Elites: New Comparative Perspectives [1 ed.] 9789047432425, 9789004164024

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Elites: New Comparative Perspectives

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International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology Series Editors

Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo Rubin Patterson Masamichi Sasaki

VOLUME 107

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Elites: New Comparative Perspectives Edited by

Masamichi Sasaki

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

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Originally published as Volume 6 no. 1–2 2007 of Brill’s journal ‘Comparative Sociology’ Cover: photograph Roel Deseyn-Bellegem This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISSN 0074–8684 ISBN 978 90 04 16402 4 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

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CONTENTS Introduction ....................................................................................... Masamichi Sasaki Articles Elite and Leadership Change in Liberal Democracies ...................... John Higley and Jan Pakulski Elite Distinction: Grand Theory and Comparative Perspectives ....... Jean-Pascal Daloz Comparing Two Charismatic Leaders: Ataturk and de Gaulle ......... Mattei Dogan New Challenges, New Elites? Changes in the Recruitment and Career Patterns of European Representative Elites ...................... Heinrich Best Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana ................................. Johanna Odonkor Svanikier Political Elites in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Recruitment and Rotation Tendencies .......................................... Oxana Gama-Golutvina Nordic Elites in Comparative Perspective .......................................... Ilkka Ruostetsaari Elite Integration and Institutional Trust in Norway .......................... Trygve Gulbrandsen From Vietnam to Iraq: American Elites’ Views on the Use of Military Force ............................................................................ Gwen Moore and Stephanie Mack

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7 25 67 77 103 123 143 171 193

Notes on Contributors ....................................................................... 209 Index .................................................................................................. 213

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Introduction

• 1

Introduction Elites come in many forms and express themselves in an extraordinary variety of ways. This book will reflect that diversity. Our first task here was to assemble a diverse set of discourses on elites and attempt to formulate a logical order for their presentation. Undoubtedly one could tap into the foci of each of the articles presented here and derive several different logical orderings. Hence, the logical order presented here is only one of many possible. The logic of the final selection here proceeds, roughly, from the general to the specific. We begin with the work of John Higley, very well known in the area of elites, and Jan Pakulski. Higley and Pakulski lead off this book because their work affords the best overview of elites for the uninitiated. This is not to say that their work is a general one, but rather that they provide background which may well be useful to readers less familiar with the topic of elites. Their paper specifically examines “elite and leadership change in liberal democracies.” Higley and Pakulski begin with a discussion of past sociological leaders in the field: Pareto and Weber. They explore the oft-cited distinction between elites with fox-like and lion-like behavior. The remainder of the article explores, in a good bit of detail, elites and leadership in a number of different liberal democracies covering most of the world’s continents, offering contemporary as well as historical comparisons, and concluding that contemporary “ascendant elites are more leonine and top leaders are more pugnacious.” Next is Jean Pascal Daloz’ “Elite Distinction: Grand Theory and Comparative Perspectives.” Daloz contends that many social theorists who have dealt with the “issue of elite differentiation largely ignored each other’s views on the matter.” Historically, the study of elitist distinction, according to Daloz, has been fraught with inconsistencies, with scholars often ignoring their counterparts’ work entirely. Daloz calls these events symptoms of “theoretical amnesia.” Additionally, Daloz emphasizes that “theoretical speculations are made on the basis of very little evidence, which leads thinkers to mistakenly postulate invariant logics.” Daloz says the same about scholars who have extrapolated from too small a number of cases. The author offers an interesting caution about studying “Western” societies en bloc. “Even among the European continent, there are obviously huge cultural variations and these should be not under-estimated. For instance,

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• Introduction

analyses emphasizing social emulation and distinction cannot be mechanically applied to the Scandinavian countries, given the stress that Nordic people place on modesty.” He goes on to argue that most theorists on elite distinction tend toward excessive reductionism. In sum, Daloz concludes that all existing “models” of elite distinction have some “real merits,” but further and comparative work is needed to “correct those theories,” to yield a “non-dogmatic theoretical eclecticism.” “Comparing Two Charismatic Leaders: Ataturk and de Gaulle” by Mattei Dogan, another scholar well known for his work on elites, is next. This insightful examination and comparison of these two extraordinary leaders appears here because it is the only work in this collection which compares persons rather than nations. Dogan focuses his comparison on several similarities: “dramatic historical circumstances,” their resistance movements during foreign military occupations, their being a “symbol of hope,” their own personal faith and determination in their respective missions, their luck, their direct contact with their peoples, their attitudes about national independence, their abandonment of their empires, their “personalization of power,” as well as other talents, characteristics and capabilities. Dogan goes on to describe their historical similarities in some detail. Finally, Dogan describes how the charismatic leader’s tenure will last only until circumstances return to normal. Successive charismatic leaders are unlikely in a democracy or an advanced industrial society. At this point, we move, in our “logical” progression, to those authors who have focused on elites in specific nations. Two of the articles which follow discuss only one nation; the remaining four compare elites in several nations. The majority of these works describe, in varying detail, empirical comparative research. We begin with Heinrich Best’s “New Challenges, New Elites? Changes in the Recruitment and Career Patterns of European Representative Elites.” Best’s focus is on “long-term changes in the recruitment patterns of European representative elites,” which he describes as the “aggregate result of selectorates’ responses to a sequence of fundamental problems challenging polities since the emergence of modern representative political institutions in the 19th century.” Twelve European nations have the benefit of 140 years of data on parliamentary recruitment. The results from recent years describe a number of interesting changes, some short-term and some long-term, in recruitment patterns and the background characteristics of members of parliaments. Best then explores whether the identified changes are a result of changes in the party systems of Western European polities and whether these changes are indicative of long-term trends. Next is Johanna Odonkor Svanikier’s “Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana.”

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Introduction

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Svanikier proposes that “elite theory is at the heart of understanding political conflict in Africa,” and provides Ghana as a case study, analyzing “the historical origins of elite conflict in Ghana before and after independence.” The case study specifically examines “circulation and differentiation among Ghana’s political elites in terms of their diversity in social status and background.” Svanikier emphasizes that, at least at this point, any extrapolations to other African countries must be regarded as tentative. By describing in detail the history of elites in Ghana, Svanikier reveals much about elite formation, elite competition and conflict and disunity among elites. Much of this significant social change is seen as driven by “increased wealth amongst commoners and the introduction of Western-style education.” Oxana Gaman-Golutvina’s “Political Elites in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Recruitment and Rotation Tendencies” explores in considerable detail the role of elites both historically and contemporarily. With their high degrees of heterogeneity, the Russian states have exhibited extraordinary variations in terms of elite roles, recruitment, and rotation. Gaman-Golutvina also explores in detail the dichotomy of the feudal and bureaucratic models of elite organization first proposed by Moska. Gaman-Golutvina divides the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into three groups and proceeds to depict how one group exemplifies the bureaucratically run state, while another group of countries “embodies the model of the clannish elite,” and the third group seems to lie somewhere in between these two. These groups have considerable bearing on these states’ progress, development and modernization. Ilkka Ruostetsaari’s “Nordic Elites in Comparative Perspective” compares elite structures in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, “based on power studies which were completed in these countries in the 2000s.” All four studies, though varying slightly on methodology, used the positional approach and identical definitions of elite composition. Ruostetsaari emphasizes that all four countries have very common histories and “political cultures.” Ruostetsaari set out to compare elites in the four countries on three different dimensions: openness of recruitment, interaction between elite groups, and interaction between elites and the people. He also sought to determine how elite structures may have changed on these three dimensions, and finally he asked how many elites actually exist in each country and whether they constitute one power elite or several “mutually competitive elites.” He found that with regard to openness of recruitment, all four countries were at the midpoint between low and high, with only minor differences. He noted that openness of recruitment had increased in all the countries. He identified Finland as having the most coherent elite pattern and Denmark the least coherent. In all four countries he found that elite coherence had decreased in recent times.

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Another single-country study is that of Trygve Gulbrandsen: “Elite Integration and Institutional Trust in Norway.” Gulbrandsen explores the degree of integration of Norway’s elites on the basis that “accommodation and compromise between national elite groups are seen as preconditions for the continuance and stability of a democratic society.” Gulbrandsen defines elites as those holding the “top positions in central institutions and organizations within significant sectors of Norway” (political, economic, cultural). Elites are seen to represent the interests of their respective institutions or organizations, who in turn have delegated to them the power to act on their behalf. Trust is seen as a core aspect of elite integration. Interestingly, Norway ranks highest in the world on interpersonal or social trust. In general, the results showed similar general, and relatively high, levels of institutional trust among the various elite groups. Gulbrandsen discusses and explains some of the variations identified in the data. Gwen Moore and Stephanie Mack, in “From Vietnam to Iraq: American Elites’ Views on the Use of Military Force,” analyze data from studies conducted between 1975 and 2004 on elites’ opinions on the use of military force. They ask “whether elites have become more militaristic” over this time period or “whether such views have been a long term characteristic of U.S. elites.” The authors first point out that the U.S. had not attacked another nation since 1898. What, they ask, does this mean for elite opinions subsequent to the Iraqi invasion? Elite opinions and attitudes are analyzed over a period of 30 years. The analyses are further broken down by looking at political and non-political elites and Democratic and Republican elites, variables not typically examined in the past. Moore and Mack provide background on such topics as militant internationalism versus cooperative internationalism. In the study, political elites are members of the Administration, Senators, and members of the House of Representatives. Non-political elites are all others. Data were collected about every four years from 1974 to 2004. The results indicate a significant difference between opinions and attitudes in 1975 (immediately post-Vietnam) and all other years following. It is hoped that the works contained in this volume will assist those less familiar with the study of elites and provide illumination to all readers with regard to current thinking and current empirical study on elites. The diversity of content herein should not be viewed as intentional or unintentional; rather, this volume should be seen as a collection of contemporary works on the very broad topic of elites. Numerous suggested opportunities for further study and research should become apparent as the reader moves through this collection. Masamichi Sasaki

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Change in Liberal Democracies

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Elite and Leadership Change in Liberal Democracies John Higley a and Jan Pakulski b University of Texas at Austin, USA, [email protected]; bUniversity of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia, [email protected]

a

Abstract This article presents and assesses the thesis that a shift in the character of governing elites and leaders has been occurring in several important liberal democracies during recent years. Ascendant elites are more leonine and top leaders are more pugnacious. We attribute the shift to strong centripetal pressures that now impinge on elites and leaders, and we ask about the shift’s consequences for the operation of liberal democracies.

Starting with the ascendancies of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Helmut Kohl in the 1980s, there has been a perceptible shift in the character and style of political leadership in liberal democracies. This is the rise of leaders less inclined to engage in a politics of compromise and consensus and more disposed toward peremptory actions backed by force or its threat. These leaders gain executive office through steadily more plebiscitary electoral contests in which their ostensibly superior instincts are glorified and their competitors’ alleged defects are savaged. In office, they concentrate government power in core executives at the expense of legislatures and bureaucracies, and they wield power with greater impunity than predecessors. The shift is not uniform across all liberal democracies, and in the countries where it is most noticeable it has not been linear—there are ebbs and flows. But a trend toward more determined and resolute leaders—or, at least, leaders widely perceived as such—is evident: George W. Bush and Tony Blair; Junichiro Koizumi and Silvio Berlusconi; Australia’s John Howard and Denmark’s Anders Fogh Rasmussen. José Zapatero in Spain, Stephen Harper in Canada, and Angela Merkel in Germany may prove to be further instances, while the aspirations of forceful individuals to national leadership elsewhere should not be ignored—Nicolas Sarkozy and Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Carl I. Hagen in Norway, for a time Jörg Haider in Austria, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands before his assas-

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• John Higley and Jan Pakulski

sination. Although the label may be overly dramatic, “caesarist” leaders who gain power by plebiscitary means form a trend somewhat reminiscent of European politics during the interwar decades (cf. Linz 1978; Linz and Stepan 1978; Lukacs 2005; Paxton 2004). This apparent shift in the character and style of political leaders is not the full story. In complex liberal democracies leaders are embedded in, and their effectiveness significantly depends upon, political elites: tiny groups of strategic position-holders with the organized capacity to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially (Higley and Burton 2006:5–8). Leaders with forceful images are in important degree creations of elites—horses they ride to power. The image of Ronald Reagan as a decisive leader was initially the handiwork of a public relations firm in California, and from start to finish his presidential leadership was carefully choreographed and staged by power-holders who knew much more about politics and issues of the day than Reagan ever bothered to learn (Cannon 1982). This is transparently the case with the unworldly George W. Bush, who, possessing a household name, has been the puppet of a neo-conservative elite that plucked him from the politically innocuous Texas governorship in order to bull itself into executive power (Lind 2003). In some situations a leader’s aura of strength may stem primarily from disarray among an opposing elite. Margaret Thatcher, who never won a majority of votes, owed much of her leadership image to chaos in the Labour Party elite, just as Tony Blair’s image has owed not a little to the Tory elite’s wanderings in the political wilderness. The ways in which leaders and elites affect each other is, of course, a knotty problem in political analysis. Few would deny that their relations are reciprocal: leaders galvanize and orient elites, but without the power and influence that elites possess leaders can accomplish little. It is also obvious that relations between leaders and elites display much variation. Like Reagan and Bush, some leaders appear to be not much more than front men for well-formed elite groups. But like Tony Blair and John Howard, other leaders impose their wills on the elites they head. Everywhere, leaders act within the norms and structures of elite politics, some of which allow leaders wide latitude while others tightly constrain them. At present in the US, for example, a considerable part of the political elite is threatening to punish George W. Bush and his White House mandarins and cabinet secretaries for breaching norms about the scope of presidential power and the degree to which it can be exercised unilaterally. Beyond loose or tight norms, leaders must contend with elite structures that may be quite concentrated or fragmented. A fair amount of research shows that in liberal democracies elite structures consist of extended circles and networks

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Change in Liberal Democracies

• 7

of political influence and personal acquaintance that tie together several thousand of the uppermost figures in politics, government administration, business, trade unions, the media, a bevy of interest groups, and so on. Such complex and far-flung elite webworks usually stifle the single-minded pursuit of a leader’s political aims. These considerations suggest that if a shift toward more forceful leaders is occurring in at least some liberal democracies then a comparable shift in elites must also be occurring. We intend to explore the thesis that this is a time of increasingly forceful leaders embedded in more aggressive, tightly organized, and mutually antagonistic elites in at least some liberal democracies. We conduct this exploration from the standpoints of Vilfredo Pareto and Max Weber. Specifically, we combine Pareto’s discussion of how fox-like elites governing ‘demagogic plutocracies’ give way to leonine elites and more forceful rule (1935:2178, 2190, 2221–2229, 2231–2236, 2257, 2480) with Weber’s discussion of how “leader democracy” (Führerdemokratie) needs charismatic leaders to be sustainable (1978:1121–1127, 1458–1460). Given the philosophical differences between Pareto and Weber, combining their insights may seem problematic, although it has been argued that the two theorists, who were contemporaries, engaged in an “unacknowledged dialogue” (Sica 1988:225–249). Both viewed politics from an elite and leadership perspective; they observed and diagnosed the same political trends in Europe (and to a lesser extent the US) during the stormy early years of the twentieth century; they held unsentimental views of democracy and regarded effective elites (Pareto) and charismatic leaders (Weber) as crucial for its workings. In spite of different philosophical underpinnings—Pareto’s positivism and Weber’s neo-Kantianism—their political analyses were complementary. Pareto saw individual leaders as displaying all manner of foibles and stupidities, so he thought it more profitable to concentrate on the overall psycho-social physiognomies and dispositions of elites. Weber, as his concept of leader democracy implies, regarded charismatic and statesmen-like leaders as vital, and he paid little attention to the characteristics of elites as wholes. Pareto largely ignored the social-historical and institutional contexts in which elites act, while Weber paid close attention to such contexts. When combined, however, the visions of Pareto and Weber dissect the vertical aspects of democracies. Pareto attacked the shortcomings and failures of their elites; Weber worried about the quality of their leaders in the era of parliamentary and mass party politics; both outlined elite and leadership changes that would or should occur. The visions of Pareto and Weber are a springboard from which to examine elite and leadership changes that appear to be impelled by extraordinary conditions during the past twenty-five years. Principally and in a nutshell,

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these conditions are the Soviet Union’s collapse and the globalisation it spurred; recent threats to security posed by terrorism; and the massive numbers of migrants fleeing failed or failing non-Western states. First, the Soviet Union’s collapse spurred an almost universal embrace of three principles: the worth of private and de-regulated capitalist markets; the superiority of popularly elected governments; the necessity for liberty in the form of an unrestricted circulation of information. But the whole-hearted embrace of these principles has tended to disorient elites and leaders in liberal democracies, causing them to adopt unrealistic expectations about what can be accomplished in domestic and international politics. Second, the spectre of terrorism encourages more assertive and zero-sum political competitions, especially in the domain of national security. Widely publicized terrorist threats, accompanied by portrayals of the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a life-or-death “global war against terror,” are used by aggressive elites and forceful leaders to rally popular support, devastate political competitors, and justify large expansions of executive power as necessary to counter external and internal enemies. Third, migrations of millions of people from failed or failing non-Western states are increasingly viewed as undermining the social and political integration of the liberal democracies to which the migrants flee. Technologies for instant worldwide communication and rapid transportation—also key aspects of globalisation—facilitate trans-national identities among migrants that make their allegiances to host countries uncertain. Migrant communities perceived as semi-allegiant or even non-allegiant ignite host population support for rising elites and leaders who promise illiberal crackdowns on these communities, the sealing of national borders against illegal migrants, and greatly reduced immigration intakes. These three conditions exert powerful centripetal pressures on the politics of liberal democracies. Our enumeration is hardly exhaustive. The spectres of disease pandemics and global warming, the volatility of petroleum and other commodity markets, as well as a host of employment insecurities and the economic consequences of ageing populations can readily be added. Our claim is simply that centripetal pressures stemming primarily from the conditions we have mentioned are a root cause of the changing elite and leader patterns in which we are interested. They intensify discords in liberal democratic politics, promote executive power concentrations, and favour putatively leonine elites and forceful leaders. One of Pareto’s dicta is pertinent: “When centripetal forces are dominant, the central government will be called on to provide it. Whenever circumstances turn in favour of this centripetal phase, a pre-existing central government, or a central authority new both in form and substance, asserts itself sooner or later” (1921/1984:47).

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Change in Liberal Democracies

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ELITES AND LEADERS It is well known that Pareto and Weber saw rule by elites-cum-oligarchies as inescapable in all societies, regardless of the form governance takes. Pareto famously claimed that “Everywhere there exists a governing class . . . Whether universal suffrage prevails or not, always it is an oligarchy that governs” (1935:2183). Weber just as famously wrote that “Everywhere the principle of the small number—that is, the superior political manoeuvrability of small leading groups—determines political activity. In mass states, this caesarist element is ineradicable” (1978:1414). Both believed, nonetheless, that different elite and leader modes are associated with different kinds of political regimes. Pareto depicted ruling elites in “demagogic plutocracies”—his pejorative term for parliamentary democracies—as consisting of a far-flung alliance of fox-like politicians and profit-seeking “speculators” who, through innumerable deals and deceptions, prevent an alliance of more leonine politicians and ‘rentiers’ from governing. Parliaments, Pareto held, are the arenas in which the dominant fox-speculator alliance arranges the chicaneries necessary to keep itself in power. Similarly, Weber portrayed the early Weimar democracy and most other democracies of his time as essentially “leaderless,” with members of elected parliaments engaged in a chaotic horse-trading of sectoral interests. Neither man thought that the situation he described could persist indefinitely. Pareto believed that the despoilments by which the fox-speculator alliance keeps itself in power ultimately undermine the economy and the state’s fiscal viability, opening the door to a take-over by the opposing lion-rentier alliance (1921/1984:71; see also Femia 2001:80–81). However, the latter’s dominance eventually proves so excessively coercive and tightfisted that it provokes a new crisis propitious for the fox-speculator alliance’s return to power. And so modern history proceeds, in endless cycles of alternating fox-like and lion-like elite rule. Weber was not quite so pessimistic or resigned. He searched for a way by which “mass democracy” could be saved from itself. Holding that any such democracy is necessarily a “leader democracy” (Körösényi 2005), he theorized that rule by professional politicians who “live off ” politics, always feathering their own nests, might be transcended in “unusual situations” by charismatic leaders not beholden to narrow sectoral interests and possessing a keen concern for the national good. If directly elected rather than chosen by parliaments, such leaders, “living for” rather than off politics, would use their charisma and “demagogy” to create powerful mass followings and loyalties that would enable them to pursue national interests and goals. The result would be a “plebiscitary” or “leadership” democracy, which Weber regarded as mass democracy’s only sustainable form (Beetham 1984:264–267).

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The foregoing is, of course, a pastiche of the complex and subtle analyses made by Pareto and Weber. But their analyses are sufficiently familiar to most students of elites and leadership to make another exegesis unnecessary (see, inter alia, Finer 1965, 1968; Parry 1969/2006; Parkin 1982; Beetham 1974/1985; Femia 2001). A few elaborations will, however, be useful. First, Pareto’s metaphorical distinction between elites as foxes and lions is at odds with any typology based on elites’ declared ideological commitments. Pareto dismissed ideologies as “derivations”—rationalizations-cum-rhetorical devices—and instead anchored his distinction in allegedly deeper and more basic psychological predispositions (“residues”) that shape elites’ modes of rule. Lions, manifesting the residues of “group-persistence,” are tough, stubborn, and aggressive; they do not hesitate to use violence to achieve and hold on to power, typically framing and merchandizing their actions in terms of mass ethno-nationalist and religious loyalties. Foxes are cunning, clever, and astute; they use wit, manipulation, and diplomacy, rather than force, and frame and merchandize their exercise of power in terms of economic prosperity and their ostensible representation of diverse public interests. Unlike ideological leanings—which elites often alter—these predispositions and proclivities remain constant. So do accompanying leadership styles. Foxes never roar; they always behave in guileful and stealthy ways. Lions never shed their manes and grow bushy tails; force and fear are their preference. For Pareto, as we have noted, elite circulation always takes a cyclical form: foxes displace lions and new lions then displace the foxes (1935:2221–2229ff.; 1921/1984:47). In the one cycle, centrifugal conditions de-centralize power, and this favours opportunistic and cunning elites adept at combining dispersed pieces of power in order to ascend and rule. In the other cycle, centripetal pressures force power’s re-centralization, and this favours aggressive and forceful elites adept at wielding it more unilaterally. Each cycle inevitably comes to an end because each elite type is prone to characteristic dysfunctions that produce unsustainable “disequilibria”. Lions fail because they exaggerate the effectiveness of force, and when they overstretch its use they are out-manoeuvred by foxes. But foxes become soft and indecisive (“humanistic”), enabling lions waiting in the wings to exploit these weaknesses. The mode of this circulation varies in depth and violence between societies and within them over time. In general, lions tend to displace foxes and impose themselves through sharp power takeovers; foxes take power through gradual penetration and permeation of a lion-dominated governmental arena. If lions enter that arena from outside it, their seizure of power takes a revolutionary form; if they displace foxes from within the arena via factional politics, their takeover is less abrupt. This embryonic theory of elite circulation (implied rather than stated in detail by Pareto) resembles a path-dependency account of political change.

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Change in Liberal Democracies

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Pareto seems to suggest that each elite cycle is brought about by the preceding cycle’s accumulating ills (disequilibria), which flow from the distinctive weaknesses of whichever type of elite is then ascendant. The failures of cunning foxes in their Machiavellian excesses of deception and stealth open the way to blunt lions and their Hobbesian excesses of coercion and force. This cyclical circulation is shaped not only by the elites’ qualitative deterioration, but also by sharply asymmetric sentiments (residues) between the governing elite and the masses—in which case the circulation tends to be revolutionary—or by a less dramatic asymmetry of sentiments within the elite stratum itself—in which case circulation is likely to be more peaceful. The elite cycles also tend to coincide with economic and cultural oscillations: the predominance of lions and their rentier allies accompanies periods of economic decline involving revivals of nationalism and religiosity; the ascendancy of foxes and speculators accompanies periods of economic prosperity and secularism. This is more an elite path-dependency sequence than a circumstances/conditions construct (Timasheff 1965:68; Parry 1969/2006:57–63). Pareto’s elite types never appear in pure form and never operate in isolation from each other. The predominance of each is always a matter of degree. Behind every leonine elite in power there is always a foxy one waiting for the lions’ dysfunctions and errors to create a political opening, and vice versa. Because such dysfunctions and errors are inevitable, neither lions nor foxes are inherently superior. When ascendant each degenerates, which is why, in Pareto’s view, elite rule seldom stabilizes for any long period of time.1 History is not only the graveyard of elites replacing each other, it is also the stage on which oscillations and stylistic successions are played out without end. This cyclical and cynical (but realistic?) view of history formed a powerful counter-vision to optimistic liberal-democratic scenarios of progress, and it was, of course, a fundamental retort to Marxism. Although Weber expounded his concept of leader democracy and his hoped-for alternative of a more charismatic and plebiscitary leadership democracy in a fragmentary way, his analysis helps us to understand the socio-historical and institutional contexts in which changes in leaders

Pareto and his intellectual comrades, Mosca and Michels, stressed the overriding and very personal interests of elites in obtaining power’s immediate psychological rewards and social protections. In pursuing power, elites of a similar type support each other, and this mutual support—reflecting calculated power interests more than ideological affinities —enhances their success. Put differently, the preponderant interest of elites is in wielding power, not in promoting the interests of a collectivity such as a class or an ethnie, or realizing an ideological program. Elites that disregard or downplay the vicissitudes of power and its exercise fall victim to more ruthless or cunning competitors. 1

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occur. According to Weber, charismatic leadership “always results from unusual, especially political or economic, situations” (1978:1121). These are situations of crisis or of sudden and unexpected developments that trigger collective excitements, anxieties, and expectations culminating in “surrender to heroism” (1978:1132). The situations or developments are transitional and are followed by more stable forms of authority, but so long as they last the transitions are tension-filled. Charismatic and plebiscitary leadership emerges as “the most important transitional type” of authority (1978:267)—a sort of halfway house between charismatic domination and the legal-rational form stable political institutions must ultimately take in modern societies. Under condition of mass democratization—in particular, the direct election of political leaders by masses of voters—charismatic and plebiscitary leadership may emerge and rest on popular acclamation (elections) and public trust. Leaders will act “on behalf of the people” and legitimate their decisions in terms of the “will of the people”. This will of the people is evoked and cultivated through leaders’ direct appeals and their use of demagogy (1978:241–271, 1111–1155). Charismatic and plebiscitary leadership, Weber observes, extends to a leader’s administrative staff—what might also be thought of as the elite surrounding the leader. Staff members worship the leader (the charismatic principle) and bask in the confidence the masses have in him or her (the plebiscitary principle). This staff elite—typically the leader’s trusted confidants—cannot easily be integrated into a hierarchical authority structure because the foundations of its power rest outside the institutional realm. Therefore, instead of an integrated hierarchy charismatic and plebiscitary leadership tends to produce centralized and autocephalous spheres of authority and diluted staff elite competencies. In this situation, top figures in the elite exercising executive power cannot be controlled by parties or parliaments and cannot be dismissed without the leader’s approval. Their political fate is determined by the leader’s trust in them and the confidence of the people, rather than by their administrative competence. In Weber’s view, by paving the way for persons skilled in demagogy, rather than just gifted orators like lawyers, the plebiscitary principle favours “the type of individual who is most spectacular, who promises the most, or who employs the most effective propaganda measures in the competition for leadership” (1978:1451). Under plebiscitary leadership, then, politics display the emotional and irrational features typical of charismatically-led orders, and they militate against deliberative policy-making and long-term rationalization. However, charismatic and plebiscitary leadership does not preclude further transition to a more rationalized, orderly, and workable leader democracy. Whether this further transition occurs, as well as its speed, depend on adopting a functional division of powers and forming

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a strong party machine that takes over as the locus of political allegiance and mobilization of public (electoral) support. In a well-functioning leader democracy, according to Weber, and as András Körösényi (2005) ably elucidates, a charismatic and plebiscitary leader can be insulated from immediate public pressures and subjected to some collegial control. The leader and the staff elite surrounding him or her still impose themselves on the people, but their political success depends on winning competitive elections—on proving themselves effective in generating mass support. This support is at once diffuse and personalized. Political rivals use rhetoric and image manipulation to engineer personal support, inspire personal loyalty, sway public opinion, and generate trust, especially at the crucial moments of electoral contests. Public support is, in other words, the product of the political process, not of some bottom-up aggregation of pre-existing interests and views (Körösényi 2005:365). If successful in using rhetoric and image to generate support, a charismatic and statesman-like leader secures public trust, loyalty, and respect. The mass demand for leadership is satisfied, the confidence of the masses is won, and, most important, an aura of responsibility is created and sustained. This, in turn, enables leaders to work with parliamentary colleagues and pursue “continuous and consistent policies” (Weber 1978:1459). Pareto and Weber were close observers of politics in their respective countries, Italy and Germany, and of European developments more widely, during the twentieth century’s early years. Agonizing over Italy’s post-World War I political turmoil, which culminated in the “March on Rome” by Mussolini and his Blackshirts in 1922, Pareto identified the ascending fascists with lions. Initially, he pinned on them his hopes for Italy’s renewal, although he recognized that the fascists were ultra-nationalists coming from outside the governmental arena and therefore likely to take power in a revolutionary and violent manner; they were profiting ruthlessly from conditions of social, economic and political crisis, and their repressions of opponents were ugly to behold. In relatively short order (albeit after Pareto’s death in 1923), Mussolini and his elite assumed dictatorial power, displaying much aggressiveness, corruption, and brutality, the early signs of which Pareto condemned in a political testament written from his deathbed. Weber, observing only briefly before his death in mid-1920 the already devastating consequences of the Treaty of Versailles for Germany, believed that his country’s authoritarian heritage, political extremism, now leaderless bureaucracy, and dispirited masses pointed toward “a polar night of icy darkness and hardness” unless a charismatic and appropriately demagogic leader emerged and headed off this fate (quoted by Antonio 1995:2370–2371). As things turned out, of course, it was Hitler who emerged as Führer, mimicking Mussolini’s title of Duce. The ascendancies of the two

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leaders and elites induced a proto-leonine shift in ruling styles throughout Europe and parts of the western hemisphere, with even an echo in far-off Australia in the form of an incipient fascist movement, the New Guard (Linz 1978; Paxton 2004; Macintyre 2004:182). We encapsulate this familiar history in order to observe that the belligerence and brutality of the fascists/Nazis discredited, so to speak, the image of leonine elites and charismatic leaders. Following their rules by terror, wartime atrocities, and the racism and ultra-nationalism they spouted, the leonine fascists/Nazis were regarded with contempt and hatred. Their grievous over-reaching and consequent defeat in World War II were the start of a shift in elite and leader types ascendant in post-war liberal democracies. ELITES AND LEADERS AFTER WORLD WAR II Pareto and Weber lived in countries and at a time when elite conflicts and rivalries between leaders were—and had always been—largely unchecked. Following national unification in Italy and Germany, deep ideological chasms and mutual distrusts separated opposing elite camps. They disagreed fundamentally about the political institutions on which their new national states rested and they strove to defend or destroy governments of the day according to their conflicting stances and bases of support. The elites that Pareto and Weber knew best were, in a word, deeply disunited. In Italy, to be sure, right-wing monarchical and left-wing republican elite camps fused in the famous trasformismo of 1876, but this proved too narrow to accommodate spreading popular mobilizations of peasants and workers suffering the harshness of industrialization and led by emerging Catholic and socialist elites who had no place in the fused elite and thus no stake in the regime (Cotta 1992). Exacerbated by foreign misadventures, such as the Libyan War in 1912, the elite power struggles became steadily more explosive during the years before and after World War I, and they led to fascist dictatorship after the assassination of Socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti in June 1924 and the withdrawal of Socialist deputies from Parliament. In the German Reich authoritarian rule by Bismarck and his successors and by elites associated with them kept the lid on a boiling political pot. But the Imperial regime was reviled by elites leading bourgeois and working-class organizations and movements, and the lid finally came off in the “leaderless” Weimar Republic, the inception of which Weber witnessed. The disunited condition of Italian and German elites was mirrored in nearly all other European countries (and in all countries of Latin America) before and after World War I. The exceptions were Britain, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland where, in much earlier and highly contingent circumstances, basic “consensual” unifications of previously disunited elites had occurred—England’s “Glorious Revolution” in 1688–1689; elites

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in the Dutch Provinces banding together to free themselves from Spanish colonial rule in the late sixteenth century; Sweden’s constitutional revolution in 1809; the unification effected by elites in the aftermath of Switzerland’s short civil war during 1847–1848. Politically, those four countries, with stable liberal oligarchies governing them, constituted marked deviations in a European landscape suffused by unbridged elite divisions and unstable, mainly authoritarian, regimes (Higley and Burton 2006:33–54). Pareto and Weber thus drew their lessons primarily from a particular pattern of elite relations—disunited—and from the capricious leaders and regimes to which it gives rise. It is interesting to speculate about how their analyses might have been tempered if Pareto and Weber had had greater knowledge of the consensually united elite pattern. In it extensive communication and influence networks integrate competing factions and leaders who share an underlying consensus about most norms of political conduct and the worth of most existing political institutions. Elite factions and leaders accord each other significant trust, cooperate tacitly to contain explosive conflicts, and compete for political power in comparatively restrained ways. Power sharing is the hallmark of a consensually united elite, and the periodic, peaceful alternations in executive power that mark liberal democracies are its principal manifestation (Higley and Burton 2006:8–15). Pareto’s grudging admiration for the politics practiced by Swiss elites and Weber’s praise for William Gladstone’s leadership role in British politics suggested an awareness that elites are not always and everywhere as blinkered as Pareto found them in Italy, and that “leader democracies” are not always as bereft of capable leaders as Weber observed of Germany. In ways and for reasons too varied to recount here, between about 1950 and 1980 consensually united elites and the liberal democracies they made possible formed in all West European countries where elites had long been disunited (for accounts, see Higley and Burton 2006). Political practices by fox-like elites and relatively prosaic leaders came to prevail. Tripartite deals were cut by government, business, and trade union elites to create neo-corporatist condominiums (Schmitter 1974), and state power was used as a regulatory-welfare tool to expand social rights, a practice that was endorsed, more tacitly than explicitly, by all main elite camps. Elites and leaders of nearly all stripes professed to believe that with minor exceptions the activities of each social grouping contributed to the well being of all groupings. Accordingly, each had an interest in securing the cooperation of others in the common operation of social and political institutions. This sense of social interests meshing in some broad common interest and leaving special interests so limited as to be easily negotiable was widespread among elites and leaders, so much so that it became fashionable to talk

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about ideology having “ended”. A period of Tweedledum and Tweedledee political contests undergirded by economic expansion unfolded—the “halcyon years” that lasted until the oil shocks and stagflation of the late 1970s (Field and Higley 1986). Had he witnessed this, Pareto would have thought his analysis of demagogic plutocracy born out, but Weber might have had second thoughts about the sustainability of democracies with leaders lacking charisma when observing West Germany under Adenauer, Erhard and their chancellor successors; Italy in the time of Fanfani, Moro, and the raft of manipulators who followed them; Norway and Sweden under somnolent father figures like Gerhardsen and Erlander; a UK led by the uninspiring but devious Macmillan and Wilson; the US during the grey Eisenhower and crafty Johnson and Nixon presidencies; the game of musical chairs being played in Japan by interchangeable LDP leaders—the list could be much longer. On the other hand, Weber might have found his analysis of leader democracy strikingly illustrated by the charismatic Charles de Gaulle’s rescue of France from its leaderless Fourth Republic. Building consensus through deals among major sectors, quieting the less well-off with welfare subsidies, paying off other disgruntled groups, and managing public opinion through increasingly powerful mass media triumphed to such an extent during the twentieth century’s third quarter that these practices came to be seen as the natural, or at least normal, form of politics in liberal democracies. In those years hardly anyone wondered if the combination of modern organization and advancing technology might be creating a social order in which it would be difficult to keep a reasonable proportion of the population engaged in activities that others could accept as contributing to the common benefit (but cf. Field and Higley 1980). Starting in the late 1970s, however, the practices of fox-like elites and sly if largely grey leaders were gradually undermined by problems or “disequilibria” as Pareto would say: the inability of welfare policies to stanch the growth of an impoverished and socially disorganized underclass; structural unemployment impervious to economic growth; high rates of inflation induced by the deficit-financed Vietnam War and OPEC oil shocks; declining state fiscal and regulatory capacities; a proliferation of single-issue parties and volatile voters contributing to the collapse of some of the elite coalitions cemented in neo-corporatist pacts. These problems-cum-disequilibria were highly publicized in the media and in critical analyses questioning the effectiveness, even the legitimacy, of ascendant leaders and elites—in particular, Jimmy Carter and his administration, the premiership of “Sunny Jim” Callaghan in the UK, Helmut Schmidt’s chancellorship in West Germany. A backlash gathered force and champions of tougher practices captured public support. Economic rationalist and neo-laissez-faire principles that leave people to sink or swim on

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their own became fashionable guides to policy, and previously marginal elite factions and leaders espousing those principles came to the fore. Thatcher, Reagan, and Kohl signified the first wave of more tough-minded governance. Thatcher launched a bold military expedition against Argentina in the Falkland Islands and faced down the previously invincible mineworkers’ union. The elite around Reagan did the same to a union of air traffic controllers, undertook a massive military build-up, armed and bankrolled mujhaddin insurgents against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and anti-Sandinist “freedom fighters” in Nicaragua, and voiced unremitting hostility toward the Soviet Union’s “evil empire”. Kohl acted decisively to reunify Germany, he led the EU’s Maastricht Treaty effort, his government precipitously legitimated Yugoslavia’s break-up, and it unshackled German military forces for previously forbidden foreign deployments. Because the collapse of Soviet communism between 1989 and 1991 could plausibly be portrayed, whatever the reality, as a Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl victory, it enhanced the shift toward more forceful elites and leaders. In the US demands for tough market rationalism and “getting government off people’s backs” became drumbeats that in 1994 delivered control of Congress to Republicans under the self-proclaimed “revolutionary” leadership of Newt Gingrich. The alleged folly of decreased US military spending in the wake of the Soviet collapse became the rallying cry of an aggressive neo-conservative elite that was now fully formed (e.g., Kristol and Kagan 2000). This elite’s no-holds-barred tactics were soon evident in the Clinton impeachment proceedings. When the elite, astride George W. Bush, failed to win the 2000 presidential election outright, it ruthlessly exploited an electoral standoff in Florida to obtain the White House keys from a friendly Supreme Court majority. Donald Rumsfeld and other top members of the elite immediately began talking, albeit in secret, about the need to eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq (Suskind 2004:80–82); the Vice President, Dick Cheney, quietly concentrated executive power in his office beyond any US historical precedent; and a symbiosis of the elite’s congressional leaders and Washington “K Street” business lobbyists began a thorough de-regulation of the energy, communications, financial, and other main economic sectors. In the course of 2001, especially after 9/11, it dawned on observers of American politics that an uncompromising elite had taken over. Coinciding with this US change, Junichiro Koizumi was installed as Japan’s prime minister that April; in May Silvio Berlusconi swept into power in Rome; Tony Blair won a second term, nearly by acclamation, a month later; and in November John Howard played the fear cards of asylum-seeking migrant hordes and terrorism to win a third and crushing election victory in Australia.

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• John Higley and Jan Pakulski CURRENT ELITES AND LEADERS ASSESSED

Elite alignments and alliances during these early years of the new century are much more complex than during the twentieth century’s “halcyon” period. They involve international elite cartels—economic, political, military, and intelligence—whose national components support each other’s positions and policies. Elite positioning in these cartels is as important as positioning in the various national power games. Leaders of the cartels’ national components consult frequently with each other, borrow freely from each other’s policy repertoires, and shore each other up in crises and election campaigns. Non-stop electronic media promote political competitions that are much more stylistic than substantive. Appeals for support focus on personalities and leadership images rather than policy platforms, and they aim at gaining short-term public approval instead of long-term support. But because these changes have occurred gradually, taking place largely within the elite stratum, they are difficult to assess. More leonine elites and forceful leaders are, nonetheless, evident in some of the most important liberal democracies. Exhibit A is the assertion of America’s geo-political hegemony by the Bush elite. With its inner core of force-oriented “Vulcans,” its Spartan élan, executive power concentration, and peremptory actions, the elite has clear leonine features (Mann 2004; Higley 2006). Efforts by ruling elites and leaders in Japan and several European countries to ameliorate economic stagnation and unemployment are also more aggressive and forceful. In Japan, for example, Koizumi and his associates ended fifteen years of deflation, stoked nationalism and military strength, and broke the hold that the “iron triangle” of bureaucrats, businessmen, and LDP placemen long had on economic policy. Merkel in Germany and de Villepin and his shadow, Sarkozy, in France have sought to act in tough ways to dispel high unemployment, especially among young people. Nearly everywhere in the face of post-9/11 security fears, governing elites deploy expanded intelligence-security apparatuses to put mass publics, notably immigrant Muslim communities, under close surveillance. Consider, for example, the Bush administration’s secret and warrantless monitoring of phone calls and e-mails among what is guessed to be 45 million US residents, as well as its secret inspection of international transfers of bank funds by many residents. Or consider the Blair government’s elaborate monitoring and tracking of two scores of UK residents allegedly intent on blowing up airplanes bound for the US in August 2006. Add to these examples the complicity of European governments in the CIA’s secret transport of abducted terrorist suspects through airports and air spaces in order to imprison or “rendition” them. A leonine ascendancy is apparent in other respects. Acting forcefully against long Labour Party proclivities, Tony Blair and his entourage have

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given the UK core executive expanded resources and a streamlined capacity to impose policies (Burch and Holliday 2004–2005), traded peerages and honours for campaign contributions, and provided business firms with lucrative opportunities to invest in the public sector. Like members of the Bush elite, most of those in the core executive elite around Blair have not served party and parliamentary apprenticeships but have instead parachuted into power positions from think tanks, public relations firms, business, and other locations. Blair and his lieutenants took the grave step of participating in the invasion of Iraq despite two cabinet resignations and vociferous opposition in parliament, the Labour Party, and the British public. In Australia John Howard and a surrounding staff elite similar in its extra-parliamentary origins to Blair’s joined the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq despite intense parliamentary and public opposition. The Howard elite has twice launched risky military peacekeeping missions in East Timor, intervened with force in the Solomon Islands, threatened pre-emptive attacks on terrorist redoubts in Southeast Asia, and won three re-elections through bare-knuckled campaigns that whipped up voters’ fears. In Italy for four years Silvio Berlusconi and the elite around him played fast and loose with parliamentary and judicial practices, exerted near monopoly control of television, and followed the Bush, Blair, and Howard elites into Iraq in the teeth of public opposition. In Denmark, where public anxieties about immigration have tended to override foreign affairs, Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s government has cut the number of asylum seekers by half, paid Afghan asylum seekers to return home, and restricted the entry of Muslim clerics, without as yet stanching growth of the anti-immigrant People’s Party and its demands for even more stringent measures. As illustrated by Donald Rumsfeld’s six-year tenure at the Pentagon, top elite figures responsible for policy disasters cannot be controlled by parliaments or parties and can be ousted only by the paramount political leader. Yet it must be asked if this onset of more leonine elites and forceful leaders is really just a blip on the radar screens of liberal democracies. Do we not mistake fairly normal alternations in power, perhaps made sharper by the magnitudes of today’s centripetal pressures, for a basic and lasting change in elite and leader modes? There are many indications, after all, that the Bush elite has in its hubris and miscalculations disastrously overextended US military power and destroyed the US claim to geo-political hegemony. The US political elite as a whole is deeply disillusioned by the course of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, by the Bush administration’s gross incompetence when responding to Hurricane Katrina’s devastation in 2005, and by craven and often corrupt deals between Bush elite allies and sundry clienteles. This enabled the Democrats to gain control of Congress in the November 2006 mid-term elections and a near paralysis of the Bush

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elite appears to have followed. In any event, Bush, Cheney and their top associates will exit power at the end of 2008. Extensive military repairs and yawning fiscal deficits will be crippling bills that their successors will have to pay. The departure of Tony Blair and his entourage from power in London will precede the Bush elite’s exit. Silvio Berlusconi is gone from power in Rome; Junichiro Koizumi vacated Japan’s prime ministership in September 2006; Australia’s 2007 federal election is certain to be John Howard’s last. Although Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s re-election in Denmark in 2005 was the first ever achieved by a Danish Liberal leader, his party, as well as the opposition Social Democrats, lost votes and seats to anti-immigrant and conservative competitors so that Rasmussen’s political dominance is in doubt. And it remains to be seen if Stephen Harper and Angela Merkel and their executive elites can act forcefully in the absence of firm parliamentary control. As regards the jockeying of elites and leaders for presidential power in France, “uncertain” is the unavoidable adjective at this writing ( January 2007). In short, the patterns we have been exploring are ambiguous; they may be more ephemeral and putative than central and lasting. Nevertheless, they warrant a few concluding reflections. CONCLUSIONS For a start, today’s seemingly more leonine elites and forceful leaders are quite timid when compared with forebears in interwar Europe. The shift that we have been exploring bears little substantive resemblance to the revolutionary changes that then took place. This difference is at least partly anticipated by Pareto’s thesis that deep and violent elite circulations occur only as the result of wars or other truly explosive crises. Although it is conceivable that the Iraq and Afghanistan military quagmires may produce a major crisis in the US, the shift in elites and leaders there and everywhere else has to date occurred more or less gradually within each country’s elite stratum and in conformance, by and large, with established institutions. There has been no clear rupturing of liberal democracy. But although timid by historical measure, the current elites and leaders we have discussed dress actions in nationalist and populist garbs and present themselves as champions of the morally upright “heartland”. They portray terrorist threats to established ways of life as being so dire that harsh and peremptory actions, many of which cannot “safely” be made public, are imperative. In a plebiscitary way they enlist mass support by daily and carefully orchestrated appearances in the mass media where they portray opponents as cowardly and unpatriotic. Second, and as we said at the outset, the shift in elites and leaders is not uniform across the liberal democracies. Signs of it are fainter and more uneven in Europe than in the US, Australia, and, arguably, Japan, where

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Shinzo Abe, a hard-line nationalist who is an enthusiastic pilgrim to the Yasukuni Shrine, has succeeded Koizumi as prime minister. But we should keep in mind that changes in interwar Europe were not uniform either, and they stretched over two decades. Mussolini and his fascists took power in 1922–1924, Stalin did so in 1928–1929, Hitler and the Nazis took over in 1933, the same year that Salazar instituted Portugal’s Estado Novo; Dolfuss took control in Vienna a year later; Metaxas did so in Athens in 1936; Franco consolidated his regime only after the civil war in Spain. Meanwhile, France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and the Anglo-American democracies experienced no such basic interwar elite and leader change, although several, like Belgium, came perilously close to it. The current shift is, in other words, no more patchy—although it is certainly less clearcut—than the interwar one. Third, the extent to which the shift is a by-product of US developments nags our exploration. Because of US influence—hegemony if one prefers— the Bush elite’s aggressive actions promote comparable actions elsewhere. Thus governments led by Blair, Berlusconi, Howard, Rasmussen, and by José María Aznar in Spain joined the Bush elite’s military interventions in Afghanistan and then Iraq, as did governing elites and leaders in most countries of Eastern Europe. They did this for reasons having as much to do with maintaining their alliances and trading relations with the allimportant US as with assessments that their own security interests dictated the costly interventions. Likewise, clampdowns on migrant communities that might be harbouring terrorist cells appear to be instigated, at least in part, by the demands of US intelligence agencies. It can be asked, in short, whether the shift we detect is mostly a reverberation of what has been occurring in the US. Another question, related to the one just posed, is whether the US developments—the Bush elite’s ascendancy and actions—are themselves an aberration or fluke that is now greatly diminished. Despite a mountainous literature examining the Bush elite, there is no agreed understanding of it. In particular, the decision to attack Iraq continues to baffle those who have studied it from outside the elite’s inner sanctum. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, which have been the main public rationale for the Iraq venture, did not change the international situation of the US one iota. Like the air raid on Tokyo led by Jimmy Doolittle in early 1942, the 9/11 takeovers of passenger planes for use as guided missiles were almost certainly non-repeatable, and, dramatic though they were, they exacted a cost in lives far fewer than the 17,000 homicides and 40,000 car accident fatalities each year in the US. While retaliating against al Queda and its Taliban hosts in Afghanistan was clearly warranted and politically essential, the decision to invade Iraq was either a blunder born of hubris and historic miscalculation about the ability

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of the US to implant “freedom and democracy” where it has never existed, or it was part of a much larger, though equally dubious, secret strategy to establish in Iraq a military platform from which the Middle East could be made safe for petroleum supplies and Israel. The consequence, in any event, has been evisceration of the Bush elite’s political credibility, even its legitimacy, so that it no longer serves as a beacon for elites and leaders in other liberal democracies. In this respect, a US stoking of the shift to more leonine elites and forceful leaders may have ended. Strong centripetal pressures on liberal democracies remain, however, and they are likely to increase. Elites and leaders sense that these pressures require bolder and more forceful responses. With leaders who may be more ersatz than genuinely charismatic, liberal democracies will have still greater plebiscitary features. Appeals for support utilizing emotional and irrational rhetoric and the careful management of leader images are here to stay. Behind their trappings are likely to be more leonine elites that benefit politically from alliances with large and propertied plutocratic strata. What remains to be seen is how strong and vigorous these elites will be, how much they will value loyalty over expertise and intellectual advice, how sharply they will centralize executive power in a few hands, and, therefore, how prone they will be to errors, overstretching, and a new penetration by foxes. REFERENCES Antonio, R. J. 1995. “Max Weber.” The Encyclopedia of Democracy. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. Beetham, D. 1985. Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press (2nd edition). Burch, M. and I. Holliday 2004–2005. “The Blair Government and the Core Executive.” Government and Opposition 39:1–21. Cannon, L. 1982. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Putnam. Cotta, M. 1992. “Elite Unification and Democratic Consolidation in Italy: An Historical Overview.” Pp. 146–177 in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe and Latin America, edited by J. Higley and R. Gunther. New York: Cambridge University Press. Femia, J. 2001. Against the Masses. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Finer, S. E. 1966. Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings. London: Pall Mall Press. ——. 1968. “Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to the Galapagos.” American Political Science Review, 62:440–450. Field, G. L. and J. Higley 1980. Elitism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ——. 1986. “After the Halcyon Years: Elites and Mass Publics at the Level of Full Development.” Jrnl. of Political & Military Sociology, 14 (1):5–27. Higley, J. 2006. “The Bush Elite: Aberration or Harbinger?” Pp. 155–168 in The Rise of Anti-Americanism, edited by B. O’Connor and M. Griffiths. London: Routledge. Higley, J. and M. Burton 2006. Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield. Körösényi, A. 2005. “Political Representation in Leader Democracy.” Government and Opposition, 40 (3):358–378. Kristol, W. and R. Kagan 2000. Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century. Washington: Project for the New American Century. Lind, M. 2003. Made in Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American Politics. New York: Basic Books.

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Macintyre, S. 2004. A Concise History of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mann, J. 2004. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Viking. Linz, J. 1978. Crisis, Breakdown & Reequilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Linz, J. and A. Stepan (eds.) 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lukacs, J. 2005. Democracy and Populism: Fear and Hatred. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pareto, V. 1935. The Mind and Society. New York: Dover Publications. ——. 1921/1984. The Transformation of Democracy. English translation by Renata Girola, with an Introduction by Charles H. Powers. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Parkin, F. 1982. Max Weber. London: Tavistock Publications. Parry, G. 1969/2006. Political Elites. London: George Allen & Unwin. Reprinted with a new Introduction, ECPR Monograph Series. Paxton, R. O. 2004. The Anatomy of Fascism. New York: Knopf. Schmitter, P. 1974. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” Review of Politics 36:85–131. Sica, A. 1988. Weber, Irrationality, and Social Order. Berkeley: University of California Press. Suskind, R. 2004. The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill. New York: Simon and Schuster. Timasheff, N. S. 1965. ‘The Social System, Structure and Dynamics.’ Pp. 63–70 in Pareto and Mosca, edited by J. H. Meisel. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Grand Theory and Comparative Perspectives

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Elite Distinction: Grand Theory and Comparative Perspectives Jean-Pascal Daloz Institute for Political Studies, Bordeaux, France, and University of Oslo, Norway [email protected]

Abstract Most of the major social theorists have addressed the issue of distinction. Largely ignoring each other’s views on the matter, they have mainly sought to integrate their discussion within their respective grand theories. The main defect is that, often extrapolating from the analysis of one particular case, they have claimed to provide sociological laws. On the basis of personal field work as well as a sound acquaintance with the literature dealing with elite groups, the author aims at suggesting how differences from one society to another challenge universalistic understanding. Although comparative research proves to make it impossible to accept any general theory of distinction, the article, however, shows that many classical perspectives are worthy of note if taken as partially valid.

