reality. Given this discrepancy, a radical revolution, no matter how necessary, appears to be a Utopian possibility - unless of course one reconsiders, and looks at Germany's situation from a perspective which permits one to perceive the decisive advantages in Germany's practical backwardness. It is precisely this perspective which Marx adopts. "But if Germany has accompanied the development of modern nations only with the abstract activity of thought without taking an active part in the real struggles of this development,

development satisfactions."

without 16

it

sharing

has also shared in the sufferings of this its

enjoyments,

or

its

partial

1

Marx

02

's

First Discussion

Marx's claim here

modern

tages of

civil

is

of the Proletariat

Germany

that

has experienced

all

society without having experienced

the disadvanits

advantages.

This argument has a familiar ring. An earlier version appears in the articles on the Wood Theft Debates. In much the same way as the poor of Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood, Germany as a nation has been "outside" the social order of modern civil society. It has experienced the suffering imposed by the modern order without having experienced the The distorting, corrupting satisfactions of modern development. familiarity of this position should provide a clue as to why Marx claims that the radical revolution is possible for Germany., Untouched by the compromising satisfactions of civil society, Germany is ready to make the radical leap

beyond these

Germany's

satisfactions.

outside the development of

modern

society gives

status as a nation a certain "purity"

it

which is the soil of the radical revolution. Vis-a-vis the modern development as a whole, Germany is an outsider. It is this status as an outsider that grounds the theoretical legitimacy of a radical German revolution.

3

The

Positive Possibility of a Radical

Having established the legitimacy of a theoretical perspective,

Marx now

German

radical

revolution from a

has to establish the legitimacy of this

revolution from a practical perspective. conceptual possibility of a radical

German Revolution

It is

German

one thing

revolution;

to

it is

demonstrate the quite another to

demonstrate "the positive possibility" of such a revolution. "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons; material

must be overthrown by material

force

that a radical revolution

is

German

theory reveals

Germany, but the

are not sufficient by themselves.

the positive possibility of

is

17

a categorical imperative for

demands of German thought Where

force."

German

emancipation? Answer: in the

formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which

of civil society, an estate that

is

the dissolution of

all

that possesses a universal character as a result of

Marx

applies the

possibility

same schema

of a radical

to the

German

estates, a

its

is

to translate the

thereby enable

Germany

not a class 1

universal suffering.

demonstration of the practical

revolution

that

he applies

demonstration of the theoretical possibility of this revolution.

which

is

sphere [of society]

demands of German thought

to

The

the

agent

into reality

and

to leap over "the intermediate stages of political

emancipation" characteristic of

civil society,

must be an agent

"outside of" and "other than" this social order.

The

proletariat

is

that

is

to the

Marx's First Discussion of the Proletariat

Germany what Germany

social order within

the

modern nation

The

proletariat

itself is to the social

is

German revolution; its mission human emancipation follows directly from its

the agent of a radical

universal character.

What

meaning of Marx's claim

the

is

proletariat "possesses a universal character as a result of

that the

universal

its

We must guard against the temptation of reading this claim as

a description of the fate of the working class

Marx

production, for at this point

capitalist

order of

19

states.

of bringing about universal

suffering"?

103

under the iron laws of

has not developed the theory

of the inevitable impoverishment of the working class under capitalism.

Thus

the suffering of the proletariat could not be "universal" in the

sense of being a universal or inevitable feature of capitalist social

But if the suffering of the what sense is it universal?

organization. sense, in

The

negation of is

is

not universal in this

description of the proletariat in the passage quoted above should

provide a clue: that

proletariat

the

proletariat

not a class, an estate that

not a sphere of society.

is

absolute

the

other,

What

is

absolute

the

Vis-a-vis civil society the proletariat

civil society.

is

a class

not an estate, a sphere of society that

justification

does

Marx have

is

for this claim?

Here we should recall that, for Marx, civil society is an antagonistic conglomerate of particular interests whose "suffering" is also particular.

The

who

individuals

injuries

to

their

The

privileges.

are

members of

traditional

rights

this antagonistic totality suffer

and

their

to

historically

granted

proletariat does not share in this social order; in this

respect proletarians are not

members of civil

society.

The

proletariat has

no historical privileges and no traditional titles. Consequendy it cannot be "injured" in any of these ways. The proletariat is thus the one social group which "can no longer invoke a historical title no particular

rights,

but only a human one."

The

suffering of the proletariat

is

like

the

Wood

Theft articles whose property and whose interests consist of "life, freedom and humanity." The suffering of the proletariat is its existence as "the complete loss of humanity." The proletariat does not suffer a "particular wrong" but "wrong itself [das Unrecht schlechthin]. And yet there is a redemptive quality to its suffering, for it is precisely the existence of the proletariat as "the complete loss of humanity" that gives it its mission as the agent which is to accomplish suffering of the poor in the

"the complete regeneration [Wiedergewinnung] of humanity."

The

discovery of the proletariat

is

the missing link

which transforms

the demonstration of the theoretical possibility of a radical revolution in

Germany

into the demonstration of its positive possibility

of practice.

by the

The

radical

on the grounds

theoretical grounds of a radical revolution are provided

nature

of

German

theory

(religious

criticism

and

1

Marx

04

First Discussion

's

of the Proletariat

But a radical revolution needs both "the weapon of criticism" and "criticism by weapons." The latter is provided by the proletariat. The revolution which is to bring about universal human emancipation has found its agent in that section of the human community which possesses a universal character. philosophy).

4

The Universal Character of the

Proletariat: Analysis

and

Critique proletariat appears in Marx's discussion as the embodiment of a Hegelian category, the category of dissolution. "This dissolution of

The

society existing as a particular estate

ontological status of the proletariat its

destiny.

The

is

seems

The

the proletariat.'" to

objective

be the determining factor in

very existence of the proletariat thus establishes

its

historical mission.

By proclaiming the merely declares the

dissolution of the hitherto existing world order, the proletariat secret

of its own

existence, for

it is

in fact the dissolution

of this

world order. By demanding the negation ofprivate property, the proletariat merely makes into a principle of society what society has already made into the principle of the proletariat, what, without its co-operation, 21 the negative result of society.

In this passage

Marx does

consciousness and the

its

subjectivity

under in

its

the

already incorporated in

it

as

not distinguish between the proletariat's

As a result, the concept of subsumes the proletariat's Because the objective place of the

place in the social order.

universal character of the

proletariat

is

proletariat

ontological status.

order

social

is

already

established

"without

its

co-operation," the subsumption of the subjectivity of the proletariat

under

its

ontological status implies that the emancipatory structure of the

proletariat's consciousness

In

effect

"possesses

Marx's a

is

also established "without

discussion

universal

implies

character"

in

its

that

because

an

objective

co-operation." the

proletariat

sense,

it

also

"possesses" a comparably universalist consciousnes, a consciousness

which, its

like the

general will in Jacobin social theory,

is

purely general in

intentions.

Marx's brief comments about the proletariat are thus particularly significant because of what he does not say about the proletariat's subjectivity. It is noteworthy that Marx does not find it necessary to comment on the subjectivity of the proletariat. The absence of any remarks about the proletariat's consciousness takes on a special significance in view of the fact that Marx does comment on the subjectivity ofother groups in German civil

Marx's

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

In rejecting the possibility of a political revolution in

society.

Marx

refers to the resignation

which

is

105

Germany

and the lack of righteous indignation

true "not only of individuals but also of classes"

22

in

German

We

should not minimize the importance which this "subjective factor" plays in Marx's analysis. The impossibility of a political revolution in Germany is at least partly the result of the fact that civil

society.

the social classes in for

German

civil

society lack the subjective capabilities

even a moderate form of struggle.

But the proletariat is different. The proletariat is "a class of civil which is not a class of civil society." The proletariat is a class of civil society inasmuch as it is the result of civil society, indeed as Marx says, the "negative result" of this social order. This is the meaning of Marx's society

statement that the proletariat

is

not the result of any natural poverty but

produced.,"

23

Marx's distinction between the artificially produced poverty is intended to counter the argument that poverty is a natural feature of any form of society. According to Marx, the existence of the proletariat is not the result of society as such but of that particular disintegration of society which is civil society. Inasmuch as the existence of the proletariat as "the complete loss of humanity" is the result of civil society, the proletariat is indeed a "class of civil society." But the proletariat is not a class of civil society inasmuch as it is the absolute other of civil society. In an objective sense the proletariat's universal character is the absolute other of the particularities of civil society. And as I have argued above, this otherness seems to extend to the proletariat's subjectivity as well. Marx's assumption seems to be that the proletariat is so much "outside" civil society that it has been spared from experiencing the comprising benefits and advantages of this social of poverty that

is "artificially

poverty that results from natural circumstances and

system.

Marx seems

be supposing that the universal suffering of the proletariat functions as a buffer which prevents the proletariat from being corrupted by a diseased social order. Not yet loaded down with the compromising burden of particular rights and historical privileges, the proletariat is free to exercise its fundamental humanity. In this sense the proletariat is much like the poor of the Wood Theft articles whose "social instinct" is not corrupted by the "abject materialism" of civil society. Just as the poor do not have to do anything to acquire their social instinct, it seems that the proletariat does not have to do anything to possess its universal character. This character belongs to it, as Marx says, "without its

to

co-operation." In this respect the proletariat

is

already emancipated

from the ambiguous blessings of civil society. The possibility that extreme suffering could itself be a distorting and perverting factor does

1

Marx

06

's

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

not seem to have occurred to

"noble savages" but they

Marx

may

The

at this point.

proletariat are not

well be "noble poor."

The difficulties in the notion of the proletariat's universal character as Marx presents it in the "Introduction" appear when we raise the following questions: Granted that the proletariat in an objective ontological sense,

proletariat's subjectivity

practice of this society?

is

Marx

is

not "of

justified in

civil

society"

supposing that the

would be unaffected by the distorted Granted that objectively the proletariat

social is

the

sphere of universality vis-a-vis a realm of warring particularities, does guarantee that its subjectivity would immediately have the structure of an emancipatory universality? Just because the proletariat has no historical rights and privileges, is Marx justified in assuming that its subjectivity would be protected from the ravages of a social order which he has already described in "On the Jewish Question" as one in which this

"the only bond which holds [people] together is natural necessity, need and private interest"? Even if we grant that the proletariat could not be motivated by the defense of its private rights (since it has none), does this mean that it would also be spared from having to struggle against 4 internalizing the oppression which it encounters daily in civil society?" The proletariat may possess a "universal character" in an objective ontological sense but this does not yet imply that there would be an immediate correspondence between its objective being and its consciousness.

As Marx presents the proletariat that

Marx

is

it

in the "Introduction," the universal character of

a static rather than a dialectical concept.

It is

significant

says the proletariat "possesses [besitzt] a universal character."

Its

something the proletariat already has by virtue of being what it is, rather than something it in any way creates, produces or develops either as a result of its activity (labor), or as a result of a self-conscious practice. If the "character" of the proletariat and its subjectivity or consciousness are one and the same, then it would seem that Marx supposes that the proletariat possesses a revolutionary

universal character

is

consciousness in the same way that as a result of

its

it

"possesses a universal character,"

the proletariat already has by virtue of is

already established "without

its

its

social

i.e.

something being, something which

suffering. If revolutionary consciousness

is

co-operation" rather than a disposition

which it must somehow strive to acquire through an intentional practice, it seems legitimate to conclude that Marx's first discussion of the proletariat exhibits a dogmatic conception of emancipatory subjectivity.

Marx's

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

107

The Proletariat and Philosophy

5

But before accepting "Introduction" text:

conclusion as a complete description of the

this

we should consider one

as yet

unmentioned aspect of this

the relation between the realization of philosophy and the abolition

of the proletariat. This relation

"Philosophy cannot realize the

proletariat

philosophy."

cannot

is

itself

expressed in the well-known formula:

without the abolition of the proletariat;

abolish

itself

without

the

realization

of

25

This compact sentence is a summary of Marx's criticism of two opposing camps in contemporary German politics. One group focuses its energy on demands for constitutional reforms; the other group concerns itself

with issues in philosophical criticism.

political party

demands

The

first

camp, "the

practical

camp demands the both demands are

the negation ofphilosophy", while the second

"the theoretical political party orignating from philosophy" 26

Marx argues that camp fully understands what is required in order for its demands to be fulfilled. The first camp does not see that the negation of philisophy in Germany cannot be achieved without transforming its moral demands into reality. The second camp does not realization

of philosophy.

legitimate but that neither

understand that the realization of philosophy will require its negation as a merely theoretical system, i.e. as philosophy. This in turn will require the accomplishment of a seemingly non-philosophical goal: the abolition of the proletariat.

Marx

treats the abolition

philosophy as an internal the plane of theory.

27

of the proletariat and the realization of

relation

on two planes, the plane of practice and

In terms of practice, the abolition of the proletariat

and the realization of philosophy represent equivalent projects each of which implies and requires the other in order to be accomplished itself. In terms of theory, the abolition of the proletariat and the realization of philosophy constitute equivalent descriptions of what it would mean to full human emancipation. Since human emancipation can be understood equally well under either description, the difference between the descriptions is purely one of perspective. In order to understand how Marx can treat the abolition of the proletariat and the realization of

achieve

philosophy as an internal relation, as

fully equivalent to

each other,

it is

necessary to briefly summarize what he understands by the realization of philosophy.

By 1843

this

concept already has

realization of philosophy has his doctoral dissertation.

28

been

Marx

a

long history in Marx's thought; the him since the days of

a desideratum for

takes the content of philosophy to be

1

Marx

08

Kant's

's

First Discussion

a

imperative

categorical

themselves. For

"demand of

of the Proletariat

Marx

treat

to

human

as for Kant, this imperative

beings

is

as

a rational

ends

in

command,

Consequently for Marx the realization of

reason."

philosophy and the fulfillment of the demands of reason are synonymous descriptions of the same project: the full actualization of reason in the world.

of this task would

The accomplishment

mean

that Kant's

moral

human

social

philosophy would become descriptive of the reality of relations. It

should

now be

clear

why Marx

says that philosophy cannot be

made

a reality without the abolition of the proletariat: the existence of the proletariat

is

the existence of a situation in which

treated as ends in themselves but as

human being

is

mere means,

beings are not

which the

"a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being."

existence of the proletariat

is

thus irrefutable proof that the rational

yet real, that philosophy has not yet

reason have not yet been

Marx

human

a situation in

been

realized, that the

The

is

not

demands of

fulfilled.

describes the interdependence of the realization of philosophy

and the abolition of the proletariat in terms of several metaphors. "As finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the 29 Philoproletariat finds its spiritual [geistige] weapons in philosophy." sophy is the head of the movement for human emancipation; the philosophy

proletariat

is its

heart.

are intended to do more than just to illustrate the interdependence of the realization of philosophy and the abolition of the proletariat; they are intended to function as a highly compressed argument to the effect that philosophy and the proletariat have a mutual

These metaphors

need

for

The

each other.

relationship

between philosophy and the

proletariat

is

significant

terms of the problematic of the "Introduction" the relationship between the proletariat and philosophy has a dual function. On the one hand, this relationship grounds Marx's demonstration of the

in several respects. In

"positive possibility" of a radical revolution in

hand, in so doing,

it

provides

Marx

Germany.

On

the other

with a non-idealist solution for the

project of the realization of reason. In terms of the problematic of this

and the proletariat have a mutual need each other implicitly raises the issue of the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. For this reason in particular, the relationship

study, the claim that philosophy

7

for

between philosophy and the

proletariat merits a

more

detailed explo-

ration.

In claiming that philosophy needs the proletariat Marx is building on Hegel's critique of the standpoint of abstract morality with regard to the realization

of reason. In the Phenomenology Hegel argues that the

Marx's realization of reason cannot

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

109

be adequately comprehended from the

perspective of morality.

What

what ought to be, in has no truth. The instinct of reason for its part rightly holds to this standpoint, and does not let itself be led astray by figments of thought which only ought to be and as oughts are 30 supposed to be true, even though they are nowhere met with in experience. universally valid

is

fact also

The

is,

is

also universally effective [geltend];

and what only ought

to

be without

[actually] being,

come about just because some "ought to happen." But Marx also rejects the Hegelian notion that the rational becomes real as a result of the internal development of reason itself. Reason needs "material weapons"; it is dependent for its realization on some force outside itself. Therefore philosophy needs the proletariat. However, Marx will not have made much advance beyond Kant if this dependence itself were to remain a mere ought. To claim that the proletariat ought to realize philosophy would return the discussion of the realization of realization of philosophy will not

philosopher has proclaimed that

it

reason to a purely philosophical framework.

Marx's question, needs?"

32

"will

theoretical

31

needs be immediate practical

indicates that he has another solution in mind. Theoretical

needs are those which are derived from or implied by German theory, specifically by Kant's moral philosophy and by the doctrine (resulting from Feuerbach's critique of religion) that "the highest being for the human being is the human being." As Marx sees it, the "need" which is implied by this doctrine is the need to abolish all those conditions in which human beings are enslaved and degraded. Thus the need which is implied by this doctrine is the need for a radical revolution. But this is a peculiar manner of speaking; how can any needs be implied by a doctrine? The peculiarity of this manner of speaking emerges when we

who has this need; whose need is it? If no one has this remains a purely "theoretical need," an objective, rational imperative, but an abstract "ought" nevertheless. It is precisely this problem that Marx recognizes through the question: "Will theoretical ask the question,

need,

it

needs become immediate practical needs?" This question is never explicitly answered in the text; it is raised and then left to hover in the air. Having raised this question Marx immediately turns his attention to the difference between a merely political and a truly radical revolution. This is the context in which he argues that the only revolution for is

Germany which

is

not a Utopian dream

a radical revolution. It is

at this point in the text that

Marx introduces the proletariat as the German situation which establishes

hitherto unnoticed element in the

110

Marx

's

First Discussion of the Proletariat

"the positive possibility" of a radical

German

And it is the Marx with the

revolution.

proletariat that obviously (although never explicitly) provides

answer

whether theoretical needs

to the question as to

practical needs.

The proletariat

is

will

be immediate

the vehicle through which theoretical needs

Theoretical needs will be "immediate practical needs" in the sense that they will be experienced as needs by the proletariat itself. Theoretical needs will thus be immediate practical needs in the sense that they will inspire and animate the practice of the will become practical needs.

human

agents of

liberation.

But if the interaction between philosophy and the proletariat is to be a truly mutual one, the proletariat must be more than the vehicle for the realization of philosophy. The need which the proletariat has for philosophy cannot be explained only from the point of view of philosophy. It must also be explained from the point of view of the proletariat. If he is to avoid the trap of idealism, Marx has to show why the proletariat needs philosophy in order to accomplish

Marx

aware of the challenge facing him.

is

thought to

strive

for

realization;

reality

must

own

its

goals.

not enough for

"It is itself

strive

towards

thought." But reality must strive towards thought for its own sake, from its own perspective as it were. Otherwise the whole business has the aura

of a sleight of hand, and reason.

"Theory

is

is

nothing but the result of the cunning of

realized in a people only in so far as

needs of that people." philosophy, Marx has

33

In order to

to

show why the

it

fulfills

proletariat

show why or how philosophy

the

needs

fulfills

the

proletariat's needs.

Why

does the proletariat need philosophy?

Marx

the task of philosophy "in the service of history."

is

quite explicit as to

The

"Introduction"

begins with a discussion of this very point. Since "the criticism of religion is 34 philosophy need no longer concern itself with essentially completed,"

unmasking human "self-estrangement" in its holy or religious form; it can now devote itself to the project of unmasking this self-estrangement in its unholy, secular form. The latter is the legal and political theory of civil society which is embodied in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The current task of philosophy

"On

is

social critique, demystification.

Marx

has already taken the position that mystified consciousness confuses the historical and the natural. MystiIn

the Jewish Question"

fied consciousness takes a particular historical social structure to

result of an

manner;

unchanging human

is it

a victim

nature.

Is

be the

the proletariat mystified in this

of this sort of mystified thinking?

Marx

certainly

does not say so; indeed his remarks about the proletariat as well as his earlier discussions

of mystified consciousness seem to imply rather that

the opposite would be the case.

Marx's

First Discussion

As the preceding discussion has shown, the

of the Proletariat

proletariat

is

111

the candidate

emancipatory agent precisely because it is not caught up in defending and protecting any particular or private interest. for the role of a universal

The proletariat invokes no If mystified

consciousness

historical title is

and

it

claims no particular right.

the expression of private interest and the

proletariat has no private interest, then it would seem that the proletariat would not need the demystifying service which social critique could

render.

35

But since Marx describes philosophy as the "spiritual weapon" of the it is clear that he intends to make a claim that the proletariat does need philosophy. "Theory is realized in a people only in so far as it fulfills the needs of that people." What needs does the proletariat have which philosophy could realize or fulfill? To be sure, the proletariat has an objective need for emancipation, but how could the "weapons" which philosophy has to offer fulfill this need? Why does the proletariat need philosophy? We cannot answer this question from the perspective of any later relation between "theory and practice" in Marxist thought. In particular, we cannot answer this question in terms of any relation between "Marxist theory" and the political practice of the working class. Philosophy, in the sense at issue here, is not "Marxist theory"; it is not "scientific socialism," and it is not proletariat,

the explanation of the laws of capitalist development.

Philosophy

is

German

idealism;

its

content

is

a categorical imperative

which calls for radical revolution. Does the claim that the proletariat needs philosophy mean that the proletariat must be aware of this imperative? In a sense this is exactly what it means. The proletariat must be conscious of the necessity of a radical revolution. The proletariat must experience the categorical imperative which calls for this revolution, not as an abstract "ought" but as its own felt need for emancipation. This sort of

awareness

is

nothing other than revolutionary consciousness.

claim that the proletariat needs philosophy that the proletariat

must have

consciousness which

is

is

The

thus a claim to the effect

a revolutionary consciousness.

It is

this

the proletariat's "spiritual weapon."

Although the claim that the proletariat must have a revolutionary is presented in metaphorical form, this claim ought not to be left to the charms or the persuasive powers of a metaphor. The metaphor itself must be interrogated as to its meaning; the claim behind the metaphor must be examined. Why does the proletariat need "spiritual weapons"; why must the proletariat have a revolutionary consciousness

consciousness? I

have argued that the assumption that the proletariat

need

for revolution as

its

own need

will

has already provided

experience the

Marx

with the

112

Marx

's

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

possibility of a non-idealist solution to the project of the realization of

philosophy. (It is the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat which answers the question "will theoretical needs be immediate practical needs?" and thus grounds "the positive possibility" of a radical German revolution.) proletariat

It

now remains

to

determine whether the claim that the

must be conscious of the need

for revolution

is

also significant

from the perspective of the proletariat. For, unless Marx can show that the proletariat needs a revolutionary consciousness as an inherent feature of its project (the abolition of itself qua proletariat), he will merely have posited the proletariat's revolutionary consciousness as a vehicle for the realization of philosophy,

relation

between the

proletariat.

and he

will

have failed to establish an internal

realization of philosophy

and the abolition of the

In effect he will not have succeeded in transcending the

viewpoint of philosophy; he will not have found a non-idealist solution for the realization of reason.

36

Although Marx does not make an the proletariat's need for philosophy necessities, this position

is

argument grounded in the

explicit is

to the effect that

proletariat's

already implicitly contained in his

own

own

earlier

Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight." If we reflect proletariat as the agent of

on the concept of the Marx's need for the proletariat's

human emancipation

in the light of

it becomes apparent that need which the proletariat has for itself. In the Critique Marx has criticized Hegel for failing

earlier

Critique,

philosophy

is

a

self-consistent philosophy of freedom.

Marx

to articulate a

has argued that Hegel's

account of the state as the realm of freedom treats the achievement of freedom as the result of "natural necessity," i.e. as a consequence of a process that takes place "against consciousness." Paraphrasing these

comments, we can say

Marx) the trouble with Hegel's Hegel fails to construe it as an intentional practice of self-determination on the part of those involved. Marx argues that such a conception of freedom is contradictory on the face of it. Consequently, according to Marx's own criteria, if the proletariat is to function as the agent of human liberation, it must that (according to

understanding of emancipation

is

that

incorporate the qualities of emancipatory action in the very project of

emancipation

itself.

Emancipation

must

be

the

result

of

self-

determination on the part of the emancipators. This means that there

must not only be an

objective

need

for radical revolution resulting

the very existence of the proletariat, but that the proletariat itself

experience this need as

The

universal

its

own

suffering

from must

need.

of the proletariat

is

an affront to the

imperatives of practical reason; the existence of the proletariat as "the

Marx

's

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

113

complete loss of humanity" establishes the objective grounds (the objective need) for revolution. But, since genuine emancipation cannot be accomplished "against consciousness," the proletariat must act as a result of its own felt need if it is really to function as an agent of universal emancipation. This means that the proletariat cannot liberate itself if it is merely the passive vehicle of a transcending purpose; freedom cannot be

who are supposed to be emancipators must emancipate themselves, and an essential part of this self-emancipation is the experiencing of the need for emancipation as one's own need. accomplished behind the backs of those

emancipated.

The

Let us retrace our steps:

have claimed that in order to establish a Marx has to show that

I

non-idealist solution for the realization of reason,

philosophy and the proletariat have a mutual need for each other.

Although the need which philosophy has for the proletariat is perhaps more readily apparent, I have maintained that Marx does intend to make a case for the proletariat's needing philosophy. I have then argued that the implication of the position that the proletariat needs philosophy is a claim to the effect that the proletariat must not only have a need for radical revolution in an ontological or objective sense, but that it must also experience this need subjectively. The proletariat must be aware that it needs a radical revolution. Thus I have interpreted Marx's claim that the proletariat needs philosophy to mean that the proletariat must have a revolutionary consciousness in order to function as the agent of universal

human

emancipation.

In section 4

I

argued that

the issue of the proletariat's subjectivity

if

subsumed under the notion of its "universal character," the "Introduction" would contain only a dogmatic concept of emancipatory

were

entirely

subjectivity. It

now

appears as

and the proletariat allows us

if

to

consciousness of the proletariat. dialectical

6

the internal relation between philosophy

disengage the notion of the revolutionary

Does

approach to emancipatory

mean

this

that this text contains a

subjectivity?

The Revolutionary Consciousness of the Proletariat: The Dogmatic Perspective

It is

significant that

Marx

describes the proletariat as the result of a

particular process of social development:

poverty, but artificially produced poverty It

is

also significant that

German

.

.

Marx grounds

.

it

is

"not naturally arising

that forms the proletariat."

the possibilities of a radical

revolution "in the formation of a class with radical chains."

Marx

114

's

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

Although he does not explicitly say so, it seems proper to assume that the same developmental model would apply to both the objective and subjective dimensions of this formative process. The notion of the "formation of a class" could thus refer both to the objective being of this class

(its

place in the social structure) and to

But although

Marx seems

revolutionary consciousness, this

have

to is

a

its

subjectivity.

developmental

mode

of

not yet sufficient to establish that he

what I have termed a dialectical approach to the issue of emancipatory subjectivity. In order to establish this, we would have to know how the development of revolutionary consciousness is thematized. And here the text is ambiguous. On the one hand, Marx seems to assume has

that the proletariat will automatically

the

need

for radical revolution.

also implies that the

On

and

inevitably

become conscious of

the other hand, the "Introduction"

development of revolutionary consciousness

is

a

project which requires an intentional practice of subjective struggle

the part of the proletariat, a struggle

preordained. Marx's

first

whose outcome

is

on by no means

discussion of the proletariat's revolutionary

consciousness thus contains both a dogmatic and a dialectical conception of emancipatory subjectivity.

The dogmatic aspect of Marx's thought can be illustrated by turning once more to the question: "will theoretical needs be immediate practical needs?" As I have already noted, Marx gives no explicit answer -to this question. To be sure, his introduction of the proletariat serves as the answer to the question, but this is precisely the origin of the problem. The existence of the proletariat cannot answer the question as to whether theoretical needs will be immediate practical needs; the existence of the proletariat can only account for the possibility that theoretical needs may become practical needs. But Marx makes no distinction between these two modalities, and this in itself is significant. Given the portrayal of the proletariat in the "Introduction," the absence of such a distinction and the lack of any discussion as to the process of the development of revolutionary consciousness suggest that Marx assumes that this development will be accounted for by the same social process which generates the proletariat

The weapon

itself.

of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons.

Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But the root for human beings is the human being itself. The clear proof of the radicalism of German theory and therefore of its practical energy is that it 38 proceeds from the decisive positive transcendence of religion.

material force once

Marx's First Discussion of the Proletariat

115

have cited

this passage in its entirety because its structure reveals the and dogmatic assumptions in Marx's conception of the development of revolutionary consciousness. This passage makes it seem as if there were only one factor at issue in the acquisition of revolutionary I

difficulties

consciousness, that factor being the radical nature of

German

"Theory

demonstrates ad

is

capable of gripping the masses as soon as

it

theory.

demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical." German theory having been established, 39 the issue as to its gripping the masses has been settled.

hominem, and It is

as

But

if,

it

it

the radical nature of

is

not only that theory has to grip the masses; the masses

themselves have to grip the theory; indeed theory cannot grip the masses unless the

masses

is not enough for thought to must itself strive towards thought." What what conditions are necessary in order for

in turn grip the theory. "It

strive for realization; reality

accounts for this possibility;

the masses to seize the theory? This issue remains unexplored in Marx's

discussion and

it is

this lack

which indicates the dogmatic element

in the

conception of revolutionary consciousness which he articulates in the "Introduction."

Marx

40

contents himself with having established "the clear proof of the

German theory," a proof which he claims is "therefore" proof of the practical energy of this theory. The practical necessity of theory's gripping the masses has thus been transformed into the 41 theoretical certainty that radical theory will grip the masses. This certainty seems to be provided by an assumption as to the unproblematic acceptance of radical theory on the part of the masses, an assumption which in turn depends on a notion of the unsullied purity of their consciousness as a result of their suffering, and as a result of their being radicalism of

"outsiders." It is as if the ontological status of the proletariat as "the complete loss of humanity" guarantees that it will become conscious of the need for "the complete regeneration of humanity," the need for a radical revolution.

Given the radicalism of German theory and the miserable existence of prise de conscience on the part of the proletariat is assured: "And once the lightning of thought has squarely struck this naive soil of the people, the emancipation of the Germans into human beings will take place." It is clear from this description that the lightning of thought is not expected to meet any obstacles; the "naive soil of the people" will offer no resistance. The acquisition of revolutionary consciousness is depicted as being both inevitable and unproblematic. The proletariat's prise de conscience is expected to proceed with the predictability of a law of the proletariat,

a.

nature.

Reflecting on the early Marx's conception of the development of

Marx

116

First Discussion

's

of the Proletariat

Wellmer comments: "the revolu-

revolutionary consciousness, Albrecht tion itself

which

is

the formation process of the revolutionary consciousness in

historical necessity

realized."

is

43

Wellmer

Marx

passage in The German Ideology where

famous

refers to the

insists that:

for the production of this communist consciousness and for the achievement of the cause itself a transformation of humanity on a mass scale is required; this can only take place in a practical movement, in a revolution. Thus a revolution is necessary not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but because only through a revolution can the class overthrowing it succeed in ridding itself of the age old trash [sich den ganzen alten Dreck vom

both

Halsezu society.

But

schaffen] in 44

new foundation

order to become capable of establishing a

for

to attribute the certainty of the proletariat's prise de conscience to the

revolutionary

process

dogmatism involved, In this connection

as it

itself

does

not

change

really

the

essential 43

Wellmer himself is forced to acknowledge. is instructive to compare the following passages

from The Holy Family (1845): [The

proletariat]

is,

to use

an expression of Hegel's,

indignation at this abasement,

an indignation

to

which

in its it

is

abasement the

necessarily driven

through the contradiction of its human nature with its life situation, which is the [second italics, my obvious, decisive, comprehensive negation of this nature .

.

.

emphasis] It

is

not a question of what this or that [proletarian] or even the whole momentarily envisages as the goal. It is a question of what the

proletariat proletariat

is

historically

and what, compelled

in

accordance with

this being [diesem Sein gemaess]

to do. Its goal

and

own

life

irrevocably and obviously, in

its

organization of contemporary society.

its

historical action

is

it

will

be

prescribed,

situation as well as in the entire

46

on the second passage. between

Lukacs's essay "Class Consciousness"

is

Lukacs makes a virtue of necessity by

explicitly distinguishing

a gloss

the class consciousness of the proletariat and

its

empirical consciousness.

For Lukacs what individuals actually think or feel is "merely the - albeit very important - material of genuine historical analysis." Lukacs defines class consciousness in terms of the category of "objective possibility." This category allows one to infer "the thoughts and feelings that individuals in a particular life situation would have if they were completely able to assess this situation and the interests arising from it both in terms of immediate action and in terms of the structure of the whole society." Thus by "class consciousness" Lukacs means "the rationally appropriate reactions which can be 'imputed' [zugerechnet] to a particular typical 8 position in the process of production." Given the distinction between

class consciousness

and empirical consciousness, the issue

for radical

Marx's practice,

First Discussion

Lukacs himself notes,

as

"the

is

of the Proletariat

question of the

realization of the objective possibility of class consciousness."

7

The

Dialectical Perspective in Religious Guise:

117 actual

49

The

"Internal Priest"

At the outset of this study

I

claimed that the heart of a dialectical theory is the recognition of the dynamics of

of emancipatory subjectivity

internalized oppression: the assimilation

and "acceptance" on the part of

the oppressed of values and patterns of behavior which echo the content

of their oppression. Accordingly

I

have argued that Marx's conception of is dogmatic whenever it makes no

the transformation of consciousness

allowance for this phenomenon.

It is

thus particularly significant for our

discussion that the "Introduction" to the Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy of Right" explicidy calls attention to the challenge posed by internalized

oppression.