There is an abundance of theories related to elite distinction.1 Explicitly or implicitly, most of the major sociologists have addressed this issue. Needless to say, their arguments have been rooted in dissimilar social theories and

1 One caveat is in order here. In this article, my concern is almost exclusively with elite distinction and not with social distinction as a whole (i.e. also including, for instance, middle class differentiation from labour classes), although subaltern representations will sometimes be touched on. I should add that I am employing the term elite because it has the advantage of subsuming many types of upper groups, including in those social contexts where the concept of class would be inappropriate. Regarding the word distinction, as is widely recognised, it presents the advantage of referring not only to the objective idea of separation but also to noticeable eminence and finally to refined manners. It might be worth noticing that this triple meaning can be found in various European languages.

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have arisen in the context of various research objects—such as statusenhancement, luxury, court society, conspicuous consumption, leisure class, fashion, presentation of self, taste, symbolic boundaries etc. They nonetheless converge around one common topic, namely: the necessity for the dominant groups to display external or internalised signs of superiority that signal their upper social position. One serious problem with this topic is that social theorists have all too often been more interested in finding confirmation for their respective grand theories than in considering the various realities of distinction comparatively. Whenever they have brought empirical evidence to support their position, the main shortcoming has been extrapolation: that is the claim to provide sociological Laws on the grounds of one particular case during a given period. Contemporary scholars rarely deem classical models of interpretation out of date, even if vigorous debates still surround some authors. Admittedly, several of the founders of the discipline that will be cited here inspire little empirical research today. But, as we shall see, Veblen, Sombart, Simmel, Weber, Elias or Bourdieu are currently being applied, or at least invoked, in case studies—by historians for instance. The latter need theories for their concrete work on elite manifestations of social prestige. On their side, the proponents of the competing sociological schools of thought enthusiastically welcome research that appears to validate and document their theoretical frameworks. The purpose of this article is to discuss the usefulness of these analytical grids (manifesting generalizing ambitions) for comparativists dealing with the realities of the present-day world or with historical enquiries. First, I think it important to emphasize that the social theorists who addressed the issue of elite differentiation largely ignored each other’s views on the matter. Seeking primarily to integrate this point within their respective grand theories, they have hardly committed themselves to situating their model of interpretation in relation to their most influential contemporaries or precursors. Second, it will be argued that the vast majority of the available reading grids have either been excessively concerned with a single key principle (e.g. imitation, emulation, habitus, domination) or have over-generalized on the basis of the material gathered from one monographic study. Sociologists are increasingly recognizing cultural dimensions. This has important theoretical implications because empirical research paying attention to these dimensions reveals variations that are not easily encompassed within a single systematic vision. Drawing from the socio-anthropological literature on elites from various parts of the world, and relying on my own field work (on ostentation in Nigeria as well as “conspicuous modesty” in Scandinavian countries), this article will shed doubt on some models leaning toward a reductionist line of reasoning.

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Although comparative research proves the total acceptance of any ubiquitous theory of social distinction impossible, I will conclude that some aspects of several classical perspectives are nevertheless valid. The limitation of their interpretations when confronted with the concrete study of elite distinction calls not for their total rejection but for an eclectic approach. I. (SCEPTICAL) EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY Many writers dealing with elite distinction have not deemed it necessary to acknowledge their indebtedness to predecessors. Indeed, the related literature appears to have given rise to an endless re-discovering of the topic—thinkers being pre-occupied above all with offering analytical models consistent with their own system of sociology. In what follows, I begin by returning to the available theories, giving a critical look to the symptomatic lack of willingness to engage a dialogue between authors. I then make some sceptical reflections upon over-generalizations and extrapolations. Endless Re-discovering Undoubtedly, elitist distance has been a phenomenon of particular significance for many social scientists. Although there is a wealth of literature on this subject, one must admit that it hardly grew through building on the achievements of those who provided pioneering formulations. In fact, not only were many influential theorists seldom motivated by the intention to refute or refine their predecessors’ interpretations but, quite often, they have tended to ignore them altogether. Whether this ignorance was due to a lack of knowledge or a deliberate disregard for others’ contributions would be an interesting matter to pursue but is beyond the scope of this article.2 In any case, apart from Veblen (1994), they all considered the question of elite superiority within the ambit of a general effort at theory building and not so much in relation to what might be termed a tradition of studies recognizing the importance of social distinction. Consequently, instead of pointing the ancestry of some seminal works, they have rather been prompted by a desire to provide writings that are theoretically coherent—usually built up around a basic principle underlying their respective approaches, as we shall see below. Not surprisingly, they often confer the uncomfortable impression that they are starting from scratch. Bourdieu’s (1979) La distinction can be discussed as a prominent example of theoretical analysis largely ignoring any forerunner. This work which still

Likewise, questions related to fundamental disputes between analysts belonging to different theoretical traditions will have to be left aside here. 2

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dominates much thinking in several academic fields should be considered as the “magnum opus” of a “long-term project” aiming at providing a “general theory applicable to all societies” (Gartman 1991:423). In this respect, it can be taken not only as an original piece on social distinction in France but also as a book expanding and synthesizing previous Bourdieusian themes. Undeniably, Bourdieu refers first and foremost to his own œuvre and not to authors who had addressed these issues before him. Generally speaking, he enters into dialogue with scarcely anyone but some philosophers and the founders of the sociological discipline—Durkheim, Weber etc.—trying to transcend some classical theoretical antagonisms between objectivism and subjectivism, class and status (cf. e.g. Brubaker 1985). It is precisely this ambitious attempt which “has established the importance of Bourdieu’s work and, for his devotees at least, has marked his brilliant success” (Alexander 1995:129).3 Yet, predictably enough, he has been criticized for ignoring the pioneers who had paved the way in the study of elite distinction and he could not but respond to this type of criticism in his subsequent works. It is useful to tell the story backwards. Readers of Bourdieu’s (1979) La distinction will no doubt remember that there was no reference to Veblen (1994) at all, not even to the latter’s chapter on “Pecuniary canons of taste” or the Veblenesque idea of “distance from economic necessity”.4 It was only later, when some commentators (e.g. Elster 1983:69–70; Miller 1987) estimated that, in many respects, Bourdieu’s La distinction was just further developing many of the ideas presented by Veblen (among others), that the French author felt compelled to reply. The way he has tried to counter these criticisms has been somewhat ambiguous. First he has denied any assimilation of his approach to Veblen’s theories of conspicuous consumption, on the ground that Veblen’s approach had a normative, moralizing, puritan tone very far from his scientific and rigorous perspective. Later he wrote that Veblen’s model meant a conscious search for distinction and could be related to rational choice theory whereas, in his own perspective, distinction would be mediated by the habitus and therefore not really intentional (see e.g. Bourdieu 1988:783). Here, as he generally does when he feels convenient, he adopts a very structuralist position, emphasizing

3 So said in passing, the appropriations of classical authors are far from being always convincing. To take just one example, I think that there is a confusion in Bourdieu’s use of the notion of “style de vie” which at times seems to refer to styles of life (in the Weberian sense of “Lebensstil ”, i.e. related to a fixed status) and at other times to the idea of lifestyle (related to taste and choice in a modern setting). 4 In just a footnote (1979:n. 23, p. 275), Bourdieu distanced himself from trickle down perspectives, only referring to the short synthesis by Fallers (1961) and to the article by Barber and Lobel (1966) on that topic.

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unconscious and spontaneous logics. But in an earlier article (1984:6–7) he had stated that distinction was not necessarily intentional, which is still another position, indirectly implying that distinction might also sometimes be a voluntaristic process.5 His latest position has been that it was a misunderstanding to reduce his book to an argument about social distinction (e.g. Bourdieu 1994). If we add that Bourdieu himself largely contributed to controversies about the applicability of his model for all societies (as will be discussed below) we are obliged to recognize that debates around his book have mainly had to do with the attempt to impose a new theoretical framework, and prove its originality. Another striking illustration as regards the lack of awareness of others’ work is the continual re-discovering of the “trickle effect”: that is the tendency for new styles in consumption goods to be introduced via the elite and then to pass down through the status hierarchy. It should be borne in mind that Veblen (1994:chapter V) had argued that as the upper class constantly demarcated itself from the lower class by defining and redefining the fashionable, the class immediately under it imitated the fashions that “trickled down” the social ladder and this, in turn, propelled the upper class to assert their superiority by resorting to new insignia of distinction. We know that this emulationist approach of status was also formulated, but independently, by Simmel in his subtle theory of fashion (1957). Later on, American functionalists were to develop perspectives in terms of “trickle down” (Barber and Lobel 1966; Fallers 1961) but without any reference to these previous bodies of thought. Actually, many social theorists, from Elias (1975) to Baudrillard (1970) have addressed the same subject, drawing almost the same conclusions about the flow of status symbols—and tastes—along the social scale, but hardly referring to those authors who had offered preparatory foundations for their own reflections.6 It would not be difficult, for a comparativist, to furnish counterexamples suggesting that the “trickle down” model is irrelevant in many cases—and not just that of our Western “post-modern world”, I shall revert to that. But what is

My emphasis. On this debate, see also Elster (1983:70); Lamont (1992); Trigg (2001). In his work on Ancien Régime France, Elias uses the expressions “dual front class” and “two front stratum” that most probably come from the Simmelean approach in terms of “Zwei-Fronten-Position” (Mennel 1989:86) but he does not refer to his countryman’s analytical framework. In his well-known book on the consumer society in the 1960s, Baudrillard (1970:82–83) elaborates on trickle down mechanisms but without indicating that he draws inspiration from anybody else, though Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class is one of the titles featuring in his bibliography. Actually, the trickle effect was already discussed in the eighteenth century, e.g. by J. Swift on fashions “descending from those of Quality to the Middle sort, and thence to the vulgar”. 5 6

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at stake in the present section is to show how some influential sociologists have sometimes tended to replicate what some of their colleagues had said somewhat earlier on, or to downplay the importance of previous models. In that respect, illustrations could be multiplied, for instance with regard to the recurring theme of nouveaux riches being able to display external signs of wealth but revealing their social origins by the insecurity of their conduct. One may also wonder whether Elias was not strongly influenced by Spencer’s (1893:§432, pp. 222–224) ideas on manners, which used to express subordination and attachment to a superior and, spreading downwards, became general forms of politeness? Or whether his often cited reference to the episode of the Maréchal de Richelieu throwing a purse out of the window in order to explain to his grandson that money is meant to be spent lavishly (Elias 1974:48) does not emanate from Sombart (1967:88) who had used it years before?7 Likewise, why did Weber (who, as is well known, rarely quoted others) not invoke Tarde (2003) on the latter’s previous anti-Marxist analysis of the aristocracy essentially deriving its authority from prestige and not from fortune?8 So much for examples of theoretical amnesia. It would be easy to propose more, but this would certainly be tedious for the reader. Admittedly, some authors dealing with elite distinction do refer to their colleagues’ analytical frameworks. This is for example the case of Simmel who had written two reviews of Tarde’s (1993) Les lois de l’imitation and was to quote him later. In his well-known article on “Symbols of Class Status”, Goffman (1951:note 3) indeed mentions that, to the best of his knowledge, “the most general approach to the study of status symbols” is Spencer’s (1893) work on “ceremonial institutions”. He also gives a passing reference to Simmel, but absolutely ignores Veblen and confers the impression of initiating a program almost from scratch. When some social theorists actually endorse ideas adumbrated by their forerunners, a thorough examination of the references proves that it is frequently with a claim to go beyond them. For instance, both Mills9 and Baudrillard (1972) seem to offer support for

Actually both authors quote the same French source (i.e. Taine’s Les origines de la France contemporaine) but Elias, although providing a more detailed analysis, seems to ignore that the very same episode had already been commented in the sociological literature. 8 It should however be acknowledged that Weber was to mention Tarde’s book (1993) Les lois de l’imitation in what was to become Economy and Society. 9 C. W. Mills has written that Veblen was the “the best critic of America that America has produced” (in Horowitz 2002:107) but that he was to supplement his approach with his analysis on The Power Elite (Mills 1956). About Mills criticizing Veblen, see Saram (1999: 227–228). 7

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Veblen’s (1994) theory but with the clear intention to provide important additions to his perspective and finally to surpass him. On Dubious Generalizations and Extrapolations In the sociological literature dealing with elite distinction there is a manifest tendency towards generalization. Actually, in this literature, words or expressions like, “human nature”, “Man”, “general truth”, “sociological law”, “in any stratified society”, “always” abound. This betrays a clear intention to offer theories transcending both time and space.10 Whether the theses produced are related to a basic principle underlying grand theories or to an inclination to over-generalize, what is intended is to provide a broadly applicable scientific framework. For expository purposes, I have separated out the discussion of fundamental assumptions and that of extrapolations, although this distinction is sometimes blurry (see for instance Bourdieu’s wish to impose the central thrusts of his theory—e.g. habitus—on us and his attempt to persuade us that the model of interpretation he has elaborated about the French case is indeed exportable). I shall then consider a third position, namely: that which consists in abstaining from referring to some elements that might contradict a general theory, and finally the very specific case of Weber’s ideal-typical constructions. The aspiration of early sociologists has mainly been theoretical. What they seem to have been overly concerned with was to offer conceptualizations and to build systems aiming towards “science”. Consequently, the key processes or principles they have brought out permeate all their writings. This obviously applies to their classical contributions as regards the understanding of elite distinctiveness which interests us here. For instance, Spencer’s views on class distinction and more generally speaking “ceremonial institutions” (1893) are clearly affected by his evolutionist, functionalist as well as organicist positions. Likewise, Tarde’s obsessive concern with the “Law of Imitation” led him to a reductionist line of reasoning on the recurring aping of one’s superiors (1993). An extreme case would be the Marxist research tradition which reduces anything symbolic to infrastructural relations of production and anything social to class, or routinely refers to the theory of “commodity fetishism”. But one could also mention Sombart who was prominent among the first theorists for whom elite distinction is a significant object of investigation. The kernel of his argument (Sombart 1967) is that with the development of court society in some European countries, a new class of women emerged, along with new attitudes towards

10

Innumerable quotations could be presented here.

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sexuality; in the last analysis, the primary cause for the development of luxury would be related to the cultural acceptance of “sexual love” and intra-elite competition in that respect (the last proposition being that strong demands for luxury products eventually led to capitalism growth—but I shall leave this point aside). Sombart’s thesis is original and to a certain extent convincing, being supported by historical evidence (admittedly secondary sources). The problem is that he confines his attention almost exclusively to this dimension. Here, the task for the comparative analyst is to highlight the weaknesses (but sometimes also, as I will show later, the interesting aspects) of such generalizing enterprises. It is thus important to complement Sombart’s onesided picture and show that challenging luxury may well serve many other purposes—for instance it may prove to be a sound political investment in some contexts. With regard to Marxist theory, the question usually raised is that of the relative autonomy of social prestige in relation to material conditions. Without even having to refer (in a Weberian way) to ancient privileged groups whose status was not systematically derived from economic standing, it is not difficult to show the limits of economistic theories, even in market-dominated societies (Anthias 2001; Pinches 1999). In order to offer an illustration and defence of my sceptical standpoint visà-vis some classical grand theories, let me turn my attention to Tarde’s case a little bit longer. Gabriel de Tarde is little read today. It should be recalled that he was a French sociologist at least as famous as Durkheim—his major competitor—during his lifetime. Focusing his attention on the relationship between individuals, he challenged abstract sociologism and was to influence the so-called school of methodological individualism as well as the American micro-sociologists. His books are, to a large extent, built around one central sociological process: that of imitation. In the opus which concerns our topic the most (Tarde 1993), he expresses the idea according to which people generally seek to imitate those socially superior to them, whom they idealise, by adopting their values and attitudes. These imitation attempts would often prove to be rough but at times also quite thorough. Several parts of Tarde’s analysis are very sophisticated. He proposes a reflection on distance from a sociological point of view (1993:243), on imitation and proximity, on elites who end up doubting themselves or on both rational and unconscious grounds for imitation. What interests him is why an imitation is not exactly the same thing as the original model. The advantage of this type of approach is that it opens a whole field of study on elites as a social model. However, from a comparative perspective, it is easy to show that the imitation of upper groups is not necessarily the only possible option, nor the only one empirically observable. One may be proud of belonging to a social group which does not stand at the very top of the ladder and keep

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up with symbolic conventions corresponding to that level. In other words, people do not always consider elites at the top as exemplary (which is well demonstrated for instance in studies on labour class sub-culture). Instead of admiring, trying to imitate or being modelled by a reference group, it is possible to forge a counter-model liable to call the established order into question. To take an example, under the Ancien Régime, the French minor provincial aristocracy, at first fascinated by court nobility which they felt close to—because of family or cultural proximity—was to finally understand that insufficient financial means would never allow them to imitate their peers living in Versailles. Consequently, they were to build up a different model emphasising honour, moral rigour, whilst denouncing the court’s decadence (Royon 2002). Sceptical views about systematic elite emulation have also been expressed by historians working on the upward thrust by middle ranks elements and their perception of the upper class during the long transition from aristocratic to bourgeois society in Great Britain.11 Another type of objection that may be put forward against Tarde’s approach is the possible multiplicity of reference models. When several elite groups are competing (for example new rich versus well-established milieux), standards of superiority often prove to be quite diverse (from pretence to subdued attitudes) for outer aspirants who may spurn the style of the upper groups. Social scientists should also wonder which model of behaviour, or consumption, groups are actually exposed to, from the nearest spheres (family, local area) to the remotest ones (in the capital city, abroad), directly or through the media. Finally, it should be acknowledged that some people seek to acquire a personal style and are keen to differentiate themselves from already existing models. Unlike situations where social success is symbolised by the acquisition of the same attributes as those of the established elites, so that everybody might draw a parallel, it is also possible to show one’s singularity and try to become a model oneself (like the French or British dandies during the nineteenth century). All this depends on cultural environments and on the concrete possibilities of personal distinction. Within a universe of standardised production, wearing taylor-made clothing or driving a unique car for instance is becoming quite rare and expensive. Very often, only small personal details (e.g. car options) are available. When we turn to succeeding generations of scholars, the impression is not really different. For instance, in their interpretations in terms of “ranking”, American functionalists are remembered for invariably postulating that status competition would have a beneficial effect on the social system.

11 See Weatherhill (1988:195–196); Langford (1992:574ff.); Smail (1994); Nenadic (1994); M. Hunt (1996).

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Besides, it is obvious that by bringing forth a perspective emphasizing social standing and lifestyle issues, “continuous prestige scale”, status attainment models etc., they have attempted to provide an entire new sociological vision aiming at contradicting the Marxist class-analytical one. With this very short summary and assessment,12 I do not however mean to suggest that their approach, usually based on serious empirical research and paying attention to (cross-)perceptions, was terribly dogmatic. Actually, more than others, the functionalist school of thought proved to be conscious of the specificities of its main research field—i.e. the North American context. I shall come back to this. It remains that this school had its own theoryobsessed thinkers like Parsons. Goffman might serve as a second illustration here. It is certainly arguable whether this author actually was an interactionist or a structuralist (Gonos 1977). The debate is not insignificant because, according to the symbolic interactionist paradigm, the shape of the status hierarchy is likely to differ depending on which status-assignment system is relevant for defining a situation. On the other hand, a structuralist metatheoretical framework means more objectivist reasoning in terms of fixed “frames” for instance (Goffman 1974). The detailed ethnographic descriptions available in a large part of his works might lead one to think that he clearly belongs to the first tradition. A thorough examination is of course beyond the scope of this article. As he describes matters, let’s say in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Goffman 1959), one cannot but conclude that the way he develops his dramaturgical theory (in terms of “front” and “back” regions, self control in public etc.) sounds universalistic. It is only at the very end of the book, in the conclusion, that he introduces a little bit of cultural relativism. From a comparative point of view, it is easy to show, however, that relations to “roles” are fairly different from one cultural context to the other. Likewise, his chapter on “Embarrassment and Social Organization” in Interaction Ritual (Goffman 1967) proves to be very ethnocentric. The way embarrassment is experienced in the Far East and in the “Western” world is extremely different, for example, and he does not seem to be aware of that. Goffman’s perspectives are not negligible for researchers working on elite distinction in so far as he deals extensively with issues like appearance before an audience, staging, wings, but just like for his famous article on “Symbols of Class Status” (1951) above-mentioned, many of his assertions can be seriously questioned.

12

It is of course not possible to give a complete outline of theories in all their wealth

here.

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Such queries could easily be multiplied. When we turn to Baudrillard’s reflections on the consumer society, for instance, one may really wonder whether his views in terms of “totalitarian codes of standing” which would constitute a universal system of differentiation (Baudrillard 1968) are still valid in post-modern societies where consumer behaviour is shaped by countless lifestyles that obviously cut across the social hierarchy. I do not mean to say that elites would no longer develop a distinctive set of consumption objects serving to express their status position. But one must admit that there are other attitudes involved henceforth, like self-satisfactions quite unconcerned with other people’s opinions. Consequently, one cannot but be astonished by his doubtful anthropological parallels between modern consumer society and the Potlatch or the Kula (Baudrillard 1972). My main objection is that, too often, a considerable number of theoretical speculations are made on the basis of very little evidence, which leads thinkers to mistakenly postulate invariant logics. As noted earlier in this section, another detrimental bias is the one which consists in extrapolating from the analysis of one particular case. The question here is whether the theoretical focus and the core concepts raised about one specific context may have their applicability beyond the confines of that local situation. In what follows, I will limit myself to a discussion of three major authors (Veblen, Simmel and Bourdieu) who, on the basis of their one-case study analysis (respectively of the United States, Berlin and France) at one particular period, provided analytical models that they themselves (or their disciples) have tended to generalize across settings. Appraising Veblen is not a straightforward task. On the one hand, he was definitely a pioneer who made a breakthrough in the study of elite distinction. He was so innovative and sometimes provided such subtle analyses in his Theory of the Leisure Class (Veblen 1994) that this book could only become a standard reference. Despite its brilliance, however, the limitations of Veblen’s theory stem from his reading of instincts and his ahistorical views about some principles allegedly guiding all human conduct (e.g. Campbell 1987). As with all the other social scientists con-sidered here, a short presentation inevitably fails to do justice to the complexity of his sociological apparatus—emphasizing “conspicuous leisure”, “conspicuous consumption”, “pecuniary emulation”, “vicarious consumption”.13 Its merit, and usefulness for comparativists, will be commented in the last section of this article. At this stage, it should be said that one can only concur with Elias (1974:48–9) who justifiably criticised Veblen for failing to understand

On the intellectual legacy of Thorstein Veblen, see for instance Tilman (1992 and 1996). 13

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the behavioural logics and the mentalities of environments different from the American bourgeois society he was familiar with. Veblen’s Americanocentricism is a complex one, since one also has to take into consideration his Norwegian roots (which made him so sensitive to the issue of waste).14 The cultural universe he knew best when he elaborated his book was that of Chicago in the 1890s with its 200 millionaires and their lavish mansions by the Michigan lake, its nouveaux riches eager to show off, aggressive capitalism and serious class antagonism (see Splinder 2002). There is no doubt that he described and analysed this kind of universe extremely well (of course in a fairly ironic tone), though I think it not impossible to level reproaches against him even here.15 Whatever the case, when he comes to sweeping statements or tries to consider other contexts (e.g. aristocratic), he is no longer convincing.16 His references are extremely vague—he would for instance just mention “certain Polynesian chiefs”, “a certain king of France” (1994:27–28)—with hardly any footnote. Although, he sometimes reasoned about stages (“peaceful savagery”, “barbarian”, “civilized”), “Veblen was almost alone in seeing continuity and persistence” (Diggins 1978:18) where early sociologists from his generation “saw change and progress” (id.). Stressing the “Conservation of Archaic Traits” (title of Veblen’s (1994) Chapter IX) could not entice him to look seriously for differences and discontinuities. Actually, Veblen may be considered as the extrapolator par excellence.17

14 Following Dorfman’s (1966) voluminous biography, Riesman (1995) was to insist a lot on this “Norskie” dimension. According to later commentators it should not be overemphasized (see principally Edgell 2001). 15 For instance, as is well-known, Veblen usually depicts women as the eternal victims of masculine domination, being condemned at best to “vicarious consumption” and ornamental reification. But to take a contemporary literary example, when one reads Edith Wharton’s (who knew this milieu pretty well) novel The House of Mirth (1997 [1905]), one sometimes gets a very different view with wives and daughters craving for some measure of conspicuousness and individual prominence at the expense of their husband or father. For instance (p. 27) “Mrs Bart’s worst reproach to her husband was to ask him if he expected her to live like a pig” and then she would order one or two dresses in Paris and call the jeweller. Admittedly, there are other passages and characters in The House of Mirth which seem to corroborate Veblen’s one-sided picture. For instance (p. 155) “I want my wife to make all the other women feel small”. 16 When he states that since the status of hereditary aristocrats is definitively fixed at birth, and since they tend to live in their own cocoon, they would not be forced to show their rank. He most unfortunately ignores intra-elite competition here, within court societies for instance. 17 A radical writing in the Monthly Review expressed it with style and is especially worth citing here. The author wrote that Veblen’s reflections about history and pre-history are “infected with his view on the contemporary United States. He saw the past through a lense encrusted with the American present and, as a consequence this past was permeated with emulatory consumption and invidious distinction” (quoted by Tilman 1992:223).

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It is of course quite easy, from a comparative perspective, to point to the limits of his general theses. I will content myself with providing two illustrations here. The following passage of Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class (1994:24) is often quoted. “In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient to merely possess wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence”. This kind of view is understandable when one considers the dominant “upstart culture” of his time, in a Northern American context which might be considered as the epitome of superiority assertion through external signs. By contrast, especially within some settings long shaped by an aristocratic tradition, the chief determinants of status may prove to be rather discreet and mainly incorporated (one thinks in particular of the importance of having a distinguished accent in England), though they aim at creating the same social effects. This raises important sociological issues, such as that of “symbolic capital” (in the Bourdieusian sense of the social recognition of legitimate, institutionalised signs) but also that of concrete inter-action. If a prominent member of the elite knows that the people s/he is facing are already quite aware of his/her superior position, demonstrations of simplicity are likely to beget astonishment and even more admiration. Paradoxically, (false) modesty and understatements should be interpreted as heights of ostentation in some contexts. By symbolically denying the distance which nevertheless still objectively exists, one adds to the myth of one’s own greatness. However, another major theoretical controversy here is whether presentation of self is mainly a question of strategy (in a Goffmanesque game of impression management) or actually takes place at a subconscious level (self-confidence or lack of ease being pre-determined by habitus for instance). As will be emphasized later, commanding social admiration is also very much dependent upon (sub-)cultural factors leading to an austere or impressive demeanour. From the perspective of this article, this dimension is by no means secondary. To give another illustration, the Veblenesque approach, by only paying attention to prestigious goods as status symbols, unfortunately tends to underestimate their functional dimension. In many cases, the more conspicuously one can consume, the greater the status others will confer upon him or her. Yet prestigious goods must also be studied taking their practical value into consideration.18 If limousines (or jets) must certainly be analyzed in terms of attributes of power and status enhancement, one cannot deny

Several social scientists rightfully criticize this mono-causal reading (e.g. Goode 1978:63– 64; Campbell 1994). Quite a number of economists, thinking in terms of “substantive” and “symbolic” goods, could also be cited here. 18

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that they also have concrete functions of “comfortableness” and rapidity for elites bound to do extensive travelling. This type of “utilitarian” perspective opens a very fascinating subject for the scholar interested in studying the artefacts with which elite individuals and families surround themselves, beyond purely symbolic dimensions. Let us continue our discussion on extrapolations by considering the case of Simmel. It goes without saying that he was one of the first sociological analysts of modernity and metropolitan experience (Simmel 1950). Whereas in European societies up until the turn of the nineteenth century prestige goods were only there to confirm and strengthen a pre-existing status, with the advent of mass societies and then consumer societies, goods in themselves became status markers regardless of the social background of each and everyone. Parallel to a growing division of labour, the measure of prestige widened and superiority was not as cumulative as in the past. New mimetic and differentiation strategies appeared and these were, most important of all, linked to socio-economic position. Members of subordinate groups often tried to copy the reference model represented by those above them. It was the end of conventional logics of ostentation and hierarchies and the beginning of a world of individual consumption, with the emergence of a contagious envy of things possessed by those who have more than us—both examples to follow and rivals to overtake at the same time (Perrot 1995). We know that social distance in this new context was a phenomenon of particular significance for Simmel. We also know that, unlike some other classics, he cannot be accused of having proposed a pervasive grand theory. What commentators usually criticize him for would rather be his impressionistic tone and the fact that his 600-page Soziologie is more a collection of small essays than a systematic treatise. Having said that, Simmel nevertheless remains as the author who formulated a lasting theory of fashion and distinction which was to be extremely influential, though it can be seriously questioned from a comparative standpoint. It is in this respect that the German author’s legacy is discussed here. As I have recalled above, Simmel elaborated an emulationist approach of status within his sophisticated analysis of fashion (1957). It can be considered as a landmark in what was later to be known as “trickle down” perspectives, that is the tendency for new styles in consumption goods to be introduced via the socio-economic elite and then to pass down through the status hierarchy. Emphasizing a tension between differentiation and imitation, Simmel certainly offered an enlightening interpretation as concerns the study of the Berlin situation in the early twentieth century, but the extension of his model to other cases is far from being convincing. Had Simmel been content with developing his subtle reading in terms of “personal conspicuousness” and collective dimensions about this particular context, there would be little

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controversy. The problem is that his famous article sometimes shows wider ambitions (referring to Renaissance Florence and Venice, dandies), not to mention the use of expressions which have a very archaic ring (“impulses of the soul”, “our race”, “human nature”, “primitive man”, “Kaffirs”). In this respect, it is unlikely that the model of fashion as understood by Simmel can be easily applied across contexts. For instance, one obviously does not always discern a tendency of the superordinate classes to relinquish old status symbols. Even if we look at the period when Simmel was writing, providing counterexamples would not prove very difficult for comparativists. Suffice it to give that of the motorcar, rejected as hopelessly vulgar by British aristocrats (Cannadine 1994:62ff.) who were still very much attached to the horse-driven carriages—a major emblem of their superior status for centuries (Stone 1967). Quite often, aristocrats would rather praise the “patina” of their belongings symbolising their long-standing elite status (McCracken 1990:Chapter two) than the latest commodities available on the market. Referring to the relevant concepts coined by economists one can distinguish here between “distinction through seniority” and “distinction through novelty”. As Swann (2001:63) shows about contemporary buyers of Rolls Royces and Ferraris respectively, “where distinction comes from novelty the elite will trade up to buy the newest models, and the second tier of consumers will suffice with last year’s models (. . .). Where greatest distinction comes from antiquity the elite will seek the older, more distinguished model, while the nouveau riche will buy the newer models”. Here, it is also pertinent to point out that, quite often, competitive display actually concerns differentiation between elites much more than with regard to other classes. If trickle down there is, the intention seems mainly to distinguish oneself from one’s peers. Furthermore, Simmel’s theory of fashion which was to inspire so many followers now seems obsolete as there are strong empirical arguments in favour of other models of interpretation more in phase with post-modern realities. These will be discussed later. All social theorists need to start from somewhere and in this respect it is always instructive to be aware of the field experiences that have most influenced their scholarly work. Quite often, there is clearly a tendency to rely on the material from monographic publications which have given them prominence. Undeniably, Bourdieu’s grand theory is based on serious empirical research on the peasant society of the Kabyle in the 1950s and on the French society later. However, to put this bluntly, it is as if his comparative horizon was confined to these two cases, which he has tried to establish as typical illustrations of precapitalist and capitalist society, respectively. In the first case, capital would be masked and take the form of “symbolic capital”, whereas under capitalism, accumulation is rationalized, the relations of dependence are institutionalized and dominant agents no longer have to

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justify their prominence through the fulfilment of patrimonial duties. To quote Dumont and Evens (1999:10), one can say that even if “Bourdieu describes an evolutionary shift from precapitalist to capitalist societies, it is critical to his argument that these are precisely not mutually exclusive kinds of social arrangements. Just as capital, though incognito, operates in precapitalist settings, so symbolic capital and the habitus are important features of capitalist orders”. Bourdieu loves to accuse other theorists of subjectivism (aiming at interactionists or some Weberians among others) or excessive objectivism (Durkheimians, old-fashioned structuralists), intellectualist voluntarism (Sartre), reductionist economism (Marxists). Those who are charged with excessive cultural relativism or would pay too much attention to local meanings and representations (like Geertz) are taxed with “anthropologism” or “semiologism” (Bourdieu dixit in Bourdieu, Chartier and Darnton 1985). Notwithstanding his denials in this respect (e.g. Bourdieu 1987:24–25), he himself can certainly be accused of sociologism in so far as he presents class and capital as universal explanatory principles. His class analysis is extremely sophisticated, but it can only be criticised for its inclination to reductionism by whoever follows a comparative perspective. Mainly considering intra-societal variations and largely evading the question of wider cultural and cross-national differences (apart from the two cases constituting his points of reference), Bourdieu can certainly be put within the category of extrapolators.19 By insisting on the fact that his theoretical model has worldwide application and dogmatically ignoring that the logics of distinction can be affected by the historical national repertoires of each country, Bourdieu could only expose himself to serious criticisms by scholars doing empirical comparative research on that topic (for a brilliant illustration, see Lamont 1992). As will be developed in the subsequent section of this article, not only is it very debatable whether Bourdieu’s model is relevant for the United States, but we cannot unproblematically assume that such an analytical framework can be applied to Scandinavian, sub-Saharan or South-East Asian countries for instance. Likewise, his attempt to defend the applicability of La distinction to Japanese society (Bourdieu 1994), by bringing up a handful of local references, cannot convince whoever is even a little bit acquainted with Japanese culture.20 This of course did not prevent him from finding

It should be recalled here that in the Preface of the English version of La distinction he did not hesitate to write: “But I believe it possible to enter into the singularity of an object without renouncing the ambition of drawing out universal propositions” (Bourdieu 1986:xi) (my emphasis). 20 Suffice it to consider the very singular realm of Japanese self-presentation and cross19

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sociologists willing to import his reading-grid and to make themselves the apostles of his approach all over the world. The founders of sociology were primarily concerned with social change in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western society. However, a few—like Weber or Elias whose approaches I shall discuss now—sought to essay a theory of historical dynamics and, for this reason, set out to analyse the social aspects of “pre-modern” or extra-European communities. Elias can certainly be classified among the authors for whom the social sciences ought to aim for large-scale theoretical synthesis. Yet, his approach in terms of configurations makes him a fairly unusual kind of comparative sociologist (the same goes for Weber’s ideal-types perspective). If Elias is clearly an antirelativist (Elias 1993), due to his insistence on the respective logics behind various types of configurations, he cannot be accused of extrapolating or of aspiring to explain everything with one single grand theory. For instance, unlike Veblen, he quite rightly points out that in industrialized societies, one is able to preserve great prestige without providing public proof for it through costly display. Social pressure for prestigious consumption would no longer have the unavoidable character it used to have (particularly under the court configuration) and would take on a much more private one (Elias 1974:54–55). Unfortunately, this does not prevent him from drawing a faulty parallel between potlatch systems and prestigious consumption within courtly society (1974:49).21 Furthermore, whilst suspicious of general theories, he remained an evolutionist (like Weber) and his strong emphasis on a process of civilisation (Elias 1973 and 1975) drastically limits the range of possible cases, even if it avoids one-dimensional universalism. This brings me to highlight another type of criticism which can be addressed to classical theory, i.e. the tendency to abstain from referring to some elements that might provide arguments for a revision of the theory. As a comparativist specialised in the study of elite distinction, I am led to concretely work on prestigious goods (clothes, vehicles, residences, luxurious eating), refined manners, the display of a certain kind of entourage (spouses, children, flaunted mistresses, servants), ceremonial pomp and

perceptions. On this, see for instance McVeigh (2000:20ff.). As will be clear in the second part of this article, however, I am also quite willing to acknowledge the merits of Bourdieu’s contribution to the study of distinction. 21 In the first case, there were reciprocal obligations between clans. It is the group as a whole, embodied in the person of the chief, which had to give and receive with “dignity”, or indulge in ostentatious “consumption” (see e.g. Codere 1950). In the second case, it was more about a competition between individual elites around the figure of the king, although maintaining the honour of one’s “house” could also be taken into consideration.

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physical appearance. In this respect, it is instructive to see how social theorists often tend to favour some of these facets at the expense of others. As is well known, Elias acutely focuses his attention upon manners. This is consistent with his intention to reveal a process of civilisation (although it should be noted that he most regrettably ignores Antiquity as well as non-Western societies which could be quite “refined”). But he says relatively little about extravagant adornment, indulgence in lavish banquets or, strikingly enough, the lack of sexual restraint which used to be so obvious in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century aristocratic life (e.g. Stone 1977). Without seeing elite competition and the development of luxury as being reducible to the latter dimension—I refer to my earlier comments on Sombart (1967)—one may wonder whether Elias did not (consciously or not) minimise the aspects that would seem to contradict his thesis about the rise of distinction through self-control?22 Unlike Elias whose relations with historians have long been controversial,23 Weber is still widely quoted by historians and considered as one of the pioneers in the field of comparative history. Any work on elite ostentatious behaviour must acknowledge the fundamental distinction between status and class he so clearly made (e.g. Gerth and Mills 1991:Chapter VII), even though he was not the first to have approached it, as well as his innovative analyses in terms of style of life (Weber 1978:932–33) or social closure (Murphy 1988). Methodologically, his ideal-typical approach certainly leads to clear and rigorous analyses, though subsuming situations under the same term often leads him to simplifications or mere allusions. This is particularly true of charisma or of his “traditional authority” ubiquitous category which has been justifiably questioned by anthropologists (notably Goody e.g. 1996). While Weber certainly had an encyclopaedic knowledge of both “Western” and Asian civilisations, he did not have much theoretical acquaintance with more “primitive” contexts (unlike a Spencer or a Durkheim) which is problematic for an author who sought to embrace all power situations for instance. To be sure, Weber was not one of those social scientists strongly inclined to propose general theories valid at any time and place. He convincingly argued about the specificity and heterogeneity of

With this hypothesis in mind, one could attempt to provide an overview of the objects of investigation ostensibly favoured and of those (purposely?) neglected by all the aboveconsidered social theoreticians. 23 It is fitting to recall that he used to warn social scientists against the dangers of historical relativism and descriptive “historism”. On their side, specialists of modern European history have demonstrated that Elias’s interpretations on court society were outdated and sometimes wrong (for discussions on this point, see principally Duindam 1995). 22

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the “West”. It remains that his evolutionist views on modernisation and rationalisation sound universalistic. Perhaps some of my critical remarks have seemed ill-conceived to the ardent admirer of some author or other. Yet I urge readers to keep an open mind. The remainder of this article is devoted to confronting the available grand theories with empirical evidence. My intention will not be to give a final blow to some analytical frameworks but, on the contrary, to underline their merits when taken not as ultimate models of interpretation but as containing elements of truth for some contexts. II. THE CLASSICS CONFRONTED WITH COMPARATIVE RESEARCH The socio-historical literature on upper-class behaviour, consumption, postmodernity, together with anthropological fieldwork on dominant groups all over the world, are rich with close observations about elite distinction. I think it relevant to bring the results of these studies together with the abovementioned theoretical models. The principal issue here is of course not that of comparison between the various thinkers—as some have attempted with a rear intention to prove the superiority of one approach over the others.24 I would rather argue that the theories elaborated by these scholars are all stimulating and worthy of note, provided we do not see them as definitive reading grids that could systematically be applied across cases and contexts, but as tools useful for interrogating particularities. Empirical Arguments Cultural sociology has gained popularity among researchers during the last fifteen years. This “cultural turn” could only but be extremely debated, since it seriously defies the meta-theoretical assumptions of many classical schools of thought. Some sociologists now go as far as considering culture as an independent variable (Alexander 2003) which is indeed a revolution for a discipline which used to ignore cultural dimensions, merely treat them as emanating from social structures or, at best, see them (like Weber) in terms of “elective affinities”.25 A certain amount of comparative knowledge

For instance, Mennel (1985:112ff., 1989:83ff.) tries to persuade us that Elias’s reflections on elite prestige consumption are more convincing than those of Veblen, Sombart, or Weber, among others, either because his argumentation is more analytically elaborated or is based on less elusive empirical grounds. To dogmatically favour one author over the others is reminiscent of a political militant always blindly agreeing with the party he belongs to. 25 Similar developments are occurring in other disciplines like History (e.g. Burke 1997) or Political Science (Chabal and Daloz 2006). 24

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is necessary for the subsequent reflection liable to raise concerns about grand theory. However, the challenging illustrations provided hereunder are by no means very detailed fieldwork results. Drawing inspiration from the studies of some anthropologists, historians, sociologists, as well as my own, I merely aim at mentioning evidence that suggests that more attention should be paid to cultural diversity. I will point to some African, Asian, North American and European examples which, I think, are consequential and lead one to discuss some theories’ basic contentions. In doing this, my hope is to encourage future research on a topic which needs more empirical investigations. When studying Nigerian “Big Men”26 in the 1980s, I was struck by the revealing fact that the local elites hardly aim at isolating themselves and building houses in residential areas. They indeed try to differentiate themselves by constructing the most impressive edifice, but generally in the very place where they have their roots: among their community and clients, be it a miserable village or an overcrowded suburb. Undoubtedly, here we are dealing less with pure logics of social distinction—as would be the case in countries where a class (horizontal) system prevails—than with logics of symbolic ascendancy depending on proximity.27 On their side, supporters hope that their respective leader will be able to display external signs of wealth in order to compete with those representing other networks. They typically revel in the idea that he possesses more prestigious and impressive goods—cars for instance (Daloz 1990)—for these are in some way a credit to the whole community which identifies with him. In other words, clients expect of their patrons that they uphold their rank. The inability to do so would come as a grave disappointment since it would denote the community’s lack of substance. In a country such as Nigeria, ostentation therefore does not only pertain to a self-glorifying quest by top elites but also meets generalised expectations. From a Western viewpoint, it is sometimes difficult to admit that considerable amounts of money are used for the importation of very costly prestige goods whilst the majority of the population barely have enough to survive on. But to be able to grasp

I am using the term “Big Men” here because it is commonly employed in this West African country but also in reference to Sahlins’s (1963) classical model, as proposed in his work on Melanesia. For discussions on the possible adaptation of this anthropological model to the study of African elites’ behaviour, see Médard (1992); Daloz (2002b); Werthmann (2003). In this type of environment, elites also have to be considered as community leaders and patrons. 27 Of course, residential areas actually exist on the outskirts of the cities, but the segregation between the rich and the poor was undeniably a much more apparent phenomenon during the colonial period than before or after it. 26

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these phenomena, we have to rid ourselves of our “Eurocentric” lenses and empirically enter the universe of meaning that prevails in this part of the world. I think that the key explanation lies in the vertical structure of socio-political competition, essentially composed of rival factions and communities. In the Nigerian case, ostentation must be interpreted in terms of “vertical symbolic redistribution” which complements more concrete redistribution at the heart of patronage systems. Conspicuous display is certainly meant to exhibit prosperity and power, but it somehow also reassures the followers of a particular Big Man’s capacity to supply and satisfy his network of dependants in a particularistic manner—which is the key aspect to acquiring social legitimacy (Daloz 2002a). Through this example, we clearly see the collective/vicarious dimension of elite distinction which is a predominant feature all over sub-Saharan Africa, albeit more pronounced in some countries than others. Most of the theoretical models I have considered above were designed for societies where class cleavages are predominant. But when societies are above all organized according to vertical axes (be they clientelistic or factional, linked to ethnic or religious identities), these classic schemes prove to be highly non-operative because “symbolic struggles” are experienced in a very different way. Faced with such evidence those analysts who favour a class analysis are prone to suggest that this behaviour is the result of “false consciousness” among the poorer people. Yet the indication is that all, from top to bottom, share such constraining representations. Far from being a mere ideological smoke-screen, this deeply engrained vertical relationship is part of a common cultural heritage. Projecting an image of substance is imperative for all elites, if they want to appear as being credible patrons.28 The acuteness of inequalities is reduced by the need to be seen as redistributing on a scale appropriate to one’s standing. In his work on “The Material Culture of Success” in Cameroon, Rowlands (1994:155–156) equally shows how conspicuous consumption is rarely just “a personal and private act of gratification”. If it may certainly serve as a “statement and confirmation of personal progress”, it is mainly concerned with “public ceremonies” where both power and generosity are meant to be emphasized. Studies concerned with cultural meanings would

28 More precisely it matters to indicate that formal roles in such contexts are seldom clearly differentiated. Elites or their entourage must hold a plurality of positions in various sectors to gain maximum resources and social recognition. Considering that enrichment in sub-Saharan Africa is primarily based on politics, Big Men usually accumulate wealth and redistribute it in order to gain political support. This political capital, in turn, allows them to extract more economic resources. The question is discussed at some length in Daloz (2002b).

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also take into consideration the continued and ambivalent significance of the occult, notably witchcraft—whether it is instrumentalized as a social leveller compelling those who have enriched themselves to share their wealth with the community (e.g. Geschiere 1997) or to demonstrate, through the display of pecuniary strength, that a Big Man’s sorcery is strong enough to immunize those under his protection to supernatural dangers and enemies. Instead of conventionally looking at things in the light of universalistic theories which have received acclaim, Africanists should produce contributions paying full attention to codes of behaviour which often prove to be culture specific.29 When turning to Asia, we also find empirical studies implicitly or directly contradicting assumptions made in the standard literature on elite distinction. For instance, specialists of South-Eastern Asia warn us against presuming that the drive to consume luxury brands would mean exactly the same thing as it does in the “individualistic” and “selfish” West (which itself begs the question of which West?—I shall come back to that). Important cross-national differences emerge and similarities are only superficial. We are told that things are indeed quite complex, for example as regards the codes of the new rich.30 As in Africa, the collective dimension is evident. In Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (but also in contemporary urban China) the members of the new middle class appear to be constrained by “traditional morality” emphasizing the necessity of community reciprocity. Wealth is definitely admired, even if it does generate some envy. But, from a cultural perspective, the point is that the conspicuous private consumption of newly rich people may be resented and obligations to “one’s people” can remain very strong. This has important theoretical implications because we are not just dealing with a class-differentiation perspective here, as many classical models would have it, but with contradictory images of success and cultural legitimation. To take two very different illustrations, at the other end of the continent, in Lebanon “if you don’t fannas [show off ] you are dead” (Gilsenan 1976:198) which may consequently involve lying;31 whereas in North Yemen the prosperous Maria old elite are determined to “keep themselves aloof from consumption styles” (vom Bruke 2005:258) so as to avoid distinction—in line with their moral commitment. It would be wrong to believe that empirical arguments challenging established grand theories would only emanate from research on very “exotic”

See, for instance, several contributions in Tiers Monde (1968). See the work of Pinches and his collaborators (1999); see also the contributions in Robinson and Goodman (1996). 31 So said in passing, the question of Burmese, Thai or Malayan elites lying to outsiders about their own status is also a fascinating topic from a comparative cultural perspective. 29

30

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places. As far as the “West” is concerned, influential articles and books also have taken issue with some of the classic models. Pivotal to most disputes is the fact that the latter would ignore important internal cultural variations from one society to another as well as across historical periods within the same society. There are a number of different variants of this critical position. One of the most vigorous debates is perhaps that on the applicability of Bourdieu’s (1979) theory of social distinction to the United States. Following some seminal contributions around the issue of social boundaries and cultural norms from a comparative perspective (Lamont and Lareau 1988; Lamont 1992) it has mainly evolved into discussions centred on the question of taste displays. This debate is presumably too well-known to need an elaboration here. Let me just recall that on the one side, there are authors paying heed to American exceptionalism and accusing Bourdieu of excessively generalizing from the French case (cf. many contributions in Lamont and Fournier 1992; Halle 1993; Erickson 1996). On the other side, one finds Bourdieu’s advocates wishing to demonstrate that his views have been largely misunderstood, whilst his treatment of the sociology of taste would still be relevant to the United States (Holt 1997; Trigg 2001).32 Such controversies can be related to the literature contesting the idea of hegemonic upper-class “legitimate” cultures. What I particularly have in mind are the reflections on eclecticism and “omnivorousness”—whether in the field of music tastes (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Kern 1996; Bryson 1996 and 1997) or that of “ethnic cuisine” (Warde, Martens and Olsen 1999)—which have brought very interesting empirical data to bear on this debate. In general, within the context of contemporary post-modern societies or “advanced consumer culture”, the profusion of lifestyles, the confusion as regards symbolic conventions embodying hierarchy is noticed by experts. The fluidity between signs stemming from both “high culture” and “popular culture” has led many to conclude that the traditional characterization of social life as a continual exchange of imitation and differentiation between the elite and their social inferiors is obsolete. Under such circumstances, most of the above-mentioned theories—from Veblen to Baudrillard—have been deemed out-of-date. It is not so much that post-modernity would tend towards an egalitarian society but rather that many codes now coexist largely independently of each other, and their appreciation hardly has any meaning except within each sub-system. I may buy an expensive limousine and spend holidays in a luxury hotel to show

Older studies about the United States like Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swideler and Tipton (1985) or Levine (1988) are worthy of interest here from an historical perspective. See also Peterson (1997). 32

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that I have succeeded but this does not necessarily earn me the envy of a Harley-Davidson’s owner who mainly fancies surfing in the summer. The goal would no longer be to actively foster one’s image but to affirm a style of life and define one’s own identity (knowing that there are no incontestable standards of superiority anymore). The problem here is that the copious literature on those issues is largely a dialogue of the deaf. Post-modernists tend to reduce everything to new trends, whereas sociologists aiming at recycling the perspectives of more traditional schools of thought try to convince us that class-marks would still be primordial. It is actually possible to find empirical illustrations corroborating both logics. On each side of the Atlantic, a youngster can probably declare nowadays that Shakespeare is boring, or that rap music is art, and not be despised. On the other hand, due to the proliferation of low cost flights which allow more and more people to travel, it is striking to see how wealthier customers are eager to differentiate themselves by ostensibly enjoying elitist privileges (airport lounges, exclusive booking system etc.). If it is now common for elites to play on different registers, and even possibly adopt traditional symbols of dominated strata, this may arguably lead to post-modernist “trickle up” or “trickle across” interpretations as to readings in terms of “poor chic” emphasizing that such “recreational” and temporary “consumption of poverty” is still, eventually, a “class distinguishing activity” (Halnon 2002). Not only are we witnessing a “mixing of codes and the deconstruction of symbolic hierarchies” (Featherstone 1991:104) but sometimes also what I would call a “reversed symbolic violence” aiming at desacralizing elitist manifestations. Political correctness and the fear of offending dominated groups may lead one to avoid blatant manifestations of superiority.33 The ambivalence of today’s situation is also well expressed in the remarkable novel The Bonfire of the Vanities (Wolfe 1987) picturing a WASP yuppie so full of himself and obsessively judging everyone else by their material possessions, but still extremely vulnerable as soon as he is not insulated anymore in his exclusive Park Avenue area or Wall Street office. An imposing car brings attention, admiration, and can certainly be interpreted in terms of intimidating “symbolic violence” in a Bourdieusian way (Boltanski 1975). But it may also cause resentment and owners have good reasons to believe that they will be targeted first. As I observed above, in a post-modern environment characterized by multiple life-style options, a lot of people are also likely to feel quite unconcerned about such a badge of distinction.

For example, I am thinking of French scholars or experts who feel almost compelled to apologize whenever they use a sophisticated concept on television. 33

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Many authors studying “Western” societies unfortunately are more inclined to demonstrate that the theory to which they give preference is right than to study possible contrasts from one country to the other. Consequently, the “West” is often implicitly presented as a homogeneous entity, in contrast with the rest of the world. From a comparative viewpoint, we obviously lack inductive work focusing on extra-societal variations. Even among the European continent, there are obviously huge cultural variations and these should not be under-estimated. For instance, analyses emphasizing social emulation and distinction cannot be mechanically applied to the Scandinavian countries, given the stress that Nordic people place on modesty.34 There, as is well known, being noticed approvingly goes through a style of presentation tending toward a great simplicity. The effects of “Jante lagen/loven” (Auchet 2004)—meaning the informal rule that discourages feelings of superiority—can be felt amongst all members of the social elite.35 They are even more powerful when it comes to political elites who cannot be seen to ignore its application and cultivate an image of “conspicuous modesty” which is hardly found elsewhere (Daloz 2007). In the above paragraphs, I just wanted to point to some cases suggesting that the meanings influencing elite distinction practices can be very diverse around the world, thereby challenging the dogmatism of grand theories. Many more illustrations could be given here.36 Trying to steer clear of the Scylla of theoretical reductionism and the Charydbis of impressionistic descriptions, one could propose some new avenues of research worth exploring. For example, it would be interesting to study whether the classical distinction—made about cuisine—between a traditional quantitative ostentation and a more modern emphasis on quality37 can be generalized to other prestige goods? Why are some objects culturally more valued than

See for instance Sellerberg (1994) for a sceptical view on the application of a Simmelian “trickle down” and differentiation model to the Swedish case. For an international comparison, see, among others, the study of Silvera and Seiger (2004) about self-esteem in Norway and the United States. 35 Admittedly, this rule appears less effective in respect of today’s nouveaux riches but even here, it is important to point out that few will ignore it. Displays of ostentation are possible mainly outside their native country, for example when they are on holiday on the French Riviera or in the Swiss Alps. 36) For instance via recurring to the anthropological literature on prestige goods or to historical monographs on the Antiquity’s Epiphanic monarchs; the extravagant Roman Empire; the pomp of Italian Renaissance; the pageantry of the court of Burgundy, of England at the end of the Elizabethan period, of the Stuarts, and particularly Versailles; the splendour of the Sultans, the grandiosity of maharajas etc. 37 See Braudel (1979). This distinction has sometimes been questioned (Flandrin 1999). 34

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others to assert social status? Why are attitudes to emulation and originality so different across time and space? Why is the display of external signs of wealth crucial in some places, whereas in others embodied signs (refined manners, self-control, eloquence, display of cultivated dispositions . . .) prove to be much more important? What is the impact of the political? Not even having to mention extreme cases such as the USSR (see Gronow 2003), it has for instance been written that a country such as Sweden would have fallen prey to acquisition of prestige goods, just like any other capitalist country, had the social-democratic watchwords not been so hegemonic (Pontusson 1988). In this respect, one must admit that the classics’ works are full of valuable insights, provided one leaves their universalistic theses aside and considers that there is often a partial truth in their respective contributions. Even though we can only but be mindful of the limits of their models (especially when it comes to a comparative interpretation of meaning) we also have to acknowledge our debt for many of their suggestions. From Limits to Merits To sum up, in view of what has been said earlier in this article, I argue that most theories related to elite distinction have tended to reduce the diversity of social experience to a uniformity which has never existed in real life. Many of the available ones appear less than convincing for a comparativist with their overarching concepts. However, in passing a judgement on thinkers we should bear in mind that a mixture of criticism and admiration is often appropriate. In the first section of this article, I have critically reviewed the literature dealing with elite distinction. As should be obvious from what has been recurrently said, the major pitfall of those theories has been to ignore the lack of similarity characterizing symbolic relations between elites and other strata. To consider that distinction, emulation, imitation, differentiation etc. would merely be the outcome of universal logics or that it would always be the same old story between upper and dominated classes is to fail to enter the world of their plural significance.38 Beyond the obvious limitations of most schools of thought in this respect, I will now try, however, to emphasize the extent of their respective insights. I maintain that the Marxist school’s formulation of upper-class symbolic domination is basically deficient. Dogmatically reasoning in terms of economic primacy, the proponents of this approach neglect to analyse

The same type of criticism may be directed against anthropologists such as Balandier (1980) or Cohen (1981) as regards universalistic readings of politics as theatre, leading to deference and respectability. 38

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the impact of cultures: reducing them to mere super-structural ideological mystification. Furthermore, by asserting that class relations have always prevailed, at least in a latent way, they tend to bring down very diverse situations to one general equation: class determines wealth, which determines supremacy and subordination. Indeed, the major currents of Marxist thought have never given top priority to symbolic issues, deemed rather secondary. I must however admit that, once in a while, in certain variant of Marxism, one finds stimulating passages. For instance, though their explanations too often degenerate into simplistic views of elites manipulating culture and assorted lured masses, members of the Frankfurt school and their critical theory descendants sometimes bring forth original lines of argument.39 Likewise, whereas he would often propose normative and systematic analysis (e.g. on “Master Symbols” and “obedient persons”: Gerth and Mills 1953), C. W. Mills is also implicitly instructive as far as the relative specificity of the United States is concerned.40 E. P. Thomson’s work is full of fascinating descriptions although he unfortunately tends to reduce eighteenth-century British elites’ ostentatious display (powdered wigs, expensive apparel) to a “theatre of the great” essentially meant to impress the lower class (e.g. 1978), thereby disregarding intra-elite competition.41 Against the typical regression of Marxism towards economism, the great advance of the Weberian approach is that it offers an illuminating distinction between status and class. In market-dominated societies, it can easily be observed that the position of social actors depends on economic in-equalities. But in many other cases, inequality is mainly structured by predefined privileges within cultural systems.42 Seen from the outside, these systems may seem quite arbitrary—this brings to mind the important

39 What I have in mind for example is Adorno’s (1981 [1941]) view of culture as a means to transcend the “drudgery of industrial life” and not just “mere ostentation” as Veblen (1994) would have it. 40 For instance when he rightfully insists on the fact that the U.S. society “makes a fetish of competition (. . .). It does seem to matter what the man is the very best at; so long as he has won out in competition over all others, he is celebrated” (Mills 1956:74). This would not be true in many countries which obviously consider some trivial activities as not very legitimate and unworthy of consideration. 41 For obvious reasons, Marxists are more interested in labour class populations. However, the strength of the Birmingham school is its ethnographic dimension focusing on well-defined groups of people. 42 One may accept the idea that social classes existed way before the advent of capitalism but they previously had a rather minor impact on stratification. It also goes without saying that periods witnessing a shift from one logic to another prove rather ambiguous as far as social stratification and supremacy of such and such a type of elite (aristocratic versus bourgeois for instance) are concerned.

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question of sumptuary laws43—however, it is important to take their continuity and deep-rootedness into consideration. In this respect, the Weberian discussion in terms of “originators”, “specific bearers” and “conservers” of conventions and particular styles of life (Weber 1978:932ff.) is particularly relevant. From a comparative point of view, it is easy to show that economic wealth is not necessarily the main criterion of power and social influence. Other backgrounds related to ancestry, honour, knowledge may prevail.44 Especially when it comes to contexts where social relationships are based on a subjective feeling of belonging together on traditional grounds (communities, differentiated estates, orders), Weber’s theoretical understanding proves to be most useful—at least as a starting point. His ability to enter different systems of meaning in a “comprehensive” way (i.e. consisting in stressing what apparently made sense for the actors concerned) is also, quite often, of lasting value,45 not to mention many occasional remarks about the sartorial styles and physical appearance of the elites, or their sense of dignity. When one leaves their recurring concern with typifications a little bit aside, Weber’s writings are far from being insignificant. Similarly, if one leaves aside his generalizations and somewhat evolutionist views, Sombart proves to be an important contributor to the study of elite distinction in several respects. Though some commentators would deplore that he is “not part of the core of classical sociology” (Grundmann and Sther 2001), one must acknowledge the fact that authors from several disciplines have tried to bring him back into favour. Against the critical appreciations made by a structuralist like Braudel (1979:206, 585) who dismissed his thesis of a link between luxury and capitalism,46 historians (Mukerji 1993; Roberts 1998) or social anthropologists (notably Appadurai

For a treatment of this aspect, see for instance A. Hunt (1996). The most current illustration given in this respect by Weber himself (Gerth and Mills 1991:192), is the one of the parvenu rejected by the established elites. History books are full of stories showing extremely rich bourgeois desperately trying to be accepted by the court. For instance, James de Rothschild who was to become the wealthiest man in France after the king in the 1830’s suffered from his non-acceptance by aristocratic elites. It is only after having been ennobled and appointed as Consul for Austria that he had access to the most prestigious salons (Martin-Fugier 1990:137). 45 For example, I am thinking of what he famously wrote about the aristocratic “ethos” and “the need for ‘ostentation’, glamour and imposing splendour” in a feudal context where luxury is “nothing superfluous” but “a means of social self-assertion” (Weber 1978:1106). 46 Actually, Braudel’s views on Sombart are fairly ambivalent. On the one hand, he would praise him for his “monumental” œuvre on the birth of capitalism and sometimes give favourable considerations to minor details. On the other hand, he basically disagrees with an approach paying too much attention to mentalities and not enough to objective socio-economic factors. 43 44

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1986) have stood for him on various grounds (both empirical and theoretical). Even if he does not establish the relationship between the “triumph of illicit love”, court splendour and the growth of capitalist consumption very convincingly, Sombart’s line of argument is original and stimulating. For the comparativist specialised in the study of elite ostentation, several of his distinctions (for instance between quantitative and qualitative emphasis, between refinements leading to sensuous pleasures or respectability, or between the concubine and the influential courtesan) are useful. Above all, he was able to catch something essential in the role played by women in elite distinction. Admittedly, Veblen should be seen as the most important student of “vicarious” ostentation. Yet his one-sided approach (see note 15 above) is not as convincing as Sombart’s more balanced picture about the relation of upper-class women to the consumption of prestigious goods at the beginning of the capitalist era (de Grazzia 1996:19–21). From a comparative perspective, luxury was of course nothing new by that time. But what has happened is that unusual logics of competitive display have taken the place of traditional ones with the advent of court society. This brings me to Elias who, although his work is open to serious criticism in many respects as we saw earlier, can nonetheless be considered as having carried the investigation on court sumptuousness a little further than Sombart. His general thesis and interpretations as regards the “courtization” and “domestication of the warriors” (Elias 1974) eventually leading to the unexpected diffusion of civilized manners (Elias1973 and 1975) can certainly be disputed from an historical perspective (e.g. Gordon 1994:88–94) or when thinking of some twentieth-century developments like informalisation or the female emancipation processes (Wouters 1991 and 2004)—not to mention barbarian genocides. The fact remains that Elias should be regarded as an outstanding precursor in the cultural history of manners. This is indeed a fertile research direction, although from a comparative perspective, manners need to be understood in terms of a general tension between modest civility and display. Elitist manners are irreducible to one single logic. For instance, they may involve a great show of magniloquence and extravagance demonstrating that you are powerful enough to ostensibly free yourself from restrictive norms. Historically, one would think of ancient aristocratic behaviour (before court life) or evoke Napoleon I who was notoriously, and purposely, rude. But elitist distinction would more often go through a perfect self-command and an understanding of prevailing codes of courteousness. Paradoxically, by controlling yourself you control others, as Elias (1974) has shown. Here, the study of gesture is of utmost importance provided comparative analysis actually takes the cultural variability of human gesture into account (e.g. Bremmer and Roodenburg 1991). In many societies, bodily control has been translated into signs of social status. Constructing and maintaining a public body is one of the means

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by which elites uphold their superiority: either walking with a swagger, sprawling out on a chair or achieving sophisticated impressions of natural spontaneity. Surprisingly enough, when it comes to this type of nondiscursive communication, commendable gaits as well as expected postures of self-abasement, Spencer still remains a fairly interesting author. Of course, he is regularly chastised for his speculative scientism, his Social Darwinism, his deterministic perspectives or his recurrent views about “advanced” or “less-advanced” minds and societies. Yet, it is worth noticing that the illustrations he has drawn from his Descriptive Sociology publications, compiled with assistants, often prove to be worthy of attention. I am mainly talking about some of the chapters included in the Second volume/Part IV of his Principles of Sociology (1893)—“Ceremonial institutions”: e.g. on trophies, forms of address, titles, badges and costumes or “further class-distinctions”. Some of these nineteenth-century descriptions and interpretations might justifiably be considered as out-dated by anthropologists—though it should be recalled that not a few pre-eminent ones, from various intellectual generations, were to pay homage to Spencer’s pioneering work—and it would be ridiculous to give them credence uncritically. Yet, for the scholar interested in ceremonial pomp, reading this opus is often instructive and inspiring. Likewise, inadequate as it may be in many respects emphasized above, the work of Veblen should still serve as source of inspiration, especially for topics related to “vicarious consumption” or “conspicuous leisure”. One would be mistaken in thinking that it should be totally rejected. But it is as wrong to indiscriminately follow a Veblenian line of argumentation just in order to provide a theoretical framework for empirical studies.47 Close rereading of the Theory of the Leisure Class (Veblen 1994) leads one to realize how sophisticated his analyses can be. Let me take his approach of “leisure” as an illustration. If the latter should obviously be understood as the opposite of labour activities (and, in the Veblenian’s terminology, as a form of “waste”), it does not connote idleness or indolence at all. On the contrary, it may mean hard work when it comes to well-groomedness or learning how to master language and other skills. Actually, “the more time-consuming certain manners or hobbies are, the higher their social respectability and reputability” (Gronow 1997:36). Veblen has concentrated attention upon many aspects of elitist activities and his classic book is indis-

47) See for instance Vichert’s (1971) or McKendrick et al.’s (1982) usage of the Veblenian concepts of “conspicuous consumption” and “pecuniary emulation” about the birth of a consumer society in eighteenth-century England. Conspicuous consumption has now become a matter of considerable debates among historians. Cf. many contributions in Brewer and Porter (1993).

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putably full of insights and scholarly suggestions. For example, any researcher taking the question of vicarious ostentation through the display of servants can only but pay tribute to his seminal well-illustrated reflections—albeit, as for all other topics, it is possible to identify forerunners.48 Yet, Veblen’s characterization of social life is now in many ways obsolete. Several authors (e.g. Linder 1970; Brooks 1981) have drawn attention to the fact that in the United States, economic elites are not in a position to devote as much time to leisure activities as the workers they employ. Indeed, there is a case for saying that many changes which occurred during the twentieth century have made Veblen’s framework of interpretation outdated, at least in the so-called “developed” countries. Consumer items have become more widely available and this has most certainly altered the nature of “pecuniary emulation”. Nevertheless, in assessing the significance of Veblen’s model, the issue is not so much whether there are still leisure classes in the contemporary world, for instance. It is rather to which extent the theoretical model and conceptual apparatus he has elaborated out of the observation of a particular type of society is relevant for the study of other ones. In the first section of this article, I examined the major weaknesses of Tarde’s theory which centres on imitation processes. But it was also mentioned that the advantage of this type of perspective is to open a whole field of study on elites as a social model. As is well known, this subject has not generated a unified field of interpretation. Tarde and many others approach it in terms of emulative behaviour whereas some schools of thought would rather put forward principles of (hegemonic) domination: the people at the top being able to impose their arbitrary signs of distinction to a whole society. Typically, authors would try to force their respective vision in a very dogmatic way as if emulation or top-down impositions were quasi-universal tendencies. Just as the prestige goods or cultivated tastes displayed by actors at the top of the social ladder sometimes play the role of a paragon but obviously do not in some contexts, it proves difficult to generalize here when one follows a comparative perspective. As underlined earlier, one should not forget that, most often, competitive display actually concerns differentiation between elites much more than with regard to other classes. In this respect, it is particularly relevant to study how elites influence each other at the international level. It is hardly a new subject. Historians, anthropologists and sociologists have long recognized the importance of working on the exportation/importation of means of distinction—and Tarde can actually

As concerns the theme of staff increasing the prestige of elites because of their own distinction and skills or because they offload their master of certain tasks, I think that one should mention particularly Pascal (1976 [1670], nº 316–95). 48

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be instructive here. However, strategies of imitation, but also of syncretism, need particular attention and research nowadays in so far as globalisation makes international cross-perceptions more acute than in the past. Needless to say, cultural dimensions should not be neglected here. It is fascinating to see, for instance, how Arab elites willingly resort to many Western status symbols but would reject the ones liable to threaten their own identity. In addition to scattered contributions on various topics—like coquetry, adornment (see Wolff 1950:50, 338–344) or flirtation (Simmel 1984)—which are of relevance for our theme, Simmel’s contribution is important in principally two respects: first as a pioneer in the field of what was to be later known as “trickle down” processes and second as a brilliant analyst of modern metropolitan experience. As regards trickle effects, I have already indicated that this model is far from being applicable to all modern cases but should not be neglected either.49 The second point deserves a little bit of elaboration here. Simmel has shown that “modern societies” are primarily characterized by the relative impersonality of social relationships. In large cities, external appearance does not just confirm an already known status but pertains to a constant re-assertion of self.50 Simmel underlines that interactions within large cities very much depend on “credit”, in the sense that one is permanently confronted with the question of knowing whether one may trust a stranger simply on his appearance. The autonomy of the symbolic may allow to artificially affect a superior condition. Yet, this type of strategy will often be hindered by the need to present a certain coherence which proves that one really belongs to the elite. Many lifestyle sociological analyses emphasise the importance of “symbolic consistency”. For instance, the objects in one’s possession must form a coherent grouping. By contrast, in the case of odd combinations, elite status becomes blurred and uncertain: there is no “status crystallization” (Lenski 1954).51 This is

An interesting attempt to rehabilitate Simmel’s reading grid was attempted by McCracken (1990, chapter six) in a study of businesswomen in the United States inspired by Sahlins (1976). The idea is that the professional woman’s business outfit would move away from a traditional style of dress affected by pejorative symbolic connotations and appropriate masculine characteristics (dark, squared, tailored jackets) meant to confer them a look of authority. Being threatened by this (relatively subordinate) group, men would in turn tend to adopt a new authority look (“heroic style”) re-establishing their distinction. Such generalisations are very debatable indeed. The “costume-tailleur” i.e. the skirt-jacket combination for women dates back a very long time (1885 in France); as for the adoption of an “heroic” new style by top male managers, it is far from being obvious! 50 For very insightful discussions on this topic, I also refer the reader to Ewen (1988). 51 An African immigrant who uses most of his salary to buy impressive label clothing and parades on the Parisian boulevards, but rents a miserable suburban dwelling, can only use the metro as a means of transportation and hardly eats will certainly not delude people for long, except possibly when he returns to his own country (Gandoulou 1989a, 1989b). 49

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well illustrated by authors studying social ascent. A nouveau riche would begin by acquiring one prestigious object (a luxurious car for instance) which will then oblige him/her to purchase others in order to enhance his/her new image. S/he would also eliminate anything likely to recall his/her former status. Consumption specialists speak of the “departure purchase” leading to subsequent ones. However, from a comparative cultural perspective, it should be emphasized that strategies may be very complex—some populations proving to hesitate between various codes and trying to find a compromise between them. Again we have an avenue of research worth exploring here, which was undoubtedly initiated by Simmel. As we have seen, the American functionalist school does not always avoid the shortcoming of over-generalisation. By stating that in any modern society (i.e. characterized by social differentiation and role specialisation) whoever occupies a given position is supposed to conform to a corresponding lifestyle, which in return symbolises his/her status, the authors in question might be right as regards the (relatively open) American social system. From a comparative perspective this view emphasizing “status symbols” would however need to be nuanced. On the other hand, when considering some of the characteristics associated with the researches concerned here, the advocator of cultural perspectivism would often tend to find the approach taken surprisingly satisfactory. What I want to stress is that the focus on self-perceptions, appraisals of others, the work on concrete objects of investigation—like cars, residential areas, clubs—the sophisticated analyses in terms of reference groups (e.g. Shibutani 1955) or the capacity to take fully into account elite diversity are reminiscent of ethnographic methodology. It should be recalled that a scholar like W. Lloyd Warner actually had received both a sociological and anthropological education. Furthermore, the fact that he concentrated his attention upon small communities and towns (e.g. Warner and Hunt 1941) contributed to the ethnological flavour of his approach (see also Warner, Mecker and Eills 1949). Of course, in the line of what has just been said about the Simmelian approach, American functionalists were to consider large cities and mass society logics (Form and Stone 1957) as well as the national level (Blau and Duncan 1967). They were also to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches (Coleman and Rainwater 1978). It remains that these scientific studies, which were supplemented by descriptive essays (e.g. Packard 1960, 1989), prove quite conscious of US specificities and generally avoid excessive objectivism. As is true of the analytical frameworks I have discussed so far, Goffman’s approach shows both virtues and defects for scholars studying elites from a symbolic perspective. As I observed in section one, his approach is plainly novel and useful in many respects. Unfortunately, he does not seem to be sensitive to comparative dimensions. When I meet elites for interviews, I always pay attention to the way I am introduced to them. There is quite

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a difference between a prominent person making the effort to come out his/her office in order to welcome you and others having you introduced very formally by a secretary or a servant and not even getting up from their chair. I am equally concerned with what they say during the five first minutes (are they going to spontaneously refer to distinguishing qualities or carefully avoid any self-enhancement?—because they want to cultivate an image of modesty or because they take for granted that their interlocutor is already aware of their eminent position?). External signs, like room decoration for instance, may also prove to be very meaningful as far as presentation of self is concerned. For all these aspects, a good knowledge of Goffman’s work is of direct utility. However, one also has to venture into the field of cultural representations and not consider that life would just be “a bowl of strategies” (Geertz 1993:25). In other words, the language of the stage as well as game analogy may be relevant in studying the particular behaviour of elites, especially when they take up a role in front of an audience. But it would be wrong to equate everything with impression management. This said, many passages in Goffman’s work open up vast areas of research worth exploring. For instance, in his famous article on “Symbols of Class Status” (Goffman 1951:298), he mentions the social gains that one may obtain through the display of some objects. It is quite interesting from a cultural perspective to see precisely how distinction in one sector (being well dressed, driving a fancy car etc.) may serve as a starting point to conquer others—although, once again, priorities are likely to vary greatly across contexts. In the same article (Goffman 1951:300), but subsequently also in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Goffman 1959), he also offers in passing a very stimulating perspective about details and general impressions. If very visible aspects are ostensibly taken care of (like impeccably cleaned windows), it may be assumed by external actors that the same would apply for other elements (which is not necessarily true). This may potentially lead to instructive enquiries about synecdochic status symbols. While sometimes oversimplifying the general picture about distinctive consumption, Baudrillard’s approach from the perspective of semiology often proves valuable. Like Veblen and others, he unfortunately tends to reduce commodities to their symbolic dimensions and downplay the importance of their concrete properties (e.g. Baudrillard 1972). However, having concerned himself with some unconventional questions: like systems of objects, combinations (Baudrillard 1968), fake, simulacrum etc., his structuralist views in terms of signs and meanings have legitimately influenced a great many social scientists. If his general interpretations and even the originality of his argumentation are disputable, it does seem to me that the richness of his books lies in his accounts of the new trends of contemporary consumerism. I think, for instance, that his reflections on “new rarities”—pure air, clean

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water, space, parks, even silence—which were taken for granted or considered negligible but now appear as “luxuries” (Baudrillard 1970:72–73)—are quite relevant. That is definitely of interest. Last but not least, let me consider Bourdieu’s case. His book on social distinction (Bourdieu 1979) has been dominating the sociological discussion in the related fields to such an extent that it appears difficult to propose a nuanced appraisal. One is hastily labelled pro or anti-Bourdieusian.52 It should be recalled that his work on social distinction is written within the general perspective of constructivist structuralism aiming at proposing a sociology of social representations which themselves contribute to the construction of the social universe. Bourdieu’s thesis (1979), like Veblen’s, starts with a reflection on taste. However, unlike the American scholar, he does not mainly consider members of the upper class but society as a whole. In short, his thesis is that distinction is based fundamentally on the power held by the upper class arbitrarily to impose on others their categories of perception and appreciation as the legitimate ones. Indicators of prestige and dominant taste originating at the top would become a hegemonic norm with regard to those of other classes (subject to “symbolic violence”) which can only be interpreted negatively. In other words what interests him is not so much the display of goods but the exhibition of “cultural capital” and a subsequent “classification of the classifiers”. Bourdieu has written many good pages on the French situation in the 1960s–1970s, but the exportation of his model to other societies is far from always being plausible. Cultural exclusiveness might be crucial for Parisian elites but much less pronounced for American ones (who focus more on moral judgements), and even for those from a French provincial city (Lamont 1992). Clearly there is a dynamic in the social genesis of needs that is driven by a process of inter-subjective or inter-group comparison. One does not make evaluations ex nihilo but in terms of a pre-coded world. References to the dominant social group may happen to be fundamental for the entire society when its monopolizing position implies a wide collective recognition of its particular norms. However, from a comparative perspective, one question immediately arises: who defines the chief determinants of status, who are the ultimate arbiters of taste? A centralized court (like Versailles), several courts vying with each other (like in Renaissance Italy), counter-elites at the fringe of court life, the upper-middle class, the Bourgeoisie, the established elite, the

To illustrate, an article I had proposed to an international journal was almost rejected because one of the anonymous reviewers thought I was unfair to Bourdieu whilst another one believed that I was indeed insufficiently critical of the French author’s methodology! 52

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rising elite, the nomenklatura, the media, the stars, countless fashion leaders and connoisseurs hardly audible within the cacophony of post-modern metropolitan life? It proves quite difficult to generalize here. In addition, are there not also examples that testify to the influence of “popular culture” over dominant social classes?53 In many respects, Bourdieu’s framework of analysis proves to be most sophisticated. His major contribution as regards the analysis of the French society might be his readings in terms of “economic” versus “intellectual poles”—and not just between three hierarchically ordered classes. This is certainly enlightening for the study of that very society. One can regret that he has devoted so much energy to building up a (more or less convincing) grand theory instead of making the best of his remarkable thick description abilities. I hope to have shown that if flaws characterize most of the available models dealing with elite distinction, all of them also have real merits. I think that it matters to correct those theories by a comparative perspective that focuses on an interpretative approach to culture. The aim would be to show by examination of empirical evidence how the models in question sometimes make sense and sometimes do not. Otherwise put, they should serve not as analytical references allegedly valid for any time and place, but as sources of hypothesis that may be tested in comparative historical enquiries or in the realities of the contemporary world. This in turn calls for a non-dogmatic theoretical eclecticism. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This article is based on a paper presented at the ISA XVI World Congress (Durban 2006, RC 20 Comparative Sociology) and more recently at a workshop on elites organized at the University of Bamberg by Ursula Hoffmann-Lange. I wish to thank the respective participants for their constructive reactions. Peter Burke was kind enough to share his immense knowledge with me and offered invaluable advice of an improving nature. I am grateful to Alan Warde, Jukka Gronow, Trygve Gulbrandsen, John Higley, Aagoth Storvik, Katri Vallaste and an anonymous reviewer for reading and commenting on earlier versions. My thanks also to Masamichi Sasaki for having welcomed the publication of this rather long text.

53 Music is perhaps the prime example: jazz, reggae, rap have all now become mainstream. Dances such as polka or tango, originally perceived merely as “lower class” entertainment, also made their way into the conventional repertoire. The ordinary man’s full-length trousers displaced the aristocratic culottes. More recently the American workingmen’s blue jeans were adopted not just by rebellious adolescents but also by the elites.

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Comparing Two Charismatic Leaders: Ataturk and de Gaulle Mattei Dogan Paris, France [email protected]

Abstract Charismatic leaderships are comparable in spite of the specific character of each case, but not necessarily in spite of the socioeconomic-cultural contexts. Significant analogies can be noticed between the political roles of Kemal Ataturk and Charles de Gaulle in the following respects: the dramatic historical circumstances of their emergence as leaders; the Resistance movement that they headed against foreign military occupation; the symbol of hope that they became in the eyes of the people; the faith they had in their historical mission and their determination; their luck in their undertakings; the outstanding political talents of these two military men; the direct contact with the people that these two leaders were able to establish; the paramount importance that they accorded to national independence; the reinforcement of the state bureaucracy that they imposed; the abandonment of the empire under the pressure of history; the foundation of a new political order and regime; the inevitable personalization of power and their routinization of their heritage. Except in the religious domain, the institutionalization of charisma has a relatively short life.

In spite of the considerable differences between the France of 1940 and the Turkey of 1919, one can still see certain surprising similarities between the political roles of Charles de Gaulle and Kemal Ataturk. Here, I shall try to briefly stress the analogy between these two leaders in the following respects: the dramatic historical circumstances surrounding their emergence as leaders; the Resistance movements they spearheaded against foreign military occupation; the symbol of hope they came to incarnate for the people; the faith they had in their historical mission and their determination; their luck in undertakings; the outstanding maneuvering talents both these

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military men possessed; the direct contact with the people that these two leaders were able to establish; the paramount importance they attributed to national independence; the reinforcement of the state bureaucracy that they imposed; the abandonment of the empire under the pressure of history; building the foundations of a new political order and regime; the inevitable personalization of power, and the routinization of their heritage. The similarities between these two men’s careers appear very early on, particularly in the ambition they showed as pupils at military academy. The similarities are all the more meaningful from the viewpoint of political leadership since both men were very different as human beings. One was born into the old bourgeoisie, the other into a modest family. One was a true religious believer, regularly attending Sunday mass, the other an agnostic. One was austere in his private life, the other a non-conformist. Turkey in 1919 and France in 1940 had just suffered a great military defeat and were experiencing the harsh ordeal of foreign occupation. The official authority lacked legitimacy. Their parliaments were dissolved on March 16, 1920 and June 10, 1940 respectively. It is in such a dramatic and chaotic situation, at a time when all seemed lost, and when the political class, the military heads and the people themselves bewildered that a country needs a new guide more than ever. In the confused situation, notes Dankwart Rustow, a single act of defiance against the Sultan or Allies by some prominent individual might easily establish a claim to charismatic authority. This act of defiance was perpetuated on June 19, 1919 and June 18, 1940 by two men who considered themselves to have a redeeming national mission. The appeal was launched from the depths of Anatolia and from the other side of the Channel: “The central government is under foreign control. The Turkish nation is determined to put an end to foreign domination.” And twenty years later: “France may have lost the battle, but not the war.” Who are these two men who appear on the horizon at just the right moment? They were not new Spartacuses, seeking to lead a popular revolt against traditional authority. On the contrary, they belonged to a small and distinctive group of some two dozen personalities amongst the most influential of the dying regime. They personally knew, and eventually became well known by all those who were at the height of power: the Sultan, the Crown Prince, the Grand Vizier, Prime Minister Reynaud, and Marshal Pétain, by all the military hierarchy and by all those on the forefront of the political scene. Kemal was one of the three highest ranking generals amongst the officers of Turkish origin; de Gaulle was Secretary of State for War a few days before the signature of the Armistice. Both were considered, in a defeated, demobilized, humiliated nation as belonging to the handful of leading officers who had victories to their credit or

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who had shown themselves to be perspicacious military strategists. Kemal was the victor of the Battle of the Dardanelles in 1915; de Gaulle in 1937 insisted on the importance of armored tanks, while the majority of the French generals were still behind the times and continued to believe in the Maginot line fortifications. They had been preparing themselves for such a mission for a long time. One only has to read de Gaulle’s At the Edge of the Sword, and the first volume of War Memoirs, as well as the first chapters of the book by Lord Kinross: Ataturk: the Rebirth of a Nation, to realize this. Although regular soldiers, both had a political vocation and the qualities required of a political leader. They were outstanding orators. As noted by F. Frey, Ataturk talked his way to authority. De Gaulle made his most important decisions in words carved into marble. They used the pen more than the sword. What Sièyes said of General Bonaparte, “He is the most civilian of soldiers,” as well as what Bonaparte said of himself, “It is not as a general that I rule, but because the nation believes that I have the civil qualities suitable for government,” could also apply to both of them. “You have conquered these lands on horseback, but can you rule them from horseback?” the Mongol sage asked the Great Khan? Ataturk and de Gaulle understood very early on the limits and the inadequacies of the soldier when cast into the political forum. Both based their power on legal norms after having gained legitimacy. They enforced the incompatibility between political and military careers by forcing officers engaged in partisan politics to resign and by purging the army of its most politicized elements. This prevented the military from later taking power indefinitely. A leader who appears in the dark night of a national disaster can only fulfill his charismatic mission if he can mobilize the energies that are available and carry along with him those who still hold fragments of power. History gives many examples of quasi-charismatic situations that have prematurely faltered. If he does not obtain sufficient support, his mission runs the risk of failing. If, on the other hand, he succeeds in gaining others’ confidence, if he is “recognized” by his peers, the building of a charismatic community becomes possible. As Heper rightly remarked about Ataturk, the most critical test of his charisma came when he had to resign from his post of inspector-general, a post he had secured in order to be able to go to Anatolia and start national resistance. The crucial issue was whether the other commanders were going to obey him when the legal-rational bans of his authority had gone. D. Rustow, in turn, stresses that the military officer whom Istanbul had designated as Kemal’s replacement continued to take his orders, and the governor who was to have him arrested resigned from his post. The impotence of Kemal’s antagonists was plain.

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De Gaulle was able to rally to his cause many military chiefs, governors of colonies and politicians who had “escaped” from France and who placed themselves spontaneously at his disposal. In addition, he obtained Churchill’s unshakable support. At the time of the Algerian uprising in May 1958, the President of the Republic, René Coty, threatened to resign if de Gaulle did not become Head of the Government, and a short while after, in yielding the “supreme magistrature” to de Gaulle, Coty declared: “from now on, the First Frenchman will be the firstman in France.” This was a way of recognizing de Gaulle’s legitimacy. A leader with charismatic potential can impose himself more if his main rivals are mediocre or have been discredited. It is amongst the most farseeing, the most sincere, or the most ambitious that the new leader recruits his companions. An ordinary leader can be followed simply because he is capable of facing up to events day after day. But to be recognized as “providential” by the masses, and above all, by the entourage that is mobilized, he must be the bearer of a collective hope and personify the future of the nation. It is clearly as “savior” that Ataturk and de Gaulle appear as leaders of the Resistance against the legal authority of Constantinople and Vichy, as President of the Congress of Erzurum and Sivas or as head of the Free French Forces, then of the provisional government. Even if the leader starts to be seen as a redeemer, the charismatic situation is still not completely fulfilled. An additional condition is necessary, namely that there no longer be any possibility of compromise or negotiation with the authority in power, since in the event of an attempt at compromise or a median formula, the leader would embark on a process of legal-rational legitimation, to employ the terminology of Max Weber. The leader, his companions, and the masses must not be able to see any alternative. They must believe in the “soundness” of their cause and in the possibility of accomplishing their mission. Their adversaries, moreover, cut off all contact by pronouncing death sentences. The Sultan sentenced Kemal to death and Pétain sentenced de Gaulle (the latter inflicted the same sentence on the other, but spared him the scaffold). The leader’s companions have a dichotomic view of the future and this vision is shared by increasingly wider strata of the population. The relentless fury of the Gestapo against the Resistance only left these latter with a single and unique hope: victory over the occupier. For the analysis of the charismatic phenomenon, another criterion can be considered, difficult to analyze sociologically, but to which history can attest: luck, in the sense of a series of fortunate accidents, and that the people, believers to a certain extent, interpret as a “miracle.” Napoleon, who was so often blessed with luck, was well acquainted with this. He was

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accustomed, before appointing high officials, either military or civilian, to ask them: “Are you lucky?” The luck of the two heroes can be seen first of all in their predestined names: Perfection, Land of the Gallic ancestor. Both “miraculously” escaped from numerous ambushes or attacks. “Out of the hundred and fifty bullets, only forth hit our car. But by incredible luck not one of us was hit” (Mémoires d’espoir, p. 138). So, de Gaulle should continue on his road and his vocation. It is said that a bullet struck the watch that Kemal wore on his chest. It is of little importance whether this fact is true or not; it is plausible, and the reality that counts for us here is the popular image. Many works devoted to de Gaulle or to Kemal accentuate the importance of these favorable events: Mustafa just narrowly escaped arrest; a bomb exploded a few minutes after de Gaulle’s passing; Mustafa was in great danger, the Sultan’s spies were everywhere, they were sowing seeds of his destruction, but “his luck held,” writes one of his biographers. Apparently, Kemal did not believe in luck, but retrospectively his life history appears to be studded with fortunate events, from which he was able to draw the maximum of advantages. He was lucky to be appointed inspector-general of the Turkish army in East Anatolia, which can be explained by the political inexperience of the Sultan. As for de Gaulle, he firmly believed in his destiny, and this implies luck. The word “destiny” is frequently used in his War Memoirs; it is even a key word in the most moving passages of his writings, but sociologically “destiny” is only a concatenation of favorable, but uncontrollable events. If luck is indiscernible, success is an historical fact. Max Weber considers success as being indispensable to the birth and survival of the charismatic phenomenon. Napoleon knew this already and said as much, in his way, to Metternich: “Your sovereigns, born to the throne, can be beaten twenty times over and return to their capital; I cannot do this because I am an upstart soldier. My domination will not survive the day I cease to be strong and consequently feared.” That is, to win victories and achieve successes. The story of Kemal and de Gaulle is one of an impressive series of successes, interspersed with a few setbacks it is true, but which appear in retrospect as causal factors. Another aspect of the charismatic phenomenon is the direct relationship between the leader and the masses. These two leaders addressed the people directly, over and above intermediary bodies, as attests de Gaulle’s recourse to the referendum and the philosophy of populism recommended by Kemal. They had the tendency to reduce the parliamentary assembly to specific functions (except on the occasion of the Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas when Ataturk was in search of a new legitimacy). Both believed in government for the people, rather than in government by the people. As

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stated by Kemal, “I do not act for public opinion, but for the people.” De Gaulle spoke of the “depths of the nation.” Since charisma is in the eyes of the people rather than in the leader’s personality, a simple, yet fundamental question must be posed: “Who are the people?” For both Kemal and de Gaulle, the answer is evident. It is the nation; it is not the “social class,” set up on a pedestal. As put by Kemal, “All the nations of the world recognize only a single sovereignty: national sovereignty.” Unity of the nation is one of the major principles of Gaullist thinking. Both recommended national solidarity, seeking to ignore its social class divisions. Both gave priority to the nation, to the “core,” over the empire by deliberately abandoning the colonies admittedly after many rifts. Ataturk and de Gaulle were not conquerors like Napoleon or Alexander. On the contrary, they were leaders who, well aware of the times, shrank the state to the boundaries of the nation. According to Kinross, Ataturk compared Napoleon’s expedition to Moscow to the Ottoman Army’s advance all the way to the walls of Vienna. Both were, in his view, detrimental to the people. Ataturk also said that Alexander went too far, thereby forgetting his country. They clearly understood the forces that stir subjugated people and the aspirations to national independence. What was more natural on the part of a Mustafa Kemal or a Charles de Gaulle than to defend the national territory against the invader, or to take the leadership of the Resistance against the enemy that planned to dismember the fatherland! But what was needed was an extraordinary capacity of judgment to accept the sacrifice of the empire against the opinion of a large part of the political class and the military hierarchy. To do this, one must have wisdom. It is by the success of such decisions—which do not come about “naturally”—that the greatness of a political guide is measured and that the charismatic phenomenon persists. State control is another analogy between de Gaulle and Ataturk, although the reasons for recourse to state bureaucracy are not the same in both cases. De Gaulle, enlightened by the unfortunate experience of the IVth Republic, wanted to limit the influence of political parties and consequently favored the major State bodies and public administration in the process of the articulation and aggregation of interests. A growing number of leading civil servants were called on to carry out political functions. In Turkey, the process of modernization could not be entrusted to the middle-class, which lacked the necessary capital and whose economic interests did not necessarily coincide with those of the State (most of the entrepreneurial elite was foreign), nor to the single party, which was entrusted with another mission. Kemal therefore based the establishment of his policy on the structure of the State. The bureaucratization of the Turkish political system was completed

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when the provincial governors were appointed chairmen of the local party organizations in the late 1930s. In 1935, the Minister of the Interior was made the general secretary of the party. Ataturk’s economic policy can be transposed to the policy of nationalization of certain basic sectors carried out by de Gaulle in 1945: the principle of state control was interpreted to mean that the state was to regulate the general run of economic activity, and that the state was to engage in areas where private enterprises had proved to be inadequate, or if national interest required it. We could also underline the similar views of the two leaders considering the role of parliament: sometimes as a sounding board, sometimes as an organ of consultations and sometimes as an organ of decision. De Gaulle buried one Republic and founded another. He radically modified the political system but did not attempt to transform the social system nor society itself. Ataturk did even better. He put an end to a six hundred year-old regime and founded a new State on its ruins, freed from the values and symbols of the former one. His accomplishment is, as Benoist-Mechin writes in Le loup et le Léopard, without historical precedent: “Imagine that at the most crucial point in Justinian’s reign, fighting for the building of an Italian nation from the ruins of the Roman empire; that is precisely what the hero of Sakharya did for Turkey” (p. 17). Both organized the State in such a way as to be able to control its principal framework. They personified political power for long years. The influence they exerted is largely explained by their prestige and personal authority. They also personalized the regime, in the sense that a single man assumed power. But how could it be otherwise in such historical circumstances? The personalization of power is an inevitable feature in circumstances calling for charismatic leadership. However, they disdainfully refused to be the object of an idolatrous cult. “I have not had pyramids built in my honor like the Pharaohs of Egypt,” stated Kemal. He did not have himself crowned like Reza Pahlavi. De Gaulle’s testament is a lesson in modesty. They had done nothing to prepare the building of the mausoleums that were raised to them in Ankara and in Colombeyles-Deux-Eglises. This was the work of their political successors. By succeeding after successive difficulties and by re-establishing order via enchantment, the charismatic leader necessarily appears as less and less indispensable, irreplaceable, and providential. Recognition may nevertheless ensure authority and prestige. So, the charismatic phenomenon obeys a dialectical law. *

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*

*

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Imposed by exceptional circumstances, the charismatic leader prepares the return to a normal situation, which no longer motivates recourse to another charismatic personality. In a democratic regime, the charismatic phenomenon cannot be chronic. A true charismatic leader could not have an immediate charismatic successor, at least not in democracy. At best, his heir is a new political class. In effect, two or three generations later, France and Turkey had to face economic, social, ethnic, religious, cultural and political problems on an international and national level, which had nothing to do with the original Gaullist and Kemalist conceptions. For a large part of the public opinion, these conceptions were directly contested. At the apex of his power in 1963, de Gaulle declared: “Any action needs a leader, and since this directive is personified, it is necessary that the leader gains the personal trust of all concerned” (De Gaulle, 1963). In “Weberian sociology,” such a pretension is called personalization of power. French society was then changing in an accelerated manner, and such a view appeared as excessive and unacceptable. In the following years, de Gaulle progressively lost a large part of his legitimacy, and in the first electoral round of the 1965 elections, he received less than half of the national vote. The Gaullist conception of the State, after having been institutionalized in 1958–1962, had become ten years later in 1968, inadequate for half of the French population. Suddenly, in May 1968, France found itself on the brink of a civil war (Dogan, 2005). The charismatic leader was forced to withdraw in 1969 after an electoral defeat. Kemalisme has lasted longer, but rather in the State structure and in the political rhetoric than in civil society. The charismatic phenomenon cannot last indefinitely in the advanced industrial societies. Institutional charisma can last only in pre-industrial traditional societies. BIBLIOGRAPHY Ataturk, M. K. 1929. Discours du Ghazi Moustapha Kemal Pasha, Président de la République Turque. Leipzig. Benoit-Mechin, J. 1954. Mustapha Kémal, ou la mort d’un empire. Paris: Albin Michel. De Gaulle, C. 1970. Mémoires d’espoir, several printings. Paris: Plon. Dogan, M. 1965. “Le personnel politique et la personnalité charismatique.” Revue Française de Sociologie VI: 304–324. —— 1968. Attitudes politiques des ouvriers français: résultats d’une enquête par échantillon national. Paris: Centre d’Etudes Sociologiques. —— 2005. “How Civil War Was Avoided in France.” Pp. 207–244 in Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians, edited by M. Dogan. Leiden: Brill. Dogan, M. and J. Higley. 1998. “Elites, Crises and Regimes in Comparative Perspective.” Pp. 3–28 in Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes, edited by M. Dogan and J. Higley. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

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Eisenstadt, S. N. 1968. Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Heper, M. 1980–1981. “Transformation of Charisma into a Political Paradigm: Ataturkism in Turkey.” Journal of American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization. Kili, S. 1969. Kemalism. Istanbul: Robert College Publications. Kinross, Lord. 1964. Ataturk: Rebirth of a Nation. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Rustow, D. 1968. “Ataturk as Founder of a State.” Deadalus 97(3). Weber, M. 1968. Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

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New Challenges, New Elites? Changes in the Recruitment and Career Patterns of European Representative Elites* Heinrich Best Institut für Soziologie, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany [email protected]

Abstract Long term changes in the recruitment patterns of European representative elites can be described as the aggregate result of selectorates’ responses to a sequence of fundamental problems challenging polities since the emergence of modern representative political institutions in the 19th century. Recent data show that some long-term trends of (Western) European parliamentary recruitment like the increase of MPs with a public sector background have reversed or plateaued since the late 1980s. At the same time a rise in turnover, a decrease of incumbency and a growing diversity of recruitment patterns can be seen in the same group of polities. This paper explores whether and to what extent these changes are linked to changes in the party systems of Western European polities and whether new trends of parliamentary recruitment are emerging. It introduces the proposition that after the ‘consensus challenge’ of the post Second World War era a ‘legitimacy challenge’ is now shaping European legislative recruitment, increasing the value of social and cultural assets of candidates that are related to their expert-status and favouring properties signalling their moral integrity.

* Research for this study was supported by grants from the European Science Foundation (EURELITE-Network) and the German Science Foundation (DFG SFB580).

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• Heinrich Best I. THE COMPETITION FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

In his famous and still provocative account of the “true nature of democracy” Joseph Schumpeter defined the democratic method as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1959:259, 269). Whilst in the classical doctrine of democracy the “selection of the representatives was made secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic arrangement which is to vest the power of deciding political issues in the electorate”, Schumpeter reversed these two elements and made “the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding” (Schumpeter 1959:259, 269). The paper presented here follows this Schumpeterian order of priorities and focuses on the “selection of the representatives”, the men (or women) who are to do the deciding. Hereby we pursue an elitist approach to representative democracy which maintains that it matters who decides and governs. The relevance of representatives’ selection and recruitment is twofold: At an individual level their social and political backgrounds and career-trajectories have supposedly an impact on their attitudes, qualifications and habits; at a systemic level the ways in which political elites’ structures adapt to the challenges posed by social, economic and political change are constitutive for political systems’ performance, legitimacy and stability (Best and Cotta 2000:16–18). Research presented in this paper follows the systemic track of research by providing a structural history of European representative elites in a comparative perspective. The approach of our study is devoted to Stein Rokkan’s tradition of historical-comparative macro-analyses of European political development, based on aggregate data (Rokkan 1999). As a result of a collaboration that has extended now over twenty years a comprehensive database on European representative elites has been built up covering the period from the mid nineteenth century to the present (Best and Edinger 2005). The purpose of this project was and still is to complete and complement the set of time-series available for a comparative macro-history of European polities, which previously has been focused on electoral data and data on welfare state development, by an evolutionary study of the personnel emerging from the “free competition for a free vote” (Schumpeter 1959:271). Processes of European state and nation-building and, foremost, of democratic development and the emergence of party systems can now be analysed at the level of the leading personnel involved. The subject of our research is national “representative elites” (Norton 1993:43), i.e. the members of national state parliaments (only second chambers) and constituent assemblies. In an earlier publication we have justified

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Changes in European Representative Elites Denmark*

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1849 1867

Germany*

1949

1861

Italy* Netherlands* Norway*

1946 1946

1849

1945

1814 1868

UK*

1948

1871

France*

1868

Spain

1977-79 1918-33

Austria

1996-04

1945 1975

Portugal

2002

1907

Finland* Hungary

1884

1990-04

Poland

1989-04

Lithuania

1990-04

Romania

1990-04

Czech Republic

1992-04

Russia

1993-04

Croatia

1990-03 1990-02

Latvia

1814 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

* Countries included in the present study

Graph 1 EurElite temporal and regional coverage of national parliaments (as of 12/2005)

this choice by the status of representative elites of being the “crucial link in the exchange process between society and polity typical of contemporary democracy”, and “the primary channel through which society, with its variety of conflicting values needs, interests, identities, resources, demands, makes itself felt in the institutional arena of democracy” (Best and Cotta 2000:7). Our research has strongly confirmed this view and identified parliaments as intersections of different segments of the elite system, a mixtum compositum of representatives of different societal interests and from various political followings. It also became clear, however, that any assumption that representative assemblies may socially “mirror” societies from whence they are recruited are normative constructs and never found in a polity where there is a “free competition for a free vote” (Schumpeter 1959:271). The parliaments which came closest to the ‘mirroring’ ideal where characteristically those of Eastern European People’s Democracies where the cadres’ offices of Communist Parties controlled admission to the assemblies according to carefully designed quota systems based on criteria such as gender, social origin and ethnic background. But even under these conditions the mirrors were distorted in favour of meritorious party activists and veterans (Mersch 1965). The paradox that representative democracy emerges as an

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order of inequality from processes of selection and election which are, in principle, egalitarian, inclusive and free was our starting point and defines the subject of our work. In this paper we intend to reconstruct the rules of the democratic game at a crucial point of its course, i.e. when it comes to the decision of who has the right of representation. We assume that these rules are inherent to the “competition for political leadership”, which was called ‘free’ by Schumpeter “in the same sense in which everyone is free to start another textile mill”, meaning everyone can be considered free to enter the competition (1959:295). The basic Schumpeterian design has to be amended, however, in two respects which are only insufficiently covered and dealt with in the original. The first one is the fact that political elites (like economic elites) try to curb the effects of competition by the introduction of cartels and the restriction of access for new competitors. The second is the observation that the competition for power is a two-layered process: Parties, or as we prefer to call them: “selectorates” compete for a bigger share of the positions in the political system which are directly or indirectly distributed through elective competition. Individual contenders compete between each other for the backing of selectorates and an access to the valuable elective offices. Both layers of political competition, selectorates and contenders, are linked by the mechanisms of candidate selection and recruitment. Here we have a situation which conforms (at least at face value) to the market model: the demand of selectorates for qualified, loyal and appealing candidates (i.e. appealing to the electorate) is to be matched by contenders who dispose of more or less valuable assets for legislative recruitment and careers. In short: Parties/selectorates want to improve their competitiveness through good candidates which can serve parties’ external and internal needs in their struggle for power, whilst contenders display and use their assets which give them an edge over their competitors in setting good starting positions in their race for offices. II. ACTORS AND ASSETS IN THE PROCESS OF RECRUITING REPRESENTATIVES We believe the changing nature of this competition to be the driving force behind the long-term transformation of recruitment patterns of representative elites. In our earlier study we have proposed the application of an supply and demand model to conceptualize the dynamics and constrains of the recruitment process, and in particular to gain a better understanding of why long-term changes of recruitment-patterns of European representative elites seem to follow regular trends, notwithstanding some erratic fluctuations at historical turning-points and caesurae of recent European history (Best and Cotta 2000:9–16).