Marx

introduces this concept in the context of a brief discussion of the

The

Protestant Reformation. is

notion of the internalization of domination

central to his analysis of the significance of Luther's claim that

The

of Marx's comments on emerge when we contrast his evaluation of Luther's achievement with Hegel's. Focusing on the significance of Luther's rejection of the distinction between the laity and the priesthood, Hegel describes the Reformation as the "abrogation of externality": everyone

is

a priest.

dialectical implications

the Protestant Reformation

"This

the great principle

is

ment of

self,

question here

is

all

externality disappears in the point of this externality, this estrange50 The servitude in

servitude has also disappeared."

all

doctrine which

- that

God; along with

the absolute relation to

the submission of the individual believer to a body of

is

proclaimed and established through the mediation of

the priesthood. For Hegel, Luther's rejection of a special religious caste establishes a direct

and immediate

relation

between the individual and

God. Thereby

a place has

nature, in

which one

been is at

set aside in the

home

depths of the individual's innermost home with God. This sense

with oneself and at

at home should not be capable of being destroyed by others; no one should presume to have a place therein. All externality in relation to me is

of being

dispelled.

51

notes that the abolition of the distinction between the laity and the priesthood destroys the authority of the church over individual conscience, but, unlike Hegel, Marx sees the sinister side of

Like Hegel,

Marx

this transformation: the

union of inner freedom and external servitude,

118

Marx

's

First Discussion

of the Proletariat

the continuity of the content of domination through a transformation of

Reformation represents the internalization of domination. Luther "freed human beings from external religiosity because he made religiosity into the inner human being. He 3 freed the body from chains because he enchained the heart." For Marx, the internalization of religious authority does not do away its

form. In

sinister aspect the Protestant

its

with this authority; themselves.

it

only anchors

To borrow

it

more deeply within

the individuals

Hegel's terminology: the Reformation

abolition of externality;

it is

is

not the

The place home" with

the internalization of externality.

Reformation establishes where the individual is "at spirits of domination which now speak with the individual's own voice. Consequently the Reformation is not itself the solution to the problem of mystified consciousness. But, says Marx, the Reformation is at least "the correct posing of the task." As a result of Luther's dictum that everyone is a priest, "It was no longer a matter of the struggle of the lay person against an external priest, it was a matter of that the

God

is

populated with the

the struggle against one's

own

internal priest, one's priestly nature."*

introjection of religious authority into the consciousness

2.

The

and conscience

of individuals means for Marx that the struggle against this authority becomes a struggle against the individual's allegiance to mystified values and beliefs, an allegiance that has been secured through the mechanisms of oppression

itself.

Marx does

not expand on this concept in the "Introduction." His

is limited to this one tantalizing remark. Furthermore, it is clear that the concept of the "internal priest" as well as the concept of one's own "priestly nature" as Marx uses them in this text

discussion of this struggle

and attitudes which made their "own." Because Marx does not take these concepts out of their religious context they remain isolated notions. Apparently Marx sees no connection between the concept of the internal priest and the issue of the preconditions for a radical revolution (radical needs as the breeding ground of such a revolution). And he draws no connection between the concept of a struggle against the internal priest and the development of the revolutionary subjectivity of refer only to the

body of repressive

religious beliefs

people have internalized and

the proletariat.

But the

fact that

Marx does

not

make

these connections explicit should

not deter us from exploring the significance of these concepts for the issue of emancipatory subjectivity. Similarly, the fact that

notion of a struggle against one's

own

Marx treats

the

"priestly nature" only as a religious

concept should not camouflage its broader meaning. In arguing for the extended significance of these concepts we would be following Marx's own hermeneutic; we would be proceeding according to his own instructions as to

how

to

understand discussions framed in theological

Marx's

119

First Discussion of the Proletariat

terms. This hermeneutic characterizes

all

the writings discussed in this

most explicit application is to be found in the essay "On the Jewish Question" and in the "Introduction" itself. It is this hermeneutic which both legitimizes and guides the attempt to decipher the secular significance of concepts which at this point Marx has delineated only in study;

its

religious form.

hermeneutic the notion of one's own "priestly expression of the secular concept of the introjection of repressive values. And, correspondingly, the concept of

According

nature"

to

the

is

"internal

the

this

religious

priest"

is

the

of the notion of

expression

religious

Together these concepts sketch out the problematic of the internalization of oppression. Using Marx's hermeneutic we dominated

subjectivity.

can say that the notion of the necessity of a struggle against one's own internal priest

is

against

struggle

the recognition in religious terminology of the necessity of a

internalized oppression.

When

Marx's hermeneutic

is

applied to Marx's discussion, the far-reaching dialectical implications of his insight are revealed: the challenge for

emancipatory social practice

is

not only to wage a successful struggle against the external forces of oppression, but also to undercut the dynamic of internalized oppression in the subjectivity

of individuals.

Conclusion and

8

The

"Introduction"

Summary brings

the

tension

Marx's early theory of

in

emancipatory subjectivity into explicit focus. Marx's first discussion of the proletariat clearly reveals the counterposed tendencies in his thinking. On the one hand, the "Introduction" romanticizes the ontological status of the proletariat as "outside society.

It

proletariat

from

its

ontological status outside

"universal character" of the proletariat

Inasmuch

of

or "other than"

civil society.

becomes

As

a result, the

a static, reified concept.

as the "Introduction" implies that a universalist subjectivity

immediately belongs to the proletariat in virtue of

inasmuch

civil

tends to deduce the emancipatory consciousness of the

as

it

its

social being, or

depicts the acquisition of a revolutionary consciousness by

the proletariat as an unproblematic and virtually inevitable this text exhibits a

phenomenon,

dogmatic perspective towards emancipatory subjectiv-

ity.

On

the other hand, the "Introduction" introduces the concept of

internalized oppression as a level

phenomenon which has an impact

at the

of individual subjectivity. Given Marx's insistence on the secular

core of religious concepts,

it

is

somewhat

ironic that the dialectical

conception of subjectivity in the "Introduction"

is

expressed in explicitly

1

Marx

20

's

First Discussion

religious language.

against

struggle

of the Proletariat

But when

"one's

this

own

subjectivity of the proletariat

is

concept

secularized the notion of a

is

inner priest"

clearly

implies

that

the

not already emancipated, and thus that the

development of an emancipatory

subjectivity

struggle against internalized oppression.

is

The

to

be conceptualized as a

notion of such a struggle

manifestly contradicts the conceptualization of an unproblematic acqui-

of revolutionary consciousness on the part of the proletariat. Inasmuch as the "Introduction" depicts the creation of a liberator}' subjectivity in terms of a struggle which must also occur at the level of sition

individual experience,

its

perspective on emancipatory subjectivity

is

dialectical.

We

conclude our examination of the tension in Marx's early theory at this point. We have traced the course of his thinking from texts where neither the revolutionary transformation of society nor the proletariat as such are topics of discussion, to texts where he is explicidy concerned with these issues. With the earlier texts our will

of emancipatory subjectivity

form of ferreting out the implications of Marx's "On the Jewish Question" we have been able to ground our argument in Marx's concern with universal human emancipation, and with the "Introduction" we have been able to focus our discussion on Marx's own remarks about revolutionary transformation and the agents of this transformation. Our analysis has revealed a gradual emergence of a dialectical perspective in Marx's thinking about emancipatory subjectivity, a perspective which is diametrically opposed both to his dogmatic conception of the subjectivity of the poor which characterizes the Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood, and to his dogmatic approach to the reform analysis has taken the

treatment of other issues; with

or abolition of mystified consciousness.

Our

discussion has also revealed

that this dialectical perspective does not supplant the earlier dogmatic

perspective, but that these two perspectives coexist in one and the text in

The

same

an uneasy tension. dialectical perspective appears in these early texts in

manner;

it

tends to be implicit rather than

an indirect

explicit. In the Critique

of

"Philosophy of Right" the dialectical perspective appears in the general tenor of Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy, rather

Hegel's

than in his own discussion of the reform of consciousness. In "On the Jewish Question" the dialectical perspective is found in Marx's critique of the dogmatic conception of human nature which characterizes the standpoint of political emancipation, rather than in his own discussion of the abolition of mystified consciousness. And, finally, in the "Introduction"

to

the

Critique of Hegel's

"Philosophy of Right" the

dialectical

Marx's

First Discussion

121

of the Proletariat

perspective appears not in the discussion of the proletariat and its consciousness, but in a comment about the significance of the Protestant

Reformation.

The

dialectical perspective has

an almost "underground" existence

in

these texts. Precisely because of this subterranean existence the tension

between the dogmatic and the dialectical perspectives in Marx's early theory of emancipatory subjectivity takes the form of an uneasy coexistence rather than the form of a blatant contradiction. Had it taken the latter form it might well have been easier to perceive.

The

fact that the dialectical perspective

in these texts

means

critical reflection

that

it is

becomes

is

implicit rather

than explicit

available for discussion only through

this does not mean that the an invention of the hermeneutical project; on

on these writings. But

dialectical perspective

the contrary,

it

is

much

rather a discovery. Critical reflection on Marx's

earliest writings reveals that the dialectical perspective, albeit implicit,

an

integral part

The dialectical perspective does not supplant the dogmatic Thus the emergence of the dialectical perspective means early thinking about emancipatory subjectivity

tension

is

of his thinking about emancipatory subjectivity.

between these

two perspectives.

is

This

perspective.

Marx's

that

characterized by a fact

has

consequ-

ences for an understanding of Marx's early work as a whole and for any attempt to resolve the present early texts

from the

crisis in

means dogmatism in

early texts. In particular

In the last chapter

I

it

will

that

Marxism by returning

we cannot

to

Marx's

seek refuge in these

the later Marxist tradition.

attempt to show

(in

a highly schematic

fashion) that Marx's later thinking about emancipatory subjectivity

characterized by a dogmatic perspective. This in turn

means

is

also

that the

struggle against the dogmatic element in the Marxist conception of

emancipatory consciousness cannot merely direct

itself against possible

distortions of Marx's thought by later theoreticians.

On the

contrary, the

disengaging and recapturing of a dialectical conception of emancipatory subjectivity for the Marxist tradition requires that we argue for Marx against

Marx.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: Dialectical

contain both

a

I have attempted dogmatic and a

emancipatory consciousness. conceptions

is

a

Marxism

In the preceding chapters writings

Towards

The

to

tension

show

that

dialectical

Marx's early

conception of

between these divergent

not limited to the texts considered in this study, however;

on the contrary, this tension permeates Marx's later writings as well as the subsequent Marxist tradition. These early texts thus constitute the starting point within the Marxist tradition of the

as yet unresolved

problematic of emancipatory subjectivity.

But at

in the late twentieth century

it is

not only Marxist practice which

is

stake. In the face of the ever-increasing threat of nuclear annihilation

"the categorical imperative to overthrow

human being

is

all

conditions in which the

a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being", an

imperative which

Marx

located in the

century industrial proletariat, imperative for the

human

has

life

conditions of the nineteenth

become ever more

urgently

the

species as a whole.

This imperative must be placed against the backdrop of twentieth history. This century has witnessed the phenomenon of "human-made death" on an unprecedented scale. It is this history itself which decisively refutes, for all time, any justification for relying on a dogmatic conception of emancipatory subjectivity. The disasters of the twentieth century have undermined the very possibility of believing in an "inevitable" realization of Reason, Progress or Freedom. Today no struggle for fundamental social change can afford to operate with a dogmatic conception of emancipatory consciousness. In order to century

1

avert a "final (nuclear) solution" progressive political practice

ways

to interrupt the

must

find

reproduction of domination whereby struggles for

eroded and defeated "from within" by the effects of It is equally imperative that people engaged in the different movements for radical change become able to develop and maintain effective alliances with each other. We are left with the conclusion that contemporary liberation efforts liberation are often

internalized oppression.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

123

must be informed by a dialectical perspective towards the transformation of consciousness. This would involve deepening the comprehension of the pyscho-social dynamics of domination and submission and recognizing the importance of undoing the sedimentation of oppression in the subjectivity of individuals. It would presuppose an openness to new modalities of transformative practice. part of this chapter I want to show, in a highly compact and manner, that a dogmatic conception of emancipatory consciousness is indeed a feature of Marx's later thought. It is my view that the discomfort with this conception of emancipatory subjectivity was a motivating factor in the attempt to rethink and re -articulate Marxist theory beginning in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, a project which has come to be called "Western Marxism". In the second part of this chapter I will attempt to buttress this claim (again in a very abbreviated manner) by textual citations which indicate that these theorists were seeking to articulate a dialectical conception of emancipatory subjectivity. In the last In the

first

provisional

I will address the issue of a "practice of subjectivity" propose a preliminary set of criteria for such a practice.

part of this chapter

and

1

will

The Dogmatic Conception of Emancipatory

Subjectivity:

A Continuing Issue in Marx's Thought In order to

show

that a

dogmatic perspective towards emancipatory

consciousness continues to haunt Marx's thought

it is

not necessary to

claim that this dogmatism takes the same form in Marx's later work as

does in the early texts discussed in

this study.

Nor

is it

it

necessary to claim

is missing from Marx's later be enough if we can show that there are elements in Marx's later work which imply that emancipatory consciousness is construed in a dogmatic manner, i.e. treated as an unproblematic and inevitable phenomenon. In what follows I will argue that a dogmatic conception of emancipa-

that a dialectical conception of subjectivity

work -

as

indeed

it is

tory consciousness itself in certain

is

not.

3

It

will

indeed a feature of Marx's

later thought. It exhibits

formulations of the thesis of historical materialism, in

Marx's own understanding of the scientific character of his work, and in a particular conception of the nature of the transition to socialism. There is a way in which Marx formulates the thesis of historical materialism such that emancipatory consciousness appears as an epiphenomenon of the inevitable conflict between the "material productive forces" and the "relations of production." The well known Preface to

124

A

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

Contribution

to

the Critique of Political

Economy contains

a

classic

example: At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or, what is only a legal expression for those relations, with the property relations within which they have been at work until now. These relations turn from forms of development of

Then a period of social revolution begins. With economic foundation, the whole immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations one must always distinguish between the transformation of the material conditions of production which can be determined with the exactitude of the natural sciences [naturwissenschaftlich treu zu konstatierenden] and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophical, in short, the ideological forms in which human beings 4 become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. the productive forces into fetters. the change in the

In this passage social revolution

is

portrayed as a progressive develop-

new higher relations of production behind the backs, as it were, of the human beings involved. The conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production is the motor of this progress; the "ideological forms in which people become conscious of this conflict and fight it out" seem to simply follow along. The development of emancipator} consciousness is not treated here as a task or project for a practical and contingent struggle. Instead, the transformation of consciousness is subsumed under the transformation of the "whole immense superstructure" which itself is "more or less rapidly transformed" in the course of the transformation of the "economic foundation." ment of the

forces of production into

7

In this formulation of historical materialism the transformation of

consciousness

is

portrayed

in

such

a

manner

that

the

issue

of

emancipatory consciousness becomes a non-issue. Not only does the development of emancipatory consciousness not seem to require a particular practice,

on the contrary,

it

seems

that the

development of

emancipatory consciousness can be safely entrusted to the inevitable transformation of the superstructure. The above reading of this passage suggests that a dogmatic perspective towards emancipator)' conscious-

ness

is

implied by a classic formulation of the thesis of historical

materialism.

A

second way in which a dogmatic conception of emancipatory

consciousness inhabits Marx's later thought tic

is disclosed by his positivis3 conception of the scientific character of his work. Marx's assertion in

the passage just cited that transformations in the material conditions of

production can be determined "with the exactitude of the natural sciences" reveals his (uncritical) admiration for these disciplines. In his

In Lieu of a Conclusion

Preface to the his

own

first

edition of the

efforts to the efforts

first

125

volume of Capital Marx compares

of natural scientists, and in the Afterword to

the second edition he cites a lengthy description of his method and aims by the Russian economist 1. 1. Kaufman, professor of political economy at the University of St. Petersburg. Writing in the St. Petersburg journal, European Messenger, Professor Kaufman echoes Marx's own description

of his efforts in the Preface and says: as a process of natural history."

Marx concerns himself

"Marx

According

with only one thing:

movement

treats the social

to Professor to

Kaufman:

show by exact

scientific

investigation the necessity of successive determinate arrangements of social facts that serve him for enough if he demonstrates, at the same time, both the necessity of the present system and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass, whether people believe it or do The scientific value of not believe it, whether they are conscious of it or not such an inquiry lies in the explanation of the particular laws which regulate the origin, existence, development and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another higher one. And it is this value which in fact Marx's 6 book has.

relations,

and

to establish, as

starting-points

impeccably as possible, the

and grounds. For

this

quite

it is

.

Marx

notes that Professor

tation as

being

(as

Marx

Kaufman puts

it)

.

.

objects to his

method of presen-

"unfortunately German-dialectical".

Kaufman, Marx's method of presentation is idealist "in the bad sense of the term." But the Russian professor obviously admires Marx's method of inquiry, which he calls "realistic." It is for this reason that Marx cites the long passage from Kaufman's review of his work. Marx uses the Russian reviewer's praise of his method of inquiry to hoist him on his own petard, and thereby to undermine his negative comments about Marx's method of presentation and the dialectical method. At the end of the long citation from European Messenger Marx asks: "Inasmuch as the reviewer describes what he takes to be my method [of inquiry] in a striking, and so far as concerns my own application of it, generous way, what else is he describing but the 8 dialectical method?" The point here is that Marx not only does not challenge Professor Kaufman's conception of the scientific character of According

German,

to

i.e.

7

his

work; he apparendy agrees with

Marx connects

the dialectical

it.

It is

particularly unfortunate that

method with the notion of the

inevitable

from a lower stage of social development to a higher one. The postulation of an inevitable progress achieved behind the backs of human transition

beings

is

not a feature of dialectical inquiry;

it

is

much

rather the

hallmark of a dogmatic certainty.

To the

the extent to which Marx understands his work as "scientific" on model of the natural sciences, he tends to construe emancipatory

1

26

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

consciousness as theoretical insight into the "natural laws of capitalist 9

This means however that emancipatory consciousness is regarded from a contemplative perspective as a body of theoretical

production." information.

This perspective fails to recognize the semi-autonomous nature of the consequences of oppression: namely, it fails to recognize that the patterns of thought and action inculcated through the experience of oppression take on a substantiality and a life of their own. This view of the matter fails to acknowledge what I would call the materiality or the sedimented nature of mystified consciousness. Namely, it fails to recognize that mystified consciousness is not merely a set of false ideas or illusions but that it encompasses modes of being, ways of acting and of experiencing oneself and one's existence to which people have become 10 accustomed, attached and even "addicted" on an affective level. The sedimentation

of mystified

consciousness

structures" and "personality types" for

the

individuals

who

inhabit

domination become forms of 11 the system of domination.

The dogmatism

in the

life

-

congeals

into

"character

naturalized and normalized cages

them. The habits engendered by through which individuals reproduce

equation of emancipatory consciousness with a

theoretical understanding of the "natural laws of capitalist production" in the failure to address the need for an undoing of the sedimented consequences of this system in the subjectivity of individuals.

consists

The dogmatism necessity I

is

consists in the failure to recognize that insight into

not equivalent to a transformative practice of subjectivity.

turn thirdly to a brief consideration of the dogmatic aspect of Marx's

conception of the transition to socialism.

The

following passages from

the Grundrisse and Capital will serve as textual examples.

development of the powers of production becomes a hence the capital relation [becomes] a barrier for the development of the productive powers of labor. When it has reached this point, capital, i.e. wage labor, enters into the same relation towards the development of social wealth and of the forces ofproduction as the guild system, serfdom, slaver}', and is necessarily stripped off as a fetter. The last form of servitude assumed by human activity, that of wage labor on the one side, capital on the other, is thereby cast off like a skin, and this casting-off itself is the result of the mode of production 12 corresponding to capital.

Beyond

a certain point, the

barrier for capital;

Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital who monopolize and usurp all the advantages of this transformation process, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist

In Lieu of a Conclusion production

The monopoly

itself.

of capital becomes a fetter upon the

production which has sprung up and flourished along with

it

127

mode

and under

of it.

means of production and socialization of labor at last reach point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. The

Centralization of the a

integument

is

burst asunder.

The

expropriators are expropriated .

.

.

knell of capitalist private property sounds.

The

.

production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature

capitalist

.

own

.

its

This does not re-establish private property for the producers, but gives them individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e. on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means negation

of production.

.

.

.

13

There

are four points to note about these passages. (1)

a truly

human

capitalist

history

production

is

The

transition to

portrayed as a direct function of the process of

itself. (2)

The

transition

is

described as the solution

problems generated by the capitalist mode of production. (3) The solution itself appears to be an inevitable consequence of the emergence of these problems. (4) The transition to a qualitatively different social order based on a co-operative mode of material production is characterized as historically necessary in the same way as the preceding transitions from "earlier forms of unfree social to the otherwise insoluble

production" into capitalism.

A

socialist society

cannot be postulated as "historically necessary",

however, without violating the integrity of the concept of socialism itself. The conditions of capitalist production make socialism a real possibility; but the creation of a liberated social order can only be a "necessity" of a very different sort. Socialism

is

not just a more efficient organization of

the conditions of capitalist production. the idea of a qualitatively different

The

totality.

idea of a socialist society

The

is

creation of a socialist

would entail what Herbert Marcuse terms "the rupture with the 14 continuum of domination." The establishment of a socialist society as a qualitatively different form of social life can only be conceptualized as the result of a collective choice which humanity makes for itself. Marx sometimes writes as if the revolution could be harnessed to the "iron laws of necessity" which constitute the capitalist process of production. For example, after detailing the "negative side" of the effects of machinery and large-scale industry upon the life conditions of the society

workers, But

if,

Marx

writes:

at present, the variation

of labor imposes

itself as

an overwhelming law of

nature and with the blindly destructive force of a natural law that meets obstacles

everywhere, large-scale industry, through

of

life

its

very catastrophes, makes

it

a matter

or death to recognize the variation of labor, and hence the greatest

possible versatility

[Vielseitigkeit]

of the workers as a general social law of

128

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

production, and to adapt the existing relations to the normal functioning of this law. Large-scale industry

makes

it

a matter of life or death to replace that

monstrosity, a suffering, disposable, laboring population, held in reserve for the

changing requirements of capitalist exploitation, by the absolute availability of the individual for varied work. The partial individual [Teilindwiduum], the mere bearer of one specialized social function, must be replaced by the totally

developed individual for

modes of

whom

the various social functions constitute successive

15

activity.

Iring Fetscher cites this passage as evidence of the "continuity"

between

being'

whom

the early

being

who had been

the

young and the old Marx: "The

Marx

posited

as

the

'total

opposite of the

human human

impoverished and limited through the development of the division of labor is here shown to be a necessity to which the capitalist 16 production itself is driven."

The this

significant issue for the present discussion

is

mode

of

not whether or not

passage illustrates the continuity of Marx's thought; the significant

is Marx's conflation of the technological necessities inherent in the dynamic of capitalist production with the human imperative of creating and establishing a qualitatively different society. The issue is Marx's attempt to harness an emancipatory practical reason to the chariot of technological reason. Fetscher's comment that throughout his work "Marx referred with unmistakable clarity to the necessity of overcoming 17 the division of labor" overlooks this issue. The necessity which drives capital to overcome the division of labor can never be the necessity postulated by practical reason - on the basis of the achievements of the

issue

capitalist

system itself- to establish a

One might socialism

is

socialist society.

18

grant that in the passages just cited the transition to

portrayed primarily in terms of the necessary technological

transformation in the sphere of material production, but one might argue that the distinction

Marx draws between

the realm of necessity and the

realm of freedom saves the conception of emancipatory subjectivity from

dogmatism inherent in the technological conception of the transition That is, one might claim that Marx is discussing only the technological aspects of the transition to socialism and therefore that his the

to socialism.

remarks are only applicable argument has a prima facie

to the

passages in which this distinction position.

To

sphere of material production. This but closer examination of the

plausibility, is

made

reveals the inadequacy of this

apply different standards to the material and non-material

aspects of the transition to socialism

is

to

undermine the notion of

socialist society as a qualitatively different totality.

realization that a

We

a

are left with the

dogmatic perspective towards emancipatory subjectivity

haunts Marx's conception of

this transition.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The

129

between the realm of necessity and the realm of most explicitly made by Marx in volume III of Capital. "The realm of freedom actually only begins where the labor determined by necessity and external purposes ceases. It is therefore, by its very nature, distinction

freedom

is

outside the sphere of essential material production." necessity

is

19

the sphere of "essential material production."

The It is

sphere of the sphere

of the production and reproduction of the means of human existence and

enjoyment. Although the modes of production through which human needs are satisfied undergo enormous changes, none of these changes transforms the sphere of essential material production into a realm of freedom. Apparently the fact of having to produce the means of existence, no matter how indirectly human effort is involved, is the determining consideration. For Marx, this factor is trans-historical. "Just as savages have to wresde with nature in order to satisfy their needs, to maintain and to reproduce their life so must civilized individuals, and they must do this in all forms of society and under all possible modes of 20 production." The realm of necessity is the "basis" upon which "true realm of freedom can bloom." The latter is defined by Marx as the arena in which the development of human faculties occurs as an end in itself, "for its own sake." For the later Marx this development is no longer envisioned as occurring in the realm of labor itself. On the contrary, "the shortening of the working day is the fundamental pre-condition." But because the realm of necessity is the basis for the realm of freedom, its characteristics will be of vital importance to the latter. Thus interactions between people in the realm of necessity must be such that they enable the realm of freedom to bloom. This in turn means that decisions regarding the organization and structure of material production must themselves proceed under the horizon of emancipatory forms of interaction. Or, to use xMarx's terminology, the realm of freedom must already be present in the realm of necessity, in the forms according to which the latter is organized. For, if interactions between the "associated producers" were to be characterized by relations of domination, this would affect the quality of human life also outside the sphere of material production. Relations of domination in the realm of necessity would make the realm of freedom unrealizable - no matter how much the working day were to be shortened. Marx's own description declares that in the new social order constituted by the co-operative mode of material production the "associated producers" will behave differently towards nature than they did under previous antagonistic modes of production. "Freedom in this realm can only consist in the fact that the socialized human beings, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally,

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

130

common

dominated by it presupposes that these associated producers would have to treat each other in a different manner from that which characterized the form of their interactions under "earlier unfree forms of social production." In effect this presupposes an essential bringing

it

under

their

as if by a blind force."

22

This

control, instead of being

in turn

transformation in the nature and quality of significant for the present

purposes

is

human

interaction.

What

that the necessity of

is

such a

is not even raised to the level of explicit notice in iMarx's remains rather an unmentioned precondition of the new relation towards nature under a co-operative mode of production. Precisely for this reason it is possible to suppose that the transformation

transformation discussion.

It

of patterns of interaction takes place

then

The

if

not "against consciousness,"

ofany focused effort on the dimension ofsubjectivity. transformation of subjectivity is thus taken for granted.

at least independently

Another way of describing this difficulty is to say that what is at stake in Marx's depiction of the interaction of the associated producers with nature is precisely what is not addressed: namely, the subjective of humanity's interchange with

prerequisites for the rational regulation

nature and the subjective prerequisites for

"common

control."

These

concepts carry an implicit reference to the dimension of subjectivity. The concept of "common control" implies that the associated producers must discuss a variety of issues.

They must

consider which projects ought to

be undertaken and how various goals are to be achieved. These are matters which cannot be adjudicated simply by referring to the objective technological possibilities which are available. On the contrary, the resolution of these questions requires a discourse which would evaluate the objective technological possibilities in terms of emancipator}- goals,

values and needs. the

"common

23

Bringing the

human

interchange with nature under

control" of the associated producers thus implies not only

by a genuine concern with the be able to articulate their various manner that is consonant with the overall

that these individuals will be motivated

communal

interest,

but that they

perceptions of this interest in a goal.

will

24

Once

again this

means

that the issue of subjectivity

process of arriving at decisions as to

how

is

crucial; the

to use the available material

resources must incorporate the emancipatory content of a co-operative

human

The manner in which decisions are made enters into the The form of the discussion itself becomes a factor. Discussions which seek to implement "common

order.

content of the result.

determining

must proceed under the horizon of emancipator)- communiinteractions between the associated producers must have an emancipatory- form, and this requires that these associated producers

control" cation.

The

In Lieu of a Conclusion

must

deliberately set about transforming their

own

nature; they

131

must

unlearn the forms of interaction, the habits of dominated thought and action that both result from and in turn reproduce an oppressive system.

As the following passage

Marx

indicates,

is fully

cognizant of the fact

that the capitalist process of production creates a

dominated human

nature as a second nature.

With the advance of capitalist production a working class is developed which by education, tradition, and habit regards the requirements of that mode of

The

production as self-evident natural laws.

organization of the capitalist

process of production, once fully developed, breaks

down

all

resistance.

The

constant production of a relative surplus population keeps the law of the supply

and demand of

and therefore wages, within the narrow limits which requirements. The mute compulsion of economic relations seals the domination of the capitalist over the workers. Direct extra-economic force is still used of course, but only in exceptional cases. In the normal course of things the workers can be left to the "natural laws of production," i.e. to their dependence on capital, a dependence which both originates and is guaranteed for all time by the conditions of production correspond

themselves.

to

labor,

capital's valorization

25

But Marx often writes as production themselves

if

the dynamics of the capitalist

will lead to the

mode of

undoing of this dominated nature.

(See the passage referred to in note 13.)

The

conjunction of these two passages from Capital illustrates the

necessary divergence between the perspective of technological reason

and the perspective of practical reason, the perspective a liberating practice.

The

that

must inform

agents of a possible revolution cannot take the

perspective of technological reason as a point of view on their situation if they are indeed to act against

of a technological determinism.

On

it.

They must

own

avoid both poles

the one hand, they cannot view

themselves as the passive beneficiaries of a victory which

is

already

inscribed in the dynamic of capitalist production; on the other hand, they

cannot regard themselves as completely dominated by these same conditions. If the early Marx tends to postulate a subject of radical change whose emancipatory consciousness remains safely "outside" civil society, the later Marx tends to assume that the dynamics of capitalist production will produce such consciousness by themselves. But when the development of emancipatory subjectivity is construed as a quasi-automatic result of

the alienated powers of

human

productivity, the dialectical thrust in 26

Marx's analysis of capitalism is lost. To the extent that the Marxist tradition has relied on the quasi-automatic development of emancipatory consciousness, it has been weakened from within, and has thus been that

132

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

much

less able to take

would indeed be

2

up the challenge of building

a socialism

which

a qualitatively different society.

An Attempt to Recapture a Dialectical Conception of Emancipatory Subjectivity: Western Marxism

In

an essay written in

1921,

Georg Lukacs argues

that

although

revolutionary initiative requires a centralized party, "the centralization of

cannot possibly be achieved by bureaucratic and means." For Lukacs the feasibility of this centralization depends upon the consciousness of the party members. He concludes:

a revolutionary party

technical

Thus

the question of organization reveals itself to be a spiritual

question. type:

The

obstacles which are to be overcome are of a spiritual

the ideological remnants of capitalist reification in the

sensibilities

of the communists themselves ...

It is

\geistige]

\geistiger]

thought and

precisely at this point that a

spiritual-practical working through [eine geistig-practische Durcharbeitung] of the 27 problem of organization is urgently necessary.

Lukacs's description of the challenges facing a revolutionary party indicative of a

growing focus among

a variety of

is

European Marxists of

upon the issue of subjectivity, a focus motivated by concern that traditional Marxist theory and practice was proving incapable of addressing this question. The Marxism of those thinkers who in one way or another focus on 28 this issue has come to be called "Western Marxism." This term seeks to distinguish their thought both from the Marxism espoused by German Social Democracy and the Second International, and later from the Marxism of the Comintern, the Marxism of the Third International. Among those thinkers who are most often grouped together as Western Marxists are the following: Karl Korsch, Georg Lukacs, the Dutch Marxists Herman Gorter and Anton Pannekoek, Antonio Gramsci and, later on, the members of the Frankfurt school, primarily Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. The Western Marxists experienced the failure of solidarity in the Second International in the face of the first world war and subsequendy witnessed both the increasing ossification of the Third International and the phenomenon of mass support for fascism. It is in this social and political context that the Western Marxists turn their attention to the role of subjectivity in revolutionary change. Many of the first generation of Western Marxists use the term Geist to refer to human subjectivity. As used by these thinkers, Geist is wider than rational thought or reflection; it is wider than theoretical consciousness. Geist the 1920s and 1930s their

133

In Lieu of a Conclusion

includes the entire intelligence

and

domain of

rationality,

individuals, their feelings

the

Thus

subjectivity.

it

includes not only

but also the imagination and the sensibility of

and

their passions.

Dutch Marxist Herman Gorter has

in

It is

this

sense of Geist that

mind when he charges

in

an

open letter to Lenin that the Third International "neglects the geistige development of the proletariat." Gorter argues that Marxists need to rethink their understanding of the causes of revolutionary action.

"The

most fearsome economic crisis is there - and the revolution however does not come. There must be still another cause which brings about a revolution, and when it is not operative, the revolution fails to appear or 29 misfires. This cause is the Geist of the masses." In a similar vein Karl Korsch criticizes German Social Democracy for 30 plays in bringing having undervalued the role which geistige Aktion about revolutionary change. The lack of attention paid to this dimension had tragic consequences according to Korsch. Commenting on the German revolutionary experience of 1918 Korsch writes:

Thus

it is

the fateful

by no means

months

after

to

be attributed

to purely external circumstances that in

November 1918 when

the political

power organizations

of the bourgeoisie had collapsed and nothing external stood in the way of a transition

from capitalism

to socialism, the great

hour had nonetheless

unseized because the social-psychological presuppositions for greatly lacking."