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In the simplest version of the recruitment function there is a demand and a supply side and sets of formal rules and/or informal practices which determine how the supply and demand sides are matched. The latter includes criteria to determine who participates in which role in the competition for parliamentary mandates and what rewards or risks contenders may expect in the competition. The main actors representing the supply or demand sides of the recruitment process are contenders, selectorates and electorates. Contenders are those actors “who are stimulated to enter the competition for offices by individual incentives like prestige, power, material rewards, spiritual or ideological commitments” (Best and Cotta 2000:11). They dispose of certain resources which qualify them for entry into the electoral competition and determine their starting position in the race for mandates and offices. Attributes and affiliations of contenders give a favourable or unfavourable momentum to their passage through the recruitment process. Selectorates are collective actors who select candidates according “to complex choices considering the probable value of the contenders’ resources for electoral success”, to their ideological fit with, their instrumental function for, and their loyalty to the selectorates (Best and Cotta 2000:11). In a distant past selectorates were informal caucuses made up of dignitaries and/or state officials involved in the selection of candidates and their presentation to constituencies. Today they are universally institutionalised in the shape of party organisations and have an inter mediate position in the recruitment market by matching the offer of contenders with the perceived preferences of electorates. Electorates are the “end consumers of offers on the electoral support markets” and the final judges of the outcomes of legislative recruitment (Best and Cotta 2000:12). Their perceived preferences for a certain type of parliamentary representation are one factor shaping the lists of candidates drawn up by selectorates. The given makeup of a parliament can therefore be regarded as the final balance of advantageous and disadvantageous factors working in the (self-)selective process preceding the act of recruitment (Best and Cotta 2000:12). The interactions of the actors involved in the recruitment process are partly concealed by the secrecy of the ballot box or the seclusion of the back-rooms where the caucuses and party dignitaries meet. However, much of the process of parliamentary recruitment is open to public scrutiny and media attention. The latter directs, adjusts and intensifies the public’s perceptions and expectations concerning the qualities and qualifications of contenders (Hetherington 2001). Legislative recruitment should therefore be considered as being part of a construction of reality by which groups of selectorates, today mostly within parties, try to influence the competition for power in their own favour. Their lists of candidates are an important element of the facade parties present to the voters and may be indicative

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• Heinrich Best Focus External

Internal

Acquired

deferential

instrumental

Attributed

symbolic

relational

Origin

Graph 2

Assets for legislative recruitment and careers

to their ‘closeness’ to certain quarters of the electorate. The makeup of a party’s parliamentary representation is therefore a potential attractor of votes and a ‘tracer’ for the groups it targets in the electorate. As far as properties and qualities of contenders may serve as attractors in electoral campaigns they are assets in the competition for mandates. Selectorates will prefer contenders who dispose of such valuable characteristics, because they provide an advantage in the struggle for power. Symbolic representation, i.e. the choice of representatives according to what image they transmit to the public in general and to their constituents in particular, is based on inborn or primordial qualities of contenders that relate to some fundamental political issue. Examples are skin colour, gender, religion (as far as it is inherited) or social origin (like working-class background). From symbolic representation which is based on inborn or inherited qualities of contenders we have to distinguish a second type of representation which is bolstered by acquired attributes that are also attractive to voters, but based on the representatives’ personal reputations. In this category we find ‘heroes’, ‘martyrs’, or well tried leaders. We call this type of representation “deferential” because it is based on voters’ deference to achievements of those who are supposed to represent them. Seen from the standpoint of selectorates, in particular from that of parties, both types of representation, symbolic and deferential, have an external focus. The main concern of selectorates here is how their offer of representatives affects their parties’ images amongst voters. However, selectorates also choose candidates for parliamentary mandates according to their internal needs, i.e. the functional requirements of party organisations and parliamentary parties that need experts for certain policy

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issues, intermediaries which connect them to powerful pressure groups or integrators who are capable of binding together diverging segments of party organisations or levels of the political system. Again we can distinguish between assets of contenders that are ascribed by the positions they hold in formal organisations and internal networks from those qualifications and competences which are achieved through education and experience. The first type of representation we call relational, because it is based on representatives’ relations to the extra parliamentary sphere which they have built up thanks to the linkage positions held in organisations and networks. The second type of assets with an internal significance to party apparatuses refers to acquired competences and qualifications of contenders which are instrumental for the exertion of the representational role. Inter alias the level of education, subjects studied, pre-parliamentary professional skills and previous political experience are to be listed here. The “internal”/“external” dichotomy of our taxonomy refers to the demand side of the recruitment function by specifying the double task of selectorates: to stock parliamentary parties with a personnel able (I) to attract voters by representing their dispersed interests convincingly and (II) to fulfil the function of MPs competently by providing effective leadership and good governance. These are competing and sometimes conflictual demands which have been grasped in the trustee and delegate conception of representations, whereby the delegate is a derivative of constituents’ preferences and the trustee is tied up in the institutional constraints of the policy making process (Eulau et al. 1959; Mansbridge 2003). It is obvious that, although these are different conceptions of representation, they are both present in the institutional fabric and political practice of representative democracies and have to be accommodated within the collective and individual actors involved. The emphasis of both conceptions of representation shifts, however, between periods of time and is differentiated between polities. For example, it is plausible to assume that the extension of suffrage and eligibility in the process of mass-democratisation was accompanied by a shift from an internal to an external focus of parliamentary recruitment and towards a “descriptive representation” which allows the represented to recognize themselves in those who represent them (Pitkin 1967). The ascribed/acquired dichotomy refers to the offer-side of the recruitment function. It considers the fact that representatives owe their mandates not only to their personal virtues, qualifications, and skills but also to the support of powerful organisations or factions of the selectorate which support them with patronage and sponsorship and which expect loyalty and services in return. In theory the offer of contenders in mass-democracies equals the size of the constituency; de facto, however, is the pool of contenders dramatically reduced by informal requirements for those who enter the competition. The “free competition for a free vote” is limited by a

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process which is commonly and somewhat euphemistically called “political professionalisation”, i.e. a configuration of social processes and informal structures that, besides constitutional and legal norms and rules, restrict access to parliamentary mandates and political offices (Best 2003:370). Political professionalisation “defines the rules and rites of access of the group, what holds the members of the group together, and what sets them apart from other individuals in lager society” (Beaver and Rosen 1978:66–67). In short: political professionalisation establishes an insider/outsider differential and provides the social mechanisms that integrate the collective of professional politicians in the “Political Class” (Borchert and Zeiss 2003). The mechanisms of candidate selection which have developed over the past 150 years are now predominantly controlled by party organisations, converting parliaments into a quasi internal labour market of parties. If the access to and support of organisational power has become a crucial advantage in the competition for mandates one could expect an increasing emphasis on relational assets in the recruitment process. It seems that there is an inherent contradiction in the recruitment function: On the one hand the persuasive mass-factor of democratisation promises an “opening of political societies” and an “expansion of choice opportunities” (Blondel 1997:96). In the long run it fosters a rise in selfexpressive values that shift cultural norms toward greater emphasis on responsive and inclusive elites (Welzel 2002). On the other hand restrict the self-interests of established elites and the functional requirements of highly complex policy-making processes the chances of potential contenders and the responsiveness of those who are in office. In fact, Max Weber has already pointed to the fact that political professionalisation is positively correlated with incumbency, and Robert Michels has based his work on the trade-off between political democratisation and the accompanying emergence of oligarchies in mass organisations (1947; 1915). The gap between the practices of parliamentary representation and the promises of mass democracy seems to be widening with a negative impact on the legitimacy of representative democracy and the reputation of those who represent it (Dalton 2004). Our previous research has analysed the contradictory co-evolution of mass-democracy and political professionalisation in a series of countryspecific studies. This initial approach was justified because the main agent and the decisive context of political development is the nation state within whose perimeters the creation and redistribution of wealth, the acquisition and attribution of power, the definition and assertion of collective identities, the institutionalisation of norms in legal systems, the formation of large bureaucratic structures, the aggregation of interests, and the emergence

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of platforms for collective political action (e.g. parties) are all performed (Rokkan 1999). If political development is path-dependent, it has been the nation state which paved and maintained the way. This is a claim which can be extended to legislative recruitment and its outcomes, since the formal structure of opportunities for access to offices, such as electoral laws and eligibility rules, the supply of and demand for contenders, the composition and the mode of operation of selectorates (such as caucuses or parties) were all defined by the national boundaries of polities and societies, although the actual act of recruitment might have taken place on a local or regional level. No wonder, therefore, that political elites have been expected to represent the national distinctiveness of polities and societies (Mosca 1939). At the end of the 20th century the concept of globalisation has lead to the claim that national boundaries are losing their significance and that the (relative) integrity and self-sufficiency of national states and societies, as well as their capacity to set and apply the rules of the game, is fading (Inkeles 1981; Albrow 1998). If the process of modernisation has followed distinctive national paths, globalisation has changed this situation and subjects societies and polities to the growing impact of trans-national interdependencies. Empirically we should be able to recognize the effects of globalisation by a decreasing degree of national distinctiveness and an increasing amount of trans-national exchange. Since in the sphere of politics, participation— including the competition for offices—is tied to citizenship, and since citizenship is still mainly granted to nationals, our study can only address the quest for distinctiveness. The current territorial range of our data-base—twelve countries which are, with the exception of Norway, all member states of the European Union—must necessarily restrict the scope of our findings. However, this limitation also has advantages, since a decrease in distinctiveness should be seen most clearly in a cluster of countries which are already unified economically, and which share common values and some institutions (Andersen and Eliassen 1993; Hansen 2000). III. LONG TERM TRENDS IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE ELITES The methodological approach pursued in our research is the long-term study of parliamentary recruitment and legislative careers. Our principal aim is to identify the factors underlying long-term changes in parliamentary recruitment and career-patterns. Specifically we intend to assess the relative weight of factors such as institutional change, social-structural change and value change which has been identified in our earlier studies as the main driving forces behind the transformation of representative elites in European polities. Originally we departed from the heuristic assumption that

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the driving forces of elite change merged into one harmonious momentum for “political development” or “political modernisation” (Best and Cotta 2000). However, our previous studies have strongly confirmed our initial scepticism towards the idea that there is an invisible hand working towards an ontological unity and harmonious interplay of the elements of representative democracy. In an overview of the long-term trends of European parliamentary representation, those deviating from expected trends following the assumptions of modernisation theory can be easily seen (Cotta and Best 2000). In some areas, recruitment patterns resisted the pressure of general social change for decades (Figures 4–6), in other areas they followed a cyclical course (Figures 1, 7–10) or diverged (Figures 4, 14), whilst there was no diffusion of modernity. Britain and France, in particular, the two ‘model polities’ for parliamentary democracy in Europe, maintained distinctly traditional features in their parliamentary recruitment patterns over extended periods (Best and Gaxie 2000; Cromwell and Rush 2000). On the other hand, the Weimar Republic displayed the most ‘modern’ parliamentary representation of the time, dominated by political professionals and closely tied to powerful party organisations (Best, Hausmann and Schmitt 2000). However, if this was modernity, it was by no means a contribution to the stability of German democracy ushering in, as it did, the breakdown of parliamentary democracy in 1933. Seen in comparison, legislative recruitment is a rather conservative element of the power structure and one might speculate whether this structural conservatism is directly (and positively!) linked to the performance of parliamentary democracies. Although it is not appropriate to describe the long-term change of European legislative recruitment patterns as one coherent, homogeneous, synchronic and progressive process of ‘modernisation’, we have seen some unidirectional developmental patterns. However, undirectionality does not exclude distinctiveness. Developments followed paths directed both by democratisation, i.e. the extension of the social niches from whence the electors and the elected were drawn, and by professionalisation, i.e. the establishment of a fairly autonomous field of political action with specific (although mostly informal) rules for access and reward. As mentioned earlier, the two trends are contradictory, since democratisation is socially inclusive, while professionalisation is exclusive, in that it creates a division between spheres of insiders and outsiders. Thus, long term-term trends of European parliamentary recruitment did not result in a harmonious community between electors and elected but in the inherently conflictual (although in most cases peaceful) coexistence between professional politicians (like MPs), who are living from and for politics, and amateur politicians (to use Max Weber’s term), i.e. the rest of us who are only incidentally involved in

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80 Mean SD

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 1

c) Best (2006)

European Parliaments 1867–2006 University Degree

40

Mean SD

35       1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005



Figure 2

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(c) Best (2006)

European Parliaments 1867–2006 Basic Education

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35 Mean SD

30 25 20 15 10 5 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 3

(c) Best (2006)

European Parliaments 1867–2006 Nobility

30

Mean SD

25 20 15 10 5

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 4

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(c) Best (2006)

European Parliaments 1867–2006 Female Legislators

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30 Mean SD

25 20 15 10 5

1865 1870 1875 1880  1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 5

(c) Best (2006)

European Parliaments 1867–2006 Primary Sector

20 Mean SD

15

10

5

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 6

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European Parliaments 1867–2006 Practicing Lawyers

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20 Mean SD

15

10

5

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 7

(c) Best (2006)

European Parliaments 1867–2006 Party/ Pressure Group Officials

15 Mean SD 10

5

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 8

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European Parliaments 1867–2006 Managers, Businessmen

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10 Mean SD

8 6 4 2

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 9

(c) Best (2006)

European Parliaments 1867–2006 Blue Collar Workers

50 Mean SD

40 30 20 10

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

(c) Best (2006)

Figure 10 European Parliaments 1867–2006 Public Sector Employees

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20 Mean SD

15

10

5

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

(c) Best (2006)

Figure 11 European Parliaments 1867–2006 Teachers and Professors

50 Mean SD

40 30 20 10

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

Figure 12

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European Parliaments 1867–2006 Newcomers

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70 Mean SD

60 50 40 30 20 10 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

(c) Best (2006)

Figure 13 European Parliaments 1867–2006 Local Politics Background

60 Mean SD

50 40 30 20 10

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

(c) Best (2006)

Figure 14 European Parliaments 1867–2006 Leading Party Position

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94

4 Mean SD

3

2

1

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

(c) Best (2006)

Figure 15 European Parliaments 1867–2006 Mean Number of Elections

50 Mean SD

40 30 20 10

1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

0

(c) Best (2006)

Figure 16 European Parliaments 1867–2006 Mean Age at Entry

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politics (Weber 1947). Much of today’s criticism of politicians because of their alleged distance towards the electorate and ruthless pursuit of self-interest is based on the contradictory logic of the processes of professionalisation and democratisation (Best 2003). Even if we apply the most general notion of the concept of political modernisation we see at least a contradictory picture: Whilst European parliaments have long ceased to be exclusive clubs for the wealthy and high born (Figures 3 and 9), and whilst women increasingly find their ways into national assembly halls (Figure 4), we have seen other barriers rise to replace those of class and gender. These new barriers and filters are no longer translating the status hierarchies and value systems prevalent in societies at large into modes of recruitment, but are now located within the narrower realm of political systems (Cotta and Best 2000). The gradual exclusion from the ranks of MPs of those who have a background in productive or distributive economic activities (like workers and agriculturists), the corresponding increase of public servants and (for some time) of officials of pressure group organisations and parties, the growing accumulation (sequential and simultaneous) of local and regional offices, and the increasing embedding of contenders into the higher ranks of party hierarchies all point into this direction (Figures 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14). The abolition of formal barriers of access to European parliaments was thus complemented by the establishment of an informal insider-outsider differential, firmly guarded and perpetuated by selectorates and party organisations. Today, those who are available (in terms of their time budget and the security of their jobs) for elective public offices, who have qualifications and skills deemed useful for a political career (preferably certificated by an academic degree of some kind) and who are willing and able to implant themselves in local or party offices, stand a greater chance to penetrate the filters and overcome the barriers on their way to a parliamentary seat (Figures 1, 2, 13, 14). The re-rise of the public service (after its early heydays in the 19th century and its decline between the two World Wars) as a preferred supplier of parliamentary representatives in Europe (Figure 10) can be associated with the emergence of the cartel party which relies “increasingly for [its] resources on the subventions and other benefits and privileges afforded by the state”. With the goals of politics becoming more self-referential and politics becoming a profession in its own right (Katz and Mair 1995:20–21), representatives with a background in the public service incarnate the fusion between party and state: whilst their stately employer sponsored them when they were amateur or semi-amateur politicians through generous exemptions, it also offers a safe haven when their political career gets into trouble. On the other hand, their background and actual interest disposes them to act as “agents of the state” in their representational role (Katz and Mair

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1995:18). Contenders from other professional backgrounds do not enjoy the same privileges and have to face a disproportionately unfavourable riskbenefit relationship when they pursue their political careers. Full-time party functionaries who might offer an alternative to public servants with regard to the compatibility between public office and ‘private’ occupation are a costly option for their employers and are probably harder to ‘sell’ to the voters as suitable representatives than state officials who can still capitalize on the (somewhat faded) aura of impartiality and competence attributed to the public service. However, the rise of the public service to become the main societal sector for parliamentary recruitment not only reflects the cost-benefit calculations of selectorates and contenders but can also be linked to the main challenge Western European polities faced in the bipolar world after World War II: namely, the establishment of consensually unified polities and societies as a primary condition for the containment of communism. The mediation of conflicts and the integration of societies was the order of the day, and corporate interest mediation and particularly the extension of welfare state benefits were the most important consensus creating policies. The ‘consensus challenge’ found a response in parliamentary recruitment whereby redistribution specialists, who are predominantly found in the public sector, have prevailed during this period (Best 2003; Figure 10). We propose to extend the challenge-response model to become a general explanatory scheme for the long term transformation of European legislative recruitment (Best 2003; Toynbee 1934–1961). It assumes that challenges which originate in, or are mediated by the social (and economic) structure and the institutional order have an impact on the elite structure and the elite agenda which in turn influence elite responses to the same challenges.1 Elite responses may recourse to elite structure and elite agenda, social structure and the institutional setting of the political order, separately or combined (Graph 3). Rather than a linear development, following the general transformation of social structure, we see indeed a pattern of change in parliamentary leadership groups that reflects the sequence of main challenges for polities and societies since (Western) Europe entered the era of democratisation and industrialisation. Thus, the first period of public service dominance in many national parliaments during the 19th century coincides with the era of state and nation-building. During this period, “symbol specialists” (Lasswell 1952) and specialists in the application of executive power, both of whom were to be found in the higher ranks of the public sector, had a dominant role. The second challenge had to be taken up in the period of accelerated economic change when most European societies faced the full impact of

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Institutional Setting of the Political Order

Social Structure

Elite Structure

Elite Agenda

Elite Behavior

Legend

Responses

Infl uences Influences

Challenges

Graph 3 A challenge response model of political elite change

industrialisation. In this period specialists in the creation and appropriation of wealth, such as entrepreneurs and landowners, prevailed in parliament (Figures 5, 8). The third challenge was the development of mass democracy and the accumulation of organisational power outside the state apparatus (like political parties and pressure groups). This period saw the rise of specialists in mass mobilisation and the running of intermediary organisations (Figure 7). Again we can establish a link here to Katz and Mair’s (1995) typology of parties, with the “Elite Party” providing a political arena for high ranking state officials and the economic elites (like entrepreneurs and large landowners), with the “Mass Party” providing career opportunities for party and pressure group officials of the Michelsian type, and with the “Catch-all Party” forming the seedbed for the redistribution specialist from public service stock, who finally takes over in the “Cartel Party”. The (limited) indications for a convergence of legislative recruitment and career patterns across (Western) Europe after the Second World War

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can therefore be attributed to a growing synchronisation of developments in party systems and of the main policy alternatives faced by European polities, while the impacts of changes in the formal structures of opportunities (like electoral laws and eligibility rules) or societal change at large have lost momentum. IV. THE END OF THE CONSENSUS CHALLENGE AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGITIMACY CHALLENGE The single most important factor that had synchronized the developments of post-WWII Western European democracies, the communist challenge, disappeared rapidly between 1989 and 1990. It was to be expected that, according to the law of challenge and response, the disappearance of the communist threat would result in a change of legislative recruitment and career patterns. In particular, this change should have affected legislative recruitment from the public sector, which was the pivotal consensus-fostering element in the representative elites of Western Europe after WWII. Our data confirm this expectation. The time series for public sector representation in Western Europe parliaments reached its turning point at the end of the Cold War and has decreased considerably since (Figures 10, 11). This development was particularly distinct in polities like Germany where the share of the public service had been particularly high compared to other Western European countries. Public sector representation among MPs in the Bundestag has continuously declined by 24 percent or 12 percentage points, from 51% to 39%, between 1990 and 2005. The levelling of extremes has reduced differences between Western European polities which are confirmed by the observation that after the turn of the 20th century the Standard Deviation of public sector representation reached its lowest level since the 1860s (Figure 10). The turning of the tide is even more pronounced in the case of the teaching profession, which is the single most important subcategory among MPs from the public sector. Since the beginning of the 1990s the average share of members of the teaching profession in the parliaments of Western Europe has dropped by more than 20% from its peak at the beginning of the 1990s, meaning that they have lost about half of their previous gains since the beginning of the 1970s (Figure 11). This process was also accompanied by a levelling down of differences in teachers’ legislative recruitment between Western European polities. Although the dominance of MPs with a professional background in the public service has not yet been contested by any other professional category, a pluralisation of recruitment-channels can already be seen. Assets like certified loyalty towards the established political order, distance to the battle-fields of class struggle, and command of the policies of redistribution, which can all be

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ascribed to contenders from the public service, are less valued after the consensus challenge has passed. The turn of trends in legislative recruitment patterns was accompanied by a sharp increase in the turnover of individual MP’s whereby the average turnover-rates of Western European parliaments nearly doubled between the end of the 1980s and the mid 1990s (Figure 12). The time-series for newcomers forms a distinct peak during these years that is only exceeded during the periods of crisis-recruitment after WWI and II. Although turnover rates have levelled off since the mid 1990s they are still above the average levels of the post-WWII era. From the late 1990s incumbency (measured by the mean number of elections) is at its lowest level since the mid 1950s and has not yet recovered (Figure 13). Standard Deviations for both indicators remain at relatively low levels indicating that the increases of turnover and the decreases of incumbency were synchronous in Western European polities. We consider these developments as signs of a disturbance in the pre-1990 regime of legislative recruitment that affected the established patterns of reproduction of Western European representative elites. It is not a mere coincidence that these changes occurred during and after the period of regime transition in Eastern Europe: The fall of communism there marked the end of the consensus challenge here. We interpret recent developments, such as the increasing pluralisation of recruitment patterns or the decrease in incumbency, as responses to a ‘legitimacy challenge’ that has emerged within the political systems of Western democracies but without confronting them from outside the polities like all the earlier challenges in their history (Dalton 2004). We relate this argument to Toynbee’s (1934) theorem that in facing external challenges, collective actors are producing internal challenges that surface after the same actors have prevailed over their initial challengers. The new challenge targets elite quality, i.e. the ability of a representative democracy to produce efficient and accountable political elites. Institutional settings for elite recruitment, like the Cartel Party, which are based on arrangements between politicians to appropriate and share the resources of the state (Katz and Mair 1995), might be suitable to meet a consensus challenge and to create a consensual political elite that is united by common material interest. In the long run, however, it undermines the legitimacy of representative democracy because the ingroup/outgroup differential becomes too large and is not justifiable by the achievements of the incumbents. The “true nature of democracy” (Schumpeter 1959) is blurred if the competitive struggle for power is impeded. Due to the logics of its internal working, which is based on a balancing of interests, patronage, loyalty and discretion, the consensus model favours the trustee over the delegate conception of representation and accentuates symbolic and relational assets for legislative

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recruitment over deferential and instrumental ones. Although it would be inappropriate to describe parliaments under the reign of the consensus model as assemblies of string-pullers and token representatives some elements of reality can be seen in this unpleasant scenario. The emergence of the legitimacy challenge indicates that there may be more consensus in a consensual political elite than a consolidated democracy can endure. The closure of the political market by political professionalisation and the pooling of interests between formally competing parties is an autocatalytic process that may jeopardize the working of democracy. In this respect, the emergence of the legitimacy challenge is a promising indication that democracy disposes of countervailing mechanisms that can infuse new competition into the system and make the political profession riskier than most of its protagonists would like it to be. V. CONCLUSION “Contemporary democracies are facing a challenge today. This challenge does not come from enemies within or outside the nation. Instead, the challenge comes from democracy’s own citizens who have grown distrustful of politicians, sceptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic process functions” (Dalton 2004:1). This paper has shown how Russel Dalton’s observations concerning the waning political support in modern democracies can be related to the emergence of a “representative elite” (Norton 1993) which is both a producer and the product of the enforcement and expansion of representative democracies during the past 150 years. We have argued that the application of a market model based on a “free competition for a free vote” (Schumpeter 1959) to the process of establishing a democratic leadership did not result in a thorough “opening of political societies” or in a linear “expansion of choice opportunities” (Blondel 1997), but that the evolution of representative democracies was basically a process of establishing an autonomous field of political action with a wide insider/outsider gap. The process of ‘democratisation’ was at least partly counterbalanced by a socially exclusive process of political ‘professionalisation’. We have also argued, however, that the contradictory co-evolution of participatory democracy and political professionalism can be best understood in terms of a challenge-response model where selectorates and electorates interact in offering and demanding a political personnel capable of addressing the fundamental problems of polity and society. Although new challenges do not lead to an indiscriminate access to the representative elite, they do lead to focused responses by selectorates through limited adaptations of the ‘recruitment function’ to changing demands. We have suggested that recent changes in recruitment

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and career patterns of Western European representative elites can be seen as first responses to the ‘legitimacy challenge’ of an eroding political support for representative democracy among its citizens. Whether these responses will suffice to render new legitimacy to the political elites of representative democracies is a question to be answered by future developments. REFERENCES Albrow, M. 1998. The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Andersen, S. S. and K. A. Eliassen (eds.). 1993. Making Policy in Europe. The Europeification of National Policy-making. London: Sage. Beaver, D. and R. Rosen. 1978. “Studies in Scientific Collaboration Part I: The Professional Origins of Scientific Co-Authorship.” Scientometrics 1:65–84. Best, H. 2003. “Der langfristige Wandel politischer Eliten in Europa 1867–2000: auf dem Weg der Konvergenz?” Pp. 369–400 in Oberschichten—Eliten—Herrschende Klassen, edited by S. Hradil and P. Imbusch. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Best, H. and M. Cotta. 2000. “Elite Transformation and Modes of Representation since the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Considerations.” Pp. 1–28 in Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries, edited by H. Best and M. Cotta. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Best, H. and M. Edinger. 2005. “Converging Representative Elites in Europe? An Introduction to the EurElite Project.” Czech Sociological Review 41:499–509. Best, H. and D. Gaxie. 2000. “Detours to Modernity: Long-Term Trends of Parliamentary Recruitment in Republican France 1848–1999.” Pp. 88–137 in Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000, edited by H. Best and M. Cotta. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Best, H., M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli. 2006. “The Circulation and Reproduction of European Political Elites: The ‘Quest for Covergence’.” Pp. 81–113 in Europe’s Nascent State. Public Policy in the European Union, edited by J. From and N. Sitter. Oslo: Gyldendal. Best, H., C. Hausmann and K. Schmitt. 2000. “Challenges, Failures, and Final Success: The Winding Path to a Structurally Integrated Elite 1848–1999.” Pp. 138–195 in Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000, edited by H. Best and M. Cotta. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blondel, J. 1997. “Political Progress. Reality or Illusion?” Pp. 77–101 in The Idea of Progress, edited by A. Burgen; P. McLaughlin and J. Mittelstraß. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter. Borchert, J. and J. Zeiss (eds.). 2003. The Political Class in Advanced Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cotta, M. and H. Best. 2000. “Between Professionalization and Democratization: A Synoptic View on the Making of the European Representative.” Pp. 493–526 in Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000, edited by H. Best and M. Cotta. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cromwell, V. and M. Rush. 2000. “Continuity and Change: Legislative Recruitment in the United Kingdom 1868–1999.” Pp. 463–492 in Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000, edited by H. Best and M. Cotta. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R. J. 2004. Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices. The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eulau, H. et al. 1959. “The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observation, on the Theory of Edmund Burke.” The American Political Science Review 53:742–756. Hetherington, M. J. 2001. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization.” American Political Science Review 95:619–631. Hansen, P. 2000. “European Citizenship, or Where Neoliberalism meets Ethnoculturalism. Analyzing the European Unions Citizenship Discourse.” European Societies 2:139–165. Inkeles, A. 1981. “Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Societies.” Pp. 3–38 in Modernization Theory. Research and Realities, edited by M. O. Attir, B. Holzner and Z. Suda. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Katz, R. S. and P. Mair. 1995. “Change Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party.” Party Politics 1:5–28. Lasswell, H. D. 1952. “The Elite Concept”. Pp. 6–21 in The Comparative Study of Political Elites, edited by H. D. Lasswell et al. Stanford, CA: University Press. Mansbridge, J. 2003. “Rethinking Representation.” American Political Science Review 97:515– 528. Mersch, W. 1965. “Volksvertreter in West und Ost. Das Sozialprofil von Bundestagsabgeordneten und Delegierten der Volkskammer.” Pp. 30–54 in Beiträge zur Analyse der deutschen Oberschicht, edited by Ralf Dahrendorf. München: Piper. Michels, R. 1915 (orig. 1911). Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Free Press. Mosca, G. 1939 (orig. 1911). The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw Hill. Norton, P. 1993. Does Parliament Matter? New York: The Harvester Press. Schumpeter, J. A. 1959 (orig. 1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin. Pitkin, H. F. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkley: University of California. Rokkan, S. 1999. State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory by Stein Rokkan (edited by P. Flora with St. Kuhnle and D. Urwin). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Toynbee, A. 1934–1961. A Study of History, Vol. 1–12. London: Oxford University Press. Weber, M. 1947 (orig. 1919). “Politics as a Vocation.” Pp. 77–128 in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Welzel, C. 2002. “Effective democracy, mass culture and the quality of elites: the human development perspective.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43:317–340.

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Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana Johanna Odonkor Svanikier Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK [email protected]

Abstract This article proposes that elite theory is at the heart of understanding political conflict in Africa. A case study of Ghana analyses the historical origins of elite conflict in Ghana before and after independence. The article links high levels of political elite circulation resulting from the transformation of traditional social structures with high levels of political elite differentiation and instability in the post-colonial era. Since 1992 Ghana’s new liberal democratic regime has flourished. There are indications that there is a gradual increase in unity amongst competing political elites. Diversity amongst political elites has resulted in greater representation at the leadership level. These factors may explain the sustained period of political stability and the gradual deepening of liberal democracy in Ghana.

INTRODUCTION This article is based on the premise that political processes in Africa are driven by the same logic as politics elsewhere. Therefore general theories which aim to explain the persistence of democratic regimes are equally applicable to Africa. Here, I aim to highlight the importance of modern elite theory in understanding the dynamics of political conflict and regime stability in Africa. This will be done by using the case study of Ghana to examine the processes of political elite formation, circulation, differentiation and transformation in an historical context. The goal is to shed light on the new consensus for democracy amongst competing political elites which

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is evidenced by the remarkable persistence and stability of Ghana’s liberal democratic regime from 1992 to the present time.1 Since undergoing decolonisation the continent of Africa has endured violent political struggle and conflict. Various paradigms have been put forth to explain the politics of the continent. (Bayart 1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Van de Walle 2001). These are generally characterised by Afro-pessimism or motivated by a repudiation of dependency theory. The emphasis on neo-patrimonialism as a cause rather than a symptom of African political instability has often led to the marginalisation of Africa from the mainstream of contemporary scholarly debate. Moreover, there is little attempt to account for different political trajectories in African countries within a unified theoretical framework. Some writers like Fatton (1991), Samatar (1997, 1999) and Ake (1967, 2000) have portrayed African political elites from a more multi-dimensional perspective and in the process recognised the critical role they play both in regime change and stability. In this article, the focus on the role of political elites in analyzing the progress of democracy in Ghana is based on historical accounts and empirical observation of events in Ghana which indicate that the major conflicts amongst Ghanaians for control of the state during the period of decolonisation and subsequently, took place at the political elite level (Apter 1955). A consensus for democracy has existed amongst Ghanaian political elites since Ghana’s formal transition to democracy under the 4th Republican Constitution in 1992 and particularly in the period between 1996 and the present. This is evidenced by a dramatic expansion of political freedoms, successive free and fair elections, the gradual institutionalisation of constitutional bodies, the peaceful alternation of power and public shows of unity amongst politicians from opposing sides. Previous to this period, Ghana experienced a series of military overthrows of government, authoritarian and repressive military rule and fierce conflict amongst competing political elites. This paper explores the dynamics of this evident transformation in political elite competition from habitual conflict and political instability to consensus and democratic regime stability.

1 It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the quality of democracy in Ghana. Nevertheless, problems as to definition and quality of democracy are not limited to African democracies. For a comprehensive and animated statement on the matter see Claude Ake. 2002. The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa.

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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND One of the most compelling recent attempts to create a universally applicable elite theory comes from John Higley and Michael Burton (2006). They distinguish between united and disunited political elites and propose a typology of elites which they suggest may apply in all cases. They define political elites as ‘persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially’ (Burton and Higley 2001:8). Burton and Higley have developed a systematic theory of elites which aims to establish the connections between political elite unity and regime stability. ‘Only after elites have entered into and sustained peaceful competitions for mass support under agreed rules do constitutions and other political institutions embodying representative principles and practices strengthen and citizens become more self-confident and sophisticated in their political participation. At varying speeds, relatively inclusive ‘democratic’ political orders emerge. But the starting point is the taming of politics by elites.’ (Burton and Higley 2001:91) The key role of political elites in sustaining political stability and liberal democratic regimes is echoed by several other writers (Aron 1950; Ake 1967; Miller 1974; Fatton 1992; Samatar 1999). What emerges is that in order to sustain a liberal democratic regime, there is the need for a balance between both diversity and cohesiveness amongst political elites to maintain political stability and an enabling environment for political and economic progress. Ake aptly describes this as: a paradigm of elite accommodation by which the elites from the different social groups could reach a consensual arrangement and rule as a coalition. Under this arrangement, some integration and political stability can be achieved by virtue of the fact that members of the diverse social groups can identify with the ruling elite or part of it and even feel that they have a stake in the government. (Ake 2000:43)

This article draws from Burton and Higley’s (2001, 2006) elegant theory linking consensually united elites to stable liberal democratic regimes. Direct links between political elite circulation and political elite unity are rightly discounted by Burton and Higley (2001, 2006). However, links between elite circulation, levels of differentiation and regime stability though alluded to are not fully explored. The revision of their typology in Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Higley and Burton 2006) further loses the nuances emanating from their concept of elite ‘differentiation’ in “The Study of Political Elite Transformations”.

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The outcome of higher levels of elite circulation and differentiation is greater representation of different sectors of society at the political elite level. Higley and Burton (2001:25–26) point out the importance of high levels of representation for regime stability. However they lose this sense of the meaning of representation in their new typology2 by focusing exclusively on elections to signify representation (2006:18). A state may hold regular multi-party elections that are not fully representative for reasons that are not immediately obvious to a casual observer. For example lack of education could act as a barrier to the full participation of social or ethnic groups in political parties and electoral competitions. This article aims to demonstrate the importance of exploring links between elite differentiation and democratic regime stability, by examining circulation and differentiation amongst Ghana’s political elites in terms of their diversity in social status and background, from an historical perspective. I suggest here that political elite circulation may lead to higher levels of political elite differentiation which could impede political elite unity in the short to medium term. “The proliferation of elite groups implies a dispersion of power and ensuing turf wars that make integration difficult to reach or sustain.” (Burton and Higley 2001:184). This may account for the frequent military coups experienced by Ghana in the sixties, seventies and eighties. However, if political elite transformation subsequently takes place, giving rise to consensually united elites, the higher levels of elite differentiation result in a more representative and therefore more stable regime. On the other hand, it may be argued that low levels of political elite circulation lead to low levels of differentiation which may enhance integration and lead to regime stability in the medium but not the long term. Any inferences that one could make regarding other African countries can only be very tentative at this stage. However, examining Ghanaian political elite struggles may shed some light on the causes of the instability and regular military coups that occurred in some African countries following independence on the one hand and the relative stability and longevity of one-party regimes on the other. In some African countries, the political power of relatively (socially and/or ethnically) homogenous political elites became entrenched following independence. However it may be argued that the exclusive and unrepresentative nature of such long-lasting regimes eventually creates political instability in the longer term and leads to deeper

2

See Higley and Burton (2006:18), Table 1.1.

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social and ethnic divisions. On the other hand, higher levels of political elite circulation can lead to more representative political leadership. Therefore when elite transformation does occur resulting in greater unity amongst highly differentiated political elite groups, there is a greater likelihood of stability under a liberal democratic regime. In this article, I shall establish the historical antecedents of political elite conflict in Ghana by examining political elite formation and circulation in the Gold Coast and Ghana. I propose that the main political conflict has centred on demands by newly educated commoners for political inclusion and their largely successful attempts to wrest power from more established political elites. This has resulted in an identifiable cycle of elite circulation spawning successive generations of political elites. The consequences have been that political elite groups have become more numerous, more socially and ethnically diverse and for the greater part of the nation’s history disunited. More recently, signs of political elite unity and consensus over democratic rule may account for the remarkable stability of the liberal democratic regime of the past 14 years. ELITE FORMATION IN THE GOLD COAST The Notion of Class In traditional Akan society, although social differentiation was often based on descent, it did not equate to the type of social stratification born out of feudalism and the industrial revolution that exists in some European societies. This view is supported by Arhin (1983) in his article “Rank and Class among the Asante and the Fante”. Both by demographic, socio-economic and cultural standards the Akan are the most dominant of Ghana’s ethnic groups. Many Akan norms have therefore been adopted as representative of traditional Ghanaian society. According to Maxwell Owusu: Though many of the symbols of the state are Akan in origin, they are often shared by other societies in Ghana who may have similar symbols and traditions. . . . During the colonial period, as the Gold Coast Chiefs List of 1936 stressed, the Akan paradigm of state-craft was, with some local modification, adopted by nearly all other ethnic groups in the country. (1986:81)

In his book Nkrumah and the Chiefs, Richard Rathbone (2000:12) states that some cultures in Ghana, “most notably that of the Akan, had a long tradition of powerful monarchs supported by extensive aristocracies.” He further explains that the colonial and anthropological convention of using the word “chief ” rather than “king” diminished the status of the position of such traditional rulers to avoid the absurdity of having “a British king with imperial subjects who were also kings”. Within the social structure of the Akan there was also the notion of commoners (asafo or nkwankwaa in Twi)

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literally meaning ‘young men’. As Allman (1993:29) points out the sense of the term was not that they were necessarily young but it distinguished them from elders (mpanyinfu) and political office holders (chiefs) who were their superiors in traditional social hierarchy. Several writers have recognised the role of organised commoner associations (e.g. asafo companies) as a means of checks and balances on chiefly power, especially in the context of the destoolment of chiefs (Rathbone 2000; Li 1995; Owusu 1986; Austin 1970; Apter 1955). The traditional rights of protest and rebellion by commoners have been linked to the protests of ‘young men’ in the nationalist struggle for independence (Rathbone 2000) and military coups in the post-colonial era (Owusu 1986). Ivor Wilks wrote of the nineteenth century Nkwankwaa as men who “belonged to old and well-established families but whose personal expectations of succeeding to office or even of acquiring wealth were low” (Wilks 1989). In his landmark study of Education and Social Change in Ghana, Philip Foster (1965) highlights how a new kind of status system emerged in the Gold Coast during the colonial period due to the critical impact of Western-style education, and the implications that this had for the configuration of political power in the independent state of Ghana. The importance of education to social mobility is also emphasised by Dennis Austin (1970). When talking about Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party, he observes that: the demand made by the party for self-government was bound up with a struggle for power which had many of the characteristics of a class struggle—provided the words were widened in scope to connote a level determined as much by education, and by social standing within a traditional political system, as by economic criteria. (Austin 1970:13)

In the pre-independence Gold Coast colony, the principal routes to elite status occurred through aristocratic connections, commercial activity and formal Western-style higher education. The corresponding elite types were neo-traditional elites, coastal merchants/intelligentsia and educated commoners. These categories are oversimplified for the sake of clarity and distinctions could sometimes be more blurred than the typology suggests. Neo-Traditional Elites—the First Generation Aristocrats form the first category of elites that I discuss in this article and I describe members of this group as the first generation of political elites that emerged in the colonial era. The authority and legitimacy of neotraditional elites lay on the one hand in their role as indigenous traditional rulers and on the other, in their role as partners of the colonial government in the administration of the colonial policy of indirect rule. I shall further sub-divide royal elites into those who had a Western-style education and those who did not. Foster (1965) suggests that from an early date British

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policy had aimed at the enrolment of the sons of chiefs into schools in the hope of co-opting them to the British side. However the British failed to take into account the fact that the Akan matrilineal system of inheritance excluded the sons of chiefs from the assumption of chiefly office. Indeed, the distinction they failed to make was between ahenemma and adehye. Ahenemma were the off-spring of the king or chief. However they were not in the line of succession. Adehye on the other hand were siblings of the chief (who had the same mother) or his sister’s children and were therefore in the direct (matrilineal) line of succession. Some chiefs’ sons did attend schools but since they were not eligible to inherit their fathers, the main motive for educating them was thwarted (Foster 1965). Moreover such a reforming role as the British hoped future chiefs would play would have been in direct conflict to their conservative role as the guardians of customs and traditions within their own societies. Indeed for this very reason, before independence, a Western-style education was generally not deemed suitable for a potential traditional ruler.3 . . . . early recruitment into the schools was from groups who were not primarily associated with traditional activities but were rather connected with the exchange economy and European-type functions; it would also appear that most of them were not eligible for traditionally prestigeful office. In functional terms, the schools by operating increasingly as the gateway to new occupational categories constituted an alternative avenue of mobility operating independently of traditional modes of status acquisition. (Foster 1965:63)

This trend had a profound impact on the future balance of political power within Ghanaian society and resulted in what Foster (1963) describes as the “dysfunctional consequences of Western education”. Here I argue that the social phenomenon created by the introduction of formal Western education formed the basis of political elite circulation, differentiation and subsequent fragmentation in the run up to independence and after. As a more immediate consequence however, the failure of traditional authorities to take up Western education for their future rulers meant that instead of the hereditary authority and power of chiefs being mutually reinforced through such education, a new breed of political elites whose high status was inextricably linked to their close connections with European merchants and colonial officials on the coast as well as their high levels of Western education, emerged to challenge the authority of the chiefs. Foster writes: The position of traditional elites in the Gold Coast was progressively weakened by their inability to perceive the necessity for European education. For, once European political control became effective, there was always the possibility

3 Ironically the exact opposite is now true in modern day Ghana where a higher education is now seen as a prerequisite for potential traditional rulers.

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Nevertheless, the fact that some chief ’s sons and lesser aristocrats were educated meant that some royals of that period did receive education to high levels helping to bridge the gap between neo-traditional elites and the coastal elites who had begun to challenge their political role. A subsequent political alliance diffused the potential conflict between these two groups. This fusion of vocal coastal elites and educated royalty formed the core of what came to be known as the “intelligentsia”. Austin asserts, To be sure, the Colony chiefs and the intelligentsia had been close rivals for power and position on the legislative council. . . . But there was little sense of permanent hostility between any section of what constituted (by 1946) a triple ruling elite—the officials, chiefs and intelligentsia. (Austin 1970:9)

Indeed because the educated aristocrats straddled the neo-traditional elites and the professional coastal elites they are not clearly defined in the literature as a unique group. However their distinctive role is central to the arguments made here as they came to form the core of a nationalist conservative faction which lay at the heart of political elite disunity in an independent Ghana. Most prominent amongst this group was Dr J. B. Danquah the younger half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I, paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa an area between the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti.4 He was a prominent lawyer and politician who had acted as his brother’s secretary before earning a PhD and a law degree in the UK. Coastal Elites—the Second Generation The political sophistication of the Gold Coast’s coastal elites is well-documented in D. B. Kimble’s A Political History of Ghana (1963). They consisted of wealthy coastal merchant families whose offspring typically travelled to Europe for their higher education. These families due to their early and direct contact with Europeans and their role in the exchange economy had by independence been educated for several generations and together with the neo-traditional elites came to form part of an established indigenous elite. By contrast, commoners who had acquired secondary school education in the decades preceding independence would tend to be the first generation to be educated in their families. According to Foster (1965:68), “[t]he great

4 They shared the same father which meant that Danquah was not in the line of succession.

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merchant families constituted a highly educated minority who to a great extent identified themselves with and were accepted by Europeans on terms of parity.” Some of this group came from Fante aristocratic backgrounds or were the descendants of European merchants and officials. From this group emerged what I categorise as the second generation of political elites. Political tensions arose between such intellectual elites and traditional rulers as to which group was more qualified to represent the people on the Gold Coast Legislative Council, However [t]he passage of time had softened the earlier disputes of the 1920s and Danquah had worked hard throughout the 1930s and the war years to form a common front between the two sets of leaders. (Rathbone 2000:50)

The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was initially created as a coalition of lawyers and coastal merchants with the aim of advancing the cause of the intelligentsia for increased representation in the Legislative Council (Foster 1965; Austin 1970). Several of the founding committee members of the UGCC were highly-educated as well as having aristocratic connections. As already mentioned, Dr J. B. Danquah was the younger halfbrother of the paramount chief of Akyem, Abuakwa, Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I and William Ofori-Atta another prominent member of the UGCC was the paramount chief ’s son. Edward Akuffo-Addo yet another prominent member, was married to a daughter of the paramount chief. Therefore characterising this particular struggle as between chiefs and commoners as Austin (1970) does is an over-simplification. Indeed, the main political struggle prior to independence was not amongst indigenous elite factions or between indigenous elites and British colonial elites who had already begun to prepare the colony for a gradual political hand over, but between a coalition of neo-traditional and professional elites on the one hand and a coalition of educated and semi-educated commoners on the other. The driving force behind the radical nationalist movement was the educated and semi-educated commoners who by dint of their education aspired to political, economic and social elite status themselves. To achieve this they would need to mobilise a mass following and the charismatic Kwame Nkrumah was just the man for the job. Educated Commoners—the Third Generation Although widely used in the literature on politics in Ghana, it is important to clarify the use of the word “commoner”. In this context it refers to those who were not traditionally of aristocratic birth. Therefore in the traditional system of social differentiation commoners could not generally have aspired to equal political and social elite status as royals. However this article seeks to highlight the dramatic nature of the social changes triggered by the

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introduction and expansion of Western-style education during the colonial period which made this possible. In this new context, education through its close association with the process of upward social and career mobility played an increasingly significant role in emergent conceptions of social status (Foster 1965). Since education and occupation were becoming the new determinants of social status, for the first time commoners could potentially become members of the political elite and eventually did. Such educated commoners some of whom obtained higher education up to university level could be categorised as the third generation of political elites. Economic Transformation and the Expansion of Education There is a popular misconception that the level of provision of education in particular regions of Ghana before independence was determined by the Christian missions or by colonial officials. However it is one of Foster’s key arguments that the expansion of schooling in the Gold Coast was demand driven. Demand for education determined where schools were established and this was in turn contingent on prospects for social mobility through available occupational opportunities and increased levels of wealth. Therefore, the progressive development of a large-scale exchange economy and the accompanying creation of a differentiated occupational structure, led to an increased demand for education in the urban areas particularly along the coast where European trade was centred. This increased demand led to the provision of basic primary education to an increasing number of children in that area. Hence a group emerged which came to be known as the “Cape Coast Scholars” (Foster 1965). Foster contrasts them with the intelligentsia of the coast: At the other extreme were the ‘Cape Coast Scholars’ poorly educated and regarded with disdain both by the Europeans and the more highly educated Africans. There is a curious ambivalence in fact about the whole European attitude towards the lesser products of the schools. Urged to emulate European behaviour, they were, at the same time, an object of derision for attempting to do so and Europeans were particularly critical of the results of a process which they themselves were responsible for setting in motion. (Foster 1965:68)

This group of semi-educated commoners expanded dramatically after the “take off ” of cocoa as a major cash crop in Ghana at the beginning of the 20th century. According to Polly Hill (1997), most of the cocoa that was produced in Ghana up to 1911 was grown on land which had been bought outright by migrant farmers for the purpose of growing cocoa: “These migrants, who in their general outlook surely had more in common with ‘capitalists’ than with ‘peasants’ were familiar with the cash economy, their principal source of wealth being the oil palm.” (Hill 1961:209)

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Therefore there appears to be a correlation between increased domestic purchasing power and the demand for schools as many commoners in the cocoa growing areas of the Eastern Province (predominantly Akwapim and Akyem) acquired increased wealth through the expansion of their cash cropping activities and could therefore increasingly afford Western-style education for their children. Indeed Foster argues that the demand for education tended to follow the movement of cocoa production with increasing educational activity in the Akwapim area quite early in the century but no real evidence of mass demand in Ashanti until the thirties, when cocoa was becoming firmly established there (Foster 1965:126). This partly accounts for the Ashanti and particularly the Northern Regions lagging behind the South in the extent and level of educational provision. The rapid expansion of the cash-crop economy and increases in incomes that followed, undermined traditional structures of social status because the new wealth acquired opened new channels for acquiring prestige and status outside of the traditional one. Kwame Arhin (1983) discusses the contrasting contemporary Asante and Fante views about the ‘ideal’ man. In the case of Asantes, to be chief-like is most esteemed whereas in Fante society being a scholar and a gentleman is the model for social excellence. This contrast in outlook of the two groups is attributed to different experiences with regard to “changes in the economy, the European presence and formal Western education as sources of new life styles” Arhin (1984). The effects on Fantes were more pronounced because of their coastal location. Traditional structures became more fluid allowing for the acceptance of Western education more readily which then became an alternative mode of achieving elevated social status. A considerable proportion of the earnings derived from cocoa production was utilised in the education of children, in such a way as to qualify them for any other occupation than cocoa farming. . . . It is therefore appropriate to regard the extension of Western education and the enlargement of the exchange sector of the economy as mutually reinforcing factors leading to the progressive disintegration of traditional structures and their successive replacement by new concepts of social status and new modes of acquiring it. (Foster 1965:127)

Moreover the provision of education was dominated by Christian mission schools who offered a predominantly academic education in response to demand. Since their main mission was to proselytise within the communities, Christian religion formed a significant part of the education which further undermined traditional beliefs and social structures. A result of the expansion of basic education was increased pressure on secondary schools. Achimota College was set up in 1927 by the colonial government as a response to this pressure. It was set up as a non-fee paying highly, selective educational establishment which would allow the brightest and

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the best from around the country to attend secondary school in a boarding environment with no emphasis on any particular religion, ethnicity or social background. It became a training ground for the future leaders of Ghana many of whom used it as a stepping stone for further studies abroad. In this way many commoners were given the opportunity for education on a par with the privileged coastal elites and educated aristocrats. By 1950 the “strategic” sector of education so far as social mobility was concerned had shifted from the primary to the secondary level (Foster 1965). Indeed, “the Gold Coast had developed a more extensive system of schooling than any other African territory outside the Union of South Africa.” (Foster 1965:171) Political Implications of Social Change The impact of this unprecedented mass extension of education to commoners particularly at the basic level, led to social tensions between elites and commoners as the economy did not grow to meet the supply of school graduates. This led to increased unrest around the country as commoners challenged the authority and legitimacy of traditional rulers. There was widespread resistance by some traditional commoner associations or asafo companies that were organised into youth organisations against the overbearing and corrupt practices of some traditional rulers whose powers were protected by the colonial authority (Rathbone 1970). In addition to the social divisions that had developed through education, there were high levels of discontent in the Gold Coast following the Second World War, due to economic hardship triggered by general inflation and the swollen shoot disease which had infected a quarter of cocoa trees. There was anger and despair amongst cocoa farmers who had seen large numbers of their trees felled under a government directive to control the disease. To add further to this social unrest, ex-service men who had been exposed to new ideas during the Second World War had now returned and expected fair compensation for their contributions to the War effort. By Austin’s (1970) account economic grievances abounded and people were demanding a change. The Role of Political Agency Having highlighted some major structural factors that led to social and political change and unrest in the Gold Coast, the picture would be incomplete without a discussion about the role and importance of certain personalities and their agency in the evolving political process. Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I was the Okyehene or paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa between 1912 and 1943 based in their capital town of Kyebi.5 The Akyem Abuakwa

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stool had a record of close cooperation with the colonial government and had collaborated in the campaign for the submission of the Ashanti King to the British Crown. “Military contingents from Akyem Abuakwa were involved in both the alliances which fought in the 1874 and 1900 wars against Asante.” Rathbone (1996:508). The rule of Ofori-Atta I coincided with the heyday of the doctrine of indirect rule and Nana Ofori Atta’s relationship with the British illustrated the policy operating at its best with him skilfully combining elements of both the traditional and the modern within his court. His authority and prestige were greatly enhanced by his close relationship with the British and his “political and economic shrewdness protected and enriched his immediate family in Akyem Abuakwa” (Rathbone 1989:446). In 1927 at the age of 46, he was honoured by the British Crown as a Knight Commander of the British Empire. He was a member of the Gold Coast Legislative Council from 1916 to 1943 where he represented the interests of the chiefs and was one of the first two Africans to sit on the Executive Council in 1942. After Nana Ofori-Atta’s death in 1943, the Odikro or sub-chief of a small town in Akyem Abuakwa was allegedly murdered at the royal palace in Kyebi by 8 members of the royal family as part of the funeral rites associated with the death of a paramount chief. The colonial government arrested, prosecuted and convicted these members of the Akyem royal family for murder. One of the counsels for the defence was Dr. J. B. Danquah the half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I. In the end 3 of the 8 men were hung despite all efforts of Danquah to obtain a pardon from the Governor and the colonial government. This event soured the relationship between the colonial government and the royal house of Akyem Abuakwa. Danquah went on to form the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 with seven others initially to agitate for increased representation of the merchant class and intelligentsia on the Legislative Council. However their overall goal was “self-government in the shortest possible time” and it is likely that the outcome of the Kyebi murder trial created the impetus for a new nationalism amongst this normally moderate group which included the late king’s brother, son and son-in-law (Rathbone 1989). They recruited Kwame Nkrumah a doctoral student at the London School of Economics to be the Secretary-General of their newly formed political organisation. Nkrumah had been active in student movements in the US and the UK and had belonged to the anti-imperialist Pan-African movement which called for independence and unity amongst African States.

5

This is written “Kibi” in the older literature.

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It is arguable that Nkrumah’s interest in Pan-Africanism in the US and the UK was bolstered by the fact that he was not a member of the established elite within his own home country and did not therefore immediately see a leading political role for himself at the national level. However his return to the Gold Coast coincided with an increased politicisation of the country particularly amongst cocoa farmers, ex-service men and the semieducated youth. His charisma, organisational skills and common touch hit a high note with this group but his increasing radicalism made the generally sedate members of the UGCC extremely uncomfortable. Amidst increasing acrimony he broke away from the UGCC to form the Convention People’s Party. With the increasing prospect of democratic elections a mass following was the key to political victory. His radical message of “Self-Government Now!” and his hostility towards the African and colonial establishment made him appear to be the more likely candidate to fulfil the aspirations of the commoners in their new heightened state of politicisation. The tension created by the murder trial between the highly influential Akyem royal family and the colonial government may have created the political space for these events to unfold with such dramatic speed. Nkrumah harnessed all the pent up frustration of the semi-educated commoners, many of whom were unemployed, who swept him to victory in elections held in 1951 (Austin 1970). Thus the stage was set for open political conflict between aristocratic, educated, conservative political elites and educated and semi-educated commoners who now replaced the colonial elite to become the new ruling elite. Commenting about the period of transition from colonial rule to full self-government where Nkrumah worked closely with the colonial officials, Sir Arden-Clarke the Gold Coast Governor stated, It was indeed, unnerving at times to observe as we worked from one Constitution to the next, how much depended upon the personal relationships between a few leading personalities. (Arden-Clarke 1958:32)

POLITICS IN INDEPENDENT GHANA Diversity in Leadership The events described above account for the extreme disunity that existed amongst Ghanaian political elites prior to and after independence, fostering a politics of fierce conflict and instability. Although indigenous political confrontation in Ghana prior to independence has been characterised in the literature as one between chiefs and commoners the real battles since independence have raged at the political elite level. Unlike other African countries where civil wars have involved the masses as combatants or victims, the casualties of political struggles in Ghana have predominantly been amongst political elite groups themselves.

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Elite circulation leads to diversity and differentiation amongst political elites both in terms of social status and ethnicity. This can result in a sense of increased representation even where political elites are not united. Higher levels of representation prevent a situation where certain social or ethnic groups feel completely excluded from the political process. As a result, political conflict is largely contained at the elite level where different groups struggle for pre-eminence. A situation where there is a low level of elite circulation and a non-representative or non-diverse group of elites monopolise political power for a long period, may lead to political stability in the medium term but widespread and violent conflict in the long term. Political elite disunity has characterised Ghanaian politics since independence. This has been evidenced by assassination attempts, imprisonment of dissidents, deaths of opposition politicians in prison, successive military coups, political persecution and the execution of leaders. Further elite circulation and differentiation occurred with the entry of the military into the political fray. The intrigues, rivalries and turf wars of the various elite factions which emerged after the military overthrow of Nkrumah are documented by Austin and Luckham (1975) in Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana. This period saw the crystallization of the two main political traditions which represent the two main political cleavages in the country. They are the Nkrumahist tradition which is perceived as ethnically and socially inclusive, broad-based, populist and left-wing and the Busia/Danquah tradition which is perceived as elitist, ethnically exclusive, liberal-democratic and right-wing. At the leadership level both traditions have representatives from all the main ethnic groupings although political parties in the Nkrumahist tradition have tended to have more diversity at the top. However the political cleavages that divide Ghanaian politics go beyond ethnicity and include historical, social and ideological ones. Colonel I. K. Acheampong the military Head of State between 1972 and 1976 was derided by established elite groups for not being a university graduate or even attending one of the more academic secondary schools. Under his regime the role of education as a vehicle for upward social mobility was deeply undermined. Suddenly kalabule had become the main channel to secure the lifestyles which had formerly been guaranteed by a university degree and a civil service job. Kalabule was a word coined to describe the rampant corruption, rent-seeking and profiteering of the Acheampong era. In this period for the first time in the 20th century Ghanaians begun to question the value of education as a vehicle for social and economic mobility. Suddenly professionals such as university lecturers, doctors, nurses, teachers and civil servants were obliged to start up small side-line businesses like poultry farming, catering and dress-making to make ends meet.

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The June 4th 1979 military mutiny coupled by the 31st December 1981 military coup led by Flight Lieutenant J. J., Rawlings acted as a catalyst in the conflict amongst Ghana’s disunited political elites. In 1979, during its brief 3 month rule, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, executed several members of the government and some former heads of state before handing over to an elected civilian government. However economic conditions did not improve significantly under the new government and by December 1981 Rawlings staged a military coup which returned him to power. Rawlings’ Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime attracted a new generation of home-grown left wing intellectuals who had been politicised by the economic chaos and corruption that had ensued in the seventies. These were predominantly commoners who had benefited from the expansionist and inclusive education policies of the Nkrumah era. These policies involved the building of new secondary schools around the country as well as the expansion of domestic, free, tertiary education. Therefore Ghanaians no longer needed to bear the cost of going abroad to acquire university degrees and this increased the number of commoners who could now benefit from a university education. However with the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions particularly under the materialistic and profligate regime of Acheampong the lifestyle and prestige which a good education was expected to deliver did not materialise creating a new generation of disaffected educated commoners ready to challenge the status quo. The return of Rawlings provided this group with the opportunity to join the ranks of the political elites. However the width and depth of elite circulation was not as far-reaching as might have been expected as links with some former politicians were not completely broken. Some of Rawlings’ new ministers and advisors had been connected with past governments in both the Nkrumahist and the Busia/Danquah traditions. Indeed the current President, J. A. Kufour served as Minister for Local Government for a brief period. Rawlings declared a people’s “revolution” and lashed out at former politicians as well as the business and professional classes. The many human rights abuses which occurred under an increasingly lawless climate included the murder of three judges who by their rulings were deemed to be unsympathetic to the regime. This marked a turning point for the Ghanaian middle-classes in general and previous generations of political elites in particular who by then felt they were living under siege. Most of their patron-client networks were broken and most who had not left the country already scuttled into exile. Rawlings’ “revolution” swept away past structures of political power and created new ones featuring a new set of

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political elites. Nugent documents the desperate scramble of the PNDC hierarchy to define the role and will of “the people” in the early days of the “revolution”: “Whereas Rawlings insisted that it was the people who should govern, the fact of the matter was that the real decisions were made in Accra by PNDC functionaries who were not, strictly speaking, accountable to anyone.” (Nugent 1995:48) A Shared Sense of Destiny: Coalitions, Alliances and Inclusion For the first time, political elites belonging both to the Busia/Danquah tradition as well as the Nkrumahist tradition, whether in exile or at home began to perceive each other as victims and potential allies. The shared trauma of persecution and human rights violations many of them had directly or indirectly experienced under the AFRC/PNDC had finally given them a sense of a shared destiny. They now came together to become an established elite united in opposition to the new ruling elite. Some of them worked together in agitating for a return to democratic rule which eventually bore fruit when multi-party elections were scheduled for 1992. However the two dominant political traditions failed to form a coalition and Rawlings won the election amidst protests of fraud from the opposition. For the 1996 elections, the “Great Alliance” was formed between the National Patriotic Party representing the Busia/Danquah tradition and the Nkrumahist People’s Convention Party, an offshoot of the CPP. Due to a lack of resources and effective organisation the alliance lost once again to Rawlings’ NDC and he became President for a second term. By 2000 the NPP had made the necessary reforms within their party and built up the confidence to enter the elections in their own right once again. None of the parties received the 50% plus one of the valid votes cast for an outright victory in the first round. In the runoff between the NDC and the NPP however, the opposition parties most of which were in the Nkrumahist tradition put their weight behind the NPP by calling on their supporters to vote for the NPP presidential candidate, J. A. Kufour helping the NPP to sweep to victory with a convincing margin of 56.9 votes to the NDC’s 43.1. The victory of the NPP in the 2000 elections signified a joint effort between two traditionally opposed political sides in their bid to oust the newcomers and bears witness to an emerging integration of Ghana’s established elites. Recognising the role the NPP’s erstwhile political opponents had played in their victory, President Kufour promised an inclusive government and in the first term of office the NPP appointed a token number of ministers from other parties to symbolise a new era of political unity. One of these was Dr. Paa Kwesi Ndoum who survived as a minister into the second term of President Kufour’s government. On his website it states:

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• Johanna Odonkor Svanikier It is indeed historic and significant that Dr. Nduom, a leading member of the Convention People’s Party can serve as a Cabinet Minister in a New Patriotic Party government. (www.ndoum.com)

Dr. Ndoum the current Minister of Public Sector Reform has also held the portfolios of Minister of Economic Planning & Regional Cooperation and Minister of Energy in President Kufour’s government. Significantly however the NPP no longer see the CPP or other offshoots of the original CPP as a major political threat but rather as potential allies or coalition partners. This may be due to the fact that in the process of becoming established elites themselves the educated commoners of the Nkrumah era and their heirs have lost their common touch. In achieving increased acceptance and integration with political elites of the Busia/Danquah tradition they have lost the political edge required to attract a mass following. The divisions within the Nkrumahist group led to the emergence of several CPP off-shoot parties which have become increasingly politically marginalised, allowing the NDC to take over the mantle as the dominant party in the Nkrumahist tradition. The question therefore is how much unity exists between the established political elites of the two opposing traditions and the new elites of the NDC. This issue is the subject of ongoing research. CONCLUSION This article has chartered the history of social change, political elite formation, competition, conflict and disunity which existed in Ghana prior to the current liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic. It has argued that the initial source of political conflict were the changes in traditional social hierarchy created by increased wealth amongst commoners and the introduction of Western-style education during the pre-colonial and colonial eras. It has further striven to illustrate how political elite circulation was fuelled by the emergence of successive generations of political elites resulting in increased differentiation amongst political elites. The ensuing disunity led to insecurity amongst political elites and a cycle of military coups interspersed with brief periods of multi-party civilian government. Nevertheless, elite differentiation also resulted in political elites becoming more heterogeneous and representative of the different interest groups within Ghanaian society compared to for example the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone or Liberia in the same period. After almost 50 years of independence, competing Ghanaian political elites are finally beginning to show signs of unity. The emerging political elite unity combined with the existing diversity amongst Ghanaian leadership may account for the persistence and deepening of the liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic over more than a decade; a record in the history of Ghanaian politics.

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REFERENCES Ake, C. 1967. A Theory of Political Integration. Homewood: Dorsey Press. ——. 2000. The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. Allman, J. M. 1993. The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Arhin, K. “Rank and Class among the Asante and Fante during the 19th Century.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 53:2–22. Arden-Clarke, C. 1958. “Eight Years of Transition.” African Affairs 57:29–37. Aron, R. 1950. “Social Structure and the Ruling Class: Part 2.” The British Journal of Sociology 2:126–143. Apter, D. E. 1955. The Gold Coast in Transition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ——. 1970. Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960. London: Oxford University Press. Austin, D. and R. Luckham. 1975. Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966–1972, Studies in Commonwealth Politics and History; No. 3. London: Cass. Bayart, J. 1993. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. London: Longman. Burton, M. and J. Higley. 2001. “The Study of Political Elite Transformations.” International Review of Sociology 2:181–200. Chabal, P. and J. Daloz. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: James Currey. Fatton Jr., R. 1992. Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Foster, P. J. 1965. Education and Social Change in Ghana. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. J. Higley and M. Burton. 2006. The Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Hill, P. 1961. “The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 3:209–230. ——. 1997. The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism, Classics in African Anthropology. Oxford: James Currey. Joseph, R. 2003. “Africa: States in Crisis.” Journal of Democracy 3:159–170. Kimble, D. 1963. A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850–1928. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Li, A. 1995. “The Asafo and Destoolment in C+olonial Southern Ghana, 1900–1953.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 28:327–357. Miller, R. A. 1974. “Elite Formation in Africa: Class, Culture and Coherence.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 4:521–542. Nugent, P. 1995. Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of History, 1982–94. London: Pinter. Owusu, M. 1986. “Custom and Coups: A Juridical Interpretation of Civil Order and Disorder in Ghana.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 24:69–99. Rathbone, R. 1996. “Defining Akyemfo: The Construction of Citizenship in Akyem Abuakwa, Ghana: 1700–1939.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 66:506–525. ——. 1989. “A Murder in the Colonial Gold Coast: Law and Politics in the 1940s.” The Journal of African History 3:445–461. ——. 2000. Nkrumah & the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951–1960, Western African Studies. Oxford: James Currey. Samatar, A. I. 1997. “Leadership and Ethnicity in the making of African State Models: Botswana versus Somalia.” Third World Quarterly 4:687–707. ——. 1999. An African Miracle: State Class and Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development. Portsmouth: Heinemann. Van de Walle, N. 2001. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wilks, I. 1989. Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order, African Studies Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Political Elites in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Recruitment and Rotation Tendencies Oxana Gaman-Golutvina Department of Political Science, Russian Academy of Public Administration, Moscow, Russia [email protected]

Abstract This paper deals with the process of elite recruitment in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The analysis of CIS countries’ experiences allows a correlation to be drawn between the model of elite organization and the political and economic policies they pursue. As a rule, based on the mold of traditionalist (patron-client) relations, elites act as the agents of de-modernization and re-traditionalization. Organized on the principles of rational bureaucracy, elites are able to ensure modernization. Looking at the evolution of the CIS countries from this angle, the author investigates three groups of states. Two of these represent an almost ‘ideal type’ or ‘clean’ example of implementing the reference model. Byelorussia, at one end of the spectrum, is an example of a bureaucratically run state. On the other side of this spectrum are the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which embody the model of the clannish elite. The third group of countries are those states maintaining an in-between position within the proposed line of analysis, or those post-Soviet polities marked by a complicated plexus and sometimes also by an acute struggle between different models (Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In our opinion, the starting point for comprehending the elite-forming processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is understanding that the theoretical interpretation of these processes should not be limited by the perception that the present CIS elites have grown from the Soviet

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political establishment (nomenclatura). The USSR did not emerge in its time from a vacuum, but was a successor to the preceding forms of Russian statehood. In fact, the USSR was a territorial, political and socioeconomic modification of the state that originated in the 15th and 16th centuries in the Moscow tsardom format. At all stages of its evolution, the Russian state has always been distinguished by a high degree of heterogeneity—territorial, ethnographic, religious and socioeconomic. Under those conditions, modernization (defined in a broad sense as the achievement of a new quality of economic, social and cultural landmarks) could be achieved through a mobilization model of development (Fonotov 1993) with bureaucracy acting as the bearing structure and the main actor of such model formation (Gaman-Golutvina 2006a). Only this model was able to bring about the modernization in Russia. This model implies that the ruling elite was recruited primarily on de-personalized grounds of professional competence, maximally free from ineffective criteria (kindred and ethnic relations, corruption motives, etc.). The dichotomy of the feudal and bureaucratic models of organizing elites as proposed by Mosca (1939) may be considered to be the most successful conceptualization pattern of this case. As it is known, Mosca’s dichotomy deepened and concretized the corresponding findings by Machiavelli (1990:12–13) and Weber (1990:650). From Mosca’s point of view, the feudal political power type is based upon the merging of power and property, while the bureaucratic type is based on the diversity of economic and political management (Mosca 1939:80–83). From a contemporary perspective, the feudal type of organization could also be defined as an oligarchic one, since one of the key features of an oligarchy is the merging of power and property. Medieval Europe is a classic example of a feudal power organization, since, at that time, Europe was like a conglomerate of small self-sufficient formations (Mosca’s term ‘feudal’ was derived from this). The 20th century brought substantial changes to the organization of European power: in spite of the serious influence of economic elites on political establishment recruitment and political decision-making processes in general, this influence is not effected directly—the functions of political management are realized by specialized bureaucracy. It is known that Mosca considered Russia to be a state managed by bureaucracy during long historical periods (Mosca 1939:83–85). This form of Russian power organization was the result of the extremely difficult conditions of Russia’s evolution (unfavorable climate, vast territory, repeated external aggressions, etc.), which determined the state’s primacy over other political institutions (Pipes 1990, 1993, 1994; Fonotov 1993; Mawdsley and

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White 2000). This, in its course, determined the fact that during considerable historical periods, Russian political elites formed within the state, having coincided with the highest echelon of administrative and political bureaucracy. The ruling classes of Kiev Russ and Moscow State (boyars), nobility and bureaucracy in the Russian Empire were recruited in accordance with this principle. The ‘bureaucracy’ principle constituted the basis for the Soviet nomenclatura recruitment (Gaman-Golutvina 2006a). The difficulties of implementation of the principles of ‘rational bureaucracy’ management across the entire territory of the Russian Empire were influenced by the fact that, along with territories historically run according to the ‘bureaucratic type’ (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia), the Russian Empire and the USSR also comprised lands where kindred and family, ethnographic and religious patron and client (i.e., traditionalist in the broad sense of this word) relations formed not only the basis for the whole system of social relations but also served as the backbone for elite formation and, as such, impeded modernization. This is the reason why the history of Russian modernizations is marked by attempts at destroying the traditionalist principles of social organization. The de-traditionalization policy was especially active in the 19th and 20th centuries in Central Asia and Transcaucasia—the lands where the traditionalist structures were the backbone of the social organization and the targets of attacks in the modernization process. In the 19th century, colonization policy was pursued primarily by fitting the traditionalist structures to the imperial system of rule. In the Soviet period, the course was set for destroying the cells of traditionalism. In particular, large-scale purges in the 1930s, intended to ensure the modernization of the ruling elite whose mission was to modernize the whole system of socioeconomic and political relations, can be considered as an element of the new policy. It is a historical fact that the implementation of this policy was accompanied by rather violent measures. However, no industrial modernization under such unfavorable conditions (the accelerated pace in the absence of important modernization resources (financial, historical, etc.) relevant for development) could occur without such measures. The measures intended to destroy the traditionalist structures obstructing modernization became elements of this policy. In fact, ‘the hand of Moscow’ was the instrument of modernization for all territories in its orbit, particularly for those that were less socioeconomically, politically, and culturally developed before they entered the Russian Empire and the USSR. For numerous population groups in many post-Soviet states, the USSR’s disintegration turned into a large-scale de-modernization and re-traditionalization. This is one of the reasons why Vladimir Putin’s statement that “the USSR’s collapse was the largest geopolitical calamity of the 20th century”

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is true. The responsibility for such distressing outcomes lies with the CIS political elites: first, because they are the key political actors setting the objectives and goals of post-communist transitions1 and second, because post-Soviet elites consciously chose to reject modernization in many CIS countries. Last, but certainly not least, the Soviet elites’ desire to convert power into property was an important factor that determined the USSR’s disintegration. The process that began at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s under the slogan of ‘democratization’, became the revolution of elites after 1991. The dominant motive of the post-Soviet elites was the distribution of the previously built economic potential and a change in the model of revenue distribution in favor of the elites at the cost of the mass groups. Thus, the egoistic mindset of the ruling elites was the reason for the unsuccessful attempts to implement democratic transitions. In our opinion, the experience of the CIS countries may help to concretize ideas (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Higley, Bayulgen, and George 2003) concerning the relationship between the structural organization of elites and political regimes. This experience allows us to identify the correlation between the model of elite organization and the political and economic policies that are pursued. As a rule, based on the mold of traditionalist (patron-client) relations, elites act as the agents of de-modernization and re-traditionalization; the clientele may be considered the matrix of the sociopolitical archaic models. Organized on the principles of rational bureaucracy, the elites are able to ensure modernization. As to the methods of modernization, they may be different. Naturally, modernization carried out democratically is much more preferable compared to an authoritarian modernization. In our opinion, the USSR of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika period had a real opportunity for democratic transition. However, this opportunity was not realized because of the ruling elite’s orientation towards nomenclatura privatization and the nomenclatura model for entering the market. Thus, today the realistic alternative for many CIS countries consists of the choice between authoritarian modernization or authoritarian re-traditionalization and de-modernization.

1 It is common knowledge that elites play a key role in ensuring democratic transitions. Proposed by classical transition theory, the transition to democracy implies that, irrespective of a foreign policy context, the initiative begins from the top, i.e., from the ruling elites which are split into reformers (supporting transformations) and conservatives (opposing changes). However, the democratic transition does not mean a guaranteed transition to democracy or, even less, its consolidation. Multi-component processes of transition from one social and political position to another are not necessarily completed by the emergence of realistic mechanisms and procedures—sometimes these mechanisms and procedures reach only ritual and superficial levels as happened, for example, in the Central Asian countries.

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Looking at the evolution of the CIS countries from this angle, we can identify three groups of states. Two of them represent an almost ‘ideal type’ or ‘clean’ example of implementing the reference model. Byelorussia, at one end of the spectrum, is an example of a bureaucratically run state. On the other side of this spectrum are five countries of post-Soviet Central Asia (CA), Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which embody the model of the clannish elite. The third group of countries are those states maintaining an in-between position within the proposed line of analysis, or those post-Soviet polities marked by a complicated plexus and sometimes also by an acute struggle between different models (Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova). To argue this position, we will review the elite recruitment processes in Byelorussia, the Central Asian countries, and Russia. One of the most important notions for conceptualization of the elite recruitment process in our context is the patron-client linkage. To our way of thinking, the patron-client relationships, which have historically grown on the basis of feudal bondage between the vassal and the suzerain, can be seen as an important component of the ‘feudal’ model of power. Modern versions of personal bondage may acquire different forms, as these are based on various modifications of bondage—economic, ethnic, family, regional, etc. The concept of clientelism is called for in the context of post-Soviet statehood because patron-client relationships in the CIS countries, and primarily in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, were widespread. It is not accidental, therefore, that the notion of a kindred ‘clan’ is actively used in terms of analysis of elite recruitment processes in the CIS countries. In so doing, however, the notions of ‘patron-client relationship’ and ‘clan’ are not identical: the former is broader than the latter because it does not imply a compulsory clan kindredship and/or ethnic proximity. Nevertheless, both notions can be used to conceptualize the processes of elite formation in the CIS countries (Afanas’ev 1997). BYELORUSSIAN BUREAUCRATIC ELITE The development of Byelorussia is an exception in the post-Soviet evolution of the CIS countries—an exception in many respects. First of all, one should underscore that Byelorussia is the only country within the CIS where the experts have recorded stable economic growth instead of economic collapse. The rates of Byelorussia’s economic growth are the highest in Europe: the rate of industrial growth in 1997 was 17 percent and in 2004 it was 15 percent. The GDP grew by 10 percent (Shevtsov 2005:216), despite 25 percent of the budget being spent on undoing the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. Byelorussia’s political history can serve as an illustration of the thesis that the model of development of a

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society interacts with the model of elite recruitment. Byelorussia’s post-Soviet evolution unfolded within the mobilization development pattern. Government bureaucracy became the agent of this model’s implementation. The exceptional significance of the bureaucratic principle, as the basis for elite recruitment and rotation, is Byelorussia’s specific elite formation; this is the aspect in which we are most interested. There is a whole range of factors—historical, economic and political—that have determined the genesis of the Byelorussian political elite. Historically, the Second World War exercised key influence on the formation of the Byelorussian political class, since the entire political class of the pre-war Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) was eliminated during the course of the war. The political elite of post-war Byelorussia was almost exclusively composed of the ‘guerrilla’ generation who distinguished themselves in the war and ensured the republic’s industrial breakthrough after the war. They receded from the political scene due to the age reasons, and a new generation of leaders replaced them. These were ‘directors’, ‘economy managers’ recruited from the corps of big industry managers and from the social groups near them. “The present leaders—the Lukashenko team—are a new generation of Byelorussian administrative managers who replaced economic managers. . . . There are no internal splits within this generation and no explicit clan or cultural divisions. There are no groupings beyond control from Minsk. This is something that one has to be mindful of while trying to think of Byelorussian ‘revolutions’: Lukashenko’s team will replace him when he is gone. There are no other administrative managers in Byelorussia” (Shevtsov 2005:77). A peculiarity of all post-war generations of the political class in Byelorussia is that it does not have any intrinsic splits. This does not preclude periodic purges at the top of the present vertical power structure in Byelorussia, but quite often these purges are aimed against corruption. The specificity of the Byelorussian economy has played a major part in the nation’s political class configuration. By the time of the USSR’s downfall, Byelorussia’s economy was super-industrialized, export-oriented (80 percent of its output was exported) and highly concentrated (50 percent of enterprises employed more than 500 people). Super-industrialization has hampered reform accomplishments in Byelorussia, following the trend in other post-socialist countries, because obstruction of enterprises that formed entire towns (and these were a majority) would have meant a social collapse that would be impossible to overcome in a self-reliant way. The third in importance, but not the least factor in Byelorussia’s case, was the Chernobyl accident. Seventy percent of the radiation ejected at the moment of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident fell on the territory

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of Byelorussia; 20 percent of Byelorussia’s territory was contaminated; 20 to 40 percent of the country’s population lives in the radiation-afflicted territory. It would not be an overstatement to say that the contemporary Byelorussian nation is a disaster-stricken nation. Experts say that Byelorussia’s present self-isolation from the rest of Europe is considerably due to the Chernobyl accident (Shevtsov 2005:178). President Lukashenko came from the region that suffered more than others from the Chernobyl disaster. It is no surprise, therefore, that he enjoys maximum support there. The abovementioned factors have determined the specificity of the Byelorussian political class. In many regions of the former USSR, big enterprises and industrial managers could become the social basis for development policy, but it was only in Byelorussia that they were able to score a victory. One should keep in mind that the support of a strong central government was not conditioned by any ideological considerations but, rather, by a pragmatic interest in the nation’s survival and development (Shevtsov 2005:119). Another fact worth noting is that Byelorussia’s path was not one of resisting market economy reforms; instead, it was a different, exclusive—if not explicable—path, to perform market economy reforms. Byelorussia simply adapted itself to the market economy, not by means of small businesses and shock therapy but, instead, by means of adapting big enterprises to the reforming external markets. As a result, the Byelorussian path proved a success: by 2004, Byelorussia’s industry had surpassed 1990 levels by 40 percent (Shevtsov 2005:120). Surely, while speaking about contemporary Belorussia, we cannot and should not ignore the authoritarian character of the country’s ruling regime. It is so evident that it needs no comment. But the problem of development goes somewhat deeper than the question of the regime’s character alone, and needs to be considered beyond an ideological framework. RE-TRADITIONALIZATION OF THE ELITE RECRUITMENT PROCESS IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES Any attempt to analyze the situation in Central Asia requires tracing societal, social, and cultural development tendencies and measuring up the cultural and historical potential for the nation-state buildup in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In this context the results of the empirical study entitled “The Role of the Clan and Family Factor in Central Asian Political Elite Recruitment”, written by K. Rogozhina under the supervision of the author of this article, is of great interest and use in its comparative aspect (Rogozhina 2006). The inclusion of the Central Asian territories in the Russian Empire initiated accelerated modernization processes. As a result, the development of nations, national identity, and state institutions is still going on in the

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former Soviet Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Notwithstanding the 15-year history of independence of the Central Asian states, it would still be premature to talk about ethnic and national consolidation in the region. The prevalent indigenous population in each of these states is a conglomerate of sub-ethnic communities with different cultural, societal, and psychological characteristics. These differences often dominate over ethnic and national unity. Sub-ethnic, tribal, clan, and territorial solidarity largely determine relationships among these people, which, in the long run, are considered as ensuring the individual’s social protection, well-being, and psychological comfort. In other words, cliental relationships based on a traditional sub-ethnic division to a great extent underlie those countries’ sociopolitical development and political elite recruitment. The predominant role of clans and families in the sociopolitical structure of society in Central Asia resulted from the re-traditionalization after independence, when the ‘hand of Moscow’ could no longer act as a modernizing agent. It was inevitable that the Central Asian states lapsed into sociopolitical traditionalism, which was true of both the political and economic elite as well as the population in general. Three generations were not enough for tribal and clan relationships to sink into oblivion. Tribalism and regionalism artfully adapted to the new conditions. The economic crisis after the USSR’s breakup decreased living standards extraordinarily. Struggle for survival consolidated kindred peoples, which in turn led to the re-emergence of new clan associations and cliental relationships. The analysis of political evolution in the five Central Asian states confirms this assumption. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan society was (and still is) traditionally divided according to the zhuz principle (zhuz, ‘hundred’, ‘horde’). The zhuz are tribal unions similar to North Caucasian teips. There are three zhuz in Kazakhstan, divided territorially: great, middle, and lesser. The ‘great zhuz’ does not mean the largest, but consists of the noblest clans. The zhuz principle underlies the sociopolitical structure of traditional nomadic society. The Kazakh zhuz was shaped on the basis of ethnic principle, in contrast, for example, to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan where clans were divided territorially. The ties between different elements of the vertical power structure were not strictly institutional but personified, as in patronclient relationships. They permeated all power relationships superimposed over clans that were closed societal groups. The Russian imperial colonial administration and the Soviet leadership fought the zhuz principle, but it survives and continues to play an important part.

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The zhuz factor should be considered in a broader context as a basis for clan solidarity. Naturally, it is not the only factor influencing the distribution of power in Kazakhstan. The clan as a group of close relatives of the second or third generation is a modification of the zhuz principle. Since obtaining independence, the clan structure became obvious though compounded with economic problems and extensive corruption. Clan (or sub-ethnic) identity serves as a supporting element of privileged patronage practices and patron-client relationships, because the identity that was previously concealed is now a matter of pride. Consanguineous dependence, becoming increasingly strong, stems in part from the purposeful campaign conducted by the government to revive clan identity as the groundwork for Kazakhstani statehood. For the majority of the Kazakh nomenklatura and business elite, often of rural origins, the clan is a way of becoming richer and more powerful on the basis of kinship. The ruling political elite in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states is a symbiotic mixture of the former Soviet nomenklatura and a group of people who came to politics as a result of their clan and family bonds. This situation is popularly termed the ‘nephews’ economy’. In Kazakhstan, big business is directly involved in political elite recruitment more than in any other Central Asian state. The political and business elites have merged due to mutual interests and benefits and consanguineous relationships. In both cases, the parties are unified by informal ties, which helps one party to enhance its importance and the other party to multiply its resources. In other words, the functioning informal institutions reflect cliental relationships within the Kazakhstani political and economic elite. Much more dangerous than the rivalry between clans and zhuzes is the tendency towards consolidation of power and economic resources by the family clan of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in attempts to establish his full control over the economy, foreign trade, and mass media. The previously predominant, albeit limited, inter-zhuz balance has been replaced by the ‘one people, one zhuz, one clan’ formula. Even in the case of the president’s sudden death or disability, power will remain in the hands of his family and the ‘great zhuz’, controlling all secret services, military agencies and political structures. Many persons having dealings with the Nazarbayev family are neither the president’s relatives, nor even Kazakhs, yet their money makes up for the lack of family bonds. The situation reminds one of the relationships within the Russian political and economic elite under President Yeltsin, also an example of fusion between political power and business by means of patron-client relationships (Rogozhina 2006). Thus the family, clan, zhuz, and ethnic factors of consolidation within the Kazakhstani elite can be regarded as manifestations of patron-client relationships.

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The formation of patron-client relationships in Kyrgyzstani politics is determined by a complex system of traditional and neo-traditional factors at different levels. At the national level, there is a long-standing conflict between the northern and southern Kyrgyz sub-ethnic communities. At the subnational level, the Kyrgyz identify themselves with one of the three clan groups called ‘wings’—Right, Left, and the Ichkilik group (that belongs to neither of the wings). Each wing unites several tribes (clans). There are fourteen tribes in the north and eight in the south. The importance of the clan factor in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan shows that the Soviet system was able to reduce temporarily the effect of tribalism on the country’s political and social life. But the principles of tribalism and nepotism played a role during the Soviet period. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the struggle between the ‘liberals’ and the Communist nomenklatura was in fact the struggle between sub-ethnic elites and regional political centers for the redistribution of power. In the post-Soviet period, tribalism was on the rise. The process culminated in the revolutionary events of March 2005 when the ‘Southerners’ ousted President Askar Akayev, who represented the North. Apart from the ethnic element as such, the North-South confrontation contains a sociostructural aspect. The Northerners have a strong tribal organization while the Southerners have relied on family and clan bonds. During the Soviet period, the North was more urbanized, Russified, and less dependent on religious traditions. The South was mainly agrarian, traditionally influenced by the Uzbek culture, and with a strong Islamic tradition and current re-Islamization. President Akayev’s rule was favorable for the new political elite that was based on clan and family principles and consisted of representatives of Northern clans. As in Kazakhstan, the ruling ‘family’ controlled not only politics but also the economy in Kyrgyzstan. Its members hoarded their wealth by patronizing their clients. Two factors leading up to the collapse of the Akayev government were the discontent of both the political elite and the general population in the South with the Akayev clan’s unlimited authority, which doomed the South to economic and political backwardness and gave its representatives no chances to come to power, and the ruling regime’s weakness. The same factors determined the outcome of the March 2005 protests. To some extent, the events were not so much a revolution as the disintegration of the state. There have hardly been any changes since 2005. The ‘new’ political elite consists of ‘old-timers’ selected on the basis of consanguinity or represent-

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ing nomenclatura. Notwithstanding the active participation of the younger generation during protest demonstrations, the government lacks capable young officials. The Southern clans, whose rights had been restricted, ousted the ‘Northerners’. But the role of clans, new national and regional appointment practices, and the nature of the revolution conducted by the Southern elite show that clan and family identity remain key factors in the development of the political elite in Kyrgyzstan, and cliental relationships still prevail in Kyrgyzstani politics. Tajikistan Acute territorial and clan antagonisms in Tajikistan in the early 1990s led to the civil war that lasted several years (since 1992) and in turn resulted in Tajikistan’s splitting into ethnic territories with their own subcultures and mentalities. Those groups pursued economic and political goals of their own, partly based on ideology. The Tajiks’ idea of the divisions of social and political functions between regions is expressed in a popular saying: “Leninabad is ruling, Kulyab is fighting, and Pamir is dancing”. From the 1930s until the breakup of the Soviet Union, the political elite comprised representatives of Leninabad who gained from industrialization and urbanization more than any other region. During the civil war of 1990, two regional elites allied against the opposition. But after the war, the roles changed. The Kulyab elites became the senior partner. Despite being in power, Kulyab remains the poorest region. The Kulyabians, coming from the South, are stereotypically regarded in the North as uneducated and uncivilized people. The situation changed to some extent in 2000–2001. After a few reshuffles, five of the eight personal advisers to President Rakhmonov were from Leninabad—an attempt to find new leverage and devoted supporters who would not depend on clan identity. Incidentally, there is no single Kulyab elite. The sub-elites of Dangara, Rakhmonov’s home district, and Farkhar (supporting Rakhmonov’s major political rival, the mayor of Dushanbe and speaker of the Upper House) predominate, while representatives of other Kulyab districts are demoted or forced out of office. Rakhmonov’s recent attempts to strengthen his position provoked an acute confrontation between the regions, reaffirming the contradiction between the regional discord and the need for the preservation of the state. Turkmenistan Cliental relationships in Turkmenistan are based on a few dozen tribes. Tribal identity also underlies the division into regional clans.

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During the modernization period, the Bolsheviks quickly eliminated not only anti-Communist insurgents but also the traditional elite as such. Yet the struggle against tribalism and nepotism could not completely resolve the issue in Turkmenistan as in other Central Asian republics. After obtaining independence, tribalism played a major role in political elite recruitment. Key positions are held by the Akhal-Teke subethnic group, (that is the domination formation among other tribes) and only then the rest of the Turkmen representatives. In other words, the tribalism that forms the ethnic clientele is graphically expressed in the rivalry between the clans of the Akhal oasis (where the capital is situated) and clans in other regions. In spite of the tribal nature of the ruling elite, clan solidarity functions by default, and demonstrating any clan loyalty today is as dangerous as it was in the Soviet period. President Niyazov formally expresses his negative attitude toward any attempts to create family clans within the government. But in reality, the struggle against tribalism and nepotism is aimed at forcing out the non-Akhal-Teke. In Turkmenistan, the president does not need a clan of his own; here, a person in power automatically acquires clients (first of all, among his relatives and clansmen). Clan mentality makes it easier to pursue the policy of tribal hegemony without declaring it. It should be noted that the struggle for power in contemporary Turkmenistan is being waged not between different tribes but between the hegemonic tribe and the rest of the tribes. Niyazov’s dictatorship tried to unite the Turkmen around the capital tribe, but this attempted consolidation resulted not in unity, but its opposite—anti-Akhal-Teke sentiment. That the opposition relied on the non-Akhal-Teke clans was a distinctive feature of the domestic political struggle. The tribal division of society is reflected even at the symbolical level (the national flag, the national anthem, and the national emblem of independent Turkmenistan reflect the tribal division of society). Demonstrating striving for national unity on official level, political leadership can not hide it, and the tribal discord is reflected even by means of symbols. Notwithstanding various scenarios for changing the regime, the capital clans are unlikely to share power voluntarily with anyone if Niyazov (who is officially named Turkmenbashi—Turkmenistan father) quits. Hence the cliental relationships based on ethnicity and devotion to the patron are expected to dominate in Turkmenistani politics. Uzbekistan The cliental relationships in Uzbekistan are also based on clan identity, but the Uzbek clans are implicitly involved in politics, in contrast to Kazakhstan

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and Kyrgyzstan, where tribalism is open. Nevertheless, they are no less strong and influence the domestic situation. The Uzbekistani clans are territorial, not consanguine, with sub-ethnic differences between the Uzbeks living in Fergana, Khorezm, Samarkand, Tashkent, etc. Naturally, kinship bonds are important, but they do not always determine a person’s status in a clan. Clans try to place their men in major economic and political institutions and in the government to promote their clansmen, strengthen their position and financial power, and enhance their influence. Clans played rather an important part in Soviet Uzbekistan, but after gaining independence they were institutionalized. Clan identity and parochialism determine not only domestic but also foreign policy. Without control from Moscow and consequent personnel turnover, re-traditionalization affected the life of society, including politics and governance. Although President Karimov’s regime may be called authoritarian and even despotic, this would not be an objective appraisal of the situation. In reality, the president is impelled into balancing between several leading clan groups. It should be noted that Islam Karimov has not practiced new appointments to the government. For many years he has worked with the same persons, time-tested officials. The replacement of top officials is quite often nothing but the realignment of clan forces. Clans constantly fight one another to access resources and gain political influence. Karimov pursues his personal benefits, but he also has to take into account the interests of strong regional groups that have their representatives in state offices that are capable of organizing large-scale disturbances (disobedience campaigns, pogroms, strikes, etc.). Today there are several regional clientele networks in domestic politics, including Fan (Fergana Valley elite), Surkash (influential representative of the southern Surkhandaria and Kashkadaria regions), Samarkand, Tashkent and Khorezm, and Karakalpakstan. Samarkand, Tashkent, and Fergana were the leading regional clans. Now regional clans are divided into subethnic groups. There are two clans currently in power—Tashkent and Samarkand. The third strong clan—Fergana—is practically isolated from power (Rogozhina 2006). Built into the government and other structures, clans strengthen the authoritarian regime. The regime in turn does not interfere in clans’ autonomy in their regions and industries. As a result of the tacit division of major industries and sectors (oil and gas, finance and banking, agro-industrial and trade sectors) among top clans, the persons representing concrete clans use the industrial and sectoral potentials for their interests. Clan leaders heading industries and sectors try to increase the representation of their clans.

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Thus the deep-rooted sub-ethnicity-based cliental relationships that, to a great extent, determine the power hierarchy stipulate the weakness of modern sociopolitical institutions and the inability to ensure sustainability and safety in society in Central Asian post-communist states. Furthermore, informal patronage and back-benefit practices are institutionalized, replacing legal structures. Social and political mobility beyond the patron-client framework becomes simply impossible. The clientele and the elites are trying to perpetuate cliental relationships not only for rational reasons but also intuitively, due to an unwillingness to live under other forms of societal organization. The ongoing re-traditionalization of society, also caused by the deep socioeconomic crisis, spreads inter-clan discord and enhances its role. Widespread clan and cliental relationships in Central Asia prove the deficiency of national unity and identity that underlie national statehood and undermine the nation-states already formed. The main problem, however, is that the clan-based regimes are not developing but regressing. SEMI-MODERNIZATION ELITES: RUSSIAN VERSION The ‘clan’ concept is the one most used in the literature on contemporary Russian elites. From a formal point of view this concept is not quite correct, since neither familial nor ethnic ties are obligatory features of Russian elites (Ruthland 1997). However, the Russian clans have the same typical features (secrecy, especially corporate-particular orientations, etc.) which constitute the core of clan relations (Peregudov 1998:147, 2003, 2004; Gaman-Golutvina 2006a). The wide-scale economic and political reforms of the 1990’s were accompanied by revolutionary changes in the traditionally Russian elite-recruitment model: a relatively homogeneous nomenclatura turning into an association of political and economic clans, pretending to make key political decisions (Wasilewski 1998). The implementation of such a deep transformation within such a short period in history (five to seven years) attests to the fact that in that period we dealt with the tectonic changes that had emerged earlier. Actually, by the end of the Soviet period, a lot of sub-groups had appeared inside the nomenclatura shell (though they were weakly formed). There was not enough opportunitiy for these groups promoting; they were awaiting the proper time for conversion of various previously accumulated resources into financial capital. In the course of the reforms, the political role of the business elite, in elaborating the political course and in political establishment recruitment, grew considerably. Moreover, for the first time in Russian history, the business representatives entered the political elite. Thus, Yeltsin’s economic reforms of the 1990s caused a transformation of the elite-recruitment model that was much deeper than that which had taken place in 1917 (Gaman-Golutvina

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2006a). At that time, the elite-formation model changed only its exterior form, while its core principle was left untouched. The 1990s oligarchic elite-recruitment model gradually replaced the bureaucratic one. It is worth mentioning that a key characteristic of the largest Russian elite clans under Yeltsin was their self-sufficiency. By this I mean self-sufficiency in a ‘feudal’ sense, since the oligarchic empires formed in the 1990s gained their own financial and industrial potentials, their own security services, their protégés in power bodies at different levels in military and special services (Ministry of Interior Affairs, General Prosecutor’s Office, courts, etc.), and their own analytic services; their own allies in the political opposition ranks. We can state that these oligarchic empires looked like quasi-feudal states. The high level of self-sufficiency of these elite clans gives us the opportunity to note the tendency toward quasi-feudalization of the eliteformation model in Russia under Yeltsin. Thus, in Russia of the 1990s, the reconstruction of the European elite-formation model of the feudal (not contemporary) West took place. In contemporary Western countries, the autonomy of the state as regards corporate interests is not dismantled (Page and Wright 1999). Another important peculiarity of the Yeltsin elite was the identification of state interests with corporate ones, a ‘privatization’ of the state instituted by clans, pretending to replace the state and to fulfill its functions. Paradoxically, the famous Marxian prophecy concerning the extinction of the state under communism came into being in post-communist Russia: not only were industries privatized, but the state institutes as well. The oligarchic nature of elite formation is the most evident feature of the substantial transformation of the elite-recruitment model, which occurred in Russia in the course of the 1990s reforms. By the mid-1990s, property had become the source of political influence, and first of all, the property of the state institutes. The oligarchs, created by the state itself, obtained the means to dictate their will to the state. The unlimited predominance of this oligarchy naturally resulted in default on 17 August 1998. The ensuing total discrediting of the oligarchy-affiliated political class gave the bureaucracy a chance to return to its leading political role. The appointment of E. Primakov as prime minister and the promotion of Moscow’s Mayor Y. Luzhkov to federal politics, coupled with the formation of his own political movement, known as the ‘Fatherland,’ signified an attempt at nomenclatura revenge. However, the attempt at a nomenclature renaissance was interrupted twice. The first time was in May 1999, when Yeltsin, under strong pressure from the oligarchs, dismissed Primakov. It happened a second time after the defeat of the Primakov-Luzhkov, ‘Fatherland’ movement in the 1999 parliamentary elections (December 1999). As a result, the bureaucracy of

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nomenclatura origin was ruined. To emphasize: it origin was the ruin of the nomenclatura bureaucracy, not bureaucracy in general. This notion is based not only on the fact that people with nomenclatura backgrounds were excluded from the highest echelons of power, but also on the defeat of the nomenclatura political mentality and appropriate technologies of political leadership. The nomenclatura mentality is founded on two principles: the stability of the game rules, and the behind-the-scenes nature of the political struggle involved with nomenclatura politics. The public psychological discrediting of the bureaucrats Primakov and Luzhkov played a decisive role in the defeat of nomenclatura bureaucracy. Meanwhile, contemporary Russian politics is a public game without rules, not only in the sense that the infringement of taboos became a rule, but also in the sense that the stability of political principles and values are fundamentally doubtful. Under such circumstances the advantage is inevitably on the side of those who are adapted to this type of game. This is a new generation of bureaucracy (though age itself is not very important—we mean first of all the change in mentality and behavior) that differs from the Soviet nomenclatura. The latter considered ideological identification to be quite important, while the new generation of political elites shares a utilitarian philosophy: ‘what is useful, is true’. As regards structural aspects in terms of J. Higley’s typology, this change may also be considered the transformation of an ideocratic elite to a fragmented one (Higley, Bayulgen, George, 2003:13–14). The new generation of bureaucracy is ready for multi-path combinations and games with oligarchs; it is prepared to design new mechanisms and channels of communications with other public and behind-the-scenes actors. It is exactly this cohort that composed the backbone of the political class formed under Vladimir Putin. CONCLUSIONS Thus, having studied the three major typological forms of elite organization in the CIS states, one can see that the elites’ re-traditionalization and society’s de-modernization are interdependent and mutually conditioned processes. The primary common model that brought the elites back to traditionalization in those CIS countries that experienced a re-traditionalization was the model of patron-client relationship that has determined the whole system while manifesting itself in various modifications. In some cases, the clienteles’ dominant foundation is the specific national entities (for example, the zhuz in Kazakhstan, complemented with kindred and family relations); in other cases this is family-kindred, ethnic and/or religious community; or in some other cases, a regional consolidation (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and, in part, Uzbekistan). Even a full-fledged sultanate is pos-

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sible when the whole population of a country finds itself in the position of vassals, as is the case in Turkmenistan (Rogozhina 2006). Sometimes a clientele comes about in the process of mutual penetration between the representatives of power and business, who are not kin but are bound together by common economic interests. But, as is shown by the experience of Russia and Kazakhstan, in these cases, too, the representatives of the ruling families act as rapprochement channels. The experience of the CIS countries shows that there can be various combinations of different formation entities that ensure consolidation within the elite, and that can become basic to the emergence of odd sets of regional and family clans (the case of Kyrgyzstan), family businesses (in Russia under Yeltsin), and other symbiotic entities. The study of functional features within this range of possible arrangements reveals a similarity between the entities under review: their exclusive focus on clan interests and their failure as development agents in their states. Absolute majorities of the populations in the countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia live below the poverty line. This failure puts into question the elite status of the ruling groups because they fail to accomplish an elite’s fundamental mission. The latter, as is known, implies not only an involvement in decision making (a decision approach) but also an alignment between the decisions made and the interests of the governed community, that is, with the populations of their countries. The ruling CIS groups reviewed in this context appear in the capacity of politicians (who, as is known, are concerned with the next election) rather than in the capacity of state rulers (called upon to take care of their countries’ futures). Catastrophic declines in the living standards of the masses of the populations are neither an accidental nor unexpected effect of clan governance. Instead, this is a predictable result of elite recruitment on the basis of clientele relationships rather than on professional competency principles. In this connection, a question arises as to whether or not the strategic impotence of clan regimes is their attributive feature or a specific feature of state formations of the post-Soviet type. Experience from other parts of the world shows that the consequences of clientelism are ambiguous (though in most cases they are certainly negative). For instance, many ruling regimes in Southeast Asia include clientelism to some degree. In so doing, in certain countries, informal interpersonal relationships have not interfered with rapid development (as was the case in Singapore), while in other countries they accompanied corruption. Indeed, the generally pessimistic picture within the CIS seems to have started to change. Development policy steps have been taken in Kazakhstan. President N. Nazarbayev, who was going to have his elder daughter inherit

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his presidency, has now changed his intentions and is not going to retire, after winning a victory in the presidential election in December 2005 and having scored 90 percent of the votes (which is not very surprising for this region). Moreover, he declared plans for large-scale modernization of the economy and the social sphere. For instance, plans have been announced to increase the GDP in 2007 to $7,000 per person (which means $15,000 in terms of the purchasing capacity in the region). Allocations for education and health are planned to become closer to the standards of advanced countries: 4.1 percent of the GDP for the former and 3 percent of the GDP for the latter. However, this is as yet just a proposal. But the main thing is, this modernization effort is a fortuity rather than a regularity for the clan regimes that are recruiting elites on principles that are a far cry from the demands of ‘rational bureaucracy’ and rational ruling. Against the general CIS picture, one can see certain successes for Russia that were made possible only after the break-up of the corrupt symbiosis between power and business of Yeltsin’s epoch. Nevertheless, the new Russian bureaucracy has not managed yet to solve the key problem of the country, that ensuring economic development. Now we observe in Russia growth without going ahead, growth without development. During the years of economic reforms, the petro-state in Russia was formed. The share of the oil and gas industry income in Russia’s GDP almost doubled—from 11 to 19.5 percent; this is more than in Columbia, Venezuela and other raw-export-oriented countries. Only in Nigeria is the fuel share of the GDP higher than in Russia. Incomes from raw exports have reached 65 to 68 percent, making Russia vulnerable as a global competition participant (Lane 2000; Baron 2005). Russia is lagging behind as regards intellectualization of the economy. According to Davos’ 2005 Forum data, Russia occupies the 62nd place on the competitiveness rating scale, which evaluates the criterion of IT use in the economy (the first place is occupied by Singapore; the USA is in fifth place). Though Russia occupies the 12th to 14th place on the GDP scale, its GDP per person does not allow it to rise higher than a 40-point threshold. And this is so in spite of the fact that Putin’s rule has coincided with extremely favorable oil prices, which could open up possibilities for structural economic reform in favor of high-technology industries. Owing to oil sales income, Russia occupies the third place in the world on gold and currency reserves, though neither these assets, nor another huge money Fund—the so-called Stabilization Fund, that was created for any “emergency situation”—, are used for modernization aims. Besides, the bitter struggle waged by the oligarchy clans and bureaucracy is still going on. The recent ‘transposition’ between the Russian Federation general prosecutor and the minister of justice can be seen as an echo of

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this struggle (Gaman-Golutvina 2006b). Abrupt ups and downs in Russia’s policies in the past fifteen years allow one to discern a correlation between elite structures and the course that they pursue. To be sure, it is incorrect to reduce the problem of the modernization agent exclusively to the role played by the state in the post-industrial epoch, but it is impossible to implement modernization outside active state policy and active bureaucracy; however, without efficient bureaucracy as an agent of modernization, development in the CIS countries is quite challenged. REFERENCES Afanas’ev, M. 1997. Clientelism. Istoriko-sociologicheskii ocherk. Moscow: MONF. Baron, L. 2005. “Resul’taty economicheskogo razvitiya v 2000–2005.” In Materialy metodologicheskogo seminara FRPC. Moscow: Nauka. Eisenstadt, S. and L. Roniger. 1984. Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fonotov, A. 1993. Rossiya: ot mobilizatsionnogo obshchestva k innivatsionnomu. Moscow: Nauka. Gaman-Golutvina, O. (ed.). 2004. Samye vliyatel’nye lyudi Rossii-2003. Politicheskie i economicheskie elity rossiiskikh regionov. Moscow: ISANT. Gaman-Golutvina, O. 2006a. Politicheskii elity Rossii. Vekhi istorichskoi evolyutsii. Moscow: Rosspen. ——. 2006b. “Russian Political Elites as the Mirror of Russian Revolution.” In Contemporary Politics and Its Actors. Elites. Nomenclatura. Bureaucracy, edited by O. Gaman-Golutvina. Tambov: Tambov State University. Lane, D. 2000. “Russia: The Oil Elite’s Evolution, Division, and Outlooks.” In Elites after State Socialism. Theories and Analysis, edited by J. Higley and G. Lengyel. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Higley, J. and Lengyel, G. 2000. Introduction: Elite Configuration After State Scoialism. In Elites after State Socialism. Theories and Analysis, edited by J. Higley and G. Lengyel. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Higley J., O. Bayulgen and J. George. 2003. “Political Elite Integration and Differentiation in Russia.” In Elites and Democratic Development in Russia, edited by A. Steen and V. Gel’man. London: Routledge. Machiavelli, N. 1990. Gosudar. Moscow: Politizdat. Mawdsley, E. and S. White. 2000. The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev. The Central Committee and Its Members, 1917–1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mosca, G. 1939 (orig. Ital. 1922). The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill. Page, C. and V. Wright (ed.). 1999. Bureacratic Elites in Western European States. A Comparative Analysis of Top Officials. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peregudov, S. 1998. “Noveishie tendentsii v izuchenii otnoshenii grazhdanskogo obshchestva i gisudarstva.” Polis 1:147. ——. 2003. Korporatsii. Obshchestvo. Gosudarstvo. Moscow: Nauka. ——. 2004. “Biznes i vlas’t: k novoi modeli otnoshenii.” In Vlastnye elity sovremennoi Rossii, edited by V. Ignatov, O. Gaman-Golutvina, A. Ponedelkov and A. Starostin. Rostov-onDon: Severo-Kavkazkaya Academiya Gosudarsvennoi Sluzhby. Pipes, R. 1990. The Russian Revolution. New York: Alfred Knopf. ——. 1993. Russia pri starom rezhime. Moscow: Nezavisimaya Gazeta. ——. 1994. Russia under the Bolshevic Regime. New York: Alfred Knopf. Puthland, P. 1997. Elite Consolidation and Political Stability in Russia. Paper for IPSA Congress, Seoul. Rogozhina, K. 2006. “Clan Structure of Political Elites in Central Asia Countries.” In Contemporary Politics and its Actors. Elites. Nomenclatura. Bureaucracy, edited by O. GamanGolutvina. Tambov: Tambov State University.