The

its

by were

to slip

utilization

31

fact that the "social-psychological

sition to socialism are lacking

agents of universal

human

means

presuppositions" for the tran-

that instead of functioning as the

liberation,

the proletariat itself

becomes

engaged in preserving and reconstituting the forms of domination. Anton Pannekoek is one of the first to call attention to this phenomenon. Reflecting on the fact that the German workers had failed to carry through the revolution of 1918 even though they were masters of the situation in November of that year, Pannekoek attempts to explain that failure as follows: It has repeatedly been emphasized that the revolution will take a long time in Western Europe because the bourgeoisie is so much more powerful here than in Russia. Let us analyse the basis of this power. Does it lie in their numbers? The proletarian masses are much more numerous. Does it lie in the bourgeoisie's mastery over the whole of economic life? This certainly used to be an important power-factor; but their hegemony is fading, and in Central Europe the economy is completely bankrupt. Does it lie in their control of the state, with all its means of coercion? Certainly, it has always used the latter to hold the proletariat down, which is why the conquest of state power was the proletariat's first objective. But in November 1918, state power slipped from the nerveless grasp of the bourgeoisie in Germany and Austria; the coercive apparatus of the state was

134

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

completely paralysed; the masses were in control; and the bourgeoisie was nevertheless able to build this state

workers. That proves that

still

power up again and once more subjugate the

another secret source of the power of the

bourgeoisie existed which was untouched and which permitted

it

to re-establish

hegemony when everything seemed shattered. This secret power is the geistige power of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. Because the proletariat were still its

wholly ruled by a bourgeois with their

own hands

Twenty-six years

after

mode it

of thought, they rebuilt bourgeois domination

had collapsed.

32

"What

later in his essay

is

Class Consciousness?"

Wilhelm Reich laments "an important aspect of the tragedy of the revolutionary movement: the bourgeois ification of those who are to have made 33 the revolution." In this essay Reich comments that the problem facing Marxists is not "that the ruling class disseminates and defends its 34 ideology; the problem is why the masses accept it." The "problem" which is articulated in different ways by both Pannekoek and Reich is the

phenomenon of

the

perpetuation

oppressed

of oppression by the

themselves.

This aspect of the reproduction of domination becomes a central critique of capitalism undertaken by those associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research under the leadership of Max Horkheimer. The theoretical guidelines for this critique consist of the explicit attempt by members of the Institute to "think Marx and Freud,"

theme of the

i.e.

to

integrate the insights of psychoanalysis into the structure of 5

The

on the one hand, itself to be inadequate in comprehending the subjective dimension of social life, and, on the other, their recognition of the power of the central Freudian categories to illuminate the dialectic of domination characteristic of modern capitalism, a dialectic that seems to extend to attempts at liberation as well. Herbert Marcuse's articulation of this phenomenon on Marxist theory.

justification for this project

their shared conviction that traditional

is,

Marxism had revealed

the occasion of Freud's centennial runs as follows:

[W]e can raise the question of whether alongside the socio-historical Thermidor can be demonstrated in all past revolutions there is not also perhaps a psychic Thermidor? Are revolutions perhaps not only defeated, reversed and undone from outside; is there not perhaps in the individuals themselves already a dynamic at work which internally negates a possible liberation and gratification, and allows them to submit not only externally to the forces of denial? that

,f1

World and feminist theorists and writers phenomenon of internalized oppression from a variety

In the last two decades Third

have dissected the

of perspectives, in a variety of literary forms. departure

may

j7

Different as their points of

be, their concern with this issue parallels the concerns

articulated by the

Western Marxists. In

this respect there

has been a

In Lieu of a Conclusion

135

thematic convergence between the writings of the Western Marxists and writings of leading Third World and feminist thinkers. This convergence constitutes a developing recognition of the significance of the subjective dimension of the reproduction of domination. If it is true

the

that "the formulation of a question

of theory, and

which

39

then this convergence

merely anecdotal significance.

been reached where

it

dogmatic elements in

3

38

at least

on the plane

It

may

may have much more than

a

indicate that the historical stage has

would be possible own theory and

its

for

Marxism

to transcend the

practice.

A Practice of Subjectivity: A Preliminary Outline

The

subjective side of the revolution

action guided by knowledge; I

solution,"

true that "humanity sets for itself only those tasks

if it is

can solve,"

it

is its

is

not only a matter of consciousness, and of

also a question of the emotions."

it is

have argued above that mystified consciousness

ideas or illusions but that

it

The

modes of become accustomed, attached and even

notion of attachment or addiction

attention to the affective

consciousness.

not only a set of false

includes patterns of feeling and

behavior to which people have "addicted."

is

It

component

is

intended to

call

and false component which has been largely

in the constructs of ideology

precisely this

is

40

ignored by traditional Marxist practice. In this context

which would seek working through" of which Lukacs practice would aim to begin the healing of wounds I

want

to raise the issue of a practice

to facilitate that "spiritual-practical

Such

spoke.

a

sustained in an oppressive society

- while recognizing

that this healing

occur "after the revolution," as it were. To the extent practice focused on the dimension of individual subjectivity it

could only that this

fully

would approach the realm of the therapeutic, but there are significant differences between it and the various contemporary therapies. For this reason I do not want to term such a healing effort a "therapy" but prefer to call

it

It is

practice of subjectivity social

an "emancipatory century a one essential component of an emancipatory

a "practice of subjectivity" or alternatively

subjective practice."

movement.

is

my

view that

in the late twentieth

41

Since the mid-sixties the transformation of subjectivity has been a issue in various oppositional movements in the centers of

central

advanced capitalism.

The

civil rights

movement

United States as been characterized and dignity and redefining in the

well as the struggles of other ethnic minorities have

by an

emphasis

individuals'

sense

on reclaiming pride of

self.

The New

Left,

the

women's

liberation

136

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

movement, the gay and lesbian liberation movement and the peace movement have all insisted on the importance of the subjective 42 dimensions of social change. In these movements attempts at the transformation of subjectivity have often taken the form of "self-help" groups, "consciousness-raising" groups or "affinity groups." Such groups have operated on the principle that the transformation of consciousness also requires "emotional work:" bringing to awareness

memories, experiences that may have appeared to have only a meaning but whose broader social significance can be discovered precisely through the sharing of "individual" life stories and feelings,

personal

experiences.

43

All too often

however the focus on

subjectivity has

been accompanied

by an anti-intellectualism, a hostility to theory. As a result, attempts at a practice of subjectivity have often not been grounded in terms of social theory but have been understood merely as an ad hoc remedy for the lack of emphasis on subjectivity in traditional radical practice. But a practice that understands itself only as an

ad hoc remedy

be unable

will

conceptualize itself in terms of the totality of social relations. effectiveness

its

as

a

critical

or subversive

and

force

It

will

to

will lose

tend to

degenerate into a conglomerate of contradictory "techniques"

and

rituals.

In what follows

I

will

attempt a highly schematic "prolegomena" to the

concept of an emancipatory practice of subjectivity.

My

remarks are in

on the various forms of subjective practice in the movements mentioned above. It is particularly important to attempt such a preliminary sketch in view of the explosion of various forms of "pop psycholgy" in the United States and in much of Western Europe since 44 the mid-seventies. It is crucial not to confuse the focus on subjectivity in this development with the concept of an emancipatory subjective

part a reflection

practice.

Russell Jacoby, Joel Kovel and Richard Lichtman have

all

addressed

the pitfalls of what Jacoby terms "conformist psychology" and what

Kovel characterizes as "positive therapy:" the supposition that the social produced by advanced capitalism can be cured (instandy) by a variety

ills

of do-it-yourself therapeutic techniques. Jacoby rightly holds up to ridicule Rollo May's claim that one need not be concerned about the control which economic oligarchies exercise over our lives: they "need

not destroy our freedom

if

we keep our

perspective."

45

Kovel

criticizes

the deception in the therapeutic promises of "liberation, transcendence or the answer to the riddles of

46 life,"

experience of alienation, which selfhood under capitalism,

is

lies

and Lichtman points out that "the at the heart

of the formation of

a social fact that can only be destroyed

and

137

In Lieu of a Conclusion

replaced by another social fact

movement whose aim

is

-

a mass, collective, democratic, political

the equalization of

humane power." 47

My argument for the emancipatory role of a practice of subjectivity as an ingredient in the political struggle for fundamental social change is premised on my agreement with their critique, and on the recognition that a practice of subjectivity cannot be a substitute either for political practice or for theoretical reflection. With this caveat we can proceed to sketch out the contours of such a practice.

The

arena of a practice of subjectivity would include not only explicitly

articulated

beliefs

and values;

it

would

also

include

the

unstated

assumptions which are embodied in people's lived experience, as well as

underpinnings of oppressive character structures and A practice of subjectivity would seek to implement the Such a practice, affective unlearning of the habits of oppression. undertaken as a form of subversive self-education, would seek to the

affective

behavior patterns.

interrupt both sides of the dialectic of domination; affective

it

would

strive for the

undoing of the introjected "perpetrator" and the introjected

Thus

48

and would address both "internalized domination" internalized oppression. A practice of subjectivity would aim to prevent the continual re-creation of "psychic Thermidors" even as it attempted to foster the emergence of the "social-psychological presuppositions" for the transition from capitalism to socialism. At its best, it would encourage the development (inevitably in partial and limited form) of modes of interaction which would prefigure and thereby promote the achievement "victim."

it

of a liberated society.

49

A practice

of subjectivity must have a commitment to universal human and it must embody this commitment in its own theory and praxis. An emancipatory subjective practice must be something which could, in principle, involve individuals from all social groups. In the late twentieth century a practice of subjectivity must be potentially universalizable. This requirement follows from the nature of the nuclear threat itself which tends to transform the entire "underlying population" (Marcuse's phrase) into a potential subject of radical change - in terms of their 50 objective human interest in emancipation. In a similar vein, Joel Kovel argues that it makes sense to extend the concept of oppression to the experience of living under the nuclear state. But he insists that a radical interpretation of this experience must also avoid the pitfalls of a "false humanism" which overlooks the real divisions that separate people in favor of an immediate unity whose ground is simply that "we will all go liberation,

together

when we

go."

"we" into an actual "we" politics.

The is

transformation of the potential universal

the

still

to

be accomplished task of a radical

138

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

In the "natural cycle" of oppression those to

become

who have been

victims tend

perpetrators. Although individuals have choices within the

socially pre-existing roles of victim and perpetrator, these roles themselves are recreated and imposed on new generations of human beings through the normal mechanisms of an oppressive society. This perspective can be put in the form of a "working assumption:" people

would not

deliberately mistreat or co-operate with the socially sanctioned

mistreatment of others unless they themselves had previously been mistreated. Such an assumption implies that the very real "positive re-enforcements," the material benefits and social rewards that individuals in any "oppressor role" receive in exchange for co-operating with this socialization

would not

in themselves

be sufficient

to secure their

co-operation with an oppressive system. This assumption can also be expressed in the claim that all oppressors have themselves been oppressed.

The above assumption

is

intended as an explanation, on the level of is not intended as a

social theory, of the reproduction of domination. It

an "excuse" for the oppressive actions of any individual intended as a claim that the degree of mistreatment any individual metes out to others is "proportional" to that which, they themselves have received. As a working assumption this perspective has what Albrecht Wellmer justification or as

or group.

Nor

is it

52

It cannot be validated interms a "hypothetic-practical status." emancipation, nor can its truth be human goal of of the dependently subjective practice. emancipatory an context of established outside of the

Thus, on the one hand, the existence of a practice of subjectivity would be the only legitimation which this assumption could acquire, and, on the other, an emancipatory subjective practice is itself only conceivable given such an assumption. At the level of social theory, this assumption allows us to account for the perpetuation of oppression without postulating a group of people who are "born oppressors." The alternative to this assumption is a quasi-genetic

theory of oppression,

a

claim

that

some people

are

53

But a practice which aims at universal human liberation will undermine its own effectiveness if it operates with such a premise. A perspective which posits a group of "naturally" inclined to oppress others.

"inherent oppressors" sets pre-established limits to the horizon of possible social change. Limits postulated with regard to the inherent

nature of members of the dominant group ultimately reveal themselves as the boundaries of the possible for members of the oppressed group. An

attempt to counter internalized oppression which operates with this notion of pre-established limits is thus caught in its own contradiction. If

139

In Lieu of a Conclusion "the others" are inherently (and permanently) "the

enemy" there

also

is

54

no hope for us. The working assumption

that all oppressors have themselves been oppressed implies that individuals' "acceptance" of the social role of "oppressor" is first made possible as a result of their own experience of

means that we can construe the socialization which (more accurately) forces people to take on the social role of an "oppressor" as itself a form of oppression. It is my view that this training experience takes place through a specific kind of systematic mistreatment which can be called "adultism," a form of mistreatment which targets all young people who are born into an oppressive society. oppression. This trains or

This

last

statement

not a claim that every young person in today's

is

oppressive societies undergoes the same experience. Obviously ship in other targeted groups affects one's

most economically and

life

member-

*s a child, but even the

socially "privileged" children

experience of systematic dis-empowerment that

is

cannot escape the the social fate of

55

an oppressive society. The recognition of adultism as the "training ground" for other forms of oppression does not posit an

young people

in

a-historical family experience outside

of the context of social relations.

56

On the contrary, to claim that children are an oppressed group is to acknowledge both that the family is part and parcel of these social relations and that the experience of young people comprises more than their existence "at home." A practice of subjectivity must distinguish between a materialist perspective and a materialistic psychology. The latter assumes a one-to-one correlation between individuals' economic status and their openness to and interest in radical change. Such a perspective focuses only on what people would lose in terms of privileges or material advantages and assumes that this is the determining factor in a psychology of motivation.

the

57

The

recognition

adoption of a materialistic psychology militates against of the

crucial

conditions,

everyone

"non-target group"

(at

of the

issue 58

"disadvantages

of the

under present world one time or another) is or will be in a

advantages" for "non-target" people. via-a-vis

But

since,

some other group's oppression,

essential that a practice of subjectivity

be able

it

is

to address this issue.

One

of the major aims of a practice of subjectivity would be to uncover awareness of being socialized into the roles of oppressor and 59 oppressed. That this awareness is buried and often unavailable to conscious experience can be explained by the fact that part of the socialization process is the pervasive mislabeling of this process itself. In this mislabeling the unity of the two constituent features of the the

socialization process

is

split apart.

From

the perspective of the social

140

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

whole the socialization process appears as "routine," as a "normal part of growing up"; i.e. the traumatic nature of the experience is denied. And to the extent that individuals succeed in remembering the trauma of their socialization, their recollections are privatized; they appear in consciousness as idiosyncratic occurrences in an individual's family history. In both cases the socialization process 60 socio-personal meaning.

As

is

mystified, for

it is

stripped of

its

awareness that this socialization has taken place and was originally a hurtful experience is systematically driven out of memory. The obscuring of this awareness constitutes a form of "social 61 amnesia" which is essential to the perpetuation of oppression. In attempting to counteract this socially enforced forgetting an emancipa62 tory subjective practice would be a labor of affective remembrance. that

a result, the

it

It is

not only the painful history of our

own

socialization into the roles

of victim and perpetrator that must be recovered by an affective

remembering; what oppression

is

is

also

obscured and denied by the dynamic of

the history of resistance and attempted resistance to such

63

That we can legitimately postulate such from the original working assumption. If people have

socialization.

a history follows to

be oppressed and of

into participating in or allowing the mistreatment of others

we can assume that they originally attempted to resist this The acknowledgement of adultism is crucial here as well, for attempts at resistance are those we make as very young children,

themselves, process.

our

first

these attempts which are almost universally 64 from memory. Although the remembrance and reconstruction of a buried history of individual and collective resistance must occur at the level of individual

and

it

is

particularly

obliterated

awareness, the ramifications of this process extend directly into the realm

of social and political practice. contradicts the vista

lie

that

The

recovery of the resistance of the past

one has never

resisted; in so

of a possible resistance in the present.

The

doing

it

opens the

recognition of injustice,

fact, but as a situation to be opposed and transformed, seems presuppose the assumption on the part of individuals that their actions

not just as a to

do make a difference. Of course it is (logically) possible to make this assumption ex nihilo so to speak, but in reality, the belief that one has never resisted tends to sediment itself into attitudes of passivity and hopelessness. The domination of the mystified past over the present expresses itself in a conception of the future as unalterable. Conversely, the demystification of the past through the reclamation of the history of individual

and

collective resistance permits the prefigurative envisioning

of a transformed future. Finally,

an emancipatory practice of subjectivity must continually

In Lieu of a Conclusion

141

acknowledge the paradoxical nature of the enterprise in which it is engaged. A practice which seeks to begin the healing of wounds sustained in an oppressive society is subject to the continual risk of self-deception. Albrecht Wellmer points out that even social theory which attempts to articulate the general interest in emancipation remains enclosed

the

"in

communication."

~

pathologically

distorted

His remarks are true

context

social

as well for

of

an emancipatory

practice of subjectivity.

its

The emancipatory intent of a subjective practice cannot guarantee that own activity in the service of liberation will be free from domination.

its embeddedness in the historical context of no external vantage-point from which a subjective practice could claim an immunity to the influences of the oppressive society against which it itself is directed. A practice of subjectivity cannot assume that the effects of institutionalized imbalances in economic and social power, education and general welfare will disappear at its "borders." Indeed the positing of such an ideal for a practice of subjectivity reveals a basic misconception about the dynamics of

This practice cannot escape domination. There

is

oppression in today's society.

permanent

The

66

A

practice of subjectivity thus faces a

being "contaminated" with the toxins of domination. danger of the degeneration of such a practice is a permanent risk of

danger, intrinsic to the very nature of oppression in a mass society.

The

recognition of this fact must go hand in hand with a

counter

continuing

commitment

of this emancipatory subjective practice would thus have to struggle continuously against its own reification, against the incremental sedimentation of liberatory processes into fossilized procedures, against to

the

degeneration.

as

well

the

as

causes

An

the distortions of domination It

effects

could only do so

if its

which ingress

own

individuals a critical intelligence

into

all

attempts at liberation.

praxis nourished

and

and encouraged

in

a sense of self-worth in the context of

a developing solidarity.

This context

is

a crucial factor for the

concept of an emancipatory

subjective practice. Without solidarity in the struggle for liberation as the

of subjectivity is undertaken, there is no principle of demarcation between an emancipatory subjective practice and the context in which a practice

various contemporary psychological practices or therapies

whose

goal

is

achievement of individual happiness or self-realization within the established system. For regardless of the intentions embodied in the methodologies themselves or explicidy articulated by their individual practitioners, it remains true that "in a repressive society, individual happiness and productive development are in contradiction to society; if they are defined as values to be realized the

(seemingly innocuous)

142

In Lieu ofa Conclusion

within this society, they

67 become themselves repressive." Therefore an of subjectivity must posit as its goal not the

emancipatory practice immediate realization of "the (given) self," but the emergence of a "self-in-solidarity." One measure of the effectiveness of such a practice would be the extent to which it assisted and enabled people to act in co-operation with each other in achieving the

communal

goals

of

liberation.

For the Marxist tradition, acknowledging the legitimacy of a practice of subjectivity would entail coming to grips with the tension in Marx's conception of emancipatory consciousness. Recognition of

would serve

a two-fold purpose.

On

the one hand,

it

this tension

would function

as a

caution with regard to contemporary versions of a dogmatic approach

towards emancipatory consciousness; on the other hand,

it

could spur

the further development of a dialectical perspective on this issue.

The

continuing commitment to articulate and be guided by such a perspective

could be a preliminary step towards enabling Marxism to take up the challenge of building that "not yet existing socialism," socialism with a

human

face.

Notes

Introduction 1

Oilman, "Towards Class Consciousness Next Time: Marx and Class," Politics and Society III no. 11 (Fall 1972). Two recent attempts to articulate a notion of emancipatory consciousness in terms of the dynamics of advanced capitalism and "really existing socialism" are Herbert Marcuse's concept of a "new sensibility" and Rudolf Bahro's concept of "surplus consciousness" [ueberschuessiges Bewusstsein]. For

See

Bertell

the

Working

Marcuse's discussion see An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). For Bahro's discussion of "surplus consciousness" see Rudolf Bahro, The Alternative in Eastern Europe (London: New Left Books, 1978). The original German text is entitled Die Alternative: Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus (Cologne: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1977). 2 Marx articulates this concept for the first time in his essay "On the Jewish Question" (1843), inMEGA, vol. I 1/1, p. 580 (English translation inMEW, vol. Ill, p. 150). In the context of Marx's discussion in this essay I prefer to render the

German

allgemein as "universal" rather than as "general" as the

translators have done.

chapter

For

a discussion of

"On

the Jewish Question" see

3.

3 In his book, Against the State of Nuclear Terror (Boston: South

1983), Joel Kovel comments: "the fact that

mean both under

talk

End

Press,

of a nuclear state and

the missile-bearing apparatus and the state of being that bears

this apparatus, signifies that the

technically adjusting the nature

whole

we can

nuclear

crisis is

up

not a matter of

and number of warheads, but the agony of a

Kovel argues for the necessity of a "radical interpretation of the nuclear arms race and antinuclear politics." To put forth such an civilization."

interpretation

is

to

argue that

far

reaching social transformation

alternative to nuclear annihilation." Kovel, p. xxi.

I

am in

full

is

"the [only]

agreement with

this thesis.

4 By way of explaining his decision to use Plato's term "Idea" to denote those concepts which transcend the realm of all possible theoretical experience Kant remarks "that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has

144

Notes

to page

4

understood himself." Critique ofPure Reason, A 314/B370. Kant appears not to have been troubled by the risks involved in such a project. The present study approaches the challenge with considerably more humility. 5 This concept has been most extensively articulated in the work of the Martiniquean psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, the Tunisian Jewish writer Albert

Memmi, and the Brazilian educator Paolo Freire. Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967) was written in 1952. The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963) originally appeared in 1961. Memmi's The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) was published in 1957; Portrait of a Jew (New York: Viking Press, 1971) first appeared in 1962. Paolo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: first

&

Herder, 1972) was first published in 1967. For Memmi's on the difference between his perspective and Fanon's, see "Frantz Fanon and the Notion of Deficiency," in Albert Memmi, Dominated Man (New York: Orion Press, 1968), pp. 84-92.

Herder

reflections

For

a discussion

of the internalization of oppression from a feminist

perspective see Jean Baker Miller's Toward a

New

Psychology* of

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1976). bell hook's Feminist Theory: Center (Boston: South

End

Women

From Margin

to

Press, 1984) recognizes internalized oppression

as a major issue for a united feminist

movement. The novels of Paule

Marshall, Toni Morrison and Alice Walker contain moving explorations of the dynamics of internalized racism and internalized sexism. See also the

anthology This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical

Women of Color, ed. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (Watertown, Mass.: Persephone Press, 1981),

Audre Lorde's

Sister Outsider

(New York: The Crossing

Press,

1984), and Suzanne Lipksy's influential short article "Internalized Oppres-

5-10. See also Sandra Lee Bartky's "On Psychological Oppression," in Philosophy and Women, ed. Sharon Bishop and Marjorie Weinzweig (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1979), and her "Narcissism, Femininity and Alienation," Social Theory and Practice VIII no. 2 (Summer 1982), pp. 127-43. For a discussion of some of the attempts to develop a practice to counter the effects of sexism and internalized sexism in a section of the U.S. women's movement in the early 1970s see Ann Hunter Popkin, "Bread and Roses: An Early Moment in the Development of Socialist Feminism," Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 1978. Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949) (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957) was a crucial theoretical inspiration to the thinking of these American feminists. For a study of internalized oppression among blue-collar workers see Richard Sennet and Jonathon Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Vintage Press, 1972). For a discussion of internalized oppression in the gay and lesbian communities see James W. Chesebro, ed., Gayspeak: Gay Male and Lesbian Communication (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1981), and Gerre Goodman, George Lakey, Judy Lashof and Erika Thorne, eds., No Turning Back: Gay and Lesbian Liberation For The '80s (Philadelphia: New Societv sion," Black Re-Emergence no. 2 (Winter 1977), pp.

Publishers, 1983).

Notes 6 Albert

See

Memmi

to

Adam's

4-5

145

this

phenomenon.

cross-cultural discussion of this

phenomenon

and Frantz Fanon have both documented

also Barry B.

pages

among Jews,

Blacks and gay men: The Survival of Domination: Inferiorization and Everyday Life (New York: Elsevier North-Holland, 1978). For a different perspective see Barrington Moore's Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1978).

Revolt (White Plains,

7 Albert

Memmi, The

pronouns so as

and

Colonizer

the Colonized, p. 87.

Memmi's

to generalize

have pluralized the

I

point. Describing this

phenomenon

Paolo Freire speaks of the oppressed as "housing" or "hosting" their oppressors within their own consciousness. Freire, pp. 30-3; pp. 121-30. 8 "There undoubtedly exists

-

some

at

point in

its

evolution

-

a certain

adherence of the colonized to colonization. However, this adherence is the result of colonization and not its cause." The Colonizer and the Colonized, p. 88. Memmi details the way in which this "adherence" is transmitted from the

one colonized generation

fathers of

Not considering himself

to the sons of the next.

a citizen, the colonized likewise loses

all

hope of seeing

his

son achieve citizenship. Before long, renouncing citizenship himself, he no longer it from his paternal ambitions, and allows no place Nothing therefore suggests to the young colonized the self-assurance or pride of citizenship. He will expect nothing more from it and will not be prepared to assume its responsibilities. (Ibid., p. 97)

includes for

it

it

in his plans, eliminates

in his

teachings.

9 For an earlier discussion of the concept of unlearning the introjected

consequences of oppression see

my

review of Russell Jacoby's Social Amnesia

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1975) in Telos no. 25 (Fall 1975), pp. 196-211. This article appears under the name of Erica Sherover. See also my "Towards a Perspective on Unlearning Racism: Twelve

Working Assumptions," pub-

under the name of Ricky Sherover-Marcuse and Power no. 7 (Fall 1981), pp. 14-15. lished

in Issues in Cooperation

In spite of the apparent verbal parallelism, "to unlearn"

is

not the opposite

of "to learn." Thus, for example, the necessity of "unlearning racism" does not imply that racism

"learned," or that racist attitudes are acquired

is

through a "learning" process.

On

the contrary, racist "thinking," like other

forms of mystified consciousness, represents a disturbance of the learning process, a disturbance which itself

and which

in

consciousness distorted

and

is

the consequence of social oppression

turn serves to perpetuate is

it.

In

other words, mystified

not the result of freely functioning intelligence, but of

illogical

thought.

On

this

point

see Jean-Paul

Sartre,

Anti-Semite and Jew, originally published as Reflexions sur la question juive (Paris, 1946) trans. George J. Becker (New York: Schocken Books, 1965),

Memmi, Portrait of a Jew. attempt to articulate some criteria for a "practice of subjectivity" in the

and Albert 10

1

last

For an earlier discussion of the need for such a practice see my review of Social Amnesia and my review of Joel Kovel's A Complete Guide to Therapy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976) in Telos no. 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 185-202, published under the name of Erica Sherover. section of the Conclusion.

2

1

46

to pages

Notes

6- 9

111

take up this issue in the last chapter. Juergen Habermas and Albrecht Wellmer have discussed this question at length. For Habermas's discussion see especially his Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968), translated as Knowledge and Human Interests by Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971). Wellmer's discussion is found in his Critical Theory ofSociety, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971). In a paper delivered to the Prague Hegel Congress in 1966 Herbert Marcuse argues that "it is the idea of reason itself which is the undialectical element in Hegel's philosophy." Marcuse maintains that Hegel's notion of a Reason which "comprehends everything and ultimately absolves everything, because it has its place in the whole" betrays the element of critique which is

the core of genuine dialectical thought. Herbert Marcuse, "Zum Begriff der Negation in der Dialektik," reprinted in Ideen zu einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970); English text in Telos no. 8 (Summer 1971), p. 130. See also his "A Note on Dialectic," preface to the Beacon Press paperback edition of Reason and Revolution (1941) (Boston,

1960). 1

"Dogmatism as

a

form of thinking whether

study of philosophy proposition which

is

is

in ordinary

knowledge or

in the

nothing else but the opinion that the truth consists in a

a fixed result, or

which

is

immediately known." G.W.F.

Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 23. For one example of Marx's critique of this attitude in the sphere of politics see his analysis of the French Revolution's doctrine of the natural rights of

man

in

"On

the Jewish Question."

1980), p. 70.

Two Marxisms (New York: Oxford University Press, Gouldner is careful to point out that these terms "are analytic

distinctions,

or ideal types, rather than concrete historical groups and

13 Alvin Gouldner, The

7

persons." Ibid., p. 60. Gouldner's juxtaposition of "structure"

14

Ibid., pp.

is

"human

efforts" versus

only one of the difficulties in his discussion.

56-7.

15 Ibid., pp. 34.

16 17

Ibid., p. 8.

Gouldner does not refer to other theorists' on the antinomy of freedom and necessity. His omission of any reference to Lukacs's discussion of the "Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought," in History and Class Consciousness, is particularly glaring. For a critique of Gouldner's interpretation of the tension in Marx's thought see A. P. Simonds, "How Many Marxisms?," Social Theory and Practice Mil no. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 113-26. Ibid., p. 37. It is significant that

reflections

18 Gouldner, p. 297. 19 Ibid.,

p. 34.

See

also

the

conjunction of science and

following: politics,

"Marxism

is

thus

a

tensionful

of theory and practice." Ibid. And:

"There is, then, a tension between Marx's dismissal of idealism and his call change the world, and it is a contradiction in Marx which has existed almost from the beginning." Ibid., p. 33.

to

20

Ibid., p.

297.

Notes 21

The famous

claim of the

1

1th thesis on Feuerbach:

to

pages

vol. V, p.

asserting that

it

is

to change

it."

V, p. 8) should not be misread as no longer important to understand the world. The

534;

is

MECW,

147

"The philosophers have

only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however

(MEGA,

9-11

vol.

supposition that "changing the world" can substitute for "understanding"

it

posits a false alternative.

22 The review appeared in Die Geselhchaft I (June 1924), pp. 306-14. Korsch's Marxismus und Philosophic originally appeared in 1923. 23 Althusser sets forth this claim at length in For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Random House, 1969). For Althusser's attempts to clarify both what he means by "the break" in Marx's development and what he means by claiming that Marxism is a science see Essays in Self Criticism (London: New Left Books, 1976). The question of the precise point at which Marx definitively "liberated" himself from Hegel's influence is apparently of utmost significance for Althusser. In the 1 965 Introduction to Pour Marx Althusser argues that "the Hegelian problematic inspires one absolutely unique text ... the 1844 Manuscripts." For Marx, p. 35. Three years later Althusser finds that "the famous Preface [of the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy] is unfortunately deeply marked by a Hegelian-evolutionist conception which disappears 99 per cent in Capital and completely in Marx's later texts." "Preface to Capital," in Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 103. In this essay Althusser claims that only the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875) and the Marginal Notes on Wagners "Lehrbuch der politischen Oekonomie" (1882) "are totally and definitively exempt from any trace of Hegelian influence." Ibid., pp. 94-5. 24 Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 4-5. 25 See for example the following: In his empirical analyses

Marx comprehends

the history of the species

under the

categories of material activity and the critical abolition of ideologies, of instrumental action and revolutionary practice, of labor and reflection in one. But Marx interprets what he does in the more restricted conception of the species' self reflection through work alone. (Ibid., p. 42)

Compare the discussion in Theorie und Praxis (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1963), pp. 202-3. See also Juergen Habermas, "Arbeit und Interaktion. Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenenser 'Philosophie des Geistes'," Technik und Wissenschaft

als "Ideologic"

(Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp

Verlag, 1968),

pp. 9-47.

Habermas's claim

that Marxist theory

misunderstands

itself

distinguished from Gouldner's discussion of this issue. Unlike

Gouldner

treats self-misunderstanding as

should be

Habermas

an inevitable aspect of the project

of theorizing: [T]heory

is

only the theorist's .^-understanding,

responsibility. If theory

is

i.e.

a selective, limited

pan of his

[sic]

aware and for which, presumably he [sic] will take the theorist's self-understanding, it is also however his [sic]

modus operandi of which he

[sic] is

1

1

48

Notes

to pages

11-12

self-m/sunderstanding. That

(Gouldner,

p.

is,

theory

is

also the "false consciousness" of theorists.

310)

26 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 43-63. Habermas's critique has provoked several well-argued rejoinders. See in particular Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of jfuergen Habermas (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978). See also Axel Honneth, "Work and Interaction," New German Critique no. 26 (Spring-Summer 1982), pp. 31-54, and John Keane, "On Tools and Language: Habermas on Work and Interaction," New German Critique no. 6 (Fall 1975), pp. 82-100. See also the collection of essays Arbeit, Handlung, Normativitaet, ed. Axel Honneth and Urs Jaeggi (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp

Verlag,

Necessity:

Towards

Time,"

doctoral

1980).

See

also

Morris Postone, "The Present as Marxian Critique of Labor and

a Reinterpretation of the

dissertation,

Johann

Wolfgang

Goethe

University,

Frankfurt/Main, 1983.

27 Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 316. For Habermas's discussion of the dangers of a scientistic social theory see the essay "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective," originally published in Merkur in 1965 and reprinted in Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologic (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968). The English translation appears as the Appendix to the Beacon Press edition of Knowledge and Human Interests. Compare Wellmer, pp. 67-74, and pp. 115-18. 28 Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society, p. 63. 29 Ibid., p. 70. Cumming's rendition of Verkuerzung and verkuertzte as "modification" and "modified" loses the sense of Wellmer's argument. 30 Ibid., p. 72. The classical study of the thought of the early Marx (and the early Engels) is 3 the detailed three-volume discussion by Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1955). See also Maximilien Rubel's careful work Karl Marx, essai de biographie intellectuelle (Paris: M. Riviere, 1971). For more recent studies see Michel Lowy, La Theorie de la revolution chez le jeune Marx (Paris: Maspero, 1970), Dick Howard, The Development of the Marxian Dialectic (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), H. P. Adams, Karl Marx in his Earlier Writings (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), David McLdhn, Marx Before Marxism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), and Erich Thier, Das Menschenbild des jungen Marx (Goettingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, 1961). 32 Iring Fetscher comments: "Tell me how you define the relationship between Marx and Hegel and I will tell you what kind of Marxism you have chosen." Iring Fetscher, Marx and Marxism (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), p. 41. The importance of Marx's Hegelian roots was first stressed by Lukacs and Korsch in the 1920s. Herbert Marcuse's Reason and Revolution was instrumental in revising established academic opinion in the United States and Western Europe as to the nature of Hegel's thought and its importance for Marxism. More recently Shlomo Avineri has stressed the significance of Marx's dialogue with Hegel's political philosophy. Shlomo Avineri, The

Notes Social

and

Political

Press, 1968).

jungen

Marx

See

to page

12

149

Marx (London: Cambridge University Manfred Friedrich, Philosophic and Oekonomie heim Luncker & Humbolt, 1960), and Heinrich Popitz, Der

Thought of Karl also

(Berlin:

Entfremdete Mensch (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1968).