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Shevtsov, Y. 2005. The United Nation. Byelorussia Phenomenon. Moscow: Evropa. Wasilewski, J. 1998. “Hungary, Poland, and Russia: The Fate of Nomenclaturs Elites.” In Elites, Crises, and the Origins of the Regimes, edited by M. Dogan and J. Higley. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Weber, M. 1990 (orig. 1919). “Politica kak prizvaniye i professiya.” In Izbrannye proizvedeniya, by M. Weber. Moscow: Politizdat.

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Nordic Elites in Comparative Perspective Ilkka Ruostetsaari Department of Political Science, University of Turku, Finland [email protected]

Abstract The article compares the Nordic, i.e., Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish, elite structures based on power studies which were completed in these countries in the 2000s. Despite differences in data collection methods, all of these studies employ the positional approach, and the composition of national elites is defined identically. Moreover, the four Nordic countries are associated with largely common history and political culture. The Nordic elites will be compared on the grounds of three dimensions, i.e. openness of recruitment into the elites, interaction between various elite groups, and interaction between the elites and the people. We will ask in what way the Nordic elite structures have changed as far as these dimensions are concerned and how many elites exist in the Nordic countries, i.e., one power elite or several mutually competitive elites.

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this article is to compare Nordic, i.e., Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish, elite structures based on two premises. Firstly, Nordic countries are associated with very similar political cultures, which can be accounted for by common historical roots; Norway was a part of Denmark before her independence, and Finland was a part of Sweden before being annexed to Russia. These four countries, together with the fifth Nordic country, Iceland, have cooperated closely in the Nordic Council which was established in 1952. Furthermore, linguistically, the Nordic countries are also very close to each other. The languages spoken in Denmark, Norway and Sweden are classified as Scandinavian languages. Finnish is not a Scandinavian language but Swedish is the second official language in Finland. Secondly, a comparative analysis of elite structures can be

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carried out because national power studies have been completed recently in all Nordic countries. The Danish Parliament decided in 1997 to launch a power study (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001) which was inspired somewhat by the Norwegian power studies in the 1970s (NOU 1982:3) and the Swedish studies in the 1980s. The research project was completed in 2003. In 1998, Norway launched a new power study, which has progressed parallel to the Danish study (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). It finished its work in 2003. The Swedish power studies were completed in 1990, 2000 and 2006 (SOU 1990:44, 2000:1; Göransson 2006a). The first mentioned Swedish research project also inspired the Finnish elite studies which were completed in 1992 and 2003 (Ruostetsaari 1993, 2003, 2006). However, despite the fact that these elite studies were carried out by one researcher, there has so far not been an organised national power study in Finland. The Academy of Finland launched, in 2005, a research program, “Power in Finland”, which began at the beginning of 2007 and will last for four years. Nordic elite studies can be compared because their theoretical approaches are very similar. All studies are based on the positional approach. Furthermore, national elites are divided into sub-groups almost identically. Elite groups of politics, public administration, business, organisations, media, science and culture can be found in each of the studies. There are, however, significant differences between the Nordic power studies as far as data collection methods are concerned. The Finnish and Swedish studies are based on postal surveys; the Norwegian study is based on personal interviews; while the Danish study utilises exclusively register data. The sizes of elites cannot be deduced from elite theory but constitute an empirical question depending on the focus of the respective study. However, as to the size of elites, it would appear that the bigger the country, the bigger the elite (Burton and Higley 2001:189). The number of elite members has varied from about 7,500 in the United States (Dye 1983) to 1,000–2,000 in the Nordic countries. The number of elite positions was 1,771 in 1999 in the Danish study (605 in 1932; 753 in 1963), 1,115 and 1,285 in the Finnish studies carried out in 1991 and 2001, 2,072 in the Norwegian study of 2000, and 2,546 (1990) and 3,343 (2001) in the Swedish studies (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002; Ruostetsaari 1993, 2004, 2006; SOU 1990: 44; Munk Christiansen et al. 2001; Göransson 2006a). Differences between the Nordic elite studies not only concern data collection methods but also indicators and variables employed for analysing the characteristics of national elites. Thus, we are not able to analyse systematically details on national elites based on hypotheses but rather must compare elite structures more comprehensively based on the conclusions

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drawn by the national researchers. The Swedish case is problematic in the sense that an elite analysis is not included in the latest power report (SOU 2001:1). However, Anita Göransson et al. (2006a) analysed women’s positions in Swedish elite structures in 2001. Our comparison of Nordic elite structures will be based on following theoretical framework. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In the classical view, represented by traditional pluralists and elitists, the co-existence of elites and democracy is impossible. For instance, the principal aim of the works of Mosca and Pareto was to abolish the myth of democracy. This black-and-white stand was not, however, accepted by all theoreticians. The conception that several elites or groups of leaders are compatible with democracy was called pluralist by proponents such as Dahl, Polsby and Kornhauser. This notion also included democratic elitism or the competitive theory of democracy as backed by Schumpeter, Mannheim and Sartori (Parry 1969; Schwarzmantel 1987). The existence of an elite cannot be attested by the fact that power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people who take care of day-to-day decision-making. In fact, this is the prevailing situation in practically all modern societies. The essential criterion for the existence of an elite is that it constitutes a cohesive, unitary and self-conscious group. These characteristics are to be found in almost all elite definitions, and theories of elites and empirical research on them have typically described a closed elite in terms of the three Cs (Meisel 1958:361): group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy, the last meaning a common will to action rather than secret machinations (Parry 1969:31–32). We may modify the presentation of John Scott (1991:119) and crosstabulate the variables of exclusiveness, cohesion and unanimity as shown in Figure 1. The first dimension in the typology is the openness of the elite structure, which may vary from low, elites being recruited from one single social stratum, to high, where elites are not dominated by any single stratum. In the latter case the proportion of members recruited, for instance, from the upper class is about the same as that of this class in the population at large. Moreover, the degree of openness also implies the circulation of elites, which is vital for both their renewal from the people and the implementation of stable and effective decision-making. The second dimension, i.e. the degree of coherence, combines the variables of cohesion and unanimity. These two elements may in principle be contradictory due to the fact that close interaction can be a result not only of unanimity but also of conflicts, i.e., dogfights between elites in various arenas. Nonetheless, conflicts are generally more likely to reduce interplay between elites than to increase it. Especially in highly consensual societies

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• Ilkka Ruostetsaari DEGREE OF COHERENCE

DEGREE OF OPENNESS IN RECRUITMENT

high

low

l o w

Exclusive

Segmented

h i g h

Inclusive

Fragmented

Figure 1

Types of elite structures

such as the Nordic countries (e.g. Arter 1999), the close cooperation between elites is a result of mutual consensus, not of conflict. In terms of Figure 1 the elite structure is highly coherent if its members have close interactions with each other and if they share the same opinions, attitudes and values. In other words, close interaction implies cooperation among the elites, not conflict resolution. Moreover, this coherence is also fostered by weak vertical contacts of the elites with the people, since demands and control from below cannot undermine the mutual cohesion of elites by creating conflicts between them and playing them off against each other. An elite structure may be termed exclusive if the elites are recruited from one social stratum and if it is highly coherent, i.e., if its members have close contact with each other and share the same social views. An elite structure is segmented if it is recruited mainly from one social stratum but its members have little interaction and do not share the same opinions, attitudes and values. The term “inclusive elite structure” refers to cases where elites are recruited from several social strata but are nevertheless coherent, i.e., there is close interaction among members and their views more or less coincide. The term “fragmentary elite structure” applies when elites are recruited from many different social strata and show little or no coherence (Ruostetsaari, 1993:332; see also Higley and Moore 1981, 2001). In short, Nordic elites will be compared on the basis of three dimensions, i.e., openness of elite recruitment, intensiveness of the links between various elite groups (interaction, attitudinal unanimity), and intensiveness of the links of the elites to the people (interaction, attitudinal unanimity). We will ask into which type Nordic elite structures can be classified and in what way elite structures have changed as far as these dimensions are concerned. And finally—following the tradition of classical elite theory—we

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will ask how many elites exist in the Nordic countries, i.e., one power elite, several mutually competitive elites, or none. OPENNESS OF ELITE RECRUITMENT The recruitment patterns of Nordic elites are very similar as far as gender, education, social stratum, place of birth or place growing up and reproduction is concerned. Even though the proportion of female MPs in Nordic Parliaments is among the highest in the world, their share of elite positions is still quite low, 12 to 26%. The proportion of women in elite positions is highest in Sweden, 26%, followed by Finland (19%), Norway (17%), and Denmark (12%). However, there are significant differences between various elite groups and these sectoral variations follow identical patterns. Women have acquired the highest proportion of elite positions in the political elite. In Sweden, the proportion is 45%, in Denmark 37 to 40%, in Norway 39%, and in Finland 37%. The second highest share for women is in the cultural elite: in Finland 36%, in Norway and Sweden 33%, and in Denmark 18 to 26%. The third highest proportion of women in elite positions is in the media elite, excluding Norway where it is the organisational elite (24%) and Sweden where it is the administrative elite (30%). Female representation in the media elite is 27% in Finland, 26% in Sweden, 3 to 30% (depending on the sub-group) in Denmark, and 17% in Norway. The weakest female representation is found in the business elite. In Sweden that share is 5%, in Finland and Norway 4%, and in Denmark 0 to 5%. Thus, the business elite is almost closed to women (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002; Munk Christiansen 2001; Ruostetsaari 2003; SOU 1990:44; Göransson 2006b). Elite members have much higher, usually academic, education as compared to the people. At least one-third of elite members are recruited from the upper class, which means significant overrepresentation compared to the population. It seems that an upper class background is most common while a working class background is most infrequent in Sweden. In this respect the political elite and the organisational elite are the most similar compared to the population while the business elite and the culture elite are most dissimilar. The recruitment patterns of the Danish elites are seen as relatively open. There are few barriers to recruitment for elite positions. In other words, the opportunities for successfully ascending to elite positions are open to most social groups, even if not to all. The proportions of females and young people have increased; exclusive social background is today less decisive than previously; and the population has higher education than before. Sixty-two percent of all elite members had an academic degree (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:246, 264, bilag 2).

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Danish elites are closed in the respect that professional advancement without many digressions is regularly required. Due to this, individuals are frequently systematically socialized into some professional norms. New individuals are recruited to elite positions but they are very similar in many respects to their predecessors (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:244). This is the case, for instance, also in Finland (Ruostetsaari 2003). In Norway, 22% of elites are recruited from the working class, 41% from the middle class and 37% from the upper class/upper middle class. Overrepresentation of the upper class and underrepresentation of the working class are clear; the proportions of the above mentioned classes among the population are 58%, 32% and 10%. Most Norwegian elite members have an academic degree. Despite this imbalance the Norwegian elite study does not talk about closed elites: all elite groups have recruited members from all social classes, and political and defence elites are especially important channels for individuals coming from less privileged social classes. Political and organisational elites have the most similar class backgrounds compared to the population, i.e., the lowest. This is the case not only in Norway but also in all Nordic countries (Gulbrandsen 2002:79–80). Also in this respect, all the Nordic countries are very similar in that the proportion from the upper class is highest among the business and culture elites. However, a Norwegian exception is that representation from the upper class is highest in the police and judiciary elites (53%), followed by the cultural elite (43%) and the business elite (42%). In Sweden, the most privileged elite group is the cultural elite (52%), followed by the elites of the mass media (51%) and business (50%) as far as the proportion of upper class civil servants is concerned (SOU 1990: 44, 322). In Finland, as much as half of the cultural elite (48%) is recruited from the upper class, while the respective proportions in the business and media elites are 32% (Ruostetsaari 2003:352; Gulbrandsen 2002:79–81). With respect to social background, Swedish elites do not deviate essentially from elites in other countries. The upper classes are overrepresented but the lower classes are underrepresented compared to the population at large. As much as 42% of elites are recruited from descendants of top officials (father’s occupation), while that proportion is only 14% in the population. Thus, the overrepresentation is threefold. Top officials refer here not only to higher civil servants but also to managers of big business and private entrepreneurs with qualified education (medical doctors, lawyers etc.). Thus, the category of top officials may be somewhat larger that that of the upper class referred to in most elite studies (SOU 1990:44, 322). Nineteen percent of Swedish elite members are descendants of middle level officials while the equivalent proportion of the population is 12%. Lower level officials are represented equally among the elites and the popu-

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lation (2 and 3%). By contrast, underrepresentation of blue-collar workers (10%/28%) and other employees (7%/18%) is almost threefold among elites compared to the population. Descendants of small entrepreneurs have almost equal proportions among the elites and the population (9%/8%). Farmers are somewhat underrepresented among the elites (11%/17%) (SOU 1990:44, 322). Differences between elites follow general patterns found in several elite studies. The proportion of the upper class, i.e., top officials, is highest among the elites of culture (52%), the media (51%), business (50%) and administration (49%). By contrast, representation of the lower classes is the highest among the elites of politics and organisations; 18% of political elite members are descendants of blue-collar workers while 10% are recruited from families with other employee backgrounds. The equivalent proportions in the organisational elite are 13% and 10% (SOU 1990:44, 322). Education has traditionally been seen as one of the most important factors promoting elite recruitment. However, in Finland an academic education has, since at least the beginning of the 1990s, no longer been seen as an intervening variable, which could explain the social structuration of elites. People in Finland are so highly educated that a high education is a de facto precondition for elite recruitment, excluding the political (Ruostetsaari 2003). Members of the Finnish elites are much better educated than the population at large. While 87% of elite members had taken the matriculation examination in 1991, a decade later the proportion was as high as 90%. At the same time 39% of 50–54-year-old Finns had no education at all above a basic level (SVT 2001:482). The proportion of elite members with university degrees increased from 82% to 87%. Of the population aged 50–54 the proportion who had received the highest education (university or polytechnic degree) was 26% in 1999 (SVT 2001:482). As far as social stratification of elites is concerned, the upper strata is clearly overrepresented compared to the Finnish population. In 2001 31% of elite members (the power elite) were recruited from the top stratum (includes hired mangers and self-employed entrepreneurs), 35% from the middle class (i.e., upper and white-collar functionaries) while the proportion of descendants of farmers was 19% and of blue-collar workers 15%. There are important differences between various elite groups. The proportion of the top stratum is overwhelmingly highest in the cultural elite, 48%, and it has increased significantly (11 percentage points) since the early 1990s. The second highest proportion of the top stratum is in the business and science elites (32%), followed by the political elite (30%). Almost half of the media elite (45%) is recruited from the middle class, followed by the organisational (39%) and the administrative elites (38%). Most elite groups

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are recruited rather equally (22 to 23%) from farming families, excluding the media and culture elites, where the proportion is markedly lower. Descendants of blue-collar workers have had the highest representation in the political elite (19%), the organization elite (19%) and the media elite (18%). Thus, the political elite has been a more open channel to the lower social stratum than have other elite groups for social advancement and recruitment (Ruostetsaari 2006:30). The proportion of elite members recruited from the top stratum has changed not a bit since the early 1990s. The middle class has diminished while the lower classes, i.e., descendants of blue-collar workers and farmers, have expanded. Although the proportion of the middle class in the population has increased, the power elite follows it with a delay. In other words, the proportion of elite members coming from agrarian or bluecollar families has further increased since 1991. Hence, we may conclude that there has been social mobility on the elite level which has slightly expanded the social basis of the Finnish power elite. The elite structure has thus opened up slightly to the lower classes. All in all, although the Finnish elites have slightly opened up to the lower social classes, the emphasised factual precondition of high-level education for recruitment indicates an opposite development. All in all, Nordic elites are rather open for various social groups. In fact, the openness of elite recruitment has increased during last decades. However, there are also phenomena, besides female underrepresentation, which indicate the opposite direction. The importance of metropolitan areas has not decreased but rather increased as the areas where elite members grew up. In fact, individuals born in metropolitan areas are clearly overrepresented among the elites compared to the populations in all Nordic countries. For instance, with respect to geographical representation, Sweden follows the general patterns reported by several elite studies. Twenty-nine percent of elite members grew up in metropolitan areas while the equivalent proportion is 14% in the population. Twenty-one percent of elites but 35% of the population grew up in the countryside (SOU 1990:44, 323). Finnish elites developed in a closed direction rather than opening up to the periphery; 67% of individuals who belonged to the elites in 2001 spent their childhood and youth in Southern Finland. A decade earlier the figure was 2 percentage points lower (Ruostetsaari 2006). We may ask to what degree elites are recruited from families where a parent had an equivalent elite position. Self-reproduction of elites is still a noteworthy phenomenon, at least in Denmark and Norway. Individuals’ chances to be recruited to the Danish elites increase significantly if their parents had an elite position. Twenty percent of members of some elite groups are recruited from families where a parent had the same or a com-

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parable elite position. However, most present elite members experienced upward social mobility which surpassed their parents’ positions (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:243). In Norway, self-reproduction is clearly highest among the business elite: 29% of elite members come from families where parents had equivalent elite positions. In other elite groups the proportion is markedly lower. All in all, more than 70% of elite members do not have a parent with an elite position (Gulbrandsen 2002:79–81). These proportions are clearly smaller in Sweden and Finland. This kind of elite reproduction has been quite modest among Swedish elites. Only 7% of elite members were recruited from families where one or the other parent had an elite position. However, there are differences between elites. Elite reproduction is highest among the media and science elites (13%), followed by the business elite (10%). The lowest degree of reproduction can be found in the elites of organisations (2%), culture (4%) and politics (5%). However, even though these figures are very small, reproduction of elites is not insignificant. The statistical probability that one family will have an elite position in two generations is almost nil. Thus, 7% represents a highly significant deviation from ideal complete openness of elite structure (SOU 1990:44, 318). In Finland, self-reproduction of elites has not been studied systematically. Even if most of the elite members were recruited from families where parents had been socially active, these activities were concentrated at local levels, i.e., municipal councils and elective positions of political parties and civic associations. Only an insignificant share of the parents were elected to the Parliament or the Government. This indicates that only a marginal proportion of present-day elite members are recruited from the elites (Ruostetsaari 1992:162–163). Despite the insignificant self-reproduction of the Finnish elites, the permanency of elite positions has been significant. This can be analysed in terms of the proportion of elite members who maintained their positions over the years 1991–2001. The permanency of positions has been greatest among the political elite, even if most of this group, differing from others, are subject to the tests of the constituencies in general elections every fourth year: 33% of members of the political elite maintained their position from 1991 to 2001. The proportion in the administrative elite was 30%, 29% in the business, 26% in the mass media and science, 25% in the organizational, and no more than 18% in the cultural elite. As about half the individuals who belonged to the elites in 1991 caught up to retirement age in 2001, the stability of the Finnish elites is rather high (Ruostetsaari 2006). Which one of the Nordic elite structures can be characterised as most open with respect to elite recruitment? This question is almost impossible to answer due to the facts that national elite studies have not utilised identical

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indicators and countries’ positions are different with respect to various issues. All in all, differences are rather small between the Nordic countries. LINKS BETWEEN THE ELITE GROUPS Small differences between the Nordic countries concern also the links within and between various elite groups measured by their mutual interaction and attitudinal unanimity. These links, which illustrates elite cohesion, have decreased in all Nordic countries. Denmark has a long tradition of including interest organisations in binding cooperation in connection with the preparation of legislation as well as the administration of enacted legislation. Corporatism was gradually established in Denmark during the 20th century, and culminated in the 1960s. From the mid-1970s, the corporatist system gradually weakened. Organisations are no longer included on the same formal and binding terms in legislative preparation as previously. Fewer legislative preparation committees and fewer decision preparation committees are being formed. More and more frequently, even large organisations are not invited to join the committees that are formed (Togeby et al. 2003:25). However, participation of the organisations in the administration of current legislation does not seem to have declined. The organisations continue to enjoy close relations with the authorities, and in many cases they have significant influence on legislation. While formal inclusion in legislative preparation has declined, informal contacts with civil servants as well as the Parliament have apparently become very extensive. One consequence is that large organisations gain privileges at the expense of small organisations, i.e., organisational participation has become more unequal (Togeby et al. 2003:25–26). In some respects private business has been able to increase its influence on political decisions. Some of the largest corporations now enjoy relations with public authorities that are comparable to the organisations. In addition, the corporations with frequent contact with the authorities are the same corporations that are active in the media, coordinating their strategies with other players and employing actual lobbyists. If there are signs of growing political influence in some trades, the relations between elite groups seem to have faded since the mid-1930s and further since the 1960s. There is little overlap in membership between business, on the one side, and the political and administrative elites on the other (Togeby et al. 2003:26–27). The Danish media have increased their influence in recent years, but they have not taken over power. In other words, the media have gradually liberated themselves from the parties and have become an independent player which is at odds with the idea of the primacy of the chain of governance (Munk Christiansen and Togeby 2006:15–16).

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Politicians have many and various interaction networks but they are surprisingly weakly integrated into other elite groups. In fact, the intensiveness of these contacts has decreased. In other words, the political elite has a central position in Danish society but it is relatively isolated. The same concerns also the positions of artists, officers and, surprisingly, chief editors. The formal network of interaction between elites has disintegrated in Denmark. Moreover, with respect to career patterns, the elite groups are today relatively closed, even if circulation between elites has increased (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:240–243). The findings of the Danish power study refer to the fragmentation of the elite structure and to a decreased call for consensual decision-making. Historically, the Norwegian economy has been without large, concentrated firms in production and credit supply. The higher bourgeoisie has been weak, with many small and medium-sized enterprises. On the other hand, the state has taken an unusually active part in Norwegian capitalism, partly as compensation for the lack of heavy private actors. By the midnineteenth century, Norwegian capitalism emerged as publicly produced capitalism. Hence, there was a more decentralized private structure and relatively stronger state involvement in the economy compared to the other Nordic countries (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:28). With respect to the state-centeredness of the economy, however, Norway may be compared to Finland. One of the implications of the Norwegian “new state” is the partial decline of the traditional type of corporatism. Certainly, organised interests and the state are still tied together in wage negotiations and other aspects of economic conduct, but the numbers of corporative institutions is radically reduced and the old corporative structure is irrelevant when public enterprises are transformed into market-oriented businesses. Thus, an intrinsic feature in the Nordic model is subject to change. Organised interests have, on the other hand, built up substantial staffs for information management and lobbying. Professional lobbying has increased relative to the old corporative networks, partly directed to decision makers in Parliament and the ministries and partly to the mass media. Even so, a new segmental policy community has emerged in Norway’s most notable globalisation strategy, as a mode of national corporatism of nongovernmental organisations, consultancy firms, research institutions and the state, in the formation and conduct of foreign policy (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:33). The institutional stability of Norway is preserved in a two-tier structure of elite compromise. A compromise of the first order is tied to the Constitution, the emergence of parliamentarianism and the gradual accommodation of popular movements from below into the polity. This culture of elite responsiveness is still basically intact. Compromises of the second

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order comprise the systems of wage negotiations and relative egalitarianism of women in the wage market and public affairs, the regional policy of redistribution, and the conduct of defence and foreign policy. In these fields, change runs from moderate in some of them to radical in others. The shattering of elite compromises is felt most strongly in foreign affairs (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:36). The Norwegian elite study has found consensus between most elites, excluding leaders of the church with respect to relatively indifferent attitudes to the church and Christian values, which refers to the wide-ranging secularisation of the Norwegian society. On the other hand, analyses refer to significant polarity concerning the balance between public and private, the centre and periphery as well as growth and safety (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:163). Some elite theorists have referred to the fact that elites represent different interests and will therefore have different attitudes on social conflicts. Crossing conflict lines contributes to broader mutual understanding between groups and encourages the moderation of one’s own interests. This process will improve national elite integration. The results of the Norwegian elite study support this interpretation. With respect to the three conflict dimensions of public/private, centre/periphery and growth/safety, there is no pluralism between Norwegian elites. By contrast, there can be found a somewhat similar pattern. However, concerning Christian values among leaders the pattern is not the same. Placing elites along the conflict dimension of Christian versus more material values differs from the dimensions. However, if we put together these four conflict dimensions we can speak of moderate pluralism within Norwegian elites (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:163–164). International elite studies have referred to the fact that participation of elites in national elite networks or corporative decision-making systems will moderate them politically and thus lay the foundation for consensus between the elites. Norwegian researchers are suspicious of this reasoning; namely, this effect was not found among the leaders who had the most negative attitudes on the state-centeredness pattern (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:163–164). Every fifth top leader working in private business had previously worked a year or more in public administration. Circulation of careers between sectors seems to contribute to moderate attitudes on the state. In fact, this circulation between different elites may have important effects on society in general. Circulation may increase understanding and sympathy concerning other sectors and institutions, which may in turn attenuate tensions between various societal groups. This kind of development may lay the foundation for political compromises (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:163–164). It is important to note that there was traditionally in Norway a strong

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polarisation between the socialist labour movement and the bourgeois parties. Since the 1960s, minority governments have been the norm, either with the Labour Party alone or with a minority coalition of non-socialist parties, including or not including the Conservatives to the right of centre (Østerud and Selle 2006:27). Elite compromises have shattered, for instance, with respect to membership in the EU and NATO. Participation of elites in national elite networks or corporative decision-making systems have not laid the foundation for consensus between elites. Even if consensus can be found between most elites, the Norwegian findings refer also to significant polarity concerning the balances between public and private, centre and periphery as well as growth and safety. However, with respect to these dimensions there is no pluralism but a somewhat similar pattern between Norwegian elites (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:163–164). As far as attitudes on democracy are concerned, Norwegian elites follow a mixed model of coherence and incoherence. Despite the fact that many elites have their own focal interests, concurrently they have identical attitudes on many issues (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:122). Despite the decreased elite consensus, it is likely that Norwegian elite cohesion is more extensive than in Denmark. The Swedish power study published in 1990 argues that there are significant differences between the elites with respect to some issues. For example, attitudes of the political elite and the business elite were very different dealing with Sweden’s EU-membership. However, as a rule, the elites were relatively near each other in most cases. The business elite is an exception to this rule, usually differing importantly from other elites. Surprisingly, the political elite was nearest to the business elite. (SOU 1990:44, 341). Despite rather small general differences between the elites, it cannot be interpreted that the Swedish elite structure is characterised by extensive cohesiveness. On one hand, there are naturally wide individual differences. On the other hand, these differences follow a pattern determined more by the sub-group rather than the main elite group to which an elite member belongs. Differences are often larger within the main elite groups than between them (SOU 1990:341–343). The Swedish elite study concludes that the Swedish elite structure may be characterised by significant homogeneity with respect to the way of thinking. This does not mean that elite members are united with respect to appropriate opinions, but by contrast, differences are wide. However, elite members are nearly unanimous as to what opinion combinations should be. In this respect there is wide consensus (SOU 1990:342–343). However, the second Swedish power study documents a set of changes within the policy-making and administrative structures of the Swedish

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state, and argues that these changes to the output side of government have troubling implications for the operation of democracy. In fact, Sweden resembles Norway rather than Denmark in the sense that few students of Swedish democracy would summarise their findings like the observation of their Danish colleagues that “actually, things have gone surprisingly well” (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006:47, 59; Togeby et al. 2003:50). The first Swedish power study (SOU 1990:44), initiated by the Social Democratic government, concluded that the distinctive institutions and policy programmes that had characterised Swedish politics in the postwar period were being dismantled: Sweden was turning into a new kind of democracy, more individualistic and more similar to political systems elsewhere. An end had come to strong public expansion, centralized bargaining based on a historical compromise between labour and capital, social engineering and centrally planned standards solutions. Ten years later, the second power study (SOU 2000:1), led by politicians, also suggested that twentieth-century models of democratic governance were out of date (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006:48). Institutional changes have in many ways been more far-reaching in Sweden than in other small European countries. These changes have been described in terms of the dismantling of socialist policies previously defended by the ruling Social Democrats in terms of “decorporatisation”, whereby one of the world’s most centralised labour markets disintegrated and labour market organisations lost their pivotal role in policy making, and in terms of idea-change, through which a set of ruling ideas, blueprints for institution-building, fell victim to the ascendancy of neo-liberal economic thought. These policy changes, institutional changes and idea changes are all linked to the decline and eventual demise of a certain model of social steering, i.e., the strong state. Swedish politics is no longer carried by the vision of the role of the state in society that characterised the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The most important consequence of the fall of the strong state is that since the strong state provided a relatively clear idea of how the preferences of voters (input) were translated into policy (output), the breakdown in the mechanisms of social steering presents an important challenge for democratic institutions (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006:48–49). Beyond rationalism and planning, the Swedish political culture was traditionally based on consensus in the sense that wide political majorities and the support of interest groups were thought to be of great value. In the last two or three decades, this rationalist, centralist and national political culture has changed. Centralism, rule by experts, and large-scale solutions are criticised. Policy steering has been reshaped, as central planning and common national norms have had to bow to demands for local influence, decentralisation and individual freedom of choice (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006:49–50).

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On an ideological level, the belief that society can be changed—or social problems managed—through a centralised and rational reform and planning process has withered. This is clear from the changing nature of government commissions of inquiry, which play a far less prominent role than before when it comes to combining expert knowledge and political legitimacy. However, the most obvious sign of the strong state’s decline is the weakening of central administrative institutions. Another change is the decorporatisation of public administration boards. For many decades, representatives of major interest organisations served as board members in these agencies, but this system was abolished in 1991. Partly because of intense conflicts between employers and the blue-collar unions, employers decided to withdraw from administrative corporatism, which led to the demise of that system (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006:50–51). In short, with respect to the mutual links between the elites, i.e., elite cohesion, Sweden may be compared rather to Norway than Denmark. In the 1990s, Finland experienced widespread social transformations which in the 20th century can be compared only to World War II. Finland plunged into the deepest economic recession in the country’s history, i.e., deeper than that of the early 1930s. The GNP decreased by more than 10% between 1991 and 1993, the value of the national currency fell almost 40%, unemployment climbed to 20%, and 130,000 jobs, a quarter of all industrial workplaces, were lost. There was also a bank crisis and many business concerns went bankrupt. In a few years Finland fell from the “club of the world’s wealthiest countries” to below mid-level among the industrial countries (see Kiander 2001). Finnish society did not recover from the recession even in a decade. Even though the gross production prevailing prior to the recession was restored as early as the end of 1996, domestic demand and employment did not regain pre-recession levels until 2000. Private consumption exceeded the level of 1989 in 1997, while public consumption reached the 1991 level as late as 2000 (Kiander 2001:62–65). With regard to the Government coalition, Finland has been an exception to the Nordic tradition of minority rule. Since the early 1980s, Finland has been ruled by majority Governments. As any political party has had hegemonic parliamentary support, the Governments have been grand coalitions comprised of two of the three major parties; in fact, both left-wing parties and bourgeois parties. This parliamentary tradition has contributed to the maintenance of consensus. Moreover, Finland is also a Nordic exception regarding the decline of corporatism. However, the utilization of committees for preparation of legislation has also markedly decreased in Finland which has cut the number of arenas for interest group participation. On the other hand, as a result of EU membership (1995), more than thirty new preparatory

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divisions were established in public administration, which has opened up new forums for participation and influence for interest groups, e.g., employer and employee organisations. Tripartism is still important in Finland; even if centralization of the incomes policy has decreased a little; i.e., the number of collective wage agreements has increased at the local level, not only wages but also many legislative matters (which are formally sealed by the Parliament), are negotiated and contracted on the macro level between the Governments and the employers’ and employees’ central organisations. Most importantly, as a result of their close contacts with the left-wing parties, especially the Social Democrats, e.g., through campaign support in general and presidential elections, wage-earner organisations have retained their influence. Finnish elite cohesion has transformed in the same direction as in other Nordic countries. The interaction network of the elites has dispersed since the early 1990s and the number of institutions with which they interact very intensively has decreased. In other words, the core of the network became more centralised whereas the structure of the whole dispersed. The elites have become increasingly differentiated. The fragmentation of the network or its disintegration is reflected in the fact that the interaction between elites and most institutions/organisations declined in 1991–2001. At the beginning of the 1990s, the most central institution in the elite network—according to network analysis—was the mass media. Until 2001, the mass media maintained its most central position even though it dropped to the lower circle in the network. At the beginning of the 1990s, the next circle in the interaction network was occupied by three institutions, i.e., the Government, private firms and banks. Until the beginning of the 2000s, only private firms had maintained their position, while the Government and banks had dropped to the lower circle of intensity. In fact, the influence of firms and market forces were the focus of a public debate throughout the 1990s. The position of the banks in the interaction network declined during 1991–2001 more than that of any other institution. This change can be explained at least partly by the fact that the Government, which enforced cuts in welfare services in order to deal with the fiscal crises, and the banks, which were paralysed by the bank crises, were not particularly attractive to elite actors. By contrast, the university has significantly consolidated its position in the network. This change can be explained by the pivotal role which was reserved for R & D policy in strategies coping with the economic recession. The position of the government office declined and dropped to the lower circle in the 1990s. All in all, the core of the power elite interaction network comprised six institutions at the beginning of the 1990s, i.e., the mass media, the Government, private firms, banks, government offices and the university, which represented five

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out of seven elite groups. Thus the core of the network integrated different elite groups fairly extensively (Ruostetsaari 2003, 2006). With respect to attitudes on democracy and distribution of influence in Finnish society, elites also grew apart. In other words, the attitudinal distance between the elite groups has increased since the early 1990s (Ruostetsaari 2006). However, taking into account the starting point in the early 1990s, i.e., the wide consensus between the Finnish elites, we have to conclude that, despite the disintegration of elite networks and decreased attitudinal unanimity, the elite structure in Finland is more cohesive than that in other Nordic countries. To conclude, the interaction networks and attitudinal unanimity between the elites seem to be closest in Finland, followed by Norway and Sweden while the link is loosest in Denmark. LINKS BETWEEN THE ELITES AND THE POPULATION The links between the elites and the populace at large have changed in all Nordic countries. There has been a development from collective political activity to increasingly individual activity. Collective organisations, such as political parties and labour unions, have weakened over the past decades with respect to declining membership. Thus, their ability to function as links between the people and power holders has weakened (Togeby et al. 2003:16–17). Despite this common Nordic trend, conclusions drawn by national power studies are different with respect to the relationship between the elites and the people. A common theme in the political debate is that the gap between the people and the elites is growing. However, according to the Danish power study this is not the case in Denmark. Danish voters are generally interested in politics, they are knowledgeable, and feel capable of grasping political issues, their attitudes are fairly consistent, and there is a high correlation between their attitudes and their choice of party. They also find it important to make up their mind from issue to issue. The validity of this is increasing. Moreover, their trust in politicians is growing rather than diminishing (Togeby et al. 2003:18). The gap between the electorate and the political elite would appear to have narrowed in most respects. The similarity between politicians and the general population is greater than ever in terms of gender, age and education. In terms of attitudes, the gap between politicians and the people is small in most cases, with convictions pertaining to the EU being the most prominent exception. The state is no longer distant and superior, but instead at eye-level with the citizens. It has been transformed from an authority state into everyday life. (Togeby et al. 2003:19).

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However, the general conclusion about the diminished gap between the elites and the people is not straightforward. Danish researchers admit that occasionally the people perceive a great gap between themselves and the politicians. Likewise, the politicians indicate that they perceive a great gap separating them from the people, or at least they sense that the people perceive a great gap between them. So, although the distance between the people and the elites may be smaller, dissatisfaction with the existing distances may nevertheless have grown (Togeby et al. 2003:18–22). Palle Svensson has, via comparisons of surveys, demonstrated a significant decline from 1979 to 2002 in terms of the share of people who feel that the key political decisions in Denmark are made by a small power elite or by big business. More people think that decisions are made in deals between several different interests, and that all citizens have significant influence via ballot. In other words, more Danes feel that the actual exercise of power in Danish society complies with democratic ideals today than was the case 25 years ago. Moreover, there is widespread agreement among the general population about how to perceive power relations. The view that power is disseminated is commonly accepted. In other words, the individual citizen feels more capable and less powerless than has previously been the case. They are still critical of those in power, but they no longer have the same antagonistic relationship to them (Togeby et al. 2003:45). New social movements that bloomed in the 1970s and 1980s have lost much of their efficacy, being replaced by less ambitious single-issue organisations. Activism is increasingly situational and changing, not stable and long-term. We may ask, does this development refer to a weakening of civil society vis-à-vis the elites? The answer presented by the Danish power study seems to be negative; the Danes have more resources, they are more capable, and they are more self-confident than was previously the case. They are interested in politics, they exhibit a relatively high level of political trust, but they do not have much respect for authority and they are critical of the actual authority holders. The power gap between the people and the elites has shrunk. In other words, political participation has not dropped, and participatory democracy has not been replaced by a passive spectator democracy (Togeby et al. 2003:16–17, 49–50) The major conclusion in the Norwegian power study is much more pessimistic than that of the Danish study: representative democracy is eroding. Rule by popular consent is weaker than it was just a few decades ago, even if citizens do have a stronger position in terms of formalised rights, consumer options, welfare and education (Østerud and Selle 2006:25). The Norwegian power study concludes that the Norwegian democratic system is still functioning rather well as a small polity with responsive and accommodating elites, a decent level of trust in government, relatively low

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levels of outright corruption and crime, and a fairly resourceful population with a high level of education and channels for voice in local governments, organisations, schools and the workplace. Even so, there is less power in Parliament as well as in local governments and civil society organisations. It is this social contract—a high level institutional centralisation balanced by high levels of citizen control—that is now being eroded (Østerud and Selle 2006:44, 26). While the substance of local government has been shrinking due to the standardisation of welfare services and centralised command, parliamentary democracy has been weakening in every link from the electorate to the executive. The decline in the quality of representative democracy is reinforced by the transformation of civil society and an ideological lack of political concern for the decline. These changes have profound consequences for how Norwegian democracy works, giving insights into the Nordic context of institutional centralisation and state-centeredness (Østerud and Selle 2006:44). An exceptional feature of traditional Nordic “associationalism”—a feature that is probably more pronounced in Norway than in, for instance, Sweden and Denmark—is vertical integration: civil society organisations became an integral part of the state machinery so that the members of these organisations exercised a fair amount of indirect control over the central government decision-making processes. Tight vertical integration, i.e., corporate pluralism, must, in the Norwegian case, be explained by a rather weak state, an even weaker market and no landed aristocracy at the time when the decisive social and political mobilisation processes that came to shape the outlook of the political system were set in motion (Østerud and Selle 2006:34). The Norwegian civil society developments of the last twenty years represent the definitive break with the traditional mass-movement model. Broad-based membership recruitment, cross-level integration (from local to national) and organisational democracy are not the typical features that Norwegians opt for any longer—the mass-movement model has lost most of its attraction as a cognitive model of reference (Østerud and Selle 2006:34–35). Norwegian conclusions dealing with civil society are much more negative than in Denmark. As a consequence of the above mentioned processes, the democratic chain of command from voter to government is disintegrating. The recruitment base for party leadership is shrinking as the total membership in political parties has reduced by half in a decade. Turnout at elections is falling overall, particularly at local elections. Trust in politicians is also approaching a rather low level, which has been normal in many other industrialised countries for some time. Elected local assemblies are

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increasingly subject to state instruction as service suppliers in standardised welfare schemes. At the same time, nationwide popular movements with political agendas and mass membership have also been declining, while ad hoc activism, neighbourhood groups and hobby associations have been on the increase (Østerud and Selle 2006:37–38). As a consequence, parliamentary politics are in some respects perceived as less relevant to voters, not because voters are generally more apathetic, but because they think constitutional politics have less to offer. This can be explained by two reasons. First, the current Norwegian mode of minority governments tends to make elections inconsequential for the composition and policy of the cabinet due to intra-party compromises. Second, power has been transferred to institutions such as business and the mass media (Østerud and Selle 2006:38). In contrast to Denmark, in Norway the attitudinal gap between the elite and the general population has increased. The Norwegian elite study argues that the attitudinal difference is significant, even if it is not enormous with respect to redistribution of economic resources. However, as far as distribution of power between the elites and the population is concerned, the gap is dramatic (Gulbrandsen 2002:121). With respect to three questions under study in the Swedish power study in 1990, there are significant differences between the elites and the population. These questions concern the introduction of the six-hour work day (the population is more positive), increased reception of refugees (the population is more positive), and lowering of taxes in the higher salary categories (the elites are more positive). By contrast, the lowest differences concern constructing more nurseries, decreasing military expenses, applying for EU membership, as well as abolishing the employee funds. All in all, dealing with certain issues, there is quite strong polarisation between the elites as an entity and the people. However, this is more an exception than the norm. Dealing with most statements, the differences are less and the elite groups are not located systematically on the same side in relation to the population. The difference between “top people” and “lower levels” is usually rather weak. However, the differences conform to rather regular patterns. With respect to statements about “care”, i.e. refugees, aid to developing countries, and social security, the attitudes of the elites are more generous than those of the people. Dealing with statements about decreasing governmental and collective influence, e.g., curtailing the public sectors, privatisation of health care and selling state-owned companies, the people generally have more negative attitudes. The Swedish elite study concludes that the results do not support the existence of a value conflict between the elites and the people. Instead, we may speak about differences concerning conceptions of the real world rather than values (SOU 1990:44:339–341).

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The conclusions of the second Swedish power study published in the 2000s are much more pessimistic with respect to the link between the elites and the population. Lindvall and Rothstein argue that the link from input to output, from elections to policy, is partly obscure, partly broken. What is obscure now may become clearer as new ideas about democratic government settle into norms, but some aspects of the political culture that has replaced the strong state seem more troubling. For example, the development of ideological bureaucracies1 has many implications. First, the state, as an organisation, has become less coherent. It is no longer an instrument for the political parties that dominate the Parliament to steer and change society. Instead, the administrative state is turning into another ideological battlefield, where sectoral interests seek power and influence. Second, the role of political parties as the main producers of policy-oriented ideology and ideas is challenged. If their role as producers of political ideas and policies are taken over by ideological bureaucracies it is no surprise that they fail to attract members. Third, this may lead to an even more fundamental change in Swedish democracy. One common view of the democratic ideal is that the state should do what the people want it to do. With the development of ideological state apparatuses, Swedish democracy looks more like a society where the state decides what the people ought to think and do. Ideological bureaucracies create ideas that they translate into proposals for policy change. They also take care of securing public support for these policies, which are then taken by the cabinet and presented to the political parties in the Parliament. The role of political parties is confined to selling these ideas and policy proposals to their constituencies. The system still spins, but it spins backwards (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006:61). The attitudinal unanimity between the Finnish elites and the population was analysed in terms of two indicators. Attitudes of the elites and the population were measured dealing with the functioning of Finnish democracy and changes in the distribution of societal influence in the period 1991–2001 (Ruostetsaari 2006:34). Attitudes regarding the functioning of Finnish democracy were assessed on the basis of the statement: “Democracy is functioning so well in Finland so there is no reason to speak of citizens’ deficient opportunities to exert

Since the 1980s, a large number of national administrative agencies have been set up with ideology production as their main aim. They are not designed to implement specific policies based on laws; instead they are engaged in the production of ideological positions. Former politicians or political aides head most of them, or a new sort of public official that blends political and bureaucratic skills (which maybe could be labelled “policrats”) (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006:52). 1

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influence”, which was presented both to the elites and the population in 1991 and 2001. At the beginning of the 1990s, the elites were dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy: 28% agreed and 60% disagreed with the statement. A decade later satisfaction had essentially increased among the elites: in 2001, 48% of the elites agreed while 42% disagreed. Meanwhile the satisfaction of the population had changed only marginally. In 1991, 18%, but in 2001, 20%, of the population agreed with the statement, i.e., were satisfied with Finnish democracy. The majority of the population disagreed with the statement at both time-points (65 and 63%). All in all, the attitudinal difference between the elites and the population has increased (Ruostetsaari 2006:34). In fact, the statement used is of a very general nature: it measures not only satisfaction with the functioning of democracy but also the output of the political system. The widening attitudinal gap between the elites and the Finnish population may be explained by the fact that the recession and the cuts in welfare services influenced citizens more than the elites. Recovery from the recession was rapid on the level of macro-economics but slow as far as the standard of living and attitudes of the population were concerned. EU membership, for instance, was characteristically a project of the elites (Ruostetsaari 2006:34). Furthermore, members of the elites as well as a sample of the population were asked absolutely concurrently to say how much influence they thought 22 out of 24 listed institutions had in decision-making on matters of social and political importance. The years of deepest recession, 1991–1993, dramatically altered citizens’ views of influence; politics experienced a “comeback” as a social force. The Government rose in the views of the population from sixth position is 1991 to the most influential institution in 2001. The degree of the change can be characterised by the fact that the last time the Government was evaluated as influential was as far back as the mid-1970s. However, the social upheavals of the 1990s did not affect the views held by the elites: they evaluated the Government as the most influential institution both in 1991 and in 2001. The population’s rating of Parliament’s influence increased even more than that of the Government; Parliament rose from 13th position in 1991 to 6th. According to the evaluation of the elites, Parliament rose from 12th position to 5th. All in all, the Finnish elites and the population have moved closer to each other since the early 1990s as far as views on the distribution of influence are concerned. However, concerning changes in the influence of institutions, the elites and the population grew apart after the early 1990s. In other words, in 1991, the views of the elites and the population were

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identical (influence will increase or decrease in the future) in the case of 17 institutions out of 22 (77%), while in 2001 it was identical in 16 cases out of 24 (67%). In fact, the wide attitudinal gap between the elites and the population just in Finland has been attested by several comparative studies (e.g. Holmberg 2000; Wiberg 2000; Mattila and Raunio 2006). The number of members of political parties has decreased in all European countries since the early 1960s. The share of party members of the population is about the same in all Nordic countries (Norway 9%, Finland and Sweden 8%, Denmark 6%). However, the aggregate number of party members is still highest in Finland, which can be explained by the Centre Party which alone covers about half of all party members. At the same time the share of party members among voters decreased in Finland more than the average, from 18.9% to 9.6%. However, the proportional losses were clearly highest in Sweden (–16.5 percentage points) and Denmark (–16), but in Norway (–5.8) they were smaller than in Finland (Katz 2002:101–102; Borg 2005:20–23). As far as participation in political party activities—as well as voting turnout in general elections—is concerned Finland is behind other Nordic countries. In Finland the citizens and political parties have grown apart more than in other Nordic countries. According to a postal survey in Finland, only four percent of the citizenry feels that they are very close to some political party, while the share is two times higher in Denmark and one and a half times higher in Denmark and Norway (Borg 2005:20–23). The same trends concern also the Finnish civic associations. The comparison of the interactions and attitudes between the Nordic elites and the population is a very problematic task due to the different kinds of variables used in national elite studies. However, it seems evident that the gap between the elites and the people is narrowest in Denmark, followed in order by Sweden, Norway and Finland. CONCLUSIONS How the Nordic elite structures can be located in the typology of elite structures is presented in Figure 1. Nordic elites were compared in this article on the grounds of three dimensions, i.e., openness of recruitment into the elites, intensiveness of the links between various elite groups (interaction, attitudinal unanimity), and intensiveness of the links between the elites and the people (interaction, attitudinal unanimity). The last two dimensions mentioned together illustrate the coherence of the elite structures. With respect to the openness of elite structures, i.e., recruitment to the elites, all Nordic countries may be located about the midpoint between “low” and “high”. The differences between Nordic countries are minor and the openness of elite recruitment has increased in all societies under study.

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In regard to the first dimension of elite coherence, i.e., intensiveness of interaction and unanimity between various elite groups, the most coherent is Finland, followed equally by Norway and Sweden, while Demark is the least coherent. As far as the second dimension of coherence, i.e., intensiveness of interaction and unanimity between the elites and the population, is concerned, the most coherent is Finland, followed (in this order) by Norway, Sweden and Denmark. If we put together these two dimensions of elite coherence we may conclude that the most coherent is Finland, followed by Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The coherence of the elite structures has decreased in all Nordic countries. In terms of Figure 1, the Finnish elite structure is inclusive, while that of Denmark is fragmented. Norway and Sweden may be situated between the inclusive and fragmented models (Figure 2). But how many elites are there in the Nordic countries? The general conclusion drawn by the Danish elite study is that Danish elites have grown apart during the 20th century. The elites have been differentiated but they resemble more the population even if they differ significantly from the population with respect to, for instance, gender, education and social background. The three major elite groups, composed of governmental civil servants, business persons and politicians, are relatively isolated. The formal interaction network between the elites as well as between the elites and society has weakened. Cohesion of the elite structure has diminished, i.e., elites have become more autonomous. Even though the openness of elites has increased, the recruitment pattern is still closed (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:239–244, 246).

DEGREE OF COHERENCE high

low

Finland Norway

Sweden Denmark

l o w DEGREE OF OPENNESS IN RECRUITMENT

Figure 2

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h i g h

Types of the Nordic elite structures

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The Danish elite study concluded that there was in the late 1990s neither a single power elite, which Ruostetsaari (1992, 1993) reported to be the case in Finland in the beginning of the 1990s, nor two competing elites, as in Sweden in the late 1980s found by the Swedish power study (SOU 1990:44) but rather several more or less autonomous elites. Moreover, there was not in Denmark firm evidence of segmentation, i.e., corporative forums where businesses, organisations and civil servants come together institutionally, as delineated by the Norwegian power study in the late 1970s (Egeberg et al. 1978). The Danish elite structure is relatively dispersed. The Danish elites were more united and similar at the beginning of the 1960s than earlier in the 1930s, and later in the 1990s (Munk Christiansen et al. 2001:244). The Norwegian elite study does not support either the model of one elite or that of two elites. Hence, the picture of a coherent elite is not typical. However, neither is it satisfying to speak about “several” or “many” elites without more accurate specification. In Norway there can be found evidence both of fragmentation and integration of the elite structure. In other words, analyses refer to the combination of coherence and incoherence with respect to important social matters (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:277). The consensual core between the elites is composed of democracy and democratic order. There is firm common trust in central institutions. These common views are encircled by political and social compromises. At the same time, many elite groups have their own special interests and core issues. All in all, the Norwegian power structure can be characterised by a significant degree of elite pluralism (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002:279–280). The Swedish findings with respect to social background and gender indicate that the Swedish power structure is built up of relatively separate spheres. The picture of the two major elite groups is two-fold. On the one hand, the division between the two elite groups is built up of social categories, i.e., the labour movement and “bourgeoisness”. On the other hand, the division is based on differences between sectors, nearest to those of politics and business (SOU 1990:44, 356). Thus, Sweden is ruled by two major power blocs, i.e., economic power and political power which are connected by a thin link. The elites’ attitudes with respect to many social matters are characterised by wide heterogeneity, i.e., unanimity among the elites is low. On the other hand, a wide attitudinal gap between the elites and the people cannot be found. However, as these findings of the Swedish elite study were from the early 1990s, they cannot be directly compared to the newer Nordic elite studies. On the grounds of a newer Swedish power study (Lindvall and Rothstein 2006), it is evident that the gap between the Swedish elites and the population is wider than that in Denmark. The changes occurring in the Finnish elite structure since the early 1990s have moved in the same direction as in other Nordic countries. Openness

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has increased but coherence has declined. There are also indications of a disintegration of the elite structure. Interaction networks between elite groups have loosened, even as the number of core actors has decreased. As far as views on the distribution of influence and attitudes to the functioning of democracy are concerned, the elite groups grew apart from each other over the decade in question. All in all, rifts have appeared in overall consensus among elites, i.e., the Finnish elites are diversifying. On the other hand, attitudinal unanimity has decreased between the elites and the people since the early 1990s. The social upheavals in the 1990s, especially the deepest recession since the independence in 1917, affiliation to the European Union, the collapse of the Soviet Union, did not, however, significantly alter the Finnish consensual political culture until the 2000s. In Finland there do not exist two dominating power blocs or several competing elites. For instance, business and the labour movement are part of a wider social network of interaction which is fairly closely interconnected. The state-owned companies and cooperatives, which have played an important role in the Finnish economy, have linked the left-wing parties and the Centre party (formerly the Agrarians) to the business sector. In fact, the Finnish cooperative sector was divided into two blocs; the first, originally representing mainly agricultural producers, was dominated by the bourgeois parties, especially the Centre party, while the second, representing mainly consumers, was dominated by the left-wing parties. Both blocs have had industrial production. Thus, the wielding of power on the elite level can be characterised rather by consensus than polarisation. Since the early 1980s, Finland has been ruled by majority Governments. As any political party has had hegemonic parliamentary support, like the Social Democrats in other Nordic countries, the Governments have been grand coalitions comprising two of three major parties; in fact, both left-wing parties and bourgeois parties. This parliamentary tradition has contributed to the maintenance of consensus. In Sweden the debate between elites, sometimes also within elites, is carried on publicly and the mass media play the important role of mediator. In Finland, by contrast, the debate between elites is carried on outside the public arena, mostly in informal discussion groups. This practice contributes to the maintenance of elite consensus when the mass media and the audience cannot disintegrate the elites. On the other hand, the media elite is part of the wider elite structure, i.e., the power elite (Ruostetsaari 2006). All in all, the competition between the Finnish elites is somewhat exiguous. The Finnish elite structure can still be equated with an inclusive rather than a fragmented elite structure, albeit to a decreasing extent. Thus, we may conclude that it is still legitimate to speak about the existence of a power elite in Finland.

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Referring to the Nordic power studies, Linvall and Rotstein (2006, 61) argue that when it comes to models of governance, the Nordic countries are far more different than is commonly believed. With respect to interpretations of findings of the Nordic elite studies, there are differences, too. On the other hand, differences dealing with the elite structures are not extensive; rather they have moved in the identical direction. Thus, we may ask, do the differences concern researchers’ indicators and interpretations more than actual phenomena (see Karvonen 2004)? Due to the fact that the Nordic elite studies employed different kinds of variables and indicators, the conclusions of the present comparative analysis can be only tentative. It is evident that we need a strictly comparative study based on identical variables dealing with the Nordic, and also European, elite structures. REFERENCES Arter, D. 1999. Scandinavian Politics Today. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Borg, S. 2005. Kansalaisena Suomessa. Kansalaisvaikuttaminen Pohjoismaissa ja European Social Survey 2002. Oikeusministeriön julkaisu nr 15. Helsinki: oikeusministeriö. Burton, M. and J. Higley 2001. “The Study of Political Elite Transformations.” International Review of Sociology 11(2):181–199. Dye, T. R. 1983. Who’s Running America? The Reagan Years. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Egeberg, M., J. P. Olsen, and H. Sætren 1978. “Organisasjonssamfundet og den segment erte stat.” In Politisk organisering, edited by J. P. Olsen. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. Gulbrandsen, T., F. Engelstad, T. Beldo Klausen, M. Teigen and Ø. Østerud 2002. Norske makteliter. Oslo: Gyldendahl Norsk Forlag. Göransson, A. (ed.). 2006a. Maktes kön. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur. ——. 2006b. “Makteliter och kön.” In Maktes kön, edited by A. Göransson. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur. Higley, J. and G. Moore 1981. “Elite Integration in the United States and Australia.” American Political Science Review 75:581–597. ——. 2001. “Political Elite Studies at the Year 2000: Introduction.” International Review of Sociology 11(2):175–180. Holmberg, S. 2000. “Issue Agreement.” In Beyond Westmininster and Congress: The Nordic Experience, edited by P. Esaiasson and K. Heidat. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. Katz, R. S. 2002. “The Internal Life of Parties.” In Political Parties in the New Europe. Political and Analytical Challenge, edited by K. R. Luther and F. Müller-Rommel. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Karvonen, L. 2004. “Review of Scandinavian Power Studies.” Scandinavian Political Studies 27(4):423–427. Kiander, J. 2001. Laman opetukset. Suomen 1990-luvun kriisin syyt ja seuraukset. Julkaisuja 27:5. Helsinki: Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus. Lindvall, J. and B. Rothstein 2006. “Sweden: The Fall of the Strong State.” Scandinavian Political Studies 29(1):47–63. Mattila, M. and T. Raunio 2006. “Cautious Voters—Supportive Parties. Opinion Congruence between Voters and Parties on the EU Dimension.” European Union Politics 7(4). Meisel, J. 1958. The Myth of the Ruling Class. Gaetano Mosca and the “Elite.” Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Munk Cristiansen, P., B. Møller and L. Tolgeby 2001. Den danske elite. Kåbenhavn: Hans Reitzels Forlag. Munk Christiansen, P. and L. Togeby 2006. “Power and Democracy in Denmark: Still a Viable Democracy.” Scandinavian Political Studies 29(1):1–24.

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NOU 1982: 3. 1982. Maktutredningen. Slutrapport. Norges offentlige utredninger. Oslo / Bergen / Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget. Østerud, Ø. and P. Selle 2006. “Power and Democracy in Norway: The Transformation of Norwegian Politics.” Scandinavian Political Studies 29(1):25–46. Parry, G. 1969. Political Elites. London: Allen & Unwin. Ruostetsaari, I. 1992. Vallan ytimessä. Tutkimus suomalaisesta valtaeliitistä. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. ——. 1993. “The Anatomy of Finnish Power Elite.” Scandinavian Political Studies 16(4): 305–337. ——. 2003. Valta muutoksessa. Helsinki: WSOY. ——. 2004. “L’évolution des élites Finlandaises aprés la crise des années 1990.” Nordiques 4 (spring):83–101. ——. 2006. “Social Upheaval and Transformation of Elite Structures; the Case of Finland.” Political Studies 54:23–42. Scott, J. 1991. Who Rules Britain? Cambridge: Polity Press. Schwarzmantel, J. J. 1987. Structures of Power. An Introduction to Politics. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. SOU 1990: 44. 1990. Demokrati och makt i Sverige. Stockholm: Statens offentliga utredningar. ——. 2000: 1. 2000. En uthållig demokrati! Stockholm: Statens offentliga utredningar. SVT . 2001. Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 2001. Helsinki: Statistics Finland. Togeby, L., J. Goul Andersen, P. Munk Christiansen, T. Beck Jørgensen and S. Vallgårda 2003. Power and Democracy in Denmark. Conclusions. København: Hans Reitzels Forlag. Wiberg, M. 2000. “Yleinen mielipide. Vuoden 1994 kansanäänestyksen rintamalinjat tallella.” In EU ja Suomi. Unionijäsenyyden vaikutukset suomalaiseen yhteiskuntaan, edited by T. Raunio and M. Wiberg. Helsinki: Edita.

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Elite Integration and Institutional Trust in Norway Trygve Gulbrandsen Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway, and Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Norway [email protected]

Abstract In modern elite theory accommodation and compromise between national elite groups are seen as preconditions for the continuance and stability of a democratic society. It is claimed that elite accommodation is facilitated to the extent that the elites are integrated. In this article trust between the various elite groups and their respective institutions is investigated as a core aspect of elite integration. The analyses presented in the article demonstrate that in general there is a relatively high level of institutional trust among national elite groups in Norway. There is, however, some variation in how much trust the various elite groups accord the institutions to which other elite groups belong, and this is explained by (1) the extent to which one elite identifies with the functions of other elites, (2) has a similar ideological orientation, and (3) has social contact with members of other elites.

INTRODUCTION The traditional elite theorists—Pareto, Mosca and Michels—contended that in any society there will be distinction between an elite of leaders and the masses, the led. As Higley and Burton (2006) have demonstrated, these theorists did not, however, claim that the elite always and everywhere will be unitary. On the contrary, Mosca (1939), for instance, stressed the variability of elite organization, cohesion and collective will. Some decades later scholars within the “power elite” tradition (Mills 1956; Porter 1965) maintained that the private and public elites in USA and Canada were integrated to an extent that they constituted a single ruling group in society—a power elite. According to Mills (1956), the economic, political and military elites in USA were integrated through common class

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background and education and through family ties and belonging to the same social networks. This research spurred an increased interest in studying whether national elites or particular sector elites are cohesive and integrated or, alternatively, whether they are fragmented (Domhoff 1967; Putnam 1976; Hoffman-Lange 1985; Higley et al. 1991; Kadushin 1995; Bürklin and Rebenstorf 1997). In contrast to the “power elite” theory, in more recent elite theory (Lijphart 1969a, 1969b; Presthus 1973; Putnam 1976; Higley and Burton 1989) elites are rather described as institutionally distinct, socially disparate and politically diverse groups of national leaders. Mutual accommodation, compromises and consensus between these elite groups are seen as preconditions for the continuance and stability of democracies. In such a context “traditional” mechanisms of elite integration, as the ones focussed upon by Mills (1959), are less significant. In my analysis, using the same framework, elites are defined as the holders of top positions in central institutions and organizations within significant sectors of the Norwegian society, for instance the political system, the economy and cultural life. As holders of leadership positions these elites act as representatives of the interests and concerns embodied in the particular institutions or organizations. They have been delegated power to act on behalf of and are responsible to the principals of the individual institutions. Members of parliament are for instance responsible to the voters, senior civil servants to the elected politicians, union leaders to the union members, and private business leaders to the shareholders. Through processes of selection and socialisation the institutions and their principals see to that the persons entering the top leader positions are familiar with and have internalised the values and interests which the institutions are embodying. Because the institutions stand for different concerns and interests, the various elite groups are prevented from automatically converging into one single ruling group. Under these circumstances some extent of elite integration is a prerequisite for arriving at accommodation and compromise between the institutionally disparate elites. It becomes important then to focus upon those aspects of elite cohesion which motivate elites to enter into and stick to compromises with other elite groups. Following Higley and Moore (1981), I argue in this paper that trust is a core aspect of elite integration. In line with this argument I examine to what extent the different elite groups in the Norwegian society have confidence in each other’s institutions. In an earlier article, Gulbrandsen (2005a) focussed on the overall trust of the national elites in the most important private and public institutions

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in Norway. This study documented that many of the institutions receive relatively high trust by the elites. Any high overall trust, indicating that the elites are integrated, may however, conceal situations where particular elite groups have low trust in significant institutions. Instances of low institutional trust on the part of particular elite groups can create social tension and undermine the possibility for compromise and national elite accommodation. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the structure of the trust relations between individual elite groups and institutions. In this paper, therefore, an examination is made of the extent to which variations are found in the trust which the members of the various elite groups accord the institutions concerned together with an attempt to explain any variations observed. Three factors or circumstances are discussed which may explain variations in institutional trust and accordingly in the extent of elite integration along this dimension: (1) the institutional affiliation of the top leaders and the significance of the basic functions and interests of the institution or sector for their orientations and actions, (2) the leaders’ own ideological attitudes, (3) the extent of personal contact or interaction with top leaders in other institutions and sectors. The hypotheses developed in this discussion are subsequently analysed empirically with the aid of data from a large and unique survey study of a sample of Norwegian economic, political and social elites, the Norwegian Leadership Study, undertaken in 2000. This study was an important part of the Power and Democracy Project, a five year project commissioned by the Norwegian parliament. The Leadership Study was conducted by Institute for Social Research in collaboration with Statistics Norway. THE CASE OF NORWAY Norway is an interesting case for three reasons. First, it is a high trust society. A recent study has demonstrated that Norway ranks highest in the world as to interpersonal or social trust (Delhey and Newton 2005). The high trust level is related to Norway’s Protestant tradition and ethnic homogeneity as well as good government, wealth and income equality. The citizens’ trust in the political institutions has traditionally also been quite high. Their trust in politicians is, however, approaching a rather low level, although this has been normal in many other industrial countries for some time (Strømsnes 2003). Secondly, Norway is a stable democracy with roots back to the early nineteenth century. With the 1814 Constitution Norway acquired one of the most democratic systems in Europe. It is a society with striking egalitarianism, a strong public sector and an advanced welfare system. Moreover, there has been a widespread consensus on basic properties and norms of

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the Norwegian democracy. The consensus has grown out of previous class compromises, and compromises between opposing interest groups. The compromises were forged between the leaders of the various class and interest organisations or movements. In that sense, these compromises were elite compromises. The elite compromises have a two-tier structure (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). A compromise of the first order is tied to the constitution, the emergence of parliamentarianism and the gradual accommodation of popular movements into the polity. This culture of responsiveness by the elites is still basically intact. Compromises of the second order comprise the centralized system of wage negotiations and relative egalitarianism, the inclusion of women in the wage market and public affairs, the regional policy of redistribution, and the conduct of defence and foreign policy. Thirdly, Norway has a particular variety of capitalism which partly explains Norway’s egalitarian and popular state policies and its universalistic welfare system. Historically, the Norwegian economy lacked large, dominating firms in production and credit supply and the bourgeoisie has been weak, characterized by many small and medium-sized enterprises. In spite of a liberal orientation the State had to step in to safeguard the emerging industries, investing heavily in the infrastructure and assisting the establishment of a national banking system. The State had thus to compensate for the absence of an ‘organized capitalism’ and became a senior partner to private business. This model has been characterized by a leading historian as “democratic capitalism” (Sejersted 1993), a state dominated capitalism tempered by small-scale enterprises and strong norms of popular legitimation. These particular features of Norwegian society make Norway an interesting case concerning integration and institutional trust within the national elite. The high-trust culture can be expected to give a fertile ground also for the elites’ trust in each other’s institutions. This trust has probably been strengthened by the widespread elite consensus and elite compromises. Also, the long tradition of public involvement in business may have fostered trust in the political institutions even among elite groups usually sceptical toward the State. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES Elite Integration In general, integration means that different elements are combined into a whole, that a kind of unity is created among the elements. Elite integration thus implies that the different elites are unified in one way or another. This unity is manifested in various ways: (1) as consensus on significant values

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or on the desired properties of the society, (2) as subjective feelings or perceptions of belonging to the same community, (3) as perceptions across different elite groups of being complementary, i.e. that they are mutually dependent upon each other, (4) through instances of collective action and cooperation. I suggest that widespread trust in the main institutions of a society is a significant characteristic of elite unity. Institutional trust is a vital expression of both of an awareness of community and of complementarity. Elite integration then has many dimensions, implying that a particular set of elites may be integrated along one dimension, but not necessarily along another. For instance, national elites can be integrated through institutional trust and general support for the democratic institutions and rules of the game, but at the same disagree about the size and scope of the welfare state; or they are integrated through an extensive network of contacts and interaction, but still oppose each other on important ideological issues. It is difficult to specify concrete criteria for determining whether national elites or subsections of a particular elite group are integrated or not. Elite integration is a rather continuous (and composite) variable, i.e. the national elites are more or less integrated or united along the different dimensions. Institutional Trust In an early analysis Deutsch (1962) defined trust giving as acts which increase a person’s vulnerability to another person at the same time as the behaviour of this second person cannot be controlled by the first one. According to Baier (1986) trust is present when a person accepts to be vulnerable to another person’s potential but not expected lack of good will. Offe (1999) maintains that we have trust when we believe that another person will increase our welfare or abstain from hurting us. These definitions illustrate that within the theoretical literature on trust there is a distinction between those contributions viewing trust as first and foremost concrete acts and those focussing upon trust as beliefs or attitudes. I define trust as an attitude on the part of one individual towards another individual, or towards an institution or a social system concerning the future behaviour of the other or the future outcome of relating to the particular institution. It involves an expectation that the other individual or the institution will execute or abstain from certain actions at a certain point of time in the near or distant future. One characteristic of situations where such an attitude emerges is that the trust-giver has no control of the future actions of the other part: there is a risk that the other’s behaviour will fall short of the trust-giver’s expectations. Another characteristic is that the trust-giver will suffer a noticeable loss if his or her expectations concerning the behaviour of the other part are not met.

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Since the elites relate to each other as representatives of particular institutions, their trust in each other is as much a trust in their respective institutions. Institutional trust embodies the belief that institutions have established mechanisms for guaranteeing that actions taken by their representatives are binding for the institution as such. In this way institutional trust provides a basis for having trust in the promises made by the representatives of the individual institutions. Institutional trust bears witness to a perception on the part of the various elite groups of national unity and a support for the basic institutions of society. This awareness of unity stimulates cooperation and compromise between the different elites and helps them concert their actions to the benefit of all, the effects of which are to reinforce the integration of the national elites. There are, however, reasons to believe that there are variations as to how much trust the various elite groups accord the individual institutions. On the level of the individual members of the elite groups there are three main sources of such variations: (1) As emphasized above, the orientations and actions of the top leaders in the Norwegian society are affected by, and reflect the institutions or sectors which they represent. I suggest that the institutional affiliation of the elite persons also influences how they consider the trustworthiness of other institutions. Social psychological belief-congruency theory (Rokeach et al. 1960) claims that there is a natural tendency for people to associate with and be more comfortable with others having similar belief systems. Similar groups are assessed more favourably than dissimilar ones. This theory has been developed for explaining the prejudice and stereotype majorities hold about minorities. Delhey and Newton (2005) argue that this theory can be transferred to social trust: the greater the perceived similarity of other people, the more they are trusted. Similarly, I suggest that one mechanism through which institutional affiliation may affect the top leaders’ institutional trust is identification. Identification implies an association of feeling or interest with another person or a group. Top leaders who work in institutions with similar basic functions will have a particular understanding for each other’s responsibilities, which may promote a mutual identification between the involved leaders. Without personal experiences from a particular institution or with its representatives identifying with it/them nonetheless stimulates a feeling of familiarity which in itself may foster trust in the institution concerned. I distinguish between four types of elite groups according to the basic function of their institution: (i) Social order elites, i.e. the military elite, top

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leaders within the police and the judges in the courts of justice and top leaders within the church; (ii) Intellectual elites, comprising the academic elite, the cultural elite and leading persons within the mass media; (iii) Political elites covering members of parliament, leaders of political parties, members of the cabinet, political leaders in the largest municipalities, and top leaders in state bureaucracy; (iv) Production elites, including top leaders within private business, public (state) business enterprises and within the cooperative sector. I expect the trust between elite groups representing institutions with similar basic functions to be higher than between elite groups which have different functions, i.e. such trust relations are to be expected within each of the groups of “social order”, “intellectual”, “political”, and “production” elites/institutions respectively. As an example, I expect that top leaders in the military services and the judges and top leaders within the police have more trust in each other’s institutions than in other elite groups. But the responsibilities of the members of a particular elite group may also bring them in opposition to other institutions or to foster distrust in them. One example is the mass media elite. Mass media feel responsible for monitoring what is going on in the other institutions in society. They watch and report any abuse of the power which leaders in these institutions hold. This task instils into the members of the mass media elite a critical attitude towards society which may breed institutional distrust. (2) It is reasonable to assume that the top leaders’ ideological beliefs influence the level of trust in the main institutions of society, independent of their institutional affiliation.1 For many individuals ideology is an important cognitive aid when attempting to orient themselves in a complex world. The same is probably valid for top leaders as well. By attaching labels of positive or negative value to particular institutions ideological beliefs then influence the top leaders’ cognitive/emotional process of trust giving. The ideological controversies in Norwegian history, and up to the present day, have particularly gravitated around the size and role of the state. The structure of the political parties in Norway has to large extent developed around the private/public issue. Moreover, citizens’ attitudes towards this private/public cleavage have significantly influenced how their votes have been cast in elections (Aardal 2003). The Norwegian welfare state model is supported by a majority of the political parties and the members of the Norwegian parliament (“the Storting”). I therefore assume that elite groups whose members largely oppose

1 Studies of ordinary citizens have demonstrated that their institutional trust is significantly related to their ideological orientation (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995).

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this model “translate” their ideological dissatisfaction into lower trust in the political institutions. Among the Norwegian elites the top leaders within private business are the strongest opponents against the present authority and responsibilities of the state (Gulbrandsen 2005b). Accordingly, it is to be expected that the private business elite will appear with distinctly lower trust in the political institutions than the other elite groups. Conversely, I expect that elite groups which ideologically have much sympathy for the present welfare state model have relatively high trust in political institutions. (3) According to general theories about trust (Blau 1964; Coleman 1990), this gradually evolves and is extended the more frequently two individuals or partners see each other, and the longer their relationship lasts. In line with these ideas it is to be expected that a top leader’s trust in a particular institution will depend upon how much contact he or she has with the top leaders representing that institution. Accordingly, I expect to find that members of elite groups with frequent contacts with the top leaders in an institution will have more trust in the institution concerned than elite groups with less contact. An example of frequent contacts between two elite groups is the relationship between top leaders in the state administration and politicians in the Cabinet and the Storting. It is to be expected that politicians and senior public officials will also have a high degree of trust in each other’s institutions. DATA AND METHOD In the Leadership Study the sample of top leaders was constructed on the basis of a so-called “position” method., i.e. we included those persons who occupy the most important leadership positions in twelve sectors of Norwegian society.2 Personal interviews were held with 1710 top leaders, 87.3 per cent of those who were approached for an interview. In the Leadership Study institutional trust was enquired into in the following manner: “How much trust do you have in the institutions listed on this card. Please rank the institutions on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is no trust and 10 is very high trust.”3 In this article the focus is upon the elites’

2 (1) The church, (2) the State administration, (3) culture, (4) mass media, (5) private business, (6) cooperative enterprises, (7) public business enterprises, (8) organizations, (9) universities and research institutes, (10) police and the judicial system, (11) military services, and (12) politicians, i.e. members of the Storting, leaders of the political parties and members of the Cabinet and their political secretaries. 3 The chosen formulation of the trust question covers the leaders’ generalized or diffuse trust. The replies we have received must be seen as an aggregated or condensed judgment which may be founded upon several different experiences, impressions and views held by the leaders. A particular top leader may have a trust or distrust for several different reasons.

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trust in the following 13 institutions: (1) the Cabinet, (2) the political parties, (3) the Storting, (4) the courts of law, (5) the public administration, (6) the police, (7) the mass media, (8) the church and the religious organizations, (9) the trade unions, (10) private business, (11) voluntary organizations, (12) universities and research institutes, (13) the military services. Figure 1 aggregates the trust of each of the twelve elite groups in all the thirteen institutions.4 As indicator of the leaders’ ideological orientation it is used a “public/private” index including questions measuring the extent to which the individual leaders endorse some main properties of the welfare state model.5 The leaders’ contacts with other top leaders in society were charted enquiring how frequently during the last year they had been in contact with a member of the various elite groups.6 As control variables in the analyses I have used (i) Education, a variable with 8 values according to educational level, (ii) Age as a continuous variable, and (iii) Gender. In order to test the hypotheses about which factors and circumstances influence the variations in the elites’ institutional trust it was carried out a series of statistical analyses relating the individual top leaders trust in each of ten selected institutions to the explanatory and control variables, cf. Tables 2 and 3.7 Accordingly, there may be some variation between different leaders in the emphasis expressed in their judgment. We know nothing, however, about the individual reasons for this. 4 The information about the top leaders’ trust in their own institutions was taken out. 5 We asked the leaders whether they agreed with the following four statements: (1) “It is more important to extend public services than to reduce taxes”; (2) “In Norway one should put stronger emphasis upon privatisation and a smaller public sector”; (3) “The state influence on private business should be reduced”; (4) “In Norway we have gone far enough in the reduction of income inequalities”. The answers were coded similarly. The index is based upon the mean of the leaders’ evaluation of the four statements and has values from 1 to 4. The value 4 indicates that the leaders fully back the public sector and policies for levelling incomes. The value 1 indicates that the leaders favour a smaller public sector, more privatisation and a curtailing of the state power over private business. Cronbach’s alpha for the index is 0.83. 6 A contact variable for each elite group was constructed, each with four values: “weekly or more frequently” (4), “monthly”, (3) “less frequently” (2) and “never” (1). In the models the variables were used as continuous variables. In the Leadership Study top leaders within the state administration were not asked about their contacts with the members of the Cabinet and the Storting. 7 In each of these analyses I excluded those leader groups which are closely connected to the institutions concerned, i.e. (1) and (2) politicians and senior public officials, (3) politicians, (4) senior public officials, (5) leaders in the police and the judicial system, (6) higher military officers, (7) leaders in the church, (8) top leaders in private business, and (9) national leaders in the trade unions.

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• Trygve Gulbrandsen RESULTS The Leaders’ Trust in the Institutions of Society

Figure 1 presents the mean trust scores across all the thirteen institutions for each of the twelve elite groups, what we may term the general institutional trust of the elite groups. The figure demonstrates that in general there is a relatively high level of institutional trust among the national elite groups in Norway. Given the particular trust fostering features of the Norwegian society described above, I had expected, however, that the level of institutional trust was somewhat higher. The differences between the various elite groups as to general institutional trust are small. None of the elite groups stand out from the other elite groups neither as to high nor low trust, in itself an indication of an extensive degree of integration among the elites in Norway. To explore the interrelations between the various elite groups and their respective institutions table 1 shows each elite group’s average trust in each of the thirteen institutions. The patterns which emerge in the table support several of the empirical expectations which were formulated above. As expected, the top leaders in the state administration constitute the elite group which has the highest trust in the political institutions—the Storting (6.8), the Cabinet (7.6) and the political parties (5.1). Their trust in the Cabinet is higher than what any other elite group has reported. This finding may be a result of what I described above as “identification”. They may identify with the basic responsibilities of the politicians in the Cabinet, and this identification may in itself foster trust. Another possibility is that the top leaders reported high trust in the Cabinet because they had ideological sympathy with the political party which at the time of the interviews occupied the Cabinet—the Labour Party. But the finding may also be an indication of the relevance of the idea that frequent contact with a specific institution promotes higher trust in that institution. Finally, the initiatives and decisions taken by the Cabinet are usually based upon advice given by the civil service itself. The trust that the top leaders in the administration gives to the Cabinet is then as much a trust in their own work. Below, I study the relative significance of the various theories more thoroughly through multivariate statistical analyses of the trust attitudes of the individual top leaders. For their part the politicians reciprocate the trust received by the senior public officials by giving the state administration relatively high trust (6.4), second only to the level of trust given by judges and top leaders within the police (6.9).

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10 9 8

Trust 0 -10

7 6 5 4 3 2

Police leaders and judges Leaders in research institutes and universities Leaders in culture institutions

Leaders in voluntary organizations

Leaders in cooperative enterprises Leaders in private business

Church leaders

Leaders in state enterprises

Leaders in the state administration

Higher military officers

Politicians

0

Leaders in the mass media

1

Elite groups Figure 1

Average institutional trust within the various elite groups

Also, as expected, the order institutions constitute a cluster of institutions characterized by high mutual trust. The top officers in the military services accord the courts of justice and the police high trust (8.3 and 7.9 respectively), while the leaders within the police and the group of judges on their part give more trust to the military services than any other elite groups (6.8). This pattern of high mutual trust between the members of the elite groups connected to the two order institutions is an indication of the significance of the process of “functional” identification for the development of institutional trust. Above, I suggested that top leaders within the mass media may be particularly critical of the other institutions. Table 1 lends support to this idea.The table demonstrates that the mass media elite, but also the top leaders within the culture sector have in fact lower trust in the order institutions (the courts of justice, the military services and the police) and the church, than any of the other elite groups. The members of the two intellectual elites then seem to be less willing than other top leaders to accept the reasons for legitimacy traditionally pleaded by the order institutions and the church. As expected, the members of the private business elite express reservations towards the political institutions. Not surprisingly, private business leaders have lower trust in the Cabinet and public administration than any other elite group, and second lowest trust in the Storting and the political parties. The differences to the other elite groups are, however, relatively

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Military officers

4.2

6.2

6.3

6.4

8.3

8.0

7.8

5.9

6.4

5.8

6.9

6.4

6.0

6.4

5.4

5.2

5.7

5.8

7.1

7.3

7.9

6.9

6.9

7.2

7.3

7.3

6.2

6.5

4.1

4.3

4.3

3.7

4.0

4.2

3.6

3.5

4.2

4.4

5.1

5.5

6.0

5.8

4.7

4.8

4.9

5.6

5.4

4.6

4.4

5.8

6.1

5.9

5.5

5.5

5.7

6.1

5.9

5.4

6.0

5.6

5.0

5.3

5.4

4.8

5.0

5.2

5.2

4.9

5.0

4.6

6.8

7.1

7.3

6.8

6.7

6.5

7.1

6.9

6.7

6.9

6.4

7.2

7.4

7.6

7.9

7.5

7.3

7.3

7.3

7.4

7.1

7.4

7.3

7.3

* I have omitted information about how the various elite groups evaluate the trustworthiness of their own institutions (blank cells).

4.7

4.7

6.4

6.4

8.1

8.1

6.5 6.6

Police, judges

4.7

4.8

5.8

8.1

8.0

6.6

Research

6.4

6.4

Civic org.

4.7

6.3

7.3 8.0

Total

7.0

Leaders in public enterprises

4.4

6.0 5.9

Politicians

6.1

Cooperative enterprises

4.3

7.5

5.0

4.7

6.3 5.8

Mass media

Private business leaders

6.2

4.2

3.9

4.7

7.2

7.2

6.1

6.0

Culture leaders

8.4

7.8

6.0

6.8

6.7

7.6

State adm.

5.1

6.0

Church leaders

5.0

.

Elite groups

6.2

6.6

6.8

6.1

6.0

6.1

6.4

6.4

5.4

5.4

6.4

6.5

6.1

6.5

6.4

5.9

5.9

6.0

6.3

6.2

6.0

5.9

5.9

6.3

6.2

The Political The Courts Public Police Mass The Trade Private Volun- Univer- Military Average Cabinet parties Storting of jus- adminismedia church unions business tary sities and services trust in tice tration organiza- research all the tions institut. institutions

Table 1 The top leaders’ trust in each other’s institutions*

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small. In line with the discussion above this trust pattern may be related to the ideological beliefs of the private business leaders. Ideologically, the top leaders within private business are strongly in favour of reducing the size and responsibilities of the public sector and of allowing larger income inequalities. Below I will examine whether their relative low trust in the political institutions is a reflection of these ideas. Table 1 shows that the church leaders have lower trust in private business than any other elite groups. Gulbrandsen et al. (2002) found that the church leaders ideologically represent a counterpart to the private business leaders. It is probable that this state of affairs influences church leaders to place low confidence in private business. On the other hand the private business leaders’ trust in the church is on a par with the other elite groups. Table 1 reveals that the mass media receives much less trust from the other elite groups (on average 4.1) than leaders in the mass media on average give the other institutions in the society (5.9). In empirical studies of trust relations between individual citizens it has been found that individuals who are met with low trust react by reducing their own trust in other persons. It is noticeable that this social psychological mechanism does not seem to be operative among the top leaders in the mass media. In spite of the low trust they receive from the other elite groups, they continue to have a general institutional trust on a level similar to these groups. The leaders within the mass media are probably well aware of the costs of their role as watchdogs in the society and accept that low trust is the price they have to pay for meeting the requirements of this role. Factors Explaining the Variations in the Elite Groups’ Institutional Trust Table 1 demonstrates that there are distinct variations between the elite groups as to how much trust they accord each of the other institutions. Moreover, the findings also seem to lend support to the hypotheses discussed in the theoretical section above. The simple descriptive analysis in Table 1 is not sufficient however for confirming or refuting the hypotheses. A more satisfactory statistical basis for determining the relative merit of the three explanations of the variations in the elites’ institutional trust is presented in Tables 2 and 3. These tables present the results of regression analyses where the variations in the individual top leaders’ trust in each of ten of the institutions are related to the three explanatory variables.

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Table 2 The individual top leaders’ trust in political institutions. Regression analyses (OLS). Non-standardized estimates Trust in the Storting

Intercept 4.839** Ideological orientation: 0.325** the private/public cleavage Contact with leaders in 0.149* the respective institutions Elite group (reference group: private business leaders): Leaders in the Church 0.406 Leaders in the state 0.686** admin. Leaders in culture –0.068 institutions Leaders in mass –0.227 media Leaders in 0.246 cooperative enterprises Leaders in public –0.284 enterprises Leaders in voluntary 0.154 org. Leaders in research 0.052 institutes and universities Leaders in police and 0.019 courts of justice Leaders in the 0.329 military services Politicians Controlled for age, Yes education and gender R2 adjusted 0.05 N 1386

Trust in the cabinet

Trust in the public administration

Trust in the political parties

4.549** 0.374**

5.23** 0.381**

3.609** 0.368**

0.225**

0.223**

0.167**

–0.241 1.135**

0.090

0.286 0.474**

–0.095

0.177

–0.035

0.079

–0.305

–0.033

0.0005

0.001

–0.197

0.911**

0.789**

0.232

0.193

0.474**

0.136

0.286

0.506**

0.010

0.320

1.112**

–0.346*

0.489**

0.099

0.171

Yes

0.773** Yes

Yes

0.08 1388

0.13 1488

0.06 1490

** Significant at the 1 per cent level. * Significant at the 5 per cent level. Source: The Norwegian Leadership Study 2000.

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Table 3 The individual top leaders’ trust in other institutions. Regression analyses (OLS). Non-standardized estimates Trust in the courts of law

Trust in the police

Trust in private business

Trust in the military services

Trust in Trust in the church the mass media

Intercept Ideological orientation: the private/public cleavage Contact with leaders in the respective institutions Elite group (reference group: private business leaders): Leaders in the Church Leaders in the state admin.

6.818** –0.001

6.521** –0.130**

7.189** –0.479**

4.354** –0.167**

2.498** –0.311**

4.330*** 0.131*

0.194**

0.257**

0.123**

0.321**

0.898**

0.237**

Leaders in culture institutions

–0.382*

–0.125

–0.701**

0.170

0.330*

0.004

–0.445*

–0.053

–0.234

–0.610**

–0.431**

–0.490**

–0.501*

–0.565**

–0.623**

–0.565**

Leaders in –0.634** mass media

–0.964**

–0.593*

–0.738**

–0.791**

0.441

0.263

0.495

–1.203**

–0.231

–0.366

–1.044**

–0.127

–0.341

–0.720**

Leaders in cooperative enterprises

0.201

0.163

Leaders in public enterprises

0.093

–0.082

Leaders in voluntary org.

–0.105

–0.227

Leaders in –0.059 research institutes and universities Leaders in police and courts of justice

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0.243

–0.419

–0.870**

0.440**

–0.193*

–0.758**

–0.838**

–0.655**

0.357*

0.408

–1.041**

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Table 3 (cont.) Trust in the courts of law

Trust in the police

Trust in private business

Leaders in the military services

0.082

0.441*

–0.321

Politicians

0.218

Trust in the military services

Trust in Trust in the church the mass media 0.069

–0.469*

0.308

–0.834**

0.234

–0.211

0.529**

Controlled for age, education and gender

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2 adjusted

0.06

0.08

0.12

0.06

0.15

0.05

1544

1545

1380

1490

1555

1681

N

** Significant at the 1 per cent level. * Significant at the 5 per cent level. Source: The Norwegian Leadership Study 2000.

The findings presented in the two tables confirm first of all that variations in the top leaders’ institutional trust are significantly related to the sector or institution to which they belong. This result supports the theoretical idea which was advocated above, that institutional affiliation significantly affects the attitudes, in this case the trust of the elite persons. In the theory section I suggested that one mechanism by which institutional affiliation influence the top leaders’ trust in other institutions is identification: the members of an elite group identify with other elite groups who have similar basic function as their own group. I hypothesized that this identification may promote trust in the institutions concerned. In line with this hypothesis Table 2 demonstrates that when controlling for ideological orientation the top civil servants have more trust in the Storting, the Cabinet and the political parties than the other elite groups. Their trust is not then not due to any ideological sympathy with the political party holding power at the time of the interviews.8 Similarly, the members of military elite have significantly more trust in the police, also an order elite group, than the other elite groups; and on their part the police leaders and judges have high trust in the military services.

Unfortunately we cannot control for the frequency of contact with members of the Cabinet and the Storting, cf. note 6. The analysis of the trust of the senior state officials in the political parties is, however, controlled for the frequency of contact with top leaders in the political parties. 8

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The preceding interpretations are, however, somewhat weakened by the fact that the political elite has no more trust in the public administration than the other elite groups, and the military elite has no more trust in the courts of justice than the other elites. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that other aspects of the elite groups’ functions also affect their trust evaluations. As shown in Table 1 also, the mass media and the culture elites in particular have significantly lower trust in the police, the military services and the private business, even when controlled for their ideological orientation and their frequency of contact with the institutions. The idea elites are also negative in their evaluation of the trustworthiness of the church. As indicated above, these findings probably reflect the role as critical institutions which the mass media and the culture occupy. Secondly, and as expected, institutional trust is also significantly related to the ideological orientation of the groups’ members. The more the members of an elite group support the present welfare state model of Norway, the more trust they have in the public administration and the less trust in private business and in the church. On the other hand, this finding implies that the stronger the opposition by an elite person to the state model, the less trust its members have in the public administration and the more trust in private business (and the church). Above, I discussed whether the private business leaders’ lower confidence in the political institutions, relatively to the other elite groups, might be a result of their negative ideological attitudes towards the public sector. In order to follow up this idea I have carried out a separate set of analyses (not reported here) checking whether the effect on political trust of belonging to the business elite group is affected by introducing the business leaders’ individual ideological views. The results of the analyses confirm that the business leaders’ trust towards the political institutions to some extent is explained by their more conservative ideological attitudes. However, even when controlling for ideological outlook there remains a significant (negative) statistical relationship between being a member of the business elite and trust in the Storting, the Cabinet and the public administration compared to being a member of some of the other elite groups. Their relatively lower trust in these institutions is then not only a result of their ideological stance, but is probably related also to other aspects of the business elite’s culture and world views. Within the research on citizens’ confidence in the political institutions it has been discussed whether their attitudes are influence by how satisfied they are with the economic and political performance of the government (McAllister 1999; Miller and Listhaug 1999). In line with this discussion it is possible that the private business leaders’ more sceptical attitude towards the political institutions is caused by a discontent with the concrete public

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benefits accruing to themselves. I have attempted to follow up this idea using data from the Leadership on the top leaders’ lobby activities. They were asked whether (and how) they last year had attempted to influence the outcome of a political decision which was vital to their organization or company. They were also requested to report whether they were satisfied with the outcome of their lobby actions. I have carried out separate analyses (not reported here) where I have related the business leaders’ political trust to their evaluation of the result of the lobbying. It appeared to be no significant relationship between these two variables, indicating that the business leaders’ trust attitudes are not primarily based upon their perceptions of any positive or negative outcome of relating directly to the political system. It is surprising that the elite groups which are the most eager proponents of the welfare state accord the church less trust than other elite groups. The relatively negative evaluation of the church expressed by these elite groups may be a reaction to the conservative role that the church traditionally used to have in the Norwegian society and the conservative attitudes which previously prevailed within the church. But this situation implies that the elite groups which are sceptical to the church have failed to notice the changes of mentality and ideology that have been going on within the church. They have missed the fact that the top leaders in the church today appear as one of the most radical elite groups in the Norwegian society. The tables also offer evidence for the linkage between the frequency of contact that elite persons have with top leaders in another institution and their trust in this institution, i.e. top leaders who see each other frequently develop more trust in each other’s institutions than elite groups with less frequent contact. The politicians emerged as an elite group which exhibit slightly more general institutional trust than the other elite groups. The difference is, however, not significant. This finding is nonetheless interesting when related to some other results from the Leadership study. In another paper I have reported that the members of the politic elite are less apprehended of populism and political indifference among the voters, and they report less frequently worries about too weak political parties and the power of the government (Gulbrandsen 2005c). Both this more “laid-back” attitude and their general institutional trust are consistent with studies of politicians’ tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1993) and with theories of political socialization (Sullivan et al. 1993; Searing 1986). Several studies have documented that politicians are more tolerant for instance towards extremist groups than the general public. To a certain extent this has been explained by selective recruitment. Individuals recruited to politics have psychological and social properties which foster greater tolerance. As Sullivan et al. (1993) have dem-

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onstrated, this is not a sufficient explanation. They claim that the tolerance of the politicians also is a result of the gradual political socialization of political recruits before they enter the main positions in the political system. Politicians are exposed to more ideological variation and learn the necessity of political compromise both of which instil in them a more realistic and less dramatic image of the potential threats of non-conformist groups and their ideas. The experience of having to take political responsibility and consider the consequences of ones actions inhibits them from intolerance of others. Moreover, central politicians acquire a sense of personal control which also may be favourable to the development of political tolerance. These mechanisms of political socialization may also explain why Norwegian politicians more frequently have trust in the main institutions in the society and a more relaxed view upon populism and voter indifference. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Elites in a modern democracy are to a large extent elected and employed leaders of large institutions and organizations. They are expected to represent and take care of the interests of the principals of their respective institutions and organizations. Living up to this responsibility necessitates that the members of the individual elite groups cooperate, negotiate and enter into compromises with the representatives of the other elite groups in society. In previous elite research it has been claimed that this kind of elite accommodation is facilitated to the extent that the various elites are integrated. In this paper I have argued that trust is an important characteristic of such elite integration. Following up this theoretical idea I have set out to examine the extent to which important elite groups in the Norwegian society have trust in each other’s institutions. I have also attempted to discuss how variations in institutional trust between the various elite groups and their members can be explained. The analyses presented above have demonstrated that the general level of institutional trust is about the same in the different elite groups. Nonetheless, the elites appeared as less enthusiastic about the trustworthiness of the Norwegian institutions than expected. There are, however, interesting variations as to how much trust the individual elite groups accord the various institutions. The top leaders within private business elite stand out with less trust in the political institutions than the other elite groups. At the same time private business as an institution is given relatively low trust by the other elite groups. The church leaders have less trust in private business than all the other national leaders. The top civil servants distinguish themselves by having more trust in the political institutions compared to the other elites. The two order elites, the top

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officers in the military services and the top leaders within the police, have more trust in each other’s institutions than the rest of the elite groups. Top leaders within the mass media and the cultural sector for their part emerged as being particularly sceptical towards the order institutions and the church. The analyses indicate that top leaders’ evaluation of trust is affected by the extent of which they identify with the functions of the individual institutions. To a certain extent the patterns of trust between elite groups and institutions are attributable to the ideological orientation of the members of the various elite groups and to their contact with the institutions concerned. The distrust expressed by the mass media and culture elites, particularly in the order institutions, cannot however, be explained by any of these three factors. Their distrust illustrates that the elites’ institutional trust may be significantly affected by basic orientations and responsibilities which are specific for the particular institutions and which are not necessarily influenced by the private attitudes, characteristics and experiences of the individual leaders. Against the background of the business leaders’ right wing ideological orientation, I had expected that they also distinguished themselves as less integrated in the trust structure than the other elite groups. Admittedly, private business receives relatively little trust from the other elites groups, and the business leaders on their part express less trust in the Cabinet and public administration than the other top leaders. The differences are, however, modest. This finding is in contrast to what Vogel (1978) some years ago observed in USA. Vogel described the private business leaders as an elite group which had very little faith in the state and the public sector. Accordingly, the Norwegian business leaders seem to be less in an “outsider” position concerning institutional trust than their colleagues in USA. The mass media are characterized by receiving distinctly lower trust than other institutions. This situation should not, however, be seen as an evidence of the mass media elite being an outcast among the national elites in Norway. The low trust which the mass media is accorded is probably caused by a discontent on the part of these elites both with the pressing and critical scrutiny of the mass media and with their power to direct the political agenda. Nonetheless, there is a general recognition of the basic role and function of the mass media. The mass media as an institution is thus well integrated into the Norwegian society. The relatively low standing of the mass media within the “trust structure” may illustrate a more general idea within the elite theory. Both Raymond Aron (1968) and Schmuel N. Eisenstadt (1966) have emphasized that democracy is dependent upon a balance between elite unity and elite

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independence. To Aron, an integrated elite would end freedom, while a fragmented elite would undermine the state. Similarly, Eisenstadt claimed that the success of democracy rested on two seemingly contradictory conditions: a differentiation between the elites which could open up for competition between alternative power centres, and a consensus between the elites about the basic values and rules of the game. From such a perspective the independent and critical role of the mass media is a significant prerequisite for democracy, even if it is accompanied by low trust shown by the other elite groups in society. REFERENCES Aardal, B. 2003. “Kritiske velgere.” Chapter 9 in Velgere i villrede. En analyse av stortings-valget i 2001, edited by B. Aardal. Oslo: Damm forlag. Aron, R. 1968. Progress and Disillusion. London: Pall Mall. Baier, A. 1986. “Trust and Antitrust.” Ethics 96:231–260. Blau, P. 1964. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley. Bürklin, W., H. Rebenstorf et al. 1997. Eliten in Deutschland. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. Coleman, J. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Chapters 5 and 8. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Delhey, J. and K. Newton 2005. “Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Patterns or Nordic Exceptionalism?” European Sociological Review 21:311–327. Deutsch, M. 1962. “Cooperation and Trust: Some Theoretical Notes.” In Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, edited by M. R. Jones. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Domhoff, G. 1967. Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Eisenstadt, S. N. 1966. Modernization: Protest and Change. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Gulbrandsen, T. 2005a. “Norway; Trust Among Elites in a Corporatist Democracy.” Comparative Sociology 4:115–135. ——. 2005b. “Ideological Integration and Variation within the Private Business Elite in Norway.” European Sociological Review 21:329–344. ——. 2005c. “An Elitist Norwegian Elite? Elite Perceptions of Challenges to Democracy in Norway.” Paper presented at an international conference on elite research in, Balestrand, Norway, June 9–12. Gulbrandsen, T., F. Engelstad, T. B. Klausen, H. Skjeie, M. Teigen and Ø. Østerud 2002. Norske makteliter (Norwegian Power Elites). Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk. Higley, J. and M. G. Burton 1989. “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns.” American Sociological Review 54:17–32. ——. 2006, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Higley, J. and G. Moore 1981. “Elite Integration in the United States and Australia.” The American Political Science Review 75:581–597. Higley, J., U. Hoffmann-Lange, C. Kadushin and G. Moore 1991. “Elite Integration in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration.” European Sociological Review 7:35–53. Hoffmann-Lange, U. 1985. “Structural Prerequisites of Elite Integration in the Federal Republic of Germany.” Research in Politics and Society 1:45–96. Kadushin, C. 1995. “Friendship among the French Financial Elite.” American Sociological Review 60:202–221. Lijphart, A. 1969a. The Politics of Accomodation. Berkeley: University of California Press. ——. 1969b. “Consociational democracy.” World Politics 21:207–225. Listhaug, O. and M. Wiberg 1995. “Confidence in Political and Private Institutions.” In Citizens and the State, edited by H. D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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McAllister, I. 1999. “The Economic Performance of Governments.” In Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance, edited by P. Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, A. and O. Listhaug 1999. “Political Performance and Institutional Trust.” In Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance, edited by P. Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mills, C. Wright 1956. The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mosca, G. 1939. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill. Offe, C. 1999. “How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?” In Democracy and Trust, edited by P. Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parry, G. 1976. “Trust, Distrust and Consensus.” British Journal of Political Science 6:129–142. Porter, J. 1965. The Vertical Mosaic. An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Presthus, R. 1973. Elite Accomodation in Canadian Politics. Toronto: McMillan. Putnam, R. D. 1976. The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Rokeach, M., P. W. Smith and R. I. Evans 1960. “Two Kinds of Prejudice or One?” Pp. 132–168 in The Open and the Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems, edited by M. Rokeach. New York: Basic Books. Searing, D. D. 1986. “A Theory of Political Socialization: Institutional Support and Deradicalization in Britain.” British Journal of Political Science 16:341–376. Sejersted, F. 1993. Demokratisk kapitalisme. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Strømsnes, K. 2003, Folkets makt. Medborgerskap, demokrati og deltakelse. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. Sullivan, J. L., P. Walsh, M. Shamir, D. G. Barnum and J. l. Gibson 1993. “Why Politicians Are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States.” British Journal of Political Science 23:51–76. Sztompka, P. 1999. Trust. A Sociological Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vogel, D. 1978. “Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of Corporate Executives.” British Journal of Political Science 8:45–78.

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From Vietnam to Iraq: American Elites’ Views on the Use of Military Force Gwen Moore and Stephanie Mack University at Albany, State University of New York, USA [email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract In this paper we present trends in US elites’ opinions on the use of military force abroad in the period from the end of US military involvement in Vietnam in 1975 to 2004 during the ‘war on terror.’ With data from quadrennial surveys of US elites’ foreign policy attitudes sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations since 1975, we ask whether elites have become more militaristic or whether such views have been a long term characteristic of US elites. We find support for the view of United States leaders as prone to the use of military might, even without the support of allies. Yet the findings also indicate that American elites have held this military view of reality for a long time.

INTRODUCTION American foreign policy has often included the use of military force in other nations. Between the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, the US took military action with air strikes or troops in Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq (Collier 1993; Yorkshire CND 1999). In those instances, the President obtained congressional approval beforehand or ordered military action in support of multinational operations or mutual security pacts (Grimmett 2003:3). In a 2002 statement on security strategy, the Bush Administration asserted the right to preemptive military force not only to forestall an imminent military threat (“preemptive use”) but also to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies (cited in Grimmett 2003). The latter was a significant expansion of previous US

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policy on the use of military force. Prior to 2003, the United States had attacked another nation without prior attack on it or its citizens’ interests only in the Spanish-American War of 1898 (Grimmett 2003). According to Grimmett’s review of the history of US use of military force, the Iraq War represents not a preemptive war against a presumed imminent threat but a more drastic use of military force as a preventive action “to forestall a presumed military threat from that nation at some point in the future, whether months or years” (2003:2; italics in original). Such a doctrine is entirely consistent with Pareto’s concept of lion-like elite behavior and the necessity at times for elites to employ force (Finer 1966). We seek to uncover the views of US elites on militarism in foreign policy by examining elite attitudes and the patterns of such attitudes over the past three decades. We present trends in US elites’ opinions on the use of force from the end of US military involvement in Vietnam in 1975 to 2004 during the ‘war on terror.’ With data from quadrennial surveys of US elites’ foreign policy attitudes sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations since 1975, we learn whether elites have become more militaristic or whether such views have been a long-lasting characteristic of US elites. We also compare attitudes of political and nonpolitical elites and of Republicans and Democrats within the political elite. In these comparisons, we examine trends over time and the extent of agreement between specific groups. These analyses show whether political elites are more prone to approve of the use of force than are elites outside of the federal government. Similarly, the extent of agreement between governing elites in the two political parties reveals trends in elite consensus or dissensus on the use of military force. Our goal is to offer a long term view of US elites’ opinions on the use of military force, as well as similarities and differences in these opinions between elite groups and political parties. BACKGROUND Studies of foreign policy attitudes in the United States have found that elites are more internationalist while mass publics are relatively more isolationalist (e.g., Oldendick and Bardes 1982; Wittkopf 1987; Cunningham and Moore 1997). With evidence from surveys of elite foreign policy opinions, Holsti and Rosenau (1990:103) report that about 70% of American leaders from 1976 to 1984 were internationalists, with most favoring cooperative relations with other nations and a smaller number favoring an active international role but with an emphasis on conflict and security. They note a slight movement toward preferences for the cooperative role during the period examined.