33 For a discussion of the political views of the Young Hegelians see the articles by Gustav Mayer, Die Anfaenge des politischen Radikalismus im vormaerzlichen Preussen, originally published in Zeitschrift filer Politik vol. 6, 1913. Reprinted in Radikalismus, Sozialismus

kamp

and

buergerliche

Demokratie (Frankfurt: Suhr-

Verlag, 1968). For general studies of the

Young Hegelians

see Horst

Stuke, Philosophic der Tat: Studien zur Verrvirklichung der Philosophic bei den J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), and David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (New York: Praeger, 1969). See also the early study by Sidney Hook, Prom Hegel to Marx (1936) (reprint ed. Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1962), and Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations ofMarxism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966). For the relationship between Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx see Zwi Rosen, Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx: The Influence of Bruno Bauer on Marx's Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). 34 Karl Korsch, "The Crisis of Marxism," in Karl Korsch, Revolutionary Theory, ed. Douglas Kellner (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1977),

Junghegelianern (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1963), William

p. 171.

Erich Gerlach gives the date of composition of this text as 1931. Karl

Korsch, Die

materialistische Geschichtsaujfassung und andere Schriften, ed. Erich Gerlach (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1971), p. 167. The text consists of seven numbered paragraphs written more or less in programmatic form. Korsch never published this manuscript. He apparently intended it

primarily for purposes of internal discussion. In a letter to Paul Partos, dated

26 April 1935 and published in the Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung 2, Korsch on the crisis of Marxism, 1927." See Karl Korsch:

refers to his "theses

Revolutionary Theory ed., Kellner, p. 170.

35 Lukacs's reflections are found in "A Final Rethinking: Georg Lukacs Talks with Franco Ferarotti," Social Policy (July-August 1972), pp. 4-8 and 56-7.

For Althusser's remarks on the

crisis

in

Marxism

see his Essays in Self

Criticism.

Juergen Habermas's collection of essays, Zur Rekonstruktion chen Materialismus (Frankfurt:

by a sense of the

crisis in

Suhrkamp

Marxism,

Verlag, 1976),

as are Albrecht

is

des Historis-

clearly motivated

Wellmer's

Critical Theory

ofSociety, Stanley Aronowitz's The Crisis in Historical Materialism (New York: Praeger, 1981), and Alvin Gouldner's The Two Marxisms. See also Jack Lindsay, The Crisis in Marxism (Totowa, 1981), and

Andre Gorz, Farewell

Press, 1982),

and the

fine study

to the

New

Jersey: Barnes

&

Noble,

Working Class (Boston: South End

by Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the

of Marxism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Among the articles concerned with this issue see the following:

Crisis

Birnbaum, "The Crisis

in

Marxist Sociology," Social Research

Norman (Summer

4

1

5

Notes

to pages

12- 1

1968), pp. 348-80, Fernando Claudin,

Marxism,"

"Some

Reflections on the Crisis in

Review no. 45 (May-June 1979), pp. 137-44. See also the interview with Lucio Colletti in New Left Review, no. 86 (July-August 1974), pp. 3-29. Paul Baran's article in 1958 anticipates some of the recent Socialist

Paul Baran, "Crisis of Marxism," Monthly Review X no. 6 (October 1958), pp. 224-34, and no. 7 (November 1958), pp. 259-69. See also Paul Sweezy, "Crisis in Marxian Theory," Monthly Review XXXI no. 2 discussion:

(June 1979), pp. 20-4, and Iring Fetscher, "Sieben Thesen zur Krise des Marxismus," in Vom Wohlfahrtsstaat zur neuen Lebensqnalitaet (Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1982). 36 Sweezy, p. 22. 37 Goran Therborn, Science Class and Society (London: New Left Books, 1976), p. 38. Therborn argues that the crisis in Marxism "is expressed, above all, in the absence of [an] effort of auto-analysis." Ibid. Therborn's attempt to remedy this situation takes the form of a call to elaborate "a Marxism of Marxism, an analysis of the formation of Marxism by Marx and Engels." According to Therborn a Marxism of Marxism must "adopt as a guiding principle (whose foundations and development are themselves to be .

.

.

investigated) the claim that

Marx himself made

a specific science, related to the

revolution." Ibid., p. 40.

For

working

for his work: that

class

as

a

Marxism

is

guide to socialist

Marxism as a work of Juergen Habefmas and

a critique of the conception of

"specific science" see in particular the

Albrecht Wellmer. 38 Althusser, Essays, p. 186. For an excellent recent discussion of the difficulties of attempting to comprehend the Russian Revolution in these terms see Ronald Aronson's Dialectics of Disaster: A Preface to Hope (London: Verso Editions, 1983), pp. 64-137."

39 Sweezy, p. 21. 40 Lukacs, "A Final Rethinking," p. 7. Lukacs claims that what passes for current Marxist theory can only be described as Stalinism. For Lukacs Stalinism means simply putting practice "ahead of and indeed in opposition to theory." In effect it means supplanting theory with tactics. The crisis in Marxism thus expresses itself in the fact that "There are no longer any

theorists, there are only tacticians."

vis-a-vis the historical Stalin,

Regardless of one's particular position

Lukacs maintains: "We are

all still

because we do not have a Marxist theorv of capitalism todav."

Stalinists

Ibid., p. 56.

41 Ibid., p. 57.

42 43

Ibid., p. 7. Ibid.,

p.

57. Lukacs's description of this state of affairs as "Stalinism"

underlines the urgency of the situation.

44 Among the recent attempts this

fashion

(London:

New

to

come

to

terms with the

crisis in

Marxism

in

Marxism Left Books, 1976), and David Hillel-Rubin's Marxism and

are

Perry

Anderson's

on

Considerations

Western

Materialism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1977).

45 Paul Sweezy's discussion of the strategy.

crisis in

Marxism

is

one example of

this

1

Notes Marxism works

as well as ever

- and

I

would say even better -

understanding the development of global capitalism and anomalies

I

14-17

to pages

its

1

way of

as a

the particular

crises;

have been alluding to have no bearing on the validity of Marxism in

crucially important sphere.

The

part of Marxism that needs to be put

5

on

a

new

this

basis

is

which deals with the post-revolutionary societies (with which, of course, Marx and Engels had no experience). (Sweezy, pp. 23-4) that

Sweezy's recommendation that one "recognize that a proletarian revolution

can give

rise to a non-socialist society" is

Marxism than 46 Responding

more an expression of the

crisis in

a proposal for solving the difficulties.

to the question in a

B.B.C. interview

in

1977 as

to

why,

in

view

of the necessity of rethinking significant aspects of Marxist theory, he did not simply abandon Marxism and "look

at reality afresh,"

Herbert Marcuse

replied:

Easy answer: because

What

has happened

is

I

do not believe

that

that the theory, as such, has

some of the concepts of Marxian theory

.

.

.

been

falsified.

have had to be

this is not something from outside brought into Marxist theory, it is something which Marxist theory itself, as an historical and dialectical theory, demands. (Herbert Marcuse, in Men of Ideas, ed. Bryan Magee (London: B.B.C. Publications, 1978) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 48-9)

re-examined; but

47 Korsch, "The Crisis in Marxism," p. 171. 48 Wellmer, p. 54. Compare the following comment by Stanley Aronowitz: "The crisis of historical materialism which forms the specific theoretical content of Marxism was detonated by social and historical developments, but cannot be confined to them." Aronowitz, p. 31. 49 Such a re -articulation does not presuppose that all aspects of Marx's thought can be reformulated as a coherent system. For one recent study which argues against the attempt to preserve the radical impetus and insights in Marx's thought by reconstituting it as a completed, tension-free theoretical corpus, see Walter L. Adamson's Marx and the Disillusionment ofMarxism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).

Chapter

1

References

The Wood Theft will

{MECW). The

be made

to the

Articles

German

text

{MEGA) and

to the

series of articles, titled collectively, Debates on the

English text

Law on

Wood, occupies pp. 266-305 in MEGA, vol. I 1/1, and pp. 224-64 in vol. I. Unless otherwise indicated, references to and to

MEGA

Thefts of

MECW,

MECW in

this

chapter will be to these volumes. 1

The

debates in the Rhenish Parliament took place in the spring of 1 841

was how

.

The

and regulate the customary activity of the rural poor of gathering wood that had fallen from trees growing on privately owned land. Traditionally this practice had been unrestricted; it was assumed that the poor had a right to gather fallen wood. The dramatic increase in rural poverty following the agrarian crisis of the 1820s in issue before the Deputies

to construe

1

52

to pages

Notes

17-19

conjunction with the incipient industrial development of the Rhineland region focused attention on the conflict between customary right and the

of private property. Legal controls were imposed and by the mid- 1830s prosecutions for wood gathering became increasingly numerous. The law debated in the Rhenish Parliament made the regulations even more severe; the proposed law defined the act of gathering fallen wood as theft and decreed that the wood gatherer was to be punished according to the criminal instead of the civil code. In addition, the law mandated that the damages be assessed only by the forest keeper - who alone was to determine whether any offense had occurred. The landowner was to receive both the fine and compensation for the wood. 2 Karl Marx, "Preface to a Critique of Political Economy," in MEW, vol. XIII, rights

English translation:

p. 8;

trans.

N.

I.

A

Contribution

Critique of Political Economy,

to the

Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr

Engels reports that he had "always heard

& Company,

Marx

say that

it

1904), p. 10.

was precisely

through his concern with the Wood Theft Law and the situation of the Mosel peasants that he had been prompted to focus on economic relations

and so had come to socialism." MEW, vol. it was Engels "who set Marx on the road to specialized economic studies," a claim made in a recent study by Thomas Meyer, is contradicted by the evidence of the Wood Theft articles. Thomas Meyer, Der Zwiespalt in der Marx'schen Emanzipationstheorie (Kronberg:

mere

instead of on

XXXIX,

p.

466.

politics

The view

that

Scriptor Verlag, 1973), p. 131.

For

a discussion

political milieu

of the role of the Rheinische Zeitung in the intellectual and

of the time see Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx

et

Friedrich Engels

and David McLellan, Marx Before Marxism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 79-101. For the significance of the situation of the rural poor for Marx's thought see Hans Stein, "Karl Marx und der Rheinische Pauperismus," jfahrbuch des koelnischen Geschichtsvereins, XIV (1932), pp. 130-6. Presses

(Paris:

3 Heinz Lubasz,

Universitaires,

"Marx's

Initial

1955),

vol.

II,

pp. 1-105,

The Problem

Problematic:

of Poverty,"

XXIV (March 1976), p. 34. Lubasz's article has the merit of Wood Theft articles as significant texts in their own right. I am him for calling my attention to the importance of these articles

Political Studies

treating the

indebted to

an understanding of Marx's later thinking about the proletariat. As proponents of the established thesis Lubasz cites Rjazanov, Lukacs, Marcuse, Cornu, McLellan and Althusser. Lubasz asserts that all of for

4

Ibid., p. 24.

these theorists "take their cue from Marx's that with

Hegel the

dialectic

upside

down

shell.'"

Lubasz claims

in

is

standing on

own well-known

its

.

.

.

it

order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical that Rjazanov

et al. treat this

described a straight-forward piece of ratiocination

moment"

statement

head and that 'one must turn statement "as though

Marx had performed

it

at a given

(italics in original).

5 Ibid., p. 25.

6 Marx's doctoral dissertation was entitled The Difference Between the Democritean

and

the Epicurean Philosophy of Nature.

1/1, pp. 5-81;

MECW,

vol.

I,

pp. 34-73.

The

text

is

found

in

MEGA vol.

I

Notes 7

MEGA,

vol.

I

MECW,

1/1, p. xxxiv;

vol.

I,

to pages 1

9-22

1

53

p. 106.

8 Lubasz, p. 26. 9 For further discussion of this point, see chapter

4.

Lubasz argues that Marx rejects both "speculative historical schematisms" and "doctrinaire appeals to or attacks on the state ... in favour of empirical inquiry." Ibid. But to pay tribute to Marx's insistence on empirical inquiry with regard to the problem of poverty is not yet to establish that there are no dogmatic or a priori elements in his own discussion.

10 Lubasz,

11

p. 28.

Ibid., p. 27.

12 Ibid., p. 25. 13

MEGA,

p. 274;

MECW,

p.

272.

14 For Hegel's discussion of poverty and the poor see G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy ofRight, trans, with notes T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). Paragraphs 241-6 are concerned with the question of poverty and the poor. References in my discussion of Hegel's views are to the numbered paragraphs in this text. For an earlier version of my argument see Erica Sherover, "The Virtue of Poverty: Marx's Transformation of Hegel's Concept of the Poor," Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory III (Winter 1979), pp. 53-64.

15

MEGA,

276;

p.

MECW,

p.

234.

One

Marx uses the term mean any social

should note that

Klasse at this point in a very loose and generalized sense to

group. In fact even

when he

refers to the proletariat in the "Introduction" to

the Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight" (1843)

16 17 18

19

20

21

22 23 24 25

Marx

uses the terms Klasse

and Stand interchangeably. Hegel, no. 301, Remark. Ibid., no. 258, Remark. Ibid., no. 253, Remark. Ibid., no. 207, Addition, second set of italics, mine. For another statement of this same point see no. 301. Ibid., no 260. The state is the actuality of concrete freedom because it recognizes both the principle of personal individuality and the principle of community. According to Hegel in the modern political community individuals "know and will the universal" as their own end. Ibid., no. 303, Remark. Ibid., no.

305.

Ibid., no.

306.

Ibid., no.

250.

I

have used the masculine pronoun in this passage because

more accurate

reflection of German political reality.

26 Hegel, no. 308. 27 Ibid. "The concrete spheres; the

state is a whole which

member of the

this, their objective

state is a

is

See

it

seemed

articulated into

member of one such

determination, can individuals

to

be a

also note 28, below.

[estate];

come

its

particular

only through

into consideration

in the state."

28 Ibid., no. 251. 29 Ibid., no. 252, Remark. 30 "Poverty itself does not make people into

a rabble; a rabble

is

created only

1

54

Notes

when

to pages

poverty

is

23-26 connected with a disposition of mind, an inner indignation

against the rich, against society, against the government, etc." Ibid., no. 244,

Addition.

31 Ibid., no. 253, Remark.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid., no.

245.

34

Ibid., no.

253, Remark.

35

Ibid.

36 37 38 39 40 41

Ibid., no.

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

42 43 44 The

244, Addition.

MECW, p. 234. MECW, p. 231. pp. 271-2; MECW, p. 230. p. 272; MECW, p. 230. p. 273; MECW, p. 231. p. 275; MECW, p. 233. p. 271; MECW, p. 230. p.

276;

p.

273;

distinction

between comparative and

strict universality is

comparable

the distinction between empirical and rational universality. Only the latter

to is

grounded in reason and hence absolutely binding. Comparative universality as Kant uses the term is in effect an empirical generalization and can justify neither a priori knowledge nor morality. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1963), J34. 45

MEGA,

p.

275;

MECW, p.

aspect which comprises

Marx

its

233.

The

indeterminate aspect of property

existence as

common

argues that feudal laws regarding property

this aspect

is

that

property [Gemeineigentum].

made some allowance

for

of property inasmuch as in recognizing the existence of property

form of privilege they also recognized the traditional rights of the poor form of institutionalized (and customary) charity. As a result, medieval laws regarding property were essentially ambiguous or two-sided. The reform of medieval law consisted of the "transformation of privileges into rights" (MEGA, p. 274; MECW, p. 232), a transformation which was "one-sided" in that it overlooked the customary rights of the underprivileged. The monasteries are a case in point. When church property was secularized the monasteries received compensation; the poor who lived by the monasteries (and who had a traditional source of income thereby) did not in the

in the

receive any compensation. In view of the issue of "Marx's relation to Hegel," the following passage

is

worth noting. Marx attributes the one-sided nature of modern property legislation to the one-sided nature of the mental faculty of understanding. Marx's characterization of the understanding is practically a paraphrase of Hegel's discussion of the understanding in the Phenomenology of Spirit and in the Lesser Logic. Marx writes: particularly

The

which grasped such ambiguous forms was the understanding, and is not only one-sided, but it has as its essential task the making of the world one-sided, a great and remarkable work, for only one-sidedness forms and tears faculty

understanding

Notes

to

pages

26-28

the particular out of the inorganic slime of the whole.

The

character of things

product of the understanding. Each thing must isolate

itself

and become

1

55

is

a

isolated in

order to be something. Inasmuch as the understanding confines each of the contents

of the world

in a stable definiteness,

and

solidifies the fluid

essence of things,

it

brings

out the manifoldness of the world, for the world would not be manifold without the

many one-sidednesses. (MEGA, 46 47 48 49 50

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

p. p. p.

p. p.

275; MECW, 276; MECW, 277; MECW, 275; MECW, 276; MECW,

pp. 274-5;

233,

p.

italics,

MECW, my

p.

233)

emphasis.

p. 234.

235.

p.

pp. 233-4.

234.

p.

The

significance that

Marx

places here on

the activity of the poor anticipates his later emphasis on the significance of

human 51

labor in shaping the world.

MEGA, MEGA,

p.

276;

MECW,

234.

p.

52 p. 276; MECW, p. 234. 53 One of the Rhineland Deputies had argued that there was essentially no difference between gathering fallen wood and stealing live timber and he had supported his argument by claiming " 'that in the forests of his region at first only gashes were made in the young trees, and later when they were dead, they were treated as fallen wood.'" Marx contrasts this concern for the welfare of the young trees with the lack of concern for human welfare, and remarks: "It would be impossible to find a more elegant and at the same time

more simple manner of letting the right of human beings give way to the right of young trees the wooden idols triumph and human beings are .

sacrificed!"

54

"How

.

p.

268;

MECW,

p. 226.

could the selfish legislator be

inhuman

MEGA, begun

.

MEGA,

[das Unmenschliche],

p.

278;

MECW,

p.

human

[menschlich]

an alien material being,

is

his

236. This remark suggests that

when something supreme being?"

Marx

has already

methodology of Feuerbach's critique of religion for purposes of social criticism. For Feuerbach, the essence of religious consciousness is its worship of human nature in the guise of another (divine) nature. See chapter 2. 55 MEGA, p. 304; MECW, pp. 262-3. The various references in the Wood Theft articles to idols, animal masks, worship of animals, and fetishes reflect Marx's systematic study in 1841-2 of primitive religion. His notebooks from that time indicate that he was particularly interested in the concept of fetishism - its nature, its origins, and the difference between ancient and "modern" froms of fetishism. One bit of information gleaned form his earlier study appears directly in his discussion of the wood theft laws: Marx's notebooks contain the phrase "Gold als Fetisch in Kuba." MEGA, vol. I, 1/2, p. 115. This phrase reappears in the context of Marx's comparison of the Spaniards and the Rhineland Deputies. There is a significant difference between the notion of fetishism which to appropriate the

The

Marx

uses here and the later notion of the fetishism of commodities.

latter

has to do with the mystification inherent in the form of capitalist

production; the concept of fetishism which

Marx

is

using here

is

a fetishism

156

Notes

to page

29

of possession or property, not a fetishism of production.

Lubasz. See also Karl Loewith, "Man's Self-alienation of Marx," Social Research

XXI

no. 2 (1954), pp. 211

ff.,

On

this point see

in the Early

Writings

reprinted in Loewith,

Nature, History and Existentialism (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,

1966).

56 MEGA, p. 304; MECW, p. 262. 57 For a discussion of the antecedents of

this attitude

towards the poor see

section 9, below.

58 59

MEGA, MEGA, time

p.

304;

p.

300;

MECW, p. 262. MECW, p. 259.

Marx wrote

the

Wood

Maximilien Rubel has argued that at the articles he was only "a step away from

Theft

rejecting the state as such." Maximilien Rubel, Karl Marx, essai de biographie intellectuelle (Paris:

M.

Riviere, 1971), p. 48.

But however

critical

have been of some of the institutions of Prussian society, the fact still

Marx may is

that

he

considers the state as the locus and guardian of universality in the society

- provided that the state this point Marx assumes of private interest

and "corresponds to its concept." At and the perspective "whose meager soul has never been illuminated and is

a true state,

that the perspective of the state

thrilled

by state-like thought [Staatsgedanken]

See

example the following:

for

If the state,

n

even in a single respect, stoops so low as

property instead of in

its

own manner,

are diametrically opposed.

to act in the

manner of private is that it must

the immediate consequence

accommodate itself in its methods to the limits of private property. Private interest is crafty enough to intensify this consequence to the point where private interest in its most narrow and paltry form becomes the limit and rule for the action of the state Every modern state, however little it corresponds to its concept, will be forced to exclaim at the first practical attempt at such legislative power [on the part of private interest]: Your ways are not mv ways, and vour thoughts are not my thoughts! IOMEGA, .

p.

283;

MECW,

.

.

p. 241).

Marx argues that the forest owners have no right to expect that would forsake "the sunlit path of justice," in order to guarantee them compensation for the stolen wood. MEGA, p. 299; MECW, p. 257. Additional evidence as to Marx's acceptance of a "Hegelian" view of the state at this time is found in his articles "On the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia" which appeared in three numbers of the Rheinische Zeitung in December 1842: no. 345 (11 December), no. 354 (20 December), and no. 265 (31 December). The articles can be found in MEGA, vol. I 1/1, pp. 321-35; MECW, vol. I, pp. 292-307. Marx distinguishes between "state-need" [Staatsbeduerfnis], and "state-necessity" [Stautsnotwendigkeit] on the one hand, and the "pressing need [Notdurft] of private interest" on the Accordingly the state

60

other. MEGA, p. 332; MECW, p. 302. MEGA, p. 303; MECW, p. 262. Marx

argues that the advice given to the

Rhineland Deputies by the Pruessische Staatszeitung that in considering the wood theft law they should "only think about wood and forest and should solve each single material problem in a non-political way, i.e. not in connection with the whole of civic reason [Staatsvernunft] and civic morality

Notes [Staatssittlichkeit]"

p.

61

MECW,

304;

The German

is

p.

text

precisely the

wrong advice

to pages

29-30

have given.

to

1

57

MEGA,

262.

makes the

says the interest of the

poor

Freiheitseigentuemers,

des

relation to property even is

more

explicit.

Marx

the interest "des Lebenseigenruemers, des

Menschheitseigentuemers,

des

Staatseigen-

298; MECW, p. 256. The German text says quite clearly that the poor are the "Eigentuemer" [proprietors] of all of these - hence the

tuemers"M£G4,

p.

poor are among other things the proprietors of the (genuine) state. Marx's description of the poor as "Staatseigentuemer" (literally, "proprietors of the complete reversal of the conception of the poor as a danger to the political theory beginning with Hobbes and Locke. state")

is

state, a

a

conception which characterizes bourgeois

62 Hegel, no. 66. Hegel does not

"The

justify

property on any utilitarian grounds.

rational [element] of property does not lie in

but in the fact that

it

overcomes the mere

its

satisfaction of needs,

subjectivity of personality. In

first time as Reason." No. 41, Addition. Remark: "Possession of property appears to be connected to the satisfaction of needs, as a means, since this does occur, but the true position is that from the standpoint of freedom property is the first embodiment [Dasein] of freedom, an essential end in itself." And no. 49: "The rational moment in relation to external things is that I possess property; the particular aspect however comprises the subjective goals, needs, arbitrariness, abilities, external circumstances, etc. (see no. 45) What and how much I possess, is therefore a matter of indifference as far as rights are

property the person exists for the

See

also no. 45,

.

.

.

concerned."

how little attention has been paid and the private property belonging in this sphere, even by the literature on Hegel's Philosophy of Right.'" Ritter Joachim

Ritter

comments:

"It is striking

to Hegel's theory of civil law

maintains that Hegel's justification of private property incorporates elements

of Locke's natural rights argument, elements of Montesquieu's legal theory

and elements of Fichte's

justification of property as the basic right of the

person. According to Ritter, the unity of this

amalgam

consists "in the task of

which has developed in world history and is now posited with civil society and its right of the person as the existence [Dasein] of freedom. With this Hegel takes the theory of property beyond its former state." See Joachim Ritter, "Person and Property: On Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Paragraphs 34-81," in Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1982), pp. 143, 147, translation slightly changed. For another discussion of hermeneutically interpreting the property

the philosophical significance of property in Hegel's system see Richard

Teichgrabber, "Hegel on Property and Poverty," Journal of the History of Ideas

63

XXXVII (Jan-March

MEGA, property

p. is

303;

MECW,

p.

1977), pp. 47-64.

261.

The

"lawless natural instinct" of private

thus actually a deformation of human nature; the social instinct of

the poor, expressing as

it

does a universalist consciousness, exemplifies an

undeformed human nature. 64 Hegel, no. 241.

158 65

Notes

MEGA,

to pages

p.

278;

31-32

MECW,

p.

236.

66 Marx's German makes the point in a pun: "Er macht seine Huehneraugen zu den Augen, mit denen er sieht und urteilt." MEGA, p. 277; MECW, p. 236. Literally, "He makes which he sees and judges."

67

To

his corns [Huehernaugen] into eyes \Augen] with

consider the disadvantages of the advantages or the disbenefits of social

mean

privilege does not

that

one denies the very

real

economic and

rewards which accrue to members of any dominant group. disadvantages of the advantages simply

human

cost

of domination for people

To

social

discuss the

means that one acknowledges the are members of the "non-target"

who

group, the group that is not the target of a particular oppression. To acknowledge these "disbenefits" does not imply that one is equating the experience of the oppressed and the oppressor. For further discussion of the implications of this perspective on oppression for an emancipatory practice of subjectivity see the Conclusion.

much more

critical in the Jfenenser Realphilosophie which Marx could was first published in 1931-2.) For a discussion of the radical content of this work see Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Beacon Press paperback edition, 1960, pp. 62-91. 69 Hegel, no. 289, Remark. Indeed Hegel's analysis of the "illegal" status of the poor in civil society is itself a prima facie condemnation of this social order. But it is Marx rather than Hegel who draws out the critical implications

68 Hegel

is

not have known.

(It

contained in the Hegelian analysis. 70 In other contexts Hegel is not unaware of the "disadvantages of the advantages." His discussion of the master-slave relationship in the Phenomenology focuses on the "disbenefits" of privilege for the privileged. Although the master clearly possesses material benefits as a result of his dominant position, his role as master deprives him of contact with reality;

Hegel's dissection of the master-slave relationship reveals that the master's self-perception

is

independent but

The master

fundamentally inaccurate. in fact

he

is

absolutely dependent

takes himself to be

upon the work of the

slave.

In a completely different context Jean-Paul Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew

See for example the following: "[Anti-Semites] are people who are afraid. Not of the Jews, to be sure, but of themselves, of their own consciousness, of their instincts, of their responsibilities, of solitariness, of change, of society, and of dissects the "disbenefits" of anti-Semitism for the anti-Semite.

the world

of the

- of everything except the Jews

human

condition.

The

pitiless stone, a furious torrent, a

human

being."

Gallimard,

Sartre,

1954),

.

.

Anti-Semitism, in short,

is

a

person

devasting thunderbolt

Reflexions

pp. 62-4;

.

anti-Semite sur la

who wishes

is

to

fear

be a

- anything except

question juive,

(Paris:

a

Editions

English translation, Anti-Semite and Jew,

pp. 53-4.

71

Hegel's identification of membership in civil society with membership in the modern human community might be traced to his reading of Aristotle's Politics.

If the

human being

is

a political animal, a zoon politikon, then

Notes

to

pages

32-36

1

59

membership in the polis is tantamount to being fully human. Slaves of course were not members of the polis, but then slaves were not assumed to have fully

human 72 For

status.

importance of Marx's Jewish background as the Marx Before Marxism. McLellan maintains that the attempt to discount the significance of Marx's Jewish a discussion of the

context for his thought see David McLellan,

background "betrays a facile disregard both for Marx's heredity and environment that even the enlightened atmosphere of Marx's home and attachment

his

his

Judaism should not conceal. For Jewishness, above all at that time, was not something that it was easy to slough off." McLellan, p. 27. For an example of the view which McLellan is criticizing see H. P. Adam's claim: "it is impossible to say that [Marx's] Jewish origin had any influence on any part of his life." Karl Marx in his Earlier Writings, (London: Frank Cass, 1965), p. 11. father's

73 MEGA, 74 Lubasz,

very

p.

277;

loose

MECW,

p.

to

235.

p. 33.

15 Private interest

is

both cowardly and cruel. In

cowardly. "Private interest, however,

is

fact

it

is

cruel because

always cowardly because

its

it is

heart,

its

an external object which can always be wrenched away and injured, and who does not tremble before the danger of losing one's heart and soul?" soul

is

MEGA,

p.

278;

MECW,

p.

236.

76 Lubasz, p. 33. 11 Ibid. 78 Ibid., p. 29. Lubasz argues that Hegel's discussion of poverty was based not so much on actual German conditions as upon the conditions described by the English political economists. This is not surprising inasmuch as the situation of the unincorporated poor in Germany was only recognized as a problem in the decades following Hegel's death. See Reinhart Koselleck, Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution (Stuttgart: Klett Verlag, 1 967) and Joanna Koester, Der Rheinische Fruehliberalismus und die soziale Frage (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1938). See also W. Conze, "Vom Poebel zum Proletariat," Vierteljahrschrift fuer Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte XLI (1954), pp. 333-64, and Carl Jantke and Dietrich Hilger, eds., Die Eigentuemlosen (Munich: K. Alber, 1965), pp. 7-47. 79 Lubasz, p. 28. 80 It is certainly possible that Marx read the writings of Robespierre and Saint-Just before or during the period when he was writing for the Rheinische Zeitung. (His Kreuznach notebooks reveal that he studied Rousseau very carefully.) But to claim that Marx's views of the poor have their antecedents in the

Jacobin tradition

is

not to claim that the only way

the time

Marx

is

Marx could have

by a systematic study of their writings. By thinking about the poor the Jacobin tradition has become

been influenced by the Jacobins

is

part of the wider tradition of political thought;

it is

in the air, so to speak.

say that certain assumptions originate with the Jacobins

assumptions to their roots. source to acquire them.

It is

not to claim that

is

To

only to trace these

Marx went

directly to the

1

60

81

Notes

For

to pages

36-39

discussion

a

of Robespierre's

"Robespierre and the Popular

(May 82

84

ideals,

see

Albert

Soboul,

Past and Present

Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E.

J. J.

V

1954), pp. 54-70.

Dutton, 1950), bk. 83

social

Movement of 1793-4,"

P.

2, ch. 3, 4.

Ibid., p. 29. ".

.

.

when

the State, on the eve of ruin, maintains only a vain, illusory, and

formal existence,

meanest

when

in every heart the social

interest brazenly lays hold of the sacred

general will

becomes mute;

[individuals],

bond

name

is

broken, and the

of 'public good,' the

guided by secret motives, no more

give their views as citizens than if the State

had never been."

Ibid., p. 103.

85 Robespierre's justification for revolutionary action by the poor people of Paris is most explicitly set forth in his speeches on the issue of the trial and

jugement du roi," 3 December le jugement de Louis XVI," 28 December 1792. Both speeches are found in Maximilien Robespierre, Oeuvres Completes, 10 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1910-67) IX, pp. 120-34 and 183-204. (Vols. VI-X are published by Presses Universiexecution of Louis XVI. See his "Sur

le

1792, and his "Sur l'appel au peuple dans

taires.)

86 Robespierre, "Sur le marc d'argent," Oeuvres VII, pp. 164. 87 Ibid., second set of italics added. 88 As is clear from his analysis of the consciousness of the Provincial Deputies in the Wood Theft articles, the conflation of particular interest with universal interest becomes a thematic element in Marx's own discussion of mystified consciousness.

89 90

Ibid., p. 166.

Ibid., pp.

164-5.

91 Ibid., p. 165. Other examples of Robespierre's views about the poor are

found

in his "Lettre a

Mm.

Vergniaud, Gensonne, Brissot

et

Gaudet,"

in

Robespierre, Lettres a Ses Commettans (Paris: Imprimerie Louis-Jean, 1961), Oeuvres V, pp. 189-205. See also his "Observations sur une petition relative la constitu-

aux Subsistences," Oeuvres V, pp. 283-7, and his speech "Sur tion," 10 May 1793, Oeuvres IX, pp. 495-513.

92 Robespierre, "Sur la guerre," Oeuvres VIII, p. 90. 93 Robespierre, "Sur le marc d'argent," Oeuvres VII, p. 166. This passage illustrates the way in which the Jacobin concept of "the people" refers essentially to those

who

exist in the state of

"honorable poverty."

94 Robespierre, Oeuvres IX, p. 496. 95 Albert Soboul notes that even from the beginning there was a "radical difference between any societe populaire and the Jacobin Club, which the sans culottes attended seldom, if at all." Soboul, p. 57. As the revolution progressed these initial differences became more and more exacerbated. The sans culottes were partisans of direct democracy and demanded localized production of war supplies. They petitioned frequently and to no avail for permanent section meetings and for decentralized economic production. Thus their favorite means of political action and their economic

Notes

41-45

to pages

161

needs of the Revolution at war. The and the Jacobins became so marked that Robespierre was led to claim (in a speech to the Jacobin Club on 17 September 1793) that the petitions urging permanent sessions for the sections did not come from "the people" at all.

were

ideals

in direct conflict with the

divergence between the sans

culottes

96 Robespierre, "Observations generates sur

le

projet d'instruction publique,"

Oeuvres V, p. 208.

97

Robespierre grants that revolutionary rhetoric praises the

p. 20.

Ibid.,

virtues of the people but he

our

high-flown

maxims

acknowledges that "our beautiful formulas and more in our memories and in our

reside

imagination than in our souls." Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Robespierre, Oeuvres IX, p. 497. Saint-Just in particular was concerned with the problem of forming a "conscience publique." See especially his discussion of this point in his speech "Sur la police general, sur la justice, le commerce, la legislation et les crimes des factions," Discours et Rapports (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1957), pp. 177-98.

100 "Plan d'education national propose a Robespierre,

Textes

choisis,

3

Convention," 13 July 1793, in

la

(Paris:

vols.

Editions Sociales,

1957),

II,

pp. 167-8.

101

Marx

is

rights,

1

so long as their

crime"

regulation:'

MEGA,

The

poor be punished for exercising

that the

anti-social

Chapter 2

He even customary

not arguing for the abolition of poverty by a revolution.

seems willing

but p.

wood -gathering only

277;

"a

as

MECW,

p.

activity

simple

their

not regarded as "an

is

contravention

of a

police

235.

The Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right"

both untitled and undated. It is missing its cover text. The manuscript is traditionally referred to as the Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight". I will refer to it here as the Critique. This text is to be distinguished from a shorter essay which Marx wrote towards the end of 1843 as the Introduction to a more developed extant manuscript

page and the

first

is

four pages of the

critique of Hegel's political philosophy which he apparently intended to write but never did. This essay will be discussed in chapter 4. References to the Critique will follow the procedure used in chapter 1 This text is found in MEGA, vol. I 1/1, pp. 401-553. The English translation is found inMECW, .

vol. Ill, pp.

3-129. Unless otherwise indicated, references

MECW in this chapter are to the As

text in these

a result of the loss of the cover

to

MEGA

and

to

volumes.

page there has been some debate as to Landshut and Mayer place the

the date of composition of the Critique.

composition in 1841-2 but their dating has not generally been accepted. Most Marx scholars now accept Rjazanov's conclusion that the Critique was written during the spring and summer of 1843. Rjazanov bases his

162

to page

Notes

45

conclusion on textual similarities between the Critique and Marx's 1843

Kreuznach notebooks

as well as

on several remarks made by Marx

works. For Rjazanov's discussion see vol.

I

1/2, pp. xxvi-xxx.

On

MEGA,

vol.

I

in later

1/1, pp. xxvi-xxx,

and

the similarities between passages in the Critique

and Marx's Kreuznach notebooks, see Heinz Lubasz, "Marx's Initial Problematic; The Problem of Poverty," Political Studies XXIV (March 1976), pp. 38-9. 2 MEGA, vol. I 1/2, pp. 268-9; MECW, vol. I, p. 382. Although Hegel did write an essay on natural law, "Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" (1802), in which he takes a critical stance vis-a-vis all natural law theories, he did not defend the constitutional monarchy in his essay. Marx's comment thus seems to refer to Hegel's discussion of this issue in the Philosophy of Right.

3

272; MECW, p. 385. In this letter Marx refers to the essay on "Die Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," and he informs Ruge that he had been intending to send it to him for publication in the next issue of Ruge's new journal Anekdota along with the essay on Christian art which is now entitled "Ueber Religion und Kunst mit besondrer Beziehung auf christliche Kunst." Marx reports that personal circumstances have prevented him from attending to both essays and making the necessary revisions. Marx promises to send Ruge the essay on religion and art by the middle of April, if Ruge is willing to wait that long. He does not say when he will send the critique of Hegel. There is no further mention of this essay in their correspondence. Although it appears that he fully intended to

MEGA, Hegel

p.

as

undertake the necessary revisions,

"Hegelian natural law" and there article as

described in the 5

Marx never is

March

publishes an article criticizing

no manuscript which corresponds

to the

letter.

For the discussion of the plan to publish these essays in a volume edited by Marx and Bruno Bauer see the correspondence between Bauer, Ruge and Marx in MEGA vol. I 1/2, pp. 263-8. Joseph O'Malley takes the essay mentioned by Marx in his 5 March letter to Ruge as evidence that Marx had planned to do a critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right for over a year before he actually wrote one. O'Malley suggests that Marx's "failure to write the Critique when originally planned may have been due to his lack of a methodology suitable for a systematic criticism of Hegel's political philosophy." Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right", trans. Annette John and Joseph O'xMalley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. x. But the fact that Marx was critical of both the concept and the reality of a constitutional monarchy in March of 1842 does not mean that he was ready to undertake a "systematic criticism" of Hegel's political thought at this time, and that he lacked only the methodology to do so. O'Malley's "explanation" for why Marx did not write jointly

his critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right a year earlier than he did treats methodology as an element which is entirely external to content and thus overlooks the fact that in 1842 Marx uncritically accepts the Hegelian separation between the state and civil society.

Notes

to page

46

163

For a review of O'Malley's Introduction and translation see Stanley Moore's discussion in The Owl of Minerva III (December 1971), pp. 1-7. 4 See in particular Marx's articles "On the Commission of the Estates in Prussia," MEGA, vol. I 1/1, pp. 321-35; MECW, vol. I, pp. 292-307. The aforementioned oppositions are thematic in these articles. Marx argues that the estates and the Provincial Assemblies represent private interest and that therefore any extension of the power of the Provincial Assemblies is contrary to the state interest. He maintains that in a state based on estates representing particular interest, "the officers of the state represent the state interest as

such and are therefore

private interest of the estates"

MEGA,

hostile towards the representatives

p.

331;

MECW,

p.

302,

italics

of the added. At

one point Marx describes the state as the "natural realm of the spirit which cannot seek and find its true essence in a fact of sensory appearance."

MEGA, The

p. 324;

MECW,

In a true state there

is

p.

295.

the series concludes with the following claim:

last article in

no landed property, no industry, no material thing which

crude element could make a bargain with the

state; there are only spiritual forces,

as a

and

only in their statelike resurrection, in their political rebirth are these natural forces

entided to a voice in the nerves, and at every point

state. it

The

state

pervades the whole of nature with spiritual

must be apparent

form, not nature, but the state, not die unfree p.

335;

The

MECW,

p.

that

what

object,

is

dominant

is

but the free human

not matter, but being.

(MEGA,

306)

development has been For a full-length treatment of the relation between Feuerbach and Marx see Klaus Erich Bockmuhl, Leiblichkeit und Gesellschaft: Studien zur Religionskritik und Anthropologic im Fruehrverk von Ludwig Feuerbach und Karl Marx (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961). See also Werner Schuffenhauer, Feuerbach und der junge Marx: zur Enstehungsgeschichte der marxistischen Weltanschauung (Berlin: VEB Deutsche Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1965). Marx Wartofsky's Feuerbach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977) is far more carefully argued than Eugene Kamenka's The Philosophy of Eudwig Feuerbach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). See also the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Frederick M. Gordon, "The Development of Marx's Conception of Human Nature," University of California, San Diego, 1975. 6 Shlomo Avineri maintains that "all the main achievements, as well as dilemmas of Marx's later thought originate in this work." Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 3. Joseph O'Malley describes the Critique as the "first major work undertaken in [the] early crucial period of [Marx's] theoretical self-clarification," p. xviii. See also Jean Hyppolite, "La Conception hegelienne de l'etat et sa critique par Karl Marx," Cahiers internationaux de sociologie II (1947), pp. 142 ff. This essay is reprinted in Jean Hyppolite, Etudes sur Marx et Hegel (Paris: Marcel Riviere et Cie, second edition, 1965), pp. 120-41. An excellent discussion of the significance of Hegel's political 5

significance of Feuerbach's thought for Marx's

noted by almost every commentator

in the field.

.

.

.

1

1

64

Notes

to pages

47-48

is Jakob Barion's Hegel und die Marxistische H. Bouvier Verlag, 1963). See also Manfred Friedrich, Philosophie und Oekonomie beim jungen Marx (Berlin: Luncker & Humbolt,

thought for Marx's thinking

Staatslehre (Bonn:

1960).

7 Feuerbach's

"Vorlaeufige

Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie" was

supposed to appear in the Deutsche Jahrbuecher but fell victim to the censor. It was first published in 1843 in Switzerland along with a variety of other essays in a volume edited by Arnold Ruge entitled Anekdota. Feuerbach considered that he had demonstrated the need for a "reform of philosophy" three years earlier in his book Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie. References to Feuerbach's work are to the following edition: Ludwig Feuerbach,

W.

Saemmtliche Werke, ed. Cannstatt:

"Thesen"

Frommann is

in

II,

10

(Stuttgart-Bad

vols.

The

text of the

of this edition, pp. 222-45. 231. For another statement of this same thought see

volume

8 Feuerbach, Werke

Bolin and F. Jodl,

Verlag, 1903-11. Reissued, 1959). II

p.

the following:

The

Absolute or the Infinite of speculative philosophy is, psychologically considered, nothing other than the not determined, the not defined - the abstraction from everything determinate posited as an essence which

but simultaneously again as an essence which

Absolute

[the

is

is

different

identical to

it.

from

this abstraction,

Historically considered

nothing other than the old theological-metaphysical wow-finite,

is]

wow-human, wow-material, wow-determinate, wow-created Being or Nonbeing - the preworldly nothingness posited as deed.

(Ibid., p.

225)

9 Ibid., p. 231.

10 See for example the following:

When that

the critical philosophy understands the relationship of these three terms such

we

place thoughts between ourselves and things as

means

in the sense that this

intermediary excludes us from the things rather than connects us with them, this view

may be opposed by

the remark that these very things

which are supposed

to

be beyond

ourselves and beyond the thoughts referring to them, are themselves, at the opposite

extreme, objects of thought, and as entirely undetermined, are only one thing - the so called thing-in-itself, the product of

ofLogic, 2

vols., trans.

Unwin, 1929),

The

vol.

I,

empty abstraction

W. H. Johnson and p.

itself.

(G.

W.

L. C. Struthers (London:

F. Hegel, Science

George Allen

&

44)

question of whether Hegel's interpretation of Kant

received a substantial

amount of

is

correct has

scholarly attention in recent years.

The

on how one interprets Kant's conception of things-in-themselves. For recent discussions of this topic see Gerold Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich, (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1974), and Henry E. Allison, "Things in Themselves, Noumena, and the Transcendental Object," Dialectica XXXII no. 1 (1978), pp. 49-76. issue

depends

in large part

1

Feuerbach, Werke

12

Ibid.,

p.

II,

transcendent thinking, p. 226.

p.

227.

243. See also the following:

human

"the essence of Hegel's logic

thinking posited as outside

human

is

beings." Ibid.,

Notes In

some

to pages

48-49

1

65

respects, Feuerbach's discussion of the transposition of qualities

or processes into things recalls Kant's discussion of the paralogisms of pure

reason in the Critique ofPure Reason. Kant had argued that a paralogism is the result of attributing the characteristics of the activity of thinking to a putative metaphysical thinking

is

Thus

subject. a

unifying

the

legitimate

and unified substance. As

assertion

transcendental

becomes an

activity

that

pretension

illegitimate

to

dogmatic claim that the subject of thought is a a result of this error transcendent metaphysics supposes that it can make knowledge claims about the nature of the soul and thereby construct "a science of pure reason" (A 345). In the A version of the transcendent insight

Critique

Kant describes

a

this illusion as "hypostatization": "all

regard to the nature of our thinking being [the soul] and the corporeal world

is

merely a result of

filling

the gap

its

controversy in

connection with

where knowledge

is

wholly lacking to us with paralogisms of pure reason, treating our thoughts as things and hypostatizing them."

13 Feuerbach,

Werke

II,

p.

224.

It

A

395. See also

A

may be tempting

384-5. to regard

Feuerbach's

"reformative critique" as an early ancestor of Bertrand Russell's attempt to

reform the structure of ordinary English descriptive sentences by rewriting them in such a way that the "real subject" of the sentence is revealed. But while

it

may be

helpful to understand both Feuerbach and Russell as

philosophical reductionists,

i.e.

as thinkers

cal statements to their essential (and

who

seek to "reduce" philosophi-

hidden) core,

it

would be incorrect

to

include Feuerbach in the tradition of metaphysical or logical empiricism to

which the

early

Russell belongs.

The

"elements" to which Feuerbach

"reduces" philosophical statements are not putative sense data or logical

but

atoms,

the

feelings,

characteristics of the is

human

desires

and

needs

which

he

takes

to

be

species as a whole. Feuerbach's "reductionism"

thus part and parcel of a project of philosophical anthropology.

What

Feuerbach is the light which religious concepts and concept formation shed on human nature and human consciousness. On this point see Wartofsky, pp. 207 ff. 14 Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christenthums (1841). This text is vol. VI of the Bolin-Jodl edition. George Eliot (Marian Evans) translated this work into English in 1854. Her translation was republished in 1957 by Harper & Brothers. References will be made to the Bolin-Jodl edition and to the Eliot translation in the Harper Torchbook paperback edition of 1957. The English translations are my own; I have attempted to depart as little as possible from the Eliot translation. 15 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 17; Eliot, p. 13. 16 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 257; Eliot, p. 213. See also the following: interests

But when religion, the consciousness of God, is designated as the self-consciousness of humankind, this is not to be understood as [a claim that] religious individuals are directly

aware that their consciousness of

being; on the contrary,

it is

God

is

the self-consciousness of their

precisely the lack of this consciousness

own

which constitutes

the specific essence of religion. (Feuerbach, Werke \\, p. 16; Eliot, p. 13)

1

66

Notes

49-51

to pages

And: "Religion

is

the relation of human beings to their

own

nature

.

.

.

but to

own, and instead [regarded] as another them." Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 238; Eliot,

their nature [regarded] as not their

nature, distinct and opposed to p. 197.

As is evident from these citations, Feuerbach's account of religious consciousness depends heavily on Hegel's characterization of mystified consciousness in the Phenomenology. The defining characteristic of such consciousness itself as

its

is

penchant for mis-recognition,

its

failure to recognize

it is.

17 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 238; Eliot, p. 197. 18 Accordingly the task of the reformative critique of religion

is

simply to

destroy an illusion.

And we need

only

.

.

.

invert the religious relations, regard that as a goal

which

religion

means, exalt as primary, as cause what for religion is subordinate, secondary, conditional: in so doing we destroy an illusion and have the unclouded light of truth before our eyes. (Feuerbach, Werke VI, Eliot, p. 274)

posits as a

19 Feuerbach, Werke VI, pp. 187-8; Eliot, pp. 155-6. 20 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 190; Eliot, p. 157. 21 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 29; Eliot, p. 24.

22 23 24 25

Feuerbach, Werke VI,

p. 17; Eliot, p. 14.

Feuerbach, Werke VI, pp. 183-4; Eliot, p. 152. Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 26; Eliot, p. 21.

"But what is then the essence of the human of which one is conscious, or what constitutes the species, the essentially human in human beings? Reason, Will, Heart. To a complete human being belongs the power of thought, the power of willing and the power of the heart." Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 3; Eliot, p. 3.

Ostensibly Feuerbach

is

arguing from the nature of religion in general to

the essence of human nature, but

would

if this were the case the variety of religions one but many human natures. Actually his claim that human nature depends on the fact that Feuerbach identifies

establish not

religion reflects

i.e.

with the Christian

Thus Feuerbach moves from a claim that "the divine and the human is an illusory one" to the claim

opposition between

religion generally with

its

"highest manifestation,"

religion.

the

content of the Christian religion that religion

is

is

"the self-consciousness of

expressed by him as the claim: "Religion, of humankind claim:

"The

to itself."

consciousness of the

"The

humankind"

at least

Feuerbach, WerkeXl,

self-consciousness

that "the object

and

thoroughly human." Similarly, his claim is

more honestly

the Christian,

p. 17; Eliot, p. 15.

of the individual in

its

is

the relation

See

totality

also the is

the

Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 80; Eliot, p. 65. And: humankind above the individual human being is the

trinity."

divine trinity in

unity of reason, love, will." Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 3; Eliot, p. 3.

Eugene Kamenka seems not Feuerbach's thought.

He

writes:

to

have perceived the Christian bias in

"The

principles of analysis

and the general

Notes conclusions to which they lead him

would regard

I

to

pages 51 -53

1

67

as Feuerbach's greatest

contribution to thought and as a lasting and correct statement of approach to religious

phenomenon

1

[sic].

'

Kamenka,

p. 57.

For

Wartofsky's discussion, pp. 260 ff. For another discussion of religion see Frederick M. Gordon,

a different perspective see

critical

view of Feuerbach's

"The Contradictory Nature of Feuerbachian Humanism," The Philosophical Forum VIII nos. 2-3 (1978),

pp. 31-48.

26 27 28 29

Feuerbach, Werke VI,

p. 3. Eliot, p. 3.

Feuerbach, Werke VI, Feuerbach, Werke VI,

p. 22; Eliot, p. 18.

Feuerbach, Werke VI,

p. 2; Eliot, p. 2.

p. 7; Eliot, p. 6.

Eliot, pp. 2-3. While Feuerbach does not share Hegel's monistic idealism, his definition of species consciousness is

30 Feuerbach, Werke VI, pp. 2-3;

heavily indebted to Hegel's concept of infinity as self-relation. finitude

For Hegel

the condition of being determined by an other, while infinity

is

self-determination. Hegel's Phenomenology

dual sense:

is

a history of consciousness in a

the record of the overcoming by consciousness of apparent

it is

otherness, and

is

it is

the record of the progressive discovery and recognition

on the part of consciousness

as to

Hegel,

equivalent

self-realization

is

real (and infinite) nature.

its

to

full

(and

Thus

adequate)

for

self-

consciousness. It

is

important to point out the Hegelian background of Feuerbach's

notion of species consciousness in order to rescue Feuerbach from a reading

which attaches

a sentimental

consciousness.

"The term

meaning

'infinity'

to the notion

of the infinity of

human

prescribes that the object of knowledge

in this instance is man's [sic] own 'essence' - that is, the totality of relations in which human consciousness is the subject and human activity in every one of its

modes

is

the object, each

mode being

without limit in

its

own

sphere."

Wartofsky, p. 272. 31 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 1; Eliot, p. 1. 32 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 80; Eliot, p. 65.

33 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 189; Eliot, this awareness as "mysterious." 34 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 190; Eliot, 35 "Individual limited

human

- herein

p. 165. Eliot gratuitously characterizes

p. 157.

beings can and must feel and recognize themselves as

lies

human] and the animal one's finitude inasmuch as the

the difference between [the

but one can only be aware of one's

limits,

perfection, the infinity of the species

is

feeling, of conscience, or

an object, whether

it

be an object of

of thinking consciousness." Feuerbach, Werke'VI,

p. 8; Eliot, p. 7.

The awareness

of perfection on the part of finite and imperfect individuals

has traditionally led other philosophers to entirely different conclusions. Descartes's argument for the existence of

God depends upon

the finite individual has an idea of perfection

the claim that

which could not come from

this

individual's consciousness. I

see that there

is

manifestly

more

reality in infinite

substance than in

finite,

and

1

68

Notes

to pages

therefore that in

-

to wit the

53-57

some way

notion of

should know that

God

have in

I

me

the notion of the infinite earlier than the finite

before that of myself. For

how would

it

be possible that

I

doubt and desire, that is to say, that something is lacking to me, and that I am not quite perfect, unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than myself, in comparison with which I should recognize the deficiencies of my nature? (Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," The Philosophical Works of I

Descartes, 2 vols., trans. Elizabeth S.

Publications, 1955), vol.

See that

Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover

p. 166).

I,

also Descartes's claim that because the characteristics of

God

are such

they do not appear capable of proceeding from the single finite

individual "we must conclude that God necessarily exists." Ibid., p. 165. 36 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 9; Eliot, p. 7. 37 Feuerbach argues that Christianity is the undialectical negation of "heathen" religion.

The

ancients sacrificed the individual to the species; the Christians sacrificed the

species to the individuals. Or, heathenism conceived the individual only as a part in distinction

from the whole of the species; Christianity on the contrary conceives of the

individual only in immediate indistinguisable unity with the species. (Feuerbach,

Werke \\,

p. 182; Eliot, p. 152)

38 Feuerbach, WerkeW, pp. 189-90; Eliot, p. 157. 39 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 9; Eliot, p. 7. 40 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 192; Eliot, p. 159. 41 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 184; Eliot, p. 153. 42 Feuerbach, Werke VI, p. 90; Eliot, p. 73. 43 The distinction between implicit and explicit species consciousness can be illustrated in the following: "Where therefore the species as species is not an object for individual consciousness, then

it

consciousness as God.'" Feuerbach, Werke \\,

44 Feuerbach, Werke

II, p.

will p.

be an object for

this

190; Eliot, p. 157.

238.

45 Marx returns to this point again and again in the course of his commentary. See for example the following: "The important thing is that Hegel always into the makes the Idea the subject and turns the proper, the real subject predicate. But development always takes place on the side of the predicate." .

MEGA,

MECW,

pp. 410; p. 8.

differences."

MECW,

"The Idea

MEGA,

p.

p. 11. is

"The Idea

is

subjectivized."

spoken of as a subject which

411;

MECW,

p. 12.

is

.

.

MEGA,

p.

406;

developed to

"Abstract reality,

its

necessity (or

difference of substance), substantiality, thus the abstract logical categories are

made

1

into subjects.

'

MEGA,

p.

417;

MECW,

46 Feuerbach, Werke II, p. 225. 47 MEGA, p. 406; MECW, p. 8. 48 Feuerbach, Werke II, p. 239. 49 "The actual relation of the family and its

inner imaginary activity."

MEGA,

civil

p.

50 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, no. 279. 51 MEGA, p. 426; MECW, p. 23. See

p. 16.

society to the state

406;

MECW,

also

Marx's

is

conceived as

p. 8.

reaction

to

Hegel's

Notes

to

pages

57-59

1

69

description of the substantiality of the state (Philosophy of Right, no. 270).

Hegel

phase of

writes: "this very substantiality having passed through the

education [Bildung]

knows what

it

knowing and willing itself. Therefore the state knows this in its universality, as that which is

spirit

is

wants and

it

thought; the state acts therefore according to conscious goals."

Marx's comment

is:

"The

'goal of the state'

and the

'state authorities' are

mystified inasmuch as they are separated from their real existence and

presented as 'modes of existence' of the 'self-knowing and willing educated

MEGA,

spirit'."

p.

418;

MECW,

p. 17.

See also the following: "sovereignty, the essence of the state, is treated to begin with as an independent being, objectified." MEGA, p. 427; MECW, p. 25. And: "Hegel converts all the attributes of the constitutional monarch in contemporary Europe into absolute self determinations of the will. He does not

say: 'the will

decision

will's final

of the monarch the monarch.'

is

second twists the empirical

MECW,

the final decision,' but rather, 'the

fact into a

first

proposition

Marx

claim that

empirical; the

MEGA,

427;

p.

See

for

in the text

which seem

to justify Stanley

Moore's

simply "took over" Feuerbach's method. Stanley Moore,

example the following: "The existence of the predicate

subject; therefore the subject

p. 23), as well as the

is

the

the existence of subjectivity, etc." And,

[is]

"Hegel transforms the predicates into independent

MECW,

is

metaphysical axiom."

p. 25.

52 There are some passages p. 1.

is

The

entities"

(MEGA,

426;

p.

passages cited in notes 45 and 51 above.

Compare Feuerbach's claim is

in the Essence of Christianity: "What the subject only in the predicate; the predicate is the truth of the subject."

lies

Feuerbach, Werke VI,

p. 23; Eliot, p. 19.

53

from his comments in the penultimate paragraph of the "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy" for example that Feuerbach essentially accepts Hegel's account of the relation of the estates to the head of the state: "In the state, the essential human qualities or activities are realized in particular estates, but in the person of the head of the state they are again resolved into an identity." Feuerbach, Werke II, p. 244. This sentence is to all extents and purposes a rendering of Hegel's point of view in Feuerbachian terms. Similarly Feuerbach's objection that "Hegel makes unreason into reason" is not a political criticism but only a logical one. Ibid.,

54

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

It

p.

55

56

is

clear

238.

MECW, MECW, 426; MECW,

p.

408;

p. 9.

p.

446;

p. 39.

p.

p. 23.

See

also the following:

[Hegel] does not develop his thinking from the object, rather he explains the object in

accordance with ready-made thinking in the sphere of abstract

logic.

It

is

not a

question of developing the specific idea of the political constitution, but of giving the political constitution a relation to the abstract Idea,

[the Idea's] life history,

57

MEGA,

p.

476;

- an obvious

MECW,

p. 63.

mystification.

Marx

is

of classifying

(MEGA,

not

p.

it

415;

entirely

as a phase of

MECW,

accurate

its

p. 14)

in

his

1

70

Notes

59-65

to pages

representation of Hegel's political philosophy. entirely fair in his critique.

There

Consequently he

is

not

certainly are sections of the Philosophy of

Right where Hegel can justly be accused of attempting to rationalize the status

The

quo.

passages in the Preface which criticize the movements for political

reform are a case in point. But there are also sections of the text where Hegel takes a critical stance towards existing institutions. His discussion of the Legislature is one example. On this issue see Stanley Moore, pp. 2-3.

58

p. 510; MECW, p. 91. Marx is clearly acknowledging here his debt Feuerbach's "critico-genetic" method. In his Critique of Hegel's

MEGA, to

philosophy Feuerbach outlines the task of a genetic-critical philosophy. Distinguishing genetic criticism from the sort of philosophical criticism that is

to

be found

Feuerbach

in Hegel's philosophy,

With Hegel, philosophy had,

to

Genetic-critical

philosophy

is

comprehend an

object which

is

says:

be sure, a critical but not a genetic-critical meaning. that which does not dogmatically establish and given through a representation but which instead .

.

.

investigates the origin [of the representation]; genetic-critical philosophy questions

whether the object

is

a real object or

in general only a psychological

whether

phenomenon;

it is

only a representation, whether

it is

genetic-critical philosophy distinguishes

therefore in the strictest fashion between the subjective and the objective. (Feuerbach,

Werke\\,p. 194)

59 60 61

62 63

64 65

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

MECW, p. 33. MECW, p. 91. 17. p. 540; MECW, p. pp. 539-40; MECW, p. 117. p. 539; MECW, p. 117. p. 539; MECW, p. 117. p. 496; MECW, p. 79. It is p.

439;

p.

510;

1

kommunistiches Wesen

is

yet thinking in terms of any change in the

66

from the context that the term

clear

simply equivalent here to a Getneinwesen.

mode

Marx

is

not

of material production.

p. 538; MECW, p. 115. Arguing against Hegel's claim that the democratic perspective "keeps civil and political life apart from each other

MEGA,

and suspends the latter so to speak in the air" {Philosophy of Right, no. 303, Remark), Marx says: "[The] notion [Vorstellung] does not keep civil and political life separate; it is merely the representation of an actually existing separation. That notion does not suspend political life in the air, rather political life is

the

life

in

the air [Luftleben], the ethereal region of civil

MEGA, pp. 496-7; MECW, MEGA, p. 508; MECW, p. 90. MEGA, p. 542; MECW, p. 119. MEGA, p. 542; MECW, p. 19. society."

p. 79.

67 68 69 1 70 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A vii-viii. 71 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, no. 258, Remark. 72 MEGA, p. 436; MECW, p. 31. 73 MEGA, pp. 460-1; MECW, p. 50. Compare the following from the Wood Theft Debates: "The wise legislator will not confine himself to removing .

.

.

1

Notes the impossibility for right,

but

rights."

74

MEGA,

members of one

belong

class to

to pages

to a

65-68

1

7

higher sphere of

will raise this class itself to the real possibility [of enjoying] its

MEGA,

vol.

I

1/1, p. 277;

MECW,

461;

p.

MECW,

vol.

Staatsmssen

p. 51.

I,

p.

235.

the sort of knowledge that

is

Greek or Roman statesmen allegedly possessed. Marx comments caustically: "One does not hear that Greek or Roman statesmen passed examinations." p. 461; MECW, p. 51. Plato's philosopher kings were indeed supposed to undergo a rigorous set of examinations, but these examinations were designed to test their fitness to rule in accordance with absolute standards of justice and truth, not their acquisition of bureaucratic skills.

MEGA,

75

MEGA,

p.

436;

MECW,

p. 31.

76 Feuerbach, WerkeVl, pp. 194-5; Eliot, p. 161. 77 "The present civil society is the accomplished Individual

individualism.

existence

content, etc. are only means."

MEGA, p.

[durchgefuehrte] principle

ultimate

goal;

498; MECW,

p. 81.

the

is

activity,

of

labor,

Marx comments

"war of each against all" is 41. See no. 289 of the Philosophy

that Hegel's characterization of civil society as the

"worth noting." MEGA,

p.

450;

MECW, p.

of Right.

78 MEGA, p. 544; MECW, p. 121. 79 See in this connection Walter Goodman's interview of Kenneth B. Clark, "I am Bewildered," originally published in the New York Times, reprinted in the San Francisco Chronicle, 17 February 1985. See also Stereotypes, Distortions and Omissions in U.S. History Textbooks, published by the Council on Interracial

made 80 In

in

Books

a letter to

Ruge

will "collapse

written to a I

for

Children (New York, 1977). (This argument can be

terms of sexism as well.)

by

written on 30

itself."

member

November 1842 Marx

Reporting on the contents of a

claims that religion letter

which he had

of the Berlin group Die Freien ["The Free"]

Marx

says:

requested that religion should be criticized in the critique of political conditions

rather than that political conditions be criticized in the critique of religion ... for religion itself

is

without content:

it

owes

its

being not to heaven but to earth, and with

the collapse of the distorted [verkehrten] reality of which

it

will collapse

81 This correspondence thus brackets the period during which

Marx was

by

itself.

(MEGA,

vol.

I

1/2, p. 286;

MECW,

vol.

I,

p.

it is

writing the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right.

82

On

the theory,

395)

"

the issue of the conservative nature of Hegel's philosophy of history see

Habermas and Joachim Ritter. In his essay "Hegel and the French Revolution" Joachim Ritter seeks to rescue Hegel from the clutches of those who argue that his is a reactionary philosophy. Ritter argues that Hegel's entire philosophical enterprise can be understood as a dialogue with the French Revolution. The essay appears in Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge; MIT Press, 1982), pp. 35-90. Habermas argues that Hegel has at best an ambiguous relation to the French Revolution inasmuch as "Hegel wants the revolutionizing of reality the discussion between Juergen

172

Notes

to pages

69-72

without revolutionaries." Juergen Habermas, Theorie und Praxis (Neuwied

am

Rhein: Luchterhand, 1963), p. 105. Habermas thus grants Ritter that Hegel makes revolution the heart of his philosophy, but he argues that Hegel only does so for the sake of a philosophy which as such overcomes the revolution. Theorie und Praxis, p. 103. 83 Marx is not alone in holding this attitude. His views in this regard are shared by other Young Hegelians, among them Bruno Bauer, Moses Hess, Arnold Ruge and August von Cieszkowski. See David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (New York; Praeger, 1969), William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), and Horst Stuke, der

Philosophie

84

Tat:

zur

Studien

Verwirklichung

der Philosophie

Junghegelianern

(Stuttgart: Ernst Kiett Verlag, 1963).

MEGA,

MECW,

p.

574;

Marx

p. 143.

bei

den

argues that for this reason religion

(and politics) are legitimate objects of criticism. Indeed inasmuch as the

contemporary German public subjects. itself to

Marx

claims that

passionately concerned about these two

is

much more important for criticism to address criticize German reality by opposing it to some

it is

these issues than to

abstract Utopia such as Cabet's Voyage

85

86 87 88 89

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

MECW, p. 142. p. 565; MECW, p. 141. p. 573; MECW, p. 142. p. 573; MECW, p. 142. pp. 574-5; MECW, p.

p.

to Icaria.

573;

Marx seems

144.

Hegel's use of the Greek proverb Hie Rhodus, hie

to

have in mind here

saltus.

Hegel

cites this

proverb in the Preface of the Philosophy of Right by way of buttressing his claim that "The task of philosophy is to comprehend that which is, for what is is

reason." Hegel argues that philosophy cannot leap over

leap over Rhodes. In this respect

90

much contempt

as

MEGA,

MECW,

575;

p.

Hegel does

Marx

fully

its

agrees with Hegel.

time, cannot

Marx

has as

for the project of constructing ideal worlds.

p. 144.

"We

can formulate the direction of our

journal in one word: self-understanding of the age (critical philosophy)

concerning 91

92 93

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

its

struggles and wishes."

MECW,

575;

p.

512;LMECW, 575;

MECW,

467;

MECW,

MEGA,

p.

575;

MECW,

p. 145.

p. 144.

p.

p.

141.

Here Marx has taken a position which is one he accuses Hegel of holding: supposing that the realization of freedom will or could come about "against consciousness." See note 94 p.

p. 144.

exactly the

below.

94

MEGA,

Chapter

3

p.

p. 56.

Dogmatic and

Dialectical Perspectives

on the

"Jewish Question" 1

The German

text

is

found

in

MEGA,

vol.

I

1/1, pp.

567-607. The English

Notes

to

page 74

173

MECW, vol.

Ill, pp. 146-74. Unless otherwise indicated the and in this chapter are to these volumes. "On the Jewish Question" was published in the first (and only) edition of the Deutsch-Franzoeische Jahrbuecher, co-edited by Marx and Arnold Ruge in February- of 1 844. There is some controversy as to whether Marx wrote his essay before or after he had seen Moses Hess's essay "Ueber das Geldwesen" ["On the Essence of Money"]. Hess had submitted his article to

text is

found

in

references to

the

MECW

MEGA

Deutsch-Franzoeische Jahrbuecher but

Marx

rejected

publication. (See his letter to Julius Froebel of 21 vol.