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Several scholars have distinguished two types of internationalist attitudes: militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism (e.g., Wittkopf 1990; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Chanley 1999). In general, the former favor the use of military force in various situations and oppose cooperation with ideological opponents, while the latter favor more cooperation with allies and opponents in the international sphere. A time-series analysis of elite foreign policy opinions from 1974 to 1994 uncovered an inconsistent pattern of changes in attitudes toward militant internationalism, in particular in attitudes toward increasing defense spending and using US troops abroad, although approval for both was higher in 1994 than in 1974 (Cunningham and Moore 1997, Table 2). Subsequent studies of elite opinion in the 1990s found some evidence of an increase in approval of the use of military force but more elites favored cooperative international relations (Holsti 1997). Holsti reports that surveys during the Cold War found that about one-third of elites favored the United States taking “all steps including the use of force to prevent the spread of communism,” but that surveys in the 1990s found that a majority of elites supported the statement that the US should “be prepared to use force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power” (1997). In 1996 about three-fourths of elites supported cooperative internationalism but the proportion of militant internationalists also increased (Holsti 1997, 16). These studies indicate some increase in support for military action during the 1975 to 1996 period but the majority of leaders still preferred cooperative international relations. Analysts of elite foreign policy views, including those cited above, rarely distinguish between governing and non-governing elites but report results for all elite groups combined. We contend that it is valuable to distinguish between political and nonpolitical elites in order to see if political elites’ views are distinct from those of other elite groups. Some researchers have analyzed behavior and opinions in specific elite groups at one point in time. For example, research based on interviews with US elites in the early 1970s concluded that American elites are unified through informal inclusive networks (Moore 1979; Higley et al. 1991). Higley et al. conclude that such structures are essential for the survival of stable democracies (1991:16). However, this ease of informal access for elites in different sectors was not accompanied by elite agreement across parties on policy issues. Barton (1985) reports disparate views between Republican and Democratic politicians on many domestic and foreign policy issues. As an example, in 1972–1973 31% of Republican politicians and nearly twice as many Democrats favored withdrawal from Vietnam. A large majority of

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Democrats but far fewer Republicans agreed that defense spending should be reduced (Barton 1985, Table 10). The partisan divide in Congress in 2007 is wider and deeper, with a declining number of moderate members over the past two decades. Despite partisan differences, however, in 2002 a large majority of members of both parties in the Senate and the House of Representatives voted to authorize the President to use force if necessary to compel Iraq to give up its presumed weapons of mass destruction. Apparently leonine behavior in foreign affairs is widely accepted by US politicians today. We ask whether this is a recent or longstanding development in elites’ foreign policy attitudes. DATA The longitudinal survey “American Public Opinion and United States Foreign Policy” has been conducted quadrennially since 1975 to “investigate the opinions and attitudes of the general public and a select group of opinion leaders (or elites) on matters relating to United States foreign policy. For purposes of this series, opinion leaders are defined as individuals in positions of leadership in government, academia, business and labor, the media, religious institutions, special interest groups, and private foreign policy organizations” (CCFR 2005; CCFR various dates).1 Some questions are repeated in each survey, while others change. In this paper we use a series of attitude questions on the proper role of the United States in world affairs, responses to hypothetical invasions of South Korea, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and favored responses to terrorism. Interviews were conducted in person or by telephone, depending on the year. Individual surveys have a total of 330– 450 elite interviews in the above groups. The number of persons interviewed varies from one sector to another, with a far larger number of media leaders in most studies. For this reason, we have weighted the data to give equal weight to each of the elite groups. Most analyses compare political and non-political elites. The

Groups comprising the elite samples vary only slightly across the years. In each leadership group top positions whose incumbents would have knowledge of international affairs were identified. In the Senate and House of Representatives these are members of the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. If the Senator or Representative was unavailable, a top foreign policy aide was interviewed. In the Administration they are assistant secretaries in State, Defense, Treasury and other related departments. Also included are: chairmen and vice presidents of large corporations and heads of business associations; heads of major labor unions, editors, broadcasters and publishers of print and broadcast media; presidents and scholars from major universities; leaders from private foreign policy institutes, religious organizations, volunteer organizations and various ethnic organizations (CCFR 2005). 1

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former include members of the Administration, Senators, and members of the House of Representatives. Nonpolitical elites include members of all other groups. Respondents in these sectors can be seen as a census rather than a sample since all persons in the selected positions were included in the sample. Data from these years are used: 1975, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2004. To measure elites’ attitudes toward militaristic foreign policy, we used a series of questions. They are listed below along with the years in which the specific question was asked. • “In general, in responding to international crises, do you think the US should or should not take action alone?” (1975, 1998, 2002) • “There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world. I’d like to ask your opinion about some situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of US troops if North Korea invaded South Korea?” . . . “if Arab forces invaded Israel?”2 . . . “if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia?” (Questions on South Korea and Israel asked each year, question on Iraq from 1990 through 2002) • “In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures. First, How about”. . . . “US air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities” . . . “Attacks by US ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities” . . . “Assassination of individual terrorist leaders.” First, we present results of trends in political and nonpolitical elites’ views toward the US acting alone, how to deal with terrorism, and hypothetical situations in which the US might send troops abroad. We look for patterns over time and differences between political and nonpolitical elites over time. Our focus is more on the overall patterns than on results for specific questions and years. A consistent pattern over time and between groups gives us more confidence in results. Subsequent analyses are based on political elites, comparing the views of Republicans and Democrats. We ask if Republicans and Democrats have both trended toward more militaristic views as well as whether there is a gap between them on such attitudes.

2

In 1975, the question wording was “if Israel were being defeated by the Arabs?”

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• Gwen Moore and Stephanie Mack RESULTS A. Political and Nonpolitical Elites

Figures 1–7 show results for political and nonpolitical elites over time on the militaristic opinion measures. Approval of the US acting alone in international crises (Figure 1)—asked only in 1975, 1998 and 2002—reveals a large upward leap from 1975 when the percentage was close to zero. A pattern that we will also see in other results is the anti-militaristic attitudes in 1975, a few months after the final US withdrawal from Vietnam. Those attitudes seem to be anomalous, however, because they are rarely present in any of our measures in later years. More than half of nonpolitical and political elites approved of unilateral action in 1998 but the proportion declined somewhat by 2002. The two elite groups expressed similar attitudes on this question. Three questions ask opinions on whether the US should commit troops in the hypothetical situations of enemy invasions of Israel, South Korea and Saudi Arabia. Results in Figures 2 (Arab forces invading Israel) and 3 (North Korea invading South Korea) are for each survey since 1975. The patterns are similar, with relatively low proportions favoring use of US troops in 1975 and far higher and stable proportions expressing that opinion from 1986 on. In 2004 over 90% of political elites and over 80% of nonpolitical elites favored use of US troops if North Korea invaded South Korea. The figures for 1975 are just over 20% and just under 20%, respectively. The approval rates for employing US troops to counter an Arab invasion of Israel are a bit lower, but show a gradual upward trend and little difference in opinion between elites in and outside of government. Though the question about an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia was not asked before 1990, approval of use of US troops in that situation is above 90% for political elites and only a little lower from nonpolitical elites in three of the four surveys (Figure 4). These results are clear evidence that US elites are overwhelmingly willing to commit US troops to counter enemy invasions of our allies. Figures 5–7 show results for approval of using violence to counter terrorism. This question series is more recent, beginning in 1986 and not asked consistently until 1998. Approval for air strikes and ground troops has been high throughout the series, especially among political elites. Over 90% approved of these two approaches in 2002 and 2004. Opinions on whether or not the US should seek to assassinate terrorist leaders is lower but has risen to over half of nonpolitical elites and more than two-thirds of political elites in the most recent survey (Figure 7). The approval rates are only slightly lower among nonpolitical elites. As in the hypothetical questions about sending US troops to support allies, responses to favored means for combating international terrorism show a readiness to employ

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80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1975

1998

2002

Year Nonpolitical

Percentage Favoring the Use of Troops

Figure 1

Political

In responding to international crises, do you think the US should or should not take action alone?

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1975

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

2004

Year Nonpolitical

Figure 2

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Political

Do you favor or oppose the use of US troops if Arab forces invaded Israel?

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Percentage Favoring the Use of Troops

200

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1975

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

2004

Year Nonpolitical

Percentage Favoring the Use of Troops

Figure 3

Political

Do you favor or oppose the use of US troops if North Korean invaded South Korea?

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1990

1994

1998

2002

Year Nonpolitical

Figure 4

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Political

Do you favor or oppose the use of US troops if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia?

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Percentage Favoring Air Strikes

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1986

1998

2002

2004

Year Nonpolitical

Political

Figure 5 In order to combat international terrorism, do you favor or oppose US air srikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities?

Percentage Favoring Attacks by U.S. Ground Troops

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1998

2002

2004

Year Nonpolitical

Political

Figure 6 In order to combat international terrorism, do you favor or oppose attacks by US groups against troops terrorist training camps and other facilities?

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Percentage Favoring Assasination

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100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1986

1998

2002

2004

Year Nonpolitical

Political

Figure 7 In order to combat international terrorism, do you favor or oppose the assassination of individual terrorist leaders?

violent methods, especially air strikes and troops against terrorist training facilities. B. Partisan Differences among Political Elites Figures 8–13 show the trends for political elites’ opinions on taking unilateral action, committing troops to counter attacks on friendly countries, and on military policies to combat terrorism. No Democrats or Republicans expressed support for the US acting alone in crisis situations in 1975, but far larger numbers, especially of Republicans, supported such action in 1998 and 2002 (Figure 8). On whether or not the United States should commit troops in the case of an enemy attack on South Korea or Israel, both parties show growing approval between 1975 and 1990 (Figures 9–10). The percentages remain high from 1990 to 2004, with large majorities of Republican and Democratic politicians approving committing US troops to South Korea, Israel and Saudi Arabia (not shown) in these hypothetical situations. On attitudes toward employing force in fighting terrorism, the time series is short, from 1998 to 2004 (Figures 11–13). Air strikes against terrorist training camps garner overwhelming approval of both parties throughout the period. Use of ground troops and assassination of terrorist leaders had far lower approval in 1998 than they did in 2002 and 2004, after September 11, 2001. There are moderate party differences, with Republicans giving more support to ground troops and assassination of terrorist leaders than do their Democratic counterparts. Political elites of both parties expressed relatively low rates of militaristic attitudes in 1975. By 2004, the majority of Democratic and Republican politicians expressed positive attitudes toward

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100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1975

1998

2002

Year Republican

Democrat

* Within Political Elites

Percentage Favoring the Use of Troops

Figure 8

In responding to international crises, do you think the US should or shoul not take action alone?

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1975

1990

1998

2002

2004

Year Republican

Democrat

* Within Political Elites

Figure 9

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Do yo favor or oppose the use of US troops if Arab forces invaded Israel?

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Percentage Favoring the Use of Troops

204

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1975

1990

1998

2002

2004

Year Republican

Democrat

* Within Political Elites

Figure 10 Do you favor or oppose the use of US troops if North Korea invaded South Korea?

Percentage Favoring Air Strikes

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1998

2002

2004

Year Republican

Democrat

* Within Political Elites

Figure 11 In order to compabt international terrorism, do you favor or oppose US air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities?

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Percentage Favoring Attacks by U.S. Ground Troops

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100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1998

2002

2004

Year Republican

Democrat

* Within Political Elites

Figure 12 In order to combat international terrorism, do you favor or oppose attacks by US ground troops against terrosist training camps and other facilities?

Percentage Favoring Assasination

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1998

2002

2004

Year Republican

Democrat

* Within Political Elites

Figure 13 In oder to combat international terrorism, do you favor or oppose the assasination of individual terrorist leaders/

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the use of military force abroad. For both Democrats and Republicans the lowest level of support was for assassination of terrorist leaders, 64.8% and 81.0% respectively. Clearly, political leaders of the two parties are close to agreement on favoring the use of military force abroad. CONCLUSIONS US leaders in and outside of government, as well as Republicans and Democrats in government, voiced overwhelming support for the use of American troops if necessary to defend three allies against invasion and to combat terrorism in 2004. There are slight differences by sector and party on some measures, but the pattern is clear. In 1975, months after the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, few leaders supported the use of military force abroad. In the three decades since, those anti-militaristic opinions have shifted to strong support for the use of military force in a variety of possible international situations. By 1986 most of the post-Vietnam reticence to use force had disappeared. In general, opinions became more militant after 1986. These findings indicate a long term trend toward higher levels of approval among US leaders for the use of military force abroad. Apparently, the anomaly was the temporary reluctance to do so after the Vietnam War. Systematic evidence of elites’ views on militarism before 1975 is not available. However, even in the mid-1950s, C. Wright Mills worried that the power elite had developed a military view of reality (1956, ch. 8). “. . . the American elite does not have any real image of peace—other than as an uneasy interlude existing precariously by virtue of the balance of mutual fright. The only seriously accepted plan for ‘peace’ is the fully loaded pistol” (Mills 1956:185; also cited in Bacevich 2005:33). Many journalists and others believe that the militaristic turn in US foreign policy is of recent vintage. For example, writing in the New York Times on May 30, 2005, Bob Herbert began his opinion column: “This Memorial Day is not a good one for the country that was once the world’s most brilliant beacon of freedom and justice.” He ends: “In much of the world, the image of the US under Mr. Bush has morphed from an idealized champion of liberty to a heavily armed thug in camouflage fatigues. America is increasingly being seen as a dangerously arrogant military power that is due for a comeuppance” (2005, A15). The Bush Administration’s preventive war in Iraq does illustrate a more extreme foreign policy than in previous US history. In his recent book, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War, Andrew J. Bacevich argues that US elites’ propensity to use force is not an aberration of the Bush Administration but is a long-term trend at least in part as a reaction against the (seeming) excesses of the 1960s

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(2005:5–6). In full agreement with Mills’ concerns about a military view of reality in the mid-1950s, Bacevich argues that over the past twenty-five years an elite (and public) consensus has developed that “American military supremacy is an unqualified good” (2005:15). After the Cold War, the US did not cut back on military spending and action. With no strong military opponent after the demise of the Soviet Union, the US might have drawn down its military, or its leaders might have felt safer in using military force. Actions suggest the latter. In the past decade, Bacevich cites nearly annual use of military force abroad by the United States (2005:19). We have analyzed the attitudes rather than the actions of American elites from the war in Vietnam to the ‘war on terror’. Our evidence supports the views of Mills, Bacevich and others by showing that most leaders in the United States today, and for at least the past two decades, approve of the use of military force to achieve the nation’s foreign policy goals. These elite surveys support the view of the United States as prone to the use of military might, even without the support of allies. Yet the findings also indicate that American elites have held this military view of reality for a long time. The elite attitudes that we have described are not a response to the events of September 11th nor are they new to the Bush administration. Instead, they are a long term move toward approval of military force and unilateral action. Examination of these views since 2004 would reveal if these opinions remain steady even with the current situation in the war in Iraq. While elite attitudes have moved in this direction for some time, it is possible that this trend may be on the verge of reversing as support for the Iraq war wanes. Many politicians since the 2006 midterm elections have refused to approve of an escalation or, for some, even continuation of the war. Instead, there have been calls for plans to withdraw troops from the region and opposition to President Bush’s decision to send more combat troops to Iraq (Babington and VandeHei 2006, Knowlton 2007). However, though support for the Iraq war has been decreasing, US political elites maintain a firm commitment to fighting the ‘war on terror’. This suggests that even as the Iraq war loses elite support, the militant attitudes remain in the case of the ‘war on terror’, and the approval of the use of military force among elites remains high. REFERENCES Babington, C. and J. VandeHei. 2006. “Hill Democrats Unite to Urge Bush to Begin Iraq Pullout.” Washington Post, August 1, A01. Bacevich, Andrew J. 2005. The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Barton, Allen H. 1985. “Determinants of Economic Attitudes in the American Business Elite.” The American Journal of Sociology 91(1) ( July):54–87.

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Chanley, Virginia A. 1999. “U.S. Public Views of International Involvement from 1964 to 1993.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(1) (February):23–45. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR). 1991. “American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy.” http://www.ccfr.org/publications/opinion/American%20Public%20Op inion%20Report%201991.pdf, accessed 26 May 2005. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1986 [Computer file]. Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations [producer], 1987. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1987. ——. 1990 [Computer file]. ICPSR09564-v1. Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization, Inc. [producer], 1990. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2006–06–26. ——. 1994 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization [producer], 1995. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1996. ——. 1975 [Computer file]. Conducted by Louis Harris & Associates and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1999. ——. 1998 [General Population Data] [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization [producer], 1999. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000. ——. 2002 [Computer file]. ICPSR03673-v1. Rochester, NY : Harris Interactive [producer], 2002. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2004. —— [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Menlo Park, CA: Knowledge Networks, Inc. [producer], 2004. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2005. Collier, E. 1993. “Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798–1993.” http:// www.fas.org/man/crs/crs_931007.htm. Accessed 26 May 2005. Cunningham, Jennifer and Michael K. Moore. 1997. “Elite and Mass Foreign Policy Options: Who Is Leading This Parade? ” Social Science Quarterly 78(3) (September):641– 656. Finer, S. E. 1966. Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings. New York: Praeger. Grimmett, R. F. “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995–2002.” DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management 6(1) (fall):21–72. Herbert, B. 2005. “America, a Symbol of . . .” New York Times, May 30, A15. Higley, J., U. Hoffmann-Lange, C. Kadushin and G. Moore. 1991. “Elite Integration in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration.” European Sociological Review 7(1) (May):35–53. Holsti, O. R. and J. N. Rosenau. 1990. “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders.” Journal of Politics 52(1) (February):94–126. Holsti, O. R. 1997. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. University of Michigan Press. Knowlton, B. 2007. “House Democrats Propose Iraq Resolutions.” New York Times, http:// www.nytimes.com/2007/02/12/washington/12cnd-cong.html, accessed 12 February 2007. Mills, C. W. 1956. The Power Elite. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Moore, G. 1979. “The Structure of a National Elite Network.” American Sociological Review 44 (October):673– 691. Oldendick, R. W. and B. A. Bardes. 1982. “Mass and Elite Foreign Policy Opinions.” Public Opinion Quarterly 46(3) (fall):368–382. Wittkopf, E. R. 1987. “Elites and Masses: Another Look at Attitudes Toward America’s World Role.” International Studies Quarterly 31(2) ( June):131–159. ——. 1990. Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Durham: Duke University Press. Yorkshire CND. 1999. 25th March. “U.S. Military Actions Since Vietnam.” http://cndyorks. gn.apc.org/news/articles/usacts.htm, accessed 26 May 2005.

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Notes on Contributors Heinrich Best (Dr) is currently Professor of Sociology at the University of Jena, where he holds the Chair of Social Science Research Methods/ Structural Analysis of Modern Societies. He is also Director of the multidisciplinary collaborative Research Centre, ‘Societal Developments after the End of State Socialism: Discontinuity, Tradition and the Emergence of New Structures,’ funded by the German Science Foundation (SFB 580), and was Co-director of the Scientific Network, ‘European Political Elites in Comparison: the long road to convergence’ (EURELITE) funded by the European Science Foundation. Professor Best’s research is mainly focussed on the intertemporal and intercultural comparison of political actors and settings in a European context based on quantitative analyses of individual and aggregate data. A second focus of his research is the social history and subsequent transformation of former communist countries including East Germany. Professor Best’s publication list entails 28 books or special issues of journals and 110 journal and book contributions as primary author and editor. His recent publications include “Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000” (ed. with M. Cotta) (Oxford, 2000); Elites in Transition: Elite Research in Central and Eastern Europe (with U. Becker) (Opladen, 1997); Functional Elites in the GDR: Theoretical Controversies and Empirical Evidence (special issue of HSR 2003, with S. Hornbostel). E-mail: [email protected] Jean-Pascal Daloz is Senior Research Fellow (Department of Politics & CNRS/Maison Française) at Oxford University. He is also Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Oslo, Executive Secretary of the ISA Research Committee for Comparative Sociology and of the IPSA Research Committee on Political Elites. He has a substantial research and publications record in both Comparative Politics and Comparative Sociology. His latest book is Culture Troubles: politics and the interpretation of meaning. London: Hurst publishers / Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006 (co-authored with P. Chabal). His current research focuses on the sociology of distinction and on political elites’ ostentation and modesty. Address : [email protected]

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Mattei Dogan, a sociologist and political scientist, is a Senior Fellow at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris and Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Trento, Indiana University, Yale University, the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in Tokyo and the University of Florence. He is co-founder of the Society for Comparative Research. For many years he was a member of the editorial boards of the Revue Française de Sociologie and other academic journals. Author, co-author, editor or co-editor of 35 books, he has also published more than one hundred articles in academic journals. He is listed in Who’s Who in France? and in Contemporary Authors. Formerly chair of the IPSA research committee on political elites, until 2002, he is currently chair of the ISA research committee on comparative sociology. E-mail: [email protected] Oxana Gaman-Golutvina, Dr Sc. (Political Science; 1998), is a Professor at the Russian Academy of Public Administration (Department of Political Science) and the Moscow Institute (University) of Foreign Relations. His research interests include political elites, political leadership, political consciousness, and political culture. Current research projects include: the future of Russia: scenarios of political development of Russia, 2008–2017; parliamentary representation in Russia (1905–2006); and comparative studies of political elites. His publications total more than 150 works, with 23 in 2006 alone. Some of his latest publications include: Russian Parliamentary Tradition and Current Development. In: Russian Civilization (Delhi, 2007); Russian Political Elites: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions. In: Russian Civilization (Delhi, 2007); Russian Political Elites as the Mirror of Russian Revolution. In: O. Gaman-Golutvina (ed.), Contemporary Politics and Its Actors. Elites. Nomenclatura. Bureaucracy (Tambov, 2006); O. Gaman-Golutvina and Y. Plyais (eds), Parliamentary Representation in Russia and Germany. History and Nowadays (Moscow, 2006). E-mail: [email protected] Trygve Gulbrandsen, Dr Philos., is senior researcher at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway and professor of Sociology at the University of Oslo. His research interests include power, elites, trust, ownership, and family businesses. Recent publications include a volume of Comparative Social Research on “Comparative Studies of Social and Political Elites” (Elsevier 2007, edited with Fredrik Engelstad), an article on “Ideological Integration and Variation within the Private Business Elite in Norway” (2005, in European Sociological Review), and an article on “Elite Consensus on the Norwegian Welfare State Model” (2005, written together with Fredrik Engelstad, in West European Politics). His current projects include a study of challenges facing ownership in a modern economy, an empirical analysis of mechanisms

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behind elite integration, and a study of private business leaders’ lobbying activities. E-mail: [email protected] John Higley is Professor of Government and Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin and chair of the Research Committee on Political Elites of the International Political Science Association. His research interests cover comparative politics and political sociology and his books and edited volumes in the field of elite studies include: Elites in Australia (1979); Elitism (1980); Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (1992); Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (1998); Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (1998); Elites after State Socialism (2000); Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (2006). E-mail: [email protected] Stephanie Mack is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University at Albany, State University of New York. Her research interests include political sociology, globalization, cultural sociology and social movements. Her dissertation will focus on globalization and environmental social movements. E-mail: [email protected] Gwen Moore earned a PhD in sociology at New York University. She is Associate Professor of Sociology and Women’s Studies and Co-Director of the Institute for Research on Women at the University at Albany, State University of New York. Her research focuses on comparative elite studies, analyses of gender and authority, and investigations of personal, community and national network structures. Recent publications include Women and Men in Political and Business Elites: A Comparative Study, with Mino Vianello and others (Sage, 2004); “Elite Recruitment” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics (2004); “Social Capital: Mentors and Contacts,” with Michal Palgi, Current Sociology (2004); and “Comments: Mommies and Daddies on the Fast Track in Other Wealthy Nations,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (2004). E-mail: [email protected] Jan Pakulski is Dean of Arts and Professor of Sociology at the University of Tasmania and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Social Sciences. He writes on elites, social inequality, social movements and social change, and is (co)authorof Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society (with S. Crook and M. Waters) (Sage, 1992; Chinese edition, 2001); The Death of Class (with M. Waters) (Sage, 1996); and Globalizing Inequalities (Allan and Unwin, 2005). Pakulski also co-edited Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (with J. Higley and W. Wesolowski) (Macmillan, 1998), and published over 70 academic articles and chapters in scholarly books. E-mail: [email protected]

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Ilkka Ruostetsaari is Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Turku, Finland. His research interests cover elite study, professionalisation of politics, political class, recruitment of MPs, local democracy, and energy policy. He is currently working on governance of Finnish energy policy-making. His recent publications include “Elites and Democracy: Are They Compatible?” Comparative Social Research, 23 (2007); “Social Upheaval and Transformation of Elite Structures: The Case of Finland,” Political Studies, 54(1) (2006); “Finland: From Political Amateurs to Political Class” in Jens Borchert and Jürgen Zeiss (eds.), The Political Class in Advanced Democracies (OUP, 2003) and “From Political Amateur to Professional Politician and Expert Representative: Parliamentary Recruitment in Finland since 1863” in Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000. (OUP, 2000). E-mail: [email protected] Johanna Odonkor Svanikier is a DPhil candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. She has bachelor and master’s degrees in Law from the London School of Economics, a Master’s in Public Administration from Harvard University (USA) and an MSc Research degree in Politics from the University of Oxford. She was formerly a lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ghana and the Legon Centre for International Affairs (Ghana). She has worked as a development consultant for UNDP, USAID, Danida, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Soros Foundation in the areas of governance and democracy. She has published on comparative democracy and women’s rights. Her research interests are in comparative politics, African politics, democratization and political elite transformation. E-mail: [email protected]

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Index Abe, Shinzo 21 access to parliaments 95 accommodation, of elites 171, 172, 189 Acheampong, I.K. 117 Achimota College (Ghana) 113–114 activism, in Denmark 160 administrative elites, women in 147 Africa democracies in 104 n1 elites in 45–46, 104, 106 political conflict in 103, 104 age, of members of parliament 94 Akan (Ghana) 107–108, 109 Akayev, Askar 132 Ake, C. 105 Akhal-Teke clans (Turkmenistan) 134 Akuffo-Addo, Edward 111 Akyem Abuakwa (Ghana) 114–115 alliances of elites 18 Allman, J.M. 108 “American Public Opinion and United States Foreign Policy” (survey) 196–197 Americanocentrism 36 amnesia, theoretical 1, 27–31 anti-militaristic attitudes, in US 198, 206 Arden-Clark, C. 116 Arhin, Kwame 107, 113 aristocracy in France 33 in Gold Coast 108–110 members of parliament 88 in United Kingdom 39 Veblen on 36 n16 Aron, Raymond 190–191 Asantes (Ghana) 113 Ashanti region (Ghana) 113 Asia see Central Asia; Southeast Asia At the Edge of the Sword (de Gaulle) 69 Ataturk, Mustapha Kemal 2, 67–74 Ataturk: the Rebirth of a Nation (Kinross) 69 Austin, Dennis 108, 110, 111, 114, 117 Australia, political elites in 19 authoritarian regimes, in CIS 129, 135 Azerbaijan 123, 127 Bacevich, Andrew J. 206–207 Baier, A. 175 barriers of access, to parliaments

SASAKI_index-213-222.indd 213

95

Barton, Allen H. 195 Baudrillard, J. 29 n6, 30–31, 35, 58–59 belief-congruency theory 176 Benoist-Mechin, J. 73 Berlusconi, Silvio 17, 19 Best, Heinrich 2, 209 Blair, Tony 17 image of 6 and political elites 18–19 blue collar workers, members of parliament 91 Bonaparte, Napoleon see Napoleon I bondage systems 127 The Bonfire of the Vanities (Wolfe) 48 Bourdieu, P. 27–29, 39–41, 47, 59–60 Braudel, F. 52 bureaucracies, ideological, in Sweden 163 bureaucratic political elites 124, 137–138 bureaucratic states 123 Byelorussia 127 Russia 124–125 Burton, Michael 105–106, 171 Bush, George W. image of 6 and neo-conservative elite 17, 21–22 and US political elite 6, 18, 19–20 Bush administration (George W.), foreign policy of 193, 206–207 business elites in Norway 178, 181, 183, 187–188, 189, 190 and political elites in CIS 131, 136 in Sweden 155 in United States 55, 190 women in 147 business sector, influence on political decision making 152 businessmen, members of parliament 89 businesswomen, in United States 56 n49 Byelorussia 123, 127 Chernobyl nuclear accident 128–129 political elites in 128, 129 ‘caesarist’ leaders 6 ‘Cape Coast Scholars’ 112 capital, political 45 n28 capitalism, in Norway 153, 174

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214

• Index

capitalist societies 39–40 cartels of elites 18 cash crop economy, in Gold Coast 112–113 Central Asian CIS states 129–136 challenge-response models of political elite change 96–97, 100 charismatic leaders 2, 67, 68, 69, 70–71 and the masses 71–72 and personalization of power 73, 74 succession of 73–74 Weber on 7, 9, 12, 13, 71 wisdom of 72 Cheney, Dick 17 Chernobyl nuclear accident (Byelorussia) 128–129 Chicago 36 chiefs 107 see also traditional rulers Christian missionary education, in Gold Coast 113 church leaders, institutional trust of 183, 188, 189 Churchill, Sir Winston 70 circulations between elites 154 of ruling elites 10–11, 20, 105–106, 145 in Ghana 117, 118, 120 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) authoritarian regimes in 129, 135 Central Asian states 129–136 clientelism in 127, 130, 131–132, 134, 135–136, 138–139 demodernization in 125–126, 138 modernization in 126, 141 political elites in 3, 126–127, 138–140 Byelorussia 128, 129 Kazakhstan 131 Kyrgyzstan 132–133 recruitment of 123, 136–137 Russia 125, 136–138, 140–141 Tajikistan 133 Turkmenistan 133–134 Uzbekistan 134–135 civil society, in Norway 161 civil war, in Tajikistan 133 clannish elites in Central Asian CIS states 123, 127, 136, 139 Kazakhstan 130–131 Kyrgyzstan 132–133 Russia 136 Tajikistan 133 Turkmenistan 133–134 Uzbekistan 134–135

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class in Ghana 107–108 and status 51 upper, recruitment of elites from 147, 148, 149 clientelism 127 in Central Asian CIS states 130, 131–132, 134, 135–136, 138–139 in Southeast Asia 139 closed elites 145 coastal elites, in Gold Coast 110–111 cocoa production 112–113, 114 coherence of elite structures 145, 146 in Scandinavia 3, 155, 157, 158, 166–167 collective organizations, weakening of 159 colonization policies, of Russian Empire 125 commoners in Ghana 118 in Gold coast 107–108 education of 111–114 companions, of charismatic leaders 70 comparative analysis 32, 43–44 competition intra-elite 33, 36 n16, 39 for power 80 status 33 in United States 51 n40 compromises, elite 174 consensually united elite patterns in Europe 15 in Scandinavia 154, 155, 159, 167 consensus challenges 99–100 conspicuous consumption 45, 54 n47 constructivist structuralism 59 consumption by elites 35 conspicuous 45, 54 n47 in post-modern societies 47–48 trickle effect in 29 contacts between elites see interaction networks contenders for political office 80, 81, 82, 83–84 cooperation among elites 145–146 cooperative internationalism 195 corporatism in Denmark 152–153 in Finland 157–158 in Norway 153 in Sweden 156, 157 Coty, René 70 critical theory 51

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Index cultural dimensions, in sociology 43, 45–50, 60 cultural elites women in 147 see also media elites cultural representations 58

26, 34,

Daloz, Jean Pascal 1–2, 209 Dalton, Russel 100 Danquah, J.B. 110, 111, 115 decorporatization, in Sweden 156, 157 deferential representation 82 defiance, acts of 68 definitions of democracy 78 of elites 4, 145, 172 political 105 of opinion leaders 196 of trust 175 delegate conceptions of representation 83 Delhey, J. 176 democracies 9, 13, 78, 84 in Africa 104 n1 and elites 145, 190–191 legitimacy challenge of 99–100, 101 transitions to 126 see also liberal democracies Democratic political elites (US), foreign policy views of 195–196, 202–206 democratization 86, 100 demodernization, in CIS 125–126, 138 Denmark corporatism in 152–153 elites in 147–148, 150–151, 166–167 links between them 153 links with population 159–160 politics in 19, 20, 159, 160 power studies in 144, 159 Descriptive Sociology (Spencer) 54 destiny, and luck 71 detraditionalization 125 Deutsch, M. 175 differentiation, of elites 105–106, 117, 120 distinction elitist 1–2, 25 n1 social theories on 25–26 and cultural diversity 43–50, 59, 60 generalization in 31–43 merits of 50–60 selectiveness of 41–43 theoretical amnesia in 1, 27–31 personal 33 La distinction (Bourdieu) 27–28, 40 disunity of elites in Europe 14–15 in Ghana 116, 120

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diversity cultural and social theories on elite distinction 43–50, 59, 60 of Western societies 1–2, 49 of elites 1 of Scandinavian countries 169 Dogan, Mattei 2, 210 dress styles, of businesswomen in US n49 Dumont, L. 40

• 215

56

economic development in Byelorussia 127, 128, 129 in Central Asian CIS states 139 in Finland 157 in Ghana 112–113, 114 in Norway 153 in Russia 140 economic elites see business elites economic policies of Ataturk and de Gaulle 73 in Kazakhstan 140 economistic theories 32 education and elite recruitment 149 in Ghana/Gold Coast 109–114, 117 of members of parliament 87 and social mobility 108, 109, 112, 113, 117 Education and Social Change in Ghana (Foster) 108 Eisenstadt, Schmuel N. 190–191 elections in Ghana 119 parliamentary 94 representative 106 electorates 81 and political elites, in Denmark 159–160 Elias, N. 29 n6, 30, 41, 42, 53 criticism of Veblen 35 elite accommodation 171, 172, 189 elite compromises, in Norway 174 elite differentiation 105–106, 117, 120 elite distinction 1–2, 25 n1 social theories on 25–26 and cultural diversity 43–50, 59, 60 generalization in 31–43 merits of 50–60 selectiveness of 41–43 theoretical amnesia in 1, 27–31 Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Burton & Higley) 105–106 elite integration 171, 172, 174–175, 191 and trust 4, 171, 173, 175, 189

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216

• Index

elite structures 191, 195 in liberal democracies 6–7 in Scandinavia 165–169 typologies of 145–146 elite studies, in Scandinavia 144 elite theory 105, 171–172, 190–191 and political conflict in Africa 103 see also social theories on elite distinction elitist approaches, to representative democracy 78 employment background, of members of parliament 89–92 England elites in 14 see also United Kingdom ethnographic methodologies 57 European continent cultural diversity of 1–2, 49 forceful leadership in 21 European elites disunity of 14–15 medieval 124 representative, recruitment patterns of 2, 77, 80–81, 85–101 research into 78–79 Evens, T.M.S. 40 exclusiveness of elite structures 146 extrapolations, in social theories on elite distinction 35–41 Fantes (Ghana) 113 fascism in Italy 13 and lion-like ruling elites 14 fashion, theories of 38, 39 feudal political elites 124, 127 Finland elite studies in 144 elites in 148, 149–150, 151, 157–159, 167–168 links with population 163, 164–165 politics in 157, 163–164, 165, 168 forceful elites 7 shift to 17 and terrorist threats to security 8 see also lion-like ruling elites forceful leadership in liberal democracies 5–6, 7, 17, 20 and terrorist threats to security 8 foreign policy, of US, use of force in 193–194, 206 Foster, Philip 108, 109–110, 112, 113 fox-like ruling elites (Pareto) 9, 10, 11 fragmentary elite structures 146, 191 in Finland 158 France aristocracy in 33

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and de Gaulle 68 electoral defeat of 74 political reform by 72 parliamentary recruitment patterns in 86 Frankfurt school 51 Frey, F. 69 functionalism 33–34, 57 Gaman-Golutvina, Oxana 3, 210 de Gaulle, Charles 2, 67–74 generalization, in social theories on elite distinction 31–43 Georgia 123, 127 Germany elites in 14 parliamentary recruitment patterns in 86, 98 politics in 13, 14 Ghana colonial rule of see Gold Coast elite conflict in 2–3, 103 independence of 116 military regimes in 117–118 political conflict in 107, 117, 120 political elites in 2–3, 103, 104, 107, 118–119 disunity of 116, 120 unity of 119–120 social stratification in 107–108 globalization 56 and parliamentary recruitment 85 Goffman, E. 30, 34, 57–58 Gold Coast commoners in 112–113 education in 109–114 elites in 108–112 indirect rule in 115 see also Ghana Göransson, Anita 145 Grimmett, R.F. 194 Gulbrandsen, Trygve 4, 172, 183, 210–211 Harper, Stephen 20 Heper, M. 69 Herbert, Bob 206 Higley, John 1, 105–106, 138, 171, 172, 195, 211 Hill, Polly 112 historical analyses, of Elias 42 n22 Hitler, Adolf 13 Holsti, O.R. 194 The House of Mirth (Wharton) 36 n15 Howard, John 17 and political elites 19 human rights abuses, in Ghana 118

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Index ideal-typical approaches, of Weber 42–43 identification 176, 186 ideological bureaucracies, in Sweden 163 ideologies and institutional trust 177 of Norwegian elites 179, 183, 187, 190 Pareto on 10 imitation processes 29, 32–33, 55–56 inclusive elite structures 146 incumbency 99 indirect rule, of Gold Coast 108–109, 115 institutional change, in Sweden 156 institutional charisma 74 institutional trust 176 among elites 177 in Norway 4, 171, 173, 178–190 instrumental representation 83 integration of elites 171, 172, 174–175, 191 and trust 4, 171, 173, 175, 189 intellectual elites 177 intelligentsia, in Gold Coast 110 interaction networks of Finnish elites 158–159 of Norwegian elites 178, 179, 188 Interaction Ritual (Goffman) 34 interactionism 34 interests, of elites 11 n1 internationalist attitudes, of elites 194–195 intra-elite competition 33, 36 n16, 39 Iraq, US military intervention in 21–22, 194, 207 Italy elites in 14 political 19 politics in 13, 14 Japan 40 forceful leadership in ruling elites in 18

21

kalabule (corruption, profiteering) 117 Karimov, Islam 135 Katz, R.S. 97 Kazakhstan 130–131, 139–140 Kimble, D.B. 110 Kinross, Lord (John Patrick Balfour) 69, 72 Kohl, Helmut 17 Koizumi, Junichiro 17 Körösényi, András 13 Kufour, J.A. 118, 119 Kyrgyzstan 132–133

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• 217

lawyers, members of parliament 89 leaders see charismatic leaders leadership and elites 1, 6–7 Weber on 12 of liberal democracies 1, 15–16 forceful 5–6, 7, 17, 20 ‘leadership’ democracy (Weber) 9, 13 “Leadership Study” (Institute of Social Research & Statistics Norway) 173, 178 leadership styles, of ruling elites 10 Lebanon 46 legislative recruitment see parliaments, recruitment of leisure 54 leonine ruling elites see lion-like ruling elites liberal democracies elites in lion-like 18–20, 22 political 6, 105 structures of 6–7 in Ghana 103, 104, 119–120 leadership of 1, 15–16 forceful 5–6, 7, 17, 20 politics of 8 Lindvall, J. 163, 169 links of Scandinavian elites with each other 152–159 with population 159–165 lion-like ruling elites (Pareto) 9, 10, 11 and fascism 14 in liberal democracies 18–20, 22 and US foreign policy 194, 196 Lloyd Warner, W. 57 local politics, members of parliament recruited from 93 Le Loup et le Léopard (Benoist-Mechin) 73 luck, of charismatic leaders 70–71 Luckham, R. 117 Lukashenko, Alexander 129 Lukashenko government (Byelorussia) 128 luxury products, demand for 32 Luzkov, Y. 137, 138 Mack, Stephanie 4, 211 Mair, P. 97 managers, members of parliament 89 manners, cultural history of 53 market economy, Byelorussia’s transition to 129 Marxist theories 31, 32, 50–51 mass democracy 84 mass media, low standing of 190 masses, and charismatic leaders 71–72

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218

• Index

“The Material Culture of Success” (Rowlands) 45 McCracken, G. 56 n49 media elites 177 low trust of 190, 191 in Norway 181, 182, 183, 190 women in 147 media sector in Finland 158, 168 political decision making influence of 152 Mémoires d’espoir (de Gaulle) 71 Mennel, S. 43 n24 merchants, of Gold Coast 110–111 Merkel, Angela 18, 20 metropolitan areas, elite recruitment from 150 Michels, Robert 84 migrations from failed non-Western states 8 militant internationalism 195 militarism, in US 206–207 military political participation of 69 in Ghana 117–118 military force US elites views on use of 4, 193, 194–196, 197–207 in US foreign policy 193–194, 206 military interventions, of US in Iraq 21–22, 194, 207 military regimes, in Ghana 117–118 military strategists, Ataturk and de Gaulle as 69 Mills, C. Wright 30–31, 51, 171, 172, 206 missionary education, in Gold Coast 113 modern societies 56, 57 see also post-modern societies modernization in CIS 126, 141 Kazakhstan 140 Russia 124, 125 see also demodernization political 95 rejection of 125–126 in Soviet Union 125 theory, and parliamentary recruitment patterns 86 Moore, Gwen 4, 172, 211 Mosca, G. 124, 145, 171 music, popular 60 n53 Mussolini, Benito 13 Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I (Chief of Akyem Abuakwa) 114–115 Napoleon I 69, 70–71

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nation states 84–85 national security, terrorism as threat to 8, 18 nationalism, of Ataturk and de Gaulle 72 Nazarbayev, Nursultan 131, 139–140 Ndoum, Paa Kwesi 119–120 neo-conservative elites, in United States 6, 17, 21–22 neo-traditional elites, in Gold Coast 108–110 Netherlands, elites in 15 The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (Bacevich) 206–207 ‘new rarities’ 58–59 new social movements, in Denmark 160 New York Times 206 newcomers, members of parliament 92, 99 Newton, K. 176 Nigeria, elites in 44–45 9/11 terrorist attacks 21 Niyazov, Saparmurat 134 Nkrumah and the Chiefs (Rathbone) 107 Nkrumah, Kwame 111, 115–116 Nkwankwaa (Ghana) 108 nomenclatura bureaucratic political elites 124, 126, 137–138 nonpolitical elites, in US 197 Nordic Council 143 Nordic elites see Scandinavia North Yemen 46 Norway capitalism in 153, 174 civil society in 161 corporatism in 153 elites in 4, 148, 151, 153–155, 162, 167 compromises by 174 institutional trust of 4, 171, 173, 178–190 politics in 160–162, 173–174, 177 power studies in 144, 160 trust levels in 173, 174 nouveaux riches 30, 57 Nugent, P. 119 Offe, C. 175 Ofori-Atta I, Nana Sir (Chief of Akyem Abuakwa) 114–115 Ofori-Atta, William 111 oil revenues, in Russia 140 oligarchic elite-recruitment models 137 oligarchy 124 openness of elites 145 in Scandinavia 3, 147–152, 165 opinion leaders, definition of 196 orators, Ataturk and de Gaulle as 69 Owusu, Maxwell 107

1/15/2008 2:37:03 PM

Index Pakulski, Jan 1, 211 Pareto, V. political analyses of 7, 10, 13, 15, 145 on ruling elites 9, 10–11, 20, 194 parliamentary elections 94 parliaments and elites 79–80 recruitment of patterns 2, 77, 80–81, 85–101 process 81–85 Pascal, B. 55 n48 patron-client relations 127 in CIS 130, 131–132, 134, 135–136, 138–139 in Southeast Asia 139 personal distinction 33 personalization of power, and charismatic leaders 73, 74 plebiscitary leadership, Weber on 12 pluralism 145 political capital 45 n28 political change, through elite circulation 10–11, 20 political conflicts in Africa 103, 104 in Ghana 2–3, 107, 117, 120 political elites 78, 80, 105, 177 in Africa 104, 106 in CIS 3, 126–127, 138–140 Byelorussia 128, 129 Kazakhstan 131 Kyrgyzstan 132–133 recruitment of 123, 136–137 Russia 125, 136–138, 140–141 Tajikistan 133 Turkmenistan 133–134 Uzbekistan 134–135 feudal-bureaucratic dichotomy 124, 127 in Ghana 2–3, 103, 104, 107, 118–119 disunity of 116, 120 unity of 119–120 in liberal democracies 6, 105 and nation states 85 and political stability 105, 106–107, 117 recruitment of 123, 127, 136–137 in Scandinavia 49 Denmark 153, 159–160 Norway 161, 188–189 Sweden 155 in US 196–197 and George W. Bush administration 6, 18, 19–20 views on use of force 195–196, 202–206, 207 women in 147

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• 219

see also representative elites; ruling elites A Political History of Ghana (Kimble) 110 political leadership Pareto on 7 Weber on 12 see also charismatic leaders political modernization 95 political parties 80, 81 fusion with states 95–96 and parliamentary recruitment 81–83, 100 role of, in Scandinavia 163 in Scandinavia 165 typologies of 97 political professionalization 84, 86, 95, 100 political reforms, by Ataturk and de Gaulle 72–73 political stability and political elites 105, 106, 117 in Africa 106–107 politicians, militarists as 69, 117 Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana (Austin & Luckham) 117 politics in Denmark 19, 20, 159, 160 in Finland 157, 163–164, 165, 168 in Italy 13, 14 of liberal democracies 8 military participation in 69, 117–118 in Norway 160–162, 173–174, 177 in Russia 138 in Sweden 156, 163 welfare 16 popular culture 60 post-modern societies, consumption in 47–48 power competition for 80 elites 171 personalization of, and charismatic leaders 73, 74 pursued by elites 11 n1 relations, in Denmark 160 sharing of, by consensually united elites 15 studies, in Scandinavia 144–145, 159, 160 precapitalist societies 39–40 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Goffman) 34, 58 prestigious goods, as status symbols 37–38, 41, 57 Primakov, E. 137, 138 Principles of Sociology (Spencer) 54 privatization, of the state, in Russia 137

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220

• Index

professionalization, political 84, 86, 95, 100 property, as source of political influence 137 public sector employees, members of parliament 91, 95–96, 98 Putin, Vladimir 125 quasi-feudalism, of Russian elites

137

Rakhmonov, Imomali 133 “Rank and Class among the Asante en Fante” (Arhin) 107 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 19, 20 Rathbone, Richard 107, 111, 115 Rawlings, J.J. 118–119 Reagan, Ronald 6, 17 recruitment of elites political 127 in CIS 123, 136–137 representative 81–85 European 2, 77, 80–81, 85–101 Scandinavian 3, 147–152, 165 from upper classes 147, 148, 149 regime stability see political stability relational representation 83 representation conceptions of 83, 99 cultural 58 increasing 117 symbolic 82 representative democracy elitist approaches to 78 legitimacy of 99–100, 101 representative elections 106 representative elites recruitment patterns of 81–85 in Europe 2, 77, 80–81, 85–101 Republican political elites (US), foreign policy views of 195–196, 202–206 retraditionalization, in Central Asian CIS states 125–126, 130, 136, 138 Riesman, D. 36 Rogozhina, K. 129 Rokkan, Stein 78 “The Role of the Clan and Family Factor in Central Asian Political Elite Recruitment” (Rogozhina) 129 Rosenau, J.N. 194 de Rothschild, James de 52 n44 Rothstein, B. 163, 169 Rowlands, M. 45 rulers, traditional, in Ghana 107, 109, 114–115 ruling elites 9, 10 circulations of 10–11, 20, 105–106, 145 in Ghana 117, 118, 120

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and democratic transitions 126 n1 feudal and bureaucratic dichotomy of 124, 127 lion-like 14, 18–20, 22, 194, 196 in Soviet Union 125 Rumsfeld, Donald 17 Ruostetsaari, Ilkka 3, 167, 212 Russia bureaucracy in 124–125 economic development in 140 modernization in 124, 125 political elites in 136–138, 140–141 see also Soviet Union Rustow, Dankwart 68, 69 Sahlins, M. 44 n26 Sarkozy, Nicolas 18 saviors, leaders seen as 70 Scandinavia elites in 3, 49, 143 links between them 152–159 links with population 159–165 recruitment of 147–152 size of 144 structures of 165–169 political parties in 165 power studies in 144–145, 159, 160 role of states in 153, 156–157, 163 Schumpeter, Joseph 78, 80 Scott, John 145 segmented elite structures 146 see also fragmentary elite structures selectiveness, of social theories on distinction 41–43 ‘selectorates’ (political parties) 80, 81 and parliamentary recruitment process 81–83, 100 self, presentations of 37 self-reproduction of elites 150–151 servants, increasing prestige of elites 55 n48 Shevtov, Y. 128 shortcomings of social theories on distinction 26 generalization 31–43 selectiveness 41–43 theoretical amnesia 1, 27–31 of welfare politics 16 Sièyes, Emmanuel Joseph 69 Simmel, G. 29, 30, 38–39, 56, 57 size of elites, in Scandinavia 144 social admiration 37 social distance 38 social mobility, and education 108, 109, 112, 113, 117 social movements, new, in Denmark 160 social order elites 176–177

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Index social stratification, in Ghana 107–108 social theories on elite distinction 25–26 and cultural diversity 43–50, 59, 60 generalization in 31–43 merits of 50–60 selectiveness of 41–43 theoretical amnesia in 1, 27–31 social trust 176 sociologism 40 sociologists, early 31 sociology, cultural dimensions in 26, 34, 43, 45–50, 60 Sombart, W. 30, 31–32, 52–53 Southeast Asia clientelism in 139 elites in 46 Soviet Union collapse of 8, 125–126 modernization in 125 political elites in (nomenclatura) 124, 126 see also Russia Soziologie (Simmel) 38 Spencer, H. 30, 31, 54 staff elites of political leaders 12 states bureaucratic 123 in CIS 124–125, 127 control of, by Ataturk and de Gaulle 72–73 fusion with political parties 95–96 nation 84–85 privatization of 137 role of in Scandinavia 153, 156–157, 163 Norway 174, 177 statistical analyses, of Norwegian elites 179, 182, 184–186 status and class 51 competition 33 emulationist approach of 38 status symbols, prestigious goods as 37–38, 41, 58 structuralism 34 constructivist 59 structures of elites 191, 195 in liberal democracies 6–7 in Scandinavia 165–169 typologies of 145–146 sub-Saharan Africa see Africa success 71 succession, of charismatic leaders 73–74 Sullivan, J.L. 188–189 supply and demand models, for recruitment patterns of representative elites 80–81 Svanikier, Johanna Odonkor 2–3, 212

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Svensson, Palle 160 Swann, G.M.P. 39 Sweden elites in 15, 148–1449, 150, 151, 155–156, 157, 167, 168 links with population 162–163 politics in 156, 163 power studies in 144–145 role of state in 156–157 Switzerland, elites in 15 ‘symbolic consistency’ 56–57 symbolic representation 82 “Symbols of Class Status” (Goffman) 30, 34, 58 Tajikistan 133 de Tarde, Gabriel 30, 31, 32–33, 55–56 teachers, members of parliament 92, 98 terrorism approval for use of violence against 198, 202, 206, 207 threats to national security 8, 18 Thatcher, Margaret 6, 17 ‘theoretical amnesia’ 1, 27–31 Theory of the Leisure Class (Veblen) 35, 37, 54 Thomson, E.P. 51 Toynbee, A. 99 traditional rulers, in Ghana 107, 109, 114–115 traditionalist structures in Russian Empire 125 see also retraditionalization tribalism, in Central Asia 132, 134 ‘trickle down processes’ 38, 56 rediscovering of 29 trust definitions of 175 and elite integration 4, 171, 173, 175, 189 institutional 176 of elites 177 in Norway 4, 171, 173, 178–190 in Norway 173, 174 social 176 trustee conception of representation 83, 99 Turkey chaotic situation in 68 political reform by Ataturk in 72–73 Turkmenistan 133–134 turnover rates, of members of parliament 99 typologies of elites 176–177 political 105, 106, 138 structures of 145–146 of political parties 97

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222

• Index

UGCC (United Gold Coast Convention) 111, 115, 116 United Kingdom aristocracy in 39 parliamentary recruitment patterns in 86 political elites in 18–19 United States Bourdieu’s theory of social distinction applicable in 47 businesswomen in 56 n49 competition in 51 n40 elites in 171–172 business 55, 190 lion-like 18, 194, 196 neo-conservative 6, 17, 21–22 nonpolitical 197 political 6, 18, 19–20, 196–197, 202–206, 207 Veblen on 36 views on use of military force 4, 193, 194–196, 197–207 foreign policy of, use of military force 193–194, 206 hegemony of 21 military intervention in Iraq 21–22, 194, 207 unity of political elites 107 in Byelorussia 128 in Ghana 119–120 see also disunity of elites university education, of members of parliament 87 upper classes, recruitment for elites from 147, 148, 149 USSR see Soviet Union Uzbekistan 134–135

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Veblen, Thorstein 27, 28, 29, 30 n9, 31, 35–37, 53, 54–55 vertical integration, in Norway 161 de Villepin, Dominique 18 Vogel, D. 190 War Memoirs (de Gaulle) 69, 71 ‘war on terror’ 207 Weber, M. on charismatic leadership 7, 9, 12, 13, 71 on elites 9, 52 ideal-typical approach of 42–43 on ‘leadership’ democracy 9, 13 political analyses of 7, 10, 11, 13, 15 on political professionalization 84 theoretical amnesia of 30 Weberian theories 51–52 Weimar Republic, parliamentary recruitment patterns of 86 welfare politics, shortcomings of 16 Western education, in Gold Coast 109–114 Western societies, cultural diversity of 1–2, 49 Wharton, Edith 36 n15 Wilks, Ivor 108 wisdom, of charismatic leaders 72 Wolfe, T. 48 women dress styles of, US 56 n49 members of parliament 88 in Scandinavian elites 147 Veblen on 36 n15 Yeltsin, Boris

137

zhuz (tribal unions, Kazakhstan)

130–131

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