XXVII,

Hess's essay was eventually published

p. 423.)

the

article

November 1843,

for

MEW,

in the Rheinische

H. Puttmann (Darmstadt, 1845). It is reprinted in Moses Hess, Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften, ed. Auguste Cornu and Wolfgang Moenke (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1961). The controversy centers on the second section of Marx's essay. The point at issue is the source of Marx's brief comments about money as well as the source of his characterization of Judaism. David McLellan maintains that Marx actually "copied heavily from Hess's essay." McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 155. This claim is repeated on p. 158. Both Silberner (see note 2 below) and Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), argue that Hess's influence was of major importance for Marx's essay. For a contrary view see Julius Carlebach, Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 110-24. I find Carlebach's discussion of the textual dissimilarities between Hess and Marx convincing. To reject the Silberner, Tucker, McLellan view is not however to claim that Marx is "original" in his characterization of Judaism; on the contrary Marx's depiction of the Jews and Judaism is indebted primarily to two non-Jews: Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer. See note 41 below. Jahrbuecher zur vpissentschaftlichen Reform, ed.

Edmund

Silberner characterizes

Marx

in this fashion in his Sozialisten

Judenfrage: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sozialismus

Jahrhundert

bis

1914

(Berlin:

vom Anfang

Colloquium Verlag, 1962),

p. 140.

zur

der 19.

Silberner

of Marx's remarks about Jews and easily shows that the number of "negative" remarks far outweighs the number of "positive" ones. compiles a

He

list

concludes: "provided that one understands anti-Semitism as hostility

towards the Jews and does not make an arbitrary selection of Marx's statements regarding the Jews but takes them in their entirety, one not only

can but must characterize Marx as an outspoken anti-Semite." For a critique of Silberner's approach see Helmut Hirsch, "The Ugly Marx: Analysis of an

'Outspoken Anti-Semite'," The Philosophical Forum VIII nos. 2-3 (1978), pp. 150-63.

trans,

"On

the Jewish Question" reveals "the sanguinary dream world without Jews." Karl Marx: A World without Jews, from the original German with an introduction by Dagobert D. Runes

Runes claims of Karl

that

Marx -

(New York:

a

Philosophical Library,

from the

start.

1959), p.

xi.

That Runes was only

"On the Jewish Question" as a Cold War text is evident The dust cover announces: "here is the first English

interested in using

174

Notes

74

to page

translation" of a

work

Russia." Runes,

who

that has

been "long

available to the readers in Soviet

describes himself modestly as "an eminent philo-

sopher," asserts that this same "eminent philosopher" has provided "a

and illuminating critical introduction" to the "unexpurgated papers Marx on the so-called 'Jewish Question'." The "critical introduction" consists of Runes's unabashed attempt to make Marx responsible both for National Socialism and for Soviet anti-Semitism. fearless

of Karl

"first English translation" of "On the complete English translation was published by Edward Fitzgerald (London, 1935). An earlier version was published in 1926 in a volume of Marx's early writings entitled Selected Essays by International

Runes's claim to have provided the

Jewish Question"

Publishers in

German

is false.

New

York.

A

The

translator,

H.

J.

Stenning, renders Marx's

number of Stenning omits several passages from material which Marx himself quotes and about 500 words of Marx's original into

inaccuracies

text,

somewhat

in

stilted English. Additionally there are a

translation.

this

but these defects, although regrettable, do not radically distort the sense

The same cannot be

of Marx's essay. deletes

a

variety

of key phrases

said for the

Runes

and sentences

edition,

(without

which

appropriate

and arbitrarily uses giant, bold-face type to emphasize certain passages in the text. Runes also adds a section from The Holy Family without indicating the source of these paragraphs. indications), transposes passages

In addition to

its

other defects the Runes edition mistranslates, several

crucial concepts, the

most

significant of

which

is

the rendering of the

German Judentum [Judaism] as "Jewry," for which the German word is Judenschaft. The difference between "Judaism" and "Jewry" is the difference between the religion and the people. Marx does not use the term Judenschaft at any point in his essay. The rendering of Judentum as "Jewry" transforms Marx's

final

sentence:

"The

social

emancipation of the Jew [desjuden]

emancipation of society from Judaism {JudentumY (A1EGA, p. 606; p. 174), a

statement which admittedly requires

critical

is

the

MECIV,

comment and analysis, The presentation of

into an exhortation to exterminate the Jewish people.

Marx

as a (self-convicted) forerunner of National Socialism exactly serves

Runes's purposes.

For an expose of the Cold War nature of Runes's "scholarship" see Louis Harap, "Karl Marx and the Jewish Question," Jewish Currents XIII (July-August 1959), pp. 11-15, 33-4. It is unfortunate that at least one introductory discussion of the development of Marx's thought relies on

Runes. See Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Harcourt Brace 1966).

4 Bauer's reflections on the issue of Jewish emancipation are contained in his book Die Judenfrage (Braunschweig, 1843) and in a polemical essay, "Die Faehigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu werden," Einundzwanzig Bogen aus derSchweiz, ed. G. Herweg (Zurich and Winterthur, 1843), 56-71.

"Die Faehigkeit" ("The Capacity of Present Day Jews and Christians to Become Free") has been republished in Bruno Bauer, Feldzuege der reinen Kritik, ed. Hans Martin Sass (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968). An

Notes English translation

is

to pages

available in The Philosophical

75- 76

Forum VIII

175

nos.

2-4

(1978), pp. 135-48.

For a discussion of the theological and philosophical premises underlying Bauer's rejection of the demands for Jewish emancipation see Nathan

The Bruno Bauer ConThe Leo Baeck Institute of Jems from Germany, Year Book IV (London, 1959), pp. 3-36. For a discussion of the Jewish response to Bauer in the German-Jewish press see Rotenstreich and Carlebach. 5 Jacob Katz comments that this edict "was far from granting the Jews more than a carefully circumscribed living space and choice of occupation, with a Rotenstreich, "For and Against Emancipation:

troversy,"

to send their children to modern schools." The edict number of Jewish families that could live in particular communities. The Jews of Austria- Hungary had to wait until 1867 before they were granted complete formal emancipation. Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism from 1700-1933 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

concomitant obligation also regulated the

University Press, 1980), p. 223.

6 For a discussion of the issue of Jewish emancipation in the

German

Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction, pp. 51104 and 147-220. See also Jacob Katz, Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background ofJewish Emancipation, 1770-1870 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1973). Carlebach has a good discussion of the issue of Jewish emancipation in the Prussian context. See pp. 9-90. 7 Bauer, "Die Faehigkeit," in Feldzuege, p. 179. For a discussion of the conception of the Jews in the theology of the Young Hegelians see intellectual tradition see

Carlebach, pp. 92-110. 8 "Die Faehigkeit," p. 176.

9 Bauer, Die Judenfrage, p. 65. 10 Bauer, "Die Faehigkeit," p. 176. position

is

The

traditional anti-Semitism in Bauer's

clearly revealed; the trouble with the Jews

the Jews did not insist

them

is

that they arejewish; if

on being Jewish there would be no

difficulties in

Bauer's depiction of the Jews' "unfitness" for emancipation relies on a comparison which neatly illustrates the symbiosis of granting

civil

rights.

as Jews can no more be made "suitable" Moors" can be made white by a scrubbing. "Whoever wants to know the Jew as emancipated Jew not only undertakes the same useless effort that one would undertake if one wanted to wash the

anti-Semitism and racism.

The Jews

for emancipation than "the

Moor

white, but one also deceives oneself with useless toil." Ibid.

racism in this comparison

is

the

assumption that "whiteness"

is

The the

preferential state of being.

Given that the suitability for inclusion in the modern state requires that washed clean of their Jewishness (the Christian symbolism of baptism is unmistakable), one might well wonder whether such a cultural scrubbing is worth it. 11 Having argued that a secular state would require the abolition of every religious privilege including the monopoly of a privileged religion, Bauer the Jews be

says: "if

some or many

or even the overwhelming majority

still

believed themselves

2

1

76

Notes

bound

76- 77

to pages

to fulfill religious duties,

the fulfillment

private matter.'" Bauer, Diejudenfrage, p. 65,

must be left to them as a purely quoted bv Marx, MEGA, p. 579;

MECW,

p. 149; italics, Marx. Holding the victims accountable or responsible for the oppression to which they are subject, i.e. "blaming the victim" for the systematic mistreatment which they receive, is one of the elements of this mistreatment itself. The consequences of this process appear in the consciousness of the victims as their conviction that they are to blame for their own oppression. 13 It is worth noting that Marx's interest in the issue of Jewish emancipation antedates his polemic with Bauer. In a letter to Arnold Ruge dated 9 July 1842 Marx had announced his intention to stop the "blabbering" of one Dr. Karl Heinrich Hermes, a journalist who had written a number of articles 1

against the

civic

emancipation of the Jews for the more conservative which he was an editor. MEGA, vol. I 1/2, p. 278; 390. Hermes originally argued that Prussia could not grant

Koelnische Zeitung of

MECW, vol.

p.

I,

equal

the Jews

contradiction,"

civil

rights

inasmuch

"without

creating

an

as the Christian religion

impossible

internal

was the basis of the

state. In the course of his polemic with Ludwig Phillipson, the founder and editor of the Allgemeine Zeitung des jfudentums, Hermes cites additional grounds: the majority of Jews are marked by "moral degene-

Prussian

Hermes concludes

ration."

that "Jews will not cease to offend us until they

cease to be Jews." Cited by Carlebach, pp. 83-4. In late August of 1842 Marx wrote to his friend Dagobert Oppenheim and asked Oppenheim to (italics, Marx). Marx says soon as possible, which if it does not conclusively solve the [Jewish] question, will at least put it on another track." MEGA, vol. I 1/2, p. 279; MECW, vol. I, pp. 391-2. Various pressing

send him he

will

"all

of Hermes's articles against the Jems"

send Oppenheim "an

matters

apparently

emancipation

kept

at this time.

article as

Marx from

On

taking

up

the

issue

of Jewish

21 January 1843 the Rheinische Zeitung was

prohibited by the censor. Marx's next opportunity to address the "Jewish

question"

came

in the fall

of 1843.

For the history of Marx's concern with the issue of Jewish emancipation see Hirsch. See also Shlomo Avineri, "Marx and Jewish Emancipation," Journal of the History of Ideas XXV (1964), pp. 445-50. 14 MEGA, p. 579-80; MECW, p. 149. Marx is not quite accurate in his portrayal of Bauer's discussion, for Bauer does consider exactly the question which Marx accuses him of not considering but he considers it from a perspective which accepts the established form of social life. In actuality Marx's disagreement with Bauer is not simply a disagreement over method, but a disagreement about the nature of emancipation: what should count as real emancipation?

MECW,

15

MEGA,

16

Marx does not use the term "social relations" but it is clear that his vision of universal human emancipation entails a complete transformation of the social relations which obtain in modern civil society. Universal human emancipation, as Marx defines this concept, requires that "in one's everyday

p.

580;

p. 149.

Notes life,

to

77- 78

pages

1

77

work, in one's particular situation, the individual has

in one's particular

become a species-being [Gattungsrvesen]." MEGA, p. 599; MECW, p. 168. 17 Compare the new meaning which Marx gives to the term "political" in "On the Jewish Question" with the meaning this term had in the articles on the

Wood

Theft Debates. See for example Marx's remark at the end of one Assembly had acted in a manner that was "not political, i.e. without any connection with the whole of civic reason article that the Provincial

and

[Staatsvernunft] p.

304;

MECW,

vol.

civic morality

[Staatssittlichkeit]."

MEGA,

vol.

I

1/1,

262.

p.

I,

But Marx is not consistent in his usage of the term "political." The essay on the "Jewish question" still shows traces of the old meaning of the term. See note 56 below. 18 "Political emancipation

MECW,

is,

of course, a great step forward."

MEGA,

p.

585;

from the perspective of universal human emancipation that the perspective of political emancipation can be called limited. Marx's critique of political emancipation is undertaken from this p. 155.

It

only

is

transcending perspective.

19

The term

MECW,

appears only once in

"On

the Jewish Question"

(MEGA,

p.

590;

159) but the analysis of mystified consciousness in terms of

p.

Marx's discussion. For this is most crucially indebted to Hegel's account of the various forms of dualism in the Phenomenology. In fact the Phenomenology itself can be read as the adventure story of the overcoming of dualism. 20 In the Phenomenology this antagonism is an indication of the essentially unstable nature of mystified consciousness. For Hegel it is the selfdualism

is

integral to the entire structure of

characterization of mystified consciousness

contradictory

of

nature

each

unsatisfactory

understanding of an issue) that leads to

improved

formulations

particularity

21

mark

Marx

of the

its

position

dissolution.

relationship

(each

The

between

dualistic

sequential and

universality

and

the progress of consciousness along the path to Absolute

Knowledge. Inasmuch as Marx uses the term "religious" as a synonym for mystification, he collapses the Feuerbachian distinction between religious consciousness and theological consciousness. Whereas for Feuerbach it is reflection which corrupts the innocence of an originally harmless religious feeling, for Marx, the villain

is

not "reflection" but mystified

reflection, or, in his

terminology,

"religious reflection."

The

derivation

of Marx's usage of "religious" as synonymous with

"mystified" can be reconstructed in the following syllogistic form: Mystified consciousness

between

universality

is

and

dualistic (in

terms of

particularity).

-

its

worships the universal). - Mystified consciousness

what

its

understanding of the relationship

Dualistic consciousness is

is

religious

(it

inherently religious, no matter

contents.

The view

that religious consciousness

is

a matter not only of content but of

form has already been articulated by Marx

in incipient fashion in the Critique

178

to pages

Notes

79-80

of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right". This is apparent in his claim that Hegel's acceptance of the separation of the political state from civil society results "

from a

theological

notion of the political state."

MEGA

vol. I 1/1, p.

542;

MECW, vol. Ill, p. 119. MEGA, p. 586; MECW,

22 p. 155. 23 Commenting on Bauer's claim that "There is no longer any religion when there is no privileged religion" (Bauer, Diejudenfrage, p. 66, quoted by Marx, MEGA, p. 579), Marx refers to Bauer's remark that the fulfillment of (Christian) religious duties is a purely private matter and says: "the overwhelming majority does not thereby cease to be religious by being religious in private."

MEGA,

582;

p.

MECW,

p. 152.

24 Marx never wavered on the issue of Jewish emancipation, in spite of his personal antipathy towards the Jewish religion. In a letter to Ruge of 13 March 1843 Marx declares that he finds the Jewish religion "disgusting" [widerlich]. In this same letter Marx reports that he has just been visited by the leader of the Jewish community in Cologne who has asked Marx "to petition the Provincial Assembly" for the Jews. Marx writes: "and I want to do this ... It is a matter of punching as many holes as possible in the Christian state and smuggling in as much as we can of what is rational."

MEGA,

vol.

Marx

I

1/2, p. 308;

MECW,

vol.

p.

I,

400.

up the "Jewish question" again in his polemical critique The Holy Family (1845) and restates the case for the political emancipation of the Jews in unequivocal terms. Bauer's argument against Jewish emancipation had elicited a variety of replies from leading publicists in the Jewish community to which Bauer had in turn responded. In reviewing the debate between Bauer and his Jewish critics Marx finds that the latter have correctly takes

detected the fallacies in Bauer's reasoning. Marx's discussion

found

is

in

three separate sub-sections of chapter VI.

One remark

of Marx's

is

particularly

worth noting: again restating his full human emancipation and

point that political emancipation differs from

some

and Christians are politically on the other hand which cannot yet emancipate the Jews politically must be measured against the perfected political state and shown to be under-developed states." MEGA, vol. Ill, noting

that

emancipated,

p.

25

26 27

285;

MEGA, MEGA,

in

Marx

MECW, p. p.

both Jews

"Those

states

vol. IV, p. 111.

MECW, 584; MECW,

590;

states

says:

p. 159. p. 154.

Bauer intends to give a secularist critique of religion and religious claims. Arguing against the view that "religious hatred" is the cause of difficulties between Christians and Jews, Bauer says: "Human beings have when never done anything historical merely for the sake of religion these people supposed that they were acting and suffering for God's sake actions and sufferings were much more about what humankind had to be and become." Die Judetifrage, p. 94. One passage in which Bauer insists on the non-religious content of religious belief systems seems to suggest that It

is

clear that

.

.

.

.

.

.

Notes Bauer's critique of religion

We would be we wished

is

is

human

1

79

falsely, that is as

it

understands

itself, if

was only concerned with the divine and the other-worldly. rather the self-alienated world of humankind's interests projected it

into another world; the shape of this world

prevailing in

80-81

not so vastly different from Marx's.

understanding religious history

to think that

This other-world

to pages

and

society,

its

understanding of worldly interests into

manner. (Bauer, Die Judenfrage,

is

only an imagination of the order

heresies and struggles only an attempt to bring the this

imaginary world in a violent and inverted

p. 95)

Citing this passage, McLellan claims that Bauer has in effect succeeded

"with as

much

Marx

clarity as

ever achieved" in transforming theological

questions into secular ones. McLellan finds this passage "strikingly akin to

Marx." McLellan, The Young Hegelians, p. 77. Such a claim focuses essentially on the verbal similarities in Marx's and Bauer's discussion; it ignores the major differences in their definition of "religion." 28 MEGA, p. 584; MECW, p. 154. Marx criticizes Bauer for having simply accepted Hegel's description of the relationship of the state to

civil

society

without reflecting on what this relationship implies about the nature of society.

Marx

claims that Bauer's discussion of both states and

civil

civil

society

"has been drawn up according to the main features of Hegel's philosophy of right. Civil society in its

opposition to the political state

necessary because the political state p.

585;

MECW,

According

p. 155.

criticizing only the Christian state

29

MEGA,

p. 595;

MECW,

characterization of

civil

is

p. 164.

to

is

recognized as

recognized as necessary."

MEGA,

Marx, Bauer has succeeded

Both Bauer and Marx accept Hegel's

society as "the system of needs" {Philosophy of Right,

no. 189 ff). Hegel had already pointed to the inherent instability of society.

in

but not "the state as such."

Bauer's description of the dynamic of needs in

opening pages of Die Judenfrage reads

like a

civil

civil

society in the

paraphrase of Hegel's discussion

of the "inner dialectic of civil society" in paragraphs

243-6 of the

Philosophy

ofRight.

Need

is

the powerful motor that sets

civil

other in order to satisfy their needs, and

is

society in motion.

in turn

Each person uses the

used by them for the same purpose

precisely its foundation, need, which while it secures the existence of civil and guarantees its necessity, exposes it to constant dangers; [need] contains within itself an uncertain element and creates the perpetual oscillation between poverty and wealth, destitution and prosperity. (Die jfudenfrage, p. 8) ...

It is

society

30

MEGA,

31

The

p.

584;

literature

MECW,

on

p. 154.

this issue is so vast that

it is

well

beyond the scope of

my

discussion here. Carlebach's book contains an excellent bibliography on the

Carlebach himself has an extended discussion of this issue but in at one case he fails to understand a perspective which differs from his. In the process of criticizing McLellan's handling of the question: "Marx as

topic.

least

180

Notes

to pages

8 1-83

Carlebach takes issue with McLellan's use of "Shlomo which emphasized Marx's support of the Jewish claim for emancipation." Carlebach complains that McLellan "seemingly overlooked anti-Semite?",

Avineri's discourse

the fact that Avineri began his article ["Marx and Jewish Emancipation"]

Marx was an inveterate anti-semite' " Perhaps because of his own views, Carlebach takes

with the simple assertion 'that Karl (Carlebach, p. 279). Avineri's opening

the

first

remark

be a statement of agreement with

this claim. But "That Karl Marx was an today considered a commonplace which is hardly

to

sentence in Avineri's

inveterate anti-semite

is

article

ever questioned." (Avineri, p. 445).

reads:

Had Carlebach

paid closer attention to

Avineri's essay he might have seen that Avineri intends to challenge the

"commonplace which is hardly ever questioned." For the history of the term "anti-Semitism" (which was introduced in Germany only in 1879) see Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction, pp. 260 ff. 32 33

MEGA, p. MEGA, p. for a

586;

581;

MECW, p. 155. MECW, p. 151. If religious consciousness

deeper malaise, does

effortlessly)

disappear

discussion of

some of

this

when

mean

that the

symptom

the deeper malaise

is

is

only a

symptom

will inevitably

(and

cured? See below for a

the problematic assumptions in this conception of

mystified consciousness.

34 In the

last analysis it is civil society which expresses its dominance in and through the existence of the state. Marx's analysis of the pseudo-universality of the state owes much to Hegel's expose of the pseudo-independence of consciousness before it attains Absolute Knowledge. Consciousness supposes that it is independent, that it is entirely self-determined; its experience

in the

Phenomenology

is

the history of its progressive realizations that

it

has in

been determined by an Other. 35 MEGA, p. 580; MECW, p. 150. For the significance as to how the term Aufhebung is translated in the context of the issue "Marx as anti-Semite?" see note 38 below. 36 MEGA, p. 580; MECW, p. 149. Bauer had termed the Jewish question "the fact

universal question of the age."

37 From this perspective Marx's "On the Jewish Question" reveals its distinctly contemporary relevance. In an era when the progressive forces are often split into a variety of competing movements, Marx's essay reminds us that the liberation of any one group will require a vigilant commitment on the part of this group to the liberation struggles of every other group. Thus no liberation effort can afford to discount or trivialize the issues of other groups. 38 MEGA, pp. 600-1; MECW, p. 169. The rendering of the German aujheben one of the factors that contributes to is found in three of the more recent standard translations of "Zur Judenfrage": Easton and Guddat's Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 243, T. B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 34, and the MECW. The German as "abolish" instead of as "transcend"

is

the misunderstanding of Marx's essay. This rendering

Notes aufheben can be rendered by "abolish" only

if this

to

page 83

"abolition"

is

181

understood

be a matter of preserving the progressive elements and achievements of a particular historical development. Depending on the context, aufheben is thus to

more accurately rendered

often

as "transcend."

Carlebach writes that "Marx's

178), but he fails to

Zionism"

(p.

Aufhebung

in the

comments on

German

the 'abolition of Judaism'

call for

many Jewish writers and justification for some of the vicious disturbed

may

.

.

Moscow

Carlebach himself

of the German aujloesen [dissolve] as "abolish." Pointing Marx "no more intended harm to individual Jews by calling

would have wanted workers

called for the abolition of labor" (Carlebach, p.

refers to a passage in the

German

Ideology

matter of freeing labor but of abolishing p.

39 40

\S5;

MECW,

vol.

has

edition of The Holy Family,

p. 146)

when he

.

also have

idealist tradition. Interestingly,

the mistranslation (in the

dissolution of Judaism than he

.

.

been seen as a attacks on Jews, Judaism and even discuss the meaning of the concept of .

it

where Marx [sie

out that for

the

be attacked 178), Carlebach to

writes: "it

aujzuheben]."

is

MEGA,

not a

vol. V,

V, p. 205.

MEGA, p. 605; MECW, p. 174. MEGA, p. 601; MECW, p. 170. McLellan's comment that "Judaism has very little

religious,

and

less racial,

still

content for Marx," while accurate, ignores

the misinformation in the use of "Judaism" to symbolize the "narrowness of society"

civil

as

"bargaining and

well

all its

as

the

misinformation

in

the

identification

of

conditions" with "the empirical essence of Judaism."

Before Marxism (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 142. For one attempt to justify Marx's use of "practical, real Judaism" to characterize the narrowness of civil society see Istvan Meszaros, Marxs Theory ofAlienation (London: Merlin Press, 1970), pp. 28-33. Meszaros sees nothing problematical in Marx's discussion. Meszaros interprets Marx to be

Marx

discussing "not simply the empirical

reality

ofJewish communities in Europe but

i.e. the internal principle of European social of Judaism developments culminating in the emergence and stabilization of capitalistic society." Meszaros, p. 30; first set of italics, my emphasis. For a different formulation of the issue see Hal Draper, "Marx and the Economic -Jew Stereotype," Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), vol. I, pp. 591-609. 41 For Feuerbach's discussion of the Jewish religion see The Essence of Christianity, ch. 11. (In the German text this chapter is chapter 12.) Bauer characterizes Judaism as a religion of "sensuous need" and "sensuous

the

spirit

',

egoism" at several points in his article "The Capacity of Present Day Jews and Christians to Become Free." 42 In reality, according to Poliakov, the Jews themselves "played only a minor role in the economic life of the period." Leon Poliakov, The History of Anti-Semitism: From the Time of Christ to the Court Jews (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), p. 211. The misidentification of the Jews with money was so tenacious that the term " Christen-Juden" was popularly used to refer to the

182

Notes

to page

84

great late medieval corporations of the Fuggers, the Welsers, the Imhofs and

the Hochstaetters.

The

English expression "to

Jew someone down"

contemporary expression of the same misinformation. Albert Memmi exposes the workings of anti-Semitism portrait of the Jew as an economic figure and concludes:

is

a

in the traditional

[T]he fact is [the Jews'] money is always considered censurable. It follows [them] like an odor of illegitimacy and of doubt ... It is not so much the Jew's money that is more scandalous or more dubious than other men's money, it is the scandal of the Jew's whole existence The heart of the matter resides ndt in the Jew's economic .

activities,

judge and

.

.

but in what [the Jew]

condemn

...

It is

is

as a whole.

It is

the

Jew whom [non-Jews] suspect, Jew that gives the economy

in short the Jewishness of the

of the Jew an infamous meaning and not the reverse. (Albert

Memmi, Portrait of a Jew,

from the French by Elisabeth Abbott (New York: Viking Press, 1971), pp. 161-3) trans,

Thus

the popular identification of "the usurer" and "the Jew" should not be

taken to imply that only Jews were engaged in moneylending, or even that

most moneylenders were Jews. Nor should one conclude that either the officially initiated and sanctioned mistreatment to which the Jews as a group were subject can be explained by referring to the particular economic activities in which Jews were engaged. On the contrary, the stigmatization of the Jews in general as "money-lenders" was an integral popular antagonism or the

element of traditional Christian anti-Semitism. In the twisted dialectic of cause and effect that characterizes

Jews were moneylenders

easily

all

forms of oppression the

became "confirming evidence"

some

fact that

for the socially

sanctioned misinformation which "justified" the continued mistreatment of the Jews as a group.

The the

inversion of cause and effect and the consequent rationalization of

mistreatment meted out to individuals in the targeted group

is

a

forms of oppression. For a critique of the equally tenacious myth of the "Black rapist" see Angela Davis, Women, Race and Class (New York: Random House, 1981), pp. 172-201. characteristic of

all

43 Moishe Postone points out that all forms of anti-Semitism attribute an uncommon degree of power to the Jews, but that "in modern anti-Semitism [this power] is mysteriously intangible, abstract and universal." Moishe Postone, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to 'Holocaust'," New German Critique no. 19 (Winter 1980), p. 106. 44 For the individual member of a targeted group the "acceptance" of the myths about this group often takes the form of a "discovery." Compare the following from Memmi's Portrait of a Jew, p. 26: "Sooner or later, be the discovery slow or sudden, hesitant or an overwhelming decisive intuition, a man becomes aware that he is a Jew. Sooner or later each Jew discovers his little Jew, the little Jews he sees around him and the little Jew who according to other men, is within him." Although Memmi's account appears to describe only the experience of Jewish males, his description of the dynamics of internalized oppression applies equally well to Jewish women, but the features of the "portrait" are different.

For

a discussion of the "Jews"

which

Notes Jewish

women

to

pages

84-86

1

83

"discover within themselves" see Evelyn Torton Beck, ed.,

Nice Jewish Girls, (Watertown, Mass.: Persephone Press, 1982).

45

It is

my

view that the failure to understand the dynamics of internalized

oppression

is

responsible both for the hesitancy to confront the misinform-

on the part of many Marxist scholars and for the which characterizes much of the non-Marxist Jewish response. The failure to distinguish between anti-Semitism and internalized antiSemitism reveals itself also in the attempt to make Marx responsible for the anti-Semitism in the socialist tradition. As if anticipating this possibility, August Bebel and Edward Bernstein, the first editors of the Marx-Engels correspondence, deleted all of Marx's anti-Jewish remarks from their ation in Marx's discussion

bitterness

edition.

46 MEGA, p. 603; MECW, p. 171. 47 MEGA, p. 601; MECW, p. 170. 48 That Marx's essay has been misused

make Marx

to support genocidal policies

does not

responsible for them. Carlebach cites a speech of Hitler's in

which he remarks: "it is quite enough that the scientific knowledge of the danger of Judaism is gradually deepened and that every individual begins to eliminate the Jew within himself, and I am very much afraid that this beautiful thought originates from none other than a Jew." Carlebach, p. 355. But the fact that Hitler attributes "this beautiful thought" to Marx does not justify a conclusion such as the following by Carlebach, a conclusion which in view of his own discussion (see note 38 above) must be regarded as a radical anomaly in his book. [the second section of his essay] on the Jewish question is cast in same mould as those of Luther and Hitler. Like them, Marx knew little about Judaism and cared little for any empirical realities. Luther wanted to convert Jews; Marx wanted to abolish them. Hitler wanted to expel and subsequently to exterminate them. Marx is a logical and indispensable link between Luther and Hitler. (Carlebach,

Marx's second essay the

p.

49

352)

MEGA, also

p.

5S\;MECW, favor

in

of

p. 151.

abolishing

misunderstanding of Marx's and Karl Marx, p. 75.

50

MEGA, am

p. 581;

MECW,

McLellan's claim that religious

position.

ideas"

(like

Bauer) "Marx

expresses

a

is

common

David McLellan, The Young Hegelians

p. 151.

indebted to Theophus H. Smith of the Pacific School of Religion,

51

I

52

MEGA, p.

Berkeley, California for this perspective on religious traditions.

596;

MECW, p.

165. Quite obviously,

discussion of inversion in chapter

reworked Hegel's account

III

Marx

is

indebted to Hegel's

of the Phenomenology, but he has

one very significant respect. Hegel focuses on was considered despicable is now considered honorable, what was thought to be sweet, now appears to be sour). For Marx, however, inversion carries the implication of a value distortion as well. Thus Marx's sense of inversion is more nearly likened to the concept of the perversion of what ought to be. in

the characteristic of polar opposition as a feature of inversion (what

53

MEGA,

p.

595;

MECW,

p. 164.

1

84

54

Notes

MEGA, first

to pages

86- 91

pp. 593-4;

MECW,

"On

p. 162.

the Jewish Question" contains the

of several critiques of the concept of natural rights on Marx's part.

up this issue in Economy and in the takes

Capital, in

A

Contribution

He

Critique of Political

to the

of the Gotha Program. There are some of these critiques, but Marx's objections to the

Critique

overlapping features in

all

man" in "On the Jewish Question" do not depend do his later remarks) on his analysis of the nature of capitalist production. 55 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, doctrine of the "rights of (as

1958).

56

MEGA,

p.

597;

MECW,

synonym

for

individual

member

p.

598;

universal

MECW,

"political" as

of

The phrase "political, although political in Marx is here retaining the term "political" as

p. 165.

feudal sense" suggests that

or communal.

civil

See

also

society as "the unpolitical

As noted above (note synonymous with "universal" is p. 167.

description

his

human

17), the

being."

a a

of the

MEGA,

usage of the term

characteristic of an earlier

period in Marx's thought.

The new

definition of "political" as a limited

form of emancipation

is

exemplified by Marx's discussion of the individual's relationship to the larger society during the feudal era.

This new definition carries with

exclusion as part of the meaning of "political." individual's relations,

relation

i.e.

to

the

feudal

58 59 60 61

62

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

MEGA,

MECW, p. 166. p. 597; MECW, p. 166. p. 598; MECW, p. 166. p. 596; MECW, p. 165. p. 597; MECW, p. 166. p. 599; MECW, p. 168. p.

as

"[the

p.

596;

it

the sense of

characterizes the

individual's]

political

and exclusion from

[the individual's] relation of separation

other elements of the society."

57

state

Thus Mark

MECW,

p. 165.

597;

In this respect Marx's claim that the

theorists of the political revolution invert the relation

between means and

ends echoes his account of the distorted consciousness of the deputies Rhineland Provincial Assembly. See chapter 1. 63

MEGA,

vol.

I

1/1, p. 436;

MECW,

in the

vol. Ill, p. 31.

Arnold Ruge cited earlier (note 24 above) Marx refers to Feuerbach's "Preliminary Theses" and comments critically that Feuerbach "refers too much to nature and too little to politics." MEGA, vol. I, 1/2, p. 308; MECW, vol. I, p. 400. Marx might equally well have said that Feuerbach refers too little to history.

64 In

65

66 67 68 69 70

his letter to

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

MECW, MECW, 586; MECW, 598; MECW, 598; MECW, 598; MECW,

p.

598;

p.

590;

p.

p. p. p.

p. 167.

p. 159.

p. 155. p. 167. p. 167. p. 167.

71 Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 58.

Notes

to

91- 99

pages

185

72 Ibid., p. 66. 73 Ibid., p. 64. 74 Ibid., pp. 58-9. 75 The critique of the "naturalistic standpoint" of mystified consciousness will become a prime element of Marx's later conception of ideology. In Capital the naturalistic standpoint of mystified consciousness

is

shown

from

to result

the social deception inherent in the capitalist process of production; the formal equality of the exchange relationship disguises the inequality of force and

usurpation which

76 77

MEGA, MEGA,

lies at

MECW, 601; MECW, 598;

p. p.

statement cited earlier:

the origin of the system of free

wage

labor.

p. 167.

p. 170; italics

"We

Compare

added.

maintain that they

will

this

remark

to the

transcend their religious

narrowness once they transcend their secular limits." Both of these remarks echo a comment Marx makes in a letter to Ruge, 30 November 1842, that religion "collapses

are

no longer

by itself when the secular conditions which produce

extant.

MEGA,

vol. I 1/1, p.

286;

MECW,

vol.

I,

p.

it

395. See

the discussion of this point in chapter 2.

MECW, MECW, 577; MECW,

80

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

81

Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed

78 79

p.

601;

p. 170; italics,

p.

606;

p.

p.

mv

emphasis.

174.

p. 147.

(New York: Herder & Herder,

1972),

p. 33.

82 Freire maintains that the "culture of domination" must be confronted even after "the reality of oppression has already been transformed." This confrontation involves "the expulsion of the myths created and developed in

new

the old order which like spectres haunt the

structure emerging from the

revolutionary transformation." Freire, p. 40.

Dogmatic and Dialectical Perspectives in Marx's First Discussion of the Proletariat

Chapter 4

1

The German text

is

found

references to

2 3

4 5

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

text

in

is

found

MEGA

and

MEGA,

Ill,

vol.

From now on

607-21. The English

this

chapter are to these volumes.

186. 184.

187. p. 184.

The

revolution and a radical revolution has thinking.

1/1, pp.

I

pp. 175-87. Unless otherwise indicated the

MECW in

to

MECW, p. p. 617; MECW, p. p. 621; MECW, p. p. 617; MECW, 619;

p.

in

MECW, vol.

a political

between

distinction

now become

revolution

is

a

definitive in

political

Marx's

synonymous with an

incomplete revolution. 6

MEGA,

p.

617;

MECW,

p. 185.

As

in

"On

the Jewish Question"

argues that a political revolution constitutes a stage in

Marx

still

considers that a political revolution

is

human

Marx

emancipation.

"a great step forward."

The

1

86

Notes

pages

to

99-103

dangers inherent in a political revolution lie in the tendency to mistake partial emancipation for complete emancipation. 7

MEGA, p. 618; MECW, p. 185. Compare the following comment by Jean-Paul Sartre: "It is on the day that we can conceive of a different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and our suffering and that we decide that these are unbearable." Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 435. For an attempt to describe a feminist consciousness in these terms see Sandra Lee Bartky, "Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness," Feminism and Philosophy, ed. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Elliston trans.

and Jane English (Totowa,

New Jersey:

Littlefield,

Adams and

Co., 1977),

pp. 22-35.

8

9

MEGA, MEGA,

p.

609;

p.

618;

MECW, MECW,

p. 177. p. 185.

Although ostensibly Marx only intends

remarks to be an account of the subjective civil

11

12 13

14 15

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

in fact describing the consciousness of all victims of

not perceive the possibility that things could be different

MECW, p. 183. p. 619; MECW, p. 186. p. 615; MECW, p. 183. p. 615; MECW, p. 183. p. 614; MECW, p. 182. p. 615; MECW, p. 182. p.

his

members of German

is

he

and who are therefore "content" with 10

of the

who do

society,

oppression

state

their lot.

616;

Marx's introduction of the concept of the

categorical imperative suggests that he considers his discussion at least in

part

as

dialogue with Kant's moral philosophy.

a

instructive: for Kant, the issue

is

the moral law. For Marx, the point

is

revolution.

What

possibility

of a radical

The Kantian

demand of

possibility of a

establishes the reality of the moral law for

the individual's experience of obligation;

suffering.

German

is

to discover the real conditions in the

contemporary situation which would ground the

German

The comparison

the absolute validity or objective reality of

Marx

revolution

will is

radical

Kant

is

argue that what grounds the

the proletariat's experience of

individual experiences obligation as an unconditional

practical reason; the proletariat's experience of suffering

"absolute"; the proletariat experiences "wrong itself"

MEGA, p.

is

also

6\9; MECW,

p. 186.

16 17

18

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

MECW, MECW, 619; MECW,

p.

616;

p. 183.

p.

614;

p. 182.

p.

p. 186.

Thomas Meyer's Der

Zrviespalt in der Marx'schen Emanzipationstheorie (Kronberg: Scriptor Verlag, 1973) for a summary of some of the recent discussion on the issue of "Marx's discovery of the proletariat." Meyer's claim that "Marx's own version of the philosophical role of the proletariat

19 See

can be understood to begin with only as an implicit answer to [Lorenz von] Stein's theory of the proletariat" (Meyer, p. 47) ignores both Marx's early discussion of the nature of the poor and the significance of the concept of the

Notes

to

pages

103-107

187

universal estate in Hegel's political philosophy. For a discussion of the latter, Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 56. 20 MEGA, pp. 619-20; MECW, p. 186. The "Introduction" focuses on the significance of the proletariat's suffering rather than on its activity as labor or its role in the productive process. Joseph O'Malley comments: "The ability

see

of the proletariat to play the historical role of a truly universal class derives

from the universal character of its deprivation." Editor's Introduction to Karl n Marx, Critique ofHegel's "Philosophy ofRight, trans. Annette John and Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. liv. Compare the transvaluation of values in the New Testament promise: "The last will be first" (Matthew, 20:16). 21 MEGA, p. 620; MECW, pp. 186-7. 22 MEGA, p. 618; MECW, p. 185. See for example Marx's insistence that "One must describe every sphere of German society as the partie honteuse [disgraceful part] of German society."

my emphasis. For Marx

610; MECW, p. 178;

MEGA, p.

every group in

German

thus the transformative agent can only

civil

society

come from

italics,

compromised;

is

outside

German

civil

society.

23 24

MEGA, p. 620; MECW, p. 187. When theorists who are members

of an oppressed group reflect on

group's subjectivity, their assessment

Their portrayal of the damage done often unsparing.

On

this point see

is likely

to

be

far

to the subjectivity

Memmi's The

this

more circumspect. of the oppressed

Colonizer

and

is

the Colonized,

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) and Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks

(New

York: Grove Press, 1967).

25

MEGA,

p.

621;

MECW,

p. 187.

26 MEGA, p. 613; MECW, pp. 180-1. 27 See Bertell Oilman's discussion of the necessity of understanding Marx's thought in terms of a philosophical framework which recognizes internal relations. Bertell Oilman, Alienation (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 27-43. In addition to textual evidence and hermeneutical considerations Oilman points to the philosophical tradition of Leibniz,

Spinoza and Hegel, in which the concept of internal relations is central. Oilman argues that it is simply more plausible prima facie to attribute a

Marx than it is to assume that he discarded One is "justified in ascribing a philosophy of internal Marx because it would have required a total break with the

philosophy of internal relations to this

framework.

relations to

philosophical tradition in which he was nourished for this not to be so."

Oilman, claim

p. 31.

Oilman argues

Marx abandoned

that the

"burden of proof

lies

with those

who

this philosophical tradition.

28 The discussion of the realization of philosophy occurs as part of Marx's notes and remarks to his dissertation under the section entitled "The General Principal Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature." MEGA, vol. I 1/1, pp. 63-7; MECW, vol. I, pp. 84-7.

188

Notes

The

to pages

108-109

bulk of this section

is

devoted to a critique of what

Marx terms

the

"unphilosophical trend of a large section of Hegel's school" which explains various aspects of Hegel's philosophical system by his desire for

MEGA,

dation.

p. 64;

phenomenon

the

discusses

MECW,

p. 85. In the context

Marx

claims that this project

to realize itself in

is

immediate realization of philosophy contradictions."

The

turning

of philosophy's

surrounding world and attempting

doomed

to

itself

inasmuch

is

as

"this

innermost essence with

contradictions have to do with the fact that this

the realization of philosophy

the

against

an immediate fashion.

failure

afflicted in its

is

accommoMarx

of this critique

mode

of

form of shadow boxing: "that

essentially a

which [philosophy] struggles against externally, is its own inner lack; in the very struggle it falls into the weaknesses which it struggles against in the opposite camp That which opposes it and which it struggles against is .

.

.

always the same, only with the factors inverted." Unreflective consciousness

supposes that

"[its]

simultaneously

[its]

from the unphilosophical

liberation of the world

own emancipation from

MEGA,

chains as a particular system."

the philosophy which held

pp. 64-5;

MECW,

is

[it]

in

pp. 85-6.

two sides; which Marx calls the liberal party, turns philosophy outward towards the world and takes the stance of critique. The other turns philosophy inward towards itself and attempts to philosophize from the Vis-a-vis the project of the realization of philosophy there are

one

side,

established viewpoint of philosophy.

Marx terms

this perspective "positive

philosophy." Each side has an element of truth: the

world has deficiency the

first

to is

side

in philosophy. In the dissertation is

first

side knows' that the

be made philosophical; the second side knows that the

Marx

takes the position that

the only one that can achieve real progress, "because

party of the concept."

Marx argues

it is

the

that the first side at least has the

advantage of perceiving the inadequacies and contradictions of

its

position.

For further discussion on the importance of the issue of the realization of philosophy for Marx's thought see Juergen Habermas, "Zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und Marxismus," in Theorie und Praxis (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1963), pp. 261-336. See also Thomas Meyer, Der Zwiespalt, pp. 9-44. 29

MEGA, pp. Marx

620-1; MECW,

Easton and Guddat (Writings of the Young (New York: Anchor Books, 1967) translate

p. 187.

on Philosophy and Society

This does not do justice to the more encompassing which Marx intends here. The "spiritual weapons" of the proletariat are "weapons of the spirit" or the mind, the proletariat's sense of itself, and its awareness of the need for a radical revolution. See pp. 109-13

geistig as "intellectual."

sense of

geistig

in this chapter.

The

rendering of

geistig as

religious interpretation. religious meaning.

Marx

See the passage cited

30 Hegel, Phenomenology (Miller entitled "Spirit

Which

is

should not however suggest a

"spiritual"

uses the term

in note

translation),

Certain of

when he intends a 28 of chapter 3. p. 151. See also the chapter Morality." The entire second

spiritualistisch

Itself:

Notes section of Hegel's Philosophy of Right

is

morality, the standpoint of Kantian ethics.

pages

to

also

189

of the standpoint of

a critique

See

109-113

Joachim

Ritter's essay

"Morality and Ethical Life: Hegel's Controversy with Kantian Ethics" (1966) in Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield

MIT Press, 1982), pp. 151-78. See Marx's correspondence with Ruge in September 1843, MEGA, vol. I 1/1, pp. 572-5; MECW, vol. Ill, pp. 133-45. In "Zur philosophischen (Cambridge:

31

um Marx und

Diskussion

sophical misreadings of

Marxismus" Habermas

Marx which

fail

criticizes various philo-

to take into

account his attempt to

philosophize from a perspective of the transcendence of philosophy.

"Marx

under the presuppositions of philosophy, rather he wants to philosophize, indeed criticize under the presupposition of the transcendence of philosophy." Theorie und Praxis, p. 279. Habermas argues that this attempt on Marx's part changes both the categories and the problems which he takes up as well as the method of reflection. Habermas maintains than when Marx is read as though he were philosophizing from an untranscended philosophical standpoint he is read as though he were just another Young Hegelian. According to Habermas the Marx interpretations of Ludwig Langrebe, Erwin Metzke and Heinrich Popitz make this sort of

no longer wants

to philosophize

error.

32 33

34

MEGA, MEGA, MEGA,

MECW, MECW, 608; MECW,

p.

616;

p. 183.

p.

616;

p. 183.

p.

p. 174.

35 In the "Introduction" Marx still connects mystified consciousness with the possession of private property. He has not yet discovered how mystified consciousness

is

an inherent aspect of the system of wage labor. Compare first volume of Capital:

the following from the

The wage -form

thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the working day into

necessary labor and surplus labor, into paid labor and unpaid labor. All labor appears as paid labor

One can

.

.

.

therefore understand the decisive importance of the transformation of the

value and price of labor into the form of wages, or into the value and price of labor itself.

All the notions of justice of the worker

mode of production,

the capitalist tricks

and

XXIII,

p.

Vintage Books),

the capitalist,

this

the mystifications of all

and indeed presents the exact opposite of that

680; translation changed,

the apologetic

phenomenal form which makes

562; English translation, Capital, trans. p.

all

of its illusions about freedom,

of the vulgar economists are based on

actual relation invisible vol.

all

italics

relation.

the

(MEW,

Ben Fowkes (New York:

mine)

36 Various commentators have argued that Marx does not succeed in this project and that the proletariat does in fact appear as the vehicle of the realization of reason. Several critics have pointed to the significance of this

between philosophy and the proletariat for the later between theory and practice in the socialist movement. See among others Lucien Goldmann, "Philosophic et sociologie dans l'oeuvre du jeune Marx: Contribution a l'etude du probleme" in Marxisme et sciences early relationship

relationship

1

90

Notes

to

pages 1 13-115

humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), pp. 148 ff., and Albrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), pp. 56 ff. See also William Leiss, "Critical Theory and Its Future," Political Theory II

(August 1974), pp. 330-49. 37 MEGA, p. 620; MECW, p. 187. 38 MEGA, p. 614; MECW, p. 182. 39 Marx's discussion assumes that radical theory will grip the masses, but as the following comment by Georg Lukacs makes clear, the question of "theory gripping the masses" is not without complexities. In commenting on the relation between Marxist theory and radical practice Lukacs says: [I]n

manner of gripping

theory as well as in the

the masses

it is

even more a matter of

discovering those moments, those determinations which convert the theory, the

method into a vehicle of revolution. The practical essence of the theory must be developed from it [the dialectical method] and from its relation to its object. Otherwise this "gripping of the masses" could become an empty illusion. It could happen that the masses would be moved by entirely different forces, that they would act according to entirely different goals, and that theory would have for their movement a purely arbitrary content; it would be a form in which they become dialectical

conscious of their socially necessary or fortuitous actions without

this

consciousness

being essentially and really connected to their action. (Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. 2; translation

40

Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T.

striking that

"It is

proletariat actually

Marx never

conditions of

life

mechanisms by which the

discusses the

becomes conscious of

itself as the

Dick Howard, "On Marx's Critical Theory," Bertell Oilman claims that Marx attempts

revolutionary agent."

Telos no. 6 (Fall 1970), p. 232.

advance "from the workers'

to

to their class consciousness in a single

bound; the various

psychological mediations are treated as one." Bertell Oilman,

Consciousness Next Time: Marx and the Working Class," III

no.

II

Press, 1971), p.

changed)

(Fall 1972), p. 7. In a possible

revolutionary consciousness,

which would be required

"Toward Class

and Society schema of the development of

Oilman delineates

at least

Politics

nine different steps

which Marx describes

as

Second, they must be able

to

to constitute the situation

theory gripping the masses: First,

workers must recognize that they have

interests.

see their interests as individuals in their interests as

must be able

to distinguish

what Marx considers

members of a

their

main

class.

interests as

Third, they

workers from

other less important economic matters. Fourth, they must believe that their class interests

come

etc. Fifth,

prior to their interests as

members of a

particular nation, religion, race,

they must truly hate their capitalist exploiters. Sixth, they must have an idea,

however vague, that their situation could be qualitatively improved. Seventh, they must believe that they themselves, through some means or other, can help bring about this improvement. Eighth, they must believe that Marx's strategy, or that advocated by

And ninth, having when the time comes.

Marxist leaders, offers the best means for achieving their aims. arrived at

(Oilman,

all

the foregoing, they

must not be

afraid to act

p. 8)

41 See Habermas's discussion of this distinction in Theorie und Praxis, pp. 289 ff.

Notes

42

MEGA, for

p.

most

620;

MECW,

p. 187.

romantics

social

.

.

.

Now

immediately.

demonstrated

it:

I

let is

like to say so,

not the way

it

115-122

remain proud and

the victim[s]

new human being

do not

this is

pages

191

Compare Memmi's comment:

oppression; [they] suffered but did not

oppression ceases, the

to

intact

[themselves] be broken.

supposed but

to

And

through the day

appear before our eyes

must, since decolonization has

I

happens. (Albert

Memmi, Dominated Man (New

York: Orion Press, 1968), p. 88)

To

be sure, the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 present an unromantic summary of the devesting effects which capitalism has on the proletariat. In this respect Marx is under no illusions that the subjectivity of the proletariat remains undamaged by its experience as free wage laborers. See in particular the section of the Manuscripts on "Alienated Labor," MEGA, vol. Ill, pp. 81-94; MECW, vol. Ill, pp. 270-82. But when Marx focuses on the damage that capitalism does to the proletariat, he relies on the driving force of a redemptive historical logic to account for the entirely

certainty of the proletariat's prise de conscience.

46 below. 43 Wellmer, p. 56. 44 MEGA, vol. V, p. 60; 45 Wellmer, p. 59:

MECW,

See the passages

cited in note

vol. V, p. 53.

Marx for his belief that the consciousness of material need will have end of the revolutionary struggle, to a mass-scale perception of what is practically necessary, and hence to the success of the revolution? This trust can ultimately be explained only by Marx's tacit enfolding of the proletariat in the all too capacious cloak of the World Spirit, which must both think and accomplish the rational - which is also what is timely. (Translation slightly changed.) What

basis has

led, at the

46 MEGA, vol. Ill, pp. 206-7; MECW, vol. IV, pp. 36-7. 47 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 51. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., p. 79. 50 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, 20 vols., ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), vol. XX, p. 52. English translation in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy ofHistory, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simon, 3 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), vol. Ill, p. 150.

51 Hegel, Werke

52 53

MEGA, MEGA,

Chapter 1

5

p. p.

XX,

p. 52;

MECW, 615; MECW, 6\5;

Hegel's Lectures

III, p.

150.

p. 182. p. 182.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

to Hope (London: Verso Editions, 1983) Ronald Aronson comments: "For 100 million people, perhaps one out of every hundred people who have lived in this century, Doomsday has happened. Death - untimely, violent, human-made death on a scale never

In his Dialectics of Disaster: Preface

1

92

Notes

to pages

122- 126

before possible - has

become one of

the keys to our civilization." Aronson,

pp. 7-8. See also in this connection Gil Eliot's The Twentieth Century Book of the

Dead (New York: Charles

Scribner, 1972).

2 Hegel's account of history as "the slaughter bench at which the happiness of

wisdom of States and the virtue of individuals have been ..." argued that precisely through the events which made up this slaughter bench there was progress in Reason and Freedom. G. W. F.

peoples, the sacrificed

Hegel, Reason

in History:

A

General Introduction

to the

Philosophy of History.

Company, Inc., 1953), p. 27. As in the early writings, one must distinguish between the implications of certain concepts and the consequences which Marx himself draws from them. For example, the concept of commodity fetishism clearly argues for a (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill

3

dialectical

conception of emancipatory subjectivity.

The

logic of the

which

contradicts the dogmatic notion of a consciousness

is

concept

protected from

the mystification inherent in the capitalist process of production. See Carol

Johnson's "The Problem of Reformism and Marx's Theory of Fetishism," New Left Review no. 119 (Jan-Feb 1980), pp. 70-98, for an argument that Marx himself does not develop the dialectical implications of the theory of fetishism.

4

MEW, XIII, p.

9.

English translation: A Contribution

Economy, trans. N.

Stone, p. 12.

I.

Adamson

to the Critique of Political argues that this "nomological

is only one of four incompatible understandings of history in Marx's thought. See his Marx and the Disillusionment of Marxism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 13-39. For other perspectives on this issue see G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx s Theory of History: A Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), and William Shaw, Marx's Theory of History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978). See also Helmut Fleischer, Marxism and History, trans. E. Mosbacher (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 1973) and Philip J. Kain, "Marx's Dialectical Method," History and Theory XIX (1980), pp. 294-312.

view" of history

5

See the discussion of this issue in Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) and Wellmer's Critical Theory of Society (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971). That Marx himself polemicizes against the fetishistic admiration for science evinced by Proudhon and others does not guarantee that his own work completely avoids such tendencies. See Paul Thomas, "Marx and Science," Political Studies, XXIV no. 1 (1976),

6

MEW,

pp. 1-23.

XXIII,

p. 26.

English translation: Capital

I,

trans.

Ben Fowkes (New

York: Vintage Books), pp. 100-2. 7 MEW, XXIII, p. 25; Fowkes, p. 100. 8

MEW,

XXIII,

p. 27;

Fowkes,

Professor Kaufman's review better

way than by quoting

p. 102.

Marx

Prefacing the lengthy citation of

says: "I

cannot answer the reviewer in any

a few extracts

from

his

own

criticism."

MEW,

XXIII, p. 25; Fowkes, p. 100. 9 "Essentially it is not a matter of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms which spring from the natural laws of capitalist

1

Notes production.

It is

to pages

126- 127

a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies

function and work themselves out with iron necessity."

MEW,

XXIII,

1

93

which p. 12;

Fowkes, pp. 90-1; italics added. 10 For a discussion of the "addiction" phenomenon in the context of advanced capitalism see Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press,

1969):

"The

consumer economy and

so-called

corporate capitalism have created a second nature of man libidinally

by

this

and aggressively

commodity form

to the

system are thus eminently

stabilizing,

.

.

.

the

politics

of

which ties him The needs generated [sic]

conservative

needs:

the

counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure." Essay, p. 11. Compare the following passage from Paul Baran's discussion of the crisis in

Marxism:

[T]he actual wants of men

[sic]

in the societies

of advanced capitalism are determined

by aggressive drives, are directed towards the attainment of individual privileges and the exploitation of others, towards frivolous consumption and barren entertainment. With bourgeois taboos and moral injunctions internalized, people steeped in the culture of monopoly capitalism do not want what they need and do not need what they want. (Baran, "Crisis of Marxism?, "Monthly Rei-iew X no. 6 (October 1958), p. 233)

1

It

would be absurd

false

Marx fails to recognize the materiality of moment in the process of capitalist

to claim that

consciousness as an essential

production, but his account

incomplete in fundamental ways. Richard

is

Lichtman comments: "Marx focused on structure and left the issue of motivation largely untouched However if structure and motivation are truly dialectical concepts, it must be the case that in avoiding the issue of .

Marx

.

.

some aspect of social structure Lichtman, Marx's analysis "lacks any real account of the embodiment of logical structures in the lives of individual men and women." This in turn means that Marx has no account of the reproduction of motivation too."

According

domination

simultaneously avoided

to

at the level

of individual subjectivity. The Production of Desire

See also the following: "The most profound and difficult problem facing Marxist social theory has gone largely unanswered: how the illusory and phenomenal consciousness of men and women in capitalist societies reproduce [sic] the essential relations of exploitation which in turn regenerate the opaque awareness of common life." Ibid., p. 224. Lichtman regards this as "an absence in [Marx's] work rather

(New York: Free

Press, 1982), p. 259.

than a positive error." Ibid., p. 259. 12 Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie (Berlin Dietz Verlag,

1953), p. 635. English translation: Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans.

Martin Nicolaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973),

p.

749;

italics

added,

my

emphasis. 13

MEW,

XXIII, pp. 790-1; Fowkes, p. 929; italics added, my emphasis. This passage should of course be compared with the famous passage in which

Marx describes the effects of the process of capitalist production upon the working class: see the passage cited in note 25 below. 14 The concept of socialism as a "qualitatively different totality" is a central

8

1

94

Notes

to pages

128- 130

theme of Marcuse's later works. See in particular Essay on Liberation and Counter Revolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). See also his "Re-examination of the Concept of Revolution" in Karl Marx and Contemporary Scientific Thought (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), pp. 477-82. Marcuse argues that socialism as a "rupture with the continuum of domination" implies "not only rational development of the productive forces but also redirection of progress toward the ending of the competitive struggle for existence, not only abolition of poverty and toil, but also reconstruction of the social and natural environment as a peaceful, beautiful universe: transvaluation of values, transformation of needs

and

-

total

Marcuse, "Re-

goals."

examination," p. 481. 15

MEW,

XXIII, pp. 511-12; Fowkes, p. 618. Marx and Marxism (New York: Herder

16 Iring Fetscher, p. 24,

my

&

Herder, 1971),

translation.

17

Ibid., p. 23, translation

1

Citing the "uncritical enthusiasm for technology" that has characterized the history of

what he

calls

changed. "conformist Marxism" Russell Jacoby writes:

The history of Marxism is the history of the society. The irresistible temptation was to into a

one-way and upward path. Progress

socialism.

The

texts

Dialectic of Defeat

in capitalism

movements of society was read as progress towards

of Marx could always be interpreted in

this light. (Russell

Jacoby,

p. 27)

discussion of this point in his Critical Theory of

108-12.

19

MEW, XXV, p.

20

MEW, XXV, MEW, XXV,

21

of the dialectical critique of bourgeois

cast the dialectical

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),

Compare Albrecht Wellmer's Society, pp.

loss

828. English translation: Karl Marx, Capital Fernbach (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), pp. 958-9. p. p.

III,

trans.

David

828; Fernbach, p. 959. p. 959. Basing his argument on the passage

828; Fernbach,

which Marx envisions the radical potential of automation Herbert Marcuse suggests that perhaps "Marx's own idea of (pp. The technical socialism was not radical enough and not Utopian enough achievements of capitalism would make possible a socialist development

in the Grundrisse in

592

ff.),

.

.

.

which would surpass the Marxian distinction between socially necessary labor and creative work, between alienated labor and nonalienated work, between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom." "The Obsolescence of Marxism?," in Nicholas Lobkowicz, ed., Marx and the Western World (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 413. (The title as printed leaves out Marcuse's original question mark.) 22 MEW, XXV, p. 828; Fernbach, p. 959. 23 Compare Wellmer, pp. 74 ff. and 115-19. For another discussion of this issue see Gyorgy Markus, "Practical-Social Rationality in Marx: A Dialectical Critique," Dialectical Anthropology IV (December 1979), pp. 25588, and V (May 1980), pp. 1-32. Herbert Marcuse argues that the formula "from each according to their needs" could very well result in a "bureaucratic welfare state [which] would still be a state of repression"

Notes

human needs

unless

pages

to

130-132

195

themselves also undergo a fundamental transformation.

Essay on Liberation, p. 4.

24 Under capitalism individuals are not motivated by the communal interest. The "common interest" is accomplished behind their backs. In capitalism the relationship which individuals have to each other is a reciprocal dependence which is imposed on them as an external force. Just because individuals seek only their particular interest which for

communal \genieinschaftlichen] interest form of communal life [Gemeinschaftlkhkeit] - the

in fact the universal

illusory

latter will

them

as

an interest which is "alien" and distinctive "general

particular,

MECW,

to

them, and independent of them, as in

interest." (The

German

the

its

turn a

V, p. 23;

the following from the Grundrisse:

[T]he

common

whole

is

interest

which appears

as the motive of the act [of exchange] as a

recognized as a fact by both sides; but, as such,

proceeds, as

it

it is

not the motive, but rather

were, behind the back of these self-reflected particular interests,

behind the back of one individual's interest in opposition (Grundrisse, pp. 155-6; Nicholas translation, p. 244)

MEW,

MEGA,

Ideology,

is

be imposed on

V, p. 47)

Compare

25

them does not

coincide with their

XXIII,

p.

to that

of the other.

765; Fowkes, p. 899.

26 Compare Lichtman: [T]here

is

a

tendency in Marxist theory

structuralism.

to fall into reified and abstract forms of emphasis on the system of alienated relations acting behind the

A valid

backs of individuals comes to be replaced by a doctrine that structures exist and act

Not only

independently of individuals.

consequences are

likely to

is

be regressive

this .

.

.

view unintelligible but

considered to be separate from us, a structure of real forces which represent in the world,

of theoretical praxis,

it is

(p.

its

political

Since the structure of alienation

these structures and not ourselves that

is

we merely bear or become the object

256)

practice undertaken from this perspective tends to focus on "changing the world", forgetting that there is a dialectical relationship between "the world" and human subjectivity, between social structure and the consciousness of the human beings who produce and reproduce that Political

structure.

27 Georg Lukacs, "Organisatorische Fragen der revolutionaeren Initiative," Werke II, p. 153. English translation in Georg Lukacs, Tactics and Ethics, trans. Michael McColgan (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 116. This essay

first

appeared in Die Internationale

III

no. 8 (1921).

Compare

the

statement from his earlier essay on "Class Consciousness": Lukacs writes that the proletariat's struggle for a classless society "is not only a struggle

against an external enemy, the bourgeoisie, proletariat against capitalist

system on

overcome these II,

p.

itself,

its

it is

equally the struggle of the

against the devastating and degrading effects of the class consciousness.

effects in itself, will

it

Only when the

proletariat has

have achieved the real victory." Werke

256; History and Class Consciousness trans. Livingstone,

p. 80.

196

Notes

to page

132

28 In the course of commenting Philosophy (1923)

orthodoxy,

among

Korsch

refers

in

the to

1930 on the reaction

members of the

to his Alarxismus

und

the inner circles of Marxist

encounter between Marxist-Leninist

" 'west European' Communists". Korsch, "Der Gegenwaertige Stand des Problems 'Marasmus und Philosophic'," in Karl Korsch, Marxismus und Philosophic, ed. Erich Gerlach (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1966), p. 50. English translation: Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy trans. Fred Hallidav (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 119. Korsch's reference to himself and other " 'west European' Communists" may well have been the origin of the term "Western Marxism." The coining of this term is usually attributed to Merleau-Ponty, whose essay "Le marxisme 'occidental' " is itself an extended reflection on Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness vis-a-vis the problem of a dogmatic Soviet or Russian Marxism. For Merleau-Ponty the dogmatism of Soviet Marxism (a dogmatism which he claims also characterizes Leninism) consists in its tendency to absolutize consciousness by placing the knowing subject (in the form of the Party) "outside the tissue of history." Les Aventures de la

philosophy and the works of Lukacs himself and other

,

dialectique (Paris:

Gallimard, 1955),

p. 83.

Merleau-Ponty traces the ancestry of this dogmatism to Marx himself. He argues that the ancestor of Soviet dogmatism is Marx's undialectical preference for a scientific naturalism over philosophy. "The conflict between 'western Marxism' and Leninism is already found in Marx as the conflict between dialectical thought, and naturalism; the Leninist orthodoxy has eliminated Lukacs's attempt just as

Marx

liquidated his

first

'philosophical'

period." Les Aventures, p. 87.

For an excellent recent study of the relation of Lukacs to Western see Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, The Young Lukacs and the Origins of Western Marxism (New York: Seabury Press, 1979). See also Breines's earlier article: "Praxis and its Theorists: The Impact of Lukacs and Korsch in the 1920 Telos no. 11 (Spring 1972), pp. 67-103. For a passionate and incisive discussion of Western Marxism see Russell Jacoby's Dialectic of Defeat. Martin Jay's Marxism and Totality (Berkeley and Los

Marxism

V

Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) argues for the centrality of the category of totality for understanding the diverse expressions of Western

Marxism. Perry Anderson's Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1976) is tendentiously polemical throughout. Anderson's work is distinguished by his rather idiosyncratic characterization of thinkers such as Althusser and della Volpe as "Western Marxists." Anderson's primary interest appears to be to assert the superiority of "classical Marxism" (Marx, Lenin, Trotsky) vis-a-vis the "typically philosophical orientation"

(p.

121) of

Western Marxism. The Afterword (written three years later) attempts to mute the polemical tone of his discussion. But Anderson's admission that he has failed to treat "the possibility that there may have been elements in the with classical tradition which are not so much incomplete as incorrect sufficient seriousness" does not go nearly far enough (p. 112). .

.

.

Notes

to

pages

133-134

1

97

29 Herman Goiter, "Offener Brief an den Genossen Lenin" (1920), cited by Jacoby, Social Amnesia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 80. Gorter's letter was written in response to Lenin's pamphlet Left- Wing Communism. As Paul Breines points out, the emphasis on the crucial role of consciousness in revolutionary change "had been sharply formulated beginning in 1914-1915 by Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and others from the left-wing of the Second International immediately after the latter's capitulation in the face of the imperialist war." Breines, "Praxis

and

certain historical irony in Gorter's

its

Theorists," p. 68. There

"Open

is

thus a

Letter" to Lenin.

1

pp. 135-6. Fred Halliday's term as "intellectual action" does not do justice to the breadth and depth of the concept of Geist as used bv Korsch. See Halliday,

30 Karl

Korsch, Marxismus

una Philosophie,

translation of this

p. 97.

31

Karl Korsch, "Grundsaetzliches ueber Sozialisierung" (1920), in Korsch, Gesamtausgabe, 2 vols., ed. Michael Buckmiller (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1980),

II,

p.

218;

italics in original.

English translation in Karl

Korsch, Revolutionary Theory, ed. Douglas Kellner,

p. 128.

In this essay

Korsch argues that the element which is missing in German Social Democracy is the element of "revolutionary fantasy." "From this lack of revolutionary fantasy we can explain the ghostliness [Schattenhaftigkeit] of the programs of action and the plans for socialization - pale and not sufficient for anyone, but least of all to the striving masses." Gesamtausgabe, pp. 217-18;

Kellner, p. 128.

32 Anton Pannekoek, "World Revolution and Communist Tactics" (1920), in Pannekoek and Gorter's Marxism, ed. D. A. Smart (London: Pluto Press, 1978), p. 103. See also Pannekoek's comment that "The spiritual [geistige] dependence of the proletariat on the bourgeoisie is the main cause of the weakness of the proletariat," and his claim that "the essence of [proletarian] organization is something spiritual [Geistiges]; it is the complete transformation of the proletarian character." Both remarks are from the article "Massenaktion und Revolution" (1912), cited in Jacoby, Dialectic, p. 74. 33 Wilhelm Reich, "What Baxandall

(New

York:

is

Class Consciousness?," in Sex-Pol, ed. Lee

Random House,

1966), p. 295.

For Reich the

symbolic indication that "bourgeoisification" had taken place

is

the story

"whether it is true or merely well invented" that when the mass demonstrations were taking place to Berlin in the area of the Tiergarten "most of the demonstrators took great care not to walk on the grass." Ibid. In the 1980s such an incident might be an indication of the ecological consciousness of the populace!

34

Ibid., p.

356. See also his Character Analysis

(New York:

Farrar, Straus

&

Giroux, 1949).

35 For thoughtful and substantial discussions of the work of the Frankfurt

School see the following among others: Helmut Dubiel, Wissenschaftsorganisund politische Erfahrung: Studien zur fruehen Kritischen Theorie (Frank-

ation furt:

Suhrkamp

Verlag, 1978), Alfons Soellner, Geschichte und Herrschaft:

1919-1942 (Frankfurt: SuhrSusan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: T

Studien zur materialistischen Sozialrvissenschaft

kamp

Verlag, 1979),

1

98

to pages

Notes

134-135

W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: Free Press, 1977). Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) is the first general introductory discussion of the work of the Frankfurt School in English. For a more philosophically sophisticated discussion see

David

Held's

Introduction

to

Critical

Horkheimer

Theory:

Habennas

to

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). For a discussion of some of

the recent literature see Douglas Kellner and Rick Roderick, "Recent

on

Literature

Critical

Theory,"

New German

Critique

no.

23

(1981),

pp. 141-70.

For sympathetic discussions of the project of "thinking Marx and Freud" (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), originally published as Neurose und Klassenkampf: Materialistische Kritik und Versuch einer Neubegruendung der Psychoanalyse (Hamburg: Rowolt, 1973), and Russell Jacoby's chapter "Negative Psychoanalysis and Marxism" in Social Amnesia. For a critique of Schneider's and Jacoby's understanding of this project see Richard Lichtman's The Production of Desire. Lichtman argues that it is possible to integrate Freudian insights into Marxist theory only when Freud's theory is restructured through social categories. Thus while social theory can expand upon the critical foundation provided by Marx by incorporating the restructured insights of Freudian theory, the process cannot be reversed; Freudian theory cannot be "remedied" by Marxism because Freud takes the point of view of capitalist social relations for see Michael Schneider, Neurosis and Civilization

granted.

36 Herbert Marcuse, "Die Idee des Fortschritts im Lichte der Psychoanalyse," in Psychoanalyse und Politik (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1968), p. 47; English translation in Herbert Marcuse, Five Lectures, trans. Jeremy Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 38-9. For an earlier statement of this notion see the following passage from Eros and Civilization: In every revolution there

seems to have been a historical moment when the struggle been victorious - but the moment passed. An element

against domination might have

of

self-defeat

seems

to

be involved

in this

dynamic, regardless of the validity of such

reasons as the prematurity' and the inequality of forces. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955; reissued in 1966, pp. 90-1)

37 For an indication of the breadth of these discussions see note

5 in the

Introduction.

38 Karl Marx,

"On

the Jewish Question,"

MEGA,

vol.

I

1/1, p. 577;

MECW,

vol. Ill, p. 147.

A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, MEW, XIII, English translation, N.I. Stone, p. 11. 40 Herbert Marcuse, "Protosocialism and Late Capitalism: Toward a Theor39 Karl Marx, p. 9;

Based on Bahro's Synthesis,' International Journal ofPolitics X 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1980), p. 41. This essay is reprinted in RudolfBahro: Critical Responses, ed. Ulf Wolter (White Plains, New York: M. E. Sharpe,

etical Analysis

nos.

1980).

Notes 41

I

have argued

some length

this point at

in

my

Social Amnesia in Telos no. 25 (Fall 1975), pp.

Joel Kovel's/i Complete Guide

to

Therapy

to

pages

135- 136

1

99

discussion of Russell Jacoby's

196-211, and

in

my

review of

(New York: Pentheon Books, 1976)

in Telos no. 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 185-202. 42 For an attempt to conceptualize the concern with subjectivity in these movements as an appropriate response to the dynamics of advanced capitalism see among others Herbert Marcuse: "Under total capitalist administration and introjection, the social determination of consciousness is all but complete and immediate: direct implantation of the latter into the former. Under these circumstances, radical change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing social existence." Essay on Liberation, p. 53. For a similar argument in terms of "really existing socialism," see Rudolf Bahro, The Alternative in Eastern Europe (London: New Left Books,

1978).

The is

recognition of the importance of the transformation of consciousness

not limited however to the oppositional movements in the industrialized

nations.

The

Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua has consistently emphasized

the subjective aspects of revolutionary change. This

ways

in the support given

is

apparent

among

other

by the government to women's groups and to the

brigadistas of the mental health projects. 43 The various attempts to develop what might be called a "counter-therapy" or a "radical therapy" are also relevant here. See in this connection the writings of Claude Steiner, Hogie Wyckoff and Joy Marcus in Readings in Radical Psychiatry, ed. Claude Steiner (New York: Grove Press, 1974) and the

of Harvey Jackins and others on the theory and practice of

writings

Re-evaluation Counseling, which despite

its

name does

not construe itself as

work of Michael Lerner, Lee Shore and others at the Institute for Labor and Mental Health, Oakland, California. Robert Jay Lifton, Joanna Rogers Macy, Joy Marcus and others have attempted to apply therapeutic insights and strategies to issues of "despair and empowerment" in the nuclear age. For a critique of the theoretical framework articulated in a "therapy."

See

also the

particular by Lifton, see Joel Kovel's Against the State of Nuclear Terror

(Boston: South

44

A

End

Press, 1983), pp. 17-24.

I

share his concerns.

brief survey of the psychology section of almost any bookstore in the

United States reader

she

is

is

enough

to

overwhelm even the most intrepid browser. The

offered a myriad of instant solutions for whatever problems he or

to have: How to be Awake and Alive; How to Love Every Minute How to Go From Sad to Glad; How to Enjoy Your Life in Spite of it How to Win at Love, Work and Play. If one has forgotten that one is

may happen

of Your Life;

and "OK", help

All;

is at hand in the form of recipes for Staying OK. 45 Cited byjacoby, Social Amnesia, p. 51. Jacoby's critique is deeply indebted to the earlier critique by Herbert Marcuse and Theodore Adorno of neo-Freudian revisionism. For Marcuse's discussion see his essay "The Social Implications of Freudian 'Revisionism'," Dissent, nos. 2 and 3 (Summer 1955), pp. 221-40. Reprinted as the epilogue to Eros and

Civilization.

For Adorno's discussion see "Sociology and Psychology,"

New

200

Notes

to pages

136-137

46 and 47 (November-December 1967 and JanuaryFebruary 1968), and his essay "Die revidierte Psychoanalyse," in Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, Kritische Theorie der Gesellschaft, IV (n.p.,n.d). 46 Joel Kovel, A Complete Guide To Therapy, p. 254. 47 Lichtman, p. 276. Lichtman's discussion of the interconnections between radical politics and therapy is far more nuanced than either Jacoby's or Kovel's, neither of whom distinguish between a conformist psychology and a Left Review nos.

possible emancipatory practice of subjectivity. While pointing out the "social

conservatism"

of a therapeutic

self-reflective,

ironic,

mode which

contemplative,

is

and above

"verbal, all,

archaeological,

privatized

(p.

275)

Lichtman argues that "therapeutic awareness - the recognition of the unconscious dynamics behind lived experience" - (p. 285) "can play a very important role in the development of emancipatory politics" (p. 280). "Therapeutic awareness is a lever that can dislodge the complacency that masks defeated hope" (ibid.). But Lichtman does not address the issue of a (possible) radical therapeutic practice.

He

notes only that "the categories of

therapy are individualistic [inherently so?] and so reproduce the individual structures of capitalist domination" (p. 268). Yet in spite of this Lichtman

maintains that "[therapy] can participate fruitfully in the slow, patient, laborious development of ... a revolutionary practice"

connection

Michael

Lerner's

"Surplus

(p.

269). See in this

Powerlessness,"

Social

Policy

(January-February 1979). 48 I owe the term "internalized domination" to my friend and colleague Gail Pheterson, recently of the University of Utrecht. See her working paper "Alliance Between Women: Psychological Processes Against Racism,

Anti-Semitism and Heterosexism," Institute for the Study of Social Change, Berkeley, California, 1984. Forthcoming in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Pheterson defines internalized domination as "the incorporation and acceptance by individuals within a dominant group of prejudices against others." Pheterson, p.

2.

I

would extend her

definition to

but also a variety of unstated assumptions which postulate the alleged inferiority of the targeted group, as well as the behavioral patterns which embody these assumptions. 49 Kovel defines a prefigurative perspective as one which "recognizes present reality as a prefiguration of what can be, but is not yet. [Such a perspective] include

not

sees a world

only

explicit

beyond the

"prejudices"

nation-state,

beyond technocracy, beyond economic

domination, beyond racism, beyond sexism: a Utopian vision, not here and not looming, but not to be put off either." Kovel, Against the State of Nuclear Terror, p. 166. For an excellent discussion of the necessity of a prefigurative perspective for antinuclear politics see the entire last section of this book. 50 This argument has been made earlier with reference to the dynamics of

advanced capitalism and "really existing socialism" by Herbert Marcuse, Andre Gorz and Rudolf Bahro, among others. Their claim is that these developments mandate the rethinking of the traditional Marxist designation of the industrial proletariat as the revolutionary subject. See in particular Marcuse's discussion of Bahro's The Alternative

in his article "Protosocialism

Notes

to

pages

137-139

201

and Late Capitalism." See also the collection of Bahro's articles, speeches and interviews in Socialism and Survival (London: Heretic Books, 1982). For Gorz's discussion see his Farewell to the Working Class (Boston: South End Press, 1982).

51 Against the State of Nuclear Terror, pp. 18-30 and pp. 145-9. 52 Albrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society, p. 72. Wellmer argues that

Marxism 53

same

as critical social theory has this

status.

have in mind here the notion of "men as the enemy," a view which has been expressed by sections of the women's movement in the United States. For a I

of this position see Adrienne Rich's "Disloyal to Feminism, Racism and Gynephobia," first published in Chrysalis: A Magazine of Women's Culture no. 7 (1978), reprinted in On Lies, Secrets and Silence (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979). For a critique of the position represented by Adrienne Rich see bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press, 1984). See also Elizabeth Spelman, "Theories of Race and Gender: The Erasure of Black Women," Quest V no. 4 (1982), pp. 36-62. 54 For an analogous argument with regard to even the most extreme forms of human behavior, see Ronald Aronson's Dialectics ofDisaster. The temptation in discussing the Holocaust for example is to "demonize" the Nazis and classic

exposition

Civilization:

regard them as a "separate race." actions

are

From

this perspective,

fundamentally incomprehensible.

But

to

however, their

categorize

evil

as

abandon the possibility of discovering any (nontranscendent) grounds for hope. See Aronson, pp. 1-17. 55 For a classical account of the routine mistreatment experienced by the sons of the British upper class in public schools see Thomas Hughes, Tom Brown School Days (Boston: James R. Osgood, 1876). 56 See in this connection Roger Gottlieb's critique of the work of Chodorow and Dinnerstein in his "Mothering and the Reproduction of Power: Chodorow, Dinnerstein and Social Theory," Socialist Review no. 77 (September-October 1984), pp. 91-119, and the exchange between Chowdorow, Dinnerstein and Gottlieb in Socialist Review no. 78 (NovemberDecember 1984), pp. 121-31. Alice Miller's otherwise excellent study For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence (New incomprehensible

is

to

's

York: Farrar, Straus

&

Giroux, 1983) tends to discuss the issue without totality. Miller's book was originally Anfang war Erziehung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp

reference to an oppressive social

published in

German

as

Am

Verlag, 1980).

57 See Rudolf Bahro's Socialism and Survival, esp. pp. 98-121, for an argument that progressive social movements can no longer afford to operate with this perspective. See also Kate Soper's claim that a revolution in the societies of advanced capitalism will also have to take account of "psychological deprivation," deprivation of the "immaterial sources of gratification." On Human Needs: Open and Closed Theories in a Marxist Perspective (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 182 ff. 58 For additional discussion of this issue see notes 67 and 70 in chapter 1. In a

202

Notes topages

139-140

"when the real effects of pornography on men are understood, one can see that in being asked to give up pornography men are being asked to give up disadvantages, not advantages of their position." "Eros Thanatized: Pornography and Male Sexuality," Humanities in Society VII nos. 1 & 2 (Winter-Spring 1984), p. 47. For an excellent general discussion of the harmful consequences of sexism upon men as the non-target group see Jean Baker Miller's Toward a New Psychology of Women (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). For a parallel perspective in terms of racism see Benjamin P. Bowser and Raymond G. Hunt, eds., Impacts ofRacism on White Americans (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1981). See also my unpublished paper "Acknowledging the Pain of Racism for White," presented to the Northern California Group Psychotherapy Conference, November 1981. For moving accounts of the painful socialization of young Southern whites see Lillian Smith's Killers of the Dream (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949) and Anne Braden, The Wall Between (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1958). Joel Kovel's White Racism: A Psychohistory (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970) shares similar assumptions and discusses the issue from a psychoanalytic recent article Harry Brod argues that

perspective.

59

who belong group on one issue may well belong to the non-target group on another issue. The challenge of an emancipatory politics is to 'address It is

often overlooked that these roles overlap each other. People

to a targeted

people's lived experience of this overlap. duality of these roles

is

what makes

The

coalition

inability to

work

recognize the

so difficult. For two

attempts to grapple with this issue see Elly Bulkin, Minnie Bruce Pratt,

Barbara Smith, Yours

in Struggle:

Three Feminist Perspectives on Anti-Semitism

and Racism (Brooklyn: Long Haul Press, 1984), and Terry Wolverton, "Unlearning Complicity, Remembering Resistance: White Women's AntiRacism Education," in Learning Our Way: Essays in Feminist Education, ed. Charlotte Bunch and Sandra Pollack (New York: The Crossing Press), 1983, pp. 187-99. 60 The split between the personal and the social which characterizes lived experience under capitalism is a hallmark of capitalist relations of production. Capitalism appears to be the result of individuals' "personal choices"; in reality these "choices" are extorted by a system of social relations

which individuals are unfreedom. in

forced

to

become

agents

the

of their

own

61 Russell Jacoby distinguishes between an amnesia which can be explained as a

phenomenon and that form of forgetting which is the consequence of "the social and economic dynamic of this society." Social Amnesia, p. 4. Jacoby juxtaposes childhood amnesia and social amnesia, forgetting perhaps that the production of childhood amnesia is itself an aspect of that social loss of memory which is imposed by an oppressive psychological

society.

62 "Forgetting past suffering and past reality.

In contrast,

joy alleviates

remembrance spurs the

life

drive

under

for

a repressive

the conquest of

Notes suffering and the

permanence of

joy."

to

pages

140-142

203

Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic

Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 73. Original version published in German as Die Permanence der Kunst: wider eine bestimmte Marxistische Aesthetik (Munich: Hanser Verlag, 1977). English version revised and translated by Herbert Marcuse and Erica

Sherover.

63

The

obscuring and the denial of the resistance of the oppressed is one systematically recycled social myths about all oppressed

component of the

groups. The internalization of this misinformation leads to the belief by members of the oppressed group that they themselves are to blame for their oppression. Part of the process of undoing the

lies

involves expanding the

concept of "resistance", recognizing a broader spectrum of behavior under this category. For one example of historical research which argues for a broader concept of resistance see Angela Davis, "Reflections on the Black

Woman's Role

in the

Community of

Slaves," The Black Scholar

III

no. 4,

(December 1971), pp. 3-15. 64 See Alice Miller, Thou Shalt Not Be Aware,

Hannum (New in

York: Farrar, Straus

German under

the

title

Du

&

sollst

trans.

Hildegard and Hunter

Giroux, 1984). Originally published nicht merken (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp

Verlag, 1981).

65 Wellmer,

Critical Theory, p. 50.

66 See in this connection Bernice Johnson Reagon's "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century," a talk given at the West Coast Women's Music Festival in 1981 at Yosemite National Forest, California. Reprinted in Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, ed. Barbara Smith (New York: Kitchen Table, Women of Color Press, 1983), pp. 356-68. 67 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and

Civilization, p. 245.

Index

Abstraction

Bebel, A., 183

Feuerbach on, 48, 62-3, 164 Marx on, 60-3, 67, 90 Adams, B. B., 144 Adams, H. P., 148 Adamson, W. L., 151,192 Addiction, 126, 192-3

Berlin,

Adorno,T., 132,199-200 Alienation see Civil society; Proletariat Allison,

H.

E.,

164

Althusser, L.

on crisis in Marxism, 12-13,150 on Marxism as science, 10, 147 Anderson, P., 150, 196 Anti-semitism, 76, 81-5, 173, 175-6, 180, 181-3; see also Jewish question 196

Arato, A., Aristotle,

158-9

Aronowitz,

S.,

12, 149, 151

I.,

184

Bernstein, E., 183

Birnbaum, N., 149 Bochmuhl, K. E., 163 Braden, A., 202 Brazill,W.J., 149, 172 Breines, P., 196, 197 Brod, H., 202 Buck-Morss, S., 198 Bulkin, E., 202 Capitalism, 83, 126-7, 134, 191,

192-5;

see also Proletariat

CarlebachJ., 173, 175, 176, 179-81, 183 Categorical imperative, 101,186 Christianity see Religion

Citizenship, 75-81, 82; see also State Civil society

Aronson, R., 150, 191,201

Hegel on, 20-4,31-2

Aufhebung (transcendence), 67, 82,

Marx

84,

180-1

Avineri, S., 148, 163, 176, 180, 186

Bahro, R., 143, 199, 200-1 Baran,

P.,

149-50, 193

BarionJ., 164 Bartky, S. L., 144, 186

Bauer, B., 15, 35, 45

on Jewish question, 74-6,174-6, 178-80; Marx's critique of, 76-81; Marx's reframing of, 81-5

on,

24-9,31-2

non-membership

in,

103, 105-6;

benefits of, 31-2; see also Poor

and state, 65-6, 67, 71-2, 75-82; see also Germany Clark, K. B., 171 Class consciousness, 116-17, 134, 190, 191, 195, 197

elemental, 24-7, 35, 40

oppression, 100, 190-1 see also

Poor; Proletariat

Claudin, F., 149

205

Index

Cobb, J., 144 Cohen, G. A., 192 Colletti, L., 149

Dialectical thought as critique, 6, 146

Dogmatic perspective on emancipatory

6-7

consciousness,

Colonization, 4-5, 145, 187

on reform of consciousness, 67-71

Common

towards revolutionary

130,194-5

interest,

Consciousness class, 116-17, 134, 190, 191, 195, 197 exclusive self-, ideological,

53-4

1

of infinite, 52

85-8, 182, 183-4

inverted,

87-8

of,

7, 56,

Dubiel, H., 197

Dupre,

149, 174

L.,

Ebering, E., 159

Education, Jacobin emphasis on,

above

consciousness/subjectivity;

41-3 Egoism see

Mystified consciousness;

Elemental class of society, poor

see also

Emancipatory

Religion

Cornu,

see

Dualism, 77-80, 177-8

67-73, 74, 93-5 revolutionary, 111-12, 113-17 species, 52-6, 101, 109, 168 transformation of see reform of reform

92-5, 123-32; Poor Dogmatism, 9, 146 potential, 43 Domination see Oppression subjectivity,

also

Draper, H., 181

natural, 91 political,

consciousness, 113-17

towards emancipatory

A.,

as,

148, 152

Corporations,

21-4

Marxism, 12-15,149-51 Critical Marxism and scientific Marxism, tension between, 8-12, 147 Critico-genetic method, 59-60,170 Crisis in

Private interest

24-7,35,40

Emancipation 77, 79, 82, 86-9, 95-6,

political,

176-8, 184; universal see also

182,203 Day laborer, 22 De Beauvoir, S., 144 Descartes, R., 167-8 Dialectical Marxism, 122-42, 190-1; Western Marxism, 132-5, 196-8 Dialectical perspective

on emancipatory consciousness,

4-6

Revolution

subjectivity

towards emancipatory subjectivity,

95-6

1-2

dialectical perspective on,

4-6,

71-3,95-6, 117-121 dogmatic perspective on, 6-7,

67-71,92-5,113-17,123-32; see also

Ends

Poor

in themselves,

as,

human

beings

108

Engels, F.,

14,152

Estates (Stand), 20-4, 46, 163, 169; see also

on reform of consciousness, 71-3 on revolutionary consciousness, 117-121

Citizenship

74, 77, 94, 177

Emancipatory consciousness/ definition of,

Davis, A.,

see also

human,

Hegel, on poor

Fanon, F., 144, 187 Feminism, 134-6, 144, 201 Fetishism, 28-9, 155-6, 192 Fetscher,!.,

128,148,150,194

206

Index

Feuerbach, L., 18

on

164 method, 170

abstraction, 48, 62-3,

genetic critical

Hegel and, 169-70 on Judaism, 83, 84, 181 Marx and, 163, 184 on mystified consciousness, 46-73, 78, 88, 101, 109, 155, 163-8; Marx's

18,

57-67 on reform of philosophy, 164-5 reformulation

on

religion see

of,

on mystified

consciousness above

H, 192 Forces on production, 123-6,130-1

Fleischer,

France revolution, 88, 71-2; see also

Jacobins Frankfurt School, 132-4, 197-8

Freedom and

necessity, realms of,

see also

129

72,172

realization of,

Emancipation

Freire, P., 94, 144, 145, 185

Freud,

HabermasJ., 145-7, 192 on Hegel, 171-2 on misreadings of Marx, 189 on realization of philosophy, 188 on scientism, 10-11,148 Harap, L., 174 Hegel, G. W. F., 12,18,81,191

on civil society, 20-4,31-2 on dogmatism, 146 on dualism, 1 77 Feuerbach and, 169-70 on history, 6, 171, 192 on infinity, 167 on inversion, 183 on poor, 15, 19,20-4,31-2,46, 153-4, 158-9, 179

on property, 29-30, 157 on realization of reason, 108-9 on Reformation, 117-18 on sense certainty, 90-1 on state, 112, 168-9 Held, D., 198

134, 198

S.,

Friedrich, M.,

Gouldner, A, 8-10, 146, 147, 149 Gramsci, A., 132

Hermes, K.

148

R,

176

Geist,

Hess, M., 18, 35, 173 Hillel-Rubin, D., 150

Gerlach,

Hirsch, H., 173

132-4 E, 149 Germany Idealism,

Marxism

1 1 1

in,

;

Historical materialism, see also

Philosophy

132-4,197

political revolution, impossible, 12,

98-100, 133-4 radical revolution, possible,

100-4,

110, 186

Girondins, 37

God, 117 idea of,

49-52,55,165, 167-8

see also Religion

Goldmann,

L.,

F. M.,

123-6

183

Hobbes, T., 23 Honneth, A., 148 Honor, 23 Hook, S., 149 Hooks, B., 144,201 Horkheimer, M., 132, 134 Howard, D., 148, 190 Human nature, 38-9, 89-90, 166 Hyppolite,J.,

163

189

Goodman, W., 171 Gordon,

Hitler, A.,

163, 167

Idea, 58, 143 Idealist voluntarism,

54-7

Gorter, H., 132, 133, 197

Ideological consciousness,

Gorz, A., 149,200-1 Gottlieb, R., 201

Individual/individualism, 53-5, 66,17 state and,

61, 64,

80-1

1

Index Infinite,

consciousness

of,

52

117-19,120-1 relations, 107,187

Internal priest,

Internal

Internalized oppression, 4-5, 84, 94,

117-19,134-5,144,183, 190-1, 198, 200, 203 Inversion (Verkehrung), 58, 85-8,

183-4

182,

207

KovelJ., 136, 137, 143, 145, 199-200, 202 Leiss,W., 189 Lenin, V. I. and Leninism, 13, 196, 197 Lerner,

M. 200

Liberation see Emancipation

Lichtman, R., 136-7, 193, 195, 198, Jackins,

R,

200

199

Jacobin

Lipsky, S.,

144

concept of education, 41-3

Locke,J., 23, 157

concept of poor, 19, 36-40

Loewith, K., 156

Jacoby, R., 136, 145, 194, 196, 198, 199, 202

Jay,M., 196,198 Jewish question, 74-97, 173-85, 192 Bauer's solution see under Bauer Feuerbachon, 83, 84, 181

Marx on Johnson,

Judaism

I.,

under

Marx

192

see Jewish

Kamenka, Kant,

see

C,

E.,

question

163,

166-7

64

on comparative universality, 25, 254 Hegel and, 47-8, 164 on humans as ends in

Lorde, A., 144

Lowy, M., 148 Lubasz, H., 156 on origins of Marxism, 18, 19, 150 on poor, 34, 35, 152-3, 159 Lukacs, G. on class consciousness, 116-17, 191,195 on crisis in Marxism, 12, 13 on Marxist theory and radical practice, 190 on transformation of consciousness, 132 as

Western Marxist, 132,137,196

Luther, M., 117-18, 183

Luxemburg,

R.,

197

themselves, 108

on Ideas, 143-4 on moral law, 186 on paralogisms, 165 on private property, 30 on things-in-themselves, 48 Katz,J.,

175

Kaufman,

1. 1.,

125, 192

Kautsky, K., 10

KeaneJ., 148 Kellner, D.,

149, 198

KoesterJ., 159 Korsch, K., 10

on as

crisis in Marxism, 12, 14, 149 Western Marxist, 132, 133,

195-6, 197 Koselleck, R., 159

McCarthy, T., 148 McLellan, D., 148, 149, 152, 159, 172, 173, 179-81 Marcus, J., 199 Marcuse, H., 143,203 on addiction, 193-4 on advanced capitalism, 199, 200-1 on dialectical thought, 146 on Freudian revisionism, 199-200 on Hegel, 146, 148 on Marxism, 151 on psychic Thermidor, 134 on remembrance, 203 on self-defeat, 198 on socialism, 127, 193-4, 200 as Western Marxist, 132,134

208

Index

Markus, G., 194 Marx, K. and Marxism crisis in, 12-15, 149-51 critical and scientific, tension between, 8-12, 147 as critique of a-historical

88-92

consciousness,

on Jewish question, 176,178; critique of, 76-81; reframing of, 81-5 on mystified consciousness; dialectical perspective,

71-3; dogmatic perspective, 67-71; reformulation of Feuerbach's theory, 57-62; as social incipient,

phenomenon, 62-7 'origins of, 18-19 on poor, transformation of Hegel's concept, 31, 34-5, 43

8-12, 124-6, 147-8

scientific,

two concepts of, 8-12 Western, 132-5, 137, 195-8 see also Dialectical

Marxism; Poor;

Proletariat

Materialism, 18-19,28-9, 123-6,139

139,202

Materialistic psychology,

May,

136

R.,

Mayer, G., 149, 161 Memmi, A., 144 on anti-Semitism, 182-3 on colonization, 4-5, 145, 187 on internalized oppression, 190-1 Merleau-Ponty, M., 196 Meszaros,

I.,

Marx

Necessity and freedom, realms of,

129

Non-target group, 139,158,202 Nuclear state, 122, 143, 191 B., 143, 187, 190 O'MalleyJ., 162-3, 187 Oppenheim, D., 176

Oilman,

Oppression blaming victim for, 76,176 consequences of, 126 perpetuation

138-41

of,

see also Internalized

Pannekoek,

oppression

132,133-4,197

A.,

Paralogisms, 165 Particularity

and

78-9

universality,

People, 36-40; see also Poor; Proletariat

Pheterson, G., 200

176

Phillipson, L.,

Philosopher kings, 28, 30, 32-4, 171 Philosophy, realization of and abolition of proletariat,

107-13,

187-8 Plato, 32-3 on Ideas, 143 on philosopher 32-3, 171

kings, 28, 30,

Poliakov, L., 83, 181

consciousness,

87-8

emanipation

under Emancipation

see

revolution see under Revolution

201,203 B., 144,202

Miller, A.,

Moore, Moore,

phenomenon, 62-7

under Feuerbach;

Political

181

Meyer, T., 152,186,188 Miller, J.

as social see also

Poor/poverty

produced, 105,113

B.,

145

artificially

S.,

163, 169

as elemental class of

human

88-92

24-7, 35, 40 Hegel on: estates and those of no estate, 15, 19, 20-4, 31-2,

as a-historical consciousness,

153-4, 158-9, 179 Marx's transformation of Hegel's

Mystified consciousness, abolition of, 7

addiction

to,

135

88-92 materiality of,

1

26

society,

discussion,

31,34-5,43

209

Index

Marxism, 'origins of ', 18-19 non-membership in civil society, benefits of,

31-2

Racism, 68, 145, 202

Reagon, B.J., 203

as philosopher kings,

28, 30,

32-4,

171

Reason

29-30 unincorporated, 20-4

Reductionism, 165

Reform/transformation of

universalist subjectivity of,

27-9,

consciousness,

30,39

74,

virtuous, Jacobin conception

36-40

Religion/ religious

consciousness, 48-56, 59, 63, 66,

148

Practice of subjectivity, B.,

state,

128

Practical reason,

and radical revolution, 102-4, 110,186 revolutionary consciousness

113-7 104-6

85-7, 95-6, 98-100,

radical,

in

100-4,110,186

unexpected countries, 12-13

Revolutionary consciousness, 99,

111-17, 197 dialectical perspective on,

1

17-9,

120-1 dogmatic perspective on, 113-17 Rich, A., 201

Rights

human, 38 85-6, 184

RitterJ., 157, 171, 188

Rjazanov, 161-2

36-42, 159-61

38-9 private, 30,33,38,157,189 universal, 29-30,40 basic,

Propertylessness

and

12,

133-4

Robespierre, M., on poor, 15,

Poor

Property

universality,

see also

political,

natural,

104-5, 119, 120, 187

universal character of, see also

Jewish question

Resistance, 140, 203

France, 19,36-43,88,171-2

137, 140,

subjectivity of,

78-9

Revolution

200 Priest, internal 117-9, 120-1 Priestly nature, 118-9 Private interest (egoism), 31-4, 89-91 Private property, 30, 33, 38, 157, 189 Production, forces of, 123-6, 130-1 Proletariat, 98-121, 185-9 abolition of, and philosophy, 107-13, 187-8

of,

76,

see also

5,135-42

202 164

Prefiguration,

177-8

78, 80, 101, 109, 165-8,

Postone, M., 148, 182

M.

67-73,

Reformation, 101, 117-18

PopkimA. R, 144

Prauss, G.,

7, 56,

93-5

Reich, W., 134,197

see also Proletariat

Popitz, H.,

108-9, 172, 189

realization of, 69,

universality,

Pratt,

128

practical,

propertylessness and

of,

100-4,110,186

Radical revolution,

29-30

Poor

Rosen,

Z.,

149

Rousseau, J. -J., 36,37,160 RubeLM., 148, 156 Ruge, A., Marx's correspondence with on essays on Christian art and Hegel, 45, 162

Psychology conformist, 136, 199-200, 202 materialistic,

Roderick, R., 198

139; see also

Therapy

on Feuerbach, 184 on Jewish Question, 176, 178, 184

210

Index

on reform of consciousness, 68-70 on religion, 171, 185 Runes, D., 74, 174 165

Russell, B.,

163 and universality, 46, 60, 68, 81, 180

true,

voting and, 60, 61,

Saint-Just, L. A. de,

15,

36-7, 159

Stuke, H., 149,172

Sans -culottes, 39 Sartre, J.-P.,

Schneider,

145,158,185-6

M,

of proletariat, 104-5, 119, 120,

Marxism, 124-6 and critical Marxism, tension between, 8-12, 147 Scientism, 10-1, 148 Scientific

53-4

Self-consciousness,

Sennet, R., 144

187 of, 68, 72-3, 135-42, 199 universalist, 27-9, 137 see also Emancipatory

transformation

consciousness/subjectivity

90-1

certainty,

57-8

Subjectivity,

practice of, 5, 135-42, 199

198

Schuffenhauer, W., 163

Sense

67-8

R,

152 Steiner, C, 199

Stein,

Suffrage, universal see Voting and the

Shaw,W., 192

state

150-1

Sherover, E., 145, 153

Sweezy,

Sherover-Marcuse, R., 145, 202 Silberner, E., 173 Smith, B., 202 Smith, L., 202 Smith, T. H., 183

Technology, 128, 194 Teichgrabber, R., 157 Theology see Religion

Soboul, A., 160 Social amnesia, 140, 202

Socialism transition to,

126-8,193-4 13-14

unlike Marx's prediction,

Society see Civil society Soellner, A.,

197

P.,

12, 13,

Therapy, 135, 136, 200 radical, 199; see also Psychology

Therborn, G., 12, 150 Thier, E., 148 Thing-in-itself, 48, 164 Thomas, P, 192 Transformation of concept of poor, 31, 34-5, 43

Soper, K., 201

of consciousness

Species

of subjectivity,

consciousness, 52-6, 101, 109,

see

5,

Reform

135-42, 199

Tucker, R., 173

168 content of human

Spelman,

E.,

Stalinism, State,

and

life,

64

150

46 civil society,

Unincorporated poor, 20-4 human emancipation see under Emancipation; see also Revolution

Universal

201

65-6, 67, 71-2,

Universality'

empirical, 20, 68

75-82 feudal, 86-7

estates and,

individual and, 61, 64, 80-1, 171

individual and, 61, 64, 171

knowledge, 65-6, 171 nuclear, 22, 143, 191

partial,

religion,

76,

78-9

20-2

87

particularity and,

78-9

and the poor, 27-30, 39

Index

and the proletariat, 104-6, 187 and propertylessness, 29-30 social, 65 and the state, 46,60,68,81,180 Unlearning,

5, 68,

also Practice

131, 137, 145; see

of subjectivity

Values, transvaluation

Voluntarism,

idealist,

Voting and the

state,

40 54-7 of,

37, 60, 61,

211

Wellmer, A., 145-6, 189, 192, 194, 201 on crisis in Marxism, 14, 149, 151

on emancipation, 141 on scientism, 10, 11, 148 Western Marxism, 132-4, 137, 195-8 Wolverton, T., 202

Wood

Theft

articles see

Poor

Wyckoff, H., 199

67-8

Young

Wage

labor,

Wartofsky,

Hegelians, 12, 74, 149, 189

189

M,

163,167

Index by

Ann

Hall

Hi